IN SEARCH FOR THE DEMOS: AN EXISTENTIALIST DIALECTICAL VIEW OF NOMOS AND PHUSIS

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ABSTRACT

IN SEARCH FOR THE DEMOS: AN EXISTENTIALIST DIALECTICAL VIEW OF NOMOS AND PHUSIS

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The thesis is propelled towards a rethinking of the preponderant tenets of an existentialist dialectical conception of totalizing projects undertaken by different parts of social totalities. With an overriding interest in reconstruing the present human potentialities that are afforded by the late capitalist relations of domination, production and reproduction, the ontological premises and epistemological preconditions that enable this theorization of praxis are unraveled. Taking his cue from the Adornian modification of the Hegelian dialectics, Spinozist postulation of material action as predicated upon an ingrained element of immanence and the Aristotelian preeminence attributed to *dunamis*, the author tries to retrace an existentialist pathway through the dialectical materialism of Marx, Engels and Lenin. Responsive to the call that is emanated by the theoretical peculiarities of traversing that pathway, he, then, endeavors to come to terms with some relevant ideas drawn from the corpus of Schopenhauer, Kant, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Lukács, etc., putting the finishing touches on that theoretical effort by engaging in frequent dialogues with Sartre’s existentialist dialectics. Although not being a thoroughbred historicist himself, he, then, puts the theoretical insights he garnered into a historical perspective, thus working toward the achievement of a multi-level double hermeneutics of human potentialities past and present. That existentialist dialectical attempt to reconstruct a diachronics of re-coded textualities that are organized into antagonistic totalities focuses on the collective projects that have been conducted by archaic and classical
Greek communities in order to realize the acuteness of the pain that is inflicted from our curbed human potentialities.

**Keywords**: Dialectics, Existentialism, Totalisation, Nomos, Phusis
ÖZ

DEMOS’U ARAMAK: NOMOS VE PHUSIS’E VAROLUŞÇU DIYALEKTİK BİR BAKIŞ

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Anahtar Kelimeler: Diyalektik, Varołuşçuluk, Tümlemim, Nomos, Phusis
In Memoriam Jean-François Prel
(1989-2020)
I owe a debt of gratitude to many people from whose works, ideas and sacrifices I have drawn numerous insights to the point of turning the formulation of my ideas into a truly communal project. I have benefited tremendously from the meticulous analyses and considerate disposition of my dissertation supervisor, Mehmet Okyayuz, in and through the conception and materialisation of this work. I have often exchanged ideas and borrowed insights from the other members of my supervision committee, Mehmet Yetiş and Kürşad Ertuğrul. A close circle of friends at my institution, among whom must be counted Özenç Kivanç Demir, Ozan Ekin Derin and Pınar Kahya have somehow managed to put up with my long and hysterically delivered bouts of theoretical newsfeeds. A former co-advisor of my M.Sc. thesis at METU, Sheila Margaret Pelizzon has proved as steady as a rock on which have foundered all of my theoretical attempts to cut corners in hopes of achieving empty, yet juvenile, universalisms. I have found a bottomless wellspring of guidance and erudition in Jean-Marie Donegani’s suggestions and warnings. Nicolas Genis and Thierry Lucas at École Français d’Athènes and Pauline Cuzel at École Française de Rome have always managed to call me back with the voice of intellectual rigour to the illuminating bonfire of archaeological scepticism any time I wanted, sometimes desperately, to lose my way as the crow flies in the aprioristic conceptions of Daedalian ilk. I have made so full use of the library of École Francaise de Rome that I am positively assured about having made a nuisance of myself every so often when I had to pull down entire shelves, so I hereby thank the librarians yet again for the endless serenity they displayed in not having me kicked out. And I express heartfelt gratitude to all the others whose names I, unfortunately, miss, but whose efforts have been key in aiding the production of this work.

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Και όταν θα ρθούν οι καιροί
Που θα χα σβήσει το κερι
Στην καταιγίδα
Υπερασπισού το παιδί
Γιατί αν γλυτώσει το παιδί
Υπάρχει ελπίδα

And as the time comes
When the candle goes out
In the storm
Protect the child
For if the child escapes it
There is hope

-Pavlos Sidiropoulos, through Mikis Theodorakis and Lefteris Papadopoulos
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PLAGIARISM</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ÖZ</td>
<td>vii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEDICATION</td>
<td>vi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS</td>
<td>viii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TABLE OF CONTENTS</td>
<td>xi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS</td>
<td>xv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTERS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1. Summary of the Chapters</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2. Methodology</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. DIAMAT UNIVERSALISM AS THE PENEOLE’S THREAD</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1. Hegelian Spirit and a Dialectics of Absolution</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2. Aristotle and the Preponderance of a <em>Dunamis Ensouled</em></td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3. Spinoza’s Immanence of <em>Potentia</em></td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4. Marx, Engels and the Force of Totality</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. HISTORY AND A DIALECTICS OF EXISTENCE</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1. A Post-Sartrean Conception of Needs</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1.1. A Triad of Needs</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2. Totalisation as the Re-Organisation of an Organised Social Reality</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2.1. A Projection of Totalisation</td>
<td>177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2.2. Totalisation with an Aristotelian Voice and a Spinozist Face</td>
<td>184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2.3. Existentialist Dialectical Totalisation in Linguistic Context</td>
<td>190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3. Dialectics: Either Existentialist or Negative?</td>
<td>194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4. On a Dyad of Universals</td>
<td>207</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.4.1. Existential Dialectics and Heidegger’s Hermeneutical Ontology ..........215
3.4.2. The Ties That Bind: Schopenhauer and Nietzsche………………………….230
3.5. A Post-Sartrean Existentialist Dialectics Possible?……………………………245

4. NOMOS AND PHUSIS BEYOND THE BINARISM OF THE IXION’S WHEEL…….271

4.1. The Uncharted Waters Beyond the Binarism…………………………………….271
   4.1.1. The Essential Copy Explained……………………………………………………273
   4.1.2. The Timeline and the Making of the Essential Copy ……………………….283
4.2. Archaeological and Later Historical Evidence of Mycenae’s Fall………………308
   4.2.1. A Reconstruction of the Wide-Scale Polis Formation by 800………………..317
   4.2.2. Colonisation and Land Hunger………………………………………………….323
4.3. The Duality’s Conception in the Seventh Century…………………………….328
   4.3.1. The Main Topoi of Archaic Greek Poetry and the Formation of Sparta… 334
   4.3.2. Solon of Athens and the Athenian Polity……………………………………….356
4.4. The Phusiologoi of Ionia and the First Transformation of the Essential Copy …368
   4.4.1. An Alternative Course of State-Building in Sicily…………………………..380
   4.4.2. The Part Played by Thêtes in the Rise and Fall of the Peisistratidae……386
   4.4.3. The Athenian Thêtes and the Cleisthenic Reforms…………………………..397
   4.4.4. Eleatic, Pythagorean and Heraclitan Philosophies………………………….403
   4.4.5. The Medes and the Thêtes as the Building Blocks of the Thalassocracy..408
   4.4.6. Themistocles’ Political Reforms………………………………………………..416
   4.4.7. The Political Centralisation in Sicily………………………………………….419
4.5. The Second Transformation of the Essential Copy and Conclusion…………….425

5. OLD SKINS ARE SHED, HENCE THE NEW …………………………………………433

5.1. The Setting of the Political, Dramatic, Philosophical and Social Stages ………433
   5.1.1. Introducing the Dramatis Personae……………………………………………….439
   5.1.2. Syracuse and the Last Chance for Evading the ‘Collision Course’ …………448
   5.1.3. Hoi Homoioi at the Ropes at Mt. Ithome and Ephialtes’ Reforms…………..460
6.3.4. Plato’s Epistemology in Later Dialogues .........................................................830

6.4. Plato’s Political Philosophy, the Fifth Transformation and Conclusion ..........841

7. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................856

BIBLIOGRAPHY ........................................................................................................861

APPENDICES
A. CURRICULUM VITAE ...............................................................................................938
B. TURKISH SUMMARY / TÜRKÇE ÖZET ..................................................................939
C. THESIS PERMISSION FORM / TEZ İZİN FORMU ..............................................958
# LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IG</td>
<td><em>Inscriptiones Graecae</em> (1873-) Berlin.</td>
</tr>
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<td>MECW</td>
<td>Marx, Karl and Frederick Engels (1975-) <em>Collected Works</em>. Moscow.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The working thesis of this study can be summarized as follows: Based on an existentially qualified understanding of Marxian dialectical materialism we can rethink the relationship between individuals and groups in the light of a reworking of our understanding of history and with the aim of elaborating the human potentialities with which we are currently endowed. But before we carry on with the specificities, let us take a brief look, burdensome as it is, at our species’ disturbing track record.

First the raw, hard facts: Statistical proof approved by international labour organizations, long overdue in more ways than one, was granted in 2014 for arguments that leaned on the import of the total number of globally unemployed, upwards of two-hundred million, in fact. Concomitantly, The United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization estimated, in 2016, the total number of people suffering from chronic undernourishment, or unnatural famine in less technical terms, to be 815 million, corresponding to 10.7 per cent of the world population. A research that was conducted by the contributing actors to the United Nations High-Level Dialogue on Migration and Development Programme, dating back to 3-4 October 2013, pegs the total number of international migrants around 232 million with an average annual growth of two million. Happy, indeed, are the few who experience the self-valorised bliss of the end of history. But there is nothing beautiful about the suffering of the others, to whom have been allocated mere existential crumbs, that continue dancing a macabre jig on the precipice of self-subsistence.¹ Upswings and downswings of a NASDAQ or a Dow Jones might be seen capable

¹ “For it must be cried out, at a time when some have the audacity to neo-evangelize in the name of the ideal of a liberal democracy that has finally realized itself as the ideal of human history: never have violence, inequality, exclusion, famine, and thus economic oppression affected as many human beings in the history of the earth and humanity. Instead of singing the advent of the ideal of liberal democracy and of the capitalist market in the euphoria of the end of history, instead of celebrating the 'end of ideologies' and the end of the great emancipatory discourses, let us never neglect this obvious macroscopic fact, made up of innumerable singular sites of suffering: no degree of progress allows one to ignore that never before, in absolute figures, never have so many men, women, and children been subjugated, starved, or exterminated on the earth.” Jacques Derrida, Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning and the New International, trans. by Peggy Kamuf, (London and New York, 2006), pp. 106.
of making or breaking the fortunes of a stockholding minority whose manifest destiny runs circles of endless repetition about the perpetual plight of the rest of shareholding majority. For all we know, those adrenaline-packed cycles of boom and busts serve as the icons alongside which the existential burials of weakened millions around the globe take place. Epistemological realism allows us to surmise, in the light of that continuing trend, that the flickering light of hope\textsuperscript{2} that washes the reality surrounding us with its pertinent meaning, i.e., colours, has tended to become dimmer yet over the four to seven-year spans that bridge the year 2021 with the years in which the statistical surveys took place.

Second, a little bit of political flavour. The Occupy movements with the bridgehead loci of Wall Street and Zuccotti Park have dwindled to a low ebb in the absence of any viable transition from economically-motivated communality of self-interests into the rise of a novel, and potentially hybrid in terms of the equivocal premises of its demands, type of political agency that would prolong the struggle regardless of how dire the straits were.\textsuperscript{3} Arab Spring was followed directly by one Goliath of a ‘summer’ that scorched the erstwhile participants under the dual yoke of religious fundamentalism and bona fide Americanism, as well as smouldering any likelihood of a passage to democratic criticism in the ashtray of nationalism. With other social movements smashed into bits elsewhere, e.g., Ukraine, the self-proclaimed political scientist \textit{qua} observer of the political events has not much else of a material other than the bits and pieces of resistance that has but blown away by the typhoon of hegemonic politics in order to work her way around the otherwise insurmountable epistemological gaps.

Now, threading, figuratively and not theoretically, in the footsteps of Lévi-Strauss, let us attempt to cook the aforementioned ‘givens’ along the lines of a revamped Idea of

\textsuperscript{2} This is not to say anything of the disembowelling of the concept that is undertaken with surgical precision in the hands of the neoliberal journalists who invent a tailored-fit language for the hegemonic purposes of the financial oligarchy in crisis, or the Empire to frequent Toni Negri and Michael Hardt’s conceptual address: “The way the global financial crisis is described to us makes it look like one of those big bad films that are concocted by the ready-made hit machine that we now call the ‘cinema’. It’s all there: the gradual spectacle of the disaster, the crude manipulation of the suspense, the exoticism of the identical – the Jakarta stock exchange in the same spectacular boat as New York, the link between Moscow and São Paulo, the same banks going up in the same flames – the terrifying repercussions: ouch, ouch the best laid ‘plans’ could not prevent Black Friday… but there is still hope: the little squad of the powerful has taken centre stage…. The Sarkozys, the Paulsons, the Merkels, the Browns, the Trichets – the monetary fire-fighters, pouring billions upon billions into the central hole…. ‘Save the banks!’ That noble, humanist and democratic cry springs from the breast of every politician and all the media.” Alain Badiou, \textit{The Communist Hypothesis}, trans. by David Macey and Steve Corcoran, (London and New York, 2010), pp. 91-92; cf. Tariq Ali, \textit{Extreme Centre: A Warning}, (London, 2015), pp. 3 ff.

Communism. Thing is, the productive genius of Slavoj Zizek has managed to beat us, yet again, to our cherished project. Indeed, publishing two volumes of conference presentations that were convened in 2009 and 2011 respectively, Zizek and his collaborators have managed to build a myriad of prisms through which the Idea of communism can be examined and pondered upon in the face of what Douzinas and Zizek calls, with ample reason, “socialism for the banks, capitalism for the poor.” The theoretically manufactured lens that aids us to peer into the multi-layered dimensions of that Idea are varied to the point of arduous opposition of approaches concerning how to walk the tightrope that is laid out between the historic-theoretical works of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Mao, etc., and the discomforting shades of reality that we previously touched upon. A central philosophical concern of some of the principal arguments that are devised by the authors, for instance, appear to be defining their theoretical position vis-à-vis the Idea in terms of their espousal of Badiou’s nomination of the latter as an ‘event’. The event, as Badiou portrays it, is “a rupture in the normal order of bodies and languages as it exists for any particular situation … or as it appears in any particular world.” That rupture is based on the creation of new possibilities that creates a lacuna of discontinuity in which any Idea can be anchored. Charging the flanks of historical reality for the emanation of a flat ontological ground that would serve as the grinding stone for the spatio-temporal event *qua* ‘rupture’ which would crack open the bounds of finitude and infinitizes the range of what is taken as historically possible, Badiou construes a flotsam that comprises of temporal arrangements of resistance that aims to build an alternative rulebook of the physics of time and space, politically emancipatory only to the extent of its defiance of capitalist spatio-temporality: “The main lesson learned from the last century’s revolutions can be expressed as follows: the political time of the communist Idea must never compete with the established time of domination and its urgencies.” The aspirations of the untimely communists is thus wedded to a phenomenologist construal of action and agency that confers

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6 “I call an ‘event’ a rupture in the normal order of bodies and languages as it exists for any particular situation … or as it appears in any particular world …. What is important to note here is that an event is not the realization of a possibility that resides within the situation or that is dependent on the transcendental laws of the world. An event is the creation of new possibilities. It is located not merely at the level of objective possibilities but at the level of the possibility of possibilities. Another way of putting this is: with respect to a situation or a world, an event paves the way for the possibility of what – from the limited perspective of the make-up of this situation or the legality of this world – is strictly impossible.” Badiou, *The Communist Hypothesis*, pp. 242-243; cf. Badiou, ‘The Idea of Communism’, pp. 12.
the epistemological tools with which the fleeting moments of reality, especially at times of violent or non-violent social confrontation, will be vivisected. Communist Idea is hence brought forward as the touchstone of political action that Zizek discriminates as having a certain similarity to the Kantian ‘regulative idea’\(^8\) that is regulative only insofar as it disturbs the regulative processes of reality:

“L’hypothèse communiste reste la bonne hypothèse, je l’ai dit, je n’en vois aucune autre. Si cette hypothèse doit être abandonnée, ce n’est pas la peine de faire quoi que ce soit, dans l’ordre de l’action collective. Sans l’horizon du communisme, sans cette Idée, rien dans le devenir historique et politique n’est de nature à intéresser le philosophe. ... Mais tenir sur l’Idée, sur l’existence de l’hypothèse, cela ne veut dire que sa première forme de présentation, centrée sur la propriété et sur l’État, doit être maintenue telle quelle. En fait, ce qui nous est imposé comme tâche, disons même comme devoir philosophique, c’est d’aider à ce que se dégage un nouveau mode d’existence de l’hypothèse.”\(^9\)

Refreshing as philosophical accounts of the Idea of communism go, this preoccupation with the former also appear to entail a promotion of the historical present as a hyperreal that, with the right frame of collectivist mind, is assured to lead right into the alley of any zero-degree communism. While the hyperreal is an operative concept of Eco and Baudrillard that does not seem to find an exact philosophical niche to fit in within the architectonics of Badiou’s Idea, the latter’s semiosis of history qua narration functions on a level that has an asymptotic present as its existential epitome. The “hyperrealistic”\(^10\) dimensions of a Disneyland offering its visitors a mechanics of imagination to procure more reality than nature itself can provide\(^11\) – at the suitable price of becoming a willing part of the veil of outspoken falsity, of course\(^12\) – thus appears conducive to Badiou’s post-Platonic Idea of a factual present whose truth procedure can only be assessed on the basis of a process relating actual existence to symbolic history.\(^13\) In less cryptic terms, Badiou’s defence of the communist hypothesis sets out from the all too human premise that there has been an unmistakable polarity between the anti-state

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\(^10\) “In this sense Disneyland is more hyperrealistic than the wax museum, precisely because the latter still tries to make us believe that what we are seeing reproduces reality absolutely, whereas Disneyland makes it clear that within its magic enclosure it is fantasy that is absolutely reproduced.” Umberto Eco, Faith in Fakes: Travels in Hyperreality, trans. by William Weaver, (London, 1995), pp. 43; cf. Jean Baudrillard, ‘Simulacra and Simulations’, in Selected Writings, ed. by Mark Poster, trans. by Jacques Mourrain et al., (Stanford, 1988), pp. 166-184.

\(^11\) Eco, Faith in Fakes, pp. 44.

\(^12\) “L’iperrealismo denuncia il fatto che la realtà, come ci siamo abituati a vederla, è effetto di una manipolazione meccanica: e quindi mette in pubblico la propria falsità programmatica. ... L’iperrealismo è bugiardo perché vuol farci credere che dica la verità, mentre l’iperrealismo mette subito in chiaro il fatto che sta dicendo bugie. Questa è la grande differenza fra i due.” Umberto Eco, ‘L’Illusione realistica’, in Sugli specchi e altri saggi, (Milan, 1985), pp. 59.

\(^13\) For the distinction Badiou posits between truth procedures and knowledge, a distinction that is largely followed in the adjacent sections concerning the usum et abusum of existential dialectics, see Badiou, Being and Event, pp. 339 ff.
and pro-state currents feeding into the monumental works of the forefathers of communism about the peculiarities of various historical and contemporary non-communist societies. And with frequent hand-to-hand clashes between these two dialectical poles there emerged a clear rift between the theory and practice of communism which bode ill for any return to any ‘hermeneutics of scale’ concerning the discrepancy between the characteristics ascribed to an essentially stateless future communist society, and the somewhat more coarse and brutal manifestations of actually existing socialisms of the twentieth century with their centripetal statism. The heightened awareness of the present-day absence of any socialist power of the magnitude of the USSR or even that of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), if we leave aside the curious case of China, which in any case appears to have more to tell us what capitalism, rather than socialism, is about largely thanks to right-wing bulwark that was formed by Deng Xiaoping and his trusted cadres, bar the currency of any talk of orthodox theory and practice. For the generation that lived and breathed communism in the form of delayed emancipation of the proletariat and the toxic vapours that suffocated the Rollenträger of the five-year development plans the terminus of now turns into a monument to those that did not live long enough to see the sun rise in our post-apocalyptic times that are still haunted by what Lefebvre called “fear replaced by terror.” The apocalypse came and went with mementos like Bukharin’s trial, Zhukov’s defiance and Solzhenitsyn’s memoirs that do not allow the modern Oedipus even to gouge out his own eyes after the ‘event’:

“The collapse, the catastrophe, are real … the collapse has indeed taken place, it continues, not everything has fallen as yet. The collapse is that of the idea. One cannot separate the idea from the material disaster; it does not float intact above the ruins. Ideas exist only in their

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14 For a thoroughgoing historical example that displays the full range of all these dialectical swings in action one can resort to Badiou’s examination of the Paris Commune as a philosophical event: Badiou, The Communist Hypothesis, pp. 200-228.
18 A balanced peephole into the significance of the works of an author whose political swings would take him from one end of the dissident spectrum, i.e., Leninist anti-Stalinism, to the other, i.e., purveyor of everything with the faintest whiff of pre-Revolution absolutism, can be found in H. Stuart Hughes, Sophisticated Rebels: The Political Culture of European Dissent, 1968-1987, (Cambridge, MA., 1990), pp. 94-106.
incarnation; if the incarnation disappears, the idea itself is mortally wounded. So communism has entered into its final phrase.”

Without digressing inadvertently on the psychological shockwaves of this downfall, we need to reassert the primacy of dialectical materialism in regard to any attempt to analyse the signifiers that float around the theme of the Idea of communism chiefly for two reasons. First, heeding what Marx wrote in the sentence preceding exactly his analogy between the tradition of the dead traditions and the incapacitating memory thereof, the murky drags of history cannot be shed by postulating a synchronic time interval in which the shibboleths of the immediate past play an intoxicating drumbeat that does not permit anything other than marching in trance. Put differently, the mnemonic accent on the mass trauma that was catapulted into the imagination of the communists by the demise of the Soviet Union appears likely to have festered with the penchant for relegating the whole experience of the twentieth century that is also brimming with numerous unprecedented instances of working class and socialist intellectual solidarity. This reminds us that either seeing capitalism as the Goliath or ascribing the role of David to communists would be tantamount to a basic and ahistorical defeatism. Marx’s historical insight, precisely at times like this, turns into an invaluable instrument that is adequately forceful to banish the twin evils of utopianism and defeatism as in the case of his observations regarding Richard Jones:

“from the moment that the bourgeois mode of production and the conditions of production and distribution which correspond to it are recognized as historical, the delusion of regarding them as natural laws of production vanishes and the prospect opens up of a new society, [a new] economic social formation, to which capitalism is only the transition.”


21 ‘Men make their own history, but not of their own free will; not under circumstances they themselves have chosen but under the given and inherited circumstances with which they are directly confronted.’ Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, pp. 146; cf. “Die Geschichte wird von Menschen gemacht, aber die Handlungen und Entscheidungen der Menschen werden von den sie umgebenden Bedingungen und den durch diese Bedingungen hervorgerufenen Bedürfnissen beeinflußt. Nichts geschieht hier außerhalb der Menschen noch unabhängig von ihnen. In dem, was geschieht, ist nichts Mystisches.” Adam Schaff, Marx oder Sartre? Versuch einer Philosophie des Menschen, (Frankfurt, 1966), pp. 81.

22 Overcoming this hackneyed ahistoricism turns out to be a true possibility indeed when we recall some other historical examples, notwithstanding their lukewarm repercussions, in order to canvass a more nuanced picture of the historical account: “…the worldwide general strike of 1919 that was one of the earliest, largely spontaneous acts of global solidarity. In the US, Eugene V. Debs responded to Lenin’s victory by exclaiming: ‘From the top of my head to the bottom of my shoes, I am a Bolshevik, and proud of it!’ In 1920 he ran for president from jail as the Socialist Party candidate, and won a million votes. The journalist Victor Berger posted on billboards: ‘War is Hell Caused by Capitalism’ – and was the first Socialist candidate elected to US Congress. Convicted, like Debs, under the Espionage Act, he was denied the Congressional seat into which he was twice voted by the electorate.” Susan Buck-Morss, ‘A Commonist Ethics’, in The Idea of Communism, II, pp. 64.

23 Karl Marx, Theories of Surplus Value, (Moscow, 1971), pp. 429.
Second, severing the golden thread of epistemological and historical richness that bind the works of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Gramsci, Luxemburg and others to the twenty-first century formulations of the Idea of communism amid the structural crises that plague capitalism across the board cannot be effected without at the same time jettisoning the element of internationalism, or (dare we say it?) projective universality that can be read in a Sartrean vein into the works the founding figures of dialectical materialism. Having opened the theoretical and practical floodgates, it appears that we have arrived at the point where the threshold separating the banality of la vie quotidienne from that of demiurgic concepts needs to be crossed.

1.1 Summary of the Chapters

The passage from the Idea to theory is not wholly without its difficulties. A case in point is, of course, none other than our transition from the Idea of communism to Marxist theory. Having to proceed under the ever-vigilant gaze of various theoretical dualities that have manifested a tendency, at times, to verge on mutual-exclusivity, it appears that we need to carve out a niche into the theoretical granite of Marxism prior to elaborating on what we convey as projective universalism and its distinct elements. A pertinent question to be asked, in that vein, is our steadfast application of dialectical materialism to the discussions concerning Marx and Engels’ method. Why insist on dialectics? What does it have to do with Marxist analysis of history? And, more importantly, what connection does it have to the claims to universalism?

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24 And, one ought to add, that element has continued to be pillorised, at the latest, since the waning of the revolutionary tide of 1968. Berlinguer’s address, as the leader of the Italian delegation at the International Congress of Moscow in 1969, avowed, in that sense, to a growing sense of unease with respect to the blurring of the boundaries between the self-same talks about international socialist solidarity and the callous strongarming realities that continued to be on display between the CPSU and the ‘fraternal parties’ throughout the 1950s and 1960s: “Aujourd’hui, entre les principaux participants à la lutte révolutionnaire il n’existe pas d’unité complète. En outre, sont apparues de nombreuses difficultés et des problèmes fort graves qui ne sont pas encore résolus. Par certains aspects on est peut-être en droit de parler d’une crise de l’internationalisme, crise que nous n’avons pas encore réussi à surmonter.” Enrico Berlinguer, ‘Une crise de mouvement international’, in Roger Garaudy, Toute la vérité : Mai 1968-Février 1970, (Paris, 1970b), pp. 85 ; cf. “Le classi borghesi cessano di essere nazionali quando diventano imperialiste. ... La classe operaia diventa nazionale in quanto lotta contro l’imperialismo; ma è davvero, come diceva il Manifesto, nazionale in un altro senso. In un senso universale, si potrebbe dire, perché difende l’indipendenza del proprio Paese affermando e difendendo l’indipendenza di tutte le nazioni; allontana dalla propria Patria la rovina combattendo perché il flagello della guerra non si abbatta più sul mondo. Combattendo contro l’asasperazione imperialista e sciovinista dei gruppi borghesi più reazionari, lavora e combatte perché si instauri un’era di sicurezza e pace per tutti i popoli.” Palmiro Togliatti, Il Partito Comunista Italiano, (Milan, 1958), pp. 89-90; Alain Badiou, Philosophy and the Idea of Communism, trans. by Susan Spitzer, (Cambridge, 2015), pp. 81.

25 For a detailed foray into the origins of Marxian dialectics, see Lezsek Kolakowski, Main Currents of Marxism, trans. by P. S. Falla, (New York, 2005), pp. 10-68.
Marxism has been torn apart into numerous theoretical fractions over the course of the twentieth century, starting with the great revisionist debate that began to take a definitive shape in the ebbing years of the nineteenth century. Following the death of Engels in 1895, his hitherto well-monitored disciples began to peck at some of the most fundamental premises of the works of Marx and Engels. In the leadership of influential figures including Eduard Bernstein and Jean Jaurès, the revisionist Marxists claimed that a violent revolution against the capitalist class to take control of the state and society had taken on the appearance of an antediluvian adventurist strategy, thus judging it to be dismissible as an outmoded cornerstone of Marxian works. Other foremost socialist intellectuals such as Lenin, Kautsky, Luxemburg, Plekhanov, etc. argued, however, that the contrary was the case in both industrialized, e.g., Germany, and pre-industrial, e.g., Russia, states. Yet, this great schism among the rank and file of Marxist theoreticians was only a minor harbinger of what was to pit one group of self-proclaimed orthodox Marxist scholars against other groups of similar nature over the course of the structuralist debate that found its most sublime and uncompromising expressions in the early works of the French philosopher Louis Althusser. Attempting to ‘tidy up’ the historical materialist method of studying history by a theorist intervention employing elements that were borrowed from Spinoza’s geometric monism, Althusser built up vast nets of generalities in order to draw a clear line of demarcation between epistemic, i.e., sensory, experience and theoretical knowledge:

“Generality I forms the starting point, the raw material of theoretical practice, that is to say, the body of concepts – either scientific or ideological – upon which the process will set to work in order to transform them. Generality II is the corpus of concepts whose more or less contradictory unity constitutes the “theory” of the science in question by defining the field in which the problems of the science must necessarily be posed – in other words, the science’s problematic. Generality III is the “concrete-in-thought,” the knowledge that is produced by the work of Generality II on Generality I, of the concepts defined by the science’s problematic on the pre-existing theories that constitute the prehistory of this stage in the science’s development.”  

26 Though works of the order of Jaeggi’s contemporary critique, among others, managed to undermine some of the most glaring incongruities between Althusser’s brand of anti-humanist scientific socialism and their supposedly Marxian origins, only with the advent of the 1980s would the last remnants of that once proud theoretical edifice would crumble into dust once and for all: Urs Jaeggi, Ordnung und Chaos: Strukturalismus als Methode und Mode, (Frankfurt, 1970); Alfred Schmidt, ‘Der strukturalistische Angriff auf die Geschichte’, in Beiträge zur marxistischen Erkenntnistheorie, (Frankfurt, 1970), pp. 194-265.

27 The primacy of theory as the supremely scientific endeavor that once self-extrapolated to the full extent would not need to resort to any kind of historical aides-de-camps is underscored in the following programmatic statement: “Once they are truly constituted and developed [the sciences] have no need for verification from external practices to declare the knowledges they produce to be ‘true’, i.e., to be knowledges. No mathematician in the world waits until physics has verified a theorem to declare it proved… The truth of this theorem is a hundred per cent provided by criteria purely internal to the practice of mathematical proof, hence by the criterion of mathematical practice, i.e., by the forms required by existing mathematical scientficity. We can say the same for the results of every science…” Louis Althusser and Etienne Balibar, Reading Capital, trans. by Ben Brewster, (London, 1970), pp. 59.

28 Alex Callinicos, Althusser’s Marxism, (California, 1976), pp. 56.
Yet, this excavation of the concrete object of scientific Marxism through retracing Marx’s own theoretical development from the *Frühschriften* to the period beginning with *The German Ideology* (1846) also meant, in Althusser’s case, the utilization of the preventive medicine of an ultimately damaging textual censorship in terms of what elements of which works were to be discarded or kept.²⁹ What were to be dubbed by Althusser as ‘survivals’ of the later full development of ‘scientific concepts’³⁰ were such occurrences that were condoned by Marx himself in the context of his arguments against the usefulness of philosophy starting from *The German Ideology*.³¹ Against this theoretical straitjacketing of historical knowledge that was realized in the hands of Althusser and Balibar and their progeny in England, Hindess and Hirst,³² Edward P. Thompson and Raymond Williams set out on an engaged and meticulous critique accusing the former of “theoretical imperialism”³³ and of “idealism”³⁴ and underscoring the contingency of history that merits careful study in the stead of overarching scientific theory qua theological generalities.³⁵ Analytical categories, in other words, are of historical value only to the extent that their content puts its nose to the great grindstone of history, for otherwise they risk abstracting from concrete circumstances that leads to a hyperbolic sort of idealism without anything to say in historical parlance: “That is to say, the analytic categories, as so often in idealist thought, have, almost unnoticed, become substantive descriptions, which then take habitual priority over the whole social process to which, as analytic categories, they are attempting to speak.”³⁶

The theoretical ramifications of the ‘Althusserian moment’ were so wide-ranging that they brought virtually all the epistemological and ontological tenets of Marxist theory and practice to the fore. Indeed, the watershed movement from history to science heralded a renaissance of epistemological and ontological studies that ranged from those who advocated a direct return to Kant in regard of the general problem of the generation and transmission of social

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²⁹ Meikle, *Essentialism in the Thought of Karl Marx*, pp. 56; for a timely critical engagement with the Althusserian notion of rupture and the construal of history that is watered by it one can turn to Rancière’s confrontation with his earlier contributions to Althusser’s reading: Jacques Rancière, ‘Mode d’emploi pour une réédition de Lire ‘le Capital”, *Les Temps modernes*, vol. 328 (Nov., 1973), pp. 800 ff.
³⁴ “If there is a “Marxism” of the contemporary World which Marx or Engels would have recognized instantly as an idealism, Althusserian structuralism is this. The category has attained to a primacy over its material referent, the conceptual structure hangs above and dominates social being.” *Ibid*, pp. 205.
³⁵ “History is not order. It is disorder: a rational disorder. At the very moment when it maintains order, i.e., structure, history is already on the way to undoing it.” Jean-Paul Sartre, “Sartre Aujourd’hui”, *l’Arc*, no. 30, translated in *Telos*, vol. 9, (1971); cited in *ibid*, pp. 230.
knowledge,\textsuperscript{37} to those that argued for a more balanced approach to questions pertaining to the two central sources of knowledge, i.e., thought and reality,\textsuperscript{38} and to those that drew, to varying extends, from the realist theory of knowledge that was construed by Roy Bhaskar.\textsuperscript{39} The influence of Bhaskar’s work, coupled with the pressing need to take the Althusserian bull by its horns, was so wide-ranging that a three volume set of articles was published in 1979 under the title of \textit{Issues in Marxist Philosophy}.\textsuperscript{40} Siding with dialectics in their attempts to refute the false unity that is presumed to exist between ontology and epistemology in the works that were written by granting a privileged sphere to formal logic and its idealist analytical tendencies, the authors claimed that the only epistemological remedy to the overriding divide between the Scylla of positivism and the Charybdis of idealism was to attempt to unify the necessity of empiric (historical) knowledge and the conception as well as the study of the former via the transformative faculties of the mind:

“Thus, referring back to section I above, dialectic is, without paradox, both a movement of the mind, and something mind-independent that imposes itself from the realm of Being. The form and its transformations are revealed by enquiry and abstraction, but the form and transformations so revealed are (or arise from) the essence of the reality (system or whole) under study. So once the science has been developed ‘to the point where one can present it dialectically,’ one has then to achieve its presentation in that way (dialectically); having traced out the ‘inner connexion’ in thought, one has then to adequately portray the real process of genesis of the forms.”\textsuperscript{41}


\textsuperscript{38}“We do not deny that, in addition to social transmit, a man receives a biological transmit. On the contrary, Marxist materialism must be especially alive to the ways in which the natural world continues to exercise its influence, its constraining and limiting influence as well as the possibilities it provides, over social man. The extent of the importance of the biological transmit is an empirical, \textit{a posteriori} question, and the role of the philosophy is to sum up, rather than dictate, these scientific results.” David-Hillel Ruben, \textit{Marxism and Materialism: A Study in Marxist Theory of Knowledge}, (Sussex, 1979), pp. 110.

\textsuperscript{39}Roy Bhaskar, \textit{A Realist Theory of Science}, (York, 1975); cf. “I have argued elsewhere that it is a condition of the intelligibility of the experimental establishment and the practical application of knowledge that its objects are real structures which exist and act independently of the patterns of events they generate. If (sic) follows from this that causal laws must be analyzed as tendencies, which are only necessarily manifest in empirical invariances under relatively special closed conditions. Thus, contrary to the specific claims of Popper and Hempel and the tacit presuppositions of Winch, deducibility from empirical invariances, depending upon the availability of constant conjunction of events, can be neither necessary nor sufficient for a natural scientific explanation. There is an ontological gap between causal laws and their empirical grounds, which both parties to the naturalist debate have hitherto ignored.” Roy Bhaskar, ‘Social Scientific Knowledge’, in \textit{Issues in Marxist Philosophy, Volume III: Epistemology, Science, Ideology}, ed. by John Mepham and David-Hillel Ruben, (Sussex., 1979), pp. 109.

\textsuperscript{40}“A related common theme is the insistence on the need for a re-emphasis of the importance of materialism and on the necessity for a realist theory of science. It is apparent that the work of Roy Bhaskar (\textit{A Realist Theory of Science, Leeds 1975, Hassocks 1978}) has been very influential in this area of discussion and we hope that one of the effects that these books might have is to encourage the development of Marxist philosophy in directions which his work … have opened up.” John Mepham and David-Hillel Ruben, ‘General Introduction’, in \textit{Issues in Marxist Philosophy, Volume I: Dialectics and Method}, ed. by John Mepham and David-Hillel Ruben, (Sussex., 1979), pp. xi-xii.

Dialectics, in other words, is not a form of logic that betokens a privileged position for itself along other logical positivist tendencies. It is not based on a priori deductions of all the historically convoluted and semantically charged evidence into logical interconnections that are purported to reign supreme over history itself. Indeed, tied to an uncompromising predilection for taking static concepts over dynamic reality, such timeless ‘analytics’ can neither afford to locate the theoretical significance of the Aristotelian concept of *dunamis*, i.e., potentiality that is inherent to a substance, nor grasp the perpetual tension that interlock nitty-gritty historical analysis and the diligent construal of concepts that possess their theoretical aptness only so long as they retain their historical roots. The significant theoretical role that is played by detailed historical surveys, in that vein, obliterates the idealist boulder of Sisyphus, the falling and rolling uphill of which takes place only within the inner-circuits of mind. The inner-connexion of the concepts, on this view, appertains to a movement that takes place from the real, i.e., historically observable, movements of the objects of analysis themselves, setting Marx and Engels apart from Hegel’s understanding of the dialectic and his peculiar conception of the latter as the rational manifestation of the rules of logic themselves. Turning the reality inside out, Hegel drew Marx’s biting ire in regard to the idealist garb with which he donned history:

“The idealist side of his [Hegel’s] philosophy was that he denied the reality of what the senses perceive. He recognized that there are senses and that they do perceive something, and he correctly pointed out that these perceptions by themselves can grasp only the appearance of things, not their truth. The truth can be worked out only through the criticism and reconstruction of sense-perceptions by logical reasoning. From this correct principle, Hegel

42 Nor is it a masqueraded epistemology of multifaceted and open totality that is capable of sublating its own impediments when left to its own devices. Lefebvre’s early account, ridiculed by Meikle with some well-earned epithets such as unilluminating and inconsistent in equal measure, has served as just the kind of vindication that the later analytical Marxists needed in order to sweep away any traces of dialectics from the stage of Marxist theory: Henri Lefebvre, *Dialectical Materialism*, trans. by John Sturrock. (Minnesota, 2009), pp. 86-109; cf. Scott Meikle, *Essentialism in the Thought of Karl Marx*, (La Salle, IL, 1985), pp. 2.

43 Marx’s discussion of the concepts of ‘productive consumption’ and ‘consumptive production’ that are conceived to take place simultaneously under the aegis of capitalist mode of production appears to be a case in point: “Production, then, is also immediately consumption, consumption is also immediately production. Each is immediately its opposite. But at the same time a mediating movement takes place between the two. Production mediates consumption; it creates the latter’s material; without it, consumption would lack an object. But consumption also mediates production in that it alone creates for the products the subject for whom they are products. The product only obtains its ‘last finish’ in consumption. A railway on which no trains run, hence which is not used up, is a railway only *dunamei* [emphasis added C.O.], and not in reality.” Karl Marx, *Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy*, trans. by Martin Nicolaus. (London, 1993), pp. 91; nor is this the only time the Aristotelian concept is used in the work, cf. *Ibid*, pp. 106, 134, 468, 503, 737.

44 “The relation of the quality to the state (or to the action) is a relation of actualization. The quality is given as a potentiality, a virtuality, which, under the influence of diverse factors, can pass into actuality. … Potentiality is not mere possibility: it presents itself as something which naturally exists, but its mode of existence is potency.” Jean-Paul Sartre, *The Transcendence of the Ego: An Existentialist Theory of Consciousness*, trans. by Forrest Williams and Robert Kirkpatrick. (New York, 1960), pp. 70-71.

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drew the false conclusion that only the logical concepts worked up by the mind have any reality.”

Yet, seeing that the idealist tendencies of the Hegelian logic had spawned its distant progeny in the form of Althusserian structuralism and its fascination with scientific generalities, the authors of the three volumes ventured to set the record straight with the old analytical penchant for coronating steady state equilibria at the expense of stasis-ridden dunamis:

“Formal logic exists only in the form that it does partly because of the metaphysical and ontological (pre-)dispositions of its practitioners. This was the case in Hegel’s time, when the formal logic of the day was a debased Aristotelian syllogistic, the accompanying world-view a static one allied to a classificatory conception of knowledge based on definition per genus ad differentiam, and the whole lot interlocked in a philosophical-ideological unity.”

With the demarcation of the spheres of materialist ontology and dialectical epistemology, despite bearing a certain programmatic resemblance to the older attempts to conceive dialectics as an essential part of historical materialism, the Hegelian historical genesis of dialectics was acknowledged with heavy emphasis on the limitations whence it originated. Indeed, for it was Hegel who insisted on carrying the notion of permanence of internal contradictions of concepts to its logical conclusion, i.e., a history without any subject in its spatio-temporally defined particularity. The pitfalls of positivism and idealism hence could only be surpassed by the identification of dialectical materialism as the unnamed clé de voûte holding the historical materialist arc together. Henceforth, we arrive at the rebirth of dialectical materialism with its three pillars of complex totalities, dialectical contradiction and irreducible existence, with the underlying theme of relationality that lock each of these theses by close

45 Martin Nicolaus, ‘Foreword’, in Grundrisse, pp. 27.
47 Henri Lefebvre’s Le matérialisme dialectique and Jean Hyppolite’s Studies on Marx and Hegel are both cases in point that appear to have anticipated, though with grandiose veneration of holding incongruent readings together by their threads, the historical thrusts of the later works especially in regard to the complexity of the concept of dialectics and its internal contradictions that are conveyed as the conceptual representations of the dynamics of external reality: “The dialectic is a ‘method of exposition’, a word to which Marx gives a very powerful meaning. The ‘exposition’ is nothing less than the complete reconstitution of the concrete in its inner movement, not a mere juxtapositioning or external organization of the results of the analysis. We must start from the content. The content comes first, it is the real Being which determines dialectical thought. ‘The object of our method of enquiry is to take possession of matter in its detail, to analyze its various forms of development and to discover its inner laws.’ The analysis therefore determines the relations and moments of the complex content.” Lefebvre, Dialectical Materialism, pp. 74.
48 Lukács’ conception of the Hegelian view of history as a totality of self-conscious movements that can only be rendered intelligible if we take a step back from particular manifestations and direct our gaze upon the internal dynamics of the totality’s movement seems fitting to note here: “The spirit which is supposed to make history and whose very essence is supposed to be the fact that it is the actual driving force, the motor of history, ends up by turning history into a mere simulacrum.” Georg Lukács, The Young Hegel, Studies in the Relations between Dialectics and Economics, trans. by Rodney Livingstone, (London, 1975), pp. 547.
proximity to one another.\textsuperscript{50} In contradistinction to the inherent atomism of empiricism dialecticians argue, for one, that entities are composite complexities that are made up of diverse tendencies that manifest themselves in relation to other such composite entities. The contradiction thesis argues, likewise, that entities have the potential to change only if their contradictory internal structure is conceived as the peculiar attribute that sets them apart from other entities. With the thesis of existence and its postulation of at least one internal element that is definitive in its explanatory power of each act and the particular types of transformations it undergoes as a part of any collectivity, we arrive at the full circle of dialectical materialist ontology that is concurrently underpinned by the three concepts.\textsuperscript{51} Stipulated as the three terms that render their full service only insofar as they are conceived in connection with the uncorked genie of history, they seep into the dialectical itinerary that propels historical materialism not only towards the discovery of historically prominent phenomena but also towards the construal of diachronic understanding of history that has relationality as its lynchpin:

“In its mystified form, dialectic became the fashion in Germany, because it seemed to transfigure and to glorify the existing state of things. In its rational form it is a scandal and abomination to bourgeoisdom and its doctrinaire professors, because it includes in its comprehension and affirmative recognition of the existing state of things, at the same time also, the recognition of the negation of that state, of its inevitable breaking up because it regards every historically developed social form as in fluid movement, and therefore takes into account its transient nature not less than is momentary existence; because it lets nothing impose upon it, and is in its essence critical and revolutionary.”\textsuperscript{52}

An attempt to rethink these three pillars in their respective relations with the dialectical materialist structure whose preponderant features, as I understand them, can be gleaned from the works of Marx, Engels and Lenin is the subject of the first chapter of this study. Why is a rethinking of dialectical materialism either necessary or timely? Simply put, it is both because the analytical Marxist defence of positing logical positivism at the heart of historical materialism has served in my case as a wake-up call to re-evaluate all three dialectical materialist premises in the light of Sartrean existentialism. Hence the import of uncovering of

\textsuperscript{50} This tripartite understanding of dialectical ontology, we should add, does not follow the traditional account of the ‘three dialectical laws’ that are construed by Engels with significant stress on Hegel’s \textit{Logic}: “It is, therefore, from the history of nature and human society that the laws of dialectics are abstracted. For they are nothing but the most general laws of these two aspects of historical development, as well as of thought itself. And indeed they can be reduced in the main to three: The law of the transformation of quantity into quality and vice versa; The law of the interpenetration of opposites; The law of the negation of the negation.” Friedrich Engels, \textit{The Dialectics of Nature}, (Moscow, 1976), pp. 62.

\textsuperscript{51} Cf. “Dialectical materialism rejects traditional materialism because traditional materialism knows nothing of real material practice. In the logical unification of theory and practice achieved by materialist dialectic the practical revolutionary transformation of society is reflected in and guided by a theory that is critical of that society.” Roy Edgley, ‘Marx’s Revolutionary Science’, in \textit{Issues in Marxist Philosophy}, III, pp. 19.

the ‘rational kernel’ of Hegelian dialectics in its metaphysical garb, the re-discovery of history that is posited against the ‘spiritual monism’ of Hegel and his disciples. Our picture of the dialectical background against which the majority of the Marxian works are drawn would remain, in that sense, somewhat incomplete if we were to hesitate to add another façade to the totality of the arguments that proclaimed to take place within Marxism in the late 1970s and 1980s. This missing ingredient is the publication of Gerald A. Cohen’s *Karl Marx’s Theory of History: A Defense* in 1978. A plea to the scientific rigor of analytical philosophy in and of itself, the importance of this work should not be underestimated. Indeed, by the token of the epistemological debates it gave rise to and its prolonged influence on the works of the Anglo-Saxon analytical Marxists, this work appears to constitute a momentous crossroads in the history of intra-Marxist skirmishes. Designating its theoretical antagonist along the lines of what could be extrapolated elegantly as “bulshitting Marxists,” and carefully sidestepping the tedious, yet crucial, conceptual difference between what Derek Sayer calls “historical vs transhistorical categories,” Cohen, throughout this work and its later modifications, engages in a sort of phenomenological abstractionism that appears to severe some of the most

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53 “What deserves admiration in Hegel and even in his *Logic* is his faithfulness to his monism, particularly on the doctrine on Essence. There he describes structures in which the essential and unessential are reflected in one another, in which the existential conditions of a dominant contradiction are an element in the contradiction itself. In Marx there is never any question of an absolute subject, Matter or Spirit, which might follow a continuous dialectical development. There are never anything but concrete pre-existing structures. There is no indivisible generic Totality, but many totalities…” Jean Hyppolite, *Studies on Marx and Hegel*, trans. by John O’Neill, (New York, 1973), pp. viii.

54 The otherwise unattainable levels of scientific clarity with which the analytical reasoning is endowed is portrayed in an idyllic manner by Cohen in his *Introduction to the 2000 Edition* as following: “And our commitment to Marxist theses (as opposed to our commitment to socialist values) is not absolute in the way that the commitment to analytical technique is. The commitment to the techniques, so we should claim, reflects nothing less than a commitment to reason itself. It is refusal to relax the demand for clear statement and rigorous argument. We believe that it is irrational obscurantism to resist analytical reasoning, to resist analysis in the broad sense in the name of dialectic, and to resist analysis in the narrow sense in the name of anti-individual holism.” Gerald A. Cohen, *Karl Marx’s Theory of History: A Defense*, (Oxford, 2000), pp. xxiv.


57 See Gerald A. Cohen, *History, Labour, and Freedom: Themes from Marx*, (Oxford, 1988); also, the overabundance of hypothetical, and equally ahistorical, narratives with which some of his articles collected in his *On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice* abound. A hypothetical case in point, in that vein, is his extraction of the proletarian tendency to work as a class rather than seek exploitative opportunities on the sly, buttressing his foremen and applauding the necessity of the efficiency argument in order to become a foreman himself: “The number of exits from proletariat is, as a matter of objective circumstance, small. But most proletarians are not trying to escape, and, as a result, it is false that each exit is being actively attempted by some proletarian. Therefore for most proletarians there exists a means of escape. So even though necessarily most proletarians will remain proletarians, and will sell their labor power, perhaps none, and at most a minority, are forced to do so.” Gerald A. Cohen, ‘Capitalism, Freedom, Proletariat’, in his *On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice and Other Essays in Political Philosophy*, (Princeton, 2011), pp. 160.
fundamentally empirical aspects of Marxian historical materialism for the sake of construing a polished, and thereby pulverized, account of scientific historical materialism. It is on that note that the aforementioned three theses of dialectics bear the imprint of the only evident solution that would let historical materialism out of this ahistorical impasse:

“An important corollary of Ollman’s argument … is that Marx’s general, transhistorical categories (like those of the 1859 Preface) acquire substantive definition from, and only from, the particular historical contexts to which they are applied. They are not applicable without change across space and time, because their content changes with the reality they seek to comprehend. This means that they cannot be substantively defined transhistorically; as general categories, they are necessarily empirically open-ended. We cannot offer a universally applicable definition, of an empirical sort, of what for instance productive forces and productive relations are. Conversely, in so far as Marx’s concepts are substantive categories – the concepts of concrete empirical phenomena – they are necessarily historical categories: a feudal force, a capitalist relation, and so on. Their content is historically specific, and their validity historically circumscribed.”

Yet the ahistorical binaries that are construed and deployed after one another in the case of material versus social relations of production, or in his enacted dichotomy of work relations and social relations, are not features peculiar to the work of G. A. Cohen. Indeed, whether we choose to focus at John Roemer’s attempt of adaptation of the rational choice theory to Marxism, or Jon Elster’s functionalist analysis of the link between collective action and classes, it is evidently difficult to banish the thought that the pervasive ahistorical tendencies of the functionalist account continue to haunt the historical materialism to this day. In fact, the phenomenological separation of theoretical categories that find their substantive significance only within their particular historical settings whence they arise corresponds to an idealist compartmentalization of reality into mutually-exclusive realms of signifiers that are bereft of any spatio-temporal specificity whereby they are rendered betwixt between actual social agents and hypothetical thought experiments. In short, strive as they do, the ‘reality’ that is

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58 Indeed, what remains of the ‘historical’ side of historical materialism once the historical specificity of the concepts is sacrificed on the altar of analytical rigor is a bare-bones idealist structuralism that we have seen, more times to none, to be ascribed to the works of Althusser and his followers.
60 Cohen, Karl Marx’s Theory of History, pp. 30.
61 Ibid, pp. 111.
64 The argumentative Arsenal that is utilized by John Roemer in his A Future for Socialism (1994), with all its underlying idealist distinctions are likely to fan the flames of our argument here, as is pertinent to his discussion on the dualism between ‘equality of welfare’ and ‘equality of opportunity for welfare’: “Were equality of welfare the goal rather than equality of opportunity for welfare, then society would be mandated to provide huge resource endowments to those who adopt terribly expensive and unrealistic goals … Calling for equality of opportunity for welfare, on the other hand, puts some responsibility on me for choosing welfare-inducing goals that are reasonable.” John Roemer, A Future for Socialism, (London, 1994), pp. 12.
conveyed by Cohen and co.’s analyses thrives only as an inverted production of reality on condition that it meets the formers’ preestablished criteria of a metaphysics of knowledge. One is entitled to aspire for more than what tiny room is reserved by stifling market mechanisms to social action in the digitised world of our day and age. We need historical acumen and theoretical elaboration just as much as analytic acuteness in order to avoid the minimalism that serves as an intersection point of stern ahistoricism and free-floating wishful thinking alike. If the depiction of social reality and its comprehension feeds into one another in the concept of dialectics that is conceived through the historical materialist lens, then we need to recall Marx’s warnings concerning the violence that is committed both by too much and too little abstraction:

“When the reality is described, a self-sufficient philosophy [die selbständige Philosophie] loses its medium of existence. At the best its place can only be taken by a summing-up of the most general results, abstractions which are derived from the observation of the historical development of men. These abstractions in themselves, divorced from real history, have no value whatsoever. They can only serve to facilitate the arrangement of historical material, to indicate the sequence of its separate strata. But they by no means afford a recipe or schema, as does philosophy, for neatly trimming the epochs of history. On the contrary, the difficulties begin only when one sets about the examination and arrangement of the material – whether of a past epoch or of the present – and its actual presentation. The removal of these difficulties is governed by premises which certainly cannot be stated here, but which only the study of the actual life-process and the activity of each epoch will make evident.”

How does all this historical exegesis of some variants of twentieth-century Marxism bear on the relation that we have postulated to exist between dialectical materialism and an existentialist re-construal of it? The shorter, and more analytic, answer is that only by locating the historical manifestations of human actions within their totalising projects aiming at the re-organisation of their ready-made totalities, which are structured in accord with the interests of the ruling class, can we evaluate the relationship between social being and his or her group, a relationship that inhabits a permanent space within dialectical materialist theory. Succinctly put, we cannot extract an Archimedean balanced standpoint between agents and groups only to project this image backwardly to pre-capitalist societies to the effect of waving our magic

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65 “Quant à la science ou plutôt à la scientificité, elle [logic] prétend jouer aujourd’hui le rôle de référentiel et même de code général. Prétention qui inverse les termes. La science n’est-elle pas par définition connaissance du réel? Le réel n’est pas le réel de la science, encore moins la scientificité, sauf pour une métaphysique du savoir.” Lefebvre, *La vie quotidienne dans le monde moderne*, pp. 220.


67 Cf. “De prime abord, I do not start from ‘concepts’ … What I start from is the simplest social form in which the labour product is represented in contemporary society, and that is the ‘commodity’. I analyze this, and, indeed, first in the form in which it appears … Thus it is not I who divide ‘value’ into use-value and exchange-value as oppositions into which the abstraction ‘value’ divides itself, but the concrete social form of the labour product.” Karl Marx, *Notes on Adolf Wagner*, pp. 50, 51; cited in Derek Sayer, ‘Science as Critique: Marx vs Althusser’, pp. 32.
wand that would allow our conception of agency to manage a record jump at the Rhodesian Olympics. Indeed, what little evidence can be found to exist between forces of production and relations of production as it pertains to the social revolutionary cast of mind that has found champions in various epochs of human history, e.g., ancient Greece and Renaissance Florence, they need to be conceived according to the profuse realism of ‘Hic Rhodus, hic salta!’. Turning back to the elongated form of our answer, a meticulous application of the dialectical materialist tools of trade to the rudiments of existentialist theory à la Kant, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Heidegger and Sartre, in addition to grassroots history would allow us to posit the human potentialities that are afforded at this stage by late capitalism in a longer view as it appertains to the different relations of domination, production and reproduction that can be viewed as rendering verdicts on our being-in-the-world despite having born and bred into substantially different social milieus.68 Such an existentialist re-theorisation of dialectical materialism in a post-Jamesonian manner forms the subject of the second chapter. That attempt takes us through a wide range of theoretical stops starting with an updated version of the Sartrean conception of needs and culminating in the appraisal of the possibility of upholding an existentialist dialectical view of history as a transmission of past collective actions. With the understanding of those transmissions as the interweaving of widely different historical threads through the political interests that link the class societies of today with those of yesteryears, we, then, attempt to construe historical interpretation as a definite form of human action that is geared toward the razing as well as the building of new Bastilles. Only by the threading of lives that are historically parallel à la Plutarch to our contemporary life of self-avowedly ‘framed’ democracy can we, as our argument goes, reinvigorate dialectical materialism with an injection of the post-Sartrean existentialist dialectics.

Now, it has been argued by some of the most influential opponents of an existential re-interpretation of Marxian dialectics that Marxism and existentialism differ so widely on some of the fundamental theoretical premises that any attempt to find common ground between the two would be doomed to imminent failure.69 Having been proven to be a theoretical


battleground of foremost instance for theoretical shouting matches and filibustering between the happy campers of the Soviet aims and agendas and those that found no consolation in being comradely related to those campers of solemn adherence in and through the two decades that followed the Second World War, those theoretical fields do not appear substantially enticing for any candidate that is on the lookout for finding new theoretical ways of assessing Marxism’s claims to universalism. In fact, so fierce did the those borderline clashes grow to be, especially early on in those two decades, that any pathway toward a reconciliation was seen by the debaters to have been firmly shut by the end of the 1940s. For the leftward-leaning figures of the existentialist camp, such as Jean-Paul Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir, Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Leszek Kolakowski, not only was Marxism theoretically culpable because of its tendency to reduce the subject to a mere object among other material objects, its self-styled practice by the officials of the USSR also deserved to be on the receiving end of the harshest criticism that arose from the proud dictates of the doctrine of ‘socialism in one country’ that saw no need for outcry in working upon those comrade workers just as uncompromisingly as they did before the outbreak of the war. As far as they were concerned, Marxist historical materialism did not stand to gain anything in styling itself theoretically after a mirror-image conception of what the transcendental and absolute variants of German idealisms used to stand for, losing many a vital component in the process instead. Carrying the Heideggerian being-towards-death to its capitalistically logical conclusion in Auschwitz and Dachau among numerous others, the fascist tyrants of the post-Great Depression era had created a moral king’s gambit out of the rapidly increasing existential discomfort into which the European individual of the interwar years was thrown. Having raised the stakes by commanding all those who opposed them, by their supposedly inferior ‘genes,’ political deliberations or else, to prove their authentic worth for laying claims to their thrones, the fascist ruling classes of Western Europe spearheaded by Hitler, Mussolini, Franco, Salazar and those of their ilk had given the lie to that peculiar, and strictly theoretical if one wills to give way to a little irony, concept that had served as one of the primary building blocks of


Heidegger’s *Sein und Zeit.* And ‘prove their authenticity,’ the Jewish people did, in such staggering massified brutality that it would not be unwarranted to portray them, with the singular exceptions of the millions of the colonised peoples and the Soviet peoples, as having composed of the most authentic, at least in an early Heideggerian sense, of all individuals of the twentieth century. That loss of millions, in addition to the millions that, back then, were still to come, tainted, indefinitely, the Heideggerian essentials no less than it did some of the core tenets of existentialist philosophy. A philosophy that had unfurled its sails with the dictum that ‘existence precedes essence,’ came to a moral standstill in the face of those gassed out millions to whom was afforded the defiance to look their murderers in the eye as the only act of existential authenticity. “*Das Leben lebt nicht,*” was the answer that Adorno gave, via Ferdinand Kürnberger, to a defunct philosophy which had never dug its existential trenches deeply enough to stare back at the abyss that had long fixed its gaze at the middle-class intellectuals of *Hochkapitalismus.* Following the Husserlian guidelines of going back

73 “Being-towards-death is the anticipation of a potentiality–for-Being of that entity whose kind of Being is anticipation itself. In the anticipatory revealing of this potentiality–for-Being, Dasein discloses itself to itself as regards its uttermost possibility. But to project itself on its ownmost potentiality–for-Being means to be able to understand itself in the Being of the entity so revealed—namely, to exist. Anticipation turns out to be the possibility of understanding one’s ownmost and uttermost potentiality–for-Being— that is to say, the possibility of authentic existence. The ontological constitution of such existence must be made visible by setting forth the concrete structure of anticipation of death.” Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time,* trans by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, (Oxford, 1995a), pp. 307.

74 “Involuntarily, Heidegger’s doctrine becomes an exegesis of the futile joke: Only death is free and that costs your life. He is smitten with death as that which is supposed to be absolutely removed from the universal exchange relationship. Yet he does not realize that he remains caught up in the same fatal cycle as the exchange relationship which he sublimates into the They. Insofar as death is absolutely alien to the subject, it is the model of all reification. Only ideology praises it as a cure for exchange.” Adorno, *The Jargon of Authenticity,* pp. 125. A meticulous study of the development of the concept of death in Heidegger’s works that still retains its significance can be found in Ugo Maria Ugazio, *Il Problema della morte nella filosofia di Heidegger,* (Milan, 1976); cf. Simone de Beauvoir, *Pour une morale de l’ambiguïté,* (Paris, 1944), pp. 297 ff; Gianni Vattimo, *Les aventures de la différence,* trans. by Pascal Gabellone, Ricardo Pineri and Jacques Rolland, (Paris, 1985), pp. 64-65; Umberto Eco, *Kant and the Platypus. Essays on Language and Cognition,* trans. by Alastair McEwen, (London, 2000), pp. 30.

75 “There are, on the one hand, the Christians, amongst whom I shall name Jaspers and Gabriel Marcel, both professed Catholics; and on the other the existential atheists, amongst whom we must place Heidegger as well as the French existentialists and myself. What they have in common is simply the fact that they believe that existence comes before essence—or, if you will, that we must begin from subjective.” Sartre, *Existentialism & Humanism,* pp. 26; cf. Schaff, *Marx oder Sartre?,* pp. 101 ff; Henri Lefebvre, *Le langage et la société,* (Paris, 1966), pp. 144.


77 “Il n’y a pas d’authenticité de l’individu dans un monde inauthentique; c’est seulement avec le changement d’ensemble de ce monde, avec le commencement d’une autre “époque de l’être”, que peut s’opérer le passage à l’authenticité.” Vattimo, *Les aventures de la différence,* pp. 65.
to the objects through putting all the inessential intentionalities in parentheses, existentialists had un-prepared themselves for the high capitalist, i.e., imperialist, eventuality of encountering lives that were put in parentheses themselves. Fought out against the occupation forces in Paris, Rome, Madrid, Crete, Athens and many others as they did, the non-conformist existentialists, unlike Heidegger or Jaspers, realised how brittle that last ditch attempt was against the fascist tyrants who had already succeeded in turning any matter of life and death into a mere numbers game. To be sure, that refusal to stand ever again by the high capitalist theorisation of the ultimate wiling away of people for the creation of additional living space for the ‘master folk’ in Russia, Poland, Algiers, Palestine, Vietnam and elsewhere, was to become the practical significance of all the existential rethinking that was initiated by Jean-Paul Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir, Jean Genet and those that were like-minded around periodicals such as Les Temps modernes, whose first issue was released in October 1945.

And yet it was practically assured that a reinvigorated existentialism that still condoned itself in staying aloof of the ongoing struggle between the USSR and the Western bloc would continue to go through that existentialist sickness unto death with hardly any recuperation arising from an advanced comprehension of just how ridden with issues pertaining to the politics of class were the socio-political determinations that were set about contemporarily available avenues of existence.

Ironically, the other side of the divide was also comprised of those that had proved their Heideggerian authenticity beyond all doubt precisely by laying approximately thirty million human beings that were accosted to them by the Nazis to rest. Having undergone a stifling

79 "It is neither our fault nor out merit if we lived in a time when torture was a daily fact. Châteaubriand, Oradour, the Rue des Saussaies, Tulle, Dachau, and Auschwitz have all demonstrated to us that Evil is not an appearance, that knowing its cause does not dispel it, that it is not opposed to Good as a confused idea is to a clear one, that it is not the effects of passions which might be cured, of a fear which might be overcome, of a passing aberration which might be excused, of an ignorance which might be enlightened, that it can in no way be diverted, brought back, reduced, and incorporated into idealistic humanism, like that shade of which Leibniz has written that it is necessary for the glare of daylight." Jean-Paul Sartre, What is Literature?, trans. by Bernard Frechtman, (London, 1993), pp. 160.
80 "If truth is one, I thought, then we should seek it, as Gide said of God, nowhere except everywhere. Every social product and every attitude – from the most intimate to the most public -are allusive embodiments of it. An anecdote reflects a whole epoch as much as a political constitution does. We should be hunters of meaning, we would tell the truth about the world and about our lives." Jean-Paul Sartre, Merleau-Ponty vivant; cited in de Beauvoir, Force of Circumstance, pp. 21-22.
81 Needless to add, my condemnation of the Stalinist ethos of all the purges that materialised in the USSR from 1930s onwards does not spring from either a Heideggerian or a Jasperian understanding of a value of authenticity that is bestowed upon the relationship between individual testimony and scientific truth value. A Kierkegaardian pathos may go a long way in expressing the difference concerning an existential re-appraisal of Galileo’s reticence and Bruno’s fervent engagement. But that ‘long way’ can never extend to the wuthering heights of ahistorical normativity. Not that there is anything that is intrinsically wrong in self-consciously mining an individual exemplar for the sake of forging it into a scale of historical assessment. And yet, as de Beauvoir underscored time and again,
diet of wartime theoretical compression at the hands of Stalin, Zhdanov and Beria, the Soviets had emerged significantly battered, albeit unbroken, from the Second World War. With an overdue settling of socio-political accounts having become the norm in the former colonies and backwaters of the Western imperialists, the political influence of the Soviets, and that of Marxism by extension, was to soar to the loftiest of heights. Reassured of the potentially beneficial outcomes of the rising wave of Western European popular discontent that they rode, the Soviet administrators kicked off, following the death of Stalin in 1953, a programme of de-Stalinization aiming at bringing down what was then considered to have become a 'cult of personality.' 82 Espoused to a self-avowedly wider berth that was to be granted to the Western European communist parties so long as they continued to abide by the basic programmatic statements that were passed on to them by the official delegates of the international congresses, even the hitherto most stern of top-brass pro-Soviet theoreticians of the French PCF such as Roger Garaudy and Henri Lefebvre or that of the Italian PCI including, but not limited to Palmiro Togliatti, 83 then, began to tone down their formerly ardent vituperations of existentialism 84 as an anti-socialist philosophical remnant of the irrational Lebensphilosophie of old. 85 By the beginning of the 1950s, a rapprochement between the erstwhile theoreticians of existential authenticity and a harbinger of authenticated world revolution, as such, was

82 Sartre and Merleau-Ponty were to lend their voice to applaud the razing of what had then became Stalinist dogma in their own way in Les Temps modernes: “Cela signifie que nous n’avons rien de commun avec un nazi et que nous avons les mêmes valeurs qu’un communiste. Un communiste, dira-t-on, n’a pas de valeurs. Il n’a que des fidélités. Nous répondrons qu’il fait bien ce qu’il peut vivre sans respirer. Il a des valeurs malgré lui.” Jean-Paul Sartre and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, ‘Les jours de notre vie’, in Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Signes, (Paris, 2001), pp. 434.


84 Roger Garaudy, Une littérature de fossoyeurs: Jean-Paul Sartre, François Mauriac, André Malraux, Arthur Koestler, (Paris, 1947); cf. “However, the bridges between Sartre and the Communists were broken [in 1946]. The Party intellectuals attacked him unmercifully because they were afraid that he would steal their clientele; that his position was so close to theirs only made them consider him as more dangerous than ever. ‘You are preventing people from coming to us,’ Garaudy told him. And Elsa Triolet: ‘You are a philosopher and therefore an anti-Communist.’” de Beauvoir, Force of Circumstance, pp. 140.

85 For a study of the so-called ‘anti-existentialist offensive’ that was initiated by the foremost members of the PCF in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, see David Drake, “The ‘Anti-Existentialist Offensive’: The French Communist Party against Sartre (1944-1948)”, Sartre Studies International, vol. 16 no. 1 (2010), pp. 69-94; for an in-depth analysis of the evolution of Garaudy’s views on existentialism with emphasis on his theoretical rapport with Sartre, see Didier Gauvin, Un intellectuel communiste illégitime: Roger Garaudy, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, (Grenoble Alpes, 2016).
underway in earnest. Unfortunately, it did not even take half a decade for that uneasy relationship to fall apart, taking a severe blow when the Soviet tanks rolled in to stop the government of Imre Nagy, whose minister of education was none other than Lukács, from carrying out reforms which were promptly called out to have been the numerous brainchildren of the same progenitor: anti-communist juggernauts of the West. Now, laying aside the question of whether they relied on any financial or ideological backing by the Western superpowers, for close testimony suggests that even Lukács himself was of the opinion that any such unproven insinuation would hardly suffice for a hatching out of plans of a full-scale invasion, the Nagy government appears to have had a popular backing of the Hungarian working class who had unwrapped the covering that was adorned by Soviet promises of moderate interference to realise that a bouquet of chains was lying in store for them for the indefinite duration of the Cold War. Granted, the cross that they were asked to bear was one that was bore by the Eastern European proletarians elsewhere. Then again, was not that sort of justification precisely what was on offer in the non-socialist Western European countries and in the USA? Thatcher’s fondness of the market’s dictates was no intergenerational

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86 Arguably, the groundwork for such inroads had begun to be laid by Sartre and de Beauvoir as early as during the final years of the Second World War. De Beauvoir’s emphasis on the harsh ‘class against class’ reality that was facing the existentialists who saw theoretically aiding the oppressed’s transcendence of the conditions of wide-spread socio-political oppression as their most coveted task strikes one as a crucial coup against the hypostasis that was introduced between the two camps in the 1930s: “… mais ce que le révolutionnaire indique par ce mot [‘vol’], c’est que le régime actuel est un fait humain. En tant que tel il doit être refusé. Ce refus coupe à son tour la volonté de l’opprresseur de cet avenir vers lequel il prétendait se jeter seul: un autre avenir lui est substitué, qui est celui de la révolution. La lutte n’est pas de mots ou d’idéologies, elle est réelle et concrète: si c’est cet avenir qui triomphe et non celui-là, c’est l’opprimé qui se réalise comme liberté positive et ouverte, c’est l’opprresseur qui devient un obstacle, une chose.” De Beauvoir, Pour une morale de l’ambiguïté, pp. 121.


88 “In 1952, when I wrote Communists and Peace, the essential political choice was the defence of the French Communist Party, and particularly of the Soviet Union, accused as it was of imperialism. It was essential to reject this accusation if one did not wish to find oneself on the side of the Americans. Afterwards, it was shown that the USSR, by behaving in Budapest as Stalin (whether because of political intelligence or for other reasons) did not behave in 1948 in relation to Yugoslavia, and then by repeating the operation in Czechoslovakia, was acting in the manner of an imperialist power. In saying this, I do not intend to express a moral judgment. I am only stating that the external policy of the USSR seems essentially inspired by its antagonistic relations with the United States, and not by a principle of respect, of equality, vis-à-vis other socialist states.” France: Masses, Spontaneity, Party’, Jean-Paul Sartre, ‘The Itinerary of a Thought’, in Between Existentialism and Marxism, trans. by John Matthews, (London, 1974), pp. 119; this take should be compared to that of Garaudy, whose once steadfast adherence to the party line was shaken to its core as it could not withstand the shockwaves of the Soviet
peculiarity that had fallen on the lap of the post-1970s ruling classes from the capitalist heaven above. Competition and productivity had always been the cornerstone commandments of Taylorism with the accent it put on more production at the least intellectual expense. In short, by adopting the rulebook of a game that the capitalists had already excelled in at a time when the exigencies of impending belligerence were nowhere to be seen, the Soviet planners attempted to re-enact the trial by ordeal on the Eastern European working classes whose creative potentialities had already been grinded to dust during the Second World War. The Soviet intervention at Budapest in 1956 thus inaugurated a period of mutual distrust between the two sides that eventually led to a politically opportunistic compartmentalisation of philosophical critique based on a revamped notion of communist orthodoxy. At the side of a wide range of detractors that either paved a post-Marxist vitalist path of their own making, e.g., Deleuze and Guattari, or that of a post-Nietzschean ethos of opposition to any power-hungry episteme, e.g., Foucault, the French existentialists took their part by continuing their theoretical and practical work in hopes of attaining a higher dialectical correspondence between Marxism and existentialism. Occupying a self-styled sphere of political autonomy with no official ties to the pro-Soviet communist parties, they lent their pens and voices to the French and Italian proletarians who were on the brink of being completely hemmed in by the struggle of de-Marxification that was waged against them. Sartre’s momentous Critique de la raison dialectique and its unfinished second tome was the apex of those theoretical reflections that was to portray the communist Brunet of Les Chemins de la liberté in an altogether different, if not entirely positive, light. And although the crucial second part of the project was to be inundated by the thousands of pages that were allocated to his study of Flaubert’s invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968: “On ne peut rien faire de valable en France sans le Parti communiste; on ne peut rien faire si ce Parti ne se transforme pas lui-même profondément.” Garaudy, Le grand tournant du socialisme, pp. 9; Garaudy, Toute la vérité, pp. 8; Carrillo, ‘The Struggle for Socialism Today’, pp. 154.

90 All types of oppositional intellectuals, ranging from the ‘organic’ ones of Gramsci to the clerical ones that ever carefully toed the Stalinist line that was transmitted on to them by their local Communist Party have been diligently analysed and extrapolated within the divides that were cracking through the topography of French politics in the post-war years by Didier Gauvin: Gauvin, Un intellectuel communiste illégitime, pp. 142-179; also, for a first-hand account of the anti-capitalist solidarity which was exhibited by those intellectuals for the better half of the 1970s following the renegade 1960s, see Simone de Beauvoir, Adieux: A Farewell to Sartre, trans. by Patrick O’Brian, (New York, 1984).

91 Interestingly, the second tome of that work is not the only one that washes the prospects of a communist engagement in a more appreciative light. The unfinished fourth instalment of Les chemins de la liberté, or Dernière chance, has, after all, a twist in store for the unsuspecting reader who has accustomed herself to the rather unassuming characterology that the communist Brunet had hitherto displayed in the first three books. On the import that Les chemins de la liberté bears in relation to Sartre’s political change of heart vis-à-vis the PCF surfacing as early as 1952, see Michel Contat, ‘General Introduction for Roads of Freedom’, in Jean-Paul Sartre, The Last Chance: Roads of Freedom IV, trans. by Craig Vasey, (London, 2009), pp. 177-197; de Beauvoir, Adieux, pp. 411.
life and times in *L’Idiot de la famille*, Sartre made no secret of his understanding of where things stood in regard to the famished back and forth between Marxism and existentialism. Existentialism was to be a thorn on Marxism’s side so long as the subject was not given her due of her inherent incapability of being reduced to the status of a mere being-in-itself. But if the Marxists were to engage in a self-conscious attempt of their own making that was propelled towards the overcoming of their topsy-turvy idealism of matter toward the positing of the subject as the re-organiser of her space and time that always arrive neatly pre-organised thanks to the efforts of the capitalist owners of the means of production, then, existentialism, mere appendage to the living philosophy of dialectical materialism that it was, was to wither away on its own accord.92 Coming from one of the most self-critical intellectuals of the twentieth century who had an unillusioned appreciation of his entire work, this was not a tongue in cheek challenge that was levelled at the self-proclaimed Marxist orthodoxy to whose steady recitation the pro-Soviet intellectuals owed their ideological supremacy; it was an invitation, laying aside all sorts of *noli mi tangere*, to the root-and-branch Marxist philosophers to rediscover the notion of human potentiality that lay buried beneath the debris that was created by the exigencies of preparing for the most anti-humanist of all wars.93 After all, the only existentialism that could be built upon the ruins of mass murder that surfaced during the ebb of Nazi occupation was one that was a namesake of socialism. Of course, no congruence could be built, poetic or otherwise, between the scale of sacrifices that were made by either the members of the French resistance or by those of the Italian partisans especially from 1943-194594 and the Herculean struggles that were undertaken by the Red Army soldiers and civilians during the siege of Stalingrad.95

92 “Thus the autonomy of existential studies results necessarily from the negative qualities of Marxists (and not from Marxism itself). So long as the doctrine does not recognize its anemia, so long as it founds its Knowledge upon a dogmatic metaphysics (a dialectic of Nature) of the living man, so long as it rejects as irrational those ideologies which wish, as Marx did, to separate being from Knowledge and, in anthropology, to found the knowing of man on human existence, existentialism will follow its own path of study.” Jean-Paul Sartre, *Search for a Method*, trans. by Hazel E. Barnes, (New York, 1968), pp. 181; cf. Adorno, *Philosophische Elemente einer Theorie der Gesellschaft*, pp. 162; Henri Lefebvre, ‘Zum Begriff der ‘Erklärung’ in der politischen Ökonomie und in der Soziologie’, in *Beiträge zur marxistischen Erkenntnistheorie*, trans. by Alfred Schmidt, pp. 157-158.

93 And Sartre’s Marxian turn was recognised as such by some of the most formidable Marxist theoreticians within both sides of the *Berliner Mauer*: Schaff, *Marx oder Sartre*, pp. 16; Schmidt, ‘Der strukturalistische Angriff auf die Geschichte’, pp. 211 ff.

94 For an account that has not lost its historical sense of betrayal despite the passing of more than half a century from its first publication, see Luigi Longo, Pietro Secchia, *Der Kampf des italienischen Volkes für seine nationale Befreiung 1943-1945: Eine Auswahl von Berichten und Artikel aus der illegalen antifaschistischen Presse*, trans. by Helmut Kessler, (Berlin, 1959); for another peek at what then, and now, seems to have been the order of the day with roll-calls of partisans on the one side and ex-fascist conglomerates on the other, see Dominique Eudes, *The Kapetanios: Partisans and Civil War in Greece*, trans. by John Howe, (London, 1972).

95 “But equally, there can be no doubt about the astonishing resolution of many, if not most, Red Army soldiers to hold on to their diminishing foothold on the west bank of the Volga. No comparable feat was
pedagogy geared towards the building of a counter hegemony\textsuperscript{96} and Beckett’s dramatization of epic failures of the order of those of an Oedipus Rex.\textsuperscript{97} I have always been of the opinion that the most assured way of giving the lie to a tyranny is to strike at where it makes itself to be most at home.\textsuperscript{98} And on different levels, the liberation of Paris and Rome were just that.\textsuperscript{99} They were the taking up of the gauntlet that was thrown by the Nazis to all the socialistically inclined who still managed to muster enough courage to tempt failing again even in the aftermath of their momentous let-down to lift a finger against any and all parties that had coalesced in the deportation of the Jews from their hometowns. Those partisans who were willing to gamble away what little of their psyche had remained after having seen the bullet marks on the walls and heard the gunshots barrel-rolling down like quotidian thunders on their brittle bones were the order of a new day that was then dawning on Europe.\textsuperscript{100} Crowded out by a massified figure of Yes-Ministers who we all recognise from documentaries on the war, what little was achieved on psychological or social grounds by those partisans has left its distinctive mark in the collective consciousness of the resistance in their vehement praxis

\textsuperscript{96} For an example of the Gramscian critical pedagogy at work in his translations of Grimm’s Fairy Tales, see Antonio Gramsci, Fiabe, ed. by Tommaso Gurrieri, (Florence, 2010), pp. 97-101; for a recent compilation of essays analysing particular aspects of Gramsci’s counterhegemonic pedagogy, see Alessio Panichi (ed.), Antonio Gramsci e la favola. Un itinerario tra letteratura, politica e pedagogia, (Pisa, 2019).
\textsuperscript{98} And on one particular plane, at least, the revolutionary struggle waged by the female members of the Italian resistance, for one, against fascist exploitation no less than against the traditional patriarchalism of the revolutionary parties was just such a piercing strike at the heart of the sexual politics of the Hochkapitalismus of 1940s. Belated as it was, a point that was made by Togliatti at the First Women’s Congress of PCI in June 1945, namely, that the partisan women had actively renovated the means of class warfare as it had, hitherto, been practised by the male partisans, was the verbal coronation of what had already been heralded as “la grande novità storica di quello che è accaduto nel corso degli ultimi anni e degli ultimi mesi nel nostro paese …” Cited in Ragioneri, Palmiro Togliatti, pp. 104; a more sublime expression than Togliatti’s acknowledgment of the historical import that was born by the armed struggle of the female partisans of the Second World War can be gleaned from Schulman’s emotionally charged memoir: Faye Schulman, Die Schreie meines Volkes in mir: Wie ich als jüdische Partisanin den Holocaust überlebte, (Munich, 2000).
\textsuperscript{99} There is a slowly growing literature covering various aspects of the resistance movements of France and Italy. But despite its steady growth over the past thirty years as exemplified by the appearance of significant book-length studies such as Claude Collin’s L’Ète des partisans in 1996 and Sergio Luzzato’s “Partigia”. Una storia della Resistenza in 2013, we are still quite some way off from ascertaining the full social and anthropological significance of those resistance movements that continue to exert discernible influence on the contemporary dissenting imaginations of partisan felicity of the order of “la felicità di soggetti che sono riusciti a pensare e dirigere le loro passioni non restandovi assoggettati, fino a creare un momento politico unico,” in the two countries: Valerio Romitelli, La felicità dei partigiani e la nostra, (Napoli, 2015), pp. 39; Claude Collin, L’Ète des Partisans. Les F.T.P. et l’organisation de la Résistance en Meuse, (Nancy, 1996); Sergio Luzzato, “Partigia”. Una Storia della Resistenza, (Milan, 2013).
against the philosophies of as if. The modifications that Sartre, de Beauvoir, Genet and others made to existentialism, therefore, was a part of that wider rage against the high capitalist ruling classes who would step down from their völkisch offices only to rise again within the ranks of the post-war bureaucracy.¹⁰¹ In a world in which the transition from the regimes of extra-economic oppression that were imposed on the non-Aryans of Europe to those that set up shop in Algiers, Vietnam and elsewhere was realised without the least bit of compunction, the partisans became a manifestation of the unhappy consciousness that was squeezed betwixt two particularly dark horizons: a schizophrenic one that drowned every instance of an unhappy memory in the waters of oblivion and a millenarian one that attempted to justify the infinite delay of the advent of the dreamscapes on grounds that the Marxist orthodoxy had presaged the wait.¹⁰²

Also carrying out their share of defence against the anti-socialist ideological crusade was the pro-Soviet intelligentsia with a similarly limited supply of first-tier theoreticians such as Georg Lukács, Adam Schaff, Luigi Longo, Roger Garaudy, Henri Lefebvre and Louis Althusser.¹⁰³ And with their fair share of nose-thumbing at their existentialist liaisons, those intellectuals

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¹⁰¹ One of the most relentless J’Accuse that was aimed at the ‘stainless’ bureaucrats of the time was, of course, Hochhuth’s ferocious Der Stellvertreter. Written in response to two decades of massified atrocities when formal Reichskonkordat and informal anti-communist pacts between Vatican and Nazis had carried the vogue, Hochhuth’s play was an indictment that took away the last gasp of the God on the cross: Rolf Hochhuth, Der Stellvertreter: Ein Christliches Taurerspiel, Soldaten: Nekrolog auf Genf (Gütersloh, 1968), pp. 9-282; cf. David Hume, ‘Of the Parties of Great Britain’, in Selected Essays, ed. by Stephen Copley and Andrew Edgar, (Oxford and New York, 2008), pp. 33; Santiago Carrillo, ‘A New Look at Present-day Problems’, in Problems of Socialism Today, pp. 20 ff; Giuliana Chamedes, “The Vatican, Nazi-Fascism, and the Making of Transnational Anti-communism in the 1930s”, Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 51 no. 2 (April, 2016), pp. 261-290.

¹⁰² And for good measure, this research has not evolved from an antiquarian interest that was piqued by a plethora of what ifs that hover above an alternative history of the post-1945 rapport between Sartrean existentialism and (Euro)communism. Not that I find that an idea that is hardly worth, at least on narrative grounds, to be entertained for a literary penny. A burning question that threatens to scorch the gaze of any theoretically un-famished Marxian probe into the myriad of socio-political problems that are created by the divers forms of late capitalism is how to come to dialectical terms with the fact that the dying throes of Soviet communism has left behind millions of human beings with their lives and hopes for a better future ground to dust. And lest my attempt appears to verge, solely, on building theoretical castles in the sand as it is, I think that rethinking the ties that bind the Marxian epistemology of the subject and the Sartrean ontology of subjection is as plausible a place to start as any other in order to recollect those shadowy post-Soviet ‘existents’ whose lingering presence have been carefully documented in the works of Svetlana Alexievich: Svetlana Alexievich, Voices from Chernobyl: The Oral History of a Nuclear Disaster, trans. by Keith Gessen, (London, 2006); Svetlana Alexievich, Secondhand-Zeit: Leben auf den Trümmern des Sozialismus, trans. by Ganna-Maria Braungardt, (Frankfurt, 2015).

¹⁰³ A compelling case can be made for the inclusion of the members of the so-called Budapest School among that select few. Spearheaded by influential figures such as Agnes Heller, Györy Márkus, Maria Márkus, Mihály Vajda, Andras Hegedüs and Ferenc Feher, all of whom would be forcibly scattered to the four winds after the death of Lukács, the intellectual circle proffered a thoroughgoing engagement with all the dimensions of the concept of totality: J. F. Dorahy, The Budapest School, (Leiden and Boston, 2019).
kept up the pretence of a whitewashed productivism that was supposedly on the right course toward the achievement of the ideal communist society. Only when the realm of necessity was conquered through the planned and communalised use of human labour, as Marx had stated more than two-thirds of a century ago, could the communist realm of freedom enter into the ever-widening horizon of human potencies. With the promulgation of the post-war economic programmes that were to be implemented by all parties to the Warsaw Pact, that necessary allowance Marx had made for accommodating the immense pressure that would be exerted on any economy due to the transition to socialism was rearranged into a socialist dogma, practically nullifying the likelihood of any dialectical sublation of what is otherwise a lopsided relationship between mutually-exclusive epistemological categories: the subject and the object. Getting a head start in the Space Race or in the development of the weapons of mass destruction vis-à-vis the US were the means of granting whatever existential comfort that could be afforded by a system to its human constituents who were posited strictly as

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104 In one way or another, Bloch’s trenchant criticism of Marx’s reductivist totality of production was there to stay in regard to its Ungleichzeitig application to many of the Western, not to mention the Eastern, Marxists who would continue to be stuck with the same notion of totality for the better part of the second half of the twentieth century: “And so the man who expelled any element of fetishism from the process of production; who would analyze and exorcise all irrationalities of history as merely unclarified, uncomprehended (and thus, in effect, fateful) obscurities of the class situation and productive process; who banished all dreams, effective utopias, and religiously garbed teleologies from history: the same man now treated “the productive forces” in the same over-constitutive, pantheistic, and mythicizing way; and accorded to the design of a “productive process” ultimately the same power of using and guiding which Hegel had granted the “idea,” and even Schopenhauer his a-logical will.” Ernst Bloch, Man on His Own, trans. by E. B. Ashton, (New York, 1970), pp. 35.


106 “Die Subjekt-Objekt-Relation ist … nicht durch das Bild zweier konstanter, begrifflich völlig durchleuchteter Größen zu beschreiben, die sich aufeinander zubewegen – vielmehr stecken in den als objektiv bezeichneten subjektive und in den sogenannten subjektiven auch objektive Faktoren, und zwar so, daß wir … das Ineinanderspielen beider, als menschlicher und außermenschlicher, individueller und klassenmäßiger, methodologischer und gegenständlicher Momente darzustellen haben, ohne jedes dieser Momente von den anderen in seiner Wirksamkeit restlos isolieren zu können.” Max Horkheimer, ‘Materialismus und Metaphysik’ [1933], in Kritische Theorie. Eine Dokumentation, I, ed. by Alfred Schmidt, (Frankfurt, 1968), pp.50; cf. Max Horkheimer, Eclipse of Reason, (Oxford, 1947), pp. 59; Ernst Bloch, Das Prinzip Hoffnung, (Frankfurt, 1959), pp. 299-301; Adorno, “Wozu noch Philosophie”, in Eingriffe, pp. 23 ff; contra Roger Garaudy, ‘Un crime contre le socialisme’, in Toute le vérité, pp. 68; whether Adorno managed to live up to his philosophical ideal of anti-productivist critique within a capitalist society that furnished its dissenters with space for criticism so long as, as he would be among the first to point out, they were dovetailed to the prescribed models and formulations, of course, is an altogether different matter. For an analysis of that question that tends towards a positive response, see Fabian Freyenhagen, “Adorno’s Politics: Theory and Praxis in Germany’s 1960s”, Philosophy & Social Criticism, vol. 40 no. 9 (November, 2014), pp. 867-893; cf. Habermas, Technik und Wissenschaft als ‘Ideologie’, pp. 46, 96; Lefebvre, La vie quotidienne dans le monde moderne, pp. 364.
beings-for-another or for the Soviets tout court. 

And yet, that experience of a fierce partisan struggle against the Nazis, which had its Soviet counterpart in the flat-by-flat fighting that went on for months in border zone apartments in Leningrad, Stalingrad and elsewhere, was not to be conjured away by a swish of the magic wand of the collective toil against the class enemy. Indeed, minuscule though it was, that oppositional tradition was to pop up time and again amid the Gulags that were well on their way to become signposts for the creation of archipelagos of de-subjectification. If the tyranny of productivism was there to stay, so were all the pre-Marxist forms of theoretical and practical struggle which, as Sartre was to point out, were to continue gathering dust only to the extent that the proponents of Marxism would safeguard the lively components of their philosophy. 

Beating down on the existential barriers of any subject that defies any attempt to fashion it into a being-for-another was the end product that fell from the conveyor belt which continued to be operated by Soviet men and women for almost half a century after the conclusion of the Second World War. 

In the end, it was the Soviet planners who ordered the end of the age of partisanship by branding any outspoken extra-party critic, feeble and prone to failures as they often were, as an enemy of the Soviet proletariat. 


108 Sartre, *Search for a Method*, pp. 7.

109 Cf. “I wonder whether there is not something hypocritical in the talk about having a cause, being a serious man who stands for something … Indeed, yes: the fact that in our time no one dares to be a person. For each man is so afraid of ‘the others’ that he, that is, nobody, dares to be an I. Fear of men is what dominates, and as was already said in classical times … ‘Tyranny and democracy hate one another as one potter hates another’; that is, they are the same form of government, only in a tyranny it is one man, in a democracy it is the crowd which is the tyrant.” Soren Kierkegaard, *The Last Years: Journals 1853-55*, ed. and trans. by Ronald Gregor Smith, (London, 1968), pp. 40; needless to add, this early take on the spirit of commitment should be compared to the ‘spirit of seriousness’ which was attributed by Sartre to Marx in *Being and Nothingness* for the sake of condemning the historical materialism of the latter in regard to the bad-faith-ridden seriousness it displays in taking oneself as an object: Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, pp. 39, 580, 626-627, 633; de Beauvoir, *Pour une morale de l’ambiguïté*, pp. 51 ff; cf. Thomas C. Anderson, “Atheistic and Christian Existentialism: A Comparison of Sartre and Marcel”, in *New Perspectives in Sartre*, ed. by Adrian Mirvish and Adrian van den Hoven, (Newcastle, 2010), pp. 44-63.

when that command was uttered in a manner of Wilde’s “we all kill the things we love.”111 No; from France and Italy to Cuba and Vietnam the uncorked genie managed to find new followers that were willing to fight out in the name of the sublation of the presupposed one-way-street between the object and the subject. And if I entertain no chimeras about the pre-Marxist origins of partisanship and its ultimately ineffective potential when attempting to dent a late capitalistic armour that is banged out all-too-readily, I am equally certain that a historic chance was missed by the pro-Soviet intellectuals of the post-war period when they refused to accept Sartre’s invitation for readmitting irreducible subjectivity back into their philosophies, opting out for chipping away at its allegedly anti-socialist roots instead. The chips have fallen. And for all our talk of the inextinguishable potency of a rejuvenated form of the idea of socialism, we seem to have exchanged, at times unwillingly, the world at war for a political horizon of perpetual war, waged relentlessly against any and all who dissent, either intellectually or materially, from the guidelines preached by a victorious Occident.112 The first two chapters of this dissertation, in that sense, is my own way of attempting to hark back to the existential supports on which leaned that hard-pressed age of partisanship with its emphasis on the dialectical development of subjectivity and the communal achievement of intersubjectively posited ends. To that end, I postulate three ontological pillars, the preponderance of actuality, the immanence of subjectivity and the ideational mediation of all the actions of the social being as, respectively, Aristotelian, Spinozist and Hegelian yardsticks which are needed to be accounted for in any attempt to rethink existentialist dialectics. Is not the retracing of the theoretical significance of those tenets just another attempt to paint the grass green? Not by a long shot: those conceptualisations arrive in tandem with a bundle of anti-materialist promises which can only be sifted if one traverses the theoretical road to existentialist dialectics via the earlier termini of Marxian dialectical materialism. Whilst the theoretical prominence that is allotted to actuality within the physical and metaphysical speculations of Aristotle feeds, for instance, into an understanding of potentiality that draws its rigor from the hypostatised presence of an unmoved mover, Spinoza’s attribution of immanence to nature qua causa sui finds a willing actor in the person of the prostrating theist who cannot shake away the feeling of being face to face with divinities in every action that materialises in the physical universe. Likewise, the Hegelian concept of mediation is one that cuts both ways if

111 “Yet each man kills the thing he loves, | By each let this be heard, | Some do it with a bitter look, | Some with a flattering word, | The coward does it with a kiss, | The brave man with a sword.” Oscar Wilde, The Ballad of Reading Gaol, in The Complete Poetry, ed. by Isobel Murray, (Oxford, 2009), 37-42.
its absolutely idealistic edge of ideational movement culminating in the spiritual manifestation of the Absolute Knowing is not dulled out. Decisively turning our backs on the Kierkegaardian notion of faith in line with the atheist existentialisms of Heidegger, Sartre and de Beauvoir, our attempt to retrace the dialectical materialist origins of existential dialectics incorporates that effort at wearily salvaging whatever appears to be of use in those systems of thinking without giving up the need for building an existential plane of signification into which all those elements can be safely integrated. Those three pillars are, then, subjected to a corrosive theoretical bath in the second chapter to see if they hold water when the existential plane in question is substantiated with details concerning human action. Projected onto the crossroads which divide historically transmitted actions from those that are liable to arise in the context of any hic et nunc, the tenets in question are then juxtaposed to a variety of existentially significant interpretations, including Heidegger’s hermeneutic ontology and Kant’s transcendental idealism in order to analyse the limitations they face when conceived along existentialist dialectical lines. Finally, we scrutinize the epistemological stature of our conception of existentialist dialectics by re-evaluating its promises in different lights as in Nietzsche’s creation of values, Adorno’s negative dialectics and Lukács’ totalising understanding of social reality. By those steps of ontological and epistemological elaboration, we hope to clarify what a post-Sartrean understanding of a workable existentialist dialectics with a partisan kernel would look like in the contemporary world of 2020s.

With an intensified lack of assuage of the existential discomfort that is felt by the grassroots lower-class postmodern actors, rather than a diminished sense thereof, having turned into a hallmark feature of our late capitalistic world, a revolutionary way of averting the summoning of the Kierkegaardian knight of faith appears to be a rethinking of our contemporary social commitments in the light of those that can be gleaned from the textual gatherings of the past intersections of the jostle between the curbing and alleviating of human potentialities. Thankfully, we have just such a package of illusions and broken promises that emanate from the historical case of archaic and classical Greece to the point of enticing modern scholars to partake of their respective turns in a circle of eternal recurrence whether their hunt is undertaken for jotting down some celebratory remarks that are occasioned by the 2500th anniversary of the Cleisthenic reforms, or the so-called birth of democracy, or for the possible

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113 “When around me all has become still, solemn as a starlit night, when the soul is all alone in the world, there appears before it not a distinguished person, but the eternal power itself. It is as though the heavens parted, and the I chooses itself – or, more correctly, it accepts itself. The soul has then seen the highest, which no mortal eye can see and which never can be forgotten. The personality receives the accolade of knighthood which ennobles it for an eternity. He does not become someone other than he was before, he becomes himself; consciousness unites.” Soren Kierkegaard, Either/Or. A Fragment of Life, trans. by Alastair Hannay, (London, 2004), pp. 491.
reasons underpinning the eventual victory of the ‘Occident’ over the ‘Orient.’ If we follow in the footsteps of Sartre of early and late works alike in his claim that existentialism is never an obscuring but always an elaboration of the different strands of individual and collective human action, then it would hardly amount to an exaggeration to say that one appears to have hit a veritable goldmine of potential existential elaboration in juxtaposition to the conflicts that were involved in the making and dispelling of various myths in the case of ancient Greece. Given the centrality that that universe has assumed in regard to the conception of the Marxian modes of production and its later permutations, darting an existentialist dialectical eye at the diachronic tectonics of ancient Greece in hopes of implementing our theoretical output seems rather self-explanatory. On top of that import that the ancient Greek history bears for the conception of the historical materialist forma mentis, the two-staged historiography of the ancient Greek world allows us to test the water to see if our ontological predicates are capable of offering novel solutions to the myriads of predicaments that swamp various speculations about the socio-political structures of archaic Greek poleis. Now, the desperate sequestration of the different citizen-bodies of archaic Greece poleis in terms of their class-laden rifts has become a well-entrenched feature of the numerous conventionalist historiographical studies whose authors appear to find it appealing, more times to none, to take the later aristocratic traditions at their own word rather than chasing lower-class phantoms who never bred spokespersons of their own ilk of the order of a Herodotus, Thucydides or Xenophon. And yet, there is no skirting around the fact that it was precisely those lower classes and their particular universalities, as in those of the Athenian thêtes or the Spartan helots and perioikoi, that toiled and boiled in sweatshops, on rented-out plots and beside one another in triremes to sustain the level of production that enabled the writing of those histories with universalist denotations in the first place.114 In fact, the dimmer the hum of their labour gets, the brighter becomes the part they take in the creation of the total surplus production. And that tale of caution fits rather like a glove when we move on from the darker shades of historical record of the archaic Greece to the classical age with its fair share of fathers, sons, and grandsons (all male, of course) of history. Ours is an attempt to listen to the Sirens sing, unheeding the modern Odysseus who warns any passenger against straying too far from the beaten track. I know that the beaten track eventually leads to the steady paeans of the cradle of Western civilisation with its remarkable quality of philosophical speculation, political ingenuity, artistic excellence, martial

114 Cf. “In opposition to a centralising, abstract socialism, Sartre asserted the value of “another socialism, decentralizing and concrete: such is the Basques’ particular universal, the one that the E.T.A. rightly set against the abstract centralization of the oppressors.” What should be done, he said, was to bring “socialist man” into being “on the basis of his land, his language, and even his old ways and customs restored. It is from that basis only that man will gradually cease to be the production of his own product and at last become the son of man.” De Beauvoir, Adieux, pp. 13.
And for all that, I also know that it was only through the immense daily suffering of tens of thousands of slaves panting for breath beneath the mines of Mt. Thorikos, or through the drudgery of those propertyless multitude who were indentured to let half of their production fly away onto the palms of their contractors that the potentialities afforded to the upper classes reached such unfathomable heights. The main historiographical promise of our study, in that vein, is nothing short of a rediscovery of the dêmos of ancient Athens and Sparta through the existential dialectical combination of pointers gleaned from the historical traditions of the classical era and the archaeological and fragmentary literary remains which glue together the archaic era. As with the new order of human potentialities that were heralded by the partisans of early 1940s, so with those that were supplied by the ancient Athenian and Spartan lower classes without whose supplying of the necessary wherewithal there would not materialise anything either like the Spartan mirage or the Athenian arkhê. And coupled with the discomfiting number of theoretically aprioristic pigeonholes which abound in what can otherwise be regarded as paragon works of writing Marxist history such as Ste. Croix’s *The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World* or Ellen M. Wood’s *Peasant-Citizen and Slave*, that choice of historical episode takes on a different significance of returning to the theme of the socio-political capabilities that are allotted to the lower classes of archaic and classical Greek societies in their incessant vying for the fulfilment of their existential needs. Viewed through a dialectical lens, our spatio-temporally definite existence is just as historical as those that are relayed via the imaginative constructions of a Herodotus or Thucydides. Drawn against the background heteroglossia of human potentialities, our determinate existence begins to shine in a different light, one that is liable to lift our consciousness to hitherto unfathomed

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115 “The collapse of communism (sic) has left the people of half of Europe struggling to reorganize their political institutions and their social and economic lives. The choices they are making and the future they are forging will reflect in large measure their understanding of their heritage. To follow and participate in that process we too need to understand the heritage.” Donald Kagan, Steven Ozment and Frank M. Turner, *The Western Heritage: Brief Edition*, (Upper Saddle River, NJ., 1996), pp. xxv; cf. Ian Morris, *Why the West Rules for Now: The Patterns of History and What They Reveal about the Future*, (Suffolk, 2011), pp. 260-261.

116 Unlike Ian Morris, I do not find reason for worry if the social development of varying collectivities take a turn for what he dubs as ‘Nightfall’ rather than for ‘Singularity.’ Unlike him, I think that we live in a world in which for the vast majority of its inhabitants the day after tomorrow is practically the least of their concerns. The end of history has left millions among us in an existential space whose zero-degree necessities such as finding food, shelter, vaccines and whatever else are of the measure of those of stone age. Once his critics took Sartre of *Being and Nothingness* to task for creating a Cartesian universe in which the I and Thou could never harmonise in a higher unity. Now we know that the higher unity called capitalism that reigns supreme in which la rareté has become the grinning norm rather than an exception has precious little to offer to those Schattenhaft images of personhood that surround us. Singularity means the prolongation of the damaged lives that we insist on living. Only too well do we know, however, that no *Colonne de Juillet* is worthy of hypostatised adulation just because it stands on the razed remains of what used to be a Bastille. In the end, the call of communitarian pluralism may not always be in the right, but that of productivist Singularity is always in the wrong: Morris, *Why the West Rules for Now*, pp. 619 ff; contra Tariq Ali, *Pirates of Caribbean: Axis of Hope*, revised edition, (London, 2008), pp. 26 ff.
heights no less than to weigh it down as a nightmare within the quagmire of digitised existence that is much more the order of our day than it was for that of Marx.

Therefore, agreeing with the historian’s words of wisdom that ‘Proof of the pudding is in the eating,’ we argue that the only method of probing beneath paens of micropolitics or spontaneity that surfaces in every historical setting, but especially so in ours, in the form of socially stranded and delusional instances of endemic examples hovering above the generic theme of Diogenes of Sinope, is by avoiding to fix our gaze on the peculiarities of any single period and its communitarian morals. Necessitating an attempt to juxtapose a Sartrean reading of Lukács’ totality to a diachronics of textuality with a post-metaphysical ontological basis in the concept of need, our theoretical findings, then, prompt us to shift our sights to a reconstructive reading of Late Helladic, archaic and classical Greece in chapters three, four and five to see if our existentialist dialectics offers an expansion of our historical horizons. Our historical probes take us from the destruction of the Mycenaean palatial centres to the demise of the Spartan hegemony at the end of the first third of the fourth century in what is diachronically interlocked by five transformations pertaining to the philosophical, political, dramatic and poetic construals of the dualism of nomos and phusis. Deserving, perhaps, of being one of the foremost catalysts of (mis)conceptions about particular nuances of ancient Greek political thought, that dualism serves as the historical touchstone of our attempt to assess the practical purchase of the existentialist dialectics as we conceive of it. We are not, to put both the shorter and the longer answers into a fold, advocating for the possibility of a cut and dried existentialist dialectical ontology to be applied to any historical crack, but for a theory that operates on a plane of crossroad textuality between the past and the present, opening up new cracks on the perpetually protruded, yet smooth as it can be in its phantasmagorical reflexions, surface of our digitised human potentialities à la Adorno, which is explicitly propelled toward the questioning of the viability of any timeless postulations that appears akin to Nigerian playwright Wole Soyinka’s chastisement of négritude as ontology:

117 Cf. “The driving contradiction of a social organism, the source of its history and the reason why it has a history, is identical with its real essence. For what it is is the co-presence, necessary to (=essentially constitutive of) that specific form of organism, of two elements that are necessarily opposed. What the extractors seek to do is to maintain the contradiction in some form; the other side of the class struggle is that the suppliers of surplus labour are constantly challenging the contradiction, forcing changes in its form and occasionally seeking to abolish it.” Meikle, Essentialism in the Thought of Karl Marx, pp. 120-121.

118 Cf. “We are not going to scratch images to bring truth to the surface; we are going to shove them aside so that other figures may come together and decompose there. We do not hold for the affectation of those who denounce the tyranny of truth. Rather, insofar as we scrape and clean and take off the varnish, we are surprised to find again and always the pattern of our illustrious Charlet.” Jacques Rancière, The Nights of Labor. The Workers’ Dream in Nineteenth-Century France, trans. by John Drury, (Philadelphia, 1989), pp.10.
“A tiger does not proclaim its tigritude, he pounces.’ He later clarified: ‘a tiger does not stand in the forest and say “I am a tiger.” When you pass where the tiger has walked before, you see the skeleton of a duiker, you know that some tigritude has emanated there.”

1.2 Methodology

Break open, as we did, the Pandora’s box by intimating a nonlinear transition between existentialism and dialectics within the general context of dialectical materialist theory and practice, we are obliged to envelope it in sustainable terms so that methodologically well-versed critics do not attempt to hone their convictions by our arsenal of arguments. An acknowledgement that needs to be voiced right away, in that vein, is that our theoretical understanding of the notion of existentialism incorporates the representatives of various ruling classes, capitalist or otherwise, that appear to have been mesmerized in regard to their possession of unrealised utopian human potentialities that may either betray a tendency to chafe when they are put on the totalising projects of lower classes or not. Indeed, taking our cue from Richard Miller when he hastens to add that “Marx might well have doubted that socialism would benefit everyone, even if he were not a revolutionary,”120 we argue that an existentialist re-foundation of a dialectics of group formation cannot be conceived in absentia of the individual members of historical ruling classes. This expanded existentialism,121 however, speaks to a need as much as a choice. The incorporation of the numerous clashing ruling class projections of totality122 is a need in so far as the literary production of any historical society before the advent of monopoly capitalism has been monopolised by those members of the society who had an actual choice between production and leisure, or, more intricately, between different sorts of fatigue.123 And ontologically, our conception of totality

121 The introduction of this unreserved existentialism can be conceived against the grain of capitalism’s enactment of an apparently level field of ‘general human morality’, i.e., morality of modernity, which confers only a sham existence to the working class to separate them from the ‘permanently excluded’, i.e., illegal migrants, convicts and those that aspire with yearning for radical change. This general human morality was brought to life, according to Kautsky, by “the development of the productive forces of man, by the extension of the social division of labour, the perfection of the means of intercourse. This new morality is, however, even today far from being a morality of all men even in the economically progressive countries. It is in essence even today the morality of the class-conscious proletariat, that part of the proletariat which in its feeling and thinking has emancipated itself from the rest of the people and has formed its own morality in opposition to the bourgeoisie.” Karl Kautsky, Ethics and the Materialistic Conception of History, trans. by J. R. Askew, (Chicago, n.d.), pp. 159-160.
122 For two general uses of the Marxian concept of totality with one serving the purpose of normative projections of a future communist context and the other functioning as an analytical tool of criticism of any contemporary modality of social being in relation to its totalistic presumptions, see Martin Jay, Marxism and Totality: The Adventures of a Concept from Lukács to Habermas, (Berkeley, 1984b), pp. 23-24.
123 “Poverty is not defined in the relationship of idleness to work but in the choosing of one’s fatigue: “I would have liked to have been a painter. But poverty enjoys no privileges, not even that of choosing
is never one that springs from a foundation that is unthreatened by the jostling of antagonistic projects, stemming from the ranks of upper classes no less than from those of the lower classes. Violence and terror are media of totalising projects that often risk becoming the message if taken out of context. And dovetailing our insistence on a historical appraisal of theory in which the concepts are unleashed to approximate toward their own contextual significance is an equally trenchant rejection of the lingering naturalistic proposal that the social scientist can and must assume a trans-valuative position. Indeed, the aborted Nietzschean attempt of the revaluation of all values, ironic as it is, bears on this question of how anything even remotely reminiscent of a totalising rewriting of past textualities into discordant wholes must rid itself of any trace of normative apriorism:

“Communism is quite incomprehensible to our saint [Stirner] because the communists do not oppose egoism to selflessness or selflessness to egoism, nor do they express this contradiction theoretically either in its sentimental or in its highflown ideological form; they rather demonstrate its material source, with which it appears of itself. The communists do not preach morality at all, as Stirner does so extensively. They do not put to people the moral demand: love one another, do not be egoists, etc.; on the contrary, they are very well aware that egoism, just as much as selflessness, is in definite circumstances a necessary form of the self-assertion of individuals.”

124 Although I will expand upon this topic via a detour around the fertile grounds of the Aristotelian dunamis toward a Sartrean rethinking thereof, I should still note my agreement with Lefebvre’s notion that any semblance of social coherence in view of the post-1960 late capitalistic societies can only be formed if one conceives that semblance as one of perennial disconcert that arises due to the incessant clash of existential projects undertaken in concert by particular human agents situated in specific historical contexts: Lefebvre, La vie quotidienne dans le monde moderne, pp. 212.

125 Needless to add, by that proclamation we are neither attempting to water the mill of the sovereignty of intellectual cadres that sublimates in the everlasting proclamation of the words of Danton, “Let us be terrible, so that the people need not be,” nor are we romanticizing the terror that accompanies the ascendancy of the downtrodden to the actors of revolution: “But there do exist, I can assure you, souls that are feeling and pure; it exists, that tender, imperious and irresistible passion, the torment and delight of magnanimous hearts; that deep horror of tyranny, that compassionate zeal for the oppressed, that sacred love for the homeland, that even more sublime and holy love for humanity, without which a great revolution is just a noisy crime that destroys another crime; it does exist, that generous ambition to establish here on earth the world’s first Republic.” Maximilien Robespierre, Virtue and Terror, (London, 2007), pp. 129; Danton, 10 March 1793, cited in Sophie Wahnich, La Liberté ou la mort: Essai sur la terreur et le terrorisme, (Paris, 2003), pp. 62; cf. Aimé Césaire, Et les chiens se taisent, in Les armes miraculeuses, (Paris, 1970), pp. 106-107. Those are thorny questions that remain so to this day especially concerning the sheer scale and magnitude of terror that is unleashed on society in general and on its specific strata in particular.

126 This recurrent theme of the later works of Nietzsche can be found in its explicitly anti-Christian garb starting from Beyond Good and Evil: “Modern men, with their obtuseness to all Christian nomenclature, no longer sense the gruesome superlative which lay for an antique taste in the paradoxical formula ‘god on the cross’. Never and nowhere has there hitherto been a comparable boldness in inversion, anything so fearsome, questioning and questionable, as this formula: it promised the revaluation of all antique values.” Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, trans. by R. J. Hollingdale, (London, 2003), pp. 75.

Having left aside the thorny issue of existentialist dialectics’ encompassing of all constituents of social reality, we can now focus more directly on the methodology adopted in our study. The outlines of the existentialist dialectical analysis of collective human projects that are sketched above are, first, to be theoretically assessed and, then, to be put into practice in the context of a diachronic Nachkonstruktion,\(^{128}\) rather than a cut-and-dried reconstruction, of material and social histories of Greek societies between the Mycenaean collapse in the early twelfth century BC and the loss of mainland hegemonic status of Sparta in 371 BC following the latter’s defeat in the Battle of Leuctra. Given that an after-construction of the history of any Greek community over the period covering the destruction of the Mycenaean palatial centres to the glimpses of literary survival that date as far back as the early eight century has to do with archaeological remains and their evaluation much more than anything else, I have examined published records of findings at key areas such as Lefkandi, Athens, Pylos, Knossos, etc., in addition to consulting some of the leaders of the excavation teams whose researches have been published. On top of the personal field surveys undertaken in those key sites, I have resorted to the opinion of historians and philosophers at Patras Philosophical Institute among others to see if my interpretations of the archaeological evidence would hold water in the eyes of some of the experts. The results of my field trips to those sites, museums and institutions have not been fully integrated to the work due to a combination of reasons having to do largely with the scope of the study and the ongoing exigency created by the COVID-19 pandemic. Practically, I considered it a negligible addition to an already voluminous study to add all the building and settlement plans that I drew based on my research on sites such as Chalcis, Lefkandi and Laurium. Coupled with the field research that I had planned to undertake at Gela, Syracuse, Selinous and other sites on Sicily, I conjectured to make up for that heightened sense of archaeological scepticism by a combination of grassroots study of archaeological remains and expert opinion. With the abortion of my plan of conducting extensive on-site research on Sicily, however, I backtracked from that initial commitment and decided to leave the hypotheses that I had conceived on the formation of the Early Iron Age mainland Greek settlements as they were.

By the beginning of the eight century BC, and especially toward its end, there is a watershed of historical inscriptions that appear in a variety of contexts such as epigrams on funeral steles, public inscriptions of nomoi on marble blocks, vandal graffiti etched on artworks and so on. And I have tried to make full use of both my personal observations of the exhibited part of those artefacts and the studies that are focused on the structures of significance in which their

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historical meanings were attributed. Making use of the double hermeneutics as it has been used by Fredric Jameson, Peter Rose, Klaus Junker, etc., and drawing from structuralist semiotics of systems of semiology and from critical theory in art history, I have attempted to assemble those artefacts into systems of interpretation highlighting a dialectical interplay between different sensibilities that arose from different socio-political contexts at the time of their production and the later references that were made to them in literary tracts. Speaking of literary production, I analysed each surviving fragment that is published in collections or anthologies in its original language and often tried to make emendations when a more contextual and up-to-date rendering was not available. I often consulted the various historiographical debates that are continuously focused on a hotbed of orthodoxy versus unorthodoxy that virtually seeps into every vein of interpretation especially in historical reconstructions of various dimensions of archaic Greek communities. By making an effort toward the inclusion of all facets of social totalities, I have also attempted to present the reader not only with a synoptic account of many the classicist debates hovering above the themes but also with my rationale for actively taking sides on each debate in addition to making hypothetical suggestions of my own.

On the whole, the technicalities of the adopted methodologies in the study runs like this: the first two theoretical chapters are conceived mainly as an attempt to re-found, or de-found from a post-metaphysical standpoint, an existential dialectics of praxis via a combination of analyses of content and context, attempting to identify the social milieu of each conceptual link or artwork within which the philosophical, artistic, etc., artefacts in question have generated nexuses of significance for their communities. Those intertwined channels of communication, or what I designate as the two levels of formal and political intertextuality, function as a heuristic tool to locate economic, philosophical, dramatic, etc., thoughts within the larger political totalising projects of whose parts they were. An equally comprehensive rebuilding of ancient Greek political thoughts within their spatio-temporality, and in line with the theoretical postulations of the first two chapters, guides my effort in chapters three, four and five to reorganise the social reality of various Greek communities on an ontological basis that accords just as much capability to actively engage in totalising projects to the lower-class constituents of those communities as to their upper-class counterparts. That existentialist

129 Ibid, pp. 15.
130 One ought to not forget that Sartre and de Beauvoir’s conception of the existentialist will to uncover one’s Being as an unfulfillable Being to come is intrinsically linked to the definition of one’s project as in constant interference with those of others: “… le choix que l’homme fait de lui-même en tant que présence au monde. On ne peut dire ni que l’homme libre veut la liberté pour dévoiler l’être, ni le dévoilement de l’être pour la liberté; ce sont là deux aspects d’une seule réalité. Et quel que soit celui
construal of the ontology of human praxis results in the arising of a need to be constantly on the lookout for structured silences, linguistic mishaps and frequent *double entendre* with which the opinions of the ruling class intelligentsia on their social realities were voiced. Due to the urgency of that need, I have constantly consulted the original language in which the works were written and compared them to modern editions, which has urged me, at times, to make translations from Ancient Greek, French, German and Italian. I have indicated my own translations in square brackets. Needless to add, my Sartrean understanding of Lukács’ conception of totality has obliged me to take every piece of historical evidence, be they defence speeches, fragmentary panegyrics, or epinician odes into account without leaving any single piece of evidence unaddressed. And, as a result, a not inconsiderable part of both my theoretical and historical studies have been underpinned by systematic forays into literary, dramatic, etc., spheres of production. Totalising singular transmitted episodes into a tight-knit complex that is never unified is an endeavour that often self-consciously testifies against itself. But that is to be expected in a work that attempts to ask so many questions while working toward unearthing the connections that link each existential dimensionality that is addressed by those questions to others. And given that my overriding intellectual justification for conceiving this work has always been to problematise the Heideggerian horizon of the present human potentialities no less than those of the past, I think it apt to conclude by repeating a maxim of Edward Thompson: “History knows no regular verbs.”

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CHAPTER 2

DIAMAT UNIVERSALISM AS THE PENELOPE’S THREAD

2.1 Hegelian Spirit and a Dialectics of Absolution
We commence our study with an epistemological and ontological excursion of dialectical materialism and attempt to achieve a theoretical grasp of what theoretical relationships it posits between singulars, particulars and universals. The perceptual and cognitive steps culminating in the attainment of natural and social knowledge, from a dialectical materialist vein, can be traced along the lines of an external dialectic combing environmental externality and hence mining it in order to forge a reliable set of theoretical correspondences so that an ever-increasing reach of natural scientific knowledge can be self-critically utilised to rethink our knowledge of social reality; whereas the introduction of dialectical materialist predicates to the sphere of social knowledge can be realized via the historicization of materially determinate individuals within the given spatial and temporal context. Our principal aim in this section, in that vein, is to excavate the theoretical linkages that are constructed by dialectical materialism for the sake of uniting social phenomena in the cognitive movement from the indeterminate singulars to historicized universals through the interplay of market mechanisms. In the light of Marx and Engels’ avowed theoretical debt to Hegelian dialectics as the root and branch origin of the Marxian epistemology, we claim that a theoretically conceived pathway commencing with the grassroots of Hegelian dialectics, followed up by Aristotelian foundations of an interconnected conception of particulars and universals, and terminating with Spinoza’s relatively early refutation of dialectics as theoretical obscurantism needs to be drawn out as the necessary theoretical terminus ante quem leading up to our post-

133 “As we know, the materialist dialectic answers the latter question [on the relationship between consciousness and dialectic viewed as the objective motive form of reality] to the effect that the subjective dialectic in human knowledge is precisely the reflection of the objective dialectic of reality, and that as a result of the structure of objective reality, this process of reflection likewise proceeds dialectically, not mechanically as the old materialism would have it.” Georg Lukács, The Destruction of Reason, trans. by Peter Palmer, (Atlantic Highlands, NJ., 1981), pp. 247.

Jamesonian construal of existential dialectics. Giving vent to our claim that universals pertinent to social knowledge are dialectically conceivable only to the extent of that an outright rejection of any ahistorical universalism is made, this section will attempt to blaze a trail that is conducive to an existentialist re-contrual of the pre-Marxian foundations of some key dialectical materialist conceptions in order to discern the qualitative distinctions that separate the groundwork from the rest of the edifice. Harkening back to one of the poetic images perched above the roots of the Hegelian dialectic, any attentive reader of Hegel’s principal works would have noticed Hegel’s fascination with one of Antigone’s defiant proclamations that takes place at one of the climactic points of Sophocles’ Antigone. Having buried the corpse of her brother, Polyneices, against the expressed disapproval of his uncle Creon, Antigone, facing her uncle’s stern chastisement, exclaims:

“It was not Zeus who published this decree, | Nor have the Powers who rule among the dead | Imposed such laws as this upon mankind; | Nor could I think that a decree of yours— | A man—could override the laws of Heaven | Unwritten and unchanging. Not of today | Or yesterday is their authority; | They are eternal; no man saw their birth.”

Antigone’s insubordination to the laws of her polis, or those of Creon writ large, is thus wedded to her reverent loyalty displayed for the laws of the everlasting, i.e., gods. Hegel cites the verses 456-7 twice in his Philosophy of Right and Phenomenology of Spirit in an attempt to vindicate the essential unity of the immediate self-consciousness and the ethical substance: “Ethical disposition consists just in sticking steadfastly to what is right, and

137 For an anthology of all the ancient and modern renditions of the myth of Antigone’s defiance of Creon’s order to refrain from burying her dead brother, see Lutz Walther and Martina Hayo (eds.), Mythos Antigone: Texte von Sophokles bis Hochhuth, (Leipzig, 2004).
139 Although a balanced reading, which may be truer to Aristotle’s understanding of the tragic spirit, appears within the range of possibilities, I incline toward a more para phusin construal of it à la Lukács. Hegel cites the same passage at key moments when a sublation of family life as the ground of ethical life toward ethical life as the plenum of social universality appears imminent. Now, as we will analyse later on, the key to the tragic structure of the myth’s Sophoclean rendition is that the negation of the respective ethical creeds of the two figures proves consumptive not only socially but also physically. With Antigone sequestered to die enclosed in a cave and Creon’s family torn apart all thanks to the blind eye he had turned to Antigone’s plight, the play is one of the gloomiest among Sophocles’ surviving plays. Yet, Antigone’s desperate struggle against the unnatural commands of her sovereign still has a silver lining in that she knew in advance how her punishment, in case she was to attempt to bury her brother, would be meted out, whereas Creon’s total obliviousness makes one to see him as a figure who self-voluntarily got lost within the labyrinth of his hubris. So, loser wins? Perhaps so, especially given how enthusiastic she was willing to lose. For a more feminist construal of the import that the text had for Hegel’s works, see Patricia J. Mills, “Hegel’s Antigone”, The Owl of Minerva, vol. 17 no. 2 (Spring, 1986), pp. 131-152; for a more Derridean reconstruction of Antigone’s plight as having been torn apart between two contradictory laws, i.e., that of the divine and that of the community, see Hannes Charen, “Hegel Reading “Antigone’”, Monatshfte, vol. 103 no. 4 (Winter, 2011), pp. 504-516; cf. Jameson, The Hegel Variations: On the Phenomenology of Spirit, (London, 2010), pp. 79 ff; Lukács, The Young Hegel, pp. 46-49, 411-412.
abstaining from all attempts to move or shake it, or derive it…. It is not, therefore, because I
find something is not self-contradictory that it is right; on the contrary, it is right because it is
what is right.”

Reordered as the sufficient condition of self-consciousness’ seeking its
immutable ethical place to reside, which shines through a haze of dichotomies,
uptight reverence for the timeless is thereby juxtaposed to relinquishing the will to excavate its
origins. This thus leads to a sublimated unity of the actuality and existence of the substance
heralding the dawn of Geist, conceived as the actuality of the ethical substance. The
actualization of the ethical substance betrays the demotion of any scrutiny of the eternal to
impertinent transgression, crossing the threshold between the time-honoured custom and time-
devoured reason by attempting to temporalize the timeless. The impression of the seraphim’s
footsteps is left behind to revere, not to criticize, or, least of all, to follow in order to see
whither they lead. The particularity with which the spatio-temporally located individual is
endowed, be it conceived in terms of ethnic, religious or sexual ties, drags her down into the
boggy marshlands of inertial activity, gullible in her own sense-perceptions and theoretical
conceptions alike to the utmost point of falling for the universality of the critical signposts that
were erected earlier by none other than herself. Transcendental only in regard to the extent of
her tense restlessness, the refusal to serve as the handmaiden of Geist is accompanied by the
individual’s mistaking Creon for gods, jubilantly turning down the spiritual surcease of sorrow
only to succumb to the perpetual ignorance consigned to those who confuse their fleeting
presence for unwavering permanence. Spiritual forsakenness of this mirage, on an interesting

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citation of the same verses is brought forward in the ‘Ethical Life’ section of the *Philosophy of Right*,

141 As Hegel had earlier opined, philosophy springs from the need to resolve temporal dichotomies
which are conceived by those who encounter them as fixed and absolute: G. W. F. Hegel, *The Difference
between Fichte’s and Schelling’s System of Philosophy*, trans. by H. S. Harris and W. Cerf, (New York,
1977b), pp. 89.

142 It seems interesting to compare Hegel’s standpoint with that of MacIntyre, according to whom an
absence of virtue, or equally a presence of vice, is a form of violence inflicted to one’s community and
hence constitutes a failure to uphold the collective project which is integral to a community’s definition:
“an offence against the laws destroys those relationships which make common pursuit of the good
possible. … The response to such offences would have to be that of taking the person who committed
them to have thereby excluded himself or herself from the community.” Alasdair MacIntyre, *After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory*, (Notre Dame, 1981), pp. 142.

143 Incidentally, Hegel’s frequent resort to Sophocles’ *Antigone* as the tragic unconcealment of
primordially recognized truths disregards the intricacies of the wordplays with which Sophocles
adorned his play. Contrary to the cited proclamations of Antigone, Sophocles, earlier in the play, makes
the chorus preach conformity to the law of the land (νόμους περαινων χθονος) as the harbinger of
peaceful existence within the polis. The foremost point to note, in that vein, is that the interplay between
convention and nature, as we will emphasize in the following chapter, is never as clear-cut as Hegel
makes it out to be: “σοφόν τι το μαχανον | τεχνας υπερ ελπιδ’ εχων | τότε μεν κακον, αλλοτ’ επ’ εσθλον
ερπει, | νόμους περαινων χθονος | θεων τ’ ενορκον δικαι’ | υψιπολις’ απολις οτω το μη καλον | ξυνεστι
tόλμας χάριν. | μητ’ εμοί παρεστιος | γενοιτο μητ’ ισον φρονων | ος ταδ’ ερδοι.” Sophocles, *Antigone*,
365-75.
note, translates into materiality in Hegelian terms. The ideal unity of particularity and universality that resides at the heart of Geist conceived through the Hegelian lens, corresponds to the diametric opposite of the shifting materiality whose transience tallies with the state of pure abstraction:

“The nature of Spirit may be understood by a glance at its direct opposite—Matter. As the essence of the Matter is Gravity, so, on the other hand, we may affirm that the substance, the essence of Spirit is Freedom…. Matter possesses gravity in virtue of its tendency toward a central point. It is essentially composite; consisting of parts that exclude each other. It seeks its Unity; and therefore exhibits itself as self-destructive, as verging towards its opposite [an indivisible point]. If it could attain this, it would be Matter no longer, it would have perished. It strives after the realization of its Idea; for in Unity it exists ideally. Spirit, on the contrary, may be defined as that which has its centre in itself. It has not a unity outside itself, but has already found it; it exists in and with itself. Matter has its essence out of itself; Spirit is self-contained existence (Bei-sich-selbst-seyn).”

The lynchpin of matter’s uncentred existence is hence captured in a perpetual to and fro in search of the Unity it simply cannot attain by its own effort. Reminiscent of Creon’s bewildered state of ‘consistent inconsistence,’ the distinguishing trait of matter turns out to be that it is only a presupposition that is wanting for any determinant. It is the absence of Unity just as much as that of singularity that underpins matter’s unattainable quest for absolution. And that quest can only be fulfilled within a dialectical purview of history. Matter is in-itself only agonistically and insatiably, yearning for an anchored place on the Moebius Strip without recognition that its existence is validated only in reference to the preconditional on which every other logical category rests:

“Essence becomes matter in that its reflection is determined as relating itself to the formless indeterminate. Matter, therefore, is the simple identity, void of distinction, that essence is, with the determination that it is the other of form…If abstraction is made from every determination, from every form of a something, matter is what is left over. Matter is the absolutely abstract [Die Materie ist ein schlechthin Abstraktes]. (One cannot see, feel, etc. matter; what one sees or feels is a determinate matter, that is, a unity of matter and form.)”

Dubbed logically as the ‘absolute abstraction,’ the conceptual existence of matter is just as fragile as the fleeting assertiveness of Creon in his raving list of punishments that could potentially be meted out to Antigone. Fuming yet irresolute, matter is lost in its transition into perpetual movement just as Creon, the ruler, meets Creon the mortal, deciding to deface his authority in exculpating Antigone as the upholder of the eternal:

“Just as I am I go. — You men-at-arms, | You here, and those within: away at once | Up to the hill, and take your implements, | Now that my resolution is reversed | I who imprisoned here | will set her free. — | I fear it may be wisest to observe | Throughout one’s life the laws that are established.”

Interjected within this aperçu of Antigone’s plight that found appeal in the works of Hegel, any conceptualization of universalism that claims to adhere to the general contours of dialectical materialism would find little purchase. Universalism, after all, is directly linked to the logical category of the universal, intermingling with its logical counterparts, the singular and the particular in a metaphysical movement that beckons the dialectical understanding of the Spirit. Henceforth, as a logical category in its own right it basically leads a precarious existence as a precondition bereft of any ethical meaning. It is the Nietzschean Shadow par excellence recognized only in its lacunae and the perplexment that is aroused when aspects of it are negated. The aforementioned logical girdles that constitute the threefold structure consisting of the singular, the particular, and the universal, on this view, turn into the clés de volûte that are supposed to hold the whole logical edifice together. The fortunes of the Hegelian concept depend, indeed, to the fullest extent on the categorical linkages that allow singular characteristics to find their specific determinateness in the universal through their participation in the particular. Hegel’s conception of the ‘mediated simplicity’ of spatial and temporal indicatives canvasses precisely this categorical tension that does not allow us to capture the fullest meaning of ‘thisness’ or ‘now’ without incessant conjunction with other singularities and the particularities that are made up of them. Positing ‘I’ as the universal medium, Hegel purports that the maelstrom of singularities are elusive even at the most primordial level of cognition, that is the apprehension or sense-certainty. In his attempt to elucidate the issue, Hegel illustrates the unintelligibility of day and night as things-in-themselves eluding the linguistic snares of ‘thisness’ and ‘thatness,’ which culminates in his similar example of the inapprehensible ‘this paper’:

“But… those who put forward such an assertion [the argument that external things perceived through cognitive channels has absolute truth for human consciousness] also themselves say the direct opposite of what they mean: a phenomenon which is perhaps best calculated to induce them to reflect on the nature of sense-certainty. They speak of the existence of external objects, which can be more precisely defined as actual, absolutely singular, wholly personal, individual things, each of them absolutely unlike anything else; this existence, they say, has

150 The following passage appears to be an apt one to bring our idea home: “Only now do I notice how impolite I am towards you, my beloved shadow: I have not yet said a word of how very much I rejoice to hear you and not merely to see you. You will know that I love shadow as much as I love light. For there to be beauty of face, clarity of speech, benevolence and firmness of character, shadow is as needful as light. They are not opponents: they stand, rather, lovingly, hand in hand, and when light disappears, shadow slips away after it.” Friedrich Nietzsche, ‘The Wanderer and His Shadow’, in Human All Too Human: A Book for Free Spirits, trans. By R. J. Hollingdale, (Cambridge, 1996), pp. 301.
151 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, pp. 61.
absolute certainty and truth. They mean ‘this’ bit of paper on which I am writing – or rather have written – ‘this’; but what they mean is not what they say. If they actually wanted to say ‘this’ bit of paper which they mean, if they wanted to say it, then this is impossible, because the sensuous This that is meant cannot be reached by language, which belongs to consciousness, i.e., to that which is inherently universal. In the actual attempt to say it, it would therefore crumble away; those who started to describe it would not be able to complete the description, but would be compelled to leave it to others, who would themselves finally admit to speaking about something which is nor.”

Leaping from an apparently simple case of sense-certainty and basic cognition to a plane on which any social effort at naming takes place, hence moving toward the full display of the incapacitating gap between the infinity of perceivable singularities and the enfeebled finitude of universals, and toward the mediation of the sphere of work with its presupposed degrees of stratification and conflict, Spirit’s logical manifestation as a reconciled terminus of actuality and essence pertaining to both the universal and the particular is made clear once again.

Positing work as the universal medium through which the individual agents comprehend their separate individuality (i.e., determinates) in addition to their self-identity as beings-for-another (i.e., conjunction with totality) Hegel purports the creation of wealth and the feeling of joy as synonymous pathways through which self-consciousness takes its substance into recognition:

“It is true that in the enjoyment, the individuality develops an awareness of himself as a particular individual, but this enjoyment itself is the result of the general activity, just as reciprocally, wealth produces universal labour and enjoyment for all. The actual has simply the spiritual significance of being immediately universal. Each individual is quite sure that he is acting in his own interest when seeking this enjoyment; for it is in this that he becomes conscious of his own independent existence and for that reason does not take it to be something spiritual. Yet, even when looked at from an external point of view, it is evident that each in his own enjoyment provides enjoyment for all, just as in working for himself he is at the same time working for all and all are working for him. His being for himself is therefore in itself universal and his self-interest is something merely in his mind, something that cannot get as far as making a reality of what it means to do, viz. to do something that would not benefit all.”


153 “We have few names and few definitions for an infinity of single things. Therefore recourse to the universal is not strength of thought but weakness of discourse. The problem is that man always talks in general while things are singular. Language names by blurring the irrepressible proof of the existing individual.” Eco, Kant and the Platypus, pp. 23; cf. Umberto Eco, The Search for the Perfect Language, trans. by James Fentress, (London, 1997), pp. 169, 287.

154 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, pp. 301-302; for locating this phenomenological reconceptualization of the concept of ‘work’ within a rapidly transforming capitalist milieu, consider the following well-known passage from Smith’s Wealth of Nations: “Whoever offers to another a bargain of any kind, proposes to do this. Give me that which I want, and you shall have this which you want, is the meaning of every such offer; and it is in this manner that we obtain from one another the far greater part of those good offices which we stand in need of. It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. We address ourselves not to their humanity but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our own necessities but of their advantages. Nobody but a beggar chuses to depend chiefly upon the benevolence of his fellow-citizens. Even a beggar does not depend upon it entirely.” Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations, (Bantam, 2003), pp. 23-24; cf. “Bare Vertue can’t make Nations live | In splendour; they, that
A phenomenological construal of work, in that vein, serves as the hub of recognition of in-itself singularities and for-other particularities that are conjured in their reciprocity only if their relationality with otherwise abstract universals is conceived. This connection is further substantiated with the admission, which has been highlighted by Habermas,\textsuperscript{155} of the crucial Hegelian rapport that is posited between work and the war of recognition. As with any human individual setting oneself to work upon nature in order to become free from the dictates of unmediated violence of nature, so with any worker whose participation in the unequal production process induces him or her to attain a state of self-consciousness that continually paves new roads for his or her eventual recognition. Engaging in productive activities, in short, is the catalyst of emancipation from unmediated natural as well as social determinations. Working for oneself to earn wages is therewith portrayed as working for others in the universality of the activity done, services rendered, etc., germinating in the enjoyment that accrues to oneself not only in the form of income but also in that of actualizing a productive activity that is dovetailed to the rest of productive activities.\textsuperscript{156} The completion of the Spirit itself in-itself, in the ultimate realm of absolute knowledge, thus consummates the circular movement of the universal, sublimating only in taking account of the concrete particulars that are incorporated within the development from the in-itself to for-itself,\textsuperscript{157} or from the Substance to the Subject.\textsuperscript{158}

The trials and tribulations of the dialectical reason, on this view, are circumscribed by the inherent movement of understanding from the singular to the universal, effacing the former in


\textsuperscript{156}Jay, \textit{Marxism and Totality}, pp. 55.


\textsuperscript{158}“The understanding determines, and holds the determination fixed. Reason is negative and dialectical, since it dissolves the determinations of the understanding into nothing; it is positive, since it generates the universal, and comprehends the particular therein. Just as the understanding is usually taken as something separate from reason in general, so also dialectical reason is taken as something separate from positive reason. In its truth reason is however spirit, which is higher than both reason bound to the understanding and understanding bound to reason. It is the negative, that which constitutes the quality of both the dialectical reason and the understanding: it negates the simple, thereby posits the determinate difference of the understanding; but it equally dissolves this difference, and so it is dialectical. But spirit does not stay at the nothing of this result but is in it rather equally positive, and thereby restores the first simplicity, but as universal, such as it is concrete in itself; a given particular is not subsumed under this universal but, on the contrary, it has already been determined together with the determining of the difference and the dissolution of this determining.” Hegel, \textit{The Science of Logic}, pp. 10.
identifying its particularity within the universal and eroding the latter in denoting the determinateteness of the particular case whence any universal in question is exposed. The higher unity of the two, therefore, actualizes at a level of logical confluence that serves as the bridge to gap the fully abstract indeterminate matter and unstipulated universal. That logical bridge, in Hegelian terms, is also linked to the process of Becoming. The indeterminateness of the singular is turned into determinacy with the aid of the hitherto indeterminate universal in order to surpass the intrinsic boundlessness of the two, which appears to be reminiscent of a view of becoming which encapsulates the unity of pure being and pure nothing. Becoming is thus dissolved in the to and fro that takes place between pure being and pure nothing as does the intellectual process of determination in the liquification of the particular in the universal and vice versa:

“Pure being and pure nothing are therefore the same. The truth is neither being nor nothing, but rather that being has passed over into nothing and nothing into being—“has passed over,” not passes over. But the truth is just as much that they are not without distinction; it is rather that they are not the same, that they are absolutely distinct yet equally unseparated and inseparable, and that each immediately vanishes in its opposite. Their truth is therefore this movement of the immediate vanishing of the one into the other: becoming, a movement in which the two are distinguished, but by a distinction which has just as immediately dissolved itself.”

Yet the conceptual insolvency of the universal that is probed by using Hegelian categories remains only halfway unveiled when one does not recall the other side of the coin, i.e., the fact that Antigone’s evocation of the universal powers—that-be in her defence appears to correspond, in post-Hegelian terms, to nothing other than the inhuman. With an uncanny air about it that appears reminiscent of the higher truth content of the Slave’s labour over the Master’s leisure in its capability of mediating the relationship of domination between the subject and the object, the universal needs the singular to externalise itself onto a higher conceptual elaboration so that their relationality can be established via the middle term of negation. A heavy price that needs to be paid immediately, in other words, accompanies the recital of the magic words of gods and divinity: the singularities, the particular individuals that rise and grow with their yesterdays and todays are the ones that are beckoned to be laid down on the sacrificial altar of timelessness. Creon’s final acknowledgment of the temporality of his

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159 Ibid, pp. 59-60.
rule and King Oedipus’ self-imposed exile as a punishment for the atrocities he inadvertently committed are united by the golden thread of human helplessness. No questions asked, no answers given. Antigone just abides by what the gods ordained. Oedipus, albeit somewhat unwillingly,\(^{163}\) does the same. An almost exact equivalence signifies the relationship between the fateful necessities that were encountered by father and daughter with proud defiance and encumbering sorrow in equal measure accruing to their lot. For not only inter-generational guilt but also steadfast resolution is inherited by the characters of Sophoclean drama which introduces an element of indefatigable inter-subjectivity in regard to the circularity it affords to both tragedies.\(^{164}\) And if those figures seem rather unpalatably larger-than-life to one’s postmodern taste, then it appears all but unrelatable that the unbridled coercion of either Laertius’ or Creon’s prerogatives find a distant echo of their own in the watertight Hegelian atmosphere of enlightened monarchs – not to mention in our largely debunk worship of universal human rights. The laws are not in the right because of our assent, they are just so because they simply are. Does this supposed to be the ‘higher unity’ of the particular and the universal that is enacted by the ‘sweat of Spirit’s brow’?

Working at the intersection of logic and history, the Hegelian image of individual qua valet de chambre makes its first appearance in the Phenomenology. This peculiar figure is invoked by Hegel in his rebuke of the Kantian maxim of ‘duty for duty’s sake’ in order to vindicate the premise that duty is not a term of service that is apt to convey anything more than the image of the Garden of Eden, i.e., unreality; an unreality that finds no theoretical support within the entire body of the three critiques.\(^{165}\) Kant’s purported universality of duty ethics conveys, as we will observe in the following chapter, little more than a feelgood fantasy, wallowing in self-deceit that flows from its avowed unrecognition of the particularity of each subject in terms of social, spatial, temporal, political configurations.\(^{166}\) This whitewashing of the concept of duty, hence, neglects the fact that the very concept of duty is internally torn apart by clashing material and social interests which gives expression to the belief that “There is no moral existence in reality.”\(^{167}\) The unwarranted enactment of a phantasmagorical sphere of morality

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\(^{163}\) Creon’s ultimate admonishing of Oedipus epitomizes the prompt and intransigent response that awaits the transgressor: “Seek not to have your way in all things: | Where you had your way before, | Your mastery broke before the end.” Sophocles, Oedipus the King, 1524-26.

\(^{164}\) Kierkegaard, Either/Or, pp. 154.

\(^{165}\) “His [Kant’s] attempt to derive the duty of mutual respect from a law of reason, although more cautious than any other such undertaking in Western philosophy, has no support within the Critique. … The citizen who renounced a profit out of the Kantian motive of respect for the mere form of law would not be enlightened but superstitious—a fool.” Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer, ‘Juliette or Enlightenment and Morality’, pp. 67.

\(^{166}\) Lukács, The Ontology of Social Being, I, pp. 10.

\(^{167}\) Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, pp. 373.
functions as a smokescreen whose dissipation can only be ensured by the swift dissection of the forces with which that pacified conception of duty is saturated:

“Since, in the action as such, the doer attains to a vision of himself in objectivity, or to a feeling of self in his existence, and thus to enjoyment, the inner aspect is judged to be an urge to secure his own happiness, even though this were to consist merely in an inner moral conceit, in the enjoyment of being conscious of his own superiority and in the foretaste of a hope of future happiness. No action can escape such judgement, for duty for duty’s sake, this pure purpose, is an unreality; it becomes a reality in the deed of an individuality, and the action is thereby charged with the aspect of particularity. No man is a hero to his valet; not, however, because the man is not a hero, but because the valet—is a valet, whose dealings are with the man, not as a hero, but as one who eats, drinks, wears clothes, in general, with his individual wants and fancies. Thus, for the judging consciousness, there is no action in which it could not oppose to the universal aspect of the action, the personal aspect of the individuality, and play the part of the moral valet towards the agent.”

Any paragon of duty ethics is thus portrayed by Hegel as prone to be led astray by the intricacies with which the society is, in and through the ages, constituted. Those intricacies are part and parcel of the complex of relationships which envelop any particular dimension of being without either dissolving them in an overarching totality or fragmenting them as singular facets of a categorised existence à la Kant. Freedom of the individual does not consist in an abstract ‘ought’ that would heed the dictates of his self-regulated reason, but in her willingness to substitute the medley of heteronomy that the agent is subjected to by willing itself alone in the higher realm of the overriding interests of the state. Antigone’s wrathful disposition against the temporal authority of Creon is thereby dovetailed to Hegel’s meek acceptance of Red Eagle Third Class in an environment whose stifling air he could attest to no less than any other Prussian academic of his day. The establishment of the ‘Kingdom of the Will,’ i.e., the enlightened state, is thus conceived as obliterating Antigone’s predicament of abiding by the eternal laws while scornig those of the commonwealth. Hegel’s refutation of the argument that it is facile for one to engage in heroic acts while being surrounded by an army of valets is thus that the fruits of modern state can be gathered only if the two work in reciprocal unity so that liberty trees can be planted:

“The Will is Free only when it does not will anything alien, extrinsic, foreign to itself (for as long as it does so, it is dependent), but wills itself alone—wills the Will. This is absolute Will—the volition to be free. Will making itself its own object is the basis of all Right and Obligation—consequently of all statutory determinations of Right, categorical imperatives, and enjoined obligations. The Freedom of the Will per se, is the principle and substantial basis of all Right—is itself absolute, inherently eternal Right, and the Supreme Right in comparison with other specific Rights; nay, it is even that by which Man becomes Man, and is therefore the fundamental principle of Spirit.”\(^{172}\)

The sublation of the singular characteristics with which our hero and valet are respectively endowed is thus corroborated in conjunction with the socialisation of the modern citoyen, willingly accomplishing the tasks that are preordained for her in the modern state so that the Kantian antagonism enveloping the unsociable sociability of humans can be sublated.\(^{173}\) The capitalist division of labour is just one of the instances whereby the contingency of the singular is wedded to the necessity of the universal, seeping, in turn, into the modern citoyen that discards her singularity for the sake of attaining a dissolving universality.\(^{174}\) The loss of singularity, therefore, sheds the ‘determinate determinateness’ in conjunction with the dismissal of the universal with which the singular determinateness is defined in full abstraction. The result is the rise of freedom in the field of logic that echoes the rise of the bourgeois citoyen as the upholder of freedom.\(^{175}\)

“No longer, therefore, does absolute substance as self-differentiating absolute form repel itself as necessity from itself, nor does it fall apart as contingency into different, external substances, but, on the contrary, it differentiates itself: on the one hand, into the totality (the heretofore passive substance) which is at the origin, as the reflection from internal determinateness, as simple whole that contains its positedness within itself and in this positedness is posited as self-identical – this is the universal –; on the other hand, into the totality (the hitherto causal substance) which is the reflection, equally from internal determinateness, into the negative determinateness which, just as the self-identical determinateness, equally is the whole, but posited as the self-identical negativity – the singular. But, because the universal is self-

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\(^{174}\) That dissolution oscillates between the dialectical poles of doing away with the old parasitic relationship between the Master and the Slave and that of levelling every component of that relationship to the Hegelian Trupp: “Enlightenment dissolves away the injustice of the old inequality of unmediated mastery, but at the same time perpetuates it as universal mediation, by relating every existing thing to every other. … That has been the trajectory of the European civilization. Abstraction, the instrument of enlightenment, stands in the same relationship to its objects as fate, whose concept it eradicates: as liquidation. Under the levelling rule of abstraction, which makes everything in nature repeatable, and of industry, for which abstraction prepared the way, the liberated finally themselves become the “herd” (Trupp), which Hegel identified as the outcome of enlightenment.” Adorno and Horkheimer, ‘The Concept of Enlightenment’, in *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, pp 8, 9; cf. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, pp. 342; Goldmann, *The Philosophy of the Enlightenment*, pp. 2.

identical only in that the *determinateness* that it holds within is *sublated*, hence it is the negative as negative, immediately is the *same identity* that *universality* is. This, their *simple identity*, is the particularity that, from the singular, holds the moment of determinateness; from the universal, that of imminent reflection — the two in immediate unity. These three totalities are therefore one and the same reflection that, as negative self-reference, differentiates itself into the other two totalities — but as into a perfectly transparent difference, namely into the determinate simplicity, or into the simple determinateness, which is their one same identity. — This is the concept, the realm subjectivity or of freedom.

The realm of subjectivity as the meta-narrative mélange of the three totalities is synonymous with its postulation in terms of the differentiated unity of singulars, particulars, and universals that, in the reflection of their self-references identify themselves with one another. The foundation of their external accord follows the internal self-development through which each of the totalities had passed. Harkening back to the linguistic elusiveness of words that refuse to attain the meaning of thisness without partaking of the interplay between the singular and the universal, the Smithian butcher is also conceived as the agreement of singularities that the former possesses with their universal epitomes, essentially procreating his character as a singularity qua totality that is mediated by particularity. This process is characterized no less by what Hegel dubs as the ‘double transition’ between quantity and quality fumigating the internal indeterminateness of the singular. The positedness that is purported as an essential feature of freedom is thereby alloyed with the subject of singularity in-itself, which must cross over lopsided termini to reach the beacon of totality. Quantum, in its immediate determinateness, grounds itself on the external immediacy of the numerical rise and fall that


177 “Second, by employing the term “totality” to refer to all coherent entities within the cosmic whole, Hegel encouraged the vision that lesser or partial totalities existed on all levels of the meta-totality. This acceptance of what we have called “latitudinal totalities” meant that any part in a larger whole itself be considered an organized whole from the perspective of its internal dynamics.” Jay, *Marxism and Totality*, pp. 59.

178 The totality pertinent to particularity and the clashing particular interests among which it is located is canvassed in relation to the opposition between the exigencies of the hypothetical state of nature and its sublation in an earlier work of Hegel in the following manner: “D’un côté le trouble pressentiment d’une unité originaire et absolue qui s’exprime dans le chaos de l’état de nature et dans l’abstraction des facultés et des inclinations, ne parvient pas jusqu’à l’unité absolue négative. Elle ne va plus loin que l’extinction d’une grande masse de particularités et d’oppositions et il reste encore dans ce chaos une masse indéterminable de déterminations qualitatives dont la nécessité pour chacune d’elles reste seulement empirique et tout extérieure si on les considère les unes par rapport aux autres. Elles n’ont pas d’autre relation que d’être définies comme opposées et en conflit absolu les unes avec les autres en tant qu’elles sont un multiple et parce que ce multiple est relation réciproque, mais sans unité. Dans l’état de nature ou dans l’idée abstraite de l’homme, on est forcé de penser les énergies du monde éthique, que l’on a séparées, comme une guerre d’extermination réciproque. Mais alors justement il est facile de montrer que ces qualités puisqu’elles sont purement et simplement opposées et donc purement idéelles, ne peuvent à cause de cela subsister comme elles doivent le faire, mais se suppriment et se réduisent au néant.” G. W. F. Hegel, *Le Droit Naturel*, trans. by André Kaan (Paris, 1972), pp. 72-73.

relates to its other, i.e., quality. The externality that is presupposed in any quantitative change thus reflects the latter in referring itself to itself as an integral part of the determinateness that sets it apart from other qualitative and quantitative substances.\textsuperscript{180}

The postulation of the singular in the essential totality of its positedness, therefore, presupposes the conception of totality as constituted by the \textit{reversible} reflection of quantity as external immediacy and quality as self-referring determinateness into one another that the moment of sublation conveys.\textsuperscript{181} The inherent positivity of the negation of one-sided determinateness sublimes in this account via the incorporation of the incremental, and potentially extraneous, numerical changes of the matter in relation to the determinate content that Hegel portrays as comprising of the higher unity of the in-itself and its opposite. The positedness of the singular, as such, can be hurled back at the flux of Heraclitan movement, not merely capable of achieving a higher totality but also decomposing into its indifferent constituents. The concept of negation that is the alpha and the omega of this double transition, bears a distinct mark of double positivity that can be conceived of not only as indeterminate’s yearning of determinate content, but also as the determinateness not fashioning itself after a pseudo-absolute and attempt to eliminate its indifferences, no matter how extraneous, on behalf of the absolute qua terminus. Negation can thus be conceived as the conceptual substantiation of the political, religious, etc., firewalls that are needed to be erected against any tendency to harken back to antediluvian proclamations of absolute states of rest.\textsuperscript{182}:

\textsuperscript{180} "At first quantity as such thus appears in opposition to quality; but quantity is itself a quality, self-referring determinateness as such, distinct from the determinateness which is its other, from quality as such. Except that quantity is not only a quality, but the truth of quality itself is quantity, and quality has demonstrated itself as passing over into it. Quantity, in its truth, is instead the externality which has returned into itself, which is no longer indifferent. Thus is quantity quality itself, in such a way that outside this determination quality as such would yet not be anything at all. – For the totality to be \textit{posited}, a \textit{double} transition is required, not only the transition of one determinateness into the other, but equally the transition of this other into the first, its going back into it. Through the first transition, the identity of the two is present at first only \textit{in itself}; quality is contained in quantity, but the latter still is only a one-sided determinateness. Conversely, that quantity is equally contained in quality, that it is equally also only as sublated, this results in the second transition, the going back into the first determinateness. This remark regarding the necessity of the \textit{double} transition is everywhere of great importance for scientific method." Hegel, \textit{Science of Logic}, pp. 279.

\textsuperscript{181} Or, conceived along the lines of Hegel’s highly influential critique of the in-built limits with which the Kantian cognition had to operate, the positing of each phenomenon is also, simultaneously, a positing of a noumenon which goes beyond the phenomenon itself: “The noumenon is not something separate from the phenomenon, but part and parcel of its essence; and it is within the mind that realities outside or beyond the mind are “posited.”” Jameson, \textit{The Hegel Variations}, pp. 29; on the limitations inherent to a logical reading of the Hegelian transformation of quantity into quality, see Lukács, \textit{The Ontology of Social Being}, I, pp. 103-104.

\textsuperscript{182} Hegel’s rebuttal of jurist and romantic reactionary Karl Ludwig von Haller’s revamped use of the doctrine ‘might makes right’ is a case in point that involves one of the few direct criticisms that takes place in \textit{The Philosophy of Right}: “The historical origin of the judge and his court may have had the form of a particular relationship or of force or free choice; but this makes no difference to the concept of the thing. To regard the introduction of a legal system as no more than an optional act of grace or
“The one thing needed to achieve scientific progress – and it is essential to make an effort at gaining this quite simple insight into it – is the recognition of the logical principle that negation is equally positive, or that what is self-contradictory does not resolve itself into a nullity, into abstract nothingness, but essentially only into the negation of its particular content; or that such a negation is not just negation, but is the negation of the determined fact which is resolved, and is therefore determinate negation; that in the result there is therefore contained in essence that from which the result drives – a tautology indeed, since the result would otherwise be something immediate and not a result. Because the result, the negation, is a determinate negation, it has a content. It is a new concept but one higher and richer than the preceding – richer because it negates or opposes the preceding and therefore contains it, and it contains even more than that, for it is the unity of itself and its opposite.— It is above all in this way that the system of concepts is to be erected – and it has to come to completion in an unstoppable and pure progression that admits of nothing extraneous.”

The inner contradictions of the singular are thus carried to their logical conclusion by their resolution into a content that is determinate only in so far as it runs through the particularities whose constituents are nothing other than the singularities themselves. The three totalities that make up the nodal points of the logical nexus are thus utilized as spheres of determinate signification in which the in-itself comprehends that the attainment of its liberating self-recognition can only be actualized if its determinateness, i.e., for-itself, is construed in conjunction with that which posits itself, i.e., for-another. The logical ties that bind each and every singular together through space and time is preconceived in the respective totalities that each matter partakes of. The historical conditionality that accompanies the unified conception of the three totalities is only surpassed in its diachronic association with other conditionalities, breathing logical life into the dictum, natura non facit saltus in proscribing any attempt to confuse the ethics of Sophocles’ Antigone that is epitomized in the latter’s heeding of the divine commandment with Herr von Haller’s blatant disregard for the intrinsic rationality of favour on the part of monarchs and governments (as Herr von Haller does in his Restoration of Political Science) is a piece of the mere thoughtlessness which has no inkling of the point at issue in a discussion of law and the state. The point is that legal and political institutions are rational and therefore necessary in and for themselves, and the question of the form in which they arose or were introduced is irrelevant to a consideration of their rational basis.” Hegel, The Philosophy of Right, pp. 208; cf. Karl Popper, The Open Society, and its Enemies, II (London, 1966), pp. 41.


184 Yet the Versöhnung, i.e., ‘reconciliation,’ in question is never a linear one that is logical to the full extent which would effectively transform history into a mere footnote. On that note, I follow Lukács and Jameson in regard to their point that even at his most generalising and careless, as in the notes assembled together by the students from his lectures on the philosophy of history, Hegel’s logicism never takes on an overweening character that could conjure past events practically on whim. Fredric Jameson, ‘Of Islands and Trenches’, in Ideologies of Theory: Essays 1971-1986, Volume II: Syntax of History, pp. 90; Fredric Jameson, Postmodernism, or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism, (London, 1991), pp. 334-335; Georg Lukács, ‘Balzac: Lost Illusions’, in Studies in European Realism, (New York, 1964), pp. 63.

the modern, e.g., Prussian, institutions in the name of ordinances of God safeguarding the interests of the mighty from the intervention of the less well-off.\textsuperscript{186}

Further, the internal synchronicity of the singular needs to be taken in its comprehensive relation not only with other singularities but also with the other two totalities since only in their community can the movements of Spirit be conceived. The propositions that convey an ossified understanding of quantities or qualities, by contrast, betray their ahistorical roots in propagating images of abstract particularities and universalities that amount to nothingness in their fully abstract and rigid conceptions.\textsuperscript{187} The apparent selfsameness of any absolutized quality signals, as such, its evident lack of its Notion whence the movement between the in-itself and its opposite are thrown into the dustbin along with the Spirit, a manoeuvre which, in effect, turns their abstract opposition into mere suspended moments capable of full bloom only in their connection. The positedness of the singular in-itself that risks being conceived as frozen in the context of phenomenal abstractions of ‘sameness,’ ‘difference,’ ‘identicalness,’ etc., can only be overcome if its momentary suspension is predicated upon its communality.\textsuperscript{188}


\textsuperscript{187} Contrary to Fichte’s stretching of the limits of the Kantian transcendental subject to the point of positing an I that effectively creates the whole universe, Hegel always appears to have conceived of the activity realising the permanent interconnection between objectivity and subjectivity as a moment rather than a constitutive experience: Lukács, \textit{The Ontology of Social Being}, I, pp. 79.

\textsuperscript{188} The intrinsic transitivity of apparent binaries is exemplified by Hegel in the context of goodness and evil as an apt case for demonstration: “If Evil is the same as Goodness, then Evil is just not Evil, nor Goodness Good; on the contrary, both are suspended moments–Evil in general is self-centered being-for-self, and Goodness is what is simple and without a self. When thus expressed in terms of their Notion, their unity is at once evident; for self-centered being-for-self is simple knowing, and simple [being] that lacks a Self is equally pure self-centered being-for-self. If, therefore, it must be said, that according to this their Notion, Good and Evil, i.e., in so far as they are \textit{not} Good and Evil, are the \textit{same}, it must also no less emphatically be asserted that they are \textit{not} the same, but are \textit{utterly} different; for simple being-for-self, or pure knowing too, is each in its own self equally pure negativity or absolute difference. The whole is only complete when the two propositions are made together, and when the first is asserted and maintained, it must be countered by clinging to the other with invincible stubbornness. Since both are equally right, they are both equally wrong, and the mistake consists in taking such abstract forms as ‘the same’ and ‘not the same’, ‘identity’ and ‘non-identity’, to be something true, fixed, and actual, and in resting on them. Neither the one nor the other has truth; the truth is just their movement in which simple sameness is an abstraction and hence absolute difference, but this, as difference in itself, is distinguished from itself and is therefore selfsameness.” Hegel, \textit{Phenomenology of Spirit}, pp. 472-3; cf. “Geist ist dann nicht das Fundamentum, das der Subjektivität des Selbst im Selbstbewußtsein zugrunde liegt, sondern das Medium, in dem ein Ich mit einem anderen Ich kommuniziert und aus dem, als einer absoluten Vermittlung, beide zu Subjekten wechselseitig sich erst bilden.” Habermas, \textit{Technik und Wissenschaft als 'Ideologie'}, pp. 13.
Taken in abstract, i.e., sans historical relationality, all the qualifiers betray their precarious roots in designating objects that appear to correspond to them no less than to their opposites. Indeed, without the hither and tither that is the predicate of their Notion, they are metonyms at most, reflecting their lack of content in the relativistic realm of sense-perception recurring significant furore against anything that invokes the Mneme as the everlasting muse of conceptual recollection. The measure of the unequivocal is the movement that eludes any fixating gaze that is darted at it. The singular instances of goodness can only be rendered intelligible by their hyperbolic vacillation against their opposite, i.e., vileness; whilst the totalities that are brought to bear on the individual act are made up of the constant interplay between the quantity and the quality on one level; and the logical back and forth between the singular, the particular, and the universal on another, with mediation tying the Gordian knot at precisely the point where the blurry demarcations setting one in-itself against its opposite are the thinnest.189 The constant to and fro that is wrought on the singular, on this view, is the ground on which sublimated determinateness enters into the realm of absolute freedom, animating the external life in the realm of objectivity and the idea in the totality of the concept, both of which, taken separately, give rise to utter unintelligibility. This realm of absolute freedom denoting the consummation of the circular movement of the absolute Idea is Chorus’ rebuttal of Creon’s lament as the concluding note of the Antigone: “Of happiness, far the greatest part | Is wisdom, and reverence towards the gods. | Proud words of the arrogant man, in the end, | Meet punishment, great as his pride was great, | Till at last he is schooled in wisdom.”190 The tearing apart of Creon’s life, with his son and wife having taken their own lives while cursing his name, and the chaotic ebb in which the bereaved Creon meets the look of disdain that is in the eye of his former pride and fortune is thus rendered purposeful as the just retribution for his former transgressions that had accosted the gods. Idea’s internal rest takes place in a field that is perforated with the unending struggle of the totalities to proliferate their negations in order to attain the pure conceptuality that is expressed in sphere of absolute knowing.191

189 That is not to say, of course, that dialectical thought moves in circles within a self-same plane of logic. Hegel’s logicised transitions between categories is an analytical tool that can never oblige higher sublations to neatly decompose into their erstwhile constituents. The higher reality, irreducible in its being, can only ever move forward without ever renouncing its autonomy: “In a truly dialectical theory, such as historical materialism, phenomena derive from each other dialectically: there are different configurations of dialectical reality, and each of these configurations is rigorously conditioned by the previous one, while preserving and superseding it at the same time. This supersession is, however, precisely irreducible. While one configuration may preserve another, it can never simply be reduced to its predecessor.” Jean-Paul Sartre, ‘The Itinerary of a Thought’, in Between Existentialism and Marxism, pp. 39.

190 Sophocles, Antigone, 1348-52.

191 “The idea, namely, in positing itself as the absolute unity of the pure concept and its reality and thus collecting itself in the immediacy of being, is in this form as totality – nature. – This determination, however, is nothing that has become, is not a transition, as was the case above when the subjective
The extrapolation of the concept of the universal in the general corpus of Hegelian works that we have thus far scrutinized conveys a gallery of other conceptualizations that invite us to construe an understanding of the conceptual offshoots of Hegelian universalism by using this gallery to our advantage. Following is a series of propositions through which we will attempt to work out a way to examine the possibility of offering an admittedly stretched, in its congruence to an existentialist rethinking, albeit to the minimal extent, definition of Hegelian universalism.

(I) The universal is a logico-ontological concept that corresponds to the self-identical in its purest postulation.

(II) The universal is a dynamic concept that is predicated upon entrenched ties to the concept of totality.

(III) The dynamicity of the universal as a concept is directly linked with the dynamicity of the concepts of the singular and the particular.

(IV) The dynamicity of the three concepts is made manifest through the concept of negation.

(V) The established links between the singular, the particular and the universal alludes to the concept of becoming as it pertains to individual subjects.

(VI) Historical configurations determine how the positedness of any singular and its reciprocal sublation with its counterposing particular and universal is to take place.

(VII) The actualization of the historical configurations within a predefined setting opposes the absolutisation of any positedness or self-identicality as the ultimate.

(VIII) The self-conscious movement of concepts in and through their conglomerations with one another is the embodiment of the Spirit, whose Becoming turns the hitherto vacillating coexistence of concepts in its spatio-temporally located fragments, i.e., History, into “a slow-moving succession of Spirits, a gallery of images, each of which, endowed with all the riches of Spirit, moves thus slowly..."
just because the Self has to penetrate and digest this entire wealth of its substance.”

It is our contention that the first four propositions cover up the groundwork of the concept of the universal in its relation to the singular and the particular, thereby allowing us to derive the fifth and sixth propositions from them. Negation as the movement from the determinate content to determinateness itself and vice versa, for one, harks back to the movement between pure being and pure nothing that dissolves immediacies and posits being as an essentially transitive concept. Likewise, the historical configurations that appear to have been brought to the fore out of the blue can be seen to reside within the concepts of totality and negation already in their respective conceptions. The three totalities, in any event, are intertwined with the concepts of space and time as they configure the potentialities with which each historical locale is bestowed. Bequeathing distinctive marks of historicity, the spatio-temporal specificity of concepts serves as the historical bases of their development, marring the pure abstractions with former expansions and contractions that the concept had hitherto endured. The same line of reasoning is also of service when we consider the relation of the seventh proposition as another corollary. The constant historical movement of the three totalities, for one, appears to refute any attempt to construe an ultimate universality or singularity, which are equivalents of one another when they are taken in absentia, as a timeless determinate in-and-for-itself. Relating those three totalities to one another is the Hegelian conception of mediation, aiming at the attainment of a higher unity in order to overturn the element of self-destructivity that is inherent to any moment that is taken by itself and to render it capable of effecting a reconciliation. Harmless in its appearance, that mediation, as Lukács pointed out as early as in the 1930s, signals an uneasy balance between a construal of philosophy as the understanding of the historical present and that of unearthing the ground rules by which any

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192 Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, pp. 492.
194 Shedding light on the travails of the concept is thus reminiscent of Hegel’s treatment of the disfigured permanence of the spirit that is eternally present only in its progressive, and hence historical, embodiments: “Nothing in the past is lost for it [philosophy], for the Idea is ever present; Spirit is immortal; with it there is no past, no future, but an essential now. This necessarily implies that the present form of Spirit comprehends within it all earlier steps. These have indeed unfolded themselves in succession independently; but what Spirit is it has always been essentially; distinctions are only the development of this essential nature. The life of the ever present Spirit is a circle of progressive embodiments, which looked at in one aspect still exist beside each other, and only as looked at from another point of view appear as past. The grades which Spirit seems to have left behind it, it still possesses in the depths of its present.” Hegel, *Philosophy of History*, pp. 79.
historical change needs to abide. And as any reader of both the earlier and later works of Hegel could opine, there is a remarkable shift from the former standpoint toward its later well-nigh dismissal, which would later go on to induce myriads of attempts, with an ever-increasing price to pay, to sever any notion of a Hegelian identity of history and logic.\textsuperscript{197} The ever-shifting quest for the attainment of Absolute Knowing precludes any attempt to essentialize the eternal present in contradistinction to its fleeting qualities. Amid the historical change exist only Camus’ \textit{Le premier homme} in his determinate singularity, yearning to live in a land untouched by his forefathers despite its belonging to a past that is just as unrecognizably scorched as the rest of it.\textsuperscript{198} Yet, there is an undeniably different side to the qualitative leap that one is to take from the Hegelian Spirit to Camus’ \textit{Le Premier Homme}: the latter, as figuratively out of time as it may be, is still temporally located in his determinateness of human existence, an existence that is built on top of mass murders, torture, rapes and ‘punitive measures’ of similar nature that washed away the pre-colonial lay of the land, but could not touch the lay of the mind that saw the re-enactment of lordship and bondage in the 1950s and on behalf of ‘\textit{la mission civilisatrice}'. The timelessness of the Hegelian Spirit, on the other hand, can only be conceived in Hegelian terms if its own \textit{mission civilisatrice} is excavated:

\textbf{“The goal, Absolute Knowing, or Spirit that knows itself as Spirit, has for its path the recollection of the Spirits as they are in themselves and as they accomplish the organization of their realm. Their preservation, regarded from the side of their free existence appearing in the form of contingency, is History; but regarded from the side of their [philosophically] comprehended organization, it is the Science of Knowing in the sphere of appearance: the two together, comprehended History, form alike the inwardizing and the Calvary of absolute Spirit, the actuality, truth, and certainty of his throne, without which he would be lifeless and alone.”}\textsuperscript{199}

Beholding the heart of the matter, we see History as the free materialization of Spirit in-itself linked to the scientific comprehension of its determinateness with other such manifestations as constituting History qua the Absolute Spirit that is self-conscious of its erstwhile

\textsuperscript{197} “Die geisteswissenschaftliche Historiographie verweigert sich dieser Erkenntnis der Einheit von Historischem und Logischem. Der Preis ist hoch, den sie dafür zahlt: der Preis ist die Scheinaporie der Zirkelhaftigkeit historischen Verstehens, der apriorischen Vorurteilsbefangenheit des Geschichtsbewußtseins, das – angekettet an die Erkenntnisinteressen der Gegenwart – zu keinen objektiven Aussagen über die Geschichte gelangt; der Preis ist entweder die Flucht in die Faktographie der Siegesschlagungen, der Kriege und Verträge, oder in die Biographie der Sieger und der Krieger, oder in den Skeptizismus völliger Geschichtslosigkeit.” Sandkühler, \textit{Praxis und Geschichtsbewußtsein}, pp. 39; Hegel’s growing fascination with dialectical logic also played a vital part in his gradual normative slide towards the prioritisation of intellectual over manual labour. Playing ever wistfully to the age-old Aristotelian anti-banausic tune, the imperturbable science of logic was meant, as skilfully drawn out by Sohn-Rethel, to serve as the ultimate coronation of substantiative philosophy: Sohn-Rethel, \textit{Geistige und körperliche Arbeit}, pp. 9.

\textsuperscript{198} Albert Camus, \textit{Le premier homme}, (Paris, 1994).

\textsuperscript{199} Hegel, \textit{Phenomenology of Spirit}, pp. 493.
actualizations.\(^{200}\) Connecting this with the goal of Absolute Knowing we are but one step away from the eight proposition and its conceptualization of History as the mouthpiece of Spirit. That one step is nothing other than the presupposed purposiveness of the Spirit as the principle guiding history to its eventual culmination, i.e., telos. The foremost point to note, in that vein, is that a telos conceived as the goal of Spirit’s movement, i.e., its transformation into the immovable, is a contradiction in terms not only in its incompatibility with propositions six and seven, but also with the fact that the dialectical unity of being and its approximation, i.e., concept, necessitates the eternal movement of Spirits-in-themselves. The unity of the external object and its positedness in the higher unity of the concept that is in-and-for-itself is possible only if the Spirit in-itself is allowed to shed its own determinate wrappings in order to find its positedness vis-à-vis the Absolute Spirit, whose eternity is thereby also shed in that its existence would be null and void without the vestiges of the former.\(^{201}\) The telos pertaining to the dialectical reason does not appear, as such, to subscribe to any kind of mechanical teleology that would deface the operations of Spirit just as much as those of History as the realm of contingency. Indeed, Hegel’s treatment of teleology in his Science of Logic is quite adamant in his firm rebuttal of mechanism as the opposite of teleology.\(^{202}\) Mechanism is the purposiveness qua mere necessity wanting of any change that is incurred in the content of the object of change; teleology, au contraire, generates a sphere of reciprocal determinateness that leads the content to its future within the realm of contingency.\(^{203}\) Corresponding to a higher construal of conceptual change, teleology elaborates the determinate in order for it to partake of its determinateness while reserving its singular in-itself qualities.\(^{204}\) The teleological unity

\(^{200}\) An interesting point to note, in that vein, is Hegel’s conception of the world historical individual whose self-conscious acts aid the advancement of reason often in the most remarkable of ways. As the harbingers of particular societies’ potential for self-determination serve as the individual handmaiden of Spirit, finding a timely manifestation in the person of Napoleon, in whose celebration, according to Lukács, Hegel wrote his Phenomenology of Spirit: “The Phenomenology of Mind, completed at the time of the Battle of Jena, makes the French Revolution and the new bourgeois society it had created the climax of modern history and allot to the Germans the task of constructing an ideology appropriate to the new conditions—i.e., ‘power-protected inwardness’ plus the guarantee of those political and social reforms which Napoleon, the ‘great constitutional lawyer’, as Hegel later called him, was to introduce, against the wishes of the princes of the Rhine Confederation.” Georg Lukács, ‘In Search of Bourgeois Man’, in Essays on Thomas Mann, trans. by Stanley Mitchell, (London, 1979), pp. 28; Lukács, The Young Hegel, pp. 101, 137, 141.


\(^{203}\) The mechanistic necessity in question does not prevent, of course, a reading of necessity into history. Yet, the further one proceeds along that course, the dimmer grows the self-conscious light of an externally imposed dialectics that is used to unveil the multi-dimensionalities of historical events: Jameson, ‘Architecture and the Critique of Ideology’, in Ideologies of Theory, II, pp. 41; cf. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, pp. 250.

\(^{204}\) “Now purposiveness presents itself from the first as something of a generally higher nature, as an intelligence that externally determines the manifoldness of objects through a unity that exists in and for itself, so that the indifferent determinacies of the objects become essential by virtue of this connection.
of the concept and its content via the mediation of historical development, therefore, is a step above and beyond the mere external determining of mechanism. Reconciling the indifferent content and the formal change enacted by mechanism, Hegel’s postulation of teleology is predicated upon purposiveness that is unified with its object in its own realization. Conceived as the acme of the absolute idealism, the fusion of purpose with its objective being perils the vanishing of the latter as a mere instant of positedness that is an integral capacity of the concept of purpose pertinent to the Spirit:

“Consequently, the movement of purpose can now be expressed as being directed at sublating its presupposition, that is, the immediacy of the object, and at positing it as determined by the concept. This negative relating to the object is equally a negative attitude towards itself, a sublating of the subjectivity of purpose, namely the unification of the objective being with it, so that this being, which as a moment of purpose is immediately the determinateness identical with it, shall be as external determinateness, and conversely the objective, as presupposition, shall be posited rather as determined by the concept.”

By sublating its unification with the external object, the dialectical movement of purpose transforms the object by the act of positing that holds together all the determinateness it has hitherto underwent thereby resolving the immediacy of the former in the purposive positedness of its own. History, in that event, is turned into a gallery of images of the Absolute Spirit whose contingent apparitions, i.e., historically conceived Spirits in-themselves, relate to it in their self-inflicted gradual resolutions toward the attainment of a totality that was enacted by the purposive sublation of each image. Spirit’s becoming conscious in and of itself, therefore,

In mechanism they become so through the mere form of necessity that leaves their content indifferent, for they are supposed to remain external and only the understanding as such is expected to find satisfaction by recognizing its principle of union, the abstract identity. In teleology, on the contrary, the content becomes important, for teleology presupposes a concept, something determined in and for itself and consequently self-determining, and has therefore extracted from the connection of differences and their reciprocal determinateness, from the form, a unity that is reflected into itself, something that is determined in and for itself and is consequently a content.” Hegel, Science of Logic, pp. 653.


Adorno’s point against the oft-repeated equation of Spirit with society, which is largely based on the later Lectures on the Philosophy of History, that the interpretation does not speak to the content, if not the letter, of Hegel’s continued attempts to grasp the truth content of any concept should, of course, be kept in mind: “The interpretation of spirit as society, accordingly, appears to be … incompatible with the sense of Hegel’s philosophy if only because it does not satisfy the precept of immanent criticism and attempts to grasp the truth content of Hegelian philosophy in terms of something external to it, something that his philosophy, within its own framework, would have derived as conditioned or posited.” Adorno, Hegel, pp. 19; cf. Jameson, The Hegel Variations, pp. 51.

Although I partially concur with Jameson’s caution against construing the Absolute Spirit as bearing any kind of trace of a “moment,” historical, methodological or else, I think that assuming away the element of abstraction to which the Hegelian philosophy ultimately draws near involves a bit more of reading Hegel against himself than reiterating, however vital, Lukács’ earlier stress on the Hegelian distinction of Verstand from Vernunft: cf. Jameson, The Hegel Variations, pp. 1-2; Jameson, Late Marxism, pp. 237; Lukács, The Ontology of Social Being, I, pp. 76-79; cf. “With the concept of
corresponds to a higher degree of sublation involving the concepts that are derived from the original sublation of singulars, particulars, and universals through the initial movement of Spirit-in-itself or scientific knowledge that is yet to achieve the status of Absolute Knowing. With the recognition of the travails of its subject matter (Gegenstand) in a predefined historical specificity, the movement of the subject matter through time and space is rationalized and thereby ratiocinated as its contingent determinateness is externalized allowing its concept to be sublated in the purposive movement of the Absolute Spirit alone. Harking back to the conceptual separation of intelligibility-to-us and intelligibility-in-itself that was made earlier by Aristotle, the Absolute Spirit assigns signification and course to the incessant movement that typifies historical process as a whole. Purposiveness that is embedded in the Absolute Spirit thus functions as the comprehensive totality that refurbishes the signification that was initially lost to contingencies in their partaking of the individual Spirits-in-themselves. The underlying import of this eightfold elaboration of the Hegelian concept of the universal will become clear as we follow its thread further into Marx and Engels’ approach to the question. For now, however, we would like to sojourn for a brief while in another theoretical domain of chief import for the dialectical materialist epistemology of Marx and Engels: Aristotle. Indeed, it is apt to recall at this point that the incessant dynamicity of Hegelian concepts draws their theoretical vindication from the erstwhile precursory formulations through Aristotle’s twin pillars of Physics and Metaphysics. Further, given the aforementioned metahistorical grounds that support the foundations of Hegelian dialectics in its theoretical culmination of Absolute Knowledge, the Aristotelian premise of the necessary existence of a prime mover whence originate all movement appears to be in dire need of elucidation. This theoretical passage, we contend, will not only provide us with the necessary understanding pertaining to the conceptual origins of some of the chief Marxian theoretical dualisms, such as essence and appearance, but will also warrant our eventual attempts at delineation of the sphere of each determinate negation Hegel gave prominence to an element which distinguishes enlightenment from the positivist decay to which he consigned it. However, by finally postulating the known result of the whole process of negation, totality in the system and in history, as the absolute, he violated the prohibition and himself succumbed to mythology.” Adorno and Horkheimer, ‘The Concept of Enlightenment’, pp. 18.

210 “An aspect under which it might well be fruitful to treat the history of modern philosophy is how it managed to cope with the antagonism of statics and dynamics in its systems. The Hegelian system in itself was not a true becoming; implicitly, each single definition in it was already preconceived. Such safeguards condemn it to untruth. Unconsciously, so to speak, consciousness would have to immerse itself in the phenomena on which it takes a stand. This would, of course, effect a qualitative change in dialectics. Systematic unanimity would crumble.” Adorno, Negative Dialectics, pp. 27; cf. Lukács, ‘What Is Orthodox Marxism’, pp. 16-20; Georg Lukács, ‘Class Consciousness’, in History and Class Consciousness, pp. 77.


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precedent theoretical influence as we claim that Marx and Engels achieved a lot more than simple twists and turns of the hitherto extant dialectics and mechanical materialism.

2.2 Aristotle and the Preponderance of a Dunamis Ensouled

The Aristotelian concept of change, which is part and parcel of the Hegelian understanding of the universal and its relation to historical movement, serves as the stepping stone for an understanding of change as conceived though the spectacles of dialectical reason. Aristotle defines change as “the actuality of that which exists potentially, in so far as it is potentially this actuality.” Its tautological resonances laid aside, any change, on this view, is predicated upon the existence of the capability to undergo the change in question that is required of the object on one level; and the capability to effect change that denotes the ability to induce mutability on another. Both the object and the subject of change, therefore, are presupposed to act within a determinate sphere of reciprocal inducement circumscribing the potential avenues of change through which their unity in change can traverse its course. Directly related to the final cause as it was conceived by Aristotle, the determinate construal of change resonated with his view that, “What a thing is and its purpose are the same, and the original source of change is, in terms of form, the same as these two: after all, it is man who generates a man.”

The unity of the end, i.e., purpose, and the beginning, i.e., cause, of the entity in motion grounds change within the plane of nature (phasis) according to which the individual

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214 “Everything that causes change is changed, as I stated earlier, as long as it is capable of change, and as long as it is at rest when not changing…. For to act on something changeable, in so far as it is changeable, is precisely to change it, and it takes contact to do this, so the agent of change is also acted on at the same time.” *Ibid.*, 202a3-6.

215 “A fourth way in which the word [cause] is used is for the end. This is what something is for, as health, for example, may be what walking is for. If asked, ‘Why is he walking?’ we reply, ‘To get healthy’, and in saying this we mean to explain the cause of his walking.” *Ibid.*, 194b32-36; cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 1013a–1013b; a congruent philosophical appraisal of the concept of telos can also be glanced through the analytical lens that Aristotle grinded in his attempt of dividing rhetorical discourse into three genres principally on the basis of the peculiarities of the audience. After all, it is “the audience that gives a speech its end.” Aristotle, *The Art of Rhetoric*, trans. by Robin Waterfield, (Oxford and New York, 2018), 1358b1-2.


217 The plane in question can be viewed as possessing all the conceptual configurations that are related to an aristocratised space of phusis à la Deleuze and Guattari. And though we will have plenty of occasions to conjure away any lingering doubts as to the plausibility of making such a claim either in the archaic or the classical Greek world, it should still be pointed out that no later than at the end of the
case of change, either in its conformity or in its deviation, is defined. If change is actualized in accord with the nature of the entity in question it is designated kata phusin or labelled simply as natural (phuseil/phusikos); whereas, if the change was actualized against a contrary disposition of the entity, i.e., against its phusis, it would be dubbed either as forced (biài) or contrary to nature (para phusin). The nature of an entity is explained by Aristotle in two interrelated ways in allusion to the unnatural things with the essential difference setting the former apart from the latter being “each of the natural ones contains within itself a source of change and of stability, in respect of either movement or increase and decrease or alteration.” The respective origins of movement, quantitative and qualitative change are hence located within the nature of the thing that grants it a certain measure of stability that is explained in regard to both states, i.e., motion and rest. Things with nature are substantial things underpinned by their own natural properties pertaining to different types of change. Secondly, things with nature are separated from things without nature in their characteristic possession of an end-point towards which the entity grows: “Moreover, ‘nature’ in the sense of process is a passage towards nature.” The natural movement of the principal elements, such as earth’s downward, i.e., centripetal, movement when left without support or fire’s upward, i.e., centrifugal, movement when it is not subject to any force, therefore, signals a point of intersection at which the substantial entities are connected with sublunar elements in their approximations to natural places of rest leading to the naturalization of different types of motion. The specific potentialities with which an entity is endowed thus dictate the eventual set of outcomes that are prone to take place as the actualization of the former occurs.

sixth century there materialised a veritable watershed of linguistic transformation in which even the most commonplace of terms, e.g., kalon, agathon, kakon, etc. came to be seen in distinctly aristocratic lights. Deleuze and Guattari, What Is Philosophy?, pp. 19-20. Aristotle, Parva Naturalia, in On the Soul and Other Psychological Works, 478b22-29, 479a33-479b3.

Aristotle, Physics, 192b14-16; cf. Aristotle, On the Soul, 406a4-406a27. Cf. “In addition, a thing’s activity originates in the form by which it actually exists: behind activity always lies actuality. So the way agents have form determines the way they are active. Thus, from forms that are in agents but not from them, there issues activity of which its agent is not master.” Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, trans. by Timothy McDermott, in Aquinas: Selected Philosophical Writings, (Oxford and New York, 2008), 2.47.

Aristotle, Politics, 1252a24-1252a34; cf. Ibid, 1324b22-1324b41.
Substance’s relation to telos is hence utilized to bestow priority on necessary actuality over potentiality as the defining feature of the entity that precedes the accidentalness that is prone to unify any other connotative attributes: “The fact is that a thing’s active function is its end, and its actuality is its active function. Hence, indeed, the very name, actuality [energeia], has an account based on the active function [ergon], which is extended to the entelechy [entelecheia].”

Hinting at more than mere wordplay, the conception of energeia as being-in-actuality of a determinate entity demonstrates Aristotle’s derivation and the subsequent coinage of entelecheia not only as being-at-an-end from its root telos, but also as connoting continuity that takes its cue from endelecheia, i.e., persistence. Entelecheia’s adjective form is thereby consummated with the verb exein, “to be” or “to remain” in order to fuse the everyday meaning of entele, “grown”, “complete”, etc., with the sense of a continuous state, i.e., completeness or finality. Entelecheia is substance and form condensed in energeia, the actuality that pumps blood to the life and limb of the substance that precedes any meta-creative capacity that can be rendered as the due potency of dunamis:

“So, for all cases in which there is some other product over and above the mere employment of the potentiality, the actuality resides in what is made (with the act of building residing in the thing being built and the act of weaving in the thing being woven, etc., always the process residing in the thing being processed). And in cases in which there is no other function over and above the actuality the actuality resides in the subjects, seeing in the see-er, theorizing in the theorizer.... I think that all this makes it pretty clear that the substance and the form are actuality. And the argument also suffices to show that actuality has substantial priority over potentiality and also, as we have said, one actuality always has temporal priority over another, going back to that which always, and in a primary way, initiates process.”

The actuality of motion in general and developmental change in particular thus serve as the élán vital of entities encompassing both those with substance and with others that lack it. Actuality of change, whether observed in objects in their natural movements or in their activities of change, whether observed in objects in their natural movements or in their

223 Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1050a21-23; Aristotle, On the Soul, 415a17-20; a remarkably similar take on the primacy of action in the context of the classical Attic tragedy, for example, is offered by Aristotle in his Poetics on the grounds that, “Tragedy is a representation not of persons but of action and life, and happiness and unhappiness consist in action. The point is action, not character: it is their moral status that gives people the character they have, but it is their actions that make them happy or unhappy.” Aristotle, Poetics, 1450a15-20.

224 A fitting example of Aristotle’s use of the concept as denoting completeness and boundedness in opposition to infinity takes place in the third book of Physics. In construing teleios as a thing that achieves its purpose, Aristotle posits it against an infinite (apeiron) thing and argues that action corresponds to the motion of the thing towards its end that is dubbed teleia when the thing’s purpose is fulfilled: Aristotle, Physics, 207a7.

225 Energeia’s root ergonó is work or deed; likewise, aktó is the root of energon rendered in common parlance as preoccupied, at work.

movements that are not in harmony with their specific natures, therefore, presupposes the potentiality of oppositional manifestations that are liable to transpire depending on how \textit{energeia} takes place. The relation that is purported to exist between form (\textit{eidos} or \textit{morphê}) and its privation fans the flames of the Aristotelian argument that whatever does not participate in its proper form can be relegated into the sphere of the corresponding privation without any resort to oppositional specificities. Further, postulating locomotion, i.e., spatial movement, as the primary kind of change generating all other kinds Aristotle accentuates the opposition between form and privation in his claim that those entities that are capable of movement have attained their natures more completely:

“Now, the last thing gained by everything which is in the process of coming into being is movement. This is why although some living things (such as plants and a number of kinds of animals) lack what it takes to move and are utterly immobile, others—the ones which have attained completion—do have the ability to move. And so, if movement belongs more to things which have more completely attained their nature, then this kind of change must be prior to all the other kinds in terms of form.”

According to this hierarchical pyramid of substance, motion (\textit{kinêsis}), is the proof of participation in a higher degree of being-in-actuality. Coupled with the ensuing coronation of circular movement as the only type of movement that is continuous and eternal, and with the construal of the eternal first mover as the unchanged origin of each particular type of change, actuality is utilized by Aristotle as the yardstick of truthfulness dissipating any clouds of doubt lingering over the identification of particular features with respect to the finite scales of his categories.

227 The example of a lever given by Aristotle in \textit{Physics} is a case in point in illustrating the reconciliation of the subject and the object of action in their relations to their respective natures. To that end, a lever applies the extra force accumulated by the leverage mechanism in moving weights that it naturally, i.e., by itself, could not budge. Aristotle, \textit{Physics}, 255a18-24; For a comparison of the natural movement of entities and the natural disposition for the ethical beings, one needs to revisit Aristotle’s derivation of happiness from being in compliance with one’s own nature in one’s actions: “And what we said before will apply now: that which is proper to each thing is by nature best and most pleasant for each thing; for man, therefore, the life according to reason is best and pleasantest, since reason more than anything else is man. This life is also the happiest.” Aristotle, \textit{Nicomachean Ethics}, 1178a5-10.

228 “It has been said, then, in general what the soul is: it is the substance corresponding to the account, and this is the essence of a particular sort of body. It is just as if some tool, for example an axe, were a natural body: the being of the axe would be its substance, and this would be its soul; and if this had been separated from it, it would no longer be an axe, except in a homonymous way. But, in fact, it is an axe; for the soul is not the essence and account of this sort of body, but instead it belongs to a particular sort of natural body that possesses a principle of movement and standing within itself.” Aristotle, \textit{On the Soul}, in \textit{On the Soul and Other Psychological Works}, trans. by Fred D. Miller, Jr., (Oxford and New York, 2018), 412b10-17.

229 For a detailed account given of different types of privation, see Aristotle, \textit{Metaphysics}, 1022b-1023a.


vigour, Aristotle’s ranking actuality above potentiality as the preferred tool of trade of the logician qua metaphysician finds its sublime expression in the *escamotage* that is initiated by the ‘unmoved mover’ or the first principle of movement upon which every other kind is predicated without any risk of falling prey to infinite regress.

The potential logical transitivity between the possession and privation of some quality, in that vein, is utilized as the driving force of Aristotle’s argument that actualization of individual states and scientific knowledge alike can precede the former as the manifestation of change whose logical roots are traced back to the first agent of change giving rise to potentialities only as ramifications of its being the origin of *energeia* qua being-in-actuality. Portraying the actual as signifying the genesis of change, and movement by implication, regardless of how remote the movement in question may be from its original harbinger, Aristotle opposes it to the countless abstract possibilities signalling the designation of the former as the nucleus of being-in-potentiality. Relativism imbibed by trenchant potentialities that beleaguer the basic intelligibility of movement in their gale force is thus subdued by putting the latter on the short leash of attaining determinateness only in their actualization, i.e., negation of abstraction. Heralding the prime mover as the catalyst of change and caretaker of potentiality, Aristotle thus substantiated his logical bestowal of anteriority to actuality over potentiality with the doctrine of divisibility postulating that the changing object, the time, the change, and the scope of change are all subject to divisibility.

The point to note is that this necessary divisibility of the changing object does not reach what can be called, according to Aristotle, its Heraclitan conclusion if one were to argue for the

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233 “The way to deal with anyone basing his opinion on this sort of consideration [on the argument that nothing comes from nothing, therefore, what is in existence must have had a former existence of everything that constitutes it including its negation] is as follows. They should be told that in a way they are right and in a way wrong. That which is is spoken of in two ways, so that there is a way in which it is possible for something to come to be from that which is not and a way in which it is not possible. By the same token, the same thing can be both a thing that is and a thing that is not, only not in the same respect. In potentiality, a single thing can be simultaneous opposites. In actuality, however, it cannot.” Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 1009a-1009b.

234 “The point is that it is impossible for there to be an infinite series of agents of change which are themselves changed by something else, because an infinite series has no first term. Therefore, if everything that changes is changed by something, and if the first agent is changed, but not by something other than itself, it necessarily follows that it is changed by itself.” Aristotle, *Physics*, 256a8-21; cf. Cicero, *The Republic*, 6.27; Lukács, *The Ontology of Social Being*, III, pp. 9; Eco, *Kant and the Platypus*, pp. 25; contra Meikle, *Essentialism in the Thought of Karl Marx*, pp. 21-22, 169 ff.

235 “Everything that changes is necessarily divisible. For every change has a starting-point and an endpoint, and when something—the thing itself and all its parts—is at the end-point of its change, it is no longer changing, and when it is at the starting-point of its change, it is not yet changing, because anything which remains the same in itself and in its parts is not changing. It necessarily follows, therefore, that part of the changing object is at the one point and part is at the other point.” Aristotle, *Physics*, 324b10-21.
infinite divisibility of any mutable object. Object’s divisibility, as such, can only take place within the limits of change as it pertains to the continuity with which the prime mover changes itself by the strength of its own sources. The quasi-metaphysically sustained permanence of the first agent of change is thus conceived of as the root and branch of the suspension of not only potentiality but also divisibility of change tout court with regard to their respective determinateness. This opposition between infinite divisibility and continuity betrays the logical snake biting its own tail as the purportedly logical category of prime mover is thereby granted a measure of divinity ironing out anything that is deemed to be a ‘scientific inconsistency’ is transgressing the limits of divisibility and potentiality.

Viewed through the lens of his championing energeia over dunamis, Aristotle’s construal of continuity as the originator of a plethora of potentialities that find their determinateness in the individual actualities bred by the former appears as a balanced analysis of change. Yet this apparent balance hardly curries favour to a dialectically informed critic that is prone to gander at Aristotle’s adumbration of change in its relation to the prime mover as a metaphysical garb that is donned by a logical concept foreshadowing the manifestations of the Absolute Spirit in historical Spirits-in-themselves. Furthermore, the agonistically conceived relation between natural dispositions and the privation of their exhibition, appears to add more metaphysical flavour when the illuminating light of the first cause of change is shed on it. The avowed

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236 Aristotle’s definition of scientific knowledge in *The Nicomachean Ethics* seems apt for highlighting a programmatic sketch of the valorisation of the eternal as the proper subject matter of the Aristotelian science: “Now what the scientific knowledge is, if we are to speak exactly and not follow mere similarities, is plain from what follows. We all suppose that what we know is not even capable of being otherwise; of things capable of being otherwise we do not know, when they have passed outside our observation, whether they exist or not. Therefore the object of scientific knowledge is of necessity. Therefore it is eternal; for things that are of necessity in the unqualified sense are all eternal; and things that are eternal are ungenerated and imperishable.” Aristotle, *The Nicomachean Ethics*, 1139b18-25; cf. “And so it is necessary that the principles of the eternally existing things are most true (for they are not just sometimes true, nor is there any cause of their being, but rather they are such causes for other things), so that as each thing is related to being so is it to truth.” Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 993b-994a.

237 “The solution that Aristotle gives to these dialectical tropes is contained in his truly speculative concepts of space, time, and movement, and merits high praise. The most famous of his proofs rest on opposing infinite divisibility (imagined as if it were actually carried out and hence as equivalent to infinite partition, the atoms) to continuity, which applies just as well to time as to space, so that the infinite, that is, abstract plurality is contained in this continuity only in itself, as possibility. The actual as contrasted to abstract plurality and also to abstract continuity is the concreteness of these, space and time themselves, just as, in contrast to space and time, movement and matter are the concrete in turn. What is abstract has being only in itself or as possibility; it is only a moment of something real [Nur an sich oder nur der Möglichkeit nach ist das Abstrakte, es ist nur als Moment eines Reellen].” Hegel, *Science of Logic*, pp. 164-5.


239 Those metaphysical swerves can be contrasted with the satirical edge of Lucretius’ verse which follows up an apparently stringent adherence to the Parmenidean ‘no thing can come out of nothing,’ with a thoroughgoing attempt at the removal of all its accompanying religious humbugs and delusions: Lucretius, *On the Nature of the Universe*, 1.159-166, 1.62-79.
primacy that is attributed to particular actualizations of changing matter, time, space, and change itself, is sustained only so long as their habitation in the sphere of the continuity of prime mover is well accounted for. The instantiation of any particular which is located in time and space, as such, brings also the re-instantiation of generative determinateness that operates as the erector of signposts showing the possible pathways of change that the entity in question can undergo. Underscored primarily in reference to potentiality, the Aristotelian actuality is thus nipped in its bud through the postulation of the first cause of change that is posited beyond the causal prowess of the finite, and hence divisible, entities. Revoking the primacy of the actual in a roundabout way, Aristotle measures the verisimilitude that is exhibited by any instance of actuality with respect to the rigid limits that predefine the determinateness of the entity in regard to the intellectual penetration with which the gaze of philosopher abounds. Indeed, the primacy of actuality runs the risk of vanishing into thin air precisely at the moment when we take a step forward from actuality par nous, i.e., actuality-in-itself, to actuality par praxis, actuality-for-others that takes place in Aristotle's discussion in Politics on ‘doing well’ (eupraxein) in a state that is conceived as the playground of active citizens endowed with the faculty of action (praxis):

“But the active life need not, as some suppose, be always concerned with our relations with other people, nor is intelligence ‘active’ only when it is directed towards results that flow from action. On the contrary, thinking and speculation that are their own end and are done for their own sake are more ‘active’, because the aim in such thinking is to do well, and therefore also, in a sense, action. Master-craftsmen in particular, even though the actions they direct by their intellect are external to them, are nevertheless said to ‘act’, in a sovereign sense.”

The designs with which master-craftsmen come up is instructive on both epistemological and historical grounds. First, it is significant in the sense that it appears to pit ideational against material change. We saw, in the context of the discussion of change in the Physics, that the concept of change encapsulates any kind of motion that can be translated into a discussion of movement through space. Indeed, whether the instant in question seems to pertain to qualitative, quantitative, sublunar, celestial, etc., categories, ‘change’ appeared, in that context, as the nomenclature par excellence denoting any instance of movement from one state to another. Yet, here Aristotle embellishes the fundamental concept of ‘activity’ with a signifier conveying quantitative change that is suggestive of the preconception of an internal-hierarchy which is prone to order the rank and file of activity. A specific instance of ideational activity that is aimed at the amelioration of a certain strand of activity is thus championed to shield the concept of active-life from the charge that activity-in-itself is a term of service for epistemological communalism. Forging an analogical link between master-craftsmen and

240 Aristotle, Politics, 1325b14-1325b23.
monarchs, Aristotle poses ‘active thought’ as the ultimate court of appeal for any action that claims to be ‘more active’ than any other. Corresponding to the infinite enlargement of the share of epistemological spoils accruing to intellectual activity, Aristotle’s quantification of action posits ideational activity, and change by extension, as a veritable “god among men” that resides beyond the realm of locomotion in which activity is held to reign supreme:

“But if there is one man (or several, but not enough to make up the whole complement of a state) of such superlative virtue that the capacity for statecraft and the virtue of all the rest are simply not to be compared with his (or theirs), such men we must take not to be part of the state. To judge them worthy of mere equality with the rest would be to do them an injustice, so far unequal to them are they in virtue and in the capacity for statecraft. We may reasonably regard such a one as a god among men – which shows, clearly, that legislation too must apply only to equals in birth or capacity. But there is no law that embraces men of that calibre: they are themselves law, and anyone who tried legislate for them would be snubbed for his pains.”

The solution Aristotle proposes to overcome this difficulty: give the superhuman ‘his due’ and “let nature take its course” since the democratic practice of ostracization, which is conceived, from an aristocratic vein, to be aimed at banishing such cases of superiority from the commonwealth of mediocrity, is not beneficial in its disuse of the overabundance of political skill and prowess. Translated into epistemological terms, the politics of supreme virtue appears to be capable of protruding through the level space that is allocated by Aristotle to change in its different forms in *Physics*. Deploying the chain of speculation as the chief logical instrument that restlessly assigns the particular degrees of activity to their proper places, Aristotle’s nature flows in its course from epistemology to the banks of history as the necessity that coronates the ‘god among men,’ which is thereby transformed into the draconic tormenter of banausic (from *baunos*, i.e., forge) activities that can be sniffed out in the slightest whiffs of necessity that they bear. The separation of thought from activity is thenceforth instantiated in the categorical demarcation between necessary and unnecessary activity. The designation of mechanical activity as aporetic in its incommensurateness with regard to virtuous active life is thus utilized to stigmatize the former as uncivil, base, ignoble, and basically unserviceable for the free citizens of the commonwealth to engage in.

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241 *Ibid*, 1284a3-1284a17.
244 “Then as to the useful things: there are obviously certain essentials which the young must learn; but it is clear (a) that they must not learn *all* useful tasks, since we distinguish those that are proper for a free man and those that are not, and (b) that they must take part only in those useful occupations which will not turn the participant into a mechanic. We must reckon a task or skill or study as mechanical if it renders the body or intellect of free men unserviceable for the uses and activities of virtue. We therefore
Strikingly congruous with the Smithian description of pin-maker as an apt example modern division of labour at the beginning of *The Wealth of Nations*, the degrading parts of useful tasks are thus condemned as fit for hirelings and slaves who lose their potential attainment of the credentials of virtuous citizenship as a result of carving out a living in the realm of necessity. The underlying meaning of work is thus wrested and wiled away from necessary occupations that risk the contamination of its participants with a mechanical quality which sits atop the heap of refuse that the society must produce in order to generate the virtuous, i.e., redundant, part of the society. Notwithstanding his trenchant refusal of necessary activity as congruous with the active-life of righteous citizenship, Aristotle, however, is fully cognizant of the temporal order with which necessity and *scholé*, ‘leisure,’ spring in the actual genesis of historical societies. Indeed, a passage in Book Alpha of *Metaphysics* bears full testimony to Aristotle’s recognition of leisure as the origin of intellectual activity that is classified as categorically different in comparison with pleasure and necessity:

“For when several skills had been discovered, some having to do with necessity and some with indulgence, it is reasonable that the practitioners of the latter were always more admired than those of the former because of the uselessness of their knowledge. Hence, indeed, it was that when all such arts had been discovered, those arts were discovered which had to do neither with pleasure nor with necessities, and this happened first in those places where men had leisure. That is why it was in Egypt that the mathematical sciences were first developed, for there leisure was available to the priestly caste.”

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245 “One man draws out the wire, another straights it, a third cuts it, a fourth points it, a fifth grinds it at the top for receiving the head; to make the head requires two or three distinct operations; to put it on, is a peculiar business, to whiten the pins is another; it is even a trade to put them into the paper; and the important business of making a pin is, in this manner, divided into about eighteen distinct operations…” *Smith, The Wealth of Nations*, pp. 11; cf. Roman Rosdolsky, *The Making of Marx’s ‘Capital’*, trans. by Pete Burgess, (London, 1977), pp. 243.

246 Aristotle’s synonymous treatment of slavery and mechanics is one of those historical threads with which his *Politics* is woven part and parcel: “Indeed, in ancient times in certain countries the mechanics were slaves or foreigners, and therefore mostly still are. But the best state will not make the mechanic a citizen. But if even he is to be a citizen, then at any rate what we called the virtue of a citizen cannot be ascribed to everyone, nor yet to free men alone, but simply to those who are in fact relieved of necessary tasks.” Aristotle, *Politics*, 1277b33–1278a13; cf. Dimitris J. Kyratatas, ‘Domination and Exploitation’, in *Money, Labour and Land: Approaches to the Economics of Ancient Greece*, ed. by Paul Cartledge, Edward E. Cohen and Lin Foxhall, (London and New York, 2002), pp. 141, 143 ff.

247 Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 981b–982a; it is interesting to note that the page of this quotation is almost fully cited approvingly by Hegel in his *Science of Logic*, who argues that “Indeed, the need to occupy oneself with pure thoughts presupposes a long road that the human spirit must have traversed; it is the need, one may say, of having already attained the satisfaction of necessary need, the need of freedom from need, of abstraction from the material of intuition, imagination, and so forth; from the material of the concrete interests of desire, impulse, will, in which the determinations of thought hide as if behind a veil. In the silent regions of thought that has come to itself and communes only with itself, the interests that move the life of peoples and individuals are hushed.” Hegel, *Science of Logic*, pp. 14.
Hence the double entendre with which the biblical maxim, *Contritionem praecedit superbia et ante ruinam exaltatur spiritus*,\textsuperscript{248} is endowed in Aristotle’s depiction of necessary labour as the precondition of ‘leisure cometh before mathematical, not to mention philosophical, knowledge”: leisure is as necessary as brilliant minds to effect intellectual progress; its necessity is, however, qualitatively superior to that society’s prior engagement in useful and useless work alike. On one level we have necessity as a virtual *sumum malum* that degrades any virtual disposition which would-be-citizens might have. On another, necessary work is graced with a dignifying tip of one’s hat as the touchtone of intellectual labour in all its manifestations. How does the Scylla of necessary labour qua precondition and the Charybdis of necessary labour qua degradation meet? The answer, we argue, is by and through the workings of the postulated continuity of the prime mover manifesting itself as the generator of final cause in infusing entities with purposeful existence. In its existence alone for itself, the unchanged changer ratiocinates perception and empirical evidence thus turning them into scientific knowledge.\textsuperscript{249}

The knowledge of universals, conceived only in their particular instantiations as they are, as the knowledge pertaining to the generality of particulars is thus projected as the subject matter of scientific knowledge in an intertwined duality of interpretation. First, the philosophical ratiocination concerning the realisation of particular changes dictates the construction of scientific deduction that proceeds from commonalities to specificities. The movement from the universal to the particular, in that vein, lightens up the burden that is otherwise imposed on the advancement of scientific knowledge which is prone to get tangled at each and every snare that is set up by entities intelligible-in-themselves, i.e., particulars. Positing inquiries into generality as the point that separates scientific knowledge from sense-perception, the principles of nature can only be unveiled if the scientist qua philosopher takes the easy route in attaining the knowledge of what is common to entities before setting them further apart as the particularities of a universal. The comprehension of particular instants of things-in-

\textsuperscript{248} Proverbia (16:18).
\textsuperscript{249} “To begin with, they [men] wondered at those puzzles that were to hand, such as about the affections of the moon and events connected with the sun and the stars and about the origins of the universe. And the man who is puzzled and amazed is thought to be ignorant… And so, if men indeed began to philosophize to escape ignorance, it is clear that they pursued science for the sake of knowledge and not for any utility. And events bear this out. For when more or less all the necessary sciences existed, and also those connected with leisure and lifestyle, this kind of understanding began to be sought after. So it is clear that we seek it for no other use but rather, as we say, as a free man is for himself and not for another, so is this science the only one of the sciences that is free. For it alone exists for its own sake.” Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 982b-983a.
themselves can be purported as an expedient, not to mention publicly requisite,\footnote{Cf. “What matters is whether I stop at the traffic lights, and not my colour imagery or absence of it. I identify what my senses show me by means of the public schemata which I have learned, and in no other way can this be known by me, since knowledge involves the rigidity supplied by a public test.” Murdoch, \textit{The Sovereignty of Good}, pp. 11.} endeavour only so long as the communality of particulars is compiled.\footnote{“The natural way to go about this [the process of gaining scientific knowledge of nature] is to start with what is more intelligible and clear to \textit{us} and move from there to what is clearer and more intelligible \textit{in itself}… The things which are immediately obvious and clear to us are usually mixed together; their elements and principles only become intelligible later, when one separates them. That is why we have to progress from the general to the particular; it is because it is whole entities that are more intelligible to the senses, and anything general is a kind of whole, in the sense that it includes a number of things which we could call its parts.” Aristotle, \textit{Physics}, 184a16-186a26.}

The ‘naturalization’\footnote{\textit{Ibid}, 189b30-189b32.} of the scientific movement from commonalities to distinctiveness is not realized, however, for the purposes of expediency alone. Indeed, the transition from universals to particulars also sets the limits of probability on entities in terms of their approximation toward their teleological completion, i.e., purpose. Having derived the necessity of the prime mover as a remedy for the potential rise of infinite regress that is likely to accompany the immutableness of matter’s movement, Aristotle claimed that particulars are not sufficient in themselves to stave off any relapse into the tortured logic of the infinity of matter. A thing’s particularity, in that vein, can be proposed only if a certainty pertaining to its probability is ensured. Motion requires rest in order to prevent the scientist from falling for the accidental attributes of an entity and consequently elevating them to the place of universal attributes. Aristotle vehemently brands any such tendency as arising from mistaking contingent determinateness for indeterminate abstractions, which, in epistemological terms, is tantamount to taking perception as \textit{episteme}.\footnote{“If, then, there is nothing beyond the individuals, then there would be nothing intelligible, but all things would be sensible and there would be science of nothing, unless one were to say that perception was science. And also there would be nothing that was eternal and unmoved (for all sensibles are perishable and in motion). But if there is nothing eternal, then there cannot be generation.” Aristotle, \textit{Metaphysics}, 999b-1000a; Aristotle, \textit{Eudemian Ethics}, 1248a22-30.}

Universal’s pertinence to a plurality of particular things is,\footnote{Aristotle, \textit{Metaphysics}, 1038b-1039a.} therefore, predicated upon its preconceived attribute of setting limits of intelligibility, which harks back to one of Aristotle’s maxims in \textit{Poetics}, \textit{alogon de miden einai en toîs pragmasin}, “Nothing improbable should there be among the actual incidents.”\footnote{Aristotle, \textit{Poetics}, 1454a35-6.} Given the fact that \textit{alogon} can be equally rendered as improbable or irrational, the first cause’s purposive generativity is made manifest, first and foremost, in regard to abstract universals. Indeed, even granting the essential limitedness of
universals in the face of substance as the fully definitive and complete case of *to ti én einai*, or the-what-it-was-to-be, universals still seem to operate as the litmus test providing particularities with yardsticks of definiteness and restrictedness. Dividing contingent properties into accidental and determinate ones, intellect processes through the antechamber of universals in order to gain a foothold in the sphere of intelligible substances. The modicum of intellectual faculties that link the antechamber to the rest of the edifice, however, run with a veneer of metaphysical finality that bears a distinctly universalistic shade:

“Given all the ways of using the locution, we can begin by saying that there can be no theoretical treatment of that which is accidentally. This is clearly borne out by the fact that no science, be it practical, productive or theoretical, takes cognizance of the accidental. Take production. If one produces a building, one does not produce all the accidental properties that come into being with the building. (In fact, there is an infinity of the latter. It happens very often that a building produced provides pleasure for some, harm for others and convenience for still others, so that the building can be described as different from every other thing that is. But the architect has not produced any of these properties.)”

Thrown away thus into the dustbin of contingency, the dismissal of accidental properties constitutes the threshold of scientific reasoning that the philosopher ought to cross in order to treat particulars and to excavate their substance as the final step of philosophizing. Distinguishing the probable from the improbable, the scientific gaze stands ever vigilant in its proselytizing finality qua naturalized determinateness as the fundamental credo pillorizing accidentals in favour of intelligibility, i.e., congruence to universals. For while it is true that the doctor never treats any universals as such and that “it is the particulars that must be treated” the prescription that is to be filled as a significant part of that treatment is still prepared along the lines of information that is compiled and hence classified as universals.

Our bird-eye view of his concepts of change, particular and universal warrants a concluding attempt to define the characteristics of the universal as it was conceived by Aristotle. The universal, on this view, is (I) an ideational concept that is (II) construed in its encompassing connection to a class of particulars and in its (III) opposition to those particulars thanks in large part to its inherent abstractness contrasting the definitiveness of particulars; both of which are (IV) predicated upon the conception of change and its (V) attribution of primacy to actuality which is (VI) qualified with respect to its attainment of finality. One of the core presuppositions of this account is Aristotle’s rebuttal of any attempt to posit more than just an analytical one-way bridge to link universals with particulars. The movement from one
concept to another is thus conceived \textit{ex nihilo} from the standpoint of at least one of the categories that are to be thought in their unity in regard to any contingent, i.e., historical, case. Framing the antecedent thinkers that proposed to conceive the concepts in their commonality in the context of a monistically conceived prime matter, e.g., water for Thales and fire for Heraclitus, as purveyors of the poison of unintelligibility,\textsuperscript{260} Aristotle did not attempt to make either heads or tails of their proposed unity and opted, instead, for a mechanical drawbridge. Devoid of any allusion to an understanding that is reminiscent, even vaguely, of the Heraclitan notion of Becoming, Aristotelian logic qua metaphysics solved the intricacies of the two-way problem of entities flowing from singularity to universality and vice versa by insisting on the synonymy of contingency with improbability. Aristotle’s momentary significance as the leader of \textit{lukêion}, i.e., lyceum, whose insistence on engaging in diligent excavations and assessments of historical forms of thought or political rule\textsuperscript{261} appears to have been quite extraordinary in his day and age, is also suggestive of his uncompromising portrayal of the primacy of generalities in defence of logical precepts such as \textit{ex nihilo, nihil fit} that are understood as the groundwork of scientific knowledge. Barring any dialectical movement between particulars and universals, the Aristotelian generalities stood in-and-for-themselves as the thread with which the philosopher’s scientific net should be woven only to lose some of the ‘goods’ that were prone to fall through the logical holes regardless of how tight-knit the net was.

Compared to our Hegelian postulation of universals this bare-bones sketch of its Aristotelian predecessor appears instructive in its leapfrogging from the first Hegelian proposition, i.e., the self-identicalness of universal in its purest conception, to a metaphysically twisted form of the eighth that posits the first mover as unidimensional anticipation of the Absolute Spirit. Traversing the alternative route of construing the particular and the universal \textit{in absentia} of the respective totalities of which they partake, Aristotle’s postulation of activity as the root factor of change and his naturalization of the latter with respect to completion of the individual

\textsuperscript{260} Aristotle, \textit{Metaphysics}, 986b-987a.

\textsuperscript{261} Aristotle’s allusions to the 158 historical constitutions that he studied as the preparatory material of \textit{Politics} is a case in point in bearing witness to his ‘hard-nosed empiricism’ as the bread and butter of any attempt geared at proposing the best possible constitution: “Now our predecessors have left the subject of legislation to us unexamined; it is perhaps best, therefore, that we should ourselves study it, and in general study the question of the constitution, in order to complete to the best of our ability the philosophy of human nature. First, then, if anything has been said well in detail by earlier thinkers, let us try to review it; then in the light of the constitutions we have collected let us study what sorts of influence preserve and destroy states, and what sorts preserve or destroy the particular kinds of constitution, and to what causes it is due that some are well and others ill administrated. When these matters have been studied we shall perhaps be more likely to see with a comprehensive view which constitution is best, and how each must be ordered, and what laws and customs it must use, if it is to be at its best.” Aristotle, \textit{Nicomachean Ethics}, 1181b10-1181b20; for a surviving part of his constitutional studies, see Aristotle, \textit{Constitution of Athens}, trans. by Thomas J. Dymes (London, 1981).
entity intimates a static understanding of change as distribution of actualities along a predefined set of potentialities. In other words, the logical separation of totality from particulars and universals is realized only at the expense of conceiving historical process as indicating the rise of a plethora of spirits-in-themselves that succeed in attaining self-awareness of their accomplishments and failures in and through the actions of their constituent peoples only in their failure to see through their locality in their unity with Absolute Knowing. In short, the pre-eminence of actuality is baptized as the actuality of the prime mover turning totalities into an overarching closet of Totality which abounds with historical garments untouched by any element that is deemed improbable. Turning historical definiteness into timeless circumscriptions, Aristotle’s proposed resolution of his predecessors’ vain quest of seeking out primary, yet not necessarily primordial, elements through his postulation of the first cause runs the risk of making an Alexandros out of every basileus:

“After these thinkers and principles like these, as they were not sufficient to generate the nature of entities, once again, by the truth itself, as we have said, they were obliged to seek out the next principle. For of the fact that some entities have and some entities are the good and noble perhaps neither fire nor earth nor any of such things is either likely to be the cause nor did they think that it was. Nor indeed would it be good to hand so great a responsibility over to chance and the automatic. Now one of them said that mind was present in the universe, as in the animals, and that this was the cause of order in nature and the whole arrangement – making the earlier thinkers look absurd…. Those, then, who made this supposition said that the cause of nobility was a principle of entities, and also a cause of the kind from which change comes to entities.”

Aristotle’s nomination of the first cause of change as the embodiment of eternal motion-in-itself and as the generative cause leading to the germination of all the consequent, whether elementary or not, causes hence divests the unitary correspondence between particulars and universals in order to purport substance qua finality in contradistinction to the determinateness of actuality and indeterminateness of potentiality alike. Principles pertaining to the first cause of change are therefore grappled away from the interstices of the logical classification of the historical instant whose particularity is duly noted only in reference to the abstract generalities. The Aristotelian definition of substance as the definitive properties of an entity in its complete form thus ousts the universality of demonstrative reasoning and argues for particularity and universality with which inquisitive knowledge needs to be simultaneously endowed. The presupposed existence of substance is used therewith to vindicate the claim that the necessity of the Grundprinzip, i.e., prime mover, proscribes the claim that the knowledge of contingents can be construed with direct reference to universality.

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263 “As for the fact that all knowledge is of the universal, so that it is necessary that the principles of the things that are also universal and not separated substances, this contains the profoundest problem of all that we have mentioned. Even so, there is a way in which it is true and a way in which it is not. For
Knowledge is universal in the way that it is the knowledge of the indefinite, i.e., abstract potentiality. It is also universal in the way that it pertains to the definite, i.e., historically located actuality. Yet, it is not universal with respect to the point of intersection of spatio-temporally specified entities that are identified in their relation to the abstract limits that are set upon an entity’s potentiality by its participation within the historical process. Aristotle’s substance impedes viewing the actuality of an object of change as a double movement between particularized universals, i.e., scientific deduction, and universalized particulars, i.e., scientific induction, that is needed to reinforce scientific reasoning if it is to sever any of its branches that exhibit a metaphysical hue. In anticipation of the travails of the Absolute Spirit that were to transpire approximately twenty-two centuries from his own time, Aristotle’s doctrine of substance negates the construal of history as a more fundamental concept than a mere container of contingency. In his avowed attempt to separate determinate necessities from irrational contingencies, Aristotle, indeed, undermined the import of utilizing historical knowledge as indicative of the relentless interplay between contingencies that make universals just as much as they are being made by it in return. Denying this epistemological reciprocity in the name of the almighty substance, Aristotle’s separation of determinate wheat from historical chaff overlooks the fact that the storehouse of tranquillity that emerges as the outcome of that endeavour can be baptized as scientific only to the extent that the researcher either willingly prostrates before the ontologically unquestionable primacy of substance or inadvertently takes her place among the members of the scientific congregation thereby transforming temporal postulations into eternal maxims. The ascension of metaphysics to the status of first philosophy is realized if and only if the universality of knowledge concerning the changes that take place in the natural world is compromised in order to clear room for substance as the subject matter of the former in its ebbs and flows: “So, if, in the case of things that are, the primary object is substance, then we can state the fundamental duty of the philosopher: it is to gain possession of the principles and causes of substances.”

264 This evangelisation of substance serves as the altar on which determinativeness is affirmed in its immolation as its approximation to teleological development is gauged, signed, and sealed in its relation to the knowledge is, like indeed knowing, a double thing, being both potential and actual. Now potentiality is like matter. It is universal and indefinite and it is the potentiality of something that is universal and indefinite. But actuality is definite and of something definite, being the this such of a this such. Accidentally, to be sure, sight sees the universal, in that the particular colour that it sees is colour, and similarly the object of the grammarian’s perusal, this alpha, is alpha. If, then, the principles must be universal, then the things from them must also be universal, as with demonstrative reasoning. But if this is right, then there will not be any separate thing nor any substance.

“Perhaps all we can say is this: in a way knowledge is universal, in a way it is not.” Ibid, 1087a-1087b.

preconceived limits of intelligibility. Forging the limits of probability with a cast of eternity, Aristotle’s positing of motion as the fundamental form of change hence occludes the attainment of knowledge relating to any actual ideational movement, either forward or backward in epistemological terms, of peoples in their making of history. Following in the footsteps of Cratylus in regard to the latter’s carrying the Heraclitan doctrine of flux to its logical conclusion of considering to take vows of silence because of the inappropriateness of uttering any word for the depiction of a constantly changing reality by his allusion to the view that, “In his, Cratylus’, opinion it was already going far too far to admit stepping into the same river once,” Aristotle uncorked the genie of Being qua substance as the finality with which determinateness is measured. The first elements of Thales, Anaximander, Heraclitus, Empedocles, etc., are thus swept under the rug of Being, which is, then, completely separated from Becoming through the instants of negation that posit determinateness into the flux of constant play.

Positing being as the accompaniment of the absolute substance, this metaphysical outlook establishes becoming as a redundant misnomer purloining the essential immediacy of the former. The jettisoning of any off-the-grid capability for internal change, as such, boils down to the construction of a labyrinthine gallery of determinateness that yield another manifestation of being at its every movement without any reference to logical coherence or historical

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265 Needless to add, elsewhere Aristotle proved quite clearly that he was able to punch holes, at least partially, in his metaphysical canopy of substance in observing that social relationality is the key ingredient in holding together the otherwise incommensurable. Sure as rain, his drift from metaphysical foundations to those of historical and social origins in his attempts to ascertain the notion of summertria, i.e., ‘commensurability,’ in the context of the possible binds between exchange and use of goods can be taken as a sign for a materialistically-oriented reading of the concept. And though this conundrum was to remain unsolved from a metaphysical standpoint, Aristotle took decisive steps, as noted by Meikle, towards providing his readers with a historical one emphasising social effects of commensurability rather than its supposedly metaphysical origins: Ibid, pp. 35-39; cf. Scott Meikle, “Aristotle and the Political Economy of the Polis”, The Journal of Hellenic Studies, vol. 99 (1979a), pp. 57-73; Aristotle, Politics, 1257b35 ff.

266 Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1010a-1010b.

267 This point is underscored by Hegel in the context of his discussion of the thesis with respect to the Parmenidean exegesis as it was challenged by Aristotle: “Parmenides held fast to being and was the most consistent, since he also said of nothing that it absolutely is not; only being is. Totally for itself, being is thus the indeterminate, and has therefore no connecting reference to any other; consequently, it seems that from this beginning no further forward move is possible – that is, from that beginning itself – and that an advance can only occur by adding something foreign to it from outside. The advance, where being is the same as nothing, thus appears as a second, absolute beginning—a transition which is for itself, and that would be added to being externally. Being would not be an absolute beginning at all if it had a determinateness; in that case, it would depend on another and would not be immediate, would not be the beginning, it has nothing by virtue of which it can pass over to an other; as beginning it is equally the end. It is just as impossible for anything to break out of it as to break into it; with Parmenides as with Spinoza, there is no advance from being or from absolute substance to the negative, the finite. If there is forward movement nevertheless –something which, as just remarked, can occur only externally if we start from being devoid of any connecting reference and so without further movement – then, this is a second, new beginning.” Hegel, Science of Logic, pp. 70-71.
accuracy. In its disconnection with becoming, the immediacy of being turns into the basis of its self-referential quality that incorporates change only in so far as it is conceived as external, i.e., as another instant of being’s actuality. This system of exteriority, to borrow a Hegelian phrase, transforms every instance of contingency that is enveloped in accordance with the epistemological opposition of particulars and universals, into an epiphenomenon of being thereby growing into a self-fulfilling prophecy in itself. Through his demolition of the dialectical bridge connecting particulars and universals, Aristotle hence bound the potentiality of movement of each moving object to the pre-existence of the stationary prime mover. Yet, this omnipresence of the unmoved mover as the Grundprinzip of each material change ran the risk of summoning an unimpeachable omnipotence in the stead of empirical reasoning if the latter were to be stigmatized as essentially untrustworthy and, hence, ancillary. With the gradual rise of trenchant scholastic reasoning to fiat ecclesia pereat mundus, Aristotelian epistemology devoured its own roots as metaphysics was elevated from its original status as first philosophy to the only one scoffing at any advancement of natural science tout court. The examination of this Archimedean metaphysical standpoint can only be consummated in its eventual culmination in the hands of Spinoza and his position of the unity of substance and God’s immanence in the world in contradistinction to the medieval understanding of philosophy as the ‘hand maiden’ of theology.

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268 Hegel utilizes this concept in his early critique of Fichtean conception of state in his Le droit naturel: “Nous suivons ici l’exposition fichtéenne qui est la plus conséquente et la moins formelle parce qu’elle recherche vraiment un système cohérent qui n’aît pas besoin de l’apport étranger de l’éthique et de religion. Dans de tels système d’extériorité, comme dans toute méthode qui va du conditionné au conditionné, on ne peut pas relever d’inconditionné, ou bien ce n’est qu’une indifférence formelle qui laisse en dehors de soi la différence conditionné ; c’est l’essence sans forme, la puissance sans sagesse, la quantité sans qualité immanente ou sans infinité, le repos sans mouvement.” Hegel, Le droit naturel, pp. 101.

269 “Although the class struggle of those days was clothed in religious shibboleths, and though the interests, requirements, and demands of various classes were concealed behind a religious screen. This changed nothing at all and is easily explained by the conditions of the times…. They [the Middle Ages] wiped the old civilization, the old philosophy, politics and jurisprudence off the state, to begin anew in everything. The only thing they kept from the shattered old world was Christianity and a number of half-ruined towns divested of all civilization. As a consequence, just as in every primitive stage of development, the clergy attained a monopoly in intellectual education and education itself became essentially theological. In the hands of the clergy politics and jurisprudence, much like all other sciences, remained mere branches of theology, and were treated in accordance with the principles prevailing in the latter. Church dogmas were also political axioms, and Bible quotations had the validity of law in any court.” Friedrich Engels, The Peasant War in Germany, in MECW, X, pp. 412.

270 Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I, q. 1, a. 5; cf. “The aim of philosophy is, quite simply, truth, while the aim of faith, as we have abundantly shown, is nothing other than obedience and piety. Again, philosophy rests on the basis of universally valid axioms, and must be constructed by studying Nature alone, whereas faith is based on history and language, and must be derived only from Scripture and revelation…” Baruch Spinoza, Theological-Political Treatise, trans. by Samuel Shirley (Indianapolis, 1988), pp. 169.
2.3 Spinoza’s Immanence of Potentia

Designating the aim of philosophy as the attainment of truth, Spinoza’s inquiry into the basic premises of the universal religion was propelled towards ascertaining whether its teachings agreed with the “natural light of reason” or differed from them to any significant degree. To be sure, the Scripture conveys its divine truth as *logos qua* the Word of God in its own peculiar way. All the same, Spinoza’s point is that one needs to study the Scripture and divine precepts using the natural light of reason and *not* the other way around, which, in all likelihood, would lead to blind worship of dogmatised maxims. Pitting imagination as uncertain obscurity against reason as natural assuredness, Spinoza’s ascription of priority to natural knowledge vis-à-vis prophecy is based on the purported fallibility of prophetic reason. A prophet’s imaginative faculty, for one, can put him head and shoulders above the rest of the prophets whereas another may be distinguished by his higher command of the language in which the precepts are ordained. The *ad hominem* composition of the Scripture thus serves as the logical lodestar that guides Spinoza’s attempt to wed the natural light of reason with “the knowledge and love of God [that] is the final end to which all our actions should be directed.” This possibility of attaining divine knowledge comprises of two intertwined arguments that posit, in their complex relations, the former as the highest aim of reason. The first argument is that hu(man) will is the mouthpiece of natural laws so long as the former is conceived to be a part of Nature. Defining Nature’s necessity as the simple definition of a thing, Spinoza posits human will as the voluntary, yet necessary, accompaniment of *Nihil in sensu quod non prius in Deo*:

“Man, in so far as he is part of Nature, constitutes a part of the power of Nature. Thus whatever follows from the necessity of man’s nature – that is, from Nature as we conceive her to be determinedly expressed in man’s nature – follows from human power, even though it does so necessarily.”

This deistic equation of will and necessity is based, in its turn, on the definition of God as *causa sui*, i.e., activity *qua* existence and divinity. The actual in its manifestations, in short, is

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272 Cf. “It is a contradiction in terms and ideas to call anything a revelation that comes to us at second hand, either verbally or in writing. Revelation is necessarily limited to the first communication. After this, it is only an account of something which that person says was a revelation made to him; and though he may find himself obliged to believe it, it cannot be incumbent on me to believe it in the same manner, for it was not a revelation made to me, and I have only his word for it that it was made to him.” Thomas Paine, *The Age of Reason. Being an Investigation of True and Fabulous Theology*, ed. by Moncure Daniel Conway, (Mineola, 2004), pp. 24, 179.
274 Ibid, pp. 34.
275 Ibid, pp. 52.
276 Ibid, pp. 49.
God: only in acting\(^{277}\) (agere) does he exists (esse): “I understand that to be CAUSE OF ITSELF (causa sui) whose essence involves existence and whose nature cannot be conceived unless existing.”\(^{278}\) In the self-referential existence in action that God is purported to exhibit, Spinoza finds not only the roots of human will but also Nature as the domicile of existence qua action that is heralded as the property of all intellectual entities, God and human alike. Henceforth, the second argument that God’s will is the causa prima of all things by the token of its being causa sui. God’s essence in existence, on this view, decrees the rest of lesser beings to partake of their existence only in the preordained actions of God. Positing God as causa sui thus entails the precondition that “the origin of human knowledge”\(^{279}\) can be found nowhere else other than in the fountainhead of God.\(^{280}\) The Spinozist substance (substantia), which is defined as “that which is in itself and is conceived through itself,”\(^{281}\) is thus used in its crystallization in God as existence in action as the locus classicus of the Augustinian unity of amor and intellectus. Taking his cue from the propositions VII and XIV,\(^{282}\) Spinoza’s conception of God as the only possible substance is predicated upon his argument that there necessarily needs to be a cause for everything in existence and non-existence alike and upon his metaphysics of causality that posits each cause as the provision of reason why such-and-such is the case or is not. Elaborating on the necessary causality of each conceivable thing, Spinoza reverts to Prop. VII in arguing that the absence of causality would be tantamount to eliminating the unity of essence and existence:

\(^{277}\) Cf. “we cannot know anyone except by his works.” Ibid, pp. 71.


\(^{279}\) A mention is made of this notion, the demonstration of which was noted as one of the central aims of Ethics, in Spinoza’s letter Guillaume de Blyenberg on 13 March 1665: “J’entends, dit l’auteur, par un homme juste celui qui désire d’une façon constante que chacun possède ce qui lui appartient en propre, et je démontre dans mon Ethique (non encore éditée) que ce désir chez les hommes pieux tire nécessairement son origine de la connaissance claire qu’ils ont, tant d’eux-mêmes que de Dieu.” Cited in Spinoza, Oeuvres de Spinoza III: Éthique, trans. by Charles Appuhn, (Paris, 1965), pp. 8.

\(^{280}\) “Moreover… if intellect and will appertain to the central essence of God, something far else must be understood by these two attributes than what is commonly understood by men. For intellect and will, which would constitute the essence of God, must differ toto coelo from our will and intellect…. If intellect appertains to divine nature, it cannot, as with our intellect, be posterior (as many would have it) or even simultaneous in nature with the things conceived by the intellect since (Coroll. I, Prop. 16) God is prior in cause alike to all things; but on the other hand, truth and the formal essence of things are such, because they so exist objectively in God’s intellect. Wherefore the intellect of God, as far as it can be conceived to form his essence, is in truth the cause of things, both of their essence and their existence; which seems to have been noticed by those who have asserted that God’s intellect, will, and power are one and the same thing. Now as God’s intellect is the only cause of things, i.e., the cause both of their essence and their existence, it must therefore necessarily differ from them in respect to its essence and in respect to its existence. For that which is caused differs from its cause precisely in that which it has from its cause.” Spinoza, Ethics, pp. 17.

\(^{281}\) Ibid, pp. 1.

\(^{282}\) Prop. VII. reads “Existence appertains to the nature of substance,” indicating that every existing substance must exist necessarily; whereas Prop. XIV reads “Except God no substance can be granted or conceived,” i.e., only this one substance could have existed as the origin of existence qua action, ibid, pp. 4, 11.
“A cause or reason ought to be assigned for each thing, why it exists or why it does not. E.g., if a triangle exists, the reason or cause of its existence should be granted; but if it does not exist, the reason or cause should be granted which prevents it from existing or which takes its existence from it. Now this reason or cause must be contained in the nature of the thing or outside of it.”

Further, given the necessary in-itself existence of God in divine nature, which is wholly separate in its perfect existence from the universal corporeal nature, God’s existence in absence of any contradiction casts the net of causality far beyond the cognitive limits of human perception. This enlarged sphere of causality is also embellished with an overriding metaphysical conception thereof that inserts the absolute determinism of nature into the place of the Aristotelian final cause and its accompanying telos. The preconception of God as absolute nature, relying heavily on the principle of sufficient reason as it is defined by the proofs given for Prop. XI, is thus turned into the lens-grinder’s weapon to dissipate any whiff of Aristotelian teleology that may be associated with his concept of Nature:

“It is scarcely necessary that I should show that nature has no fixed aim in view, and that all final causes are merely fabrications of men. For I think this is sufficiently clear from the bases and traces from which I have traced the origin of this prejudice, from Prop. 16, and the corollaries of Prop. 32, and above all, from all those propositions in which I have shown that all things in nature proceed eternally from a certain necessity and with the utmost perfection. I should add, however, this further point, that the doctrine of final causes overthrows nature entirely.”

Everything that exists has a train of causes that reach their terminus in the absolute determinism of the acts of God: *quicquid est in Deus est.* Indeed, even if we concur with Spinoza’s conception of causation as a relational one that surfaces in the modal determinateness of a substance and bar any insinuation towards a metaphysics of causation reaching its crescendo with respect to the natural determination of things by God, we are still left with the unexplained assumption of God’s internal coherence leading to its conception as the only perfect agency qua substance. Having thus cleared the logical ground for the infinite extension of natural determinism, God’s self-referential existence in actions give rise to Spinoza’s nature that is intelligible only in the diametric opposition of its absolute determination to the construal of God as the only free cause: “Hence it follows that God alone

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284 Ibid, pp. 32.
286 “Rather than a reciprocity between the whole and the parts, Spinoza’s whole dominated the parts entirely. Despite his liberal stress on the value of free thought, there was no place in his system for human agency; indeed free will itself was an illusion which an understanding of the logical necessity of reality would dispel.” Jay, *Marxism and Totality,* pp. 29.
287 Prop. II, Part II: “Extension (extensio) is an attribute of God, or God is an extended thing.” Spinoza, *Ethics,* pp. 39.
is a free cause. For God exists from the mere necessity of his own nature (Prop. II, and Coroll. I, Prop. 14), and by the mere necessity of his nature he acts (prev. Prop.). And therefore (Def. 7) he is the only free cause.”288 The concept of telos and its suggestion of the attainment of pseudo-perfection is effaced only to purport the infinite determinism of God as the only spearhead with which any attempt to render entities intelligible must be realized. Mind’s independence from the dogmas of revelation and custom,289 and the ensuing affirmation of the spatio-temporally specified, i.e., historical, existence of humanity, is made, therefore, only at the expense of any conceptual understanding of negation, and hence at the risk of forsaking any historical determinateness in and for itself, bringing the historicity of both particulars and universals into purview. In subverting the Aristotelian finality as nature following its necessary propensity toward completion, Spinoza ascribes indeterminacy to human existence and concreteness to natural determination whereby history is transformed into a frozen set of maxims that are timeless only in the eye of the divine beholder.290

Commencing with the absolute self-referentiality of the infinite substance, Spinoza took note of historical contingencies that constitute the dictates of historical reason only in their respective negation of the first principle. The only intelligible thing about contingencies, i.e., individual things lying outside us, is that they can be grasped only inadequately. This partial comprehension of contingencies is, to be sure, situated upon the precondition that reason is available only historically as the main tool of human cognition. Notwithstanding this aspect of contingency, however, is Spinoza’s conception of God as natura naturans291 in its absolute determinism. The temporalized Spirit in-itself, in Hegelian terms, cannot snap out of its

288 Ibid, pp. 16.
289 Spinoza’s position in this confrontation is made abundantly clear in his probes beneath the surface meanings of various passages of the Scripture unearthing the possibility of a myriad of denotative changes that is indicative of equivocalness. This fuels the Spinozist claim that “Thus it follows that nothing is sacred or profane or impure in an absolute sense apart from the mind.” Spinoza, Theological-Political Treatise, pp. 151.
290 “This is not surprising, for Nature’s bounds are not set by the laws of human reason which aim only at man’s true interest and his preservation, but by infinite other laws which have regard to the eternal order of the whole of Nature, of which man is but a particle. It is from the necessity of this order alone that all individual things are determined to exist and to act in a definite way. So when something in Nature appears to us as ridiculous, absurd, or evil, this is due to the fact that our knowledge is only partial, that we are largely ignorant of the order and coherence of the whole of Nature and want all things to be arranged to suit our reason. Yet that which our reason declares to be evil is not evil in respect of the order and laws of universal Nature, but only in respect of the laws of our own nature.” Ibid, pp. 180-181; cf. “It [the deception resulting from conceiving things too abstractly] arises finally from the fact that we do not understand the primary elements of the whole nature; whence, proceeding without order and confusing nature with abstract things which may yet be axioms, we confuse ourselves and pervert the order of nature.” Baruch Spinoza, On the Correction of The Understanding, in Spinoza’s Ethics and On the Correction of Human Understanding, pp. 251; Lukács, ‘Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat’, pp. 140.
historical universe that is incomprehensible in regard to both its constituent contingencies, and hence missing the middle term of a particular totality, and its relation to Nature qua God, whose divine reason is separated from human reasoning in its entirety, which effaces, in effect, universal totality. Having achieved his declared aim of unifying “mind with the whole of nature”292 by virtue of elucidating the limits to human comprehension, Spinoza thus allowed the entrance of the Aristotelian first cause in a slightly Christianized form through the backdoor of his geometric order despite having formerly, and rhetorically, shut down the door of philosophical reasoning to its face. The determinateness of entities, having lost their historically specified reference to totalities, thus serve as limited negation of the first affirmation concerning the absolute perfection of God. Determinatio est negatio, seu determinatio ad rem juxta suum esse non pertinent (Determination is negation for determination does not pertain to a thing according its being) hence translates into the logical corollary of the infinite essence of God and his eternity. Particulars, conceived as they are in their historical determinateness, as such, are catapulted out of the plane of full perfection that accords to the only infinite substance that there is: “Individual things therefore, so far as they only exist in a certain determinate mode, are non-entia; the indeterminate infinite being is the one single true ens reale, hoc est, est omne esse, & praeter quod nullum datur est [the real being, the being of all that is and apart from it there is no being].”293 Jacobi’s interest in the Spinozist conception of negation as the being’s gradual process to non-being through its admission of further degrees of determinateness, managing to rekindle the old flame of scholarly interest in the eighteenth century Germany,294 was followed by Hegel’s studies in Spinoza and his construal of negation as the foundational element of historical process ranging from humanoid’s cognition of sensual data to modern human’s advancement of scientific knowledge:

“With regard to the determinate, Spinoza establishes this thesis: omnis determinatio est negatio. Hence only the non-particularized or the universal is. It alone is what is substantial and therefore truly actual. As a singular thing, the soul or the mind is something limited. It is by negation that the singular thing is. Therefore [the singular thing] does not have genuine actuality. This on the whole is Spinoza’s idea…. What differentiates and forms the particular is said to be just a modification of the absolute substance and nothing actual in its own self. The operation upon it is just the stripping away of its determination or particularity, so that it can be thrown back into the one absolute substance. This is what is unsatisfying in Spinoza.”295

Sinking into the metaphysical quicksand of positing God as the infinite determination in action, the determination of particular minds is taken as the supple indication of their lack of higher degrees of being as they are stifled to the brim by the infinite regress of causation. Every step along the road of any particular’s attainment of its historical contingency is thence turned into an embittered widening of the *distance substantielle* that is preconceived to exist between infinite abstraction and finite determinateness. Having posited the substance and its idea as the unmoved unity of self-referentiality, Spinoza’s announced distance from the metaphysics of causation betrays his redeployment thereof for the sake of surviving the maelstrom caused by the potential emergence of infinite regress.\(^{296}\)

This rifted understanding of absolute being and temporal determinate, is thus used to land the *coup-de-grâce* to contingency in its derivative existence qua corruption. The presupposed epistemological fissure between idea and its ideal (*ideatum*)\(^{297}\) as denoting the separation of thought in action from thought in-itself is thereby utilized in order to vindicate Spinoza’s treatment of determinateness, and not to mention contingencies, as *non-entia* that is in action only in its subordinated mimicry of the infinite substance in *actu*. In his rejection *tout court* of the intellectual teleology of Aristotle, Spinoza espouses natural determinism in its most uncompromising form of reinstituting a secularized understanding of the scholastic great chain of being dividing a section into strands of contingency and substantiality with the former’s avowed inability to hold a candle to the infinite determinism of the latter.\(^{298}\)

\(^{296}\) pp. 141; cf. “‘Determinateness is negation’ is the absolute principle of Spinozist philosophy; this true and simple insight is at the basis of the absolute unity of substance. But Spinoza stops short at negation as determinateness or quality; he does not advance to the cognition of it as absolute, that is, self-negating negation; therefore his substance does not contain the absolute form, and the cognition of it is not a cognition from within.” Hegel, *Science of Logic*, pp. 472; on the centrality of the maxim for Hegel’s thought, see Lukács, *The Ontology of Social Being*, I, pp. 40.

\(^{297}\) “The mind is a fixed and determined mode of thinking (Prop. II, Part II.) and therefore (Coroll. 2, Prop. 17, Part I.) cannot be the free cause of its actions, or it cannot have the absolute faculty of willing and unwilling; but for willing this or that it must be determined (Prop. 28, Part I.) by a cause which is determined by another, and this again by another, etc. *Q.e.d.*” Spinoza, *Ethics*, pp. 74-75.

\(^{298}\) Spinoza’s separation of circle from its idea with regard to objective essence of the former appears to be a relevant case to revisit: “A true idea (for we have a true idea) is something different from its ideal (*ideatum*). For a circle is one thing, and the idea of one another; for the idea of a circle is not something having a circumference and a centre, as is a circle, nor is the idea of a body the body itself. And as it is something different from its ideal, it must also be something intelligible in itself, that is, the idea as regards its formal essence can be the object of another objective essence; and again, this second objective essence will also be, when regarded in itself, something real and intelligible, and so on indefinitely.” Spinoza, *On the Correction of the Understanding*, pp. 236-7; cf. Prop. XXX. Proof, Spinoza, *Ethics*, pp. 24.

\(^{298}\) “He [Spinoza] starts by defining the *infinite* as the *absolute* affirmation of the concrete existence of any one nature, and the finite on the contrary as determinateness, or negation. That is to say, the absolute affirmation of a concrete existence is to be taken as its *referring to itself*, its not being dependent on another; the finite is negation instead, a cessation in the form of a *reference to an other* which begins *outside it*. Now the affirmation of a concrete existence does not by any means exhaust the concept of infinity; the full concept implies that the infinity is an affirmation, not as immediate but only as restored
Positing \textit{infinitum actu} as the central element of self-referentiality, the completeness with which Spinoza’s \textit{actu} is endowed leads to the moments of a mathematical series falling prey to ‘the nature of their fact’ that conveys an increment of its completeness only to the extent that its unpositedness is granted. This conflict between the measurable contingent and the measureless substance is thus resolved by granting the spoils of all historicity to the presupposed victory of measurelessness. With the abstraction of the Parmenidean necessity qua the \textit{ancient limit imposed on all things}\textsuperscript{299} banished, Spinoza’s infinite substance traverses an inhabitable universe that endangers the contingent existence of any intruder with its marshes, bogs and swamps of determinism. From the absolute indifference of the Spinozist substance to the dismissible differentiation of his contingent runs the golden thread of conceiving the substance as essence without a subject, i.e., without the capability of recognizing itself in its various one-sidedness in the logical highway that unites singulars with particulars and universals whereby substance itself undergoes incessant change in its recognition of its own historical conditionality:

“Differentiation occurs with Spinoza quite empirically – attributes (thought and extension) and then modes, affects and all the remaining. The differentiation falls to the intellect, itself a mode; the connection of the attributes to substance and to each other says no more than that they express the whole of substance, that their content, the order of things as extended and as thoughts, is this same substance. But by the determination of substance as indifference, \textit{difference} itself now becomes a topic of reflection and is now \textit{explicitly posited} as it \textit{de facto} is in Spinoza, namely as an \textit{external} and therefore, more precisely, a \textit{quantitative} difference. The indifference does remain, just like substance, immanent in the differentiation, but \textit{abstractly}, only \textit{in itself}; the difference is not immanent in the indifference but, being quantitative, is rather the opposite of immanence, and the quantitative indifference is rather the self-externality of the unity. Thus the difference is also not conceptually grasped qualitatively, and the substance is not determined as self-differentiating, as subject.”\textsuperscript{300}

Spinoza’s conception of the self-evidential existence of God in action is thus predicated upon the presupposed non-self-reflexive postulation of the latter that is limited in its actions by the absolute self-referentiality through which its actions are made manifest. Callous in regard to its relation to the shifting totalities that are caused by the constant to and fro that takes place

\textsuperscript{299} Parmenides, F. DK 28B8.
\textsuperscript{300} Hegel, \textit{Science of Logic}, pp. 333; cf. Prop. XXXII. Proof. “Will, like intellect, is only a certain mode of thinking, and therefore (Prop. 28) any single volition cannot exist or be determined for performing anything unless it be determined by some other cause, and this one again by another, and so on to infinity. Now if will be supposed infinite, it must then be determined for existence and action by God, in so far, not as he is an infinite substance, but as he has an attribute expressing infinite and eternal essence of thought (Prop. 23). So in whatever way it be conceived, whether as finite or infinite, it requires a cause by which it is determined for existence or action: and therefore (Def. 7) it cannot be said to be a free cause, but only a necessary one.” Spinoza, \textit{Ethics}, pp. 25; Deleuze and Guattari, \textit{What Is Philosophy?}, pp. 48.
between particulars and universals, Spinoza’s God harkens back to Aeschylus’ Zeus in *Prometheus Bound* whose freedom consists precisely in the necessity of his rule over other gods. With the mechanic determinism pertaining to Nature established, historically specified modes of singularity are discarded as finding the origins of their attributions only in God.

In his thinking in action, God dissolves attributes in their communality with one another that allows each singular to play a part in particulars and vice versa in order to create agents that find the causation of their determinateness truly only in the image of God. In rationalizing nature, Spinoza ends up with a hedged universe whose purported lifelessness begs the interrelations of its constituent parts that make it brim with variety and teem with life. With the journey of the ‘lens-grinder’ coming to its full circle in the necessary omnipresence of san Francesco’s *Signore*, we may contend that the *terris novalis* of Spinoza is built around the idea of eternal substance that functions, in its perfect self-referential affirmation, as the barrier of inaction, i.e., rest, which relays any kind of singular change back to itself as contingent and, hence, imperfectly graspable. The question of transition from one state to another in its historical variety is thereby quenched by resorting to action in-itself that grants pseudo-accolades to the instant only in its referentiality to God and his divine reason. Yet, this priority of singular moments of action also downplays the Aristotelian primacy of actuality as the Spinozist accent on action operates at a level of topsy-turvy immanentism with an overdose of mechanical empiricism in corresponding to the dictum, ‘actuality is what action does.’ Entities are awash with the penetrating gaze of the Spinozist conception of human mind only so long as they are decontaminated from their quintessential contingency according to the decrees thereof. From prophecy to habituation of temporal awareness nothing escapes the inevitable subjection to the eternal decrees of mind in its self-referential propagation of its

301 Against the protests of ruthlessness voiced by Hephaestus in regard to the punishment decreed by Zeus to Prometheus, Power exclaims that “Everything is a burden except ruling over gods; no one is free except Zeus.” Spinoza in attempting to necessitate the existence of God in action, makes the latter conceivable through the rational process of mind at the cost of making everything else automated. Aeschylus, *Prometheus Bound* in *Persians and Other Plays*, trans. by Christopher Collard, (Oxford, 2008), pp. 102.

302 Prop. VI. Proof. “Each attribute is conceived through itself without the aid of another (Prop. 10, Part I.). Wherefore the modes of each attribute involve the conception of their attribute and not that of another; and so (Ax. 4, Part I.) the modes of any attribute of God have God for their causes only in so far as he is considered through that attribute, and not in so far as he is considered through any other attribute.” Spinoza, *Ethics*, pp. 41.

303 In his *Cantico delle Creature*, St. Francis of Assissi praises God for manifesting his glory in fire and water, sun and moon, life and death among others that mentions material human beings only *en passant* at a climactic point of the canticle: “Laudato si’, mi Signore, per sora nostra morte corporale | Da la quale nullu homo vivente po scappare, | guai a quelli che morranno ne le peccata mortali | beati quelli che trovarà ne le tue sanctissime voluntati | ca la morte secunda nol farrà male.” Francesco d’Assisi, *Cantico delle Creature*, in *The Penguin Book of Italian Verse*, ed. by George R. Kay, (Harmondsworth, 1958), pp. 2.


own subjectless existence in action. Accepting his fundamental proposition that “Whatever is, is in God, and nothing can exist or be conceived without God,” into terms of logical purchase, we see that Spinoza’s modal particularity is conceived in its (I) admitted incomprehension of singularities that are (II) deemed ineffective in their determinateness; this determinateness, in its turn, is particularized (III) by reference to the attributions of divine reason, which is beatified by ratiocination (IV) that is realized in compliance with the imperishable decrees of eternal mind in its (V) self-referential existence (VI) in action conceived as the (VII) measureless causa sui. The movement of comprehension that posit moments in their determinateness, on this view, corresponds to the circular ratiocination that posits its own historical decrees as that of an eternal and absolute mind and gauges any singularity in regard to the degree of its accord with the universal precepts. Putting the hitherto mutable categorical interrelations between time, space, quality, quantity, etc., in their definitive order, the linearity of Spinozist intelligibility portrays the elusive parts of singularity as simple determinate ineffectiveness in complete disarray. Severed in its logical connections to spatio-temporal specificity, divine reason turns into the Nietzschean bird of prey that is dignified in its oblivious consumption of what-it-is-not:

“The concepts that Spinoza gives of substance are that it is the cause of itself, that its essence includes concrete existence within itself, that the concept of the absolute is in no need of the concept of an other by which it would have to be formed. These concepts, however profound and correct, are definitions that are immediately assumed in the science from the start. Mathematics and other subordinate sciences must begin with something presupposed that constitutes their element and positive substrate…. The further definition of the attribute is introduced in Spinoza simply following that of the absolute. Spinoza defines the attribute as the manner in which the understanding conceives the essence of the absolute. Leaving aside the fact that the understanding is assumed to be by nature posterior to the attribute (for Spinoza defines it as mode), the attribute, or determination as the determination of the absolute, is made to depend on an other, namely the understanding, which simply occurs over against substance externally and immediately.”

2.4 Marx, Engels and the Force of Totality

Having cleared some conceptually level ground that appears suitable for our substantiation of the Marxian understanding of concepts pertaining to universals amid other epistemological concepts such as singulars, particulars, and totalities, we would like to begin our venture by

306 Ibid, pp. 11.
307 “There [in the midst of strangers to their decadent morality] they [the self-justified “good men”] savour a freedom from all social constraints, they compensate themselves in the wilderness for the tension engendered by protracted confinement and enclosure within the peace of society, they go back to the innocent conscience of the beast of prey, as triumphant monsters who perhaps emerge from a disgusting [scheußlichen] procession of murder, arson, rape, and torture, exhilarated and undisturbed of soul, as if it were no more than a student’s prank, convinced they have provided the poets with a lot more material for song and praise.” Friedrich Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morals, ed. and trans. by Walter Kaufmann, in Basic Writings of Nietzsche, (New York, 2000), pp. 476.
stating the obvious: Marx and Engels were not interested in compiling the rational connections of logical categories. Rather, the categories that bore import in the formative years of their respective lives were abject misery and delinquency of the working class, bearing intellectual fruit in a doctoral dissertation, *Difference Between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature* (1840-1841), in the case of Marx, and in a great sociological survey of contemporary England, *The Conditions of the Working Class in England* (1844-1845) in that of Engels. As will become clear as we move forward, both individuals were well on their way to become ‘swarthy chaps of Trier’:

“Who runs up next with wild impetuosity? | A swarthy chap of Trier, a marked monstrosity. | He neither hops no skips, but moves in leaps and bounds, | Raving aloud. As if to seize and then pull down | To earth the spacious tent of Heaven up on high, | He opens wide his arms and reaches for the sky. | He shakes his wicked fist, raves with a frantic air. | As if ten thousand devils had him by the hair.”

Afire with a yearning for improvement of the conditions befogging the working masses eking out their existence, the philosophy of praxis that proved to be the inseparable bond between the two figures appears quite evident in its embryonic form in the earliest published works of the two authors. We ought to revisit the epistemological premises that gave philosophical vent to this desire to alleviate human suffering lest our venture to assess Marxian universalism is viewed as an ode to the political commitment of the two figures. The first point to note, in that vein, is Marx’s endorsement of the materialist thesis that sensuous world is the realm of objective appearance.\(^\text{310}\) By pitting Epicurean insistence on the objective appearance of the external world against the Democritean argument that the only true principles are the atoms and void whereby objects of sense perception are stigmatized as ‘untrue’ in that they are mere opinion and semblance [Schein],\(^\text{312}\) Marx concurred with Epicurus in that external appearance is objective in-itself.\(^\text{313}\) Marx also claimed that Democritus could not help but be guided by a restless spirit of empirical research concerning physical, geographical and empirical matter, which amounted to the collection of mere semblances in the form of empirical steadfastness. Fusing Epicurus’ laid-back assurance with his disregard of compiling sensory data, Marx


\(^{313}\) “All nature, as it is in itself, consists | Of two things: there are bodies and there is void | In which these bodies are and through which they move. | The senses which are common to men declare | That body has a separate existence. | Without faith firmly founded in our senses | There will be no standard to which we can refer | In hidden matters, giving us the power, | To establish anything by reasoning.” Lucretius, *On the Nature of the Universe*, trans. by Ronald Melville, (Oxford and New York, 1999), 1.419-425.
posed Democritus’ impetuosity as the antithesis to the Epicurean peace of mind that takes account of phenomenal variations as they make themselves apparent. Marx turns back to the themes of necessity and chance as the third pillar of his core argument. Recalling that necessity, in Democritus, is the basic form of reflection of the external semblance that is intolerant of the introduction even of the slightest whiff of chance, Marx rejoices in the momentousness of Epicurus’ attempt to dethrone necessity as the mouthpiece of an irrational understanding of capricious gods pillorizing human, as well as natural, free will.314 These three points serve as the touchstone with which the details of Democritian and Epicurean theories of the movements and qualities of atoms, divisible and indivisible principles, time and meteors are adumbrated in their contrast, whose importance can be testified by reference to some of the few extant letters written by Epicurus. In his letter to Herodotus, for example, Epicurus not only offers detailed information in regard to the principal tenets of his philosophy and their application to the life of the philosopher but also to the ethical and political resonances that are expressed by those tenets:

“In addition to all these points in general, one must also conceive that the worst disturbance occurs in human souls [1] because of the opinion that these things [the heavenly phenomena] are blessed and indestructible and that they have wishes and undertake actions and exert causality in a manner inconsistent with those attributes, and [2] because of the external expectation and suspicion that something dreadful [might happen] such as myths tell about, or [3] even because they fear that very lack of sense-perception which occurs in death, as though it were relevant to them, and [4] because they are not in this state as a result of their opinions but because of some irrational condition; hence, not setting a limit on their dread, they suffer a disturbance equal to or even greater than what they would suffer if they actually held these opinions…. Hence, one must attend to one’s present feelings and sense-perception to the common sense-perceptions for common properties and to the individual sense-perceptions for individual properties, and to every immediately clear fact as revealed by each of the criteria. For, if we attend to these things, we will give a correct and complete causal account of the source of our disturbance and fear, and [so] dissolve them, by accounting for the causes of meteorological and other phenomena which we are constantly exposed to and which terrify other men most severely.”315

Our understanding of external reality is thus shaped by the sensory data that we gather using our senses.316 The collection of images, sounds, scents, etc., is dependent, one and all, upon

316 Cf. “Get used to believing that death is nothing to us. For all good and bad consists in sense-experience, and death is the privation of sense-experience. Hence, a correct knowledge of the fact that death is nothing to us makes the mortality of life a matter for contentment, not by adding a limitless time [to life] but by removing the longing for immortality.” Epicurus, Letter to Menoeceus, Diogenes Laertius 10.124. The same sentiment of defiance of death is on display fast verbatim in Cicero’s Tusculan Disputations: “Death is especially likely to be met with equanimity when the person departing from life can find consolation in his own laudable actions. No life is too short if virtue is complete. Many times I’ve felt the time was right for me to die – if only I could have done so!” Marcus Tullius Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, I, in On Living and Dying Well, trans. by Thomas Habinek (London, 2012), pp. 52; Lucretius, On the Nature of the Universe, 3.830-854.
the predicate of objects of external reality that actually exist by themselves in the world. That is not tantamount to saying, however, that anything surpassing this zero-degree conditionality of spatiality can be reached in absentia of any cognitively active historical agent to apprehend and process them. In phenomenological terms of Merleau-Ponty, the rapport between the observer and the observed is never one of any regular cardinality that is introduced in accord with the ordinances of an active principle.\textsuperscript{317} ‘I do not live before the world, I live encompassed within the world,’ is the regulative principle of the intellect that acts in any cognitive capacity as a being-toward-the-world. Corresponding to an empty set that serves as the glass floor of existence, the matter’s independence from human reasoning lasts only so long as its dreary insignificance is not perturbed. Put differently, the matter of any anti-idealistic materialism is one that is utterly ineffable and inexplicable in regard to what Peirce used to call its allegedly unmediated derivation.\textsuperscript{318} Its postulation is one that is afforded thanks to human reasoning. But dare to take a step beyond that mediation in the direction of its supposed positing as an unqualified entity not unlike an aesthetic sublimity and you will end up reflecting on Poe’s \textit{Raven} as the zenith of an aesthetics of detached sentimentalism.\textsuperscript{319} Well, not to cut the floor beneath any hard-nosed aesthete’s feet but thanks to the disarmingly honest reflections of Poe on the poem we know that the latter was anything but a gush of inspiration that burst forward without the slightest quarter given to the poem’s formal aspects.\textsuperscript{320} And with the formalist reflections that are induced by choices concerning a rhyme here and a cadence there the perforation created by any reasoning on the still waters of cognition deepens into a self-inflicted abyss.\textsuperscript{321} By mediating on the hitherto unmediated, the individual cognises the immaterial \textit{rondo} with which he or she has to round up every act of cognition on the material

\textsuperscript{317} \textquote{Ici le corps n’est plus moyen de la vision et du toucher, mais leur dépositaire. Loin que nos organes soient des instruments, ce sont nos instruments au contraire qui sont des organes rapportés. L’espace n’est plus celui dont parle la \textit{Dioptrique}, réseau de relations entre objets, tel que le verrait un tiers témoin de ma vision, ou un géomètre qui la reconstruit et la survole, c’est un espace compté à partir de moi comme point ou degré zéro de la spatialité. Je ne le vois pas selon son enveloppe extérieure, je le vis du \textit{dedans}, j’y suis englobé. Après tout, le monde est autour de moi, non devant moi.” Merleau-Ponty, \textit{L’Œil et l’Esprit}, pp. 58-59.

\textsuperscript{318} \textquote{“Every unidealistic philosophy supposes some absolutely inexplicable, unanalysable ultimate; in short, something resulting from mediation itself not susceptible of mediation. Now that anything \textit{is} that inexplicable can only be known by reasoning from signs. But the only justification of an inference from signs is that the conclusion explains the fact. To suppose the fact absolutely inexplicable is not to explain it, and hence this supposition is never allowable.” Charles S. Peirce, \textquote{Some Consequences of Four Incapacities}, in \textit{Writings of Charles S. Peirce}, II, (Bloomington, 1983), pp. 213; cf. Kierkegaard, \textit{Either/Or}, pp. 50.


\textsuperscript{320} \textquote{“The extraordinary thing about this text [The Philosophy of Composition] is that its author explains the rule whereby he managed to convey the impression of spontaneity, and this message, which goes against any aesthetics of ineffability, is the same as that transmitted by the \textit{Poetics}.” Eco, \textquote{The Poetics and Us}, pp. 239.

universe. Just as the harmonic integrity of *Für Elise* is entirely dependent upon the swings back to the theme in an ABACA form, or the poetic structure of the *Raven* hinges for the most part on the musicality of the oft-repeated ‘nevermore,’ cognitive operations of any individual actively refer back to a continuum of perceptions.\(^{322}\) Even in the darkest night of the anti-idealistic obliviousness, we are all eidetic idealists ever since we have refused to abide by the glass floor of unintelligibility.

Besides, take vows of sensory unrecognition as one may, any anti-idealistic reckoning needs to make allowance for the fact that language functions as a threshing floor of quasi-particularistic discernment enticing any individual to cross the threshold of bare universality once and for all.\(^{323}\) Indeed, as Peirce, and Eco following in his footsteps, used to argue, the instant of transition from the Firstness, i.e., the first moment of sensory reaction to external stimuli, to Secondness, i.e., the momentary admission of a singular quality as a quality of something, is prone to vanish faster than any mayfly’s dream.\(^{324}\) Vanish abruptly as it does, however, any Firstness always leaves traces through which the linguistic community of the Thirdness in which every representative generality is formed comes into being. Including as it is the first two steps of semiotic appropriation,\(^{325}\) the Thirdness is the storehouse of generalities from which we make our inferential borrowings only to see that they perpetually fall short of either previously recorded or unrecorded phenomena. When I see a cat that is strolling around just as leisurely in my backyard and with virtually the same stripes as does my temperamental feline housemate, I momentarily let those stripes, perceived at this instant and from this perspective, sink into conformity with his representation without any trouble. But with the slightest of changes to pseudo-Boris’ (the name of my cat) posture or the most minute distortion from his immensely self-assured gait onto which I latch obliges me to return Boris’ *Doppelgänger* to the sensory register whence I borrowed it. Was that an instance of tactical retreat without muddying the waters of a serene Thirdness? I beg to differ. Determined not to mistake just any Boris-like passer-by for my feline companion, I occasionally study this particular specimen from the same angle that I had observed his double in addition to from other angles. And with each addition to the repository of qualities that I confer on Boris, seeing that his left-hand stripe in the sunlight of a midsummer afternoon are precisely a kind of a dark brownish hue that glitters by contrast to those patches of light grey that crisscross that

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\(^{322}\) Eco, ‘The Poetics and Us’, pp. 250.


\(^{324}\) Eco, *Kant and the Platypus*, pp. 64.

part of his fur, I rethink the representative measurements that were handed down on me from my accumulated yesterdays. That dark brownish hue that I just noted, for example, glitters just the way a cherry tree does which is why we, meaning Boris and I, have agreed to dub that patch of his ‘cilineko,’ from *ciliegia* and *neko* which are Italian for cherry and Japanese for cat respectively. And with that addition of a colour pattern into a pre-existing system of inferences concerning any feline passing over my backyard, I hence expand the correspondence set between fleeting singularities and rough-hewn generalities that operate when a similar experience materialises. Too much trouble and not much bite, with a touch of Robbe-Grillet to boot? Perhaps. I can only sympathise with other fellow cat-people if they do not have either the time or the willingness to diarise the visual qualities of their feline companions. Luckily, this whisker of anodyne futility can be trimmed short via a more historically spectacular case of a perceptual misreading.

A case in point is Marco Polo’s encounter with what he interpreted to be a unicorn in Java, only except that the Asiatic ‘unicorn’ in question had the head of a wild boar, two horns instead of one, and the temper of a hysterical queen, on top of being scaly and overweight which made it as ugly as they came for a unicorn – but not for a rhinoceros! Marco Polo’s cognitive ‘meet and greet’ with the unicorn, which served as one of Eco’s favourite examples of a misreading, is a fitting tale of how prone to transformation any culturally driven

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327 My example can be compared to the one Eco gives in the context of the incessant re-evaluations concerning the gradations of any inferential quality in the realm of Peircean Thirdness while taking his cue from the washing powder commercials. At any rate, the assertions of any brand-induced whiteness in-itself notwithstanding, I claim that the instant movement between the cognitive steps of Firstness and Secondness is no less subject to change with regard to its semiotic contents as a result of deliberate re-conditioning: Eco, *Kant and the Platypus*, pp. 101-102.

328 The perceptive reader will, of course, recognise this allusion as an assured sign to a parody of the prosody of the *Nouveau Roman*’s leading representative: Umberto Eco, ‘*Esquisse d’un nouveau chat*’, in *Misreadings*, trans. by William Weaver, (London, 1994), pp. 47-52.

329 “There are wild elephants in the country, and numerous unicorns, which are very nearly as big. They have hair like that of a buffalo, feet like those of an elephant, and a horn in the middle of the forehead, which is black and very thick. They do no mischief, however, with the horn, but with the tongue alone; for this is covered all over with long and strong prickles [and when savage with anyone, they crush him under their knees and then rasp him with their tongue]. The head resembles that of a wild boar, and they carry it ever bent towards the ground. They delight much to abide in mire and mud. ’Tis a passing ugly beast to look upon, and is not in the least like what which our stories tell of as being caught in the lap of a virgin; in fact, ‘tis altogether different from what we fancied.” Marco Polo, *The Book of Ser Marco Polo, the Venetian: Concerning the Kingdoms and Marvels of the East*, ed. and trans. by Henry Yule, (Cambridge, 2010), pp. 227.

330 Umberto Eco, ‘From Marco Polo to Leibniz’, in *Serendipities*, pp. 71-72; Eco, *Kant and the Platypus*, pp. 57-58; Umberto Eco, ‘Il Milione: Descrivere l’ignoto’, in *Sugli specchi*, pp. 64-65; for a synoptic account underscoring the import of the episode for Eco’s take on the theory of predictive coding, see
categorisation is whenever an external stimulus begins to fly in the face of our preconceptions. Recorded down to the smallest bits of its allegorical existence in regard to, for example, how to capture it, but unrecorded except for that polysemous literary quality, unicorns were the stuff of legends for whom any travelling merchant of Marco Polo’s day with a bit of keen interest in exotica was likely to keep an eye out.331 So if he was not quite hell-bent in discovering one through conducting a taxonomic field analysis, neither was he one to shun any approximate sighting just because it somehow deviated from how those graceful creatures were represented by a millennial tradition. And when the opportunity came knocking, he became the first documented post-medieval Occidental traveller ever to warp that millennial entry in order for it to accommodate the well-known image to the hitherto unknown – at least for the generations that did not grow up in the vicinity of a performing Roman circus332 – reality. No: he did not attempt to carve out a new zoological registry. For all he knew, the beasts he saw were unicorns if not in accordance with the spirit of the legends purveyed by medieval bestiaries and troubadours then at least in agreement with its law. So, instead of hassling with the registry of unicorn itself, he chose to take issue with the explanations it provided, replacing milky white with black, smooth hides with pelts like buffalo, etc.333 In the end, he would manage to refashion that semiotic registry in constant negotiation with his perceptions in order to make sure the transmission of that vital and validated message to his prospective readers: ‘Unicorns exist – just not in the way you think.’ Downgrade the expectations so that you can upgrade the experience; or as Eco would put it, he was, after all, a recipient of his own background books.334 And yet, any such attribution of a semiotic status of an unquestioning beneficiary to our dashing merchant would qualify as nothing but a retrospective philistinism that is uninformed of how semiotic complexification takes place. Marco Polo may have skirted around the terrible ordeal of inventing a novel representational category. But today we recognise the cognitive effort he betook himself in order to rewrite his past readings of ‘unicornhood,’ as the first stirrings of the perpetual negotiation between preconceptions and experiential discoveries. His was a first order compromise of the


331 The Christian allegorical poetry, for one, had turned the representation by the beginning of the fourteenth century into a spiritual *topos* with occasionally drawn analogies between the unicorn and Christ: “die maget reine | laet man da sitzen eine. | so si gesihet der einhurn, | so springet er ir an ir barm | unde slaefet danne. |so wirt er gevangen … | Also tet unser trothin der haltende Ch | der ein geistlich einhurn ist.” Cited in Susan L. Smith, *The Power of Women: A “Topos” in Medieval Art and Literature*, (Pennsylvania, 2016), pp. 164.

332 Strabo, *Geography*, 16.4.15.


antediluvian representation to allow it to keep holding water without discarding it tout court. If the representation was to remain as that of a graceful beast that ate only from the laps of virgins, then it was destined to sink, rudder and all, into the bottomless depths when an unnamed rhinoceros would have been pegged as its potential referent. His confounding of the erstwhile representative entry, as such, can be viewed as a negotiation of the significative boundaries of a moribund concept rather than a refractory, and hopeless, adhesion to its dictates. In rough correspondence with the pianist girl from the McDonalds’ TV commercial from the late 1980s, whose eerie E7s heartily suffice to set off an implosion of any theses of an irrelevance between Beethoven’s gradual loss of hearing and his growing preference of high pitch compositions which may be defended by any tone-deaf ear, Marco Polo overcharged the legendary representation of unicorns to such an extent that it only took a handful of zoologically well-versed later explorers to set those majestic animals apart as a semiotic concept in its own right. And if the once formidable implosion of that concept is too far from us to take note of its semiotic significance, then what to make of the fact that the semiotic generality afforded to the concept of rhinoceros has never been of the same ilk before and after the initial production (1959) on stage of Ionesco’s play with the same name? In short, the dialectics between semiotic intension and extension can function only so long as we grant the materiality of matter as a semiotic opening obliging our cognitive projections to kick in.

Having skipped around the full Peircean circle of semiosis, we once again return to Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of painting. Once we get our feet wet in the crystalline waters of singularities, either via linguistic or physical acts, it takes only the briefest of moments to realise that an existential opening toward the englobing materiality is always equally an opening within. I touch and be touched, see and be seen, hear and be heard, taste and be tasted, etc., so that, in the end, the momentary cognition of any external stimuli draws me back to the drawing board of experiential negotiation. In comprehending my being-toward-the-world along the lines of an erstwhile material coexistence that can only leave behind any metaphysics of matter via self-conscious deployments of concepts from one’s own cognitive matrix, I obstruct any remaining avenues of escape from the existential nausea that keeps popping up due to the ontological intertwining of being and nothingness. Further, on an epistemological note, for the attainment of any generalisable knowledge of nature to turn into

335 Cf. Ibid, pp. 58.
337 “Quand je vois à travers l’épaisseur de l’eau le carrelage au fond de la piscine, je ne le vois pas malgré l’eau, les reflets, je le vois justement à travers eux, par eux. S’il n’y avait pas ces distorsions, ces zébrures de soleil, si je voyais sans cette chair la géométrie de carrelage, c’est alors que je cesserais de le voir comme il est, où il est, à savoir: plus loin que tout lieu identique.” Merleau-Ponty, L’Œil et l’Esprit, pp. 70.
a possibility, the collection of sensory data needs to be built upon the premise that the perceivable appearance of external reality allows the observer, at least potentially, to reach a high degree of approximation of the thing in its material existence. Antiquated though the idea that posits mind as the mirror of universe may seem to be, it still appears to have a grain of truth in that in conceiving nature as a theatre of active physical, chemical and biological entities at play that is dependent upon the observing mind it also hints at the possible pathways for the advancement of knowledge pertaining to particular objects and their existence in nature. In acknowledging that the existence of matter resides in objects themselves only as a grounding principle, the philosopher reclaims the right to conceive objects in their perceived forms solely as the product of cognitive processes. If it is true that the absence of the human eye would directly translate into the unintelligibility of colours for any hypothetical beholder, it also needs to be accorded that the stripes of any zebra or antelope would continue to differ from one another and would continue to be perceived as such by other animals that have photoreceptors that function in tandem, if not in complete qualitative harmony, with human cones only to the extent that a cognitive community of existents is posited. With light deflected from the apple hitting the cones, the stimulation that takes place results in a signal that is relayed by the optic nerve to the visual cortex of the human brain whose processing of the information provided to it leads to the sensory awareness that any apple in question is either green, red, or rosy. The point being, despite the fact that most of the other animals cannot see the way most humans do and do not discern the colours of apples by calling them the way they see them using larynx and vocal cords, apples, in their objective existence, display a myriad of differences some of which can be garnered under the rubric of a generalized classification. In addition to drawing from the classified range of sensory data, the scientist proceeds with further classification and refinement of the former, which leads, at times, to hitherto inconceivable development in scientific understanding such as the Ultraviolet theory, that betrayed, in its non-correspondence with human optic nerves, the potential and gradual discovery of qualifiers pertaining to things in their existence in nature through the gradual expansion of the social needs as well as the potential means of their satisfaction. If there is an objectively existing world that we are able to touch, smell, see, hear and taste it is only to be expected that it is one’s hand that does the ‘touching’ and another’s nose that does the ‘smelling’ which may not exhaust either surface qualities of an object or its odour, enacting a space of scientific treatment of objects in question that exhibits an innate likelihood to

approximate further towards a more comprehensive, if essentially incomplete, understanding of those perceptual data.  

In admitting the zero-degree self-sustained existence of matter, Epicurus commenced his philosophical reasoning with the atom, i.e., indivisible individual or singular, that is presupposed to have objective existence in itself. This “affirmation of abstract self-consciousness” of the matter, as Marx puts it in the context of the Epicurean analysis of the movement of celestial bodies, gives expression to the idea that the absolute individuality of the matter finds its logical counterpart in the person of Epicurus qua philosopher, who encounters the diametric opposite of matter’s singularity when he lifts his gaze upwards to connect the individual atom with heavenly bodies. Indeed, given the determinate and deceptively self-perpetuating movement of celestial bodies, Epicurus finds himself at odds in the light of his theory of atomic swerve or declination and its incongruity with the former. Attempting to surpass the Democritian understanding of the necessary courses that atoms follow in the void, Epicurus resorts to the motion of clinamen, or declination, as the irregular final movement of an atom that finds the relativity with which it moves in a straight line, for example, in jeopardy as it is traversed by other atoms in the opposite direction. Conceding the abstract, yet relativized, existence of the atom in movement as an indicator of atom’s momentary non-self-sufficiency, Epicurus restores the latter’s self-sufficiency by the atom’s immediate negation of the straight line and, hence, of its relativity: “But the relative existence which confronts the atom, the mode of being which it has to negate, is the straight line. The immediate negation of this motion is another motion, which, therefore, spatially conceived, is the declination from the straight line.” Marx’s Hegelian interpretation of atomic declination thus transposes declination from a concept of simple, and final, negation of all determinate movement to that of atom’s recognition of its singular determinate existence in movement in

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339 "One must also believe that it is when something from the external objects enters into us that we see and think about their shapes. For external objects would not stamp into us the nature of their own colour and shape via the air which is between us and them, nor via the rays or any kind of flows which move from us to them, entering the vision or the intellect according to the size and fit [of the effluences] and moving very quickly; then, for this reason, they give the presentation of a single, continuous thing, and preserve the harmonious set [of qualities] generated by the external object, as a result of the coordinate impact from that object [on us], which [in turn] originates in the vibrations of the atoms deep inside the solid object. And whatever presentation we receive by a form of application, whether by the intellect or by the sense organs, and whether of a shape or of accidents, this is the shape of the solid object, produced by the continuous compacting or residue of the image. Falsehood or error always resides in the added opinion (in the case of something which awaits) testimony for or against it but in the event receives neither supporting testimony (nor opposing testimony).” Epicurus, Letter to Herodotus, 10.49-50.


342 Marx, Difference between the Democritian and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature, pp. 49.
its relation to all other atoms. Atom’s negation of its own relativized existence that is epitomized in its precarious relation to every other atom, is therefore the establishment of atom’s singular existence itself which can be realized only in the company of equals. In negating all relation to every other atom, the singular atom thus sheds its full abstraction in its partaking of lex atomi denoting the declination of each atom with regard to the movement of any other:

“The concept of the atom is therefore realized in repulsion, inasmuch as it is abstract form, but no less also the opposite, inasmuch as it is abstract matter; for that to which it relates itself consists, to be true, of atoms, but other atoms. But when I relate myself to myself as to something which is directly another, then my relationship is a material one. This is the most extreme degree of externality that can be conceived. In the repulsion of the atoms, therefore, their materiality, which was posited in the fall in a straight line, and the form-determination, which was established in the declination, are united synthetically.”

The Epicurean theory of atomic swerve, in that vein, is the logical conception of atoms recognizing their individual determinateness as the negation of their abstract existence for the purpose of attaining the communality of materiality that envelopes their singular existence. Translating these terms of philosophy of nature to those of astronomy, Epicurus upheld the principle of subjective freedom that pertains to individual atoms in regard to the movement of celestial bodies in order to highlight the incongruity of the Stoic doctrine of fate with the determinate freedom that characterizes the movement of individual atoms. The theory of the movement of meteors, as it was postulated by Epicurus, is hence used as the astronomical equivalent of the theory of clinamen. Focusing his gaze on the non-linear movement of meteors, Epicurus ripped apart the preconceived ataraxy of the celestial sphere for the sake of ensuring the ataraxy inherent to the freedom of human freedom: “Since eternity of the heavenly bodies would disturb the ataraxy of self-consciousness, it is a necessary, a stringent consequence that they are not eternal.” Refusing to grant a measure of tranquillity to the conception of celestial bodies as the ultimate resolution of antediluvian antinomies including form and matter, concept and existence, etc., the Epicurean theory of atomic swerve shook the foundations of procrustean conformity to arbitrarily enacted necessity which was embodied in the worship of planets and their consummate movements. Attacking the profoundest roots of necessitarianism with Cicero’s unremitting rebuke of Stoic doctrine of fate, Marx salvages the principle of declination from the murky waters of oblivion by virtue of the fact that, “the law

343 Cf. “Again, if movement always is connected, | New motions coming from old in order fixed, | If atoms never swerve and make beginning | Of motions that can break the bonds of fate, | And foil the infinite chain of cause and effect, | What is the origin of this free will | Possessed by living creatures throughout the earth?” Lucretius, On the Nature of the Universe, trans. by Ronald Melville, 2.251-257; contra Cicero, The Nature of the Gods, 1.69-70.

344 Marx, Difference between the Democritian and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature, pp. 52.

345 Ibid, pp. 70.
which it expresses goes through the whole Epicurean philosophy, in such a way, however, that, as goes without saying, the determination of its appearance depends on the domain in which it is applied.  

“The first consequence of this theology is your doctrine of the necessity of fate, which you call Heimarmene. This impels you to claim that every chance event is the outcome of an eternal verity and a chain of causation. … Next follows your doctrine of mantike, the Latin for which is divination (divination). If we were disposed to take any notice of you, this would overwhelm us with superstition, impelling us to cultivate soothsayers, augurs, fortune-tellers, seers, and dream-interpreters. Epicurus has delivered us from these terrors. Now that we are liberated, we have no fear of the gods, for we realize that they neither create trouble for themselves, nor seek to impose it on another. We venerate with devoted reverence their pre-eminent and outstanding nature.”

In surveying the fundamental differences between Democritian and Epicurean philosophies of nature, Marx, thus posits the latter as the consciousness of philosopher becoming conscious of itself and its opposition to other self-consciousnesses whereby the sublation of its abstract isolation is turned into the possibility of positing its subjectivity inter pares and hence reflecting its own materiality back into itself in its thereby materialized existence.

Conceived through the kaleidoscope in which materialism meets dialectics, Marx’s Hegelian treatment of the theory of atomic swerve posits objects’ confrontation with one another in the mind of the beholder as the essential second step of dialectical reason. The categorical compilation of instances of the eventual transition between particulars and universals, on this view, is deferred to the steps following the analysis of singulars and interweaving of the dialectical thread in order to construe singular and free determinateness according to the subjective consciousness of the former that emerges in the sublation of its erstwhile abstraction:

“In Epicurus, therefore, atomistics with all its contradictions has been carried through and completed as the natural science of self-consciousness. This self-consciousness under the form of abstract individuality is an absolute principle. Epicurus has thus carried atomistics to its final conclusion, which is its dissolution and conscious opposition to the universal. For Democritus, on the other hand, the atom is only the general objective expression of the empirical investigation of nature as a whole. Hence the atom remains for him a pure and abstract category, a hypothesis, the result of experience, not its active [energisches] principle. This hypothesis remains therefore without realization, just as it plays no further part in determining the real investigation of nature.”

The materialization of the individual self-consciousness is realized at the level of natural philosophy with the threefold preparatory process of the dialectical cognition of matter: (I) By

346 Ibid, pp. 50.
349 Marx, *Difference Between Democritian and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature*, pp. 73.
defining the matter as that which has an objective existence in itself. Marx construed nature as a collection of determinate singularities that exist only in their abstraction from every other matter; further, in his agreement with the Democritian perpetuity of motion and its admission by Epicurus, (II) Marx conceived atoms’ existence in motion as indicating the inevitability of confrontation whose ties to necessitarianism can only be overcome by (III) direct allusion to the dialectics of self-conscious praxis as it comprehends the material positedness of the object in the reflection of other determinate matters whereby the abstract individuality is sublated in the material subjectivity of the object. This account of matter’s recognition of its materiality and subjectivity, foreshadowing as it is in regard to the general contours of our construal of dialectical universals in relation to its Hegelian anticipations, however, cannot be viewed as conclusive prior to taking its essential counterpart, i.e., history, into consideration. Indeed, stunningly programmatic as it is with regard to the epistemologically nuanced formulations it offers, Marx’s dissertation hardly emits substantial signs of life concerning the historical exigencies that were surrounding Democritus and Epicurus. Marx had, to be sure, a nuanced knowledge of the history of philosophy that allowed him to situate his understanding of Epicurean philosophy of nature, along with that of the Stoic, as “the boon of its time; thus when the universal sun goes down, the moth seeks the lamplight of the private individual.” Further, it should be noted that Marx’s preliminary notebooks on Epicurean philosophy and its conception through the ages conveys an acute sense of self-awareness in its relation to the


352 And that when Lucretius’ verse abounds with evasive will-o-the-wisps answering the poet’s need for departing from what Virgil was to go on to call “tot bella per omnem” reality of his day, swiping the ground of permanence beneath the latter’s feet in contradistinction to the immutable intactness that is afforded by the underlying atoms and void: “But slavery, by contrast, poverty and riches | Freedom, war, peace and all such things | As may come and go but leave things in their essence | Intact, these, as is right, we call accidents.” Lucretius, *On the Nature of the Universe*, trans. by Ronald Melville, 1.545-457; cf. Virgil, *Georgics*, 1.505-506.

353 Karl Marx, *Notebooks on Epicurean Philosophy*, trans. by Richard Dixon in *MECW*, I, pp. 492; to the extent that he traces the elements of Marx’s philosophy of history in the formative years culminating in his dissertation to his preparatory notebooks Karl Löwith was in the right. He was in the wrong to argue, however, that this tentatively held philosophy of history span the whole corpus of his and Engels’ writings thereby turning them effectively into the representatives of historical messianism: “Eventually the whole realm of life’s necessities will be replaced by a “realm of freedom” in a supreme community of communist character: a Kingdom of God, without God and on earth, which is the ultimate goal and ideal of Marx’s historical messianism.” Karl Löwith, *Meaning in History: The Theological Implications of the Philosophy of History*, (Chicago, 1957), pp. 42.

98
Hashing out the details of the culmination of the philosophical consciousness of an age, never the less, hardly adds up to diligent sociological probes beneath one’s own ‘historical time’. This perspicuous attentiveness to historical detail, in a nutshell, was precisely what Engels was to attain during his two-year stay in the industrialized areas of England (1842-1844). Setting all the unwarranted allusions to prefigurations of an eventual intellectual division of labour between the two figures aside, it was Engels who was in possession of an invaluable compilation of first-hand knowledge of the ‘workshop of the world’, England. Engaging in a careful study of minute detail regarding the misery of existence that shrouded the lives of workers, Engels worked out the nitty-gritty of the pauperization of the proletariat in the early 1840s with such economic perspicacity that allowed him to anticipate some of the core Marxian arguments which would develop to their full extent not earlier than in the later works of the two figures. Having depicted his observations of the inhuman conditions of the working class in the industrial heartlands of England, Engels tore apart the veil of freedom that adorned the Victorian construal of industrial work as a mere question of unforced reproduction of the working class. To that end, Engels brought forward the ancient institution of slavery to draw parallels with the perpetual locomotion of British workers to and fro the sweatshops or factories that does not seem to display even the slightest whiff of anything concerning the freedom of contract:

“If the demand for workers increases, the price of workers rises; if it falls, their price falls. If it falls so greatly that a number of them become unsaleable, if they are left in stock, they are simply left idle; and as they cannot live upon that, they die of starvation. For, to speak in the words of the economists, the expense incurred in maintaining them would not ‘be reproduced’, would be money thrown away, and to this end no man advances capital; and, so far, Malthus was perfectly right in his theory of population. The only difference as compared with the old, outspoken slavery is this, that the worker of today seems to be free because he is not sold once for all, but piecemeal by the day, the week, the year, and because no one owner sells him to another, but he is forced to sell himself in this way instead, being the slave of no particular person, but of the whole property-holding class. For him the matter is unchanged at bottom, and if this semblance of liberty necessarily gives him some real freedom on the one hand, it entails on the other the disadvantage that no one guarantees him a subsistence.”

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354 Putting his contemporaries working at various philosophy departments in Prussia alongside the earlier emergence of Zeno, Epicurus, etc., following the fall of the absolute after Aristotle, Marx beckons that it is high time to jump the ship of the Hegelian absolute: “At such times half-hearted minds have opposite views to those of whole-minded generals. They believe that they can compensate losses by cutting the armed forces, by splitting them up, by a peace treaty with the real needs, whereas Themistocles, when Athens was threatened with destruction, tried to persuade the Athenians to abandon the city and found a new Athens at sea, in another element.” Marx, Notebooks on Epicurean Philosophy, pp. 492.

355 “The twenty-one months Engels then spent in England had the same significance for him as the year spent in Paris had for Marx. Both of them had gone through the German philosophic school and whilst abroad they came to the same conclusions, but while Marx arrived at an understanding of the struggles and the demands of the age on the basis of the French Revolution, Engels did so on the basis of English industry.” Franz Mehring, Karl Marx, (Sussex, 1981), pp. 93.

With his frequent allusions to well-known political economists of his day, such as Edward Baines, Adam Smith and Thomas Malthus, and the ease with which he used some basic terms of service of bourgeois economists, only to subvert them thoroughly in their moral reverberations one might add, 357 it indeed appears that Engels could speak the words of the economists just as well as he did his native German. Moreover, by turning the tables against the Victorian morality with its hallmark feature of ghastly delinquents donning the clothes of crooks and workers, 358 Engels also managed to exhibit the ghastly interior of bourgeois economics with its cherished phenomenological separation of politics, economy, morals, crime, etc. With an untiring eye for material detail matched only by a down-to-earth understanding of the ‘capitalist system’ as a whole, Engels discussed a variety of topics ranging from the physical working conditions of female 359 and child labour 360 to average wages paid and precondition of leaves granted to workers in textile factories of Lancashire, 361 in the concentrated metalworks of Birmingham 362 and so on. Linking together all the minute details that he gives is hence Engels’ understanding of singular, and otherwise dismissible, social developments as bearing intelligibility for social criticism in their connection with one another and in their relation to industrial development writ large:

“Engels starts by looking at how the Industrial Revolution transformed the old ways of working to such an extent that it created a whole class of wage labourers, the proletariat. The introduction of machinery into the production of textiles, coal and iron turned the British economy into the most dynamic in the world, creating a mass of communications networks—iron bridges, railways, canals—which in turn led to more industrial development.” 363

Engels’ comprehensive sociological gaze on historical instances posits the unquestioned primacy of the objective appearance of external reality within the litmus test of diachronicity

357 His theorization of business cycles as signalling the need of capitalists to have an industrial reserve army at the ready is a case in point in highlighting the facility with which Engels turned the analytic tools of bourgeois economists against capitalism: “So it goes on perpetually – prosperity, crisis, prosperity, crisis, and this perennial round in which English industry moves is, as has been observed before, usually completed once in five or six years… From this it is clear that English manufacture must have, at all times save the brief periods of highest prosperity, and unemployed reserve army of workers, in order to be able to produce the masses of goods required by the market in the liveliest months.” Ibid, pp. 117; cf. “The modern bourgeois forces the working-men to sell himself. The serf was the slave of the piece of land on which he was born, the working-men is the slave of his own necessaries of life and of the money with which he has to buy them – both are slaves of a thing.” Ibid, pp. 212.

358 The causal correspondence he establishes between criminal offences committed in England over the course of a thirty-seven-year period (1805-1842) and the exponential extension of the class of industrial workers serves as a fitting example of his careful attempts to ponder upon the social origins of criminality in a world of private property that is ‘plagued’ by masses without property. Ibid, pp. 159-160.


whereby the determinateness of the former is comprehended in its communality with other instances and in its relation to the theory conceived as the causal inferences between the generality of instances rendered intelligible.\textsuperscript{364} In his theoretical movement from his personal observations of singular instances of children of five to six years of age that were employed in the silk factories of Macclesfield and beginning to exhibit symptoms of spinal deformity and rickets no later than during their first few years of employment\textsuperscript{365} to his utilisation of other testimonies of doctors concerning the rapidly deteriorating health of employed children of similar ages and to his final agreement with Robert Hyde Greg, one of the largest manufacturers based in Manchester, words that “if things went on as at present, the operatives of Lancashire would soon be a race of pigmies,”\textsuperscript{366} Engels exhibits the immanent relationship between matter, subject and history whose confluence is explained in terms of three totalities: a child labour sweating in a factory in Leeds called Tom and suffering rickets due to a conglomereration of facts including protracted hours of standing, undernourishment, etc., works with other children one of whom is called Harry and suffers flat footedness as a result, again, mainly of overwork and malnutrition. On an external dialectical level, the material fact that the two children continue to toil endlessly in the sweatshop despite enduring gradually exacerbated degrees of pain that is effected by the further curving of Tom’s spine and further deformation of Harry’s foot does not amount to the creation of a seamless unity of instances, discarding the fact that the first child was originally from Cowell and had four siblings, two brothers and two sisters, whereas the other child was born in Donoughmore, county Cork, Ireland, moved to Leeds with his family at the age of six and promptly started toiling. The infinitesimally large number of personal details that can be traced back to the respective conception of children in the womb of their mothers exists within the heap of microscopic historical details that simply make Tom and Harry who they were. Further, the sheer number of personal features that appear to be lost in their classificatory sublation to Tom qua five-year old with rickets and Harry qua six-year-old with flat foot toiling away their childhood in a factory in Leeds basically wards off any logical drifts towards mechanical determinism whereby Tom and Harry are transformed into future fervent supporters of Chartist or Socialist agendas just because they drudged and hassled in that factory at that time. Just as neither

\textsuperscript{364} Cf. “The great advance over Hegel made by the scientific standpoint of the proletariat as embodied in Marxism lay in its refusal to see in the categories of reflection a ‘permanent’ stage of human knowledge and in its insistence that they were the necessary mould of thought and of life in bourgeois society, in the reification of thought and life. With this came the discovery of dialectics in history itself. Hence dialectics is not imported into history from outside, nor is it interpreted in the light of history (as often occurs in Hegel), but is derived from history made conscious as its logical manifestation at this particular point in its development.” Lukács, ‘Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat’, pp. 177.


\textsuperscript{366} Cited in \textit{ibid}, pp. 187.
Tom’s birth to a family of working-class origins of Cowell nor his being the youngest of four children affords the construction of any linear causality from cradle to factory nor does it afford any currency in terms of the ever-present human free will to project his present into his future by claiming that the combination of dehumanizing conditions that were heaved at him while he was a five-year-old would necessarily pave his way of becoming a defender of the interests of those that have gone through similar industrial ‘rites of passage’. For all intents and purposes, he could have grown into a fine foreman on the factory floor or into an informant in the service of the factory owner for the sake of earning more money to look after his family, or he could have become a bedridden patient at the age of thirteen. In short, the possibilities are endless albeit not equally likely. Accidents, to utilize the Spinozist dictum, point toward the conception of future as an indeterminate determinateness in their manifest inexhaustibility.

The respective totality of potentialities of Tom and Harry is, however, logically prerequisite in its transposition of accidents to a classified sphere of attributes, preserving the former intact as any accident can historically enter or fall out of the realm of attributes. Tom becoming a silk worker in a factory in the county of Yorkshire does not preclude his capability to move elsewhere, engage in a different type of occupation with relatively similar pay or else. Tom’s actual toiling on the factory floor at that definite moment interpolates, by contrast, his abstract existence as Tom with potentially infinite qualifiers within the plane of determinateness corresponding to a totality of workers of the Yorkshire factory in their material communality. Further, extending the range of phenomenal comprehension, Tom and Harry’s reaching the self-conscious materiality of their existence in the determinate activities of one another also brings a third person to this hypothetical, i.e., timeless, history: Dick the factory owner.

Indeed, as accentuated as singularly conceived as their totality is, Tom and Harry’s material actuality for themselves cannot be conceived in itself as an abstract, i.e., indeterminate, actuality.

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367 Cf. “Thus only when the theoretical primacy of the ‘facts’ has been broken, only when every phenomenon is recognised to be a process, will it be understood that what we are wont to call ‘facts’ consists of processes. Only then will it be understood that the facts are nothing but the parts, the aspects of the total process that have been broken off, artificially isolated and ossified.” Lukács, ‘Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat’, pp. 184; cf. Adorno, *Minima Moralia*, pp. 127.

368 A self-evident objection to this point is that Tom’s actuality can certainly be conceived with regard to his indeterminate abstraction stretched to infinity, turning Tom’s actions into a pastiche of existence in action, *par Spinoza*, and his consciousness into a self-referential reflection of his own mind, which, needless to add, can only operate at the level corresponding to Anaxagoras’ *Nous*, e.g., prime mover, first cause, etc., if it is to account for the relationality of definite instances of existence to being qua abstract indefiniteness: “Accident is known to be the dominating category with the Epicureans. A necessary consequence of this is that the idea is considered only as a *condition*; condition is existence accidental in itself. The innermost category of the world, the atom, its connection, etc., is for this reason relegated into the distance and considered as a past condition. We find the same thing with the Pietists and Supernaturalists. The creation of the world, original sin, the redemption, all this and all their godly determinations, such as paradise etc., are not an eternal, timeless, immanent determination of the idea, but a condition. As Epicurus makes the ideality of his world, the void, into [the condition for] the
Harry, also takes note of the alter-ego of the drudgery that he is subjected to thereby recognizing their work for itself essentially as work done to further the material interests of another, i.e., as a work-for-another. With the hierarchically posited arbiter qua capitalist put into its ‘rightful place,’ the microcosm of Tom, Dick, Harry and nameless others reaches its tentative conclusion in a logic of disjunct singularities with no mention having been made of universals what so ever. Acknowledging the looming threat of leapfrogging particulars and their relation to singulars, however, it is evident that we ought to proceed step by step in our dialectical survey without falling for the glittering lure of programmatic statements and tout court generalizations:

“The relation of the manufacturer to his operatives has nothing human in it; it is purely economic. The manufacturer is Capital, the operative Labour. And if the operative will not be forced into this abstraction, if he insists that he is not Labour, but a man, who possesses, among other things, the attribute of labour-force, if the takes it into his head that he need not allow himself to be sold and bought in the market, as the commodity ‘Labour’, the bourgeois reason comes to a standstill. He cannot comprehend that he holds any other relation to the operatives than that of purchase and sale; he sees them not human beings, but hands, as he constantly calls them to their faces; he insists, as Carlyle says, that ‘Cash Payment is the only nexus between man and man. Even the relation between himself and his wife is, in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred, mere ‘Cash Payment’.”

Positing theoretically well-versed history as the comprehension of entity’s determinate materiality with specific reference to spatio-temporal configurations, Engels steeped his historical account with an application of inverted theory whose defining feature is the reverse movement from universals to particulars. Notwithstanding how enticing it is in its enactment of a theatrical scene led by M. and Mme. Le Capital, however, the direct transposition of the universal microcosm to its microscopic instants begs the formation of historical concepts such as capital and labour which is assumed to be grasped by the reader instead of analysed in all

creation of the world, so also the Supernaturalist gives embodiment to premiselessness, [namely] the idea of the world, in paradise.” Marx, Notebooks on Epicurean Philosophy, pp. 478.

369 Cf. “Social activity and social consumption by no means exist solely in the form of a directly communal activity and a directly communal consumption, even though communal activity and communal consumption, i.e., activity and consumption that express and confirm themselves directly in real association with other men, occur wherever that direct expression of sociality [Gesellschaftlichkeit] springs from the essential nature of the content of the activity and is appropriate to the nature of the consumption… But even if I am active in the field of science, etc. – an activity which I am seldom able to perform in direct association with other men – I am still socially active because I am active as a man. It is not only the material of my activity – including even the language in which the thinker is active – which I receive as a social product. My own existence is social activity. Therefore what I create from myself I create for society, conscious of myself as a social being.” Karl Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, in Early Writings, trans. by Rodney Livingstone and Gregory Benton (Harmondsworth, 1977), pp. 350.

370 Rancière, The Nights of Labor, 22.


its nooks and crannies. Hence the necessity to situate history in its relation to a semantical adaption of the materialist thesis of the objective existence of the world of appearances, which will be attempted, in our case, by reference to the so-called early works of Marx in general and to *Holy Family* and *German Ideology* in particular.

Postulating the basic opposition between substance and consciousness as the central contradiction of Hegel’s philosophy, Marx and Engels’ works, either authored separately or collectively, dating back to 1840s, illustrate a sustained critique of Hegel’s abstraction of consciousness from its historical situatedness in order to conceive an everlasting Idea bequeathing life and limb on individuals in their material existence. Built on the logically insolvable antimony of universal ends and particular interests, the Hegelian Spirit dissolves analytical categories from their historically filled form whereby historical processes are reduced to their *ex nihilo* positedness by an infinite mind, i.e., Idea. In following this thread to the Hegel’s conceptual separation of family and civil society from the state as respective moments of finitude in regard to the hitherto unrealized return of the Spirit to itself, Marx points out that this procedure makes mere epiphenomena out of real historical processes:

“The Idea is subjectivized and the real relationship of the family and civil society to the state is conceived as the inner, imaginary activity. The family and civil society are the preconditions of the state; they are the true agents; but in speculative philosophy it is the reverse. When the Idea is subjectivized the real subjects – civil society, the family, ‘circumstances, caprice etc.’ – are all transformed into unreal, objective moments of the Idea referring to different things [Wenn aber die Idee versubjektiviert wird, werden hier die wirklichen Subjekte, bürgerliche Gesellschaft, Familie, “Umstände, Willkür usw.” zu unwirklichen, anderes Bedeutenden, objektiven Momenten der Idee].”

Transforming historical formations such as pre-feudal family and bourgeois civil society into moments of coming to be of the Absolute Spirit, Hegel’s timeless conceptions operate within an idealist quicksand that appears to endanger the vanishing of any determinate singularity attempting to participate in them. In his designation of concrete historical formations as a gallery of epiphenomenal images of Thought that are preconceived through *The Science of Logic*, Hegel preconceived the singular subject as a second order *Träger* of the logical Idea. Bringing the modern state forward as the only sphere capable of reconciliating particular interests with universal ends, Hegel attempted to particularize the universal notion of modern


375 “If history had not exemplified Thought in one way, it would have done so in another; anything could in principle count as an exemplification. For the categories of Hegel’s history are imported from *The Science of Logic*, and history is then ‘shown’ to instantiate them.” Meikle, *Essentialism in the Thought of Karl Marx*, pp. 39.
citizenship to construe a civil sphere of harmony inimical to any kind of material, i.e., communal, subjectivity. The Hegelian subject, in other words, is allowed to wear the Phrygian cap only at the full expense of his material subjectivity: “In the modern state, as in Hegel’s *Philosophy of Right*, the conscious, true reality of the universal interest is merely formal, in other words, only *what is formal constitutes the real, universal interest.*”

Objecting to this artificial separation of family and civil society from the state and to the wedge driven between the particular individual and the universal citizen, Marx promotes bringing history back in through his inquisitive analysis of those formations. Digging deeper into the early works, it becomes evident that history is conceived by Marx and Engels, in its synchronicity, as determinate individuals in dialogue with nature in their collectivity, and, in its diachronicity, as determinate individuals peered through the lens of historically conceived abstractions, i.e., theory.

Appearances to the contrary, the synchronic conception of history that is predicated upon the unity of matter and subject offers much more insight than mere platitudes. Fusing the human cognition of matter and a theoretical conception of human individual as *homo faber,* Marx’s postulation of nature as “man’s inorganic body” posits matter as cognitively mapped and hence transposed matter. The cognitive apprehension of objects that have their independent objective existence in the external world enacts a sphere of interpellation that refer each individual object to human consciousness in regard to its potential utilization, classification, production, etc. Human apperception of external objects, in that vein, does not leave the

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376 Marx, *Critique of Hegel’s Doctrine of the State*, pp. 127.
377 This return to history in order to unearth the essential properties of various concepts that afford theoretical purchase is reminiscent of Marx’s memorable questions levelled against the *Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen* in the Jewish question: “The rights of man as such are distinguished from the rights of the citizen. Who is this man who is distinct from the citizen? None other than the member of civil society. Why is the member of civil society simply called ‘man’ and why are his rights called the rights of man? How can we explain this fact? By the relationship of the political state to civil society, by the nature of political emancipation.” Karl Marx, *On the Jewish Question*, in *Early Writings*, trans. by Rodney Livingstone and Gregory Benton (Harmondsworth, 1977), pp. 228-9; cf. “Ainsi le démocrate, comme le savant, manque le singulier: l’individu n’est pour lui qu’une somme de traits universels…. Sa défense est de persuader aux individus qu’ils existent à l’état isolé. “Il n’y a pas de Juif, dit-il, il n’y a pas de question juive.” Cela signifie qu’il souhaite séparer le Juif de sa religion, de sa famille, de sa communauté ethnique, pour l’enfourner dans le creuset démocratique, d’où il ressortira seul et nu, particule individuelle et solitaire, semblable à toutes les autres particules.” Jean-Paul Sartre, *Réflexions sur la question juive*, (Paris, 1954), pp. 66-67; Galvano della Volpe, *Rousseau and Marx, and Other Writings*, trans. by John Fraser, (London, 1978).
378 Which is another way of saying, in agreement with Lukács, that no philosophy of history is conceivable through a Marxian lens: Lukács, *The Ontology of Social Being*, II, pp. 112.
379 “Not the abstract idol of an isolated man, which never exists anywhere, but rather man in his concrete social practice, man who embodies and makes a reality of the human race with his acts and in his acts.” Lukács, *The Ontology of Social Being*, III, pp. 84.
objects stranded in their relation to human use and purpose but incorporates them into the sphere of subjective human capability not unlike making a more variegated use of bodily extensions, e.g., omni-dexterity. In taking apperceptive notes of external objects, human mind conceives of potential pathways of existential configuration that are based on the cognitive socialization of the object. A demythologized Sisyphus never rolls the same boulder of external reality uphill. The observations made by Charles Darwin as the naturalist on board HMS *Beagle* between 1831 and 1836 coupled with endless laboratory experiments, for example, culminated in his theory of natural selection not only in regard to the adaptive variation exhibited by plants and animals to their environments but also to a better understanding of purposive breeding that is catered exclusively to human needs and desires: “The key is man’s power of accumulative selection: nature gives successive variations; man adds them up in certain directions useful to him. In this sense he may be said to make for himself useful breeds.”

Indeed, with the direct allusions he made to Malthus’ *Principle of Population* (1798), Darwin challenged Lamarckian natural teleology by underscoring the transformative capability of human selection:

“I have called this principle, by which each slight variation, if useful, is preserved, by the term of Natural Selection, in order to mark its relation to man’s power of selection. We have seen that man by selection can certainly produce great results, and can adapt organic beings to his own uses, through the accumulation of slight but useful variations, given to him by the hand of nature. But Natural Selection, as we shall hereafter see, is a power incessantly ready for action, and is as immeasurably superior to man’s feeble efforts, as the works of Nature are to those of Art.”

Now, more than 150 years after the publication of *The Origins of Species* (1859), nothing seems less feeble than the selective capabilities of humanity. Indeed, with Richard Dawkins’ theorization of ‘memeplexes’ in 1976, and the ensuing debates between socio-biologists and memetics, we are now at a point where our evolution is scrutinized critically in its traditional themes and in favour of understanding cultural imitation as involving a *sui generis* growth. Each novel addition to our knowledge of human biology, such as the discovery of *eto1*

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382 Ibid., pp. 51.
383 For a modern account of the basic differences of the two systems, see Gillian Beer, *Darwin’s Plots: Evolutionary Narrative in Darwin, George Elliot and Nineteenth-Century Fiction*, (London, 1985).
386 “The bottom line here is that for all these theories [of socio-biology] culture is an adaptation, created by and for genes. But for memetics culture is not, and never was, an adaptation. Imitation was an adaptation, allowing individuals to learn from each other, but the memes it unintentionally let loose were not. Culture did not arise for our sake, but for its own. It is more like a vast parasite growing and living and feeding on us than a tool of our creation. It is a parasite that we cope with – indeed we and culture have co-evolved a symbiotic relationship. But it is a parasite nonetheless.” Susan Blackmore, ‘Imitation Makes Us Human’, in *What Makes Us Human?* ed. by Charles Pasternak, (Oxford, 2007), pp. 4.
ethylene overproducer to promote root cell growth, thus appears as a step forward in the actualization of the theory of natural selection viewed as a precursor to the approximation towards higher degrees of correspondence between the purposive selections of humans and nature. With the unprecedentedly high potential humans’ active existence as social production has realized through capitalist venture to leave no stone unturned in search for higher profits, individual’s determinate activity finds its social positedness only if it is conceived as Gemeinwesen, i.e., communal being. The realization of the determinate active existence of the singular individuals in their material positedness within the active company of other singulars is thereby linked to the reciprocal subjection of nature to individuals and vice versa, which entails the advent of an enriched field of capabilities that transform the singularities pertaining to each element in otherwise inconceivable ways. The productive capabilities that are enhanced by the construction of each new dam and power plant disturbs the abstract equilibrium of nature in-itself and posits it vis-à-vis its relation to human communities; and, yet, each natural ‘catastrophe’ erupts from a confluence of disruptive forces heralded by human activity, including the erosion of soil, pollution of air and water, etc., and levels out designs that have been heavily balanced in favour of the interests of ruling classes. The active material existence of individuals that are conscious of the sociality of their actions, which are undertaken in the company of other humans and thus potentially capable of fostering or hindering their collective existence, is thus canvassed also as simultaneously engendering the socialization of nature and the naturalization of lower classes. Galvanized by the permanent need to preserve his or her life, the human individual, grows conscious of nature as the only sphere of his or her material activity, and only then does he or she comprehend the connections of his or her actions to those of others in transforming, deploying and redeploying nature and in becoming subject to transformation in turn. Only by regarding nature as organized by an external dialectics of matter can we conceive society as through a dialectics of post-metaphysical consciousness:

388 Cf. “Thus the hand is not only the organ of labour, it is also the product of labour. Labour, adaptation to ever new operations, the inheritance of muscles, ligaments, and, over longer periods of time, bones that had undergone special development and the ever-renewed employment of this inherited finesse in new, more and more complicated operations, have given the human hand the high degree of perfection required to conjure into being the pictures of a Raphael, the statues of a Thorvaldsen, the music of a Paganini.” Engels, *Dialectics of Nature*, pp. 172.
389 Lukács, ‘Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat’, pp. 128.
391 "The main achievement was dialectics, i.e., the doctrine of development in its fullest, deepest and most comprehensive form, the doctrine of the relativity of the human knowledge that provides us with a reflection of eternally developing matter.” Vladimir I. Lenin, *The Three Sources and Three Component Parts of Marxism*, in Lenin: *Selected Works*, (Moscow, 1977b), pp. 21.
“To sum up: it is only when man’s object becomes a human object or objective man that man does not lose himself in that object. This is only possible when it becomes a social object for him and when he himself becomes a social being for himself, just as society becomes a being for him in this object.”

Individual’s social existence determining his or her consciousness, the famous formulation of the 1859 *Preface*, can thus be seen as surmising human individual’s perception of nature as objective materiality in itself that can be utilized in the service of self-preservation which precedes the singular individual’s perception of other humans working with and on nature and thereby growing conscious of the communality of his or her existence. The determinateness of that, which is endowed with the singular individual in regard to the full range of her personal attributes that are located in a specific historical instant, on this view, can only be granted by the reciprocal cooperation of the individual and nature for the sake of finding potential sources to ensure the former’s existence, i.e., work. Positing the biblical curse, “By the sweat of thy brow you will eat,” within the transformations that human labour has underwent through the course of history, Marx has noted that determinate consciousness can only spring from material existence and in the material recognition of work as a specific mode of social labour in the company of labouring others.

The dialectical unity of socialised humans and nature further indicates that attributions pertaining to the mode of work qua actualization of determinate singularity and its corresponding totality can be discerned only in their relation to spatio-temporal specificity.

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393 “The general conclusion at which I arrived and which, once reached, became the guiding principle of my studies can be summarized as follows. In the social production of their existence, men inevitably enter into definite relations, which are independent of their will, namely relations of production appropriate to a given stage in the development of their material forces of production. The totality of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which arises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the general process of social, political and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness.” Karl Marx, *Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, in *Early Writings*, trans. by Rodney Livingstone and Gregory Benton (Harmondsworth, 1977), pp. 425.
395 Genesis, (3:19).
The employment of productive capacities as any individual partakes of different activities in taking advantage of his or her natural surroundings thus insinuates the formation of a conscious relation with the totality of activities that emanate from the society encompassing the individual, which are, then, collectivised in the communal appropriation of nature.\textsuperscript{397} External material’s appropriation by human individual, whether conceived along the lines of Lockean man existing in the state of nature collecting acorns\textsuperscript{398} or along the full-fledged private ownership of a house, thus serves as the hub whence arise the association of determinate labour of the individual on natural matter with the second degree positedness of that labouring activity in its reference to the prefigured generation of material subjectivity in the determination by the particular totality of the social body in question. Working through the abstract particularity in which individual qua social being finds him or herself in his or her historically conditioned communal activity, particular individual’s apperception of the communal ties of subjection concerning productive activity forces abstract categories such as work, property, subject, etc., to find their respective historical expressions thereby concretizing his or her historically circumscribed comprehension in regard to the temporally available forms of production, consumption, domination, insubordination etc. Working out the limitations that are superimposed by society on their activity in all its manifestations, particular individuals conceive their bifurcated communality as a temporal, and hence contingent, totality. In Hegelian terms, particular individuals comprehend the abstract particularity of their historically limited consciousness in and through the social actions à la Marx that they engage in whereby the voluntary conception of the superimposed limits that are put not only on different parts of population but also on different parts of nature are rendered intelligible in temporal terms. Comprehending the apparently abstract, and hence timeless, forms of concepts with regard to their respective historical forms, particular individuals recognize the movement of their self-conscious activities through time and space as the paintbrush of their material existence colouring interrelations between individuals as well as those between determinate individuals and nature alike. Understanding history without retrospective reproach, the particularized individual qua subject begins to resolve the besetting rigidity that surrounds frozen concepts and their presupposed timelessness for the sake of conceiving history as the transformations of material subjectivity:

“In mass type history there were no factory towns before there were factories; but in Critical history [of Bruno Bauer and other subjectivists that numbered among the Young Hegelians],

\textsuperscript{397} “In this way there arises the only objective and quite general law of social being, which is as ‘eternal’ as social being itself, and is also a historical law, in so far as it arises simultaneously with social being, and remains effective just as long as this exists. All other laws that are situated within social being are thus already of a historical character.” Lukács, \textit{The Ontology of Social Being}, II, pp. 93.

in which, as already in Hegel, the son begets his father, Manchester, Bolton, and Preston were flourishing factory towns before factories were even thought of. In real history the cotton industry was founded mainly on Hargreaves’ jenny and Arkwright’s throstle, Crompton’s mule being only an improvement of the spinning jenny according to the new principle discovered by Arkwright. But Critical history knows how to make distinctions: it scorns the one-sidedness of the jenny and the throstle, and gives the crown to the mule as the speculative identity of the extremes. In reality, the invention of the throstle and the mule immediately made possible the application of waterpower to those machines, but Critical Criticism sorts out the principles lumped together by crude history and makes this application come only later, as something quite special. In reality the invention of the steam-engine preceded all the above-mentioned inventions; according to Criticism it is the crown of them all and the last.”

Individual’s relation to other individuals and to nature, which is encapsulated in dubbing her activity as a sensuous complex of social and natural intercourse, thus serves to flank not only the idealist separation of consciousness from material existence that was displayed by the theoretical efforts of St. Max (Stirner) and St. Bruno (Bauer) as they were crowned as the foremost patrons of post-Hegelian German idealism but also to challenge the inconsistent materialism of Ludwig Feuerbach which is characterized by the comprehension of external objects in their material existence alone. In waging this struggle against the contemplative abstraction of matter, à la Feuerbach, and ideas or categories, à la Stirner, Bauer and Proudhon, from its immediate historical form, Marx relied on the inherent historicity of any such conception, such as liberty, that sublates its full abstraction by noting its determinate historical signification. Unfurling the sails of historical determination in order to identify determinate individuals in their immediate social and natural environment, Marx advanced his understanding of the historical individual that achieves conscious existence in and through his or her sensuous activity not walking past any of its instances. Pitting historicized individuals and socialized objects respectively against abstract ‘Human’ and ‘Matter’ in their indeterminate forms, Marx thus broke open the floodgates of history in order to drown any penchant for metaphysical abstraction:

“If from real apples, pears, strawberries and almonds I form the general idea “Fruit”, if I go further and imagine that my abstract idea “Fruit” derived from real fruit, is an entity existing outside me, is indeed the true essence of the pear, the apple, etc., then—in the language of


400 Marx’s criticisms of Feuerbach were indicative, as it would later be emphasized by Lenin in his Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, in that vein, of Feuerbach’s reservations of carrying his critique of idealist abstraction to its logical conclusion by positing historical matter as the unity of particular individuals and nature in the form of productive activity. Feuerbach’s premises were, as such, true to their materialist origins if somewhat reminiscent of eighteenth century French mechanical materialism in their postulation of matter as self-referential externality: “To abstract means to posit the essence of nature outside nature, the essence of Man outside Man, the essence of thought outside the act of thinking. The Hegelian philosophy has alienated Man from himself in so far as its whole system is based on these acts of abstraction.” Ludwig Feuerbach, ‘Preliminary Theses on the Reform of Philosophy’, in Z. Hanfi (ed.), The Fiery Brook, Selected Writings of Ludwig Feuerbach, (New York, 1972), pp. 157; cf. Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, pp. 102-106.
speculative philosophy—I am declaring that “Fruit” is the “Substance” of the pear, the apple, the almond, etc. I am saying, therefore, that to be a pear is not essential to the pear, that to be an apple is not essential to the apple; that what is essential to these things is not their real existence, perceptible to the senses, but the essence that I have abstracted from them and then foisted on them, the essence of my idea—“Fruit”. I therefore declare apples, pears, almonds, etc., to be mere forms of existence, modi, of “Fruit”. My finite understanding supported by my senses does of course distinguish an apple from a pear and a pear from an almond, but my speculative reason declares these sensuous differences inessential and irrelevant. It sees in the apple the same as in the pear, and in the pear the same as in the almond, namely “Fruit”. Particular real fruits are no more than semblances whose true essence is “the substance”—“Fruit”.  

Speculative philosophy thus proceeds by substituting its own categorical abstractions with determinate instances of actuality, which are promptly turned into plastic reflections of ideational creations, freedom, fraternity, love, universality, etc., that are divested from their historical roots. In conceiving a senseless object crude materialism and metaphysical idealism end up with a history sans sujet that marches to the drumbeat of the speculative philosopher. Heaping immutable abstractions together with definite material activity, speculative philosopher preaches tranquility from the pulpit of Idea, substance, reason, etc., in a desperate attempt to crystallize a historical instant devouring an infinite series of contingencies that are sacrificed so that the relative hierarchical and historical positions of the preacher and the preached remain ever the same.

Encompassing not only the objectivity of external reality but also that of human capability pertaining to the changes that can be collectively realised, and indeed are, caused immutably by human agents on nature with respect to the specific changes it is made to undergo, Marx and Engels’ positing of historicized matter leads to the sublation of the abstract materiality of

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403 Ibid., pp. 22-23.
404 “[…] in reality and for the practical materialist, i.e., the communist, it is a question of revolutionising the existing world, of practically coming to grips with and changing the things found in existence…. Feuerbach’s “conception” of the sensuous world is confined on the one hand to mere contemplation of it, and on the other to mere feeling; he posits “Man” instead of “real historical man…. In the first case, the contemplation of the sensuous world, he necessarily lights on things which contradict his consciousness and feeling, which disturb the harmony he presupposes, the harmony of all parts of the sensuous world and especially of man and nature…. He does not see that the sensuous world around him is not a thing given direct from all eternity, remaining ever the same, but the product of industry and of the state of society; and, indeed, [a product] in the sense that it is an historical product, the result of the activity of a whole succession of generations, each standing on the shoulders of the preceding one, developing its industry and its intercourse, and modifying its social system according to the changed needs. Even the objects of the simplest “sensuous certainty” are only given him through social development, industry and commercial intercourse. The cherry-tree, like almost all fruit trees, was, as is well known, only a few centuries ago transplanted by commerce into our zone, and therefore only by this action of a definite society in a definite age has it become “sensuous certainty” for Feuerbach.” Marx and Engels, *The German Ideology*, pp. 38-39.
nature and the abstract actuality of particular individuals in the double movement of nature’s socialization and human agents’ self-conscious subjectification. Marxian materialist history appears, as such, infinitely more complex than the earlier ramshackle materialism of Feuerbach purloining Prometheus’ gifts to humanity only to convert him into an idol of an eternal observer of external world, and the subverted history of idealists in their construal of the former as the embodiment of timeless abstractions. It involves, in that vein, the incorporation of any temporal enhancement or impediment of human productive powers which are understood as historically specified determinate forms of human actuality. Beside the socialization of material relations that are otherwise construed as intimating the complete, and religious, separation of matter and ideas from their immediate counterpart, i.e., human productive capacities, this speculative tendency also obliterates the relationality that is embedded in the determinate material existence of individuals in and through their activities, which are realized with respect to particular manifestations of any collectivity’s historicized nature. This speculative manoeuvre is brought to its presupposed full circle as one historical image, i.e., instant, is taken out of Idea’s or substance’s gallery of images to replace all others. Having uprooted any semblance of spatio-temporal specificity, speculative philosophy, indeed, concludes by making an absolute out of historical contingency thus making a virtue of having heard Eurydice’s footsteps moments before she was whisked back to the Stygian realm. Henceforth, whether conceived in terms of the mythical unity of ‘essence’ and ‘being’ or ‘being’ and ‘thinking’, the token of speculation serves to offer the pure ether of

405 “Man alone has succeeded in impressing his stamp on nature, not only by shifting plant and animal species from one place to another, but also by so altering the aspect and climate of his dwelling-place, and even the plants and animals themselves, that the consequences of his activity can disappear only with the general extinction of the terrestrial globe.” Engels, *Dialectics of Nature*, pp. 34.


407 Marx and Engels’ postulation of religious conceptions as the cul de sac of speculative German criticism is a case in point in its reduction of everything else to a conception of “Man” that is preconceived to be necessarily a religious one whereby history is divested from its material and hence objective roots and made to fit the garb of piety that is theorized for it. See Marx and Engels, *The German Ideology*, pp. 30-31.

408 By contrast, Marxian dialectical materialism posits any conferral of value on acts of a certain sort as an arbitrary attribution dancing to the tune of socio-economic necessities as they frame historical human existences without, contrary to what they may claim, ever turning into eternal pillars of Heracles: “A la différence des vieux socialismes utopiques qui confrontaient l’ordre terrestre avec les archétypes de Justice, d’Ordre, de Bien, Marx ne considère pas que certaines situations humaines soient en soi et absolument préférables à d’autres: ce sont les besoins d’un peuple, les révoltes d’une classe qui définissent des buts et des fins; c’est du sein d’une situation refusée, à la lumière de ce refus, qu’on état nouveau apparaît comme désirable: seule la volonté des hommes décide …” De Beauvoir, *Pour une morale de l’ambiguïté*, pp. 25-26.
thought on the silver platter of history conceived exclusively in one of its fragmentary moments for the sake of upbraiding its continuous transitivity.\textsuperscript{409}

Purporting to bridge the abyss of interconnection between timeless ‘Humans’, idealist philosophers feel at home as they observe each and every particular and historically determinate individual falling through its unsurpassable cracks making way for the eternal substance that owes its absolutized being to none other than its absolution from the historically determinate. Having overthrown the materiality of objects and historical determinateness of subjects, idealist speculation ends up with the infinite regress from the material existence in regard to particular totalities to the prehistoric arkhê of Hegelian absolute idealism with its historical subject settling for his or her immediate apprehension of the object without any recognition of the fact that this “actual sense-certainty is not merely this pure immediacy, but an instance of it.”\textsuperscript{410} With the cognitive connections linking this “pure immediacy” wiled away in the wake of speculative reason, an instance is rediscovered as the philosopher’s stone illuminating everything with its radiant unity of preconceptions restoring linearity of historical process by its re-insertion of its own stipulations in the place of the constantly developing external reality. Reversing the Aristotelian priority of actuality to potentiality, it is only a matter of time for the speculative philosopher to begin anew her preaching of the salvation of the Spirit that whisks away the determinate individual and her material existence to the Elysian Fields in order to perfume any notion of external world with the unseen censers of the Seraphim. The pathos of fully abstracted consciousness prostrates before the effigy of its immateriality, seeking out a blissful state of non-existence that is ushered in by the chimes of indifference that are echoed by the nuggets of wisdom of Krishnamurti\textsuperscript{411} inviting all to pardon the abject misery of phenomenal world in the service of a higher principle of liberty:

\textsuperscript{409} “Besides the real relations of the house-owner, the acting “individual force”, to his house (the “objective basis), mystical speculation, and speculative aesthetics too, need a third concrete, speculative unity, a Subject-Object which is the house and the house-owner in one. As speculation does not like natural mediations in their extensive circumstantiality, it does not realize that the same “bit of world system”, the house, for example, which for one, the house-owner, for example, is an “objective basis”, is for the other, the builder of the house, an “epic event”. In order to get a “really single whole” and “real unity”, Critical Criticism, which reproaches “romantic art” with the “dogma of unity”, replaces the natural and human connection between the world system and world events by a fantastic connection, a mystical Subject-Object, just as Hegel replaces the real connection between man and nature by an absolute Subject-Object which is at one and the same time the whole of nature and the whole of humanity, the Absolute Spirit.” Marx and Engels, The Holy Family, pp. 167.
\textsuperscript{410} Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, pp. 59.
\textsuperscript{411} “Ce que vous êtes dans vos rapports avec autrui, avec votre femme, votre enfant, votre employeur, votre cousin, constitue la société. La société en soi n’existe pas. La société est ce que vous et moi, dans nos relations réciproques, avons créé ; c’est la projection extérieure de tous nos états psychologiques intérieurs. Donc si vous et moi ne nous comprenons pas nous-mêmes, transformer le monde extérieur, lequel est la projection de l’intérieur, est une entreprise vaine : les modifications ou transformations qu’on peut y apporter ne sont pas réelles. Si je suis dans la confusion en ce qui concerne mes rapports
“Critical critics, on the contrary, teaches them [the workers in Manchester and Lyons workshops] that they cease in reality to be wage-workers if in thinking they abolish the thought of wage-labour; if in thinking they cease to regard themselves as wage-workers and, in accordance with that extravagant notion, no longer let themselves be paid for their person. As absolute idealists, as ethereal beings, they will then naturally be able to live on the ether of pure thought. Critical Criticism teaches them that they abolish real capital by overcoming in thinking the category Capital, that they really change and transform themselves into real human beings by changing their “abstract ego” in consciousness and scorning as an un-Critical operation all real change of their real existence, of the real conditions of their existence, that is to say, of their real ego. The “spirit”, which sees in reality only categories, naturally reduces all human activity and practice to the dialectical process of thought of Critical Criticism. This is what distinguishes its socialism from mass-type socialism and communism.”

The all-pervading impeccable eye of the scientific beholder, whether it consults its quasi-divine nature to side with materialism or idealism, thus turns into the nucleus of the speculative dual process of abstraction from material contingencies and proposing to epitomise a singular contingent instant of idea as the mover of history. Celebrating any thought experiment as the only harbinger of social change, the speculative philosopher extrapolates reality out of his mind qua categorical laboratory. With the hypothetical three-man studies, just as in the case of our Tom, Dick and Harry, deposing the determinate particular materiality of each individual in their indefatigable march of triumph, the philosopher-king enters into history, siding either with socialistically conceived categories, in the case of Proudhon, or with spiritualistically conceived ones, as in the case of saints Bauer and Stirner, but forming an avowed liaison with categorical abstractions all the same. With determinate historical individuals vanishing faster than a mayfly’s dream in the inquisitive gaze of the speculative philosopher, his Pharos

humains, je crée une société qui est la réplique de cette confusion, l’expression extérieure de ce que je suis.” Krishnamurti, La Première et Dernière Liberté, trans. by Carlo Suares, (Paris, 1994), pp. 33.


413 To that end, Marx’s relentless criticisms directed at Proudhon’s negligence of historical processes and social transformations that are argued to reach their sublime expressions in the categorical to and fro that is conceived through the Proudhonian lens appears instructive: “How does M. Proudhon, who assumes the division of labour as the known, manage to explain exchange value, which for him is always the unknown?... A man” sets out to “propose to other men, his collaborators in various functions”, that they establish exchange, and make a distinction between use value and exchange value. In accepting this proposed distinction, the collaborators have left M. Proudhon no other “care” than that of recording the fact, of marking, of “noting” in his treatise on political economy “the genesis of the idea of value”. But he has still to explain to us the “genesis” of this proposal, to tell us at last how this single individual, this Robinson, suddenly had the idea of making “to his collaborators” a proposal of the type known and how these collaborators accepted it without the slightest protest… M. Proudhon does not enter into these genealogical details. He merely places a sort of historical stamp upon the fact of exchange, by presenting it in the form of a motion supposed to have been made by a third party, tending to establish exchange.” Karl Marx, The Poverty of Philosophy. Answer to the Philosophy of Poverty by M. Proudhon, trans. by Frida Knight, in MECW, VI, pp. 112-113; cf. Marx and Engels, The Holy Family, pp. 31-34.

comprising of all the essentialized categories turn into the tree of knowledge whose fruits are labelled ‘freedom’, ‘liberty’, ‘mission’, and ‘progress’.415

Marx’s firm rebuttal of any frozen construal of these concepts thus appears to be based on the self-aware premise that the philosopher qua critical analyst him or herself operates on a field of contingency in deploying his or her logical skills to continually developing particular historical cases.416 Taking philosopher’s exhibited insensitivity to his or her own spatio-temporal identification with historical contingency as suggesting his or her drift towards idealistic speculation overcoming his or her positedness at the expense of any historically determinate particularity, Marx challenged any allusion to pure categories that is made by the philosopher. There can be no preservation of any absolute category that could suffice to warrant the dismissal of histories of particular determinate individuals. Indeed, not even the apparently most value-neutral of categories, such as the “pure” natural science, is exempt from Marx’s charge that timelessness breeds an immutable and hence subjectless understanding of history. Separating the prehistory of primordial organisms from the history of homo sapiens genealogy, Marx underscores the coexistence of natural and social phenomena as the defining attribute of the latter. Further, if nature’s positedness in humanity and humanity’s positedness in nature are taken in their respective relation to particular historical totalities,417 then no un-self-critical account of productive human actuality can be taken in its face-value as having

415 “Absolute Criticism proceeds from the dogma of the absolute competency of the “Spirit”. Furthermore, it proceeds from the dogma of the extramundane existence of the Spirit, i.e., of its existence outside the mass of humanity. Finally, it transforms “the Spirit”, “Progress” on the one hand, and “the Mass”, on the other, into fixed entities, into concepts, and then relates them to one another as such given rigid extremes. It does not occur to Absolute Criticism to investigate the “Spirit” itself… No, the Spirit is absolute, but unfortunately at the same time it continually turns into spiritlessness; it continually reckons without its host…. The position is the same with “Progress”. In spite of the pretensions of “Progress”, continual retrogressions and circular movements occur. Far from suspecting that the category “Progress” is completely empty and abstract, Absolute Criticism is so profound as to recognize “Progress” as being absolute, so as to explain retrogression by assuming a “personal adversary” of Progress, the Mass.” Marx and Engels, The Holy Family, pp. 83-84.


417 “The naturalistic conception of history, as found, for instance, to a greater or lesser extent in Draper and other scientists, as if nature exclusively reacts on man, and natural conditions everywhere exclusively determined his historical development, is therefore one-sided and forgets that man also reacts on nature, changing it and creating new conditions of existence for himself. There is devilishly little left of “nature” as it was in Germany at the time when the Germanic peoples immigrated into it. The earth’s surface, climate, vegetation, fauna, and the human beings themselves have infinitely changed, and all this owing to human activity, while the changes of nature in Germany which have occurred in this period of time without human interference are incalculably small.” Engels, Dialectics of Nature, pp. 231; cf. Lukács, The Ontology of Social Being, III, pp. 22.
severed its metaphysical terms surfacing in the form of historical missions,\textsuperscript{418} substances, etc.\textsuperscript{419}

Made on behalf of socialism or else, Marx and Engels condemned any attempt to conceive reality in terms of blanket conceptions and timeless generalizations. This propensity, according to their argument, begins exactly where it concludes its rhetoric flourishes: the indeterminate opposition of eternal idea, substance, liberty or mission to abstract collectivities that are eternally haunted by their immaterial existence. Straitjacketing the determinate historical existence of particular individuals so that their unposed effigies can be herded back to the pastures of fresh idealism, speculation disrupts the cycle of reciprocal movement from abstract indeterminate singulars to posited historical particulars whereby the subversion of actual spatio-temporal transformations and self-propagating categories is rendered complete. Banishing Tom, Dick and Harry together as ideal-typical representatives of a preconceived hypothetical situation that is coyly purveyed as reality, speculative philosophy divests all the attributes of the three historical individuals to erect them as conceptual scarecrows delineating the area where fledgling idealists cannot land safely. With their historical and material relationality with one another and nature dissolved in the cold waters of idealism, the three

\textsuperscript{418}This point can prove to be baffling for those critical analysts who claim that the class struggle waged by the European proletariat of Marx’s day was conceived by the latter along the lines of a secularized eschatology that awaited its redemptive delivery from the Kingdom of Babylon through proletarian’s messianic struggle. Never mind the fact that observers of such a disposition find only the programmatic statements of \textit{The Communist Manifesto} and few other sweeping assertions taken from other works of Marx and Engels to vindicate their congruous portrayal of religious messianism and Marxian dialectical materialism, Marx’s analysis of the significance of the working class as a strictly historical formation that is displayed in its central contours in \textit{The Holy Family}, \textit{The German Ideology} and \textit{The Poverty of Philosophy} alike shows that what “it [the proletariat] will historically be compelled to do” is precisely the overcoming of its contingent domination by capitalist bourgeoisie. The Marxian ‘mission’ attributed to the working-class rises, as such, from historical conditionality and reaches its culmination in working out a limitless contingency for the dominated class of toilers as a whole. Marxian understanding of proletariat’s activity is as messianic as Christ’s Passion is materialistic in regard to its metahistorical metanarrative. Marx and Engels, \textit{The Holy Family}, pp. 37; cf. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, \textit{The Communist Manifesto}, trans. by Samuel Moore, (London, 2014), pp. 338-339; Friedrich Engels, \textit{Anti-Dühring. Herr Eugen Dühring’s Revolution in Science}, (Moscow, 1977), pp. 346.

\textsuperscript{419}“Industry and commerce, production and the exchange of the necessities of life in their turn determine distribution, the structure of the different social classes and are, in turn, determined by it as to the mode in which they are carried on; and so it happens that in Manchester, for instance, Feuerbach sees only factories and machines, where a hundred years ago only spinning-wheels and weaving-loom were to be seen, or in the Campagna di Roma he finds only pasture lands and swamps, where in the time of Augustus he would have found nothing but the vineyards and villas of Roman capitalists. Feuerbach speaks in particular of the perception of natural science; he mentions secrets which are disclosed only to the eye of the physicist and the chemist; but where would natural science be without industry and commerce? Even this “pure” natural science is provided with an aim, as with its material, only through trade and industry, through the sensuous activity of men. So much is this activity, this unceasing sensuous labour and creation, this production, the foundation of the whole sensuous world as it now exists that, were it interrupted only for a year, Feuerbach would not only find an enormous change in the natural world, but would very soon find that the whole world of men and his own perceptive faculty, nay his own existence, were missing.” Marx and Engels, \textit{The German Ideology}, pp. 40.
individuals appear as collaborative, albeit unequal, producers in the history of one and as egotist self-seeking individual atoms in another. The ‘catch,’ of course, is nothing other than that today’s events can be muzzled just as easily as those of yesterdays. And, with history discarded as an ‘empty signifier’, nothing is easier than to glorify the past or detest what the future may bring given that either way no determinate material actuality is conceived to underpin an eternal present.420 By endorsing the cycle of historical affirmation consecrating the categorical grounds it rests upon, one can designate the proletariat as harbingers of communist salvation421 or purport economic history as guided by a priori concepts utility, supply, demand, etc., as is his or her wont:

“The very moment civilization begins, production begins to be founded on the antagonism of orders, estates, classes, and finally on the antagonism of accumulated labour and immediate labour. No antagonism, no progress. This is the law that civilisation has followed up to our days. Till now the productive forces have been developed by virtue of this system of class antagonisms. To say now that, because all the needs of all the workers were satisfied, men could devote themselves to the creation of products of a higher order—to more complicated industries [as does M. Proudhon]—would be to leave class antagonism out of account and turn all historical development upside down. It is like saying that because, under the Roman emperors, muraena were fattened in artificial fishponds, therefore there was enough to feed abundantly the whole Roman population. Actually, on the contrary, the Roman people had enough to buy bread with, while the Roman aristocrats had slaves enough to throw as fodder to the muraena.”422

420 “It is, then, inside the particularity of a history, through the peculiar contradictions of this family, that Gustave Flaubert unwittingly served his class apprenticeship. Chance does not exist or, at least, not in the way that is generally believed. The child becomes this or that because he lives the universal as particular. This child lived, in the particular, the conflict between the religious ceremonies of a monarchist regime which was claiming a renaissance and the irreligion of his father, a petit bourgeois intellectual and son of the French Revolution.” Sartre, Search for a Method, pp. 58; cf. Lukács, ‘What Is Orthodox Marxism?’, pp. 7.

421 A memorable passage borrowed from Marx and Engels’ The Holy Family demonstrates how material determinateness results directly from conceiving history in its implicit relation to particular totality that is constituted by a communality of materially existing, i.e., labouring, individuals, in addition to hinting at the necessary loss of any claim to reality that accompanies any obfuscation, i.e., rejection, of history as the common denominator of materially existent collectivities: “When socialist writers ascribe this world-historic role to the proletariat, it is not at all, as Critical Criticism pretends to believe, because they regard the proletarians as gods. Rather the contrary. Since in the fully-formed proletariat the abstraction of all humanity, even of the semblance of humanity, is practically complete; since the conditions of life of the proletariat sum up all the conditions of life of society today in their most inhuman form; since man has lost himself in the proletariat, yet at the same time has not only gained theoretical consciousness of that loss, but through urgent, no longer removable, no longer disguiseable, absolutely imperative need—the practical expression of necessity—is driven directly to revolt against this inhumanity, it follows that the proletariat can and must emancipate itself. But it cannot emancipate itself without abolishing the conditions of its own life. It cannot abolish the conditions of its own life without abolishing all the inhuman conditions of life of society today which are summed up in its own situation. Not in vain does it go through the stern but steeling school of labour. It is not a question of what this or that proletarian, or even the whole proletariat, at the moment regards as its aim. It is a question of what the proletariat is, and what, in accordance with this being, it will historically be compelled to do. Its aim and historical action is visibly and irrevocably foreshadowed in its own life situation as well as in the whole organisation of bourgeois society today.” Marx and Engels, The Holy Family, pp. 36-37.

422 Marx, The Poverty of Philosophy, pp. 132-133.
This speculative reversal of historically determinate particular totalities into unposited abstract singularity is thus realized with respect to each logical category. With contingent time, space, causality, negation, etc., replacing the self-conscious postulation of their abstract generalizations, speculative philosopher gains a logical foothold to vindicate the self-referential primacy of his or her sapience as the “Universal I.”\(^\text{423}\)

The epistemological gist of this elevation of the materially situated observer to the unquestionable echelons of Episcopal authority is, of course, the severing of any ties that theory may be conceived to have with history. Canvassing material history as free-floating solitary signifiers pending the scrutinizing wisdom of the Universal I in order to be rendered intelligible, idealist philosopher renounces the particular conditionality within which his thought and work is situated thereby falling back to the lofty contemplation of Siddhartha purporting his travails of being and becoming for “the voice of life, the voice of Being, of perpetual Becoming.”\(^\text{424}\)

Elevating an inverted singularity to the status of ontological individualism, speculative philosopher rediscovers history only in the few moments of communally unconscious lucidity betraying the materially determined breezes turning into gale force winds in the context of rhetorical flourishes that are darted by any value-neutral philosopher. Notwithstanding the different spectacles through which respective speculative philosophers make their contemplative augurs, e.g., scientific, divine, etc., they commence with Malthus’ naturalization of two postulata\(^\text{425}\) without enquiring into what sort of food is necessary for which type of human or what kind of sexual passion between the sexes is necessary for whom, etc., and conclude by fleetingly recollecting, if they do so at all, the historically conditioned basis\(^\text{426}\) of their abstract-theoretical, i.e., unreal, ‘human natures’:

“If in every society that has advanced beyond the savage state, a class of proprietors and a class of labourers must necessarily exist, it is evident that, as labour is the only property of the class of labourers, every thing that tends to diminish the value of this property must tend to diminish the possessions of this part of society. The only way that a poor man has of supporting himself in independence is by the exertion of his bodily strength. This is the only commodity he has to give in exchange for the necessaries of life. It would hardly appear then that you benefit him by narrowing the market for this commodity, by decreasing the demand for labour, and lessening the value of the only property that he possesses.”\(^\text{427}\)

Confounding normativity with social history, speculation thus proposes its own subjectivity as the objective comprehension of reality, connecting normative roots and mechanical


\(^{426}\) In the case of Malthus, this historical determination corresponds, of course, to his fervent opposition to the Poor Law that was proposed to the parliament by William Pitt in 1796 and to Condorcet and Godwin’s conception of human rationality as capable of infinite perfectibility. *Ibid*, pp. 36-37, 60-66.

\(^{427}\) *Ibid*, pp. 112.
empiricist branches that produce a history whose flaws are readily available in its claims to flawlessness. Idealist philosopher’s smuggling his or her effigies in the stead of materially posited particular individuals, therefore, is explicitly related to one’s idealistic drive towards the enactment of an idiosyncratic universalism establishing a class of categories indifferent toward their historical forms. In the light of the fact that uncanny productions of such an idiosyncratic universalism took place in the context of the canonical works of classical political economy along the lines of ‘free competition’, ‘the inexorable laws of supply and demand’, ‘market dictates’, etc., this appears to be a fitting point to begin our analysis of the transition from particular totalities to an understanding of universal as it can purported to be viewed from the Marxian vein. The foremost point to note, to that end, is our direct debt to one of Engels’ concepts as it was remarked in a thumbnail sketch in his preparatory etchings for *Anti-Dühring* (1872). The concept is theorized in passing in taking note of the whimsical subjectivity that is incorporated into negation in its full abstraction. Recognizing the existence of no mediated, i.e., theoretical, relationship between oneself and the material history he or she depicts, individual inspectors mistake their subjective postulations for the objectivity with which only the grey eyes of Pallas Athena can be endowed:

“A barren negation is a purely subjective, individual one. Not being a stage of development of the thing itself, it is an opinion introduced from without. And as nothing can result from it, the negator must be at loggerheads with the world, sullenly finding fault with everything that exists or ever happened, with the whole historical development. True, the Greeks of antiquity accomplished a few things, but they knew nothing of spectral analysis, chemistry, differential calculus, steam-engines, chaussées, the electric telegraph or the railway. Why dwell at length on the products of people of such minor importance? Everything is bad – so far this sort of negator is a pessimist – save our own exalted selves, who are perfect, and thus our pessimism resolves itself into optimism. And thus we ourselves have perpetrated a negation of the negation.”

This subjectivized cosmogony of material history found its most revered practitioners in the figures like Adam Smith, Jean-Baptiste Say, François Quesnay, Thomas Malthus, and David Ricardo who announced, in their respective ways, a new idiosyncratic universal’s coming into being. Indeed, from Malthus’ pleas concerning the repeal of Corn Laws and the completion of the enclosure of commons to Smith’s steady paeans to free trade on the preconceived basis of absolute advantage of nations and to Ricardo’s sober treatment of the relation between rising rate of profit and diminishing wages caused by rising productivity, the Archimedean

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standpoint destroying the Roman fleet of material history closing in on the walls of Syracuse appears to be that of a revolutionizing transformation of the available mode of production. The metahistorical postulation of the rapid changes pertaining to productive relations, which had hitherto prevailed in England till the advent of the eighteenth century, as an inverted universalism that is conceived as the culmination of all previous historical formations and events thus purports a linear understanding of movement from all historical singularities to their terminus in the political economy of England at the turn of the century. With the ascension of political economists to a jury box of scientific disinterestedness thus complete, determinate particular workers are canvassed as excessive baggage either waiting to be baptized in the cold waters of Malthus’ ‘iron laws of subsistence’ or in those of lukewarm capitalist tolerance given their useful existence as surplus population. And with the consummation of that barren negation of determinateness in both spheres, the political economist qua speculative philosopher dons the robs of benevolent philanthropist sermonizing benignity towards his or her historical antithesis, the working-class:

“The friends of humanity cannot but wish that in all countries the laboring classes should have a taste for comforts and enjoyments, and that they should be stimulated by all legal means in their exertions to procure them. There cannot be a better security against a superabundant population. In those countries where the laboring classes have the fewest wants, and are contented with the cheapest food, the people are exposed to the greatest vicissitudes and miseries. They have no place or refuge from calamity; they cannot seek safety in a lower station; they are already so low that they can fall no lower. On any deficiency of the chief article of their subsistence there are few substitutes of which they can avail themselves and dearth to them is attended with almost all the evils of famine.  

Under-nourish the labouring classes but do not starve them out; donate a few crumbs of black bread to workers every once in a while, so that they have something to fall back upon in case things go awry: potato. Make the workers grow accustomed to routinized back-breaking jobs but do not over-exploit them lest they realize that they are regarded as nothing but mere potato-eating appendages to machines. It is against this gospel of inverted universality reserving humanity for itself and for those in its favour that later Marxian works and their respective depictions of universals should be peered at. Indeed, we argue that undermining the Marxian emphasis on the essential unity of theory and history is only possible at the cost of discarding Marx and Engels’ earlier pronounced disavowals of any conception of communism as an ideal state of affairs. Keeping the aforementioned strictly relational and communitarian origins of dialectical materialism, it should hardly arouse bewilderment that any conception of universals is necessarily predicated upon theoretician’s self-conscious historical positedness concerning

432 Ibid, pp. 57 [Italics added C.O.].
433 “Communism is not for us a state of affairs which is to be established, an ideal to which reality (will) have to adjust itself. We call Communism the real movement the real movement which abolishes the present state of things.” Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, pp. 49.
not only his or her subject matter but the epistemological imprint with which the former is theorised. Naturally, dialectical materialism’s constant resort to material development of socially produced objects thus appears as the first discerning element setting Marxian universals apart from their speculative, idealist or mechanical materialist, counterparts.434

Marxian universals operate at the level of a theoretical purview that is enacted by the thorough saturation of particulars with history qua spatio-temporal totality pertaining to them. The Marxian conception of universals, on this view, necessitates the excavation of historical roots carrying theoretical nutrition to any category. In moving from the surface appearances of categories to their subterranean vestiges Marx and Engels attempted to approximate as closely as they could within their own scientifically and economically determined material existences to the historical development of concepts. That itinerary from historically closed singular origins to their actualisations in contemporary fields of open social possibilities precludes any attempt to conceive reality from the kaleidoscope of dead concepts in their full abstraction.435

Any economic category, such as exchange, has a history of its own that can be sketched materialistically without any necessary allusion to their undocumented prehistory. The deceptively simple term, ‘exchange,’ for example, has come to embrace a myriad of meanings ranging from different strands of monetary and non-monetary, i.e., in kind, swaps of material goods in the classical Athens to the barter of superfluous commodities in Middle Ages in certain parts of Europe or its intercontinental counterparts between European and Asian empires, kingdoms, duchies, etc., that was geared more towards supplying European monarchies with their desired luxuries, and, finally, to the commercialized vistas of mercantilism with its heavy reliance on cash-cropping in England, parts of Italy, etc., in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.436 In fact, we even have the luxury of expanding this account to various examples taken from indigenous populations thanks to the anthropological efforts spent by classical figures like Marcel Mauss, Bronislaw Malinowski and Margaret Mead,437 not to mention many others, that are now considered to be hallmarks of

434 “We all agree that in every field of science, in natural as in historical science, one must proceed from the given facts, in natural science therefore from the various material forms and the various forms of motion of matter; that therefore in theoretical natural science too the interconnections are not to be built into the facts but to be discovered in them, and when discovered to be verified as far as possible by experiment.” Friedrich Engels, ‘Old Preface to (Anti-)Dühring’, in Dialectics of Nature, pp. 47.
435 “The objectivity of Marxist science extends even to recognising the abstraction—the truly meaningful abstraction—not as a mere product of man’s consciousness, but further to demonstrating how (especially with the primary forms of the social process, the economic forms) the abstraction is itself a product of social reality.” Georg Lukács, ‘Marx and Engels on Aesthetics’, in Writer and Critic, trans. by Arthur Kahn, (London, 1978b), pp. 80-81.
437 Mead’s detailed comparison of American and Samoan youths with emphasis on Samoan girls’ reaching puberty appears, for instance, as capable of upsetting the Malthusian naturalization of procreative drive to the extent that it shows the dearth of sexual acts that were condemned as illicit in
ethnographical field study and its overcoming of its erstwhile armchair origins. Bringing the spatio-temporal determinateness of any kind of scientific knowledge, the celebrated *Essai sur le don* (1925) is, for example, propelled by Mauss’ conception of gift exchange as bearing the imprint of the totality of social relations as is indicated by his depiction of gift exchanges using the term *les prestations totales*. The totality of significations that any concept can be claimed to partake of, in that sense, is completely circumscribed by the historical context in which it is situated. The interstices between particular instances and the semantic, productive, reproductive, etc., totalities to which they speak are thus conceived as the field of self-conscious application for any historicised category. Furthermore, taking Marx’s extrapolation of money’s transformation into capital into account, we contend that the conception of theoretical universals in regard to their historically diversified determinateness should be regarded as bearing infinitely more import than a simple mode of presentation. It appears almost as a self-evident fact that without the historical basis to support them the theoretical edifice of Marxian critique, from its jibes against Bauer, Hegel, and Stirner at its inception to its full-scale assault of the political economic fortresses, would crumble away. Only by regarding theoretical concepts as reciprocally filling the void between abstract money and capital can we grasp Marx’s formulation of M-C-M as the categorical representation *par excellence* of the latter:

“In simple circulation, C-M-C, the value of commodities attained at the most a form independent of their use values, i.e., the form of money; but that same value now in the circulation M-C-M, or the circulation of capital, suddenly presents itself as an independent substance, endowed with a motion of its own, passing through a life process of its own, in which money and commodities are mere forms which it assumes and casts off in turn. Nay, more: instead of simply representing the relations of commodities, it enters now, so to say, into private relations with itself. It differentiates itself as original value from itself as surplus value; as father differentiates himself from himself qua the son, yet both are one and of one the Samoan society of 1920s: “Il sesso è una cosa naturale e piacevole; la libertà con cui può abbandonarvisi è limitata da una sola condizione: la posizione sociale. Le figlie e le mogli dei capi non dovrebbero lasciarsi andare a esprimere extra-coniugali. Adulti che hanno delle responsabilità, capi di casa e madri di famiglia, dovrebbero avere troppa cosa importanti da fare per immischiarsi in casuali avventure amorose. Nella comunità tutti sono d’accordo su questo argomento, gli unici a dissentire sono i missionari ma con risultato molto scarso e le loro proteste contano poco. Tuttavia, quando un certo consenso si sarà raccolto intorno all’atteggiamento sei missionari e al loro ideale europeo di comportamento sessuale, il bisogno di scegliere farà il suo ingresso nella società samoana.” Margaret Mead, *L’Adolescenza in Samoa*, trans. by Lisa Sarfatti, (Florence, 2007), pp. 168.


439 “If there is no production in general, then there is also no general production. Production is always a particular branch of production – e.g., agriculture, cattle-raising, manufactures etc. – or it is a totality…. Lastly, production also is not only a particular production. Rather, it is always a certain social body, a social subject, which is active in a greater or sparser totality of branches of production.” Marx, *Grundrisse*, pp. 86.


441 For a detailed scrutiny of the role that is played by the different functions of money that distinguish the circuit of C-M-C from that of M-C-M, see Rosdolsky, *The Making of Marx’s ‘Capital’*, pp. 142-58.
age: for only by surplus value of £10 does the £100 originally advanced become capital, and as soon as this takes place, so soon as the son, and by the son, the father, is begotten, so soon their difference vanish, and they again become one, £110.”

Notwithstanding its exhibition of the continuation of the theme of coquetry with Hegelian presentation, this exposition demonstrates that Marxian universal categories reveal a threefold tenet in the recognition of their historical positedness. First, all Marxian universals are conceived in relational terms. Exchange, labour, circulation, capital, rent, money, etc., all intimate a preestablished set of material and conceptional rapports binding particular individuals not only to their immediate peers but also to nature and social totality. Even the age-old bastions of romanticism like artistic production or bread-and-butter conceptions of enlightenment rationality, such as household labour, cannot escape Marx and Engels’ attempts of injecting a dose of historicity to them. Surpassing the entrenched binaries that could not be dismissed even in the case of the inquiries that were most sympathetic to the cause of liberation of women or artists from the subjugation imposed upon them, the Marxian focus on relationality inherent to theoretical universals serve to ward off any creeping drift towards idealism. Disregard that is shown for the relational basis of universals, by contrast, shatters the latter’s historical form whereby their determinate particularity is lost. This loss of historical specificity, in turn, feeds into patchwork designs of history that are grounded upon barren negations in stead of interconnectedness of instances. Having relinquished any claim to objective movement of material individuals through time and space, history turns into the valet of fully-abstracted concepts, disembowelling itself in thirsting after modern equality and

443 Cf. Marx, Grundrisse, pp. 146-147.
444 Mary Wollstonecraft’s A Vindication of the Rights of Women (1792) is a typical example of advocating female rationality with respect to the preconceived dichotomies of reason and passion, cherishing the first a garland of flowers whilst scorning the second with a crown of thorns: “In order to fulfil duties of life, and to be able to pursue with vigour the various employments which form the moral character, a master and mistress of family ought not to continue to love each other with passion. I mean to say, that they ought not to indulge those emotions which disturb the order of society, and engross the thoughts that should be otherwise employed. The mind that has never been engrossed by one object wants vigour – if it can long be so, it is weak.” Mary Wollstonecraft, A Vindication of the Rights of Women, (London, 2004), pp. 42.
445 “If, then, the specific form of capital is abstracted away, and only the content is emphasized, as which it is a necessary moment of all labour, then of course nothing is easier than to demonstrate that capital is a necessary condition for all human production. The proof of this proceeds precisely by abstraction from the specific aspects which make it the moment of a specifically developed historic stage of human production. The catch is that if all capital is objectified labour which serves as means for new production, it is not the case that all objectified labour which serves as means for new production is capital. Capital is conceived as a thing, not as a relation.” Marx, Grundrisse, pp. 258; cf. Rosdolsky, The Making of Marx’s ‘Capital’, pp. 293-4.
446 Cf. Ibid, pp. 414-416.
freedom in the historical context of antiquity or purporting, with Fourier, productive labour as conducive to its conceptualization as 'play.' Either way, what begins by formless individuality has a certain likelihood of ending up with the 'natural men' of Smith, Malthus, etc., which prompts a harking back to the warning calls of Marx and Engels against any such slide toward ahistoricism, serving as the Marxian counterpart of Ceterum censeo Carthaginem esse delendam.

Directly bearing the stamp of Marxian universal’s denoted characteristic of social relationality is the second attribute of the former, its absorption of the contingent generality from which particular generalities are conceived. Universals, in their Marxian construal, are products of contingent development of concepts in so far as they are regarded as historical products of human comprehension. The capitalist mode of production, in that sense, fared no different when Marx and Engels subjected it to a genealogical study covering as many historical locales as they could. In grappling with classical political economists and idealist post-Hegelians on their preferred ground confounding de-subjectivized nature and indefinite history, Marx and Engels aimed at showing the essential contingency, as opposed to the necessary development, of any historical form. Positing “laws of capitalist accumulation” interchangeably with “historical tendencies of capitalist accumulation”, Marx in Capital establishes, for one, not

447 Marx, Grundrisse, pp. 245.
448 Ibid, pp. 712.
449 “One of the most persistent myths about our period in English history, which saw the birth of modern world with its complex articulation of modes of production (some portion of which has a special place in the minds of millions under the title ‘The Industrial Revolution’), is that this birth took place without the help or intervention of governments, and in spite of the actions of the dominant class in agrarian capitalist mode of production. According to this myth, what Adam Smith called the ‘Expenses of the Sovereign’ were negligible, and Western peoples’ entry into their present abundant estate and the industrial capitalist mode of production, was brought about by the spontaneous effort and enterprise of a new ‘middle class’ of men. These men, allegedly the product of the protestant ethic, are said to have moved peacefully and freely, but restlessly, about their business, rather like individual atoms or monads, but in reality as agents of a benevolent, man-centred, hidden hand. And they worked wonders; according to a contemporary of theirs, Bernard Mandeville, even their private vices resulted in public benefits.” R. S. Neale, Writing Marxist History: British History, Economy & Culture Since 1700, (Oxford, 1985), pp. 44.
450 “It is Malthus who abstracts from these specific historical laws of the movement of population, which are indeed the story of the nature of humanity, the natural laws, but natural laws of humanity only at a specific historic development, with a development of the forces of production determined by humanity’s own process of history. Malthusian man, abstracted from historically determined man, exists only in his brain; hence also the geometric method of reproduction corresponding to this natural Malthusian man. Real history thus appears to him in such a way that the reproduction of his natural humanity is not an abstraction from the historic process of real reproduction, but just the contrary, that real reproduction is an application of the Malthusian theory. Hence the inherent conditions of population as well as of overpopulation at every stage of history appear to him as a series of external checks which have prevented the population from developing in the Malthusian form.” Marx, Grundrisse, pp. 606; cf. Rodolsky, The Making of Marx’s ‘Capital’, pp. 252-5.
452 Ibid, pp. 748-751.
only the historical ground upon which the whole edifice of capitalism rises but also underscores the fact that that ground is made up of human potentiality.453 Indeed, with his frequent forays into how the particular manifestations of labour struggle had a continuous impact on the historical forms of wage-labour and capitalists’ arguments against 10-hour working day Marx challenged, for example, the procrustean conception of human activity as naturally fixed in its scope and argues that therein lies the core contradiction of classical political economy:

“The question why this free labourer confronts him in the market, has no interest for the owner of money, who regards the labour market as a branch of the general market for commodities…. One thing, however, is clear – Nature does not produce on the one side owners of money or commodities, and on the other men possessing nothing but their own labour power. This relation has no natural basis, neither is its social basis one that is common to all historical periods. It is clearly the result of a past historical development, the product of many economic revolutions, of the extinction of a whole series of older forms of social production.”454

Conceiving the discrepancy between laws qua historical tendencies and the actuality of social formations as the hallmark of dialectical materialist epistemology, Marx and Engels argued that any such incongruity cannot be regarded as mere offshoots of an otherwise optimally-working structure but its incessant seepages of human potentiality which it is made to ideologically devour in its nineteenth-century historical form. Whereas classical political economists always arrive as epigones after the initial set of social transformations have taken place yet essentialize their determinacy as the time-immemorial human condition, Marxian works focus on this rift between essence, i.e., historically refurbished natural necessities,455 or ‘the lacking’ as we will attempt to show in the following chapter, and appearance, i.e., historical forms, to stress the fact that particular individuals, social formations and nature alike

453 Cf. R. S. Neale, Writing Marxist History, pp. xvii; Meikle, Essentialism in the Thought of Karl Marx, pp. 10-11.
455 Conceived along historical lines, the Marxian notion of need begins to shine in a different epistemological light. Mediated, practically, by the rapport between the existing state of forces and relations of production, the overcoming of external impediments is translated into the communal language of social labour, hence casting aside any unmediated understanding of needs: “Daß sich die materiellen Bedürfnisse nicht unmittelbar individuell in ideologisches Bewußtsein umsetzen, ist ihre [that of dialectical, material, historical and social epistemology] Einsicht wie ihr Problem. Mit der dialektischen Psychologie bestimmt sie die ‘Persönlichkeit’ als den Ort der individuellen Vermittlung und Übersetzung äußerer Bedingungen in ideologisches Bewußtsein.” Sandkühler, Praxis und Geschichtsbewußtsein, pp. 32; put differently, however classified its particular manifestations are, their arising, development and fulfilment ought to be interpolated into a dialectical materialist framework of social history so that the concept of ‘needs’ can relinquish its otherwise passive qualities: cf. “Die Weltanschauung des praktischen Bedürfnisses ist von Natur aus beschränkt und erschöpft sich in einigen Zügen. Das praktische Bedürfnis ist passiv, seine Entwicklung kann nur durch die Änderung der äußeren Bedingungen hervorgerufen werden, und so kann es nicht als Grundlage und Erklärung des sich ständig entwickelnden theoretischen Denkens dienen.” Márkus, ‘Über die Erkenntnistheoretischen Ansichten des jungen Marx’, pp. 31.
operate only when they are seen along the lines of contingent human actuality. The necessity of the gap between theory and history, as such, corresponds to the historically determined forms of human actuality that cannot be squeezed to the full extent by the iron-clad laws of historical development. The disagreement between theory and history, in that vein, serves as the touchstone whose beckoning is taken as the direct indication of the self-conscious historical positedness of any social scientist who is concerned with reciprocal processes of productive transformation that are realized at the heart of the triad of singular individuals, particular societies and socialized natures as the epistemological primacy of determinately conscious human activity.

456 The essential discrepancy between historical laws and determinate actualities is brought forward by Marx in the context of direct exploitation of workers by capitalists and the realization of the aim of profitmaking, which is immanent to this exploitation, as the ultimate outcome of consumption of the produced goods. The labourer’s exploitation and its realization in the form of profit, inseparable as they are in their historical causality, thus do not correspond to the same stage of the process of capitalist production, leaving the actuality of profits to be determined elsewhere, i.e., the sphere of consumptive activities, thus bridging historical tendencies and their realization with materially determinate actuality: “The entire mass of commodities, i.e., the total product, including the portion which replaces the constant and variable capital, and that representing surplus value, must be sold. If this is not done, or done only in part, or only at prices below the prices of production, the labourer has been indeed exploited, but this exploitation is not realized as such for the capitalist, and this can be bound up with a total or partial failure to realise the surplus value pressed out of him, indeed even with the partial or total loss of the capital. The conditions of direct exploitation, and those of realising it, are not identical. They diverge not only in place and time, but also logically.” Karl Marx, Capital. A Critique of Political Economy Volume III, in MECW, XXXVII, pp. 242-243.

457 We have in mind Rostow’s ‘six stages of economic growth’ more than any of Marx’s formulations concerning either capitalist or pre-capitalist social forms as we note this feature. Marx and Engels’ meticulous researches conducted in the fields of English, Russian, German, French histories should, if anything, afford the warrant of granting them the benefit of doubt concerning their occasional lapses into biological metaphors or physical allusions, a quality which Rostow, not to mention other early writers of economic development, sorely lacked. The following passage is indicative of this ‘historical tendency’ to unite the bubbles of economy, society, politics, etc., that can be theorized only along the lines of their preconceived separation: “S’il est vrai que l’évolution économique a des conséquences politiques et sociales, nous considérons cette évolution elle-même comme la résultante de forces politiques et sociales aussi bien qu’économiques au sens étroit de terme. Et si nous nous plaçons du point de vue des mobiles de l’action humaine, nous considérons que nombre de changements économiques des plus profonds sont dictés par des motifs et des aspirations dépourvus de tout caractère économique.” W. W. Rostow, Les étapes de la croissance économique, trans. by M.-J. Du Rouret, (Paris, 1960), pp. 14-15; cf. Eric J. Hobsbawm, ‘Karl Marx’s Contribution to Historiography’, in Ideology in Social Science, pp. 274-275.

458 “Labour is, in the first place, a process in which both man and Nature participate, and in which man of his own accord starts, regulates, and controls the material reactions between himself and Nature. He opposes himself to Nature as one of her own forces, setting in motion arms and legs, head and hands, the natural forces of his body, in order to appropriate Nature’s productions in a form adapted to his own wants. By thus acting on the external world and changing it, he at the same time changes his own nature. He develops his slumbering powers and compels them to act in obedience to his sway. We are not now dealing with those primitive instinctive forms of labour that reminds us of the mere animal. An immeasurable interval of time separates the state of things in which a man brings his labour power to market for sale as a commodity, from that state in which human labour was still in its first instinctive stage. We presuppose labour in a form that stamps it as exclusively human. A spider conducts operations that resemble those of a weaver, and a bee puts to shame many an architect in the construction of her cells. But what distinguishes the worst architect from the best of bees is this, that the architect raises his structure in imagination before he erects it in reality. At the end of every labour process, we get a result
As the worst architect conducts his operation in a state of self-conscious conception prior to putting pen to paper, so does the worst theoretician in compiling, sorting, arranging and proposing his or her gathered scientific knowledge in a continuous state of intellectual formation of the subject matter. This understanding of actuality that works in tandem with imaginative and material faculties brings us to the postulation of the third attribute of Marxian universals, their mediation between the external reality and any scientific observer. Based on the basic discrepancy between theoretical essence and historical appearance, universal concepts are used to reconcile the independent appearance of material forms through their theoretically historicising connections to other commensurate social phenomena. Marx’s conception of productive consumption and consumptive production, to that end, illustrates how theoretical intervention can ascribe commensurate significance to otherwise isolated categories. Bearing on a Hegelian construal of being and becoming, the conception of theoretical mediations connecting singular social phenomena harks back to Marx’s acknowledgement that “all science would be superfluous if the outward appearance and the essence of things directly coincided.” Yet, instead of climbing back to the bust of scientific Pallas on the back of this epistemological separation, Marx utilizes theory not only to postulate external reality in its historically mediated interconnectedness but also to function as the self-conscious conceptual tool that is amenable in working towards the realisation of his erstwhile dictum, “Die Philosophen haben die Welt nur verschieden interpretiert; es kommt darauf an, sie zu verändern.” Indeed, by attempting to prove the theoretical mettle of each core tenet of Hegelian dialectics Marx turns theoretical comprehension into a tool of action, i.e., praxis, that shows the inherent potentiality of alternative courses of historical process in delineating the historical determinateness of any particular sociality. The possibility of conscious particular agents collectively transforming the capitalist mode of production into that of the communist, therefore, is not synonymous with the spiritual revival of a microcosmic ‘Garden of Eden’ reminiscent of Fourier’s perfected phalanstères. The Marxian society of the future rises on the shoulders of the capitalist mode of production with all its technological developments in the sphere of production, which had paved the roads for the erection of the ‘satanic mills’ of overexploitation while affording, in its later stages, the first glimpses at the

that already existed in the imagination of the labourer at its commencement.” Marx, Capital, I, pp. 187-188.

459 Marx, Grundrisse, pp. 90-91.
460 Marx, Capital, III, pp. 804.
462 For his application of the Hegelian transformation of quality into quantity to material historical instances in order to see if it holds theoretical water, see Marx, Capital, I, pp. 312-313; 329-331; and for a memorable example of a similar historical derivation of negation of the negation in the light of the historical expropriation of immediate producers by the capitalists, see ibid, pp. 748-751.
463 Stedman Jones, Karl Marx, pp. 149-150.
potentiality of securing a materially and socially affluent existence for each member of society as a whole:

“The possibility of securing for every member of society, by means of socialized production, an existence not only fully sufficient materially, and becoming day by day more full, but an existence guaranteeing to all the free development and exercise of their physical and mental faculties – this possibility is now for the first time here, but it is here.”

The realm of freedom necessarily passes through the realm of necessity. Never the less, by honing their theoretical faculties in the grindstone of social history humans can achieve a scientific understanding of particular processes that form the material backdrop of their society which can, then, be put into practice in the activity of particular individuals aiming to transform the present state of social affairs for a projective future state of communism.

Conjecturing the congruence of natural and social scientific knowledge, Marx and Engels’ interpolation of the Kantian thing-in-itself to the realm of dialectical materialist theory as not-yet-known disparages any potential shift either towards idealism or mechanical materialism by its postulation of scientific knowledge as determinate in its historicity and amendable in its scope in equal measure. Universal concepts are thus recognized as the mediating instrument traversing social reality from its initial conception as comprehensible only determinedly to its historical culmination with the closest approximation to the presupposed thing-in-itself ideal. Anticipating Lenin’s crucial elaboration of dialectical materialist epistemology using the gradual scientific progress from the indefinite thing-in-itself to historically comprehensible thing-for-us, the approximation of a scientist’s spatio-temporally determinate knowledge of either the world of objects or that of humans to its historically procured qualities turn theoretical universals into historically located apperceptive instruments of science: “From the standpoint of modern materialism, i.e., Marxism, the limits of approximation of our knowledge to objective, absolute truth are historically conditional, but the existence of such truth is unconditional, and the fact that we are approaching nearer to it is also unconditional.”

Arguing for the necessity of theoretical analysis in any attempt to achieve a certain degree of

464 Engels, Anti-Dühring, pp. 343; cf. “Just as the savage man must wrestle with Nature to satisfy his wants, to maintain and reproduce life, so must civilised man, and he must do so in all social formations and under all possible modes of production. With his development this realm of physical necessity expands as a result of his wants; but, at the same time, the forces of production which satisfy these wants also increase. Freedom in this field can only consist in socialised man, the associated producers, rationally regulating their interchange with Nature, bringing it under their common control, instead of being ruled by it as by the blind forces of Nature; and achieving this with the least expenditure of energy and under conditions most favourable to, and worthy of, their human nature. But it nonetheless still remains a realm of necessity. Beyond it begins that development of human energy which is an end in itself, the true realm of freedom, which, however, can blossom forth only with this realm of necessity at its basis. The shortening of the working day is its basic prerequisite.” Marx, Capital, III, pp. 807; Heller, The Theory of Need in Marx, pp. 47, 119f.

465 “Taken historically the thing would have a certain meaning: we can only know under the conditions of our epoch and as far as these allow.” Engels, Dialectics of Nature, pp. 241.

466 Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, pp. 120.
approximation to social reality in itself, Marx and Engels thus posited the scientist as intellectual *homo faber* working with and on external reality simultaneously:

“Indeed, dialectics cannot be despised with impunity. However great one’s contempt for all theoretical thought, nevertheless one cannot bring two natural facts into relation with each other, or understand the connection existing between them, without theoretical thought. The only question is whether one’s thinking is correct or not, and contempt of theory is evidently the most certain way to think naturalistically, and therefore incorrectly.”

The movement away from mere verisimilitude towards the attainment of an understanding of external reality as necessary in its historical advancement, realised by scientists honing their conceptual tools against the background of historically conceived physical matter and social nexus, can thus only be attained if universal concepts are taken as self-consciously posited mediators and *not* reflectors of reality. Having discarded any kind of logical concept that purports to be the looking glass corresponding to external reality as ideological, i.e., unscientific, Marx and Engels departed from the conventional understanding of scientist qua value-neutral observer only to bring him or her back into the realm of history as the self-conscious intellectual labourer aiming to expand the limits of his or her social or natural scientific knowledge. With the approximation of scientific knowledge to its spatio-temporally conceived limits fulfilled, particular individuals rediscover the determinate material and social limits that are imposed on their posited actuality and decide partake of it however they like, using the scope of their determinate self-consciousness in any event. With the realm of ahistorical necessity pushed further afield to verge on the entrenched, i.e., indefinite, limits of human cognitive powers, singular individuals recover their hitherto renounced comprehensive capabilities that once appeared to be lost eternally to idealism, spiritualism, solipsism, etc. In theoretically moving from thing-in-itself to thing-for-us, particular individuals grow conscious of essential parts of their historically determined ‘nature’ as presently intelligible necessities-for-us.

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467 Engels, *Dialectics of Nature*, pp. 60.

468 “The development of consciousness in each human individual and the development of collective knowledge of humanity as a whole presents us at every step with examples of the transformation of the unknown “thing-in-itself” into the known “thing-for-us”, of the transformation of blind, unknown necessity, “necessity-in-itself”, into the known “necessity-for-us”. Epistemologically, there is no difference whatever between these two transformations, for the basic point of view in both cases is the same, viz., materialistic, the recognition of the objective reality of the external world and of the laws of external nature, and of the fact that both this world and these laws are fully knowable to man but can never be known to him with finality. We do not know the necessity of nature in the phenomena of the weather, and to that extent we are inevitably slaves of the weather. But while we do not know this necessity, we know that it exists. Whence this knowledge? From the very source whence comes the knowledge that things exist outside our mind and independently of it, namely, from the development of our knowledge, which provides millions of examples to every individual of knowledge replacing ignorance when an object acts upon our sense-organs, and conversely of ignorance replacing knowledge when the possibility of such action is eliminated.” Lenin, *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*, pp. 172; cf. Lukács, *The Ontology of Social Being*, III, pp. 17.
With the postulation of self-conscious historical positedness of scientists therein emerges a set of theoretical universals that form an interconnected generality, i.e., theory, in continuous collective attempts to cast the net of social or natural science to its widest historical limits. Marx’s concession to the charge that he confines himself “to the mere critical analysis of actual facts, instead of writing receipts (Comtist ones?) for the cook-shops of the future,”469 seizes, therefore, its theoretical significance only if we conceive dialectical materialism as explicitly conceived against any idiosyncratic universalism that secretes its idealist scent once its rhetorically rosy hue is peeled off. Henceforth, leaving all its polemical evocations aside, we claim that there is no Marxian universalism that can be devised for the unequivocal purpose of combatting the idiosyncratic universalisms embraced by the capitalist mode of production. Conjuring the spirit of capitalist mode of production by rubbing the lamb of Marxian universalist platitudes, as such, was seen as the tacit espousal of speculative self-edifying prophecies, or the bread-and-butter of classical political economists. Marx and Engels’ lifelong commitment to the unity of dialectical materialist philosophy and history, by contrast, indicates their recognition of the fact that neither determinate singulars nor theoretical universals can be self-referentiality validated.470 The generality of the universal concepts, indeed, cannot be postulated ex nihilo without comprehending their historical premises or at the absence of accounting for the historical contingency with which determinate singulars attain the knowledge of their historical social and material positedness.471 Capital’s transformation from capitalist mode of production in all its historical determinateness to capitalism as a free-floating timeless entity betrays the fact that the universalism of the latter can only be defended if the former is universalized to an equal extent. Yet, presenting a particular class of owners of the means of production as the representatives of an abstract universality, i.e., humanity, in full bloom hardly adds up to anything more than a barren negation of the utmost degree. By positing capitalist class as the Spinozist equivalent of God classical political economists begged the question of on whose shoulder this novel class of social agents might have arisen. Spinozist nature, after all, requires its inquirers to be endowed with a measure of natural reason just as the capitalist class needs its expropriated toilers to keep its holy trinity intact. The immutable theoretical progress of dialectical materialism serves, in that sense, as the principal safeguard against any self-proclaimed universalism emerging on behalf of humanity as its necessary saviour. Jibing and jeering as it, at times,

469 Marx, Capital, I, pp. 17.
470 Sandkühler, Praxis und Geschichtsbewusstsein, pp. 40-41.
471 Cf. “Measured by its concept, the individual has indeed become as null and void as Hegel’s philosophy anticipate: seen sub specie individuationis, however, absolute contingency, permitted to persist as a seemingly abnormal state, is itself the essential.” Adorno, Minima Moralia, pp. 113.
appears to be, the scorn with which Marx and Engels treat prescriptive determinism is in full accord with their proposed unity of social and natural scientific epistemology:

“Two philosophical tendencies, the metaphysical with fixed categories, the dialectical (Aristotle and especially Hegel) with fluid categories; the proofs that these fixed opposites of basis and consequence, cause and effect, identity and difference, appearance and essence are untenable, that analysis shows one pole already present in the other in nuce, that at a definite point the one pole becomes transformed into the other, and that all logic develops only from these progressing contradictions.—This mystical in Hegel himself, because the categories appear as pre-existing and the dialectics of the real world as their mere reflection. In reality it is the reverse: the dialectics of the mind is only the reflection of the forms of motion of the real world, both of nature and of history.”

And yet, there is no dialectics, except for a human-induced one, in nature. External environment in which any being-towards-the-world externalises his or her projects has no interlocking features whose mediations are just waiting to be discovered. If there emerges a comprehensive picture of external reality as a result of centuries-long scientific effort and struggle, then, that is one that is imposed in accord with the architectonics of analysis that are utilised in operative capacity so long as they continue to be modified in tandem with the results obtained from other natural scientific research. In the context of natural scientific research, the scientist is afforded the benefit of working within an artificially reproduced level of certainty which guides his or her attempt to make interconnections between singular natural phenomena. A probabilistic understanding of the reproduction of a pattern into which singular

474 Cf. Jay, Marxism and Totality, pp. 116-118.
476 “L'être-dans-le-monde est un dépassement de la pure contingence singulière vers l’unité synthétique de tous les hasards, c’est le projet de ne jamais saisir d’apparition particulière sinon sur le fond de l’Univers et comme une certaine limitation concrète de tout. L’ambiguïté de cette relation vient de ce qu’elle n’est pas relation du Tout à lui-même mais pro-jet d’une certaine réalité contingente et accidentelle, perdue au sein des phénomènes de soi vers la totalité qui l’écrase ; c’est donc à la fois l’éclatement d’une singularité qui se projette l’infinit des phénomènes et qui se perd pour que puisse exister quelque chose comme un Monde – et le repliement d’un En-Soi éparpillé, dans l’unité d’un même acte.” Sartre, ‘L’engagement de Mallarmé’, pp. 94-95; cf. Adorno, “Wozu noch Philosophie”, pp. 21.
477 It goes practically without saying that only with the establishment of epistemic links between linguistic conceptualisation and scientific comprehension can that element of compactness be introduced. Any attempt to harness that measure of wholesome intelligibility from within the unstipulated interrelationality among the material elements under purview, relying either on a presupposed dialectics of nature or on a metaphysics of supernatural concord or else, would give way, on the other hand, to passing by de Beauvoir and Sartre’s earlier warnings as to a likely result of such negligence in askance: “… ceux qui ont accepté le dualisme ont établi entre le corps et l’âme une hiérarchie qui permettait de considérer comme négligeable la partie de soi-même qu’on ne pouvait pas sauver.” De Beauvoir, Pour une morale de l’ambiguïté, pp. 10; cf. Sartre, Existentialism & Humanism, pp. 44 ff.
observations are structured a posteriori is one in which the very scientific interconnection itself is problematised in regard to the forms of structuration that it produces. A beckoning hope of making sense of every natural thing that fits into our lived experience is, at best, a harmless superficial addition to the working premises of research on nature; and, at worst, a socio-political ideal that is willing to undertake any hassle to erase its kowtowing before the interests of the ruling class. Be that as it may, the chasm that separates natural scientific probability from human potentiality that is the subject of any probe beneath the social reality is infinitely wider than the one that distinguishes self-conscious researchers of natural phenomena from the corporate Yes-Man. In the end, the forward push of the natural scientist to negotiate for, and thus negate, the expansion of the limits of historically available knowledge of nature is not concomitant to the social scientists’ endeavour to have a firmer grasp of the social reality against which every thought of him or her must rub up.

Wertfreiheit in the context of social reality is a phantom that suggests more about the one who is chasing it than itself. Having acquired a heightened tenor with respect to epistemological debates involving it at least from Nietzsche’s relentless attacks on it onwards, the concept is as modern as Fordism and militarisation. Granted, the discussion of pros and cons pertaining to any social phenomenon has been subjected to self-edifying attempts of naturalisation at least ever since Heraclitus and the Eleatics with their aristocratically pronounced philosophical opinions showering all the uninitiated with heaps of abuse. The ignoramuses, philistines, ne’er-do-wells, or simply the dispossessed one and all, have always been the butt of the rapier wit of aristocratically-inclined social scientist who felt no compunction at poking holes on the materially tattered existence of wage labourers that had no access either to the philosophers or their teachings.478 And for every blue-blooded philosopher who claimed to speak with the voice of the divinities from his pulpit, there arose another one who disclaimed those heaven-forged links by exposing their socio-political essence. Then again, Nietzsche’s perpetual bombardment of the ramparts of value-neutral research conducted in the name of scientific progress spoke to a completely different sensibility: a rancorous defacing of every noble value that had adorned the Homeric existence of the Presocratic Greeks and Pre-Christian Europeans was fast approaching its end against whose prospect was to be mustered all the surviving forces of everything natural, noble-spirited, light-footed and lethal. Nietzsche tried to fight off this...

478 And vice versa one ought to add, which is a feeling that is as definitive as it is for our age as aristocratic scorn was for the autodidacts of old: “True Gramscian subalternity that: the deep sense of inferiority in the face of the cultural other, the implicit acknowledgment of their innate superiority, to which punctual rage or anti-intellectualism or working-class contempt and machismo is itself only a secondary reaction, a reaction to my inferiority first and foremost, before being transferred onto the intellectual.” Jameson, *Postmodernism*, pp. 315.
nightmare by a combination of epistemologically conceived vantage point beyond all values, a point which was earlier discerned by Adorno and Horkheimer, and an ethics of value-creation that was to leave its mark on the post-Nietzschean strands of twentieth century philosophy. At the other end of the pole of philosophical dialectics was Engels who tried to translate the terms of dialectical materialism into a dialectics of nature so that the former could stylise its attempts at historical structuration with an overriding authority of scientific truth. Little did he know that this old curiosity shop of images of certainty would be instrumentalised by some of his self-proclaimed epigones to disabuse dialectical materialism of all its dialectical roots, leaving a shell of empty historicism that could be bent in accord with the whims of a capitalist eternal-present just as easily as to those of an orthodox socialism to the chagrin of some of its most prominent defenders. In the end, Nietzsche was right. He was right not only in the sense that value-creation is inherent to any attempt at the production of social scientific knowledge, but also in that, left to its own devices, scientists would choose to will something rather than not will, and that something could eventually lead to a professional coalition of interests between the value-neutralised scientist and the value-neutralising politician. And once the social scientist disavows his or her claim to create and defend values, all that remains is to give a ‘body-count’ of how many millions were gassed out and where, since the question of ‘why’ always has a tendency to sort itself out in the least worrisome way for the ruling classes. Unfortunately, for Engels’ case, the long twentieth century has exhausted the anti-Blochian dystopian potential of his dialectics of nature, and left us with nary a copper besides a resolute hatred for positivistic schematism of any kind.

480 “However whereas Nietzsche’s attitude to enlightenment, and thus to Homer, remained ambivalent; whereas he perceived in enlightenment both the universal movement of sovereign mind, whose supreme exponent he believed himself to be, and a “nihilistic,” life-denying power, only the second moment was taken over by his pre-fascist followers and perverted into ideology.” Adorno and Horkheimer, ‘Odysseus or Myth and Enlightenment’, pp. 36.
481 Especially following what is still misconstrued by many as an equivocal sign of Weber’s placing of the concept on to the supreme pedestal of objective scientific research. In fact, Weber’s attempt can equally be viewed as one that was conceived explicitly against Nietzsche’s earlier assumption of a transvaluative position. For a Marxist critique of the orthodox view of Weber’s point, see John Lewis, Max Weber and Value-free Sociology: A Marxist Critique, (London, 1975); cf. Habermas, Technik und Wissenschaft als ‘Ideologie’, pp. 165 ff; Martin Nicolaus, ‘The Professional Organization of Sociology: A View from Below’, in Ideology in Social Science, pp. 48-49; Jameson, ‘The Vanishing Mediator’, pp. 3-34.
484 “Je kürzer die Ausbildungszeit des Industriearbeiters, desto länger wird die des Militärs. Es gehört vielleicht mit zur Vorbereitung der Gesellschaft auf den totalen Krieg, daß die Übung aus der Praxis der Produktion in die Praxis der Destructivität abwandert.” Benjamin, Charles Baudelaire, pp. 128.
Alas, the process of our late capitalistic monadisation carries on. Indeed, voluntarily marooned as we are from any positivistic aim of a society of the future, we are too often faced with the terrible matter-of-factly totality that keeps throwing the nauseating either/or à la Kierkegaard in our face.\textsuperscript{486} For an audience that is faithless to a fault in any positive reproof of contemporary reality, we feel terribly at home with the pervasive monologue of spiritual self-mutilation and sacrifice, which appears reminiscent of the historical significance of the Stylites prodding our ego to transcend the borders imposed by a trumpeting superego without ever coming to recognise them. As the French experience of 2019 has shown once again,\textsuperscript{487} however, any conscious struggle against a unique historical totality\textsuperscript{488} can only be realised if we do not sidestep the issue of the boundedness of our being-in-the-world and dare to re-structure that reality through an actual transcendence of our lived experience.\textsuperscript{489} With no Kierkegaardian knight of faith or Heideggerian philosopher of Sein listed among the number of our expected visitors,\textsuperscript{490} only a single recourse to re-totalisation appears available for our fragmentary Dasein which is perpetually at the mercy of the powers-that-be. Ego’s ruse of transcendence obliges us to engage in concert with other beings-for-themselves toward the attainment of self-consciously posited and organised ends.\textsuperscript{491} And if that engagement is ever to be renewed à la Sartre, then, we have to rethink the philosophical groundwork which vindicates it even to the point of recharting some of its core tenets. Thanks in large part to Jameson’s continued effort to re-ignite the theoretical class struggle against an overarching late capitalistic reality in the field of literary criticism, we do have a viable framework of a Sartrean Marxism which does not forsake any insight that can be garnered from the works of Hegel, Adorno, Benjamin, Lukács, Freud, Althusser, Williams, etc. And if we think it historically plausible to thread a partially modified post-Jamesonian path to reconceive the relationship of our human potentialities to the totalising projections we share with the others, we also recognise that the

\textsuperscript{486} Kierkegaard, \textit{Either/Or}, pp. 477 ff.
\textsuperscript{488} Sartre, \textit{Search for a Method}, pp. 25.
\textsuperscript{489} “The apparition that is constituted in a world that produces me by assigning me through the banal singularity of my birth to a unique adventure, while at the same time conferring on me by my situation (the son of a man, of a petty-bourgeois intellectual, of such and such a family) a general destiny (a class destiny, a family destiny, an historical destiny), is none other than what I call being-in-the-world or the singular universal.” Jean-Paul Sartre, ‘A Plea for Intellectuals’, in \textit{Between Existentialism and Marxism}, pp. 274-275; cf. Sartre, ‘L’Engagement de Mallarmé’, pp. 122.
\textsuperscript{490} Lukács, \textit{Von Nietzsche zu Hitler}, pp. 194-195; Lukács, \textit{The Destruction of Reason}, pp. 258.
\textsuperscript{491} Cf. “What emerges then is the need for combined action on the individual and on the group. As a psychoanalyst, I should help my patient to become conscious of his unconscious and abandon his attempts at a hallucinatory whitening, but also to act in the direction of a change in the social structure.” Fanon, \textit{Black Skin, White Masks}, pp. 100.
realisation of that effort requires us to climb down from the comfort of our metahistorical pillar back into the level playing field of textually transmitted past events. But in order to come to terms with our experience of totalisation as a collectivised presence of ‘what hurts’ an indefinite negation needs to be made: dialectics conceived from an existentialist point of view can have nothing positivistic to promise to its practitioners.\textsuperscript{492} In other words, there can be no existentialist naturalisation of Marxian universalism, some varieties of which will be partially analysed in the following chapter. To bring our point home, conceived through a lens of existentialist dialectics, any Marxian attempt at totalisation, must continuously unweave itself. We do not have the benefit of doubt that induced Penelope to carry on with her fool’s errand, helping her to put up with all the abuse that her suitors managed to come up with even to the point of imparting a trancelike existence on her. The recognition scene tells it all, Penelope, as we will have plenty of chances to observe later on, has given up all hope of ever seeing Odysseus again. His sweet lullabies find her, and not any other, to have been spellbound, drudging through the quotidian so that no cause for perturbation emerges. We all know how the story ends, at least for Penelope: her husband arrives to dispel any lingering illusions that the suitors had entertained by becoming vengeance personified with the aid of Telemachus. So, in a very twisted way, Penelope’s dreamlike existence can be said to have kept up its state of \textit{ataraxia}, replacing a multitude of illicit masters by a single one with his lawful ilk to bonds of marriage.\textsuperscript{493} Now, with the post-Soviet vanguard parties practically in shambles, there does not seem to be much realism to the claim that proof of the pudding is still in its eating. Handing out flyers, putting posters, organising roundtable discussions and information sessions might be defended as necessary drudgeries through which one needs to slug so that a sublation of the egocentric standpoint turns into a possibility. But with their ossified concepts and analyses pervading through virtually all their channels of communication,\textsuperscript{494} what little remains of the yesteryear does not seem to offer anything narratively new to those who are not on a treasure hunt for a magical sublation of their being-in-the-world,\textsuperscript{495} which often emerges in a form that

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\textsuperscript{492} Cf. Sartre, \textit{Search for a Method}, pp. 7; Adorno, \textit{Minima Moralia}, pp. 16. The only identification upon which an existentialist dialectics can be predicated in its attempts to confer convivial significance on human actions is one in which identity itself is rejected as a regulative principle: “For identification, identity is never an \textit{a priori}, nor a finished product; it is only ever the problematic process of access to an ‘image’ of totality.” Homi Bhabha, ‘Foreword: Remembering Fanon’, in \textit{Black Skin, White Masks}, pp. xvii.

\textsuperscript{493} Adorno and Horkheimer, ‘Juliette or Enlightenment and Morality’, pp. 87-88; cf. “Ce problème est un même temps le plus difficile, celui que l’espèce humaine résoudra en dernier. La difficulté, que la simple idée de cette tâche nous met déjà sous les yeux, est la suivante : l’homme est un animal qui, lorsqu’il vit parmi d’autres individus de son espèce, a besoin d’un maître.” Kant, \textit{Idée d’une histoire universelle au point de vue cosmopolitique}, pp. 20.


\textsuperscript{495} “Cf. So we slowly begin to grasp the enormity of a historical situation in which the truth of our social life as a whole–Lukács would have said, as a totality–is increasingly irreconcilable with the aesthetic
is akin to the annulment of the same individual human potentialities which have previously been sought to be enhanced. And for a theoretical re-appraisal of that banter between the externalising beings-for-themselves and internalising institutions-in-themselves, any lived experience of existentialist dialectics needs to come to terms with Lukács’ understanding of totality and Adorno’s conception of negative dialectics to see what kind of purchase any attempt at anti-totality totalisation would have today. For attempting to move beyond a Marxian horizon, to further a Sartrean train of thought, even at the cost of potentially falling back to different pre-Marxist arguments, need not devalue the self-conscious use of dialectics as a tool in class struggle that can hone the understanding of the present just as much as that of the collective events of the past so that our willingness not to ‘go on’ becomes an actuality.496

quality of language or of individual expression; of a situation about which it can be asserted that if we can make a work of art from our experience, if we can tell it in the form of a story, it is no longer true; and if we can grasp the truth about our world as totality, as something transcending mere individual experience, we can no longer make it accessible in narrative or literary form.” Jameson, ‘Beyond the Cave’, in Ideologies of Theory, II, pp. 131.

496 “It is only when the “lower classes” do not want to live in the old way and the “upper classes” cannot carry on in the old way that the revolution can triumph.” Lenin, “Left-Wing” Communism–An Infantile Disorder, in Lenin, pp. 561-562; Lefebvre, La vie quotidienne dans le monde moderne, pp. 66; Ali, The Extreme Centre, pp. 135.
CHAPTER 3

HISTORY AND A DIALECTICS OF EXISTENCE

3.1 A Post-Sartrean Conception of Needs

There are two basic theoretical postulates of dialectical materialism that can wedge all other fundamental premises shoulder to shoulder within the cramped space of ontology in regard to the first and epistemology with respect to the second: the necessity of production and the unity of reality. The necessity of production, self-explanatory as it seems, colours natural and social reality with the bright hue of employment in the service of needs pertinent to human existence. Notwithstanding the ease of the quest with which the necessity of this alpha and omega of Buridan’s Ass is solved, we ask the reader’s indulgence in treading a bit longer on this ground before moving on to the second postulate.

Production’s necessity, in the context of human physiology and tool-making, warrants one to fathom it as theoretically capable of clipping an angel’s wings.\(^{497}\) Human individual, in less poetic terms, needs a healthy dose of nourishment to survive, a steady shelter to protect from the elements, hunting implements to evade any looming physical threat and so on. The physical thread with which all these activities are united is, of course, that it requires a certain degree of physical effort to set about the completion of each task. Indeed, even the postmodern survivors of TV shows need to hunt and gather with a bit of flair to spice up what the aboriginal peoples have been doing for millennia. All jests aside, our dealings with nature are predicated on the principle of fair transaction, and our haggling counterpart only accepts the currency of our sweat. Denoting a lack of foremost physical rank, the necessity of production as it composes human being’s relation with her material ensemble is “univocal, and of interiority.”\(^{498}\)

The concept of need, combined with that of \textit{la rareté}, i.e., ‘scarcity,’’ that characterises any historical individual with his or her accompanying environmental externality

\(^{497}\) “Philosophy will clip an angel’s wings, | Conquer all mysteries by rule and line, | Empty the haunted air, the gnomed mine – | Unweave a rainbow, as it erewhile made | The tender-person’d Lamia melt into a shade.” John Keats, \textit{The Poetical Works of John Keats}, (London, 1884), II, 235.

as “une lutte acharnée contre la rareté,”⁴⁹⁹ corresponds, in Sartre’s terms, to the first negation of negation as it is the physical expression of the lack that impedes the preservation of the organic totality of the organism.⁵⁰⁰ Before the “need to lend a voice to suffering,”⁵⁰¹ comes the need to lend a voice to rumbling.⁵⁰² Following in the footsteps of Sartre, the species surpass the first negation by the transcendence towards the inorganic, e.g., the forceful appropriation of the lacked element. Production, conceived as a process involving many steps⁵⁰³ or as a singular action relating to immediate satisfaction of the needs, thus encapsulates the basic contingency of “primam vivere…” that squeezes human individual even in the fully hypothetical moment of nonsociality.⁵⁰⁴ The overriding import thus assigned to the necessity

⁴⁹⁹ Forcefully expressed as it is, I find it hard to discover any reverberations of what Schaff elaborates as a Sartrean “Verwandtschaft mit den Ideen des Malthusianismus und des Sozialdarwinismus” that seem to be in tune with Sartre’s notion of rareté. Speaking to a need for re-historicising his use of the indispensable concept of surplus value, Schaff’s is an endeavour that makes a peaceful norm of the economically induced cooperation which is occasioned by the individual capitalists at a certain time and in a certain place in human history. Unfortunately, for the millions that vanished in chains at least, no idealistic talk of cooperation would suffice to oblige the negation of the element of scarcity that managed to wag the tails of all the hounds of pre-capitalist societies with their overindulgent reliance on the means of extra-economic coercion: Schaff, Marx oder Sartre?, pp. 44-45; cf. Jean-Paul Sartre, Critique de la raison dialectique, précédé de Question de méthode, I, Théorie des ensembles pratiques, (Paris, 1960c), pp. 201; cf. “The genealogy of lesser folk presents an exact contrast to genealogies of power: it is a tale of abuse and exploitation, not of great deeds; of powerlessness, not power; of inarticulatness, not voice…. When they manage to exert power, it is only by inventing forms that pool individual weakness.” Sheldon S. Wolin, “Transgression, Equality, and Voice”, in Demokratia: A Conversation on Democracies, Ancient and Modern, ed. by Josiah Ober and Charles Hedrick, (Princeton, 1996), pp. 67.

⁵⁰⁰ Cf. Marx to Kugelmann, 11 July 1868; Meikle, Essentialism in the Thought of Karl Marx, pp. 94, 135 ff.


⁵⁰² “For us man is characterized above all by his going beyond a situation, and by what he succeeds in making of what he has been made—even if he never recognizes himself in his objectification. This going beyond we find at the very root of the human–in need.” Jean-Paul Sartre, Search for a Method, trans. by Hazel E. Barnes, (New York, 1963), pp. 91; in Aristotelian terms, chreia, or ‘need,’ exists by phasis whereas wants exist by nomos. And the natural existence in question, as carefully picked up by Nussbaum and Meikle, never serves as an expression only of the bare necessities of a bare life but one that involves the flourishing of all the human capabilities that are required for active participation in a polis community. For a lucid discussion on the unintentional objectivity that is denoted by the concept of need contrary to the neo-and-post-classical economic fetish of want, see, David Wiggins, Needs, Values, Truth, (Oxford, 1987), esp. pp. 5-9, 25-26; Martha Nussbaum, ‘Nature, Function, and Capability: Aristotle on Political Distribution’, in Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy: Supplementary Volume, (Oxford, 1988); Meikle, Aristotle’s Economic Thought, pp. 119 ff.

⁵⁰³ Marx alludes to this understanding when he purports the necessity of production for the existence of capital: “We have already seen so far that capital presupposes: (I) the production process in general, such as is common to all social conditions, that is, without historic character, human, if you like…” Marx, Grundrisse, pp. 320.

⁵⁰⁴ Marx underscores this point in his critique of Ricardo’s theory of surplus value by emphasizing, “And finally, as third party in this union, a mere ghost – “the” Labour, which is no more than an abstraction and taken by itself does not exist at all, or, if we take… the productive activity of human beings in general, by which they promote the interchange with Nature, divested not only of every social form and well-defined character, but even in its bare natural existence, independent of society, removed
of production does not, however, make it immune to negligence on the part of certain analytically oriented researchers. Indeed, Gerald Cohen, as one of the self-proclaimed founders of analytical Marxism,\textsuperscript{505} does not refrain from evoking the binary of history/nature in order to pierce the logic of necessity that engraves the Marxian realm of production:

“If people produce, historically, not because it belongs to their nature to do so, but for the almost opposite reason that it is a requirement of survival and improvement in their inclement situation, then it follows that the Marxist theory of human nature is, as I contend, an inappropriate basis on which to found historical materialism.”\textsuperscript{506}

Two principal objections appear overdue to set matters straight: How can we conceive self-preservation, i.e., survival, apart from natural exigence; and, how can any conception of a frozen human nature be postulated as the theoretical ground of historical materialism? Nature is wrested away from self-preservation because only via this hypothetically conceived dyad can Cohen sweep any remnants of dialectical epistemology under the rug of human nature to infuse a cut-and-dried Marxist analytics with a roundabout pampering of the latter. The demarcated fourfold strands of Marxian thought as Cohen enumerates them, namely a philosophical anthropology, a theory of history, an economics, and a vision of the future society can be vindicated only so long as the analytical pedant prevails as the prototype ‘non-bullshitting’\textsuperscript{507} Marxist par excellence.\textsuperscript{508} Cohen’s bone to pick with Marx’s postulation of the necessity of production as the defining character of the agent of dialectical materialism,\textsuperscript{509} in

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\item [\textsuperscript{505}]“Now, scholars who write about analytical Marxism usually name three people as its founders: G. A. Cohen, Jon Elster, and John Roemer.” Cohen, \textit{Karl Marx’s Theory of History}, pp. xviii.
\item [\textsuperscript{506}]Ibid, pp. 358.
\item [\textsuperscript{507}]The bulshitting variant, according to this interpretation of course, is epitomized by any adherence to dialectics as involving a lot more than mere stylistic preference. On an interesting note, Cohen’s attempt to refute any dialectically-oriented understanding of Marxian epistemology was anticipated no later than in the works of Engels, Lenin and Lukács. Lukács, for instance, wrote in his influential \textit{History and Class Consciousness} (1922) that, this watered-down Marxism was a result of the bad habit of regarding the dialectic “no more than a superficial stylistic ornament… Even otherwise conscientious scholars like Professor Vorländer, for example, believed that they could prove that Marx had “flirted” with Hegelian concepts “in only two places” and then again in a “third” place. Yet they failed to notice that a whole series of categories of central importance and in constant use stem directly from Hegel’s Logic.” Georg Lukács, ‘Preface’, in \textit{History and Class Consciousness}, pp. xlv; cf. E. W. Iljenkow, ‘Die Dialektik der Abstrakten und Konkreten im ‘Kapital’ von Marx’, in \textit{Beiträge zur marxistischen Erkenntnistheorie}, pp. 94-95; Hans-Georg Backhaus, ‘Zur Dialektik der Wertform’, in \textit{Beiträge zur marxistischen Erkenntnistheorie}, pp. 128.
\item [\textsuperscript{508}]Cohen, \textit{Karl Marx’s Theory of History}, pp. xxv.
\item [\textsuperscript{509}]That is, of course, apart from his, and other analytical Marxists’, unspiring denunciation of a medley of unintelligibility that he preconceives to form an integral part of the difficulty that its defenders face when trying to define the premises and predicates of dialectical Marxism. Now, I consider Derek Sayer’s attempt to dissolve Cohen’s analytical postulations of his fundamental concepts and their interrelationality in the caustic mix of Marx’s own conduct of historical analyses to be conclusive. And though I try to refute any post-Marxist tendency to throw the baby with the bathwater on my own terms, without indulging in truncated programmatic statements, through this work, I, never the less, see it vital to reiterate Jameson’s point that the passage from the rejection of Engels’ dialectics of nature to
that vein, is that it demonstrates the untenability of the former’s fourfold division by virtue of its intact comprehension of human understanding and natural reality along the same epistemological lines: “The philosophical anthropology says that humans are essentially creative beings, or, in standard sexist Marxist language: man is an essentially creative being, most at home with himself when he is developing and exercising his talents and powers.”

With the common denominator of production whiskered away, Cohen rests content with the likelihood of the rest of the cumbersome theoretical edifice crumbling into bits and pieces. Yet, it is not so clear for others how the leap of faith from social arrangements to physical necessities is made as the corollary to the second part of our question indicates. Indeed, dialectics tout court is never one that can be conceived of as a step but rather that of a post-Marxist faith, in which Sartre’s historical insight, “A so-called “going beyond” Marxism will be at worst only a return to pre-Marxism; at best, only the rediscovery of a thought already contained in the philosophy which one believes he has gone beyond,” proves timely once again: “From the feeling—virtually universal in “Western Marxism” – that the dialectic was not likely to occur “in nature,” and that Engels’s illicit transformation of inert, external, natural, and physical differences (water is not an ice cube) into dialectical oppositions … was philosophically shoddy and ideologically suspect, to the conviction that “dialectical oppositions” are not even “in society” and that the dialectic is itself a mystification—from the first of these positions to the second is not quite what you would call a “mere step,” since it involves political apostasy and a deconversion in shame and betrayal; but it is surely the central philosophical step in what is called post-Marxism.”

Jameson, *Postmodernism*, pp. 344; Sartre, *Search for a Method*, pp. 7; cf. Derrida, *Specters of Marx*, pp. 14; an equally impassioned defence of the Idea of communism, which serves as the formative principle that emerges from the politico-philosophical need to engage in projective actions on a formal basis of a compilation of all the concrete situations hitherto created by the agents in question in the struggle against ‘capitalo-parliamentarian order’ has been continuously made along similar lines in the works of Alain Badiou: “Depuis la Révolution française et son écho progressivement universel, depuis les développements les plus radicalement égalitaires de cette révolution … nous savons … que le communisme est la bonne hypothèse. En vérité, il n’y en a pas d’autre, en tout cas, je n’en connaîs pas autre. Quiconque abandonne cette hypothèse se résigne à la minute même à l’économie de marché, à la démocratie parlementaire (qui est la forme d’État appropriée au capitalisme), et au caractère inévitable, “naturel”, des inégalités les plus monstrueuses.” Badiou, *De quoi Sarkozy est-il le nom?*, pp. 129-130; Badiou, *Philosophy and the Idea of Communism*, pp. 43-44; cf. Derrida, *Specters of Marx*, pp. 98-99.

510 Cohen, Karl Marx’s Theory of History, pp. 345; that tidy line of demarcation between scientific and philosophical, i.e., critical, Marxism has been neatly swept aside by Therborn as a direct refutation of the Marxian corroboration between the two strands of thought: Göran Therborn, *From Marxism to Post-Marxism*, (London, 2008), pp. 71. I need to add that my conception of nineteenth and twentieth-century labour is more in tune with Jameson and Rancière’s “nightmare of history” than Cohen’s rather starry-eyed construal of it. It should not surprise anyone, in this day and age, that the creativity in question which has turned into a virtual prefix of any historical materialist purview of labour as a fundamental category of social being situated within a capitalist mode of production is always pre-ordered. Succinctly put, we create the pre-created in demand and on command. And though it should not take a spell in a sweatshop or at the assembly line to think of the structured backbreaking creativity of millions around the world as the freedom of a modern Ixion who is free to roll around as it pleases the gods, the romantically-inclined should bear in mind at all times that there can never be a romance of labour as we live and understand it: cf. Fredric Jameson, ‘Marxism and Historicism’, in *The Ideologies of Theory*, II, pp. 162; Rancière, *The Nights of Labor*, pp. 58.

511 And this key omission is made notwithstanding the positing of the Marxian conception of human being as an essentially productive being by some of the foremost Marxist thinkers of the twentieth century: “What Marx means by “species-character” is the essence of man; it is that which is universally human, and which is realized in the process of history by man through his productive activity.” Erich Fromm, *Marx’s Concept of Man*, (New York, 1968), pp. 34.

banishing the necessity of production from the realm of analysis on the grounds that it does not concord with the hypothetical categorical premise of human nature, Cohen consummates his effort by smuggling in a different understanding of human nature whose elements are scattered around his works:

“It is a Marxist tradition to deny that there exists an historically invariant human nature. The point is made against conservatives who fix on some historically virulent behaviour pattern (usually an unpleasant one) assign it to human nature, and conclude that the pattern will appear in every society, or be eliminated only by extreme tyranny… But it is not necessary to claim, in response, that there are no quite permanent facts of human nature. All that need be denied is that the particular feature the conservative emphasizes is one of them.”

The denial of the physiological necessities pressing on any human individual is hence wedded to a socially naturalized set of attributes that seem apposite to the ‘God’s eye view’ of analytical Marxism. Indeed, mistaking self-referential sources of satisfaction without even bothering to classify the components of his construction of a Marxian-oriented human nature, such as belonging to a nation with a vast literary tradition or to a city as an offshoot

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513 Ibid, pp. 150-1; cf. “A child has an autonomous tendency to grow up. He is born with a disposition to do so which is not externally instilled in him by, for example, his parents. But it does not follow that he has a tendency to grow up autonomously, where that means independently of parental and other assistance. The asserted autonomy of the tendency of productive power to grow is relevantly similar. The tendency’s explanation lies not within social relations, but in the sub-social facts about humanity… That the tendency of the forces to develop is realized through the specific social relations of particular societies does not contradict the claim that it is rooted in material and, therefore, socially unspecific circumstances of human nature and the human condition.” Cohen, History, Labour, and Freedom, pp. 90.

514 Sartre could not have the later vogue of the analytical school in mind when he contrasted the workings of the bourgeois analytical mind with its Heimlichkeit within a milieu that is packed with violent abstractions to the view of human as a being that is made by a fundamental project of the early authors of Les Temps modernes. Yet, with his characterisation of the analytically-oriented bourgeois intellectuals as comfortably brandishing their tools of trade that turn every distinct individual into “peas in a can” through a priori categorizations thereof, he appears to have overshot his temporal targets without essentially missing them: Eugen J. Weber (ed.), Paths to the Present: Aspects of European Thought from Romanticism to Existentialism, (New York, 1960), pp. 435-439; cf. Desan, The Marxism of Jean-Paul Sartre, pp. 10-11.

515 Taking his cue from Marx and Engels’ earlier works, Fromm has built, for example, his rethinking of a Marxian theory of human nature upon a division of needs between fixed and relative ones. Needs that are prone to rise and fall with the tenor of the times, according to that interpretation, are appendages to constant drives that steadily rock the boat of the individual psyche. No accord with any such theory is evinced by my attempt to theoretically ground a post-Sartrean existential dialectics in this work. Without further digression, I can add this much: only through a complete introversion of the historical basis of Marx and Engels’ writings can any placid universalism, and especially one with explicit ties to a bourgeois normative conception of humanism, be stipulated as an intrinsic element of classic Marxism: “Nature is a societal category. That is to say, whatever is held to be natural at any stage of social development, however this nature is related to man and whatever form this involvement with it takes, i.e., nature’s form, its content, its range and its objectivity are all socially conditioned.” Georg Lukács, ‘The Changing Function of Historical Materialism’, pp. 234; George Novack, ‘Introduction’, in Existentialism Versus Marxism, pp. 48-49; Stedman Jones, Karl Marx, pp. 199; contra Fromm, Marx’s Concept of Man, pp. 25, 62-63; cf. Erich Fromm, Man for Himself, (New York, 1947); Georgi V. Plekhanov, Art and Social Life, ed. by Andrew Rothstein, trans. by Eric Hartley and Eleanor Fox, (London, 1953), pp. 30; Erich Fromm, Beyond the Chains of Illusion: My Encounter with Marx and Freud, (London, 1980), pp. 26-35; for an understanding of the Marxian interpretation of human nature
of ethnic mélange, e.g., Quebec, for themes of unwavering empirical import. Cohen theorizes a restricted variant of Marxism that might be analytical in its careful adherence to the intellectual division of labour as it is imperialistically sanctioned by the official brand of the North American academia but definitely not either Marxian or Marxist. Notwithstanding these essential limitations, however, there appears to be a silver lining in the main predicament of Cohen’s analytics: his watered-down understanding of what he dubs the ‘philosophical anthropology’ of Marxian works. It serves as a reminder of the centrality of the thesis it connotes and as a theoretical warning of what might indeed ensue if the analyst opts out to take any nonhistorical category at its mutually-exclusive face value. Through his implicit juxtaposition of the Marxian realm of natural necessity (Naturnotwendigkeit) to the secularized transitory state between Arcadia and the realm of freedom, Cohen underpinned his extrapolation of Marx’s theory of history with respect to the cornerstone premise of the necessity of production. We have attempted to render a theoretical judgment on a dialectical understanding of this dyad in the previous chapter; but, to recapitulate, it should suffice to note, against Cohen’s analytics, that neither Marx’s abstraction of production as a hypothetical élan vital of human beings, nor any other quotations with congruent

as a regulative principle with distant normative echoes that was not discarded by Marx in his later works, see Norman Geras, Marx and Human Nature: Refutation of a Legend, (London, 1985).


517 “For its part, the science of logic is abstract in the simplest sense of the word: the reduction to general concepts is an advance elimination of the counter-agent to those concepts, of that concrete element which idealist dialectics boasts of harbouring and unfolding.” Adorno, Negative Dialectics, pp. 39.


519 This point is rendered quite evident, for example, when Cohen proposes to conceive Marxism as attempting to substitute nature with history qua the history of production. As apparently enjoyable as Cohen’s hypothetical thought experiments are on rhetorical grounds, more than a frail sketch of the state of endless physical satisfaction without effort is needed to warrant the transposition of an adorned concept of classical political economists to the theoretical place of the Marxian understanding of history: “Marx said that nature is then ‘too lavish’, for she ‘keeps man in hand, like a child in leading-strings. ‘She does not make humanity’s own development a nature-imposed necessity. It is the necessity of bringing a natural force under the control of society, of economising on its energy, of appropriating it or subduing it on a large scale by the work of human hand, that plays the most decisive role in the history of industry’, and hence, we may safely add by way of interpretation, in history sans phrase. In Arcadia the fruit falls from the tree into people’s laps and they make no history because they do not have to. For Marxism, ‘people have history because they must produce their life’: history is a substitute for nature.” Cohen, History, Labour, and Freedom, pp. 126.


521 “But this argument for the relevance of anthropology to the theory of history is mistaken. For the relevant implicit premiss of the theory of history is not that humanity is essentially productive, but just that, whether or not this is an essential truth about them, human beings can produce, and perhaps, indeed, in a sense of ‘produce’ different from that in which, according to Marx, producing belongs to their essence.” Cohen, Karl Marx’s Theory of History, pp. 360.
overtones, can be criticized on the grounds of their phantasmagorical historical indeterminateness. Appearances of their jibes against the leading representatives of the classical political economy to the contrary, Marx and Engels attempted to strike an epistemological balance between empirical history and dialectical materialist theory beginning no later than in their earliest works, as we observed in the previous chapter.

3.1.1 A Triad of Needs

The abstract exhaustiveness of the necessity of production can be analytically divided into three subsections in order to evaluate its import: (I) empirical necessity, (II) intelligible necessity, (III) acquired necessity. The empirical division of necessity is nothing other than Sartre’s univocal and interior need to consume the edible fruits of productive labour; and its driving catalyst is no less than a slightly modified dictum of Bertold Brecht, “Erst kommt das Fressen, dann kommt die Moral,”

522 first the feeders, then everything else. That assignment of priority to food and shelter does not exactly uncover, however, the dynamic incongruity that is likely to arise between the two basic sorts of needs. And yet, there is hardly any clash-free relationship that can be realistically conceived to exist between different fundamental needs. A case in point, on top of its historical relevance to our study, is the continued occupation of the Late Bronze Age Attica over the Protogeometric stages right through the substantial Early Geometric population increase. Just like any other occupant of Late Helladic and Early Archaic Greece, the settlers of Attica had to fulfil two quorums of need with respect to the procurement of food and shelter. With its impregnable natural fortress, i.e., Acropolis, situated atop its surroundings with a steady archaeological layer of Late Bronze Age occupation, the area’s natural defences seem to have been noted and utilised fairly early on by its occupants. Whether it managed to spatially accommodate the entire population or

523 “The first premise of all human history is, of course, the existence of living human individuals. Thus the first fact to be established is the physical organisation of these individuals and their consequent relation to the rest of nature. Of course, we cannot here go either into the actual physical nature of man, or into the natural conditions in which man finds himself – geological, oro-hydrographical, climatic and so on. All historical writing must set out from these natural bases and their modification in the course of history through the action of men.” Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, pp. 31; cf. ibid, pp. 41.
525 The archaeological evidence for choosing this site as potentially the earliest one to be occupied by the Athenians comes mainly in the form of the excavation of an inscription that identifies the site of one of the oldest shrines of Athens: Aglaurion. And by locating Aglaurion the identification of other well-documented sites of early Athenian history, such as the Theseion, can also be made: Robin Osborne, ‘Did Democracy Transform Athenian Space?’, in Building Communities: House, Settlement and Society
not, the Attic Greeks of the period appear to have been happy campers in regard to the natural protection that was afforded to them by their environment.\textsuperscript{526} That suitability of the settlement for defensive purposes take on an altogether different colour, however, when we note the rather despicable quality of most of the arable Attic land. With a notable overabundance of layers of limestone that owed their geological existence to the lack of substantial precipitation, the Attic soil provided its cultivators with only a limited number of plots whose owners could realistically entertain any hope for the production of wheat, which was the cereal of choice for many farmers around Greece, e.g., the Peloponnese and Euboea, during the better part of the archaic and classical ages.\textsuperscript{527} So pulverised, in fact, was the majority of arable plots around Attica that even the cultivation of barley, a relatively risk-free venture owing to its lesser dependence on a welter of substantial rainfall, appears, by modern estimates, to have been in risk of failure of every sixteen years on approximate. With the social frustration accompanying the right of early occupation beginning to be in full swing no later than the final third of the seventh century, an expedient question pops up with barely any room for allowing easy aprioristic solutions: why did the Attic settlers not seek greener pastures elsewhere? Euboea and Boeotia, both nearby regions that were to develop myriads of mythological ties to the Attic settlers, offered plenty of more productive plots of arable land that could have absorbed a not insignificant part of Attic farmers. The drawback was, of course, that the most defensible positions of both those regions were just as fully occupied as Attica. Lacking, by and large, anything that surpassed the limits of a ramshackle militia corps, the forced appropriation of land from their neighbours was off the agenda of the Attic peasantry. When the chips fell down, the Attic settlers do not appear to have had a recourse to make ends meet other than living off the unreliable cereal supply from their landholdings, which they did in what seems to be quite ingenious ways. If cereal supply was destined to fail in every handful of years with the then widespread methods of extensive farming, then the Attic farmers could always depend on both their olives and pulse crops to make up for that loss. Now either oil or pulse may not appear to promise much to the necessary calory intake of a swelling population. On that count at least the appearance does deceive: specialising in olive production, for one, afforded the Attic settlers with a myriad of commercial opportunities since olive oil in Greece at least from the Late Helladic onwards had a practically universal area of implementation. Ranging from being


\textsuperscript{526} The availability of arable land in and the protection afforded by its natural surroundings of Attikê is positively correlated to the population increase beginning from the eighth century. Anything inducing the collective defence of the land was a major boon for the rising numbers that occupied it, which, as it turned out, the Attic land could easily provide: Coldstream, \textit{Geometric Greece}, pp. 135; Snodgrass, \textit{Archaic Greece}, pp. 23, 35-40.

\textsuperscript{527} Strabo, \textit{Geography}, 8.1.2; Thucydides, \textit{The Peloponnesian War}, 1.2.5.
a primary hygienic agent to the most available means of indoor and outdoor lighting, olive oil had a vast grimoire of uses in addition to olive plants’ obstinate nature in managing to dig deeper than many other fruit-bearing plants in order to reach well tucked away layers of minerals which turned them into a valuable asset for any commercial purposes. And if the Attic settlers were, on occasion at least, not to find unwilling trade partners in any of the nearby communities, then there always was to be a glass floor of pulse to fall back on. Having need of scarce any substantial precipitation to bear fruit, and with a major boon in their nutritional capacity, pulses would largely mitigate any otherwise disparaging effects that would arise from the occasional failure of cereal production. If the Attic farmers did not have the agricultural means to feed a growing population with their preferred cereals, they did have the commercial means to turn the Euboean cultivators of wheat into eager trading partners, not to mention their ability to make up for any shortage of cereals with their supply of pulses. Olives and pulses might have made an uninvitingly meagre diet, but with plenty of cereal producers elsewhere, the Athenian settlers opted for holding on to the safety which was afforded to them by the geographical features of their Acropolis. Food and security, in brief, are two basic needs the attainment of which appears more disparate than compatible. Still, when all is said and done, the fact that any historical community had to wade through that valley of sorrows gives a totalising tenor to any social ideal, communitarian or not, that is taken over other collective projects. Euboean farmers might have had an easy going with their production of wheat given how fertile their fields were, but the relatively unprotected situatedness of their island also meant that they had to put together a fleet that could hold its own against any intruders from the Aegean. And given their dearth of timber suitable for shipbuilding, they had to look eastward toward Thessaly for the sake of building commercial networks that would allow them to send their cherished wheat in return for timber. Qualified as natural or otherwise, the needs that serve as the material knots weaving together human communities operate in complete isolation from their fulfilment elsewhere only on the most abstract level of diagrammatic thinking. In more aesthetic terms, the san Giorgio of Tintoretto’s famous painting is never an epiphenomenon that is reflected sub specie aeternitatis through the timeless lens of a struggle between basic needs, i.e., il dragho, and the community in question, i.e., la principessa. Just as the peculiarities of the striking posture of Jacopo’s san Giorgio or his introduction of an imposing element of diagonality to the walls of la Serenissima attain their full meaning only in the combined, yet refractorily irreducible, light of Carpaccio’s and Veronese’s thematised aesthetics, the fundamentality of the needs that informed the rough-

528 Strabo, Geography, 9.1.7.
529 For Sartre’s brief study of Tintoretto’s San Giorgio, see Jean-Paul Sartre, ‘Tintoretto: St George and the Dragon’, in Between Existentialism and Marxism, pp. 179-198.
hewn existence of the late Protogeometric Attic farmer begins to display its full historical specificity only if they are located within their society in addition to the identification of the political space that was occupied by Attic settlers within the larger generality of early archaic Greek communities. The movement from theoretical abstraction to historical concretisation is never one without its share of traps and travails, a point which radiates with even more lucidity as we approach the hypothetical threshold that separates empirical needs from what we called intelligible ones.

The intelligible counterpart, in that vein, relates to the natural configurations that further qualify the empirical need for survival as a survival that is to endure the historical convulsions which risk besetting the illusion of the timeless structuration of basic necessities in a constantly shifting spatio-temporal setting.\textsuperscript{530} The particularities of geography ranging from a mountainous interior to a seaside locale with its fair share of gorges and ravines might appear to dictate the permanent terms of any endeavour of self-preservation just as much as the climate, the combination of which gives the botanical investigator all the relevant clues to guess the local fauna and flora of any setting. Alas, there is no boundless permanence to be sought after even in the context of geographical features. By the end of the classical period there hardly remained a trace of the Early Archaic fertility of the subsoil around Sparta, indicated by the diminished record of concentrated archaeological remains suggesting an archaic proliferation of hamlet-sized settlements,\textsuperscript{531} for example, while the late archaic coastline meandering from Miletus to Ephesus was well on its way in its forward march. Deforestation breeds erosion just as assured as extensive cultivation without fallow causes soil exhaustion fairly rapidly and alluvial accumulation results in the creation of additional fertile landholdings at the expense of local hubs of maritime networks. Preponderately brought about by collectivised human agents or an interplay of natural elements, one can sniff out a certain whiff of linearity that induces such abstract aetiologies that appear somewhat independent from their local transpositions. Ironically, no historical causality ever transpires at the behest of a time immemorial relationship between the signifier and the signified. In their oft-bizarre


\textsuperscript{531} Following a sudden mushrooming of sites in the area that is covered by the Laconia Survey, which was undertaken by a group of Dutch and British archaeologists in the 1980s across a 70 sq. km area to the east of Sparta, the classical period (450-300 BC) witnessed an anti-climax of settlement numbers. Occasioned, in large, by the failed conquest of Tegea, widespread abandonment of many small-sized settlements and an increased record of larger sites allow us to surmise that the increased number of the landless non-Spartiates and an intensified imbalance of landholdings both exerted a pressure to bring even marginally productive lands under cultivation so that the material basis supporting the parasitic \textit{homoioi} could be maintained. R. W. V. Catling, ‘The Survey Area from the Early Iron Age to the Classical Period’, in \textit{Continuity and Change in a Greek Rural Landscape: The Laconia Survey. Volume I: Methodology and Interpretation}, ed. by William G. Cavanagh \textit{et al.}, (London, 1996-2002), pp 151-256.
ways, human agents not only react to the alterations of their natural surroundings but also act upon them, determining the ‘whither’ just as much as ‘whence’ in regard to how a natural change transpires. After all, the extensive cultivation of Messenian and Laconian fields in the Southern Peloponnese was as deliberate a choice as the Milesian decision to form an alliance with the nearby coastal towns in the likely case of the blocking off of their waterways. Spartiates’ polity of subjugating a vast portion of the Messenian and Laconian populations to rule over a vast lay of land without taking direct productive responsibilities, in that sense, was the driving factor of the exhaustion of local subsoil behind which lay the motivation of the removal of a further obstacle along the way to achieving regional hegemony. As their area of operations widened, so did the necessary wherewithal that the Spartiates required with the result of a series of expansionary measures that were taken in order to counter the decreasing rate of return that their helots had to cope with on forcefully appropriated lands. Translated into the language of social being, instantaneous cataclysms and slow but steady environmental changes alike speak to their need to be accommodated along the historical line of intertextuality which affords an additional measure of intelligibility to any otherwise completely idiosyncratic collective action. Spartiates’ commitment to the further extensification of the arable lands of Southern Peloponnese was undertaken, for instance, in order to reproduce an ideology of inertial ethnic superiority with a material basis that was deemed capable of supporting it. Fusing into an overarching project that served as the conflict-ridden aggregate of all the individual existential projects, in the Sartrean sense of “l’homme se définit par son projet,” that were created by the Spartiate ruling class, the entailed human costs of territorial expansion were deemed negligible up to a certain point beyond which the maintenance of the material grounds of the Spartan mode of production and domination would become questionable. To be more precise, by the end of the first half of the sixth century the Spartan armies would reach the natural limit of their expansionary endeavours in their conflict against the Arcadians and Tegeans which would oblige their ruling class to explore new opportunities for sustaining their mode of servile production. Having met their match on the Northern Peloponnesian battlefields, the Spartiates backed down from their commitment to

532 “Every work, every action, every human situation must be understood starting from its genesis, and its genesis presupposes not only a single collective subject, but a confrontation of collective subjects. Actions have results which rarely correspond to the precise aspirations of any of these groups. An event, in fact, objectively results from an aggregate of projects and tendencies which confront each other.” Lucien Goldmann, *Lukács and Heidegger: Towards a New Philosophy*, trans. by William Q. Boelhower, (London, 1979), pp. 52.

533 “Man defines himself by his project. This material being perpetually goes beyond the condition which is made for him; he reveals and determines his situation by transcending it in order to objectify himself—by work, action, or gesture.” Sartre, *Search for a Method*, pp. 150; cf. de Beauvoir, *Pour une morale de l’ambiguïté*, pp. 166; Iris Murdoch, *Sartre: Romantic Rationalist*, (London, 1999), pp. 11, 21.
territorial expansion, thus deputising the Tegeans as external custodians of their rigid caste system. Corresponding to a struck of fortune for the Spartiates who had partaken of the expeditionary force against their Tegean neighbours, the ceasefire was to serve as one of the first historical steps toward the formation of an inter-poleis Peloponnesian alliance that would give the Spartiates a wide berth in their over-exploitative dealings with the helotised populations of Messenia and Laconia. Unfortunately, for the Spartiates at least, the centuries-long reproduction of those relations of domination would result in the deterioration of the quality of the subsoil of the farming areas which would, in turn, become a factor in the later materialisation of the Spartan oliganthropia. An early testimony to the Hobbesian silence of laws, the Spartiates appear to have decoded their environmental changes in class-related terms that allow us to build a semiotic system of all the mentioned historical events after the fashion of the early works of Roland Barthes.

In contradistinction to an earlier semiology that was coronated as universal science by Saussure, Barthes’ multi-layered semiological system is characterised by the combination of the signifier, i.e., the mental image, and the signified, i.e., the concept, into a sign which then becomes a signifier in the context of everyday reality and modern mythologies alike. The associative continuum of the mental image invoked by san Giorgio’s ultimate victory that is mere moments away from the instant that is painted by Tintoretto, and the signified which surfaces in the form of the salvation of the champion of truth even when the odds are stacked completely in favour of the malevolence in its Manichean struggle against benevolence, is the emergence of the rightful community of the faithful. San Giorgio’s Herculean labour of overcoming the evil dragon, in other words, correlates to the baptism of Jacopo’s native Venice which was one of the major players of the Mediterranean power struggle of his day. That correlation flows, however, at least in two central veins: the formal intertextuality it establishes

534 “On peut concevoir une science qui étude la vie des signes au sein de la vie sociale … Nous la nommerons sémiologie … Elle nous apprendrait en quoi consistent les signes, quelles lois les régissent. Puisqu’elle n’existe pas encore, on ne peut dire ce qu’elle sera, mais elle a droit à l’existence, sa place est déterminée d’avance. La linguistique n’est qu’une partie de cette science générale. Les lois que découvrira la sémiologie seront applicables à la linguistique, et celle-ci se trouvera rattachée à un domaine bien défini dans l’ensemble des faits humains.” Ferdinand de Saussure, Cours de linguistique générale, (Paris, 1964), pp. 33.

535 “Let me therefore restate that any semiology postulates a relation between two terms, a signifier and a signified. This relation concerns objects which belong to different categories, and this is why it is not one of equality but one of equivalence. We must here be on our guard for despite common parlance which simply says that the signifier expresses the signified, we are dealing, in any semiological system, not with two, but with three different terms. For what we grasp is not at all one term after the other, but the correlation which unites them: there are, therefore, the signifier, the signified and the sign, which is the associative total of the first two terms.” Roland Barthes, ‘Myth Today’ in Mythologies, trans. by Annette Lavers, (London, 2009), pp. 135; cf. Lefebvre, Le langage et la société, pp. 130.

536 Merleau-Ponty, L’Œil et l’Esprit, pp. 51.
with the similarly thematically structured contemporary paintings and the political intertextuality which functions alongside the latter via a discernible predilection for certain symbols. At the formal level, the figurative preferences exhibited by Tintoretto’s capolavoro appear to denote the purposeful enactment of a certain distance from Carpaccio’s San Giorgio. With the thwarted visuality of the knight’s lance leaving, unlike that of Carpaccio’s, adequate aesthetic room for the complementary working of the viewer’s imagination and a shift from the focus of dramatic action from Carpaccio’s coup de grâce to the princess’ panicked bolt from the dragon, Tintoretto appears to have created a rigorous aesthetic plane of reinterpretation of the whole episode that appears to abscond from the sequestered memento mori of the earlier painting toward a magnificent antediluvian existence that is barely touched by the macabre except for the corpse at the centre of the painting. Jacopo has no misgivings; there will be blood. But even so, that is no reason not to heed the calling of an Arcadian spirit à la Claude Lorrain or Jacopo Sannazaro. Indeed, rather than conveying a sense of frenzied terror that vibrates with the death and gloom of Carpaccio’s San Giorgio, the corpse in Tintoretto’s painting has a serene sense of centrifugalism about it, directing the attention horizontally to san Giorgio’s heroic struggle and vertically to the dialectic interplay between the princess’ flight and the majestic posture of la Serenissima’s walls. This element of a golden age of irony – after all, the princess is the last in line of selected virgins that were to be sacrificed to the dragon despite the idyllic landscape and the stern walls overlooking it – also has a lot to promise in regard to the politics of intertextuality that surface side-by-side by the painting aesthetics. Carpaccio’s late renaissance saint of tourney, or that of Dürer for that matter, is relocated by Tintoretto onto a levelled space of representation that does not exactly outshine either the radiant citadel or the fleeing princess which jostle rather at ease with san Giorgio in an attempt to occupy the centre stage within that levelled space. San Giorgio’s delegation to relative unimportance might be taken to suggest that Tintoretto’s proud Venice

537 There can be no absorption of the level of formal intertextuality by that of the political or vice versa. Following that line of thought, one would ultimately begin gasping for air either of the autonomy of art or the primacy of the political. And in reaching either conclusion the pedant or the political prophet would finally come out of the cocoon of universality. Contra: “It is true that painters define themselves in relation to each other and that writers discuss things among themselves. Yet, the basis of these relations – or the absence of them – between painters and poets through time, that which produces similarities and differences, that which makes possible or impossible relations, borrowings, oppositions and interpretations, the basis of all these positive and negative relations, is situated in global history and in the evolution of totality.” Goldmann, Lukács and Heidegger, pp. 73-74.

538 For an appraisal of the formal links uniting various notable authors and painters of cinquecento Venice including Tintoretto and Carpaccio, see Tom Nichols, “Tintoretto, prestezza and the poligrafi: a study in the literary and visual culture of Cinquecento Venice”, Renaissance Studies, vol. 10 no. 1, (1996), pp. 72-100.

539 In fact, Sartre has likened Tintoretto’s san Giorgio, not without compelling reason, to an artisan who did not shy away from backstabbing the dragon as opposed to the upright aristocratic splendour of Carpaccio’s san Giorgio: Sartre, ‘Tintoretto: St George and the Dragon’, pp. 184.
had a lot of protective saints to brag about not the least of whom would, of course, be San Marco. And with a comparably larger focus on the sea (perhaps a lagoon?) brandishing the mannerist heraldry of ‘sprezzata disinvoltura’,540 Tintoretto seems to have completed the transposition of the legend from a barren scene in Cappadocia to a land of plenty that looks very much Venetian except for its nebulous sky.541 Yet if a such a transposition is to be warranted, then, we would need to address the narrowed allowance made by the painter to recollect the heroism displayed by San Giorgio. Carpaccio’s San Giorgio deals the finishing blow to the dragon on a veritable slaughterhouse of a landscape. Raffaello’s San Giorgio, on the other hand, is just a knight of tourney without even the faintest of resemblances, in iconography or else, to the saint’s ordeal. In a curious pathway that appears equally distant from both those trajectories of imagery, Tintoretto’s San Giorgio threads the needle in creating a quintessentially Venetian composition in its feigned likeness to the kingdom of heaven. Blessed with the rays of opalescence the likeness of which has possibly never been seen in the arid sky of his beloved town, the walls of this kingdom of the yore tower above the everlasting struggle of its subjects, saint and princess alike, not simply as a tranquil backdrop against which the entire action is portrayed but also as the metaphysical outliers of a self-styled cinquecento kingdom of plenty whose commercial activities had triggered the leap to an unprecedentedly unequal distribution of material benefits. Ever vigilant to crowd out whomever dared to lay claim to political office, be him a suitable pretender or not, the old guard of aristocratic families of the early sixteenth century formed a solid bulwark against which any watershed of noblesse de robe would break. In a period that spanned the better part of four decades between 1540-1580, Tintoretto made a name for himself with his unparalleled energy in meeting the demands of any commission that was put on a short notice. His prolific productivity attracted admirers and scorners alike, the former praising the artistic rigour of the painter while the latter countered that such ravenous productivity detracted from the elegance of his artistic representations.542 A casebook study of obsessive productivity whose brushes stroke illustrations for travel guides and subjects from Genesis that were commissioned by some of the most prestigious Venetian churches alike, Jacopo had the flair of an irreverent avant-garde who did not make a virtue of the necessity of diligently working out the details of his foremost contemporary painters. His was an artistic ethos of early mercantile capitalism,

542 A final proviso that was made by Pietro Aretino in his recommendation of Tintoretto’s recently finished Miracle of the Slave (1548) demonstrate how the two strands of evaluation could work in tandem in half-heartedly appreciating the work: “E beato il nome vostro, se reduceste la prestezza del fatto in la pazienza del fare. Benché a poco a poco a ciò provederanno gli anni; conciosia ch’essi, e non altri, sono bastanti a raffrenare il corso de la trascuratezza, di che tanto si prevale la giovem volenterosa e veloce.” Pietro Aretino, Lettere sull’arte di Pietro Aretino, ed. by E. Camesasca, (Milan, 1957-1960), II, pp. 204-205.
providing services for any institution, spiritual, educational, political, etc., provided that they were willing to pay him his rate of ducats. And from well-respected Venetian admirals to the Doge himself he created definitive artworks while often asked to recreate biblical or mythological scenes that had drawn other master painters to their respective orbits. His aesthetics of representational irony was the price that his customers were more than willing to pay, as well as his commission of ducats of course, since there was hardly any other painter around whose storehouse of inspiration was as inexhaustible. From his recognisable self-portrait carefully juxtaposed to the camel carrying san Marco’s body in Trafugamento del corpo di san Marco to his representation of the Doge as receiving the God’s Grace in his memorable Il Paradiso, Tintoretto marked the shift in the implosion of the hitherto well-entrenched embeddedness of economic enterprise which was heralded in its philosophical overtones by Raffaello’s famous Scuola di Atene.\footnote{This aspect of Tintoretto’s works can be thought along the lines of Badiou’s concept of ‘immanent exception.’ Conveying an aesthetic capacity of any artwork transcending the boundaries of the strictly material, formal, hermeneutic, etc., dimensions of creative production, the concept is used in order to stress that “if particular works are capable of having a universal value it’s because they are not entirely reducible to the particular conditions of their creation but are also an immanent exception within these conditions. They therefore reveal not just the concrete conditions of their existence but also a rupture within these conditions.” Badiou, Philosophy and the Idea of Communism, pp. 63. 543} Returning to our discussion of his San Giorgio, that spirit of coupure épistémologique appears to be on full display in Tintoretto’s dramatic contrast between the daunting quietude of the walls and the terror-riven princess. Carpaccio had painted the princess as patiently porched above a cliff overlooking the dance of death between san Giorgio and the dragon as if she was assured of its outcome. Tintoretto’s imagery of confrontation, by contrast, has none of the visible signatures of such a foregone conclusion. The moment of contact between the dragon’s scales and the knight’s spear is still off even if by nanoseconds, and, to add insult to injury, the princess has none of the tranquil certitude that Carpaccio’s rendition of her exemplified. Indeed, there seems to be only one intuitive expectation of the fierce battle if princess’ posture is to be any judge of it, and that is certainly not the impending victory of san Giorgio. Tinkering with the overarching presence of the citadel’s walls by the addition of an essentially secluded space of free-for-all, Tintoretto’s variation of the theme has a petitio principi that is barely concealed: what if san Giorgio was not there to put a halt to the princess’ sacrifice? With scarce any allusion to either parental or chivalric virtue that lends its voice to the structured absence of any stand-in for the king, whose daughter, after all, is about to become fodder to the dragon, Tintoretto’s San Giorgio speaks in the same defying tone as of Pheres in Euripides’ Alcestis to his son who accuses him of not having sacrificed himself for prolonging the allotted time-span of his son, which, in the end, accosted the latter the life of his dear departed wife. Beneath the veneer of
pomp and grandeur with all its ecclesiastical trappings lay the eerie ‘everything is permitted’ of Ivan Karamazov.

The aforementioned particular aspects of intelligible needs can also be looked up to in the case of the re-formation of the early archaic Greek communities. In the light of the fact that the overall appeal of any setting is determined by human subjects according to the natural properties of the locale in question, the demographic element is brought to the fore in regard to how suitable each geographical locale is deemed to be for settling. Demographic variations from sparsely-populated areas to urban-rural regions, to that end, appears as a direct result of purposeful projections of a particular mode of socio-economic formation that informs the evaluation of the potential risks and rewards associated with the potential consequences that are due to arise when a land of plenty is desired to be settled in. Variable elements of the necessity of production are thereby identified with each additional layer assembling the empirical snapshots of a specific geographical setting into an intellectual totality. Heaping a myriad of empirical reflections on the primordial ‘first we eat,’ this stage of deliberation determines the potential lines of modes of appropriation that appear likely to arise in accordance with the different sets of characteristics that endow each distinct locale. With the theoretical production of a kaleidoscope with a higher degree of generality, new settlers begin to discover novel patterns or grids of urban allotment of land and professions that would allow a sustainable socio-political efficiency in keeping their relations of production intact. In the seventh and sixth centuries BC settlers from various Peloponnesian poleis found a number of apoikoi on the Sicilian soil. Those ‘homes away from home’ on Sicily witnessed some of the first stirrings of diagonal urban planning and centres of amenities that had no precedent in the poleis whence originated their erstwhile occupants. With a deceptive appearance of equality that was to deceive modern historians and archaeologists for decades in taking that appearance for aprioristic reality, some of those poleis, such as Syracuse, were characterised by streets of uniform single-storey buildings that housed, in all likelihood, the grassroots settlers. As recent excavations have shown, however, this self-same mini housing was not the only type that was available to the newcomers. In especially fortified areas are found, in that vein, curious complexes of adjacent buildings that often have also a conveniently placed silo nearby. And given the current state of historical evidence with barely any suggestion toward the surmising of an originally egalitarian society, it seems well-nigh inevitable to conclude that the aristocratic leaders, or the so-called oikistês, of any colonising expedition employed their poorer compatriots as either bondsmen or in other dependent capacity until another expansion of the workforce, usually in the form of the enslavement of the locals, became viable. Likewise, many of the mainland Greek societies at the ebb of the so-called Dark Ages
following the destruction of the Mycenaean palatial centres modified their initial settlement patterns to allow them to tap into their natural resources and make the most of their geographical surroundings without attracting the least bit of unwanted attention. Curiously, that attention emanating from other suitors who were expected to be just as intrigued by the prospect of settling in a favourable locale with salvageable remains of shelter and defence appears to have been sufficiently potent to override any predilection for the re-settlement of the same areas. Indeed, as we will have plenty of chances to investigate in detail later on, there appears, if anything, to be an exodus from the relatively defensible position of the evacuated centres that had hitherto housed comparably large populations. With the permanent evacuation of two major palatial centres, Pylos and Mycenae, besides others, despite their erstwhile hunting, grazing and farming grounds, we have a novel pattern of settlement in which the entrenched avenues of satisfying empirical needs are reshuffled in accordance with the shifting historical exigencies. Put differently, basic and immutable as they are, the empirical needs are liable to be communally rethought every once in a while, in conjunction with the changing social and environmental conditions, especially when a historical upheaval takes place. And with the incessant clash between basic needs and their natural and social grounds of provision we enter the domain of history: history qua an association of individual projects that is ever prone to reformulation building a nexus of diachronicity that saturates every nook and cranny of the determinate existence of social beings.

Binding together the empirical and intelligible needs is the acquired necessity of reproducing the mode of production that fashions out platters of tradition on which the latter’s historicity is served as a changeless set of expropriative social formations pillorizing some of the historically less viable forms of appropriation of organized necessity while erecting memorials to the others. As the historical manifestations of necessity and their satisfaction are diligently classified by temporally wiping out a not insignificant part of them from the plenum of human potentialities, the intellectual refinement of our understanding of the necessity of production risks the emergence of an anti-empirical mythology, construing a discordant accord of human will and resolution by superimposing each instant of St Petersburg on every instance of settling. Never the less, that gush of anti-empiricist inclination appears to retain an aura of

546 Cf. “What do we mean by saying that existence precedes essence? We mean that man first of all exists, encounters himself, surges up in the world—and defines himself afterwards. If man as the existentialist sees him is not definable, it is because to begin with he is nothing. He will not be anything until later, and then he will be what he makes of himself. Thus, there is no human nature, because there is no God to have a conception of it. Man simply is.” Sartre, *Existentialism & Humanism*, pp. 28.
547 Harking back to Braudel’s exposition of the building of St Petersburg virtually from scratch and at a relatively later period, i.e., eighteenth century, thanks in large part to the whimsicality of the Tzar, we
hermetic value only if a mythical analogon\textsuperscript{548} is permitted to take over the historical signifier in the first place. Luckily, that tension between second-order mythologies of everlasting synchronicity at all levels of social production and the dissolution of them to their ideological elements within the turpentine of a diachronics of non-continuity can be realised by re-historicising what is claimed by the upper-class ideologues of any mode of production as a complex whole in line with the hypostatic dictates of nature. Heeding the earlier call of Barthes to explain the continuous changes in mythical narratives through the lens of the evolution of human societies over the course of time,\textsuperscript{549} we propose to substitute the officially sacrosanct linear relationship between relations of production, domination and reproduction with an understanding of the various transformations of human societies as attempts at finding class-related answers to large-scale problems. The gist of mythological thinking is, of course, its ability precisely to deafen the ears of individual humans to the sonorous ticking of their social clock. Humans, as Sartre insisted throughout his writings, are beings that actively choose and pursue projects that produce an interconnectedness of being through the impartment of the knowledge of their existential projections to their fellow group members.\textsuperscript{550} With the act of creation of any historical group begins, in fact, a process of exteriorisation of projects whereby

\textsuperscript{548} “You may remember that in my very early book \textit{L’Imaginaire} I tried to show that an image is not a sensation reawakened, or re-worked by the intellect, or even a former perception altered and attenuated by knowledge, but it is something entirely different – an absent reality, focused in its absence through what I called an analogon: that is to say, an object which serves as an analogy and is traversed by an intention.” Jean-Paul Sartre, ‘The Itinerary of a Thought’, in \textit{Between Existentialism and Marxism}, trans. by John Matthews, (London, 1974), pp. 46; cf. Jean-Paul Sartre, \textit{L’Imaginaire. Psychologie phénoménologique de l’imagination}, revised edition, (Paris, 1986b), pp. 30; on the Sartrean elaboration of the concept with respect to its roots in Husserl, see Vincent de Coorebyter, “De Husserl à Sartre. La structure intentionnelle de l’image dans \textit{L’Imagination et L’Imaginaire}”, \textit{Methodos}, vol. 12, (2012).

\textsuperscript{549} “… one can conceive of very ancient myths, but there are no eternal ones; for it is human history which converts reality into speech, and it alone rules the life and the death of mythical language. Ancient or not, mythology can only have an historical foundation, for myth is a type of speech chosen by history: it cannot possibly evolve from the ‘nature’ of things.” Barthes, ‘Myth Today’, pp. 132; cf. Sohn-Rethel, \textit{Geistige und körperliche Arbeit}, pp. 56 ff.

\textsuperscript{550} Sartre always distinguished the group, as an organisation toward a definite aim whose achievement is worked towards in a thorough attempt to eliminate all inertia, and the seriality which is the epitome of passive, inert qualities of institutionalised parties with their patronage networks and bureaucratisation. Although bearing the scars of analytical oversimplification, the distinction offers a measure of utility for any analysis of socially determined antagonistic tendencies that vie against one another in any historical party. Sartre, \textit{Critique de la raison dialectique}, pp. 307-327; Desan, \textit{The Marxism of Jean-Paul Sartre}, pp. 109 ff.
the belongingness to the group is gradually interiorised.\footnote{551} However personalised the imagery in whose terms any project’s conception may be, those endeavours are mapped onto a landscape of shared social imagination whose essentials need to operate within a communal grammar and syntax as those of the glass utopias of Calvino’s Fedora.\footnote{552} And that communality, in its turn, profligates the modalities of becoming that are entrusted to the projective capabilities of any individual in a process that has aptly been named ‘subjectivation’ by Badiou.\footnote{553} Ideationally triangulated to be within the pillars of a personally enacted history, a will to partake of its streams of collective creation and a truth content that is continually challenged and thought anew, an Idea serves as the means by which any individual can incorporate him or herself into a novel becoming writ large, i.e., a Subject.\footnote{554} Historically situated truth contents are not goods on market stalls that one peruses to his or her heart’s content to see if any one of them is worth paying the price tag attached. They involve the active participation of the individual through the purposeful contemplation of the existential promises they make, thus inviting anyone to reconstruct their respective mazes.\footnote{555} Shifting and expanding with each momentary commitment to a creation of potentialities, the warrens of subjectivation readmit the individual to his or her personal past just as much as to the communality with which one’s historical present is in constant relation. An Ariadne’s thread that is prophesised to take Theseus back to daylight is inconceivable in regard to the subjectivation of the modern individual, whose Minotaur has all the appearance of being the

\footnote{551} Needless to add, Sartre constantly conceived of interiorization of an external situation along multiple lines which can induce the singular action to be realised in a number of ways. A member of the upper-class might display the fundamentals of a self-consciously socialist position once the proletariat starts shaking the political space with mass demonstrations. Alternatively, he or she can get so worked up with all the insolence showed by the ‘pebble’ that he or she would violently try to suppress any working class demands at any cost. Those two positions, in addition to the myriad of possibilities that lay in between, are all forms of interiorization that should never be assumed away by puritan wishful thinking. Sartre, \textit{Critique de la raison dialectique}, I, pp. 221-225; Jean-Paul Sartre, \textit{Baudelaire}, (Paris, 1963), pp. 101; de Beauvoir, \textit{Pour une morale de l’ambiguïté}, pp. 28 ff; cf. Desan, \textit{The Marxism of Jean-Paul Sartre}, pp. 95.

\footnote{552} “Al centro di Fedora … sta un palazzo di metallo con una sfera di vetro in ogni stanza. Guardando dentro ogni sfera si vede una città azzurra che è il modello di un’altra Fedora. Sono le forme che la città avrebbe potuto prendere se non fosse, per una ragione o per l’altra, diventata come oggi la vediamo. In ogni epoca qualcuno, guardando Fedora qual era, aveva immaginato un modo di fare la città ideale, ma mentre costruiva il suo modello in miniatura già Fedora non era più la stessa di prima e quello che fino a ieri era stato un suo possibile futuro ormai era solo un giocattolo in una sfera di vetro.” Italo Calvino, \textit{Le città invisibili}, (Torino, 1972), pp. 39.

\footnote{553} Badiou, \textit{Being and Event}, pp. 393 ff.

\footnote{554} “This [the decision to become a militant of a body-of-truth] is the moment when an individual declares that he or she can go beyond the bounds (of selfishness, competition, finitude …) set by individualism (or animality – they’re one and the same thing). He or she can do so to the extent that, while remaining the individual that he or she is, he or she can also become, through incorporation, an active part of a new Subject. I call this decision, this will, a subjectivation. More generally, a subjectivation is always the process whereby an individual determines the place of a truth with respect to his or her own vital existence and to the world in which this existence is lived out.” Badiou, \textit{The Communist Hypothesis}, pp. 234-235.

sacrificial fire into which have been heaved all the fusillé perpetrators of ‘socialisms past.’
And lest any prolonged gaze upon the mur des fusilés formed by the collective memory of the
Communards of 1871, the Zapatistas of 1919, the Red Guards of 1968, among many others,
does not discourage anyone from engaging in any attempt to brave the warrens, we need to
recall that the most rabid atrocities against revolutionaries have always been undertaken in
clear daylight. And if an existential nausea emanating from the tension between the
mnemonics of has-been existence and the social being who reconfigures his or her communal
presence at present has been the order of the day for post-1848 friends of socialism, such as
Rimbaud and Verlaine, no less for its enemies like Flaubert, then, courage can indeed be
defended via an existential and ontological creative capacity as Badiou did a while ago.556

Flaubert’s childhood anguish over his older brother’s string of successes, not to mention his
uneasy relationships with his father and mother,557 might have had a considerable impact on
his decision to smoulder any creative project that bore a resemblance to that of his brother,
i.e., medicine. But even that creative exteriorisation is realised in the light of creative
potentialities that were lit at the Flaubert’s birth thanks in large part to the socio-economic
situatedness of his father and mother within the Second Republic that was running headstrong
into an unmaking clash with Louis-Philippe. Flaubert’s eventual selection of a career in law,
in that sense, was his creative project in response to his brother’s path of material success that
was made by sifting the lifetime potentialities that was made for him in advance by the
microcosmic socio-economic situatedness of his family.558 Externalised into personalised
dimensions of social reality,559 individual projects begin to clash with one another due to their
divergent takes on numerous aspects of existence. While that back and forth between different
existential endeavours have a personal historicity of their own that never exhaust their
capability to redefine the project within a set range of historical parameters, as in Flaubert’s
eventual shift to authorship, they also run along history which is conceived as an early

556 Badiou, De quoi Sarkozy est-il le nom?, pp. 95-102.
557 “Gustave’s relationship with his mother deprived him of affirmative power, tainted his relationship
to the word and to truth, destined him for sexual perversion; his relationship with his father made him
lose his sense of reality.” Jean-Paul Sartre, The Family Idiot. Gustave Flaubert 1821-1857, Volume II,
trans. by Carol Cosman, (Chicago, 1987), pp. 69; cf. Joseph S. Catalano, Reading Sartre, (Cambridge,
2010), pp. 3.
558 See Pierre Bourdieu, “Flaubert’s Point of View”, trans. by Priscilla Parkhurst Ferguson, Critical
559 “The meaning of human labour is that man is reduced to inorganic materiality in order to act
materially on matter and to change his material life. Through trans-substantiation, the project inscribed
by our bodies in a thing takes on the substantial characteristics of the thing without altogether losing its
original qualities. It thus possesses an inert future within which we have to determine our own future.
The future comes to man through things in so far as it previously came to things through man.” Sartre,
Critique of Dialectical Reason, I, pp. 178.
Lukácsian totality of social and material premises. Flaubert’s brand of bourgeois realism, with its density of personal descriptions as a substitute for the Balzac’s earlier stress on the social milieu, was in equal parts a renunciation of the earlier programmatic ideals of the noblesse de robe and a repatriation of the narrative ideal claiming the literary universe as one that is essentially of its author’s. Following the establishment of the July Monarchy, the liberal bourgeoisie had entered a phase of an upbeat revolutionary cadence that was to give way to the dissemination of a stifling counter-revolutionary atmosphere in the aftermath of the failed uprisings of 1848. Corresponding to the formative years in which Flaubert realised, on a personal level, that outdoing his brother would prove a consumptive effort which had no allure, the last partnership between the consolidating French bourgeoisie and growing proletariat soured Flaubert’s interpretation of the immanent vivacity of Balzacian realism. Impulsive and full of contradictions, the existential aura of Balzac’s characters had waned and waxed with the changes accruing to the reciprocal ties they had to their microcosmic universes. There was a matter-of-factly quality to those micro universes to be sure. But that ‘objectivity’ had never completely donned the mantle of Sartre’s mauvaise foi as the mistaking of the distance between particular beings-for-themselves as appendices to a singular being-for-one oneself, effectively transforming all the other self-conscious existences into beings-for-another. As we will have occasions to remark upon in our historical analyses, there is indeed


561 For the student riots and protests, in which Flaubert participated, that eventually led to the temporal suspension of scholarly activities at Flaubert’s Lycée, see Sartre, ‘The Itinerary of a Thought’, pp. 47-48; cf. Benjamin, Charles Baudelaire, pp. 11 ff.

562 Lukács would later espouse a reading of uncompromising literary honesty, in the case of Balzac no less, for explaining his truthful rendition of the “impersonal dialectic of reality,” which continue to baffle the Marxists of all fashions to this day: Lukács, ‘Marx and Engels on Aesthetics’, pp. 84.

563 Despite its limitation of having been applied almost exclusively to Balzac and Stendhal by its coiner, the Lukácsian concept of typicality as the translation of all the contradictory characters of members of different classes in a given period into frequently explosive literary characterisation can be a term of service in expanding this analysis to cover the works, for one, of Flaubert: “The crucial difference of style between the old and new realism lies in the characterization, i.e., in the conception of the typical. The older realism presented the typical by concentrating the essential determinants of a great social trend, embodying them in the passionate strivings of individuals, and placing these personages into extreme situations, situations devised in such a way as to demonstrate the social trend in its extreme consequences and implications.” Georg Lukács, ‘Tolstoy and the Development of Realism’, in Studies in European Realism, pp. 168; cf. Georg Lukács, ‘Balzac: The Peasants’, in Studies in European Realism, pp. 43; Georg Lukács, ‘Critical Realism and Socialist Realism’, in The Meaning of Contemporary Realism, pp. 122-123; Lukács, ‘Marx and Engels on Aesthetics’, pp. 78-79; Georg Lukács, ‘The Intellectual Physiognomy’, in Writer and Critic, pp. 180-181; Murdoch, The Sovereignty of Good, pp. 94.

564 Cf. “Flaubert, said to have claimed to despise the fame on which he staked his life, was still as snug in the consciousness of such contradictions as the comfortably-off bourgeois who wrote Madame Bovary. Faced by a corrupt public opinion and the press, to which he reacted in the same way as Kraus, he thought he could rely on posterity, a bourgeoisie delivered from stupidity, to give due honour to its authentic critic. But he underestimated stupidity: the society he represents cannot speak its own name,
a Homeric element to Balzac’s characters whose traces of memorability always converge with those of others in organising life-worlds that unveil virtually any trompe l’œil of an author whose preference of the old aristocratic orders almost always calls the retreat when faced with what a realistic portrayal of actually-existing aristocrats lay bare. Cynicism, greed and consumptive delights, among others, inform a vitality that had already been bent unto itself when the restoration of Bourbon dynasty obliged the exchange of the old orders’ own recreative energy for the egalitarian creative potential that sprang from the writings of Louis Blanc and St. Simon. Although a complete political bystander by phenomenal measurements, Flaubert was far from a being a clueless observer that had scarce any interest in the outcome of the prolonged class-struggle leading to 1848.\textsuperscript{565}

Flaubert problematised Balzac’s exteriorised structures of signification by creating frustratingly anomic characters. Pere Goriot’s self-assured existential ironies that had been located by Balzac at a socialised level of intercourse was to give way, in Flaubert’s hands, to the excruciating introversion of the Cartesian cogito\textsuperscript{566} that risked exposing the introvert to un secret de tout connu of the fact that doubt’s probes beneath the psyche in solitude has basically nothing to promise: cogito ergo nullum.\textsuperscript{567} At the absence of inter-subjective mediation, the individual sheds all secure finalities about oneself and the others.\textsuperscript{568} When the inter-personal relations of interiority are established at a social level for the sake of overriding that neurotic condition,\textsuperscript{569} however, the individual beholds his meta-personal determination, which is akin

\textsuperscript{565} And how could he ever be a ‘clueless observer’ given that his family, with a mother that was related to the nobility and a father who was a self-made son of a village veterinarian, had all the makings of a living contradiction? Flaubert lived that contradiction as a child the horizon of whose later aspirations was decreed on him as a destiny against which he would devote his entire life-consuming work in an endless struggle: “It is childhood which sets up unsurpassable prejudices, it is childhood which, in the violence of training and the frenzy of the tamed beast, makes us experience the fact of our belonging to our environment as a unique event.” Sartre, \textit{Search for a Method}, pp. 60.

\textsuperscript{566} For a programmatic statement of the Hegelian substance with which Descartes’ concept was imbibed in Sartre’s early conception of it, see Sartre, \textit{Existentialism & Humanism}, pp. 45.

\textsuperscript{567} Sartre, ‘The Itinerary of a Thought’, pp. 40.

\textsuperscript{568} “There are a whole of crowd of such topics,” Flaubert confided in a letter, “which annoy me just as much whatever way they are approached. … Whenever one speaks good or ill of them I am equally irritated. Most of the time conclusions seem to be acts of stupidity.” Cited in Fredric Jameson, ‘The Ideology of the Text’, in \textit{The Ideologies of Theory}, I, pp. 36; cf. Sartre, ‘The Itinerary of a Thought’, pp. 40.

\textsuperscript{569} As an example of that pathos of existential Entfremdung, the episode of Emma Bovary’s meeting with Abbé Bournisien can be given. Indeed, so formidable the gust of introvertive convulsion that emanates from the social environment of Emma, capped with a fleeting salvo that is depicted via the blubbering of children in return to a question asked by the priest, i.e., “What is a Christian?”, that the reader follows the frustration displayed by Emma’s striking of her daughter with an anguish of her own. Gustave Flaubert, \textit{Madame Bovary}, (London, 1995), pp. 124-129; cf. Georg Lukács, ‘The Playful Style’, in \textit{Essays on Thomas Mann}, pp. 101.
to the masochistic pegging of selfhood in the eye of another. Shrouded by a cloud of nothingness that separates oneself from all the other beings-for-themselves in the world, the individual, then, begins to record his reflections on a monumental guilt that weighs her down just as it does on Altona’s Franz. A space of immediate being is all that is needed to confer that guilt of being-in-the-world onto others; the dreamworld of Franz’s attic or the prison cell or any temple of Argos that would give refuge to an Electra who witnessed, mere moments ago, the unthinkable would do so long as the dark corners of an engulfed psyche remain unperturbed. Ironically, for every Franz or Electra that would wallow in the inundating torrents of interiorised oblivion there is either a Johanna or Orestes that is willing to re-bridge

570 Only a historically misinformed apriorism could allow the overlooking of the fact that this sense of abandonment was a theme that was shared by some of the foremost literary figures of post-1848 France and was attempted to be turned into a universal signifier by those who could materially afford, as Baudelaire so latently pointed out, to look ‘le Malentendu universel’ in the eye: “C’est par le Malentendu universel que tout le monde s’accorde. Car si, par malheur, on se comprenait, on ne pourrait jamais s’accorder … Dans l’amour, l’entendue cordiale est le résultat d’un malentendu. Ce malentendu, c’est le plaisir … Ces deux imbéciles sont persuadés qu’ils pensent à nous, quand nous ne pensons qu’à nous-mêmes.” Charles Baudelaire, *Mon cœur mis à nu*, cited in Jean-Paul Sartre, ‘L’engagement de Mallarmé’, pp. 54. A triumphant modern alternative to that Flaubertian condition is, of course, the depoliticised counterculture as it was theorised and practised by Deleuze and Guattari. A picturesque celebration of the textual schizophrenia, to which, as Jameson notes, no realistic aspiration can approximate, this wildcard child of monetised politics of late capitalism attempted to turn the critical eye back on itself in order to build a wellspring of self-transformative moment on a *piazza* that is bordered by towering husks of compulsory anti-creativity: “My third maxim was to try always to conquer myself rather than fortune, and to change my desires rather than the order of the world, and generally to accustom myself to believing that there is nothing entirely in our power except out thoughts, so that after we have done our best regarding things external to us, everything in which we do not succeed is for us absolutely impossible.” René Descartes, *Discourse on Method*, in *Discourse on Method and the Meditations*, trans. by F. E. Sutcliffe, (London, 1968), 47; cf. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, trans. by Robert Hurley, Mark Seem and Helen R. Lane, (Minneapolis, 1983); contra Jameson, ‘The Ideology of the Text’, pp. 70; Jameson, *Postmodernism*, pp. 345; Umberto Eco, ‘Anno nove’, in *Sette anni di desiderio: cronache 1977-1983*, (Milan, 1983), pp. 62; Umberto Eco, ‘Sono seduto a un caffè e piango’, in *ibid*, pp. 87 ff.


the objectivised plane of inter-subjectivity even at the cost of incurring the miasma of inhumanity due to stolidly spilled blood. From Flaubert’s brand of ‘realism’ to Sartre’s dialectically existentialist plays there occurs a shift of narration from a situational conditioning to a permanent condition of situationism. Take a Sartrean step towards the recognition of the fact that there can be no freedom without the necessary dialectical mediation between different beings-for-themselves or attempt a Flaubertian leap of immediacy that re-founds the inter-subjective of any individual within objectivity of consummate narrative externalisation; either way, the circularity that envelops the being-for-oneself which is dwarfed by the nothingness encasing the latter is broken. Yet, there is an enormous difference between the two solutions of the problem that pops up when the production of acquired needs turns into a hotbed of literary, aesthetic, linguistic, social, etc., conflict which can best be examined in the combined context of our three historical examples.

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576 ‘Man is only a situation: a worker is not free to think or to feel like a bourgeois; but in order that this situation should become a man, a whole man, it should be lived and left behind on the way towards a particular aim. In itself, it remains indifferent as long as a human freedom does not give it a meaning: it is neither tolerable nor unbearable as long as a freedom does not accept it, does not rebel against it, that is to say as long as a man does not choose himself in it, by choosing its significance. Then only, within this free choice, it becomes determinant …’ Jean-Paul Sartre, ‘Introduction to Les Temps Modernes’, cited in Weber, Paths to the Present, pp. 441.
577 A character that shows how crucial Sartre’s self-aware distance from Flaubert’s novels with their testimony to his self-loathing has been created in the form of Le Diable et Le Bon Dieu’s Heinrich: “The result [of my experience with the Resistance] was that I concluded that in any circumstances, there is always a possible choice. Which is false. Indeed, it is so false that I later wanted precisely to refute myself by creating a character in Le Diable et Le Bon Dieu, Heinrich, who cannot choose. He wants to choose, of course, but he cannot choose either the Church, which has abandoned the poor, or the poor, who have abandoned the Church. He is a living contradiction, who will never choose. He is totally conditioned by his situation.” Sartre, ‘The Itinerary of a Thought’, pp. 34; cf. Jean-Paul Sartre, Le Diable et Le Bon Dieu, (Paris, 2000) ; de Beauvoir, Adieux, pp. 349, 352, 358 ; for an account that stringently refuses to account for the evident irony of the play that appears congruent from the shift of political loyalties in Sartre’s and de Beauvoir’s attitude beginning from the early 1950’s, one can resort to Schaff’s interpretation of what he portrays as a Sartrean way of seeing “der Mensch” as “ein Spielzug des blinden Schicksals” as well as one’s nausea as “unabhängig vom menschlichen Handeln.” On that note, a moralist focus on the notion of existentialist ambiguity that is frequently displayed in Sartre’s plays, albeit most prominently in de Beauvoir’s Pour une morale de l’ambiguïté, might explain part of the genesis of Schaff’s undeniable skill of avoiding what would, from the writing, at least, of The Communists and Peace onwards, become a focal point of Sartre’s theoretical elaborations which were occasioned by attempts to surpass the enduring rift between individual decisions and collective conditioning: Schaff, Marx oder Sartre?, pp. 26; cf. de Beauvoir, Pour une morale de l’ambiguïté.
578 That lack of totalising commitment is given disarming voice in a latter that was written by Flaubert to George Sand: “I lack a firm, comprehensive outlook on life. You are a thousand times right, but where does one find the way to change? I ask you. You will not illuminate my ignorance with metaphysics, neither mine nor others. The words religion or Catholicism, on the one hand, and progress, fraternity and democracy, on the other, no longer meet the intellectual demands of the present. The new dogma of equality, which radicalism preaches, is refuted by physiology and history in practice. I see no possibility today either of finding a new principle or of respecting old principles. Thus I seek in vain for the ideal on which everything else depends.” Cited in Lukács, ‘Narrate or Describe?’, in Writer and Critic, pp. 142-143; cf. Sartre, Baudelaire, pp. 71.
Propelling the characterology of Flaubert is a certain element of fascination with mimetic shocks which resist any attempt to commit them to memory. Who is Madame Bovary really? Not an incorrigible possessor of clashing concentric character traits à la Balzac or a single-minded vessel of personal vendettas à la Dumas, and definitely not the consummate introvert that is embodied in the characters of Dostoyevsky. Do his characters have the touch of uneasy situatedness which are exhibited by those of Stendhal or the trenchant belief in their moral superiority that one can find, for one, in Jane Austen’s novels? Again, the answer is a firm ‘no.’ What about the sort of ‘nose to the grindstone’ sort of political l’engagement of the kind of Dickens or the revolutionary revival of Greek classical art in the manner of Hölderlin or Goethe? Once more, one can only reply in kind with the stern Laconism of the Homeric grey-eyed Athena. Ex Africa, semper aliquid novum. However one looks at it, there is no going around the crux of the matter that there is hardly any remarkable pathos that would enhance the memorability of Flaubertian characters. Granted, in the grand case of Madame Bovary, whose author was to famously avow, ‘Madame Bovary c’est moi,’ at least, one is not so hard put to identify some pathos-ridden attributes. Striking the reader as someone who appears, oft times, as quite impressionable; but so far is Madame Bovary from reaching any resolute comment on what the others make of her that it would be unwarranted to think that the gaze

579 Then again, of the two foremost measurements of mnemonic commitment, namely, the literary significance accorded to a work that seep into the canonisation thereof and the blockbuster quality which confer honours of blockbuster’s rampant success, there was, especially following the revolutions of 1848, a steady bit of convergence thanks in large part to the wide-ranging effects that the feuilleton genre had in the shaping of novel short-term tastes. Accompanied by a rising number of professional authors and poets who were then beginning to have a growing feeling for the new genre’s material implications, the quantification of the literary yardsticks might have played a certain role in Flaubert’s conscious aversion of the Balzacian characterology: “Tout homme avec fierté peut vendre sa sueur! Je vend ma grappe en fruit comme tu vend ta fleur, | Heureux quand son nectar, sous mon pied qui la foule, | Dans mes tonneaux nombreux en ruisseaux d’ambre coule, | Produisant à son maître, ivre de sa cherté, | Beauco up d’or pour payer beaucoup de liberté!” Alphonse de Lamartine, ‘Lettre à Alphonse Karr’, in Œuvres poétiques complètes, ed. by Mariüs-François Guyard, (Paris, 1963), pp. 1506; cf. Benjamin, Charles Baudelaire, pp. 24 ff.

580 “One should think of how Balzac makes Vautrin, Rastignac, Nucingen, Maxime de Trallies and others appear as episodic figures in “Le Pere Goriot,” but find their true fulfilment in other novels. Balzac’s world is, like Hegel’s, a circle consisting entirely of circles.” Lukács, ‘Balzac and Stendhal’, in Studies in European Realism, pp. 72.

581 Neale, Writing Marxist History, pp. 87-108.

582 For a critical evaluation of the Sartrean position based on the earlier writings of him, see Adorno, Noten zur Literatur, pp. 409-430.

583 Pervasive to an all-encompassing extent, Flaubert’s accentuation of situations does not spare even some of the bedrock examples of his characterology. Emma Bovary, for one, turns into a consumptive contradiction when forced into the tight mould of the Kantian empirical character. Never does the Flaubertian situation, however, divorce itself from the social reality in order to create a second-degree nexus of mnemonic sings on its basis à la Proust, hence turning into a mirror image of Sartre’s portrayal of Baudelaire as “Baudelaire, c’est l’homme qui a choisi de se voir comme s’il était un autre; sa vie n’est que l’histoire de cet échec.” Thus if there is any apparent ‘accidentiality’ to Flaubert’s characters, then, it is one that is exhumed and whitewed by the bourgeoisie of his day: Sartre, Baudelaire, pp. 32; contra, Lukács, ‘Narrate or Describe?’, pp. 115.
of the others is the rock on which her personality founders. Barthes’ second-order semiological system of mythical narrative, in that sense, corresponds to the translation of Flaubert’s lived experience of the post-1848 external totalisation584 into the horizontal terms of a literary levelling down in which each character is living through a dream, chasing after a fixity of meaning to unlearn one’s momentary glimpses of “l’enfer c’est les Autres.”585 The obverse of these Flaubertian claustrophobic experiences that were centred on the insignificance of immediate existence was the naturalisation of the post-1848 socio-political status-quo whose sets of semiological systems were signed and sealed by a coalition of the rising ranks of noblesse de robe and an aristocratic order that was fast nearing its obliteration. His acquired need of internalising all the failed promises of the July Monarchy paved Gustave’s way in lending his nit-picking literary skills to the expression of a heavily deject and bogged down manner of contemporary being-for-onself.586 Indeed, so powerful was his drive to hold on to that taste of making his characters suffer that his fictional sadism was often transposed to the fertile grounds of masochism in the form of squandering the family fortune and of complete devotion to the writing of his novels which had nothing to offer him in material terms. Flaubert lived and died by that second-order mythology of his own making, which ultimately led to the exponential growth of his acquired needs at the expense of those of empirical origins.587


585 “Le bronze… (Il le caresse.) Eh bien, voici le moment. Le bronze est là, je le contemple et je comprends que je suis en enfer. Vous disez que tout était prévu. Ils avaient prévu que je tiendrais devant cette cheminiée, pressant ma main sur ce bronze, avec tous ces regards sur moi. Tous ces regards qui me mangent… (Il se retourne brusquement.) Ha ! Vous n’êtes que deux ? Je vous croyais beaucoup plus nombreuses. (Il rit.) Alors, c’est ça l’enfer. Je n’aurais jamais cru… Vous vous rappelez : le soufre, le bûcher, le gril… Ah ! Quelle plaisanterie. Pas besoin de gril : l’enfer, c’est les Autres.” Jean-Paul Sartre, Huis Clos, in Huis Clos suivi de Les Mouches, pp. 93; cf. Sartre, Réflexions sur la question juive, pp. 126-127; for a development of the Hegelian theme of the struggle against the other along the material lines touched by la rareté, see Desan, The Marxism of Jean-Paul Sartre, pp. 90-95.


587 It seems evident that Desan would face drier straits in claiming that Sartre’s combination of the tools of psychoanalysis and social history had translated into the pressing of Flaubert by his totum had he read Lukács’ analyses of the author. With a signal endorsement of a voluntarist ontology of Sein indicated by an awkward, “only Flaubert himself can carry the present,” Desan appears to have forgotten that human actions, according to Sartre, are always impressed by those of the others which act in mediating capacity to externalise the creative projectivity. An attempt to render parts of totum intelligible from the standpoint of singular projects and historised totalities would be tantamount to the attribution of an ontological priority to either Gustave or his social environment only if the historical enterprise was to be understood in absence of its mediating capacity: Sartre, Search for a Method, pp. 62; contra Desan, The Marxism of Jean-Paul Sartre, pp. 269-270; for what can be viewed as an attempt of laying the groundwork for a literature of existential projection, see Jean-Paul Sartre, ‘The Childhood of a Leader’, in Intimacy, pp. 130-220.
Now, we have discerned two particular moments, namely dialectical mediation of the *universel singulier* toward situational totalisation and an inversion of intelligible social conflicts unto the plane of immediate introversion, in regard to the re-making of the determinate existence of any social being. Bringing the incessant interplay between the three levels of need to its full glory, these two organisations of singular projects into communally available ones speak to two concerns that are addressed by the concerted action of the members of any group: the reconfiguration of the entire relations of production on the basis of historical exigencies and the need to redress the second-order mythology in order to allow its formative reaction back on the first-order semiology. In regard to the first concern we have observed, in the case of the foundation of various Early Archaic mainland Greek settlements that the virtual absence of political authority, combined with the availability of inter-group competition on seeking the areas that were most welcoming for potential settlers, became a driving factor in the abandonment of many partially razed Mycenaean palatial centres. What we did not note, however, was that beginning with a cleaner slate effected the structuration of all the facets of the relations of production which were, then, undergoing a thorough transformation. At the current state of evidence, to peg the palatial society of Pylos as well as its later southwest Peloponnesian successors, which were either to be annexed or founded by the Spartans, as historical forerunners of a ‘slave mode of production’ would be a typical case of a violently abstracted model overshadowing a plethora of distinctions that historically separate the two forms. Slavery and patriarchy, two essential aspects of relations of production and reproduction prevailing in any historical society, can be scrutinised in order to substantiate the hypothesised difference between the two societies. In the briefest of terms, which are fully expanded in the subsequent chapters, the translated Mycenaean Linear B tablets have informed the modern researchers that a palatial class of deputies regulating affairs pertaining to the commercial transactions concerning slaves was commissioned in at least some of the major centres. And, though we remain largely in the dark regarding to the extent to which the Mycenaean palaces depended on slave labour, as opposed to various micro-regimes of servility, it appears safe to conclude that Mycenaean mines and farmlands might have housed a considerable number of slaves whose surplus product was to serve as the material foundation of the overgrowing palatial rule. Later historical tradition and the testimony of archaeological

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588 Jameson, *Postmodernism*, pp. 332-333; cf. “Man is never really an individual, he is better described as a *universel singulier*: totalised and universalised by his epoch, which he retotalises by reproducing himself within it as a singularity.” Murdoch, *Sartre*, pp. 22

589 “Thus the particular tenses of the perfect indicate beings who all really exist although in diverse modes of being, but of which the one is and at the same time was the other. The past is characterized as the past of something or of somebody; one has a past. It is this instrument, this society, this man who have their past. There is not first a universal past which would later be particularized in concrete pasts. On the contrary, it is *particular pasts* which we discover first.” Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, pp. 135.
findings also allow us to establish that the four villages of Sparta, in addition to a myriad of peri-oikic communities, were also materially supported by large groups of dependent labour, but of an entirely different kind: helots. Designating large groups of Messenian and Laconian settlers who were turned into servile labour following the invasion of their lands by the Spartiates, helots were consigned mainly to agricultural occupations to eke out an existence while handing out half of their total production to the Spartiates on whom rested the capacity to redistribute. Frequently subjected to ‘sportive’ expeditions of terrorisation not excluding manhunts, helots still retained a modicum of rights, such as the self-invoked ban on their Spartiate masters to kill any of them except in the capacity of self-defence, and could not be either bought or sold or be on the receiving end of a type of dependency that could be more unequal than the traditional 50:50. Now, we can only make educated guesses on the possible reasons, other than establishing a class and ethnic hegemony of course, of the initial Spartan decision to helotise entire populations of the two regions. Considerably less full of doubt is how hysterically the Spartiates are portrayed within the historical tradition as the deranged purveyors of medicines, which were in the form of death squads and ritual killings, to keep a tight leash on their helotised producers. Beginning at least from the late fifth century account of Herodotus, the selection of which would be a rigid example of down-dating given its omission of the surviving fragments of Tyrtaeus’ poems predating the former’s Histories by almost two centuries, the histrionics of a likely mass helot uprising leaves a distinct mark on the Spartiate evaluation of any military expedition that would take a large portion of them away from the Spartan heartlands. A procedure that might otherwise be taken as a necessary precaution for a sporadically surfacing likelihood, the steady influence exerted by such fears on a citizen body that perennially had to leave the core settlements in order to keep their political interests intact appears to speak to a more permanent organisation of the polity with all its socio-cultural dimensions. To take a curious example, despite the rigorous Spartiate efforts to erase the traces of their institutionalisation of any cultural practice from the subversive aspects of collective memory, we have chance survivals of the dress rehearsals of certain enforced actions that would later take on the deceptive shine of constancy. As luck would have it, we have testimonial evidence in the form of Tyrtaeus’ poems, dating back to the second third of the seventh century, indicating a likely historical range for the institutionalisation, for instance, of the obligatory memorial service that was imposed on the helots whenever a Spartan king died. Now, the tradition in question might seem a long way off from the much more fundamental needs of food, shelter and defence. On a singular level, it is only natural that a historical bridge connecting commemorative customs and the satisfaction of basic necessities may seem well-nigh unfathomable. And, on a universal level, a seeming voluntarism always seems to endear the concept of ‘inventing traditions’ to the
mind that is unaccustomed to the intricacies of running to and fro within the historical maze of Minos. Perhaps it is high time that we introduce a Hegelian element, i.e., *List der Vernunft*, to our re-contextualisation of Tyrtaeus and the custom he jotted and hence passed down on the others.

### 3.2 Totalisation as the Re-Organisation of an Organised Social Reality

As individual projects are collectivised via the mediation of production a materially-reinforced element of inertia is introduced by the members of the institution to the dynamics of totalisation whose appearance of bureaucratic self-referentiality veils the existential fact that no totality can ever be consummate. With an inexhaustible creative capability of remaking, within historically set determinations, any situation that keeps ‘making’ them, human agents refuse the epithet of thinghood answering to the secularised core need of any ruling class to confer fatalistic determinism on their groups. Dramatically portrayed in the nonlinear ties of reciprocal determination between the torturer/soldiers and their prisoners in Sartre’s *Men Without Shadows*, subjugation is always piecemeal in dancing to the tune of permanent fixity. A group is never reduced to the fully-objectified status of the contingency of practico-inert.

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590 “Translated into more prosaic terms the expression refers to the idea that men make their own history themselves and the actual driving-force behind the events of history is to be found in the passions of men and their individual, egoistic aspirations; but the totality of these individual passions nevertheless ends by producing *something other* than what the men involved had wanted and striven to attain. Nevertheless, this other result is no fortuitous product, on the contrary, it is here that the laws of history, the ‘reason in history’, the ‘spirit’ (to use Hegel’s terms) actually makes itself manifest.” Lukács, *The Young Hegel*, pp. 354; cf. David Hume, ‘Of Refinement in the Arts’, in *Selected Essays*, pp. 169; Lukács, *The Ontology of Social Being*, III, pp. 12; Jameson, *The Hegel Variations*, pp. 82-83; on the signification of the term *List* at the beginning of the eighteenth century, which was formed in contradistinction to *Kunst* rendered as entailing any chivalric attributes, and hence tending more towards the envelopment of all non-noble occupations rather than conveying the pejorative sense that the term was ascribed with a century later, see Lefebvre, *Le langage et la société*, pp. 142-143.

591 An apposite definition to elucidate this point is, of course, Sartre’s summary definition of bureaucracy as “the external conditioning of the inferior multiplicity; distrust and serial terror at the level of one’s equals; the eradication of organisms in obedience to a superior organism (each dissolves in himself his organic individuality as a volatile factor of multiplicity and levels himself with his peers in an organic unity of the superior).” Sartre, *Critique de la raison dialectique*, I, pp. 626 [my translation C.O.].


593 “… pour nous, l’homme se définit avant tout comme un être “en situation”. Cela signifie qu’il forme un tout synthétique avec sa situation biologique, économique, politique, culturelle, etc. On ne peut le distinguer d’elle car elle le forme et décide de ses possibilités, mais, inversement, c’est lui qui lui donne son sens en se choisissant dans et par elle. Étre en situation, selon nous, cela signifie *se choisir* en situation et les hommes diffèrent entre eux comme leurs situations font entre elles et aussi selon le choix qu’ils font de leur propre personne.” Sartre, *Réflexions sur la question juive*, pp. 72.

594 Corresponding to the concept is a practical inertness that was conceived by Sartre in order to make theoretical allowance for the inert practices of blind social forces. Opposing to this inertia of habitue is, of course, purposive groups of intellectuals that reject the blanket domination of their re-totalising projects: Murdoch, *Sartre*, pp. 28; Desan, *The Marxism of Jean-Paul Sartre*, pp. 174 ff; cf. de Beauvoir, *Pour une morale de l’ambiguïté*, pp. 61 ff.
moving within the permutations of existence with every word uttered to one’s fellow cellmates, every step taken in the confined space and every broken bone or torn nail that builds a system of semiology of its own. Swarm everyone as they might, Sartre’s flies in *Les Mouches* can never entirely devour an individual conscience, life and limb, rather ‘only’ buzzing the defiant antagonists into quasi-passive servility.\textsuperscript{595} And only when the trio of Landrieu, Pellerin and Clochet are closest to complete exteriority are their efforts to reduce their republican prisoners to practico-inertness is closest to attainment.\textsuperscript{596} No, the moral is not quite of the sort ‘we are all just prisoners here, of our own device’\textsuperscript{597}; it is rather that any lullaby sung by the rulers to the ruled in a historical class society is also a command, giving and taking with the same visible hand at least till the advent of the unforced slavery brought about by the capitalist mode of production. And commands, once heaped on top of one another over centuries, begin to take on an appearance of an unconducted symphony whose range of tonal variation only becomes audible when their historicity is accounted for. Our relation to history, in that vein, is one of a tribunal in which it is \textit{not} the historically exhausted modes of production that is on trial but \textit{us}, with our severely curtailed, albeit still open as a field of possibilities, horizon of human potentialities.\textsuperscript{598} We are, when all is said and done, condemned to history no less than to freedom.\textsuperscript{599}

What theoretical contribution does this apparently uneasy blend of structuralist stress on the inertia of institutions and the post-structuralist irreducibility of situations\textsuperscript{600} have besides taking a firm step towards Raymond Williams’ and Lucien Goldmann’s earlier analyses, respectively, of layers of ideology and of the potentiality of a dialectical \textit{Aufhebung} of the

\textsuperscript{595} Sartre, *Les Mouches*, pp. 112-113.  
\textsuperscript{596} Cf. Jameson, *Postmodernism*, pp. 35.  
\textsuperscript{597} “Man is a strange combination of transcendency and necessary compulsion, and whatever his freedom may be, he is caught in the practico-inert of his class. One is forced to conclude, “It was waiting for me before I was born.” Within this class dimension there is, of course, a certain latitude, the latitude of the individual – Peter does not behave exactly like John – but this individualism is only exercised within certain bounds.” Desan, \textit{The Marxism of Jean-Paul Sartre}, pp. 107; cf. Sartre, *Critique de la raison dialectique*, I, pp.292; Wilfrid Desan, \textit{The Tragic Finale}, revised edition, (New York, 1960), pp. 38 ff. \textsuperscript{598} “Rather, it [the lesson the past speaks to us about our increasingly truncated track record] is a lesson of privation, which radically calls into question the commodified daily life, the reified spectacles, and the simulated experience of our own plastic-and-cellophane society; and this is not merely on the level of content …, but in the very experience of form and linguistic production itself, where the primacy of collective ritual, or the splendor of uncommodified value, or even the transparency of immediate personal relations of domination, at once stigmatizes the monadization, the privatized and instrumentalized speech, the commodity reification, of our own way of life.” Fredric Jameson, ‘Marxism and Historicism’, in \textit{The Ideologies of Theory}, II, pp. 175; cf. Roland Barthes, \textit{Camera Lucida}, trans. by Richard Howard, (London, 2000), pp. 64-65; \textit{contra} Hindess and Hirst, *Pre-Capitalist Modes of Production*, pp. 29.  
\textsuperscript{600} Desan, \textit{The Marxism of Jean-Paul Sartre}, pp. 175-176.
consuming divide between object and subject? It offers this much: taking history as a textual product that partially draws its strength from the punctual feedback it gets from the arena of class struggle might shed a lot of meta-historical dead weight, not among the least of which are the final blows dealt by it to the theoretical cult of the transcendental subject and to the universalist defence of anything that proceeds linearly “from the slingshot to the megaton bomb.”

And as our ongoing attempt to ground the empirical subject on a post-Jamesonian plane of existential dialectics à la Sartre and Lukács illustrates, we have a more nuanced understanding of the active capacity of the re-externalisation of things-in-themselves than ever before. In tandem with our growing theoretical capability for overcoming the artificial antagonism between the subject and the object, however, has waned our creative capacity for committing ourselves to a Sartrean l’engagement, in the absence of which the Flaubertian condition of permanent situationism, i.e., complete objectification slowly creeps in as a possible dystopian future that is much bleaker than any Cold War fantasy, e.g., 1984. Having faced the diametrical opposite of our pending communal externalisation at the beginning of the nineteenth century, Hegel devised the concept of the ‘cunning of reason’ to show that the contemporary momentum of history, which had built a great steam until the Thermidor of the French Revolution, had a fierce potency about it that would derail any attempt to overturn its movement toward bourgeois progress. Despite concurring with Zizek’s interpretation of absolute spirit as it is sketched in the Phenomenology of Spirit as a Beckettian appreciation of failure concerning any attempt to realise the creative project of the individual as a social being, we also think that the concept of failure has taken on, in Adorno’s terms, an

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602 That is not to say, of course, that we begin our attempt at the theorisation of the collective subject with the postulation of the subject-object identity, a point which, as Goldmann diligently observed, distinguish the Sartrean position from those of Lukács and Heidegger. The third party as the Sartrean group can never finalise, in that sense, a complete identity between the object and the subject. As with the foundation of the Marxian realm of freedom within the unidyllic realm of necessity, so with the re-totalisation of any collectivised project and its unresolved tension between singularity and the practico-inert: “Cruelly, he [Dos Passos] observed mankind both in terms of the comedy labelled ‘freedom’ which they play out inside themselves, and also as the mere helpless projections of their situation. Sartre and I frequently attempted to observe some third person, or more often ourselves, in this stereoscopic fashion.” Simone de Beauvoir, The Prime of Life, trans. by Peter Green, (New York, 1962), pp. 113; Vladimir I. Lenin, The State and Revolution, in Lenin, pp. 330; cf. Goldmann, Lukács and Heidegger, pp. 11-12, 53, 69, 85; Heller, The Theory of Need in Marx, pp. 86-87; Fromm, Marx’s Concept of Man, pp. 35; Martin Jay, Adorno, (London, 1984a), pp. 63-64; Vattimo, Les aventures de la différence, pp. 35.

603 “Does not Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit tell us again and again the same story of the repeated failure of the subject’s endeavor to realize his project in social substance, to impose his vision on the social universe—the story of how the big ‘Other,’ the social substance, again and again thwarts his project and turns it upside-down?” Slavoj Zizek, The Ticklish Subject, (London, 1999), pp. 76; cf. Jameson, The Hegel Variations, pp. 20.
increasingly negative aspect in our age of totality unleashed.\textsuperscript{604} Ironically, the only remaining original artefact of a production line that has long exhausted the very concept of originality appears to have been its success of introducing an element of material actuality to Baudrillard’s ‘illusion of the end’.\textsuperscript{605} Now, ‘living at the end times’ and ‘the end of history’ are two ideological husks that have been on and off the market stalls \textit{ad nauseam} at least ever since Spengler’s \textit{Decline of the West} (1918) diagnosed Western civilisation with terminal illness.\textsuperscript{606} Still, the unappealing taste that the Lukácsian faith in the cunning of reason has for us shows that a world of Derridean \textit{la différence} separates us from the good old faith in reason writ metahistorical. Resisting the appellation to pronounce our Pascalian faith in having already past beyond the threshold that divorces historical time from a post-historical adoration of the event,\textsuperscript{607} however, are those needs that retain their potency of defining and redefining us with every breath we take in what feels to be an eternity of overproduction and underconsumption. Yes, fresh water and air or edible food and shelter are technically still members of the catalogue of needs on which we confer character and individuality in an inverted universe of Veblen’s \textit{Conspicuous Consumption} in these days. But who, ‘in all seriousness,’ cares for where to find those ‘basic foodstuffs’ among others, \textit{except for} billions of undernourished around the globe?\textsuperscript{608} Our tripartite division of needs has, in that sense, the theoretical and existential benefit of reminding that reason itself is nothing but a historical concept, a concept that assumes the revolutionary name of ‘shame’ in our post-historical societies as it did to Sartre at the time of Sétif, the FLN and cases like that of Djamila Boupacha in the hundreds if not thousands.\textsuperscript{609} That acquired need for the confrontation with an existential guilt and its re-

\begin{footnotes}
  \footnote{604}{What I mean by that accords well with an earlier point of Jameson to the effect that a vision of existentially unrealisable Necessity always needs to accompany a rigorous dialectical history. No failure can be taken as a definite closing down of the horizon of possibilities, the diminishing extent of which has to do with historical configurations, not with natural ones. And an expansion or a contraction of that horizon can only be brought about, as Badiou never tires of repeating, via the intrinsic relation between failure and proof as the dialectical poles of any social or mathematical hypothesis: Frédric Jameson, ‘Architecture and the Critique of Ideology’, in \textit{The Ideologies of Theory}, II, pp. 41; Jameson, \textit{Postmodernism}, pp. 208-209; Badiou, \textit{The Communist Hypothesis}, pp. 6-7.}
  \footnote{606}{For a well-deserved granting of the epithet of a ghost of half a century of Christmases past to either the ‘type of followers of Fukuyama’ or the ‘type Fukuyama’, see Derrida, \textit{Specters of Marx}, pp. 16-17.}
  \footnote{607}{And our trenchant suspicion of any blissful beyond that plays the tune of the spirituality à la Krishnamurti has is no less vindicated, thanks in large part to the pervasive jargon of uniformity with which the ideologues of late capitalism speak, than it was in the time of Marx and Engels: “There is no shiftless absolute, no spiritual beyond. The propositions of the \textit{philosophia perennis} are either nothing other than tautologies or only receive definite meaning through a historical and empirical context.” Henri Lefebvre, \textit{Le matérialisme dialectique}, (Paris, 1949), pp. 54-55 [my translation C.O.].}
  \footnote{608}{Jameson’s point of the material congruence between self-consciously built historical narratives and the acceptance of the Marxist paradigm appears to fit into this post-Auschwitz return of the tragic rather seamlessly for history, after all, “is not so much a text, as rather a text-to-be-(re-)constructed.” Jameson, ‘Imaginary and Symbolic in Lacan’, pp. 107.}
\end{footnotes}
organisation of all our empirical and intelligible needs can be historicised via taking aid of our historical examples in order to show that our epoch is far from being the only one whose actors have been reduced to mere asterisks in the face of *la force de choses*.

Following their co-founding of Sparta, the citizens of the four villages commenced with their attempt to realise a totalising historical project of subjugating the nearby communities to the status of virtual servitude. That ascription of servile status to a population that was considerably larger than their own obliged the Spartiates to temper the steel from which was forged their ties of civic comradery with an additionally toughened amalgam of social institutions like endogamy and polyandry. Whether they were institutionalised at the formative stages of the *polis* by a quasi-legendary Lycurgus or not, those practices ensured that the remarkable privileges of citizenship would be conferred upon only a tightly regulated number of candidates that had to follow their ethno-biological eligibility through a string of rites of passage to partake of full benefits. Never the less, any possibility of success achieved in those later crucibles completely hinged on the legitimacy bestowed upon any new-born by state officials who rendered their judgments on the basis of physical and genealogical examination of the former. Combined with the limited number of Spartiate women capable of childbearing, the need to keep a close eye on a number of citizens induced a transformation of the status of the former, effectively turning them into prized commodities. With the appropriation of vast swathes of arable land from their then subordinated tenants, there also arose the exigence to keep the landholdings in Spartiate hands without giving rise to any alarming inequality in a skewed allotment of available lands. Their organisation of those needs around the theme of sustainable domination of their subject populations took the form of a system of partible inheritance which was considered an anomaly by the later commentators of high classicism. That system had the lynchpin of a relatively gender-neutral convention of partible property that divided the property of the progenitor between sons and daughters on a 2:1 ratio in addition to handing over the entire property to daughters in the likely absence of any brother.

Although the historians are far from having explored in full the gender relations as they came to be a deep-rooted element of the Mycenaean polity at the time of the destruction of its palatial centres, no archaeological or literary evidence has been unearthed thus far to suggest that the transition from the late Mycenaean age to that of early *poleis* entailed a conversion from an essentially matriarchal social structure to one of patriarchy. Indeed, the artistic artefacts that are collected from Pylos or Minos hardly ever display the traces of precedent cults of *mater familia* in the form, for one, of the Anatolian Kybele/Artemis. To build a contrast between the Mycenaean palatial societies and the Spartan *poleis* on the basis of the surviving elements of cultural record would surely be importune given the likelihood of future discoveries. Still, the
plausibility of that archaeological scepticism has not deterred influential commentators like
Sarah Pomeroy from picturing the archaic and classical Spartan society as one of relative
sexual liberation. Though it does not appear worthwhile to get sucked into a debate of Spartan
aristocracy versus Athenian democracy against the background of gender relations, I think it
fairly obvious to observe both that the socio-economic status of Sparte women were much
more viable than their Athenian counterparts and that, chances are, the non-Sparte women
of Sparta had it much worse than the *metoikoi* women of Athens precisely for that very reason.
But in regard to the indomitable space that Sparte women occupied within the general
gender relations, I think it
context of Spartan polity, suffice it to say, for now, that the socio-economic empowerment of
women, harped on deridingly as *gunaikokratia*, ‘rule of women’, was considered by
Aristotle among others to be the driving factor behind the polarisation of the Spartan society
between a propertyed few and a propertyless mass that eventually led to the theoretical
elaboration of the concept of Spartan *oliganthropia*, literally ‘few men.’ An element that had
definitely fostered the Sparte capacity to grow first into a Peloponnesian hegemon and, then,
into a pan-Hellenic superpower, the universal, albeit unequal, particle inheritance of Sparta
began to turn, no later than at the beginning of the sixth century, against the social stability of
the polity, becoming a major bone of contest between reformers and conservatives.
*Oliganthropia*’s unforeseen outgrowth from the fertile soil of the acquired need of the Spartan
ruling class to impose their oligarchy on the material life-worlds of the non-Spartiates can be
taken to suggest two core tenets of an existentially dialectical view of social change: that even
the most evidently derogatory social institutions may have a utopian potential to whose
glimpses a critical eye surpassing the essentials of relations of production need to be darted,
and that a hernia of particular strands of totalisation is liable to emerge when historical change
permanently offsets the political semblance of balance of any project pertaining to the
communality of social being.

Human agents do not act upon their existential projects at a level that is neatly
compartmentalised with the archaeologist’s brush and scalpel. Though often subjected to
phenomenological inquiries, they convey a multitude of semiotic systems that typically
vibrate with the tonal range that is established by the projects they undertake. Further, the
entanglement of singular projects with one another at the level of group interaction shows that
the moments of collective action which give the appearance of temporal progression to distinct
events are needed to be dotted together in order to ascribe a self-conscious signification to

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612 Eco, *Faith in Fakes*, pp. 141.
their complex whole. Working side-by-side, the three epistemological and ontological reasons for abiding by the basics of early Lukács’ appraisal of history interpretative totalisation emerge. Epistemologically, taking strings of temporalities as texts that are encoded at the present temporality of the author, decoded continuously so long as the author’s social project lives on in the practices of its adherents and detractors within a relatively immediate scope of spatio-temporality, and recoded in the future for the sake of turning it into history means that the latter is always to be analysed post factum to fit into the tight categorical spaces of overspecialised social sciences whereby the dialectically vital distinction between the signified and the referent is obliterated. Partially indebted to Stuart Hall’s early expression of an encoding-decoding model of media relations, as well as to Frank Parkin’s three main codes that are stipulated to circulate in advanced capitalist societies, our existentialist

613 Cf. “By event I mean a fact that is the bearer of an idea, in other words, a singular universal – for the universality of the idea is limited by the singularity of the fact, a dated and localized event that takes place at a certain point in the history of a nation, and which resumes and totalizes it to the extent that it is a typical product of it.” Sartre, ‘A Plea for Intellectuals’, pp. 251-252; such a view of the reality that is structured through the projective actions of individual agents does not speak, of course, to a theoretical commitment to promoting the complexes over their singular constituents. If anything, Sartre’s later ontology of human action runs along the admission of singular projects as the fundamental building block of any ontological organisation of reality. The Lukácsian totality operates, by contrast, on a plane of just such an ontological priority that is accorded to the dialectically structured complexities: Lukács, The Ontology of Social Being, I, pp. 111; Lukács, The Ontology of Social Being, II, pp. 139; contra Adorno, Negative Dialectics, pp. 303-304.

614 “The blinkered empiricist will of course deny that facts can only become facts within the framework of a system–which will vary with the knowledge desired. He believes that every piece of data from economic life, every statistic, every raw event already constitutes an important fact. In so doing he forgets that however simple an enumeration of ‘facts’ may be, however lacking in commentary, it already implies an ‘interpretation’. Already at this stage the facts have been comprehended by a theory, a method; they have been wrenched away from their living context and fitted into a theory.” Lukács, ‘What Is Orthodox Marxism?’, pp. 5.

615 And that critique is aimed, first and foremost, at the statistician’s dream of a post classically salvaged fetishization of diagrams with flabbergasting sets of assumptions and presumptions that we call ‘economics’ today. Oblivious to its roots that reach back either into various subdisciplines of philosophy or sociology, the economics we have today exhibits all the makings of being the academic gift of post-Thatcherite neo-liberalism to the ruling classes. For a breath of fresh air for an interpretation of what has been the view elsewhere: “The economic works of the mature Marx are certainly consistently centred on the scientificity of economics, but they have nothing in common with the bourgeois conception of economics as simply one specific science: this conception isolates the so-called phenomena of pure economics from the total inter-relations of social being as a whole, and analyses these in an artificial way that – in principle – allows the area thus elaborated to be put in an abstract connection with another that is just as artificially isolated (law, sociology, etc.), whereas Marx’s economics always starts from the totality of social being and always flows back again into it.” Lukács, The Ontology of Social Being, II, pp. 12.

616 And yet, there are no eidolons, as hinted at by Barthes a while ago, to be employed when textualized events of the past are attempted to be organised into dialectical movement of temporality. Encoded analogons and their subsequent decoded appraisals are what aids and ails the historian in his or her endeavour to totalise events into histories: Barthes, Camera Lucida, pp. 9; cf. Umberto Eco, ‘Sugli specci, in Sugli specchi e altri saggi, pp. 33.

617 Stuart Hall, ‘Encoding and Decoding the Television Discourse’, in The Cultural Studies Reader, ed. by Simon During, (London and New York, 1993), pp. 90-103; Frank Parkin, Class Inequality and Political Order, (London, 1971); for a critical overview of Bourdieu’s more intricate model of a class-based system of signification, which has come to replace the earlier model proposed by Parkin, as
extension of the paradigm is engendered by a diachronic understanding of social reality that emerges from a mainly Sartrean take on the confluence of a steady supply of totalising projects. Embarrassing any attempt that is bent on the insertion of a certain measure either of circularity or finality into the sphere of social exchanges, our view of class societies as comprising of projective communities of human agents endeavours to squeeze through the tight opening between Hall’s early defence of structuralism and what he saw as the native culturalism whence sprouted his contemporary strands of humanism. No amount of scriptural illumination along the lines of what Lefebvre called “c’est écrit,” be its supporters take after the ilk of religiosity or mechanics or else, can herald the end of the interpretative crucible whose gears continually produce history to the benefit of the totalising projects on which they lean. Thus, instead of risking the turning of any social interaction into a singular manifestation of a structure that appears to be incapable of short-circuiting its own metalanguage of reality, and in tune with Barthes’ postulation of a second order semiological system, we regard the assembling of loops of past existences into particular wholes as a continuous interaction between human agents past and present, whose attempts are propelled towards the imposition of myriads of particular hermeneutic linkages on the otherwise exemplified, for one, in the Outline of a Theory of Practice, see M. Flemmen, “Putting Bourdieu to Work for Class Analysis: Reflections on Some Recent Contributions”, British Journal of Sociology, vol. 64 no. 2, (2013), pp. 325-343; cf. Pierre Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice, translated by Richard Nice, (Cambridge, 1977), pp. 81 ff.

Another intellectual whose works have proven to be a steady source of inspiration in my re-conception of historical semiosis is, of course, Heidegger. Heavily indebted to a reading of his magna opera that have been offered by Gadamer and Vattimo, I have attempted to re-problematise the Heideggerian différence in the context of his ontological separation of das Selbe from das Gleiche. A de-teleologised totalisation of history in which any pretence of an ontological eternal sameness is discarded so that an intertextual collection of past recollections of projective traces can be gathered, Heidegger’s understanding of Gespräch as a dialogue between Sein and Dasein, past and present, is, in that sense, an elemental building block of my conception of history: “Mais ce Durchgängiges ne peut être un toujours-égal, entendi comme généralité ou comme telos que les divers moments concourent à préparer. Il doit au contraire être pense comme un Même … Das Selbe qui traverse l’histoire est le fait qu’histoire signifie Überlieferung, transmission de messages, Gespräch dans lequel toute parole est toujours déjà Entsprachung, réponse à un Anspruch, à un appel qui comme tel est aussi toujours transcendant par rapport à celui qui le reçoit.” Vattimo, Les aventures de la différence, pp. 182. Partly because of disagreements concerning the extent, and not the content, of the hermeneutical ontology, and partly due to the allure of the Sartrean l’engagement, I have decided, however, to dig myself a theoretical hole of Adornian/Sartrean inspiration rather than jump into one that has already been considerably dug up by Vattimo. But more on my misgivings about Heidegger’s depth ontology later.

A synoptic account of Hall’s rapport with the contemporary currents of culturalism/structuralism can be peered through the lens of Chris Rojek: C. Rojek, ‘Stuart Hall and the Birmingham School’, in Cultural Theory: Classical and Contemporary Positions, ed. by Tim Edwards, (London, 2007), pp. 69-81. “Thus, whilst in no way wanting to limit research to ‘following only those leads which emerge from content analysis’, we must recognize that the discursive form of the message has a privileged position in the communicative exchange (from the viewpoint of circulation), and that the moments of ‘encoding’ and ‘decoding’, though only ‘relatively autonomous’ in relation to the communicative process as a whole, are determinate moments.” Hall, ‘Encoding and Decoding in the Television Discourse’, pp. 91.

Lefebvre, La vie quotidienne dans le monde moderne, pp. 292.

Cf. Badiou, Being and Event, pp. 176-177.
essentially ambiguous complexes of past recordings of events.\(^{623}\) Gathered, sorted, relativized and linked together to build epistemological bridges a posteriori, the production of historical knowledge, be it politically motivated overtly or not,\(^ {624}\) functions essentially as a re-working of past observations that are always transmitted in textual bundles.\(^ {625}\) If not self-consciously conceived as a re-organisation of past organisations of significations into systemic representations altering the present context, any concept’s referentiality,\(^ {626}\) then, would be generated by an undialectical circularity between matters past and present.\(^ {627}\) With the

\(^{623}\) Cf. “I use ideology as that which cuts into the infinite semiosis of Language. Language is pure textuality, but ideology wants to make a particular meaning … it’s the point where power cuts into discourse, where power overcuts knowledge and discourse; at that point you get a cut, a stoppage, you get a suture, you get an over-determination. The meaning constructed by that cut into language is never permanent, because the next sentence will take it back, will open the semiosis again. And it can’t fix it, but ideology is an attempt to fix it.” Stuart Hall, ‘Reflections upon the Encoding/Decoding Model’, in Viewing, Reading, Listening: Audiences and Cultural Perception, ed. by Jon Cruz and Justin M. Lewis, (Booulder, 1993), pp. 263-264.

\(^{624}\) The separation between historians’ history and that of politicians was a vital theoretical locus in Togliatti’s later endeavour to rethink the history of Rinascimento alongside Gramsci’s interpretation thereof. Refusing to abide by the ground rules of the scholarly production of history and replacing that professionalised gusto of a “divertimento politico” by the self-conscious effort of the politician for whom “ogni storia è sempre e veramente storia contemporanea,” Togliatti attempted to deracinate the deep-running veins of history writing and its contours that are, perennially, riven with class interests: “La formulazione più recente da Togliatti a questo problema dei rapporti tra politica e storia, anzi, per essere più esatti, alla questione della differenza tra la storia degli storici e la storia dei politici, può essere considerata inesatta e confutata soltanto da chi, appunto, tra l’interesse per la storia degli storici e dei politici ha valuto erigere barriere di separazione e di incomunicabilità.” Ragioneri, Palmiro Togliatti, pp. 94-95; cf. Pamiro Togliatti, “Le classi popolari nel Risorgimento”, Studi Storici, vol. 3, (1964), pp. 425-448; Gareth Stedman Jones, ‘History: The Poverty of Empiricism’, in Ideology in Social Science, pp. 112; Cartledge, The Greeks, pp. 51-52.

\(^{625}\) “Indeed, the lesson for us in criticism of this kind [of the kind which discredits the institutional presuppositions of the disciplines in question] may well be, among other things, precisely this: that a materialist or dialectical historiography does its work ultimately by undermining the very foundations, framework, constitutive presuppositions of the specialized disciplines themselves – by unexpectedly demonstrating the existence, not necessarily of “matter” in that limited sense, but rather in general of an Other of the discipline, an outside, a limit, the revelation of the extrinsic, which it is believed to be scandalous and unscholarly to introduce into a carefully regulated traditional debate.” Jameson, ‘Architecture and the Critique of Ideology’, pp. 43; that portrayal can be drawn against an earlier sketch of hypostatic British Cold War historiography whose orthodox currents dignified rigorous historical data-mining in order to keep watering the self-propagating grounds of their rigidly compartmentalised emanation of professional knowledge: Jones, ‘History: The Poverty of Empiricism’, esp. pp. 107-111.\(^ {626}\)

\(^{626}\) There can be no serviceable referentiality if an ideological veiling of the historian verges on a self-styled noli mi tangere by attempting to fulfil its promise of writing history for history’s sake. No miracle of any scholarly sort suffices to sever the existential chains that are forged by the historian’s endeavour to put past reminiscences together into coherent wholes. In the end, the more thickly veiled those chains are, the less there is of any self-conscious emancipatory potential oozing out of a historicised past: “On peut vivre sans grec, sans latin, sans cathédrales, sans histoire. Oui; mais il y a bien d’autres choses sans lesquelles on peut vivre; ce n’est pas à se réduire que tend l’homme, mais à accroître son pouvoir. Abandonner le passé à la nuit de la facticité, c’est une manière de dépeupler le monde … Affirmer le régime humain, c’est reconnaître l’homme dans le passé comme dans l’avenir. … Il faut essayer de reprendre à notre compte, à travers nos projets vivants, cette liberté qui s’est engagée dans le passé et de l’intégrer au monde présent.” De Beauvoir, Pour une morale de l’ambiguïté, pp. 133, 134.

\(^{627}\) “The chief defect of all hitherto existing materialism is that it has been conceived as a series of propositions about matter – and in particular the relationship of matter to consciousness, which is to say of the natural sciences to the so-called human sciences – rather than as a set of propositions about language. A materialist philosophy of language is not a semeticism, naive or otherwise, because its
additional difficulty of working on already decoded material in the absence of primary sources, the collection of past accounts into meaningful self-conscious wholes can only be realised by historicising at the crossroads of diachronicity and holism. Conceiving diachrony as the allowance of narrative room for the textually re-discovered rhythm of temporal procession to impose itself, while taking holism as the practical attempt to cover the largest ground of historical assembly whereby a hope to capture the moment-by-moment social totalisation that informs the reflections of any work is entertained, the historian imaginatively re-builds entire universes on the basis of a semiological relationship between the received texts and their interpretation.628 A dialectical existentialist conception of the human individual as a social being who remakes the situation, thus ushering in a novel event in Badiou’s dictum, which has already made him or her, by working upon beings-in-themselves as part of a project that is undertaken in the presence,629 appreciative or depreciative, of other beings-for-themselves beckons this view toward the production of historical knowledge, which is one step ahead, theoretically at least, of the earlier, and essentially Heideggerian, post-Marxist response to the postmodern vogue of relegating history qua a multiplicity of situations to the dustbin.630 No: a response to the effect that historical re-totalisation is necessary just because a totalising regime is already firmly in place does not answer the demand to provide a metapolitical rationale for the re-working of the theoretical groundwork of a system that risks becoming just a mythologizing analytical method à la Cohen,631 with its meat separation of existentially inseparable ‘categories,’632 when it sheds it claims for infinite advancement towards the

628 Cf. Sartre, Search for a Method, pp. 92 n. 3.
630 “To say that ontology is not a situation is to signify that being cannot be signified within a structured multiple, and that only an experience situated beyond all structure will afford us an access to the veiling of being’s presence.” Badiou, Being and Event, pp. 26.
632 “En même temps habitués que nous sommes depuis la Révolution à envisager chaque objet dans un esprit analytique, c’est-à-dire comme un composé qu’on peut séparer en ses éléments, nous regardons les personnes et les caractères comme des mosaïques dont chaque Pierre coexiste les autres sans que cette coexistence l’affecte dans sa nature. Ainsi l’opinion antisémite nous apparaît comme une molécule susceptible d’entrer en combinaison sans s’altérer avec d’autres molécules d’ailleurs quelconques. Un homme peut être bon père et bon mari, citoyen zélé, fin lettré, philanthrope et d’autre part antisémite. Il peut aimer la pêche à la ligne et les plaisirs de l’amour, être tolérant en matière de religion, plein d’idées généreuses sur la condition des indigènes d’Afrique centrale et, d’autre part, détester les Juifs.” Sartre, Réflexions sur la question juive, pp. 8.
attainment of the ideal of universal history.\textsuperscript{633} A dialectical existentialist interpretation is predicated on the view that Marx’s dialectical materialism is not a method to be resorted in order to batter down the Foucauldian unselfconscious, possibly with the exception of his later writings, postulation of all-pervasive power relations as the core dispositifs of the critical inquirer when posing a challenge to any historically posited regimes of episteme and their transformation over the course of time via the use of an arbitrary pastiche of synchronic snapshots.\textsuperscript{634} Indeed, it is both more and less than that. It is more in the sense that it aims at the realisation of a much more ambitious social project than an active theorisation of self-transformative practices that challenge the post-Nietzschean intelligible characters while creating islets of dissonance that throw down the gauntlet to any structure of power with even the faintest air of concordance about it. Those islets of dissonance might have worked practical wonders in the post-industrial bourgeois subcultures of a de-Marxified France.\textsuperscript{635} A little more than an archaeology of knowledge is necessary, however, when the capitalist ocean of culture engulfing those creative islets is desired to be dried out. And, hence what is precisely ‘less’ in a dialectical existentialist interpretation of Marx’s works compared to those of Foucault: a self-conscious deprecation of the transcendental individualism on behalf of collectivising interests of the group.

Totalisation is always an unfinished endeavour and human agents never form a totality that acts with the doctrinaire over-ripeness of an artificial intelligence. What is most uncanny about human projects is that they are perpetually unfulfilled.\textsuperscript{636} A Stoic philosophy of noble suicide

\textsuperscript{633} That is not to say, of course, that I subscribe to any ahistorical post-Marxist valorisation of anti-systemic movements along whose history, thus far, has shown a remarkable tendency to fold back, theoretically and practically, into the socio-political system whence they came: “What must now be affirmed, however, is the opposite of all this: namely, that no matter how desirable this postmodern philosophical free play may be, it cannot now be practiced; however conceivable and imaginable it may have become as a philosophical aesthetic (but it would be important to ask what the historical preconditions for the very conception of this ideal and the possibility of imagining it are), anti-systemic writing today is condemned to remain within the ‘system’.” Jameson, Late Marxism, pp. 27.


\textsuperscript{635} Though they avowedly took Solzhenitsyn rather than a Foucault or Popper as their main intellectual predecessor, both André Glucksmann and Bernard-Henry Lévy indulged in tracing overcompensated theoretical lineages which they then supposed to link Hegel and Marx to all forms of socialist theory in the outworn garb of Soviet-style Marxism: André Glucksmann, Les maîtres penseurs, (Paris, 1977), pp. 269, 286; cf. Hughes, Sophisticated Rebels, pp. 20-21.

\textsuperscript{636} “Existentialism, like Marxism, addresses itself to experience in order to discover there concrete syntheses; it can conceive of these syntheses only within a moving, dialectical totalization which is nothing else but history or—from the strictly cultural point of view which we have adopted here—“philosophy-becoming-the-world.” For us, truth is something which becomes, it has and will have become. It is a totalization which is forever being totalized.” Sartre, Search for a Method, pp. 30.
is, of course, a theoretical possibility that is likely to arise whenever the pinchers of temporal authority begin to inflict unbearable weariness on the soul of the philosopher yearning for an elsewhere that would serve as an idealist remedy to the omnipresence of suffering. And despite the tell-tale significance of the fact that even so laudatory philosopher of ineradicable suffering as Schopenhauer turned his back firmly on the Stoic approach to suicide, it appears rather evident that Stoic espousal of suicide is posited only as a second-best alternative for the philosopher whose achievement of the status of sage is permanently blocked by historical conditions. And given that either Epictetus or Seneca's ideal of bliss is only ever a state of flux the keeping of which is canvassed to be just as difficult as its attainment, it is but a short step to argue alongside Sartre that a totality reached equals humans de-humanised. Individual’s partaking of any totalising project at moments of historical crisis is the theoretical equivalent of the traversal of a rocky road that is perpetually beset with clashes and troubles. One’s externalisation of her own project along the lines of other externalisations that is organised without ever expecting either an ideal congruity or correspondence in between them is the stage in which the Sartrean group in fusion is founded. A quick call to raid the Bastille on the 14 July 1789, to utilise Sartre’s own example, followed tiptoe on the footsteps of a preliminary stage of coalition among the rising bourgeois which came to a head on 12 July, digging a revolutionary trench that sheltered a wide selection of future revolutionaries including some of the most radically inclined, e.g., ‘Gracchus’ Babeuf, as well as numerous moderates. It had become evident, already by the beginning of July, that the organised totalities of monarchy, army, etc., would resort to violent means in order to supress the non-totality which was none other than the citizenry of Paris. Put differently, it was the intrinsically transferrable political power with which Rousseau had earlier contrasted the inalienable will of the people that the monarchy and those that flocked around it were on the verge of utilising to supress the real body of politics. And forced by this threat of mass violence into a constellation of reciprocities, the “third man” of inert otherness slowly turned into the human mediation that rallied together each non-totalised singularity into interindividual

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637 Georg Lukács, *The Destruction of Reason*, trans. by Peter Palmer, (Atlantic Highlands, NJ., 1981), pp. 243; for a recent interpretation of Schopenhauer’s dismissal of suicide as a shortcut to bliss which, according to him, can only be brought about by diligent effort toward the attainment of will-lessness, see Michal Masny, “Schopenhauer on suicide and negation of the will”, *British Journal for the History of Philosophy*, vol. 29 no. 3, (2020), pp. 1-23; for a study of Seneca’s appreciative views on suicide, see Walter Engler, “Seneca and the Stoic View of Suicide”, *The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter*, vol. 184, (1990), pp. 1-20.
641 “The third man, in structural terms, is the human mediation through which directly the multiplicity of epicentres and ends organises itself as determined by a synthetic objective.” Sartre, *Critique de la raison dialectique*, pp 398 [my translation C.O.].
synthesis against Versailles, or the determinant that threatened all. On the faithful day of 14 July, as Sartre asserts, you could either be for or against the revolution, which, after all, was the fruit of a grand alliance between the bourgeoisie, Jacobins and Girondins alike, and peasants. And for that momentous chance to decide between the ‘for’ and ‘against’ to arise one needs to externalise her project, which is the equivalent, in a group-in-fusion, of the internalization of the projects of other group members. By that participation in the collective re-totalisation of her existential organisation, any group member realises the dialectical identity of identity and non-identity, thence shedding the illusion of personal salvation so that the fragmentary combination of projects turns into a determining phalanx at its own right ready to strike at the heart of either the Bourbon monarchy or the Nazi leadership of the occupation forces in Paris. Can any individual’s development from the mauvaise foi of singular projects to the phenomenological status of a being-for-others with its shared universality of projects be taken as a progressive moment of Aufhebung? We propose to grapple with the question at two separate ontological levels: for the being-in-group and for the group-for-itself.

3.2.1 A Projection of Totalisation

Three takes on the phenomenological situatedness of a being-in-group, dramatically diverging as they are, converge on the point that group dynamics surpass and, hence, weaken the primacy accorded by any individual to his or her existential project. Adorno disputes, for one, the mass submission of individuality to the totality of the order either of CPSU or PCF as one whose collectivisation into class struggle bears the stigma of irreversibility whereby the dialectical element of self-effacing negativity is replaced by mass-produced panacea despite its vitality for any socialist struggle that is waged within the belly of the beast. Positivity, in that vein, harks back to Hegel’s earlier critique thereof with its obvious modification to suit the needs of intellectual objection to capitalism in an age in which scientific reason has proved to be a de-deified successor of the former’s Absolute Spirit. What remains for one to do when the immediacy of the statistical objects, which, obviously, include humans, sweep the mediated objectification of things through language under the rug so that a moment of historical reason can imperialise Reason tout court? Adorno replies that any contemporary critique of

642 “The inhabitant of the quartier St.-Antoine is in grave peril, not as an isolated bandit, whose eccentric behavior needs correction, nor merely as another in the vague form of a seriality like that of the market, but as an individual of that section and of that particular political brand: he is wanted and he is object of a planned and totalizing annihilation coming down upon all the Parisians of that quartier. It is “Versailles” which makes every inhabitant realize himself to be the third man.” Desan, The Marxism of Jean-Paul Sartre, pp. 130-131.

643 Adorno, Minima Moralia, pp. 71; Lefebvre, Le langage et la société, pp. 83 ff.

capitalism that refuses to be lured by the sweet nothings of what, in his day, was about to become Spätkapitalismus645 must begin by the dialectical demolition of the nominalist faith in the equation of the object and its name, i.e., the unity principle,646 and conclude by falling on its own sword so that the epistemological success of dialectical materialism can be shown not to whitewash the ontological tendency of any institutionalised leadership to, as Marx had called, ‘plebianise’ it rank-and-file.647 Once the practitioners of the dialectic begin to fall for any positive renunciation of the current state of affairs in hopes of arriving at a definite projection of totality whose harbinger is to be the mass party, then, the scientific reason universally inaugurates its reign of supremacy whose flares are lit by the all-encompassing prostration before the statistics of productivity.648 “The communards of the 1871 have no ideals to realise,” needs to be cherished as the key to opposing the totalising tendencies of the post-New Deal capitalism without falling for the allure of that which one is fighting against sans réserve.649

Now, it is common knowledge on which side of the Berlin Wall Adorno attempted to pursue his critical endeavour against capitalist massification. A side, I need to add, that had scarce any need for further de-Marxification, given that the latter process had already neared its completion at the hands of the Nazis during their slaughterhouse reign. On the other side of the Wall chose to stay a solitary man whose earlier works had caused so much of a stir within the Stalinist/Zhdanovist camp that his rehabilitation back into it entailed a commitment to verbally refute most of the critical insights that had made his works noteworthy in the first

645 Habermas, Technik und Wissenschaft als ’Ideenlogie’, pp. 53; Jay, Adorno, pp. 95-96; Jameson, Late Marxism, pp. 11-12.
647 As an ontological foundation of that faith which continued to draw the ire of Adorno, one can turn to Heidegger whose project of the unconcealment of Sein rather than that of the beating about of Dasein stemmed from his conferral of the authority of authenticity on the act of nomination: “Language, by naming beings for the first time, first brings beings to word and to appearance. Only this naming nomimates beings to their being from out of their being. Such saying is the projecting of the clearing, in which announcement is made of what is that beings come into the Open as. Projecting is the release of a throw by which unconcealedness submits and infuses itself into what is as such. This projective announcement forthwith becomes a renunciation of all the dim confusion in which what is veils and withdraws itself.” Heidegger, ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’, pp. 71; Martin Heidegger, ‘What Are Poets For?’, in Poetry, Language, Thought, trans. by Albert Hofstadter, (New York, 2001), pp. 144; cf. “What I can name cannot really prick me. The incapacity to name is a good symptom of disturbance.” Barthes, Camera Lucida, pp. 51.
648 “Humans believe themselves free of fear when there is no longer anything unknown. This has determined the path of de-mythologization, of enlightenment, which equates the living with the nonliving as myth had equated the nonliving with the living. Enlightenment is mythical fear radicalized. The pure immanence of positivism, its ultimate product, is nothing other than a form of universal taboo. Nothing is allowed to remain outside, since the mere idea of the “outside” is the real source of fear.” Adorno and Horkheimer, ‘The Concept of Enlightenment’, pp. 11; cf. Goldmann, The Philosophy of the Enlightenment, pp. 8.
place. Lukács, according to Zizek at least, might be located on the other side of the debate on voluntarism versus determinism that was given its simplest terms by Lenin’s earlier What Is To Be Done?, but his self-styled plane of politico-philosophical existence shared common ground with Adorno’s point that massification entails not the sublation but the outright annulment, both of which are denotations afforded by Hegel to the concept of Aufhebung. That congruence of the conception of the massification with the class struggle is juxtaposed, of course, to the signal difference of the evaluation of individual projects that are endorsed by the two figures. For Adorno, the participatory re-totalisation by singular projects triggers the identification of one’s externalisation of one’s singular existential re-organisation of his or her situation with the objectification that is imposed by the party officials on the members of their organisation; whereas, for Lukács, it is precisely that objectification that induces the individual to shed her bourgeois illusions of subjectivity. Given how fiercely critical Adorno himself was of the Cartesian divide between the object and subject, the interpretation of that defence of massification against the background of Adorno’s critique of it hinges on how to locate the signified ‘bourgeois’ within the theoretical and practical universe of Lukács.

With an appearance of having been conceived along the rigid lines of party schematism, Lukács’ later works such as The Destruction of Reason, Von Nietzsche zu Hitler and The Meaning of Contemporary Realism make room for hardly any hermetic space through whose exegesis the Little Red Riding Hood of singular projects can be saved relatively unscathed.

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651 Needless to add, Hegel’s stipulation of the concept does not offer a level space for two potentialities of action that are quite distinct from one another: one as a complementary undertaking, and the other as a diminutive. Proletariat’s Aufhebung of the class society of Marx’s day, for one, and as aptly noted by de Beauvoir, can never be likened to a harmonious jostling among the capitalists for the acquisition of additional industrial space to be filled with profits. In short, whereas one indicates a complete overhaul of the illusion of stable growth and progress, the other is an attempted landfill that re-covers any social niches so that they would not lure the working class to get the ‘wrong idea.’ And hence the grandiloquent dissipation of a wide-spread intellectual mania of portraying Marx as a rightful heir to the Victorian heritage bequeathing the apotheosis of the notion of progress. No peaceful transition can be posited to exist between the capitalist and the socialist mode of production for the simple reason that the latter is anything but a concordant outgrowth of the former: “La révolte ne s’intègre pas au développement harmonieux du monde, elle ne veut pas s’y intégrer, mais bien exploser au cœur de ce monde et en briser la continuité. Ce n’est pas un hasard si Marx définit non positivement mais négativement l’attitude du prolétariat : il ne le montre pas comme s’affirmant soi-même, ni comme cherchant à réaliser une société sans classes ; mais d’abord comme tentant de se supprimer en tant que classe. Et c’est précisément parce qu’elle n’a d’autre issue que négative que cette situation doit être supprimée.” De Beauvoir, Pour une morale de l’ambiguïté, pp. 122; Lefebvre, La vie quotidienne dans le monde moderne, pp. 37; cf. Barthes, Camera Lucida, pp. 34, 38; Meikle, Essentialism in the Thought of Karl Marx, pp. 16.


653 “The heuristic principle—‘to search for the whole in its parts’—has become the terrorist practice of ‘liquidating the particularity.’ It is not by chance that Lukacs–Lukacs who so often violates history—
An overdose of anti-individualist medicine seems, indeed, to be on offer for the aspiring socialist who is to be delivered of her birth pangs thanks to the doctrinaire midwifery of Lukács à la Socrates precisely by the progressive exchange of one set of historical dogma for another.654 A somewhat nuanced construal of essentially Marxian ‘Balzac’s realism could not become subservient to his adoration of the ancient régime’s aristocrats for the temporality in which he lived and produced was that of the bourgeoisie’s revolutionary struggle against the Bourbons and their reactionary aides de camps that had already seeped into his understanding of contemporary reality,655 or the arguably drier extrapolation of the core tenets of Flaubert’s novels within the self-same corridors of tautological reasoning to the effect that ‘Flaubert had to reify his universe into playgrounds of his transcendental subject because of the historical determination of his class consciousness in the aftermath of 1848 and its ensuing tidal waves of anti-Montagnard, albeit atheist,656 restoration,’657 are indeed the order of the day for anyone looking up to Lukács’ earlier works for retrieving some nuggets of historical perspicacity. Yes: the revolutionary train was missed by the bourgeois class of post-1848 France, among whose members numbered Flaubert and Zola, just as it was by the bourgeois class of post-1922 Italy with D’Annunzio and Croce, or by that of the post-1932 Germany with Thomas and Heinrich Mann among the passengers who had a world to win had they attempted to hop on it. And, yes: the fact that those select members of the bourgeois class responded drastically differently to their dawning consciousness of having been stranded by their failure suggests that their antecedent works can be viewed as at least partially stained by the socio-political horizon of their historical situation.658

To explain Croce’s drift from seeing Mussolini as a necessary evil in the reinvigorated fight against communism to an idealist opposition, which surfaced no later than in the first publication of his History of Italy from 1871 to 1915 in 1928, to the Italy that he had helped to establish as one of la via smarrita, i.e., ‘lost way,’659 as a later manifestation has found in 1956 the best definition of this frozen Marxism. Twenty years of practice give him all the authority necessary to call this pseudo-philosophy a voluntary idealism.” Sartre, Search for a Method, pp. 28; Fredric Jameson, ‘Reflections on the Brecht-Lukács Debate’, in Ideologies of Theory, II, pp. 137; Adorno, Noten zur Literatur, pp. 251-280; Vattimo, Les aventure de la difference, pp. 28.

654 On this point, see the measured yet strong words that were reserved by Sartre for Lukács, the dogmatism displayed by the Zhdanovist purges of 1930s and Budapest 1956: Sartre, Search for a Method, pp. 21-24; cf. Garaudy, Les grand tournant du socialisme, pp. 126-127.

655 For a certain number of convergences that link, and divergences that divide, young Marx and Lukács, among which can be numbered their favourable appraisal of the legacy of Balzac, see Andrew Feenberg, Lukács, Marx, and the Sources of Critical Theory, (Totowa, NJ., 1981).


658 Sartre brings up Jasper’s existentialism in order to refute Lukács’ a priori method of arguing that the irrationalist élán vital of Western European existentialism needed but the slightest of political touches, i.e., the rising influence of the Nazis, to transform into activism: Sartre, Search for a Method, pp. 37-39.

659 For a detailed study of the idealist battle that was waged by Croce and his fellow intellectuals in La Critica against the fascist regime, which, unfortunately, suffers from downplaying the considerable
of the intensified anti-revolutionary commitment of the post-1871 European bourgeoisie would be just as disarmingly factual as explaining Nietzsche’s break with either Bismarck or Wagner as an intensification of the fervency of his nationalist ardour, which could not find a viable man of violence that was ready to answer the call of Germany for rapid colonisation without wallowing in the second-rate romanticisms of either figure. Ironical as it was for a man who had been voluntarily enlisted as a medic in 1871 against a French side whose communards he stigmatised as a plague ready to descend on all Europe to attempt to turn Voltaire into a counter-revolutionary upholder of the pathos of distance, the fact remains that Nietzsche continued to cherish Voltaire as one of his few heroes by whose erected standard was to be conceived a revaluation of the knightly aristocratic value judgments against what he judged to be a plebeian destiny. And from an existentialist dialectical standpoint the question involves just as much inquiry as a Lukácsian ‘Why did he fail?’ as the one that was posed Sartre in the context of his Herculean study of Flaubert: “How was he possible?”

Luckily, the Lukács of later works is not the only Lukács we have. Indeed, the Lukács of Soul and Form, History and Class Consciousness as well as The Young Hegel strike one as having sprung from a firm conviction against any consummate totality, be it organised in the name of Bolshevism or else. From a historically perspicacious, if incomprehensive, critique of Rosa Luxemburg’s disparaging position vis-à-vis Lenin’s theoretical vindication of Bolshevism as it pertained to the event of the latter’s casting aside of the Constituent Assembly in 1918 to
a hair-splitting study of the young Hegel with an unmistakable touch of approval that accompanies any discussion of the latter’s wiping off of any trace of theological positivism à la Schelling from his system during his stays at Frankfurt and Jena, Lukács’ earlier works show aplenty that his historical positedness as a being-in-party, which corresponds to the stage achieved in Sartre’s system following a second-degree re-totalisation realised communally among the members of the group-in-fusion, was far from having exhausted his individual project of furthering the struggle for the creation of a socialist Hungary without getting sucked into the well-nigh metaphysical quicksand of Stalinism. Once an admonisher of Engels’ undialectical adoration of a naturalised dialectics in the Anti-Dühring and Dialectics of Nature or Marx’s theory of alienation as an idealist survival in his system that had to be reconceptualised along the lines of a more multi-faceted theory of reification in the 1910s and 1920s, he needed to fashion himself, to be sure, into the standard bearer in the form of a young Hegel who was to disavow all his earlier ties to the transcendental idealism of Fichte or

not to mention Luxemburg’s deserved reputation of being one of the foremost members of the anti-Second International Pantheon indicate, contrary to the appearances, that Lukács’ reappraisal was far from calling a victor who had long been crowned. Be that as it may, Lukács’ at times perplexingly superficial analysis of Luxemburg’s appraisal of the Bolshevik Revolution in her ‘The Russian Revolution’ warrants a reading of Lukács’ response as feeding from the ulterior motive of enshrining Lenin’s works within the sacred space of Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy. If the tenor of Luxemburg’s criticism of the anti-democratic shift that was exhibited by the Bolsheviks is extenuated by the circumstances of her imprisonment and want of any reliable information concerning the anti-revolutionary activities of the non-Bolshevik members of the Constituent Assembly, such retrospective mitigation needs also to be extended, as Norman Geras noted virtually half a century ago, to a vital concern that appears to have animated the spirit of Luxemburg’s critique. That concern can be summed up as the impending risk of elimination of all possibilities of opposition and critique. With a growing emphasis on the strands of economic development to be conquered by the implementation of the New Economic Policy and on the neutralisation of any threat thereto, such as the Kronstadt Rebellion of 1921, risking the ongoing attempts at centralisation, Luxemburg’s critique can be seen as timely as it was necessary. For a sample of Lukács’ admiration of Luxemburg’s theoretical acumen, see Georg Lukács, ‘Critical Observations on Rosa Luxemburg’s “Critique of the Russian Revolution”’, in History and Class Consciousness, pp. 289; cf. Lukács, ‘The Marxism of Rosa Luxemburg’, in History and Class Consciousness, pp. 27-45; contra Norman Geras, The Legacy of Rosa Luxemburg, (London, 1983), pp. 185 ff.

667 Lukács, The Young Hegel, pp. 233-234; Stedman Jones, Karl Marx, pp. 72-74.
668 A telling sign of Lukács’ early take on Engels’ attempt to impose dialectical materialism on nature can be seen in a brief footnote that was attached to the first publishing of the former’s ‘What Is Orthodox Marxism?’: “It is of the first importance to realise that the method [dialectics] is limited here [in Marx’s A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy] to the realms of history and society. The misunderstandings that arise from Engels’ account of dialectics can in the main be put down to the fact that Engels—following Hegel’s mistaken lead—extended the method to apply also to nature. However, the crucial determinants of dialectics—the interaction of subject and object, the unity of theory and practice, the historical changes in the reality underlying the categories as the root cause of changes in thought, etc.—are absent from our knowledge of nature.” Lukács, ‘What Is Orthodox Marxism?’, pp. 24.
669 “That is to say, he [Engels in the Anti-Dühring] contrasts the ways in which concepts are formed in dialectics as opposed to ‘metaphysics’; he stresses the fact that in dialectics the definite contours of concepts (and the objects they represent) are dissolved. Dialectics, he argues, is a continuous process of transition from one definition into the other. In consequence a one-sided and rigid causality must be replaced by interaction. But he does not even mention the most vital interaction, namely the dialectical relation between subject and object in the historical process, let alone give it the prominence it deserves.” Ibid, pp. 3; Lukács, ‘Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat’, pp. 83-222.
to the increasingly irrationalised vacillations of Schelling in the 1930s. Although he often needed to explain himself to his reader on a highly personal note to the effect that 'I could not exit the party for there was no political impact that was to be made once a partially self-inflicted exile is set as exemplified by the disillusioning case of Karl Korsch,' Lukács managed to pave a projective road for himself without completely abandoning his former theoretical outlook. We all know that the price he paid for his eventual re-admission into the ranks of Soviet intelligentsia was the combination of frequent lip-service to Stalin throughout the 1930s and 1940s and of outspoken renunciation of his early criticisms of Marx and Engels from Khrushchev’s attempt at de-Stalinisation onwards. Yet an even clearer indication of this sketch of the mediation of his intellectual progression as a being-in-party from his *Soul and Form* to *The Destruction of Reason* by his collectively externalised project is Lukács’ late attempt at providing the groundwork for an ontology of social being. For any holistic appreciation of Lukács’ lifetime endeavour to theorise the concept of totality without pausing to work, one thus needs to address this unfinished attempt, like the second volume of Sartre’s *Critique of Dialectical Reason*, to furnish history with an ontological grounding in collective labour.

Labour is the mediating relationship between individuals and their collaboratively conceived projections which are, then, impressed upon their natural environment. Blending Marx’s insight of class struggle as the catalyst of historical progression toward achievement of an emancipated state of creative labour with Hegel’s ontologically conceived relationship between the human capability to posit telos and to follow it through with creative labour, Lukács managed to formulate an ontological defence of collective labour as hinting at the possibility of infinite refinement whereby some illuminations of the future communist society could be glimpsed. A new objectivity, according to those reflections, could arise at the

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672 This ascription of ontological priority to labour does not evince, as Lukács points out, a hierarchy of values that risks turning into a phenomenological divisionism à la Arendt. One needs to keep in mind, in that vein, that the creation of values, be they political or aesthetic, always hinges on the preconditionality of needs that can only be satisfied in and through labour. Lukács, *The Ontology of Social Being*, II, pp. 80.
673 He appropriated the Hegelian understanding of teleology, of course, through pruning its overgrown system of logical principles, which, according to him, did not take away the ontologically valid insight that any human is a being that organises reality around a set of posited ends: Lukács, *The Ontology of Social Being*, I, pp. 53.
674 "In other words, while causality is a principle of motion on its own basis, maintaining this character even if a causal series has its point of departure in an act of consciousness, teleology is by its nature a posited category. Every teleological process involves the posittings of a goal, and therefore a goal-positing consciousness. To posit, therefore, in this connection, does not mean simply to raise into consciousness, as with other categories, and with causality in particular; with this act of positing,
conscious collectivisation of teleological posittings, an objectivity that would answer the ontological human need to make sense of existence. This new state of objectivity would lay bare all the conditionings that are imposed on singular posited goals as a result of the compromising subordination of teleological posittings to one another.675 Epistemologically, Lukács’ attempt at re-defining the ontology of being-in-party was a backward step from Adorno’s position of eliminating the likelihood of any positivist petrification of dialectics into matter pure and simple which would be tantamount to conjuring a mirror image of idealism.676 Lukács would often pour explicit scorn on epistemology in a manner that resemble Heidegger’s aversion of it, a similarity which has been analysed down to its basics by Goldmann, without ever naming any single adversary. But given how often they came to confront each other especially, but not only, over matters pertaining to aesthetics, and how severely critical Adorno had been of Lukács’ ‘productivist’ ontology in addition to his romantic anti-capitalism that leaned heavily on a positive reading of use value in a world that was practically dominated by exchange value,677 Lukács’ reiterated rebuttal of epistemology appears certain to have served as a backlash to a thinker who owed many theoretical insights to his earlier works. In an ontological sense, however, Lukács’ late theory, though clearly not intended as a Hegelian gallery of developmental images of the ontology of socialising being, was a definite improvement over the tacit intellectualism that underpinned Adorno’s discontinuous Darstellung of facets of massified and commodified existence. Having actively lived through the historical contradictions and intra-party struggles as he did, Lukács strikes one as having had a better theoretical grasp of just how tight-knit the apparently separable dimensions of social reality is.

3.2.2 Totalisation with an Aristotelian Voice and a Spinozist Face

Having noted the epistemological postulate of existential dialectics concerning the necessity of any attempt to assemble incessantly encoded and decoded texts together into a history that

consciousness initiates a real process, precisely a teleological one.” Lukács, The Ontology of Social Being, III, pp. 5; cf. Lukács, The Young Hegel, pp. 345-346.

675 “Knowledge can only widen horizons by abiding so insistently with the particular that its isolation is dispelled. This admittedly presupposes a relation to the general, though not one of subsumption, but rather almost the reverse. Dialectical mediation is not a recourse to the more abstract, but a process of resolution of the concrete in itself.” Adorno, Minima Moralia, pp. 74.

676 “The cardinal sin of occultism is the contamination of mind and existence, the latter becoming itself an attribute of mind. Mind arose out of existence, as an organ for keeping alive. In reflecting existence, however, it becomes at the same time something else. The existent negates itself as thought upon itself. Such negation is mind’s element. To attribute to it positive existence, even of a higher order, would be to deliver it up to what it opposes.” Ibid, pp. 243.

is self-conscious of its own intertextuality,\textsuperscript{678} we would like to continue the ontological thread of the Lukácsian totality by juxtaposing it to Sartre’s later analyses and to our earlier semiological analysis of Tintoretto’s \textit{San Giorgio}. There are two ontological tenets that guide an existentialist dialectics: the irreducibility of the individual and the mutually-transformative determination that links together the individual and the group. We have noted above that existentialism is a refusal to accord completion to any collective attempt to objectify being. Indeed, whether we set our sights on the living example of Kierkegaard as the epitome of objection to be reduced to a mere moment of unhappy consciousness within the Hegelian system\textsuperscript{679} or on the Heideggerian Dasein with its \textit{Geworfenheit}\textsuperscript{680} into a material environment that has the distinct characteristic of \textit{Vorhandenheit},\textsuperscript{681} the individual, seen through the existentialist lens, has an inexhaustible source of creative action that destructures any attempt at her structuration. Likewise, our above analyses have argued in favour of a reading that conceives of any process of institutionalisation as one that always speaks to the historical availability of antagonistic interests. Spartan regime of partible property or Flaubert’s literary enterprise of surpassing the material accumulation of his family by a decumulation of subjective nominalism to the order of bare contractual objecthood were both examples through which the institutions that shone with a constancy, i.e., the Spartan mirage of changelessness and the bourgeois family structure of post-1848 France,\textsuperscript{682} have been defaced by individual acts. All the same, thus far we have refrained from stringing those two aspects in order to vindicate the ontological basis of existentialist dialectics. On that note, Lukács’ fundamental category of totality\textsuperscript{683} induces the theoretician to account for the indissoluble criss-crosses


\textsuperscript{679} “Thus even the humblest individual has a dual existence. Also, he has a history, and this is not just a product of his own free actions. But the inward work belongs to himself and will belong to him in all eternity; this neither history nor world history can take from him, it follows him either to his joy or to his sorrow. In this world there rules an absolute either/or, but it is a world philosophy has nothing to do with.” Kierkegaard, \textit{Either/Or}, pp. 489; cf. Jean-Paul Sartre, ‘The Singular Universal’, in \textit{Between Existentialism and Marxism}, pp. 141-169; cf. Georg Lukács, ‘The Foundering of Form Against Life’, in \textit{Soul and Form}, trans. by Anna Bostock, (London, 1974), pp. 28-41.

\textsuperscript{680} For a critique of the evidently subjectivist roots whence sprang this key Heideggerian concept, see Adorno, \textit{Negative Dialectics}, pp. 77-78.


\textsuperscript{683} I do not follow Jameson in maintaining a strict separation of Lukács’ conception of totality in regard to his early and late works. Lukács seems to have abided, for all intents and purposes, by the centrality of the concept for his late project to theorise an ontology of the social being at least as much as he did in the context of his earlier works: “And even the most superficial glance at social being shows how indissolubly intertwined are its decisive categories such as labour, speech, cooperation and division of labour, showing new connections between consciousness and reality and therefore of consciousness to itself.” Lukács, \textit{The Ontology of Social Being}, III, pp. i; Lukács, ‘Marx and Engels on Aesthetics’, pp. 61, 77; cf. Fredric Jameson, ‘Beyond the Cave’, in \textit{Ideologies of Theory}, II, pp. 118.
between the central categories of existence such as language, production, collaboration, etc. Now, the main predicament of that construal of totality, at least from an existential standpoint, is that it posits a structuration of social reality beyond whose historically available limits any individual may not venture.\footnote{Dialectics is, in its foundation and its beginnings, monist, and for it meaning is found in human reality and is transformed like it. Each structure possesses its own meaning which resides in its global signification, in its unity, and its structurations, which can only be understood in relation to the method of production, that is to say, by starting from the broader structurations which generates this meaning and in relation to which it constitutes a significant structure.” Goldmann, Lukács and Heidegger, pp. 78.} Yet not only historical but also contemporary examples that are far from having been imperialised by the owl of Minerva, such as the mass occupation of vacant lots by the homeless in the southern Buenos Aires of 2020, indicate that the boundaries in question are as riven with fissures and cracks as a leaky boat that is hard put to stay afloat. I have no illusions to spare, of course, that were he still alive he would make quick work of such blatant empiricism, perhaps retorting in kind that a true subversion of that sort of limit had already been achieved by the establishment of microrayons in the USSR of the late 1920s. Never the less, in the light of the fact that adequate housing was already a well-recognised problem in the archaic Greek societies that were experiencing a population boom that was far in excess of what the limited carrying capacity of their landholdings could agriculturally muster, we might still surmise that the structuring capability of any social system, including language, art, division of labour, relations of reproduction, etc., can never be conceived to fashion existential barriers through which none may pass. Now, I do not exactly follow the post-Foucauldian “poetics of a new struggle” of Holloway.\footnote{John Holloway, \textit{Crack Capitalism}, (London, 2010), pp. 10; for a balanced evaluation of the presuppositions that Holloway appears to works with, see Simon Susen, “‘Open Marxism’ against and beyond the ‘Great Enclosure’? Reflections on how (not) to crack capitalism”, \textit{Journal of Classical Sociology}, vol. 12 no. 2, (2012), pp. 281-331.} The point I rather want to make is that the formation of class consciousness entails a holistic understanding of social reality that attempts to address each existential problem to its fullest extent.\footnote{Cf. Sartre, \textit{L’Immaginazione}, pp. 109; Jean-Paul Sartre, \textit{Idea per una teoria delle emozioni}, in \textit{L’immaginazione}, pp. 149 ff.} Against an overarching temporality that moves in to colonise all dimensions of social being, totalising projects needs to be equally comprehensive and vigilant in seeking out new ways of turning the entirety of being-in-the-world into an arena for class struggle. Sartre’s and Beauvoir’s littérature engagée was one such attempt,\footnote{“Pour Mallarmé, je n’ai fait que commencer et je n’y reviendrai pas avant longtemps. Je vous parle de lui pour vous indiquer que la littérature pure est un rêve. Si la littérature n’est pas tout, elle ne vaut pas une heure de peine. C’est cela que je veux dire par “engagement.” Elle sèche sur pied si vous la réduisez à l’innocence, à des chansons. Si chaque phrase écrite ne résonne pas à tous les niveaux de l’homme et de la société, elle ne signifie rien. La littérature d’une époque, c’est l’époque digérée par sa littérature.” Jean-Paul Sartre, ‘Dans un entretien avec Madeleine Chapsal’, in \textit{Situations}, IX; on the tradition of literary activism passed down by Sartre and Beauvoir on the literary circles of 2000s, see Geoffrey Baker, “Pressing Engagement: Sartre’s \textit{Littérature}, Beauvoir’s Literature, and the Lingering}
every step along the way without ever forgetting that nothing of note can be achieved without letting one’s project be minced in and through collective attempts at re-totalisation.

Belonging to the neither side of the Wall in a German sense and actively fighting against torrents of de-Marxification that was to culminate in the Foucauldian 1980s, Sartre’s existentialism bears the birthmarks of a totalising commitment in which the hernia of class struggle was to encompass all the social dimensions that were intertwined with it. Outgrowing as it was, his political commitment never aligned itself with the tides of self-edifying dogmatism that were to give rise to the coming out of a number of great Czechoslovakian writers including Milan Kundera and Vaclav Havel precisely by crushing a popular attempt at socialist self-definition, thus occasioning the writing of one of the most shameful documents of Soviet experience, Artur London’s L’Aveu. There is no optimal degree of re-totalisation to be put into effect so that any institution’s totalising re-organisation of social life can ever be measured out against it. No midsummer night’s dream of a de-totalising institution can be realistically entertained without enduring the externalisation of individual praxis even at the likely cost of incurring a bit of an inertia. For the only way of overcoming practico-inert is by working with and suffering through it, two moments to which testifies our reading of Tintoretto’s San Giorgio.

Uncertainty of Literary Activism”, Dalhousie French Studies, vol. 63, (Summer, 2003), pp. 70-85; for a larger casting of the inquisitive net to include many facets of the Sartrean l’engagement, see T. Storm Heter, Sartre’s Ethics of Engagement, (London, 2006).


Lenin, The State and Revolution, pp. 291.

“We suffer, and we suffer from not suffering enough. The suffering that we speak of is never quite of the order which we feel. What we call “true” or “real” or “proper” suffering, suffering which moves us, is what we read on the faces of others, or better still in portraits, on the face of a statue, on a tragic mask. That is suffering which has being. Jean-Paul Sartre, L’Etre et le néant, (Paris, 1943), pp. 135 [my translation C.O.]; cf. Sartre, ‘The Itinerary of a Thought’, pp. 35.

Wie der Marxismus im arbeitenden Menschen das sich real erzeugende Subjekt der Geschichte entdeckt hat, wie er es sozialistisch erst vollends entdecken, sich verwirklichen lässt, so ist es wahrscheinlich, dass Marxismus in der Technik auch zum unbekannten, in sich selbst noch nicht

187
We have concluded our initial survey of the various semiological systems that can be built on the basis of an aesthetical and historical scrutiny of Tintoretto’s painting by suggesting that an ironic portrayal of the socio-political organisation of la Serenissima of the painter’s day can be discerned by focusing on the semiology that is established by the intertextual interaction of some of its central representational elements. Delving further into that construal of the second-order semiological system, we glance that tallying with the signifier of vast riches that had turned Venice into the serenest of all is the Arcadian senility which touches the heart of the matter: none other than the naked motive of profit, which had allowed the supply of an immense inflow of ducats to the ecclesiastical coffers in the first place, has turned the booming city into one in which artistic and architectural extravagance went hand in hand with escalating social apathy between the orders. All too well was the chanting of ad majorem dei gloriam and all that, but, in the end, it always took a san Giorgio to unexpectedly stop the tolling of any death knell. Tintoretto was no stranger to his city’s contemporary history with its frequent slides to violent bouts that generally finalised in the direction of the further consolidation of the governmental authority of I Dieci, i.e., the ‘Council of Ten.’ Indeed, it has often been noted that there was an unmistakable correlation between the solidification of the tight grip with which a few notable aristocratic families of late fifteenth century squeezed the entire growing non-aristocratic population of Venice and the significant rise in the number of Venetian political upheavals at the time. That correlation upholds the politically-oriented second-order semiological system via its hailing of la Serenissima as a place of utter political despair in which the cling of heaps of ducats was still not enough by itself to secure a place within the governing body of the city. Winded and doubtful as she is, Jacopo’s princess, huffing and puffing though she may be, flees to a magical elsewhere that appears to be not beyond the artist’s imagination albeit it is beyond the limits of the canvass. Can the princess be viewed as a dramatic self-presentation of the painter that had recognised his social quagmire for what it was? Unfortunately, we have no way of knowing. All we can say is that our reading of this second-order semiological system into Jacopo’s work recognises his disturbing diagnosis of the fact that the temporal ills of his celestial kingdom, torn apart between the stern judges, i.e., aristocrats, and the sequestered judged as it was, was there to stay. In other words, only with the establishment of the diachronics of Venice’s social history leading up to the sixteenth century can we hope to flesh out our semiological analysis of the painter who re-painted, and

thus challenged, mythologies on the material basis that was afforded by his existential situation.695

This threefold understanding of the existentialist dialectical centrality of the concept of need, and, hence, of the historically structured appropriation of externalised labour, thus lends a theoretical aid to any attempt at excavating how Marx’s historical probes beneath the apparent empirical reality was ratiocinated though different, yet converging, layers of abstraction. Marx’s rebuke of a column on the Times of November 1857 voicing the opinion of a West-Indian plantation owner in favour of the re-introduction of the African slavery can, for one, be scrutinized to assess the analytical quality of this theoretical tool. The indignant West-Indian plantation owner had raised objections against the free blacks of Jamaica, Quashees, by arguing that their indulgent contentment with producing only effects of ‘use value’, i.e., those satisfying bare necessities, and the total disregard they show for the production of luxury goods, e.g., sugar, would necessitate the re-introduction of slavery as a means of ameliorating the economic situation.696 In his assaying a critique, and meting out its due punishment, against a community on the grounds of the lack of conduciveness that the supposed loafing and plunging into over-indulgence of Quashees had when measured against the yardstick of economic profitability, the plantation owner merited Marx’s chastisement of him. In response to the landlord’s predilection for ascribing a complementary role to a different society of producers with their own structured mode of production and to the fuming rage that was exhibited by him Marx retorted with the simplest of quips: what had worked up the nerve of the plantation owner in question was the simple fact of his class of entrepreneurs’ previous observations of Quashees determining the degree of their productive activities in accordance with a level compatible with ensuring the subsistence of the lives of individuals that constituted their community. Kicking away the element of external determination that imbibes any capitalist understanding of productive action, including one that is made for personal consumption, as the impertinent retort of the Quashees to the alleged Christian benevolence of their former masters, this act of ritual violence is followed by the announcement of the impending actual violence: either heed the dictates of ‘free trade’ and work towards the fostering of the profits of your former masters, or don your shackles and begin serving those ends in a ‘slightly different’ manner:

“They [the Quashee] have ceased to be slaves, but not in order to become wage labourers, but, instead, self-sustaining peasants working for their own consumption. As far as they are concerned, capital does not exist as capital, because autonomous wealth as such can exist only either on the basis of direct forced labour, slavery, or indirect forced labour, wage labour. Wealth confronts direct forced labour not as capital, but rather as relation of domination

696 Marx, Grundrisse, pp. 325-6.
Herrschaftsverhältnis]; thus the relation of domination is the only thing which is reproduced on this basis, for which wealth itself has value only as gratification, not as wealth itself, and which can therefore never create general industriousness.”

3.2.3 Existentialist Dialectical Totalisation in Linguistic Context

In direct opposition to the former plantation owner’s pleading his case on behalf of furious paroxysms of Christian benignity, industriousness, welfare, etc., Marx chose to conceive the historically determined social being as the founding element of his thought in analyses ranging from the grassroots origins of the development of the latter’s sensory experience to the highest echelons of her idealist castles in the air. This theoretical movement from empirical observation to the ideational links further along the chain of human existence brings us to the second core postulate of existential dialectics. We propose to conceive the Marxian dialectical understanding of sensory perception along an epistemological triad that will allow us to ponder upon the epistemic relations between different stages of cognition and sapience. Human being qua sensuous activity is formed in the interstices between nature and history first by the sensation of her surroundings. This initial experience of the external world is realized through the incessant activity of the five senses. The recently-born infant does not bestow cognitive reality to anything she cannot prove tactilely. With the bodily extension touching the surface of another object or material being we learn to grant a mnemonic thinghood to the parts of the objects that we sense through the activity of the sensory and motor components of the median, ulnar, and radial nerves that innervate our hands. Likewise, physiochemical properties of different odours are delivered to the olfactory receptors whereby nasal stimulus is sensed. The optic nerves, in a similar manner, transfer the visual information to the optic centre of the brain hence transforming visual stimulant to a visual sensation. The converging result of these various sensory processes is the translation of external stimuli into which would be the first stirrings of the cognitive category of the sensible. This pseudo-universal category of sensation is prone to endless expansion and diversification as the number of transfers from external stimuli to sensory receptors increases. The second step of sensory experience is, on that note, that of apperception conceived as conscious sensation of particular instances and qualities. The consciousness in question is the univocal recognition of every object, including one’s own body, as presently available to be received sensorially. As the particularity of each object is

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697 Ibid., pp. 326.
699 “Cosa ne concludiamo? Questo: lungi dal fatto che motivi razionali possano farci mettere in dubbio le nostri percezioni, sono le nostre percezioni che governano e dirigono i nostri giudizi e i nostri ragionamenti. È a quelle che adattiamo continuamente i nostri sistemi di referenza.” Sartre, L’Immaginazione, pp. 94.
700 Cf. “To perceive is to feel; to compare is to judge; to judge and to feel are not the same. Through sensation objects present themselves to me separately and singly as they are in nature; by comparing
conceived in and through the interrelated presence of singular objects, comparison and contrast begins to be employed in relating each singular instance to another.⁷⁰¹ Even with the lack of signifying words, the infant is able to recognize the whispers of her mother or the smoothness of the cover of a book in contrast to the unevenness of a patchwork blanket. With the expanding diversity of the apperception of singular stimuli in reference to the other examples of similar experiences, sensory organs begin their work in tandem with intelligence in labouring to give birth to verbal expressions and thus to language. From mere thinghood through the course of bare similarity and difference we arrive at perception qua utterance⁷⁰² as specific stimuli are labelled with ‘thisness’ and ‘thatness’ not to mention all of their accompanying characteristics. Perception, or the third and final stage of sensory experience, is thus the epistemic point at which the universals are fashioned out of the garnered heap of particularities. Rummaging through these heaps of external stimuli are the sensory organs whose processing of sensory data is realised through subjective appropriation rather than objective abstraction.⁷⁰³ In perceiving an object, one does not poetically ascribe characteristics for the former to don and doff at will; he or she attempts to incorporate any singularity that is evoked by the object into a communally shared plane of readings, problematising, in effect, the plane itself through seeing how disruptive any case of a ‘misreading’ may prove of its

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⁷⁰¹ Cf. “Every concept originates through our equating what is unequal. No leaf ever wholly equals another, and the concept “leaf” is formed through an arbitrary abstraction from these individual differences, through forgetting the distinctions; and now it gives rise to the idea that in nature there might be something besides the leaves which would be “leaf” – some kind of original form after which all leaves have been woven, marked, copied, colored, curled, and painted, but by unskilled hands, so that no copy turned out to be a correct, reliable, and faithful image of the original form.” Friedrich Nietzsche, On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense, in The Portable Nietzsche, ed. and trans. by Walter Kaufmann, (London, 1976), pp. 46.

⁷⁰² Cf. “In brief, the development of language and the development of consciousness (not of reason but merely of the way reason enters consciousness) go hand in hand…. The emergence of our sense impressions into our own consciousness, the ability to fix them and, as it were, exhibit them externally increased proportionally with the need to communicate them to others by means of signs. The human being inventing signs is at the same time the human being who becomes ever more keenly conscious of himself. It was only as a social animal that man acquired self-consciousness–which he is still in the process of doing, more and more.” Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, with a Prelude in Rhymes and an Appendix of Songs, trans. by Walter Kaufmann, (New York, 1974), V 354; “To speak is to act; anything which one names is already no longer quite the same; it has lost its innocence.” Sartre, What is Literature?, pp. 12.

linguistic coherence. Every single demonstrative utterance, by that token, evokes a plane of heteroglossia to be imperialised by historical universalities, against which the particularly defined attributes of the singular object is to be drawn. The ramshackle foothold of unitary language, then, continues to work against the realities of heteroglossia given that the epistemic categories pertinent to the cognitive processing of sensory experience never depend entirely on the further refinement of empirical knowledge through epistemic ratiocination and the expansion of the reach of sensory appropriation. There can never be an ultimate correspondence between singular experience of the things in themselves and their categorization in accordance with universal qualifiers. Never the less, this is not the equivalent of saying that nothing in itself is inscrutable and unknowable by definition:

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704 “Unitary language constitutes the theoretical expression of the historical processes of linguistic unification and centralization, an expression of the centripetal forces of language. A unitary language is not something given [dan] but is always in essence posited [zadan] – and at every moment of its linguistic life it is opposed to the realities of heteroglossia. But at the same time it makes its real presence felt as a force for overcoming this heteroglossia, imposing specific limits to it, guaranteeing a certain maximum of mutual understanding and crystallizing into a real, although still relative, unity – the unity of reigning conversational (everyday) and literary language, ‘correct language’.” Mikhail Bakhtin, Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays, ed. and trans. by Michael Holquist, (Austin, TX., 2008), pp. 270; for a theoretical elaboration of theoretical pillars of Bakhtin’s early elaboration of the system of unitary language within the general historical materialist spectrum, see Alen Sucéska, Hegemonic Language: Towards a Historical-Materialist Theory of Language, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, (Frankfurt, 2015); cf. Alen Sucéska, ‘Hegemonic Language: The Politics of Linguistic Phenomena’, in Revising Gramsci’s Notebooks, ed. by Francesca Antonini, Aaron Bernstein, Lorenzo Fusaro and Robert Jackson, (Leiden and Boston, 2019), pp. 82-100.

705 Crucial in that context is Hegel’s postulation of an indissoluble antagonism between linguistic empty universality and concrete singularity that resists any attempt of the former to caption it whole. A point whose significance has been noted by Jameson, this existential gap between linguistic signifieds and material signifiers is assured to bear interesting results if translated into the Sartrean terms of reciprocal totalisation between the member and the group: Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, pp. 60-61; cf. Jameson, Postmodernism, pp. 138-139.

706 That is a point in the conception of which I follow Hegel’s linguistic theory of universals that are forged and re-forged by humans malgré eux in the sense of their intrinsic incapability to capture the concrete presence of any singularity. An existential farce of the highest order, we face this inbuilt limitation daily when we try to recount a dream we dreamt, only to miss the words that would transmit its lucidity to our interlocutor as we have experienced it. And yet, the joke is on us since we cannot rid ourselves of our desperate penchant for making use of those universals to render our waking universe, as well as that of the dreaming, articulate. Desan has hit the nail on its head in his outflanking of Marx’s theory by concentrating on his constant resort to his bread-and-butter universals. That nail, however, is as baleful for Sartrean existentialism as it is for Marxism. For look away as one might we still attempt, unsuccessfully by definition, to grip singularities via universals, a condition that does not appear unlike to the incessant totalisation of the group member, which can never lead to a dialectical beyond of a happy coexistence of subject-objects: Cf. “The blunt truth is that the Marxist theoreticians are incapable of understanding the complexity of the existential situation, whether philosophical or otherwise. They do not bother to read the Other, but merely impose a preconceived theory–theirs! In so doing, the modern Marxist loses sight of the fact that there is no real totality (un tout fait) but merely a totalization (a never-ending succession of events kept together by human intervention), hence that as commentator he cannot and should not draw conclusions that which is as yet unfinished. Indeed, his greatest limitation perhaps is that he cannot resist the temptation of constructing universals: from a concrete event he builds a universal, under which subsequent concrete events are to be classified.” Desan, The Marxism of Jean-Paul Sartre, pp. 50.
“The actual ‘thing out there’ is inexpressible: language belongs to the realm of generality, and so therefore does every perception as soon as we express it. Perception, by imparting generality to the world of sense, surpasses the concreteness of the given object yet at the same time preserves it. Again, the object is distinguished by its particular qualities from other objects, and this opposition gives it its dependence; yet at the same time it deprives it of independence, for the independence that consists in being different from other things is not absolute independence but a negative independence on something else.”

Indeed, the logical rift between the definite, i.e., historical, singulars with their inexhaustible physical, biological, chemical, geological, etc., significations and the intrinsic boundedness of universals can only be surpassed by taking no account of the incessant transitivitity between the three epistemic categories. Perception’s negative epistemic position as the identifier of the idiosyncratic qualities of thinghood and the hub of conception of first-order abstractions negate the likelihood of the emergence of any cognitive blind-spots in regard to the material existence of things. The dialectical materialist presumption of the zero-degree primacy of the matter accords, in that regard, with the relativity of knowledge pertaining to external objects only with reference to the inexhaustible multi-dimensionality of the matter and not as an internal limitation of human understanding. Lenin described this point with characteristic precision in his definition of the Marxian dialectics as, “the doctrine of the relativity of human knowledge that provides us with a reflection of eternally developing matter.” Instead of abstracting a predefined set of obscure metaphysical elements from the objective existence of the matter and dubbing that sphere ‘will’, ‘noumena’, etc., the sensuous activity of the subject of dialectical materialist epistemology abides both by zero-degree physical realities and by the historically conditional yet theoretically unconditional advancement of knowledge pertaining to external objects:

“The destructibility of the atom, its inexhaustibility, the mutability of all forms of matter and of its motion, have always been the stronghold of dialectical materialism. All boundaries in nature are conditional, relative, movable, and express the gradual approximation of our mind towards knowledge of matter. But this does not in any way prove that nature, matter itself, is

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707 Kolakowski, Main Currents of Marxism, pp. 52; contra Sartre, Search for a Method, pp. 29.
708 Our conception of the potentially unconditional expansion of empirical cognition of material object is formulated in congruence, despite its now antiquated fixation on a discourse of truth, with Lenin’s fervent opposition to Machists and their argument of conceding ineluctable relativity to knowledge: “All the old truths of physics, including those which were regarded as firmly established and incontestable, prove to be relative truths – hence, there can be no objective truth independent of mankind. Such is the argument not only of all the Machists, but of the “physical” idealists in general. That absolute truth results from the sum-total of relative truths in the course of their development; that relative truths represent relatively faithful reflections of an object independent of mankind; that these reflections become more and more faithful; that every scientific truth, notwithstanding its relative nature, contains an element of absolute truth – all these propositions, which are obvious to anyone who has thought over Engels’ Anti-Dühring, are for the “modern” theory of knowledge a book with seven seals.” Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, pp. 289.
709 Vladimir, I. Lenin, The Three Sources and Three Component Parts of Marxism, in Lenin, pp. 21.
710 For Lenin’s adumbration of the Kantian thing-in-itself through the Feuerbachian lens of pre-Marxian materialism, see Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, pp. 102-3.
a symbol, a conventional sign, i.e., the product of our mind. The electron is to the atom as a full stop in this book is to the size of a building 200 feet long, 100 feet broad, 50 feet high (Lodge); it moves with a velocity as high as 270,000 kilometres per second; its mass is a function of its velocity; it makes 500 trillion revolutions per second – all this is much more complicated than the old mechanics; but it is, nevertheless, movement of matter in space and time.”

3.3 Dialectics: Either Existentialist or Negative?

Does this problematisation of scientific knowledge within the theoretical plane of existential dialectics expose a flank that can be exploited by the operation of the Adornian negative dialectics? I would argue to the contrary. There are two fundamental insights, as we observed above, to Adorno’s stress on negativity that are equally essential for our formulation of the relationship between individual projects and their structuration within the totality of institutions: a vital endorsement of a self-effacing understanding of dialectics and a Pyrrhonian scepticism about any self-referential, i.e., foundationalist, text pronouncing eternal truths instead of a variety of procedures of truth. Linked to an imagery of permanent suture whose tell-tale signs of perpetuity betray an evental intervention that had effected a saturation of the sapiential as well as existential situation in the first place, any procedure of truth functions as a forceful change that is enacted on the apparent finitude of knowledge. Any claim to the possession of truth content, whether artistic, political, amorous or scientific, must, thus, intrinsically oppose itself to any participation in a sapiential eternity, following instead a truncated and necessarily self-critical course of infinitude.

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Any philosophy of ‘as if,’ can be accommodated by an existential outlook regarding the accumulation of various truth contents.

713 “The ultimate effect of an eventual caesura, and of an intervention from which the introduction into circulation of a supernumerary name proceeds, would thus be that the truth of a situation, with this caesura as its principle, forces the situation to accommodate it: to extend itself to the point at which this truth–primitively no more than a part, a representation – attains belonging, thereby becoming a presentation. This trajectory of the faithful generic procedure and its passage to infinity transform the ontological status of a truth: they do so by changing the situation ‘by force’; anonymous excrecence in the beginning, the truth will end up being normalized. However, it would remain subtracted from knowledge if the language of the situation was not radically transformed. Not only is a truth indiscernible, but its procedure requires that this indiscernibility be.” Badiou, Being and Event, pp. 342.
714 This can be compared to Vattimo and Zabala’s programmatic ‘the end of truth is the beginning of democracy,’ with the rider, of course, that the democracy in question is one in which the Heideggerian Gegenstand that defines its current form is problematised in order to be divested of its aura of sanctity: Gianni Vattimo, “The End of Philosophy in the Age of Democracy”, Le Portique, vol. 18, (2006), retrieved from http://journals.openedition.org/leportique/811 on 20 March 2021; Gianni Vattimo, A Farewell to Truth, trans. by William McCuaig, (New York, 2011); Vattimo and Zabala, Hermeneutic Communism, pp. 23; cf. Richard Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth, I: Philosophical Papers, (Cambridge, 1990), pp. 21.
In the end, a plane of infinity comprised of procedures of truth, pierced and protracted through and through by evental sites, is all that an existentialist dialectics of collective capacities can aspire to. And yet, our existential condemnation to freedom and totalising history does not cover any intrinsic ties to dialectics in and of itself. Dialectics is, in that vein, a mere appendage to our being-in-an-‘alienated world,’ allowing us to recode contemporary reality that is always served either encoded by its concurrent witnesses or decoded by those to whom it was transmitted before us. Lying at the externality of our existence, dialectics is, however, the most self-conscious of any conceptual Darstellung of an increasingly pervasive social reality that is threatening to commodify even the most minute aspects of our lived experience.

Knowing how to tell apart any utopian potential that is found within a historical artefact of any kind, e.g., Anouilh’s realistic clash between a totalising Creon and de-totalising Antigone from a positivist projection into the future, e.g., a kingdom of heaven that has completely sublated the existential clash of the playwright’s Antigone thanks either to the Messianic inspiration of a saviour or a micropolitics of schizophrenia, the practitioner of existentialist dialectics realises that hers is a work essentially of de-naturalisation. No theoretical counterpart of the analytical Marxists’ blind faith in logic can bestow Icarus wings on existentialist dialectics to soar above historical singularities while re-structuring past textualities in order to fight present totalities. And if unconscious metahistorical heights are designated as a no-flight-zone for existential dialectics, then, it also becomes part of its totalising endeavour to cast its aetiological net wide to cover any trespasser who utilizes his or her altitude to eliminate the myriad of chiaroscuro enveloping our lived experience, scientific reason included.


717 That does not necessarily lead, unlike what Goldmann argued a while ago, to the impoverishment of the overall dialectical project. Adorno does not commence his dialectical analysis with a preconception of the identical subject-object to round it off with a rediscovery of it. And his refutation of the positivistic ideal of the posited end of identity is a simultaneous movement toward the recovery of the uniqueness of any subject or object which has never been achieved in any class society. Perhaps Goldmann was searching for a positive evaluation of the contemporary Soviet literature in Adorno’s works, which, of course, he was not able to find. But we need to add, if we are willing to make that conjecture, that even so enthusiastic a critic as Lukács had at best a lukewarm appreciation of what writers even of the order of Sholokhov could offer. Cf. Goldmann, Lukács and Heidegger, pp. 91; Georg Lukács, ‘Critical Realism and Socialist Realism’, in The Meaning of Contemporary Realism, pp. 93-135.

Thanks in large part to Jameson’s works, we are relatively in the clear of how fervently Adorno pursued an articulate theory of de-articulation of either a political or philosophical regime of totality that did not settle with creating atoms out of creative human individuals but also yearned to fashion them into Epicurean ones with a conditioned reflex to swerve from any beck and call of the capitalist ruling class that was emitted through the industrialised speakers of radios.\textsuperscript{719} That totality drew its strength from what it wanted to posit as an eternity of rational inquiry into scientific truth to keep the existentialist projects of its adherents firmly in line. Guided by an imperialist reduction of everything into fact and matter,\textsuperscript{720} an obsession with unity in similarity then became the guiding ethos of what was to become a mythology of Enlightenment. From Parmenides’ \textit{to hen} to Lenin’s thing-for-us a golden thread of liaison between objectivity and instrumentality gives the lie to the regimes of sub-domination that leaves any trace of arbitrariness that is impressed by any specimen behind.\textsuperscript{721} And yet that tyranny of unity is never complete in itself and every existential signifier that we rationally discard stamps itself on history qua collective memory like a Dido the mnemonic pang of whose abandonment continues to haunt Aeneas till the end of his days.\textsuperscript{722} Further, there always springs a superhuman sage who dares to carry that proud enterprise to its logical conclusion à la Sade.\textsuperscript{723} Pressed into a tight corner of solitude with oneself by the combination of despair after \textit{les temps perdu} and a reign of efficiency which culminates in either the sexual or utilitarian objectification of social beings, Enlightenment, then, incorporates an element of amnesia to its mythology so that only bare glimpses of human potentialities that are forever lost may unconsciously surface from time to time. Still, a barely masked unity of decaying instrumentality is not the only effect of that mythology which was slowly to take on a more radicalised face in the Italian city-states that preceded the Venice of Tintoretto’s day roughly by two centuries. Marching to the drumbeat of an industrial tempo that was a far cry from the


\textsuperscript{720} Adorno and Horkheimer, ‘The Concept of Enlightenment’, pp. 4.

\textsuperscript{721} Ibid, pp. 5, 6.

\textsuperscript{722} “That [the situatedness of human thought and action within \textit{Sein}] is why, without falling into irrationalism and while being entirely convinced that human reason will succeed in elucidating more and more the nature of the cosmic and human world, it seems to us that this elucidation can never become complete and that an element of uncertainty will always remain in men’s thought and action, bound to their ontological status.” Ibid, pp. 103; cf. Sartre, \textit{Search for a Method}, pp. 78; cf. Adorno and Horkheimer, ‘The Concept of Enlightenment’, pp. 6-7.

\textsuperscript{723} “In Sade as in Mandeville, private vices are the anticipatory historiography of public virtues in the totalitarian era. It is because they did not hush up the impossibility of deriving from reason a fundamental argument against murder, but proclaimed it from the rooftops, that Sade and Nietzsche are still vilified, above all by progressive thinkers. In a different way to logical positivism, they both took science at its word.” Adorno and Horkheimer, ‘Juliette or Enlightenment and Morality’, pp. 93.
momentum that it was to build in the later stages of its crescendo, a boom in production of woollen goods whose raw materials were exported from the Scottish Highlands marked the advent of a new age in which the eternal recurrence of the same was steadily becoming a cardinal virtue. Foreshadowing what would later become a universal experience, the standardisation of production indicated that a time of reckoning was at hand for crafts with their rigid institutional structures of guild membership and promotion. For the fourteenth century social cosmos of Florence that was dominated by Arti Maggiori e Minori with a wide berth of control over the production of a number of goods and services ranging from dyers and silk weavers to bankers and pharmacists, the tidings coming from a swelling of the number of wage-labourers canned into overcrowded spaces of overspecialised production did not bear anything of interest. Those wage-labourer gente nuova, or ‘newcomers,’ were not people of note anyway, having barely a single coin to their name flying as they were from the waves of Black Death that were storming the shores of mid-fourteenth century Italy. To be sure, there was some concern on the part of various guildsmen as they wondered if the swelling number of arrivals could tip the weary balance of power, which was often the subject of social confrontations, between Arti Maggiori and Arti Minori. Their existential situation, i.e., trying to carve out a living after having been shellshocked to the point of making survival their sole occupation, did not oblige the gente nuova to seek the company of the guildsmen either. Until, that is, the wage-workers began to demand representation not unlike that of the established guilds in order to protect their interests which were too often subject to fraud and abuse.\textsuperscript{724}

With the growing numbers on their side that towered, despite the ban on their association, above any other productive collectivity in the city, the workers had grown increasingly weary of their marginalised socio-economic condition. Ironically, that measure of weariness was also shared by the craftsmen who did not belong to any guild and, to a lesser extent, by the guildsmen of Arti Minori who were often on the receiving end of the power struggle they waged against the seven major guilds. As individuals from those sides continued to explore their historical situatedness so would they discover the basics of a potential coalition of interests against the Signoria, or the Florentine oligarchy, in whose chambers were seated the upper echelons of Arti among others. Not given anything in return either politically or socially for the heavy taxes which they could not pay at any rate, the wool workers of Ciompi,\textsuperscript{725}

\textsuperscript{724} On the discernible types of Florentine urban politics of oppositional ilk over the course of the half a century when the fortunes of the rebels ebbed and flowed, with emphasis on the clandestine links that united numerous dissenting groups, see Robert A. Fredona, Political Conspiracy in Florence, 1340-1382, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, (Ithaca, NY., 2010).

\textsuperscript{725} Florentine chronicles indicate aplenty that the unskilled woolworkers whose cauldron of revolutionary dissent had been boiling at the latest from 1340s onwards were targeted by the city officials to make an example of, which was supposed to leave the other workers terror-struck. For an
reinforced by a not insignificant number of craftsmen without guilt ties and guildsmen from Arti Minori who were fed up with their crooked situation, took the lead and began to voice their demands for reforms. Aided by inviting the Guelfi, or the Popists, to join their ranks for the sake of resisting the combined force of gente nuova and Arti Minori, the oligarchs managed to hold on to their precarious hegemony until 1377. But the war against the papacy that broke out in 1375 had stretched the finances of the city to the limit. With their finances running high and dry, the Signoria did not have the means to sustain the co-option of the wage-workers into the prevailing relations of production anymore. Thus, on a faithful day in June the gente nuova began a revolt in earnest that would directly convulse the entire social landscape of Florence for four years and would continue to do so indirectly for many a decade to come. In short, as the architectonics of standardised production progressed, so did a curiously early phenomenon of workshop workers beginning to act on their increasingly disparaging experience of exploitation.

That historical episode does not find expression in the published works of Adorno. But a theoretically sublimated appearance of it, also finding its historical application, is never the less a central concern of the Negative Dialectics as it was later picked up by Jameson. In dialectical terms, the theoretical elaboration of the historical relationship we briefly flipped through is the identity of identity and non-identity. Once denoting a rather linear development to the Schellingian concept of the unconditioned, the conception was fused with a dynamic view of historical progression in the earlier works of Hegel leading up to the Phenomenology of Spirit. Hegel’s project was based on the construction of the formal identity between the instance of the exemplary overuse of the gallows, we can turn to the hanging of Ciuto Brandini and his two sons, on 24 May 1345, on unconfirmed suspicions concerning their alleged attempt to form an illegal workingmen’s association whose activities were to be geared towards the reaping of various socio-political benefits in return for their miserable toil: “Il Capitano di Frenze cioè fue Messer Neccio da Gobbio prese de notte Ciuto Brandini iscardassiere e suoi due figliuoli, imperochè ‘l detto Ciuto volea fare una compagnia a Santa Croce, e fare setta, e ragunata cogli altri lavoranti di Frenze, e in questo medesimo di i lavoranti di Firenze, cioè pettinatori e scardassieri si incontanente, ch’udirono e seppono che’il detto Ciuto era istato preso di notte in sul letto dal Capitano, incontanente veruno non andaronne i detti lavoranti a Priori pregandogli che ‘l detto Ciuto faciessono ch’ egli il riavessono sano, e lieto, e detti lavoranti tutta la Terra misono a bollire, che sela sarebbeno, se ‘l detto Ciuto non riavessono sano e lieto, e anche voleano essere meglio pagati. Il detto Ciuto fue poi impiccato per la gola.”


726 For the revolt, its immediate socio-political effects and the lingering impression it made on the Italian politics of late renaissance, see Alessandro Stella, La révolte des Ciompi: Les hommes, les lieux, le travail, (Paris, 1993); Samuel Kline Cohn, The Laboring Classes in Renaissance Florence, (New York, 1980); Samuel Kline Cohn, Women in the Streets, (Baltimore, 1996).

727 For the origins of the postulation, see Manfred Frank and Ian Alexander Moore, “‘Identity of Identity and Non-Identity’: Schelling’s Path to the “Absolute System of Identity”, in Interpreting Schelling: Critical Essays, ed. by Lara Ostaric, (Cambridge, 2014), pp. 120-144; for Hegel’s elaboration on the postulate, see Kathleen Wright, “Hegel: The Identity of Identity and Nonidentity”, Idealistic Studies, vol. 13 no. 1, (Jan., 1983), pp. 11-32; for a recent evaluation of the relationship in the light of Badiou’s
subject and the object on the basis of the principle of absolute identity, which effectively meant the reconciliation of identity and difference under the auspices of a compact articulated unity. Translating this dialectical project into a historical one, Adorno substituted Marx’s concept of exchange value as a temporally definite manifestation of the Hegelian principle of identity. As a prime carrier of the capitalist mode of production’s ideology, exchange value denoted, according to Adorno, the boundless standardisation of all the produced goods whose statistically backed claims to uniqueness would belie their essential sameness while creating a levelled out sphere of material transactions of things with widely divergent use values, and remarkably similar lack of styles conceived as totalities. True, use value can never be completely inundated by exchange value since the totality proposed by the latter cannot fabricate a life world that has no space for use value ex nihilo. Corresponding to a centrifugal movement away from the sanctified aura of hic et nunc, the mass production of objects would induce the consolidation of a culture of consumerism, which always had a taste for its acquired need par excellence, an amnesia of everything related to class, and which ran along the


“Since, with the ending of free exchange, commodities have forfeited all economic qualities except their fetish character, this character has spread like a cataract across the life of society in all its aspects. The countless agencies of mass production and its culture impress standardized behaviour on the individual as the only natural, decent, and rational one. Individuals define themselves now only as things, statistical elements, successes or failures. Their criterion is self-preservation, successful or unsuccessful adaptation to the objectivity of their function and the schemata assigned to it.” Adorno and Horkheimer, ‘The Concept of Enlightenment’, pp. 21-22; Backhaus, ‘Zur Dialektik der Wertform’, pp. 142 ff; Jay, Adorno, pp. 37; Jameson, Late Marxism, pp. 23; for two pathbreaking studies of the Aristotelian origins, in addition to the Marxian twists, of the two concepts, see Meikle, Essentialism in the Thought of Karl Marx, pp. 73 ff; Meikle, Aristotle’s Economic Thought.

Lefebvre’s vital discussion of the replacement of the pre-nineteenth-century style emananated by œuvres, i.e., ‘artefacts,’ by the seeds of culture that were sown by les produits may not figure in verbatim in Adorno’s discussion of the modernist watershed of exchange value. Still, that hardly obliges one to confer a divergent conceptual status on either one of the two profound inquiries. With a solemn disavowal of any normative appraisal pitting a low against a high, or an aristocratic against a popular culture, Lefebvre’s notion of style seems to have served as an anticipatory project to that of Adorno in capturing the sense of transition that was engendered through the pervasive standardisation of all the strands of production, that of artworks included: “La montée des masses (qui n’empêche en rien leur exploitation), la démocratie (même remarque!) accompagnent la fin des grand styles, des symboles et des mythes, des œuvres collectives: monuments et fêtes. Déjà l’homme moderne (celui qui exalte sa modernité) n’est qu’un homme de la transition, dans l’entre-deux, entre la fin du Style et sa re-création.” Lefebvre, La vie quotidienne dans le monde moderne, pp. 76.

“This is why a philosophical critique of identity transcends philosophy. But the ineffable part of the utopia is that what defies subsumption under identity—the “use value,” in Marxist terminology—is necessary anyway if life is to go on at all, even under the prevailing circumstances of production. The utopia extends to the sworn enemies of its realization. Regarding the concrete utopian possibility, dialectics is the ontology of the wrong state of things. The right state of things would be free of it: neither a system nor a contradiction.” Adorno, Negative Dialectics, pp. 11.

“For a society that wants to forget about class, therefore, reification in this consumer-packaging sense is very functional indeed; consumerism as a culture involves much more than this, but this kind
insatiable lines of prefabricated needs that are reinforced through the imperialization of the senses by the culture industry.\textsuperscript{733}

At the opposite end of this curtailed horizon of the irreducible subject, however, was a dawn of collective consciousness that could, at least potentially, be articulated towards working against any totality itself.\textsuperscript{734} Now, just the opposite reading may be derived from the works of an author that often seem to abound with reproachful remarks on the current state of culture which diverge his theoretical stance considerably from the utopian potentiality that is often found in the least likely of niches of contemporary culture by Bloch. Yet, for a thinker who strikes one as someone who always aspired to put the literary, aesthetic, musical, political, etc., phenomena that he wanted to study under close scrutiny, and with a substantial dose of dialectical evaluation that is capable of unearthing the ‘against’ as well as the ‘for,’ Adorno seems to have generally received the most prejudged of attentions. An accomplished student of Schoenberng whose modified musicological concept of model was to prove hair-splitting even for an erudite critique such as Jameson,\textsuperscript{735} and an avid reader of modernist literature whose dialectical evaluation of the works of Proust or Beckett would not escape some of the worst schematisms of later Lukács, Adorno’s essays on what he conceived to be the culture industry of 1940s have everlastingly branded him as the menacing upper-class pedant \textit{par excellence}.\textsuperscript{736} Still, cultural pessimism comes in many forms, and given just how dialectically of “effacement” is surely the indispensable condition on which all the rest can be constructed.” Jameson, \textit{Postmodernism}, pp. 315.

\textsuperscript{733} Sartre’s observations that were penned during his trip to the United States in 1945 to be used in his later works display a certain sense of reprehensive astonishment that seem contemporaneous, both in spirit and in content, to Adorno’s trenchant critique of the American roots of the European fascism. From the “ten best-selling records” to the self-referential aura of “best-selling” authority of Prix Goncourt, Sartre tore apart that veil of consumerism despite not venturing as far Adorno did. Jean-Paul Sartre, \textit{Villes d’Amérique: New York, ville colonial Venice, de ma fenêtre}, (Paris, 2002), esp. 39-43; Sartre, \textit{Critique de la raison dialectique}, I, pp. 615, 617; Sartre, ‘France: Masses, Spontaneity, Party’, pp. 124-125; cf. Desan, \textit{The Marxism of Jean-Paul Sartre}, pp. 184-189.

\textsuperscript{734} Adorno’s anti-positivism shares with Fanon a grounding upon the historical ‘now’ that does not credit the future at the exclusion of the present. In existentialist terms, \textit{la rareté de hic et nunc} is what deracinatest the lacking from the metaphysical ground of timeless lackings. What is at issue, on this view, is not to theoretically herald the dawn of a new horizon, but to lay bare the pitch-black darkness of the old: “And this future is not the future of the cosmos but rather the future of my century, my country, my existence. In no fashion should I undertake to prepare the world that will come later. I belong irreducibly to my time.” Fanon, \textit{Black Skin, White Masks}, pp. 15; cf. Sartre, \textit{L’Immaginazione}, pp. 9.


\textsuperscript{736} “The total effect of the culture industry is one of anti-enlightenment, in which, as Horkheimer and I have noted, enlightenment, that is the progressive technical domination of nature, becomes mass deception and is turned into means for fettering consciousness. It impedes the development of autonomous, independent individuals who judge and decide consciously for themselves.” Theodor W. Adorno, ‘Culture Industry Reconsidered’, in \textit{The Culture Industry}, pp. 106; for a biting parody of the Adornian currents with which the Italian left-wing criticism of the 1960s was inundated, see Umberto Eco, ‘The End Is at Hand’, in \textit{Misreadings}, pp. 94-116; cf. Jay, \textit{Adorno}, pp. 18, 119.
refined Adorno’s is, we think it rather essential to distinguish the man from the myth at the very least in regard to his understanding of the relationship between identity and totality.\(^{737}\)

Adorno’s conception of the identicality imposed by exchange value is normatively neutral and politically, at least potentially, fruitful. In regard to his project’s normative neutrality, there should not be any doubt that Adorno’s critique of the ephemeral lines that contour any modernist novel,\(^{738}\) music or painting never operates at a level of polarity that revalues earlier aesthetic forms, e.g., early realism, romanticism or neo-classicism, in order to devalue the present cultural artefacts. There is no sanctified high art that is defended against a plebeian low art to be found in Adorno’s works. Indeed, any careful reading of the passages which have provided his pedestrian critics with the apparently most devastating weapons of their arsenal would show that Adorno was sufficiently diligent in always remarking at the outset that the pre-capitalist modes of cultural production depended on the parasitic existence of the artist who necessarily had to prey on the livelihood of the others, via the mediation of the ruling class connoisseurs of art, who were permanently barred from engaging in artistic forms of expression due to the sheer force of their estate.\(^{739}\) From Michelangelo’s *David* to Giambologna’s *Abduction of a Sabine Woman*, from Mahler’s Fifth to Beethoven’s Ninth, no masterfully created work of art operates on a level of complete expressive freedom. For the artist is someone who is always kept in check precisely by the situational non-integrity of the totalising social project in which he or she lives. Further, that acute phantom pain\(^{740}\) arising from the historical situation has plagued the conception not only of modern art which is preconditioned by a phenomenological separation of the artistic plane of production from the...

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\(^{739}\) “The purity of bourgeois art, hypostatized as a realm of freedom contrasting to material praxis, was brought from the outset with the exclusion of the lower class; and art keeps faith with the cause of that class, the true universal, precisely by freeing itself from the purposes of the false. Serious art has denied itself to those for whom the hardship and oppression of life make a mockery of seriousness and who must be glad to use the time not spent at the production line in being simply carried along. Light art has accompanied autonomous art as its shadow. It is the social bad conscience of serious art.” Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer, ‘The Culture Industry: Enlightenment as Mass Deception’, in *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, pp. 107.

\(^{740}\) Merleau-Ponty used the concept to analagise his understanding of being-toward-the-world as an orientation toward the world that involves a dialectic interplay between the present body and the habit body. Briefly put, the sedimentations of repetitive capacities that are left over by any past activity are properties of the habit body, whereas any present capacity is captured by the present body. The phantom limb depicts, according to that interpretation, any patient’s experience of an ambivalent presence of an amputee member of his or her body which indicates the subject’s meta-cognitive claim to the integrity of his or her body. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, trans. by Donald Landes, (London and New York, 2013), pp. 83 ff.
rest of the productive edifice but also that of the premodern art with the periodically heightened consciousness of its creators who did not have the means, material and social, to re-integrate their existential condition into a phenomenological exclusivity. Autonomy has never been a quality that is intrinsic to any work of art. A dilettante signal of the artist cultivating a masochistic love for the relations of domination which blanket his or her production, the concept of autonomy can reach the limits of the historically defined horizon of cultural production only if it is self-consciously allowed to absorb what little creative energy is left in the fast depleted tank of forms and content that any artist necessarily needs to work with. Realising that autonomy is only ever a project, which must retain the hope of transcending the limits of any chimney sweeper’s creativity, is the very first step that eventually leads to the freeing of a sphere of cultural production precisely by giving the lie to a culture that has aided the breeding of professional chimney sweepers in the first place.741

Antenor’s first pair of Ἡρμοδιούς καὶ Ἀριστογειώτων that was sculpted around 500 BC only to be nicked by Xerxes’ troops during one of their two invasions of Athens in 480 BC had burned itself onto the minds of the survivors of the episode precisely by exposing the fragility of the sanctified Athenian polity.742 No concept of democracy seems to have attained wide currency among the demotic numbers of the Athenian upper classes until 450s at the earliest and for good reason: even after having capsized hundreds of Phoenician ships, whose crews had carried out the orders of their Persian paymasters, at the bay of Salamis in 480 by relying, literally, on the backsides of thousands of wage-labourers, there was still a lot more that was aristocratic about the Athenian polity until the reforms of Ephialtes. And in 514 BC, the year in which the event that would later be commemorated by Antenor’s first pair, the assassination of Hipparchus who was the younger brother of the Athenian tyrant Hippias, took place, Athens was just another link in the chain of the Greek sixth-century tyrannies that had remained that way for almost a full generation. Antenor’s memento mori was a powerful one. By indicating that the heroic deliverers of the Athenian dèmos were none other than unintending aristocrats, whose vendetta, if we follow the later correction proposed by Thucydides,743 appears infinitely

741 “If material reality is called the world of exchange value, and culture whatever refuses to accept the domination of that world, then it is true that such refusal is illusory as long as the existent exists. Since, however, free and honest exchange is itself a lie, to deny it is at the same time to speak for truth: in face of the lie of the commodity world, even the lie that denounces it becomes a corrective.” Adorno, Minima Moralia, pp. 44.
742 Cartledge, The Greeks, pp. 32.
743 Given that we allocate plenty of space for the discussion of these episodes in the following chapter, it should suffice, for now, the reader to look up the specifics of Thucydides’ attempted subversion of the official account of the event in the following evaluation: Elizabeth A. Meyer, “Thucydides on Harmodius and Aristogeiton, Tyranny, and History’, The Classical Quarterly, vol. 58 no. 1, (May, 2008), pp. 13-34.
more personal than political, Antenor had exposed the polity of Athens leading to the first Persian Invasion as one that was under the definite control of the upper-class eupatridae.

The works of art produced by any artist attain a degree of creative freedom by exposing the false society by which their production is preconditioned. By imparting an aesthetic autonomy to his or her artworks, an essayist, a composer or a painter shows that one is able to experience the pain of a historically dislocated missing limb by working with a philosophical concept of negativity. Characterised by an endless chase after the attainment of Schattenhaft, or a ‘shadowy’ existence of a presence that never steps into the full daylight of completion, the artwork probes beneath the smooth surface of language, harmonic tonality, etc., for the sake of enacting a plane of Mitleid, which literally means ‘suffering with’ but often transliterated as ‘sympathy’ without heeding the ancient Greek meaning of sumpazein. And given his acute conception of the fact that one’s suffering is always social and historical, it becomes rather straightforward to conclude that the aesthetic autonomy is achieved, in


Adorno’s terms, precisely by socialising and historicising one’s production of works of art.\footnote{48} In short, the medium itself needs to be philosophically mediated so that the historical completeness of the message can be derealised.\footnote{49} The barrier that keeps the early film industry of Hollywood or the harmonically diminished tonality of classical Jazz apart from a novel of Thomas Mann or an ‘Etude’ of Claude Debussy is not one of aesthetic classicism that organises the lived experience of a cultural critic around a classicised form of novel or tonality, but one of an artistic aspiration to failure whose literary or musical production functions as the establishment of an immediate relationship to the contemporary determination of a shaded existence.\footnote{50}

Drawn against the historical materialist epistemology of Lenin, this brief excursion into some of the valences of Adorno’s negative dialectics promises vital insights for our brand of existentialist dialectics that can be gathered under three points. First, the dialectical mediation between the subject and the object needs to unearth the upper-class domination of any artefact, be it philosophical or aesthetical, just as much as that of any existential dimension of historical working classes.\footnote{51} As with the dropping of the curtain on any alleged transindividual subject’s potentialities,\footnote{52} so with the utilitarian imperialist blanket that is cast over the natural potentialities of the totalising externality that informs our being-in-the-world. And given that the ruling classes themselves have the least to lose in any attempt to pulverise the environmental externalities whose mediation by labour can never be allowed to move toward any posited totality, we have to back down from any commitment to build an immediate

\footnote{48} “The doctrine of the aesthetic autonomy of the work of art is the correct one; but it is true only if grasped as the very opposite of an aestheticizing doctrine, or a kind of philosophical ‘art for art’s sake’. The work is social and historical through and through: only thus can it become autonomous. The religion of art, the glorification of the cultural and the aesthetic, is a social conduct and an ideology that has nothing to do with the work of art itself.” Jameson, \textit{Late Marxism}, pp. 185; Urs Jaeggi, ‘Das Dilemma der bürgerlichen und die Schwierigkeiten einer nichtbürgerlichen Literatur’, in Peter Kühne, \textit{Arbeiterklasse und Literatur}, pp. 14; de Beauvoir, \textit{Pour une morale de l’ambiguïté}, pp. 356 ff; contra Heidegger, ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’, pp. 28.

\footnote{49} Adorno and Horkheimer, ‘The Concept of Enlightenment’, pp. 23.

\footnote{50} “Even the performance ideal of serious music in the sense of a perfect account of the work that takes no risks, as this has developed under monopoly conditions, has fallen under an iron grip of rigidity despite the ostentatious appearance of dynamism: the performance of a symphony in which nothing can go wrong is also one in which nothing happens anymore either.” Adorno, ‘The Schema of Mass Culture’, pp. 72.


\footnote{52} “The great superiority of the transindividual subject over the transcendental \textit{ego}, is that it is not opposed to an object, it always has an empirical character in the world, and it is traceable via research: it is men who have acted during the course of history and who are the origin of objects, works, and ideas.” Goldmann, \textit{Lukács and Heidegger}, pp. 44.
domination over nature, via nominalism or else. Second, a dialectical existentialist epistemology necessarily needs to take the aforementioned remark made by Marx on the Communards of 1871 to heart by aspiring toward its own effacement that will accompany the unleashing of the creative potentialities of the social being through the collective effort toward communitarian re-totalisation. Unlike either the logical positivism of the analytical Marxists or the transcendental micropolitics of dissonance of many post-Marxist vogues, existentialist dialectical re-totalisation is one that knows itself to be a conscious effort on the part of its practitioner whose every attempt at theoretical re-organisation is the enactment of a second-degree semiological system that must retain the advantage of being mythology-free. And since it is the main merit of Adorno’s work to have laid the groundwork for an anti-systemic system of disconnected analyses that are bound together by the ever-visible threads of negative dialectics, we have to incorporate that element of anti-totalistic re-totalisation into any epistemological elaboration of existentialist dialectics. Third, taking its cue from Adorno’s theory of artistic production, the practitioner of existentialist dialectics needs to strike

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753 “Contradiction is not what Hegel’s absolute idealism was bound to transfigure it into: it is not of the essence in a Heraclitan sense. It indicates the untruth of identity, the fact that the concept does not exhaust the thing conceived.” Adorno, Negative Dialectics, pp. 5; cf. Kierkegaard, Either/Or, pp. 488.
754 “This time, this unique time, destiny was not put back in the hands of competent politicians. This time, this unique time, betrayal is invoked as a state of things to avoid and not as a simple result of an unfortunate choice. This time, this unique time, the proposal is to deal with the situation solely on the basis of the resources of the proletarian movement.” Badiou, The Communist Hypothesis, pp. 197.
755 “There is therefore one language which is not mythical, it is the language of man as a producer: wherever man speaks in order to transform reality and no longer to preserve it as an image, wherever he links his language to the making of things, metalanguage is referred to a language-object, and myth is impossible. This is why revolutionary language proper cannot be mythical. Revolution is defined as a cathartic act meant to reveal the political load of the world: it makes the world, and its language, all of it, is functionally absorbed in this making. It is because it generates speech which is fully, that is to say initially and finally, political, and not, like myth, speech which is initially political and finally natural, that Revolution excludes myth.” Barthes, ‘Myth Today’, pp. 173; cf. Valentin N. Voloshinov, Freulianism: A Critical Sketch, trans. by I. R. Titunik and ed. in collab. with N. H. Bruss, (Bloomington, 1987). That Barthesian reading of the event commencing with the fierce refusal of the armed working-class National Guard of Paris refusing to hand over the cannons in its possession on the faithful day of 18 March is in essential agreement with Badiou’s positing of the people of 18 March as the actors who turned the Commune into a philosophical event, hence bringing about “an imminent overturning of the laws of appearing.” If I choose to focus on the ontology of actors in action rather than the that of their deliberate composition that is because such historical precision can hardly be imitated in the case of the revolutionary upheavals of a number of ancient Greek poleis with which I deal in the historical sections of this work: Badiou, The Communist Hypothesis, pp. 205 ff.
756 And those threads ought to be kept evident through the use of a variety of tools of self-criticism so that the vicious circle of theory qua the proclaimer of self-fulfilling prophecies is broken: “Eine genuine Theorie der Gesellschaft prophezeit nicht; das wäre ein Rückfall ins Bereich der erwartenden Einzelfakten, über die Theorie sich erheben soll.” Adorno, Philosophische Elemente einer Theorie der Gesellschaft, pp. 39.
757 “There is in Sartre’s opinion no achieved totality but only one in the process of being made, and the attempt to encompass this totality-in-the-making, with the awareness that any exhaustive encompassing is impossible, is what he meant by totalization. The failure to appreciate this insight can lead to gross simplifications and even outright errors, for if history is arrested, if theory (Savoir) is divorced from praxis, then judgments will be made a priori and reality forced into a preconceived mold.” Desan, The Marxism of Jean-Paul Sartre, pp. 46.

205
continuously at the clay feet of the post-industrial colossus of economism with a voluntary re-totalisation of each singular detail of any work of art that is capable of making either individual or social projections without falling for the prevailing gusts of consumerism.\textsuperscript{758} If Marx’s remark to the effect that the curious thing about the ancient Greek art and culture is not explaining how they flourished but how they manage to speak to our aesthetic sensibilities after the passing of millennia still has a true ring, at least to some of us, about it, then the endeavour to totalise encoded and decoded texts into dialectical wholes has to expand its analyses to cover any aesthetic ground.\textsuperscript{759} Mahler’s scherzos or Watteau’s dialectical interplay between Baroque and Rococo with a fusion of theatrical movement and bucolic charm are not just pedantic statements that serve delightfully for the modern art historian or musicologist. Within the larger intertwined context of his irresistible movements, Mahler’s scherzos, for one, can be built into a larger musical physiognomy as \textit{Weltlauf}, or the world’s course, which incorporates the \textit{Schattenhaft} movement of the traditional ABABA pattern to be depicted as the complete inversion of the bourgeois musical aesthetics by turning the dazing effect it has on the listener against itself.\textsuperscript{760} And combined with continuous dives that often induce, as in the measure 26 of his Seventh Symphony, a stretched state of sensory puzzlement on the listener, the scherzos can be seen to relay the ‘essence’ of the life-world instead of providing a timely simulacrum for all the disorienting tendencies of the Taylorist age of monopoly capitalism.\textsuperscript{761} A focus on the specificities of historical relations of production, reproduction and domination is ought to be juxtaposed to any artistic reflection that testified to those peculiarities while fashioning creative projects of its own.\textsuperscript{762}

\textsuperscript{758} Cf. Adorno and Horkheimer, ‘Juliette or Enlightenment and Morality’, pp. 65.
\textsuperscript{759} For a fitting critique of the answer that was given by Lukács to that question, see Sandkühler, \textit{Praxis und Geschichtsbewußtsein}, pp. 346-347.
\textsuperscript{760} “It is not for nothing that Mahler is the scandal of all bourgeois musical aesthetics. They call him uncreative because he suspends their concept of creation itself. Everything with which he occupies himself is already there. He accepts it in its vulgarized form; his themes are expropriated ones.” Theodor W. Adorno, ‘On the Fetish Character’, in \textit{The Culture Industry}, pp. 59.
\textsuperscript{761} “Mahler ist ein spätes Glied der Tradition des europäischen Weltschmerzes. Gleichnisse des Weltlaufs sind bei ihm durchweg die ziellos in sich kreisenden, unaufhaltsamen Sätze, das perpetuum mobile. Das leere Getriebe ohne Selbstbestimmung ist das Immergleiche.” Adorno, \textit{Mahler}, pp. 14; that sociological thrust of Adorno’s evaluation of the works of some of the leading composers of his day would also serve as the lodestar of his lifelong commitment to defending the Schoenberg’s negation of the ‘bourgeois principle of tonality’: Theodor W. Adorno, ‘Der dialektische Komponist’, in \textit{Arnold Schönberg zum 60. Geburtstag, 13 September 1934}, (Vienna, 1934); reprinted in Theodor W. Adorno, \textit{Impromptus}, (Frankfurt, 1968).
\textsuperscript{762} “Marxism lacks any hierarchy of mediations which would permit it to grasp the process which produces the person and his product inside a class and within a given society at a given historical movement.” Sartre, \textit{Search for a Method}, pp. 56; cf. Lukács, \textit{The Ontology of Social Being}, II, pp. 130.
3.4 On a Dyad of Universals

The existentialist dialectical understanding of sensuous activity not only retains the salvageable advantages of the dialectical materialist epistemology that had carried it heads and shoulders above its mechanical predecessors, but also affixes the continuous emendation of scientific attempts to structure external reality onto the knowledge related to particular dimensions of collectivised existential projects by whom it, in its turn, is structured. Yet, the transition from the knowledge of natural objects to that of social subjects cannot be realized without evaluating the triad of pillars reinforcing the epistemology of sensory perception in the context of the social beings. Human beings conceive social reality through the dual prism of physical existence and subjective consciousness. Given that the epistemic grounds of the recognition of objective existence is homologous to the cognition of external objects, and to one’s inherent sensory capacity through experiencing them, we propose to commence our theoretical attempt to shed some light on the social part of dialectical materialist epistemology with the other end of the plane of oscillation of the pendulum; i.e., the conception of social universals.

The universals of social knowledge can be divided into two branches: logical and politico-ethical universals. We do not aim at introducing a binary between the two strands on the grounds pertaining to the general contours of language, thinking, etc. Rather, we claim that it befits our examination of the two threads when we commence with an element of convergence: both types of universals entail the creation of values in their excavation of logical and politico-ethical repositories of experience. We do not concur either with the privileged status granted...

763 For an example of Marx’s trenchant criticisms of Feuerbach’s ‘inconsistent materialism’, see Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, pp. 38-41.
764 Needless to add, this voluntary division is proposed neither to smuggle politics to the place of pride of social knowledge nor to belittle other components of social knowledge. Indeed, as the epithet ‘voluntary’ indicates this division can also be made in other ways by substituting other fields of human interaction with politics.
765 Can an accommodation be made to incorporate to our dualistic scheme Murdoch’s earlier point that the arising of concrete moral universals is hinged on an epistemic individualism pertaining to value concepts? In brief, appealing though it may seem, the granting of any measure of a priori concreteness to universals, moral or not, takes away the developmental situatedness of any universal which can only be peered at from the longer and public view. The concept of goodness I had when I was eighteen might differ drastically from any relevant concept that I uphold now. Begging the question in such epistemic moral individualism, however, is whether the development of personal outlook the only candidate for causing the widening of that conceptual gap. I incline to the contrary in thinking that any historical individual’s movement of understanding of moral universals is just as external, i.e., in endless discussion and negotiation with various publicly entertained significations that float around, as they are internal: contra “There are two senses of knowing what a word means’, one connected with ordinary language and the other very much less so. Knowledge of a value concept is something to be understood, as it were, in depth, and not in terms of switching to some impersonal network.” Murdoch, The Sovereignty of Good, pp. 28.
by Kant to logic as a priori knowledge\textsuperscript{766} or with Heidegger’s demotion of logic to the order of inauthentic and ossified thinking. To elaborate, it seems apposite to recall that the Kantian dualism of analytical and synthetical judgements was conceived with sole regard to logical premonitions. As Kant lays out his basic premise in linguistic terms, all judgements inclusive of the relation of a subject to a predicate can exhibit that relation in two ways, “Either the predicate B belongs to the subject A, as somewhat which is contained (though covertly) in the conception of A; or the predicate B lies completely out of the conception A, although it stands in connection with it. In the first instance, I term the judgment analytical, in the second, synthetical.”\textsuperscript{767}

Bracketing the linguistic shell off the statement, we arrive at the crossroads of metaphysical unintelligibility: how exactly can any predicate, be it B, C, D, etc., belong to a subject, i.e., what is the exact nature of this belongingness and how is it decided? And, likewise, how can a predicate B lay completely out of a conception A if there is even the slightest possibility that it may ‘belong’ to the conception or that it may at least be somewhat related to A? These are hypothetical questions darted at a hypothetical definition, and are, as such, inconclusive if not downright futile. Yet, apart from adding nominal signifiers to his two types of judgment, i.e., ‘explicative’ and ‘augmentative’, Kant adds precious little to this account of linguistic wild goose chase except for the example that he gives in hopes of bringing the point home. ‘All bodies are extended’, to follow in Kant’s footsteps, denotes an analytical judgment because I can derive the premise of extension from the concept of body itself; whereas, ‘all bodies are heavy’ is a synthetical judgment since heaviness does not follow from the concept of body itself. Concise and orderly as everything else that goes with Kant, the hypothetical questions that were asked above, however, still wait in askance in pondering whether to make heads or tails of this example in relation to the challenges they posed. The first judgment, for one, runs on two implicit premises: that all extant bodies have been examined and promptly validated regarding their extension, and that no cognition of a body without extension is possible. Now, the first premise can be endorsed on the basis of the conjecture that Kant, as an individual observer, has actually went about cognizing each object in his environment in Königsberg. Yet, if we are willing to grant that point, then the whole premise crumbles away as a result of the temporal determinateness that is inserted into the explicative judgment whereby it

\textsuperscript{766} Cf. “Logic, dialectic, and rhetoric belong together, since they make up the whole of a technique of reason. Under this title they should also be taught together, logic as the technique of our own thinking, dialectic as that of disputing with others, and rhetoric as that of speaking to many (concionatio); thus corresponding to the singular, dual, and plural, also to the monologue, dialogue, and panegyric.” Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation, II, pp. 102.

transforms into an augmentative one. To that end, the gist of analytical judgments is nothing other than a presupposition of everlasting immutableness of the relation between the subject and the predicate.\textsuperscript{768} When Kant set about cognizing matter, however, he presumably did not begin by the fully-abstract matter but with empirical objects he found lying around. Likewise, matter’s extension cannot be concluded from abstract matter without observing and measuring the dimensions of any object, and even if we concede that Kant’s peerless imaginative ‘faculty’ permitted him to conceive of matter without having made any empirical observation, the second question still stands: then how on earth was he able to prefigure the cognitive limits of his faculty without having cognized anything?

The problem was, of course, a lot more straightforward in Kant’s day than it is in ours. It was reported on 10 April 2019 that the first ever picture of a black hole, this one measuring forty billion kilometres across, which is the rough equivalent of three million times the size of our planet, was captured by Event Horizon Telescope (EHT), a network of eight linked telescopes. The successful venture, in fact, was just the long overdue empirical confirmation of what Einstein with his general theory of relativity had hypothesized almost a century ago. Yet, the ability to see an epitome of the incognizable still shakes the scholastic origins of some of the scientific dogma, e.g., \textit{ex nihilo nihil fit}, that are all-too-readily embraced by the advocates of value-neutrality. If the image of a vast interstellar formation without extension, yet with the capability to devour stars, can be captured though the aid of human engineering and planning, can we claim the matter’s necessity extension with the same steadfast authority as that of Kant?

That battered garb of the transcendental idealist preponderance of mind is never more astute than in Kant’s ascription of causality to matter. In his attempt to prove that the human intellect possesses a priori certain cognitions of the matter, Kant attempted to elucidate his understanding of knowledge a priori by pitting it against knowledge a posteriori. Designating all empirically attained knowledge as part and parcel of knowledge a posteriori, Kant reinforced his definition of knowledge a priori, which is “not such as is independent of this or that kind of experience, but such as is absolutely so of all experience,”\textsuperscript{769} by shedding the light of the conditions of necessity and universality on it. While inheriting necessity in its very conception as the first condition in regard to which a judgment is gauged to see if it is absolutely a priori, Kant conceived of his second condition of universality as demanding the precondition to give access to no empirical ‘taint’ in that no possible exception to it can be fathomed if it is indeed an example of knowledge a priori. Deceptively simplistic and typically

\textsuperscript{768} Cf. Habermas, \textit{Technik und Wissenschaft als 'Ideologie'}, pp. 21.

\textsuperscript{769} Kant, \textit{Critique of Pure Reason}, pp. 2.
parsimonious, these definitions are followed, again, by two examples in rapid succession to let the reader cognize the pure knowledge a priori à la Kant. The first example of mathematical propositions as a scientific example validating the strict sense of necessity and universality in their very formulation is only utilized as the mechanism with which the theoretical floodgates holding the second assertion are opened. Causal inference is thus brought forward as a necessary and universal condition of the certainty of any change we perceive in regard to the experience of external objects:

“In the latter case [that of the argument “every change must have a cause”], indeed, the conception of a cause so plainly involves the conception of a necessity of connection with an effect, and of a strict universality of the law, that the very notion of a cause would entirely disappear, were we to derive it, like Hume, from a frequent association of what happens with that which precedes, and the habit thence originating of connecting representations – the necessity inherent in the judgment being therefore merely subjective. Besides, without seeking for such examples of principles existing à priori in cognition, we might easily show that such principles are the indispensable basis of the possibility of experience itself, and consequently prove their existence à priori.”

Two objections are needed to be voiced to this juxtaposition of causality to cognitive capability: how do we surmise the necessary and universal relation of the concept of cause to that of effect, and how can the concept of causality be conceived as the ground on which the possibility of empirical experience rests? The supposed possession of the relation of a cause A to an effect B cannot be taken as a logical necessity any more than lightness can be purported as the conceptual primogeniture of that of heaviness. Now, granting that the cognition of A’s relation to B and the perception of a knapsack’s lighter load in relation to a heavier one does not stem from the same epistemic roots, the apperception of natural knowledge, as we have seen above, is realized by and through the evocation of a plenum of comparable gradations of a quality. This plenum is made out of each singular experience that is pertinent of the comparative dimension derived from a perception. The conception of this plenum, in that vein, operates on a plane of possibility whose limits are historically preconditioned yet abstractly unconditioned. Gathering numerous experiences ranging from knapsacks filled with lead to those packed with raw cotton, I begin to perceive hitherto imperceptible gradations of lightness and hence redeploy the historical limits of sensory experience accordingly. When we move on to the cognitive relation established between a cause and an effect we find, none the less, that the plenum of sensory experience hardly behoves an allusion to a plenum of cognition due to

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770 *Ibid*, pp. 3; cf. “Habit owes its charm to man’s natural idleness, and this idleness grows upon us if indulged; it is easier to do what we have already done, there is a beaten path which is easily followed. Thus we may observe that habit is very strong in the aged and in the indolent, and very weak in the young and the active. The rule of habit is only good for feeble hearts, and it makes them more feeble day by day. The only useful habit for children is to be accustomed to submit without difficulty to necessity, and the only useful habit for man is to submit without difficulty to the rule of reason. Every other habit is a vice.” Rousseau, *Emile*, pp. 148.
a preconceived inherence of the two concepts to each other. Yet, apart from the self-conscious dissection of sentimentality that is connoted in emotive expressions, such as “It causes me great pain…”, and, arguably, even in cases involving such overflowing sentimentality, we always refer to two separate states with material objects when we resort to the Gordian knot of causality in establishing a relation between them. The cognitive bridging of one state of any object with another is thus predicated upon the perceptible existence of two objective states that are not connected *in absentia* of any empirical ground.\textsuperscript{771} In apparent similarity to the arithmetic examples he gives to exemplify synthetical judgments *a posteriori*, Kant forsook the imminent analogy between specifically measurable multitudes of objects existing irrespective of human mind in nature and the dactylonomy that generally comes before any memorization in basic arithmetic. Furthermore, in moving from empirical grounds to purely cognitive faculties Kant also willingly took a decisive step in the direction of metaphysical apriorism:

“Causes are the products of the faculty of thought. They are, however, not its pure products, but are produced by it in conjunction with sense material. This sense material gives the causes thus produced their objective existence. Just as we demand that a truth should be the truth of an objective phenomenon, so we demand that a cause should be real, that is should be the cause of an objectively given effect.”\textsuperscript{772}

The Kantian pure apriorist conception of human mind proceeds, contrary to his constant jibes against Hume’s academic scepticism,\textsuperscript{773} by asking questions whose shibboleth-like answers have already been given. We have already seen, for instance, how Kant imposes a transcendental abstraction on empirical qualifiers, e.g., extension as it pertains to matter, by divesting matter completely of its empirical roots in order to illustrate that a priori judgments can cognitively be formed without any resort to sensory experience.\textsuperscript{774} To that end, it is hardly

\textsuperscript{771} “If the pure concepts of the intellect could constitute a sort of atemporal repertoire, empirical concepts could only become “historic,” or cultural, if you will.” Eco, *Kant and the Platypus*, pp. 97.


\textsuperscript{773} “So long as we confine our speculations to trade, or morals, or politics, or criticism, we make appeals, every moment, to common sense and experience, which strengthen our philosophical conclusions, and remove (at least, in part) the suspicion, which we so justly entertain with regard to every reasoning that is very subtle and refined. But in theological reasonings, we have not this advantage …” David Hume, *Dialogues*, in *Dialogues and Natural History of Religion*, ed. by J. C. A. Gaskin, (Oxford, 1998), pp. 37.

\textsuperscript{774} On that note, Schopenhauer’s critique of Kant’s hypostatisation of pure reason as existing *sui generis*, formulated in the context of Kant’s moral principles as it is, appears no less apposite than it is harsh:
surprising when he categorically allots the epithet ‘transcendental’ to a sphere of cognition conceived by reason solely with regard to knowledge a priori: “I apply the term transcendental to all knowledge which is not so much occupied with objects as with the mode of our cognition of these objects, so far as this mode of cognition is possible à priori.” It is somewhat perplexing to see, in that vein, how exactly Kant thought that he could masterfully attain the knowledge of billiards completely a priori without a whiff of reference to the surface of its table, mass of its balls, the solidity of its cushions, etc. Indeed, we do not think it unwarranted to claim that Kant needed a bit more in the way of material proofs instead of devising faculties of cognition at each and every step of his pseudo-refutation of Hume’s theses that remind playing chess against oneself, which is certainly beneficial in honing one’s game but hardly adequate for competing against others:

“But the same truth [that causes and effects are discoverable by experience, and not by reason] may not appear, at first sight, to have the same evidence with regard to events, which have become familiar to us from our first appearance in the world, which bear a close analogy to the whole course of nature, and which are supposed to depend on the simple qualities of objects, without any secret structure of parts. We are apt to imagine, that we could discover these effects by the mere operation of our reason, without experience. We fancy, that were we brought, on a sudden, into this world, we could at first have inferred, that one Billiard-ball would communicate motion to another upon impulse; and that we needed not to have waited for the event, in order to pronounce with certainty concerning it. Such is the influence of custom, that, where it is strongest, it not only covers our natural ignorance, but even conceals itself, and seems not to take place, merely because it is found in the highest degree.”

Kant’s masterful transcendental stroke, therefore, can only be venerated as timeless brilliance if the admission is made that his retaliation against the Humean understanding of cognition with its emphasis on the congruent working of habit and reason was realized only by usurping...

“Since Kant rejected all empirical incentives of the will, he thereby removed in advance everything objective and everything subjective on which he could empirically ground a law for incentives, so there remained for him nothing as substance for this law than its own form. Now, this is only conformity to law. But this conformity to law is valid for all, thus, of universal validity. This, therefore, becomes the substance. As a result, the content of the law is nothing other than its universal validity itself.” Arthur Schopenhauer, *On the Basis of Morals*, in *The Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics*, trans. by David E. Cartwright and Edward E. Erdmann, (Oxford, 2010), pp. 154; cf. Lukács, *The Ontology of Social Being*, III, pp. 68-70.

775 Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, pp. 15.
776 An exception to this point takes place in Kant’s observation that even the limited scepticism of Hume’s adherence to the empirical attainment of natural knowledge does not cross the border of arithmetic in laying claims to a full-fledged universality that could embrace even arithmetic reasoning a priori. In spite of its overall acuteness, this point, however, relegated the Humean analysis of geometrical reasoning, which, in all likelihood, can be extended to arithmetic, to the transcendental dustbin, and, as such, does not appear to warrant a reconceptualization of this epistemological consideration in favour of Kant’s criticisms. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, trans. by Thomas Kingsmill Abbot, (Mineola, NY., 2004), pp. 117-118; cf. Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, I.I.IV-V; Andrew Ward, *Kant. The Three Critiques*, (Cambridge, 2006), pp. 52.
the throne of the ‘universal I’ qua rational subject.\textsuperscript{778} This logic of the inverted eye pondering the Mind’s cognitive capability beginning with the sphere of intelligence and concluding with the perception of external world was to find a much more sublime expression in the Absolute Knowledge of Hegel. Yet, to remain on Kantian grounds, Kant’s method in unearthing the cognitive ‘faculties’ of human mind depends entirely upon his self-referential position as the universal observer that substitutes the historically determinate scientific knowledge of his day and age for de-historicized, i.e., completely abstract, human being in addition to labelling his philosophy of categorical ratiocination as an identification of the fixed limits of human cognition.\textsuperscript{779} Through his attempt to de-contextualise the cognitive dimensions of what he deemed to be pure mathematics and physics, the Kantian philosopher participated in the Smithian enactment of a capitalistic eternal present whereby a philosophical abstraction was made to grow oblivious to its own historical development.\textsuperscript{780} The theoretical basis of his philosophical endeavour, in that vein, begins with prefigured concepts whose stages of conception is then promptly assigned to critical enquiry: “Time is not an empirical conception. For neither coexistence nor succession would be perceived by us, if the representation of time did not exist as a foundation à priori.”\textsuperscript{781} The critical philosopher (read Kant) does not exist in time since nothing resembling a totalising canopy called time can be fathomed to exist if it

\textsuperscript{778} Andrew Ward’s exposition of the Kantian transcendental critique, in that sense, fails to note an intermediary stage of Kantian reasoning between the analytical forays into the foundational categories of mathematics and natural science in an attempt to postulate general laws constituting a pure form thereof, and the consequent trial of metaphysics in the courthouse of reason, or, perhaps, the other way around. This intermediary stage, which does not follow from the results obtained from its predecessor, is the generalization of the singular process of reasoning, with all its zero-degree preconceptions to an overarching metanarrative holding the keys to the treasures of necessary and universal cognition of reason in its grasp. It is in that vein that we contend that his otherwise fitting elucidation needs to be taken \textit{cum grano salis}: “The strategy of the Critique of Pure Reason may essentially be seen as proceeding in two stages: in the first stage, it investigates \textit{how} it is possible to establish these judgments in mathematics and natural science (where, as Kant sees it, they quite evidently exist); and, on the basis of this investigation, it proceeds, in the second stage, to enquire whether the leading judgments of metaphysics can also be established.” Ward, \textit{Kant}, pp. 6; cf. Schopenhauer, \textit{On the Basis of Morals}, pp. 136; Sartre, \textit{The Transcendence of the Ego}, pp. 32-33.

\textsuperscript{779} Lukács, \textit{The Young Hegel}, pp. 151-153; cf. “\textit{Put in abstracto}, Kant’s procedure is this: that he makes into a result that which would have been the principle or the presupposition (the theology), and he takes as a presupposition that which should have led to the result (the command).” Schopenhauer, \textit{On the Basis of Morals}, pp. 141.


\textsuperscript{781} Kant, \textit{Critique of Pure Reason}, pp. 28; cf. “Particular laws, inasmuch as they concern empirically determined phenomena, cannot be entirely deduced from pure laws, although they all stand under them. Experience must be superadded in order to know these particular laws; but in regard to experience in general and everything that can be cognized as an object thereof, these \textit{à priori} laws are our only rule and guide.” \textit{Ibid}, pp. 94 [Italics mine C.O.]; contra Lukács, ‘Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat’, pp. 127.
was not for the existence of the transcendental subject him or herself.\textsuperscript{782} Time exists because his or her eternalised presence does, hence the warrant to transform it into a cognitive category devoid of all experiential resonance.\textsuperscript{783} The above quotation, however, can just as easily be inverted to claim that time would not be perceived by us, if the representation of coexistence or succession did not exist as its foundational a priori requirements. The unimpeachable existence of Kantian categories, in that regard, can be validated only by the conscious solution of the Cartesian duality of mind and body along the lines of the former.\textsuperscript{784} Only by this manoeuvre of transcendental critique can one endure the endless waves of astonishment of an overripe mind that fills the pages of the three critiques with reasonings reminiscent of seeing the fading rays of light and jolting down “The sun is able to set because I have the concept of its setting in my mind.”\textsuperscript{785} Kant’s postulation of the mind of the critical philosopher as the epitome of the cognitive faculties of the human brain, \textsuperscript{786} as such, does not involve any advance


\textsuperscript{783} “The social partisanship of the idealist goes all the way down to the constituents of their systems. They glorify time as timeless, history as eternal – all for fear that history might begin.” Adorno, \textit{Negative Dialectics}, pp. 332; cf. Lukács, \textit{The Young Hegel}, pp. 160.

\textsuperscript{784} And the cutting of that Gordian knot utilizes as much punitive force as it does with respect to the dogmatic preaching of the doctrine of free will: “All the concepts whereby the \textit{Critique of Practical Reason} proposes, in honour of freedom, to fill the chasm between the Imperative and mankind – law, constraint, respect, duty – all of these are repressive. A causality produced by freedom corrupts freedom into obedience.” Adorno, \textit{Negative Dialectics}, pp. 232.

\textsuperscript{785} For a similar case, one can analyse Kant’s conclusion to his metaphysical exposition of the concept of time and his lukewarm cognitive espousal of the concept followed by the blanket refusal of conceiving time as an objective signifier of material objects arising from earth’s constant revolution around the sun irrespective of how the physiological or psychological states manage to alter its perception. Many a student has felt the injustice of the classroom when the rhythm of the ticking clock does not seem to match with his or her psychological clock of boredom. Yet none, far as anyone can tell, has vented out her anger at the reality of the time itself, threatening to conceive it as a cognitive category of the mind alone: “Time is therefore merely a subjective condition of our (human) intuition (which is always sensuous, that is, so far as we are affected by objects), and in itself, independently of the mind or subject, is nothing. Nevertheless, in respect of all phenomena, consequently of all things which come within the sphere of our experience, it is necessarily objective. We cannot say, “all things are in time,” because in this conception of things in general, we abstract and make no mention of any sort of intuition of things. But this is the proper condition under which time belongs to our representation of objects. If we add the condition to the conception, and say, “all things, as phenomena, that is, objects of sensuous intuition, are in time,” then the proposition has its sound objective validity and universality \textit{à priori}.” Kant, \textit{Critique of Pure Reason}, pp. 31; needless to add, my critique of the Kantian ties that are posited to exist between intuition and the postulation of pure mathematics and physics does not extend to cover Badiou’s meta-ontological axiom that mathematics = ontology. On that note, Badiou’s thesis can best be contemplated as an attempt of mathematically probing on the question of multiplicities without stipulating that the constituents of the latter qualify as \textit{ta onta}. For Badiou, a claim to subjective or objective transcendentalism is, by definition, liable to be haunted by history, which it forsakes, ad infinitum. And that feeble attempt of taking a step beyond the historical horizon can only be overcome if mathematics is summoned as an ontology whose \textit{ta onta} is missing without thereby being consigned on to the plane of objectless wordplay: Badiou, \textit{Being and Event}, pp. 6-7, 13.

\textsuperscript{786} I acknowledge my intellectual debt to Lenin at this point as I am in full accord with his exposition of the two possible solutions of the Cartesian duality, and would like to argue, by extension that its idealist solution certainly invites rethinking the position of Kant in respect to some of the elements that are highlighted in our account: “The materialist elimination of the “dualism of mind and body” (i.e.,

214
towards the resolution of Hume’s postulation of custom as a mediator of the intellect in its cognitive movement from singular experiences to the inference of their foreseeable particular causalities.\textsuperscript{787} His method of enacting a priori concepts as the cognitive conditionality on which any empirical experience can be made shows that the transcendental unity of self-consciousness, or the synthetical unity of apperception,\textsuperscript{788} is to be given precedence over sensory experience thanks in large part to its presupposed inherent objectivity as opposed to the latter’s subjectivity:

“The transcendental unity of apperception is alone valid; the empirical which we do not consider in this essay, and which is merely a unity deduced from the former under the given conditions in concreto, possesses only subjective validity. One person connects the notion conveyed in a word with one thing, another with another thing; and the unity of consciousness in that which is empirical, is, in relation to that which is given by experience, not necessarily and universally valid.”\textsuperscript{789}

\subsection*{3.4.1 Existential Dialectics and Heidegger’s Hermeneutical Ontology}

Moving on to the curious scorn with which Heidegger handles logic in his principal works, and to its underlying theoretical framework, first, we should take critical note of the Heideggerian conception of philosophy as the burdening of the de-historicized Dasein. The essential untimeliness of genuine philosophy\textsuperscript{790} functions, in that regard, as giving historically materialist monism) consists in the assertion that the mind does not exist independently of the body, that mind is secondary, a function of the brain, a reflection of the external world. The idealist elimination of the “dualism of mind and body” (i.e., idealist monism) consists in the assertion that mind is not a function of the body, that, consequently, mind is primary, that the “environment” and the “self” exist only in an inseparable connection of one and the same “complexes of elements.” Lenin, \textit{Materialism and Empirio-Criticism}, pp. 76; cf. “The human brain cannot explain the human mind – there must be a non-physical ingredient, beyond our microscopes, test tubes, electrodes and computers. To the truly open-minded individual, it is fruitless to physically rationalize the uniqueness of mind. There must be a non-physical essence – a ‘spirit’ – in man… Without this non-physical factor, man could be nothing more than a super-ape, more intelligent than the chimp to the same degree that the chimp is more intelligent than a complex animal.” Robert Kuhn, “The Human Mind,” \textit{Probe 69}, (Johannesburg, 1969); cited in David Hulme, ‘Material Facts from a Nonmaterialist Perspective’, in \textit{What Makes Us Human?}, ed. by Charles Pastermak, (Oxford, 2007), pp. 83.

\textsuperscript{787} “Custom, then, is the great guide of human life. It is that principle alone, which renders our experience useful to us, and makes us expect, for the future, a similar train of events with those which have appeared in the past. Without the influence of custom, we should be entirely ignorant of every matter of fact, beyond what is immediately present to the memory and senses. We should never know how to adjust means to ends, or to employ our natural powers in the production of any effect.” Hume, \textit{An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding}, 5.6.

\textsuperscript{788} Kant, \textit{Critique of Pure Reason}, pp. 76-7.

\textsuperscript{789} \textit{Ibid}, pp. 81.

\textsuperscript{790} This point, in complete accord with Nietzsche and Schopenhauer’s theme of the genuine philosopher finding ‘his’ readers only posthumously, is based on the fact that philosophy is not constrained by the necessity of marching to the drumbeat of contemporary thought and its bizarre upheavals but can choose to send tremors to the very roots of any temporality: “Philosophy is essentially untimely because it is one of those few things whose fate it remains never to be able to find a direct resonance in their own time, and never to be permitted to find such resonance. Whenever this seemingly does take place, whenever a philosophy becomes fashion, either there is no actual philosophy or else philosophy is misinterpreted and, according to some intentions alien to it, misused for the needs of the day.” Martin Heidegger, \textit{Introduction to Metaphysics}, trans. by Gregory Fried and Richard Polt, (New Haven,
determinate objects and materials “their weight (Being).” This weight is the philosophical materialization of the concept in its so-called authentic and original form. The ancient Greek concept of *phusis* is, for example, rendered by Heidegger as *das Walten*, indicating not only an “irreducible indeterminacy” of a notable portion of Heideggerian keywords, but also its self-conscious divergence from the academic convention in translating the concept univocally as ‘nature.’ Now, commendable as it is for the translators of Heidegger’s *Introduction to Metaphysics* to have inducted the concept of “holding sway” in its stead, we would like to devise our own interpretation by translating *das Walten* as the ‘prevailing force’ since it is related to a variety of meanings with two core tenets: (I) to command, to regiment, e.g., “*Ein großer König walten über die ganze Erde,*” (an almighty lord commands the land throughout), and (II) to be present as an active force and to prevail, e.g., “*und das Muß, welches in der Harmonie der physischen Kräfte waltet…*”, (and the will, which rules in the harmony of the physical forces…). Given the sense of internal competition that is conveyed by both instances we contend with Knowles in regard to his interpretation of the concept “as the agon – indeed the *polemos* – of the same within itself as carried out through a giving over or offering up of difference, a difference that is at all times driven asunder against itself.” This allusion to the concept’s heralding of the consummation of an incessant internal hermeneutical struggle that gives birth, in the end, to a forceful prevailing of one of the potential emergences of signification is further strengthened by Heidegger’s designation of *phusis* as “the event of standing forth, arising from the concealed and thus enabling the concealed to take its stand for

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the first time,“\(^796\) \textit{Physis} is das \textit{Ent-stehen}, aus dem Verborgenen sich heraus- und dieses so erst in den Stand bringen). Taking his cue from the well-known fifty-third fragment of Heraclitus and its conception of \textit{polemos}\(^797\) in addition to a passage from Aristotle’s metaphysics regarding substances of elements,\(^798\) Heidegger connects his interpretation of an authentic understanding of the Greek \textit{physis} as the prevailing force triumphant with wholeness and for all eternity following the completion of the internal strife pertaining to the beings (\textit{ton enton}) of things and subjects:

“\textit{Physis} as emergence can be experienced everywhere: for example, in celestial processes (the rising of the sun), in the surging of the sea, in the growth of plants, in the coming forth of animals and human beings from the womb. But \textit{physis}, the emerging sway [\textit{das Walten} qua prevailing force – C.O.], is not synonymous with these processes, which we still count as part of “nature.” This emerging and standing-out-in-itself-from-itself may not be taken as just one process among others that we observe in beings. \textit{Physis} is Being itself, by virtue of which beings first become and remain observable.”\(^799\)

Heidegger’s central contention against a traditional, i.e., timely, understanding of metaphysics, on that note, is that his authentic understanding of \textit{physis} as the being of the prevailing force has managed to survive from the earliest available fragments dating back to the Homeric age to those of pre-Socratics only to succumb to an eventual narrowing down towards an exclusive conveyance of the “physical”.\(^800\) Indeed, as the artificially conceived chasm between the physical and the psychical led to yet more profound divergencies between \textit{ousia} and \textit{physis}, as the twin authentic significations supporting Being’s essential rapport with constancy,\(^801\)


\(^797\) \textit{πόλεμος πάντων μεν πατήρ έστι, πάντων δε βασιλεύς, και τους μεν θεούς ἐδειξε τους δε ανθρώπους τοις μεν δούλοις ἐποίησε τοὺς δὲ ἐλευθέρους.”\ Heidegger translates this passage as “Confrontation is indeed for all (that comes to presence) the sire (who lets emerg) e, but (also) for all the preserver that holds sway. For it lets some appear as gods, others as human beings, some it produces (sets forth) as slaves, but others as free.” Heidegger, \textit{Introduction to Metaphysics}, pp. 65; some of the main divergences of Heidegger’s interpretation from a more conventional translation can be seen in comparison to our more conventional rendering: “Strife/war is both the father of all and the king of all,” and, “and it has shown some as gods and others as human beings, made some slaves and others free.”; cf. Martin Heidegger and Eugen Fink, \textit{Heraclitus Seminar 1966/67}, trans. by Charles H. Seibert, (Alabama, 1979), pp. 23-24.

\(^798\) “We, however, are investigating principles and fundamental causes, and these must evidently pertain \textit{per se} to a kind of nature. Now the traditional search for the \textit{elements} of the things that there are is in fact the search for these very principles. So the elements, too, of that which is must pertain to it not accidentally but quia thing that is. And by the same token this inquiry also comprises the investigation of the primary \textit{causes} of that which is \textit{qua} that which is.” Aristotle, \textit{Metaphysics}, 1003a26-32.


logic became the chief tool of trade to invent *episteme logike* as the science of a downgraded *logos* that has been upheld by the clueless epigones of the erstwhile rupture between the object and the subject. Corresponding to a religious-philosophical polarity between Idea and material Dasein, the post-Platonic currents of Occidental philosophy attempted to collapse Being into a tortured objectivity that is purported to be possessed by any object.\(^{802}\) The science of logic, in other words, was invented at the twilight of the recognition of the authentic relation of Being qua *phusis* to its un-concealment qua *aletheia*,\(^{803}\) whereby *logos* qua the gatheredness of beings (underscoring the derivation of *logos* from its allegedly original meaning of *legein*—to collect)\(^{804}\) and as an extended equivalent of *phusis* conceived, of course, along the lines of *das Walten*.\(^{805}\) Denoting the restriction of Being to a mere logical correspondence of discourse as mere hearsay, *glossa*, and to idea as the singular yet crystallized epiphenomenal *eidos*, the rise of the logical epistemology signals the ebb of Being qua truth as *aletheia*:\(^{806}\)

“This implies that the decision about what is true now takes place as a confrontation between correct saying and mere hearsay. Logos, in the sense of saying and asserting, now becomes the domain and place where decisions are made about truth – that is, originally, about the unconcealment of beings and thus about the Being of beings. In the inception, logos as gathering *is* the happening of unconcealment; logos is grounded in unconcealment and is in service to it. But now, logos as assertion becomes the locus of truth in the sense of correctness…. Truth, which was originally, as unconcealment, a happening of the beings

\(^{802}\) Vattimo, *Les aventures de la différence*, pp. 38.

\(^{803}\) “The true as such is in being. This says that what shows itself in its sway stands in the unconcealed. The unconcealed as such comes to a stand in showing itself. Truth, as un-concealment, is not an addendum to Being.” Heidegger, *Introduction to Metaphysics*, pp. 107; cf. Martin Heidegger, “The Origin of the Work of Art”, in *Off the Beaten Track*, ed. and trans. by Julian Young and Kenneth Haynes, (Cambridge, 2002), pp. 37. For a detailed extrapolation of the essential relationship between *phusis* and *aletheia* and their pertinence to the human Dasein in regard to Heidegger’s interpretation of the Aristotelian “φιλοσοφείν περί τις αλήθειας” (philosophizing concerning truth) and the Parmenidean “αναγκζωμενος δ’ ακολουθειν τοις φαινομενοις” (the necessity to follow the apparent ones), see Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, pp. 256-273; Heidegger, ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’, pp. 35.

\(^{804}\) Heidegger, *Introduction to Metaphysics*, pp. 131; “legein is the clue for arriving at those structures of Being which belong to the entities we encounter in addressing ourselves to anything or speaking about it [im Ansprechen und Besprechen].” Heidegger, *Being and Time*, pp. 47.

\(^{805}\) “Phusis and logos are the same. Logos thus characterizes Being in a new and yet old respect: that which is in being, which stands straight and prominently in itself, is gathered in itself and from itself, and holds itself in such gathering.” Heidegger, *Introduction to Metaphysics*, pp. 138-9; Lang exposes all the brittle preconceptions of linguistic superiority on which Heidegger’s fascination of bridging etymology with ontological authenticity stood: Lang, *Heidegger’s Silence*, pp. 44-46.

\(^{806}\) This tension between a degraded conception of language as mere hearsay and its exalted counterpart which clads the words with an armour of philosophical genuineness is brilliantly exposed by Adorno in his critique of German existentialism in general and that of Heidegger in particular: “In its objective impossibility the jargon [of existentialist authenticity] reacts toward the imminent impossibility of language. Language gives itself over either to the market, to balderdash, or to the predominating vulgarity. On the other hand language shoves its way toward the judge’s bench, envelops itself in judicial garb, and in that way asserts its privilege. The jargon is the happy synthesis which makes it explode.” Adorno, *The Jargon of Authenticity*, pp. xix; cf. Lefebvre, *Le langage et la société*, pp. 145 ff.
themselves that held sway, and was governed by means of gathering, now becomes a property of logos.”

In siding with the ontological primordiality of Being in conjunction with the irreducible polysemy of the authentic language, Heidegger thus attempted to outmanoeuvre the despotic tendencies of logic as the supreme court of judgment effacing the ancient understanding of truth as das Walten. Ontologically, Heidegger’s ascription of overarching supra-personal puissance to socio-political structures that were to inundate many European societies in the immediate aftermath of the publishing of Sein und Zeit can be seen, in harmony with the later insights of Alfred Sohn-Rethel, as a clairvoyant treatment of the infinite shrinking of the theme of bourgeois individuality. In epistemological grounds, however, this elaborate attempt to rethink the origins of the most fundamental metaphysical questions of all to invite a reinvigorated appraisal of the question of Being boils down to the enactment of a frozen yardstick of ontology that is able to lift itself only by its own bootstraps. The fusion of horizons, to utilize a Heideggerian term, in which any ontological inquiry must participate, is set by the inquirer qua philosopher as he or she defines the limits of examinations applicable to each sphere of knowledge. Beyond the metaphysical veil of Maya stretches the uncharted depths of Sein, calmly stirring its waters for those that heed the Heideggerian “alliud dicitur, alliud demonstratur.” Unless one wills to fall prey to the siren song of building inarticulate hermeneutic circles, however, he or she needs to keep an eye for predefined limits of

Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, pp. 198-9; cf. “Not only is it wrong to invoke Aristotle for the thesis that the genuine ‘locus’ of truth lies in the judgment; even in its content this thesis fails to recognize the structure of truth. Assertion is not the primary ‘locus’ of truth. On the contrary, whether as a mode in which uncoveredness is appropriated or as a way of Being-in-the-world, assertion is grounded in Dasein’s uncovering, or rather in its disclosedness. The most primordial ‘truth’ is the ‘locus’ of assertion; it is the ontological condition for the possibility that assertions can be either true or false – that they may uncover or cover things up.” Heidegger, Being and Time, pp. 268-269.

“Das Leben der wirklichen Sprache besteht in der Vieldeutlichkeit. Die Umschattung der lebendigen Wörter in der Starheit einer eindeutig, mechanisch fetgelesete Reichenfolge wäre der Tod der Sprache.”


“The Weg zum Sein ist ein Wegwerfen aller objektiven Bestimmungen der Wirklichkeit. Die Ontologie Heideggers fordert überall gebieterisch dieses Wegwerfen, damit der Mensch (das Subjekt, das Dasein) sich der entwesentlichenden, uneigentlich machenden Macht des „Man“ entziehen könne.”


“From this point [his self-proclaimed discovery of the essence of truth] on Heidegger progressively emphasizes the definition of aletheia (“Truth”) as an unveiling or disclosure–always with the stipulation, however, that the process will not occur without evocation and readiness. He thus hopes to avoid replacing the externally imposed epistemological categories of both realism and critical idealism with a subjectivist and (in his view) equally arbitrary version of intuition. There must then be mediation in some sense between Truth or its “finder,” but mediation that demands no more of Truth or its knower than an opening or evocation …”

Lang, Heidegger’s Silence, pp. 49; cf. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, pp. 71-72.

ontological inquiry at all times. With the basic opposition of ontological to ontical inquiry, for example, not only are the fields of human knowledge separated once and for all but also ranked according to the order of primordiality that the inquirer is then able to discern on ontological grounds, enticing the latter to pay scarce any heed to the fact that language itself is a “fait social.”

The ontological meaning of Being, in that vein, is not an arena of philosophical contest wherein distinct metaphysical postulations can be deployed anew in an attempt to challenge the preconceived horizons of philosophical inquiry. The horizons of any question pertaining to the meaning of Being is not to be sought without respite; it is to be defined, albeit poetically, and thereby fixed. The very formulation of the Heideggerian question, in that sense, is the formulation that foreshadows the limits of questioning which is not prone to be altered thereafter: “We do not know what ‘Being’ means. But even if we ask, ‘What is ‘Being’?’, we keep within an understanding of the ‘is’, though we are unable to fix conceptionally what that ‘is’ signifies. We do not even know the horizon in terms of which that meaning is to be grasped and fixed.”

In defining the architectonics of the ontological questionnaire Heidegger hence ‘resolves’ the interpretation of historical entities to construct a ‘non-deductive genealogy’ that serves rather as a pregiven aristocratic pedigree that can only be studied by abiding by the linear connections that had been jotted down by the oldest kin.

Yet, there appears to be a basic conditionality that needs to be satisfied if such an ontologically grounded epistemology that proposes to move from *modi essendi* to *modi significandi* is to be validated in regard to the preconceived subjectivity of the horizons that fuelled the

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817 An interesting congruity can be drawn between the hermeneutic etymology of Heidegger’s depth ontology and the hunt for a preconceived set of rules of universal grammar that was commenced by the Modistae of the late thirteen and early fourteenth centuries. Principally known for their impact on the works of Dante, this loosely integrated group with Thomas of Erfurt at its forefront led the charge of an initial wave of speculative linguistics that was later to take the form of a quest for advancing the groundwork of an a priori grammar. Susceptible to the Modist influence on what he saw in late 1910s as the question of ontological meaning, Heidegger utilised Thomas’ various linguistic theses, albeit falsely attributing them to Duns Scotus, in order to engage in a first probe into his vaunted realm of the ontological bases of semantic phenomena. Martin Heidegger, *Die Kategorien- und Bedeutungslehre des Duns Scotus*, in *Frühe Schriften*, (Frankfurt, 1972), pp. 130-375; cf. Constantino Marmo, *Semiotica e linguaggio nella scolastica: Parigi, Bologna, Erfurt, 1270-1330. La semiotica dei Modisti*, (Rome, 1994); Eco, *The Search for the Perfect Language*, pp. 43-45; Umberto Eco, ‘Languages of Paradise’, in *Serendipities. Language and Lunacy*, trans. by William Weaver, (London, 1998), pp. 50-51.
conceptions of its originator: the repositioning of Heideggerian ontological inquiry itself along the genealogical lines that he purported to exist.

Setting out from an aphoristically conceived maxim, “the entity which in every case we ourselves are, is ontologically that which is farthest,” Heidegger constructs his analytics of Dasein in a manner strikingly reminiscent of the transcendental aesthetics and analytics of Kant. Kant’s transcendental analysis of utterances in terms of the primary categories of mind that are served on the platter of logic, pure mathematical science, and pure physical science, to determine the limits of logical reasoning for all eternity thus finds its strange mirror image in the post-metaphysical ontology of Heidegger. Indeed, the Kantian critique anticipates the epistemological contours of Heideggerian ontology roughly by two and a half centuries by virtue of a fact that was missed by the Königsbergian professor but identified with great perspicacity by Heidegger in his introduction to Being and Time: their interpretation of the concept of nature: “Similarly the positive outcome of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason lies in what it has contributed towards the working out of what belongs to any Nature whatsoever, not in a ‘theory’ of knowledge. His transcendental logic is an a priori logic for the subject-matter of that area of Being called “Nature,” The Kantian transcendental analytic had aimed at the identification of the cognitive rules that are prerequisite to ratiocinate nature; Heideggerian anti-dialectical ontology ends up by essentializing nature in the form of phusis.

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818 Heidegger, Being and Time, pp. 359.
819 “Since mathematical judgments determine the form of space and time, and hence … the form of empirical objects, it follows that all our possible experience – since it has only to do with appearances – must accord with the synthetic a priori judgments of mathematics.” Ward, Kant, pp. 65.
820 Just as Kant’s transcendental analytic of judgment does not afford categorical keys to be disposed of once their basics are laid out on the open, Heidegger’s hermeneutical ontology bears no promise to finally overcome the inverted metaphysics on which has ruminated the various strands of Occidental philosophy for too long. In keeping with the subversive premises of his depth ontology, the new metaphysics will, instead, operate on a Heideggerian plane that does not make a virtue out of the once imposed Judeo-Christian necessity of obliviousness in regard to its pre-Platonic roots: “Was heißt "Überwindung der Metaphysik"? im seingeschichtlichen Denken ist dieser Titel nur behelfsmäßig gebraucht, damit es sich überhaupt verständlich machen kann. In Wahrheit gibt dieser Titel zu vielen Mißverständnissen Anlaß: denn er läßt die Erfahrung nicht auf den Grund kommen, von dem aus erst die Geschichte des Seins ihr Wesen offenbart. Es ist das Er-eignis in dem das Sein selbst verwunden wird. Überwindung meint vor allem nicht Wegdrängen einer Disziplin aus dem Geschichtskreis der philosophischen "Bildung." “Metaphysik” ist schon als Geschick der Wahrheit des Seienden gedacht, d.h. der Seiendheit, als einer noch verborgen, aber ausgezeichneten Ereignung, nämlich der Vergessenheit des Seins.” Martin Heidegger, Vorträge und Aufsätze, in Gesamtausgabe, VII, (Frankfurt, 2000b), pp. 69; cf. Meikle, Aristotle’s Economic Thought, pp. 182 ff; Derrida, Specters of Marx, pp. 32-33; for a piercing probe into the Heideggerian relationship between Überwindung and Verwindung, see Vattimo, Les aventures de la différence, pp. 130-131; Vattimo and Zabala, Hermeneutic Communism, pp. 175 n. 25.
821 Heidegger, Being and Time, pp. 31.
by allocating an ontical space for its material properties.\footnote{Heidegger, Being and Time, pp. 27.} Heidegger’s anticipation of any future criticism levelled against the evident circularity of his question,\footnote{Diligently tackled by Vattimo, that question revolves around Heidegger’s relationship with historicism. There is but one way for any anti-foundational thinking of ta onta to not to succumb to the allure of a historicist continuum while keeping its distance from any attempt to turn Prägungen, i.e., imprints, into Derridean signposts: engaging in a mnemonic dialogue with the past whose authenticity is to be attained through the reciprocal projection of the past and present onto each other: Vattimo, Les aventures de la différence, pp. 165, 193 ff; cf. Derrida, Of Spirit, pp. 9.17f.} as such, is rather a signal of the \textit{petitio principii} that gushes forth out of every pore of his inquiry into the Being of Dasein: how can Heidegger’s post-metaphysical ontology yearn for the complete definition of the horizon of any question concerning Being if the horizon itself, as the Heideggerian attempt shows, is ever prone to change?\footnote{\textit{Contra} Adorno, Negative Dialectics, pp. 65-66.}

The answer to that question brings us back to where we started. In demoting logic to a hackneyed wordplay cultivated on the soil of the lost ontological essence of Dasein,\footnote{Christopher Norris, Against Relativism: Philosophy of Science, Deconstruction, and Critical Theory, (Oxford, 1997), pp. 149.} Heidegger stigmatizes any scientific endeavour geared towards attaining a richer understanding of nature without setting out from the set of premises furnished by the hermeneutical ontology itself. Heidegger’s anti-epistemological ontology,\footnote{Cf. Sartre, Réflexions sur la question juive, pp. 46.} in that vein, mystifies any questioning of nature, irrespective of its foundational arguments, as just another instance of the predestined result of Being growing ever wearier because of being oblivious to its own ontological roots. The epistemologically, and morally according to Christopher Norris,\footnote{Heidegger, \textit{Being and Time}, pp. 27.} obtuse set of core arguments that fan the flames of the trenchant exclamations in his writings on technology, can thus be seen as the expression of Heidegger’s deep-seated distrust of any claim to philosophize in default of the horizon of ontological analytic that is set up in \textit{Being and Time}. Any ontologically unmindful attempt that is propelled towards the emendation of natural knowledge is thus dragged down by its essential boundedness, the limits of which can only be discerned by an authentically grasping depth-ontology:

“The threat to man does not come in the first instance from the potentially lethal machines and apparatuses of technology. The actual threat has already afflicted man in his essence. The rule

\footnote{“Only in some definite mode of its own Being-in-the-world can Dasein discover entities as Nature. This manner of knowing them has the character of depriving the world of its worldhood in a definite way. ‘Nature’, as the categorical aggregate of those structures of Being which a definite entity encountered within-the-world may possess, can never make \textit{worldhood} intelligible. But even the phenomenon of ‘Nature’, as it is conceived, for instance, in romanticism, can be grasped ontologically only in terms of the concept of the world – that is to say, in terms of the analytic of Dasein.” \textit{Ibid}, I.3.65; cf. Artur Schopenhauer, \textit{On the Freedom of the Will}, in \textit{The Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics}, pp. 82.}
of enframing threatens man with the possibility that it could be denied to him to enter into a more original revealing and hence to experience the call of a more primordial truth.\footnote{829} The ingrained limitation of natural knowledge is that its instrumental reason is morally self-destructive if it remains heedless of the ontological grounds of its attainment and threads the homeotic path instead. Indeed, truth as mere correspondence, as we have seen above, offers a detestable sight of idea qua ontological abomination inadvertently turning a blind eye on its pre-Socratic unity with \textit{phasis} conceived as Being in its full glory. In order for the hermeneutical ontology to complete its circles, history needs to be conceived mainly along the lines of a linguistics that is slanted towards ontology. When such a linguistically oriented expropriation of any historical content is initiated, however, there emerges the sudden risk of a de-contextual neurosis that is liable to refute any historical rapprochement between theory and practice on the basis of its own hermeneutical postulates alone.\footnote{830} And with a sanction of sagacity pertaining to individual utterances assuming the place of an understanding of historical process as a continuum of clashing complexes, bits and pieces of the latter are, then, erected as pillars of a tabernacle of Being, housing everything of ontological wonder.\footnote{831} Interestingly, in case that the pillars housing this tabernacle are extended outwards towards an ontological sphere of commonality that is susceptible of seeping into an incessantly stipulated dialogue between \textit{Sein} and \textit{Dasein} we are likely to reach an impasse of totality keeping tabs on all the processes that have hitherto been generated by human communities in order either to internalise the externality of \textit{Dasein} or externalise Being in its multifaceted valences. Combined with Vattimo’s argument that only via such a weakened conversational understanding\footnote{832} of the Heideggerian ontology can we hope to banish the Hegelianism miasma of the concept of ‘thinking in traces’ that is more in tune with \textit{An-denken} rather than \textit{Denken},\footnote{833} any glimpse of history qua totality can only be realised if any hope of millenarian reconciliation is finally shed. Alas, taking a leave of permanent absence from the existential comfort zone that has been provided by Occidental metaphysics solves only half of our

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830 ”L’ontologie herméneutique, qui saute le problème de l’unification du faire et du savoir en le donnant pour acquis grâce à la reconnaissance du caractère linguistique et herméneutique de l’existence, demeure en vérité liée à la séparation de la théorie et de la pratique.” Vattimo, \textit{Les aventures de la différence}, pp. 46-47.


problems. For if any fixed, and thus hypothesised, point of interpretation needs to be ruled out a priori, then there arises the need to construct a semiotic thread that is capable of holding together numerous acts by a single agent in order to avert falling into the zone interdite of the law of excluded middle. An unilinear collection of projective traces untracing the ossified fixity of the ‘here and now’ so that one can communalise his or her Dasein without being spirited away by the ontological raptures of Sein is hence the first step toward the enactment of an existential plane of acts whose semiosis cannot be tackled by a Derridean post-ontology of foundational absence. Taking Wittgenstein’s Sprachspiel\(^835\) rather than any professedly anti-metaphysical coup de dés as my model in keeping with the Sartrean need to provide an existential ground for the totalising singular events into a semiotic collectivity, I hark back to my the attribution of zero-degree operative reality to external universe. In order for semiosis to kick off, any individual needs to be experienced first and foremost as an incoherent continuity of acts in reference. And if no foundational seriality is to be afforded to this ever-growing nexus of acts other than a simple materiality of all that has been experienced, then a Kierkegaardian movement of repetition, as opposed to the Platonic recollection,\(^836\) turns into the utmost limit that can be conferred on our understanding of Sein by an enfeebled post-metaphysical hermeneutic. Further, given that Kierkegaard’s construal of the notion is an heir

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\(^{834}\) Though I admit the relevance of the imagery of the ever-returning Marxian spectre, as it was conceived by Derrida, for a post-metaphysical rethinking of communism, I think that the generalisation of the fact of working within a certain first world want of theoretical urgency is uncalled for in regard to considering the significance of an idea that has never been quite as out of favour with the disadvantaged masses of the global South as it has been in many parts of Europe. Anti-foundationalism has certainly played a major role in many underdeveloped corners of the world that might seem akin to the part it played in the fading away of some of the foremost parties of Eurocommunism. But with a receding of the tides of erstwhile benefits that were provided by the welfare state prior to the great neoliberal transformation of 1980s, which has hanged out millions to dry in incomparably worse conditions than their European counterparts, a foundational touchstone, self-effacing as it is, appears warranted: cf. “There are several times of the specter. It is a proper characteristic of the specter, if there is any, that no one can be sure if by returning it testifies to a living past or to a living future, for the revenant may already mark the promised return of the specter of living being. … In this regard, communism has always been and will remain spectral: it is always still to come and is distinguished, like democracy itself, from every living present understood as plenitude of a presence-to-itself, as totality of a presence effectively identical to itself. Capitalist societies can always heave a sigh of relief and say to themselves: communism is finished since the collapse of the totalitarianisms of the twentieth century and not only is it finished, but it did not take place, it was only a ghost. They do no more than disavow the undeniable itself: a ghost never dies, it remains always to come and to come-back.” Derrida, Specters of Marx, pp. 123; cf. Peter Sloterdijjk, Derrida, an Egyptian: On the Problem of the Jewish Pyramid, trans. by Wieland Hoban, (Cambridge, 2009), pp. 8-9; Ali, The Extreme Centre, pp. 128.


\(^{836}\) “Say what you will, this problem is going to play an important role in modern philosophy because repetition is a decisive expression for what ‘recollection’ was for the Greeks. Just as they thought that all knowledge is recollection, thus will modern philosophy teach that life itself is a repetition. … Repetition and recollection are the same movement, just in opposite directions, because what is recollected has already been and is thus repeated backwards, whereas genuine repetition is recollected forwards.” Kierkegaard, Repetition, in Repetition and Philosophical Crumbs, 9.
to the Christian legacy of metaphysical leaps of faith which is unpalatable by our reckoning.\(^{837}\) we propose to conceive the concept as an ontological entrenchment of our aforementioned triad of needs. On that note, no transcendental consciousness but a myriad of in situ responses to socio-historically determined needs instigates the collection of polyphonic instants of any irreducible Dasein. Constantine Constantius is a studious fellow talking head, a sensitive poet, a gambler before death and a lofty sharer of crumbs of wisdom all in one. But apart from his self-valorised thirst after a possible disentanglement of the Socratic and Christian sites of Truth, he is all the existential dimensions of a historical Dasein that is in search for a wayward communication with Being.\(^{838}\) And that desire to engage in a fruitful communication with Being springs from the satisfaction of the conditions of upholding a first-level faith which allows Constantius to attempt to climb a ladder of existence. Conceived through the lens of hermeneutic ontology, repetition is just as much a modelling of unrepeatable singular acts after a discontented modality of Being as it is any self-defeating attempt to differentiate quotidian reality as singular traces of the Derridean iteration from seamless continuity.\(^{839}\) Dasein is essentially without significance; it needs both moments of la différence in order to partake of semiotic intelligibility.\(^{840}\) For one can only quote, and hence de-contextualise, an unsaturable act so long as it retains, albeit at the zero-degree significance of communication, its capability to be re-contextualised.\(^{841}\) In Kierkegaardian imagery, if there is no Hegelian banquet, then, there can be no philosophical crumbs either. I abide by the hermeneutic communist defence

\(^{837}\) Vattimo, *Les aventures de la différence*, pp. 22.


\(^{839}\) In contrast to Searle’s foundationalist attempt to supervise the ‘scientific growth’ of a scientific language, Derrida’s concept of iterability denotes an open-ended capability of individual texts to generate different meaning complexes when transposed from one context to another. Although the margin of differentiation can never be said to follow any strict guidelines, as a rule of thumb it will depend on how much of a contextual distance separates two textual instances: Jacques Derrida, *Limited Inc.*, trans. by Samuel Weber and Jeffrey Mehlman, (Evanston, Il., 1988), pp. 62 ff; Derrida, *Specters of Marx*, pp. 10-11.

\(^{840}\) This measure of semiotic intelligibility is liable to be stretched ontologically in order for it to encompass even the most prosaic of existential questions. The fact that A.’s self-conscious derogation of both the slavishness pertaining to the necessities of being a wage-earner and the unquestioning comfort with which those that do not need to work for their living settle rather nicely into their niches of motifs of meaninglessness, thus, suggests the existence of an editor, i.e., Kierkegaard, whose editorial tonality affords a precise check on even the minutest resonances between Sein and Dasein: Kierkegaard, *Either/Or*, pp. 49; cf. “No difference without alterity, no alterity without singularity, no singularity without here-now.” Derrida, *Specters of Marx*, pp. 37.

\(^{841}\) Jacques Derrida, ‘Signature, Event, Context’, in *Margins of Philosophy*, trans. by Alan Bass, (Chicago, 1982), pp. 320; these ontological steps of decontextualization and recontextualization can be imagined as existentialist reverberations of what the Derridean image of pyramid conveys by virtue of its post-metaphysical promises. A semiotic structure of foremost cohesiveness in its erstwhile Hegelian formulation, the pyramid is rethought by Derrida so that it can retain its preservative quality only to the extent that it is subjected to the self-critical probes aiming for continuous ontological divestment. Transportable and permanent in equal measure, the pyramid is then relocated into a post-metaphysical pit of semiotic transformation in order to consummate the deconstruction of the metaphysical tradition: Sloterdijk, *Derrida, an Egyptian*, pp. 56 ff.
of anti-foundationalism, as such, only to the extent that it does not write off a Sartrean understanding of needs as an itinerary of the production of history. Needless to add, precious little remains in the way of theoretical bite if one turns, having renounced all of his or her transcendental horizons,⁸⁴² to face the late capitalistic reality of totalising rule of technical means of production and reproduction over entire societies. It is in that sense that the moral indignation of technology offered by the Heideggerian version⁸⁴³ of Hölderlin’s Der Rhein⁸⁴⁴ borders on a sublime parody when technology’s preconceived ‘mysteriousness’ urges Heidegger to “compare mechanized agriculture with the gas-chambers at Auschwitz, or – in his correspondence with Marcuse – to equate the treatment of the Jews in Nazi Germany to the post-war suffering of displaced populations in Soviet-occupied Eastern Europe.”⁸⁴⁵

Having arrived at the point where we need to jump the ship that carry the precious cargo of Kantian and Heideggerian epistemologies in hopes of salvaging anything of value, we argue that considerations relevant to logic, contrary to what the analytical Marxists may purport, are not exempt from the creation of epistemic value. We further claim, in the light of our examination of the Kantian transcendental analytic and the Heideggerian ontology of Being, that both epistemologies converge on this premise. His shunning of logic as the usurper of the crown of ontology left aside, Heidegger’s method, for one, does entail the incessant reconsideration of otherwise crystallized epitomes of ancient philosophy. The hermeneutical ontology he introduces with respect to the Parmenidean sixth fragment is an example among many others to illustrate how a simple rendering of *chre to legein te noein t’eon emmenai* (necessary it is to say and to think that being is) can swerve from the tradition when Heidegger conceives it thus: “needful is *legein* [to collect as a manifestation of Being in Heideggerian

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⁸⁴³ Canvassing a truly romantic portrayal of the dammed-up Rhine in concerting detail, Heidegger strikes the finishing note in a truly masterful manner: “But, it will be replied, the Rheine is still a river in the landscape, is it not? Perhaps. But how? In no other way than as an object on call for inspection by a tour group ordered there by the vacation industry.” Heidegger, ‘The Question Concerning Technology’, pp. 321.

⁸⁴⁴ It appears that Heidegger had the stanzas 46-53 of *Der Rhein* when he invoked Hölderlin’s poem as a striking contrast of engineering’s instrumentality. Yet, we think that the allusion goes both ways in also undermining the anti-epistemological roots of ontological analytic: “Ein Rätsel ist Reinentsprungenes. Auch | Der Gesang kaum darf es enthüllen. Denn | Wie du anfingst, wirst du bleiben, | So viel auch wirkt die Not, | Und die Zucht, das meiste nämlich | Vermag die Geburt, | Und der Lichtstrahl, der | Dem Neugebornen begegnet.” Friedrich Hölderlin, ‘Der Rhein’ in *Gedichte*, (Stuttgart, 1990), 46-53.

⁸⁴⁵ Norris, *Against Relativism*, pp. 151; still, intellectually barren as it was, the purveyor of that none too fussy lump-sum commentary, which is made up of a conflation of mechanised relations of production and those of genocide, took caution not to stray too far ahead in its course of crude analogies, leaving the pride of place for lumping together Hitler and Stalin under the blanket concept of totalitarianism to those ‘new philosophers’ of post-1970s for their signal services in the field of anti-communism: Badiou, *The Communist Hypothesis*, pp. 3 ff; cf. Badiou, *Being and Event*, pp. 255.
dictum] as well as the apprehension, namely, the being [das Seiend] in its Being.”

The Kantian aesthetic theory of the beautiful and the sublime, likewise, exemplify how the transcendental analytic, and its postulations drawing a not insignificant part of their reasoning from logic, of the Critique of Pure Reason finds its counterpart in the realm of aesthetic judgment with the same degree of theoretical expectation concerning their necessity and universality. Conceived as the theoretical bridge connecting the continent of the transcendental analytic of pure reason to that of practical reason with its corresponding synthetic a priori judgments pertaining to the sphere of morality, the judgment of taste enjoins the cognitive categories of intuition to partake of the Kantian understanding of moral duty with its direct links to a particular interpretation of freedom:

“Now, since no concept of the object underlies the judgment here [in the sphere of the principle of taste], it can consist only in the subsumption of the imagination itself (in the case of a representation whereby an object is given) under the conditions enabling the understanding in general to advance from the intuition to concepts. That is to say, since the freedom of the imagination consists precisely in the fact that it schematizes without a concept, the judgment of taste must found upon a mere sensation of the mutually enlivening activity of the imagination in its freedom, and of the understanding with its conformity to law.”

The dialectical materialist understanding of logical universals invite the constant reconceptualization of external reality on the conceptual basis of cognition whereby an agreement with Valentin Voloshinov’s classical critique of Saussurian linguistics can be reached. This challenge to Saussure’s understanding of linguistics as “the relationship of sign

846 Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, pp. 149; cf. “This is the root of Heidegger’s archaism. The ambiguity of the Greek words for “being” – an ambiguity that dates back to the Ionians’ failure to distinguish between materials, principles, and the pure essence – is not listed as a defect but as original superiority. Its mission is to heal the concept of “Being” of the wound of its conceptuality, of the split between thoughts and their content.” Adorno, Negative Dialectics, pp. 70.

847 One need not venture as far as the Kantian theory of the beautiful and the sublime in order to recognize value-creation as an inherent characteristic of practical judgments. It is to be recalled, on that note, that the sole purpose of practical judgment, according to Kant, is to find an a priori standard to distinguish good and evil actions without any resort to either pain or pleasure: Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, 184.

848 “When the form of an object, (as opposed to the matter of its representation, as sensation) is, in the mere act of reflecting upon it, without regard to any concept to be obtained from it, judged as the ground of a pleasure in the representation of such an object, then this pleasure is also judged to be combined necessarily with the representation of it, and so not merely for the subject apprehending this form, but for all in general who pass judgment. The object is then called beautiful; and the faculty of judging by means of such a pleasure (and so also with universal validity) is called taste.” Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment, trans. by James Creed Meredith, (Oxford, 2008), 190; cf. Ibid, 213.

849 “The will is a kind of causality belonging to living beings in so far as they are rational, and freedom would be this property of such causality that it can be efficient, independently of foreign causes determining it; just as physical necessity is the property that the causality of all irrational beings has of being determined to activity by the influence of foreign causes.” Immanuel Kant, Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. by Thomas Kingsmill Abbot, (Mineola, NY., 2005), pp. 65.

to sign within a closed system,”\textsuperscript{851} or the closed system of \textit{le parole}, i.e., individual speech utterances that remain incomprehensible if conceived without \textit{la langue}, i.e., the antecedent set of rules governing the space of possibility determining the signification of any singular linguistic formation, vows to complete the transition from the Saussurian monology\textsuperscript{852} to a dialogical understanding of linguistic sign. If language is to be conceived, in accord with Badiou, of as the “very being of truth,” that is made up of an infinitesimal combination of apparently finite horizon of spatio-temporal enquiries and a future anterior of generic infinities that abound with references-to-come, then, the denotations ascribed to any universal can never be afforded to possess a self-referential truth content. In order for the material basis of any future anterior to occur, one is obliged to render unto perceptions that which are theirs as collective representations whose referents can have no share of any procedures of truth in and of themselves.\textsuperscript{853} The \textit{hic et nunc} self-conscious acts of any social being serves as the passage through which all the past perfect continuous conjectures of the has-been are projected onto any truth to come.\textsuperscript{854} With a fecund materiality that can never be made to entertain any

\textsuperscript{851} Voloshinov, \textit{Marxism and the Philosophy of Language}, pp. 96; interestingly, Marxist authors with distinguishable structuralist leanings, such as Adam Schaff, have displayed a penchant for taking a linguistic turn whenever they wished to justify their defence of a quasi-mechanistic determinism along the lines of “Das vorgefundene Milieu formt der Menschen, macht ihn zu dem, was er ist.” That assured comfort which is sought within the realm of linguistics, never the less, does not appear congruent to the display of any haste either to acknowledge or to disavow any ties that can be stipulated to exist between such linguistic determinism and the iron-clad ‘naturalism’ of a foremost structuralist like Claude Lévi-Strauss, whose conception of language has been aptly torn apart by Henri Lefebvre in the following words: “Le langage, comme système, définit la société comme système, et aussi les formes de la pensée. Il détient donc une sorte de fonction transcendantale. C’est le ‘lieu de notre installation’. Nous sommes pris dans le système du langage, dans l’implication de signifiants et de signifiés … Le dogmatisme de la structure verse dans un idéalisme … assez stupéfiant. Par un vieux procédé … il met le monde à l’envers. Il voit dans la vie sociale l’œuvre du langage, au lieu du concevoir le langage comme une œuvre de la société. Il pense que les autres ‘champs’ sont les simples résultats du langage, il met mots avant et au-dessus des choses, au lieu de montrer comment les mots et les choses et leurs connexions sont des œuvres.” Cited in Schmidt, ‘Der strukturalistische Angriff auf die Geschichte’, pp. 234-235; Lefebvre, \textit{Le langage et la société}, pp. 194, 325 ff; \textit{contra} Schaff, \textit{Marx oder Sartre?}, pp. 73 ff.

\textsuperscript{852} The Saussurian binary of \textit{le parole} and \textit{la langue} is thus conceived in direct opposition to the materialist theories of knowledge upholding the epistemological precedence of the external world to any linguistic conceptions, and thus observed that “far from it being the object that antedates the viewpoint, it would seem that it is the viewpoint that creates the object.” Ferdinand de Saussure, \textit{Course in General Linguistics}, trans. by Wade Baskin, (London, 1974), pp. 3; cf. Raymond Williams, \textit{Marxism and Literature}, (Oxford, 1977), pp. 27-8; Lefebvre, \textit{La vie quotidienne dans le monde moderne}, pp. 211 ff; for a detailed attempt at locating the Russian Marxists’ critique of structuralist linguistics with regard to the general aesthetic theories of Russian formalists, see Tony Bennett, \textit{Formalism and Marxism}, (London, 1979).

\textsuperscript{853} “To exclude the intentions of the speakers, but to forge in some way the referential bond, a strong ontology would have to presuppose a Divine Mind, or an Infinite one, if you will. Taking for granted that the world exists independently of our knowledge of it, and that it exists as a population of essences reciprocally governed by laws, only a Mind that knows the world exactly as it is (and as It created it), and that indulgently accepts that the same essence can be referred to in different languages, can “fix” the referent in a stable manner.” Eco, \textit{Kant and the Platypus}, pp. 298; cf. Richard Rorty, \textit{Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature}, (Princeton, 1979), pp. 389.

\textsuperscript{854} “A subject uses names to make hypotheses about the truth. But, given that it is itself a finite configuration of the generic procedure from which a truth results, one can also maintain that a subject
thoughts of attaining anything more than a mere semblance of a closure effect resting firmly in its place, *le langage* is recognised as the site of search that it always was, a breeding ground of universals whose socio-political qualifications can be made in conjunction with the procedures of truth that they initiate. Establishing a theoretical analogy between the ever-shifting, yet completely antecedent, objects of external reality and their linguistic conception that is realized by the participation of consciousness in acts of self-conscious labour on the former, if for naught else but that the one without the other cannot retain a semblance of intelligible significance, our understanding of logical universals runs in parallel lines with our conception of politico-ethical universals in comprehending the construal of both types according to the epistemological primacy of environmental externality and the existentialist dialectical priority granted to the conscious collective procession of sensory data accumulated by the senses through the production of material goods. This epistemological cue taken from the field of linguistics allows us to see the enterprise of logic as an extended arena of class struggle underpinned by historical determination that is imposed as limits on cognitive formations and their translation into linguistic terms. Against the inherent psychologism of idealist forays into logic and the philosophy of language we hence underscore the conventional, yet not arbitrary nor fixed, grounds of linguistic conceptions: “consciousness takes shape and being in the material of signs created by an organized group in the process of its social intercourse. The individual consciousness is nurtured on signs; it derives its growth from them; it reflects their logic and laws.”

uses names in order to make hypotheses about itself, ‘itself’ meaning the infinity whose finitude it is. Here, language (*la langue*) is the fixed order within which a finitude, subject to the condition of the infinity that it is realizing, practices the supposition of reference to-come. Language is the very being of truth via the combination of current finite enquiries and the future anterior of a generic infinity.” Badiou, *Being and Event*, pp. 399; cf. Eco, *Kant and the Platypus*, pp. 270.

“Abstraction is first of all collective and not individual; objectivity is present within the subject in the form of collective linguistic or conceptual forms which are themselves produced by society, and thereby presuppose it. This has very much to do with the division of labor, and in particular with the primal separation of manual from intellectual labor which is the precondition of abstract thought itself.” Jameson, *Late Marxism*, pp. 41.

**855** Williams, *Marxism and Literature*, pp. 37.

**856** Voloshinov, *Marxism and the Philosophy of Language*, pp. 13; a historical vantage point from which such a theory of linguistics and literary production can be assessed has been on offer, with plenty of documents to choose, that sprouted from the travails of the crucial *Dortmunder Gruppe 61*, among whose contributors were Max von der Grün and Günter Wallraff, in and through the 1960s and early 1970s. For a selection and appraisal of the linguistic currents, which attempted to look backwards to the revolution of 1918 just as much as it did forwards in regard to the deafened sense of a once violent class struggle, that flowed into the production of a significant number of literary works by the circle, see Kühne, *Arbeiterklasse und Literatur*, pp. 68 ff.
3.4.2 The Ties That Bind: Schopenhauer and Nietzsche

The social commensurability of politico-ethical universals to their historical basis which is supported by the mode of production operate on a cognitive level at which the examination of the historically defined spatiality and temporality of a determinate locality turn into a possibility. The politico-ethical universals serve, as such, both the consolidation and revaluation of both strands of conception of social knowledge despite their origination in the unquestioning compliance with the specifics of any determinate spatio-temporality. Social knowledge, inasmuch as the dialectical materialist epistemology argues for its minimal congruence to natural knowledge, retains the formal processes of sensory perception as the eventual construal of social universals continue to serve as the hub of historical revaluations. Yet, politico-ethical universals carry the argument a further decisive step towards the building of a metacritique serving as the root and branch of the revaluation of historically determinate forms of totalising collective action. Henceforth, the Kantian coronation of the beautiful as the epistemological clé de voûte holding together the categorical imperative with its roots lying at the heart of transcendental analytic and the Heideggerian valorisation of the Parmenidean phusis qua ousia as denoting the primordial ontology of Being alike can be perceived as the respective theoretical enactments of an artificially level sphere of thought whose surface is packed with self-same political and ethical universals divested from their historically determinate origins. This construal of historically empty politico-ethical universals operates on par with Camus’ Caligula indiscriminately smashing of plebeian and patrician alike and Stepan’s evocation of a passage from Luke (8:32) in order to conceive the evils plaguing the Russian society of his day. The construal of politico-ethical universals, in that vein, incorporate the coining of their corresponding values that are capable of extending to the nothingness, quasi una fantasia, of historically defined actuality thereby enabling the conception of totalising projects that excite millions owing to the dire straits through which the trireme of material existence needs to set sail. The peculiar epistemological profundity of an existentialist dialectical conception of politico-ethical universals is thus that by taking

859 “There is therefore but one categorical imperative, namely this: *Act only on that maxim whereby thou canst at the same time will that it should become a universal law.*” Kant, *Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals*, pp. 38; *contra* Schopenhauer, *On the Basis of Morals*, pp. 169.

860 “I repeat; famine begins tomorrow. We all know what that means – a national catastrophe. Well, tomorrow there will be a catastrophe, and I shall end it when I choose. After all, I haven’t so many ways of proving I am free. One is always free at someone else’s expense. Absurd perhaps, but so it is.” Albert Camus, *Caligula*, in *Caligula and Other Plays*, trans. by Stuart Gilbert, (London, 2013), pp. 25.

861 “Ah yes! Yes… Those evils who depart from the sick man, chère, you see – well, you recognize them… They are our defects, our impurities, of course, and the sick man is Russia… But the impurities leave him, they enter into the swine. I mean us, my son, the others, and we run violently down a steep place as if possessed of the devil, and we shall perish. But the sick man will be cured and he will sit at the feet of Jesus and will be cured… Yes, Russia will be cured some day!” Albert Camus, *The Possessed*, in *Caligula and Other Plays*, trans. by Justin O’Brien, (London, 2013), pp. 297.
account of the historical restlessness of material universe and by positing the human agent as an irreducible transforming part thereof it retains a measure of self-reflection that is missing in other philosophical inquiries despite their agreement with our thesis that the conception of universals, be they of logical or politico-ethical origin, is linked up with the intellectual labour and need to foster new values. Neither the Kantian categorical origins of Schopenhauer’s Manichean espousal of the Stoic doctrine of fate nor the Nietzschean expansion of this theme to grace the shoulders of philosopher qua a creator of values, which stands up with Herculean dignity against the eternal recurrence of the same, holds the same introspective attitude despite the naturalist roots of their ethics. Schopenhauer’s postulation of representation, i.e., sensory intuition, of external reality as the foremost condition of the attainment of the knowledge of external objects thus falls apart in its first contact with the knowing subject due to its solipsistic feet of clay:

“Thus animals existed before men, fishes before land animals, plants before fishes, and the inorganic before that which is organic; consequently the original mass had to go through a long series of changes before the first eye could be opened. And yet the existence of this whole world remains for ever dependent on that first eye that opened, were it even that of an insect. For such an eye necessarily brings about knowledge, for which and in which alone the whole world is, and without which it is not even conceivable. The world is entirely representation, and as such requires the knowing subject as the supporter of its existence.”

The world qua an assembly of representations requires the knowing subject, i.e., philosophical inquirer, to exist just like physically existing human beings calling for the gods of Olympus to wreak havoc on their Titan forefathers in order to bestow a mythological existence on them. Naturally, when we define the material world as pure representation there emerges a dire need of a conscious entity who will receive this representation through his or her cognitive existence. Schopenhauer is in the right when he sweepingly asserts, “but without that eye [of the knowing subject], in other words, outside of knowledge, there was no before, no time.” Yet, the essentially self-effacing undercurrents of such an inverted perception rapidly verges

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865 Ibid., pp. 31.
866 The intellectual ostracization of matter as dependent representation from the realm of Kantian pure judgment a priori thus serves as the basis of the analytical elimination of historically determinate philosophical inquirer and the materialization of Schopenhauer qua the ‘Universal I’ in its stead. With this underlying theme of the Kantian transcendental idealism, i.e., disinterested and hence de-materialized observer seeking the ground rules of philosophical investigation, taken as the philosopher’s stone Schopenhauer finds no reason to presuppose a qualitates occultae on the basis of his premonition of ‘feeling’ alone to claim that matter qua body “is only the bearer of these forces…” Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation II, pp. 14; cf. “The world as representation, the objective world, has thus, so to speak, two poles, namely the knowing subject plain and simple without the forms of its knowing, and crude matter without form and quality. Both are absolutely unknowable; the subject,
on ludicrous solipsism when the world as representation is failed to be differentiated from the world as an actually existing object orbiting the sun that has more than four-and-a-half billion winters to its name. The central problem of the Kantian primacy of knowledge a priori carried to its logical conclusion is not that it interprets world as a representation but that it conceives that interpretation as the reality itself without realizing that material objects carry on with their existence that is only mediated, and not created, by the eye of the beholder, and that the antecedent existence of object needs to be admitted if there is to be any representation of external reality. Weaving an idealist thread to cover external objects in their entirety, Schopenhauer harks back to the empirical findings of palaeontologists only via the besmirching conviction that fossils are excavated simply because there are professional excavators with highly trained minds to seek after them while scorning any fossil ‘in-itself’ as mere mechanical appendage to this process. And yet the fact that in 2017 a group of scientists discovered microfossils dated approximately 4.28 billion years old in hydrothermal vent precipitates in the Nuvvuagittuq Belt of Quebec as the material indication of the oldest record of life on Earth shows that the objective proof of existence of the first organisms has predated Schopenhauer by approximately 4.28 billion years without humans catching the slightest hint of its whereabouts. Indeed, it appears rather too evident that it is Schopenhauer’s mind, and not his eyes,\textsuperscript{867} that does the seeing as typified by its continuous shifts to meaningless hypothetical thought experiments without the slightest trace of objectivity:

“According to realism, the world is supposed to exist, as we know it, independently of this knowledge. Now let us once remove from it all knowing beings, and thus leave behind only inorganic and vegetable nature. Rock, tree, and brook are there, and the blue sky; sun, moon, and stars illuminate this world, as before, only of course to no purpose, since there exists no eye to see such things. But then let us subsequently put into the world a knowing being. That world then presents itself \textit{once more} in his brain, and repeats itself inside that brain exactly as it was previously outside it.”\textsuperscript{868} 

\textsuperscript{867} This analogy, metaphorical as it is, is not without analogous support that is given by Schopenhauer himself. In his discussion of the certainty of knowledge a priori that aims to strengthen his portrayal of the world as representation in the first volume of his magnum opus, Schopenhauer gives a priori examinations of geometrical contradictions as an example to validate his point with the claim that no experience or any real object is necessary for such a judgment but “a merely mental perception.” Perhaps he should have re-scrutinized the Humean analysis of the essential imprecision embedded in geometry before taking the Kantian exposition at its face value. \textit{Ibid}, pp. 33.

\textsuperscript{868} \textit{Ibid}, pp. 9.
Once the great wheel of existence is fathomed to self-propagate its turns without any significant reference to external reality, the fathoming mind cannot do naught but ride on with this line of reasoning until it redisCOVERs the great kingdom of obscure elements. The second pillar of the Schopenhauerian thought corresponding to the world as representation is thus self-referentiality conceived as world as will just because the philosopher ‘feels’ that there needs to be a deeper signification of the representation of perception.

Determined to uncover the root cause of this uneasiness, Schopenhauer darts a glance at his body, wherein the repository of that unintelligible signification of representations ought to reside, and, just as assured, he finds, beside a physical body that acts according to the rules of natural knowledge, a metaphysical body holding the strings attached to its physical counterpart. Having commenced with the derivation of external objects from the Kantian eye of the mind, Schopenhauer concludes his twofold examination of the world with gleaning the extract of perception from the ‘objectivity of the will’. The discovery of the will as the prima causa of human action, as such, is deemed a just reason to delegate natural knowledge to a derogatory rank of an endless flux lacking rhyme and reason in equal measure. Conjuring the spectre of Narcissus that drowned in the waters of aesthetic satisfaction, The Schopenhauerian mind wallows anything material in the waters of will lest the will itself be materialized:

“Every true act of his [the knowing subject’s] will is also at once and inevitably a movement of his body; he cannot actually will the act without at the same time being aware that it appears as a movement of the body. The act of will and the action of the body are not two different states objectively known, connected by the bond of causality; they do not stand in the relation of cause and effect, but are one and the same thing, though given in two entirely different ways, first quite directly, and then in perception for the understanding. The action of the body is nothing but the act of will objectified, i.e., translated into perception. Later on, we shall see that this applies to every movement of the body, not merely to movement following on motives, but also to involuntary movement following on mere stimuli; indeed, that the whole body is nothing but the objectified will, i.e., will that has become representation.”

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869 “It will be of special interest for us to obtain information about its [the knowledge of the content of representation] real significance, that significance, otherwise merely felt, by virtue of which these pictures or images do not march past us strange and meaningless, as they would otherwise inevitably do, but speak to us directly, are understood, and acquire an interest that engrosses our whole nature.” Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Representation* I, pp. 95; cf. Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Representation* II, pp. 193.

870 Cf. “Every rational being reckons himself qua intelligence as belonging to the world of understanding, and it is simply as an efficient cause belonging to that world that he calls his causality a will. On the other side he is also conscious of himself as part of the world of sense in which his actions which are mere appearances [phenomena] of that causality, are displayed; we cannot, however, discern, how they are possible from this causality which we do not know; but instead of that, these actions as belonging to the sensible world must be viewed as determined by other phenomena, namely, desires and inclinations…. Since, however, the world of understanding contains the foundation of the world of sense, and consequently of its laws also…. Consequently I must regard the laws of the world of understanding as imperatives for me, and the actions which conform to them as duties.” Kant, *Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals*, pp. 73.

Having conceived the will as the identified *primum mobile* that brings about the actuality of existence of everything, Schopenhauer rips apart the Kantian lines of demarcation separating phenomena from noumena by postulating the act of will as the nearest and clearest phenomena. Indeed, despite occasional warnings regarding the less than optimal congruity between the inward knowledge of the will and knowledge of the thing in itself, Schopenhauer does not refrain from claiming that will is the equivalent of the thing-in-itself by virtue of the intelligibility of its corporeal manifestations. And when he posits his will as the prime mover of whose qualities every organic and inorganic object must partake of, it is but a short step for him to consider eugenics and stoic resignation in the same ethical breath. To that end, his Augustinian interpretation of the Kantian duality of empirical and intelligible character serves as the theoretical court of appeal whence any judgment pertaining to the desirability of a biological lineage is given. Indeed, if the immutability of character and its inheritance

872 “Meanwhile it is to be carefully noted, and I have always kept it in mind, that even the inward observation we have of our own will still does not by any means furnish an exhaustive and adequate knowledge of the thing-in-itself.” Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Representation*, II, pp. 196.

873 “Accordingly, the act of will is indeed only the nearest and clearest phenomenon of the thing-in-itself; yet it follows from this that, if all the other phenomena could be known by us just as immediately and intimately, we should be obliged to regard them precisely as that which the will is in us. Therefore in this sense I teach that the inner nature of every thing is will, and I call the will the thing-in-itself.” *Ibid*, pp. 197.

874 The conception of this duality allows Kant to converge the determinism that reigns in the realm of nature, i.e., phenomena, and the premise of ‘I ought’ that translates into the free action in compliance with the necessary and universal decrees of morality. Indeed, this dualistic interpretation of human character allows Kant, and hence Schopenhauer, to avoid the pitfalls of an otherwise diametric opposition between intelligible and immutable laws of nature and the daring arbitrariness connoted by the laws of convention. One of the latest examples of this uneasy dialectic between the natural laws and convention prior to Kant’s works was Rousseau with his attempts of refutation of mechanical materialism through his examination of will, e.g., “No material cause is in itself active, and I am active…. my will is independent of my senses,” and his yearning for the stability of the former, e.g., “But the eternal laws of nature and of order exist. For the wise man they take the place of positive law; they are written in the depths of his heart by conscience and reason…” Rousseau, *Emile*, pp. 290-1, 524; cf. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Discourse on Inequality*, in *Rousseau’s Political Writings*, ed. by Alan Ritter and Julia C. Bondanella, trans. by Julia C. Bondanella, (New York, 1988), pp. 5-7; Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *On Social Contract*, in *Rousseau’s Political Writings*, pp. 95-6. The undeniable import of this Kantian revision of the terms of the problematic thus functioned as the key to the conception of an understanding of freedom that was congruous to the laws of natural necessity: “In virtue of its empirical character, this subject would at the same time be subordinate to all the empirical laws of causality, and as a phenomenon and member of the sensuous world, its effects would have to be accounted for by a reference to preceding phenomena…. In virtue of intelligible character, on the other hand, (although we possess only a general conception of this character), the subject must be regarded as free from all sensuous influences, and from all phenomenal determination…. And thus nature and freedom, each in the complete and absolute signification of these terms, can exist, without contradiction or disagreement, in the same action.” Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, pp. 304; cf. Kant, *Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals*, pp. 71-2; Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, 225-7; David Hume, “The Sceptic”, in *Selected Essays*, pp. 103; Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, pp. 475; Adorno, *The Jargon of Authenticity*, pp. 95; Ward, *Kant*, pp. 121-126.

875 The postulation of character as essentially changeless is one of the basic modifications that this Kantian theory underwent in the hands of Schopenhauer. The reasoning behind Schopenhauer’s argument is that when I choose to act on the basis of a selected motive among many others, I express the dictate of my will whose permanence in its essential qualities is given, whereas my consequent
from the father and that of the intellect from the mother are both given, then what intellectual force can hope to curb the philosopher’s attempt to wipe out the delinquent and to revoke any potentially hazardous union? Bearing the distinctive marks of an incorrigible aristocratic logic in its direct allusion to the Platonic system of eugenic breeding, Schopenhauer turns into the self-proclaimed guardian of the social order and harmony in proposing various practical applications of selective breeding:

“If we could castrate all scoundrels and stick all stupid geese in a convent, and give men of noble character a whole harem, and procure men, and indeed through men, for all girls of intellect and understanding, then a generation would soon arise which would produce a better age than that of Pericles.”

Furthermore, Schopenhauer’s depiction of will as primum mobile also gives way to its construal as a constant striving towards momentary pseudo-satisfactions without remittance, hence elevating his solitary outlook to the status of a paragon of the Stoic ataraxia. Soaking in the glorification of abstinence and askesis, the monastic cell is transfigured into the ideal of painless existence simply because will’s insatiable primacy is conceived to be pregiven. With looming miseries lurking around every corner of existence, Schopenhauer translates the primacy of will over intuition into the precedence of pain over pleasure: “We feel pain, but not painlessness; care, but not freedom from care; fear, but not safety and security.” And when the joy of life is taken as the oblivious affirmation of a fleeting presence, then it is anything but difficult to note that life can never be seen as a gift since “it is evident that anyone...
would have declined it with thanks, had he looked at it and tested it beforehand…”

There still remains a consolation for all the endless toils and for the constant hassling without end: death. Indeed, the Schopenhauerian twin evils of pain and boredom only loosen their tight grasp on the endless struggle of will in the final crescendo in the ultimate moment of life, thereby becoming the final settlement of an existential debt that was contracted prior to birth.

The lack of epistemological introspection, as can be viewed from our analysis, is an element that is carried to the loftiest heights by Schopenhauer. Material objects are circumscribed by representation but so are the latter by the will, which, in turn, is dictated, in its preferential treatment of singular motives over others, by character, and, this, in effect, is smouldered by the continuous toil and boil, albeit not of those that are actually condemned to the most depreciative tasks of early industrial proletarianization, that accompanies the twin evils of pain and boredom which only cease in our final reunion with Charon. This laborious regression of will in regard to its varying manifestations from the daily occurrences of *homo homini lupus* to boredom unto death is conceived along the lines of Kantian binary understanding of phenomena and noumena and its accompanying relegation of materiality to epiphenomenal status that is overshadowed by will qua *primum mobile*.

This unintrospective account of will’s philological and politico-ethical primacy was sharpened by Nietzsche by the token of his putting the Kantian nose of Schopenhauer’s epistemology to the grindstone of genealogy in order to attain a historical understanding of values that would, then, be capable of running the circle of devaluation/revaluation without end. Indeed, the Nietzschean genealogy appears, curiously enough, as the closest approximation of any epistemology to the Marxian dialectical materialism’s conception of theory as a historically self-conscious way of seeing contemporary social events through the kaleidoscope of a spatio-temporally determinate set of concepts. It is interesting to note, in that vein, that despite his

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881 Ibid, pp. 579; cf. “Both cases prove that our existence is happiest when we perceive it least; from this it follows that it would be better not to have it.” Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Representation* II, pp. 575.


883 “In its cynicism Schopenhauer’s arrogant remark that mankind is the factory product of nature also captures something of what the totality of the commodity character actually makes man into. … However, one should not hypostatize Schopenhauer’s doctrine as something of universal validity or even as an insight into the primal character of the human species. Boredom is a function of life which is lived under the compulsion to work, and under the strict division of labour. It need not be so. Whenever behaviour in spare time is truly autonomous, determined by free people for themselves, boredom rarely figures …” Adorno, ‘Free Time’, in *The Culture Industry*, pp. 192; cf. Adorno, *Minima Moralia*, pp. 175.

abhorrence of any kind of socialist argument, Nietzsche’s endeavour to rethink philological history to fuel his arguments can be conceived as a distant echo of how Marx and Engels had utilized social history for the sake of demystifying the workings of the capitalist mode of production. Paving the way for the Heideggerian equation of \textit{phusis} with the primordial ontology of Being, Nietzsche attempted to demote the modern veneration of demos itself by harkening back to different historical periods every step along his venture. Nietzsche’s attempt to revaluate the morality of mores (\textit{die Sittlichkeit der Sitte}) through the prism of genealogical history, in that vein, is synonymous with a complete inversion of the Kantian method not only in the primacy it accords to contemporary politico-ethical issues but also in its complete negation of any unknowable yet intelligible realm of thing-in-itself. Conceiving history as a totalizing narrative whose fossilized fundamental themes can be distilled through the rigorous effort of building a genealogy of their construal in regard to both what they purvey as belonging to history and what they miss as prehistorical, the Nietzschean compartmentalized reversion to history aimed at nothing less than the revaluation of the concept of history. Rejecting the equations of history with truth, value, progress, morality, goodness, evil, welfare, etc., in their entirety, Nietzsche devised a new outlook of the diachronic conception of history in laying stress on ruptures rather than remittances, on alterations instead of emendations, and on uncompromising destructions in the place of mere demotions. The converging point of all that reconceptualization was, of course, nothing other than granting an epistemic primacy to collective human action qua convention over nature as merely a container holding together the heap of outcomes of the actions of specific historical communities: “Whatever has value in our world now does not have value in itself, according to its nature—nature is always value-less, but has been given value at some time, as a present—and it was \textit{we} who gave and bestowed it. Only we have created the world that concerns man!” \textsuperscript{885} This postulation of value-creation as an ineradicable feature of human actions\textsuperscript{886} is erected as the Nietzschean signpost that points to three congruent, yet distinct, epistemological attributes: the self-conscious purport of genealogical snapshots accompanying an understanding of language and history as compartmentalized ruptures that are shuffled endlessly; the equation of nature with the recorded practices of pre-Socratic society finding their imperfect analogons only with unmistakable irregularity and rarity following the advent of Christian morality; and an ethical

\textsuperscript{885} Nietzsche, \textit{The Gay Science}, IV 301.

\textsuperscript{886} “It is I who confer value on both the \textit{motifs} and the \textit{mobiles}; I am not an independent rational observer who estimates objectively a given situation for which I am not responsible. Moral reflexion is no more than the choice of a volitional mode of action rather than an unreflective mode. \textit{La délibération volontaire est toujours truquée … Quand je délibère les jeux sont faits.}” Murdoch, \textit{Sartre}, pp. 123; Murdoch, \textit{The Sovereignty of Good}, pp. 35; cf. Sartre, \textit{L’Être et le néant}, pp. 527.
stance presiding over the whole genealogical endeavour in order to preach its adherents to carry on living in accordance with the dictates of will.

Nietzsche’s accentuated mistrust of any universal with even the slightest claim to immutability is part and parcel of his fervent rejection of the Kantian thing-in-itself whose practical acts stage the filling of the epistemological vacuum that was preconceived at the inception of his philosophy with the imposition of his understanding of moral duty on all living and breathing individuals. Sparing neither Kant nor Schopenhauer from his vitriolic attacks, \(^{887}\) Nietzsche undermined the hollow grounds with which the Kantian thing-in-itself is conceived owing precisely to its overriding unreality. \(^{888}\) Conceiving it to be suggestive of a theological disposition to pit the real against the unreal summarily only to find sufficient metaphysical ground for one’s theoretical preference of any allegedly eternal yet non-existent set of norms, Nietzsche, in that vein, rebuked this Kantian tendency as a conscious manifestation of Kant’s will to power disguising itself in the metaphysical will to truth:

“Will to truth is a making firm, a making true and durable an abolition of the false character of things, a reinterpretation of it into beings. “Truth” is therefore not something there, that might be found or discovered—but something that must be created and that gives a name to a process, or rather to a will to overcome that has in itself no end—introducing truth, as a \textit{processus in infinitum}, an active determining—not a becoming-conscious of something that is in itself firm and determined. It is a word for the “will to power.” \(^{889}\)

Indeed, the Nietzschean emphasis on the incessant evolution of thought accords with his attribution of epistemic prevalence to becoming over being in order to render any future metaphysics “completely harmless” \(^{890}\) and to drive home the point that moral truths cannot be viewed as exempt from the gradual evolution of everything else. \(^{891}\) Having labelled the


\(^{888}\) “When Kant says “Reason does not create its laws from nature, but dictates them to her,” this is perfectly true in respect to the \textit{concept of nature} which we are obliged to apply to her (Nature = world as idea, that is, error), but which is the summation of a number of errors in reason. To a world that is \textit{not} our idea, the laws of numbers are completely inapplicable: they are valid only in the human world.” Friedrich Nietzsche, \textit{Human, All Too Human}, trans. by Marion Faber and Stephen Lehmann, (London, 2004), I 19.

\(^{889}\) Nietzsche, \textit{The Will to Power}, III 552; Nietzsche, \textit{The Gay Science}, V 344.

\(^{890}\) Nietzsche, \textit{Human, All Too Human}, I 10.

\(^{891}\) “Philosophers tend to confront life and experience (what they call the world of appearance) as they would a painting that has been revealed once and for all, depicting with unchanging constancy the same event. They think they must interpret this event correctly in order to conclude something about the essence which produced the painting, that is about the thing-in-itself, which always tends to be regarded as the sufficient reason for the world of appearance. Conversely, stricter logicians, after they had rigorously established the concept of the metaphysical as the concept of that which is unconditioned and consequently unconditioning, denied any connection between the unconditioned (the metaphysical world) and the world we are familiar with. So that the thing-in-itself \textit{does not} appear in the world of appearances, and any conclusion about the former on the basis of the latter must be rejected. But both sides overlook the possibility that that painting – that which to us men means life and experience – has
Kantian thing-in-itself as the “height of psychological mendaciousness,”892 Nietzsche generalized the results of his critique to cover any attempt to construct an eternal category with the affixing ‘in-itself’ as a self-fulfilling prophecy. Calling the philosophical propensity to lay claims to unbounded concepts the “fable of knowledge,” Nietzsche fortified his epistemological signpost with the palisade that went along with his claim that “Something unconditioned cannot be known; otherwise it would not be unconditioned!”893

Nietzsche wove this critical thread spanning the entire evolution of Western metaphysics with a highly consistent adherence to the three stylised metamorphoses that surfaced in his beloved Thus Spoke Zarathustra. And by a retrospective evaluation of that teaching the internal limits of introspection with which his critique of concepts qua lifeless universals can be grasped. The three metamorphoses of the genealogical spirit involve, (I) the collection of most of the tablets of morality that have hitherto existed, hence the historical burdening of the spirit like the dead weight that threatens to bring down the unsuspecting camel, (II) the furious rejection of any teaching that purveys commandments on behalf of any great dragon, lord, or god, that resembles the lion’s uncompromising utterance of “I will” in the face of “Thou shalt”, and (III) the daring willpower to embark on uncharted waters with the childlike innocence of a new beginning.894 The originality of the Nietzschean genealogy, as can be seen from the allegorical sense of the third metamorphosis, lies not only in its underlying postulation of history as eternal becoming but also in the introspective gaze it darts at its own spatio-temporal roots that are bracketed to uncover the will to power manifest at its heart. The attainment of knowledge of any kind can thus be said to involve the adherence to a predefined set of values whose change can only be realized by the conscious effort of the practitioner of perspectivist philosophy.895 Nietzsche’s advocation of a genealogical understanding of the inquirer, therefore, epitomizes in the touchstone of introspection as the ultimate judge separating genuine philosophy from philosophical mummification:

“We “conserve” nothing: neither do we want to return to any past periods; we are by no means “liberal”; we do not work for “progress”; we do not need to plug up our ears against sirens who in the market place sing of the future: their song about “equal rights,” “a free society,” “no more masters and no servants” has no allure for us. We simply do not consider it desirable that a realm of justice and concord should be established on earth (because it would certainly be the realm of the deepest levelling and chinoiserie); we are delighted with all who love, as we do, danger, war, and adventures, who refuse to compromise, to be captured, reconciled, evolved, indeed is still evolving, and therefore should not be considered a fixed quantity, on which basis a conclusion about the creator (the sufficient reason) may be made, or even rejected.” Ibid, 16.

892 Nietzsche, The Will to Power, II 244.
893 Ibid, 555.
895 Nietzsche, The Will to Power, III 636.
and castrated; we count ourselves among conquerors; we think about the necessity for new orders, also for a new slavery – for every strengthening and enhancement of the human type also involves a new kind of enslavement. 896

One can only see through a singular perspective. 897 Any claim to truth, on this view, is self-oblivious in regard to taking a projection of reality that it shed on an event as the reality itself; whether we posit will as the thing in itself par Schopenhauer or concur with Kant in conjecturing an impenetrable realm of thing-in-itself, the needle of the genealogical compass always points towards the same direction: the will to power. Having shown bits and pieces of his polemic skill dubbed by himself fittingly as the “philosophising with hammer” 898 in regard to the central idealist tenets, it remains to ask, what of materialism? Nietzsche was not even concerned about what seemed to him as the impending doom of false empirical premises. In fact, so few and far in between are his sparse commentary on materialism that it induces a roundabout examination and an arduous degree of backtracking to find any sustained allusion that is made in his works either to materialism in general or to materialist philosophers in particular. Yet, drawing from his patchwork of a critique that takes place in the third book of the The Will to Power and from his occasional jibes of the supposed epistemological tenets of the ‘mechanistic view of the world,’ we can arrive at a satisfactory understanding of how Nietzsche’s genealogy took a stand vis-à-vis mechanical empiricism, and, by extension, materialism. The claim of natural science to establishing objective facts, as can be seen from his disparaging remarks on any universalistic and self-proclaimed value-neutral tendency, was seen through the Nietzschean lens as a typical self-contradictory assertion that could only be proved on self-referential premises. 899 Causality, quantity, consequentiality, contiguity, etc., were thus heaped together as the crumbling mythologies of a bygone era. 900 Indeed, so trenchant was his critique of all the epistemological categories that hardly anything was left in its wake when scientific abstractions began to be viewed synonymously as mere semiotic inventions whose ascription of any kind of mechanistic inference to inertia and change of external objects was deemed totally without warrant: “Subject, object, a doer added to the doing, the doing separated from that which it does: let us not forget that this is mere semeiotics

897 “There is only a perspective seeing, only a perspective “knowing”; and the more affects we allow to speak about one thing, the more eyes, different eyes, we can use to observe one thing, the more complete will our “concept” of this thing, our “objectivity” be. But to eliminate the will altogether, to suspend each and every affect, supposing we were capable of doing this—what would that mean but to castrate the intellect?—“ Friedrich Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morals, in Basic Writings of Nietzsche, trans. by Walter Kaufmann, (New York, 2000), III 12.
898 The epilogue of Nietzsche’s Twilight of the Idols has ‘The Hammer Speaks’ for its title. Additionally, the subtitle of the work reads ‘How to Philosophize with a Hammer’. Friedrich Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols or How to Philosophize with a Hammer, trans. by Duncan Large, (Oxford, 2008).
900 Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, in Basic Writings of Nietzsche, I 21.
and nothing real. Mechanistic theory as a theory of motion is already translation into the sense language of man.”

This mythologizing of science begs the question, however, whether Nietzsche retained anything pertaining to ‘nature’ at all in conceiving his genealogical approach to moral history. Nietzsche kept hold of everything, in fact, that he deemed natural as opposed to linguistic, i.e., social and historical. This inherent naturalism of genealogy, interestingly reminiscent of Wittgenstein’s well-known dictum, “Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, darüber muß man schweigen,” harks back to an understanding of natural reality as essentially bereft of any corruption by the reasonings of a projecting mind. Indeed, the distinction of an alleged empirical purity of nature, and what is pertinent to it, from all the demeaning influence of theoretical universals is a fundamental preconception that Nietzsche would structure into one of the basic elements of his thought, the so-called eternal recurrence of the same with its professedly naturalistic basis.

The second central epistemological tenet of Nietzsche, therefore, draws against this subjective predisposition towards the values created in compliance with the presupposed ground rules of nature. With frequent insinuations towards the Promethean myth, and its interpretations by Aeschylus and Goethe, Nietzsche qua the self-styled modern Prometheus waged his epistemological battle by creating values against the Kantian thing-in-itself, the Schopenhauerian will, and Socratic morality with the yardstick of an ontologically value-neutral nature:

“What changes the general taste? The fact that some individuals who are powerful and influential announce without any shame, hoc est ridiculum, hoc est absurdum, in short, the

901 Nietzsche, The Will to Power, III 634; this point also connotes the absolute epistemic primacy Nietzsche granted to the deed. Modifying the Schopenhauerian construal of will, Nietzsche defended the idea that there is no substratum conceived as the natural result of preconceived binaries but that “there is no “being” behind doing, effecting, becoming; “the doer” is merely a fiction added to the deed—the deed is everything.” Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morals, I 13.


903 “If the world may be thought of as a certain definite quantity of force and as a certain definite number of centers of force—and every other representation remains indefinite and therefore useless—it follows that, in the great dice game of existence, it must pass through a calculable number of combinations. In infinite time, every possible combination would at some time or another be realized; more: it would be realized an infinite number of times. And since between every combination and its next recurrence all other possible combinations would have to take place, and each of these combinations conditions the entire sequence of combinations in the same series, a circular movement of absolutely identical series is thus demonstrated: the world as a circular movement that has already repeated itself infinitely often and plays its game in infinitum.” Nietzsche, The Will to Power, IV 1066.

904 Ibid, IV 900.

905 “Der Glorie der Passivität stelle ich jetzt die Glorie der Aktivität gegenüber, welche den Prometheus des Äschylus umleuchtet. Was uns hier der Denker Äschylus zu sagen hatte, was er aber als Dichter durch sein gleichnissartiges Bild uns nur ahnen läßt, das hat uns der jugendliche Goethe in den verwegenen Worten seines Prometheus zu enthüllen gewußt.” Friedrich Nietzsche, Die Geburt der Tragödie aus dem Geiste der Musik, (Stuttgart, 1991), 9.
judgment of their taste and nausea; and then they enforce it tyrannically…. The reason why these individuals have different feelings and tastes is usually to be found in some oddity of their life style, nutrition, or digestion, perhaps a deficit or excess of inorganic salts in their blood and brain; in brief, in their *physis*. They have the courage to side with their *physis* and to heed its demands down to the subtlest nuances.”

Now, as can be seen in our exposition of the first element of the Nietzschean genealogical epistemology, the boundedness of any value-creating universal needs to hold sway over the manifold of interpretations that can be made regarding this supposed unity of nobility and *phusis*. Discarding the spatio-temporal limitedness of the Nietzschean *phusis*, on that note, would translate into a mere theoretical twist given by him to the eternal will of Schopenhauer,907 to Kant’s postulation of noumenal realm as the genuine sphere of essences,908 and, eventually, to the Socratic morality of being turning its back on the Heraclitian justification of the world of becoming on the basis of the multitudinous extracts of sensory experience.909 The ethical ramifications of the concept of *phusis* thus needs to be recognized for what they epistemologically are: a new tablet of morality that was created by Nietzsche as a full-fledged revaluation of the whole Christian morality and *not* as a steadfast definition of nature in favour of the aristocratic view of society with scarce any reference to an idealised pre-bourgeois past of material accumulation and social prestige.910 This uneasy back and forth

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906 Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, I 39; “Nature, not Manu, distinguishes the pre-eminently spiritual ones, those who are preeminently strong in muscle and temperament, and those, the third type, who excel neither in one respect nor in the other, the mediocre ones – the last as the great majority, the first as the elite.” Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Antichrist*, in *The Portable Nietzsche*, 57.

907 “My proposition is: that the will of psychology hitherto is an unjustified generalization, that this will *does not exist at all*, and that instead of grasping the idea of the development of one definite will into many forms, one has eliminated the character of the will by subtracting from it its content, its “whither?” – this is in the highest degree the case with Schopenhauer: what he calls “will” is a mere empty world. It is even less a question of a “will to live”; for life is merely a special case of the will to power; - it is quite arbitrary to assert that everything strives to enter into this form of the will to power.” Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, III 692; cf. Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, I ‘On Self-Overcoming.’

908 “But that you take this or that judgement for the voice of conscience – in other words, that you feel something to be right – may be due to the fact that you have never thought much about yourself and simply have accepted blindly what you had been *told* ever since your childhood was right; or it may be due to the fact that what you call your duty has up to this point brought you sustenance and honors – and you consider it “right” because it appears to you as your own “condition of existence”… For it is selfish to experience one’s own judgment as a universal law…” Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, IV 335; cf. Nietzsche, *The Antichrist*, 10.

909 “I shall set apart, with great respect, the name *Heraclitus*. If the rest of the philosophical populace rejected the evidence of the senses because they showed multiplicity and change, he rejected their evidence because they showed things as if they had duration and unity. Heraclitus, too, did the senses an injustice. They do not lie either in the way that the Eleatics believe, or as he believed – they do not lie at all. What we *make* of their evidence gives rise to the lie, for example the lie of unity, the lie of materiality, of substance, of duration…. But Heraclitus will always be right that Being is an empty fiction. The ‘apparent’ world is the only one: the ‘real world’ has just been *lied on*…” Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols*, III 2.

between the two Nietzschean interpretations of nature, its epistemological elaboration as what is essentially without universals pertaining to value, purpose, subject, etc., and its moral adumbration as acting in accordance with the dictates of any pregiven empirical character demanding nobility from some and servility from others, is further complicated with the overall normative tenets of Nietzsche’s preaching of quietist perseverance as a corollary to his prescriptions of ethico-social roles allotted to any single individual. The essentially self-contradictory corollaries that result from this unquestioning bearing of one’s lot leads, when dignified as nature, to the adornment of the cruelty of aristocratic classes as natural, and to admonishing the others who refuse to be cruelly treated as the avowed defenders of the _chandala_ residing at the heart of Christian ethics. Nietzsche’s harkening to the concept of ‘the master-race’ is not repulsive in spelling out the epic disaster to come in the 1940s, it is abhorrent because of its unconcealed tendency to impose ontological fetters of nature on anyone that refuses to allow that he or she is merely _canaille_. The ease of reasoning with which the light-footed dancer of Nietzschean imagery waltzes between a universe that is deemed natural simply because its material necessity warrants heaping neither praise nor blame on it and a novel ‘naturalization’ of humanity perceived as the riddance of anything

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911 Nietzsche’s understanding of this concept looms large over the earlier debate between Heidegger and Derrida on whether to regard Nietzsche as the consummating figure of the metaphysical tradition. On that note, while Heidegger considered Nietzsche’s work as the ultimate accomplishment of the Platonic prying away of Being from existents, Derrida, by contrast, claimed that such a reading hinted at a profound degree of “mauvaise foi” of its expositor. For a taste of what is to come in the following pages, my interpretation of Nietzsche’s notion of _phusis_, though not indifferent to Derrida’s call to see Nietzsche as an intellectual forerunner of his concept of _la différence_, leans more towards the Heideggerian reading in regard to the import of the concept’s socio-political contextuality.


913 Nietzsche, _Human, All Too Human_, VIII 451; cf. “Brasidas seized a mouse, and being bit by it, let it go. There is nothing so contemptible, said he, but what may be safe, if it has but courage to defend itself. Bellarmine patiently and humbly allowed the fleas and other odious vermin to prey upon him. We shall have heaven, said he, to reward us for our sufferings: But these poor creatures have nothing but the enjoyment of the present life. Such difference is there between the maxims of a Greek hero and a Catholic saint.” David Hume, _The Natural History_, in _Dialogues and Natural History of Religion_, pp. 164; Thomas Paine, _The Age of Reason. Being an Investigation of True and Fabulous Theology_, ed. by Moncure Daniel Conway, (Mineola, 2004), pp. 29, 44.

914 Nietzsche, _Genealogy of Morals_, I 5.

915 Nietzsche, _Twilight of the Idols_, IX 34.
unnatural,\textsuperscript{916} is the price Nietzsche’s genealogy is willing to pay for the sake of heralding the good tidings of the eradication of the ‘last man’.\textsuperscript{917} And, hence, the full vista of the Nietzschean politico-ethical edifice: no pyramids without the slaves. The overman (\textit{Übermensch}) is an uncaged bird of prey simply because he \textit{is}.\textsuperscript{918} He creates values, that is what he is good for,\textsuperscript{919} whereas the others, well, they do not exactly require a name for they are the mere negation of everything noble, but let us call them \textit{der Pöbel}, or the mob,\textsuperscript{920} exist as they do to uphold those values that were conferred on them. The two constituent elements of the Nietzschean project \textit{are} simply not equal\textsuperscript{921} and the jury is still out to decide whether the existence of the lowly is required–if for naught else but the ensured maintenance of the highly–at all. Nietzsche’s aversion of linguistics is exemplified above, yet it appears befitting at this point to remark that two statically conceived politico-ethical universals hardly add up to the construal of their relation as a constant flux. A flux, we need to add, that was drawing ever nearer to the eye of the storm of the post-1871 class struggle, which has a thing or two to say about the uses and abuses that Nietzsche’s works were subjected to during the period of imperialist reaction.\textsuperscript{922} His epistemologically conceived doctrine of becoming, as such, remains firmly and loftily as a \textit{rerum concordia discors} without making a single inroad to socio-political shifts that characterize history just as much as they do morality. What began with the doctrine of three metamorphoses ends with Zarathustra’s metamorphosis into the prophet of being itself:

“When the water is spanned by planks, when bridges and railings leap over the river, verily, those are not believed who say, “Everything is in flux.” Even the blockheads contradict them. “How now?” say the blockheads. “Everything should be in flux? After all, planks and railings


\textsuperscript{917} Nietzsche, \textit{Thus Spoke Zarathustra}, I 129.

\textsuperscript{918} Nietzsche, \textit{Genealogy of Morals}, I 11. To interpret the overman as an inter-generational concept signifying an all-embracing transformation of society down to its smallest niches, as Vattimo does, has certainly an appealing side to it especially when Nietzsche himself is abstracted from the Prussian society of his day. Additionally, if one is to trace an unbroken line between the socio-political dimensions of the genealogical critique of Nietzsche and the ontological critique of Heidegger, then, such an interpretation turns into a practical necessity. I, however, remain sceptical as to how far we can endorse such a construal of the concept which can only be upheld at the price of rebutting – and there are quite a few – all the anti-socialistic elements that flow within the Nietzschean cauldron: cf. “Le sur-homme n’est pas possible comme simple individu exceptionnel (au plus, ce serait peut-être le Freigeist, l’esprit libre); il n’existe que s’il a un monde. D’autre part, il ne naît pas d’une décision individuelle, d’une \textit{metanoia} de l’individu: il exige une préparation de plusieurs générations.” Vattimo, \textit{Les aventures de la différence}, pp. 70; Gianni Vattimo, \textit{Dialogue with Nietzsche}, trans. by W. McCuaig, (New York, 2008), pp. 181-189; for a recent evaluation of Vattimo’s communitarian reading of Nietzsche, see Stefano G. Azzarà, “Left-Wing Nietzscheanism in Italy: Gianni Vattimo”, \textit{A Journal of Economics, Culture and Society}, vol. 30, (2018), pp. 275-290.

\textsuperscript{919} Nietzsche, \textit{Thus Spoke Zarathustra}, I ‘On the Tree on the Mountainside’.

\textsuperscript{920} “Ihr höheren Menschen” – so blinzelt der Pöbel – “es gibt keine höheren Menschen, wir sind alle gleich, Mensch ist Mensch, vor Gott – sind wir alle gleich!”” \textit{Ibid}, IV ‘On the Higher Man’.

\textsuperscript{921} \textit{Ibid}, II ‘On the Tarantulas’.

\textsuperscript{922} Lukács, \textit{Von Nietzsche zu Hitler}, pp. 34-35.
are over the river. Whatever is over the river is firm; all the values of things, the bridges, the concepts, all ‘good’ and ‘evil’—all that is firm."\textsuperscript{923}

Complete ‘muddle heads’ that they are, that is only to be expected from the mob. Never the less, the politico-ethical price to be paid in return for all the starry-eyed elements promised by epistemological perspectivism appears to be growing still when we take account of the impending snares of nature that are set up by Nietzsche to any follower of his doctrine. Nietzsche took away all tablets of morality, all scientific universals, all the monotheistic gods and their Olympian forefathers to give Zarathustra in return. Yet, the torment of Prometheus went on.\textsuperscript{924} The adder of introversion may have bit Zarathustra in the neck\textsuperscript{925} but its venom could not reach as far as projecting a self-projected light of inward examination on the Nietzschean concepts.

### 3.5 A Post-Sartrean Existentialist Dialectics Possible?

The existentialist dialectical conception of politico-ethical universals of social knowledge is conceived in accord with the understanding of nature as an externality that is in an interminable process of totalisation by the collective projects of human agents. Recalling Sartre’s construal of human being as “organic totality,”\textsuperscript{926} society is thereby conceived as a totalising fusion of projects which is based rethinking of Lukács’ early stress of the historical method of Marxism.\textsuperscript{927} Lukács himself had partially drawn, of course, from Engel’s postulation of the three fundamental laws of dialectic,\textsuperscript{928} which are construed against the preconditional background of any form of class society as indicating a determinate type of past totalising collectivity that ultimately led up to his argument of the unity of reality in its promotion of historical materialist theory. The pregiven overriding import of singular instances, as well as the particularistic act of their nomination in regard to the eventual conception of the universals that we postulated as an endless reciprocity of re-cognition of environmental externality in the context of natural knowledge, finds its epistemological counterpart in the specific levels of social knowledge. Locking away the penchant for sliding towards any ontologically normative forethought, this understanding of social knowledge generalizes singular instances of minimal transitivity between natural and social phenomena through the collectivisation of singular analogons to overtake the whole endeavour of production of knowledge, which is a point that

\textsuperscript{923} Nietzsche, \textit{Thus Spoke Zarathustra}, III 8.


\textsuperscript{925} Nietzsche, \textit{Thus Spoke Zarathustra}, I ‘On the Adder’s Bite’.

\textsuperscript{926} Sartre, \textit{Critique of Dialectical Reason} I, pp. 82.

\textsuperscript{927} Lukács, ‘What Is Orthodox Marxism?’, pp. 10.

\textsuperscript{928} Engels, \textit{The Dialectics of Nature}, pp. 62.
is partially grounded upon the arguments expounded in the previous chapter. On that note, it should suffice to add that in pondering the natural and social grounds of determinateness of any given spatio-temporally located event, existentialist dialectics is propelled towards shedding light not only on the purported relationship between explanandum and explanans but also on the mediating epistemological tools and reasoning with which the theoretical inquiry commences.

Yet, it is quite evident that a lot more is required to warrant an epistemological leap, avowedly slight as it is, from natural to social knowledge than either mere fleeting allusions to Engels’ remarkable yet antiquated work or direct resort to sweeping assertions with intoxicating auras. Indeed, judging by numerous post-Marxist, post-structuralist, and post-modern attempts to come to terms with a reconceptualized historical materialism, it appears increasingly difficult to avoid devoting more than mere momentary reflexion on otherwise self-explanatory claims such as that which serves as the lynchpin of Lukács’ approach to dialectical history as totality. The dialectics of the systematisation of natural knowledge cannot, in that sense, be purported as seamlessly congruous to that of social knowledge for the simple fact that the referent totalising potentialities of the latter is the sole organiser of the two planes. The enhancement of natural knowledge, perpetually self-transformative in regard to its methodologies and theoretical concepts as it is, still has the comfort of being conceived on the basis of essentially external designatum. An analytical criticism levelled at the roots of the advancement of scientific knowledge, as such, does not run the necessity to question the facthood that is ascribed to the things in order to transcendentalise a dialectically naturalised state thereof. In short, the empirical safety net that is capable of saving any epistemological

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929 Cf. “For word and concept, speech and conceptual thought belong together as elements of a complex, the complex of social being, and they can only be grasped in their true nature in the context of an ontological analysis of social being, by knowledge of the real functions that they fulfil within this complex.” Lukács, The Ontology of Social Being, III, pp. 49.

930 A fitting example of this tendency in a case no less authoritative than any other Marxist thinker of the twentieth century, is brought forward in Lukács’ Studies in European Realism: “Before 1848 the most advanced group of the literary vanguard in Germany (Richard Wagner, Gottfried Keller, Georg Herwegh, etc.) were all under the influence of Feuerbach, and his activities gave the young Marx and the young Engels the urge to put Hegelian dialectic on its feet, to turn it materialistically upside down.” Georg Lukács, ‘The International Significance of Russian Democratic Literary Criticism’, pp. 101.

931 Robert Young’s remark on the centrality of this problem for the twentieth century Marxism, in that vein, is not off the mark: “His [Lukács’] stress on Marxism as a historical method that presupposed and required the idea of totality initiated a course that determined the history of Western Marxism to our day.” Robert Young, White Mythologies: Writing History and the West, (London, 1990), pp. 23; cf. Jameson, ‘Beyond the Cave’, pp. 118-119.


933 “When dialectical materialism claims to establish a dialectic of Nature it does not present itself as an attempt at an extremely general synthesis of human knowledge, but rather as a mere ordering of the
analysis of the totalising cognition of external phenomena from sliding towards metaphysical speculation is a concept of nature whose referential status is barely scratched. To be sure, the central category of collective enterprise, i.e., society, is itself susceptive of looking into the abyss of Pyrrhonian scepticism when the self-referentiality of natural scientific tightrope-walking falters and begins its freefall. Yet, conceiving the cognition of nature as an analogon that may offer, provided that its voluntary re-totalisation in the light of human potentialities is problematised, clues into the organisation of social knowledge might be of some epistemological purchase after all. Indeed, we contend that an attempt can be made to bridge the epistemological gap between natural and social knowledge not by any recital of the “dogmatic dialectic” of natural science but by utilizing the repository of hitherto accumulated natural knowledge to evaluate the existential relevancy of novel dialectical ways of conceiving social projects. Naturally, the analogization of individual aspects of environmental externality’s systematisation into knowledge needs to abide, at all times, by its voluntary projection of analogons into the sphere of human projects. If handled carefully – and I realise that that is a big ‘if’ – the self-conscious use of dialectic as an external self-effacing means of re-totalisation that is employed in order to identify different facets of materializing social reality, in that vein, can be compared to the conception of collective universals that are ever liable to further alteration and emendation. Further, the heuristic value of dialectics can only be ensured if the variant dimensions of any coalition of singular existential projects is perpetually gathered whereby any structural claim to irrefutable evocations of the God’s eye view are abrogated. Statically conceived, dialectics turn into a

facts. And its claim to be concerned with facts is not unjustified: when Engels speaks of the expansion of bodies or of electric current, he is indeed referring to the facts themselves – although these facts may undergo essential changes with the progress of science. This gigantic – and, as we shall see abortive – attempt to allow the world to unfold itself by itself and to no one, we shall call external, or transcendental, dialectical materialism.” Sartre, Critique of Dialectical Reason, I, pp. 26-7.

934 Harkening back to Bacon’s preference of Democritian physics to Platonic and Aristotelian physics qua metaphysics, this point, oft-repeated as it is, is worth repeating in the light of the intransigent anti-realism of Rorty’s neo-pragmatist understanding of knowledge and its Heideggerian echoes of the ontic/ontologic dualism. Indeed, arguing with Bhaskar’s criticism of Rorty’s neo-pragmatist standpoint, we think it worthwhile to begin our foray into the totality of social knowledge by noting our agreement with one of the foremost scientific authorities of late Renaissance: “And therefore the natural philosophy of Democritus and some others, who did not suppose a mind or reason in the frame of things, but attributed the form thereof able to maintain itself to infinite essays or proofs of nature, which they term ‘fortune’ seemeth to me (as far as I can judge by the recital and fragments which remain to us) in particularities of physical causes more real and better enquired than that of Aristotle and Plato; whereof both intermingled final causes, the one as a part of theology, and the other as a part of logic, which were the favourite studies respectively of both those persons.” Francis Bacon, The Advancement of Learning, in The Major Works, ed. by Brian Vickers, (Oxford, 2002), pp. 199; for a general presentation of Rorty’s position, see Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, (Cambridge, 1989); for Bhaskar’s criticism of that position, see Roy Bhaskar, Philosophy and the Idea of Freedom, (Oxford, 1991).

935 “Marxism asserts simultaneously that both the process of knowledge and the structure of the real are dialectical, but it has never proved the former – basing its claim to truth instead on the ‘dogmatic dialectic’ of natural science.” Young, White Mythologies, pp. 29.
metaphysical deadweight, paring the middle ground between saint and scholar inexorably away. Regarded along the lines of our conception of social history, on the other hand, this otherwise helpless tool can serve to sever any unconscious espousal of mechanical determinism that sprouts from the fertile soil of the unmediated opposition between the subject and the object.\footnote{936}

The example of full moon, given by Sartre in his \textit{Being and Nothingness}, appears as a fitting point to begin our probe beneath the organisation of textually transmitted flickers of past events into social history in order to conceive its constituent elements from an existentialist dialectical lens. Sartre argues that human reality, opposed to the external nature, is riven with internal negation that constitutes a trichotomy of the “the lacking,” “the existing,” and “the lacked.” Anticipating his later discussion of nature in the first volume of the \textit{Critique of Dialectical Reason}, he portrays the full moon as the signifier of the crescent whose surpassing is the equivalent of human reality’s approximation toward a totalisation of perceptual instances. By uniting the image of the crescent moon to that of the full moon, in other words, human perception exposes the traces of a cognitive totalisation of external reality as an existentially ineradicable condition of lacking. This view of the cognition of any natural phenomenon, reminiscent of our conception of sensory perception and its immutable emendation, does not signal either a natural curiosity of humans or an intellectual propensity of human mind towards things that are complete. The perceptual completion of a thing’s spatio-temporally determinate manifestations conveys a depiction of the human being that is in a perpetual struggle with his or her environment. The need to ensure material survival, on this view, dictates the terms of engagement between individuals and their respective environmental externalities. All the stages of the moon are intuitively collected, from that angle of interpretative totalisation, in order to aid the desperate struggle for existence qua the perpetuity of the historically unfulfilled needs: “Human reality is not something which exists first in order afterwards to lack this or that; it exists first as lack and in immediate, synthetic connection with what it lacks.”\footnote{937} Indeed, the conception of socialised human existence on the basis of need and the necessity of fashioning collective projects that are capable of at least partially meeting it, as we have seen above, induces the existential significance of communal labour as the antecedent of any attempt to project thinghood on external objects as a part of an

\footnote{936} “The project, as the subjective surpassing of objectivity toward objectivity, and stretched between the objective conditions of the environment and the objective structures of the field of possibles, represents \textit{in itself} the moving unity of subjectivity and objectivity, those cardinal determinants of activity.” Sartre, \textit{Search for a Method}, pp. 97.

\footnote{937} Sartre, \textit{Being and Nothingness}, pp. 113.
inherited structure qua nature. Defined in terms of what it lacks, human presence is predicated upon the pregiven existence of a multiplicity of objects whose appropriation perpetuates the lacking. The empirical organisation of external objects through perception and labour, as such, brings about the cognitive transformation of the given multiplicity of objects into the totality of phenomena which is, then, to be related to the perceiving individual as a “detotalized totality which temporalizes itself in a perpetual incompleteness.”

Further, in the light of the fact that individual’s cognitive relation to her environment also includes the perception of other singular beings-for-themselves qua projective constituents of interiorised externality, i.e., other beings-in-the-world, the construal of external reality incorporates a multiplicity of corporeal hexis. The certainty that is embedded in the perception of external reality as the totality of ‘the lacking,’ as such, serve as the ontological vindication of our postulation of the stages of sensory perception as arising from collective sensations that allot pseudo-universal significations to the multiplicity of objects only to be honed endlessly by the grindstone of continuous attempts at historical totalisation.

This transition from objective indeterminate multiplicity to subjectively posited totality bears relevant results when transposed to the realm of social history. The conception of history qua the organisation of the textual fragments of past instances, for one, can only be produced as the gathering of singular events whose structured understanding is capable of de-structuring any un-self-conscious abstraction due to its inherent tendency to annul the theological nunc stans. Indeed, the theoretical results of this recoding of the mythical signifier of a metahistorical observer spells out the production of a self-critical method of conceiving temporality and spatiality as theoretical re-organisations of historical structures of communal lacking, which prompts any theoretical effort of an inquirer toward the re-totalisation of past textualities to begin his or her endeavour by conceiving of one’s social existence as a definitive lack in comparison to other ages. Denoted by the self-referential obviousness with which historical utterances, such as, “If we no longer write as they did in the eighteenth century, it is because the language of Racine and Saint-Evremond does not lend itself to talking about locomotives or the proletariat,” are perceived, the diachronic re-totalisation of past

938 Lukács, The Ontology of Social Being, III, pp. 22; Meikle, Essentialism in the Thought of Karl Marx, pp. 48.
939 Cf. Sartre, Being and Nothingness, pp. 199.
940 Ibid, pp. 203.
941 Ibid, pp. 268.
942 For how the pseudo-identity between universal and particular, which is imposed by the purveyors of massification of culture, is liable to be transposed to the plane of class exploitation, see Adorno and Horkheimer, ’The Culture Industry: Enlightenment as Mass Deception’, pp. 95 ff.
943 Sartre, What is Literature?, pp. 16; cf. “There is only one thing that you write for yourself, and that is a shopping list. It helps to remember what you have to buy, and when you have bought everything
textualities into continuing historicities is, therefore, realized at the cost of permanently disabling a yearning after the image of self-centred historian sitting judgment on the memory of things past. Indeed, the search, interpretation, selection, presentation, etc., that correspond to the individual stages of historical organisation require the “directed creation”944 of the individual project no less than the “directed destruction” of its own overriding present.945 Working toward the unison of various historical instants, the historian rediscovers the lack of his or her historically determined condition in the logical and politico-ethical universals with which one sets about one’s work: he or she experiences and consequently identifies the contingency of one’s own temporality as the direct refutation of nunc stans hence pushing the sphere of the unconditional to the bare minimum of human existence: “Les situations historiques varient : l’homme peut naître esclave dans une société païenne ou seigneur féodal ou prolétaire. Ce qui ne varie pas, c’est la nécessité pour lui d’être dans le monde, d’y être au travail, d’y être au milieu d’autres et d’y être mortel.”946 This re-cognition of temporal determinateness qua contingency thus points toward a conception of history that reinforces the self-conscious projective freedom of its practitioner to the same extent that it effaces any trace of spatio-temporally determinate multiplicity of social elements that fuel any attempt to naturalize the historical present. The possibility of encountering and working toward one’s freedom,947 therefore, is possible only if the individual historicizes his or her own existence in addition to that of his or her social surroundings thereby recollecting one’s capability to create values using the very concepts with which one conceives social events. This rethinking of theoretical conceptions and their interrelations in the light of a totalized history, moreover, endows the historian with the responsibility to act either for or against the old conceptions whose brittleness is rendered evident by the historical urgency of social forces being at the throats of each other:

you can destroy it, because it is no use to anyone else. Every other thing you write, you write to say something to someone.” Umberto Eco, ‘How I Write’, in On Literature, pp. 334.

944 The concept is used by Sartre in his explanation of reading as an active participation in creating a common opus: “To be sure, the author guides him, but all he does is to guide him. The landmarks he sets up are separated by the void. The reader must unite them; he must go beyond them. In short, reading is directed action.” Sartre, What is Literature?, pp. 31.

945 “If one lazily defined Flaubert as a realist and if one has decided that realism suited the public in the Second Empire (which will permit us to develop a brilliant, completely false theory [essentially that of Lukács C. O.] about the evolution of realism between 1857 and 1957), one will never succeed in comprehending either that strange monster which is Madame Bovary or the author or the public. Once more one will be playing with the shadows. But if one has taken the trouble, in a study which is going to be long and difficult, to demonstrate within this novel the objectification of the subjective and its alienation—in short, if one grasps it in the concrete sense which it still holds at the moment when it escapes from its author and at the same time from the outside as an object which is allowed to develop freely, then the book abruptly comes to oppose the objective reality which it will hold for public opinion, for the magistrates, for contemporary writers.” Sartre, Search for a Method, pp. 149.


947 Sartre, What is Literature?, pp. 49.
“If negativity is one aspect of freedom, constructiveness is the other. Now, the paradox of our age is that constructive freedom has never been so close to becoming conscious of itself and never has it been so profoundly alienated. Never has work more powerfully manifested its productivity, and never have workers been more swindled out of its products and its significance. Never has *homo faber* better understood that he has *made* history and never has he felt so powerless before history.”

With a growing consciousness of any temporal and spatial locality’s relation to other instances of historical determinateness, human subjects begin to draw their actions against the background of any historical character that is forcibly imposed on them. Posited diachronically into a string of textualities leading from past human potentialities to those of the present, the historical character ascribed by the ruling classes to a determinate ‘now’ begins to lose its veneer of timelessness as it becomes the subject of a recoding effort that attempts to collect even the otherwise most insignificant totalising projects by affording them a bright hue of historical relevancy. Indeed, even when doing is not conceived primarily on an ontological basis, the attempted re-totalisation of past instances translates the former to correspond more and more to historicised *praxis* which is conceived of actions that are practiced in the re-temporalized presence of all the accumulated eventualities of the past. Individual’s reconceptualization of his or her actions through the lens of history, on this view, entails the identification of the limits with which the historical origins of any concept, including that of the dialectics, is demystified. The historical practitioner thus attains an understanding of his or her historical time as that of a passenger which necessarily voyages in one’s trains of existential lacking while also realizing that the train does not follow a predestined course with respect to the collective projection of possibilities informing any Hegelian ‘thisness’ that define each fleeting moment as predicated on the necessity of the procession of historical time. The acting individual can encounter the socially alterable character of any spatio-temporal limits imposed on his or her existence only through the conscious reconceptualization of the necessity beckoning his or her productive effort to fulfil a modicum of basic needs of one’s present in conjunction with the horizon of human potentialities that is allotted to his or her collectivity’s otherwise uncurtailed capability to produce existential projections.

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948 *Ibid*, pp. 175.
949 “*Praxis* as action is history and on history; that is, as a synthesis of historical relativity and moral and metaphysical absolute, with this hostile and friendly, terrible and derisive world which it reveals to us.” *Ibid*, pp. 176.
950 Cf. “It is necessary that the book appear to me on the right or on the left side of the table. But it is contingent that the book appears to me specifically on the left, and finally I am free to look at the book or on the table or at the table supporting the book. It is this contingency between the necessity and the freedom of my choice that we call sense. It means that an object *must always appear to me all at once*—it is the cube, the inkwell, the cup which I see— but that this experience always takes place in a particular perspective which expresses its relations to the ground of the world and to other *thises*. It is always the *note of the violin* which I hear. But it is necessary that I hear it *through a door or by the open window or in a concert hall*. Otherwise the object would no longer be in the midst of the world and would no longer be manifested to an existent-rising-up-in-the-world.” Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, pp. 341.
upsurge of the historical past, as such, allows the reckoning of *praxis* as freedom and necessity whose attempted re-totalisation produces history as reciprocally intertwined collection of textualities that are organised in the guidance of the nudging presence of a metatextual need. In the end, the physical necessity of production is always collectively remade so that it can take its place among other constituents of a sociality whose determinants are socially organised. Indeed, just as the emendation of sensory knowledge through sensory perception and scientific experimentation can only be conjectured with a steering thread of preconditionality in regard to its presupposition of language, the multi-dimensional enrichment of social knowledge turns into a possibility only when any historically determinate individual is conceived as an active part, be him or her a radical dissident or a fervent defender of the ‘establishment,’ of an actually existing totalising project. With the historical re-totalisation of the individual there emerges the understanding of any collective action as a continually historicized praxis of the rediscovered singularities.\(^{951}\) And with the historicization of action the individual conceives the re-totalisation of the social bonds that are organised by his or her collectivity into the institutional determinants of a social existence as structures of encoded determination capable of extending their influence not only to deeds done in the actual presence of the others, but also to those which are undertaken when the individual is alone with oneself. The practice of the freedom of decoding and recoding those determination qua the historicization of the present is conceivable, therefore, only if the shifting temporality of ‘now’ is espoused to all the excavatable ‘instants’ that have hitherto existed. The mutually-exclusive idealistic categories of necessity and freedom, in addition to the normativity embedded in their indeterminateness, needs to be sublated through the existentialist dialectical conception of history as a collective organisation of past determinations into grist for the mill of collective projections with an immediate aim for any totalising project: the sublation of the class society. An overriding insistence on the theoretical stainlessness that is credited to a blind faith in the factuality of facticity can barely suffice, however, to designate positivism as the core instrument to realise that project for the simple reason that there are naught else besides additional facts to be gathered behind any and all appearances.\(^{952}\) That ancient Hindu myth of

\(^{951}\) “Man is not *opposite* the world which he tries to understand and upon which he acts, but *within* this world which he is a part of, and there is no radical break between the meaning he is trying to find or introduce into the universe and that which he is trying to find or introduce into his own existence. This meaning, common to both individual and collective human life, common as much to humanity as, ultimately, to the universe, is called *history.*” Goldmann, *Lukács and Heidegger*, pp. 6.

\(^{952}\) Cf. “La science se condamne à l’échec [of gasping towards the Absolute Knowledge] lorsque cédant au vertige du sérieux, elle prétend atteindre l’être, le contenir et le posséder; mais elle trouve sa vérité si elle se considère comme un libre engagement de la pensée dans le donné, visant à chaque découverte non la fusion avec la chose, mais la possibilité de découvertes neuves; alors ce que projette l’esprit, c’est l’accomplissement concret de sa liberté.” De Beauvoir, *Pour une morale de l’ambiguïté*, pp. 114-115.

252
a column of elephants resting on a tortoise, hence, is the bespoken image that is summoned by Adorno’s criticism of the underlying metaphysics of positivism. In strict agreement with Adorno’s stress on the indispensable anti-positivism of any historically viable dialectical epistemology, we claim that the human praxis can be redeployed as the primary ontological category of existentialist dialectics accompanying a historically ‘lacking’ human existence only if any positive ideal, except for the expansion of the Schattenhaft possibilities of human potentialities beyond the limits imposed by the purveyors of late capitalism, is avoided. Put differently, only if our otherwise indeterminate existential lacking is collectivised into a social project of definite historical negation of the Badian ‘State’ can human potentialities be wrested away from the mythologizing arms of an infinitely expanded late capitalist phusis:

“In so far as man is immersed in the historical situation, he does not even succeed in conceiving of the failures and lacks in a political organization or determined economy; this is not, as is stupidly said, because he is “accustomed to it,” but because he apprehends it in its plenitude of being and because he does not even imagine that things can be otherwise. For it is necessary here to reverse common opinion and to admit that the harshness of a situation or the sufferings which it imposes, are not sufficient motives for everybody. It is on the day that we can conceive of a different state of affairs that a new light falls on our troubles and our suffering and that we decide that these are unbearable.”

A naturalized juxtaposition of suffering to being is the linear outcome of a conception of the lacking as absolute immanence that is divested from all its historical ties. The reintegration of de-realised human individuals back into history, in that vein, expresses the attempt to

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953 “…Nämlich das, daß ich glaube, daß der Positivismus selber eine Gestalt der Ideologie heute ist und eine besonders gefährliche darum, weil die positivistische Gesinnung sich als die ideologiefündliche, nächerne, sächliche schlechthin deklariert, weil sie aber eben dadurch, daß sie überhaupt nichts zuläßt als das, was Tatsache ist, durch diese Exklusivität des Tatsächlichen der Tatsächlichkeit eine Aura verleiht, die sie im allgemeinen von eben jener Metaphysik bezieht, die von dem herrschenden Positivismus mit einem so krassen Tabu bedacht wird.” Adorno, Philosophische Elemente einer Theorie der Gesellschaft, pp. 118.


955 “I call a ‘State’ or ‘state of the situation the system of constraints that limit the possibility of possibilities. By the same token, we will say that the State is that which prescribes what, in a given situation, is the impossibility specific to that situation, from the perspective of the formal prescription of what is possible. …It follows clearly from this that an event is something that can occur only to the extent that it is subtracted from the power of the State.” Badiou, The Communist Hypothesis, pp. 243-244.

956 Sartre, Being and Nothingness, pp. 457.

957 Cf. “The dialectic that brings necessity into the foundation of my freedom drives me out of myself. It shatters my unreflected position. Still in terms of consciousness, black consciousness is immanent in its own eyes. I am not a potentiality of something, I am wholly what I am. I do not have to look for the universal. No probability has any place inside me. My Negro consciousness does not hold itself out as a lack. It is. It is its own follower.” Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, pp. 135.

958 Sartre’s description of the situation of the writer in the wake of one of the most destructive wars of history, is a case in point despite its evident ethos of writing at that period as assuming a necessary responsibility: “Our elders wrote for idle souls, but for the public which we, in our turn, were going to address the holiday was over. It was composed of men of our sort who, like us, were expecting life and death. For these readers without leisure, occupied without respite with a single concern, there was only one fitting subject. It was about their war and their death that we had to write. Brutally reintegrated into
historicise what had hitherto been under a steady process of naturalisation by re-forging the existential ties that fasten together environmental externality and totalising social projects on the basis of collective praxis. Human existence, as was observed above, is always first and foremost the anguish-ridden physical existence of the organism within an indomitable material environment. A historicised conception of the links of collectivity that can assemble physical and social needs toward their communal satisfaction, thus signals out the emptiness of theorising with ahistorical universals that are constructed at the expense of any social process whereby the recoding of textual collections about past instances is realized. Historicizing the temporally and spatially determinate significations attributed to undertakings is the very first step of an attempt to leave behind the realm of physical lacking in order to move towards organising the realm of historical human potentialities. Harking back to the Humean probabilistic conception of causality, an existentialist dialectical understanding of causality in regard to the production of social knowledge poses a continued challenge for it to forsake its minimalistic ties to natural knowledge, which had been established for the creation of analogons, and thus induces the problematisation of its own historical roots in the light of the existentialist dialectical construal of history as a collection of texts arising from the prevailing collectively determined totalising projects of any society:

“A worker in 1830 is capable of revolting if his salary is lowered, for he easily conceives of a situation in which his wretched standard of living would not be as low as the one which is about to be imposed on him. But he does not represent his sufferings to himself as unbearable; he adapts himself to them not through resignation but because he lacks the education and reflection necessary for him to conceive of a social state in which these sufferings would not exist. Consequently he does not act. Having gained control of Lyon after a riot, the workers at Croix-Rousse do not know what to do with their victory; they return home bewildered, and the regular army has no trouble in overcoming them. Their misfortunes do not appear to them “habitual” but rather natural; they are, that is all, and they constitute the worker’s condition. They are not detached; they are not seen in the clear light of day, and consequently they are history, we had no choice but to produce a literature of a historical character.” Sartre, What is Literature?, pp. 159; cf. Umberto Eco, ‘On Some Functions of Literature’, in On Literature, pp. 5.

De Beauvoir, Pour une morale de l’ambiguïté, pp. 117 ff.

We concur with Hume in his postulation of every instant of causal inference to be based on the conception of past experience as the ground of reasoning in regard to a future event. We diverge from his account, however, in our argument that the inherent risk of qualitative distortion in the case of the recounting of past experiences in history is significantly greater than in the case of natural knowledge. Causal inference of natural knowledge permits the revaluation of any experiment that was conducted centuries ago if its underlying assumptions and conditions are known. The case is remarkably different in regard to causality established between two historical events in that even the most diligent reconstruction of any historical event needs to be based on a myriad of interpretations of a limited number of first-hand, or at times second-hand, accounts. This is not to say, however, that the distortion is an element inherent to social knowledge. Recalling that historicization is an endless epistemological venture that does not furnish any internal claim to absoluteness, this appears only as the admission that it entails more pitfalls than the advancement of natural knowledge, which, incidentally, is no less devoid of any claim to an absolutely flawless cognition of external phenomena. Hume, An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding, IV 19; Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, I 3 2; Lewis Wolpert, ‘Causal Belief Makes Us Human’, in What Makes Us Human?, pp. 164-81.
integrated by the worker with his being. He suffers without considering his suffering and without conferring value upon it. To suffer and to be are one and the same for him.”

Conceived from the standpoint of Sartrean existentialism, the heuristic value of dialectics, produced initially in the context of materialistic rootedness of human existence, translates into the theoretical effort to create history as a class-infused totality of human actions that are voluntarily re-totalised by the historian in accordance with any set of existential signifiers with which he or she feeds his or her creative project. Having anticipated Young’s question, “How can man make history if at the same time it is history which makes him?” Sartre barred the likelihood of any swerve from the interrelated distinctness of the existentialist dialectical conception of the production of social knowledge via the occasional insight drawn from the analogons pertaining to natural sciences by purporting the coexistence of necessity and freedom in his coinage of “necessary freedom” in the context of the latter. The omission that was made on the part of Young as well as the former critics of Sartre’s conception of this theoretical element, such as Merleau-Ponty, is that Sartre’s use of the categories of necessity and freedom were not suggestions toward the willing admission of an imperialised state of natural knowledge and its higher epistemic capability to unearth the relations between two

961 Sartre, Being and Nothingness, pp. 457.
962 Young, White Mythologies, pp. 31.
963 “The link of our critical investigation is none other than the fundamental identity between an individual life and human history (or, from the methodological point of view, the ‘reciprocity of their perspectives’). Strictly speaking, the identity of these two totalising processes must itself be proved…. If there is a dialectic we must submit to it as the unavoidable discipline of the totalization which totalizes us and grasp it, in its free practical spontaneity, as the totalising praxis which we are; at each stage of our investigation we must discover, within the intelligible unity of the synthetic movement, the contradiction and indissoluble connection between necessity and freedom, though, at each moment, this connection appears in different forms. In any case, if my life, as it deepens, becomes History, it must reveal itself, at a deep level of its free development, as a strict necessity of the historical process so as to rediscover itself at an even deeper level, as the freedom of this necessity and, finally, as the necessity of freedom.” Sartre, Critique of Dialectical Reason I, pp. 70; cf. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, pp. 50.
964 In a direct attempt to refute the existentialist basis of Sartre’s justification of the defence of communism, Merleau-Ponty argued in 1955 that the construal of human praxis as the expression of subjective volition robbed the ground on which any collective challenge to institutions can be formed: “Sartre founds communist action precisely by refuting any productivity to history and by making history, insofar as it is intelligible, the immediate result of our volitions. As for the rest, it is an impenetrable opacity.” Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Adventures of the Dialectic, trans. by Joseph Bien, ( Evanston, 1973), pp. 97-8; in contradistinction to this view, Sartre pointed out that existentialist subjectivity is the only means of ensuring the reintroduction of existential anthropology, conceived partially through the lens of Descartes, Kant and Freud, to Marxism: “It is precisely this expulsion of man, his exclusion from Marxist knowledge, which resulted in the renaissance of existentialist thought outside the historical totalization of knowledge… Marxism will degenerate into a non-human anthropology if it does not reintegrate man into itself as its foundation… From the day that Marxist thought will have taken on the human dimension (that is the existentialist project) as the foundation of anthropological knowledge, existentialism will no longer have any reason for being.” Sartre, Search for a Method, pp. 179-81; cf. Alain Flajoliet, “Sartre’s Phenomenological Anthropology between Psychoanalysis and “Daseinsanalyse””, Sartre Studies International, vol. 16 no. 1, (2010), pp. 40-59.
distinct natural events. Indeed, the absence of any metanarrative beam, metaphysical or otherwise, from any existentialist dialectical attempt at the historicization of any given textual event may seem to have imbibed from a preconception of human action as manifestations of an absolutely unconditional will à la Schopenhauer. Yet no jump from any strand of complete determinism, e.g., institutional, technological, etc., to an equally unbridled immanentism materialises in Sartre’s existentialist dialectical attempt to theoretically relocate the creative capacity of any human agent within his or her collectivity. The construed of metanarratives as the golden thread of history merits, in that sense, no epistemological gesture other than a simple tip of the head regarding the politically-induced admission of a certain measure of natural determinism to suffuse social reality so that the domain of the Kantian intelligible character can expand its borders to envelope everything social. This ‘bane or boon’ approach to social history can be attributed to many other influential thinkers including the ones that we mentioned, but it can hardly warrant the stigmatization of Sartre’s attempt to work out the fine details of the functioning of an existentialist dialectics in the context of social affairs.

The incorporation of freedom as the autonomy of choice that is formulated against the essentially incomplete realisation of any social totalising project, apart from its ontological significance, gives expression to the historicization of the individual whose lacks, and the

965 It appears worthwhile to note, in that sense, that contrary to Young’s rather linear presentation of a limited number of Sartre’s postulations, the theoretical conceptions of the latter exhibit an ontological and phenomenological kernel, and it must be kept in mind that the former of these two elements retains its import even when the latter is shed in his later works. Young’s deliberate evasion of those implicit resonances which have their roots in Sartre’s earlier works, in addition to the hiatus that is introduced by his disconcerting lack of any insinuation to Sartre’s discussion of the external dialectics of natural knowledge result in a jaundiced and superficial approach to the critical horizon against which Sartre had formulated the basic analytical premises of his works: “The major question thus always remains unanswered in the Critique: every time that Sartre announces that the is about to proceed with the fundamental problem of how History can be a totalization without a totalizer, he turns back to a previous, more easily intelligible stage on the way. His difficulty is accompanied by a no doubt symptomatic increasing distrust of universals so that, in championing specificities against them, he seems to give up the attempt to validate the universals – History as Totalization – that originally formed the object of his project.” Young, White Mythologies, pp. 36.

966 “Even if hatred is given as the actualization of a certain power of spite or hatred, it remains something new in relation to the power it actualizes. Thus the unifying act of reflection fastens each new state, in a very special way, to the concrete totality, me. Reflection is not confined to apprehending the new state as attaching to this totality, as fusing with it: reflection intends a relation which traverses time backwards and which gives the me as the source of the state.” Sartre, The Transcendence of the Ego, pp. 77.

967 Cf. “The illusion [of Sartre] was only to precipitate into a historical fact – the proletariat’s birth and growth – history’s total meaning, to believe that history itself organized its own recovery, that the proletariat’s power would be its suppression, the negation of the negation.” Merleau-Ponty, Adventures of the Dialectic, pp. 205.

968 A case in point appears to be Sartre’s exposition of the relationship between freedom and resistance in his Being and Nothingness. Freedom’s relation to the order of existents in regard to the outward projection of the internal negation of the lacking individual, in that vein, link the otherwise binary notions of freedom and necessity in the existential plane of material human existence: “It is by means of them [the existents] that freedom is separated from and reunited to the end which it pursues and which
ensuing suffering caused by them that is endured without notice, are hence divested from being. Reminiscent of Sartre’s suggestion to historicize the goodwill of the reader, the existentialist dialectical enactment of history as ongoing totalisation reinserts the dialectical materialist conception of universals on the plane of analogons borrowed from the context of natural sciences. Furthermore, the existentialist dialectical conception of human projects as the satisfaction of any historicized lacking reintroduces the element of theoretical introspection that refuses to reify historical structures as frozen entities. The historicized lacking, on this view, appears as the theoretical vestige of the totalization of the textual past in not only the revaluation of the spatial and temporal ‘here and now,’ but also those of the conceptual tools of trade utilised by existentialist dialectical totalization. The devaluation of the historicized lacking with regard to the relation of the immediate spatio-temporal reality to all the mediated textual echoes of the past beings-in-the-world, which constitutes the first element of the existentialist dialectical re-totalisation, reintroduces the Marxian element of historicity in giving primacy to reciprocal relations between textualized events, deeds, and actors. The oft-repeated inconsistency between Sartre’s early eschewal of any materialism, the Marxian variant included, as the asocial replacement of a reign of human activity by that of material inertia, and his later espousal of the solipsist socialism of the post war Soviet Union can be criticised on these grounds. This ahistorical voluntarism, on whose back, as we have seen in the previous chapter, was painted one of the largest theoretical targets by Marx and Engels, functions only so long as the totalization into history and the accompanying makes known to it what it is. Consequently the resistance which freedom reveals in the existent, far from being a danger to freedom, results only in enabling it to arise as freedom. Outside of this engagement the notions of freedom, of determinism, of necessity lose all meaning.” Sartre, Being and Nothingness, pp. 505; cf. Sartre, L’Existentialisme est un humanisme, pp. 82.

“Tout matérialisme a pour effet de traiter tous les hommes y compris soi-même comme des objets, c’est-à-dire comme un ensemble de réactions déterminées, que rien ne distingue de l’ensemble des qualités et des phénomènes qui constituent une table ou une chaise ou une pierre. Nous voulons constituer précisément le règne humain comme un ensemble de valeurs distinctes du règne matériel.” Sartre, L’Existentialisme est un humanisme, pp. 65; Stalin’s earlier definition of internationalism in 1927 when the likelihood of a European socialist revolution had already dwindled to fast nil, can be utilized to bring Sartre’s later endorsement into historical perspective: “He is an interna- tionalist who unreservedly, unhesitatingly and unconditionally is prepared to defend the USSR, because the USSR is the base of the world revolutionary movement, and it is impossible to defend, to advance this revolutionary movement without defending the USSR.” Cited in V. Kubálková and A. Cruickshank, Marxism-Leninism and the Theory of International Relations, (London, 1980), pp. 139.

“Sartre takes the slogan ‘socialism in one country’ as an example of the unintended but necessary product of the anti-labour of the Stalin-Trotsky conflict.... Stalin therefore becomes the authentic Marxist, able to deal with specific historical circumstances, as against Trotsky who is regarded as having been hopelessly caught up with the a priori universalism of an abstract Marxism.” Young, White Mythologies, pp. 40.

On the consistent a-normative historicism that is exhibited by the Marxian works, in addition to the possible causes that can be purported to explain Marx and Engels’ adopted outlook on outlying historical events, e.g., the Commune of 1871, see Richard W. Miller, Analysing Marx: Morality, Power, and History, (Princeton, 1984); Richard W. Miller, ‘Marx and Aristotle: A Kind of Consequentialism’, 257
historicization of the lacking is not realized. Indeed, Sartre’s denunciation of the international policies of the USSR,\textsuperscript{973} which were penned through the 1940s and early 1950s and were drawn against a historical background in whose stage sojourned not only Stalin and Beria but also Tito and Mao to name only a few, in addition to events of the character of 1952 World Peace Conference; whereas the political scene of France of the 1960s was oriented decisively toward the settlement of the Algerian question and the definitive rounding off of \textit{la mission civilisatrice}.\textsuperscript{974} In the light of the fact that anyone who has read Sartre’s introduction to Fanon’s \textit{Les Damnés de la terre} can recall how desperately Sartre and other self-conscious socialist intellectuals around him sought to cling to even the least promising, yet concrete, of all political projects at re-totalisation,\textsuperscript{975} the ideological significance of this theoretical oscillation can be discerned without difficulty. This rethinking of spatio-temporal determinateness of any historical society, including one’s own, can be conceived as the principal conditionality on which any historical introspection rests. Put in the material context of Akbar Ahmed’s influential \textit{Postmodernism and Islam}, for example, the idealist preconception of history as a mélange of contingently dispersed images to be magnetized according to the whimsical transposition of events entail a staggering degree of ahistorical self-referentiality with which numerous assertions are vented in a veritable potlach of impressionism:

“After all, even Marx, with his overriding passion for the suffering of the poor, really talked of the \textit{white} poor; his references to Asians are both racially insulting and sociologically incorrect. Like his friend Engels (whose remarks on the Irish cannot be printed today), he appears to have been an unconscious racist.”\textsuperscript{976}


\textsuperscript{973} Sartre, \textit{What is Literature?}, pp. 110.

\textsuperscript{974} We cannot give any feasible explanation as to how Young, otherwise a highly perspicacious observer of the different strands of African socialism as exemplified by his later book \textit{Postcolonialism}, failed to take this political shift which necessitated the revaluation of all politico-ethical universals that were in wide circulation within the French existentialist camp by then. See, Robert J. C. Young, \textit{Postcolonialism. An Historical Introduction}, (Oxford, 2003), pp. 241-89.

\textsuperscript{975} “Chatter, chatter: liberty, equality, fraternity, love, horror, patriotism, and what have you. All this did not prevent us from making anti-racial speeches about dirty niggers, dirty Jews, and dirty Arabs…. While there was a native population somewhere this imposture was not shown up; in the notion of the human race we found an abstract assumption of universality which served as cover for the most realistic practices…. Our precious sets of values begin to molt; on closer scrutiny you won’t see one that isn’t strained with blood. If you are looking for an example, remember these fine words: “How generous France is!” Us, generous? What about Sétif, then? And those eight years of ferocious war which have cost the lives of over a million Algerians? And the tortures?” Jean-Paul Sartre, ‘Introduction’, in \textit{The Wretched of the Earth}, trans. by Constance Farrington, (New York, 1968), pp. 26; cf. Roland Barthes, ‘The Great Family of Man’, in \textit{Mythologies}, pp. 121-124.

All good and well. Two determinate lives, one of which can be viewed as the lacking personified, *engagée* to the brim exemplified by their commitment to the production of a theory whose refinement took just as much as did the erstwhile conception of its elements, with sickness unto death on top of international persecution and abuse on behalf of the executors of the ruling class hence branded as conscious carriers of supremacism and unconscious racism because of their tendency to welter in words of abuse in private correspondence and occasionally in their published works. There appears to be a pressing need to dismantle each and every concept that is used by Ahmed in forming that statement starting from his impressionist insinuations that were conceived from secondary sources on Marxism, if we are to engage in an impressionism of our own, and concluding with his self-styled psychologism with its juvenile penchant for paroxysms. Yet, to remain on strictly epistemological grounds, it appears all too evident that the impressionistic outlook exhibited by instances such as above also find their expression in the conclusion of Ahmed’s work that *appear* to have walked the tightrope between a hymn to religion, i.e., Islam, and wishful thinking: “And I thought: to hear the *hamd* in London before such a large and enthusiastic audience and to see Mick Jagger among them shaking to *Allah hu* was only possible in our age. Here was contradiction, here was juxtaposition and here was hope.” Ahmed may have found the blissful state of postmodern existence in Mick Jagger’s ecstatic shaking, but there is hardly any euphoria for us to find there on theoretical terms. An anti-communitarian project of false hope is never hard to conjure; one just has to be perseverant enough to keep looking in order to find some means of fooling oneself. Yet, epistemology is all about measuring the means themselves. And in the case of Ahmed, who wrote a book on the relation of postmodernism to Islam without gracing it with a single reference to Algeria, we find it fitting to observe a remark made by Fanon almost sixty years ago:

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977 For a sketch of all the thorny questions that figured into the decision on whether to publish an uncensored edition of the correspondance, which was to be delayed until the decisive intervention of David Riazanov in 1929, see Stedman Jones, *Karl Marx*, pp. 4.

978 Infinitely more robust and timelier than Ahmed’s culturalist diagnosis is Fanon’s firm refusal to view racism as a “disposition de l’esprit,” which was darted at his imperialist contemporaries more than half a century ago: Fanon, *Pour l’Algérie*, pp. 36.


980 This omission, given that the forceful imposition of modern explanation reached its acme in the Algerian case, warrants comparison with one of the suggestive reminiscences of de Beauvoir: “A la Sorbonne, mes professeurs ignoraient systématiquement Hegel et Marx; dans son gros livre sur “le progrès de la conscience en Occident”, c’est à peine si Brunschvicg avait consacré trois pages à Marx, qu’il mettait en parallèle avec un penseur réactionnaire de plus obscurs. Il nous enseignait l’histoire de la pensée scientifique, mais personne ne nous racontait l’aventure humaine. Le sabbat sans queue ni tête que les hommes menaient sur terre pouvait intriguer de spécialistes : il n’était pas digne d’occuper le philosophe.” Simone de Beauvoir, *Mémoires d’une jeune fille rangée*, (Paris, 1958), pp. 318; cf. Sartre, *Search for a Method*, pp. 17; incidentally, we ought to remember that Marx’s writings on Algeria, the only non-European country he visited during his lifetime, were argued by René Gallissot to emit the crystalline signals of an epistemological revolution from the general contours of Hegelian philosophy.
“The people who at the beginning of the struggle [for national liberation] had adopted the primitive Manicheism of the settler–Blacks and Whites, Arabs and Christians–realize as they go along that it sometimes happens that you get Blacks who are whiter than the Whites and that the fact of having a national flag and the hope of an independent nation does not always tempt certain strata of the population to give up their interests or privileges.”

The disarming lack of any introspection is the logical result of venturing out on a hunt after historical images to fit in the mould of prefabricated projects. The assumption of an already lived-out past is not the equivalent of its theoretical analysis. Only historically determinate groups comprising of individuals and their aggregate deeds can transform past texts into totalising histories. The epistemological solipsism exhibited by works like Ahmed’s demonstrate that the lack of continuous introspection stems directly from the author’s presumptive mythologization of the received traditions of encoded past human potentialities. Indeed, whether it is conceived in a postmodern shell or an idealist kernel, any work that produces history without also being self-critically conscious that it is only remaking, not recoding for that would involve a struggle for de-mythologization, history that has already been made by collective agents avows to play the game of historical hide and seek in which the isolated remarks that one ought to find are bound to be found in the next historical corner if not in this one. Discarding the formal manifestation of an essentially idealistic creed in defence of the essence of Islam, Greek ethos, or self-propagating Kulturkampf, etc., the Archimedean standpoint that holds the brittle arguments of an essentially ahistorical thesis together can be conceived only if the genie of the Hegelian Geist is uncorked. Animated not only with utter disregard for existentalist dialectics’ above elaborated analysis of human knowledge commencing with the cognition of natural knowledge and its perpetual emendation, and its further diversification of dialectics into an analogising and a totalising


981 Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, pp. 144.
982 “If human societies are historical, this does not stem simply from the fact that they have a past but from the fact that they reassume the past by making it a memorial.” Sartre, Being and Nothingness, pp. 521.
983 The Marxian critique of the theoretical naturalization of detotalized history on behalf of overarching ideals, is a criticism that appears worthwhile to repeat in regard to the ‘hope’ Ahmed found in the contradictory juxtaposition of postmodernism and Islam: “Many people in the West don’t understand that there is nothing ‘natural’ or ahistorical in the fact that Islamic fundamentalism is nowadays the most visible political current among Muslim peoples. They ignore or forget that the picture was completely different in other historical periods of our contemporary history – that, for instance, a few decades ago the largest non-governing communist party in the world, a party officially referring therefore to an atheist doctrine, was in the country with the largest Muslim population: Indonesia – of course, until the party was crushed in a bloodbath at the hands of the US-backed Indonesian military starting in 1965.” Achar, Marxism, Orientalism, Cosmopolitanism, pp. 34; Noam Chomsky and Gilbert Achar, Perilous Power: The Middle East and the U.S. Foreign Policy, (London, 2007).
984 The movement away from the epistemological primacy accorded to the external reality and its sensory intuition towards either a minimalist position of knowledge or a neo-pragmatist description of the cognitive production of knowledge, both of which can be theoretically traced back to the semiotics
variant that pertains respectively to the production of natural and social knowledge, the central arguments of these critics owe their essential epistemological spotlessness to their theoretical admission of the transcendental idealist spirit tacitly or explicitly.

The eternalization of the theoretician’s spatio-temporally determinate ‘here and now’ also echoes through the epistemological universals with which the analyst sets about his or her task of historical analysis. Sartre’s notion of totality, for one, was initially conceived, as we noted above, as an ontological grasp of the complex schema through which external reality is construed as the interrelation between the categories of ‘the lacking,’ ‘the existing,’ and ‘the lacked.’ Arguing that this trilinear production of the total physical image denotes the discovery of individual’s own totality as one constituted by lacks whose surpassing define the human existence conceived foremost as physical need. Sartre later introduced a much more variegated understanding of dialectics qua the totalizing force that operates on historical events to produce “the law of totalisation which creates several collectivities, several societies, and one history – realities, that is, which impose themselves on individuals; but at the same time it must be woven out of millions of individual actions.” Reconfiguring the theoretical horizon accordingly in order to incorporate historical elements such as contingency, spuriousness, unforeseeable consequences, etc., Sartre thence rethought his earlier position on praxis and the advance of history while moving away from the praxis of the solitary ego to the potentiality of collective action and its historical analysis.

of language purported in Wittgenstein’s “Die Grenzen meiner Sprache bedeuten die Grenzen Meiner Welt,” can be grappled with only by reintroducing the “epistemic fallacy”, to use Bhaskar’s term, that is involved in the conflation of the methods of scientific analysis with its corresponding external objects. As our previous forays into Eco’s semiotics suggest, positing a plane of external reality can only be realised through the incessant activity of human cognition. Still, between any such construction of a cognitive plane, which, incidentally, is a linguistic re-construction of the nth degree that is hinted by Gadamer’s well-known “Sein, das verstanden kann, ist Sprache,” and what we have called a zero-degree recognition of the in-itself must protrude the self-configuration of the observer whose existence is susceptible of forging merely the latest portion of the hermeneutic circle. To that end, the contextual realism of scientific knowledge, postulated by Meera Nanda, appears to be a relevant epistemological medicine to purvey in the context of natural sciences: “I believe that it is perfectly possible to defend a realism that can distinguish truth from superstition, and justify preferring the former not simply in terms of coherence (or “solidarity” as Rorty calls it) with a particular community of knowers (i.e., Western scientists), but in terms of how accurately it maps onto, and –yes– corresponds to some part of what there is in the world.” Meera Nanda, ‘Against Social De(con)struction of Science: Cautionary Tales from the Third World’, in In Defense of History. Marxism and the Postmodern Agenda, eds. Ellen M. Wood and John B. Foster, (New York, 1997), pp. 92; Wittgenstein, Tractatus logico-philosophicus, 5.6; Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode, pp. 450; cf. Lefebvre, Le langage et la société, pp. 98-99; Joseph Rouse, Knowledge and Power: Toward a political philosophy of science, (Ithaca, NY., 1987).

985 Sartre, Being and Nothingness, pp. 110-1; for a synoptic account of the widely divergent ontological claims feeding into Hegelian totality, see Lukács, The Ontology of Social Being, I, pp. 67-68.
986 Sartre, Critique of Dialectical Reason I, pp. 36.
987 “And each of our antagonistic acts, if it is to be dialectically comprehensible, must be able to be understood in its inadequacy, in its imperfection, and in its mistakes, on the basis of the negative determinations which it preserves as it transcends them.” Jean-Paul Sartre, Critique of Dialectical
The reconceptualization of the universals with which theoretical ties are forged thus appears to be the main motivation of Sartre’s extended discussion of the boxing match in the second volume of the Critique of Dialectical Reason. Having postulated fighting as the immediate “public incarnation of every conflict,” Sartre has developed this allegory in tune with an ontological allusion to its portrayal as the original conflict that can be conjectured to have taken place in the field of scarcity. The phenomenological representation of the boxing match, on this view, is the articulation of a series of events that reach back to a series of historical referents from the presupposed primordiality of prehistorical fighting to a series succeeding semilogies that inform the reference structure of the phenomenon. The history of boxing, regarded as a conglomeration of elements that we consciously and unconsciously hark back to, does not take away the singularity of any bout that serves as a determinate event whose singularity does not suggest, in and of itself, any linkages of it to a quasi-eternalized totality. Put differently, each bout is an incarnation onto itself and not a reincarnation of any ideal. Yet, the intelligibility of any bout as an incarnation of both primordial needs and contemporary social impositions, such as the set of rules that are ever prone to be changed and, yet, are still issued in conformity to a prescribed normativity, presuppose the dialectical comprehension of its history as a fluid totalisation encompassing its contemporary structures of signification. The theoretical organisation of the singular event into a historical totality, and vice versa, connote an understanding of the historically determinate event as admitting a determinate degree of contingency in regard to each singular event. The fact that most of the boxers have historically been brought up in working class milieu, for example, does not convey a necessity that there cannot be any boxer with middle class backgrounds. Yet, neither does the presence of any boxer that was reared in a middle-class environment refute the fact that the prevailing majority of boxers have had working class roots. And, we hardly need to note the absurdity of the claim that even the children of prime ministers can train themselves as boxers. A historically unrealized potentiality is a dead potentiality; there is no reason to attempt to reanimate it by resorting hypothetical voluntarisms of what ifs. On one level, the history of boxing as a totalisation of every previous structured bout that is textually transmitted to the present is expressed in this single bout that we are about to see; and on another, the


Ibid., pp. 22-23; cf. Sartre, Critique de la Raison Dialectique, I, pp. 688.

“Existentialism, then, can only affirm the specificity of the historical event; it seeks to restore to the event its function and its multiple dimensions.” Sartre, Search for a Method, pp. 124; cf. Lukács, The Ontology of Social Being, II, pp. 95.

single bout is comprehended as a determinate historical event only if it is conceived in the
totalising light of its historical precedents:

“Everything is given in the last punch: from the history of the one who delivers it to the
material and collective circumstances of that history; from the general indictment of capitalist
society to the singular determination of that indictment by the boxing promoters; from the
fundamental violence of the oppressed to the singular and alienating objectification of that
violence in and through each of the participants. And if everything were not present and
transcended, the singular invention – the unique and concrete reality that is this punch,
delivered on this day, in this hall, in front of this audience – would not even be possible. The
incarnation as such is at once unrealizable, other than as a totalization of everything, and
irreducible to the pure abstract unity of what it totalizes. Its concrete reality is, in fact, to be an
oriented totalization. And this orientation is precisely the other aspect of its singularity.”

The comprehension of the specific determinateness of any event, as such, hinges on unearthing
its relation to the totality of all its former incarnations. Refuting any tendency to view the
singular event as a re-enactment of an ideal prototype, existential dialectics thus temporalizes
and localizes the historical manifestation of each need and scarcity as a reconfiguration of its
own determinacy. Henceforth, conceived as the intelligible totality of singularly construed
events, Sartre’s answer, to the all-encompassing question asked at the end of the unfinished
second volume, which, incidentally, is abbreviated by Young supposedly to bring his point
home, is linked to its theoretical essence that freedom and necessity can be conceived only
as mutually-reinforcing concepts that embrace their essentially historical significations in the
light of history seen as the re-totalisation of all the textually available existential projects of
the past. Dialectical materialist conception of history as totality, which is as universal a concept
as any other, thus invites rethinking not only in terms of the categories it employs but also in
regard to their theoretical construal thanks in large part to the comprehension of any singular
event as reiteration. The norms of historical intelligibility, conceived from the existentialist
dialectical point of view, are not absolute. Indeed, while the epistemological claim to organise
dimensions of social events into structures of meaning run along qualitatively different lines
in the cases of Ahmed and Lukács, for example, this does not confer an absolute value on the

993 “Is History Essential to Man?” No.
It is the outside lived as the inside, the inside lived as an outside.
It is man’s own exteriority (his being-an-object for cosmic forces, for example) lived as his interiority.
It makes him, however (by intervening), but precisely as a being existing his own outside in the form
of interiorization: in short, as the being who cannot have an essence (for it is really something else that
he recuperates into himself as his being – and not as his essence). Yet History – which makes man
non-conceptual – comprehends him; or, if you prefer, the man made by History makes himself by
994 Young, *White Mythologies*, pp. 41.
theoretical understanding of history of the latter. The construal of theoretical universals and
the role they play in any misstep toward linear inference, as the example of “As the economic
and political struggles in the Russia of that day [post-1848 period] could not as yet have
reached the sharpness of those in Central and Western Europe, Russian thinkers could not as
yet arrive at the ideas of scientific socialism,”996 conveys, is not conceived solely with respect
to the potential advancement of the avenues of historical interpretation. Indeed, existentialist
dialectical conception of social knowledge is also discernible by its admission of circumscribed parasitism of the event, as it was envisaged by Derrida in his discussion on
textual strategies.997 Parasitism is theoretically allowable, because the singularity of the event
is not effaced by history’s existentialist dialectical conception as re-totalisation; in fact, if
anything, it aids the comprehension of the otherwise self-reverential abstractness of the latter
by projecting it as a voluntarily constructed framework of a historically determinate event.998
And yet, this deus ex machina voluntarism cannot be allowed to hold complete sway over the
singular event because the epistemological possibility of conceiving the event can be
postulated only if it is purported in its seriality. It is to that extend that an existentialist
dialectical epistemology can partially espouse Derrida’s probes beneath the idea of scientific
truth, and his consequent excavation of the Christianized logos beneath the whole discursive
debris,999 for the simple fact that its ties to the natural scientists’ postulations of relations
between different external phenomena bear only analogised relevance for the production of
social knowledge. In ontological terms, existentialist dialectics construes history as a
reconstruction in deconstruction and not as a deconstruction in deconstruction.1000
The natural scientific claim to truth, utilitarian as it sometimes is, is purported as congruent only in its
relation to the epistemic inception of human knowledge, and, hence, any negation of its various
transcendental truth-claims, in addition to the metaphysical garbs with which scientific
rationalism has come to present itself over the course of millennia, is commendable in that it
uproots the basic possibility to introduce the self-referential dialectics within the sphere of
natural knowledge.

Combined with this introduction of self-criticism to impede any sway toward the building of
self-propagating truth contents, the epistemology of existential dialectics appears preferable
compared either to the logicized Marxism of the analytical school or to any idealistically

997 “The parasite parasitizes the limits that guarantee the purity of rules and of intensions, and this is not
devoid of import for law, politics, economics, ethics, etc.” Derrida, Limited Inc., pp. 98.
1000 Derrida, Specters of Marx, pp. 33.
conceived epistemology such as Said’s critique of Orientalism. To be sure, the theoretical deficiencies of *Orientalism* are well documented. Yet, given the undeniable influence it continues to exert on some areas of social knowledge, it appears to be of theoretical import to see if it holds water in the face of the existentialist dialectical epistemology as we have construed it thus far. To that end, we began our discussion with the ontological presupposition of needs as the fundamental category supporting the physical necessity of production which has been construed according to the understanding of human individual foremost as a physical being characterized by his or her lacks. Said’s ontological definition of human individual, on the other hand, is conceived along the binary demarcation of those who accept the “distinction made between “the Orient” and (most of the time) “the Occident”” and others that refuse it. Our epistemological foray into the perception of natural knowledge, conceived in accordance with a minimised recognition of the materialist thesis of taking external reality as the ground-zero of any cognition, stemmed from our argument that the relational conceptions that have been formulated to organise singular natural phenomenon into structures of scientific reasoning can be utilised as analogons for the facilitation of any totalising projection of singular events into structures of exploitation seeping into the historically available human potentialities. Said’s epistemological analysis, however, was based on measuring isolated passages taken from works of historical literature, e.g., Aeschylus’ *Persians* or Marx’ *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*, against the yardstick of the “evidence” offered by blanket generalisations of what “a non-Oriental has made into a symbol for the whole Orient.” We proceeded by an epistemological analysis of the conception of social knowledge and argued its triad of singulars, particulars, and universals can be analogically viewed in relation to the cognitive scheme of the production of natural knowledge but differs in regard to the emphasis that is put on its heightened sense of external application which promotes the emergence of a value-creative introspective quality of the conceptual universals that are employed by its practitioners. In contradistinction, Said, staying true to his roots, excavated nine lines out of a single play to claim its representatives of an entire tradition whence the culpability arose because “Asia speaks through and by virtue of the European imagination, which is depicted as victorious over Asia, that hostile “other” world beyond the

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1005 Aeschylus, *Persians*, in *Persians and Other Plays*, 548-556.
Finally, we re-coded the universal concept *par excellence*, history, without delving into the least bit of universalism, and attempted to conceive it through the lens of totalising projects and found, in effect, that the existentialist dialectical unity of these two elements is part and parcel of the historical comprehension of deeds and doers alike; whereas Said put the finishing touches on his account by a thorough lament of the one-sided relationship between the Occident and the Orient.

Said should have read Marx and Engels more meticulously. Writing about history without theorising about the production of history, Said’s occasional laments of the Oriental situation warrant juxtaposition to Marx’s earlier rebuke of Lassalle’s petition of equal distribution and ‘fair wages for fair work’ in his *Critique of Gotha Programme*. Indeed, conceived with a disarming want of comprehensive dimensions of historical events, and with a self-edifying negligence that confer little more than passing remarks to some of the most influential works

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1007 “The under-privileged do not represent universality, which is non-existent today, but they do represent the immense majority, particularized by the oppression and exploitation which make of them the products of their products, and rob them of their ends … by reducing them to particular means of production, defined by the instruments they fashion and the tasks these utensils assign to them.” Sartre, ‘A Plea for Intellectuals’, pp. 256.
1009 Ahmad could correct us by saying that he read Marx and Engels, in addition to Gramsci, Althusser and others perhaps too carefully in regard to the ‘theoretical eclecticism’ of Said, whose roundabout ways lead to the fact that “Meanwhile, theoretical eclecticism runs increasingly out of control: sweeping, potently poststructuralist denunciations of Marxism can be delivered in the name of Gramsci, using the terminology explicitly drawn from Althusser, and listing the names of communist poets like Aimé Césaire, Pablo Neruda and Mahmoud Darwish to illustrate the sites of resistance.” Ahmad, *In Theory*, pp. 200.
1010 Karl Marx, *Critique of Gotha Programme*, in MECW, XXIV, trans. by Peter and Betty Ross, pp. 75-94.
1011 Indeed, from his virtual omission of any worthwhile discussion of the two Persian invasions that actually took place, one in 490 BC and the other in 480-79 BC, during the lifetime of Aeschylus to the disregard he has shown for any epistemological discussion of Marx and Engels concerning the relations of primitive accumulation, Said appears as the epitome of tabula rasa in his completely ahistorical dovetailing of dissonant events. One might argue, to Said’s benefit, that some of Marx’s writings on colonies, his letters from Algiers, for example, was not in wide circulation in his time. Yet, the first volume of *Capital* has been in wide circulation for almost a century and yet Said did not have any amends to make in regard to his complete omission of theoretical conceptualizations that form essential parts of that work, such as primitive accumulation, that bore directly on the question of colonization: “The discovery of gold and silver in America, the extirpation, enslavement and entombment in mines of the aboriginal population, the beginning of the conquest and looting of the East Indies, the turning of Africa into a warren for the commercial hunting of black-skins, signalised the rosy dawn of the era of capitalist production. These idyllic proceedings are the chief moments of primitive accumulation.” Marx, *Capital*, I, pp. 739; for Marx’s writings on the “light-bringing French” in Algeria and their continuous “direct robbery” of its people, see Karl Marx, *Excerpts from M. M. Kolakovskij, Obsvinne Zemlevladenic*, in Lawrence Krader, *The Asiatic Mode of Production. Sources, Development and Critique in the writings of Karl Marx*, (Assen, 1975), pp. 412; Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *Ireland and the Irish Question*, (Moscow, 1971).
that were written on the subject,\textsuperscript{1012} Said accomplished his aim to “describe a particular system of ideas,”\textsuperscript{1013} by crucifying a diachronic view of history as a totalising endeavour and actual determinate individuals that made it and passed it down on us on the cross of orientalism. By tailoring an unbroken genealogy to “accommodate Aeschylus, say, and Victor Hugo, Dante and Karl Marx,”\textsuperscript{1014} in addition to epitomes of the scholarly apparatus of Western Orientalism, e.g., Bernard Lewis, and professional colonizers like Lord Cromer, Said’s ‘Orientalism in reverse,’ invented an exclusivist snapshot narrative that used farcical and faulty interpretations as theoretical inference. Preferring impressions, even the most historically counter-intuitive ones,\textsuperscript{1015} to socially prevalent systems of signification, Said distorts Dante’s portrayal of Mohammed and has finds no allusion to spare to Boccaccio’s \textit{Decameron} wherein we find a representation of Saladin as the outstanding and cunning ruler in the third story of the first day.\textsuperscript{1016} Having constructed an impregnable ahistorical binary, Said peers history through the lens of a dogmatic anti-Orientalist vision\textsuperscript{1017} or ‘Orientalism in reverse’ that finds its idealist counterpart in the ahistorical metanarrative of Lewis\textsuperscript{1018} that relegates the history of capitalist accumulation and colonial subjugation in order to devise an explanation for a phenomenal


\textsuperscript{1013} Said, \textit{Orientalism}, pp. 325.

\textsuperscript{1014} \textit{Ibid}, pp. 3.

\textsuperscript{1015} Said’s portrayal of Dante’s Mohammed, for one, borders on clueless impressionism. Not taking account of the fact that the warnings bid by Mohammed to Frate Dolcino Tornielli da Romagnano Novarese, the follower of Gherardo Segalleli, but better known for having founded an apostolic brotherhood for the betterment of women’s condition and for arguing the restitution of the Church to its original simplicity and poverty, manifests abundantly in the lack of instances made by Said’s hypothesised understanding of Dante’s “seminator di scandolo e di scisma” to any interfacing motifs that were in fervent opposition to ecclesiastical authority and dogma: “Or di’ fra Dolcin dunque che s’armi | tu che forse vedrai il sole in breve, | s’ello non vuol qui tosto seguitarmi, | sì di vivanda, che stretta di neve | non rechi la vittoria al Noarese, | ch’altrimenti acquistar non saria leve.” Dante Alighieri, \textit{La Divina Commedia – Inferno}, (Torino, 1966), 55-60; cf. Said, \textit{Orientalism}, pp. 68-70; Ahmad, \textit{In Theory}, pp. 187-90.


\textsuperscript{1017} “Empirical data about the Orient or about any of its parts count for very little; what matters and is decisive is what I have been calling the Orientalist vision, a vision by no means confined to the Professional scholar, but rather the common possession of all who have thought about the Orient in the West.” Said, \textit{Orientalism}, pp. 69.

\textsuperscript{1018} Continuing to play the discursive developmental game of ‘catch-up’ Lewis frequently resorts to World Bank estimates to bring home his point that “a once mighty civilization has indeed fallen low,” while remarking that the Anglo-French interlude in the Middle East was “comparatively brief and ended over a century ago.” Bernard Lewis, \textit{What Went Wrong? Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response}, (London, 2002), pp. 52, 169, 170.
result by strict reference to the realm of ideas. Said’s thus meets the mirror image of his metanarrative in the form of an archetypical ‘genealogical’ nemesis.\textsuperscript{1019}

“One of the tests of civility is surely tolerance – a willingness to coexist with those who hold and practice other beliefs. John Locke, and most other Westerners, believed that the best way to ensure this was to sever or at least to weaken the bonds between religion and the state power. In the past, the Muslims never professed any such belief. They did however see a certain form of tolerance as an obligation of the dominant Islamic religion.”\textsuperscript{1020}

There is no lesser evil to pick here. An ahistorical degradation of any impressionist construal of social history with little to no attention to either synchronic intertextuality or diachronic rethinking gives rise to the primacy of the biblical word, and hence to a reading that clumsily sidesteps Derrida’s critique of the Occidental logos. Said’s veneration of discourse as the preferred method of construction, and hence of deconstruction, of the Orientalist myth attempts to build brittle bridges of sanctified impressions between Aeschylus and Marx, Battle of Salamis and Battle of Plassey, Dante’s \textit{Inferno} and Lewis’ works.\textsuperscript{1021} Yet, leaving aside his critique of Marxism, for its hardly the place of any existentialist dialectical venture to seek to ratiocinate a method of ahistorical discourse that is duly soaked into a metaphysical quicksand of its own making,\textsuperscript{1022} the discursive imperialism on whose grounds Said conceived of Orientalism as a “mental operation”\textsuperscript{1023} cuts the historical ground on which he himself stood. Having shown proud bits of the illustrious career of the professional orientalist H. A. R. Gibb as a pure example of the Orientalist frame of mind, Said rightfully straitjackets the opinions

\textsuperscript{1020} Lewis, \textit{What Went Wrong?}, pp. 126; incidentally, we ought do well to remember that the celebrated limits of Lockean toleration did not expand as much as to include the atheists who were then swiftly accused by Locke, in his \textit{A Letter Concerning Toleration}, of destroying the moral grounds of human society: “Lastly, Those are not at all to be tolerated who deny the being of God. Promises, covenants, and oaths, which are the bonds of human society, can have no hold upon an atheist. The taking away of God, though but even in thought, dissolves all.” John Locke, \textit{A Letter Concerning Toleration}, in \textit{Two Treatises of Government and A Letter Concerning Toleration}, ed. by Ian Shapiro, (New Haven, CT., 2003), pp. 246.
\textsuperscript{1021} Ahmad, \textit{In Theory}, pp. 179-181.
\textsuperscript{1022} “The fact is that Said never engaged seriously with Marxism, nor with his Marxist critiques for that matter. His ambivalence towards Marxism appeared to be at least partly the result of a contradiction between, on one hand, his own support for all aspects of human emancipation, and on the other, his professional location at the very center of US academia – in the academic “belly of the beast” – where Marxism was anathema, especially in the intensifying Cold War years during which Said soared to prominence.” Achar, \textit{Marxism, Orientalism, Cosmopolitanism}, pp. 72; cf. “All this fell in very nicely, as the book appeared in 1978 and began its career in a world supervised by Reagan and Thatcher, with various kinds of anti-communisms and post-Marxisms which were to grip the most advanced sectors of the metropolitan intelligentsia during the period…. Numerous writers had previously demonstrated the complicity of European culturale productions in the colonial enterprise, but only the most obscurantist indigenists and culturale nationalists had previously argued… that Europeans were ontologically incapable of producing any true knowledge about non-Europe. But Said was emphatic on this point, and he mobilized all sorts of eclectic procedures to establish it.” Ahmad, \textit{In Theory}, pp. 178-9.
\textsuperscript{1023} “There is nothing especially controversial or reprehensible about such domestications of the exotic. They take place between all cultures, certainly, between all men (sic). My point, however, is to emphasize the truth that the Orientalist, as much as anyone in the European West who thought about or experienced the Orient, performed this kind of mental operation.” Said, \textit{Orientalism}, pp. 60.
of the former by declaring in his stead that “History, politics, and economics do not matter. Islam is Islam, the Orient is the Orient, and please take all your ideas about a left and a right wing, revolutions, and change back to Disneyland.”1024 History, politics, and economics do, indeed, matter. They matter because they are the theoretical re-totalisation of composites of deeds done by collectivities that comprise of historically determinate yet irreducible singularities.1025 They matter because social being is a producer out of brutal necessity,1026 a being whose totalising projects can never be thoroughly conceived entirely on grounds of historical determination, but can be totalised into shared structurations of historically available human potentialities that surround human existence without ever managing to successfully invade it. And, perhaps more importantly, they matter because only with a theoretical light taken from their collective projects can one hope to banish the ahistoricizing shadows that mystify the greatest pseudo-totality of all, “one overwhelming historical reality, the “totalizing” unity of capitalism which has bound together all the epochal ruptures of the twentieth century.”1027

Unweaving the capitalist rainbow, as such, necessitates an existentialist dialectical reappropriation of the Marxian critique of the history of the capitalist mode of production. Our endeavour to focus on the underlying ontological and epistemological grounds of this critique has attempted to purport a construal of historical universals as a perpetually honed epistemological tool that takes heed from its erstwhile deployment in different fields of natural knowledge, but only in the capacity of transposable analogons. The ontological grounds of re-producing existentialist dialectics and re-coding the historical interpretation of the concepts it employs has shown that Marx’s development of the Aristotelian preponderance of dunameis as one of the fundamental attributes of social being, an existentially reworked Spinozist understanding of irreducible immanence of every single action, and Adorno’s rethinking of Lukács’ Hegelian construal of totality need to find their respective theoretical places within the attempt if the tightrope between totalisation and individuation is to be walked. Ontologically and epistemologically, we have worked our way toward an understanding of the production of historical knowledge as the erection of a value-creative pedestal on which totalising re-codings of past textualities are to be organised. We will attempt to trace the fine-

1025 “If one wants to grant to Marxist thought its full complexity, one would have to say that man in a period of exploitation is at once both the product of his own product and a historical agent who can under no circumstances be taken as a product. This contradiction is not fixed; it must be grasped in the very movement of praxis.” Sartre, Search for a Method, pp. 87; cf. Sartre, Idee per una teoria delle emozioni, pp.150; Lefebvre, ‘Zum Begriff der ‘Erklärung’ in der politischen Ökonomie und in der Soziologie’, pp. 174-175; cf. Badiou, Philosophy and the Idea of Communism, pp. 9-10.
details of this theoretical lineage in the following three chapters to see if our existentialist dialectics of re-totalisation function in rendering a diachronic retelling of the ancient Greek tale.
CHAPTER 4

NOMOS AND PHUSIS BEYOND THE BINARISM OF THE IXION’S WHEEL

4.1 The Uncharted Waters Beyond the Binarism

We have attempted, up till now, to reidentify the ontological and epistemological bases of a post-Jamesonian existentialist dialectics by focusing on some of the peculiarities of a theoretical conception that it can possibly make use of. The theoretical thread between the ontological emphasis we put on the concept of material need and the Marxian dismissal of anachronistic universalisms on the grounds of abject idealism, on this view, was knit together thanks in large part to the undeniable import assigned to social history as a compact totality. Putting the theoretical insight we garnered into practice, we now shift our sights to seek out hitherto unmapped pathways toward the potential disentanglement of one of the hallmark features of ancient Greek philosophy, the nomos/phusis dichotomy, by defacing the bane or boon approach that is devised by countless modern investigators in order to ‘historicize’ the concepts on a preferential basis. Contrary to the presupposed inheritance of the two concepts of the umbilical cords of democratism and aristocratism, we propose to conceive

1028 The debate concerning the two terms, donning, at times, various epithets such as ‘naturalism’ vs. ‘conventionalism’, has turned into one of the stock themes of Western philosophising. Arguments pertaining to a wide range of institutionalized social practices ranging from burial customs to juridical procedures can, in that vein, be conceived along the lines of arguments for or against nature in order to embellish them with an additional layer of robustness. Annas, a typical representative of this tradition, claims, for example, that ideal nature “can point beyond convention and existing institutions … We can appeal beyond them to the idea of human nature as it would be if we did not have those practices and institutions.” Julia Annas, “Ethical Arguments from Nature: Aristotle and After,” in Beiträge zur antiken Philosophie, ed. by H. C. Gunther and A. Rengakes, (Stuttgart, 1997), pp. 196-7; cf. Jean Roberts, “Justice and the Polis,” and Fred Miller, “Naturalism,” in The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Political Thought, ed. C. Rowe and M. Schofield (Cambridge, 2000), pp. 345-46, 321-43.

1029 I object to Duplouy, De Angelis and Osborne’s reading of the term with sole allusion to its veneer of ancien régime. Commendable as it is to recall the connotational shifts that the term was made to undergo as an inseparable part of modern history, it appears equally praiseworthy to note that the usage of the term was no less subject to changes and challenges. One needs only to remember how drastically the fortunes of the concept were altered in the quarter of a century between Cleisthenes’ exile at the hands of Isagoras and Cleomenes and the Persian defeat at Marathon in 490. There is a recent study of Hans van Wees and Nick Fisher that pays homage to this conflict-ridden quality of the term in ancient Greece in order to stipulate that the very concept of ‘elitehood’ is a mis-construal of a replacement that cannot be posited at the interstices of social strife which was an ever-present reality of that historical context. A. Duplouy, Le prestige des elites: Recherches sur les modes de reconnaissance sociale en Grece entre les Xe et Ve siecles avant J.-C. (Paris, 2006), pp. 11-35; Robin Osborne, Greece in the Making, 1200-479 BC, 2nd edition, (London and New York, 2009), pp. 209-210; Franco de Angelis,
them through an existentialist dialectical lens by entrapping the shifting resonances with which they were perpetually construed through the befogged poetics of the Homeric age to the moralistic politico-philosophical works of Plato. By reintroducing the historical reconfigurations that each surviving text, in addition to its author, was subjected to in the hands of its posthumous ‘adherents,’ we hope to convey the theoretical purchase of Marxian socio-historical determinism. Historical contextualization, needful as it is in regard to the theoretical construal of any episode of history, hardly accommodates the wavering fortunes of any conception of myth over the course of decades and centuries thereby prompting the espousal of essentialist strokes on a canvas that is fathomed to be made up solely of the ahistorical relations that it is conceived to bear with the ‘historical now’. We glimpsed some of the discerning traits of what such a de-historicized theorein (from ‘thea,’ a view, and ‘horan,’ to see) boils down to in the case of certain idealist philosophers and the classical representatives of political economy in the previous chapters. Indeed, even Marx’s historically well-versed attempt to rethink the theoretical stakes involved in the clash between the Democritian and the Epicurean philosophies of nature borders, at times, on eliciting an ex-temporalized view of two branches of natural philosophies hassling for primacy on a purely ideational level. To be sure, the theoretical clash between the two philosophies was significant in its own right in that nothing of the post-Socratic natural philosophy comes even close to the Epicurean reconceptualization of natural order along the lines of the temporal actions of the human individual that is unfettered in relation to her fate. Never the less, the social, economic and political exigencies that imbued life and limb of the phalanx of Greek city-states in the Democritian times can hardly be conceived to have stayed put over the course of the century that saw the fall of the mainland political powerhouses of Athens, Sparta, and Thebes and the rise of Macedon to unprecedented prominence in their stead. It is by incorporating the historical events that are recorded in defence speeches, philosophical, medicinal and dramaturgical tracts, and personal letters with sanguine authentication into the longer view of social history that the idealistic lacuna of space and time is to be filled. And the filling of that lacuna can only be realised by a thorough analysis of the class position that each major debater attempted to vindicate through his works via structured arguments and silences. As both the utterances and silences are elucidated, our primary theoretical argument is brought home in ever-increasing persuasiveness: the travails and modifications that the duality of nomos and phusis underwent in the Greek world are directly related to the making and remaking of the Athenian and Spartan working classes. Anachronistic? Perhaps so. But no less than the


1030 Cf. Wood, Citizens to Lords, pp. 3-4.
conventional alternative of postulating the late fifth-century intensification of the debate as one that appeared practically out of the blue.\textsuperscript{1031} No ‘blueness’ encases the class politics of any society, and the Greeks of that period can hardly be viewed as an exception to that rule of thumb. Five nodal pillars in the making and remaking of the Athenian and Spartan working classes enable us to re-historicise the debate within its own productive soils rather than to pay homage to ahistorical truisms that the canonised surviving works of the Greek archaic and classical ages are too easily prone. But all in due time: for now, we ought to focus a bit on what are the theoretical promises entailed by our understanding of the concept of Essential Copy and how it can be adapted to an unearthing of the politics of class in the Greek archaic and classical ages. Blazing a theoretical trail, as once did the Trojan heroes following a victorious day of fighting,\textsuperscript{1032} will hence permit us to gainsay the shadowy existence ascribed to social history for the sake of constructing history qua monolithic blocks.

4.1.1 The Essential Copy Explained

To begin our rethinking with an idealist portrayal of ancient Greek history, the classic history of the ancient Greek city-state and society is supposed to be embedded within the concepts with which the celebrated, yet vastly different, philosophers of its age attempted to tackle a myriad of social, cultural and economic problems. Darting a theoretical glance at not only their historical present and those that preceded it but also what, if any, political formation could be analytically called ideal, the Greek lovers of wisdom charted the trajectory of growth that the noteworthy cities of the Greek city-states followed. In these attempts to pen out a historical-political cartography that would, once realized, aid them to locate the social formation in question within a spatio-temporal matrix, the ancient philosophers utilized particular concepts, coining, reviving, transforming, and discarding them in order to approximate their thoughts to the empirical reality that encircled them.\textsuperscript{1033} Needless to add, thanks in large part to the dramaturgical essence of Greek verse and prose, the philosophers had access to an

\textsuperscript{1033} This point has been stressed by Malcolm Schofield in various studies. The words making up the whole pattern of thought, according to his view, serve as individual spheres of political, philosophical and ethical confrontation and negotiation. The diachronic progression of the whole endeavour, retrojecting and projecting to an equal degree, is never lost on the author despite the intellectual proximity between the predecessor and successor: “As developed by Chrysippus, the ideal city of Zeno’s \textit{Republic} is indeed in a sense a universal community, whose citizens … are \textit{kosmopolitai}. However, it is universal not in that it includes all mankind, but because it is made up of gods and sages wherever they may be: not a wider community, but a wholly different sort of “community.” When Chrysippus uses words like “city” and “law,” he intends a radical transformation of their meaning, robbing them of anything ordinarily recognizable as political content. In short, political vocabulary is depoliticized.” Malcolm Schofield, “Social and Political Thought”, in \textit{The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy}, ed. by Keimpe Algra, Jonathan Barnes, Jaap Mansfeld and Malcolm Schofield, (Cambridge, 1999), pp. 768.
overwhelming number of concepts and popular myths waiting to be re-discovered. The perpetual invention of meanings and connotations that were to be ascribed to these concepts is one of the foremost causes of the evidently fluid nature of the politic language that was passed down on us by the philosophers of the ancient Greece. Take one of the touchstones of Aristotelian philosophy, *eudaimonia*\(^{1034}\) for example, in order to contemplate about the gaping absence of a modern counterpart that steers close enough to the Aristotelian understanding of the concept as signifying the perfectly-proportioned use of our faculties on the path that is cast alight by the beacon of *aretê* (‘virtue’ or ‘excellence’) for the sake of realizing our natural being as a political, i.e., polis-dweller,\(^ {1035}\) animal that is endowed with reason.\(^ {1036}\)

The daunting obstacles that beset our attempts to convey the full meaning that is transmitted by any such concept, judging by the example of *eudaimonia*, appear to be twofold. First, the invention and reinvention of concepts almost always carry an ingrained polemical element in their ‘rediscoverer’s’ endeavour to harken back to their original coinage for the purpose of demonstrating its inapplicability to a certain socio-political context. The aim of contextualization, in that vein, fuels the rediscoverer’s jostle against the supposedly anachronistic use of the concept and his attempt to substitute those elements with more up-to-date ones, which, in certain contexts, verge on the total inversion thereof. Indeed, a partial reconfiguration of Aristotle’s postulation of *eudaimonia* can be illustrated by Diogenes


\(^{1035}\) Any historically well-attuned allusion to the ancient Greek *politai*, ‘citizens’, needs to make ample space to accommodate both the spatial and political senses of the word. Public amenities and civic edifices may be seen, somewhat anachronistically, to come with the territory of any spatial designation. The direct participation of citizens qua the building block of the polity in the regulation of their common affairs, however, formed just as vital a part of the definition as did the urban landscape of ancient Greece. Cartledge’s rendition of *polis* as ‘citizen-states,’ following in the earlier footsteps of Hansen, contrary to the rather cut-and-dried ‘city-state,’ thus, appears to have a lot to offer in regard to this often-overlooked aspect of the democratically-inclined variant of ancient Greek *poleis*. Paul Cartledge, *The Spartans: An Epic History*, (London, 2003), pp. 54; Paul Cartledge, *Democracy: A Life*, (Oxford and New York, 2016), pp. 38; cf. Mogens Herman Hansen, ‘The Polis as a Citizen-State’, in *The Ancient Greek City-State: Symposium on the Occasion of the 250th Anniversary of Royal Danish Academy of Sciences and Letters, July 1-4, 1992*, ed. by Mogens Herman Hansen, (Copenhagen, 1993), pp. 7-29; von Reden, ‘The Well-Ordered *Polis*: Topographies of Civic Space’, pp. 170; for an analytical account of a selection of various ancient city-state cultures as a growing part the widely influential Copenhagen Polis Project, see M. H. Hansen (ed.), *A Comparative Study of Six City-State Cultures*, (Copenhagen, 2002).

\(^{1036}\) Literally, ‘blessed by one’s *daimon*’ or ‘guardian spirit,’ which can be compared with *eudaimôn*, i.e., fortunate. Also, for a detailed example of the multitude of positive meanings that can be referred to by the use of *aretê* even in the context of a single work, Thucydides’ *Histories*, see C. J. Classen, ‘On *aretê* and *phusis* in Thucydides’ *Histories*, in *Phusis and Nomos. Power, Justice and the Agonistical Ideal of Life in High Classicism*, (Patras, 2007), pp. 89-111.
Laertius’ expositions of a definite number of Stoic works and their purported arguments. Comparing Chrysippus’ and Hecaton’s understanding of the relationship between virtue and happiness and those of Panaetius and Posidonius, Diogenes points out that,

“‘For if,’” [Zeno] says, “‘magnanimity is sufficient for making one superior to everything and if it is a part of virtue, virtue too is sufficient for happiness, holding in contempt even those things which seem to be bothersome.’” Panaetius, however, and Posidonius say that virtue is not sufficient [for happiness], but that there is a need for health and material resources and strength.”

Eudaimonia seen through the lens of Panaetius and Posidonius, in other words, also entails a predefined possession of external goods, e.g., health, wealth, etc., contrary to the Aristotelian employment of the term as the intellectual fulfilment of one’s preconceived nature and its accompanying physical resonances. On this view, the partial transformation that appears to be realized in the example of Panaetius and Posidonius’ approach to the concept is carried to its logical extreme in Sextus Empiricus’ descriptive forays into the significant arguments that are proposed in the works of Arcesilaus, who was the founder of Middle Academy, and those of his followers. Concerning Arcesilaus’ respective take on the sceptic premise of the suspension of judgement and the forestalling of criteria, Sextus notes that,

“But since it was necessary after this [argument that wise will not be one that renders opinion] to inquire into the conduct of life which naturally cannot be directed without a criterion, upon which happiness too, that is, the goal of life, depends for its reliability, Arcesilaus says that he who suspends judgement about everything regulates choices and avoidances and, generally, actions by reasonableness, and, proceeding according to this criterion, will act correctly [perform morally perfect actions]. For happiness arises because of prudence, and prudence resides in correct [morally perfect] actions, and a correct [morally perfect] action is that which, having been done, has a reasonable defense”.

What this brief exposition demonstrates is that the subtleties of the language of politics and philosophy is so multi-layered that any attempt to superimpose a certain degree of fixity on it is basically doomed to failure. And yet, it is precisely at this point that the second problem that haunts any pursuit of conceptual clarity is brought to the fore: the relationship between explanation and persuasion. A self-proclaimed conclusion of any theoretical discussion

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1037 Diogenes Laertius, 5.128 in *Hellenistic Philosophy*, pp. 203; for the Aristotelian take on the potential significance of external goods, defined extensively as including friends, riches, and political power, see Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1.8.1099a30-b9.
1040 It appears facile to relate to our stress on these principal uses of philosophically-informed uses of terminology given that Peithô (Persuasion) was an acknowledged member of the ancient Greek pantheon. The goddess, depicted as the handmaiden of Aphrodite, was employed as the personification of the charming speech in regard to both its moralistic reverberations, i.e., covering both persuasion and seduction alike. See, Hesiod, *Theogony*, in *Theogony and Works and Days*, trans. by M. L. West, (Oxford, 1988), 346-365; Pindar, *Pythian 4*, in *Complete Odes*, trans. by Anthony Verity, (Oxford, 2007), 217-8; Aeschylus, *Eumenides*, in *Oresteia*, trans. by Christopher Collard, (Oxford, 2002), 885; Aeschylus, *Prometheus Bound*, in *Persians and Other Plays*, 173; for a bird’s-eye study of the uses and
enacts a barrier between *episteme* as an ongoing process, a loop not unlike Jean Baudrillard’s *Moebius Strip*, and *episteme* as finalized knowledge, dully analysed and recorded thereby transposing fixity in the place of continuity, effectively shattering the latter. Knowledge, at that point, turns into a mere possession, a catchphrase or a travel guide that renders practically any of the hitherto unidentifiable objects intelligible, a light in dark that needs to be kept close, heeded, and preserved so that we are not left bereft of even the shadows that are projected on the wall of knowledge. After all, there is either indomitable brightness or pitch-black darkness provided that there are no shadows to be found. Put differently, the crystallization of *episteme* as a sublimated object of intelligence is effected at the cost of fully effacing its establishment as an everlasting process with no fathomable end towards the appropriation of the knowledge of the in-itself, a point which appears to be highly reminiscent of Adorno’s chastisement of objectification of knowledge as a notable ‘virtue’ of mass culture:

“The child becomes curious when its parents refuse to provide it with genuine information. It is not that original desire to look with which ontologies ancient and modern have obscurely connected it, but a gaze narcissistically turned upon itself. The curiosity which transforms the world into objects is not objective: it is not concerned with what is known but with the fact of knowing it, with having, with knowledge as a possession.”

Hence the two-layered struggle that we face in our attempts to excavate the social, political, and economic significances of any theoretical concept that has its roots in Greek antiquity: (1)
the shifting layers of meaning that are associated with the term in question in general and to what extent those ruptures were carried out in particular, and (2) the dialectics of ‘raw’ and ‘cooked’ thought, as Lévi-Strauss puts it, and how the spatio-temporally located and objectified ideas have an inherent claim of essentializing their peculiar configurations as an ‘eternal present’. Further, in respect to both of these issues, we claim that analytically pondering upon the intellectual cultivation and linguistic formation of a politico-philosophical idea can only be realized on the basis of unearthng its material origins and the forms of rapport that it established with its own conjectural present. The impression an ancient work of politics and philosophy attempts to make on the relations of material production and those of social reproduction, thus, is of prime import in pouring cold water on not only the dehumanizing aspects of rigid idealistic traditions of philosophical interpretation but also on intransigent empiricism. Indeed, concurring with Neal Wood’s argument that “[p]olitics refers not only to mental and verbal activity but also to physical activity relevant to the public arena, to the state and the functioning of the state, and to the all-embracing structure of power in a given society,” we argue that the underlying material presuppositions and declared aims of any philosophical work originating in the archaic and classical Greece have to be granted their due importance in order to avoid fostering false optimism. The core set of ecumenical goals that we are willing to set for this chapter does not, however, include the preconception of a linear relationship between abstract philosophical etchings and material exigencies. In short, commending, as we are, Wood’s interpretation that “[p]olitical acts comprehend more than words,” we also claim that words, in the context of the philosophical, historical, dramaturgical and rhetorical works that were written in Greek antiquity, are also inherently capable of conveying the pointers of more than just political acts that are undertaken in the guidance of material motivations. The particularly high degrees of rigor that are entertained by certain type of ideas can be compared, in that vein, to the generating power of physical resources themselves, a point that was heavily emphasized by Karl Popper in his attempts to provide an in-depth sketch of World 3 of objectively existing ideas. The professionalization

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1050 Further, another point in Popper’s examination that bears significance for our reflexive portrayal of the generating powers of material resources and ideas is his demarcation of moral and political ideas as the two types that are most prone to incorporate considerable levels of influence and power. Certain ideas, as Popper canvasses them, have a life and strength that are peculiar to them to the extent of becoming objective knowledge in World 3 without engendering a direct correspondence between them and those who have created them. For an expanded analysis of these themes and their position within
of philosophy that was put in practice by the Greek Sophists, for one, not only created its mirror-image in the figure of Platonic Socrates as the self-effacing sage who is in the self-critical possession of the form of the Good, but also paid its dividends to posterity by the token of leaving behind an understanding of philosophic knowledge as purchasable and hence democratic. The inherent asceticism of Socrates, as he was canvassed in the works of Plato and Xenophon alike, for instance, was bequeathed to the founders of Cynic philosophy through Antisthenes’ close relationship with Socrates. It is no surprise, as such, that the examination of the Cynic understanding of virtue that was carried out by Diogenes Laertius demonstrates the high degree of transitivity between Socrates as the austere philosopher of idealist forms spearheaded by that of goodness\textsuperscript{1051} and Antisthenes’ conceptualization of wise men:

“Here are his [Antisthenes’] doctrines. He argued that virtue was a thing that could be thought. Virtuous people were the true aristocrats. To be happy it was enough to be virtuous, with the assistance, perhaps, of Socratic fortitude. Virtue was a matter of deeds, not words or erudition. The wise man was self-sufficient, because what belonged to others also belonged to him.”\textsuperscript{1052}

It is the historicized determinateness, and hence particularity, of ideas, therefore, that defy the laws of natural causality, pacifying any and all attempts to ahistorically classify and bound them. Taking our cue from the commendable foreshadowing of a specific concept by Norman the thought of Karl Popper, see Karl R. Popper, *Conjectures and Refutations*, (London, 1972), pp. 373; and, Karl R. Popper, *Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach*, (Oxford, 1979), pp. 106-152.

\textsuperscript{1051} The Platonic presentation of the Socratic Idea of the Good, needless to add, is more comprehensive and multi-faceted than any of its later Judeo-Christian interpretations. One of the most complete definitions of the term is provided by Plato in the last and longest of his dialogues in the context of education in a commonwealth that is governed by strict adherence to laws in the following manner:

“No education, I maintain, is this goodness as it is making its first appearance in children; if pleasure, friendship, pain, and hatred arise in the proper way in the souls of those who cannot yet grasp the reason for them, and if, when they do grasp the reason, their feelings are consonant with that reason because they have been correctly trained by appropriate habits, then this consonance is in general called human goodness, while the part of it which has had a proper upbringing where pleasure and pain are concerned, so that, from the very beginning to the very end, they hate what they should hate and love what they should love…” Plato, *Laws*, ed. by Malcolm Schofield, trans. by Tom Griffith, (Cambridge, 2016), 653b-c; barring the rise of any misidentification of the form of goodness as the idea of aretê presiding over any other form of excellence, a point which is exemplified, albeit somewhat enigmatically, in Plato’s *Parmenides*, this understanding of goodness as the ensured correspondence between any subject and what is appropriate to him/her in a communal state of affairs was a recurrent theme in the works of intellectuals with aristocratic leanings. The opposition of arithmetic to proportional equality, to use the Aristotelian dictum, as the economic regiment along whose lines office holders would be reimbursed in addition to being subjected to property qualifications, was a point of perpetual contest as is shown, for instance, by Isocrates’ *Areopagiticus*. Plato, *Parmenides*, trans. by Mary Louise Gill and Paul Ryan, (Indianapolis, 1996); Isocrates, *Areopagiticus*, in *Isocrates in III Volumes*, II, trans. by George Norlin, (London and New York, 1929), 21-3; Aristotle, *The Nicomachean Ethics*, 5.4, 1131b32-1132a2; Aristotle, *Politics*, 5.1 1302a7-8; cf. Plato, *Gorgias*, trans. by Robin Waterfield, (Oxford,1998a), 508a; Paul Cartledge, ‘Comparatively Equal’, in *Demokratia*, pp. 177; for a penetrating critique of the Platonic and Aristotelian understanding of the arithmetic mean as the equality of the unequals, see G. E. M. de Ste. Croix, *The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World*, (Ithaca and New York, 1981), pp. 414; Wood, *Citizens to Lords*, pp. 90.

Bryson in his *Vision and Painting*, the Essential Copy, we argue that irrespective of the potential non-congeniality between the avowed aims and unforeseen consequences of any single philosophical tract, idealist abstraction and mechanical materialist interpretation should be conceived of detracting menaces in equal measure. The Essential Copy, as it is adumbrated by Bryson and was later taken up as a theme of sociological import in Irving Velody’s “Socialism as a Sociological Problem,” conveys a doctrine that consists of three essential features. These features, namely, are (1) the conception of the image as a reticent entity that is geared towards the perfect replication of reality that can found to be existing in the empirical realm, (2) the negative theorization of each advancement in technique as a further bracketing of the obscure reality as it is perceived by our senses and canvassed by our mind, and (3) admission of technical improvements and progress by virtue of general agreement over the specific advancement and its relation to the Essential Copy. A self-explanatory attempt to substantiate the doctrine of the Essential Copy can be made by resorting to Dante as Bryson does, “Credette Cimabue ne la piture | Tener lo campo, e ora ha Giotto il grido, | Si che la fama di colui è scura.” Bluntly put, the recognition of the novel technique and its higher degree of correspondence to reality ultimately hinges on its relation to its precedent, the Essential Copy. If the newcomer, on the other hand, is unsuccessful in establishing a link with its predecessor, then neither the self-effacing approximation nor the unbridled recognition of success will ever take place. Cimabue’s fame, in other words, lies buried only to the extent of its revitalization in the work of Giotto.

The construal of this multifaceted approach owes in large part to Peter Rose’s adoption of Fredric Jameson’s modification of Paul Ricoeur’s double hermeneutic as well as Klaus Junker’s more recent study of particular strands of mythological narrative in ancient Greek mythmaking. Jameson’s double hermeneutic appears useful in so far as it attempts to disabuse, negatively, any myth of its illusion-ridden origins. Positive hermeneutics, moreover, delineates a reconciliated sphere of culmination whose eu-topian qualities posit specific

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1055 Bryson, *Vision and Painting*, pp. 6-7; cf. “You know how it is with painting, say, as an activity. You get the impression it never reaches an end, in any particular work, but seems to go on endlessly beautifying, heightening the colour or softening it, or whatever it is people with a upbringing as painters do in fact call it. What has been painted never reaches a point where there is further improvement, in terms of beauty or fidelity to the original, is possible.” Plato, *Laws*, trans. by Tom Griffith, (Cambridge, 2016), 769a8-b3.
1056 “Once [it was the case that] Cimabue led the pack | In painting; now Giotto has the lead, | And the fame of the other lies buried.” Dante Alighieri, *Divina Commedia. Purgatorio*, (Milan, 2016), 11.94-6 [my translation C.O.].
solutions for determinate social issues. Our conception of the Essential Copy benefits from both of these advantages in addition to calling into question the very meta-narrative of an immaterial beginning and end, effectively shattering them as textual illusions rather than timeless yardsticks. Many an authoritative scholar would today concur with the dubbing of Homer as a fictional collective persona with heaps of mythos-related material antecedent to him thereby turning him into a treasure trove of myths whence the hermeneutic effort must necessarily spring. From the interpretation of Mycenaean boar-tusk helmets to that of the wall-paintings of the great palace of Knossos, however, archaeological remains of the pre-archaic Greek communities speak to the degree of credence that the listeners of Homeric myths were willing to lend to peculiar elements enhancing the credibility of the whole nexus of stories. Even Hermes, the self-indulgent cattle-thief that he is, needs to have a little breather from carrying messages around every once in a while. And the fact that those limits of hermeneutic narrative are voluntarily built into the semantic space of material reality does not make them any less historically defensible than their allegedly immaterial counterparts. Granted that the meandering of the hermeneutic circle is as valid a response to any close-circuit interpretative venture as any other, the lack of material evidence against which the narrative of the Essential Copy is drawn would bespeak of the latter as a Copy of Nothingness thus eliminating any likelihood of communal retrospection’s emergence. Whether faithfully conceived or not, any copy is a copy of material reality just as any message that Hermes conveys is a writ of the higher gods.

Translating this paradigm into our epistemological field of study, one immediately sees the evident similarities. On one level, the historical identification of the mythological roots of any concept serves to highlight the spatio-temporal determinateness of the Essential Copy itself. Succinctly put, there is no primordiality that can be attached to any determinate reinterpretation if we grant that the original itself is just a foremost copy among many others. On another, the emphasis that is put on the relation of the later representation to the original adumbration is held together by the thread of social history, the ebbs and flows of which can be pondered upon by using our tools of existentialist dialectics. Translating this working

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1059 For Rose’s introduction of Jameson’s double hermeneutics into his interpretative scheme, see Peter W. Rose, *Sons of the Gods, Children of Earth: Ideology and Literary Form in Ancient Greece*, (Ithaca and London, 1995), pp. 35; Junker’s hermeneutically-informed adumbration of mythical image as forming, “on the one hand a close relationship with a written version of the myth that is known to us, yet, on the other hand the pictures do more than just illustrate, they go their own way” can be gleaned from Junker, *Interpreting the Images of Greek Myths*, pp. 80; for Hermes as the mischievous cattle-thief, see Michael Crudden (ed.), *Hymn 4: To Hermes in Homeric Hymns*, trans. by Michael Crudden. (Oxford and New York, 2001).
definition to the Homeric presentation of *phusis* we observe, for example, that the latter can be aptly summarized by the phrase ‘acting in the living presence of the gods and according to the laws that are prescribed by them in compliance with one’s lot’ whereby it reserves its role as a fundamental theme in the Platonic approach to censorship in the context of the latter’s discussion concerning the study of the works of Greek poets in the ideal state. In fact, at the end of the Book II and throughout the first part of Book III of his *Republic* Plato

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1060 Apostolos Pierris in his discussion on the origins of the ancient Greek understanding of *phusis* and its relation to the Homeric notion of *môira*, i.e., fate personified, gives the example of the interwoven fates of Achilles and Aeneas in the battle of Troy in order to highlight the intricate nature of both concepts. Gods, in that vein, intervene directly and indirectly to convey their message to Aeneas that facing Achilles will be his undoing. The “catch” is, of course, that the matter proves to be an ordeal for the gods in the light of the fact that both Aeneas and Achilles are preordained to live longer than their encounter as it was bound to happen in the absence of divine intervention so that “… it takes a complex operation of divine intervention and non-intervention, rhetorical persuasion and psychological manipulation to have it all as it should. There are many strands and a multifarious variety of threads that make up the nexus of fate. The unravelling of each individual thing’s destiny gets entangled with that of very many others’. The allotment is not static: the parts interfere with each other in ways that make the appointment of individuality appear confused.” Apostolos L. Pierris, ‘The Order of Existence: *phusis*, *môira*, *anagki*, *thesmos*, *nomos*’, in *Phusis and Nomos*, pp. 163; the reference to the violent yet inconclusive confrontation of Aeneas with Achilles brings us back, of course, to Homer’s heroic depiction of the event at the interplay of class and ancestry. The theme of divine ancestry and the meticulous search by mortals and divinities alike of a trump card that would allow its holder to overcome the ‘lesser man’, not inaptly dubbed by Peter Rose as an instance of “comic treatment of the motif of divine parentage,” is the leitmotif of the struggle that takes place between the two heroes in Book 21 until the final verdict of Poseidon as the ultimate court of appeal is pronounced: “Aeneas, which of the gods is telling you to fight so recklessly, hand to hand with the high-hearted son of Peleus, who is both stronger than you and dearer to immortals?” Homer, *Iliad*, 21.332-4; Peter W. Rose, *Class in Archaic Greece*, (Cambridge, 2012), pp. 128.

1061 An overabundant supply of examples can be given to bring this point home in the context of the two Homeric classics, *Iliad* and *Odyssey*. Constraining ourselves to noting just a single case of direct divine intervention in the *Iliad*, in book eight, the following verses read in explaining how vehemently Zeus favoured the evenly-matched conflict between the Achaean and Trojan sides carry on indecisively until Achilles re-joins the battle following the predestined death of Patroclus: “While it was morning still, and the sacred light brightening, | both sides’ shots struck home, and men dropped, hit; but when | the sun reached, and bestrode, the midpoint of the sky, | then Zeus, the father, held up his golden scale | and on it set two dooms of grief-laden death, | for horse-breaker Trojan sand bronze-corseleted Achaian. | By the middle he grasped and raised it: the Achaian’s fated day | sank, and their fates all settled on the provident earth, | while those of the Trojans were raised to the wide sky. [Zeus himself thundered loudly from Ida, sent a fiery flash down among the Achaian troops; when they saw it | they were struck with amazement. Pale fear seized them all.” Homer, *Iliad*, trans. by Peter Green, (California, 2016), 8.65-78; we will attempt to tackle the complexities of the Homeric *môira* in the following pages, yet we have to note in passing that acting in accord with the divine will is never as straightforward as it otherwise may imply. The conflicting roles of conciliatory and antagonistic individuals, whether they be divine or mortal, are ever prone to change in the context of the Greek *muthos*. The individual string of fate that is allotted to any single individual, as such, does not involve a linearity even when they are peered through the eyes of divinities. Zeus’ lament at the beginning of the *Odyssey* is a case in point in demonstrating the chaotic interplay of factors that reside at the heart of anything human: “O the waywardness of these mortals! They accuse the gods, they say that their troubles come from us, and yet by their very own presumptuousness they draw down sorrow upon themselves that outruns their allotted portion. So now: Aegisthus outran his allotted portion by taking in marriage the wedded wide of the son of Atreus and killing her husband when he returned. Yet he knew the pit of destruction was before him, because we ourselves warned him of it…. Thus Hermes warned him, wishing him well, but Aegisthus’ heart would not hear reason, and now he has paid all his debts at once.” Homer, *Odyssey*, trans. by Walter Shewring, (Oxford, 1980), 1.33-46.
emphasizes in his dialogue between Socrates and Adeimantus the import of just this point in his vindication of dispensing with ‘undesirable elements’ of literary and musical sort:

‘The stories in Homer and Hesiod and the poets. For it is the poets who have always made up fictions and stories to tell men.’

‘What sorts of stories do you mean and what fault do you find in them?’

‘The worst fault possible,’ I replied, ‘especially if the fiction is an ugly one’

‘And what is that?’

‘Misrepresenting the nature of gods and heroes, like a portrait painter whose portraits bear no resemblance to their originals.’

This brief passage from the second book of Republic goes on to indicate that in contradistinction to the Homeric portrayal of the gods as interfering in the affairs of the mortals at different levels and every so often, the narrative of immortals in Platonic ideal constitution as it is canvassed in the Republic and Laws is quite distinct. Indeed, passages like this one suggest that man as the constituent entity of the ideal state can only be created if he accepts to act in the likeness of gods, who are portrayed as changeless and eternal forms of perfection.

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1062 The vivid contrast that Plato established between his demiurge and the epic epiphany of Greek gods was a trend of textual criticism that was set on its track by Xenophanes no later than in the sixth century. Criticizing the gods of the Homeric and Hesiodic epic stage as miserable effigies of immoral conduct, Xenophanes chastised the essentially Greek way in which the supposedly everlasting were canvassed: “Homer and Hesiod have attributed to the gods | Everything that men find shameful and reprehensible – Stealing, adultery, and deceiving one another | But mortals think that the gods are born, | Wear their own clothes, have voices and bodies. | If cows and horses or lions had hands, | Or could draw with their hands and make things as men can, | Horses would have drawn horse-like gods, cows cow-like gods, | And each species would have made their gods’ bodies just like their own.” This *reductio ad absurdum* is to be compared with Xenophanes’ own conception of divinity, which, incidentally, bears a striking resemblance to the Platonic demiurge: “One god, the greatest among gods and men both, unlike mortals [either] in form or thought” (εις θεος, εν τε θεοισι και άνθρωποισι μέγιστος, ούτι δεμας θνιτοισι ομοιος ουδε νοιμα). Xenophanes, F. 11, 14, 15, 23, in *Greek Elegiac Poetry: From the Seventh to the Fifth Centuries BC*, ed. and trans. by Douglas E. Gerber, (Cambridge, 1999); these theological disputes, however, did not hold Xenophanes back from celebrating Homer as a teacher of universal proportions since time immemorial as he pointed out in his tenth fragment: DK 10.

1063 However disparaging these remarks on epic poets may seem to be, they are prone to vacillation as much as any other commentary on historical formations that takes place in the Platonic dialogues. Plato’s later approval of the ancient wisdom of Homer and Hesiod, not to mention his numerous references to the fifth century tragedians in Laws is not the sole exception to the rule. Indeed, a complete account of Plato’s assertions regarding the commensurability of the works of ancient Greek poets to the construction of the ideal commonwealth caters to anything but the antithesis of their solemn banishment in the Republic. On Plato’s recurrent endorsement of Hesiod’s idea of ‘due measure,’ for example, see Plato, *The Laws*, 3.690e-691a; Plato, *Statesman*, ed. by Julia Annas and Robin Waterfield, (Cambridge, 1995), 283c-285c; Plato, *Philebus*, trans. by R. Hackforth, (Cambridge, 1972), 64c-66d; a reverberating example of Plato’s harkening back to the Homeric fountain of wisdom, see Plato, *Laws*, 4.706d-707a; cf. Plato, *Symposium*, trans. by Robin Waterfield, (Oxford, 1998b), 209c-d; likewise, one ought do well to remember Plato’s fascination with Hesiod’s opposition between the ease of moving towards malevolence and the inherent difficulty of being benevolent in his *Works and Days* in order to approach the rabid scorn that is poured on poets in the Republic. Hesiod, *Works and Days*, 287-92; Plato, *The Laws*, 4.718e-719a; Plato, *The Republic*, 2.364c-d; Plato, *Protagoras*, trans. by C. C. W. Taylor, (Oxford and New York, 2002), 340d.
The living presence of the gods, therefore, is allotted a secondary role in favour of a more commendable and glorified set of values that are epitomized in the Platonic image of god and the form of goodness. This purposeful eradication of the chaotic and capricious elements that were apparent in the Homeric image of gods can best be vindicated by Socrates’ suggestion to Adeimantus that “[t]hen of our laws laying down the principles which those who write or speak about the gods must follow, one would be this: God is the cause, not of all things, but only of good.”

4.1.2 The Timeline and the Making of the Essential Copy

Having outlined our basic premises that we intend to keep integral to this chapter, we will attempt now to focus on two allegedly dichotomized set of concepts: nomos and phusis. In line with the aforementioned transitivity between distinct idealistic categories as we come to refute them, we would like to emphasize, as the principal argument of this chapter, that the erected polarity that is utilized to pit these two concepts constantly against one another serves the ends of analytic conventionality at best, and outright hinders the advance of historical and philosophical understanding of the peculiarity of ancient Greek thought at worst. To be sure, paving the way for a deconstructionist outlook is prone to bite its own tail by leading us to trash about in muddy conceptual waters. The task, on this view, is not to lament and to undermine the validity of the two concepts which would be tantamount to putting the baby out

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1064 Plato never drifts away completely in this direction of severing the links of human agency and divine potency. His construction of the human soul as the ground of conflict of many strings that pull the marionette qua a human being hither and tither as a creature owned by god, is an everlasting example of how Plato capitalizes on this relation for the sake of validating his hallmark ethics that the Homeric notion of mōira is never far away from his articulations. Indeed, given that the catalyst of the whole allegory of the marionette is to purport that there is also a ‘golden string’ that is sacred thanks to it representing “whatever there is of immortality in us,” this conception of human nature and cardinal virtues accord with many of the early and middle dialogues in that the repository of aretē is always filled erstwhile by divine foreknowledge. Plato, Laws, 1.644d-645b, 4.713e, 5.732e-733a; cf. Plato, Symposium, 207a; Plato, Gorgias, 504d; Plato, Timaeus, in Timaeus and Critias, trans. by Robin Waterfield, (Oxford and New York, 2008), 47b-c.

1065 Plato, Republic, 2.1.380c; for the relation of divine providence to general functioning of the cosmos and the initial purge of any misbehaving elements from the latter’s sphere, see Plato, Timaeus, 42a-43a; the oxymoronic quality of this assertion should not be underrated. The configurations of divine potentia and wrath encircling the individual members of the Olympic Pantheon stood worlds apart from the those that signified their monotheistic counterparts. With the foremost members of the twelve gods, e.g., Zeus, Poseidon, Apollo, among others, ‘distinguished’ by such accolades as ‘rapist,’ ‘murderer,’ ‘trickster’ etc., the Socratic equation of gods as the fountainhead of benignity was anything but given: “In thinking about ancient Greek religion, nothing is more liable to put the modern mind on a wrong track than the assumption, axiomatic to all modern religions, that divinity is inherently good. It is evident from much that ancient Greeks, both real and fictitious, say or are made to say that they would have liked to believe that the gods were good; but only too often the gods’ actions seemed to make such a hypothesis untenable. To the ancient Greek, what was axiomatic about the gods was that they were powerful.” Alan H. Sommerstein, ‘Introduction’, in Aristophanes: Lysistrata and Other Plays, trans. by Alan H. Sommerstein, (London, 2002), pp. xliii n. 34; cf. Euripides, Heracles, in Heracles and Other Plays, trans. by Robin Waterfield, (Oxford and New York, 2003), 1341; “if gods do anything evil, they are not gods” Euripides, F. 292.7.
with the bathwater. The two concepts, after all, assume a role of cardinal import throughout the Greek antiquity, whether we opt out to examine the Homeric texts, Aristophanes’ comedy, or the writings of Pyrrho as they were expounded by Diogenes Laertius in his work *Life of Pyrrho*. Yet, the objectified diametrical opposition between the two concepts appears to excommunicate any legitimate claim whatsoever to unearthing either their material basis or ideological resonance via giving the two concepts a markedly conservative, i.e., fixed and rigid, bent. It is in that sense that we propose to assert the perpetual exchange between the two concepts at the expense of the conventional searches that are aimed at constructing polarities. Given the tightly condensed nature of our study, we will attempt to follow a timeline that roughly covers about eight centuries, from the archaeological evidence of the Mycenaean age as it was handed over, despite its catastrophic demise, to Homeric heritage of the two concepts as it was passed down, first, to the pre-Socratic thinkers and poets and then to the Sophists of the fifth century (all dates in this chapter and the next two are BC unless otherwise indicated) and, finally, to the moral philosophy of the period between 404-371. Further, we will concentrate especially on the rise and fall of the three exceptionally large

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1066 Arguably the whole corpus of Aristophanist comedy can be conceived as driven by the shock effect that is due to rise from the relaxation of natural limits and transgression of immutable borders. Aristophanist laughter, as such, is cracked when the subversion of roles overtakes the sensibility of suppression. Martial virility dethroned by sex-strikes, unquestioned rights of property ownership banished at the wave of a magic wand of sophistic persuasion, no conventional limit was deemed so irreversibly naturalized to be safe from the playwright’s approach. Indeed, not even the finality of death could be exempt from being overturned on the stage. The de-naturalization of natural, as we will see in due course, serves as the driving force, for example, in the plight of Strepsiades who could not rely either on his slaves or his boy to relieve him of his troubles: “The slaves are snoring. They never used to do. | Damnation on you, war! Not least because | We’ve reached the point where I can’t even punish my slaves. | And of course this splendid young fellow lying next to me here | Never wakes in the night– oh no, he just farts away | With five blankets, no less, to bury his head beneath.” Aristophanes, *Clouds*, in *Frogs and Other Plays*, trans. by Stephen Halliwell, (Oxford and New York, 2016), 5-10.

1067 The proposed timeline is prone to variation depending on the accepted date of Homeric works. If we take Herodotus’ claim that Homer lived four centuries before his time at its face value, then Homer’s dates can be placed about 880-830 BC, which would validate the temporal specificity of our work. Still, the element of speculation that is inherent to this calculation should not be overlooked given that the results of contemporary stylistic and other intertextual research have led to a widely shared conviction that “the poem cannot have been composed much before 700 BCE.” Pedantic as it is to resort to unwarranted epithets, it appears that we still do not have much of a choice in specifying the composition date of Homeric and Hesiodic works roughly as the latter half of the eight century: “I persist in adhering to the traditional date of about 750-700 BC… a date that corresponds with the first unambiguous indications of literacy in Greece, and at least roughly with the first evidence of Panhellenic gatherings as well as dramatically increased contracts with the Near East.” Rose, *Class in Archaic Greece*, pp.94; Herodotus, *The Histories*, trans. by Robin Waterfield, (Oxford, 1998), 2.53; cf. Anthony Verity, *The Iliad*, vii; Jonathan M. Hall, *A History of the Archaic Greek World ca. 1200-479 BCE*, 2nd edition, (West Sussex, 2014), pp. 24. For a multi-faceted attempt at locating the Homeric themes of Iliad within the dazzling social and political upheavals of the seventh century, see Robin Osborne, ‘Homer’s Society’ in *The Cambridge Companion to Homer*, ed. by R. Fowler, (Cambridge, 2004), pp. 206-219; for an alternative account that rejects the thesis that Homer was a historical poet at all, see M. L. West, “The Invention of Homer”, *The Classical Quarterly*, vol. 49 No. 2, (1999), pp. 364-82; contra Mogens Herman Hansen, *Polis: An Introduction to the Ancient Greek City-State*, (Oxford, 2006), pp. 43.
ancient Greek poleis that left their respective marks in the making and breaking of classical Greece: Athens, Sparta and Syracuse. In addition to the practical necessity caused by the limited number of reliable textual and epigraphic data, investigating the social, political, and economic relationships that were substantiated over this grand epoch will allow us to establish the balanced rapport between ideas and material circumstances in the light of the fact that the Athenian democracy, Spartan oligarchy and Syracusan vacillations in between the two polities in the fifth and fourth centuries proved to be some of the stock empirical references par excellence of any utopian commonwealth thereafter, or what was deemed incommensurate with it, in the works of a number of Sophists, Plato, Aristotle, Xenophon alike.

Periodization of this time interval will be undertaken along three lines: the emergence of the Essential Copy of Homeric narrative in the Late Geometric period, the rise of Milesian natural philosophers and Eleatics, not to mention Heraclitus of Ephesus, and its transition to Sophistic influence, the ebb of the Athenian democracy and its precursors to Platonic reverberations (478-404), and the heyday of moral philosophy between 404-371. Could the attempt to cast such a large spatio-temporal net over the two concepts be viewed as a fool’s errand? Perhaps so. Never the less, a sole focus on any determinate dimensionality of time or space would be tantamount to ringing the bell of hermeneutic snap-shots, which, incidentally, cannot be unrung. To that end, I take to heart Ian Morris’ point that, “there is no way to understand archaic Greece without plunging into the revolutionary ferment of the eight-century Aegean.

While Sparta and Syracuse, for example, have been hailed, with Cyrene and Panticopion, as the only representatives of what Hansen calls ‘city-state empires,’ Ober has dubbed the three, i.e., Athens, Sparta and Syracuse, together as ‘superpoleis.’ Possessing territory in excess of 3,000 square kilometres, these poleis were characterized as having a high number of poleis-dependencies that were situated within their territory. While we agree with the general contours of Hansen’s classification, we also assert that no circular logic of ‘exceptionality’ can be crafted out of territorial distinctions alone.

And what can be conveyed by that notion of balance if not the perpetuum mobile of looking into every nook and cranny of quotidian history? Still, only via a pre-established sense of ‘stability’, as argued by Henri Lefebvre a while back, can such an effort concerning the collection of past reminiscences into a semblance of a timeless whole be made. Alas, having firmly turned our backs on any concept of timelessness through our adherence to an existentialist dialectical stipulation of history, we embark on a substantially different enterprise of re-assembling all the remaining minutiae concerning the ebbs and flows of a number of ancient Greek poleis. After all, there has never been any recording of events without a significant ounce of partiality: “L’écrit ne conserve du quotidien que l’inscrit et le prescrit. La parole fuit; seul subsiste le stipulé.” Lefebvre, La vie quotidienne dans le monde moderne, pp. 21.

Indeed, even some of the modern scholars, who have tried to adopt a more historical approach in order to elucidate exactly what can be purposed as the causal genesis of the ceaseless bloodshed of the twentieth century, such as Popper, have defined the locus classicus of the totalitarian tendencies of modern mass movements as none other than the ancient Greece of fifth and sixth centuries. The open society of ancient Attica, and its emergence from the intellectually stagnant closed society of the preceding centuries is thus heralded as the first documentable example of how resilient ideas can turn out to be in creating their respective spheres of influence not entirely at the behest of the original position that was embraced by their creators. For more on this point, see Karl R. Popper, The Open Society and its Enemies, (London, 1966), pp. 177.
Further, there is no way to interpret the eighth-century transformation without exploring the Dark Age, and no way to make sense of Athens without putting it into the broader geographical context.”

Setting out to tread the labyrinthine ways despite the imminent danger of getting lost, in that sense, appears much more palatable than arriving at predefined termini. If in the long view do the two concepts assume their full vibrancy and dynamicity, then it is worth taking a shot at no matter the odds. Given the extraordinary temporality through which we propose to scrutinize the shifting fortunes of the two concepts from an existentialist dialectical viewpoint, in this chapter we will focus on the timespan between the Mycenaean age and the end of the Persian Wars, i.e., the end of the so-called Archaic Age (650-480), and will attempt to follow the historical trail in the following chapters.

For an idealist approach that is desperately bent on unearthing and refurbishing the supposed antinomy between nomos and phusis, the prospects of discovery of the origins of this supposed antithesis in the context of Homeric texts verge on slim to none. To be sure, one can always

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1072 Naturally, a potential critique that can be levelled against our search for the remnants of the very genesis of nomos and phusis duality in the works of Homer is engaging in an unwarranted exaggeration of the import that the latter bore for the golden age writers of High Classicism and for those who followed in their footsteps. This critique can be grounded on two separate levels: intertextual evidence and historical authentication. It is easy to report, in regard to the first level, that the critique is nothing novel in that it is roughly reminiscent of Plato’s complaint in Republic that the statesmen should control poetry instead of the other way around, which, more often than none, is the case: “And so Glaucon,” I continued, “when you meet people who admire Homer as the educator of Greece, and who say that in the administration of human affairs and education we should study him and model our whole lives on his poetry, you must feel kindly towards them as good men within their limits, and you may agree with them that Homer is the best of poets and first of tragedians. But you will know that the only poetry that should be allowed in a state is hymns to the gods and paeans in praise of good men; once you go beyond that and admit the sweet lyric or epic muse, pleasure and pain become your rulers instead of law and the rational principles commonly accepted at best.” Plato, Republic, 10.606e-607a; one ought to compare this rebuke with the Athenian’s praise of individual episodes taken from Homer’s Iliad and Odyssey in Laws: “These lines, and the ones about the Cyclopes, are somehow in tune with god and with nature. Poets are a class apart, inspired; in their songs, accompanied by the Graces and the Muses, they tend to hit upon the truth in any particular situation.” Plato, Laws, 3.682a. Yet, the impression that was made on the Greek self-awareness and consciousness by the works of Homer and Hesiod appear to be unquestionable when we probe beneath the contemporary reports as they became available following the Dark Ages of Greek Antiquity. Herodotus, for one, argues that “However, it was only yesterday or the day before, so to speak, that the Greeks came to know the provenance of each of the gods, and whether they have all existed for ever, and what they each look like. After all, I think that Hesiod and Homer lived no more than four hundred years before my time, and they were the ones who created the gods’ family trees for the Greek world, gave them their names, assigned them their honours and areas of expertise, and told us what they looked like.” Herodotus, Histories, 2.53. The important thing to bear in mind, therefore, appears not to be the questionable viability of the argument that Homer was a poetic sage with prophetic insight that was embraced by virtually each and every member of the later Greek society, but that his anthropomorphism as “the most complete, the most extreme,” example “on record,” as Moses Finley called it, was bequeathed on the posterity, drastically effecting the later appraisals of men as an entity that is in continuous relation with the divinely-governed universe: Moses I. Finley, The Ancient Greeks, (Harmondsworth, 1963), pp. 27. This bestowal of a privileged literary place was also made by Vernant in 1990 as he argued for the vital import that epic, lyric and dramatic poetry had for
deliberately endeavour to don the robes of Sisyphus, having once been even capable of cheating death, now condemned to incessant torment, and choose to harbour a wish that the promised land of the *nomos-phusis* contrast is waiting for its imminent detection by the observant eyes of the researcher. Never the less, we claim, based on a focused reading of the *Odyssey* and *Iliad*, that no such embryonic *agon* can be said to exist between the two concepts.

Having assuredly risen at least a few eyebrows by our unrelenting premise, we propose a dualistic probe into both the basic appraisal of the relation between the individual and social regularity as the connection was conceived of in the classic texts of Homer and its dramatic resonances that one is guaranteed to encounter while striding around the Homeric universe.

The individual, provided that she is a noteworthy one,\(^{1073}\) carries on with her existence along the great paths of fate that are predestined for her in the ancient world of Homer. Having seemingly recapitulated a theme that is known only too well by the specialists and the amateurs alike, the gist to draw one’s attention to is, of course, nothing but the profound complexity that is heralded by the apparently seamless substitution of the rather material conception of life with the metaphysically charged term of existence and the plurality that the word ‘paths’ signifies. Individual existence, to explain the first ground of our argument, is a material and immaterial manifestation of the outcomes of the extreme tension that is created by the conglomeration of vastly different destinies that are singularly crafted for every individual.

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\(^{1073}\) It is apt to remember, at this point, that the Homeric heroes are always noteworthy in terms of their noble, at times divine, ancestry, battle prowess, and last but not least of their possession of property.

The “structure of authority,” bankrupt as it was on both accounts, i.e., the infringed position of the sons of Atreus, Agamemnon and Menelaus, vis-à-vis other chieftains, and the deject immorality with which the male notables of Ithaca shamelessly court Penelope in the absence of Odysseus, is conceived strictly on aristocratic terms as the “collective leadership by the wiser and Achaean ruling class,” in the context of the *Iliad*. The establishment of any position with an undented bent of leadership, as such, involve a variety of causal factors including inheritance, ability and collective authority whose right constellation breathe life and limb to the leading, and disillusioning, figure of Agamemnon. For an influential survey on the fine details of the structure of authority in Homer’s *Iliad*, see Walter Donlan, “The Structure of Authority in The Iliad”, *Arethusa*, vol. 12 no. 1, (Spring, 1979), pp. 51-70; Rose, *Class in Archaic Greece*, pp. 114-119.
The ‘nexus of fate,’ as Apostolos Pierris puts it, is woven as a majestic complex that includes not only the unfolding of the life-events of any single individual but also those of the numerous others that are provoked by any single occurrence of the other destinies with which it is mingled up. Put differently, the Homeric interpretation of fate, somewhat foreshadowing the well-known Aristotelian claim that “man is by nature a political animal,” is epitomized by a stipulated balance between the individual and society, or the private and the public. This narrative balance distances itself from the ordinary mortals not by suggesting any control over the postulates of necessity on the part of their ‘betters,’ but as being the recipient of the fleeting gaze of the poet as Chiron the ferryman welcomes adjoining dead heaped up on top of one another. The emanating focus of the Homeric narrative projects the interplay between material and social inequality, and narrative balance by conveying the maxim of equality of withering away at one’s preordained time. Those belonging to the lesser ranks are simply slashed and smashed as the untiring background against which the whole action is portrayed. Collectively fought out to the bitter end, in spite of all the bravado accruing to

1075 Aristotle, Politics, 1253a1-3; the apparent biologism of this isolated dictum should be conceived, at all times, against the backdrop of the equally cardinal stipulation of human being as zoon koinōnikon, ‘community animal’: Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics, 1242a23-25; Cartledge, The Greeks, pp. 124.
1076 The dwarfing eminence of necessity found a rigorous expression in the poems of the famous fifth century poet Simonides. A part of one of his otherwise lost poems survived as a result of Plato’s frequent employment of its following lines: “But I praise and love all | Who do nothing shameful freely; | But against necessity not even gods fight.” Plato, Protagoras, 345d2-5; Plato, Laws, 5.741a3-4, 7.818a-b; its Platonic echoes aside, the depreciating portrayal of divine will in the face of necessity was anticipated time and again in the Homeric works. Indeed, the clash between divine sentiments and the necessity accompanying the fates of mortals reaches a climax in Hera’s chastisement of Zeus as he weighs potential risks and rewards of tempering with the fate of his son the Lydian Sarpedon. It is interesting to note, in that vein, that cast in an impregnable divine shell as it is, the crux of Hera’s objection is in evident conjunction with the necessities of aristocratic war-making. For who else a prominent fellow is to turn to at the beck and call of military confrontation but to Peace personified if the workings of divine favour are made visible for all to see? Children of gods need to wage wars at the helm of their armies for eulogies to be written and victory paens to be sung in a heavily militarised society that called actions as heroic as much as they were dipped in the blood of their enemies. All and sundry cannot reckon the mysterious ways of divine will, yet if the mystery is unveiled to show the rugged calculations hovering above the death-toll it will basically be inevitable that the reckoning that is due to gods as a result of the injustice that mortals suffered at the hands of gods will accrue: “Most dread son of Cronus, what is this that you have said? | This is a mortal man, whose due destiny was fixed long ago; | is it really your desire to release him from death’s gloomy lament? | Go, do it; but all we other gods will not approve it. | And I tell you another thing, and you should store it in your mind; if you send Sarpedon back to his own home, alive, | consider whether in the future some other god also will want | to send his own dear son away from the harsh crush of battle.” Homer, Iliad, 16.440-8.
1077 The collective death of the multitude that is granted to them as a momentary conciliation for their otherwise untold account harkens to the Simonidean eulogy on the Spartans fallen at Thermopylae: “Stranger, bring this message to the Lacedaemonians: that we here lie, obedient to their orders” (Ο ξειν, αγγέλειν λακεδαιμονιοις ὅτι τηδε | κειμεθα τοις κείνων ρήμασι πειθομενοι) cited in Herodotus, Histories, 7.228. Indeed, whether it is one or the other of Homeric stock expressions, e.g., ‘darkness covering one’s eyes,’ ‘falling with a thud,’ etc., to while away the engaging notables to their eternal rest, the darkness shrouding the rest of the fighters remains firmly in its place in covering their lives and deaths alike; cf. Homer, Iliad, 4.446-554.
the *hetairoi* of the leaders from the epic narrative, Homeric warfare is a gruesome business in which the divine-proportioned rank of each fighter is on display at all times. The herd of warriors, to utilize an analogy that was to become quite popular by the fifth century and later on, is deemed worthy of poet’s allusion only as a collectivity with its *poimên laôn*, i.e., ‘shepherd,’ at the forefront of the battle. The others standing on the higher echelons of heroic influence, on the other hand, abide by the course of their respective destinies thanks in large part to the dictates of their circumstances rather than their disarming resignation. In as much as the Homeric death-lot, for example, is casted out at the moment of birth of every mortal, which becomes evident in the intertwined narratives of the *Odyssey* and *Iliad*, the exact moment and form of death, more times to none, takes on the appearance of a public issue especially in the case of the commanders and warriors of note. Indeed, just as Hector’s deplorable death in the hands of Achilles was preordained as Hecuba, his mother, says “at the time I bore him,” so does Patroclus’ demise is carried out with the help of Apollo himself who stuns the former with a single blow in order to allow Euphorbus and Hector to deliver the *coup de grâce*. If the mortals prove incapable or unwilling to be the harbingers of the destruction of each other, then the responsibility is shouldered by the gods to carry out the weavings of the fate; which is another way of saying that the individual fates of mortals possess an overriding element of material and metaphysical communality in that it involves other men and gods alike.

In a different vein, our detection of the plurality of the preordained set of outcomes works in favour of a complicated understanding of fate and its workings instead of prescribing easy fatalism. The field of open possibilities, to borrow yet another term from Pierris, is brought to surface in many instances such as the two alternatives that are set before Achilles that suggest the superimposition of two different possibilities: he can either sail back to home and live long without achieving any considerable degree of renown, or he can participate in the battle, effectively ensuring the attainment of undying fame, but die in his young age on foreign

1078 That is not to say, of course, that the communal struggles of the Homeric *laoi*, i.e., commoners, do not get to count as a swaying factor in deciding the ultimate outcome of any confrontation. Indeed, the relationship between leaders and commoners betrays, if anything, a corporatist ethos uniting the rank-and-file warriors in the common wager they make against the enemy: Kurt A. Raaflaub and Robert W. Wallace, “People’s Power” and Egalitarian Trends in Archaic Greece”, in *Origins of Democracy in Ancient Greece*, ed. by Kurt A. Raaflaub, Josiah Ober and Robert W. Wallace, (Berkeley, 2007), pp. 25-27.


Likewise, The Principle of Additive Determination, also aids us in contextualizing the supernatural determination within a nexus of preordained, yet apparently weak, decrees in regard to Calypso’s keeping Odysseus against his will and those of the gods. Zeus summons Hermes to appear before the Nymph and transmit his command:

“Hermes, you are always our messenger; go then to the nymph of braided tresses and tell her my firm decree for the homecoming of staunch Odysseus, and how he is to begin his journey back, unescorted by gods or men. It will be on a raft firmly put together; on this, in spite of many troubles, he may come in twenty days’ time to fertile Scheria; that is the land of the Phaeacians, a people whose lineage is divine; with all their hearts they will honour him like a god and will send him by ship to his own dear land, with bronze and gold and clothing in plenty, more than he would have brought from Troy if he had made his return unharrassed and with his full share of spoil. In that fashion it is his destiny to see his dear ones and come once more to his high-roofed palace and his own country.”

1084 Elucidated of the divine plan that was set in motion in regard to the future of Odysseus, Hermes visits Calypso in her abode to inform her of Zeus’ commands, as was his wont, and instructs her to release Odysseus lest she incurs the divine wrath of the King of the Gods. In point of fact, faced with the Nymph’s reluctance to part ways with the man whom she had made her husband, Hermes issues a last warning to Calypso in a final attempt at inducement: “In that way, then, allow him to go, and have regard to the anger of Zeus; if not, you may feel his displeasure afterwards.”

1085 Both of these examples elaborate on the Homeric understanding of the human condition as it can be peered through the lens of mortals and immortals alike. On one level, the death of Achilles was not as predetermined as one can make it out to be: he could have withdrawn from the battle knowing full well that his glorious struggle against the Trojans could only culminate in his death. On another, Calypso was not necessarily

1083 *Ibid*, 9.410-6. Achilles’ ‘choice’ as the formulation of the options offered to him by Thetis is dubbed by the Homeric scholars has often tended to carry connotations either of unbridled narcissism or vainglory on the part of the former. Yet, such an unwarranted dose of psychologism hardly does justice to the internecine strife that tends to peck at any idea of reconciliation of Achilles and the other Achaean leaders lining mostly behind Agamemnon. Conceived through the Marxian lens of class struggle, Achilles’ decision to chase after Hector, and, by extension, his death, can be seen as the crystallization of the μηνιν that begins the epic: “Μηνιν αειδε, θεα, Πηληιαδεω ‘Αχιληος.” The wrath of Achilles, to that end, is tempered with the overbearing hatred he felt for the miserable wallowing of the members of his own class. Exposed to Agamemnon’s undiluted whims and the contemptuous aversion of other Achaean leaders, Achilles decides to stay, first and foremost, as an implicit rejection of the ill-deserved benefits that will be gathered when Troy would fall. Rose brings this point home quite clearly when he argues that his rejection of social gifts due to the benevolence of the undeserving basileus weights no less than his doom foretold by her mother in the narrative structure of Achilles’ decision. Rose, *Class in Archaic Greece*, pp. 122-3, n. 74; Homer, *Iliad*, 1. 1; incidentally, the Platonic Socrates would later take up this theme as an enlightened way of rejecting that a man ought to weigh up the prospects of life and death, while opting, instead, for the argument that the only thing that is worth any consideration is whether one acts justly or not, Plato, *Apology*, in *The Last Days of Socrates*, trans. by Hugh Tredennick and Harold Tarrant, (London, 2003a), 28b3-28d6.

1086 Homer, *Odyssey*, 5.29-42.


1086 Indeed, paying homage to this point became a hallmark feature of the later accounts that capitalized on Achilles’ devotion to his love of Patroclus as a fitting example to vindicate the veneration of
impelled by the divine command of Zeus, she could, at least hypothetically, forswear Hermes’ counsel for the sake of keeping Odysseus to herself. The potential denigration of the capacity of divine ordinance is all too clear: choosing to what extent one is to abide by the threads of fate or to scorn them altogether are all capabilities within the reach of the individual. This does not mean, of course, that mortal control over the originally open strands of fate is full. Indeed, the individual can at best be portrayed as having scant control over the decrees friendship as one of the perfect manifestations of goodness. Plato in his Symposium, for one, makes Pausanias furnish this example with an additional touch of homoeroticism, which is totally absent in Homer’s account, in his argument that Love is the most ancient and esteemed of gods: “The reason was that although Achilles found out from his mother that his killing of Hector would cause his own death, and that if he avoided doing this he’d go home and die of old age, he was brave enough to stand by his lover Patroclus and to avenge him—he didn’t choose just to die for Patroclus, but even to die as well as him, since Patroclus was already dead.” Plato, Symposium, 179e3–180a2; cf. Aeschines, Against Timarchus, 142–147; Lin Foxhall, ‘The Politics of Affection: Emotional Attachments in Athenian Society’, in Kosmos, pp. 59–60 with bibliography. Evidently, by the advent of the fourth century, the homosexual undercurrents of the relationship were already well-established to the extent that the debate was then focused on assigning roles to the two loving philoi. Aeschylus revisited the theme in his Myrmidons which is now completely lost except for two fragments. For the fragments, see Aeschylus, Fragments, ed. and trans. by Alan H. Sommerstein, (Cambridge, 2009); for an influential take on the import of the relationship for ancient Greek homosexuality as a whole, see K. J. Dover, Greek Homosexuality, (New York, 1999), pp. 169 ff; and for bibliographical notes on the references of ancient Greek authors to the relationship on the basis of preconceived homosexuality, see Gabriel Laguna Mariscal, “The Relationship between Achilles and Patroclus According to Chariton of Aphrodissias”, The Classical Quarterly, vol. 53 no. 1, (May, 2003), pp. 292–326. This type of divine negotiation to strike a balance between the distinct rank and order of the Olympian hierarchy is also evident in the Homeric Hymn to Demeter. Demeter, in that hymn, withholds her nurturing power of the soil precisely for robbing her Olympian peers from the worship that is prone to accrue to them by the gratitude of the humanity whose reliance on the fruits of the earth is without bounds. Playing into the worst fears of the Olympian stock, Demeter seeks the retribution for the latter’s implicit approval of Hades’ kidnapping of her daughter, Persephone, through scorching earth and its productive capacity. Demeter’s brilliant adoption of this tactic illustrates that humans offer dividends to the Olympians only if their material existence is secured, in addition to the fact that what one or even a group of deities ordain can be overturned by a defiant challenge levelled by another. Crudden, Hymn 2: To Demeter, 302–354.

The plenum of potential pathways of action remains in open determinateness until divinity decides to take the matter into her own hands. The account that is given of the partnership of Clytemnestra and Aegisthus in Homer’s Odyssey illustrates this point quite straightforwardly. The passage of Clytemnestra from the devoted wife of Agamemnon to the bedfellow of Aegisthus and Agamemnon’s would-be executioner is a transition that Homer links to the trumping of divine will over mortal deliberation. Notwithstanding his employment of this explanation as a pretext of what was to become the greater part of the tragedy, Homer’s interpretation of mutos is certainly more flexible in allowing the reader to relocate the story within Zeus’ greater enactment of cosmic order than the silent treatment afforded to it in Aeschylus’ trilogy, Oresteia. Indeed, apart from the brief allusion to Agamemnon’s sacrifice of his daughter, Iphigenia, at Aulis in order to reverse the winds as an extenuating circumstance of Clytemnestra’s final betrayal, Aeschylus opts for majestic retribution and Erinyes’ eventual haunting of Orestes as the personification of his guilty conscience: “But no; we were still encamped at Troy, still fighting out many a contest, when Aegisthus, sheltered deep in the Argive plain that pastures horses, had begun already with his cajolings to tempt Agamemnon’s wife. And at first Queen Clytemnestra would not consent to the deed of shame; she had discretion, and moreover there was a bard in the palace whom the king as he took ship for Troy had earnestly bidden to guard his wife. But when the gods’ purpose ordained that she should yield, Aegisthus carried the bard away to a desert island and left him there to become spoil of birds of prey; the queen he took to his own home, and he and she were of one mind.” Homer, Odyssey, 3.263–73; for Aeschylus’ remark on Iphigenia’s sacrifice, see Aeschylus, Agamemnon, 206–217. Indeed, the latent transitivity of Homer’s account may be taken as the narrative
that are derived from his or her original fate. Yet, overriding as the call of the Olympian Gods and Goddesses might seem to be, the field of possibilities that are open to any individual is far from being unwaveringly determined according to the discretion of the former. This field of open possibilities that are set within a nexus of fatal determination illustrates that the individual, as it was purported in the Homeric narrative, is not taken as a frozen entity, slowly melting down in a preordained way only to cease to exist at a predetermined temporality:

“The nexus of reality is complex. The cosmic order consists in binding determinations which are stratified. A new determination may be introduced where there is an opening of indefiniteness. This is how the fabric of reality is weaved. As time goes on, possibilities are being closed down. Actuality is completely determined, in the sense in which the past is. Time is what keeps the system open to the extent that it is, for the future.”

1089

The fixity of the preordained set of outcomes can only be conceived in relation to the things of the past, pathways that are closed down interminably where no change is possible but only probing explanations that can never imperil the closure of what is past. The course of what is about to come, however, is an essentially different matter. The cosmic order of bondage that encompasses the individual with respect to the future events in not unconditional. Being’s existence within the complex nexus of reality is contingent on the particular avenues of fate that she chooses to traverse. Withstanding the turbulent waters of fate is the condition in which the individual enacts herself and is so preordained, helping to recreate the fabric every time she takes a decision in her inadvertent attempt to constitute new paths that are subject to divine resolution: “But it is significant that there is an inherent tension in existence: the force of individuation (the power of an individual-part) is based on a bond of determination…. Being is in bondage, even if in the bondage of order which is constitutive of its very existence.”

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Further, dispelling an oversimplified attitude of ‘I get bonded, therefore I exist,’ we need to attempt to hover above the concept of individuation in regard to its relation to personal life choices so that we can fix our conceptual gaze at the original fate for the sake of shedding further light on the Homeric nexus of reality and its potential ramifications in connection with the preconceived nomos-phusis duality. To that end, based on our brief scrutiny of the Homeric myth, the concept of phusis, i.e., nature, corresponds to the imposing iron logic that the notion of original fate entails. The individual, in that sense, is surrounded by the fog of nature which

origin that fed later giants of tragedy, like Euripides, to fill out the vacuous points of his account by accentuating Agamemnon’s indecisive and fraudulent sacrifice of Iphigenia and creatively exploring the life of Clytemnestra prior to his marriage to Agamemnon. For two Euripidean plays rediscovering this theme, see Euripides, Iphigenia at Aulis; Euripides, Iphigenia among the Taurians, in Bacchae and Other Plays.

is liable to turn the distinct possibilities that are open to each and every one of us turn pale alongside its magnetic impulse. The cards of destiny, after all, are irrevocably drawn at precisely the instant of conception, as the example of Achilles rendered above suggests. Not to mention that Achilles was already a prominent warrior, and the son of a sea-goddess one might add, even before he partook of the final skirmishes, to which he was prodded from his dozing off self by the death of his dear friend Patroclus. What prospects, in that sense, does it bode for the other inconspicuous members of the Trojan or the Achaeian army that even the heroic warrior, in the end, voluntarily chose to succumb to the grimmer strand of his allotted fate? None too bright one might presume. Yet, it appears that such a rigidified idea of the original fate is most vulnerable to disparaging attacks when the intellectual force is concentrated precisely at its flank. The Homeric conception of phusis, in that vein, elicits a congenial understanding of one’s nature, character, and standing within the social/class composition, that only attain their prescribed meanings in connection with the understanding of generation, and origination. As Pierris elucidates this point, “Right from the attested beginning, in Homer, we meet with both senses…. The two senses are inherently complicated. The peculiar character of a thing is due to its origination.”

The overpowering feeling of a circular logic that is betrayed by this direct coherence between origination and constitution, however, can be sapped of its strength if we think it along the lines of nomos, understood as law and convention. The providential dispensation of decrees, as we attempted to show in our forays into the Homeric myth, is not absolute. It is subject to both potentially antagonistic divine agendas and to the workings of individual will. Indeed, the laws of fate, if our conceptual pedestrianism may be pardoned, seems to be enacted on the grounds of introducing a tolerable degree of regulation into human affairs. What this ‘regulation’ prescribes and prohibits will be pondered upon in our following discussion on the

1091 We would to express our full accord with Ste. Croix’s definition of class as it was made almost four decades ago in the widely influential The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World: “Class (essentially a relationship) is the collective social expression of the fact of exploitation, the way in which exploitation is embodied in a social structure. By exploitation, I mean the appropriation of part of the product of the labour of others: in a commodity-producing society this is the appropriation of what Marx called ‘surplus value.’” Ste. Croix, The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World, pp. 43.


1093 The congenial understanding of generation and constitution is also reminiscent of Aristotle’s postulation of the formation of the state: “The final association, formed of several villages, is the state. For all practical purposes the process [of human coming-to-be] is now complete; self-sufficiency [autarkēta] has been reached, and while the state came about as a means of securing life itself, it continues in being to secure the good life. Therefore every state exists by nature, as the early associations too were natural.” Aristotle, Politics, 1252b27-33; I would like to note my agreement with Meikle’s point that the rendering of autarkēta as ‘self-sufficiency’ is especially discomfiting in an Aristotelian context. Conductiveness to the realisation of one’s substantive potential, i.e., telos, instead of a celebration of minimal co-operation to allay the communal fears, is what is put on spot by the Aristotelian argument.
natural philosophers and Sophists and their particular appropriation of the *nomos-physis* distinction. Yet, for the moment, we dare hope that it will suffice to recall the ever-shifting nature of the divine pillars on which the Homeric laws stood. The moderation between overregulation and complete unboundedness, in that sense, is the *élan vital* of the laws of providence as they were portrayed by Homer. Just as overregulation is capable of eradicating the import of individual agency and will with one fell stroke, so does the inherently boundless conception of human agency cultivate the understanding of individual as an anti-social entity at the absence of divine guidance and her own powers of non-agonistic deliberation. Harking back to the celebrated story of Sirens in Book XII of the *Odyssey*, we contend that a detailed sketch of Odysseus’ voyage through the evil songs and deadly straits could help elaborate this point. Naturally, Odysseus’ venture in and through the straits of Sirens is quite well known to expound as it is; still, we would like to note two passages that seem to be inextricably tied from our standpoint. Leaving the Okeanos River behind them, Odysseus and his crew mourned the loss of their friend Elpenor and took solace in the foods and drinks that Kirke’s household had offered them. Odysseus then says that Kirke took him away from the rest of his crew as the sun was set and asked him “about each thing” concerning their voyage prompting the response of Kirke that it is now his turn to listen:

“You will come to the Sirens first of all; they bewitch any mortal who approaches them. If a man in ignorance draws too close and catches their music, he will never return to find wife and children near him and to see their joy at his homecoming; the high clear tones of the Sirens will bewitch him. They sit in a meadow; men’s corpses lie heaped up all round them, mouldering upon the bones as the skin decays. You must row past there; you must stop the ears of all your crew with sweet wax that you have kneaded, so that none of the rest may hear the song. But if you yourself are bent on hearing, then give them orders to bind you both hand and foot as you stand upright against the mast-stay, with the rope-ends tied to the mast itself; thus you may hear the two Sirens’ voices and be enraptured. If you implore your crew and beg them to release you, then they must bind you fast with more bonds again.”

As the story unfolds, we see that Odysseus promptly heeds the warning of Kirke in setting out a plan to nullify the bewitching impact of the songs of the Sirens, instructing his men on how to effectively shield him and the ship from the looming threat. Explaining the ominous nature of their predicament to his fellow crewmembers, Odysseus notes that, “Her [Kirke’s] first command was to shun the Sirens – their enchanting notes, their flowery meadow. I alone was to hear their song, she said. You for your part must bind me with galling ropes as I stand upright against the mast-stay, with the rope-ends tied to the mast itself...”

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1095 Ibid, 12.158-63.
We propose to focus on two elements that emerge from these passages and which appear to be noteworthy in respect of the highlighted need to elucidate the import of moderation in any attempt of appraisal of the nomos-phusis duality. The first of these themes is the type of counsel that is given to Odysseus by Kirke. As the detailed explanation of the strategy that one needs to adopt in order to overcome the imminent threat of Sirens makes clear, Kirke is very ‘well-versed’ in regard to the particular strengths and weaknesses of Sirens. In fact, her knowledge of these treacherous beasts even covers what type of wax is to be used to make sure that it will offer the most effective resistance against the Sirens’ songs. Further, she also knows exactly what kind of woe would betide those who wander without protection into the straits, namely, never to come back. Notwithstanding the perplexing quality of the extent to which her knowledge stretches, what is even more stunning is that Kirke is a god herself, with Sirens as her guardians, her hob as one could call it. Kirke appears to be in her element in the otherwise unforgiving environment precisely because it is her domain. So why does a god, albeit a lesser one, lend a helping hand to a mortal, someone with whom she certainly is not enamoured as Calypso is? The question becomes even more glaring if we add the last missing ingredient into the picture: the nomos-phusis duality. Indeed, if nothing less than turning into an inanimate addition to the already ‘massive bone-heaps’ wait those who are not informed of the menacing threat that is assured to welcome them, it would not be overstretched the issue to call this peculiar threat posed by the Sirens as a part of their nature, that is, an act that is made in accord with their very being. Sirens, in that vein, have devoured many a traveller and will continue to do so if not for the manner of the lifesaving counsel that can apparently be offered only by Kirke. The problem with this interpretation, however, is just that having depicted the nature of Sirens as vile bone collectors, why does Kirke interfere to save the life of Odysseus and those of his men by bypassing the very natural laws of her domain? Is it because some emotional bond unites the two, or because Kirke feels the need to intervene in order to guarantee the safety of Odysseus, who, as we saw above, is destined to gaze on his family again, by interceding on behalf of the higher gods who relayed their decree

1096 Delving further into the influential analogy that was coined by Adorno and Horkheimer more than three quarters of a century ago, we could historicise the metaphysical universe trodden by Kirke and Sirens as the conglomerate of the late capitalistic class interests which reconnect, at least from the perspective of the upper classes, the feigned abdication of the bourgeois pleasure principle with the reproduction of the relations of production and domination, conjuring a semblance of wilful novelty that fits the bill of the necessary supplement of everlasting sameness: “Workers must look ahead with alert concentration and ignore anything which lies to one side. The urge toward distraction must be grimly sublimated in redoubled exertions. Thus the workers are made practical. The other possibility Odysseus chooses for himself, the landowner, who has others to work for him. He listens, but does so while bound helplessly to the mast, and the stronger the allurement grows the more tightly he has himself bound, just as later the bourgeois denied themselves happiness the closer it drew them with the increase in their own power.” Adorno and Horkheimer, ‘The Concept of Enlightenment’, pp. 26.
1097 Homer, Odyssey, 5.117-223.
to upper and nether realm alike? We have touched upon a very likely answer to the first question above by emphasizing that Odysseus was no lover of Kirke. Indeed, she was his “queenly Goddess,” someone who inspired awe and fear in equal measure. What about protecting the interests of gods in general and those of Zeus in particular? None the less, the hermeneutic difficulties are no less considerable if this answer is preferred. For one, why did the Olympian gods send Odysseus through the voyage that was sure to lead him to his encounter with the Sirens? The gods, after all, could have easily sent him to his home through another route, a route that was not beset by Sirens, the overcoming of which necessitated Kirke to momentarily bend the laws of her own domain. Further, if Odysseus’ contact with Kirke was a ‘chance encounter,’ then why did the gods not act more prudently in devising a strategy for Odysseus to evade the Evil Song altogether? The answer to these obtrusive questions can only be given if we harken back to our initial argument in stressing that nomos and phusis retain their Homeric significance only if the explicit purpose they serve, i.e., moderation between overregulation and complete free reign, is taken into consideration. Indeed, we think it evident that Kirke deliberately relaxed the phusis of her own sphere for no other reason than preventing the potential transgression of nature into the forbidden city of overregulation. The laws are meant to safeguard the open possibilities that are in the service of Odysseus just like any other individual and not to issue the exact following through of decrees of fatal determination. Kirke intervenes to save Odysseus because the laws of her domain otherwise run the risk of becoming hubristically overarching, qualities both of which are not risked even by Zeus himself as he offers the alternative of not obeying his word to Calypso, an action, surely, to be undertaken at the latter’s own risk.

Moreover, another point that brings the importance of human individuation in accordance with moderation as we postulated it above is Odysseus’ choice of words when he explains his crew that “She [Kirke] told me to listen [to the Siren’s song] alone.” Again, Kirke did not command Odysseus to listen to the enticing song by ordering his crew to plug their ears with beeswax and to lash him to the mast, it was a mere suggestion. Yet, Odysseus did carry out Kirke’s wish by adopting the tactics she offered and in the exact same way by instructing his

1098 Ibid, 12.36; for an alternative interpretation construing a congruity between Hermes’ foreboding of the overriding prowess of Kirke at 293-296, which dovetail his counsel of sexual obedience to Odysseus, and an understanding of her literal function as a seductress, see Sarah B. Pomeroy, Goddesses, Whores, Wives, and Slaves: Women in Classical Antiquity, (New York, 1975), pp. 9; Adorno and Horkheimer, ‘Odysseus of Myth and Enlightenment’, pp. 54.
1099 “Scylla and Charybdis have a claim on whatever comes between their teeth, just as Circe has a right to metamorphose those who are not immune, or Polyphemus a right to the bodies of his guests. Every mythical figure is compelled to do the same thing over and over again. Each of them is constituted by repetition: its failure would mean their end.” Ibid, pp. 20.
1100 Homer, Odyssey, 12.160.
man over the details. He knew the risks, albeit having pre-empted some of them; the strait is deadly enough without the perilous addition of Sirens. What if a member of his crew were overcome by intrigue to listen to the Sirens’ song only to fall overboard, or their ship foundered on the rocks protruding from the sea floor as beset as it was with rogue currents and daunting gale-force winds? The possibilities are infinite, yet one single ending to the tale remains: Odysseus survives, and so does his crew to tell the tale that was to be a prime source of inspiration for almost three millennia. Indeed, Odysseus’ description of the relief he felt in the aftermath of the whole encounter with the Sirens is as causal as a Sunday stroll: “But when they had rowed well past the Sirens – when music and words could be heard no more – my trusty comrades were quick to take out the wax that had sealed their ears, and to rescue and unbind myself.”

And that was that. Risking life and limb just to face another danger that was lurking around the corner, The Tightest Strait. Odysseus did not ponder upon the whole episode perhaps because he saw no need to. The day was not lost, and the gods, in their own peculiar ways, were smiling. He willed to listen the charming song of the Sirens without risking the lives of his crew and listen he did. This was only a minor hiccup along the road that stretched from the fallen city of Ilium to the Savage’s Cave and his reunion with his son. The only constants in this never-ending struggle were him, his dreams of returning to his homeland, his family, and the decisions they made with the aid of gods, all open possibilities on their way either to fruition or frustration. Capricious as divine laws were, qua the laws of gods not to be taken lightly or revered redundantly, he had the nomoi of his own land to worry about as to what would happen to his wife and son during his long term of absence. And so it was that the laws of nature (read gods) and those of men ran their own respective courses to ground the Homeric man on the moderately regulated twin pillars of individuation and socialization.

The Homeric individual partakes of both his or her individuality and sociality to the extent that she is historically located within the temporal continuum. Reminiscing about the good old Mycenaean days and impatience to exploit the opportunities of the age of colonisation, two

102 We will shortly focus on the historical evaluation of literary and archaeological evidence that appears to be in support of phenomenon, but for now it needs to suffice pointing out that, “In the period between 800 and 600 numerous colonies were sent out by Greek city-states in mainland Greece and Asia Minor and hence this period is sometimes known as the ‘age of colonization’, as this was when the majority of colonies were established.” Matthew Dillon and Lynda Garland, The Ancient Greeks: History and Culture from Archaic Times to the Death of Alexander, (London and New York, 2013), pp. 43; Robin Waterfield gives 1,500 as the total number Greek communities as the high tide of colonization slowed to a trickle by the 550s whereas Terry Buckley argues that it spelled the end of the Dark Age: Robin Waterfield, Xenophon’s Retreat: Greece, Persia and the End of the Golden Age, (London, 2006), 297
themes that are interwoven in the epics if we are to follow in Rose’s footsteps, attaining their historical import only to the extent of the identification of their temporal significance. The textual light that is shed by the aid of Homeric epics on the social history of the Middle (850-750) and Late Geometric Greece (750-700) offers a threefold interpretative schema. To begin with the narrative structure of the epics, the microcosm of divine deliberation functions as the temporally and spatially limitless metanarrative whose guidance beckons the events that take place within the macrocosm of human affairs to line up in meaningful succession. Poet’s divinely inspired introduction of intelligibility to social events that otherwise seem to thread entirely on the mysterious plane of Tuche holds alight the divine strings whose precepts realize the transpiring of particular events in opposition to others. Homer’s larger-than-life transgression of temporal boundaries, whether it is made to pronounce future outcomes or to denounce past mistakes, caters to the poet’s categorical separation of immortal and mortal, which turn out to be the embodied spheres of perfect intelligibility and pure coincidence respectively. The benumbing irony of human actions boils down, in the end, to the fact that their obtuse belief in their capacities belie not only their perpetual bravado but also to a harrying degree of credulousness that is epitomized by “prorsus credibile est, quia ineptum est.” What makes this self-assuredness particularly subject to bewailing perpetuation leads us to the second focal point of interpretation that is afforded by the Homeric texts: the stakeholders’ firm belief that the cards of material prosperity have already been irrevocably dealt.
of temporal disruptions of the hierarchical order is discouraged *ad nauseam*. From the trashing dealt out by Odysseus to insolent Thersites to the ill-advised enterprise of Dolon to spy on the Achaean camp in order to draw the benefits that are promised by Hector to the one who accomplishes the task, the predefined ranks of the hierarchical pyramid of the *Iliad* do not budge in favour of any transgressor. The divine distribution of favour turns out, in that sense, to be an additional failsafe mechanism guarding the temporal allotment of material possession and political power that beats the wretched Thersites and kills the unfortunate Dolon with the same narrative weapon: the restoration of due measure. Destiny holds back divine and human alike when the proportion that is deemed due to them is attempted to be discarded for the sake of possessing something greater. Achilles’ unwilling condonement of basileus’ authority finds its celestial expression in Poseidon’s abject acknowledgement of the fate of the Trojans as springing, ultimately, from the will of Zeus. Meritocratically achieved or not, human authority cannot be meddled with impunity. With bearing one’s dispensed lot sanctified as observing the sacred proportionality of political power, the dissident aristocrat that is afire with a yearning for the solemn justice of the Gracchi before him, and his revolution: Cicero, *On Obligations*, 1.21, 26, 51, 2.73; Wood, *Citizens to Lords*, pp. 138-139. Contrariwise, one could also surmise from the trenchant reiteration of this element that the brittle basis of the Homeric basileus’ political authority was well-nigh transparent for all to see. Coupled with the stock feature of public humiliation that followed the restoration of political equilibrium, Thersites’ admonition echoes twice through the public embarrassment of the character in the poem and in the eyes of the audience alike. The whimpering parvenus of the Homeric epic thus could have served as a measure of last resort recalling *lex talionis*: “The message for Homer’s original readers and auditors was surely unambiguous: do not even think about questioning the political status quo, which is literally god-given, ordained ultimately of the greatest, best, and most powerful divine overlord, supreme father Zeus himself. But the very fact that it was spelled out in this way likely hints of a subtextual anxiety, at an at least vague sense of popular discomfort with or even resistance to the rule of those who are both in Homer and later also in Hesiod called ‘kings’ (*basileis*).” Cartledge, *Democracy*, pp. 51. Homer, *Iliad*, 2.210-277. Homer, *Iliad*, 10.313-454. Frequent uses of otherwise quite inconspicuous terms with increasingly evident socioeconomic hues, such as *kakoi* and *esthloi*, can be gleaned from a variety of contexts in the *Odyssey*: Homer, *Odyssey*, 6.63-4, 8.553, 23.66. That point appears to serve as the lynchpin of the contrast that is drawn by Adorno and Horkheimer between the untruth of the primal world of myth and the illuminable positing of the contemporary world of knowledge. Fixed property in landholdings is the restoration, in that sense, of the narrative link that mediates between demon-ridden margins of Odysseus’ universe and that of the comforting permanence, albeit temporarily threatened, of its core. Adorno and Horkheimer, ‘Odysseus or Myth and Enlightenment’, pp. 38. Homer, *Iliad*, 1.334-344; cf. Raaflaub and Wallace, ‘“People’s Power” and Egalitarian Trends in Archaic Greece’, pp. 27-28. Homer, *Iliad*, 15.205-217. “What provokes Achilles’ tragedy is the gap opened by Agamemnon’s *hubris* (1.203) between, on the one hand, the utopian ideal of heroic society as a perfect meritocracy (e.g. 12.310-21) with democratic reciprocity under the ultimate control of the whole (male) community and, on the other, the reality of greedy exploitation by the relatively cowardly beneficiary of inherited wealth and power (2.101-8).” Rose, *Class in Archaic Greece*, pp. 117.
Mycenaean *pa-si-re-u*\(^{1114}\) qua Achilles, and the new *uomo universale*\(^{1115}\) of the age of colonisation and trade qua Odysseus mend the fence of *stasis* that risks the total subversion of the social order. It takes two qualities to climb the hierarchical ladder of Homeric society: unflinching observation of due measure and a steady source of landed property to fall back on in case anything goes awry.\(^{1116}\) Minor setbacks of the divine-sanctioned temporal order, such as Euryalus’ insult to Odysseus\(^{1117}\) or Eurymachus’ mocking of the latter,\(^{1118}\) are carefully woven back into the social fabric with the silver lining of permanence. *Basileus* draws equal strength from his temporal dominion and his divine *aide-de-camps* in order to swat away any challengers to his authority.

This narrative stress on the immutability of the temporal order leads us to the third interpretative strategy of the Homeric epic: the mystification of the past for the sake of building up an incontestable eternal present. The temporal ruptures that are employed by the author to erect the steady signposts for the reader to find her way through the Minoan maze of myth and history serve as the poetic measure with which the ideational *ignis fatuus* breeding dissent and

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\(^{1114}\) The Mycenaean term is generally agreed to indicate a low-ranking local official as opposed to the expanded authority of basileus in its later usage. Though the semiotic affiliation between the Mycenaean term *wa-nu-ka*, i.e., supreme monarch, and the archaic Greek basileus appears more fitting, the phonetic resemblance between *pa-si-re-u* and basileus seem equally inviting to draw a linguistic parallel. For a brief description of basileus and its Mycenaean origins, see Hall *A History of the Archaic Greek World*, pp. 128-9; Snodgrass, *The Dark Age of Greece*, pp. 386.

\(^{1115}\) The concept belongs as such to the Italian Renaissance thinker Matteo Palmieri (1406-1475 AD). Yet the idea of growing human excellence as a result of diversification of abilities, finding one of its most famous expositions in Count Baldassare Castiglione’s *Courtier* [1528] can be traced to one of its graphic origins in the figure of Odysseus. The horizon of activities in which Odysseus appears quite proficient includes bard, trader, explorer, shipbuilder among many others that appears congruent to the singing, counselling, fencing ideal that emerged in the fifteenth century Italy. The point where this apparent parallel turn sour, as it is aptly noted by Rose, however, is the social and material basis that supported the Homeric ideal is essentially different from the one it anticipated. The new enterprising individual of the Homeric age would vanish into the thin air of absurd abstractions in the eyes of its hearers/readers were it not for its representation of the discontented masses not being able to fill any of the limited and hierarchical roles that were on offer within the society that was built on the ashes of the then smouldered Mycenaean society. Rose, *Class in Archaic Greece*, pp. 154; cf. Peter W. Rose, “Class Ambivalence in the *Odyssey*”, *Historia*, vol. 24, (1975), pp. 129-49; Peter W. Rose, *Sons of Gods, Children of Earth*; Carol Dougherty, *The Raft of Odysseus: Ethnographic Imagination of Homer’s Odyssey*, (Oxford, 2001). For a brief survey of the Renaissance idea and the *locus classicus* of *uomo universale*, see, respectively Peter Burke, *The Italian Renaissance: Culture and Society in Italy*, (Princeton, 1999), pp. 62-3; Baldassare Castiglione, *The Book of the Courtier*, trans. by L. E. Opdycke, (Hertfordshire, 2000).

\(^{1116}\) Cf. “The eighth century ... was a time of remarkable economic growth, with agricultural development bringing about a general increase in the level of prosperity, especially for the aristocracy, whose political control over their own *polis* was based on their tenure of the best and the largest amount of land, as well as their ability to defend the state from external threats. Land, especially in a pre-coingage age, was the most valuable of all possessions because it was the sole guarantee of permanent wealth.” Buckley, *Aspects of Greek History 750-323 BC*, pp. 30.


contempt of the temporal order is conjured away. The wisps of insufferable Thersites and the irreconcilable soul of Aias are entangled with the employment of the same narrative net of calling the protagonist to march to the sanctioned drumbeat of timeless order. The unyielding hum of lamentation of humankind’s lot that surrounds Andromache as one of the central tragic characters of the Iliad, for instance, is clearly conceived through the god’s eye view, stretching the poetic powers of the author to border on omnipresence in addition to his earlier manifestations of omniscience.

Having delineated the trilinear contours of narrative strands that are utilized in the Homeric epics, we claim that the Homeric society was characterized by intra-class struggle among the aristocrats no less than the inter-class struggle between the propertied few and the unpropertied mass that compelled Homer to revisit the murky historical waters of the Trojan War in order to find out novel courses of action to cope with the emerging social situation. Given the dearth of textual evidence that can be added up to evaluate the archaeological record, we think it apt to turn to Hesiod and Homeric Hymns for a quasi-contemporary account of the late eighth and early seventh centuries before turning to the correspondence between the narrative structure of the epics and historical reality. The conjunction of poetic themes that unite the Hymns and the Hesiodic works provide us with yet additional theoretical ground whose support is essential in regard to the vindication of our argument that the Homeric works gazed on the heroic past in order to work towards a hypothetical resolution of the social issues with which the Homeric society was swamped. Indeed, two reinforcing themes can be brought to the fore in the context of the Hymns and the Hesiodic works: the rigid binary between the harmonic celestial and the strife-ridden terrestrial, and a celebration of the rediscovered artisanship that was temporarily lost in the aftermath of the destruction of the Mycenaean society. Operating

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1119 Cf. “Though a man’s heart be withered with the grief of a recent bereavement, if then a singer, the servant of the Muses, sings of the famous deeds of men of old, and of the blessed gods who dwell in Olympus, he soon forgets his sorrows and thinks no more of his family troubles, quickly diverted by the goddesses’ gifts.” Hesiod, Theogony, 97-103.
1120 Homer, Odyssey, 11.528-565.
1121 In one of the most memorable passages of the twenty-second book of the Iliad, Homer depicts a comfortable scene from Hector’s house with Andromache weaving on her loom. Gullible to the point of desperation, she momentarily hears the wailing of other Trojans coming from the tower overlooking the battlefield and sorrowfully surmises the fate of her husband that she was afraid of all along. Homer, Iliad, 22.437-515.
on a rather superficial layer of antithesis between the omnipotent gods and impotent humankind, the *Hymns* emit an aura of impenetrable dejection in its portrayal of the individual’s silent compliance with divine dispensation. Conveyed on the basis of linguistic subjection, humans ‘endure’ the gifts and pains that are assigned to their lot as the pacified subject of various predicates that assume a defining instrumentality in their own right. There is no remedy for either old age or death for the customary playthings of the gods who ought “endure | At the hands of immortal gods as they live without wits or | resource,…” and no cure for the old mother who can barely hope to suckle her new-born without the aid of gods, whose assistance is shunned in sheer ignorance befitting the mortal’s plead. Thus finding herself in an uninspiring state of affairs with little to no motive underlying the dismal

1125 Crudden, *Hymn 2: To Demeter*, 252-265.
1126 Hesiod’s eternal condemnation of Pandora as the just punishment for Prometheus’ cunning trickery of Zeus certainly manages to breathe a pitiably air of misogynist contempt vindicating Rose’s argument that the transition from female to male rulership that spans the Hesiodic theogony substantiates the idea that “in Hesiod females are not simply a different class as a consequence of their reproductive capacity…but a different and distinctly suspect species.” This thienogen evaluation of the female may have been drawn by Hesiod ultimately from the Mesopotamian myths. Two elements that protrude continuously from the surviving fragments of myths from Mesopotamia point towards the possibility, whether direct or indirect, of such a transmission: the creation of man as the principal means of relieving gods from labour, and the depiction of the primordial sexual intercourse as the eternal sapping of male’s strength while bestowing the capacity of forming judgement on him. Discarding the symbolic aspects of the opening of the Pandora’s jar aside, the depiction of gods as *demiourgos*, i.e., literally “public worker,” or “craftsperson,” is a Hesiodic theme that would later on be adopted by Plato and Aristotle among others. It appears interesting to note, in that vein, that the permanent respite offered to the “overworking gods” in exchange of their creation of primeval man bears interesting comparison to the aforementioned threat of Hera to other Olympians in the form of cutting the livelihood of humankind is purported as tantamount to ceasing the prospective pious worship that will accrue to the gods themselves. The ultimate result of the creation of man, for what it is worth, seem to be the shedding of the burden of the gods in both accounts. Further, given that hysterical male supervision of female sexuality is a stock feature of class societies, it is highly likely that the Mesopotamian myths signal the existence of an already entrenched social and sexual division of labour that was also a pronounced feature of the archaic Greek society. Hesiod may be conceived as the antinome of anti-banaism that would become a vogue of aristocratic sentimentalism from the birth of elegiac and lyric poetry onwards. Yet, such a conception jettisons the fact that what can be dubbed the “DIY mentality” of Hesiodic *Ergo* hardly stretches to cover areas of female productivity except for a curious reference to the procurement of a slave woman, “not wedded, one who could follow the herds.” Coupled with the trenchant stigmatization of women that takes place in the *Theogony*, the Hesiodic conception of women as a beautiful evil (*kalon kakon*) or destructive drones pure and simple, the virulent sexism of Hesiod’s Works exhibit not only a potentially latent rapport with Mesopotamian literary traditions but also a geared-up form of sexism that verges on oversexed psychosis: Rose, *Class in Archaic Greece*, pp. 174; cf. Nicole Loraux, “Sur la race de femmes et quelque-unes de ses tribus”, *Arethusa*, vol. 2, (1978), pp. 43-87. For the myth of creation in *Atrahasis*, see Stephanie Dalley, *Atrahasis I, in Myths from Mesopotamia: Creation, The Flood, Gilgamesh, and Others*, ed. and trans. by Stephanie Dalley, (Oxford and New York, 2000), pp. 9-15; for the narrative of Gilgamesh’s sexual intercourse with Shamhat, see Dalley, *Gilgamesh*, pp. 54-57; Hesiod’s reference to the ‘chattel woman’ is located in Hesiod, *Works and Days*, 415-417; and his vitriolic comments on the creation of women are as follows: “For from her is descended the female sex, a great affliction to mortals as they dwell with their husbands—no fit partners for accursed Poverty, but only for Plenty. As the bees in their sheltered nests feed the drones, those conspirators in badness, and while they busy themselves all day and every day till sundown making the White honeycomb, the drones stay inside in sheltered cells and pile the toil of others into their own bellies, even so as a bane for mortal men has high-thundering Zeus created women, conspirators in causing difficulty.” Hesiod, *Theogony*, 302
existence with which she is generated, the human individual turns to the fruits of her own industry for the sake of recuperating her state and salvaging whatever she can from her glorious ancestors. Hesiodic gods allocate uncomfortable misery to humans that can only be mitigated by diligent labour taking the place of constant groans and moans that feature constantly in the Hymns. Striking a chord with the occasional veneration of Hephaestus as the demiourgos par excellence, Hesiod’s focus on production and self-sufficiency allows us to substantiate the material details of Homeric historicity. Contrary to the scanty and scattered evidence either of the means or the relations of production that can be gleaned from the Homeric epics, Hesiod’s hu(man) is a gentleman-farmer plain and simple. To that end, he has a clear separation of productive and leisurely activities in addition to an acute ranking of the two kinds allowing indulgence to the latter only if a certain level of material subsistence is reached. Whilst the basic need to produce is conceived along the now familiar lines of opposition between human toil and divine comfort, Hesiod does not hanker after the cessation of incessant drudgery that is an element, albeit with some emphasis on its hoped for circularity, of a bygone era. Indeed, the Hesiodic human-cum-producer realizes that, for better or for worse, he is a part of the fifth age, not to mention his recognition of the fact that the attainment of ill and well is subject to her actions no less than it was in the earlier ages of


1127 The dialectics of self-serving labour that this formulation adopts should not be considered irrelevant. Aristotle in his Rhetoric, for one, regarded it worthwhile to mould the sentiment into a maxim, uniting to kalon and eleutheroi in their opposition to ergon thêtikon, ‘hired labour,’ and banausikê technê, ‘menial craft.’ As the spirit of Achilles would so agonisingly opine, any fate would be better than to be a lord over the dead even one that involved being a thês for a mere nobody: “A specifically Greek distinction between free men outside the ruling class is between small landowners (for which I can think of no specific Greek term) and thêtès, landless freemen available for hire by larger landowners.” Rose, Class in Archaic Greece, pp. 54-55; Aristotle, The Art of Rhetoric, 1367a28-32; Homer, Odyssey, 11.488-491; Isocrates, 14.48; cf. Ellen Meiksins Wood, Peasant-Citizen and Slave: The Foundations of Athenian Democracy, (London, 1988), pp. 50-51; Edward E. Cohen, ‘An Unprofitable Masculinity’, in Money, Labour and Land, pp. 101-102 with bibliography; for an alternative interpretation of what promises this trope may have had in store for the fourth-century Athenian dêmos writ large, see Josiah Ober, Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens: Rhetoric, Ideology, and the Power of the People, (Princeton, 1989), 274-278.

1128 For an example, see Hymn 20 that is addressed to Hephaistos, Crudden, Hymn 20: To Hephaistos.


1130 “Little business has a man with disputes and debates who has not food for the year laid up at home in its ripeness, produce of the earth, Demeter’s grain. When you have got an abundance of that you can promote disputes and conflict over other men’s property.” Hesiod, Works and Days, 29-34.

1131 Ibid, 99-104.

1132 Ibid, 174-175; cf. Rose, Class in Archaic Greece, pp. 186. The theme of permanence introduced by the Hesiodic measure of cosmogenic circularity was earlier emphasized rightly by Vernant: “Chez Hésiode, l’univers divin s’organise suivant un progrès linéaire qui conduit du désordre à l’ordre, depuis un état originel de confusion indistincte jusqu’à un monde différencié et hiérarchisé sous l’autorité immuable de Zeus.” Jean-Pierre Vernant, Mythe et religion en Grèce ancienne, pp. 105.
Gold, Silver, Bronze, and Demigod existence. Hesiod’s human, in other words, is fully aware, unlike the swashbuckling heroes of Homeric epics, of the fact that observing the due measure and ensuring one’s peaceful existence depends entirely upon ploughing her fields, sharpening her irons etc. And yet there is still a petitio principi involved in this solemn ode to industriousness: how on earth has our hardworking farmer came to be in the possession of her fields? How exactly does he produce a steady supply of grain if he is taken to be by her lone self? Further, what is one supposed to make of the reference to piling up of wealth in the halls, or of the swift ship that is to set loaded with cargo in hopes of turning them into profit? The questions are endless, whilst the answers stack up to little more than to Aesopian truisms that are carefully lined out in accord with the interests of a wealthy readership that presumably would not have cared a whiff about how to amass the material riches that would enable one to procure fields and working ‘hands.’

Although he does not offer much in the way of the erstwhile acquisition of landed property, Hesiod does something no less significant than his magnification of productive labour as the key to attaining a peaceful existence in the

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1133 Both Osborne and van Wees have commendably taken up this theme as a telling tale against taking Hesiod and his intended audience as of small-farmer origin one and all: “Often described as a ‘didactic’ poem, the teaching involved in Works and Days is not practical but moral despite the injunctions about when to plough and when to sow, and the long description of how a plough is constructed, one cannot learn how to farm in Hesiod.” Osborne, Greece in the Making, pp. 137; Van Wees’ account is especially elucidating in regard to the light it sheds on the presupposed relationship between Hesiod and his slaves: “His [the farmer’s] job is to “tell the slaves in summer to build their winter shelters” (502-3), and in the harvest season, the busiest time of the year, he must “wake up the slaves; avoid shady benches and sleeping until dawn” (573-77). If these extortions do not exclude the farmer working alongside his slaves, the arrangements of the summer do: the master sits in the shade, drinking imported wine, eating milk bread, beef, and lamb, while he “tells the slaves” to thresh and store the grain.” Hans van Wees, ‘Farmers and Hoplites: Models of Historical Development’, in Men of Bronze, pp. 227; Pomeroy et al., A Brief History of Ancient Greece, pp. 73.

1134 Hesiod, Works and Days, 378-381.

1135 Ibid, 617-633.

1136 Aesopian fable of The Farmer and His Children is a case in point. A farmer summoned his children to his deathbed in order to share some of his wisdom on farming and told them to look for what is in their benefit hidden in the vineyard: “The children, imagining that their father had buried a treasure in some corner of his vineyard, hoed deeply all the ground in it as soon as their father had died. They found no treasure. But the vineyard, so well-tended, gave its fruit many times over.” The moral of the story is, of course, that there is no real treasure other than hard work itself. Yet, it hardly offers any nuggets of wisdom on how to purchase a vineyard in the first place, how to exchange its fruit for tools, utensils, etc. The context of a fable might be regarded for what we would today call middle-class truisms of the order of “I planted the seed, Apollos watered it, but God made it grow.” Yet, Hesiod’s work, a farmer’s self-help guide in short, needs a bit more ‘punch’ in regard to how material basis of agricultural sustenance is to be provided. Aesop, The Farmer and His Children (83), in The Complete Fables, trans. by Olivia and Robert Temple, (London, 1998), pp. 66; the biblical quotation is from Corinthians (3:6).

1137 Perceptive as ever, Cartledge underscored the abundance of material references that avert the reader from deducing anything like a subsistence farmer as a potential addressee of the poem: “He [Hesiod’s farmer] may not be the semi-aristocrat he has been taken to be, but he is probably a more than merely middling peasant farmer.” Cartledge, Democracy, pp. 41; contra Rose, Sons of the Gods, Children of Earth, pp. 98 n. 12.
fifth age: he extols dikê as the glue holding the community together.\textsuperscript{1138} Having separated the beneficial type of strife from the destructive type at the beginning of his work,\textsuperscript{1139} Hesiod commends paying complete obeisance toward the dictates of justice in the belief that only such a wholehearted compliance can save the mortal community from otherwise unsurpassable social turmoil.\textsuperscript{1140} Provided that the lack of juridical assurance for the ownership of landed property translates precisely into an understanding of private property that is private in name alone, Hesiod realized that the small comfort which that woeful condition would entail could only be mended if a functioning framework of legal conventions were to sustain the ephemeral relations of property ownership in its place:

“C’est que le monde d’Hésiode, contrairement à celui de l’âge d’Or, est un monde mélangé où coexistent côte à côte, mais s’opposent par leur fonction, les petits et les grands, les vilains δειλοι et les nobles εσθλοι, les agriculteurs et les rois. Dans cet univers discordant, point d’autre secours que Dikê. Si elle disparaît, tout sombre dans le chaos. Si elle est respectée à la fois par ceux dont la vie est vouée au pomos et par ceux qui disent le droit, il y aura plus de biens que de maux ; on évitera les souffrances qui ne sont pas inhérentes à la condition mortelle.”\textsuperscript{1141}

The Hesiodic universe holds its promise of due return to the hardworking farmer because the possession of private property in land is secured via institutionalized norms that justify the nomothetic equation of esthloi with the propertied and that of kakoi with those lacking any substantial amount of landed property.\textsuperscript{1142} With the fostering Eris (Strife) giving incentive to the propertied to expand their wealth and with the hindering Eris banished from the community on the grounds that it breeds hazardous contempt, we are granted an invaluable

\textsuperscript{1138} In Hesiod’s theogony, Dikê is one of the four children that was born to Themis, i.e., ‘custom,’ from her marriage to Zeus. Their other children include Horai (Norms), Eunomiê (Good Social Order) and Eirênê (Peace), thence giving rise to the conception of Zeus as the protector of human society. Hesiod, \textit{Theogony}, 901 ff; for a useful summary of multifaceted meanings that came to be ascribed to this complex concept from the archaic age onwards, see Simon Goldhill, \textit{Reading Greek Tragedy}, (Cambridge, 1986), pp. 33-56.

\textsuperscript{1139} “I see there is not only one Strife-brood on earth, there are two. One would be commended when perceived, the other is reprehensible, and their tempers are distinct. The one promotes ugly fighting and conflict, the brute: no mortal is fond of her, but they are forced by the gods’ designs to do homage to Strife the burdensome. But the other was the elder born of gloomy Night, and the son of Kronos, the high-seated one who dwells in heaven, set her in the earth’s roots, much the better for men. For when someone whose work falls short looks towards another, towards a rich man who hastens to plough and plant and manage his household well, then neighbour vies with neighbour as he hastens to wealth: this Strife is good for mortals.” Hesiod, \textit{Works and Days}, 13-26.


\textsuperscript{1142} “On the one hand we have not only words which mean property-owning, rich, fortunate, distinguished, well-born, influential, but also as alternatives for virtually the same set of people, words having a basically moral connotation and meaning literally the good, the best, the upright, the fair-minded, and so forth. And on the other hand we find applied to the lower classes, the poor, who are also the many, the mob, the populace, words with an inescapably moral quality, meaning essentially bad.” Ste. Croix, \textit{The Class Struggle in Ancient Greek World}, pp. 426.
probe beneath the Hesiod’s recurrent insistence on labour as the only means of realizing upward mobility. This stress on the dignity of labour, subversive as it is of the Homeric portrayal of the ruling-class values, needs to be regarded also as an invitation to participating in rightful industry that features hardworking labour just as much as it does to keeping the temporal law and order firmly in its place. Standing by Dikē as the metaphysical guardian of order, Hesiod lets a watered-down understanding of Eris qua economic competitiveness into his cosmos through its back door while shutting down the front door to the face of actually disruptive class struggle. Forked tongued as it is, this roundabout praise of labour and industry sheds light not only on the significance of the Homeric practice of temenos, i.e., grants of land by the basileus, but also on the economic details of the aristocratic education that Telemachus is made to undergo in the Odyssey. Indeed, the issues of the hereditary ownership of land and the distribution of conquered lands figure continuously within the mythical landscapes of the Iliad and the Odyssey. Agamemnon, for example, makes an offer, or to be more precise a apereisi aponina, i.e., ‘boundless ransom,’ including

1143 Rose, for one, underscores Hesiod’s warm reception of labour by focusing on lines 308-319 of Works and Days and points out that, “Hesiod’s insistence that labor is no disgrace but in fact the only path for upward social mobility is rightly cited in sharp contrast to the scorn of work characteristic of a slave-owning society and is indeed quietly subversive of ruling-class values.” Rose, Class in Archaic Greece, pp. 196; cf. Anthony T. Edwards, Hesiod’s Ascra, (Berkeley and London, 2004), pp. 105. To be sure, Hesiod’s treatise on farming, if one is allowed to call it that, stands alone in its early espousal of the virtuous existence accompanying hard work. Indeed, one can go so far to claim that it stands alone within the general corpus of archaic Greek literature, with the sole exceptions, albeit aristocratically fanciful ones from the classical period, of Xenophon’s Oeconomicus and Pseudo Aristotle’s treatise of the same ilk: Ps.-Aristotle, Oeconomica, 1355a25-b5. Yet, we ought not give in to this praise of agricultural work as a definite encomium of labour. The social mobility that Rose refers to does not entail a wholesale mobility that is potent enough to eradicate the class lines separating the estholiagathoi from the kakoidoiatoi. In the light of Hesiod’s taking shelter in the concept of dikê in order to eliminate the forceful workings of the conflictual Eris, we argue that Hesiod permits only the propertied side of society to engage in a race of industriousness while barring any transitivity that is prone to occur between the propertied and the unpropertied in order to obstruct any full-fledged mobility from taking place.

1144 Ian Morris’ underscoring of the Hesiodic contrast of the material superfluity of the golden age to the scarcity associated with that of iron should be recalled in regard to this uneasy back and forth between the two concepts of Eris: Ian Morris, ‘Hard Surfaces’, in Money, Labour and Land, pp. 20.


1146 Rose’s analysis of the terminological shift from the Iliad’s ktêmenata, i.e., ‘things acquired,’ to the Odyssey’s khrmêmata, i.e., ‘use,’ offers us a valuable picture to draw from. That is regarded by Rose as hinting at the completion of a poetic cycle of assumed inheritance that is ever subject to the sudden interruption of war, and hence at the implicit rejection of any notion of inherited excellence. At the right hand of every foray into battle-proven valour is the warrior’s prayers that his son will display outstanding deeds as he does: “Likewise dependent on Zeus, and the unstated burden of the prayer, is the chance to grow to manhood with adequate protection from the existing powers. Hektor and Homer’s audience know that this security is not forthcoming.” Rose, Sons of the Gods, Children of Earth, pp. 62, 59-60.

seven cities to Achilles in order to entice him back into the Achaean camp.\textsuperscript{1148} Menelaus, likewise, speaks of having wanted to offer a city in Argos to Odysseus for all the services the latter rendered to him.\textsuperscript{1149} These offerings, combined with the Hesiodic picture of the diligent farmer working his way towards a higher sum of wealth to pass down on to his sons clearly show that the land-owning aristocracy of late eighth and seventh centuries was, in line with the all-too-fickle grants of Homeric basileis,\textsuperscript{1150} a hereditary one that relied on assumed nomoi qua customs to keep any overlord from pouching the their lands at his discretion. Additionally, the Hesiodic education of the aspiring young landowner also reads as the concomitant tandem of the aristocratic education that Telemachus receives from his peers and ‘superiors’ alike in the \textit{Odyssey}.\textsuperscript{1151} The picture of aristocratic landlord that emerges vividly from the combination of Homeric and Hesiodic texts, in that sense, is one that is willing to compete with her peers, to give and take counsel from other aristocrats, to diversify his competencies, and to dirty his hands in taking part of the labour process while doing all this without causing the slightest damage to the hierarchical structure that divides laoi and esthloi.\textsuperscript{1152} The permanence of the temporal hierarchical order, a narrative nodal point that we have focused in our scrutiny of the epics, is thus endorsed rather cryptically by Hesiod through his delineation of the respective spheres of the two types of \textit{Eris}. Indeed, so far as narrative structures are concerned, there appears to be almost a direct correspondence between the epics and Hesiodic works: a clear separation of the realm of immortals, the effusion of its potencies through the course of theogony and the emergence of fundamental pieces of \textit{muthos} that leads to poet’s ultimate derivation of compliance with the temporal law and order signifying the passage to the realm of mortals; an exasperating silence with regard to questions pertaining the establishment of hereditable private property in land and a substitution of the protagonists’ ultimate accord with the conventions of classed society such as they were in the time of the late eighth and seventh centuries; and, a quality of inviolable permanence incessantly ascribed to the present configurations of society whose frozen qualities are supported by the adoption of the mythic shroud in order to propose divine-sanctioned remedies for the ills that endanger the temporal class order. What can we make of this correspondence of poetic adumbration of the social and economic pillars of the Homeric class society in the light of the archaeological evidence gathered from various sites in Greece?

\textsuperscript{1149} Homer, \textit{Odysseus}, 4.174-175.
\textsuperscript{1150} “The land of a hero, inasmuch as most heroes are also kings (basileës) in their homeland, is not a \textit{klêros} but a \textit{temenos}, the same word used for the saved territory reserved for a god (2.696, 8.48, 23.148). A hero’s temenos is not presented in the poem as inherited private property.” Rose, \textit{Sons of the Gods, Children of Earth}, pp. 60.
\textsuperscript{1151} \textit{Ibid}, pp. 310-312.
\textsuperscript{1152} Cf. Raaflaub and Wallace, “‘People’s Power’ and Egalitarian Trends in Archaic Greece’, pp. 32.
4.2 Archaeological and Later Historical Evidence of Mycenae’s Fall

The knowledge we have from the Mycenaean Linear B tablets,\footnote{The recognized writing system of the Mycenaean civilization, Linear B Script was in use between 1450 and 1100. Given the diffusion of historical sites such as the recovery of late Minoan II tablets in Crete, it appears to be a fitting description of the Script that it shared the fortunes of the Minoan as well as the Mycenaean civilizations with potentially Minoan roots based in Knossos. It is important to note, in that vein, that the so-called Chariot Tablets from Knossos, which are the oldest authenticated Linear B tablets that are excavated to date, have been tentatively dated to 1450-1350. The transformation of the Minoan Linear A Script to its later B form can be taken as suggestive of speaking to a conglomeration of causes, both internal and external, for the later invention of the Linear B Script. For a synoptic exposition of the archaeological sites that have produced the Linear B tablets and their characteristics, see Hall, A History of the Archaic Greek World, pp. 41-43.} whose existence, by showing that literacy in the period was well developed among the members of the palatial class to the point of inducing tablet-writing as a means to document economic transactions and palace administration among other activities, support the portrayal of the Mycenaean society as bureaucratic, monarchical and hierarchical with sharp differentiation between officials, soldiers, priests, artists, artisans and slaves.\footnote{Vanda P. Kazanskiene, “Land Tenure and Social Position in Mycenaean Greece”, in Politeia: Society and State in the Aegean Bronze Age, ed. by Robert Laffineur and Wolf-Dietrich Niemeier, (Liège, 1995), pp. 603-612; cf. Michael Ventris and John Chadwick, Documents in Mycenaean Greek, 2nd edition, (Cambridge, 1973), pp. 119-125; Serge Svizzero and Clement A. Tisdell, “Economic Management of Minoan and Mycenaean States and Their Development”, Rivista di storia economica, issue 3 (2015), pp. 373-394.} Coupled with the archaeological evidence of concentrated forms of art and craft activity, including bronze-working and monumental construction, this allows us to surmise that regardless of the hidden aetiology lurking behind its prolonged decline and fall over the course of the twelfth century, the demographic features of the Mycenaean society were the recognition of the administrative palace as the centre of cultural, artisanal, and commercial activities with an adequate number of prolific village communities forming hubs of production to support the population of administrative centres such as Knossos, Mycenae, Pylus, Thebes, and Tiryns.\footnote{A similar decrease in the numbers of confirmed sites in the Protocolonisation Sicily also appears to have taken place in Sicily by the end of the last two quarters of Late Helladic. Rather than suggesting a collapse of the population numbers, however, this has been taken as indicative of settlement nucleation. The deserted palace-cities of mainland Greece, however, cannot be taken as homologous to the Sicilian cities with low Sikel population. R. Leighton, “Later Prehistoric Settlement in Sicily: Old Paradigms and New Surveys”, European Journal of Archaeology, vol. 8 no. 3, (2005), pp. 279-281; cf. Anthony M. Snodgrass, The Dark Age of Greece: An Archaeological Survey of the Eleventh to the Eighth Centuries B.C., (Edinburgh, 1971), pp. 29.} From the peripheral hubs of production to the palatial centre there followed a highly skewed collection and redistribution of agricultural produce towering above the Mycenaean society.\footnote{Alas, that tower of plenty amidst the barely self-sufficient masses would continue to loom large over the Greek poleis through the Late Bronze Age and beyond: “Judging by skeletal evidence for their health and the rich goods with which they were buried, the palace elite evidently lived well in the LBA. Wealth was concentrated in the palace and in the hands of local elites in secondary centers. Rents were extracted from industrial labor at the palace and from a rural population of agriculturalists and pastoralists. This is what we would expect from premodern autocratic states. There is little reason to suppose that, outside the palatial elite and the local elites who governed the territory in the name of the}
number of bureaucrats, both military and administrative, spread throughout the kingdoms, created a political network with wa-na-ka occupying its central node. The governance of kingdoms, as such, owed its efficacy to the administration of provinces, which were subdivided into districts, thereby constituting an area perhaps in excess of 200 villages and towns in the case, for instance, of Pylos. Preoccupying the modern historical mind more with its rather sudden destruction than with its steady expansion thanks in large part to a disarming lack of contemporaneous literary evidence except the fragments in question, whose script, it hardly needs to be added, are far from having been completely deciphered, the historical black hole of ‘Dark Ages’ was coined to make up for the availability of sporadic archaeological evidence that characterized this period until its eventual elucidation in the Archaic period with a high concentration of Protogeometric (1050-900) pottery found in burial chambers and settlements.

Various theories have been offered to explain the almost staggering scale with which important Mycenaean administrative centres appear to have vanished, with two theories of decline separating themselves from the rest of the argumentative pack: the hypothesis of Dorian invasion and that of an internal revolution. Bucking the scholarly trend of Dorian invasion, once in vogue, does not appear as compelling as it used to by the token of the continued attacks of influential authorities such as Robin Osborne, Anthony Snodgrass and Jonathan Hall. The sporadic stacks of archaeological evidence indicating any marks of violence, e.g., urban concentration of charred remains of timber indicating widescale arson or findings of numerous arrowheads around buildings of defensive import, dissuade any
theoretical attempt to attribute the core reasons of Mycenaean decline to a violent struggle with an external enemy.\textsuperscript{1164} On that note, Dorians, as Snodgrass emphasized time and again,\textsuperscript{1165} can hardly be regarded as ‘foreign’ to the Mycenaean civilization. Expounding all these difficulties, there also exists the utter lack of precision that accompanies any attempt to date the Dorian invasion. Indeed, with the literary allusions\textsuperscript{1166} awash with ideological sugar-coating and apologetic reasoning,\textsuperscript{1167} even the very historical existence of a large-scale Dorian invasion can be called into question. All the same, things hardly seem to be looking up on the side of the defenders of the internal revolution thesis. Beset by a higher degree of historical speculation than its agonistic counterpart, the proponents of this thesis argue in favour of a highly speculative postulation of a historical tendency of complex societies to self-destruct.\textsuperscript{1168} Yet, with hardly any substantial evidence, literary or otherwise, to suggest that either peasant rebellion\textsuperscript{1169} or internecine intra-class strife which precipitated the downfall of the Mycenaean civilization, this attempt boils down, in the end, to give vent to the watershed of archaeological scepticism. The historical desperation of the theories of decline is indeed self-perpetuating in regard to the current state of archaeological evidence whose auspices can be summoned in defence of either thesis, or, what is more likely, as a combination of both. What the archaeological evidence clearly suggests is an unprecedented loss of population\textsuperscript{1170} and the

\textsuperscript{1164} We should also note, taking our cue from Cartledge, however, that the properties of Laconian Protogeometric pottery is unlike either any antecedent Mycenaean pottery or other forms of contemporaneous pottery found elsewhere in Greece. Paul Cartledge, \textit{Sparta and Lakonia: A Regional History 1300-362 BC}, 2nd edition, (London and New York, 2002c), pp. 75.

\textsuperscript{1165} Snodgrass, \textit{The Dark Age of Greece}, pp. 312.


\textsuperscript{1167} “One archaeological fact is undisputable: most of the Mycenaean places were violently destroyed at the end of LHIIIIB. Yet even this fact is at variance with literary tradition, which credits the Dorians and Heraclidae with ousting Agamemnon’s grandson, Tisamenus, but makes no reference to the physical destruction of any city. Indeed, destructions are attested at some sites – for example, Koukounaries on the island of Paros – which were never to be inhabited by Dorian populations. One solution might be to dissociate the Dorians from the palatial destructions but still preserve the credibility of the migration tradition by assuming that they arrived around a century after the catastrophe, easily overwhelming a civilization that had already been severely weakened by other parties or causes.” Hall, \textit{A History of the Archaic Greek World}, pp. 49; cf. Oswyn Murray, \textit{Early Greece}, 2nd edition, (London, 1993), pp. 9.

\textsuperscript{1168} Carol G. Thomas and Craig Conant, \textit{Citadel to City-State: The Transformation of Greece, 1200-700 BCE}, (Bloomington and Indianapolis, 1999), pp. 24-26.

\textsuperscript{1169} Following his detailed examination of each variant of the decline theses, Dickinson, for example, opts for a severe depression of the palace economy caused by internal factors paving the way towards the gradual enfeeblement of palatial centres rendering the Mycenaean civilization easy pickings for the rest of the communities, e.g., Dorians, ‘Sea Peoples’, etc. O. T. P. K. Dickinson, \textit{The Aegean from Bronze Age to Iron Age}, (London and New York, 2006), pp. 55.

\textsuperscript{1170} Desborough’s estimates stack up to a stunning ninety percent decline in the course of a century, whereas various estimates have defined a range between seventy-five percent to ninety percent according to the model used. V. R. d’A. Desborough, \textit{The Greek Dark Ages}, (London, 1972), pp. 18;
recession of virtually all arts and crafts to a prolonged oblivion that are taken to be the likely results of an economic disaster. Never the less, this economic collapse and recession of Mycenaean artisanal and artistic knowledge could also be viewed with the benefit of hindsight as a blessing in disguise. A clear indication of technological sophistication, the by then centuries-old Cyprian tradition of ironworking was yet to make an appearance in either the Greek mainland or on the Aegean islands. The mainland Greeks largely continued to depend on bronzeworking, using a standard alloy of tin and copper, to forge both luxury items, e.g., ceremonial swords and adornments, and everyday items, e.g., weapons and armour, dress pins, *fibulae*. This conjunction of the sumptuary and quotidian, however, was a result of supply difficulties rather than overflowing luxuries. Mainland Greece was bereft of any large deposits of tin which necessitated the maintenance of an uninterrupted inflow of tin that was mostly imported from Cyprus. The collapse of the Mycenaean maritime ties was the harbinger of a shift in metallurgy that was long in coming: with no copper supplies and hardly any prodigal customers to their name, the Greek craftsmen made do with the locally abundant iron.

Although it took centuries to craft durable weapons, armour and utensils in large numbers,
iron had the intrinsic benefit of being locally available in addition to requiring higher temperatures to be optimally tempered, thence more resistant, than copper. And, by that string of ironic events, the Early Geometric Greeks gained access to a set of instruments that was both cheaper and more durable compared to those of their predecessors. Yet, ‘one swallow does not a summer make,’ and nor did the discovery of ironworking make up for the loss of all other skills and knowledge. To that end, the only archaeologically grounded fact of this episode is that a decimating catastrophe has struck a socially and administratively complex society with a clear separation of its population along the lines of relations of material production and ideological reproduction.

The prolonged death throes of the Mycenaean civilization gave way to a state of staggeringly thin archaeological evidence of settlement nucleation and continuity in the aftermath of the drastic fall in population. With the equally disconcerting absence of Linear B tablets or any material indication, except for curious cases like relatively early settlement nucleation, e.g., Lefkandi, of a connection between the Mycenaean arts and crafts, e.g., bronze working and
wall painting, the nineteenth century scholars have thought it fitting to name the period with the ominous epithet of ‘Dark Ages.’ Naturally, the archaeological discovery of an awe-inspiring site that provokes against the grain interpretations of Protogeometric evidence such as Lefkandi has done much to redefine the material limits of possibility that is attributed to the Greek populations of this early epoch. Standing 45 m long and 10 m wide with an apsidal end and dated to just after 1000, the Toumba building, or heroön, of Lefkandi qualifies as a definitive marvel in a period whose lack of monumental architecture has adopted the status of a scholarly maxim. No less perplexing in its clearly un-Mycenaean construction techniques, including mud brick walls built on a stone foundation and an exterior peristyle of a row of wooden posts, and its potential reminiscence of later examples of multi-functional tholoi rather than anything Mycenaean, than in its dimensions, this building and the wide assortment of burial accessories made of precious metals invites us to rethink the concept of the ‘Mycenaean collapse.’ Without attempting to digress any further than our scope admits, we argue for a weak revision of the thesis of complete disruption to make room for the maintenance of minimal ties of commerce, especially with Phoenicians, that the grave goods at Lefkandi heroön display. Further, Lefkandi’s relatively distant location from the core Mycenaean palaces may have had a mitigating impact in abating the socially levelling effects of the fall of the palatial class society.

Technically, expert opinions vary and no consensus have been reached whether the building was designed as the resting place of the community’s leaders or a place of worship later to be turned into a burial. The jury, as such, is still out concerning whether the building can be classified as an anaktoron, a mausoleum, or a heroön. Crielaard and Driessen, for one, argue on the basis of stratigraphical evidence that a three-phase construction of the building can be discriminated, from the construction of the anaktoron to the first alteration of building into mausoleum and then to the final alteration of building into permanent funerary monument: Jan Paul Crielaard and Jan Driessen, “The Hero’s Home. Some Reflections on the Building at Toumba, Lefkandi”, Topoi, vol. 4, (1994), pp. 254-256, 267; for an earlier appraisal of the building and its significance in influencing other contemporary sites of burial, see Morris, “Iron Age Greece and the Meanings of “Princely Tombs””.


"Increased contacts with the eastern Mediterranean, even marked by the finding of gold objects at Lefkandi dated just before 900 B.C., suggest increased material wealth to be sure, but not simply stability." Rose, Sons of the Gods, Children of Earth, pp. 55.

Snodgrass makes a case for a group of displaced Mycenaeans that eventually came to settle on Lefkandi, Keith Walker, on the other hand, postulates a residual local elite that may have preserved their privileged socio-political position as the palaces ended with a bang: Snodgrass, The Dark Age of Greece, pp. 360-361; Keith G. Walker, Archaic Eretria: A Political and Social History from the Earliest Times to 490 BC, (London and New York, 2004), pp. 76.
as an uncanny borderline case of settlement between the small-scale residual settlements of Mycenae and the later agglomerations of villages predating the poleis.

Spanning roughly over four centuries (1150-800) that set the centrally administered complex social structure of Mycenaean civilization apart from the re-emergence of the archaic polis, the earlier interpretations of this period was one that bordered on a clean slate, whether that can be taken as a willing rejection of the cultural elements of Mycenaean civilization or an effective shutter of ignorance encapsulating the pastoral existence of communities leaving minimal shred of evidence as to how they carried on with their lives. The measure of obscurity enveloping the archaic communities that existed between 1200 and 800 hinges in large part on whether the Mycenaean administrative centres were shaken to their roots as in the case of Mycenae and Pylos or were spared relatively unscathed like the areas in Attica or Euboea. Still, while it is significant to be able to stress that thanks to the development of archaeological studies the general conceptualization of Dark Ages is not so ‘dark’ anymore,

![Image](image-url)

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1184 Snodgrass appears to have adopted this viewpoint in his arguments against an unquestioning reliance of Lefkandi as a crystal-clear example dissipating the focus on ruptures with regard to settlement patterns: “It is a nice irony that Lefkandi, the site without which none of the arguments cited at the beginning would have been advanced in so strong a form (whether about the continuity of the polis, or more especially about the survival of oriental links of the Mycenaean world) was a middle Helladic site with a thin Mycenaean occupation, to which a return in force was evidently made only in the final stages of the Bronze Age. By their very choice of such a site, one group of Greeks in the twelfth century BC made a kind of statement about the rejection of Mycenaean culture, leaving it to their descendants to rebuild the Near Eastern links on an entirely fresh basis.” A. M. Snodgrass, *Archaeology and the Emergence of Greece*, (Ithaca, 2006), pp. 170. The scanty evidence of continuous cultic activity across the Dark Age, with the sole exceptions of Kaladophi in Phocis, Kato Symi, and potentially the Diktaian Cave on Crete, certainly supports Snodgrass’ view that there might have been a widespread disillusionment with what the idea of Mycenaean civilization came to signify to the population writ large. For more on this point, see Hall, *A History of the Archaic Greek World*, pp. 61-62; cf. Osborne, *Greece in the Making*, pp. 82; Snodgrass, *The Dark Age of Greece*, pp. 275.

1185 The archaeological evidence in support of the pastoralist hypothesis is far from being entirely convincing. Resting primarily on the basis of faunal analysis from Nikhoria demonstrating a sharp increase in bovine consumption over the course of the passage between late thirteenth century and the Dark Age, the defenders of the pastoralist hypothesis claim that the eventual destruction of the Mycenaean society, especially if that is combined with a restive productive population that was fed up with exploitation, might have resulted in the former tenants of farms ‘turning back the clock.’ For more on the pastoralist hypothesis, see A. M. Snodgrass, *An Archaeology of Greece: The Present State and Future Scope of a Discipline*, (Berkeley, 1987), pp. 190-209; for an earlier rejection of the pastoral hypothesis; Snodgrass, *The Dark Age of Greece*, pp. 386.

1186 This terminus ante quem is deliberately chosen in the light of Rose’s dating the re-emergence of aristocracy to this period due to the availability of concentrated archaeological evidence of artistic samples of bronze-working through the observations of Mitten and Doeringer, as well as Osborne. Rose, *Class in Archaic Greece*, pp. 64 (n. 16); David Mitten and Susanna F. Doeringer (eds.), *Master Bronzes from the Classical World: Fogg Art Museum*, (Mainz, 1968), pp. 19; Robin Osborne, *Archaic and Classical Greek Art*, (Oxford and New York, 1998), pp. 24-27.


1188 For an evaluation of the recent archaeological evidence discrediting the notion of Dark Age, see Hall, *A History of the Archaic Greek World*, pp. 59-66. An example of a study that aims at dispelling the myth of the Dark Age can be seen in the case of J. K. Papadopoulos, ‘To kill a cemetery: The
it is equally vital to note that “such information as has come to light serves only to confirm a
general picture of isolation, introversion, and instability for mainland Greece and the islands
of the Aegean…”

With an attempted minimization of unsupported speculation, we claim
that this might indeed correspond to the backward projection of contemporary social evils on
to the Homeric image of house of gods on fire, or that of the Hesiodic age of gold, in which
intra-class stasis between gods/aristocrats was temporarily settled albeit with pronounced
difficulty.

The Mycenaean civilization bred a professional order of rhapsodes (poet-singers) who clung
to numerous themes of their day and poetically transmitted them to later generations. If the
interpretation that the history of Trojan War was orally passed on by Mycenaean rhapsodes to
later generations is to be accepted, then the Homeric disorder bringing groups of gods in direct
opposition to each can be seen as having been formulated as a conscious allusion to the social
ills that bogged the Mycenaean society during its twilight. Regardless of whether it was
triggered by successive crop failures or as a result of contemporaneous natural disasters, e.g.,
earthquakes, there appears to be a tangible wall of discontent between the palatial classes and
producers that eventually gave way to a desertion of many erstwhile heavily populated areas
which were to be haunted by the ghosts of their former inhabitants for centuries. To be sure,
this total abandonment of the Mycenaean civilization, as we noted above, cannot be
generalized to have taken place across each and every locale in Protogeometric Greece. Attica,
for a taste of what was the case elsewhere, was to be occupied with settlements that seem to
have been relatively continuous right into the beginning of the eighth century. In places
where continuity rather than interruptions was the norm, the Mycenaean authority structure
with wa-na-ka qua basileus commanding a class of elite chieftains at times of war and
presiding over juridical affairs in addition to serving as the court of appeal in matters pertaining
to private property in land, goods, etc., could have been kept at its hierarchical place while
introducing various changes to the composition of the ruling class itself. Other settlements that
did not have any ties to Mycenaean political structure, on the other hand, were more or less

Athenian Kerameikos and the Early Iron Age in the Aegean’, Journal of Mediterranean Archaeology,
vol. 6, (1993), pp. 175-206; for a recent study of the archaeological evidence of Greece in the Dark Age,
see C. Morgan, “The Early Iron Age”, in A Companion to Archaic Greece, ed. by K. A. Raaflaub and
H. Van Wees, (Chichester, 2009), pp. 43-63; for analogous archaeological evidence from Messenia, see
Nino Luraghi, Luraghi, The Ancient Messenians: Constructions of Ethnicity and Memory, (Cambridge,
2008), pp. 110-111.

1189 Hall, A History of the Archaic Greek World, pp. 60.
1190 For an updated inquiry into the arts and crafts of the Mycenaean society and their transmission of
artistic traditions to the Homeric Greece, see T. B. L. Webster, From Mycenae to Homer: A Study in
1191 Rose, Class in Archaic Greece, pp. 60.
unrestrained in regard to their ultimate attainment of an economic and political hierarchy. Yet, if we are to follow our juxtaposition of Homeric and Hesiodic society of immortals to the inter-class relationships that existed among the ranks of beneficiaries of the Mycenaean palatial economy to its logical conclusion, then it needs to be stressed that there was an unequivocally sad ending to the tale. Can this be taken as a possible way of explaining the ambiguity that surrounds both of the Homeric epics? The ordeal of Odysseus & co. was on the point of building into a high tide capable of swallowing the former were it not for the direct intervention of Zeus and Athena. And yet, for all that, we have two lines referring to a solemn covenant that is described by Zeus as halting “the strife of inexorable war.” With neither party satisfied with the terms of agreement as they were contrived by the gods, it is only fitting to call the covenant as one bearing the characteristics of a temporary burial of hatchets instead of those of an everlasting peace which suggests that the virulent strife will, if anything, rage on. In a similar vein, we are adequately informed as to how the individual fates of Agamemnon, Helen, Priam, Hecuba among many others would unfold with no enduring resolution to moments of tragic aristocratic stasis. Further, even if we are reminded of the fact that the incessant turmoil epitomizing the universe of mortals hardly ever spreads to the realm of immortals, we think it would be apt to retort back with an imagery of Homer’s own: Aphrodite bleeds, albeit not blood but ichor; Zeus makes love even if “wrapped in a beautiful golden cloud.” A point that is often overlooked; just as the Homeric gods were anthropomorphic, so were the late Geometric Greeks deomorphic. Notwithstanding the fact that there is hardly any linear algorithm typifying the relations between Homeric mortals and immortals, there still appears to be a benchmark rule for the epic narrative to go on: no aloofness is allowed. Gods may cringe, grimace, smirk or even chuckle at the joys and sufferings of individual mortals yet they just cannot afford to stand without reaction. The reconciliation of the class-related stasis of mortals does not have the whiff of a Victorian fairy-tale because no hint of permanent settlement can be poached either from the transmitted distant memory of Mycenaean civilization or from that of the recent memory of the Late Geometric period.

1192 Homer, Odyssey, 24. 44-46.
1193 Indeed, these names were to become bedrock cases of the fifth century tragedy as their travails were to be put beneath the temporal kaleidoscope of self-conscious poets effectively building a reinterpretative loop of poetic and social imagery, but more on this point later.
1194 Homer, Iliad, 5. 37-42.
1195 Ibid, 14. 46-49.
1196 Retrojection of traditional elements to the mythical time was recounted by Aristotle as one of the driving factors of the attribution of monarchy to Zeus as a foggy reminiscence of the basileis of old: “For this reason [the imprint left by the primitive times on the historical present] the gods too are said to be governed by a king – namely because men themselves were originally ruled by kings and some are so still. Just as men imagine gods in human shape, so they imagine their way of life to be like that of men.” Aristotle, Politics, 1252b23-26.
4.2.1 A Reconstruction of the Wide-Scale Polis Formation by 800

By the passing of the temporal threshold of 800, we take a firm step toward the economic and political formation of poleis that was to become a defining aspect of the ancient Greek world as it was expressed in the words of poet Poseidippus: “there is only one Hellas, but there are many poleis.”

Having endured a decimation of population across the better part of the Protogeometric era, and with little or no organized tilling of lands, there occurred a long period of subsistence-level economic activity the maintenance of which was entirely dependent on warbands protecting the lands of basileis. Realizing at first hand that a group of warriors cannot be sustained without a steady supply of food which could only accrue from the labour of farmers, the war chief organized slaves and non-slave workers into groups of farmers that tilled the common land. The paramount chief hence utilized a system of reciprocal recognition of the lesser members of the warrior band as he lavished property, which, effectively, was the surplus labour of the producers bartered into wealth, and authority on those members of the local warriors who excelled in the profession of war-making. Heavily reliant on personal communication and authority, the basileus ensured not only that the upkeep of the warrior band was met but also that the latter’s fighting prowess was up to task. This measure of comfort provided by the warrior band’s protection of community’s farms would induce a population

1197 Cited in Dillon and Garland, The Ancient Greeks, pp. 5; the assertion should be contrasted to the continuity of stagnation that was the case, for example, in Messenia: Luraghi, The Ancient Messenians, pp. 113.

1198 The transition from pastoral to arable economy was the only viable way for not only the population to grow but also for sustaining the wherewithal that was to be extorted by the warrior band due to the lack of wealth that could be siphoned off from other communities that were eking out an existence that was barely above subsistence level: “For the Greeks and Romans, it was agriculture and not trade or manufacture that constituted the basis of civilized life, that is, a life with cities.” Wood, Peasant-Citizen and Slave, pp. 106. As such, we concur with Rose and Snodgrass in regard to their stress on the gradual shift to agriculture as the central factor allowing the population expansion that took place at the end of the Dark Ages. Indeed, despite the relevance of Hall’s warning that too much focus on the significance of agriculture may obscure the import of other economic activities such as trade, in the end, one can do naught but argue “That the economy of Archaic poleis was based predominantly on agriculture can hardly be refuted.” Hall, A History of the Archaic Greek World, pp. 84; Rose, Class in Archaic Greece, pp. 68-69; Snodgrass, The Dark Age of Greece, pp. 378-380; Snodgrass, Archaic Greece, pp. 35-37; Murray, Early Greece, pp. 43; Meikle, Aristotle’s Economic Thought, pp. 150. For a detailed overview of the documented changes in farming methods see Osborne, Greece in the Making, pp. 25-29; for a reassessment of population growth in the late Geometric period, see Walter Scheidel, “The Greek demographic expansion: Models and comparisons”, Journal of Hellenic Studies, vol. 123 (2003), pp. 120-140.

1199 This account of polis formation is borrowed mainly from Rose’s ‘a tentative model of the transition’ and from the cited works of Snodgrass. See Rose, Class in Archaic Greece, pp. 68-76.

1200 The emphasis on big man’s charisma grounded upon predominantly personal, face-to-face relationships was originally highlighted in Sahlin’s influential study [1963] on Melanesian big man and Polynesian chiefs as a Weberian distinction of personal charisma and impersonal bureaucratic authority. Marshall Sahlin, “Poor Man, Rich Man, Big Man, Chief: Political Types in Melanesia and Polynesia”, Comparative Studies in Society and History, vol. 5, (1963), pp. 285-303; for a partial application of the model to the fourth-century Athens along the lines that had been anticipated by the studies of Finley, see Paul Millett, ‘Sale, Credit and Exchange in Athenian Law and Society’, in Nomos, pp. 183 ff; Millett, Lending and Borrowing in Ancient Athens.
And yet the thriving community of warriors and farmers would often catch the attention of other warrior communities who concentrated their attacks on any lucrative settlement. Given that the prominent chief with his personally-established power structure would be unable to overcome the difficulty of deployment of community’s supplies towards the enhancement of polis’ defensive capabilities, in addition to other administrative setbacks resulting from the population growth, there materialized a political crisis between the big man and the lesser warriors. The lesser warriors vied successfully, either through cooperation or antagonism, for the political power in order to establish a more efficient system of surplus extraction whereby the most productive lands would be controlled by their number and the rest would often be granted as klêroi (allotments) to regular members of the settlement, i.e., politai. The new ruling class comprising of the few, i.e., oligarchy, or the best, i.e., aristocracy, depending on how one looks at it, would continue to perform military duties discouraging invaders while presiding over decisions concerning the preservation of the polis. For the purposes of facilitating collective decision-making among them they would

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1201 Despite Hall’s warnings against the potentially spurious relation entailed in the inference of population increase from rising settlement numbers and burial sites, we think it should be accepted with a steady amount of caution that the correlation between the two is meaningful enough to permit viewing the eighth century as one of repopulation. The picture of Attica, as it was canvassed by Osborne, is a case in point: “The number of sites known in Attica increases from 15 in the ninth century BC to 50 by the end of the eighth … and the number of known adult burials from a steady rate of something under one a year virtually throughout the ninth century to a peak of 2.5 a year in the late eighth century BC.” Osborne, *Greece in the Making*, pp. 37; Murray, *Early Greece*, pp. 64-65; cf. Hall, *A History of the Archaic Greek World*, pp. 80-81.


1204 The general agreement that the eighth century saw the turning of the tide of depopulation that plagued the mainland settlements across the Dark Age has obvious consequences for the administrative structure of the society: “[a] loose organization under a dominant family, with ad hoc decisions taken by a local ruler and only occasional assemblies of any larger group, becomes unworkable when the community more than doubles in size within a single generation.” Snodgrass, *Archaic Greece*, pp. 24.


1206 One of the particularly attractive aspects of this hypothesis, which is borrowed from Snodgrass, as it is well pointed out by Rose, is that it allows us to reconstruct the origins of the insufficiency of productive land which, as we will find out, may be regarded as one of the central motives behind the mass colonization that transpired across 800-600. Snodgrass, *The Dark Age of Greece*, pp. 38-39; Rose, *Class in Archaic Greece*, pp. 73 n. 45; Rose, *Sons of the Gods, Children of the Earth*, pp. 120.

1207 These decisions concerning the wellbeing of the whole community can be substantiated in comparison to Nausicac’s famous description of the city of Phaeacians: “… a high wall with towers encircles it, and on either side is a fine harbour; the roadway leading in is narrow, and at its sides there are curving ships drawn up, because every citizen has his own landing-place. The men hold their assembly there, in a space that lies round the noble precinct of Poseidon, a space set with huge blocks of stone that are bedded deep. There too they see to the tackling of their dark vessels – the cables and the sails – and there also they shape the oars; because the Phaeacians have no regard for bow and quiver, only for masts and the oars of ships and the balanced ships themselves in which so proudly they traverse
institutionalize a boulê, or a collective Council consisting of the members of the ruling class. And as the self-consciousness of their superiority rises, so would their designs about culture and society as they would invent new ways of reinforcing collective citizenship like the Spartan example of sussitia or communal meals\textsuperscript{1208} or the public performance of religious festivals and rhapsodic events, adopting Mycenaean elements where they were available and thought to be opportune or devising new forms of collective activity where they were not.\textsuperscript{1209}

The wholesale watershed of political, social, economic and cultural transformation, or in Ian Morris’ words, ‘revolution’\textsuperscript{1210} would also be realized in order to generate a resolution for all the problems created by a bloated population.\textsuperscript{1211} The benefit of hindsight allows us to discern three particular pathways, as argued by Morris, that were devised by the ruling classes of major poleis: intensification of agricultural production; extensification through invasions, either internal or external, and colonisation; and reorganization.\textsuperscript{1212} Well-preserved remains of seeds

\textit{the whitening sea.”} Homer, \textit{ Odyssey}, 6.262-272; while it is true that Cartledge rejects any inference of historical poleis from the Homeric description of various cities, one still needs to take into account that he has the classical sense of polis in mind with its considerable incorporation of politai when he makes that assessment. Cartledge, \textit{Democracy}, pp. 39; cf. von Reden, ‘The Well-Ordered Polis: Topographies of Civic Space’, pp. 171.

\textsuperscript{1208} The rosy pictures that were drawn by later authors with aristocratic leanings, e.g., Plato and Xenophon, hardly bears any resemblance to what this famous practice meant to its Spartan participants. Stefan Link has recently argued, in that vein, that the institutional practice in Sparta induced severe status anxiety on the members of Spartiate class. Given the fact that citizenship was only granted to those who participated in communal meals, which, in turn, was based on the satisfaction of contribution of fixed monthly amounts, it is evident that “many Spartans were apparently very much opposed to their own system of communal meals.” Stefan Link, “… there shall be no punishment to them.” Observance of Law and Social Integration in Sparta and Crete’, in \textit{Cultural Practices and Material Culture in Archaic and Classical Crete}, ed. by Oliver Pilz and Gunnar Seelentag, (Berlin, 2014), pp. 163; cf. S. Hodkinson, ‘Was Sparta an Exceptional Polis?’, in \textit{Sparta: Comparative Approaches}, ed. by S. Hodkinson, (Swansea, 2009), 417-472; contra Michael Lipka, \textit{Xenophon’s Spartan Constitution}, (Berlin, 2002), 5.2-3; Seaford builds a compelling case for taking the Homeric description of the gift-giving and communal animal sacrificing activities, supported by anthropological evidence, as the likely origins of the later Spartan and Cretan custom. The difference between the two cases is, of course, none other than that the Homeric practice might have had actual elements that spoke to an egalitarian character of the attempt to arouse solidarity, whereas the later customs offers scanty evidence in favour of an egalitarianism that went beyond mere lip-service. Richard Seaford, \textit{Money and the Early Greek Mind: Homer, Philosophy, Tragedy}, (Cambridge, 2004), pp. 39-44.

\textsuperscript{1209} A wholesale rejection of or adoption of political elements of Mycenaean kingdoms is thus out of the question. The armed residue of the Mycenaean administrators and rulers salvaged the aspects of the Mycenaean political system which could have gained purchase in the eyes of the peasantry whereas peasants, in their turn, abided by the equitable measures while struggling against the over-exploitative ones. Bintliff appears to hint at the historical viability of such a system of historical continuity between the collapse of palace societies and the emergence of the pre-Homeric ones: John Bintliff, ‘Solon’s Reforms: An Archaeological Perspective’, in \textit{Solon of Athens}, pp. 331.

\textsuperscript{1210} Ian Morris, ‘The Eight-Century Revolution’, in ed. by Kurt Raaflaub and Hans van Wees, \textit{A Companion to Archaic Greece}.

\textsuperscript{1211} For a more socially inclusive construal of the set of options that were available to ancient ‘state’ to cope with the ever-present likelihood of encountering a food crisis, see Peter Garnsey, \textit{Famine and Food-Supply in the Graeco-Roman World: Responses to Risk and Crisis}, (Cambridge, 1989), pp. 69.

\textsuperscript{1212} Morris, ‘The Eight-Century Revolution’, pp. 67-68.
from Miletus\textsuperscript{1213} or olive pollen from Messenia\textsuperscript{1214} both suggest that agricultural yield and productivity might have increased during that period. Another measure that was frequently utilized was the appropriation of fields that were either close-by and vacant, as in the case of Attica, or those that were close-by but occupied, whose habitants needed to be duly defeated and subjugated, as in the case of Laconia and Messenia, or still others that were far-away with productive soil but without organised defences, e.g., Sicily. The reorganization of polity, including the enactment of laws ensuring the maintenance of a property regime and the building of an effective military force, was, likewise, another communal response that has left its mark in the historical tradition. A range of permutations including any one of these elements, in the long-run at the very least, was available to poleis whose particular difficulties would stem from a myriad of individual factors.

This exposition of polis-formation entails various institutionalized levels of social estrangement and endearment that functioned in toto in order to sustain the effective rule of the oligarchy.\textsuperscript{1215} The relationship between the ruling class and grassroots producers, making up the foundational layer of the internal level of polis formation,\textsuperscript{1216} supporting the whole political edifice, is where the ideology of citizenship with its frequent benefits is disseminated to all and sundry while reserving a certain bit of unimpeachable prestige that origins from being primus inter pares for the self-edifying representation of the rich as the boon of the community, the virtuous, the good, etc. With the male members of the community pampered and baptised as the root and branch of the polis, dêmos qua the majority except the leaders of the community\textsuperscript{1217} is introduced to new outlets of exploitative and abusive power relations in

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\textsuperscript{1215} “The creation of the polis entails a deeply contradictory movement in which the dêmos is given an elementary economic stake in guaranteed klêroi, and an ideological appeal to solidarity in shared religious sites and practices as well probably in more collective defense of the home territory, but at the same time suffers a decline in participation in political decision-making and, to the extent that an ideology of inherited superiority emerged, a decline in status to kakoi and the likelihood of more systematic exploitation.” Rose, \textit{Class in Archaic Greece}, pp. 92.
\textsuperscript{1216} “It now looks far more likely that throughout the Dark Age a class of dependent peasants was tied to the upper classes and provided essential agricultural labour for their sustenance, as well as minor surpluses for traded goods and elite feasting. The reasons for archaic dependency are to be sought in immemorial ties of agricultural servitude rather than contemporary processes.” Bintliff, ‘Solon’s Reforms: An Archaeological Perspective’, pp. 328; Lin Foxhall, “Cultures, Landscapes and Identities in the Mediterranean World”, \textit{Mediterranean Historical Review}, vol. 18 no.2, (2003), pp. 75-92.
\textsuperscript{1217} Rose, \textit{Class in Archaic Greece}, pp. 79; Ober portrays an elegant clash between the conception of dêmos in the direct aftermath of the Kleisthenic reforms and its later use with derogatory connotations during and following the Peloponnesian War. He seems to omit, however, just how imbibed the word was with class distinctions in its Homeric origins: Josiah Ober, \textit{Demopolis: Democracy Before Liberalism in Theory and Practice}, (Cambridge, 2017), pp. 27, 28.
which the ownership of means of production, i.e., land and servile labour, or those of reproduction, i.e., phallus, would be heralded as being the beneficiary of these relations of domination hence naturalizing the subjugation of slaves, women, and, at times, non-citizen

1218 “In antiquity, therefore, wealth may be said to have consisted above all in the ownership of land, and in the control of unfree labour; and it was these assets above all which enabled the propertied class to exploit the rest of the population: that is to say, to appropriate a surplus out of their labour.” Ste Croix, The Class Struggle in the Ancient World, pp. 33.

1219 Foxhall has noted, time and again, that the productivity of ancient farming techniques was quite low by modern standards. Coupled with the early increase in the number of farmsteads which were forcibly appropriated by the eupatridae, this dilemma could only be solved by keeping a tight grip on the labourers. The oft-purported land hunger was a structural predicament facing ancient Greek poleis to be sure; but also was the need for a highly-regulated population of farmers and menial workers: “The first thing that seems obvious is that the problem for our recently-discovered class of Dark Age chiefs and upper class farmers was not land shortage or control over international commerce, but people, specifically labour to work their fields with them (for the numerous second rank elite) and for them (for the chiefly families).” John Bintliff, ‘Solon’s Reforms: An Archaeological Perspective’, pp. 327.

1220 This should not be taken as a mutually-exclusive focus on issues pertaining to gender and class. While it is granted, on that note, that the ancient Greek misogyny crossed class lines, the silent sexploitation and objectification of slave women in the Iliad, not to mention the valuation of Penelope’s sexual fidelity, and hence virtuous conduct, mainly on the grounds of the absence of male kurios, which condemns female activity to ingenuously passing time so that her guardians, i.e., Telemachus or Odysseus, can come to rescue her from the shameless advances made by her aristocratic suitors, sufficiently show that relations of class and gender in the archaic Greece were, on the whole, tightly interwoven. Establishing control over women’s economic production is the most basic mean of enforcing social regulation on their reproductive capacity and the archaic Greek society was no exception to that rule. The transition from the community of ‘iron-bearing’ men to that of ‘nomoi-abiding’ citizens appears to tell a moving tale of how male authority over women’s productive and reproductive activities became more nuanced, vindictive and uncompromising. To that end, the growth of polis and the expansion of the male citizen body seems to have tightened the screw over the dual exploitation of women as it loosened, at least ideologically, the corresponding one on men: “This [the mid-seventh century development of formal organs of government] surely represented a first move away from the idea that physical prowess, the ability and willingness to fight, was the essence of male identity, and it is surely no coincidence that this move occurred at the very time that we find the first hints at a distinction between emotional women and self-controlled men. As the ideology of male physical superiority lost ground, it was replaced by an ideology of male intellectual and moral superiority, which served to provide a new legitimation for male power over women.” Hans Van Wees, ‘The Invention of the Female Mind: Women, Property and Gender Ideology in Archaic Greece’, in Women and Property, ed. by Deborah Lyons and Raymond Westbrook (2006), pp. 23; retrieved from www.chs.harvard.edu/publications.sec: 1-26. Pomeroy’s influential work on women in antiquity is arguably still the best place to start in regard to relationship of class to gender in the ancient Greek world. Likewise, Arthur’s article, which is a contemporary of Pomeroy’s work, bears heavily on the relationship between class and gender: Pomeroy, Goddesses, Whores, Wives, and Slaves; Marylin B. Arthur, ‘The Origins of the Western Attitude toward Women’, Arethusa, vol. 6, (1973), pp. 7-58; cf. Peter W. Rose, ‘The Case for Not Ignoring Marx in the Study of Women in Antiquity’, in Feminist Theory and the Classics, ed. by Nancy Sorkin Rabinowitz and Amy Richlin, (New York, 1993), pp. 211-237; Ian Morris, ‘The Strong Principle of Equality and the Archaic Origins of Greek Democracy,’ in Demokratia, pp. 22-23; Cohen, ‘An Unprofitable Masculinity’, pp. 105 ff; Lin Foxhall, Studying Gender in Classical Antiquity, (Cambridge, 2013b).

1221 The intended effects of comic exaggeration aside, Poseidippus’ third century foray into the thorny question of child exposition has a certain ring of cosmic perpetuity which the inter-sexual relations of ancient Greece often exhibited: “Everyone rears a son even if he is poor [penês] but exposes a daughter even if he is rich [ploutios].” Cited in Ste. Croix, The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World, pp. 103; conceiving this point alongside the short life expectancy of the archaic Greeks and the high rates of infant mortality, we put the finishing touches on a bleak picture of ancient Greek misogyny and its material roots: “… if a life expectancy at birth of 30 is allowed, then just under 4.5 live births per woman would produce a population growing by just under 1.5 per cent per annum. Increasing life expectancy
producers as the necessary price to pay for the hegemony of formal equals. The dynamics of exclusion, working alongside those of commonality, that were utilized by the aristocrats for the sake of forming a structure of governance fitting the needs of a growing community, the satisfaction of which necessitated the modification of the old tight-knit political structures, also engendered a segregation of spheres pertaining to various communal activities. Through their monopolization of juridical processes, for example, the major landowners created an additional buffer of legality protecting their holdings in land. On this internal layer of aristocratic collaboration would also be situated the designation of the temporal supervisors of affairs, allocation of funds to new building projects, and the prescription of new rules of conduct that would translate, in their totality, into the rule of boulê over the community at large. Having secured the willing compliance of the ‘lesser’ members of the citizen body, the ruling class also needed to differentiate itself from the hoi polloi, ‘the many,’ whose lack of property, manners, warrior-code, refinement, etc., would be employed as the ideological powder to fill the canon of aristocratic outburst and ridicule aimed equally at the nouveau riche and the defiant members of the many that dared to ask for more than was their proportioned due. Having assigned a quasi-passive role to the members of dêmos, the membership of any

at birth to 35 reduces the number of the live births per woman required to keep the population stable to just under four, but only with a life expectancy at birth around 37 do seven live births produce a growth rate of 2 per cent per annum.” Osborne, *Greece in the Making*, pp. 31; cf. “According to Angel, the interval between childbirths was approximately four years. Allowing for two years of adolescent sterility after menarche, if the typical female died at 36.2, she would have borne five or six children. Angel’s examination of female skeletal remains shows an average of 4.6 births per woman, with 1.6 juvenile deaths, resulting in 3 survivors per female.” Pomeroy, *Goddesses, Whores, Wives, and Slaves*, pp. 68.

1222 Ideological formulations of natural male superiority apart, our agreement with Pomeroy’s earlier dialectical reading of the rapport between equal male citizens and inferior females, slaves, non-citizens, etc., stretches only in so far as noting, without fully committing, the inherent phycological element of the relation of domination. Her postulation of “will to dominate” as a prime factor in triggering the avalanche of inter-group separation is something that lays entirely beyond our conception of relations of domination positing the economic aspect of social and biological reproduction on an equal footing with any psychological element. Pomeroy, *Goddesses, Whores, Wives, and Slaves*, pp. 78.

1223 The respective aetiological weighs assigned to each of these dynamics has turned into a theoretical bone of contention between the scholars granting more explanatory power to the politics of inclusion initiated by the middling class and others that preferred to put the emphasis on the institutionalized use of the ‘tools of exclusion’. We follow, in that vein, the more dialectically enriched interpretation of Rose that both dynamics played a certain role in the formation of polis with the politics of communality aiming at sowing the idea of collective citizenship while the politics of exclusion supplanting the more egalitarian processes of decision-making and agricultural production with the exclusive lines distancing estholi from kakoi. David W. Tandy, *Warriors into Traders: The Power of the Market in Early Greece*, (Berkeley, 1997), pp. 141-165; cf. Ian Morris, *Burial and Ancient Society: The Rise of the City-State*, (Cambridge, 1987).

1224 Homer’s depiction of divine invention of Achilles’ shield was analysed by McGlew with regard to ideological role it plays as the ideal representation of this transition from basileus’ personal dispensation of justice to an impersonal understanding of juridical processes as a whole: James F. McGlew, *Tyranny and Political Culture in Ancient Greece*, (Ithaca, 1993), pp. 55.
individual to the citizen body could be gauged with sole reference to the aristocratic yardsticks which were used to tell who could rank among the citizens from those who could not.\footnote{As a reminder of our theoretical premises, the obverse side of this coin of subjection is that the lower classes with little or no landholdings to their name would adamantly refuse to partake of this aristocratic merry-go-round, unsettling the aristocratic totalities and refurbishing them with new elements of resistance which they needed to address and incorporate: cf. “Democratic action, or the demos as autonomous agent, might be defined as collective action that initially gathers its power from outside the system. It begins with the démos constructing/collecting itself from scattered experiences and fusing these into a self-consciousness about common powerlessness and its causes. The demos is created from a shared realization that powerlessness comes from being shut out of the councils where power’s authority is located. The démos becomes political, not simply when it seeks to make a system of governance more responsive to its needs, but when it attempts to shape the political system in order to enable itself to emerge, to make possible a new actor, collective in nature.” Wolin, ‘Transgression, Equality, and Voice’, pp. 64; cf. Wallace, ‘Revolutions and a New Order in Solonian Athens and Archaic Greece’, pp. 71-72.}

4.2.2 Colonisation and Land Hunger

With the beginnings of the formation of polis charted out, the only missing piece of history to make our picture complete is the watershed of colonisation that came to be recognized as a distinctive feature of the Homeric epics and eighth century archaeological evidence alike.\footnote{Making a case against the ill-advertent confusion made by the later writers of Dorian invasions with Greek colonization, Hall argues against the wholehearted approval of the hypothesis. Bringing atypical cases indicating settlement continuation and uninterrupted outward communication such as Al Mina, he claims that the questionable evidence given by the later representations of the foundation stories cannot be taken as convincing literary proof to lay the debate to rest. While conceding that, “It is true both that the eighth century – and especially its latter part – sees a marked intensification of overseas contacts and that most Dark Age settlements on the Greek mainland are characterized by introspection and isolation,” he offers the few examples that demonstrate indications of continued outward communication as offsetting any focus on the isolation of the majority of Greek settlements as suggesting a proof of the colonization hypothesis. Yet, the lure of Al Mina fades away considerably when Hall recognizes that the clear Euboean provenance of pottery found at the site does not signal any continued presence of Greek merchants on the site given the absence of any Greek everyday items. Indeed, the interpretation of the presence of Euboean pottery can equally be taken as purporting the earlier transactions between the Euboeans and a third party who ultimately traded them for something that the traders in Al Mina had. Further, despite the aforementioned disparities on the specific details of foundation stories as they were brought up by later literary tradition, the fact that the divergencies can, at least in the main, be seen to figure within respectable boundaries, e.g., Thucydides dating the foundation of Syracuse by the Spartans to 733, whereas a third-century Parian marble dates it to 757, appears adequately encouraging to not to sweep it aside as faulty by default. The traditions are always invented, yet the more groundlessly they are invented the more they scream ‘sham’ to those by whom they are to be traditionalized. Hall, A History of the Archaic Greek World, pp. 99-124; for the evidence collected at Al Mina, see J. K. Papadopoulos, “Phantom Euboeans”, Journal of Mediterranean Archaeology, vol. 10, (1997), pp. 191-219; cf. Snodgrass, The Dark Age of Greece, pp. 72; for a recent foray into the trading patterns in the Aegean as they came to be established over the course of the Bronze Age, see Thomas F. Tartaron, ‘Geography Matters: Defining Maritime Small Worlds of the Aegean Bronze Age’, in Maritime Networks in the Ancient Mediterranean World, ed. by Justin Leidwanger and Carl Knappett, (Cambridge, 2018), pp. 61-93.}

Despite the inherently anachronistic nature of the term,\footnote{For a trenchant critique of the term and an examination of the overall settlement patterns of the Greeks over this period, see Osborne, Greece in the Making, pp. 111-123; contra Hansen, Polis, pp. 25-26.} the foundation of numerous apoikoi overseas does seem to warrant an analogy that is made between the ancient Greek practice and
the modern understanding of the term. Resolving to call this process with the more neutral Greek apoikismos, i.e., ‘home away [from home],’ for the purposes of historical correctness, we would like to commence our analysis of this phenomenon by noting that literary and archaeological evidence supports the hypothesis that there was mass, whether sporadic or continuous, movement of populations across 800 and 600. From Hesiod’s father braving stormy waters in his ship full of cargo to Athena’s assumed identity of Mentes, who sails about to find willing partners to exchange copper for iron, literary tradition gives us a clear clue regarding the availability of both professional traders and warrior merchants within the temporal context of their respective narratives. Likewise, a convincing case has been offered by Antonaccio regarding the potential trafficking of exquisite wares of Near Eastern origin or raiding for the sake of collecting that paraphernalia that is based on the concentrated findings of exotic trinkets and talismans found in the heroön and other grave sites at Lefkandi. Indeed the permanent establishment of supply lines and commercial ties appears to have been proven beyond doubt by the availability of such cases like Pithekoussai. Apoikoi did not comprise exclusively of large settlements. But the fact that there indeed were some larger ones among them indicates a much more organized effort capable of transferring high numbers of people that were, willingly or not, on the move. Sadly, the evidence concerning the possible causes of these mass apoikoi hardly invite agreement left to their own archaeological purchase. There are two hypotheses that are propelled towards the explanation of this phenomenon: overpopulation-induced exodus

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1230 Hesiod, Works and Days, 631-639.

1231 Homer, Odyssey, 1.180-187.


1234 Recent archaeological reports have shown that this highly successful emporion has a contingent of Levantine, i.e., Phoenician and north Syrian, settlers right from the beginning. This may in part explain that rapid growth of the emporion into an influential trading partner within the networks of Mediterranean trade. For the foundation of Pithekoussai, its ethnically diverse composition and its commanding commercial place, see Nancy H. Demand, The Mediterranean Context of Early Greek History, (Chichester, 2011), pp. 245-248.

1235 Osborne, Greece in the Making, pp. 110; contra Waterfield, Creators, Conquerors, and Citizens, pp. 29.

1236 Osborne rejects this hypothesis out of hand, whereas Tandy mentions “an enormous increase in population density on the mainland of Greece,” and Pomeroy notes that “No doubt population pressure on the mainland was a factor in colonization...”; Robin Osborne, ‘Early Greek Colonization? The
and a radically skewed allocation of land which gave impetus to lesser aristocrats and commoners alike to find other commercial outlets for the accumulation of wealth.\footnote{1237} Overpopulation may indeed have become a decisive factor as the supply of arable land, with the most productive fields already under enclosure by the members of the aristocracy, was generally quite limited around most of the archaic settlements. Furthermore, the initial klêroi may have proved to be an impediment hindering the production of surplus crops that was necessary for the growth of the citizen body due to the inherent limitation of arable land. The establishment of aristocratic monopoly over the most productive tracts of land meant the effective extortion of a not insignificant part of surplus cereal directly by the members of the esthloi whereby a higher proportion of it has surely seeped into the wealth of the ruling families.\footnote{1238} The common farmers, on the other hand, faced a twin predicament effected by the limited supply of fertile land that was available to them for feeding their growing families while sustaining a degree of production that was above the level of subsistence-farming in order to turn what little extra they produced into other goods and services.\footnote{1239} The higher

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\footnote{1237} Garnsey singles out biased land distribution as the foremost cause of the pervasive social-strife of the sixth-century Attica, while Rose expands upon this etiology to cover the period of colonization as well. Given the results of my previous scrutiny of the primacy of land among other contributing factors to wealth in Homeric and Hesiodic works, I find no grounds of disagreement with Rose in regard to his hypothesis: Garnsey, \textit{Famine and Food-Supply in the Graeco-Roman World}; Ste. Croix, \textit{How Far was Trade a Cause of Early Greek Colonisation?}, pp. 352; Rose, \textsl{Class in Archaic Greece}, pp. 139-140.

\footnote{1238} \textquote{It is clear from the literary and archaeological evidence that there was a major problem of over-population in the second half of the eighth century. The shortage of fertile, cultivable land in mainland Greece and the tradition of dividing up land equally among male heirs were causing major social and economic problems: there was insufficient land to absorb and support the growing population, and the increasingly smaller inheritances of land were threatening to reduce many small landowners and their families to poverty.} Buckley, \textit{Aspects in Greek History 750-323 BC}, pp. 32; Garnsey, \textit{Famine and Food-Supply in the Graeco-Roman World}, pp. 31-32; Ober, \textit{The Rise and Fall of Classical Greece}, pp. 193-194; Foxhall’s studies of the archaic landscape has been influential in giving rise to reconsiderations about the part played by land shortage in triggering rising waves of political tumult. It is imperative in borrowing her conclusions, however, to recall that fertility of the land in question is just as crucial as its vacancy in a land crisscrossed by mountain ranges. Pomeroy \textit{et al.}’s estimate of fertile agricultural land as making up only about 20 percent of total arable land in the mainland gives a clue about what to expect. Even granting that the eventual filling up of the Greek landscape, excepting Sparta, has really taken place well into the sixth century we are still a long way from drawing a vista of the former as comparable to the Sicilian soil in equal parts fertility and vacancy: Lin Foxhall, \textit{Access to Resources in Ancient Greece: The Egalitarianism of the Polis in Practice}, in \textit{Money, Labour and Land}, pp. 211; Lin Foxhall, \textit{Can We See the “Hoplite Revolution” on the Ground?} \textit{Archaeological Landscapes, Material Culture, and Social Status in Early Greece}, in \textit{Men of Bronze}, pp. 217; Pomeroy \textit{et al.}, \textit{A Brief History of Ancient Greece}, pp. 9, 53.

\footnote{1239} The miserable lot of the small farmer also had a tendency to be aggravated towards explosive discontent if the discrepancy between their living standards and those of the aristocracy was to be widened enough to cancel off the potentiality of any ideological mitigation: \textquote{As a rule of thumb, the annual grain yield of one hectare (about 2.5 acres) could maintain one member of a household, but many
difficulty of meeting the inflated demands of aristocrats on surplus production may have convinced many members of large families to seek out a living elsewhere.\textsuperscript{1240} In a similar manner, the younger members of the aristocratic families could have been enticed with the daring prospect of leading an expedition to some unexploited stretch of land that would entail being the masters of their own financial prospects.\textsuperscript{1241} Either way, overseas apoiokoi became a common feature of the archaic Greek world in addition to having a direct impact on the growth of the pan-Hellenic sentiment across vast territories. By the beginning of the fifth century, both pan-Hellenism and inter-polis ties of aristocratic solidarity\textsuperscript{1242} were well on their way to become themes that expressed the idea of shared values and ancestry.

The circle of communality and exclusion is brought to full circle only with the conclusion of the epoch of founding new settlements. Speaking to an effort of expansion not only in space but also in time, the confounding rise of new ties between the colonies and founding cities (metropoleis), in addition to the invention of genealogical traditions on the founders\textsuperscript{1243} (oikistês) spurred interest in the collective identity presumed to be shared with all Greeks.

drowned poor that the owners must have struggled to make ends meet and put food on the table.” Waterfield, Creators, Conquerors and Citizens, pp. 5; Van Wees, ‘Mass and Elite in Solon’s Athens: The Property Class Revisited’, pp. 357. Providing the dêmos with commercial incentives, in that vein, was an effective method of shipping off any social elements that were deemed undesirable. Further, the chance to rub the slate clean could have enticed many commoners who hardly excepted anything but backbreaking toil from the leaders of their own polis. This point is elaborated in Ira Malkin, The Returns of Odysseus: Colonization and Ethnicity, (Berkeley, 1998), pp. 13; Matthew Trundle, Greek Mercenaries: From the Late Archaic Period to Alexander, (London and New York, 2004), pp. 39.

\textsuperscript{1240} The tempting prospects of commerce, for one, would surely attract a large number of aristocratic children that were down the pecking order. Indeed, while it appears risky to subscribe any hypothesis that commercial incentive lured many citizens from their respective poleis prior to any colonization took place, one can still hold that what little trade there was ‘before the flag’ could have increased enormously to take on a life of its own. For more on the potential impact of commercial motives, see Hall, A History of the Archaic Greek World, pp. 120-124; contra Ste. Croix, ‘How Far was Trade a Cause of Early Greek Colonisation?’, pp. 357 ff; cf. Ira Malkin, ‘Inside and Outside: Colonization and the Formation of the Mother City’, in, Apoikia: Scritti in onore di Giorgio Buchner, ed. by B. Augustino and D. Ridgway, (Naples, 1994), pp. 2; Tandy, Warriors into Traders, pp. 59-83; contra Buckley, Aspects of Greek History 750-323 BC, pp. 39.

\textsuperscript{1241} Cf. “What I call the colonizing element was made up of three components: discontented peasants, who either had inadequate land or had lost their land altogether; enterprising soldiers of fortune, who may have been déclassé aristocrats—poorer relations or bastard sons of the ruling elite, as Archilochos in the next century was alleged to be; and peasants who had given up farming for full time trading.” Rose, Sons of the Gods, Children of Earth, pp. 120-1.

\textsuperscript{1242} “In short, the elites of seventh-century Greece contracted with one another to distribute, share, and rotate political offices as part of a voluntary self-regulation that entailed, as its necessary function, the exclusion of non-elites. There were some, however, who were not prepared to abide by this ‘gentlemen’s agreement.’” Hall, A History of the Archaic Greek World, pp. 144.

\textsuperscript{1243} The celebration of heroic ancestry would become a stock theme not only of aristocratic families but also of the panegyric addresses made to poleis and odes to their notable citizens, e.g., the victors of the pan-Hellenic games. For more on the hero cult, see Carla M. Antonaccio, ‘The Archaeology of Ancestors’, in Tomb and Hero Cult in Early Greece: The Archaeology of Ancestors, ed. by C. Dougherty and L. Kurke, (Cambridge, 1993), pp. 64.
notwithstanding their idiosyncrasies. Indeed, a pronounced feature of the odes, fables, as well as elegiac, lyric iambic and melic poetry of this period, as we will see below, is a preoccupation with collective themes that have their origins residing in *muthos*, shared genealogy, etc. Permitting forgiveness for a bit of a poetic turn, the ancient Greeks rediscovered the communitarian potential of their archaic origins via the discovery, and hence settlement, of unoccupied lands. Indeed, the fragmentary evidence that we have of the works of the poets of this period clearly suggests that there was an undeniable poetic penchant, albeit not shared by all and sundry such as Tyrtaeus and Solon, for diluting even the most profane of parables with a touch of divine solace uniting the tutor and pupil with the reassuring link of shared tradition. This higher level of ideological production disseminated the all too familiar themes of estrangement and endearment, albeit on an entirely different economic and political plane. Providing the members of the ruling class with a further discursive horizon legitimizing the hardened yoke of economic exploitation of the *dèmos*, this discursive level would allow the rise of various brand-new positive spins that were used to adorn the emergency measures: aiding the colonies, saving the Dorian brethren, preserving the freedom of the Ionian communities, etc. Following hard on the heels of incorporation of villages into the administrative structure of single city-states, i.e., *sunoikismos*¹,¹ this introduction of a longer view to matters of political attitudes and economic exploitation gave way to an aristocratic inter-state solidarity² whereby defiant class enemies, as well as ethnic ones, would be branded as damaging to the ancient interests of all Hellenes.¹²⁶

¹²⁴ “While the Mycenaean world had to some degree been a city-state culture, following the destruction of Mycenaean civilization there was a gap of some three centuries before the emergence of the polis in the late Geometric period, c. 750. Inspired by a growth in both population and prosperity, during the Dark Ages in Greece and in the archaic period which followed, small communities came together to create larger urban groups, each consisting of the territory. This process of the amalgamation of villages into a single city-state was known as *sunoikismos* (synoeism), which means ‘coming to live together’ and was a process which created more complex and developed political and social structures to cope with the challenges which arise from large numbers of people living together.” Dillon and Garland, *The Ancient Greeks*, pp. 6.

¹²⁵ Herodotus’ account of the competition organized by Cleisthenes the tyrant of Sicyon for the hand of his daughter, regardless of the historical accuracy of its details, is one of the more memorable manifestations of this aristocratic tendency to cross the borders of *poleis*: Herodotus, *The Histories*, 6.126-131.

¹²⁶ “One of the most important phenomena of these early migrations was a growing sense of Greekness. In recent scholarship on Greek ethnicity, a great deal has been made of the Persian Wars of the early fifth century as a watershed in how the Greeks perceived themselves. Before this watershed, it is said, the Greeks began to notice certain similarities—of language, worship, clothing, foodways, heritage, laws, stories, political institutions, and so on—and by aggregating these qualities they arrived at a sense of what it was to be Greek and postulated a common kinship. And then, after violent and victorious contact with the Persians, they defined themselves as possessing the opposite set of qualities to those possessed by Persians and other “barbarians.”” Waterfield, *Creators, Conquerors and Citizens*, pp. 29.
4.3 The Duality’s Conception in the Seventh Century

This attempted reconstruction of the formation of *polis* brings us squarely to the end of the seventh and the beginning of the sixth centuries. Our review of literary and archaeological evidence antecedent to this period in which Greek poetry and philosophy was to attain some of its defining features indicates that the notions of *nomos* and *phusis*, far from embracing rigid definitions, were excessively fluid and placid. To be sure, social and political complexity of Mycenaean and Minoan civilizations, advanced as they were, could hardly measure up to the classic *polis* which housed myriads of economic constellations and ethnic conglomerates that would induce the charging of the terms with an antagonistic flavour. And yet, our account shows that Mycenaean civilization, for all its avowed simplicity, was highly hierarchical in addition to having been predicated upon potentially eruptive social and economic antagonisms including the multi-layered opposition between producers of surplus grain and its extortioners. To that end, our reconstruction of the Mycenaean collapse emphasises the potential role that the unresolved class conflicts between the haves and have nots might have played in the gradual disappearance of Mycenaean civilization from the historical record. Looking back to this age with a measure of nostalgia on one hand and some degree of detached comfort on the other, Homer and Hesiod projected whatever social ill they regarded as haunting their contemporary society to its permanent reconciliation within a celestial microcosm effectively conjuring divine mystery in the stead of social intelligibility. This resort to divine authority on social issues was drawn against the background of naturalization of class differences that was signalled by the narrator’s steady gaze upon the leaders of the war party and their close, albeit occasionally non-aristocratic, e.g., Eumaeaus the swineherd, confidants and those who ranked among the possessors of at least medium scale property that entertained the hopes of adding to their wealth. The human drama that was on display in large scale was thus relegated to the sphere of divine providence and *Tuche*, thus contriving immortal aid to realize the mortal ambitions that were in tune with the former’s dispensation of noble justice until their allotted lot gave out. With the petering out of the social and political elements with Mycenaean beginnings and the exasperation of the hopes of those who looked up to the antiquated figure of big man as the embodiment of meritocratically-inclined umpire, the naked reality was that the social ills that beset the temporal order could

1247 On terminological grounds, at least, this equivocality appears quite discernible. *Phusis* is used but once in the entire corpus of Homer and in the sense of ‘outward appearance’ of the plant that is given by Hermes to Odysseus to protect him from Kirke’s spells. *Phuē*, or another form of the word, on the other hand, occurs nine times apparently denoting a significance closely aligned with the verb *phuô*, ‘to grow into something.’ Needless to add, there is quite a space to cover the shift that would unite these two strands of meaning; a shift that would only be partially brought about by the sixth-century philosophers and their continued preoccupation with the essence of things. Homer, *Odyssey*, 10.303; Rose, *Sons of the Gods, Children of Earth*, pp. 149-150.

not be resolved even when they were transposed directly to the immortal universe. And with the ultimate recognition of strife as the purveyor of ‘ills and wells’ in equal measure,\textsuperscript{1240} the literary transition from the isolated and introspective villages of the Protogeometric to the emergence of the \textit{polis}-centric demographic clusters across the eighth and seventh centuries was complete. From the initial stirrings of the gradual outpour of poetic and philosophical works there took place the very first attempts to transform \textit{hoi polloi} into \textit{kakoi} and \textit{hoi oligoi} into \textit{esthloi sans} allusion to myth or divine providence.\textsuperscript{1250} With the enactment of the obtuse self-effacing circularity of Zeus’ divine rule, the images that used to belong to the microcosm of immortal universe were reshuffled and the archaic descendants of the Homeric and Hesiodic works could then be celebrated on the basis of their wealth, consumption of luxury goods or noble heritage alone.

In its social and political connotation \textit{phusis} at this formative stage was made to convey a plenum of distinctions that were to be abided by individual agents. Consigning a spectrum of divine actions ranging from those that are carefully deliberated by councils of gods to others that were apparently undertaken at the spur of the moment to the ethical purview of poetic mythmaking, the tradition thence transplanted the epic moment of \textit{krisis}, ‘judgement,’ into the realm of material reality. Foretelling the later apogee of \textit{katharsis} as a crowning element of Aristotelian poetics,\textsuperscript{1251} the direct correspondence between actions of mortal and immortal

\textsuperscript{1240} The Hesiodic ode to industriousness and Homer’s construal of the opposition between Polyphemus’ realm of gullible simplicity and that of Odysseus’ crafty ingenuity can be taken as blurry portends of what would later become a full-blown poetic exposition of the relationship between \textit{nomos} and \textit{phusis}：“Thrice blest and happy are the beasts, which have | No reason in these things, no questionings, | Nor other harmful superfluities— | Their law is their own nature; but the life | Of man is more than he can bear—he is | The slave of fancies, he has invented laws.” Philoct, 93; cited in George Thomson, \textit{Studies in Ancient Greek Society: The First Philosophers}, second edition, (London, 1961), pp. 231.

\textsuperscript{1250} Technically, the first attempt at providing the term \textit{oligoi} with a historical background was made by Plutarch in the late first century AD. Plutarch’s claim that \textit{hoi oligoi} had earned the unmistakably anti-democratic connotations at a time when the Athenian aristocrats were growing desperate in their hopes of inserting moral cushions between them and the rapidly growing pro-democratic faction of Pericles and Ephialtes should, in that sense, be kept in mind while I replace, for rhetorical purposes, \textit{hoi oligoi} for the more historically correct \textit{hoi pleious}. In the event, the oligarchic numbers game was a long time in coming. Still, a structured silence rather than a concern for an extensive politeia seems to pervade through the connections between the social vocabulary of this earlier epoch. For what else the usage of \textit{hoi polloi} may have hinted at but an unmistakable, yet not spelled-out, gap between the ruling few and the ruled many? Plutarch, \textit{Pericles}, 11.3; cf. Ps. Xenophon, \textit{Constitution of the Athenians}, 1.1; P. J. Rhodes, ‘Oligarchs in Athens’, in \textit{Alternatives to Athens: Varieties of Political Organization and Community in Ancient Greece}, ed. by R. Brock and Stephen Hodkinson, (Oxford, 2000), pp. 126-131; Maurizio Giangiulio, ‘Oligarchies of Fixed Number’ or Citizen Bodies in the Making?”, in \textit{Defining Citizenship in Archaic Greece}, ed. by Alain Duploy and Roger W. Brock, (Oxford and New York, 2018), pp. 275-293.

\textsuperscript{1251} “Tragedy is a representation of an action of a superior kind – grand, and complete in itself – presented in embellished language, in distinct forms in different parts, performed by actors rather than told by a narrator, effecting, through pity and fear, the purification [\textit{katharsis}] of such emotions.” Aristotle, \textit{Poetics}, 1449b24-28.
origins served to make the whole business of aristocratic education a basic necessity. With the multitudes’ ‘need’ to be goaded, cajoled and herded according to the interests of their natural superiors hence poeticized and enshrined, the poet took shelter beneath the canopy of aristocratic daydreams. This safe haven of natural status quo, however, was anything but uncontested. The ‘nature’ of the contest that blackened this brightest of skies, in fact, involved no lesser a degree of volatile bloodletting. In one fell swoop did Odysseus’ palace transform into a slaughterhouse of vengeance and Hesiod’s verses mould into a petition to dikê as the impartial umpire of the iron age. Sanctified only to the extent that it was smeared with the honey of divine retribution or mortal redress, phusis’ sway was hence blunted with the initial stirrings of nomos countering the ravenous claims of ‘gift-devouring basileis’ of Hesiod and Homer. On the surface at least, suitors’ rageful laying waste to their overlord’s resources was unreasonable and improper not because Telemachus, Odysseus’ true heir was alive and well, but for the simple reason that Odysseus could indeed turn out to be alive. But for all the pomp and narrative circumstance that bellowed through the theme of a hero’s return, the still waters of Homeric muthos hid telling secrets in its depths: there was no readily-enforced patrilineal succession or rights of guardianship in the Homeric universe.

1252 “But you, Perses, must take in what I say and hearken to Right, forgetting force altogether. For this was the rule for men that Kronos’ son laid down: whereas fish and beasts and flying birds would eat one another, because Right is not among them, to men he gave Right, which is much the best in practice. For if a man is willing to say what he knows to be just, to him wide-seeing Zeus gives prosperity; but whoever deliberately lies in his sworn testimony, therein, by injuring Right, he is blighted past healing; his family remains more obscure thereafter, while the true-sworn man’s line gains in worth.” Hesiod, Works and Days, 285-295.
1254 The unbridled avarice of the Homeric Agamemnon, as we highlighted above, fits in with the company of Hesiodic basileis rather easily.
1255 Penelope’s promise to choose a suitor when the shroud she weaves will be finished, thereby forestalling the suitors’ hopes for three years serves as the narrative clinch that Odysseus’ kin is willing to concede in order to keep their dreams alive. Once that concession is made, however, it is but inevitable that even Odysseus himself cannot disprove it without resorting to guile and savage slaughter. In an ironic turn that is often overlooked, Penelope’s mule-headed disbelief in Odysseus’ homecoming is a testimony to the deduction that the trickster herself has been tricked. The ‘feminine’ propriety and devotion accorded to Penelope’s refusal to accept a suitor’s hand attains its full dramatic meaning only if it is counterposed to the inherent aristocratic justice of the latter’s claims. Homer, Odyssey, 2.81-145.
1256 The fact that Odysseus was presumed dead further reinforces this position. Tactful ploys adopted by Telemachus and Penelope aside, had there been a community-wide ready recognition of either patrilineal succession or male guardianship, then it would easily follow that the Ithacan notables should have found it a little harder to woo the princess, openly or otherwise. An interpretation that focuses on the hand of the princess, as in the case of Pomeroy for one, as the legitimating clinch of assuming kingly authority, on the other hand, needs to mend the broken fences of the curious division between inheritable landed property and other goods that are voiced by the suitors in two occasions. We do not operate exactly on unequivocal grounds in regard to our conjectures of what benefits would accrue to the new consort of the queen. Indeed, with the sole exception of the satisfaction sexual motives, the only clear inference that can be made concerning the potential aims of suitors to vie for being chosen as the new consort is that they would get the inheritable share of the former king’s property. It is not only the inheritance of excellence that is in question, it is also that of property. Pomeroy, Goddesses, Whores.
Eurymachus and his cronies raid Odysseus’ palace to their hearts’ content because the title of basileus is up for grabs whether or not the latter’s offspring, or even father as the case may pertain, is alive.1257 The shallow agony of insolence that is defiantly set up between the suitors and their absent overlord is overtaken by the more systemic antagonism stemming from the prolonged adherence to the big man’s rules. If justice is to be served in perpetuity without any direct intervention of gods, then the antique kernel of the outdated customs needs to be shed once and for all.1258 Phusis needs to outlive itself. Only with its undesirable offshoots trimmed down and novel replacements grafted in their place can nature follow function. With doom and disorder banished forthwith by the sanction of Athena in the case of Odyssey and in those of the muses in Hesiod’s Erga kai Hemerai, kosmos is rendered orderly, in compliance with the accepted etymology of the word and the dictates of the material living conditions.

Some of the first implementations of the polis-wide measures that were taken for the introducing a modicum of order to what seemed, at least to the first settlers, by definition, disorderly can be glimpsed in the case of the colonisation of Sicily. Numerous apoikoi were founded by the Greek settlers on the Sicilian soil throughout the eighth century, among which ranked Pithekoussai, one of the first examples of “long distance extensification”1259 in the western Mediterranean. The majority of apoikoi started out small, with an estimate of about 225 for Megara Hyblaea in the years 725-700,1260 giving a hint about the general picture. Colonisation answered a myriad of needs, gaining access to an abundant supply of productive fields as well as to minerals and raw materials, subordinating the locals to turn them into slaves and debt-bondspersons, establishing of emporia, and exporting of the restless numbering not the least among them. Scheidel’s estimation of 1-2 per cent as the proportion of colonizers to the total Greek population between 750 and 650 is perhaps in the right,1261 but in an appropriate context even 1-2 per cent can be decisive.


1257 The ambiguity surrounding the term in the Odyssey can be seen crystal-clearly in Telemachus’ reply to Antinous’ scorning recognition of his hereditary kingship: “Nevertheless, in this island of Ithaca there are many princes [basileis] beside myself, some young, some old; one of these may well gain the kingship, now that great Odysseus is dead. But I shall reign over my house and over the slaves that Odysseus once made his prize and left for me.” Homer, Odyssey, 1.387, 1.394-7.

1258 From the antagonistic clash of inherited excellence and battle-proven valour that finds its heroic purveyors in the figures of Agamemnon and Achilles respectively to the Odyssey’s suitors poking endless holes on the status quo endorsed by the ideology of kingly authority, this cleansing of ill-fitting traditional elements turns into a golden thread of thematic unity. Cf. Rose, Sons of the Gods, Children of Earth, pp. 58.


1260 Franco de Angelis, Megara Hyblaea and Selinous: The Development of Two Greek City-states in Archaic Sicily, (Oxford, 2003a), pp. 44.

1261 Scheidel, ‘The Greek Demographic Expansion’.

331
We have pointed out above that a likely reason for the rise of apoikoi was the land hunger of the unpropertied poor who were exposed to the increasingly insatiable demands of the propertied class.\footnote{For an evaluation of the contemporaneous colonisation of Thera along the lines that link desperate land hunger on the brink of starvation with the expeditions in general, see Buckley, \textit{Aspects of Greek History 750-323 BC}, pp. 35; Murray, \textit{Early Greece}, pp. 120-121.} Sicily, for all intents and purposes, was the farmer’s dream with vast swathes of cultivable land enjoining any of the geographical locations that were chosen by the colonisers to settle on.\footnote{De Angelis’ estimates have shown that even when ample allowance for the presumable gaps in the archaeological record is made, the native population of Sicily was quite minuscule even by ancient standards: “… we are still talking about an overall native Sicilian population of 100,000 people exploiting 3,000 square kilometres. These estimates represent about 12 percent of Sicily’s surface area and about 3-4 percent of Sicily’s carrying capacity. That would work out to about 3 people per square kilometre. On this rough-and-ready picture, Sicily was thinly populated and had much available land to clear and work.” De Angelis, \textit{Archaic and Classical Greek Sicily}, pp. 55; Franco de Angelis, “Estimating the Agricultural Base of Greek Sicily”, \textit{Papers of the British School at Rome}, vol. 68, (2000), pp. 138-139.} Sicilian land had the further benefit of being largely uninhabited and hence uncultivated.\footnote{The recent archaeological and paleoecological studies have shown that the cultivated land in Sicily, if anything, had diminished since the Late Bronze Age to the foundation of the first apoikoi. For a study of the abrupt decline of the evergreen forests in the area surrounding Selinous following its settlement, see Hans-Peter Stika, A. G. Heiss, and B. Zach, “Plant Remains from the Early Iron Age in Western Sicily: Differences in Subsistence Strategies of Greek and Elymian Sites”, \textit{Vegetation History and Archaeobotany}, Vol. 17 (Suppl. 1) pp. 139–48; for an overview of the evidence, see De Angelis, \textit{Archaic and Classical Greek Sicily}, pp. 230-232.} Many of the apoikoi that were established did not have to contend with native settlements as the latter, when they were located in closer proximity, were generally in the interior with small areas under cultivation around them.\footnote{\textit{Ibid}, pp. 53-54; for an exception to this pattern, see M. C. Lentini, Naxos tra Egeo e Sicilia: Ricerche nel piu antico abitato coloniale (scavi 2003-2006), in \textit{Immagine e immagini della Sicilia e di altre isole del Mediterraneo antico: Atti delle seste giornate internazionale di studi sull'area etrusca e la Sicilia occidentale nel contesto mediterraneo, Erice 12–16 ottobre 2006}, ed. C. Ampolo, (Pisa, 2010), pp. 521-525.} Provided with a steady supply of rainfall that easily sufficed for the wide-scale production of wheat, whose consumption was considered a luxury in Attica throughout the classical antiquity,\footnote{Provided that there has not been a noteworthy change in the climate of Athens from ancient times to the present day, Garnsey’s following report shows just how prone to failure wheat production in Attica was: “An analysis of precipitation from October to May in Attica (1931-60) produces the following results. The percentage probability of a failure of the wheat crop was 28\%, of the barley crop 5.5\%; that is, wheat failed more than 1 year in 4, barley about 1 year in 20.” Garnsey, \textit{Famine and Food Supply in the Graeco-Roman World}, pp. 10; Andrew Dalby, \textit{Siren Feasts: A History of Food and Gastronomy in Greece}, (London and New York, 1996), pp. 22.} the coastal areas of eastern and southern Sicily would begin to feature large silos from quite early on. Although not particularly well-endowed in metals or minerals with the exception of Zankle,\footnote{C. Ingoglia, ‘La Valle del Patri: Un corridoio obbligato tra Tirreno e Ionio?’, in ed. by A. Calderone, in \textit{Cultura e religione della acqua}, (Rome, 2012).} Sicily was particularly affluent in timber, sulphur and different variety of salts and had a veritable trading...
partner in iron-rich Pithekoussai. Indeed, with its close proximity to the apoikoi established in southern Magna Graecia, not to mention the Etruscan traders to the north, Sicily appeared to rest at the heart of a network of commerce. With ample supply of unworked land and a favourable climate to boot, Sicily had the further advantage of having a largely dispersed native population whose lack of higher degrees of political or military organisation meant that the bellicose colonisers would wreak havoc on them. Not particularly interested either in expanding their borders or making exorbitant profits at the expense of their Phoenician or Greek trading partners, the native Sikels had all the makings of a serf population farming what used to be their own lands on the orders of their new overlords. Gradually but surely, ties of recursivity would bind the natives and Greeks together thus paving the way for later agglomerations of ethnically separated populations. Vacant lands need obedient hands to work them and those of the Sikels who were unfortunate enough to have settled on lands that were close to the first wave of apoikoi were thus inundated to be on the giving end of the bargain. As they began to produce large quantities of wheat using the servile labour of the natives on the unoccupied lands the colonisers began to discover the endless potential of being conveniently located at the navel of Mediterranean. Shipping grain to the four points of the

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1268 The favourable commercial location of the emporion was due to, to be precise, its close off-shore proximity to Elba and Etruria, both areas that are rich in metal deposits: Demand, The Mediterranean Context of Early Greek History, pp. 246-247; De Angelis, Archaic and Classical Greek Sicily, pp. 249.

1269 “Thus for the early Greek poleis in Sicily to thrive, it was vital that population movements were minimized, so that economic exploitation could take root. Movements could have been restricted by both conquest and the cooperation of native elites. That something along these lines occurred in early Greek Sicily may also be suspected from a later societal feature that would otherwise be left unexplained: the heavy use of serfs and slaves. This was not due to socio-political and economic backwardness, as is sometimes thought, but to land abundance and to the sociopolitical and economic structures of Sicily’s prehistoric cultures. Sicily offered the right land conditions (abundant and better-quality land), but also the right social conditions with their weakly developed institutions, all of which together formed ideal circumstances for the making of successful agricultural systems.” Ibid, pp. 57.

1270 For a later appraisal of the particular ways of recursivity that brought together the natives and Greeks via a combined use of carrot and stick, see Diodorus Siculus, The Library, 5.6.5; Diodorus’ analysis is supported by Veronese among others: Francesca Veronese, Lo spazio e la dimensione del sacro: Santuari greci e territorio nella Arcaica, (Padua, 2006), pp. 636-637.

1271 This mixture of conditions of abundant land and scarce labour appears quite homologous to the erstwhile helotisation of the non-Spartan Laconians and Messenians. We elaborate on the relation between land and labour hunger below, and thus conclude this remark by noting the similarity that the Egyptian state formation had to the Sicilian ones from this point of view: “The situation is different when labour is scarce and land abundant. In that case, land does not command a rent, and labour is valuable. The ownership or control of labour—rather than land—is the basis of wealth. … Underpopulation has far reaching implications for social organization because it limits the ability of elites to extract surplus from farmers. When there is “free land,” farmers who are dissatisfied with their circumstances can move to other locations to improve their lot.” R.C. Allen, “Agriculture and the Origins of the State in Ancient Egypt”, Explorations in Economic History, vol. 34, (Apr., 1997), pp. 145-146; for the exploration of similar conditions in Sicily, see Franco de Angelis, “Equations of Culture: The Meeting of Natives and Greeks in Sicily (ca. 750-450 BC)”, Ancient West and East, vol. 2, (2003b), 29-30, 34; Franco de Angelis, “Re-assessing the Earliest Social and Economic Developments in Greek Sicily”, Mitteilungen des Deutschen Archäologischen Instituts Römische Abteilung, vol. 116, (2010), pp. 21-53.
compass, the Sicilian *apoikoi* became major players in Mediterranean commerce that would throw their weight around to decide the victors of pan-Hellenic wars by the second half of the fifth century.\(^{1272}\) The exponential growth of these vibrant communities offered ample opportunity to menial workers and the unpropertied of the mainland Greece no less than to the aristocratic undesirables and exiles. The hazy traditions of the prehistoric Dorian and Ionian invasions to the contrary,\(^{1273}\) here was a virgin soil to be upturned in the midst of other *apoikoi* whose rulers would need mercenaries to oversee the servile natives and to terrorise their opponents. If there was any truth to the claim that *ex oriente lux* then the light of fortune was by now washing the Sicilian Greeks, whose freedom from the mainland gift-devouring\(^{1274}\) *basileis* was to wait for the political stakes to rise in the sixth century to be toppled.

### 4.3.1 The Main Topoi of Archaic Greek Poetry and the Formation of Sparta

To carry on in the steps of our brief extrapolation of central poetic and philosophic elements of the polis-centric universe, we propose to excavate the themes that were congruous no less than others without displaying discordant characteristics within the surviving fragments of the period. In terms of the current state of the literary evidence,\(^{1275}\) some fragments belonging to the poems of Archilochus, Semonides and Tyrtaeus, which are conventionally dated to the late

\(^{1272}\) An a priori conceivable high correlation between territory size and numbers of sites which have been pegged as potential *emporía* can be discerned from the current results of archaeological surveys. Whilst Syracuse, Selinous and Akragas, mega-*poleis* with estimated territories in 1,670, 1,500 and 2,500 square kilometres respectively, all possess multiple identified sites of *emporía*, smaller *poleis* such as Naxos, Leontinoi and Megara Hyblaia, with estimated territories of 600, 830 and 400 square kilometres each, do not even have a single identified *emporium*. For more on the estimates and their interpretation, see De Angelis, *Archaic and Classical Greek Sicily*, pp. 65-111; for the relation between the economic development of eastern Greeks and the consequent rise of Sicilian exports of grain, see Ober, *The Rise and Fall of Classical Greece*, pp. 188.

\(^{1273}\) For an early account in support of the authenticity of the Ionian Invasion, see Snodgrass, *The Dark Age of Greece*, pp. 302.

\(^{1274}\) Murray makes a convincing case for rendering *dôrophagoi* *basileis* in strict connection to the arbitrator’s fee to which the Hesiodic *basileis* appear to have been conventionally entitled without ascribing any insinuation to extra-legal means, i.e., bribery, which may also be seen as a customary part of the arbitration process. Though I do not share either his or Gagarin’s rigid separation of legal from extra-legal gifts, I still regard the appeasements in question as morally sanctioned by the ruling class which might have grinded Hesiod’s axe in his attempt to persuade his brother. Murray, *Early Greece*, pp. 60; Michael Gagarin, “Hesiod’s Dispute with Perses”, *Transactions of the American Philological Association*, vol. 104, (1974), pp. 103-111; cf. Ian Morris, “Gift and Commodity in Archaic Greece”, *Man*, vol. 21 no. 1, (Mar., 1986), pp. 1-17.

\(^{1275}\) It is worth noting, if for no other reason than to rethink the rapport between colonization and the invention of the Greek alphabet, that one of the earliest extant pieces of evidence is a cup dubbed ‘Nestor’s’ from Pithekoussai, which was a joint *apokos* sent from Chalcis and Eretria, in the bay of Neapolis on which are written the following verses in Chalcidian dialect: “I am Nestor’s cup, good to drink from. | Whoever drinks from me will at once be seized | By desire for fair-crowned Aphrodite.” Jeffrey M. Hurwit, ‘Art, Poetry, and Polis in the Age of Homer’, in ed. by Susan Langdon, *From Pasture to Polis: Art in the Age of Homer*, (Columbia and London, 1993), pp. 28.
seventh century, rank among the earliest that is on offer. Three thematic clusters can be discerned by looking into the fragmentary evidence of these poets: occasional appeals made to Zeus/Tuche as the princeps dispensing justice and fortune alike; a shared emphasis on the aristocratic glorification of blood and glory; and, attempts to ethnographically record and to ideologically mitigate the economic and ethnic distinctions that incessantly surfaced with the widespread establishment of apoikoi and internal colonization. The poetic designation of Zeus as the reigning arbiter of human ills and fortunes can be taken both as the continuation of the Homeric tradition of paying poetic homage to the divine hierarchy, and, contrariwise, as a disruption within that tradition signalled by the expansion of divine licence accorded to Tuche at the expense of careful deliberation of gods over the affairs of mortals. Conceived through the eyes of Archilochus, for example, Zeus is equally the sole overseer of blunders and successes of mortals and the leader of whimsical divinities, whose capricious naughtiness would hardly invoke unquestioning belief in their flawless providence. This scepticism of divine benevolence, a theme that was shared by Semonides, coupled with the frequent asides to aristocratic pastimes, such as hunting, food-connoisseurship, wine-drinking and eugenic courtship, appears to have functioned as the direct continuation of the Hesiodic DIY mentality. Indeed, the uomo universale of the age of colonization found the ultimate judge of his poverty and prosperity alike in his acumen and in serendipity following the reconceptualization of Zeus qua Tuche. From the plea to Zeus made by Archilochus’s sailor to Tyrtaeus’ steadfast celebration of death while fighting in the front line, the poetic actions described in the fragments are effected by men who appear to have realised that they were making and breaking their own fortune. Furling sails toward uncharted waters or voluntarily choosing immortality in death rather than disgrace in life, either way the moral stands: the

1277 Archilochus, F. W 177, 298, 130; Semonides, F. W 1, 7; Tyrtaeus, F. W 23a.
1278 Archilochus, F. W 2, 96-98; Tyrtaeus, F. W 2, 10-12.
1279 Archilochus, F. W 2; Semonides, W F. 22-23; Tyrtaeus, F. W 5-6.
1280 “It all depends upon the gods. Often enough, when men | are prostrate on the ground with woe, they | set them up again; | and often enough, when men are standing proud and all seems bright, | they tip them | over on their backs, and they’re in a plight –” Archilochus, F. W 130, trans. by M. L. West, in Greek Lyric Poetry, (Oxford and New York, 1993); cf. Robin Osborne, ‘Inter-Personal Relations on Athenian Pots: Putting Others in Their Place’, in Kosmos, pp. 24-25.
1281 Archilochus, F. W 25, 35.
1282 Semonides, F. W 1.
1283 Archilochus, F. W 4, 11, 48, 93, 196a; Semonides, F. W 7, 22-23.
1284 Archilochus, F. W 106; Murray, Early Greece, pp. 19.
1285 Tyrtaeus, F. W 10-11.
The protagonist is at the helm of his destiny. Further, with a pronounced turn of the graphic ventures towards contemporary events including the skirmishes between the new settlers and the old inhabitants, and the momentous Second Messenian War, the protruding clamour of ancient muthoi is effectively hushed in favour of leaving the centre stage to the travails of individuals that lived and breathed with the poets. The subjugation of Messenians, and not that of Trojans, and the warring settlers of Thasos, and not those of Odysseus’ compatriots, both indicate that no allegoric representation was deemed necessary to fight out the novel evils of extended societies on their own grounds.

The two Messenian Wars that were referred to by Tyrtaeus is significant not only in regard to its exhibition of the quasi profanation of the self-circumscribed circularity of muthos but is also momentous in its own right which warrant the first digression into the history of archaic Greek mainland poleis on our part. Indeed, given the role they played in the gradual building of the Spartan mirage that would continue to captivate the minds of aristocratically-inclined writers down to the fourth century and beyond, Tyrtaeus’ exposition, fragmentary as it is, emerges as a proto-Solonian venture to single out the stakes involved in Spartans’ struggle against the Messenians as well as their eventual resolution. To be sure, there is no clear-cut

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1286 It has been argued by Roland Martin that a likely interpretation of Archilochus’ vivid descriptions of battles and the geographic features of the locale can be made by inferring that his poems dealt with the struggles of his colony established Thasos with the Thracians who were settled on the mainland opposite Thasos. Roland Martin, “Thasos Colonie de Paros”, *Annuario della Scuola Archeologica di Atene e delle Missioni Italiane in Oriente*, vol. 14, (1984), pp. 175; cf. Tandy, ‘Trade and Commerce in Archilochus, Sappho, and Alkaios’, pp. 185-186.

1287 Questions concerning whether to take Tyrtaeus’ poetic fragments as historical sources has been posed. Though some interesting, yet antiquated, arguments have been put forward, for instance, by Bowie, we agree with Rose that there is a sufficient amount of peculiarly Spartan elements in his poetry to suggest the authenticity of Tyrtaeus’ Spartiate status. Ewen Bowie, ‘Miles Ludens? The Problem of Martial Exhortation in Early Greek Elegy’, in *Symptotica. Proceedings of a Symposium on the Symposium September 1984*, ed. by Oswyn Murray, (Oxford, 1990), pp. 221-229; cf. Rose, *Class in Archaic Greece*, pp. 268-272; Waterfield, *Creators, Conquerors and Citizens*, pp. 105-106.

1288 “A specific tone of epic history can be detected in all the fragments that seem to belong to this second level [embeddedness in political events] in the poet’s work, and they represent a new departure in the history of archaic literature. The new epic no longer deals with mythical wars fought in the remote past but with armed skirmishes between Greek settlers and the indigenous populations (largely Thracian) whom they encountered … Some fragments … almost sound like a war diary, where occasional, unheroic aspects of the soldier’s life are described along everything else.” Bruno Gentili, *Poetry and Its Public in Ancient Greece: From Homer to the Fifth Century*, trans. by A. Thomas Cole, (Baltimore, 1988), pp. 194-195.

1289 A lively debate has steamrolled through the better part of the twentieth century on whether the complete conquest of Messenia was clinched by the Spartan victory at the end of the First Messenian War, thence warranting the claim that the second confrontation was between Spartans and revolting Messenians, or the full Spartan domination over Laconia and Messenia could only fit the bill with respect to the occurrence of the Second Messenian War. We argue in conjunction with the historical tradition that the Spartans had indeed managed to thoroughly subjugate the Messenians at the conclusion to the first confrontation. Pausanias, *Guide to Greece*, 4.1.4; Strabo, *Geography*, 8.5.8; Luraghi, *The Ancient Messenians*, pp. 70.
agreement over the role played by Tyrtaeus in the second phase of the conflict,\textsuperscript{1290} presumed to have taken place, by extrapolating from Tyrtaeus’ allusion to the ‘spearmen of our fathers’

\textsuperscript{1291} fathers’ time,\textsuperscript{1291} in the decade 650-640. Further, Tyrtaeus’ allusions to \textit{casus bellum}\textsuperscript{1292} and the social outcome of the war,\textsuperscript{1293} though inferential, is directly related to other fragments in which he postulates a quasi-mythical account of the Spartan state-formation. Constituting the only piece of contemporary literary evidence to both of these historical episodes, the fragmentary remains of Tyrtaeus’ poems, combined with Plutarch’s later exposition of the Great Rhêtra,\textsuperscript{1294} which is almost certainly taken from Aristotle’s lost \textit{Lakedaimonion Politeia},\textsuperscript{1295} serve as the beginning point whence fleshing out the story of the formation of a state that was to become a powerhouse later on necessarily needs to pass through.

As a starter, \textit{homoioi}, or the ‘similars,’\textsuperscript{1296} formed the class of overseer-warriors filling the ranks of the army as well as any political office. Dedicating their leisure to an endless quest of

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\item[1290] Jaeger noted that Tyrtaeus’ use of the plural “we will obey the leaders” impedes any ascription of leadership to the role he played. Werner Jaeger, \textit{Five Essays}, (Montreal, 1966), pp. 117 n. 1; cf. Osborne, \textit{Greece in the Making}, pp. 166-167.
\item[1292] Tyrtaeus, F. W. 5. 1-11.
\item[1293] Tyrtaeus, F. W. 6. 1-4. 7. 1-3.
\item[1294] The text of the Great Rhêtra as well as the two riders that are mentioned by Plutarch have been subject to various studies concerning its claims to authenticity. Archaic and classical Sparta generally lacked written legislation, and on that count, at least, we appear to have reasons to partially validate Plutarch’s argument that some legislative measure, whether a \textit{rhêtra} or not, may have prevented their written documentation. The Greek original of the document is as follows: “Διος Συλλανιου και Αθανας Συλλανιας ιερόν ιδρυσαμενον, φυλάς φυλάζαντα, ωρας ες ωρας απελλαζειν μεταξύ Βαβυκας τε και Κνακιωνος, ώστε εισφερειν τε και αφιστασθαι δαμο δε ταν κυριανη ημεν και κράτος …. αι δε σκολιαν δαμον ελοιτο, τους πρεσβυγενεας και αρχαγετας αποστατιρας ημεν.” Plutarch, \textit{Lycurgus}, 6.1-10. Concentrated attempts at proving the inauthenticity of the document can be seen in the case of Michael Gagarin, \textit{Early Greek Law}, (Berkeley, 1986), pp. 53-54; Massimo Nafissi, \textit{La nascita del kosmos: Studi sulla storia e società di Sparta}, (Naples, 1991), pp. 72; for an in-depth attempt at elaboration of Great Rhêtra’s arguments, see Mary Fragkaki, “The Great Rhêtra”, \textit{Rosetta}, vol. 17, (2015), pp. 35-51; Rose, while accepting the authenticity of the document, objects that there is no clear evidence, apart from the language employed in the two texts, to connect it with Tyrtaeus’ \textit{Eunomia} whereas Cartledge and Osborne tentatively accept the authenticity of the document on the basis of the originality of its language and its correspondence to what can be gleaned from the contemporary and later historical sources elsewhere, e.g., Tyrtaeus’ fragments: Rose, \textit{Class in Archaic Greece}, pp. 275-276; Cartledge, \textit{Democracy}, pp. 44; Osborne, \textit{Greece in the Making}, pp. 167; cf. Nafissi, ‘Sparta’, pp. 116-128; Hall, \textit{A History of the Archaic Greek World}, pp. 205-211; Waterfield, \textit{Creators, Conquerors and Citizens}, pp. 112.
\item[1295] Plenty of reasons obliges one to adjudge the standard rendering of the concept as ‘equals’ practically unpalatable. Although we will attempt to tackle those reasons in our following discussion of the development of Spartan \textit{politeia}, our agreement with Cartledge’s point that it would be unthinkable for
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martial and physical perfection they formed the bulwark of military juggernaut crushing any external or internal challengers to Laconia’s prominence in the Peloponnesian War. As the primary creators and carriers of the dominant ideology of divine-sanctioned Spartan superiority, they forced their publicly owned part of the helotised Messenians and Laconians to toil on the lands that were allotted to them, appropriating half of their product. Utilising the extorted surplus product of helots to sustain an economy of collective similarity, their honed skills of war and mythmaking stipulated a zealously guarded steady state of exploitation whence sprang an ethos of bloodcurdling ruthlessness exhibited to any perceived threat to the naturalised status quo. The perioikoi, on the other hand, were the political subjects of Sparta who had to support the Spartiates in the conduct of external affairs but were otherwise internally independent. The main economic function assigned to perioikoi was to supervise all kinds of industrial production which was the domain of artisans of foreign origin specialising on a wide range from the manufacture of weapons and armour to that of bricks and furniture. Following the emergence of a Spartan tradition to scorn commercial enterprise, the perioikoi began to serve as the central axis channelling the stagnant supply of extorted agricultural production to any non-farmers in exchange for non-agrarian goods. As the numbers of homoioi entered a perpetual loop of decline mainly due to a defect of the initial distribution of land and the laws of inheritance, perioikoi would also come to be increasingly relied on as soldiers

a non-revolutionary Spartiate to seek isotês should still be noted: Cartledge, ‘Comparatively Equal’, pp. 180.

“...What the Lakonians [Spartans] did to the Messenians [after their victory in the First Messenian War] was this: first they imposed an oath never to rebel against Sparta and never to introduce any political change at all; secondly they imposed no fixed tribute but the Messenians had to bring half of all the produce of their farms to Sparta. It was decreed that at the burial of Spartan kings and governors men must come from Messenia with their women dressed in black: and there was a penalty for failure.” Pausanias, Guide to Greece: Vol II Southern Greece, trans. by Peter Levi, (London, 1979), 4.14.3-5; cf. Strabo, Geography, 8.5.4; for an alternative reading of the passage that is geared towards the stipulation of a better socio-economic status of the defeated Messenians as opposed to helots, see Luraghi, The Ancient Messenians, pp. 73-74.

Ober’s designation of Spartans’ perpetual preoccupation with war as “hyperspecialization in heavy-infantry warfare,” hyperbolic as it is, does not appear to be wide of the mark. Ober, The Rise and Fall of Classical Greece, pp. 124.

Thucydides’ account of the mass murder of 2,000 select helots ruthfully ensnared with the promise of citizenship differs from other signs of widespread terrorization only in regard to its brutal efficiency; Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, 4.80.

Whether or not the perioikoi took part in the production of artistic and artisanal goods in large part is up for discussion. Francis Prost, for one, claims, on the basis of a mélange of archaeological and literary evidence, that no postulation of perioikoi’s monopolisation of artisanship can be made. Dillon and Garland, by contrast, perpetuate the earlier academic orthodoxy that perioikoi were indeed responsible for crafts: Francis Prost, ‘Laconian Art’, in A Companion to Sparta, 1, pp. 164-165; Dillon and Garland, The Ancient Greeks, pp. 207; Cartledge, Sparta and Lakonia, pp. 153; Cartledge, The Spartans, pp. 68; Philip de Souza, Waldemar Heckel and Lloyd Llewelyn-Jones, The Greeks at War: From Athens to Alexander, (Oxford, 2004), pp. 33; Lipka, Xenophon’s Spartan Constitution, 7.1-4.

Attrition was just as crucial a factor as the other two which have been mulled over more often in the historical tradition and modern scholarly analyses alike. For a recent emphasis on attrition as a major factor of dwindling numbers of homoioi, see Nathan Decety, “When Valor Isn’t Always Superior to
forming the Spartan phalanx with the former. These two classes would squeeze the helots through a combination of ritual violence,\textsuperscript{1302} unflinching supervision\textsuperscript{1303} and incessant mortification effectively creating a regime of brutally enforced ethnic boundaries in order to ensure the self-perpetuation of the helot class and the extortion of its surplus production.\textsuperscript{1304} Hard-pressed as they were, helots, never the less, would continue to be on the prowl for any opportune moment to spring at the throats of their Spartan masters. Ironically, the harder the Spartans pressed helots to answer their demands the mistier would the ethnic and religious boundaries that otherwise separated particular helot groups would get. In a gradual transformation that took about two centuries, Messenian helots were brought to generate a series of myths ‘proving’ their ancestral superiority to their erstwhile captors already before the Theban liberation of Messenia after the Battle of Leuctra in 371. This briefly sketched threefold class structure, we argue, was firmly established prior to the conclusion of the Second Messenian War and was partly entrenched by the Great Rhêtra which served as a flexible charter of regional expansionism.

There are four particularly important points, textual and historical, that appear to vindicate a reading of Great Rhêtra as a document of reform foreshadowing the Messenian Wars.\textsuperscript{1305} First,

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\item An Aristotelian fragment later used by Plutarch mentions ephors’ perennial ritual declaration of war on the helots. The reception of this passage has also proved a mixed bag with Ste. Croix enthusiastically taking it at its face value while Borimir Jordan latently accepting it: Ste. Croix, \textit{The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greece}, pp. 149; B. Jordan, “The Ceremony of the Helots in Thucydides IV 80,” \textit{L’antiquité classique}, vol. 59, (1990), pp. 54.
\item Calling \textit{krupteia}, or the “Secret Service Brigade,” as the “ultimate rationale and raison d’être” of the particularly gruesome \textit{agôgê}, Cartledge sheds some light on one of the darkest institutions of ancient Sparta in the following words: “An élite few of the eighteen-year-olds were specially selected … to kill, after dark, any of the Spartans’ enslaved Greek population whom they should accidentally-on-purpose come upon either in Lakonia or more especially in Messenia.” Cartledge, \textit{Spartan Reflections}, pp. 88-90; Cartledge, \textit{The Spartans}, pp. 29.
\item Evidence for similar land-bound agricultural servitude can be drawn from Theopompus, F. 122 = Athenaeus, \textit{Deipnosophistae}, 265b-c; for an evaluation of Theopompus’ views on Sparta, see Michael A. Flower, \textit{Theopompus of Chios: History and Rhetoric in the Fourth Century BC}, (Oxford, 1997), pp. 80-82; Hansen’s dubbing of Sparta as a typical example of Werner Sombart’s ‘consumer city’ appears congruous to our historical sketch of a polity that rested on the relation of domination between the producer-serfs and consumer-\textit{homoioi}: “In c. 500 BC there lived in the city of Sparta c. 8,000 Spartan full citizens and their families. The Spartans were neither farmers nor craftsmen: they were professional soldiers. Out in the countryside in Lakedaimon and Messenia the land was cultivated by helots, farmers tied to their masters, who were required to hand over a part of their crops to the Spartans. In the relation between helots and Spartans we can see a distinction between a larger population of farmers on the land, exploited by a much smaller population of consumers in the urban centre.” Hansen, \textit{Polis}, pp. 91; cf. Foxhall, ‘Access to Resources in Classical Greece: The Egalitarianism of the Polis in Practice’, pp. 216-217.
\item Viggiano dates the Rhêtra to a later date following the Spartan defeat at Hysiae in 669 and what he calls the “subsequent helot revolt that resulted in the Second Messenian War”. Relaying no other evidence, literary or otherwise, than the intensely questioned, and largely rejected, solitary reference of Pausanias, he argues that Rhêtra served as the political remedy for a Sparta that was in demographic
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on textual grounds, the document is centred upon the recognition of phulai, ‘tribes,’ and obai, ‘villages,’ in what seems to be a spatial organization of the demographic basis of polity. This preponderance of spatial elements, not to mention their explicitly Dorian colouring, matches rather well with later forms of political reform. The structural correspondence between Great Rhêtra and later politically programmatic documents can, of course, be taken

and military trouble. Leaving aside the historicity of Pausanias’ record, there is no corroborating of later traditions to the effect that Rhêtra severed the political ties between the initial three Dorian tribes to reforge it covering the wider expanse of the five obai. Further, only if the later invention of the Lykurgan constitution as a panacea for all the issues of the pre-Lycurgan Sparta is taken for its word can one take seriously the claim that there was no re-emergence of polity-related problems once the Rhêtra was issued. Unfortunately, despite what little evidence he offers for his reconstruction, Viggiano’s attempt largely boils down, in the end, to one that aims at planting facts on the ground. Gregory F. Viggiano, ‘The Hoplite Revolution and the Rise of the Polis’, in Men of Bronze, pp. 125; Pausanias, Guide to Greece, 2.24.7; for the earliest thorough critique of the historicity of Pausanias’ record, see Thomas Kelly, “The Traditional Enmity Between Sparta and Argos: The Birth and Development of a Myth”, The American Historical Review, vol. 75 no. 4, (Apr., 1970), pp. 971-1003; for a recent questioning of the battle’s historicity, see Matthew Trundle, ‘Spartan Responses to Defeat: From a Mythical Hyseaia to a Very Real Sellasia’, in Brill’s Companion to Military Defeat in Ancient Mediterranean Society, ed. by Jessica H. Clark and Brian Turner, (Leiden and Boston, 2017), pp. 145-146.

Massimo Nafissi renders the much discussed ‘phulai phulaxanta kai obas obaxanta’ as a physical equivalent of the literal foundation of three tribes and five villages. He carries that literal translation to its conclusion by claiming that the ‘fictitious character’ of the document is most evident in that it does not venturing into spelling out the specifics of either polity or administration. I have two central objections to these assertions. First, Nafissi’s rendition of the rather ambivalent phrase seems to border on a typical case of ‘traduttore traditore’ as it completely evades any question pertaining to the metaphorical sense in which the words might have been used. In short, ‘to obe the obai,’ may signify the positing of the obai as the foundations of the politeia. Even if it is granted that the terms are primarily used in their physical sense, moreover, the retrospective outlook of the document would again permit a reading of obai’s foundation as homologous to the erection of the polity’s pillars. Second, Nafissi does not name what other archaic laws he has in mind when he points out an alleged incongruence. And yet what, admittedly limited, surviving first-hand accounts of archaic laws we have all enact a ground of hermeneutic ambivalence without necessarily spitting out procedures and specificities. Both Tyrtaeus’ ‘oracle’ and Solon’s idiosyncratic horoi or shield between dêmos and hêgemones, to give two oft-analysed examples, are much more obscure than they are translucent. The literary allusions to the Draco’s code of law, likewise, are full of non-procedural elements to the effect that there does not appear to be something remotely similar to the modern understanding of the word of the law. So, despite agreeing with the modern scholarly consensus that the what little fragments survive from the ancient Greek law reflect a procedural rather than a substantive itineracy, I do not think that this argument, by itself, suffices to overturn the authenticity of any record backed by ancient, albeit feeble, testimonia: Plutarch, Solon, 17.1-6; contra, Gagarin, Early Greek Law, pp. 12-14, 19-20; Stephen Todd and Paul Millett, ‘Law, Society and Athens’, in Nomos: Essays in Athenian Law, Politics and Society, (Cambridge, 1990), pp. 5. Conceived through the lens of an ingrained interplay between politics and poetics, the phrases these verses utilise demonstrate twists and turns that are, at times, no less perplexing than the fifth-century tragedians’ ceaseless recycling of Homeric and Hesiodic myths. In the end, Nafissi’s rejection of the document on the basis of its textual qualities, not to mention the similarities the document displays, as remarked by Lipka, in relation to other extant Spartan sunthekai, or ‘official treaties,’ on account of its grammatical structure that is heavy-laden with infinitives, overlooks the fact that the document as we have it fills a historical lacuna between a backwater Sparta and one that began to dominate Messenia and Laconia no later than at the end of the first half of the seventh century: se non è vero, è ben trovato. Massimo Nafissi, ‘Lykourgos the Spartan “Lawgiver”: Ancient Beliefs and Modern Scholarship’, in A Companion to Sparta, 1, pp. 98; Massimo Nafissi, ‘The Great Rhêtra (Plut. Lyc. 6): A Retrospective and Intentional Construct?’, in Intentionale Geschichte: Spinning Time in Ancient Greece, ed. by Lin Foxhall, Hans-Joachim Gehrke and Nino Luraghi, pp. 104-110; cf. Lipka, Xenophon’s Spartan Constitution, pp. 33-34.
as the implicit proof of a historiographically well-versed attempt at forgery. The document’s tailored-fit into the historical timeline, however, dissuades such a sceptical elaboration while leading us towards our second argument: it can be hypothesised that the addition of Amyklai to the initially four-village structure of Sparta can be historically juxtaposed on the basis of archaeological evidence to a temporal range that can plausibly be ascribed to the document.  

This reconstruction has the further advantage of providing a plausible explanation for the peculiar Spartan institution of dyarchy. Epitomising the equal distribution of political authority while taking note of the differences in seniority, the institution might well have functioned as a formal recognition of the political kratos of the former king of Amyklai. The “physical coalescence of the four villages that constituted the heart of Sparta,” may have occasioned a formalisation of the most vital aspects of a polity reformed to answer the needs of a citizen body that was growing into a Laconic force in its own right. Thirdly, the resonance of Great Rhêtra’s political programme with the features of the Spartan polity as it is mentioned in Tyrtaeus’ fragments affords us a valuable chance of cross-examination, which largely holds out. The omission of the otherwise well-documented body of ephoroi, for example, strikes one as a conspicuous absence. We are in a position to retrospectively evaluate this absence, in the case of Great Rhêtra at least, as a likely candidate for an intentional omission of the earliest defenders of the return to patrios politeia, or ‘ancestral constitution,’ that took the Spartan

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1307 The specifics of which village’s incorporation may have triggered the issuance of the Great Rhêtra need not concern us. Indeed, Cartledge’s hypothesis that the merger of Pitana and Limnai, which are the ancient seats of Agiad and Eurypontid kings respectively, and not the final addition of Amyklai into the coalition may have led to the document’s production can be accepted without necessarily changing the premise: the document was issued before the eventual conquest of Messenia: Paul Cartledge, *Sparta and Lakonia*, pp. 90-92; we do not avow, of course, any adherence to the standard model that attempts to explain the Rhêtra as announcing the twin membership of any Spartiate in any one of the phylai and obai. For a recent appraisal of the standard model, see Marcello Lupi, ‘Citizenship and Civic Subdivisions: The Case of Sparta’, in *Defining Citizenship in Archaic Greece*, pp. 163-167.

1308 Hall, *A History of the Archaic Greek World*, pp. 213; de Souza, Heckel and Llewellyn-Jones, *The Greeks at War*, pp. 33; any role that was ascribed by the later tradition to the Pythia in regard to the institutionalisation of the dyarchy appears to stretch back at least as far as Herodotus: *Herodotus, Histories*, 6.52.5; cf. Lipka, *Xenophon’s Spartan Constitution*, 8.5.

1309 Equally disconcerting, however, is that the only document that is making a clear reference to ephors is a list that is compiled by Charon of Lampsacus in the fifth century. The historical context whence this list sprang, moreover, is barely more congenial to an authentication. Indeed, with an ever-increasing inventiveness endowing the quasi-mythical figure of Lycurgus with any and all aspects of the Spartan polity, including its amendments, the foggy provenance of Charon’s list has enticed many modern scholars to rest their case with the authenticity of Pausanias’ Rhêtra. *FGrH*, 262 T1; for an evaluation of Ephorate on the basis of associated literary evidence, see Nigel M. Kennell, *Spartans: A New History*, (Chichester, 2011); Cartledge makes the additional point that Ephorate’s absence from the Rhêtra may either have to do with the official propaganda of the almighty dyarchs or the relative brittleness of the office at the time of Rhêtra’s writing: Cartledge, *Sparta and Lakonia*, pp. 117; we have no way of knowing which historical tradition was used by Plutarch in his attribution of the institute to the quasi-mythical Lycurgus: Plutarch, *Lycurgus*, 5.35-39; cf. Strabo, *Geography*, 10.4.18; Lipka, *Xenophon’s Spartan Constitution*, 8.4; Pausanias, *Guide to Greece*, 3.5.2.

1310 Throughout this historical study I refrain from rendering the ancient Greek politeia as constitution for two main reasons. First comes a philological reason: the Latin constitutio whence the modern term
politics by storm during the first quarter of the fourth century. Indeed, there is an oft-mentioned likelihood that the finalized version of Great Rhêtra as it was passed on to us itself may be the brainchild of the Agiad Pausanias.\textsuperscript{1311} Never the less, it is anything but conceivable that such an interjection of extensive forgery could be offered to the Spartans with a still-formidable and increasingly hostile \emph{homoioi} constituency by a regent who saw his fortunes rise and fall at the behest of the “oligarchy within oligarchy.”\textsuperscript{1312} Likewise, we have the scholarly authority of the Aristotelian Lyceum from whose corpus Plutarch has almost certainly pouched the Great Rhêtra. Given that either Aristotle or some senior members of his school who might have written the document could simply not be oblivious to the state of the Spartan world that started to leak heavily following the naval defeat of Cnidus in 394, the provenance of the original document, albeit modified but not extensively, appears to be vindicated.

Fourthly, thanks largely to the studious probes of Hodkinson beneath the veneer of Spartan austerity, we are now in a better position to evaluate the later tradition’s relationship to the history of Sparta prior to the invasion of Laconia and Messenia. Hodkinson’s study of the Olympic victory lists,\textsuperscript{1313} for one, has convincingly shown that the archaic Sparta was far from

\textsuperscript{1311} And yet to substantiate such a sceptical reading is no easy task. First off, only one historical document refers to Pausanias’ booklet, i.e., a fragment of Ephorus cited by Strabo and the rest of literary evidence seems quite circumstantial. Aristotle’s claim that Pausanias wanted to abolish the Ephorate, for one, even granting that it is true, does not offer anything about the history of the institution. Grounded upon what little evidence we have, I incline to accept the authenticity of the Rhêtra as it was preserved by Pausanias or whomever else and concur with Ephraim David in arguing that the omission of both any allusion to Pausanias’ booklet and to Great Rhêtra by Xenophon can be conceived of as part of Xenophon’s infamous silences. Strabo, \emph{Geography}, 8.5.5; Aristotle, \emph{Politics}, 1301b; Ephraim David, ‘Xenophon and the Myth of Lykourgos,’ in ed. by Anton Powell and Nicolas Richer, \emph{Xenophon and Sparta}, (Swansea, 2020), pp. 212.

\textsuperscript{1312} Anton Powell, \emph{Athens and Sparta: Constructing Greek Political and Social History from 478 BC}, 2nd edition, (London, 2001), pp. 103

being the land of homoioi in economic terms. Sumptuary legislation, one of the foremost strands of historical evidence denoting a higher aversion to flamboyant consumption, is indeed conspicuous by its absence until at least the end of the sixth century. In fact, the Olympic four-horse chariot race, the very byword of luxury in the ancient Greek world, has all the makings of having been a Spartan playground through the archaic period. And while it is fitting to recall that Olympics had taken on the mantle of being the most prestigious of pan-Hellenic events, which is another way of saying that the individual Spartans who were crowned victors achieved renown for themselves and their polis alike, it is equally apt to note that contemporary archaeological evidence of conspicuous spending are also present. The abundance of Laconian black-figure pottery, with its carefully adorned species ranking foremost among grave offerings and sumposia utensils in equal measure, for example, show no trend of dwindling until the end of the sixth century. How far back into the archaic period can this vista of Spartan homoioi that is internally divided into an oligarchy within an oligarchy, and an oligarchy plain and simple can be carried? We claim, in answering that question, that the foundations of the ‘twin oligarchy’ of Sparta were well in their place by the emanation of the Great Rhêtra. While any inadvertent shift toward teleologism is to be rejected out of hand, the


1315 Anton Powell, ‘Sparta: Reconstructing History from Secrecy, Lies and Myth’, in A Companion to Sparta in 2 Volumes, ed. by Anton Powell, (Hoboken and Chichester, 2017), pp. 20; Maria Pipili argues against Powell’s argument by insisting on the export-oriented production of the Laconian black-figure which depended essentially on satisfying the aesthetic demands of Samian and Etruscan elite. The continued tradition of the black-figure, according to that interpretation, should not be regarded as suggestive of social changes. Pipili’s elucidation does not address, however, the important question of what to make of the undisturbed production of exquisite pottery if the literary tradition of sixth-century Spartan puritanism is taken at its word. The discrepancy between official propaganda and economic activity that would arise from such a clash of social and economic interests is not improbable to conceive. But nor it is highly likely given that it would introduce an additional layer of social division within the homoioi. Maria Pipili, ‘Laconian Pottery’, in A Companion to Sparta, 1, pp. 139; cf. Hans van Wees, ‘The Common Messes’, in A Companion to Sparta, pp. 250-251.


1318 The internal cleavages, needless to add, did not translate into a strife-ridden phalanx which was incessantly reproduced against the demands of helots, perioikoi and Spartan women: “Even if we discount the 95 percent or so of disenfranchised residents of Laconia–perioikoi, helots and Spartan women–the truth is that even within the subgroup of male citizens, participation in government was limited to a very small group of men, most of them rich.” Pomeroy et al., A Brief History of Ancient Greece. pp. 105.
continued expansion of territory under the control of Spartan polity over the course of the seventh century indicates that the document was particularly well-suited to sate what has been fittingly called a “permanent state of internal war.” Messenia’s subjugation and the helotisation of its population, in that vein, was the stepping stone whence sprang the Spartans to Peloponnesian hegemony. Further, there is also the historical tradition that Spartan polity largely operated on laws that were unwritten and thus unbinding. Indeed, for a community that ventured into unprecedented lengths to ensure the “rearing” of law-abiding homoioi it appears quite puzzling that the archaic Spartans seem to have scorned any transcriptions of nomoi. And yet the Rhêtra’s status as a peculiar exception to the rule elicits no amazement if we account for the fact that it facilitated the adoption of quite ad hoc measures with little to no strict adherence to the guidelines. Appearances notwithstanding, the Rhêtra facilitated the production of made-to-measure responses of polity to tame any wildcard of a social or political development back into the deck. So, cui bono?

If this interpretation is correct, then the Rhêtra served as a colonial charter rather than a Lycurgan document of foundation, which is validated by the thorough subjection of Laconia and Messenia with hardly any change of the Spartan polity. The third century

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1319 Ober, Demopolis, pp. 54 n. 22.
1320 Horrific as collective treatments go, it is always important to recall there was nothing typical about Messenia’s subjugation to the contemporary Greek citizen: “the treatment meted out to the unfortunate Messenians was unparalleled in the whole of Greek antiquity, being comparable perhaps only to the treatment of the Irish by England in more recent times.” Cartledge, Sparta and Lakonia, pp. 100.
1321 We will presently ponder upon the (in)famous agôgê or upbringing but Cartledge’s analysis of the Spartan terminology can be taken as a clue of what will be substantiated: “Literally, this [agôgê] means a ‘leading’ or ‘raising’ and might therefore be thought by us to be more appropriate for cattle than humans. But the Spartans could not have agreed less: they extended the cattle-rearing metaphor to the groups and sub-groups into which the boys were divided and subdivided.” Paul Cartledge, Spartan Reflections, (Berkeley, 2001), pp. 83; Cartledge, The Spartans, pp. 64.
1323 I find it quite difficult to grasp how Osborne manages to dissociate land hunger from waging war as a means of communal self-definition. On that note, it appears rather evident that Spartans did not strive either for the possession of Messenian or Laconian soil per se but for the formation of an overweening polity of extortion that was driven by the perpetual economic and social antagonism between them and their publicly owned helots. Indeed, for all we know, the four obai that constituted Sparta may indeed have less than sufficient manpower to effectively farm all their territory. The point is, of course, that land hunger is almost always accompanied by labour hunger in the ancient Greek world. I do not contend that the Spartan miles ludens did not play an extensive part in the definition of the homoioi. But I think it equally certain that Spartans made war to invade a spacious territory and to helotise a large population in that order and not the other way around. Further, objecting to the motivation of territorial expansion also results in the rejection of the authenticity of what little arguably contemporary evidence we have whose references to the ‘bountiful Messenia,’ as we will presently see, seem illuminating. Osborne, Greece in the Making, pp. 172; cf. Forsdyke, Exile, Ostracism, and Democracy, pp. 291-292; Lin Foxhall, ‘The Control of the Attic Landscape’, in Agriculture in Ancient Greece: Proceedings of the Seventh International Symposium at the Swedish Institute at Athens 16-17 May, ed. by Berit Wells, (Stockholm, 1992), pp. 157-158.
debates circulating around the theme of ancestral klêroi and their later embezzlement by the rich homoioi offers us a viable picture of what might have ensued the invasion of Messenia. Polybius and Plutarch, who appear to have leaned heavily on the Aristotelian Lakedaimonian Politeia, both insist on an initially equal division of lots, which is further detailed in Plutarch’s account as distributed to a round number of citizens: 9,000. Polybius further notes that a certain proportion of this standard klêroi was assigned to each of the homoioi as a public bestowal dubbed politike khora that could only be confiscated if the stipulated monthly contributions to sussitia were forfeit. Defaulting on monthly contributions had the social stigma, moreover, of demotion to the rank of hypomeiones which entailed the complete loss of rights accorded to homoioi. But the question still stands: cui bono?

Every Spartiate benefited, tremendously. Parts of Tyrtaeus’ verses have been taken as indicative of an alarming disparity between the rich landholders and the poor multitude, and with good reason: if the exploitative edifice that homoioi built utilised Messenian land as the former’s pillars then helotised Messenians would make for its girldes. Why redistribute your own property when you can appropriate those of others? The Spartans created a veritable Garden of Eden for themselves by laying waste to all other poleis around them. This earthly paradise, however, needed to be fed continuously in order not to wither away. Retrospection allows us to claim, in fact, that the homoioi would spend the better part of the sixth century on chasing the dream of further conquests in Arkadia, Libya and Sicily. Since there is no

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1324 Plutarch, Lycurgus, 8.3; Polybius, The Histories, 6.45.3.
1325 I agree with Cartledge’s rendering of the word as signifying an extension of politai, i.e., ‘citizen-holdings’, which would separate it from the publicly owned land that included all the that was farmed by perioikoi. This interpretation would not only iron out the mismatches between Polybius’ and Plutarch’s accounts but it would also allow us to date politike khora’s invention to the period after the Battle of Leuktra in 371 BC, which, despite the Spartan ingenuity in mythmaking, seems too late to speak to any ambition of a Spartiate body that had shrunk to a historical low in the Classical era: Cartledge, Sparta and Lakonia, pp. 143; Jean Ducat, ‘Le citoyen et le sol à Sparte à l’époque classique’, in Hommage à Maurice Bordes, Annales de la Faculté des Lettres et Sciences Humaines de Nice, vol. 45, (1983), pp. 143–66; Hodkinson, Property and Wealth in Classical Sparta, pp. 63-112; Hodkinson, ‘Sparta: An Exceptional Domination of State over Society?’, pp. 42-43; Hodkinson, Property and Wealth in Classical Sparta, pp. 65-186; contra Hans van Wees, ‘Luxury, Austerity and Equality in Sparta’, in A Companion to Sparta, pp. 206.
1326 Aristotle, who is our earliest source to refer to klêroi, on the other hand, appears quite unequivocal in his treatment of the legally permissible transfer of land either by gift or bequest: “For their lawgiver [presumably Lycurgus], while he quite rightly made it a disgrace to buy and sell land in someone’s possession, left it open to anyone to transfer it to other ownership by gift or bequest – and yet this inevitably leads to the same result.” Aristotle, Politics, 1270a19-21.
1327 See, for example the so-called Eunomia’s interpretation in Hans van Wees, ‘Tytaeus’ Eunomia: Nothing to Do with the Great Rhetra’, in Sparta: New Perspectives, ed. by Stephen Hodkinson and Anton Powell, pp. 2-6.
1328 For Libyan and Sicilian episodes that took place between 515-510 as well as their import see Herodotus, The Histories, 5.42-46; Figueira, ‘Population Patterns in Late Archaic and Classical Sparta’, pp. 173-175; Stephen Hodkinson, ‘Inheritance, Marriage and Demography: Perspectives upon the
rupture of the Spartan eugenics in the historical tradition and no indication of a sudden population boom, there does not seem to be much of an answer to the question “why bother?” besides a very material and class-ridden one: the equal lots in Messenia were growing increasingly unequal. Indeed, the rich Spartiate’s elaboration of equal klēros was problematic from the beginning. Following the historical tradition with reserve, we claim with van Wees that the principal of equality that is accorded to the initial klēroi need not be conceived in absolutist terms. If we concede that the conquered land of Messenia was divided into equal lots and distributed among the Spartiates in addition to the Laconian periōikoi, who might have been growing restless as a result of their relative lack of property, there is still the question of what to make of the unequal landholdings in Laconia. Likewise, if a relative principle of equal distribution of annexed lots in proportion to respective differences in tenure, officeholding, etc., is conjectured to be the norm, then we would again arrive at a more skewed picture of landholdings distinguishing the rich homoioi from the rest. Either way, the creation of a body of citizens to the order of 10,000 with equal landholdings in Messenia, but unequal ones in Laconia, had fleshed out a polity whose politai would easily be classified as gentleman-warriors in any poleis of the archaic Greek world.

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1329 Indeed, the results of various archaeological surveys of Laconia has confirmed that there was no population pressure as the land was far from having been filled in the seventh century. If there was a land hunger, it was instigated in the main by the increased landholdings of the rich homoioi: “It was not a single shortage of land which lay behind the Spartan occupation of Messenia or indeed its colonization of Taras. Rather, any kind of land hunger might have been a result of the engrossment by aristocratic families of large estates, which were not intensively farmed, but equally were not made available for free subsistence farmers …” William Cavanagh, ‘An Archaeology of Ancient Sparta with Reference to Laconia and Messenia’, in A Companion to Sparta, pp. 65; William Cavanagh, Christopher Mee and Peter James, The Laconia Rural Sites Project, (London, 2005); the settlement patterns obtained from the Laconia survey can be compared to those of the Messenia which sprang from the long-term studies conducted by University of Minnesota Messenia Expedition and Pylos Regional Archaeological Project: Susan E. Alcock, ‘A Simple Case of Exploitation? The Helots of Messenia’, in Money, Labour and Land, pp. 185-199.


1331 If pressed to make a choice between the two models, however, I would prefer the first reading on the grounds that its alternative would exert too much pressure on a polity of inequality at a time when the socio-political constraints on sumptuary consumption or communal messes were potentially absent.

1332 Thomas Figueira’s comparison between the posited landholdings of the Athenian census classes and those of the homoioi appears to be a fitting way to flesh out the context: “The size of the late archaic or the early classical klēroi has been a matter for scholarly speculation, but c. 14.4-17.2 ha. is a likely magnitude. … Klēroi not only exceeded the median Attic landholdings, but they also generated output surpassing that of Athenian Zeugitai (notional hoplites), or 200 agricultural measures, and approximating that of Hippeis (‘Knights’) of Athens (300 measures). All Spartiates possessed holdings comparable to the lower range of the affluent elite in other poleis.” Thomas J. Figueira, ‘Helotage and the Spartan Economy’, in A Companion to Sparta, pp. 571; Thomas J. Figueira, ‘Helot Demography and Class Demarcation in Classical Sparta’, in Helots and Their Masters in Laconia and Messenia: Histories, Ideologies, Structures, ed. by Nino Luraghi and Susan E. Alcock, (Cambridge, 2003), pp. 199-201; cf. Hodkinson, Property and Wealth in Classical Sparta, pp. 131-145.
how did the rich Spartiates apportion the land that had been publicly consigned to their poor counterparts? The answer is simple: by letting time take its course.

Spartan rights of partible inheritance differed from the examples known from other poleis. The Spartan heiresses, or patrouchoi which literarily meant the ‘holder of patrimony,’ could, unlike the Athenian epiklêroi, or transmitters of klêroi, for example, inherit property. Hailed as one of the most significant attributes that gave rise to the later ideal of empowered Spartan women,1333 this feature would allow the latter to inherit property without any interference from a male kurios. Two models have been offered by Hodkinson to measure out the demographic effects of discrepancies in childbirth, or legitimate children reaching to maturity, between different social groups: the first one, ‘the universal female inheritance,’ which he postulates for Sparta, involves daughters inheriting the whole property if there is no brother around and inheriting only half the son’s share if there is one. The second ‘residual female inheritance,’ by contrast has the daughters inherit only if there is no son. Hodkinson’s study,1334 and van Wees’ later extrapolations from its results,1335 show a dramatic rise in the inequality of wealth is a discerning feature of the both systems which is further entrenched with each passing generation. Even if full equality to the ‘Generation One’ is granted, for example, two generations would suffice for the Spartan model to regress to a point at which half of the population has 0.75 of their original shares whereas 25 per cent would have at least 1.2. Further, if we make allowance for the conceivable fact that those with the most property would choose to marry one another, the projected distortion is even more rampant: it takes one generation for 63 per cent of men to inherit just 0.2-0.5 of their equal shares which is coupled with 0.1-0.3 units owned by women to produce, at most, 80 per cent of the original unit. It did not take long for the ancestral klêroi to begin crumbling, and that with the assumption that the Messenian klêroi had introduced a measure of equality to the whole citizen-body. What remains, in that vein, is to discuss that promise itself.

We are more or less in the dark regarding the political structures that were built in most of the other poleis of the archaic period. Yet, the Spartan polity may be viewed as ranking among

1333 See, for example, Sue Blundell, Women in Ancient Greece, (Harvard, 1995), pp. 155-156.
the first manifestations of the ancient Greek maxim “land qualification equals citizenship.” There are three main loose ends that have been claimed to contradict this reconstruction of the Spartan archaic polity. First off, there is the question of round figures. Both numbers, in that vein, seem to be educated guesstimates based on a limited number of figures available elsewhere. Herodotus’ remark on 7,000 Spartiates accompanied by 35,000 helots travelling to fight at Plataea, provides us with a number that is certainly within the acceptable range of the Spartiate population at the time. If we extrapolate the numbers of the Spartan force at Plataea back through time along the lines of a population model to the eighth century, then we arrive at numbers that are quite comparable to those of Thucydides. The problem is, so could either Polybius or the author of Lakedeimonion Politeia. Despite the evident shortcoming of not having a working population model or the benefits of modern statistics close by, both of the authors were of considerable erudition about the Spartan population trends in particular to postulate a tentative calculation on the basis of other surviving evidence. A second loophole arises in regard to the potential construal of the supposed equality of lots. Employing a strong reading is basically out of question for the simple reason that there is enough contemporary evidence to suspect that archaic Spartan politics was dominated not only by the diarchic Agiad and Eurypontid houses but also by other eupatrid, or ‘of good fatherhood,’


Figueira carries this point forward by arguing that the number of 9,000 ancient shares could have been estimated by the ancient authors on the basis of Herodotus’ and Aristotle’s works in which the highest number of Spartiates is given to the order of 9,000-10,000 at the time of battle of Plataia. If numbers are anything to go by, Figueira contends, then based on the limited allusions to the numbers of archaic Spartiates in the historical tradition one can argue for a steady increase in the citizen-body from c. 630 to c. 465, which is consequently followed by a steep decline. The lack of historical room that this account offers for otherwise attested events such as the foundation of Taras and the conquest of Kythera, however, not to mention the implausibility of conceiving a Spartan force of 2,000 to achieve a task of the tall order of subduing Messenians, however unorganized they were, do not seem adequately persuasive: Figueira, ‘Helotage and the Spartan Economy’, pp. 571-572; Figueira, ‘Helot Demography and Class Demarcation in Classical Sparta’, pp. 223; Thomas J. Figueira, ‘Population Patterns in Late Archaic and Classical Sparta’, Transactions of the American Philological Association, vol. 116, (1986), pp. 170.

The relationship between eupatridae as the carriers of an exclusively male ideology reminiscent of the Roman dictum, “mater certa, pater incertus,” and the presumable forms of what Aristotle in the third century called the Spartan gynarchy offers a good sparring field to jostle against the thesis of relatively liberated Dorian women. A truncated version of any elaboration of the rapport necessarily needs to tie some historical loose ends: the political kratos that was simply denied to the archaic Spartan women, and the economic kratos that they had through the use of their right to inherit property. Recent studies have demonstrated, in regard to the first question, that a certain degree of pre-martial culture of athletic prowess and public upbringing aside, there was precious little that the women of ancient Sparta had in the way of political power. Their economic potency, by contrast, was indeed formidable in the light of the fact that unlike their counterparts elsewhere they had the right to inherit property on a rate of 2:1 to the male Spartiates. Given that further consideration of this relatively equal inheritance scheme is offered above, we conclude this synopsis with our agreement with Hodkinson’s claim that “women’s contribution of property to the household gave them the capacity for varying degrees of influence [within the oikos].” Stephen Hodkinson, ‘Female Property Ownership and Status in Classical and Hellenistic Sparta’, in ed. by Deborah Lyons and Raymond Westbrook, Women and Property, (2002), pp. 14; Ellen G. Millender, ‘Spartan Women’, in A Companion to Sparta, 2, pp. 508; Ellen G. Millender,
families\textsuperscript{1339} that controlled the \textit{gerousia}.\textsuperscript{1340} Given the obscurity of the office of ephorate at this early date, the \textit{gerontes} needed to be endowed with a sufficient degree of political authority and economic rigor in order to counterweigh the dyarchs. The particular degrees of weak interpretation to be chosen, on the other hand, hinges on the population model that is used and the import that is attached to archaeological evidence showing widespread disparity in wealth. Drawing from the modern renditions of recently conducted area surveys,\textsuperscript{1341} later literary traditions of steadily falling numbers of the homoioi or what Aristotle later called \textit{oliganthropia}\textsuperscript{1342} and the aforementioned Spartiate tendency to indulge in conspicuous expenditure, we argue that a lightly skewed distribution of kl\textit{ê}roi was all that was required for the ‘oligarchy within oligarchy’ to build vast networks of land holdings through selective marriages and extra-legal appropriations of the kl\textit{ê}roi of defaulting homoioi. This leads us to the third issue that needs to be addressed in the accounts provided by Polybius and

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'Athenian Ideology and the Empowered Spartan Women’, in \textit{Sparta: New Perspectives}, pp. 363-364; for a more optimistic reading of the communal upbringing of Spartan women, see Sarah Pomeroy, \textit{Spartan Women}, (New York, 2002), pp. 3-32; Pomeroy, \textit{Goddesses, Whores, Wives, and Slaves}, pp. 42; Lipka, \textit{Xenophon’s Spartan Constitution}, 6.1-2; for some historical references to the eupatrides, see Aristotle, \textit{The Athenian Constitution}, 13.2; Plutarch, \textit{Theseus}, 24-25.\textsuperscript{1339} “Even if there was a degree of “similarity” among the Spartiates themselves, Sparta was a layered oligarchy. At the top, at least in a titular sense, were the two kings; they were supported by twenty-eight Elders and checked by five Ephors, who kept everyone on the Spartan straight and narrow path. Then there were thousands of Spartiates who made up the assembly – eight thousand at the start of the fifth century. This was the ruling class, and their subjects were the mass of the disenfranchised or relatively disenfranchised populations of Laconia and Messenia.” Waterfield, \textit{Creators, Conquerors, and Citizens}, pp. 115.\textsuperscript{1340} Rose mentions no preference and argues instead that the prolonged distortion of initial allotments of kl\textit{ê}roi indicate a prominence of aristocrats in squeezing \textit{damos} as it does elsewhere in archaic Greece: Rose, \textit{Class in Archaic Greece}, pp. 284.\textsuperscript{1341} Cavanagh \textit{et al.’s} surveys of rural Laconia, for one, has shown that the area began to be covered with an extensive network of small farmsteads only in the sixth century. There are two ways of interpreting the rise of the small plots of cultivated lands: to take it as a sign of increasing equality in landholdings or just a smaller proportioning of fields than before. According to the second construal, the ‘facts on the ground’ need not speak to a more egalitarian social order and may just as well indicate that the rich homoioi diversified their landholdings for the sake of minimising risk in economic and social in equal measure. We incline on a view that conveys a relative equality in landholdings as a result of the apportioning of Messenia into roughly equal kl\textit{ê}roi in the first couple of generations. Needless to say, this view does not confirm, as argued above, that the former equality of landholdings had become increasingly distorted by the turn of the century. Cavanagh, ‘An Archaeology of Ancient Sparta with Reference to Laconia and Messenia’, pp. 70; Catling’s reports have confirmed the location at least one new \textit{perioikik} settlement founded in the vicinity of Sellasia around 550 BCE. R. W. V. Catling, ‘The Survey Area from the Early Iron Age to the Classical Period (c.1050–c.300 BC)’, in \textit{Laconia Survey I: Methodology and Interpretation}, ed. by W. Cavanagh, J. Crouwel, R. W. V. Catling, and G. Shipley, (London, 2002), pp. 168-169, 183.\textsuperscript{1342} Aristotle, \textit{Politics}, 1270a33-34; contra Lipka, \textit{Xenophon’s Spartan Constitution}, 1.1; Paul Cartledge, \textit{Agesilaos and the Crisis of Sparta}, (London, 1987), pp. 400-405; for a recent introduction to the historical phenomenon that does not appear to account for the paucity of archaeological evidence, see Timothy Doran, \textit{Spartan Oliganthropia}, (Leiden and Boston, 2018); for a recent espousal of Aristotle’s analysis especially for the post-Leuktra Sparta, see Josiah Ober and Barry R. Weingast, ‘The Sparta Game: Violence, Proportionality, Austerity, Collapse’, in \textit{How to Do Things with History: New Approaches to Archaic Greece}, ed. by Danielle Allen, Paul Christesen and Paul Millett, (Oxford and New York, 2018), pp. 161-185.

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Xenophon's *Lakedaimonion Politeia*\(^{1343}\), namely, other sorts of action that was deemed punishable by the loss of citizenship. The addition of the failure in completing *agôgê* does not render whole one’s inquiry into the economic and social cracks through which the *homoioi* fall. A string of humiliating reprimands for the offence of fleeing from the battlefield,\(^{1344}\) for example, is well-attested in later sources. Whether there were other offences that were punishable by the loss of ancestral *klêroi*, however, is basically anybody’s guess. The only extenuating piece of evidence that we can offer to throw some light on these Spartan institutions that are shrouded in a fog of mystery is the fact that the *homoioi* recognized that they had to rely on their collective valour and vigilance in order to keep a vastly outnumbering helot population in line. The Spartiates were masters of correctly gauging waves of disgruntlement. They knew that they could encounter a tough pill of class struggle to swallow if they pushed their helots into the muddy swamps of overexploitation.\(^{1345}\) Indeed, the very existence of a later tradition that brands the appropriation exceeding the half of the total production of helots that were publicly assigned to one’s *klêroi* as an offence indiscutable by demotion to the ranks of *hypomeiones* speaks volumes to the significance attached by the Spartiates to the maintenance of their relations of production.\(^{1346}\) We claim, on that note, that the *homoioi* were well aware of the necessity to keep their numbers abreast of a certain glass floor and thus negated the potentially shrinking impact of rising numbers of confiscations by assigning the re-appropriated land to other *hypomeiones* that had lost their Spartiate status for

\(^{1343}\) For an account of all the major debates hovering above the theme of the document’s authenticity, see Lipka, *Xenophon’s Spartan Constitution*, pp. 5-9.

\(^{1344}\) The string of punishments that the *tresantes*, i.e., ‘tremblers,’ were liable to are memorably recorded by pseudo-Xenophon’s late fourth century *Lakedaimonion Politeia*: “ἐν μεν γαρ ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσιν, ὅποταν τικοῖς γῆνηται, ἐπικλῆσιν μόνον ἔχει κακός εἶναι, ἀγοράζει δὲ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ὁ κακὸς τάγαθρο καὶ κάβηται καὶ γομνᾶται, εὖν βούληται- ἐν δὲ τῇ Λακεδαίμονι πᾶς μὲν τις αἰσθηθεῖ τὸν κακὸν σύσκηνην παραλαβεῖν, πᾶς δὲ ἐν παλαιόματι συγγυμναστείν, πολλάκις δ’ τοῦ τουτοῦ καὶ διαμορφοῦντος τοὺς ἀντισφαιριωτάς ἀχώριστος περιγίγνεται, καὶ ἐν χοραίς δ’ εἰς τὰς ἐποιείδιστους χώρας απελαύνεται, καὶ μὴν ἐν δόοις παρασχωρητέοιν αὐτῷ καὶ ἐν θάκοις καὶ [ἐν] τοῖς νεοτέροις ὑπαναστατεῖν, καὶ τὰς μὲν προσήκουσις κόρας οἴκου θρεπτέουν, καὶ ταύτας τῆς ἀνανδρίας αἴτιαν ὑφεκτέον, γνακακὸς δὲ κενὴν ἔστιν οὐσίν περισσέον καὶ ἀμα τούτοις ζημίαν ἀποτειστέον, λιπαρὸν δὲ οὔ πλανητέον οὖν διήμητέον τοὺς ἀνεγκλήτους, ἡ πληγᾶς ὑπὸ τῶν ἀμινδόνων ληπτέον.” *Ibid*, 9.4-6.

\(^{1345}\) “The appearance of a massive theoretical and empirical study of class struggle in the ancient Graeco-Roman world as a whole (Ste. Croix 1981) has confirmed my earlier view (Cartledge 1975) that the dominant and decisive contradiction or tension of Spartan society can fruitfully be analysed in terms of a class struggle between the Spartiates and the Helots.” Cartledge, *Agesilaos and the Crisis of Sparta*, pp. 165; for an analysis that is quite similar except for its toned-down references to anything related to class, see Ober, *The Rise and Fall of Classical Greece*, pp. 142-143.

\(^{1346}\) Tyrtaeus, F. W 6; Hodkinson develops the details of this sharecropping system and argues against the modern misconception that the appropriation of half of production took away any incentive of the farmer to increase productivity. His emphasis on the significance that the maintenance of the relations of production bore for the Spartiates merits reiteration: “The uninterrupted maintenance of helot production was crucial to their [Spartiates’] own position. Sharecropping was consequently the most secure arrangement in the Spartan-helot relationship, characterized as it was by a long-term mutual interdependence between landowner and cultivator.” Hodkinson, *Property and Wealth in Classical Sparta*, pp. 130.
one reason or another. The main drawback of such a system of essentially *ad hominem* check
and balances is, of course, that it had no safety-net to fall back upon in case oligarchy within
oligarchy grew too powerful to contend with.

How did the Spartiates manage to cope with all these socio-political issues that they were
entangled with? One way of floating the boat was to carry on with the expansionist agenda.
As we highlighted above, fifth-century Sparta acted no less predatorily towards other *poleis*
than that of the earlier centuries. Kynouria’s conquest was one such sixth-century high
watermark that showed,\(^\text{1347}\) alliances with other Peloponnesian states to the contrary, the old *ethos* of conquest was alive and well. By 550, with the trickling down of all external
expansions to the lowest ebb in centuries Spartiates rediscovered the possibility of internal
colonisation and began to push their helots ever harder.\(^\text{1348}\) Foreboding half a century of
interneceine warfare, the helots would repay in kind, but then so would the *hypomeiones* whose
ranks were deepening as the century’s close draw nearer. A second way of maintaining the
steady course of overexploitation was the continuous development of martial capabilities and
cohesion. There was nought besides war-making that the *homoioi* excelled at. As their
landholdings expanded, heavier additions to the erstwhile light panoply became more
affordable for the rank and file *hoplitai*.\(^\text{1349}\) Combined with the further benefit of all-
encompassing military drills,\(^\text{1350}\) the heavily-armoured hoplites created an *ethos* of a virtual
‘war camp’ out of the five *obai* and built a life of martial prowess to send tremors to their
enemies’ hearts on and off the battlefield.\(^\text{1351}\) By the end of the sixth century Sparta had grown
into a bootcamp with festivals celebrating athletic rigor and war dances,\(^\text{1352}\) *agôgê* and its

\(^{1347}\) Although insecurely dated to the half century between 600-550, as recent studies of the Spartan road
system and its use of Kynouria as a hub has suggested the border zone’s conquest was finalised no later
than in the first half of the sixth century: Jacqueline Christien, ‘Roads and Quarries in Laconia’, in *A
Companion to Sparta*, pp. 620.


\(^{1350}\) We accord with van Wees’ proposed dates of a hoplite transition that took place, contrary to what
the proponents of ‘hoplite orthodoxy’ claim, during the first half of the sixth century: *Ibid*, pp. 254;
Hans van Wees, *Greek Warfare: Myths and Realities*, (London, 2004), pp. 166-183; Louis Rawlings,
The Ancient Greeks at War, (Manchester, 2007), pp. 54-58.

\(^{1351}\) I do not necessarily disagree with Hodkinson’s idea that the literary tradition beginning with
Thucydides is responsible, in the main, for the generation of this facet of the ‘Spartan mirage.’ The
point I am willing to make is rather that an adulation of athletic rigor intertwined with a drill-ridden
upbringing of Spartan youth to instil discipline and obedience to authority could also have been amped
up in this period. To the eyes of the external observers this appeared as a discerning trait of the Spartan
society. Whether or not Spartans actually believed in their ethos of martial distinction, is an entirely
different matter: cf. Stephen Hodkinson, ‘Was Classical Sparta a Military Society?’, in *Sparta and War*,
ed. by S. Hodkinson and A. Powell, (Swansea, 2006), pp. 111-162; for the analogy between peacetime
Spartan regulations and those of contemporary war camps set up by soldiers from other *poleis*, see Plato,

\(^{1352}\) Everett L. Wheeler, “*Hoplomachia* and Greek Dances in Arms”, *Greek, Roman, and Byzantine
uncompromising age-groups and whippings, officially-sanctioned ridicules of tremblers and a growing supply of ‘delinquent’ hypomeiones that bade their time and waited for a window of opportunity to strike at their former messmates. Sussitia and like-minded measures make up the third, and final, safe harbour that the Spartan ship would take shelter in against the turbulent waters of class and ethnic struggle. The turn of the century marks, as we noted above, an abrupt drop in the number of recorded votive offerings. A similar trend can also be observed in the context of smaller number of Spartan victors at the Olympics. Sussitia fits into this context of increased aversion of ostentatious spending as the pomp and grandeur of former andreia is replaced with an institution that appears to encourage uniformity. One should be careful, of course, not to create a polarity between the former andreia and its successor. Sussitia, in the end, was only a halfway social measure to create an illusion of distorted equality: distorted because the kings’ portions were twice as much as that of other Spartiates; and, illusionary because one knew which messmate had the adequate material means to make bonus contributions and which others were feeling the breath of hypomeiones breathing down their neck. Concomitant with a notable slide away from economic and social equality, by the end of the sixth century the supposedly egalitarian ideas of yore had already begun to peck at the ideology of austerity masking the Spartiate luxury.

Tyrtaeus’ specification of Messenia as eurokhoros, i.e., ‘spacious,’ and good for farming, fits into the general pattern of lust for land that we highlighted above as speaking to the need

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1353 Lipka, Xenophon’s Spartan Constitution, 2.7-9.
1354 What van Wees dubs a “a programme of reform” to introduce the “classical culture of austerity” comprised elements that were hoped to provide some measure of comfort to an ideology of sameness that had begun to leak heavily as conquests broke to a halt. Instituted sometime after 550 BCE, sussitia can be juxtaposed to sumptuary legislation and an increasing weariness shown towards imported luxury goods, which blunted the dazzling glare of luxury consumption. Van Wees, ‘Luxury, Austerity and Equality in Sparta’, pp. 226; van Wees, ‘The Common Messes’, pp. 236; Anton Powell, ‘Sixth-Century Lakonian Vase-Painting: Continuities and Discontinuities with the “Lykourgan” ethos’, in ed. by Fisher and Van Wees, pp. 128-138.
1355 Aristotle, Politics, 1272a2-4; Alcman, F. W 98.
1356 It is interesting to note that even that illusion was somewhat unpalatable to the aristocratic taste of Aristotle. He could stomach the prospect, after all, only if there was an additional layer of social discrimination to keep two distinct sussitia from one another – one for the citizens and the other for the non-citizens! Aristotle, Politics, 1331a19-1331b13; cf. Paul Millett, ‘Encounters in the Agora’, in Kosmos, pp. 203-228.
1357 “In consequence, throughout the classical period Sparta operated effectively as a plutocracy in which Spartan state and society were dominated by the private interests of the wealthiest families. For much of the time the impact of this plutocracy was masked by the superficially levelling effects of the common citizen way of life and restrictions imposed on certain means of everyday expenditures.” Hodkinson, ‘Sparta: An Exceptional Domination of State over Society?’, pp. 49.
1358 Tyrtaeus, F. W 5. 2-3; Osborne argues that the spaciousness in question can hardly be a compelling factor for the Spartans whose settlement were far from occupying the majority of arable lands in Laconia, which is further supported by archaeological evidence concerning Dark Age settlements. Only with the combination of a lopsided use of Tyrtaeus’ poems and the conjectured import of identity building in the expense of a vilified other, however, can this train of thought emphasizing ‘roles’ and
of ensuring a steady supply of cereal to sustain the members of the war band.\footnote{identities’ can supplant the record of Sparta’s prolonged struggle with, for instance, Argos and Tegea, but more on this point later. Osborne, \textit{Greece in the Making}, pp. 172-174; for the archaeological record concerning the expansionist leanings of Dark Age Spartan settlements, see Cartledge, \textit{Sparta and Lakonia}; cf. Waterfield, \textit{Creators, Conquerors and Citizens}, pp. 115-116.} What creates a rather idiosyncratic pattern in its own right is the enslavement of the defeated Messenian and Laconian population as farmers bound to the appropriated land as helots.\footnote{Luraghi counters the claim that the First Messenian War was propelled towards the conquest of the whole Messenian region by arguing that the former “was not an all-out war of regional expansion, all the more so since for him [Tyrtaeus] Messene was not the whole region, but probably only a settlement or a portion of the region.” Luraghi, \textit{The Ancient Messenians}, pp. 71-73.} With the satisfaction of the territorial motives, the tables were set for the enactment of a frozen class structure that was based on ethnic differences and the δορικτητος χώρα, i.e., power of spear.\footnote{This can be compared to Waterfield’s adumbration of the personal seizure of defaulting debtors that led to the crisis of the early sixth century Athens as a fitting into a common pattern of enslavement in the ancient world: “The main symptom was that many of the poor had got themselves into a vicious cycle of escalating debt to the rich, which was exacerbated by the fact that security for debt was taken out on the debtor’s own person. This was not an uncommon procedure in the ancient world – the Babylonians were already doing it early in the second millennium BCE, for instance – but it meant that if the debtor defaulted, the creditor sold him and his family abroad into slavery to recover what he was owed, or turned them into debt-bondsmen to work for him for free.” Waterfield, \textit{Creators, Conquerors and Citizens}, pp. 78; for a recent discussion of different slave systems utilized by the archaic and classical Greeks in the eastern Mediterranean, see David M. Lewis, \textit{Greek Slave Systems in Their Eastern Mediterranean Context}, c. 800-146 BC, (Oxford, 2018).} The parallels of political structure as it was canvassed by Tyrtaeus and the writer of the Great Rhêtra offer not uncompelling evidence of a political system that had underwent a major transformation by the advent of the Second Messenian War. The kings, despite the obscurity of their quantity, presided over a community of gerontes that consisted of thirty members with the addition of the former. \textit{Gerousia} served in the capacity of the principal decision-making body with the kings divested of their initial prerogative powers. Selected from a pool of over sixty-year-old Spartiates, gerontes served for life and prepared business for the Assembly. They also acted in judicial capacity as the court that rendered judgements on a variety of cases from homicide suits to public cases and demotions to Inferior status. In short, the Council, whether it was instituted by the legendary figure of Lycurgus or not,\footnote{Our reconstruction of the timeline for this period accords with Millender’s postulation of the Great Rhêtra as predating Tyrtaeus. We also concur, on that note, with Papakonstantinou’s hypothetical arguments to the effect that the renown that would be enjoyed by a document of the Great Rhêtra’s import could explain the familiarity that Tyrtaeus exhibits in regard to the content of the constitutional changes. Ellen G. Millender, “Spartan Literacy Revisited”, \textit{Classical Antiquity}, vol. 20 no. 1, (April, 2001), pp. 127-129; Zinon Papakonstantinou, \textit{Lawmaking and Adjudication in Archaic Greece}, (London, 2008), pp. 74 n. 6; contra Hans van Wees, ‘Tyrtaeus’ Eunomia. Nothing to Do with the Great Rhêtra’, in \textit{Sparta: New Perspectives}, pp. 24, 35 n. 70; for the later Alexandrian expansion of the theme of ‘spear-won land’, see Silvia Barbantani, “The Glory of the Spear: A Powerful Symbol in Hellenistic Poetry and Art”, \textit{Studi Classici e Orientali}, vol. 53, (2007), pp. 67-138.} manifested the legitimation of gerontes’ poaching on the erstwhile monarchical grounds of political...
power. This alteration of power relations, however, could only be supported if the economic basis of gerontes’ power was consolidated. And, by the time of Tyrtaeus’ writing of Eunomia, i.e., ‘good order’, we have clear indications that the economic groundwork of the Spartan society was established along the mutually-exclusive trilinear class lines of ‘pure’ Spartiate citizens, non-slave workers who ‘lived around’ Sparta or perioikoi, and the enslaved captives of common Messenian and Laconian stock.

Predating the Solonian reforms by more than half a century, the historical glimpses that we have of the Spartan state formation show that the boiling conflict between damos and aristocrats struck a chord of commonality between different poleis across the sixth century. Indeed, the growing opposition within the class structure of the Spartan and Athenian poleis during this period became an entrenched literary theme pitting commendable eunomia against loathed dusnomia. On that note, the Spartans of Tyrtaeus’ day preserved the oligarchic rule of their state by catering to the Spartan community’s interests in the form of outright regional expansionism. The Spartans, homoioi and perioikoi alike, could be politically free only if other Laconians and Messenians were subjected to the gruesome yoke. This dulling of the edge of economic demands via a recourse to political interests found another sublime expression in the reforms of Solon, which, again, were made in the hopes of establishing eunomia, a point which will be elucidated momentarily.

Returning to our thematic triad, it would be also be taken up, albeit in quite varied contexts, by the ‘pre-tyranny’ poets of the late seventh and early sixth centuries. The guiding threads that unite the works of Alcman, Sappho, Alcaeus, Theognis, and Solon as close contemporaries to one another spoke only sparingly to the potential continuation of Zeus’

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1363 There were two hereditary kings from the families of the Agiads and the Eyrypontids, and, although the former were traditionally the senior (Herodotus 6. 51), there (sic) were constitutionally equal in authority and thus acted as a check upon each other’s power. By the terms of the Great Rhêtra, their constitutional power was diminished by being included with no special privileges.” Fragkaki, “The Great Rhetra”, pp. 41 n. 38; cf. T. Buckley, Aspects of Greek History 750-323 BC, pp. 66.

1364 We side with Rose and van Wees on the question of the rider. Tyrtaeus’ fragments are quite translucent in spelling out the political hierarchy that should have been well-entrenched by his time. Further, if the rider is taken as a part of the original Rhêtra then a historically compelling case can be established between the Rhêtra’s enactment and the Second Messenian War in which the combing of the Messenian countryside was completed thereby strengthening the economic position of aristocrats and the political position of the non-Spartiate citizens with one fell swoop. Rose, Class in Archaic Greece, pp. 277 n. 26; van Wees, ‘Tyrtaeus’ Eunomia: Nothing to Do with the Great Rhêtra’, pp. 20-22; cf. Fragkaki, “The Great Rhetra”, pp. 48-49; contra Raaflaub and Wallace, “People’s Power” and Egalitarian Trends in Archaic Greece’, pp. 39.

coronation as one who hurls happy and hard times alike.\textsuperscript{1366} While the persistent reverberations of the Trojan War\textsuperscript{1367} and the struggles in the universe of immortals were still audible, the social setting in which the poet found herself figured increasingly along the more traditional themes even to the extent of colouring the reconstruction of mythic events with distinct hues. When Alcman, for example, alludes to divine requital and invokes arousing memories of a desired Hagesichora, literally, ‘chorus-leader,’ in the same fragment taken from a partheneion or maiden songs to be sung before the wedlock chamber,\textsuperscript{1368} or Sappho consoles her daughter Kleïs to be content with the headband she has while summoning Apollo to a ceremony presumably of a wedding,\textsuperscript{1369} the poetic time appears to conjunct with contemporary social and political permutations. Indeed, even the age-old celebration of aristocratic heritage and inherited wealth voices its steady paean to wealth juxtaposed to aristocracy\textsuperscript{1370} or pours invectives on poverty in the ‘common language’ of what goes around.\textsuperscript{1371} In fact, not only do we have passing remarks of the plight of some and the fortunes of the others,\textsuperscript{1372} but also have resonating examples of jibes against tyrants\textsuperscript{1373} as well as attempts to postulate some of the basic social ills that infect particular societies.\textsuperscript{1374} To be sure, the absorption of the poetic imagery in the social affairs of poets’ own days, even where a highly developed library of mythology does exist, is only to be expected when large-scale economic and social changes are in close vicinity. Yet, there arises the novel phenomenon of the quasi-de-mystification of the poetic representation when we turn our sights to the peculiar case of Solon.

\textsuperscript{1366} Alcman, F. W 1; Alcaeus, F. W 200; Theognis, F. W 11-14; Solon, F. W 4, 13.
\textsuperscript{1367} Sappho, F. W 16, 23, 44; Alcaeus, F. W 42, 44, 283, 387.
\textsuperscript{1368} Alcman, F. W 1.
\textsuperscript{1369} “I have a daughter who reminds me of | A marigold in bloom. | Kleïs is her name. | And I adore her. | I would refuse all Lydia’s glitter for her | And all other love. | I do not have an | Ornately woven | Bandeau to hand to you, | Kleïs. From | Where would it come?” Sappho, F. 132, trans. by Aaron Poochigian, in Sappho, Stung with Love: Poems and Fragments, (London, 2015).
\textsuperscript{1370} “With horses, rams, and asses, Cyrnus, we seek out | good blood, and everyone wants pedigree | to breed from; yet a man of class, if offered wealth, doesn’t mind marrying from worthless stock, | nor does a woman turn a base groom down, if he | be rich: she chooses money over worth. | Property’s what they value. Good stock breeds from bad | and bad from good; wealth has confounded blood. | Don’t be surprised then, Cyrnus, that the burgher’s stock | is fading: they’re diluting good with bad.” Theognis, F. W 183-92, trans. by M. L. West.
\textsuperscript{1371} Alcaeus, F. W 130b, 360, 364.
\textsuperscript{1372} Alcman, F. W 16; Sappho, F. W 55, 57.
\textsuperscript{1373} Alcaeus, F. W 70, 74, 141, 332, 348, 351.
\textsuperscript{1374} Theognis, F. W 39-52, 53-68, 183-192; Osborne designates Theognis’ bitter jibes against the unworthy nouveau-riches as a thematic nodal point that speaks to the age-old eupatrid grimace at the admission of the less well-born into their ranks that does not indicate any contemporary falling-out among the elite. That may be so. Still, such an approach hardly explains why those complaints were poetised at this point either by the Megaran Theognis or the Athenian Solon except for blanket dismissals on grounds of wanton fragmentary survivals or later fabrication of poems: Osborne, Greece in the Making, pp. 209.
4.3.2 Solon of Athens and the Athenian Polity

First off, we ought to state the obvious: Solon was not a poet alone. Written in the early sixth century, the surviving fragments of his political poems qualify as some of the few contemporary literary evidences that, combined with archaeological and epigraphic record, elucidates the transformation of the Athenian political system by himself. Elected as the regent by the two warring classes essentially made up by the hêgemenes, i.e., propertied aristocrats, and the dêmos, i.e., all the rest of the society made up mostly of pauperized commoners, to oversee wide-ranging reforms Solon acted in full capacity in order to devise political strategies delivering the Athenian citizens from the edge of the social precipice of undiluted class warfare. Naturally, Solon, as we noted above, cannot be regarded as the sole representative of this poetic focus on the social issues that were the order of his day, we have the testimony of both Alcaeus and Theognis to attest to that. Solon’s historical idiosyncrasy lays rather on the fact that he gave a first-hand account of the changes which he was not only a participant but the very enactor of, and one that was heavily invested in their outcome at

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1375 Whether he was an oral poet whose poems were only later, that is in the fourth century, collected into a corpus or not appears largely beside the point. An allowance for later introduction of potential changes needs, naturally, to be made. But such concessions hardly amount to a wholesale transformation of the historical Solon as our sources have him. The point that needs to be stressed, in that sense, is that in the case of Solon and his philologically authenticable fragments we have a more secure footing than, say, in that of Theognis. For an example of the argument that Solon was an oral poet that did not commit anything to writing, see André Lardinois, ‘Have We Solon’s Verses?’, in Solon of Athens, pp. 24; for the fourth century invention of the Solonian tradition, see Eva Stehle, ‘Solon’s Self-Reflective Political Persona and Its Audience’, in Solon of Athens, pp. 110.


1379 The thematic correspondence between Solon’s and Theognis’ surviving fragments on the gaping maw between the rich and the poor, as well as the social strife it breeds, for one, has been argued by some scholars to vindicate a universalising reading. Forsdyke, for one, surmises from Theognis’ verses that the otherwise unattested Plutarchan tradition about the Megaran palintokia, ‘the return of the interest,’ which was issued to make the creditors refund the interest that they collected on the debts that they had given to the poor, shows a structural affinity between the social impediments and their conceived remedies between the two poleis. Sara Forsdyke, Exile, Ostracism, and Democracy: The Politics of Expulsion in Ancient Greece, (Princeton and Oxford, 2005), pp. 53-54; Plutarch, Moralia, 295c-d.
In terms of the historical build-up to the crisis of 594 BC, available literary and archaeological evidence appear to support the vista that the period 636 and 594 was especially turbulent for Athens. The oligarchic system that had been in existence for about a century and a half by the middle of the seventh century was based on the annual election of nine Archons with clear distinctions as to their respective jurisdictions. The eponymous archon, for example, served as the head of the polis and gave his name to the calendar year with the king archon presiding over religious affairs, the polemarch regulating military activities and the other six *themosmothetai*, i.e., regulators, probably overlooking the office-related actions of their peers in auditing capacity. The archons also exercised juridical powers, though it eludes us in which spheres and to what extent exactly, and the cases of homicide were judged by a total of fifty-one judges that made up the Areopagus Council which met on the hill by that name in the western part of the Acropolis. Further, there was also an aristocratic *boulê* that deliberated on what recommendations to propose to the *ekklêsia*, i.e., Assembly. The *boulê* would inform the officers responsible when the ratification in favour of a measure was made by the councilors. That the assembly did not have any, in all likelihood, sovereign capacity we can infer both from Solon’s creation of a second council and its dubbing in literary and archaeological evidence both as *boulê демосиê* (popular council). Indeed, aptly named by Ste. Croix, Ober and Waterfield as the “rubber-stamp of the Council’s decisions,” the assembly functioned as the pictorial manifestation of the rampant economic and social inequality that gripped the Athenian society. The selective preservation of some significant pieces of Solonian reforms, in addition to the emphases made by Solon himself, suggests that

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1380 Solon, F. W 32.
1381 The contemporary evidence that is given by Theognis for his native Megara, not to mention the grim picture that was later drawn, probably with the aid of other literary evidence that is not available to us, by the Aristotelian *Athenaion Politeia*, show that the aristocrats’ devouring of the *hekêmoroi* was all too real. Theognis, F. W 39-52; Aristotle, *The Athenian Constitution*, trans. by P. J. Rhodes, (London, 2002), 2.1-3.
1382 “An attempt at tyranny by Cylon in 636 was followed by two emergency appointments (Dracon in 621 and Solon in 594), and then three further attempts at tyranny (Damasias in 581 and Peisistratus in both 560 and 556), before Peisistratus was finally successful on his third attempt in 546. Evidence has turned up recently of the violence of at least one of these lurches: in 2015 archaeologists have discovered, in a mass grave in a suburb of Athens, the remains of eighty young men, dating from the second half of the seventh century; they were tied together at their wrists, and all eighty of them had been executed by heavy blows to the head. Perhaps they were supporters of Cylon.” Waterfield, *Creators, Conquerors and Citizens*, pp. 76; for Cylon in the ancient Greek historical tradition, see Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War*, 1.126.3; Herodotus, *The Histories*, 5.71; Plutarch, *Solon*, 12.1-9; Aristotle, *The Athenian Constitution*, 1; Herodotus, *The Histories*, 5.71; Pausanias, *Guide to Greece*, 1.28.1, 7.25.3.
the stacking up of burdens and the phenomena of hektémoroi and pelatai, ‘sixth-partners’\textsuperscript{1385} and ‘dependants,’ respectively, were both common evils that haunted the vast majority of the Athenian population.\textsuperscript{1386} Perhaps having played a role also in inducing many debtors to leave their lands and seek to settle elsewhere, the unbridled piling up of debt, coupled with the lack of any protection on the persons of the defaulting citizens, effectively meant slavery for the pelatoi or the poor farmers who largely made up the citizen body.\textsuperscript{1387} All the surviving historical evidence, in that vein, support the argument that “The crisis which Solon attempted to solve in 594/3 was, therefore, one between exploiters and exploited, rich against poor, there was at this stage no regional dysfunction or geographical disunity in Attica.”\textsuperscript{1388}

\textsuperscript{1385} The Athenaion Politeia’s equivocal rendering of the rate of dues regularly collected in kind from the hektémoroi has led to a divergence of scholarly opinions. While some scholars insist that one-sixth of the total produce could make a difference because of the inherent constraints to agricultural productivity, others have pointed out that a bondage of one-sixth hardly qualifies as dire-straits given that the limited contemporary testimony of other such collective arrangements, such as Tyrtaeus’ passing reference to helots bringing their Spartiate masters half of their produce, and claim on that grounds that the term should be taken as signifying the amount owed as five-sixths instead. Given the unendurably stifling air of social discontent that any kind of arrangement along the lines of latter interpretation would generate and the dire social circumstances portrayed in Solon’s poems, I incline to interpret the term as indicating that the pre-Solonian farmers kept only one-sixth of the produce to themselves. For similar arguments in favour of our adopted position; Thomson, Studies in Ancient Greek Society, pp. 213; Buckley, Aspects of Greek History 750–323 BC, pp. 86–87; Van Wees, Farmers and Hoplites: Models of Historical Development’, pp. 232–233; Hans van Wees, The Mafia of Early Greece: Violent Exploitation in the Seventh and Sixth Centuries BC’, in Organized Crime in Antiquity, ed. by Keith Hopwood, (London, 1999); van Wees, ‘Mass and Elite in Solon’s Athens: The Property Classes Revisited’, pp. 378–379; Hanson, The Other Greeks, pp. 122; contra Dillon and Garland, The Ancient Greeks, pp. 306; Murray, Early Greece, pp. 191; G. E. M. de Ste. Croix, ‘Solon, the Horoi and the Hektemoroi’, in Athenian Democratic Origins and Other Essays, pp. 116–117, 122; Pomeroy et al., A Brief History of Ancient Greece, pp. 114; Rose, Class in Archaic Greece, pp. 300 n. 78; P. J. Rhodes, ‘The Reforms and Laws of Solon: An Optimistic View’, in Solon of Athens, pp. 252-253; Sancisi-Weerdenburg takes the term to denote the low percentage of rent as a realistic “correlate of the quality of the soil.” Put differently, the hektémoroi’s dependence on productively marginal land as a measure of last resort may have translated into the lower than usual rent, if one is to interpret it as owing only a sixth: Heleen Sancisi-Weerdenburg, ‘Solon’s Hektemoroi and Pisistratid Dektemoroi’, in De Agricultura, ed. by Sancisi-Weerdenburg et al., (Amsterdam, 1991), pp. 20-21; for an altogether distinct conception of hektémoroi as referring to a “politically-imposed socio-geographical distinction,” which, unfortunately, is not supported by any allusion in the historical tradition, see Josiah Ober, ‘Solon and the Horoi: Facts on the Ground in Archaic Athens’, in Solon of Athens, pp. 451.

\textsuperscript{1386} “After this there was strife for a long time between the notables and the masses. For the Athenians’ constitution was oligarchic in all respects, and in particular the poor were enslaved to the rich – themselves and their children and their wives. The poor were called dependents and sixth-partners, since it was for the rent of a sixth that they worked the fields of the rich. All the lands were in the hands of a few, and if the poor failed to pay their rents both they and their children were liable to seizure. All loans were made on the security of the person until the time of Solon: he was the first champion of the people. The harshest and the bitterest aspect of the constitution for the masses was the fact of their enslavement, though they were discontented on other grounds too: it could be said that there was nothing in which they had a share.” Aristotle, The Athenian Constitution, 2.1-3; cf. Millett, Lending and Borrowing in Ancient Athens, pp. 48; Dillon and Garland, The Ancient Greeks, pp. 206.

\textsuperscript{1387} For Aristotle’s equation between debt-bondage and slavery as two subtypes of an entirely doulikon, i.e., ‘slavish,’ mode of labour, see Aristotle, The Athenian Constitution, 2.2; Kyrtatas, ‘Domination and Exploitation’, pp. 143.

\textsuperscript{1388} Dillon and Garland, The Ancient Greeks, pp. 306; cf. “The kind of class struggle which does force itself upon our attention again and again though Greek history (and much of Roman history) is mainly
Despite the fact of not knowing the exact mechanisms with which *esthloí* squeezed what little breathing space was left over to *kakoi*, it stands on firm historical ground in contending that the unlimited accumulation of wealth, as it was stigmatized, albeit on opposing grounds, by Theognis and Solon was seen by the contemporaries to be a prime suspect. The main predicament of the economic structure, in that vein, was not that it allowed the erection of a binary between the aristocrats and commoners on the basis of the existing relations of production. Indeed, not only was the emergence of a wealthy few at the expense of the barely self-sufficient majority considered to be entirely normal, but so was the social distinction afforded to the wealthy and the scorn poured on the poor. The natural differentiation of the wealthy and the poor only became a problem only when the material gap that separated them was widened into an unbridgeable chasm. Provided that we continue to hold that the primary source of wealth in ancient Greece was land, it can be induced from the Solonian poetic reconstruction of the tale of two cities that there was an intensification of aristocrats’ property in highly productive land. In the light of the fact that the radical demand of land redistribution is scornfully referred to in the Solonian poems, one core factor sparking the

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1389 It is interesting to note that these originally normatively changed terms were came to be embraced in common circulation as neutral ones by the time of Solon’s reforms. Indeed, Solon himself presents the fundamental social contradiction of his day as one between *esthloí* (‘good’=wealthy) and *kakoi* (‘bad’=poor). The presupposition that the self-proclaimed *horoi*-like (boundary stone) standing of the poet between the poor and the wealthy is a denunciation of partiality speaks volumes to the process of naturalization that the concepts underwent from the Homeric and Hesiodic works to early Classical period. Solon, F. W 5. 1-6; 36. 14-17; cf. Edward M. Harris, “Did Solon Abolish Debt-Bondage?”, *Classical Quarterly*, vol. 52, (2002a), pp. 415-430; Hans van Wees, ‘Mass and Elite in Solonian Athens: The Property Classes Revisited’, in *Solon of Athens: New Historical and Philological Approaches*, ed. by Josine Blok and André Lardinois, (Leiden, 2006), pp. 351; for a more detailed study of the aristocratic bias inherent to Solon’s poems, see Christoph Mülke, *Solons politische Elegien und Ianthen: Einleitung, Text, Übersetzung, Kommentar*, (Munich, 2002), pp. 358, 398; for an elaboration of the Aristotelian tradition of viewing Solon as a *mesos politês* or a ‘middling citizen,’ capable of issuing a polity which lies between the extremes, see Hans-Joachim Gehrke, ‘The Figure of Solon in the Athénaion Politieia’, in *Solon of Athens*, pp. 278-279; cf. Ellen M. Wood, ‘Demos versus “We, the People”: Freedom and Democracy Ancient and Modern’, in *Demokratia*, pp. 126-127.


1391 “It is like they say Aristodemus said | in Sparta once, a quite astute re | mark: | a man is what he owns; | no pauper is | a man of quality or high esteem. | Poverty is a hard and unstoppable evil: she, | with her | sister Resourcelessness, conquers a mighty host.” Alcaeus, F. W 360-364, trans. by M. L. West.

1392 Hall appears to concede this point despite voicing concerns that the relationship between public and private land in archaic Greece is not as straightforward as we might expect. His hypothetical reconstruction shows that even when hypotheses of overpopulation and colonization are rejected *tout court* on the basis of equivocal evidence, textual and archaeological record still afford the composition of a tune with a crescendo of class conflict: Hall, *A History of the Archaic Greek World*, pp. 216; cf. “What I think is clear from the parallels to Theognis and Alcaeus is that those who controlled the best land were somehow dramatically escalating their economic position to such a degree that the rest of the community were ready to resort to open conflict and welcomed any leader who offered to restrain these depredations and improve the lot of the poor.” Rose, *Class in Archaic Greece*, pp. 224.

1393 “Others came along for plunder. They had hopes of being rich, | every one of them expecting he | would make his fortune there | and that I, for all my cooing, would reveal a harsh intent. | After those
crisis indeed seems to be the commoners’ wholesale rejection of the material inequality effected by the economic structure of the polis.

Solon devised a fourfold scheme to mitigate the two sides by partially acknowledging their demands. First of all, he enacted seisachtheia or the ‘shaking off of burdens’ and cancelled the system of debt-slavery long established under the aegis of hektēmoroi. While being nothing like a concession of land redistribution to the poor, the seisachtheia granted minimal material allowance to those who had enough land only to practice subsistence farming. With the clear advantage of keeping five-sixths of their products to themselves, small farmers found it a bit easier to bear with their lot. As to the aristocrats, disappointed as they were of being ‘robbed’ of their customary due, they were granted a comforting solace in not having to cope...

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1394 Seisachtheia’s interpretation has proved to be a major bone of content between the majority who, either self-critically or not, conceive it in maximalist terms and the minority relying on the delicate separation of debt-slavery from debt-bondage. The maximalist may have the numbers on its side but hardly any crystal-clear textual evidence to settle the debate once and for all. The historically well-documented travails of Athenian polity in the immediate aftermath, not to mention the first two quarters of a century following it, moreover, argue that the contrary is more likely to be the case. In the end, it all boils down to whether one is prepared to confer historical agency to Athenian thêtès who were certainly growing more conscious of their economic and political potency by the day. We argue, based on the current state of literary and archaeological evidence, that such a hypothetical admission can indeed be made, which, in turn, leads to our inference that the lack of measures to lighten the economic load of thêtès was the driving force of swelling tides of discontent in the pre-Peisistratid period; Aristotle, The Athenian Constitution, 6.1; cf. Plutarch, Solon, 15; Dillon and Garland, The Ancient Greeks, pp. 299; Osborne, Greece in the Making, pp. 211; Morris, ‘Hard Surfaces’, pp. 40; Robert W. Wallace, ‘Revolutions and a New Order in Solonian Athens and Archaic Greece’, in Origins of Democracy in Ancient Greece, pp. 59; Wood, Citizens to Lords, pp. 32; Buckley, Aspects of Greek History 750–323 BC, pp. 98-99; for surveys and espousals of the minimalist arguments, see Lysias, Against Theomnestus, 18; Millett, Lending and Borrowing in Ancient Athens, pp. 49-50; Rose, Class in Archaic Greece, pp. 264–265; Rose, Sons of the Gods, Children of Earth, pp. 187; Paul Cartledge, ‘The Political Economy of Greek Slavery’, in Money, Labour and Land, pp. 162; Ste. Croix, ‘Solon, the Horoi and the Hektemoroi’, pp. 119; Josiah Ober, Democracy and Knowledge: Innovation and Learning in Classical Athens, (Princeton and Oxford, 2008), pp. 58; for an outright rejection of any cancellation of debts, see Hall, A History of the Archaic Greek World, pp. 218.

1395 Solon’s legislation on the standardization of weights and measures was directly related to the taxation system he devised for his four-class schema. Given that 560s is the earliest estimate of widespread use of coinage in Athens, Athenaios Politeia’s claim that Solon also legislated on coinage should be taken with a grain of salt. Aristotle, The Athenian Constitution, 10.1-2; cf. Dillon and Garland, The Ancient Greeks, pp. 314.

1396 Every penny mattered in the case of the small farmers of Attica. Agreeing with the estimate of 2-4 hectares (20-40 plethra) as the size of farm that an Athenian small farmer had to work with in the classical period whose conditions were, of course, incomparably better for reasons are elucidated below, we regard it as inevitable that secondary employment was prerequisite to sustain a family of four: “The essential point is that the ‘basic’ farm of Attica and Italy is universally considered too small to have supported by itself a peasant family, and the shortfall was significantly greater if animal labour was employed. It follows that access to other, typically uncultivated, land (and to other employment) was crucial, and that the fortunes of the peasantry fluctuated significantly with the availability of such land.” Garnsey, Famine and Food-Supply in the Graeco-Roman World, pp. 46.
with the heartrending prospects of a land redistribution.\(^{1397}\) The second measure of Solon was the cancellation of the practice of debts made on the security of the person and the repatriation of the former citizens that were enslaved due to having defaulted on their debts.\(^{1398}\) We do not have adequate literary or archaeological evidence to quantify the citizens that had been enslaved prior to the Solonian reforms. Solon’s fleeting remarks on the plight of the poor\(^ {1399}\) and the later reconstruction that is offered by the *Athenaion Politeia*,\(^ {1400}\) however, hardly invite the drawing of a rosy picture. Indeed, if we are to concede the claim that not only the debtor but his whole family was subject to seizure then this practice turns into quite a Procrustean one in that it allowed, coupled with the seizure of the defaulters’ land, a steady supply of slaves that were to toil on the farms that were used to be owned by them.\(^ {1401}\) With the elimination of seizure this screw on the small farmers was loosened.\(^ {1402}\) Yet, the comfort afforded to them was nowhere near a complete one since the lands that were seized antecedent to the passing of Solon’s law were not returned to their erstwhile owners. On the flip side, the aristocrats were content with not having to deal with a complete redress of the seizures that they made on defaulters’ lands, while presumably not exactly content with having lost their former slaves.\(^ {1403}\)

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\(^{1397}\) Waxing eloquent on the supposedly timeless roots whence sprout the twin sentries of fairness and harmony keeping the sacrosanct ideal of private property under their solemn gaze was to remain firmly in its place as a hallmark of aristocratic rhetoric from Solon’s time to that of Cicero. Vexed by the prospect of an agrarian reform that had steadily kept on ramming the socio-political basis of power of the entrenched *optimates* of the Late Republic, Cicero would not refrain from utilising any moralistic weapon, including setting the ideal of fairness on its head, that seemed plausibly potent in halting the advance of the reformist claims: “So those who seek to pose as ‘people-pleasers’, and with this in mind raise the agrarian issue to have owners shifted from their properties, or think that money owed by debtors should be remitted, are undermining the foundations of the state, which depends first and foremost on the harmony between classes … and secondly on fair dealing, which is totally abrogated if the individual cannot keep what belongs to him.” Cicero, *On Obligations*, trans. by P. G. Walsh, (Oxford and New York, 2001), 2.78; Wood, *Citizens to Lords*, pp. 129-130.

\(^{1398}\) Osborne, *Greece in the Making*, pp. 210; Waterfield, *Creators, Conquerors and Citizens*, pp. 78-79; for a reading that focuses on the implausibility of locating the enslaved citizens and hence argues that the claim should be read as propagandistic, see A. J. Dominguez-Monedero, *Solón de Atenas*, (Barcelona, 2001), pp. 54.

\(^{1399}\) Solon, F. 5. 1-6 Waterfield.


\(^{1401}\) “Moreover, at that time the disparity between rich and poor had, as it were, reached a peak…. All the common people were in debt to the wealthy members of society, because either they paid them a sixth of the produce they gained from working the land (which earned them the name of sixth-partners [*hektêmoroi*] or hired-hands [*thêtes*]), or else they put up their own persons as collateral for their debts and were forfeit to their creditors, in which case they might become slaves right there in Attica or be sold into slavery abroad. The creditors were so ruthless that people were often forced to sell even their own children—there was no law prohibiting this—or to go into exile.” Plutarch, *Solon*, in *Greek Lives*, trans. by Robin Waterfield, (Oxford, 1998), 13.10-11, 14-22.

\(^{1402}\) Osborne, *Greece in the Making*, pp. 213.

\(^{1403}\) Cf. “First, he forced the big landowners to disenclose common land and return it to public use, and he set limits on the amount of land that one man could own in Attica. These measures must have hurt, but the landowners had agreed to Solon’s appointment, and so they also agreed to his reforms, for the sake of stability. In the short term, this made more land available for public grazing. In the longer term, it also opened up this land for purchase, and indeed the evidence of archaeology shows that by the end
The legal promotion of artisanal production was the third of the Solonian measures. Striving to turn Athens into a vibrant commercial centre with a sufficient supply of grain to accommodate the newly arriving artisans and traders, Solon enacted new laws delineating the rights and liabilities of the growing population of *metoikoi*, i.e., resident non-citizens. As things stood before then, visitors from abroad were allowed to stay in Athens for a limited number of days as *parepidemos*; if they wanted to extend their period of stay then they were considered resident *metoikoi* and were responsible to pay *metoikion* or the metic tax.\(^{1404}\) The *metoikion* was collected monthly by the state officials at the rate of one drachma per month for a man and half that amount for a woman living without a male *kurios*, i.e., guardian. Given that they were not granted citizenship, they had no voting rights on either deme or *polis* level, but this did not mean that they were without legal protection.\(^{1405}\) Indeed, each metic was assigned a *prostates* or a citizen patron, who would represent them in court in case the need arose. Slowly but surely, artisans, artists, philosophers, orators, courtesans, metics one and all, would propel Athens towards being the epitome of excellence in production of numerous goods from Attic pottery\(^{1406}\) to the celebrated Athenian ‘owls.’ Arts and crafts needed practitioners to expand and grow. Solon, in all likelihood, may have hoped that the proliferation of professions would soak a not insignificant proportion of the urban poor thereby decreasing the general level of social discontent as well as generate income with hardly any effort on the officials’ part.\(^{1407}\) And yet, combined with the ban on the export of any edible goods except for the celebrated Attic olive oil,\(^{1408}\) *metoikoi*’s flocking to Athens did more: it created a more hybridised culture of commonality that stimulated the transmission of political,

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1404 Aristophanes of Byzantium, F. 38.
1406 It was during the Peisistratid reign that Athens finally supplanted Corinth as the centre of ceramics industry. With an additional touch of creative elegance, Athenian pottery then came to define styles that were to influence potters across the Mediterranean: Ober, *The Rise and Fall of Classical Greece*, pp. 158.
1407 Xenophon would feel no need to dim his enthusiastic portrayal of metics as most favourable source of income of Athens: “This group [metics] constitutes, I believe, one of the best sources of income Athens has, because they are self-supporting and help their states in a number of ways without receiving public pay for it; in fact, they pay a resident alien’s tax. I think their interests would be adequately served if we were to abolish all the rules which apparently deprive resident aliens of status and honour without helping the state in the slightest, and also were to rescind their obligation to form a company of heavy-armed infantry to serve alongside citizen units.” Xenophon, *Poroi*, in *Hiero the Tyrant and Other Treatises*, trans. by Robin Waterfield, (London, 2006), 1.6; cf. Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War*, 1.143.1, 3.16.1; Vincent Azoulay, *Xenophon and the Graces of Power: A Greek Guide to Political Manipulation*, trans. by Angela Krieger, (Swansea, 2018), pp. 60-61.
1408 While most of the commentators accept the ban as authentic, Garnsey carries the argument forward by claiming that a food crisis may have eventuated the preventive solution: “I believe that the law was an ad hoc measure issued in the context of a food crisis, and that shortage had been aggravated by unscrupulous land owners who were sending their grain abroad in search of higher prices.” Garnsey, *Famine and Food-Supply in the Graeco-Roman World*, pp. 74, 111; Plutarch, *Solon*, 24.1-2; Waterfield, *Creators, Conquerors, and Citizens*, pp. 79; Ober, *The Rise and Fall of Classical Greece*, pp. 152.
philosophical, artistic, religious, ethical, etc., ideas. Athens always stood apart from the majority of the poleis of Greek mainland in regard to its favourable maritime location. With the addition of foreign experts of a myriad of arts and crafts it would also begin to distance itself from the competition in artistic, artisanal and philosophical achievement.

The fourth, and the most democratically inclined, Solonian measure was widespread reforms of polity that can be addressed under three headings: political, administrative, and juridical. On the political front, Solon instituted an additional ‘probeuletic’ Council that was made up of four hundred citizens, a hundred from each new tribe he created. There is widespread disagreement concerning the election of the members of the new assembly and their relation to the selection of archons. All we can say with some measure of historical certainty is that Solon stymied aristocrats’ monopoly of council membership and hence tilted the balance of representative power significantly in favour of the non-aristocrats. Further, downscaling the eligibility criteria for highest political offices and boule service alike, Solon introduced a less aristocratically flawed political structure that allowed the voice of the demands of the members of the zeugitai to be heard in the boule in addition to acknowledging the participation of thetæ in the assembly. The enacted changes of the political structure, as can be seen, leaned heavily upon the new administrative division of the citizen body into four property classes. This division was made according to the specific measure of barley any estate was calculated to produce. The pentakosiomedimnoi owned estates that proved capable of producing a minimum of five hundred medimnoi of barley per year; the hippeis, or the ‘knights,’ estates

1409 In ancient Greek boule primarily denotes a deliberative function which is etymologically linked to bouleuetai and bouleuesthai meaning ‘to take counsel’ and ‘to deliberate’ respectively.


1411 Property class was named by the Athenians of the classical age as telê, hence giving its understanding a civic tenor, which stemmed from its semiotic roots in the fulfilment of obligations, with which it needs to be reconsidered from our contemporary lens: Martin Ostwald, ‘Shares and Rights: “Citizenship” Greek Style and American Style’, in Demokratia, pp. 56-57; contra Alain Duplouy, “The So-Called Solonian Property Classes: Citizenship in Archaic Athens”, Annales, vol. 69 no. 3, (2014), pp. 409-439.


1413 We are in agreement with Raaflaub and van Wees in interpreting the nomenclature as having to do, in the main, with the capability of owning a horse and not with riding one into battle. Solonian property classes appear to have taken their names from what their annual gross product could afford to keep and we do not think that hippeis was exception to that rule: Kurt Raaflaub, ‘Athenian and Spartan Eunomia, or: What to Do with Solon’s Timocracy?’, pp. 406; van Wees, ‘Mass and Elite in Solon’s Athens: The Property Classes Revisited’, pp. 362; cf. Herodotus, Histories, 1.63.2; Xenophon, Anabasis, 2.4.6; G. E. M. de Ste. Croix, ‘The Solonian Census Classes and the Qualifications for Cavalry and Hoplite Service’, in Athenian Democratic Origins and Other Essays, pp. 14 ff.
were valued at three to five hundred medimnoi annually; if someone produced between two hundred and three hundred medimnoi he belonged to zeugitai, which probably may have been drawn from zeugos, i.e., a span of oxen; and if he produced less than two hundred he became a thêtes, which originally meant a wage-labourer.\footnote{Mogens Herman Hansen, \textit{The Athenian Democracy in the Age of Demosthenes: Structure, Principles, and Ideology}, (Oklahoma, 1999), pp. 43-44.} The first two classes, pentakosiomedimnoi and hippeis were eligible, as we noted, for the highest offices, whereas zeugos in addition to the first two could be elected to boulê.\footnote{We are largely in agreement with van Wees’ extrapolation of the top three census classes’ ratio within the whole citizen-body from the literary evidence concerning the Athenian demography in 322 BCE. An estimate of 15 percent appears, in that vein, to accord well with later historical traditions and what we can confirm using archaeological studies: van Wees, ‘Farmers and Hoplites: Models of Historical Development’, pp. 231; van Wees, ‘Mass and Elite in Solon’s Athens: The Property Classes Revisited’, pp. 361; cf. Ian Morris and Barry B. Powell, \textit{The Greeks: History, Culture, and Society}, (Essex, 2014), pp. 225.} Thêtès, presumably by far the largest class, could only participate in the assembly.\footnote{The offices that were now open to the zeugitai were poletai, supervisors of public contracts and taxation, the ‘Eleven’ who were assigned the charge of the prison, and kolakretai who were endowed with financial functions: Buckley, \textit{Aspects of Greek History 750-323 BC}, pp. 92; Dillon and Garland, \textit{The Ancient Greeks}, pp. 309.} These administrative changes clearly signalled, coupled with the likely passing of additional measures geared towards stimulating rotation in office,\footnote{Though conjecturing a precise date as to the institutionalisation of the principles of rotation and non-iteration seems a rather risky venture given the patchy state of historical evidence, a survey of the contemporary epigraphic sources offers viable cues concerning the setting up of a reasonable time frame for the enactments. On that note, an inscription from Dreris on Crete that is dated back to 650-600 is one of the earliest examples of an unequivocal expression of a wide variety of punishments for anyone who transgressed the stipulated time limit—10 years—on re-election: ML 2; Raaflaub and Wallace, “‘People’s Power’ and Egalitarian Trends in Archaic Greece’, pp. 23.} an expansion of the decision-making body to cover a larger proportion of citizens\footnote{It is imperative to underscore the fact that the expansion of political participation was a far cry of an approximation to the later fifth-century ideal of equal participation for each adult male citizen. Indeed, the overall participative structure of the four-class system was, for all intents and purposes, as skewed as it was before the reforms. The reason for this latent oligarchic bias was that the numbers of zeugitai and thêtès were incomparably higher than the first two property classes. Combining this with the lack of any jury pay, it seems evident that the councillors and assembly-members belonging to the last two property classes could only come from the least pauperized portion of their number who could own slaves or hire free workers to make up for their own absence: “Far from abolishing these [classes based on property qualification], Solon seems to have extended them, perhaps adding another class and certainly making membership of a particular class a determining criterion for possession of various rights and duties. Not the least striking feature of these classes, however, as has emerged from recent re-examinations, is that they were heavily weighted towards the richest members of the society. Three of the four classes seem to have involved owning very substantial amounts of land. Solon is not here dividing responsibilities across the whole population of Attica, he is introducing distinctions among the rights of the rich élite.” Osborne, \textit{Greece in the Making}, pp. 208; cf. Lin Foxhall, ‘A View from the Top: Evaluating the Solonian Property Classes’, in \textit{The Development of the Polis in Archaic Greece}, ed. by L. G. Mitchell and P. J. Rhodes, (London and New York, 1997), pp. 113-136.} and can thus be taken as a significant factor reinforcing the ideology of polis-citizenship and accelerating, in hindsight, the movement towards fuller participation.\footnote{For a better appreciation of the peculiarity of the Athenian occasion, one can turn to a rich selection of examples, which are topped by the well-known case of Hippobotai of Chalcis, of hippeis-driven...}
the potential reception of the administrative measures of Solon, we have, on one hand, the reconciled masses whose unanswered economic demands were mellowed by their acquisition of political rights, which broke of the aristocratic monopoly of polis office. Not to mention the differential status of *geras* or *timê*, ‘honour,’ that was accorded to each census class, lower-class citizens had to trade off their aspirations of redressing social and economic inequality on ideological grounds of common citizenship. Esthloi, on the other hand, made a necessary sacrifice for the sake of extracting the deadly sting of potential redistribution of land. Likewise, the tweaks made in the juridical sphere accorded more rights to *ho boulomenos*, or any willing commoner, by allowing both the right to appeal to the jury-court and the right to bring cases that involved public interest to the *heliaia* or popular courts. Having acquired the legal means to protect their interests, common citizens became more perceptive of any potential infringement of their rights and thus identified with their polis much more than was the case beforehand.

An overall evaluation of the Solonian reforms needs to account for their effect on material production, political dissemination, and on the ideology of equal citizenship. The measures that was on offer at the time within the wider Greek world: Herodotus, *Histories*, 5.77.2; Aristotle, *Politics*, 1289b39, 1297b16-22; Plutarch, *Pericles*, 23.4.

1420 The conferral of citizenship to *hoi polloi*, according to Ober, had the further benefit of enacting a social barrier between lower class citizens and slaves thereby putting paid to any chance of a unified hyperpolitised *demos*’ rise: “If the Athenian masses fell into a position of status equality with the slave population, there would be a manifest danger of creating a homogenous lower class. And if that large lower class became conscious of its collective power, it could mean the end of the existing social order. Therefore, many among the elite may well have decided that the trade-off was to their advantage; the creation of a citizen mass, secure in its status, allowed the rich to exploit their foreign-born slaves as vigorously as they wished, with less fear of class revolt.” Ober, *Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens*, pp. 63.


1422 Aristotle, *The Athenian Constitution*, 9.1; Aristotle, *Politics*, 1274a; cf. “Cases were now divided into *dikai* and *graphai*. For a *dike*, a “suit” (in effect, a private suit), the prosecutor had to be the injured party himself or, if he was dead, his closest kin. For a *graphê*, a “writ” (in effect, a public suit), the prosecutor could be anyone at all–any disinterestedly concerned citizen, acting on behalf of the community.” Waterfield, *Creators, Conquerors and Citizens*, pp. 81; Nick R. E. Fisher, ‘The Law of *Hubris* in Athens’, in *Nomos*, pp. 124; for an analysis of the core distinctions between *graphai* and *dikai*, including some historical examples, see G. E. M. de Ste. Croix, “Notes on Jurisdiction in the Athenian Empire. I”, *The Classical Quarterly*, vol. 11 no. 1 (May, 1961), pp. 94-112; “Notes on Jurisdiction in the Athenian Empire. II”, *The Classical Quarterly*, vol. 11 no. 2 (Nov., 1961), pp. 268-280.

1423 Hansen’s estimates coveys a range of 175-225 days per year on which the courts were convened: Mogens Herman Hansen, *The Athenian Assembly: in the Age of Demosthenes*, (Oxford, 1991), pp. 186-188.

taken by Solon in regard to relations of production barely touched the root causes of widespread material inequality.\textsuperscript{1425} We have argued above that land redistribution had, by this time, become a shared demand of commoners which aids us to surmise that both \textit{dèmos} and \textit{hègemenes} recognized the concentration of landed property in the hands of the few as the origin of the social \textit{stasis} that ensued. Solon had no thought to spare for \textit{dèmos} in regard to resolving the structural impediments squeezing the material existence of the latter.\textsuperscript{1426} Indeed, both \textit{seisachtheia} and the cancellation of the \textit{hektêmoro} type of debt-slavery, were minimalist concessions which would economically lead to standardized deprivation, and not outright pauperization, of the small farmers.\textsuperscript{1427} The elimination of debt-slavery, after all, did not amount to a wholesale cancellation of debt-bondage.\textsuperscript{1428} With no trace, either archaeological or literary, of evidence indicating any degree of land redistribution, the debt-bondsmen qua \textit{thêtes} were continued to be exposed to the same degree of bondage that their predecessors had

\textsuperscript{1425} The tradition of Solon’s attempted restriction of funerary expenditure, for example, is clearly contradicted by archaeological evidence. Indeed, the aristocratic convention of erecting extravagant \textit{kouroi}, i.e., life-size or larger nude male or dressed female youths generally made from marble, carried on to be practiced without intrusion. Of course, one can resort to the Herodotean view of Solon’s ten-year absence from Athens in order to claim that some of his measures entertained very lax standards of application. Yet, the fact that \textit{kouro}-offerings continued unhindered shows simply that conspicuous consumption was still largely on offer: “Although \textit{kouroi} later became more modest in size, they formed one of the standard dedications for more than a century, and similarly the sphinx stele was the shape of grandiose commemoration of the dead until the middle of the sixth century. Neither of these developments shows any sign of having been checked in the early sixth century, despite the tradition of Solon’s interest in curbing funerary extravagance.” Osborne, \textit{Greece in the Making}, pp. 212; Cicero, \textit{The Laws}, 2.64; Herodotus, \textit{The Histories}, 1.29.1-10; cf. Rose, \textit{Class in Archaic Greece}, pp. 264; for a study that accepts the authenticity of the alleged laws but goes on to argue against its connection to socio-economic motives, see Josine H. Blok, ‘Solon’s Funerary Laws: Questions of Authenticity and Function’, in \textit{Solon of Athens}, pp. 199, 227.

\textsuperscript{1426} Lin Foxhall’s continued probes beneath the archaic and classical Greek soil utilizing the advanced techniques of survey archaeology has rendered this conclusion as lucid as any other. Dispelling unwarranted optimism and implicit teleologism alike, she has managed to point out that the orthodox binarism juxtaposing a debt-ridden Athenian \textit{dèmos} in the firm grip of slavery to the post-Solonian one that was epitomized with an enlarged basis of land-owning independent peasants owes its essentials less to fact than to fiction: “Although peasant smallholders were most likely the overwhelming majority of the citizen body, they did not, as a group, control a similarly overwhelming proportion of the primary means of production, that is, land. It is generally agreed that it is even less likely that they controlled a substantial proportion of other economic resources: shipping, mining, and slave-operated workshops, to mention a few, were generally activities of rich households. Therefore, it is evident that the overall economic control of Athens was in the hands of the ruling class, not peasant households. And, if this is so, given the substantial overlap between political and economic power in Athens, it is doubtful whether the model of the ‘peasant-democracy’, in which smallholders are considered to have held the most power, can seriously be maintained.” Foxhall, ‘The Control of the Attic Landscape’, pp. 156; cf. Osborne, \textit{Greece in the Making}, pp. 211, 213; Wood, \textit{Peasant-Citizen and Slave}, pp. 82.

\textsuperscript{1427} “What Solon did was to establish a “glass floor” or lower limit, below which members of the community could no longer fall.” Hall, \textit{A History of the Archaic Greek World}, pp. 219.

\textsuperscript{1428} Harris has demonstrated convincingly that various types of debt-bondage continued to be in wide circulation at least until the beginning of the fourth century: Harris, “Did Solon Abolish Debt-Bondage?”; this reappraisal of historical evidence should be contrasted to Ste. Croix’s earlier enthusiastic portrayal of Solonian reforms as they prohibited “pledging the body as security,” and thus “ruled out all forms of debt bondage too.” Ste Croix, \textit{The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World}, pp. 137; Millett, \textit{Lending and Borrowing in Ancient Athens}, pp. 78.
been. Further, the political liberation of thêtes from slave status could have worked to their detriment in incorporating an element of seasonal employment, not to mention tightened channels of credit.\textsuperscript{1429} That would exacerbate their economic ills.\textsuperscript{1430} If there was less dissatisfaction with the general contours of the Solonian reforms than with the antecedent relations of domination, that was largely because the social stigma of slavery clearly outweighed what little economic purchase it had in regard to having permanent ‘employment.’

Having realized that a tacit approval of ever-escalating politics of slavery that were to continue, albeit along ethnic lines from then onwards,\textsuperscript{1431} to hold the Athenian society in its tight grasp would put the tantalized dêmos potentially under even more pressure, Solon made significant concessions to the hitherto inarticulate, yet already politicised, political interests of commoners.\textsuperscript{1432} By getting the right to propose and vote nomoi through their partial participation in boulê and full participation in ekkôsi, the commoners now had a share in the political interests of the community that was worth looking after. Retrospection may entice us to assert that the overall impact of Solon’s laws was one that when dêmos had asked for bread they were given the vote.\textsuperscript{1433} Such an undialectical linearity, however, certainly overlooks the

\textsuperscript{1429} Buckley, Aspects of Greek History 750-323 BC, pp. 96; Millett, Lending and Borrowing in Ancient Athens, pp. 186-188.

\textsuperscript{1430} This point was first raised by Rihll in an influential article: Tracey E. Rihll, ‘The Origin and Establishment of Ancient Greek Slavery’, in ed. by M. L. Bush, Serfdom and Slavery: Studies in Legal Bondage, (London, 1996), pp. 93 n. 29;

\textsuperscript{1431} Slavery’s transition from being one of the prominent to the dominant relation of production has proved a fertile ground of dissent among the heavyweights of Marxist classical historiography. Ste Croix’s stipulation of slavery as the “the most important form of unfree labour at the highest periods of Greek and Roman civilizations,” was dismissed by Ellen Wood in a later work on the grounds that ancient literary evidence of slavery’s magnitude is so few and far in between that no such deduction from working premises, i.e., the preconception of slavery the most profitable form of relation of production, to historical reality can be made. Wood’s argument that the resolution of the Solonian crisis did not entail the establishment of an economically independent core group of small farmers, effectively tantamount to land redistribution, was then taken up and further refined by Harris and Rihll’s studies refuting the erstwhile orthodoxy of Finley’s claim that Solon “debt-bondage was abolished tout court, by political action.” Evidently, there are still many questions waiting to be answered such as debt-bondsmen’s relationship to small farmers, e.g., potential tenants that are employed due to the lack of financial means to own slaves. But a discernible breakthrough appears to have been made in our understanding of the hiring of thêtes as a quasi-dominant relation of production that would keep the imperialist dreams of Athenians alive at least until the total defeat at the end of the Peloponnesian War in 404. Ste Croix, The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World, pp. 39, 52-53; Wood, Peasant-Citizen and Slave, pp. 47-51, 64-80; Moses Finley, Economy and Society in Ancient Greece, ed. by Brent D. Shaw and Richard P. Saller, (New York, 1982), pp. 102; Rihll, ‘The Origin and Establishment of Ancient Greek Slavery’, pp. 94-95; Rose, Class in Archaic Greece, pp. 336-338.\textsuperscript{1432} “Solon was not attempting to politicize the people. His poems show that they were politicized already. His task was to mediate between the dêmos and the Eupatrids by legislation that would pacify the revolutionaries and restore the people’s voice.” Wallace, ‘Revolutions and a New Order in Solonian Athens and Archaic Greece’, pp. 72; cf. Wood, Citizens to Lords, pp. 33.

\textsuperscript{1433} “More generally … one way of understanding the reforms of Solon is to see in them a trade-off on behalf of his primary goal of preserving the essential property relations that enabled the existence of the Athenian aristocracy: rather than acceding to what seem to have been powerful forces demanding a complete redistribution of the land, Solon offered the dêmos a taste of purely political power in the assembly and the courts.” Rose, Class in Archaic Greece, pp. 263; Peter W. Rose, ‘Theorizing Athenian
point that with their significant investment in the processes of law-making dēmos now had the effective means not only of dispossessing the aristocrats of their traditional prerogatives but also of pursuing the means to expand the demographic basis of Athens’ polity.\textsuperscript{1434} Naturally, dēmos was stuck with the hopes of getting admission to office through increasing the value of their property for now.\textsuperscript{1435} And yet, as it was incessantly shown at times of internecine strife, non-aristocrats could hope to cope with the wealth-induced political power of the aristocrats only by diminishing the eligibility criteria of holding office. The triarii had to be included as part of the decision-making citizen body lest ad triarios redisse turn into an actuality. Conceived in connection with the ideology of common citizenship, the ‘vote’ that dēmos was ‘given’ had the likelihood to gradually bear economic and social fruits whose realization would figure heavily on the Athenian politics for the rest of the sixth century.

4.4 The Phusiologoi of Ionia and the First Transformation of the Essential Copy

The erosion of the old aristocratic ideas of natural political distinction, hereditary courage, overbearing shunning of the lowly and the uncomplacent submission to authority did not speak only to poetic imagination and political ambition. Philosophical speculation, indebted to the poetic tradition for divesting the elaboration of temporal events from their myth-infused origins as it was, had also found a room of its own to tackle practical, cosmic and metaphysical phenomena. Indeed, the Ionian philosophers that flourished in the first half of the sixth century were united by ties of close spatial proximity no less than they were with the scope of the problems that tackled and the methods they used in tackling them. The phusiologoi of Miletus, with the curious addition of Xenophanes of Colophon,\textsuperscript{1436} offer us the very first philosophical

\textsuperscript{1434}Nor, however, can the relation between law and the social and economic privileges of the aristocracy be conceived through the exclusive lens of linear causality. The formal homogenization that is introduced by law-making may have spelled a faltering of the unconditional use of the aristocratic prerogative, but this ‘formality’ could hardly suffice, as the subsequent history of the sixth-century Athens clearly indicates, to bring about the widespread adherence to nomoi by itself; cf. “To agree to laws is to accept a degree of homogeneity, to subordinate the separate interests of family or other group to the unity of the community. As law is made, the Agamemnon of the Iliad admits defeat.” Osborne, Greece in the Making, pp. 178; Plato, Statesman, in Plato: Complete Works, ed. by John M. Cooper and D. S. Hutchinson, (Indianapolis, 1997), 301b11-301c5.

\textsuperscript{1435}Indeed, even this unveiling of the economic factors that largely determined who would sit in the sessions of boule had the unforeseeable effect of levelling out any remnant of aristocratic ideology that ruling-class identity could only be inherited and not attained. In short, the Hesiodic Plutus, or Wealth, was pontificated as a full-time member of the Greek Pantheon no later than at this point. Hesiod, Theogony, 969.

\textsuperscript{1436}Xenophanes’ inclusion among the Ionian phusiologoi may seem a curious choice to some. The portrait of the philosopher that emerges from the fragments, however, validate his inclusion as anything but arbitrary. On that note, we agree with Lesher’s argument based on Xenophanes’ interest in natural and celestial phenomena, not to mention principal substances, is sufficiently compelling to support his designation as an Ionian through and through. James H. Lesher (ed.), Xenophanes of Colophon: Fragments, trans. by J. H. Lesher, (Toronto, 1992), pp. 4.
attempts to see through nature in order to unearth cosmic patterns thereby gathering commonalities as well as divergencies into an intelligible whole.\footnote{Material plenty, diversification of professions, expanded borders, commercial ties forged with ethnically, culturally and religiously diverse populations are all long-accorded features of the Milesian background against which the \textit{phusiologoi} philosophised. The German excavations have irrefutably shown that the settlement already had a city wall beside a population total that perhaps reached five digits as early as the seventh century: “Thales’ lifetime coincided with the cultural and economic hegemony of Miletus, the flourishing port of the trading city of Ephesus. City-states like Miletus, Colophon, Clazomenae, and Samos formed an ideal setting for speculative innovation in every sphere of life. Economic growth, rising standards of living, an increasingly elaborate division of labour, and an expansive mercantile capitalism introduced creative contradictions and structural instabilities into an already fluid historical situation.” Barry Sandywell, \textit{Presocratic Reflexivity: The Construction of Philosophical Discourse c. 600-450 B.C.} (Logological Investigations Vol. 3), (London, 1996), pp. 111.} While it is unfortunate that we have, just as in the case of archaic poets, mere isolated fragments of their thoughts, what philosophical remnants we have of \textit{phusiologoi’s} ideational creations can be gleaned with the aid of the parallels of their ideas to their poetic and political contemporaries. To that end, we argue, based on the surviving secondary evidence from the works of later philosophers and historians, that a triad of philosophical themes can be built into a kaleidoscope for locating these thinkers within their respective historical contexts. The themes in question are: (I) a predisposition geared towards the advancement of instrumentality; (II) a willingness to venture \textit{beyond} mere appearances to gaze at what is truer still; (III) a flexible drawing of the epistemic boundaries of human reason, which, can only theorize in excess of its recognized level of cognition, however, with the aid of diligent research.

The Milesian thinkers were politicians, geometricians and engineers just as much as they were philosophers.\footnote{Cf. “The intellectual expression of this general revolution in Greek society [the one that resulted from the gradual liberation from the tyrants in the sixth century] was the remarkable phenomenon of what we may term thorough Gnosticism, the awareness that everything is a question of knowledge – in morals, aesthetics, politics included. The wise man as \textit{sophos} and \textit{fronimos} substituted the seer, the prophet, the mythologist and ritualist, the sage, the general, the statesman, even the artist.” Pierris, ‘The Order of Existence,’ pp. 193.} The range of activities that were attributed to Thales by the later literary tradition offers us the picture of a man who contrived administrative systems,\footnote{Thales, F. in Herodotus, \textit{The Histories}, 1.170.3 = DK 11A4.} diverted rivers to allow safe passage to armies,\footnote{Thales, F. in Herodotus, \textit{The Histories}, 1.75.4-5 = DK 11A6.} calculated solar eclipses,\footnote{Thales, F. DK 11A17.} and invented geometric theorems.\footnote{Thales, F. DK 11A20.} Ironically turned into the archetypical absent-minded thinker by the later doxographers,\footnote{The \textit{locus classicus} of this literary transformation is Plato’s \textit{Theaetetus} in which Socrates relays the story about Thales as a fitting example of the characteristically detached outlook of the philosopher: “The story is that he was doing astronomy and looking upwards, when he fell into a pit; and a Thracian servant, a girl of some wit and humour, made fun of him, because, as she said, he was eager to know the contents of heaven, but didn’t notice what was in front of him, under his feet.” Plato, \textit{Theaetetus}, trans. by John McDowell, (Oxford, 2014), 174a; needless to say, this account is the diatomic opposite to the one in the \textit{Histories}! It is a testament to the enduring power of literary tradition that the archetypical absent-mindedness ascribed to Thales by the doxographers has dominated the popular imagination for so many centuries.”} Thales seems to have been a multi-faceted thinker who did not scorn

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instrumental reason to the benefit of exclusive preoccupation with lofty speculation. Further, this fascination with things of practical application also found an appreciative mind in the case of Anaximander. Sharing Thales’ interest in celestial and natural phenomena, Anaximander invented devices to indicate the precise dates of equinoxes and solstices in addition to delving in cartography. And how else can we describe Xenophanes if not as a travelling thinker with a keen eye for ethnographic detail? The surviving fragments as well as testimonia, however sketchy and brittle they may appear, suggests a not unfounded chain of instrumental reasoning that linked these figures to one another. The poetic emphasis on the postulation of resolutions on problems pertaining to material temporal events could be seen, in that vein, as shared by the phusiologoi of Miletus and by Xenophanes alike.

This group of thinkers can also be associated with a penchant for delving in hylozoist enquiry into the origination principle or element that is supposed to lay behind the appearances. Not satisfied with the prospects of concluding the philosophical study with the empirical evidence afforded by the senses, the philosophers, in their own respective ways, attempted to vindicate a hypothetical belief in substances that could be exposed by the rigorous study of natural phenomena. The theoretical reason accompanying the collection of empirical evidence was

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1445 Anaximander, F. DK 12A6; the monumental production of Hekataios’ map and his description of the geography of the Greek world is closely interlocked with these erstwhile delving of cartography. Heralded by some of the notable earlier as well as more recent scholars as the investigator that is more deserving of the epithet *pater historiae*, Hekataios has had a clear impact on the historiographical tradition at least from Herodotus onwards: “Hekataios ist eine der bedeutendsten Erscheinungen in der Geschichte der älteren Prosaliteratur und der Wissenschaft, der erste Vertreter ionischer Ιστοριη auf den Gebieten, die wir jetzt Geschichte und Geographie nennen.” Felix Jacoby, “Hekataios 3”, *RE*, vii, 2667-2750; cited in Stephanie West, “Herodotus’ Portrait of Hecataeus”, *The Journal of Hellenic Studies*, vol. 111. (1991), pp. 144; Herodotus, *Histories*, 2.143, 4.31; Roller, *Ancient Geography*, esp. Ch. 1.
1447 Xenophanes, F. DK 21B16, 21B15. The most explicit fragment, potentially of all the Ionian philosophers, that stress the significance attached to enhancing practical capabilities and promoting the public good is, of course, Xenophanes’ unfavourable comparison of the Olympic victor in *Pankrateion* or chariot-racing to the philosopher, who is able, contrary to the former, to fill the city’s treasury thanks to his knowledge of things: “For neither if there were a good boxer among the people | nor if there were a pentathlete or wrestler | nor again if there were someone swift afoot – | which is most honoured of all men’s deeds of strength – | would for this reason a city be better governed. | Small joy a city would have from this – | if someone were to be victorious in competing for a prize on Pisa’s banks – | for these do not enrich a city’s treasure room.” Xenophanes, F. 2, in Athenaeus, *Deipnosophistae*, 10.413, trans. by J. H. Lesher; cf. Plato, *Republic*, 465d6-8.
1448 The recognizable anticipation of some features of the Aristotelian substance that are implicit in this postulation should not be taken as predicated upon an admission of the hypothesis that the Milesian thinkers and Xenophanes were proto-Aristotelian in their unending quest for an underlying substance. Indeed, as we remarked oft times before in the previous chapter, a distinct feature of Aristotle’s substance is precisely its essential immutability. In the case of our earlier group of thinkers, however, there is clear evidence in support of the evidence that it is the constant formal change of the originitive
thus prioritized as the ‘Open Sesame!’ uttered by the philosopher in the face of potentially misleading information passed through sensation. From Thales’ postulation of water as the material originative element of all things and Anaximander’s *apeiron* qua boundless encapsulating the original sources of all existing things to Anaximenes’ hypothesizing air as the first principle of everything and Xenophanes’ earth as the element whence begin and end all the things, there appears to be conjugation of theoretical reasoning that finalized empirical inquiry in accordance with the hypothetical existence of universal primary substance steering all perceptible things to the realm of intelligibility. This speculative endeavour to step beyond the world of appearance signalled an infusion of empirical observation and theoretical reasoning that would measure up the results obtained by sensory experience against the secure yardstick of comprehensibility which was to be provided by relentless forays into the imponderable. Although furnishing the alpha and omega of speculative activity, natural phenomena did not lead directly to the comprehension of the workings of a unifying substance generating an essentially ordered universe of what otherwise could only be seen as a random patchwork of things.

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element, and not the lack thereof, that distinguishes the primary element. It is in that vein that Bréhier’s otherwise compelling criticism of the Aristotelian lens that are inadvertently adopted by modern scholars in their attempts to revisit the Milesian thinkers misses its mark: “Now, what Aristotle looked for above all in their [the Presocratics’] teaching was an answer to this question: What is the matter of which things are composed? It was Aristotle who put the question and he put it in the language of his own doctrine. We have no proof that the Milesians themselves were concerned with the problem for which a solution was sought in their writings.” Émile Bréhier, *The Hellenic Age*, trans. by Joseph Thomas, (Chicago, 1963), pp. 37.

1449 We accept the authenticity of a fragment claimed by Galen to be taken from Thales, and propose to take it as the principal formulation of Thales cosmology. Despite the arguments to the contrary, a comparison with other fragments and testimonia indicate that there are no clear grounds for its refutation as inauthentic. Given that the we will focus on the passage in question momentarily, for now we refer only to other testimonia: Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 983b6-32 = DK 11A12; Aristotle, *On the Heavens*, 294a28-294b1 = DK 11A14.


1451 “[A]lthough they did not refer to anyone as a ‘Presocratic’, ancient writers nevertheless often identify a specific phase in the development of Greek philosophy before Socrates and give a narrative account of its development, characterizing it as driven by some shared general concerns, principally concerns in “natural philosophy”: the study of the nature, origin and processes of the natural world…. In brief, this story of Presocratic philosophy begins with Thales and the other Milesians, who are principally interested in the question of what is the original material principle out of which all things in the universe are made or from which all things originate…. Each Milesian offers a different candidate and goes on to offer a description of how the universe and the workings of the natural world can be explained in these terms.” James Warren, *Presocratics: Natural Philosophers before Socrates*, (Berkeley, 2007), pp. 2-3.
The nodal philosophical element of pushing against the temporally and spatially determinate level of comprehension, in conjunction with the focus on primary substances, worked its way around the acknowledged insufficiency of empirical observation combined with first order categorization by highlighting the unquenchable study of elements of physical and metaphysical provenance alike as the only pathway toward the gradual enlargement of the theoretical horizon. Working in tandem with the dual contraption locating the individual enquirer on the level of microcosm and her object of study, i.e., natural universe, on that of macrocosm, the Ionians foreshadowed the later ‘*ars longa*’ in their self-conscious attempts to record, interpret, and classify natural events. The avowed scepticism pertaining to the determinate capabilities of human cognition and conception stimulated the development of a self-conscious epistemology that recognized the intellectual boundaries it ran up against as socially acquired and hence rectifiable.

These Ionian thinkers can thus be regarded as individual parts of a tradition that attempted to conceive isolated natural events as constituting intelligible parts of an ordered universe.

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1456 Whether the advancement of epistemological refinement could cross the preconceived threshold that divided mortal from immortal cognition, the question is largely up for grabs given the dearth of *phusioi*’s fragments which are relevant to the relationship between humans and gods. In the case of Xenophon whose extant fragments allow more room for interpretation, however, the answer should necessarily be in the negative showing a potentially well-trodden channel between Ionian *phusioi* and the later logographers: “What Xenophanes asserts in these remarks is not the complete incomparability of gods and men, but rather their complete dissimilarity. It would not have confounded this critique of religious belief for him held that both men and gods had some (vastly different) kind of body, thought, way of life, or capacity for goodness and justice.” Lesher, ‘Commentary’, in *Xenophanes of Colophon: Fragments*, pp. 94.

1457 One of the central pieces of fragmentary evidence we have of this conception of ordered universe is the one that is used by Galen in his exposition of Thales’ views. The original passage runs as follows: “μεν ειπερ και του βούλεται [sc. μεταβαλλειν εις αλληλα τα στοιχεια]. Αμεινον δε και αυτού την ρησιν προσθειναι εκ του δεύτερου Περι τον αρχων εχουσαν ωδε πος ‘τα μεν ουν πολυθρυλιτα τετταρα, ων το πρώτον είναι ύδωρ φαμεν και ωσανει μόνον στοιχείον τιθεμεν, προς συγκρισιν τε και πηγνυσιν και συστασιν των εγκοσμιον προς αλληλα συγκραννυται. Πος δε, ηδη λε λεκται ημιν εν τωι προτωι. ’” Galen, DK 11B3. A recent rendering of the passage is based on the preconceived equation of *kosmos* with the physical universe, which appears difficult to qualify given the other usages one encounters in contemporary fragments. Further, the rendering of *kosmos* as ‘universe’ appears to take no note of the earlier Homeric usage of the term that is always weighted toward an understanding of order and orderliness: Homer, *Iliad*, 10.472; Homer, *Odyssey*, 8.489; cf. Plato, *Protagoras*, 322c; Paul Cartledge, ‘Introduction: Defining a *Kosmos*’, in *Kosmos*, pp. 3-4. On that note, concurring with Lähteenoja’s stress of orderliness as the unshed primary meaning of the term, we think that the following translation may fit its historical context more appropriately: “Even if Thales says that all things are composed of water, he still wants this in addition [i.e., that the elements change into one another]. But [still] better to add also his saying from the second [book of] *On the Principles* which goes as follows: “The famous four, of which we say the first is water and as it were posit as the only element, [they] blend with each other for the formation and putting together and composition of things that have been ordered. But how [this occurs], we have already said before.” For discussion of this passage’s authenticity, see Georg
Notwithstanding the fact that the focus on the eventual elucidation of cosmogonic order was couched in terms that saw equilibrium as what is to be sought after, the presumed unity emanated by any cosmic principle could be potentially consolidated just as much as undermined as a result of the scientific effort to understand nature in its own terms. The absence of any comforting progenitor of inquiry on natural phenomena to feed from effected the formation of a roundabout relationship between the epistemic ventures of the Ionians and the earlier cosmogonic traditions of muθos.\textsuperscript{1458} With a pronounced potency to break off any circuit of linearity espoused by poetic descriptions of the transition from muθos to logos,\textsuperscript{1459} the Ionian philosophers sought to tame the haphazard occurrence of natural and social events by incorporating them into a flexible framework underlined by order rather than chance. Having accommodated Tuche to afford the smooth progression of inquiry in the case of natural affairs, they mingled around with citizens and basileis to their hearts’ content in order to hunt for potential ways to redress the influx of social problems created by the initial waves of Lydian expansion which were later overtaken by the steady expansion of the Persian Empire.\textsuperscript{1460} The Ionian philosophers came to recognize quickly, in all historical likelihood, that there was a wide discrepancy between the archaic ideology of divine aristocratic descent and the unbridled accumulation of wealth that dictated, in the end, who was to rule and who else to be ruled.\textsuperscript{1461} The Olympic Pantheon, for all its romp and grandeur, could, at best, be

\textsuperscript{1458} Cf. “The Milesian thinkers give us the first cosmogonies as opposed to mythical creation stories or theogonies. The nature of these cosmogonies is contested. Here I argue a common line for Thales, Anaximander and Anaximenes, that they believed that their principal substance, be it water, the unlimited or air, had an inherent ability to steer the processes leading to the formation of the kosmos.” A. Gregory, Ancient Greek Cosmogony, (Duckworth, 2007), pp. 26.

\textsuperscript{1459} Vernant’s narration of this story is as apt as it is concise: “All of a sudden, on the soil of Ionia, logos presumably broke free of myth, as the scales fell from the blind man’s eyes. And the light of reason, revealed once and for all, has never ceased to guide the progress of the human mind.” Jean-Pierre Vernant, The Origins of Greek Thought, (Ithaca, 1984), pp. 104; cf. Murray, Early Greece, pp. 21.

\textsuperscript{1460} Lydian king Croesus’ conquests of the Ionian Greeks and his ensuing submission to Cyrus the Persian in 546 is the temporal track that is followed by Herodotus’ narrative in the first book of his Histories.

\textsuperscript{1461} The association of material wealth with the generative principle of the experiential life has been made by Seaford following in the footsteps of an earlier attempt by George Thomson. On that note, whereas Thomson hinted at the Heraclitan fire as a likely erstwhile receptacle for the idea a medium of exchange, Sohn-Rethel elaborated on the Parmenidean concept of to on as a rather unselfconscious imagination of money. While it is tempting to point out some elements either of Anaximander’s conception of apeiron or those of the Heraclitan fire or else as signalling the original unlimited mixture of all oppositions and the notion of exchangeability that is suggested by this indeterminate mass among other apparent similarities, I do not think that such a hypothesis can be validated by fragmentary philosophical evidence alone. Seaford, Money and the Early Greek Mind, pp. 175-291; George Thomson, Studies in Ancient Greek Society. I: The Prehistoric Aegean, 3rd edition, (London, 1961a), pp. 300-301; Sohn-Rethel, Geistige und körperliche Arbeit, pp. 64 ff; Osborne, Greece in the Making,
posited in equal footing with material distinctions in dictating the course that one’s fortunes were likely to take. The epistemic division between the undiligent fools that fell for any sensory presentation and the enterprising philosophers who refused to settle with the feeble-minded awe of the former cut both ways, sanctifying scientific and material distinction alike.\footnote{1462}

The charter of political, poetic and philosophical developments that we have attempted to map out for the first half of the sixth century marks out the first stage of datable transformation of the Homeric and Hesiodic Essential Copy of "nomos" and "phasis"' conception. Population’s steady growth, the revitalization of erstwhile commercial ties established with Near Eastern civilizations, not to mention the dwindling stock of uninhabited productive land, all played their respective parts in the formation of societies that were further stratified than ever before. By the end of the seventh century the Homeric tripartite division of "basileis, hoi polloi and douloi" was simply considered to be out of tune with the contemporary reality. Naturally, the basic class polarities continued to rhyme the verses of aristocratic "skolia" and the prose of early law codes to an unmistakable extent. The governance structure of these increasingly complex societies, however, needed to be adjusted to contemporary realities as "poleis" like Sparta began to form exceptionally large political entities while others like Corinth sent numerous expeditions to Sicily and Black Sea region to cope with the rising waves of social discontent. One way or the other, encroachment on a "polis'" borders was a theme that united otherwise widely different "poleis" such as Elis and Chalkis.

The impetus driving these territorial upheavals came from the intensification of intra-elite and inter-class struggles that took on a more threatening hue for the purveyors of order and stability. The enumeration of census classes in addition to the shirking of property-qualification to cover a larger part of the citizen body as eligible for minor and "boulê" offices and a strict reliance on "klêroi" holdings as a de jure homogenized definition of "politai" qua "homoioi" (generally rendered as ‘similars’ but simply meaning the ‘same ones’), in Athens and Sparta respectively, offer a political testimony to this influx of the contemporary conceptions of polity. With quantification came entitlement. Corresponding roughly to the long and short rendition of the relations of extortion and domination that set the minor citizen from his social

\footnote{1462} "Indeed, there never has been nor will there ever be a man | Who knows the truth about the gods and all the matters of which I speak | For even if one should happen to speak what is the case especially well, | Still he himself would not know it. But belief occurs in all matters." Xenophanes, F. DK 21B34 = Sextus Empiricus, Against the Professors, 7.49.4-7, trans. by Robin Waterfield.
'better,' the idea of property qualification had nothing new to it. Otherwise a tale as old as time, this rendering of it was uncanny in its erecting pretty straightforward yardsticks to separate the classes on the basis of landed property alone. Sure enough, there was an ideological smokescreen that lingered around any allusion to the sacred community of citizens. But all the pomp and glamour aside, when owning a pair of oxen or making monthly contributions to common mess is singled out as a major criterion for de facto citizenship then the very wielding of political \textit{kratos} begins to solidify in quite monetary terms.\footnote{Small wonder then that the old ideals of \textit{phusis} and \textit{nomos} went belly-up and gave way to a more classical understanding of justified material deserts and the conditions setting out their procurement. When the spoils of war diminished and the erstwhile warriors acquired a taste for the spoils of self-regimented farming a new ruling \textit{ethos} was formed out of the reinvigorated elements of Homeric and Hesiodic \textit{phusis} and those that were newly incorporated into the aristocratic code.\footnote{The Solonian profanation of the Hesiodic divinities \textit{Eunomia} and \textit{Dysnomia}, as perceptively observed by Blaise, carries the notion of expanding borders of human polity enclosing the discursive realm that had hitherto been consigned to supernatural entities. Taking the element of disorderliness as part and parcel of \textit{kosmos}, the law-maker redefines orderliness as an exclusive feature of collective human action: “The regulating principle need not be looked for beyond the world of our experience: it already exists, in its opposite, which we meet everyday.” Fabienne Blaise, ‘Poetics and Politics: Tradition Reworked in Solon’s ‘Eunomia’ (Poem 4),’ in \textit{Solon of Athens}, pp. 123.} Two such rectified motifs that ought to be mentioned are the formation of an army of amateur citizen-soldiers and the publicization of political decision-making to cover areas even of minute import.\footnote{Needless to add, this is not the equivalent of saying that spoils of war were ever firmly out of the lower-class agenda in considering whether to answer any call-up. Though I remain unconvinced of Potts’ argument that spoils could have made participating in naval warfare more ideologically attractive as it was not regarded as out of keeping with the aristocratic sentiment of \textit{anti-banausoi}, material urgencies alone were sufficiently potent to dictate any lower-class Athenian’s voluntary course toward conscription. A systematised redistribution scheme, as van Wees argued, and not a wholehearted revaluation of claiming spoils of war was what the cat dragged in moving towards the classical period: van Wees, \textit{Greek Warfare}, pp. 236-237; cf. Samuel Potts, \textit{The Athenian Navy. An Investigation into the Operations, Politics and Ideology of the Athenian Fleet between 480 and 322 BC}, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, (Cardiff, 2013), pp. 236.} The physical armament of political power was one of the distinctive features of ancient Greek \textit{poleis}. Rank and file members of the \textit{politeuma}, ‘ruling class,’ in the cases of Sparta and Athens, were designated by a strict separation from the other residents of the \textit{polis} by their shared \textit{ethos} of their legitimate possession of the means of domination. Comradery at the front lines was savoured as the stuff of genuine citizens not unwilling to get their hands dirty at the beck and call of their respective \textit{poleis}.\footnote{“Ideally, Greek citizens were land-holding soldiers who provided their own equipment and defended their state and their land from attack.” Trundle, \textit{Greek Mercenaries}, pp. 1.} With the ideological paraphernalia of items such as heroic sacrifice and the collective overpowering of the enemy came the claim of the belligerents to be the sole body capable of decision-making within the community. The

\footnote{The Solonian profanation of the Hesiodic divinities \textit{Eunomia} and \textit{Dysnomia}, as perceptively observed by Blaise, carries the notion of expanding borders of human polity enclosing the discursive realm that had hitherto been consigned to supernatural entities. Taking the element of disorderliness as part and parcel of \textit{kosmos}, the law-maker redefines orderliness as an exclusive feature of collective human action: “The regulating principle need not be looked for beyond the world of our experience: it already exists, in its opposite, which we meet everyday.” Fabienne Blaise, ‘Poetics and Politics: Tradition Reworked in Solon’s ‘Eunomia’ (Poem 4),’ in \textit{Solon of Athens}, pp. 123.}
attrition involved in the periodic mobilizations and the hardened attitude of military fellowship that such continuous service cemented the social status of the soldiers in the face of swollen ranks of city-dwellers of their own poleis. Subjugation of major cities, let alone vast territories, however, required a more numerous fighting force that fought down the opposition by a combination of its higher cohesion and numbers. On top of the creation of specific units that engaged the enemy on a rather predictable pattern of set pieces and using a more standardised panoply of weapons, shield and armour, the higher stakes of warfare inaugurated a strategic standardization of army manoeuvres and campaign seasons due in large part to their amateur constituents. The enlargement of relatively standardised armies effected the

1466 Aspis or the hoplite shield commands an extra air of scholarly attention in that its widespread production and use have largely been taken as touchstones for a thoroughgoing transformation of military encounters. Hanson, for one, has put the unmaneuverability and weight of aspis as certain indicators of a close-packed wall of shields defining the new norm of the hoplite warfare. Making the further claim that aspis, large as its surface is, can only cover the left half of a hoplite’s body while fully facing the enemy. Van Wees, by contrast, has argued on the basis of graphic representations of surviving pottery, bronze figurines and modern re-enactments of hoplite warfare that facing the enemy in the posture of fencers, i.e., sideways, would be beneficial not only in protecting his otherwise exposed right-hand side but also giving more force to any trust he could make with his spear. On the whole we concur with van Wees’ revision on both grounds in addition to making the further claim that if the rugby scramble analogy that is often used by the adherents of orthodoxy is correct, coupled with the initial force of collision, the depletion of front-line’s energy would quickly materialize without even extending to the minimum amount of push-and-shove that is sometimes described in the historical accounts. Victor Davis Hanson, ‘The Hoplite Narrative’, in Men of Bronze, pp. 258; van Wees, ‘The City at War’, pp. 99-100; cf. Morris and Powell, The Greeks, pp. 162.

1467 The procurement of hopla, to be sure, was still beyond the means of the majority of the Athenian thêtes. Extrapolating from literary evidence that is available for the fifth and fourth centuries, it appears all but certain that only the wealthiest among the thêtes could afford the hopla. Never the less, a movement toward higher degrees of social inclusivity can still be discerned in comparison with the existing literary and archaeological evidence about earlier warfare: “In the fifth and fourth centuries the range of prices for hopla was about seventy-five to 300 drachmae. Good arms and armour were expensive, sometimes costing the entire gross annual produce value of zeugitéis’ farm of 200 bushels (=200 drachmae) and even rising to that of hippéis’ gross annual product of 300. On average, scholars price hopla at between seventy-five and 100 drachmae. Even at the lower end, an advance payment of this magnitude was a significant sum for many Athenians. … As arms got cheaper, lighter and increasingly mass-produced, more and more poorer citizens could have bought themselves into the hoplite army and so would have been in a position to join mercenary armies as well.” Trundle, Greek Mercenaries, pp. 125; cf. Ste. Croix, ‘The Solonian Census Classes and the Qualifications for Cavalry and Hoplite Service’, pp.17; that account can be compared with the earliest inscription, dating to the late sixth century, commanding the men of Salamis to procure their arms to the value of 30 drachmae, ML 14; for the archaeologically supported evidence of increase in the number of votive offerings of what could be viewed as items belonging to the panoply, e.g., Corinthian helmet, breastplate, etc., see Anthony Snodgrass, ‘Setting the Frame Chronologically’, in Men of Bronze, pp. 88.

1468 Hansen links this increased social inclusivity of the Late Archaic armies as a testimony to the growth of a ‘middle-class ideology.’ Likewise, Hanson, arguably the most influential and fervent of the defenders of the orthodoxy, argues in his The Other Greeks that hoplite warfare “cannot be understood apart from the economic, cultural and political agenda of a new group of middling agrarians, whose unique notions of private property, landed timocratic government, free economic practice, and distrust of rich and poor established the foundations of the Greek poleis.” Purveying the classical case of Athens and Sparta as the ideal representatives of hoplite-led polities, this early postulation of the pre-eminent middle class appears no less anachronistic than teleological. It is a telling feature of Hanson’s account, in that vein, that he implements his preconceived model of hardworking ‘middle class yeomanry’ to the shrouded archaic Greek reality entirely on the basis of a potpourri of historical evidence with barely
revamp of the older Homeric code of warfare whereby the inclusion of hitherto disregarded proportions of the citizen mass was allowed to stand shoulder-to-shoulder with the rest of the warriors. Carefully working out a renegotiated aristocratic equilibrium meant that the immobilised parts of the citizen body had either to be terrorized into forceful submission or appeased through other ideological and political mechanisms to willingly concede the exclusive allotment of the means of violence to the armed few. The middling group of the hoplite orthodoxy, largely comprised of the poorer members of the upper-class citizens that were considered genealogically too profane to join the ranks of the birth-aristocracy and yet materialistically too distinct from the grassroots citizen with the smallest, if anything, of landholdings. Having worked out the differences between them and the zeugitai parvenus, the old aristocrats hardened their grip on the working-class citizens whose plight would be closely heeded by those among them who had tyrannical aspirations. The zeugitai were, if anything, ideal partners in crime: they owned land in such abundance that a clear line of division separated the gross annual product of their farms from incomparably numerous subsistence farmers; numerically, they were larger than the pentakosiomedimnoi and

any hint of source criticism darted at the hermeneutic incongruence emanating from his dovetailing a speech delivered by Demosthenes in the 350s to the Corcyraean episode as it was conveyed by Thucydides. That lack of robust comprehensiveness, coupled with his occasional slides toward endorsing some of the strictly oligarchic commonplaces, e.g. pegging a substantial part of thêtes as a landless mob, of the historical tradition, display Hanson’s self-conscious adherence to a class prism through which his hoplite orthodoxy appears to have been conceived: Hansen, *Polis*, pp. 116; Victor Davis Hanson, *The Other Greeks: The Family Farm and the Agrarian Roots of Western Civilization,* (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London, 1999), pp. 403; Victor Davis Hanson, ‘Hoplites into Democrats: The Changing Ideology of Athenian Infantry’, in *Demokratia*, pp. 290-292; Murray, *Early Greece*, pp. 124-125.

1469 If the invention of mass-produced sets of weapon, armour and shield was a foremost driving force in the making of the new hoplite warfare, so was the rising middle-class yeomen whose numbers in phalanx largely dwarfed that of the birth-elites, or so the main thrust of the arguments of those defending the hoplite orthodoxy goes. As we will elaborate presently, however, this account has all the makings of being a Colossus with the feet of clay in more ways than one, but for a brief sketch of the four pillars of hoplite orthodoxy, see Donald Kagan and Gregory F. Viggiano, ‘The Hoplite Debate’, in *Men of Bronze: Hoplite Warfare in Ancient Greece*, ed. by Donald Kagan and Gregory F. Viggiano, pp. 1.

1470 “Indeed, it had the makings of a brilliant compromise. The relevant commoners were enabled at a stroke to defend not only their own property but also the polis of which they were citizens. At the same time the devolution of military responsibility did not obviously imperil the aristocratic structure of the society. Rather, it could have reasonably been hoped that phalanx-warfare would defuse the potentially explosive contradiction between aristocratic arete and polis-equalitarianism. For although membership of the phalanx was open in principle to all who could provide their own hopla, and although sheer numbers were an advantage in the hoplite style of fighting, rarely was as much as one half of a citizen-body able to turn out as hoplites in practice.” Paul Cartledge, “Hoplites as Heroes: Sparta’s Contribution to the Technique of Ancient Warfare”, *The Journal of Hellenic Studies*, vol. 97, (1977), pp. 23.

1471 Cf. “The tyrant springs from the people [dêmos], from the populace, and directs his efforts against the notables, to the end that the people may not be wronged by them. This is clear from the record; for it is generally true to say that tyrants have mostly begun as demagogues, being trusted because they abused notables.” Aristotle, *Politics*, 1310b12-17.

1472 Lin Foxhall’s studies have created a new path in our understanding of zeugitai and their productive capacity of their landholdings. Taken up and developed through the later studies of Hans van Wees, these probes beneath the middle-class veneer of zeugitai have shown that a leisurely life based on the
hippeis combined but much smaller than thêtes to afford a large reliable trench in keeping the latter in peonage and thrall;[1473] finally, the fact that their hired thêtes and owned slaves were able to produce in great excess of any stipulated subsistence level meant that they had a significant stake in maintaining a viable commerce within and without.[1474] The absorption of zeugitai to the ranks of the archaic Greek ruling class made the novel early sixth-century polity, not the incorporation of the eupatridae into a level space of governance on which the social status of birth-aristocracy would be replaced with that of the yeoman-farmer. If there ever was a hoplite revolution in the archaic Greece it was a long time in coming.[1475]

supervised exploitation of their slaves and labourers’ surplus production was all that there is to this later manifestation of the Hesiodic ideal: Lin Foxhall, ‘A View from the Top: Evaluating the Solonian Property Classes’, pp. 129-132; Hans van Wees, ‘The Myth of the Middle-Class Army: Military and Social Status in Ancient Athens’, in War as a Cultural and Social Force: Essays on Warfare in Antiquity, ed. by L. Hannestad and T. Bekker-Nielsen, (Copenhagen, 2001); Hans van Wees, ‘Mass and Elite in Solon’s Athens’, in Solon of Athens: New Historical and Philological Approaches, ed. by Josine Blok and André Lardinois, (Leiden and Boston, 2006); this account should be compared with Hanson’s argument that there was an emphasis on the “natural generalized connection” in the Greek mind between those who farmed and those who fought in phalanxes. Sparta, according to this interpretation, was the exception to this natural propensity. Propagating a line of thought that is rather antiquated, Hanson’s ‘Greek mind’ is certainly one that belongs to what van Wees calls a gentleman-farmer. Indeed, it appears ironic that none other than Hanson himself pointed out more than a decade ago that a telling lynchpin in the literary tradition is that it is always hoplites that are reaped and sowed, and never rowers or peltasts. Hanson, ‘The Hoplite Narrative’, pp. 260; Victor Davis Hanson, ‘Hoplite Battle as Ancient Greek Warfare: When, Where, and Why?’, in War and Violence in Ancient Greece, ed. by Hans van Wees, (London, 2000), pp. 209.[1476] The total citizen population of Athens in 322 BC was about 30,000, so the richest 5,000 constituted about 17 percent of citizens. And this was when public pay for jury and military service, and later also for attending assemblies and festivals, had done much to ensure a relatively even distribution of wealth. Under Solon, the proportion of citizens in the top three property classes must, if anything, have been much smaller, and is unlikely to have been higher than 15 percent.” Van Wees, ‘Farmers and Hoplites: Models of Historical Development’, pp. 231; cf. Ste. Croix, ‘The Solonian Census Classes and the Qualifications for Cavalry and Hoplite Service’, pp. 48.

Van Wees offers plenty in the way of estimations by drawing from contemporary historical allusions and modern calculations indicating monetary value, daily nutrition intake, productivity per hectare, etc., to bring home the point that zeugitai’s at least 200-bushel landholding meant that they were no yeoman-farmer. But to use the most fitting of those estimates: “Although the evidence for prices is limited, the average price of barley in the late fifth and fourth century BC was 3 or 4 drachmae per medimnos, wheat 5 or 6 drachmae per medimnos, and wine probably 12 drachmae per metretes. After deducting seed corn, therefore, a zeugites might in principle sell 150 measures of barley or wheat for 450-600 dr or 750-900 dr, respectively, and his 200 measures of wine could be worth 2,400 dr. Yet at the same time the minimum annual cost of feeding a family was a mere 3 obols per day, or about 180 dr a year. Even a crop of 200 measures of nothing but barley, the cheapest staple, was therefore worth at least two-and-a-half times as much as a family needed.” Van Wees, ‘Farmers and Hoplites: Models of Historical Development’, pp. 230; for wages and prices, see William T. Loomis, Wages, Welfare Costs and Inflation in Classical Athens, (Ann Arbor, 1999), pp. 220-231; a further use of the surplus product for gentleman-farmers was its distribution among their clients. This feature, despite bearing more import in the entrenchment of the Roman clientage system, began to play a prominent role especially in the post-404 Athens: Garnsey, Food and Society in Classical Antiquity, pp. 29.[1477] Figurative evidence from pottery, literary evidence from Homeric poems and archaeological evidence from grave offerings are liable to various strands of interpretation and Raaflaub’s hypothesis underscoring the long drawn-out process of change as opposed to the revolutionary aspects of the hoplite-centred military confrontations is equally appealing as the account that is offered by Hanson: Raaflaub, ‘Early Greek Infantry Fighting in a Mediterranean Context’, pp. 95, 102; Kurt A. Raaflaub, ‘Equalities and Inequalities in Athenian Democracy’, in Demokratia, pp. 151 ff; Kurt A. Raaflaub, ‘The
The reformation of citizen-armies ran in parallel lines with the collectivization of the official channels of decision-making. Replaced by \textit{boulê} and Gerousia of differing rank and file constituency, the Homeric council of \textit{basileis} lost its internal structure with a prominent chief presiding over decisions concerning the community. As the numbers of the army had swollen so did those eligible to serve in the \textit{boulê}.\footnote{1476} Averse to the effects of any single voice suppressing the rest, the aristocrats relied on a mélange of peer pressure resonating from their shared rule and a set of abstract rules governing the capacity of each office in order to minimise the risks of sliding backwards into tyranny. The key to maintaining any kind of distributive balance was to allot the material benefits of territorial expansion or the further entrenchment of the relations of domination proportionately among the members of aristocracy according to the potency of each individual member to assume leadership without drawing the ire of the poor masses. Translating the Homeric vacillation of \textit{môira} between overdetermination and underregulation into walking the fine line between ‘mob-rule’ and ‘tyranny,’\footnote{1477} the steady

\textbf{Breakthrough of Démokratia in Mid-fifth-century Athens’, in Origins of Democracy in Ancient Greece, pp. 133; Raaflaub and Wallace, ‘‘People’s Power’ and Egalitarian Trends in Archaic Greece’, pp. 35; Viggiano’s attempt to re-validate the hoplite revolution thesis on the grounds that no class conscious participation of middle class gentleman-farmers is prerequisite for the crystallisation of their demanding a voice in polity misses its mark. The point, rather, is that there was no sizeable middle-class on the basis of the Solonian census classes to begin with; cf. Gregory F. Viggiano, ‘The Hoplite Revolution and the Rise of the Polis’, in \textit{Men of Bronze}, pp. 115, 120; \textit{contra} ‘If there was a hoplite revolution as conventionally envisaged, a military change that brought a share in power for up to half of adult male citizens, it would have taken place in the late sixth century. … If warfare did have an impact on politics, it would in any case have been the whole complex of late sixth-century military changes that did so, not just the further development of the hoplite phalanx. The rise of the yeoman hoplite went hand in hand with the rise of the trireme rower, and if they changed the face of Greek politics, they changed it together.’ Van Wees, ‘Farmers and Hoplites: Models of Historical Development’, pp. 245; van Wees, ‘Mass and Elite in Solon’s Athens: The Property Classes Revisited’, pp. 376-377; Hans van Wees, ‘The Homeric Way of War: The \textit{Iliad} and the Hoplite Phalanx’, \textit{Greece and Rome}, vol. 41, (April and October, 1994), pp. 1-18, 131-155.

\textbf{1476} This did not speak to any willingness to abrogate the census bars on officeholding in their entirety. In fact, if we take van Wees’ calculations as a viable starting point, then it would effectively mean that 80 to 85 per cent of the citizen-body was still prevented the access to political office: van Wees, ‘Mass and Elite in Solon’s Athens: The Property Classes Revisited’, pp. 367-368.

\textbf{1477} The analogy between the two pairs over/underdetermination and rule by ‘superhuman’/'subhuman’ brings us forward to the fourth century when the Aristotelian discussion of ideal polity in accord with nature took over. Alluding to the Homeric heroes of old, Aristotle likened the two outliers to frenzied men who knew nothing but war. On an interesting note, the thread of martial and athletic excellence would leave an everlasting imprint on the Greek conceptions of \textit{archein}, i.e., ‘to rule,’ as in the rather sacrosanct manner in which Pausanias relayed the tradition about the three-time Olympic pankration winner Dorieus and his capture by the Athenians while fighting for the Lacedaemonian cause during the Peloponnesian War: “Before Dorieus was brought to them the Athenians were threatening and furious with him, but when they met in their assembly and saw a man so big and tall and so extremely famous presented as a prisoner they changed their minds about him and let him go without doing him the least ungracious action, though they could have done many, and with justice.” Pausanias, \textit{Guide to Greece}, 6.7.5; Aristotelian passage is from Aristotle, \textit{Politics}, 1253a1-1253a7; for an alternative explanation of the Aristotelian passage in question in line with the detachment of ever-increasing numbers of people from their \textit{poleis} in the fourth century Greece, see Waterfield, \textit{Xenophon’s Retreat}, pp. 194.
supply of eligible citizens kept an unflinching eye on the actions of one another while collectively forming a bulwark to turn down any demotic claim to political power.

These two modifications of Homeric and Hesiodic *phusis* merged into a novel element of introvertive governance by the end of the seventh century. Regulated under the auspices of battle-tested oligarchs, the newly formed citizen-regiments formed cohorts ready to descend on ambitious enemies and *dēmos*-leaders (*demagogoi*) in battlefields and arenas of class struggle respectively. Having firmly established quantitative limits to distinguish respectable citizens from others, the ever-vigilant gaze of sentinel-oligarchs showered any democratically-inclined attempt to refurbish property qualifications for office holding with heaps of abuse. With the ranks of army likewise closed to any of the *hoi polloi*, the only pathway left open to *dēmos* was to bide its time in preparation and wait for any opportunity that would arise among the oligarchic few. As the later history of the sixth and fifth centuries would amply prove the commoners were not the only ones waiting for an opportunity to take with respect to holding sway over polity. The widening influence of *nomoi* as a culmination of the efforts at quantification and military-political reformation meant that nothing political was either preordained or divine-sanctioned. Once conceived by Homer to be at the behest of divine agents, social reform and reconciliation were by now purported to be within the purview of citizens alone. No enactment of *nomoi*, to be sure, was completely bereft of the discursive elements of *phusis* marking the righteous Dorians or the god-favoured Ionians from the rest. Yet, the fact that the twin pillars of political over- and underdetermination were now deemed to be within the gambit of political struggle spelled out the stakes involved no less than it identified the antagonistic sides.

4.4.1 An Alternative Course of State-Building in Sicily

There was nothing linear in this socio-political transformation of the sixth-century mainland *poleis*. What has sometimes been anachronistically constructed as a law-abiding Peisitratid interruption of an otherwise oligarchically led community in Athens did have remarkably different outcomes elsewhere. Predating Peisistratus’ rise to tyranny roughly by a century, the political centralisation of Sicilian *apoikoi* offer us a valuable picture of how a politically rigidified class society was capable of building a viable monopoly on the ‘Mediterranean triad,’ and monumental temples that were of a similar scale to those that were later to be built during the Periclean building programme while fighting a rear-guard action against the Carthaginians who were located towards the western tip of the island. Some of the factors that

1478 Garnsey makes the further observation that the triad remains basic, albeit with some diminish in its importance, even today. Garnsey, *Food and Society in Classical Antiquity*, pp. 13.
made the pre-\textit{apoikia} Sicily a land flowing with milk and honey to the Greek mind have been highlighted above. An analysis of how those advantages were crafted by the colonisers into a socio-political structure, however, was not conducted. To carry on, the numbers of the early settlers between 750-650 appear, as mentioned above, rather low to have been capable of making a difference.\textsuperscript{1479} And yet we have the testimony not only of the still-surviving colonnades of gigantic temples but also those of perpetually expanding urban areas to argue that the contrary was indeed the case. The social context that made such rapid transformation of the Sicilian landscape possible involved small-scale settler groups with clear lines of class division between the few organisers of colonising expeditions and their retinue.\textsuperscript{1480} Contrary to the former orthodoxy of a comparatively equal distribution of land among the expeditioners, we now have a more variegated picture underpinning the earlier stages of Sicilian \textit{apoikoi}'s formation.\textsuperscript{1481} Equal, if anything, in name alone, the distribution of land was made in accord with the prominence of a close group of \textit{hoi esthloi} who needed to re-establish their accustomed relations of production and reproduction by resorting to the limited number of poor colonisers and native Sicilians that were close at hand. On the top of the social pyramid were the leading \textit{oikistês}, or founders, who became the self-proclaimed owners of the most productive and defensible lots of land. Signalling a lack to be remedied which is highlighted by the availability of archaeological evidence dated to the eighth century in Megara Hyblaia,\textsuperscript{1482} and Syracuse for example, the new \textit{hêgemones} quickly fortified their position by cementing their aristocratic network within and without the \textit{apoikoi}. In staggering contrast to

\textsuperscript{1479} External migration and internal dynamics are the two factors that, according to De Angelis, the Sicilian \textit{apoikoi} necessarily needed to rely on given the difficulties inherent to working with an initially small base of colonisers. De Angelis, \textit{Archaic and Classical Greek Sicily}, pp. 179.

\textsuperscript{1480} \textquote[De Angelis, \textit{Archaic and Classical Greek Sicily}, pp. 179.]{“Social inequality characterized Greek Sicily from the eighth century. The only political equality that existed at this time was between the ruling elites sharing power. Any social change was driven by the lower classes, leading to civil strife, and, if successful, resolved by legislated compromise. The lower classes wanted a piece of economic success and wealth that occurred from the seventh century onward and to recalibrate the control of Sicilian resources. In general, therefore, oligarchic governments were the order of the day and were opposed by the \textit{demos} (“people”).” \textit{Ibid}, pp. 179; Federica Cordano, \textit{Antiche fondazioni greeche}, (Palermo, 2000), pp. 127.}

\textsuperscript{1481} For a trenchant critique of the former orthodoxy on \textit{apoikoi}'s initial egalitarianism, see De Angelis, \textit{Archaic and Classical Greek Sicily}, pp. 152-159; \textit{contra} Murray, \textit{Early Greece}, pp. 114-115.

\textsuperscript{1482} The three large subterranean silos were uncovered in the courtyards of three mansions and consequently studied by De Angelis who interpreted the early archaeological dating of the silos as a sign that urban settlement may have followed the monopolisation of the redistributive office itself. Further, given the continued occupation of the three estates in the following century, not to mention their material status as the largest houses on record of Megara Hyblaia, it appears highly likely indeed that the class divisions begun to take root just after \textit{apoikoi}'s foundation: Franco De Angelis, “Trade and Agriculture at Megara Hyblaia”, \textit{Oxford Journal of Archaeology}, vol. 21, (2002), pp. 299-310; De Angelis, \textit{Megara Hyblaia and Selinous}, pp. 51; Henri Tréziny, “Nouvelles Recherches à Mégara Hyblaea”, \textit{Revue Archéologique}, (2007), pp. 183-188; \textit{contra} Moses I. Finley, \textit{Ancient Sicily}, 2nd edition, (London, 1979), pp. 77.
these large plots were the tiny lots that were granted to the commoners, which was to adopt a planned urban space by the second half of the seventh century.1483

Having an unmistakable air of a class society right at the outset, the binary socio-political structure of *apoikoi* would only exacerbate in the seventh century.1484 With an ostentatious rise in the accumulated wealth of the *hêgemones*, which was skillfully siphoned off the combined labour of native serfs and Greek commoners, *apoikoi* would come to be adorned with a measure of civic and religious buildings that served as the beacons of ruling ideology.1485 As they kept on growing in wealth and population, however, the *apoikoi* would begin to offer more chances of building communal identities to their commoner inhabitants.1486 Making room for further variation of social differences while entrenching the older polarities with a hitherto absent touch of sanctity, the old oligarchs of the communities filled the ranks of *prutaneis* and began to achieve Olympic renown.1487 Further, shoring up and controlling power via the formation of oligarchic polities, the commercial and political ties that were established between *oikistês* and their social counterparts in the respective *metropoleis* created an additional buffer of aristocratic network on which the former could rely. The rising tides of social discontent at Corinth against the *eupatrid* Bacchiad clan,1488 which resulted in their eventual overthrow and exile in Syracuse, would also increase the cultural means of self-distinction that were at the disposal of the Syracusan ruling class. Combined with an economic take-off, the presence of the Bacchiad *eupatridae* gave way towards two bouts of civil strife

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1483 The relationship between town planning and polity has previously been interpreted as a proto-democratic sign of egalitarian society. Forging such a causal link on the basis of a priori reasoning alone is, of course, in itself inadvertent. In the case of ancient Sicily, however, the inference verges on sheer rejection of archaeological evidence. A logical deduction, in any case, when tiny urban plots and a limited number of large estates are identified would be to surmise economic and social inequality and not its contrary: “Democracy is sometimes thought to have existed in Archaic Greek Sicily. There is no shred of evidence for this. The regularly laid out town plans have been traditionally interpreted as containing socially inclusive and egalitarian communities, or, put another way, democracies in embryo, which sought to divide land and power on equal terms. Town plans need not mean any such thing. … The ancient Greek frontier, like its modern counterpart, did indeed change people and their societies, but democracy is not a necessary corollary of this in antiquity.” De Angelis, *Archaic and Classical Greek Sicily*, pp. 173; cf. Meiggs and Lewis, *Greek Historical Inscriptions*, no. 49; Foxhall, ‘Access to Resources in Classical Greece: The Egalitarianism of the Polis in Practice’, pp. 214; contra J. McInerney, ‘Nereids, Colonies and the Origin of Isegoria’, in *Free Speech in Classical Antiquity*, ed. I. Sluiter and R.M. Rosen, (Leiden and Boston, 2004) pp. 22-26; Raaflaub and Wallace, “‘People’s Power’ and Egalitarian Trends in Archaic Greece”, pp. 44.


1485 Leontinoi’s city wall as well as a host of shrines inside the city, for one, belong to this century. As the *polis*’ borders expanded so rose the numbers of the civic buildings within the urban space: Massimo Frasca, *Leontinoi: Archeologia di una colonia greca*, (Rome, 2009), pp. 39.


around 650.\textsuperscript{1489} One of the postulated reasons for these upheavals has been the desire for a more egalitarian reconstruction of a moderate oligarchy, potentially entailing lower property qualifications for holding office in councils and courts. A rather more lucid picture emerges from the later tradition that was established around the figure of Kharondas of Katane.\textsuperscript{1490} This seventh-century law-maker, victim of later literary embellishment and distortion no less than the quasi-mythical Lycurgus of Sparta, appears as an arbitrator between hostile classes whose numbers and economic significance fell out of tune with an earlier set of customs that bore, in all likelihood, little relevance to contemporary reality.\textsuperscript{1491} Dividing the society into income classes, Kharondas draw a direct correspondence between a committed offence and the nature of the penalty imposed based on the perpetrator’s assigned class. He also legislated on false testimony, inheritance, contracts, homicide and marriage, enacting a bundle of nomoi in order to reconcile hêgemones with dêmos. The reconciliation in question, however, did not amount to more than a minimal compromise as the rich continued their tight grip on the political reins without the least bit of hindrance. Kharondas’ law-code is purported by the later tradition to be adopted also in other seventh and sixth-century Sicilian poleis including Leontinoi, Zankle and Naxos.\textsuperscript{1492} Adding Syracuse into this eastern Sicilian mix, we arrive, with the exception of Megara Hyblaia and Katane, which, it needs to be added, are also viable candidates of oligarchic rule, at the full circle of eastern Sicilian politeia dominated by the oligarchs.

The case in the south of the island was no more favourable for the enthusiasts of proto-democracy if some recent studies are to be any judge of it. Akragas, for one, was the archetypical stronghold of tyranny, whereas it is all but certain that Selinous was governed by oligarchs.\textsuperscript{1493} Akragas’ rise to prominence, frequently at the expense of its western neighbour Selinous, are associated with the infamous Phalaris and his reign of terror between c. 570-554. Having risen to tyranny either by riding ethnic cleavages that separated Rhodian and Cretan settlers from one another or by directing that boiling internecine strife towards a contempt for the local population, Phalaris later became, largely as a consequence of Polyaenus’ testimony,\textsuperscript{1494} the byword for ingenious schemes and cruelty against the natives. While it is

\textsuperscript{1489} De Angelis, Archaic and Classical Greek Sicily, pp. 168.
\textsuperscript{1490} For recent studies on Kharondas, see Hölkeskamp, Schiedsrichter, Gesetzgeber und Gesetzgebung im archaischen Griechenland, 130-144; Papakonstantinou, Lawmaking and Adjudication in Archaic Greece, pp. 67; Michael Gagarin, ‘Early Greek Law’, in The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Greek Law, ed. by M. Gagarin and D. Cohen, (Cambridge, 2005), pp. 44.
\textsuperscript{1491} De Angelis, Archaic and Classical Greek Sicily, pp. 174-175.
\textsuperscript{1493} De Angelis, Archaic and Classical Greek Sicily, pp. 170-171.
\textsuperscript{1494} Polyaenus, F. 5.1.3-4.
impossible to know for certain whether the later tradition of tyrant’s rise to power as one that was based on his slaves, it is all but given that the native populations around Akragas were being integrated into the *polis* community in ever-increasing numbers. Whether he made use of a large supply of natives that were enslaved prior to his tyranny or he raided the surrounding communities in order to gather a military force to do his bidding, Phalaris left no progeny and his exit from the Acragantine politics was as abrupt as was his grand entrance. Despite his retrospective status as a curious road block on the Sicilian road to power, the achievement of Phalaris was one of a trail-blazer whose politics of terror and guile were to find faithful companions in the later Sicilian tyrants.

The sixth century Sicilian *poleis* also saw high-quality craft production, soaring levels of grain exports, flocking bands of mercenaries, widespread use of mint and Herculean architectural efforts as the respective ruling classes of the communities came to be preoccupied with self-definition. With an increasing political gap that distanced them from their Carthaginian neighbours and higher professionalisation among their numerous populations, Sicilian *poleis* became hubs of production including pottery, clay working and terracotta which were produced in large quantities and with widely-acclaimed taste. This period also marks the recognition of Sicily as the grain silo of the Western Mediterranean. Making full use of the island’s favourable geography many Sicilian mega-*poleis* engaged in building extensive networks of maritime commerce. Shipping grain especially, but not only, to their respective *metropoleis* in mainland Greece, Sicilian traders earned a name for themselves that was

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1498 “It can be argued that these economic take-offs [between 750-650 and 650-550 BCE] were driven by the export of a staple in high demand in homeland Greek markets and associated linkages which provided the necessary economic infrastructure for its export. The main staple was most certainly grain, because of its importance to the diet of Sicilian Greeks and other peoples in the wider world. What percentage grain occupied in the local and export economy is, of course, difficult to estimate given the paucity of our sources, but, as a guess, agriculture as a whole would have probably occupied at least three-quarters of all economic activity, and exports perhaps about one-third of this total output.” De Angelis, Archaic and Classical Greek Sicily, pp. 267; Mogens Herman Hansen, The Shotgun Method: The Demography of the Ancient City-State Culture, (Columbia and London, 2006), pp. 34; cf. R. C. Allen, Global Economic History: A Very Short Introduction, (Oxford, 2011), pp. 56, 68-71.
reminiscent of those of the Homeric Phaeacia as they took an active part in the creation of the Mediterranean triad.\textsuperscript{1499} By the mainland tyrants and oligarchs’ side was always depicted, at least in the fifth-century tradition,\textsuperscript{1500} an armed band of bruisers and the Sicilian \textit{hoi esthloi} fared no different on that count.\textsuperscript{1501} Providing profitable outlets for any bellicose yes-man to wreak terror on friend and foe, Greek and Sikel alike, Sicily became the Greek mercenaries preferred destination long before the Achaemenid Persia. These bands of mercenary troops gave further sustenance to economies that were already growing rapidly.\textsuperscript{1502} All the dazing hustle and bustle of artisan, commercial and mercenary activity also required the use of coined money and the Sicilian oligarchs were happy to deliver coins with their cities’ symbols, as was the ancient Greek practice, on the obverse.\textsuperscript{1503} The exchange of goods was generally in the hands of merchants, who depended on economic diversification, demographic growth and socio-political reorganization in turn, and so was the decision to start minting as a facilitator of import and export.\textsuperscript{1504} With the Phoenician introduction of weighted silver bullion,\textsuperscript{1505} the

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\item[1499] "If De Angelis [2002] is correct that grain trading tied Sicily and the Aegean together from the eighth century, colonization fundamentally changed the land: labor ratio in the Greek world, allowing Aegean Greeks to exploit comparative advantages in some agricultural goods (wine, oil) and in manufactures such as pottery while Sicilian Greeks sold them grain. Rather than a developed Aegean core coupled with an underdeveloped periphery, as world-systems models would predict, gains from trade benefited all parties.” Ian Morris, ‘Early Iron Age Greece’, in \textit{The Cambridge Economic History of the Graeco-Roman World}, ed. by Walter Scheidel, Ian Morris and R. Saller, pp. 240.
\item[1500] For a well-known example in the case of Peisistratidae of Athens, see Herodotus, \textit{The Histories}, 1.64.3-4; Aristotle, \textit{The Athenian Constitution}, 15.1-3.
\item[1501] For similar employment opportunities that were available elsewhere in the Greek world in the second half of the sixth century, see Trundle, \textit{Greek Mercenaries}, pp. 44.
\item[1502] Scholars have highlighted the significance of the part played by mercenaries in the revitalisation of Gela’s economy. From production of imitated Chian wine to agricultural intensification bringing previously unworked land under cultivation, the propertied class of Gelans had a lot to be thankful for to Gela’s tyrants as they injected ever-increasing numbers of mercenaries into the \textit{polis}; R. M. Albanese-Procelli, “Appunti sulla distribuzione delle anfore commerciali nella Sicilia arcaica”, \textit{Kokalos}, vol. 42, (1996), pp. 124; John Wilkins and Shaun Hill, \textit{Food in the Ancient World}, (Oxford, 2006), pp. 61-62; for a postulation of the direct relationship between the hiring of mercenaries and the introduction of mint including its later examples, see Trundle, \textit{Greek Mercenaries}, pp. 2.
\item[1503] There is no study as yet of the iconography of Sicilian coins which appear more detailed than their counterparts in the Greek mainland. Competition with native Sikels’ bronze coins and Carthaginians’ silver in obtaining credit, as pointed out by De Angelis, is quite likely to have played a part in the elaborate mint of Sicilian coins. De Angelis, \textit{Archaic and Classical Greek Sicily}, pp. 264-266.
\item[1504] Gela’s prolonged delay in minting, for example, ended only when its tyrants began their conquest of eastern Sicilian \textit{poleis} in the early fifth century thereby creating a need for coins to pay mercenaries. Leontinoi’s coinage, likewise, followed its subjugation at the hands of Deinomenid tyrants of Syracuse. If the promotion of trade with the \textit{poleis} of mainland Greece and Sicily was a certain motive, so was the decision to partake of that nexus of trade. The case of Megara Hyblaia is a fitting case of how the \textit{colonisers} could entirely rely on trade with the native Sikels that was made in kind without incurring any social or economic reorganisation. N. K. Rutter, \textit{Greek Coinages of Southern Italy and Sicily}, (London, 1997), pp. 118; Frasca, \textit{Leontinoi}, pp. 115; De Angelis, \textit{Megara Hyblaia and Selinus}, pp. 84; for a postulation of the hiring and payment of mercenaries as a driving motive for the early introduction of coinage in Western Asia Minor, see Marco Bettalli, \textit{I mercenari nel mondo greco. Dalle origini all fine del v sec. a. C.}, (Pisa, 1995), pp. 78-79.
\item[1505] Kroll connects the well-established international trade of Phoenicians with a growing degree of involvement by the Sicilian Greeks in weights and measures. J. H. Kroll, ‘The Monetary Use of
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Greek hêgemones saw that the standardization introduced by minting was well worth the trouble of importing silver from elsewhere. Further, the increase in the numbers of artisans was followed by a comparable upsurge in the numbers of the urban poor that effectively meant that building projects that were comparable in scale and ambition to the great Heraion at Samos or Artemision at Didymus could be undertaken. The large polis of Selinous, for example, was adorned with seven peripteral temples between 550-460 BCE among which ranks the so-called Temple G outshining all the others.1506

4.4.2 The Part Played by Thêtès in the Rise and Fall of the Peisistratidae

The travails of the sixth-century Athens, as our incursion into the socio-politics of contemporary Sicilian poleis has attempted to show, were nothing exceptional. But then again, nor were the Athenian responses to those crises anything typical. Ian Morris’ postulation of three polity-wide responses to social strife, material and political inequality, population rise, etc., has given us a paradigmatic list of scripted actions taken in order to alleviate structural problems. The script in question, however, was written with sole reference to the oligarchic exigencies.1507 Perhaps we will never know what the dêmost of any particular polis made of the set-responses that the hêgemones of their respective cities took. One of the commonplaces of ancient Greek historiography, after all, is precisely that there is no account ‘from below.’ And yet there are points in the fifth and fourth century histories showing despite itself that dêmos also responded to the oligarchs’ resolutions with a clearly defined set of social and economic goals that are related to the possession of political kratos. Indeed, we have already seen some of the memorable examples of how such a counteract has taken place in the context of

Weighed Bullion in Archaic Greece’, in The Monetary Systems of the Greeks and Romans, ed. by W.V. Harris, (Oxford, 2008), pp. 31-32, 35-36. 1506 De Angelis’ comparison between the seven temples and the Athenian Parthenon appears a fitting way to put things into historical perspective: “Selinous’ seven monumental temples cost about three to four times more than the finished Parthenon in Classical Athens. To take another tack, if we convert the cost in talents (1,200 to 1,600) of Selinous’ temples to drachmae, we arrive at totals of 7,200,000 to 9,600,000 drachmae. As assumed below, a hired mercenary infantryman and cavalryman required about 1 drachma per day to maintain. Put another way, Selinous’ temples represent a comparable investment of 7,200,000 to 9,600,000 infantry and cavalrymen for a single day.”’ De Angelis, Archaic and Classical Greek Sicily, pp. 90-91.

1507 The intellectual borders of this predilection for viewing the travails and responses of oligarchs as the embryonic representation of those of dêmos can also be observed in Hansen’s retrojection of the idea of creating well-oiled oligarchic poleis as a motive inclusive of the rank-and-file citizenry. Unfortunately, as the example of Kharondas’ law code has shown, the whole socio-historical context would have to be homologous with the preconceived shifts in order for Hansen’s hypothetical construction of replicated polity to work: “In every single case Greek colonization led to the founding of a city, to a confrontation between the local inhabitants and the Greek colonists, who came to form the privileged citizen body, and to the introduction of laws and political institutions for the new society. All three functions are central elements in a polis in the sense of a city state. Colonization may have resulted in all three being accentuated and developed earliest in the colonies and then being copied back at home, shortly after.” Hansen, Polis, pp. 44.
Messenians constructing a new collective identity as a part of their politics of resistance or in that of Katane’s dēmos putting paid to the political claims of their polis’ hēgemones. To lay another major building block into that demotic brick wall of resistance and counteracts, we now step into the Athenian timeline leading to Peisistratus’ rise to power.

The glaring wealth differential between the Athenian dēmos and hēgemones would keep on widening across the sixth century. Commoners’ frequent resorts to turannos to weaken their dependency on aristocrats, a leitmotif of the period,\(^{1508}\) suggests that the Solonian measures that were taken to counter any slide towards the materialization of outright class warfare were far from accommodating the social demands of either party.\(^{1509}\) Returning to our earlier attempt at the reconstruction of Solonian crisis, the rebuking warnings of Solon did not suffice to hold back the popular sentiment from allying itself to Peisistratus.\(^{1510}\) The two main sources of later literary evidence that we have of this period, Herodotus\(^{1511}\) and Athenaión Politeia, appear pregnant in their silences and references alike to the Peisistratid reign. Indeed, even if we were to lend credence to the admittedly surreal stories told by Herodotus to exhibit the lack of scruple of Peisistratus in his bid to political power,\(^{1512}\) the fact remains that even Herodotus,

\(^{1508}\) “I cite here for the reader’s convenience the very tentative dates offered in the third edition of the Oxford Classical Dictionary of some of the more frequently discussed tyrants: Pheidon of Argos (c. 680-660), Kypselos of Corinth (c. 657-627), Periander of Corinth (c. 627-587), Orthagoras and Kleisthenes of Sikyon (c. 665-570), Polykrates of Samos (c. 535-c. 522), Peisistratos of Athens (c. 560, c. 557, c. 546-527), Hippias of Athens (527-510).” Rose, Class in Archaic Greece, pp. 203.

\(^{1509}\) Not only Solon’s fragments rebuking his fellow citizens for complacently offering korunēphoroi, i.e., ‘club-bearers,’ to those who would trample on their slavery, but also the later tradition, no doubt influenced by Herodotus’ severe hatred of tyranny, fostering the image of Solon’s desperate plight against tyrants offer compelling support for dēmos’ then lowly opinion of greedy aristocrats: “Throughout the Greek world the traditional aristocracy was tending to alienate the rest of society, and tyrannies should be seen in some sense as proto-democracies in which the tyrant had the tacit support of the population.” Dillon and Garland, pp. 265; Solon, F. 11.1-8; Herodotus, 1.59-61; this proto-democratic element is further highlighted by Trundle’s remark that the korunēphoroi were, after all, Athenian citizens: Trundle, Greek Mercenaries, pp. 105.

\(^{1510}\) A later addition to the Solonian lore depicts Solon rushing in to the Assembly armed with spear and shield to warn his compatriots of the machinations Peisistratus was devising. His warnings falling on deaf ears of those who belonged to the Peisistratid party, he was declared mad, sharing a moral, in turn, to the effect that the day of their reckoning was not long in coming: “Δείξει δὴ μανήν μὲν ἐμὴν βαῖος χρόνος ἀστοῖς, ἥ δείχξαι, ἀληθείης ἐς μέσον ἐρχομένης.” Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, 1.49.10-11; cf. Aristotle, The Athenian Constitution, 14.2-3; cf. Tracey E. Rihill, “Lawgivers and Tyrants” (Solon fr. 9-11 West), Classical Quarterly, vol. 39, (1989), pp. 277-286; Alex Gottesman, Politics and the Street in Democratic Athens, (Cambridge, 2014), pp. 78.


\(^{1512}\) Peisistratus appeared driving his cart to the city square with self-inflicted wounds claiming that he was beaten to death by his enemies as he was going out of town and was granted the right by the unsuspecting citizens to be accompanied by bodyguards. Additionally, he later on came up with the plan to put a strikingly tall woman dressed in full armour beside him on a chariot to drive through the city after sending heralds to Agora declaring that none other than Athena was personally escorting him back from his exile. Herodotus’ preamble to the second mēkhānōntai, i.e. ‘publicity stunt’ as Gottesman calls it, offers a rare moment of self-conscious reflection on the credence that may be given to the whole episode: “Now, the trick that he and Megacles played in order to bring about his return was by far the
archetypical advocate of anti-tyranny that he was,\textsuperscript{1513} does not give any quarters to the Athenian aristocrats and their disastrous aristocratic clashes that had torn the city and countryside along faction-ridden lines. In the light of this textual evidence and the significance of the Peisistratid tyranny in paving the historical road to Cleisthenes’ reforms at the end of the sixth century, we think it apt to probe beneath the surface of the ‘middling ideology’\textsuperscript{1514} thesis before elaborating the political and social context of the arguments that were offered by the remaining Presocratic philosophers of the sixth century.

Grounded upon a reinterpretation of the collected burial evidence dating back to the eight century, Ian Morris’ thesis combines increased number of archaeologically confirmed burial sites and literary traditions canvassing a period of expanded polity in various Greek poleis to bring home the claim that a community of male citizens was set on track to become a standard political tenet by the end of this period. The formation of the male community of peers, according to this postulation, was an intermingling of the old-guard of former basileis and the new-blood of non-eupatrid parvenues. Having shed the age-old dichotomy between aristocrat and commoner in order to create an impregnable ideological fortress of exclusive equality, the proponents of this united front dismissed women, non-citizens and slaves as inherently antagonistic to their peer-polity. Expressed in the verses of elegiac poets including Tyrtaeus, Solon, Semonides and Hipponax, or in the sober prose of Xenophanes, this image of male citizen as the building block of polity found its anathema in the “elitist ideology”\textsuperscript{1515} of a new

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\textsuperscript{1513} A large number of studies have pondered upon Herodotus’ portrayals of tyranny and narrative linkages that may be conceived to unite the particular representations. Dewald, for example, claims that eastern tyrants occupy the pride of place in offering paradigm cases of tyranny as opposed to the more ambiguous effigies of Greek tyrants in Herodotus’ inquiries: C. Dewald, ‘Form and Content: The Question of Tyranny in Herodotus’, in \textit{Popular Tyranny}, pp. 25-58.

\textsuperscript{1514} Dewald, for example, claims that eastern tyrants occupy the pride of place in offering paradigm cases of tyranny as opposed to the more ambiguous effigies of Greek tyrants in Herodotus’ inquiries: C. Dewald, ‘Form and Content: The Question of Tyranny in Herodotus’, in \textit{Popular Tyranny}, pp. 25-58.

\textsuperscript{1515} For Morris’ complete discussion of ‘middling’ and ‘elitist’ ideologies, see Ian Morris, \textit{Archaeology as Cultural History: Words and Things in Iron Age Greece}, (Oxford and Malden), pp. 155-191; for a
group of intellectual dissenters, such as Sappho, Alcaeus and Anacreon, who looked up to Homeric epics for the sake of elevating an aristocracy of birth to the exclusion of all other preconceived polarities. As the elitist ideology faded into oblivion in the final quarter of the sixth century, Morris concludes, “the general acceptance of middling values made democracy a real possibility.” All the thorny questions concerning his interpretation of burial evidence aside, Morris’ whole attempt to track a presupposed pendulum swinging back and forth between elite subgroups rests on the a priori rejection of archaic dēmos of various poleis as actors imbued with political consciousness. Yet this a priori rendition of dēmos’ lethargic and brittle state of political consciousness begs the question: if the commoners of sixth century poleis were politically carefree to a fault, then how come did they find either the guts or the collective willpower to betray their ineffectual selves in supporting dēmos-friendly tyrants or aristocrats whose arrival on the scene had been induced by the popular sentiment in the first place? As Marx and Engels wrote long ago, and Rose reemphasised recently, class conflict does not require a full-blown opposition of overripe class consciousness battling it out. Morris’ re-examination can do many things in regard to the elaboration of intra-elite relationships in archaic Greece; but it cannot hope to offer a smidgeon of penetrative explanation regarding the rise of Greek tyrants to power in the sixth century.


1516 Morris, Archaeology as Cultural History, pp. 163.

1517 Ibid, pp. 185; for a similar take on the rise of tyranny with an exclusive focus on intra-elite strife, see Osborne, Greece in the Making, pp. 185, 232; Ober, Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens, pp. 53-54; Forsdyke carries the theory to its logical conclusion by arguing that democracy itself, “was the unexpected outcome of a particularly intense episode of intra-elite politics of exile …” Forsdyke, Exile, Ostracism, and Democracy, pp. 16; cf. Potts, The Athenian Navy, pp. 127.

1518 The intellectually clueless penchant for equating only the most explicit of political struggles with the notion of class struggle and then etching any historical use of the latter exceeding the limits of the former as the most blatant theoretical misstep on the epitaph of a Marxism, whose death is all too frequently announced, is no jejune view that has recently came to vogue. Moses Finley, for one, has built a maze of classical enquiries with little compunction to chip away the Marxian concept of class as one that hardly offers a richer glance at ancient Greek history. Moses Finley, The Ancient Economy, (Berkeley, 1973), pp. 50; Moses Finley, Politics in the Ancient World, (Cambridge, 1983), pp. 9-10; Buckley, Aspects of Greek History 750-323 BC, pp. 99; contra: “I use the expression class struggle for the fundamental relationship between classes (and their respective individual members), involving essentially exploitation, or resistance to it. It does not necessarily involve collective action by a class as such, and it may or may not include activity on a political plane, although such political activity becomes increasingly probable when the tension of class struggle becomes acute.” Ste. Croix, The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World, pp. 44, 58; Rose, Class in Archaic Greece, pp. 4-12; Stedman Jones, Karl Marx, pp. 306.

1519 Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, pp. 60.

1520 “The slave who does the minimum amount of work that will evade punishment or who runs away is, in Marxist terms, engaging in class struggle – albeit without class consciousness in the strong sense of the term, a struggle which in certain circumstances … may have political consequences, but by no stretch of imagination could be termed a specifically political struggle.” Rose, Class in Archaic Greece, pp. 10.
To retrace our steps to the most well-documented case of sixth-century tyrants, the unifying social leitmotifs connecting Peisistratus’ three bids at tyranny are aristocratic faction leaders riding popular support to restrain one another from vying successfully for tyrannical power and Peisistratus’ growing wealth as he attempts to outspend his competition. We are informed by both of our sources that there arose, in the period following Solon’s reforms, three factions that held an uneasy distribution of political power.\(^{1521}\) Notwithstanding the discrepancy concerning whether Peisistratus created a faction or merely assumed the leadership of an already existing one,\(^ {1522}\) the Alcmaeonid Megacles led the people of the coast while Lycurgus and Peisistratus were the leaders of people of the plain and the hill people respectively. As the \textit{eupatrid} leaders vied with each other Peisistratus was initially ousted by the combined force of Megacles and Lycurgus, who, interestingly, are purported by \textit{Athenaion Politeia} to be interested in the establishment of mixed constitution and oligarchy correspondingly. Now, this is where the Herodotean account gets somewhat hard to follow: when Megacles and Lycurgus, for unknown reasons, fell out with each other in 552/551, Megacles, being on the losing side of the power struggle, sent for Peisistratus asking the latter to come to his aid in return for marrying his daughter and becoming a tyrant.\(^ {1523}\) I fail to see any reason why Megacles would add the promise of tyranny to gain the upper hand in his conflict with Lycurgus, for the simple reason that Peisistratus’, who no doubt had a reputation of untrustworthiness by this time, establishment of tyranny could effectively spell disaster for his interests. Fortunately, the curious cloud of silence hovering above Herodotus’ account is rectified by \textit{Athenaion Politeia}’s clear-cut reference to Peisistratus as the man most inclined to democracy among the three. Yet, the respite offered by \textit{Athenaion Politeia}’s narrative is only momentary, as it is followed by a perplexing, “Ranked with this last faction [that of Peisistratus] were the men deprived of debts due to them, discontented because of the hardship resulting from this, and those who were not of pure Athenian descent…”\(^ {1524}\) Thus, on one hand there is an endangered aristocratic leader giving in to tyranny in order to turn the tables on his aristocratic opponent, whereas, on the other we have a steady group of landowners with sufficient property in land flocking to a self-proclaimed democratically-inclined aristocrat’s side with the hopes of getting material requital, not to mention potentially foreign-born residents who came to live in Athens and rooting for the same leader. Resembling as it is an unconducted symphony, the

\(^{1521}\) Herodotus, \textit{Histories}, 1.59.14-18; Aristotle, \textit{The Athenian Constitution}, 13.4; by contrast, Lavelle, opines that the historical tradition’s emphasis on the clear-cut political preferences of the three sides is a later fiction attempting to whitewash the support given by some influential aristocrats to Peisistratus in his three bids at tyrannical power: Brian M. Lavelle, “Herodotus and the ‘Parties’ of Attika”, \textit{Classica et Mediaevalia}, vol. 51, (2000), pp. 51-102.

\(^{1522}\) \textit{Athenaion Politeia} gives the latter interpretation whereas Herodotus opts for the former; cf. Osborne, \textit{Greece in the Making}, pp. 268.


inconsistencies of this account can be ironed out in the following three-fold manner. First off, given Herodotus’ inherently biased view of democracy, we think it apt for him to relegate the preferred polity of each faction-leader to silence. Peisistratus’ courting of popular favour makes sense especially if he was a relative late-comer to the political struggle as démos was not only the most numerous class in the polis but also could have been deliberately left out by aristocratically-disposed hēgemones. Peisistratus wooed the non-aristocrats whose support, in his eyes, would suffice to make him achieve his desired tyranny.1525 Secondly, with Solon’s cancellation of debts on the security of persons, the customary debt-bondage could not be seen in a favourable light at this time, which necessitated the maintenance either of a steady supply of slaves or free wage-labour. Given the age-old aristocratic predisposition to prefer submissive slaves to citizens, and provided the fact that this was not a particularly bellicose episode for the Athenians which would mean that there was not an excess supply of slaves, we contend that aristocrats with large assets in land may have soaked up the available slave labour to leave the citizens that were less well-supplied in land with only wage-labour to rely upon. In this hypothetical case of thêtes extorting the surplus cereal that was produced by more hard-pressed thêtes, we glance at a situation where the worker could simply walk off from the agreed job if he or she felt that the terms of trade were not exactly equal in order to find a new one. Further, if we accept the short supply of slaves then the aristocrats would also need to concede the demands of free labourers who, again, could seek employment elsewhere. Finally, the repatriation of former-citizens-turned-slaves could have been handled haphazardly and with minimal care afforded to re-establishing the formal ties of the individuals to the community.1526 In a society in which the social status distinguishing slave, free and manumitted were as rigid as any other slave society, repatriated individuals would welcome any aid to redress their precarious position, even one that is offered by a man of unchecked political ambition.

Having hypothetically established the strange bed-fellowship of démos and Peisistratus, we now turn to the theme of growing wealth of Peisistratus that is addressed especially by Athenaion Politeia as a central underlying factor of his eventual success at tyranny.1527

1525 And given Herodotus embarrassed account of the success he enjoyed in his three bids, he appears, contrary to what Ober suggests, to have succeeded. The contrast of scheming tyrant and gullible démos was a fifth century invention which does not mask any of the ‘achievements’ of Peisistratus: either through wounds that had been self-inflicted to draw sympathy or with the ‘divine aid’ of the most goddess-like of the Athenian women Peisistratus managed to complete the building blocks of his eventual tyranny completely through appeals made to the Athenian démos: Ober, Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens, pp. 65.

1526 Athenaion Politeia’s mention of Solonian laws falling into disuse in the period of tyranny, though temporally distant, can be taken as suggestive evidence. Aristotle, The Athenian Constitution, 22.1.

1527 Ibid, 15.2.
Backing down on his promise to marry Megacles’ daughter due to the fright that potential unison would endanger spreading the Alcmaeonid curse that had originated from the Cylonian affair to the Peisistratid line, Peisistratus found himself cornered yet again and fled into a self-imposed exile. Though quite conservative on the details, Athenaios Politeia charts a journey beginning with a temporary sojourn at Rhaecelus in the region of the Thermaic Gulf; “from there he proceeded to the district about Pangaeum, where he enriched himself and hired soldiers; then he went to Eretria.”

Taking a leap of chronology to set the time frame directly on 536/535, the account rounds off with the mention of “the Thebans, Lygdamis of Naxos, and the cavalry who controlled the state at Eretria,” that supported Peisistratus’ final push to power. At this juncture we appear to hit another lacuna in the historical narrative of the Athenaios Politeia, which can be mended when the following allusions from Herodotus pitch in. Indeed, the emendation offered by the Herodotean interpretation is critical to any effort to tentatively complete the jigsaw puzzle:

“The first place in Attica they [the Peisistratid faction] took was Marathon. While they were camped there, they were joined by supporters from the city and there was also an influx of men from the country demes who found the rule of a tyrant more pleasant than freedom. So their ranks were swelling. Now, the Athenians in the city had taken no account of Pisistratus while he was collecting money, or even afterwards, when he had taken Marathon; but when they found out that he was marching on the city, they came out to defend the city against him.”

We postulate, on the basis of this textual evidence, that the time Peisistratidae spent in Pangaeum was particularly lucrative for their fortunes. Now, the age of Greek mercenaries ravaging the land and filling Isocrates with terror was still off at this time by roughly two centuries. Yet, given that there is no reference in the literary sources either to the Thebans or the Eretrians in regard to having any bone to pick with the Athenians, it seems rather evident that these factions could be enticed only by a share in the spoils or by payment in advance

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1529 Aristotle, The Athenian Constitution, 15.2.2-4; cf. “When Peisistratus heard about the actions that were being taken against him, he got right out of the country and went to Eretria…. They [Peisistratus and his sons] set about collecting contributions from all the communities which were under some kind of obligation to them and, although a number of communities were extremely generous with their financial support, the Thebans were the most generous of all with their money. Eventually, to cut a long story short, they were fully equipped to return. Argive mercenaries had come from the Peloponnesse, and a volunteer from Naxos, whose name was Lygdamis, came and raised morale a great deal by bringing both money and man.” Herodotus, Histories, 1.61.10-12,13-22, trans. by Robin Waterfield; Herodotus’ use of the word misthôtoi, i.e., earners of misthos or ‘payment,’ instead of the more archaic epikouroi goes on to dispel, as noted by Trundle, any doubt regarding the part played by Peisistratus’ wealth in building his army: Trundle, Greek Mercenaries, pp. 13, 28.
1530 Aristotle, The Athenian Constitution, 15.2.6-7.
1531 Herodotus, Histories, 1.62.2-10, trans. by Robin Waterfield.
1532 Waterfield, Creators, Conquerors and Citizens, pp. 82-83.
1533 See especially Isocrates, Panegyricus, 115, 168; To Philip, 96, 120, 121; Epistle, 9.
which is made quite explicit by Herodotus reference to a mercenary force. Peisistratus’ collection of vast sums of money could also encourage the reading of the large numbers of Athenians entering the fray on his side on a purely clientelist basis. Based on our interpretation of the hypothetical grounds of his popular support, however, we think it more compelling to argue that the men from the country who preferred ‘tyranny to freedom’ were largely none other than the enslaved population of the pre-Solonian era. In short, fed up with the exorbitant demands of aristocrats and the incessant political strife, the small landowners, comprising of both former debt-bondspersons and others, threw their weight in Peisistratus’ defence.

The historical trajectory of Peisistratus’ time as tyrant is just as vital to render a comprehensive account of the Athenian polis between 546 and 511 as is his rise to power. Yet, Herodotus’ take on the period is abruptly cut off at the outset of Peisistratus’ tyranny with a dry reference to the exile of the Alcmaeonidae and to the pitiable state of oppression that the Athenians at this time were in. Herodotus’ aversion of Peisistratus’ tyranny is hardly puzzling, however, since quite a commendable portrait of the period emerges from Athenaiion Politeia’s account until the murder one of the two sons of Peisistratus, Hipparchus, which, for all intents and purposes, would potentially jeopardize his theme of divine retribution in its entirety. Peisistratus, who reigned “more like a citizen than like a tyrant,” owed the popularity of his rule to a combination of factors including relative material affluence, isolation of mechanisms of political participation, and monumental construction efforts. In regard to the material welfare of the citizens, the Athenaiion Politeia makes the oblique reference to his

1534 Lavelle counters this argument by showing that the exorbitant rates, inter-state rivalries and military ineffectiveness all made the employment of foreign mercenaries a practical impossibility. Yet, his case appears less than compelling when the material resources of Peisistratids as well as their entrenched inter-state relations with other aristocratic factions are accounted for. We think, in that vein, that Peisistratidae, one of the eunaprid families with most renown, were more than capable of bending the rigid laws of mercenary recruitment sketched by Lavelle. B. M. Lavelle, “Herodotus, Skythian Archers, and the doryphoroi of the Peisistratids”, Klio, vol. 74, (1992), pp. 78-97.


1536 The concept of tisis, i.e., ‘divine redress,’ is a fundamental one in the Herodotean universe. Acts of sacrilege and benevolence have their own cosmic trajectories through which divine concern and reflection manifests itself. “Retribution is one wheel in a complex cycle of reciprocities that entails responsibilities and obligations, usually of a personal kind and shaped by ties of kinship which can be inherited across generations.” Sean Sheehan, A Guide to Reading Herodotus’ Histories, (New York, 2018), pp. 26; cf. Homer, Odyssey, 4.78-99; Hesiod, Works and Days, 319-326; Kallet-Marx, Money, Expense, and Naval Power in Thucydides’ History 1-5.24, pp. 14-15, 72.

1537 Aristotle, The Athenian Constitution, 16.2.3; cf. 16.2.8, 14.3; Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, 6.54.6; Herodotus, Histories, 1.59.6; Plutarch, Solon, 31.3; Ste. Croix, ‘Five Notes on Solon’s Constitution’, pp. 82.
lending “money to those who were in difficulties,” but then attempts to bring this point home by mentioning farmers as the principal address of these monetary aids. The farmers were to be kept materially floating in order to keep them away from the polis as well as to induce a complete absorption in ensuring material sustenance that would serve as a clear impediment for any farmer to participate in the political affairs. Peisistratus may also have engaged in minimal land distribution for the citizens that were in the direst need of sustaining themselves, which would shed further light on the allusion to his increased revenues that were ultimately due to the enlargement of the fields that were under extensive cultivation.

All the same, he devised a new tithe on cereal produce and recruited a team of overseers that saw to the timely collection of the due amount in official capacity. The Athenion Politeia does not exactly spell it out, but the tithe in question could be one that was quite manageable for the majority of the small farmers since the whole point to the taxation scheme that he devised seems to be Peisistratus’ belief that ‘if you keep them well-fed they respect, but if the well either goes dry or inundates they rebel’. Peisistratus could afford the partial loss of revenue which would be due to him if the tithe were set higher. Indeed, as the Athenion Politeia makes it abundantly evident, this loss of potential material revenue was more than

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1538 Aristotle, *The Athenian Constitution*, 16.2.4; Cawkwell, interestingly, rejects this reference with a solemn reference to the conventional timeline of the use of coinage in Athens. He is promptly refuted, however, both by compelling literary evidence that loans, just like taxes, could also be collected from produce and by the stretched timeline of coinage that is now accepted: “The first Athenian coins were minted under the Peisistratids; an early series of “blazon money” (dump silver two-drachma pieces marked with various blazons) under Peisistratus was replaced under his sons by the first series of Athens’ famous “owls.” These were four-drachma pieces of about seventeen grams (a bit more than half an ounce), made out of high-grade Attic silver from Laurium mines in the southeast of the peninsula.” Waterfield, *Creators, Conquerors and Citizens*, pp. 83; Ober, *Democracy and Knowledge*, pp. 58-59, 246; George L. Cawkwell, “Early Greek Tyranny and the People”, *Classical Quarterly*, vol. 45, (1995), pp. 73-86; contra Murray, *Early Greece*, pp. 190; H. Kim, ‘Archaic Coinage as Evidence for the Use of Money’, in *Money and Its Uses*, ed. by A. Meadows and R. Shipton, (Oxford, 2002), pp. 7-21; Buckley, *Aspects of Greek History 750-323 BC*, pp. 107.

1539 Cf. “But even if he did not distribute land, Peisistratus did improve conditions for the common people. The commissions for the construction of new temples and the increased industrial activity provided the necessary employment. The small farmers in Attica benefited greatly from his relief measures. It was thanks to Solon and Peisistratus that the majority of the Athenian citizens were able to support themselves as small farmers in the Classical period.” Lukas de Blois and R. J. van der Spek, *An Introduction to the Ancient World*, (London and New York, 2008), pp. 86; Millett, *Lending and Borrowing in Ancient Athens*, pp. 51. The case for a comprehensive land redistribution, needless to say, is essentially different. Indeed, even granting the benefit of doubt to the likelihood of distribution of minimal tracts of land to the most needful subsistence farmers or wage workers, there is absolutely no indication of any comprehensive land reform in any of the surviving histories. Rose, *Class in Archaic Greece*, pp. 212 n. 29; cf. Victor Parker, ‘Tyrants and Lawgivers’, in *The Cambridge Companion to the Archaic Age*, ed. by H. A. Shapiro, (Cambridge, 2007), pp. 13-39.


1541 Ibid., 16.4-5.

1542 Thankfully we have Thucydides’ convincing earlier testimony to elucidate this point: “Although they [the Peisistratidæ] taxed the Athenians at only five per cent of their produce, they still beautified the city, supported wars through to the end, and maintained sacrificial offerings in the temples.” Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War*, 6.54.23-26, trans. by Hammond; cf. Aristotle, *The Athenian Constitution*, 16.4, 16.6.
made up by the small farmers’ self-induced exile from polis and politics. In fact, this picture of the benevolent law-abiding tyrant also emerges in regard to Peisistratus’ attempts of lifting the public weal and upholding law and order. Constructing waterways to deliver a steady supply of water that would promote public hygiene and allowing the relatively unhindered functioning of the Areopagus Council were two of the foremost measures that were taken by the tyrant to make sure that no public disorder would arise to imperil his reign.\footnote{1543} The beginning of the Herculean construction of the Olympieion, or the Temple of Olympian Zeus, which, incidentally, would be completed only by the time of the Roman princeps Hadrian in 131/2 AD, shows the extent that Peisistratus was willing to go to revitalize the public spirit\footnote{1544} and to cover the polis qua the seat of his tyranny with a shroud of sanctity.\footnote{1545}

The overweening veneer\footnote{1546} of the story told by the Athenaios Politeia of Peisistratus’ reign appears to hold a historical grain of truth only when an attempt to fill the lacuna that appears to exist between Hipparchus’ assassination in 514/3 and the Spartan aid to Athens that proved to be the undoing of the Peisistratidae is made.\footnote{1547} On that note, Herodotus makes an intriguing

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\footnoteref{1544} The accentuated efforts of building an ethos of common citizenship were not limited to overambitious architectural projects. Peisistratus’ introduction of systematized Homeric recitations, as the traditional account goes, at the Panathenaea is a case in point in showing how the tyrant made a virtue of the necessity to enshroud the nitty-gritty of political participation; cf. S. West, in A Commentary on Homer’s Odyssey: Volume I, (Oxford, 1988), pp. 35-39.

\footnoteref{1545} Osborne, Greece in the Making, pp. 269-270.

\footnoteref{1546} A mention of citizens’ supposed allusion to Peisistratus’ rule as “the age of Kronos,” is only the most conspicuous of this explicit ideological twist that was made by its author to exculpate a well-known tyrant in the second half of the fourth century when tyranny and the consummate stifling of freedom were regarded as synonyms. Aristotle, The Athenian Constitution, 16.7.4; cf. Rose, Class in Archaic Greece, pp. 235-236.

\footnoteref{1547} Of course, a more devastating lacuna separates Peisistratus’ death in 528/7 from the assassination of Hipparchus. Alas, the two historical sources that we have hardly make more than brief mention of this period. The corresponding silence enveloping the period is especially disconcerting in regard to the Athenaios Politeia’s abundantly sympathetic account of Peisistratus’ rule, the continuation of which, to be exact, is hinted at by the author: “On the death of Peisistratus his sons took over the regime, and continued the management of affairs in the same way.” Aristotle, The Athenian Constitution, 17.3.1-3. Are we to take the author at his word and make nothing of the element of suspense that is thrown into the narrative dustbin in favour of the focus on more ‘juicy’ love triangle that is said to exist between Hipparchus, Harmodius, and Aristogiton? Though we are in no way of knowing, based on the current state of archaeological and literary evidence, the dwindling extent of the popular support for Peisistratids at the time of their struggle against the Spartans led by king Cleomenes in 511/0 signalled by the heavy reliance of Hippias on Thessalian cavalry seems to warrant the inference of the effective withholding of public support that Peisistratus used to depend upon: “He [Hippias] executed a good number of citizens, and also began to look abroad in the search for some ready asylum should there be a revolution.” Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, 6.59.6-8. Naturally, this was in the aftermath of his brother’s murder that made Hippias’ contempt of anything ‘suspicious’ especially overbearing: “Hippias took revenge for his brother’s death, with many executions and expulsions, and became suspicious and bitter towards everyone.” Aristotle, The Athenian Constitution, 19.1.1-3. The resentful suspicion in question, we contend, was directed not to all and sundry but to other aristocratic factions,

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digression into the Spartan politics for the explicit purpose of contrasting their fortunes to those of the Athenians at the time of Peisistratus’ rise to tyranny. Spartans, having subjugated the Messenians and Laconians, were looking for other populations to subordinate to their rule in addition to new allies in their ongoing struggle against Argos. They found the partners they were looking for in Tegeans and other populations that were settled to the north of Lacedaemon and promptly sent an expeditionary force the overcome the Tegean resistance. Yet, the military trial of strength proved to be indecisive and the Spartans could only overwhelm their opponents, according to Herodotus, by a curious *mélange* of human perspicacity and divine providence. Herodotus’ digression breaks off at this point by stressing that the Spartans were more appealing candidates for a potential alliance for the Lydian king Croesus in his quest to subdue the Persian Empire. Recent studies, however, have shown that instead of occupying the Tegean land or turning the Tegeans into helots as they did with the Messenians, the Spartans chose to fasten the subject population to a permanent alliance whose aims would be dictated by the Spartan interests. This imposition of an alliance that was conceived in quite unilateral terms constitutes a singular case among a series of alliances that would serve as the diplomatic basis of the eventual formation of the Peloponnesian League in the fifth century.

To be sure, there was a broad coalition of interests that made up the initial partnerships. Except for the Corinthians, however, there does not seem to be many *poleis* who had the political and military standing to offset any decision particularly the Alcmaeonidae, and their supporters. Indeed, given the Alcmaeonid response to the eventual mop-up operations that were conducted by Hippias, i.e., recalling Spartan aid through promises of human and divine (Delphic) aid, we claim that Hippias’ rule was characterized by steady attempts at the pacification of other aristocratic functions even before the murder of Hipparchus; cf. G. E. M. de Ste. Croix, ‘Herodotus and King Cleomenes I of Sparta’, in *Athenian Democratic Origins and Other Essays*, pp. 432.

1548 The approximate dates can be given for the initial failure as having occurred under the kings Leon and Hegesikles (c. 575-560) and for the eventual success under Anaxandridas and Ariston with a *terminus ante quem* set at c. 546.

1549 The Herodotean story, as usual, is filled with oracles to the effect that Pythia, or the Delphic oracle, prophesies a certain place in Tegea where the Spartans would need to go in order to find the burial site of Orestes and to bring him back to Sparta. Only after their restitution of Orestes’ bones, so the story goes, could the Spartans finally subdue the Tegeans. Herodotus, *Histories*, 1.67-68; for a scurrilous critique of the plausibility of the Herodotean interpretation of the story, see Karl-Wilhem Welwei, *Sparta: Aufstieg und Niedergang einer antiken Grossmacht*, (Stuttgart, 2004).


1551 This modern byword for the coalition does not do justice to either the Sparta’s leading position within the League or the extent of the liabilities of League membership. Technically rendered by Cartledge as a hegemonic *summachos*, the deliberative mechanism of the League was bicameral, meaning that an action voted for in the Spartan Assembly was duly sent to the League Council where a secondary voting would take place. The alliance covered defensive as well as offensive measures. Cartledge, *Democracy*, pp. 154; Ste. Croix, *The Origins of the Peloponnesian War*, pp. 117; Buckley, *Aspects of Greek History 750-323 BC*, pp. 223; Cartledge, *Sparta and Lakonia*, pp. 118, 127.

1552 For a learned evaluation of the archaeological evidence concerning the early Spartan activity down to the Tegean conflict, see Cartledge, *Sparta and Lakonia*, pp. 118-123.
that was made with sole reference to the Spartan motives. The expansion of this coalition afforded the Spartans a buffer of territorial security against their traditional enemies and a safeguard to consolidate their class-based political system in equal measure. Indeed, as the first half of the fifth century would explicate time and again, the formation of the League was the only decisive factor that could keep the Spartan population comfortably free while necessitating the perpetual terrorization of the ethnically homogenous helots.

4.4.3 The Athenian Thêtes and the Cleisthenic Reforms

The Alcmaeonid idea of forging a potential partnership with Sparta against Hippias shows, as our brief foray into the Spartan affairs across this period suggests, the inherent paltriness of any attempt at historical reconstruction along the lines of a timeless opposition between ‘tyranny’ and ‘freedom.’ Alcmaeonidae knew that any capitulation made to the Spartans to temper with Athenian politics would likely result in the creation of a political system that was more in tune with the Spartan interests. To that end, the two ultimately abortive military attempts made by the Spartans in 508 and 506 for reinstating the more oligarchically-inclined group of Isagoras in lieu of that of Cleisthenes reminds us of the innate fragility that such a temporary partnership would have. The Alcmaeonidae may have spent their time in exile collecting funds and raising armies just like Peisistratus once did; still, they presumably lacked the one thing that tipped the scales decisively in favour of Peisistratus in the earlier case: dēmos’ support. Hippias’ reign of terror, however uncompromising it may have been, might have hardly descended on the small farmer thêtes who did not stand to gain any material or social benefit in another aristocratic upheaval. Lacking Peisistratid’s pervasive influence to enlist thêtes to their political project, Alcmaeonids’ only viable recourse to reverse their fortunes was the Spartans. Alcmaeonidae managed to oust Peisistratidae only with the Spartan aid that was offered in return for compelling the Athenians to adopt a political diet that was more indulgent towards the Spartans. When Cleisthenes jeopardized the class basis of

1553 “This final expedition against Athens [in 506] shows two things. First, Sparta now had numerous allies in the Peloponnese, though certainly not ‘the whole Peloponnese’ since Argos and Achaia were not allied to Sparta…. Second, Sparta could not operate without the consent of its allies, or at least the powerful states among the allies such as Corinth.” Roy, ‘Sparta and the Peloponnese from the Archaic Period to 362 BC,’ pp. 357; cf. Ste Croix, The Origins of Peloponnesian War, pp. 117.

1554 We will see a welter of such self-same clichés in the context of the fifth-century playwrights. Never the less, it appears interesting to note that this antiquated outlook can still lay claim to adherents. For one such example that pits tyranny against nomoi, see Hans-Joachim Gehrke, ‘States’, in A Companion to Archaic Greece, pp. 395-410.

1555 Waterfield, Creators, Conquerors and Citizens, pp. 89.

1556 The lack of edifying allusions signalling the workings of divine redress in the case of Herodotus’ abrupt conclusion to the end of the Peisistratid tyranny, not to mention the absence of even muffled references to what may be taken as the plight of dēmos, could be taken as a silent acknowledgement of the likelihood of this coalition of interests between thêtes and Peisistratidae. Herodotus, The Histories, 5.65.
aristocratic politics, Spartans were needed once more by Isagoras to enforce the class distinctions that were put in place by Solon’s reforms. The narratives traced by both of our historical sources pass through an initial stage of Cleisthenes’ coming off worst in the aristocratic dispute which prompted him to lure the dêmos – indicated ironically by Herodotus with the aid of the pro-aristocratic word, prosetairizetai, or to companion-ise\textsuperscript{1557} – with the promise of more political power. And given Herodotus’ passing remark of this compulsory alliance\textsuperscript{1558} the rather detailed account of the contours of the struggle between Isagoras and Cleisthenes following the latter’s turn to the people given by the \textit{Athenaion Politeia} appear to warrant a full citation:

“Isagoras then fell behind in power, so he called back Cleomenes, with whom he had a tie of hospitality, and since it appeared that the Alemaeonids were among those who were under a curse, persuaded Cleomenes to join him in driving out the accursed. Cleisthenes withdrew; and Cleomenes came with a few men and solemnly expelled seven hundred Athenian households. After doing this he tried to dissolve the council and make Isagoras and three hundred of his friends masters of the city. However, the council resisted and the common people gathered in force; the supporters of Cleomenes and Isagoras fled to the Acropolis; the people settled down and besieged them for two days, but on the third made a truce to release Cleomenes and all the men with him, and recalled Cleisthenes and the other exiles. \textit{Thus the people obtained control of the affairs, and Cleisthenes became leader and champion of the people.}\textsuperscript{1559}

Put differently, Cleisthenes owed the victory of his aristocratic faction in large part to dêmos in general and thêtes in particular. In the light of the engulfed position of Cleisthenes, flanked as he was on all sides by opposing aristocratic factions and by the looming Spartan threat, the administrative and political benefits granted by him to small farmers, labourers, petty artisans, in short, thêtes one and all, becomes all the more conceivable. On the count of administrative measures, he cancelled the four property classes instituted by Solon and established a system comprising of ten tribes in its place.\textsuperscript{1560} The ten tribes were to select fifty representatives each that would be elected in a tribal council among those males who were over thirty and had never served in the boulê before.\textsuperscript{1561} With the cancellation of the formal property qualification the necessity of creating an administrative system that was based on geography was met with a division of the entire Attic region into three areas: paralia, mesogeios and astu, or, respectively, ‘coastal’ region, ‘inland,’ and ‘city’ including the farmland around the polis.\textsuperscript{1562}

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\footnote{\textsuperscript{1557} Cartledge, ‘Democracy, Origins of: Contribution to a Debate’, pp. 159.}
\footnote{\textsuperscript{1558} Herodotus, \textit{The Histories}, 5.66.9-11.}
\footnote{\textsuperscript{1559} Aristotle, \textit{The Athenian Constitution}, 20.2-4 [my emphasis C.O.].}
\footnote{\textsuperscript{1560} Herodotus, \textit{The Histories}, 5.69.8-10, Aristotle, \textit{The Athenian Constitution}, 21.2.}
\footnote{\textsuperscript{1561} Legislation allowing election to the boulê twice was passed later on, consecutive elections, however, was still banned.}
\footnote{\textsuperscript{1562} Aristotle, \textit{The Athenian Constitution}, 21.3-4.}
\end{footnotesize}
More than 140 demes or ‘parishes’\(^{1563}\) were reformed\(^{1564}\) to fill the population quota of each tribe’s trittyes or ‘thirds’ which were to be supplied from a number of demes located within the three regions respectively. The upshot of this complete overhaul of the administrative system was the assurance of each tribe having a roughly equal population that was taken from a cross section of the citizen body.\(^{1565}\) The conferral of citizenship was one of the main instances on which the reforms left a lasting impression. Monopolized hitherto by genêtaï or cult members of genê the formal expansion of the popular basis of the polity introduced demes as the official arbitators of any decisions rendered on the granting, withholding and divesting of citizenship.\(^{1566}\) Although the administrative reforms ironed out the most drastic bits of an otherwise considerably skewed election process, being elected boulesteis was still largely out of the reach of poor members of demes. In fact, if any kind of social balance was struck through the reforms then it largely had to do with the mitigation of the ongoing material impediments to boulê service for the majority of dêmos with the more realisable capacity of holding office in deme councils.\(^{1567}\) This apparent balance of political representation that was spread

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\(^{1563}\) “Pre-existing villages, and perceptibly distinct communities within the town of Athens, were turned into ‘demes’, perhaps with the simple expedient of requiring every Athenian male over the age of 18 to register in what he regarded as his home community. Demes, on this view, were not parishes, not districts of Attica, to which one belonged because one resided within their boundaries. Demes will have had no physical boundaries as such, but were communities whose members were men who identified themselves as members of that community because that was where, no doubt normally for reasons of family history, they felt at home.” Osborne, *Greece in the Making*, pp. 280.

\(^{1564}\) Cleisthenes’ reforms of the administrative structure presuppose a loosely linked nexus of already existing demes that comprised of more or less nucleated settlements located around Attica. Cleisthenic reforms involved the moulding of these existing demes through division and addition as well as the creation of new demes in order to curb the power of aristocratic strongholds while keeping the poor citizens politically abreast. In short, a reorganisation of the polity, which had hitherto been conceived genikai, or ‘by descent,’ along topikai, ‘by location,’ lines served as an aim of Cleisthenes’ reforms. For a classic study of the Attic demes before and after the reforms, see Robin Osborne, *Demos: The Discovery of Classical Attica*, (Cambridge, 1985a); Ober, *Democracy and Knowledge*, pp. 140-142; Ste. Croix, ‘Cleisthenes I: The Constitution’, pp. 139; Ober, *The Rise and Fall of Classical Polis*, pp. 162-163.


\(^{1566}\) The continued significance of genê through the classical period, a point that is often overlooked, should make it clear that there was no condemnation of this archaic aristocratic institution into oblivion as its official capacity was wrested away. Whenever there was a crucial turn in democracy’s fortunes for the worse, e.g., the Sicilian expedition of 415-413, the popularity of genê re-surfaced in comedy and tragedy alike. There is no reason not to suspect that some of the old genê, at the very least, were absorbed into the routine operations of Cleisthenic demes, whereby they constituted a viable ‘aristocratic underground.’ For a recent study on the kinship organisations and their structures that were tempered through administrative reforms, see S. C. Humphreys, *Kinship in Ancient Athens: An Anthropological Analysis*, (Oxford, 2018).

\(^{1567}\) “Athenian democracy was founded upon a belief in equality, and all citizens could in theory take a direct and equal part. To a certain extent this ethos could be enforced by the institutions: thus most citizens must have served at least once on the boule. To a large extent, however, geographical constraints and social inequalities intervened, and although a large number of citizens probably did attend the assembly … political decision-making rested in the hands of a restricted portion of the citizen body.” Osborne, *Demos*, pp. 91; for a similar evaluation of the reforms, see Junker, *Interpreting the Images of Greek Myths*, pp. 5. Granting that a strict, albeit non-legalised, separation of polis and chora or gê, ‘hinterland’ or ‘fields’, cannot be conceived on the basis of late classical historical evidence alone,
relatively equally over polis with its politically experienced population weighted more towards upper class hēgemones and its breadbasket with high concentrations of small farmers and producers, however, hardly amounted to anything more than the accession of the formal equality of all citizens to hold office.\textsuperscript{1568} Recalling that small farmers and workers did not have the means to hire workers or purchase slaves to work in their stead, not to mention the absence of any pay for public service that would somehow mitigate their vacancy, the formal political equality, vital as it was, was confined to theory alone.\textsuperscript{1569}

The political reforms that were adopted by Cleisthenes were not limited to those concerning boulê and ekklesia; instead, all the political dispensations including the military ones were to be made according to the newly constituted tribe system. In as much as Polemarch’s office still appeared to endure the blowing gales of the reforms, a ten-member committee, elected on the basis of the new tribal system, was assigned to the former’s office, which, in turn, would eventually be eclipsed. Granted that the selection of strategoi, unlike that of councillorship, would be made by election rather than sortition even in the most democratic of times, it also needs to be noted that their popular appointment entailed the initiation of their subjection to

Hansen’s hypothesis that the majority of the ancient Greeks were urban dwellers seems to swing the pendulum to the other end. Hansen relies heavily on the results of survey archaeology and the catalogue of poleis sizes and populations estimated by the influential Copenhagen Polis Center in his attempts to dub the archaic and classical citizen-farmers as an early manifestation of the Weberian Acherbürger. The results offered by survey archaeology, however, are capable of accommodating a large range of interpretations, and, in the end, Hansen’s argument, based on statistical estimations as they are, is just one among many others equally compelling: Hansen, The Shotgun Method, pp. 73; cf. Osborne, Demos, pp. 67-72, 88; Waterfield, Creators, Conquerors, and Citizens, pp. 92; for a synoptic evaluation of pros and cons of survey archaeology by one of its leading practitioners, see Lin Foxhall, ‘Can We See the “Hoplite Revolution” on the Ground? Archaeological Landscapes, Material Culture, and Social Status in Early Greece’, pp. 216; for a reinterpretation of the reports of a relatively scarcely populated Attic landscape along the lines of a model of intensive agriculture which require the continuous cultivation of grain and pulses without fallow, and hence intensifying the prerequisite labour requirement that could have been supervised by the yeomen-farmers themselves, see Sara Forsdyke, ‘Land, Labour and Economy in Solonian Athens: Breaking the Impasse Between Archaeology and History’, in Solon of Athens, pp. 343-345.

\textsuperscript{1568} Indeed, the smooth proceeding of the whole Cleisthenic system was predicated upon a closely supervised separation of demes from polis as small peasants would find it quite hard, if not impossible, to regularly travel to the city while ploughing their own fields: “The whole working of Athenian democracy demanded that the demes continued to be communities, and without modern means of communication that was effectively a demand that people continued to dwell together in villages.” Osborne, Demos, pp. 41.

\textsuperscript{1569} “So before long Thetes were allowed into the Council as well as the Assembly—but this made a difference only to town-dwelling Thetes, since there was no pay (yet) for public service, and their country cousins could not afford to take time off. It is a full day’s walk from Marathon, for instance, to Athens, and Assembly meetings might be called at short notice. The frequency of council meetings (every day except for holidays and days of ill omen) made it difficult for the poor to serve in this capacity too, even after councillors began to receive a daily allowance. Throughout democratic Athens’ history, the Council tended to be peopled by those who were better off, and politics in general was played more by those who lived in or near the city than by those whose homes were father away, who, if they cared, focused more on local deme politics.” Waterfield, Creators, Conquerors and Citizens, pp. 94.
audit mechanisms, which comprised, in its developed fifth-century form, of two stages antecedent to and following their term.\textsuperscript{1570} Cleisthenes’ introduction of this high degree of accountability was further consolidated by a unique measure to add to the ‘bite’ of dêmos’ political power: ostracism.\textsuperscript{1571} Each year the members of the ekklêsia could decide whether to hold a secret ballot or not\textsuperscript{1572}; in the case that they opined to do so, granted that they reached a quorum of six thousand, they would later invite all citizens to the Agora to write the name of any prominent politician that they deemed to be most ‘deserving’ of a ten-year exile on ostraca or potsherds. Once the voting was complete, the politician whose name appeared most would be duly sent off while reserving his right to property.

The overall impact of Cleisthenes’ reforms on the Athenian politics can be analysed along two strands: the apparent erosion of the aristocratic ideology and the further solidification of the relations of material production. The prevailing ideology of citizenship did not exclude the traditional ethos of aristocratic heritage and superiority.\textsuperscript{1573} The supervisory powers of the Areopagus were not undercut, no pay for officeholding was introduced and no wholesale abandonment of property qualifications for officeholding took place.\textsuperscript{1574} In fact, not only the material gap distinguishing eupatrid from dêmos but also the social superiority of aristocratic lineages like Peisistratids and Alcmaeonids compared to the rest of the citizens, as we saw above, was widening.\textsuperscript{1575} The political fortunes of dêmos, for better or for worse, rose and fall with those of the ‘well-born’. Another thing that the whole episode from Peisistratus’ rise to power to Cleisthenes’ reforms shows in abundance, however, is that guaranteeing the material

\textsuperscript{1570} Ibid, pp. 95.

\textsuperscript{1571} Though we are not in a position to establish Cleisthenes’ formation of this institution with clarity except through a complete reliance on a brief reference in the Athenaiou Politieia, a thorough analysis of the democratic bias of his reforms allows us to surmise that Cleisthenes was quite likely to institute this practice if for nothing else than the consolidation of his leading aristocratic position. Aristotle, The Athenian Constitution, 22.1. An evaluation of the textual evidence can be seen in Buckley, Aspects of Greek History 750-323 BC, pp. 132-136; Ste. Croix, ‘Cleisthenes II: Ostracism, Archons and Strategoi’, in Athenian Democratic Origins and Other Essays, pp. 181-; cf. Hall, A History of the Archaic Greek World, pp. 309-310; Rose, Class in Archaic Greece, pp. 356; Ober, The Rise and Fall of Classical Greece, pp. 167-168.


\textsuperscript{1573} The cessation of aristocratic infighting appears just as essential for Cleisthenes’ agenda as his eschewing of the property classes that were introduced by Solon. Of course, deliberately or not, his reforms had the overall impact of granting more equal footing to dêmos and hêgemones in politics. His aversion of any interference with the class basis of the political system, however, hardly speaks to the picture of him as an ‘altrusitic idealist’: ‘Cleisthenes, in other words, did not, in reality, either “add the people/masses to his hetair(e)ia” or “make the masses/people his hetairoi”. Rather, he transformed the whole nature of Athenian politics by finessing or overriding the previously taken-for-granted, aristocratic factionalism model of political infighting.” Paul Cartledge, Ancient Greek Political Thought in Practice, (Cambridge, 2009), pp. 59; cf. Ste. Croix, ‘Cleisthenes I: The Constitution’, pp. 134.

\textsuperscript{1574} Ober, Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens, pp. 47.

\textsuperscript{1575} Hall, A History of the Archaic Greek World, pp. 240-241.
well-being of thêtes was absolutely essential to any aristocratic endeavour to wrestle political power away from other aristocrats. Ensuring that the small farmers were not tight-pressed without making them abundantly well-off lest they develop an interest in politics was the first condition to be satisfied if the class position of the pentakosiomedimnoi, who were resigned to oblivion in name alone, was to be secure. The ingenious blend of material welfare and the expanded ideological theme of communality formed the core of the idea of collective citizenship which was reinforced by the physical intermingling of esthloi and kakoi in tribal councils, in the citizen army, and in pan-Hellenic games and festivals. Spawning saviours and destructors alike, the eupatrid families still held the reins that rode the chariot of politics, making sure that the warhorses were well groomed and fed lest they came to realize that it was they who pulled the material fortunes of the hêgemoses and not the other way around. Yet, for all their efforts, thêtes recognized the fact that all the bravado about freedom and tyranny verged on mere gibberish once one knew where to look. Indeed, their siding with Peisistratus and Cleisthenes at two critical junctures show that thêtes were quite self-consciously betting on the winning horse that would solidify their own economic and

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1576 The much-scrutinized citizen ‘riot,’ to use Ober’s term, that occurred in response to Cleomenes’ abortive attempt to disband the Council in 508/507, suggests that a combination of direct Spartan intervention and meddling with dêmos-friendly political structures sufficed to draw the leaderless citizens’ ire. Expectations of Isagoras and Cleomenes to the contrary, the Athenians came to the rescue of Cleisthenes to rid the city of the most oligarchically minded factions of aristocracy. The irony was, of course, that the dêmos faction itself was led by an aristocrat albeit one with a self-proclaimed espousal of dêmos’ political goals. It is almost natural to expect the non-aristocrat city-dwellers to lend vehement support to Cleisthenes as a result of their identification with the Council. Citizens’ root and branch defence of the Council, however, is a different matter, which can only be explained by a comprehensive reference to their economic and political interests. Bread and butter issues, in plain terms, such as small farmers’ sustaining their level of comfortable subsistence, was on display during the mass opposition to Spartan intervention no less than in the avowed support for political institutions. Josiah Ober, ‘The Athenian Revolution of 508/507 B.C.E.: Violence, Authority, and the Origins of Democracy’, in Cultural Politics in Archaic Greece: Cult, Performance, Politics, ed. by C. Dougherty and L. Kurke, (Cambridge, 1993), pp. 215-232; Ober, Democracy and Knowledge, pp. 138-139; Wood, Citizens to Lords, pp. 34-35; for a later reappraisal of the significance of the term for his historical reconstruction, see Josiah Ober, ‘“I Besieged That Man”: Democracy’s Revolutionary Start’, in Origins of Democracy in Ancient Greece, pp. 92 ff; ML 26; Plutarch, Cimon, 7; for a trenchant critique of Ober’s hypothesis, see David Ames Curtis, ‘Translator’s Foreword’, in Pierre Lévêque and Pierre Vidal-Naquet, Cleisthenes the Athenian: An Essay on the Representation of Space and Time in Greek Political Thought from the End of the Sixth Century to the Death of Plato, (Atlantic Highlands, NJ, 1996), pp. xiv-xvi; cf. Raaffaub, ‘Equalities and Inequalities in Athenian Democracy’, pp. 146-148; Raaffaub, ‘The Breakthrough of Dêmokratia in Mid-Fifth-Century Greece’, pp. 146-149; Forsdyke, Exile, Ostracism and Democracy, pp. 139-141; Waterfield, Creators, Conquerors and Citizens, pp. 100-101.

1577 Osborne, Greece in the Making, pp. 278-283.

1578 Gentili, Poetry and Its Public in Ancient Greece.

1579 Cf. “Looking at fifth-century developments as a whole, I think it is fair to say that the decisive shift in the political power of the dêmos enabled it to direct Athenian policy toward actions that would offer poor Athenians the prospect of land without touching the economic base of their own ruling class. In that sense Kleisthenes’ reforms were yet another brilliant means of salvaging what mattered most to the aristocracy at the cost of changing the rules of the game.” Rose, Class in Archaic Greece, pp. 360; contra Cynthia Farrar, ‘Power to the People’, in Origins of Democracy in Ancient Greece, pp. 174-175.
political interest. The Athenian aristocrats, aware and weary of the prospects of démos’ increasing recognition of its powers to make or break class politics, inserted new political and cultural safety-valves, e.g., ostracism, the city Dionysia, the invention of barbaroi as the timeless enemy of everything Greek, etc., for the sake of ensuring that they would opt for making and not breaking.

4.4.4 Eleatic, Pythagorean and Heraclitan Philosophies
The social tension caused by the curtailing of hereditary transmission of aristocratic privileges and the unbroken accumulation of wealth would also leave its mark on the philosophic and poetic traditions as they neared the end of the sixth century. By the turn of the century, the Pythagorean, Heraclitan and Eleatic universes as well as Pindar’s epinician odes were coming into their own, twisting the themes that were passed down to them by the Ionians and others while attempting to shed philosophical light on the social flux that their respective societies were going through. The Ionian system of natural philosophy that can be conceived, as we have done so, on the three pillars of the continuous search for principal substances, emphasizing the industrious philosophical enquiry, and grappling with natural and social phenomena on their own terms did not require any translation to the vernacular for these thinkers to take note of them. The study of originative elements and their distinctive states of change and rest, for example, did find an equally learned and obscure appraiser in Heraclitus. Positing fire as the primary element imbuing each and every physical thing and committing himself to metaphysical speculation covering the ground extending from the movement of atmospheric phenomena to the eschatological doctrine of conflagration of universe, Heraclitus reanimated the Ionian tradition of probing the impenetrable. This accession to the fundamental strands of Ionian enquiry, however, does not signal a direct transition of the epistemic grounds of philosophical research to its new practitioners. Expanding upon Xenophanes’ dual conception of unattainable authentic sapience and knowledge pertaining to natural and social phenomena, Heraclitus dug an unsurpassable mound of epistemological gap stretching across the stronghold of pure reason and downgraded conventions.

1580 Waterfield sees the evidence as purporting that the beneficiaries of the aristocratic struggle kept their promises of an enlarged basis of popular government while noting in passing that, “Cleisthenes certainly assured them [the great Athenian families] that their families and his would still occupy all the top positions in the new system.” Waterfield, Creators, Conquerors and Citizens, pp. 90; cf. Osborne, Greece in the Making, pp. 287-288.
1583 Sextus Empiricus, Against the Professors, 7.49.4-7 = DK 21B34.
Conveying the esoteric message of the realm of pure reasoning to the select-few of industrious collaborators, Heraclitus effectively donned the robes of philosopher-prophet who would catalyse the dissemination of the principles of authentic conception. The esoteric mode of teaching that was thence adopted could not be disseminated to all citizens across the society, for truth was too precious a study to be meddled occasionally. This exclusivist conception of authentic sapience, in other words, could engage in self-proclaimed probes beneath the apparent only if its separation from uninspiring candidates was naturalized as being a part of the order of things. The Pythagorean school and its members’ overriding interest in number symbolism carried this instinctive esoterism of enquiries beneath the sensory evidence to new heights. Grounded in a lexicon of meanings with a prescribed aura of reverence, the Pythagoreans merged cosmology and arithmetic to distil a nexus of postulations that was supposed to relay the unblemished essence behind appearances. To be sure, this focus on introvertive self-perpetuating teaching did not discard the philosophic attempt to advance the knowledge of numbers; nor did it allow, however, the inquiry to be made without admitting the predicated symbolism. Having purported numbers as the primary substance of physical entities, the Pythagoreans could wander off the beaten track of abstract inquiry through their probes into numerical relations and equations. Operating thus at the crossroads of rhapsodic transmission and independent research, the enlightened philosopher bowed to her destiny, consuming a strict diet of prescriptions and proscriptions. Parmenides’ self-edifying quest as the protagonist of a philosophic odyssey spelled out the philosopher’s cosmic role as concisely as possible: he was to thread the path of that which is while scorning that which

1585 “Those who speak with intelligence must stand firm by that which is common to all, as a state stands by the law, and even more firmly. For all human laws are in keeping with the one divine law; for the one divine law has as much power as it wishes, is an unfailing defence for all laws, and prevails over all laws.” Heraclitus, F. DK 22B114, trans. by Robin Waterfield; cf. Cicero, The Nature of the Gods, 3.35.

1586 “But of this account, which holds forever, people forever prove uncomprehending, both before they have heard it and when once they have heard it. For although all things happen in accordance with this account, they are like people without experience when they experience words and deeds such as I set forth, distinguishing [as I do] each thing according to [its] real constitution, i.e., pointing out how it is. The rest of mankind, however, fail to be aware of what they do after they wake up just as they forget what they do while asleep.” Heraclitus, F. 1, in T. M. Robinson, Heraclitus: Fragments, (Toronto, 1987).

1587 “What intelligence or insight do they have? They trust the people’s bards and take for their teacher the mob, not realizing that ‘Most men are bad, few good.’” Heraclitus, DK 22B104, trans. by Robin Waterfield; cf. Heraclitus, F. 17,56,57, in T. M. Robinson, Heraclitus; cf. Heidegger and Fink, Heraclitus Seminar 1966/67, pp. 21-22.

1588 Porphyry, Life of Pythagoras, 19.6-13 = DK 14A8a.

1589 Eudemus in Proclus, Commentary on Euclid, 379.2-16 = DK 58B21.


1592 Parmenides, F. in Sextus Empiricus, Against the Professors, 7.111; and Simplicius, Commentary on Aristotle’s ‘On the Heavens’, CAG VII, 557.25-558.2 = DK 28B1.
is not, giving a logical turn to the element of *to hen* that was also sanctified numerically by the Pythagoreans as the symbolized unity whence originates all perceptible things.\textsuperscript{1593} Conceiving the philosopher as the mouthpiece of divine providence,\textsuperscript{1594} Parmenides would come close to intimating the impeccable quality of his teaching to immortal provenance commanding the agent, object, scope, method, and outcome of philosophic research, effectively turning its practitioner into a worshipper. With the summoning of cosmic aid for the sake of privileging a particular branch of scientific inquiry, e.g., logic *par* Parmenides, and arithmetic and geometry *par* Pythagoreans, its practitioners would be ascribed a naturally favoured epistemic position as the harbingers of truth. Prefiguring Pindar’s self-edifying method\textsuperscript{1595} of congratulating the Olympian victors by the token of their exhibition of natural talent in contradistinction to acquired ability,\textsuperscript{1596} these philosophers of the late archaic Greece devoted themselves to the study of natural phenomena while essentializing, contrary to their Ionian predecessors, their preferred stream of inquiry as the *basileus* among all. Put differently, the theme of epistemological pre-eminence would reverberate with Pindar’s utilization of the aristocratic sentiment of inherited excellence,\textsuperscript{1597} creating a whole new philosophical-poetic language with a novel focus on the genealogical principle.\textsuperscript{1598}

\textsuperscript{1593} “Come, I shall tell you, and do you listen and convey the story, | What routes of inquiry alone there are for thinking; | The one – that [it] is, and that [it] *cannot not be*, | Is the path of Persuasion (for it attends upon truth); | The other – that [it] *is not* and that [it] *needs must not be*, | That I point out to you to be a path wholly unlearnable, | For you could not know what-is-not (for that is not feasible), | Nor could you point it out.” Parmenides, F. 2, in David Gallop, *Parmenides of Elea: Fragments*, (Toronto, 1984).
\textsuperscript{1595} The transcendental status bestowed upon the athletic victory depends on Pindar’s acknowledgment of the deed in an ode thereby granting blessedness that is arguably comparable to the deed itself. The poet’s power to eternalise the present, in other words, turns a particular method of celebration into *the* essential form thereby serving as a roundabout confirmation that medium is the message. Cf. Rose, *Sons of the Gods, Children of Earth*, pp. 176, 178.
\textsuperscript{1596} “I have many swift arrows in the quiver under my arm. | They speak to those who understand, | but for the most part they require interpreters. | Wise is the man who knows much by nature, | while those who have acquire their knowledge | chatter in pointless confusion, just like | a pair of crows against the divine bird of Zeus.” Pindar, *Olympian* 2, 85-91, trans. by Anthony Verity; cf. *Olympian* 9, 100-104; *Nemean* 3,40-43; cf. “The slave can never hold his head up straight: | it’s always crooked, and his neck is bent. | For rose and hyacinth grow not from squills, | nor from slave mother child with spirit free.” Anonymous *Theognidae*, 535-538.
\textsuperscript{1597} For some examples of Pindar’s celebration of victors’ genealogical excellence, see Pindar, *Olympian*, 2, 6, 7, 8; *Pythian*, 4,5; *Nemean*, 2,3,4,5,6; Pomeroy *et al*., *A Brief History of Ancient Greece*, pp. 149; for a reserved affirmation of the theme in Pindar, see Junker, *Interpreting the Images of Greek Myths*, pp. 72.
\textsuperscript{1598} A selection of the terms Pindar employs in order to convey his insistence on the manifold connotative pathways that derive from a conception of “inborn excellence” would necessarily include *phua*, *sungenês*, *emphuês*, *gennaios*, *gnêsios*, *emphulios* among others. Rose, *Sons of the Gods, Children of Earth*, pp. 161.
Accompanying this transition from ontological significance of the primary substance to the avowed import of epistemologies viewed as capable, exclusively, of unearthing it was the accentuation of the theme that philosophically unverified sense-experience was hapless and misguiding.\textsuperscript{1599} Riding Xenophanes’ train of thought with a discernible flavour of wretchedness of the uninitiated, Heraclitus would locate the ultimate reality of things strictly beyond the empirical.\textsuperscript{1600} The infinitely elusive metaphysical links that were preconceived to connect the world of sense-perception, on this view, could only be conceived if incessant philosophical reflection was admitted to oversee each step of empirical cognition. Naturally, Heraclitus did not jump from this ascription of superiority to ideational rumination to a downright rejection of empirical evidence,\textsuperscript{1601} for they are our only means, their deficiency notwithstanding, of collecting data from the natural world. The underestimation of sense-experience, never the less, would tighten the screw on the study of natural phenomena, which was conducted with scarce any reference to unifying metaphysical powers and primary elements, as capable only of holding a light to the reflective premises of its Heraclitan alternative. The Pythagorean kaleidoscope of numeral relations, likewise, appears to have bordered on supplanting the innate doubtfulness of sense-experience with the absolute certainty of abstract mathematics. Replacing social relations by numerical combinations and politico/ethical ideas with series of numbers, the Pythagoreans created an abstract universe in which number indeed became a message in and of itself.\textsuperscript{1602} Subverting the Milesian order of study from the industrious collection of empirical facts to inferences regarding their deductible aetiological ties, Pythagoreans introduced a quasi-monastic method for studying the social and natural phenomena that took pride in their essentially isolated teaching.\textsuperscript{1603} Parmenides and Zeno, in a similar vein, seem to have jostled against the intrinsically faulty characteristic of the world of appearance.\textsuperscript{1604} Zeno’s attempts to make Achilles race against a tortoise, or to

\textsuperscript{1599} A comparison offered by Schofield between Anaxagoras and Parmenides on the possibility of natural philosophy offers food for thought in its surprising resemblance to the general epistemological shift that occurred in the transition of philosophical outlook from the phusiologoi to logographers: “Plainly, in view of his [Anaxagoras’] confidence in the possibility of natural philosophy, he could not have accepted that argument alone was necessary and sufficient for the discovery of truth. He evidently took our common experience of the world as a structure containing a plurality of changing things to be the necessary basis for all fruitful enquiry into truth. And, of course, we possess one fragment in which he explicitly asserts the epistemological value of phenomena, which had been rejected as worthless by Parmenides.” Malcolm Schofield, An Essay on Anaxagoras, (Cambridge, 1980), pp. 24.

\textsuperscript{1600} Heraclitus, F. DK 22B123, 22B54, 22B107.

\textsuperscript{1601} Heraclitus, F. DK 22B55, 22B7.


\textsuperscript{1604} Parmenides, F. DK 28B7; 28B8.
posit a hypothetical observer ideationally observing an arrow loosened from a bow\textsuperscript{1605} to prove the impossibility of motion, are obtuse discussions of an entirely logicized and overripe mind whose scoff at experiential knowledge would not allow leaving the boundaries of the plane of logic even momentarily. Marching to the drumbeat of Pindar’s poetic representation of humans as the playthings of gods,\textsuperscript{1606} the underrated epistemological status of the experient would translate into a presupposition that there was a certain time and place for the philosophical production of genuine knowledge and that it was not observatories or decks of ships but comfortable mansions closed to uneducated prying eyes.

The sectarian focus on the esoteric transmission of primary substances conceived with a novel dislike of experiential epistemology would also give rise to the eventual anesthetization of social phenomena which would be conjured up ephemerally along ethical and ascetic lines. The Heraclitan doctrine positing soul as the governing part of empirical cognition\textsuperscript{1607} and the rational element as regimenting nature and cosmos,\textsuperscript{1608} for one, would anticipate the later Stoic emphasis on preserving the inner freedom as the one true fortress while taking barely any notice of the expansionist vultures from Lydian and Persian empires. Fostering the growth of an ideational connection between the cosmic fire’s regulation of cosmos’ affairs and human soul’s arrangement of those pertaining to society, Ionians’ attempts at the explanation of natural and social phenomena in their own terms would be replaced by an ingenious quietism turning its back on political filibustering and the mudslinging of hackneyed demagogues. Putting concern for soul’s well-being above all else was not only a shared theme in the Pythagorean school but one that would be granted a decisive import in separating philosophical wheat from chaff. Conceived alongside the doctrines of the immortality and the transmigration of the soul,\textsuperscript{1609} this doctrine would chafe the philosopher’s universe into one that was made up of a presupposed set of commandments coming together in the form of a self-help book on personal conduct.\textsuperscript{1610} Diminishing the philosophical value of body as the temporal prison of the soul,\textsuperscript{1611} the pervasive potency of the Pythagorean soul degraded the universe of its followers to a second-order existence that paled in the face of the genuine realm.

\textsuperscript{1607} Heraclitus, F. in Sextus Empiricus, \textit{Against the Professors}, 7.126.8-9 = DK 22B107, 7.129.30 = DK 22A16.
\textsuperscript{1608} Heraclitus, F. in Diogenes Laertius, \textit{Lives of Eminent Philosophers}, 9.7.6-8 = DK 22B45.
\textsuperscript{1611} Philolaus in Clement, \textit{Miscellanies}, 2.203.11 = DK 44B14.
of immateriality.\textsuperscript{1612} The changelessness induced by Parmenidean \textit{to hen},\textsuperscript{1613} in similar fashion, would spell success for the paradoxical existence of a philosopher who deconstructed each and every instance of physical change so that the logical principle would remain alive. Transformed into the poetically reinvigorated Homeric distinction of mortal and immortal realms, with the hierarchical glue of due proportion holding the reins of both,\textsuperscript{1614} Pindar would lend his undying voice to the aristocratic victors of the pan-Hellenic games. Projecting the material universe with its class struggles, aristocratic strife, invasions, and so on, on to the agonistic plane of the race track, he would hone his tools of trade exclaiming that, contrary to what Xenophanes might have said, eternal fortune awaited only those who bested their opposition at the Olympic games.\textsuperscript{1615}

\textbf{4.4.5 The Medes and the \textit{Thêtes} as the Building Blocks of the Thalassocracy}

The beginning of the fifth century saw the soaring of Persia’s prominence in the context of the internal affairs of the mainland Greek \textit{poleis}. For the Ionian Greeks, Persian influence had been on a steady path of growth commencing no later than at the end of the first half of the sixth century. Croesus’ defeat by the armies of Cyrus the Great in the 540s served as one of the epitomes of Herodotean \textit{titis} where the overambitious Lydian, dazed by the material prospects involved in a potential conquest of Persian territory, is reminded of the force of the timeless maxim that immoderate aggression provokes divine wrath.\textsuperscript{1616} In the longer run of things, however, Lydia’s subjugation was only a single, albeit important, part of an unflinching effort at territorial expansion by the Achaemenid Persians that had already swallowed the

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\item \textsuperscript{1612} I realise that there is a tradition that portrays individual Pythagoreans as associating with younger men and with influential figures such as Cylon of Croton. It appears telling, however, that the \textit{testimonia} making allusions to these interactions generally conclude with other political communities violently objecting the Pythagorean presence on the grounds of the latter’s refusing to admit them to membership: Aristoxenus in Iamblichus, \textit{Pythagorean Life}, 248.8-251.3 = DK 14A16; Strabo, \textit{Geography}, 8.7.1; cf. Peter Garnsey, \textit{Thinking about Property: From Antiquity to the Age of Revolution}, (Cambridge, 2007), pp. 34.
\item \textsuperscript{1613} Parmenides, F. in Simplicius, \textit{Commentary on Aristotle’s ‘Physics’}, CAG IX, 145.1-146.25 = DK 28B8.
\item \textsuperscript{1614} “Whatever the necessarily tentative conclusions one might draw about Simonides, in Pindar the whole elaboration of the form is directed towards affirming the strict hierarchy of “god, hero, man” (cf. \textit{Ol}. 2.2) and presenting any celebration of the victor’s community in terms that clearly subsume the distinction of the polis under the distinction of its rulers.” Rose, \textit{Sons of the Gods, Children of Earth}, pp. 160.
\item \textsuperscript{1615} “Different rewards bring pleasure to men for different deeds: | the shepherd, the ploughman, thee bird-trapper, | the man whose livelihood is in the sea; | for all men strain to keep persistent hunger from their bellies. | But the greatest profit is earned by the man | who wins splendid glory in war or in the games, | through praise, which is the choicest address | from the tongues of citizens and strangers.” Pindar, \textit{Isthmian 1}, 45-52, trans. by Anthony Verity.
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Medes, the Egyptians and the Babylonians.\footnote{Amélie Kuhrt, *The Ancient Near East, c. 3000-33 BC, II*, (New York and London, 1995), pp. 656-664.} The fall of Lydia thus may have been precipitated by Croesus’ unbridled warmongering but was more likely caused by Lydia’s conventional location to tap into the material resources of Asia Minor. The expansionist effort was temporally put off its track during the reign of Croesus’ son Cambyses who was largely preoccupied with rebellions and internal strife that rose, in the main, from the withering away of the administrative ties connecting satraps, or provincial governors appointed by the king, and the king’s inner circle.\footnote{Herodotus, *Histories*, 3.66.} Indeed, Cambyses’ premature death in 522 broke open the floodgates that had hitherto held the inter-satrap power struggle in check.\footnote{Amélie Kuhrt, *The Ancient Near East*, pp. 649, 664-7, 676-80.} Darius’ first measure as king would be to calm the threatening disquiet that had swamped large parts of the empire by cutting ties with defiant satraps and to put an end to the existence of personal spheres of influence that were carved up by the latter to the detriment of the empire’s social and administrative stability.\footnote{Ibid, pp. 689-692.; cf. Herodotus, *Histories*, 5.52-3.}

The *eupatridae* of the Ionian cities had long realized that the brittle administrative ties of the overextended empire would translate into the satraps developing themselves into the de facto rulers within their respective zones of jurisdiction. The further recognition of the ongoing discord between the king and satraps, perhaps no sooner than in the 520s, however, meant them noticing the plethora of opportunities that could arise from playing the interests of one against the other.\footnote{“For the Greeks this combination of local rulers, powerful but always wary of their reputations, and a Persian king with great power and also constant fear of disloyalty among the satraps offered great opportunities.” Osborne, *Greece in the Making*, pp. 301.} For those that supposedly had the luxury of the Aegean to separate them from the Empire, the situation was, likewise, similar. The geographical distance that afforded a measure of complacency, for one, was fast dwindling: the armies of the Empire forced their way through the Bosporus and were proceeding towards ensuring the capitulation of Thracians which prompted Macedonia’s submission.\footnote{Herodotus, *Histories*, 5.18.1.} Whether as a friend or foe, king’s armies were already closing in on the Thermopylae during the last decade of the sixth century. It was at this juncture that enlisting the king’s resources, material if not military, to their side was considered by the Athenians in fortifying the defence of their *polis* against the Spartan king Cleomenes in 506 to offset any potential repercussions of attracting the unnecessary attention of the Persians.\footnote{The suggestion that Alcmaeonidae in general and Cleisthenes in particular was behind the idea of forging a military alliance with Persia against Sparta is made by Buckley. Herodotus and *Athenaion Politeia* both refrain from making even a passing allusion to such a relationship; then again, the curious}
drawn. The satraps’ answer to the Athenian messengers, as it was recorded by Herodotus, and their accommodating reply, however, made the matters a little more complicated. Infuriated by the demands voiced by Hypastes, the Athenians declared the pact non-promulgated and hence null and void in order to concentrate their forces on the formidable force that had been mobilized by Cleomenes from across Peloponnesia. The Athenians would not forget the Persian demands and their literary traditions would capitalize upon it as the epitome of hubristic barbarian; but, then again, neither would the Persians. For what it is worth, the Athenian delegation had consented to Persian demands, and this, by itself, would be utilized as a core pretext in Darius’ and Xerxes’ later attempts to invade Greece.

The unauthorized consent given by the Athenian delegation to Persian demands was not the only element factoring in the eventual breaking out of hostilities. The abortive Spartan attempt at Isagoras’ reinstatement in 506 was ensued by Spartans’ turn to Hippias and his potential restoration as tyrant to salvage the Peloponnesian interests. Having summoned their Peloponnesian allies to chart out the most viable course of invading Athens the Spartans, however, were stopped dead in their bellicose tracks once more by the Corinthians who refused to abide by the forceful establishment of tyranny anywhere. Not able to overcome the Corinthian opposition, the Spartans gave up on their plans and decided to send Hippias back to Sigeum. Hippias, however, had different plans and approached the satrap of Ionia and Lydia and brother of Darius, Artaphrenes in hopes of finding a new ally to support his way back to tyranny. Informed of his activities, the Athenians sent a delegation to persuade Artaphrenes not to lend any credence to their slanderers and fugitives. Alas, Artaphrenes’ disappearance of Cleisthenes from both accounts in the years following the enactment of his reforms has been noted by many. Further, given the lengths Herodotus went in rejecting any indictment of the Alcmaeonidae in regard to the events at the Battle of Marathon, it may indeed be the case that this is another one of the examples of Herodotus’ pregnant silences. Buckley, Aspects of Greek History 750-323 BC, pp. 137.

1624 “The delegation reached Sardis and was in the middle of delivering its message when Artaphrenes the son of Hystaspes, who was the governor of Sardis, asked the Athenians who they were and where they were from that they sought an alliance with the Persians. The Athenians gave him the information he had asked for, and then he curtly stated his position as follows: ‘If the Athenians give King Darius earth and water, he will enter into an alliance with them; otherwise, they will have to leave.’” Herodotus, Histories, 5.73.6-13, trans. by Robin Waterfield.

1625 Incidentally, Herodotus’ eulogising tone that colours his description of the Athenian attitude that won both of its battles against Cleomenes’ remaining force, battered as it was owing to Corinthians’ ultimate refusal to partake of the battle and Cleomenes’ clash with the other Spartan king, Demaratus, comprising of Boeotians and Chalcidians, is one of the striking examples of his general anti-tyrannical stance: “Now, the advantages of everyone having a voice in the political procedure are not restricted just to single instances, but are plain to see wherever one looks. For instance, while the Athenians were ruled by tyrants, they were no better at warfare than any of their neighbours, but once they had got rid of the tyrants they became vastly superior. This goes to show that while they were under an oppressive regime they were below their best because they were working for a master, whereas as free men each individual wanted to achieve something for himself.” Ibid, 5.78.1-10.

1626 Ibid, 5.91-94.
refused, and ordered the Athenians to take Hippias back if they valued their safety, which was consequently turned down by the latter. Pegged as the date of the Athenians’ declaration of open hostilities against the Persians by Herodotus, the effects of the events of 501 came close to a breaking point when Aristagoras of Miletus, having failed to capture Naxos for the Persians and seeing revolt as the only means of ensuring his safety, appealed to the Athenians for an alliance against the Empire in 499. Alluding to ties of ancient colonial kinship and the supposed lack of military strength of the Persian armies deployed in Asia Minor, Aristagoras managed to sway the Athenians to send 20 ships from their fleet, which totalled 50 ships at this time. The Athenian forces hardly played a decisive role in the Ionian Revolt that broke out in 499, however, and were abruptly called back when they were defeated by the Persians in the aftermath of their burning of Sardis.

Having filled the chalice of political sorrows drop by drop, it appears that both sides were gradually coming to entertain the idea of an eventual confrontation, the outcome of which would largely depend upon the solidity of the Athenian class structure supporting its army and, more importantly, navy. Indeed, two events that occurred in the first decade of the fifth century give particularly compelling evidence that all the talk of dēmos’ rule would be tempered with the rise of hēgemones with established ties to Hippias in order to offer a sturdy line of defence against the Persians which would not risk meddling with the class structure. First, Hipparchus, an influential Peisistratid and probably the grandson of the exiled Hippias, was elected eponymous archon just a year after the Athenian withdrawal from Ionia in 496. Hipparchus’ election has been viewed mainly as resulting from the willingness of the Athenian eupatridae to placate the Persians through his ties to Hippias. The policy of open warfare against the Empire, so the argument goes, would be temporarily shelved to prevent the relations from souring further. The alignment of Hipparchus’ election alongside the concomitant event of Miltiades’ return to Athens in 493/2, however, appears to have the potency to impede such an interpretation. On that note, the Ionians were finally defeated at the sea battle of Lade which was accompanied with the ensuing fall of Miletus to Darius’ armies.

1627 Ibid, 5.96.
1629 Herodotus, Histories, 5.97.
With the completion of the mop up operations in Lydia, the Persians turned their attention to the Hellespontine region in order to stamp out the last bastions of the Ionian resistance. Fleeing the redoubled efforts of the Persians was Miltiades, the tyrant of Thracian Chersonese.

Miltiades, just like Hipparchus, strikes one as a controversial figure if there is presupposed to exist a democratic vogue among the eupatrid Athenians at this time. Indeed, given his eponymous archonship under the auspices of Peisistratus, his leadership of the robust Philaid clan, and his entrenched relationships to other Peisistratidae, which, enabled, in large part, his establishment of tyranny in Thracian Chersonese, Miltiades had all the possible flaws of a candidate to lead the democratically-inclined Athens. And these flaws were duly exposed by his political opponents who prosecuted Miltiades with the charge of turannis on account of his former rulership in the Thracian Chersonese. Miltiades’ prosecution did not bear any fruit for his opposition, however, as he was not only acquitted of all the charges laid on him but was elected stratêgos as a compensation, as it were, for all the undue trouble he had to put up with. The outcome of the ex post facto indictment of Miltiades showed to things: that despite the otherwise balanced representation of pro and anti-Peisistratid interests the looming Persian threat had effectively tipped the scales toward the philoi of Peisistratidae, and that halting the united plans of Hippias and Darius was considered to be worth any price, even that of reinstating the Peisistratid influence at the heart of Athenian polis. Yet, the apparent terror evoked by Hippias’ leading the punitive Persian expedition cannot, in and of itself, provide the historical grounds of the majority of Athenian eupatridae siding with the restoration of Peisistratidae. The election of Themistocles to eponymous archonship in 493/492 is the missing piece of evidence that put all this political back and forth under a different light. Themistocles’ archonship is particularly significant, of course, in regard to his fortification of

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1632 The sack of the Athenian ‘colony’ of Miletus and the burning of the temple of Apollo at Didymus left its mark on the Athenian consciousness. Exacerbating the fears aroused by the steady growth of the Empire, the event was deemed too sorrowful to be the plot of a play and Phynichos’ Capture of Miletus was punished with a stiff fine in addition to cancelling any future productions of the play. Herodotus, Histories, 6.21.2; Thomsen, The Origin of Ostracism, pp. 127; Lavelle, The Sorrow and the Pity, pp. 31; Munn, The Mother of the Gods, Athens, and the Tyranny of Asia, pp. 249-250.

1633 Ibid, 6.39; Greek Historical Inscriptions, no. 6; Murray, Early Greece, pp. 274-275; Buckley, Aspects of Greek History 750-323 BC, 140-141; Lavelle, The Sorrow and the Pity, pp. 29; Garnsey, Famine and Food-Supply in the Graeco-Roman World, pp. 118.

1634 Herodotus, Histories, 6.104.2.

Piraeus as the new centre of naval operations. Indeed, the growing Persian threat, not to mention the prolonged war with Aegina had revealed the indefensibility of the bay of Phalerum, the previous base of naval operations, as a glaring weakness that could have proved to be the undoing of Athens.

The concentrated development of Piraeus that was initiated under the archonship of Themistocles has the potentiality to signal the class dynamics that factored in the eventual amplification of the navy’s status. Now, these events took place more than half a century before the Peloponnesian War; and, one can claim that Themistocles, among other like-minded eupatridae, realized that the citizen army which had hitherto been conscripted out of those who passed the checks of property qualifications would hardly suffice to offset any threat coming either from Sparta or Persia. To be sure, a precedent of the effectiveness of the citizen army was set during the brief struggle against Boeotians and Chalcidians. Neither the Boeotians nor the Chalcidians, however, could hope to compare favourably with either the resources of the Empire or combined strength of the Peloponnesians. Athens needed all the help it could muster from the most numerous parts of its society, thêtes and even metoikos, many among whom did not have the material means to procure hoplite armour. Refraining from tempering with the class-based lines of demarcation that served as the ‘originative principle’ of the fifth century hoplite warfare, the Athenian eupatridae had the brilliant

1637 “Themistocles also persuaded the Athenians to finish the building of the Peiraeus, on which a start had been made earlier, in his year of office as archon. He could see the virtue of the place, with its three natural harbours, and realized that becoming a seafaring nation was the key to the acquisition of power. He had been the first to advance the proposal that the Athenians should take to the sea: and now he was quick to help lay the foundations of empire.” Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, 1.93.3-4, trans. by Martin Hammond.

1638 There was no public system of armour dispensation in the majority of the ancient Greek states. Further, given that the hoplite warfare was predicated upon the socio-political tradition of being an aristocratic enterprise, which was exemplified in Solon’s dismissal of thêtes from participating in the citizen army, Ridley’s mention of the timocratic basis of the hoplite army does not seem unwarranted: “The third feature of the hoplite army was the timocratic basis of it. The individual soldier had to provide his own equipment, apart from the shield and spear given him by the state …. Thus in the classical system, only the citizens with means to arm themselves could be hoplites. There was a property-qualification for service.” Ronald Thomas Ridley, “The Hoplite as Citizen: Athenian Military Institutions in Their Social Context”, L’antiquité classique, vol. 48 no. 2, (1979), pp. 519; Kallet-Marx, Money, Expense, and Naval Power in Thucydides’ History 1-5.24, pp. 10. The socio-political implications of specific developments in hoplite warfare has recently been studied in a collection of essays: Kagan and Viggiano, Men of Bronze.

1639 We agree, in that sense, with Raaflaub’s emphasis of the slow development of hoplite warfare that was not precipitated, contra the earlier ‘hoplite orthodoxy’ with Victor Davis Hanson as its foremost proponent, by any revolution in the seventh or sixth century: “‘Timocratic systems,’” then, resulted from a long evolution, not a “hoplite revolution”; they formalized, but did not introduce, the linking of the triad of functions typical of Greek polis citizens: the landowners (above a minimal subsistence level) fought in the polis army and sat in the assembly to share in the polis’s decision making.” Kurt Raaflaub, ‘Archaic and Classical Greece’, in War and Society in the Ancient and Medieval Worlds, ed. by Kurt Raaflaub and Nathan S. Rosenstein, (Michigan, 1999), pp. 235; Raaflaub, ‘The Breakthrough of Dêmokratia in Mid-Fifth-Century Athens’, pp. 133; cf. Waterfield, Creators, Conquerors and Citizens, pp. 62. The socio-political implications of specific developments in hoplite warfare has recently been studied in a collection of essays: Kagan and Viggiano, Men of Bronze.
plan of channelling the overabundance of subsistence farmers and wage-labourers systematically towards navy. And with reliable estimates pegging the need for manpower to fully operate the docks in the fourth century to an incredible 15,000 the Athenians needed all those hands on board. The gradual rise of Athenians to thalassocracy, of course, was still quite some way off when the Persians appeared dead-set on pushing through northern Greece. None the less, given that the adoption of naval strategies to counter Greek and Persian heavyweights could only be realized on a piecemeal basis, the incorporation of thêtes and metoikos into navy appears to accord well with the Herodotean portrayal of Themistocles’ steadfast attempts to build a naval force basically from humble beginnings. The flip side of the equation of assigning an increased share of military toil to thêtes was, of course, the potential expansion of the latter’s political demands to accommodate their waxing share of safeguarding their beneficiaries. Put bluntly, in admitting thêtes to their ranks, eupatridae knew that they could end up being asked a proportionately higher share of the political spoils. We propose, in that vein, to conceive Hipparchus’ and Miltiades’ elections to eponymous archonship as well as the withdrawal of prosecutions of influential Peisistratidae, and Themistocles’ development of Piraeus as a continuous line of reinforcing the political position of hêgemones while adding to the travails of thêtes.

1641 For a brief classic overview of the ascribed denotations of the term, see Arnaldo Momigliano, “Sea-Power in Greek Thought”, *The Classical Review*, vol. 28 no.1, (May, 1944), pp. 1-7.
1642 The modesty of the naval force that was taken over by Themistocles, however, does not merit the suspicion that the Athenians before the reforms of 480s might have lacked anything resembling an operating naval force. Their long-standing conflict with Aegina elicits that the contrary was indeed the case. The late sixth century Athenians possessed a navy that was capable of answering the needs of their immediate small-scale operations; the problem being that their impending defence against the Persians was to be anything but small-scale. For a discussion on the Athenian naval capabilities over the pre-490 period, see Christopher J. Haas, “Athenian Naval Power before Themistocles”, *Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte*, vol. 34 no. 1, (1st Qtr., 1985), pp. 29-46; for an argument that Themistocles’ motion of 483 was a continuation of the earlier building of a 50-trireme strong navy at the time of Cleisthenes, see Hans van Wees, *Ships and Silver, Taxes and Tribute: A Fiscal History of Archaic Athens*, (London, 2013), pp. 66-67; cf. Raaflaub, ‘The Breakthrough of Dêmokratia in Mid-Fifth-Century Greece’, pp. 134-135.
1643 Plutarch’s testimony, late as it is, shows clearly the rift between Themistocles’ group and more aristocratically minded members of eupatridae by spelling out the stakes: “After this [his accepted motion to direct the money from Laurium to the naval building effort], he gradually enticed the city down to the sea. He argued that on land they were no match even for their neighbours, whereas with naval power they could go so far as to keep the Persians at bay and make themselves the masters of Greece. And so he made them mariners and seafarers rather than ‘steady infantrymen’, to quote Plato. In the process, he brought down on himself the following charge: ‘Themistocles has robbed his fellow citizens of the spear and the shield and reduced the Athenian people to the rowing-bench and the oar.’ In order to achieve this, he had, as Stesimbrotus reports, to overcome Miltiades’ objections.” Plutarch, *Themistocles*, 4.18-27; cf. Ps. Xenophon, *Constitution of the Athenians*, 1.2; the allusion to Plato is Plato, *Laws*, 706b-c.
The completion of the consummate subjugation of the Ionian Greeks under the shallow pretext of them having participated in the Ionian Revolt allowed the Persians to focus on the rebuilding of the destroyed cities and devising a course for punishing the mainland Greeks who supported the uprising. Mardonius, having reasserted the Persian control over Thracians and Macedonians, was sent to lead the punitive measures against Athens and Eretria but had to endure the significant loss of ships and crew as he was hit by a terrible storm while attempting to sail around the peninsula of Mount Athos. Then, in 490, Darius dispensed Datis and Artaphrenes, accompanied by none other than Hippias, to conquer Eretria and Athens. Sailing across the Aegean to evade the woes that befell the earlier expedition, the Persian army triumphed over Naxos and marched on Eretria. Defeating what little opposition they faced, they burned the city and enslaved its citizens as a recompense for the atrocities committed in Sardis. Applying to Spartans in hopes of receiving a relief force to aid them in the upcoming war, who duly replied that they could not commission an army until the full moon had passed, the Athenians realized that they were about to face the Persian army with the lone help of the Plataeans. Herodotus’ careful reconstruction of the Athenian deliberations before the battle explicitly shows that polemarch Callimachus was frightened of the eventuality of turncoats who were in favour of appeasing the Persians deciding to side with the invaders if the battle preparations would drag on for long. In the event, he, with the significant aid of Miltiades, resolved to risk battle that was joined on the Marathon plain laying to the north-east of Attica. The battle ended with the swift, yet indecisive, victory of the Athenians who could not capture the fleeing Persians in their heavy hoplite armours. The Persians took to the ships and, buoyed by the curious sight of a flashing shield reflected from Athens, raced the Athenians to the undefended city. Barely managing to overtake the Persian ships, Athenians prevented the Persian attempts to land who were sent packing to Asia Minor. The whole affair of flashing shield, if we take Herodotus’ word for it, showed the widespread belief that a cloud of rightful suspicion hovered above some of the most influential eupatrid families, particularly the Alcmaeonidae, concerning any pacts they might have made with the Persians. Indeed, Herodotus’ concentrated attempt to exculpate the Alcmaeonidae from any indictment indicates

1645 Herodotus, Histories, 6.44-45.
1649 “The Alcmaeonidae hated tyranny at least as much as Callias, and that is why I find the slander too implausible to accept. It is beyond belief that they could have signalled with the shield, seeing that they spent the whole era of the Athenian tyrants in exile, and were responsible for the Pisistratidae losing their tyranny—and so played a far greater part in winning Athens’ freedom than Harmodius and Aristogiton, in my opinion…. It might be thought, however, that they turned traitors because they had a grudge against the Athenian people. But no men in Athens were respected or admired more than they were, so it makes no sense to suggest that a shield was held up by them, at any rate, for any such reason.” Ibid, 6.123-124; cf. Buckley, Aspects of Greek History 750-323 BC, pp. 142.
that he, among many other Athenians of his day, took the allegation seriously. The conclusion
of the battle of Marathon afforded a precious momentary peak into the loyalties of many
eupatridae who certainly would rather have kept their cards close to their chests. This
momentary peak, however, was more than enough in precipitating a delicate reshuffling of the
aristocratic pecking order separating tyrants’ philoi from the rest.1650

4.4.6 Themistocles’ Political Reforms

The ten-year period between 490 and 480 proved to be a battle ground for opposing aristocratic
interests that would dictate the eventual solution to the brewing trouble with the Persians.
Miltiades was the first eupatrid to attempt to ride the popular support that uplifted him as a
result of the decisive part he played at the Battle of Marathon. Given the enormous resources
of seventy ships with crew for an unspecified mission to acquire great wealth for Athens, he
lay siege to the island of Paros but returned empty handed and with a festering wound to his
thigh in less than a month’s time. The irony was, of course, that he inadvertently jumped from
the frying pan into the fire as his aristocratic compatriots had no intentions to welcome him
with open arms. Indeed, a delegation led by Xanthippus, who was married to Alcmaeonid
Agariste, brought charges on him and demanded a death penalty in return for his deceiving the
Athenians. The jury rejected the death penalty and yet fined him the eye-watering sum of fifty
talents.1651 With Miltiades’ death soon after his conviction, the penalty was paid by his son.
The aristocratic push and shove, however, would hardly settle for long for the major ground
of content among the foremost eupatrid families at this time was whether to continue open
hostilities with Persia or to cease them. A series of ostracisms of some of the most prominent
members of eupatridae followed in the footsteps of Miltiades’ conviction: Hippias’ grandson
Hipparchus in 488/7, Megacles, the leading figure of the Alcmaeonid camp, in 487/6, Callias,
another aristocratic supporter of Acmaeonidae, in 486/5, and Xanthippus, the prosecutor of
Miltiades and brother-in-law of Megacles in 485/4, were all ostracized one after another to rid
the city of some of the most antagonistic cases of aristocratic infighting.1652 Yet, the averred
concentration of aristocratic clash on the basis of suspected ties to the Empire gives us only
half of the picture. The soaring influence of Themistocles, which roughly corresponds to the
ebb of the ostracophoria, gives us the other half of the social context in which the aristocratic
struggles played out.

1650 “The emotional pitch of the Athenians generated by the events of the Marathon campaign is thus
not difficult to gauge. Their fears of Hippias’ visitation were further increased by the known presence
in Athens of a prominent group readily identifiable with the tyranny which was strongly suspected of
treason. The “enemy within,” while he continued to abide in the city, threatened the very survival of the
polis,” Lavelle, The Sorrow and the Pity, pp. 32.
1651 Herodotus, Histories, 6.136.
Literary sources refocus on the political activities of Themistocles no earlier than 483/2 and with an emphasis on some details regarding his famous naval programme.\textsuperscript{1653} The dearth of literary evidence, however, should not induce any claim to his obscurity. \textit{Ostraka} dated to pre-480 that steadily bear his name, for one, lend support to his continued prominence in political affairs.\textsuperscript{1654} Still, the proposal to build one invincible juggernaut of a navy was to oblige him to becoming the de facto dominant politician of the period in addition to paving the road for his eventual election to the post of \textit{stratêgos autokrator}, i.e., general with absolute power over military matters. Capitalizing on the recently found silver veins at Mount Laurium that were exceptionally richer compared to the older veins,\textsuperscript{1655} Themistocles’ proposal addressed two issues with particular vigour: the tying of the loose end of how to cope with the all-too-likely possibility of the Persians’ return and the revitalization of the citizen army \textit{ethos} based on naval comradery arising from the rank and file \textit{thêtes} rowing beside one another.\textsuperscript{1656} The gist of \textit{thêtes}’ inclusion in the citizen navy, conceived though \textit{eupatrid}'s rose-tinted spectacles, was the additional benefit of enacting a socially crooked distribution of risks associated with warfare. To that end, given Themistocles’ self-proclaimed venture to turn Athens into a naval superpower, it became evident that the realization of Athenian imperialistic ambitions would largely depend on naval operations at the expense of those of the army. The fundamental distinction between hoplite and naval warfare, however, was precisely the ability to own a polished set of heavy armour that covered a soldier’s vital parts in the phalanx formation.\textsuperscript{1657} Now, we pointed out above that the majority of \textit{thêtes} would find it incredibly difficult, if not impossible, to afford any piece of hoplite equipment let alone the whole set. The prescribed role of the unarmoured soldiers, as such, would be to serve either in light infantry squadrons or in auxiliary capacity. Further, modern estimates have shown that major battles in phalanx formation tended to resolve rather quickly with the winning side generally proving incapable of chasing their opponents due to the relative absence of Greek cavalry units\textsuperscript{1658} and the

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\textsuperscript{1654} Buckley, \textit{Aspects of Greek History 750-323 BC}, pp. 144.
\textsuperscript{1655} Aristotle, \textit{The Athenian Constitution}, 22.7; Plutarch, \textit{Themistocles}, 4.
\textsuperscript{1656} Ste. Croix rejects the literary evidence without giving any compelling reason it. His point that it is possible for the \textit{thêtes} to be included only in the emergency levies, e.g., 428, 406 and 376, is not based on textual evidence but on a suspicion that their conscription was legalized only by 362; Ste. Croix, \textit{The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World}, pp. 207.
\textsuperscript{1657} For a later testimony to the political link between the private provision of hoplite armour and belonging to the higher echelons of the society, see Thucydides, \textit{The Peloponnesian War}, 8.97.1; for a later attempt at downscaling the estimated total range of hoplite panoply from an earlier c. 36 to 14-21 kilograms on the cue of archaeological evidence borrowed from the German excavations at Olympia, see Peter Krenz, ‘Hoplite Hell: How Hoplites Fought’, in \textit{Men of Bronze}, pp. 135.
\textsuperscript{1658} “Most of the territory occupied by Greeks lay outside the dry and frigid grassland zone in which the horse-centred culture of the steppe nomads flourished. In much of the Greek world, lack of grazing land meant that cavalry could not readily operate at the grand scale required by the steppe cultures.” Ober, \textit{The Rise and Fall of Classical Greece}, pp. 28; Ste. Croix, “The Solonian Census Classes and the
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aforementioned cumbersomeness of hoplite armour.\textsuperscript{1659} Naval warfare, it goes without saying, did not necessitate the use of any heavy armour, except for a dozen or so mariners as opposed to 170 rowers, to the point of being able to be waged by a combination of rowers in light and mariners in heavy armour.\textsuperscript{1660} Yet, this relative equality of participation in naval battles also meant the grim probability of facing either slavery or death that would be the lot of the soldier who had nowhere to run.\textsuperscript{1661} Themistocles’ skewed weighing of navy as the ultimate judge of the Athenian fortunes, in that vein, would translate into a higher causality rate spread across \textit{thêtès} compared to hoplite warfare.


\textsuperscript{1659} Battlefield casualties are extremely hard to calculate, but, though there were exceptions, they seem rarely to have been horrendous--perhaps about 5 percent, on average, for the winning side and about 15 or 20 percent for the losers. Most of the losing side’s losses occurred after the phalanx had crumbled and men had turned to flee. Flight made men vulnerable, and in his heavy armor he could be outrun by light-armed troops or horsemen. The first thing a fleeting hoplite did was discard his cumbersome shield: hence the famous instruction of a Spartan mother to her son, to return “either with your shield or on it.”\textsuperscript{1662} Waterfield, \textit{Creators, Conquerors and Citizens}, pp. 160; the Spartan dictum is borrowed from Tyrtaeus, W 10.23-27; cf. Victor Davis Hanson, \textit{The Western Way of War: Infantry Battle in Classical Greece}, 2nd edition, (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1998), pp. 35-36; Victor Davis Hanson, \textit{Why the West Has Won. Carnage and Culture from Salamis to Vietnam}, (London, 2001), pp. 92-93; Hans van Wees, ‘The City at War’, in \textit{Classical Greece}, ed. by Robin Osborne, pp. 81; Ober notes an additional economic rift between the wealthy hoplites and their poorer counterparts: the former had relatives with the requisite financial means to pay his ransom if he was ever taken as a prisoner of war; a quick death or a life in servitude were the only avenues of fate that remained open to his labouring-class counterpart: Ober, \textit{Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens}, pp. 204.

\textsuperscript{1660} Waterfield gives the potential figures of a trireme’s crew as follows: “Crews, two hundred to a ship, were drawn largely from poorer citizens, but also foreigners (the Aegean islands were a good source), slaves, andmetics. These made up the 170 rowers (though not every ship went to sea with a full complement, since top speed was necessary only for battle), and then there were the ship’s captain, helmsman, and other seamen, and a dozen or so archers and hoplite marines.” Waterfield, \textit{Creators, Conquerors and Citizens}, pp. 166; van Wees, ‘The City at War’, in \textit{Classical Greece}, pp. 92; Potts, \textit{The Athenian Navy}, pp. 19. Ste. Croix’s lead on the interpretation of the social background of \textit{epibatai}, i.e., marines, to the effect that it is highly probable that their documented \textit{thêtès} origins in the late fifth century can be expanded backwards to cover the occasion of other naval campaigns as early as the Persian Wars is still worthy of consideration: Ste. Croix, ‘The Solonian Census Classes and the Qualification for Cavalry and Hoplite Service’, pp. 71. For the development of ramming in the early fifth century and the consequently diminished role of boarding, see Haas, “Athenian Naval Power before Themistocles”; Buckley, \textit{Aspects of Greek History 750-323 BC}, pp. 152-153.

\textsuperscript{1661} This hardly reasons away the gruesome essence of hoplite warfare. After all, the front lines as well as the flanks were directly exposed to the compound force of the opposing phalanx which make hoplite fighting, appearances to the contrary, a cruel effort of grinding out with small margin for error. For an alternative earlier reconstruction focusing on the display of bravado and the erection of trophies: “Eine Ausnutzung des Sieges zu möglichst vollständiger Vernichtung des Gegners liegt diesen kleinen Rivalitätskämpfen der Städte noch fern. Man ist zufrieden, im offenen Felde gezeigt zu haben, dass man der Stärkere ist und das Schachfeld behauptet hat, so dass man ein Siegeszeichen aufstellen und den Gegner durch die Bitte um Auslieferung der Gefallenen zum Eingeständnis seiner Unterlegenheit zwingen kann.” Kromayer- Veith, \textit{Heerwesen u. Kriegführung der Griechen u. Römer}, (1928), pp. 85; cited in Ridley, ‘The Hoplite as Citizen’, pp. 512.
Themistocles and his *eupatrid* compatriots would attempt to compensate for the expectation of higher causality of *thêtes* participating in naval skirmishes with the political reforms of 487/6. The archons, according to this proposal, would no longer be elected but chosen through an initial phase of election and the later sortition of the elected candidates. Undermining the roots of the prestige accorded to all archons, the potential transference of symbolic authority associated with archonship to *dêmos* satisfying the ritual criteria functioned as a clear blow to the aristocratic ideology that came to divest itself more and more from the office. Diminishing the political functions of archons and alleviating the social status of *thêtes* in equal measure, the reforms of 487/6 also meant, in tandem with the increased prominence of the navy, that *strategeia* or generalship would assume the rank of the most prestigious political post. Election to *strategeia* was not limited, unlike that of archonship, to a certain number. With the measure of comfort afforded to military strategies adopted by successful *stratégos*, the reforms ensured that the Athenian defence against the impending Persian invasion would be spearheaded by the most talented strategists with upper-class backgrounds that Athens had to offer. Undaunted by the prospects of a potential aristocratic backlash, Athenians issued a recalling of all the ostracized *eupatridae* who just had to admit the wrongs they committed and would thence be allowed to rub their slate clean. All of the ostracized returned with the sole exception of Hipparchus, creating a united front for a military confrontation against the Persians that was expected to be decisive.

### 4.4.7 The Political Centralisation in Sicily

Elsewhere in the Greek world, the last quarter of the sixth century saw the first attempt at what de Angelis calls ‘political centralisation’. Accelerating a process that had begun during the reign of the tyrant brothers Kleander and Hippokrates of Gela, Gelon, a cavalry commander in the service of the latter, self-styled himself as a tyrant when Hippokrates died in 491 and promptly set his sights on the prosperous *poleis* of eastern Sicily. There is no way of inferring why Gelon chose to prey on Gela’s neighbours at this time. Seizing the material wealth of the eastern Greek *poleis* offers, of course, a viable starting point. Indeed, given

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Gelon’s tendency to rely heavily on mercenaries, the deductive links connecting his capture of the eastern Sicilian poleis to the maintenance of the foremost enforcers of his rule, i.e., the army, seems logical. And yet, the logic in question appears quite circular since the restless expansionism that Gelon displayed shows that he might have been after something bigger: an eastern Sicilian koine united against the Carthaginian presence to the southwestern tip of the island under his banner. We postulate three factors that are quite likely to have played major parts in persuading Gelon to follow this course of centralisation. First of all, Gelon needed to consolidate his power. He was a regent-turned-usurper1669 and had no claim to inherited excellence at a time when the perennial aristocratic theme of being elite by birth, as we saw in the context of Pindar’s epinician odes, was on the mend. His martial prowess had won him popularity in the eyes of dêmos to be sure. But dêmos’ continued support was predicated upon divesting the exclusive socio-political rights out of the Sicilian aristocrats or gamoroi’s, i.e., ‘Landowners,’ hands. Indeed, the internal strife within Syracuse had reached such rampant heights that in 491/0 dêmos and killyríoi, ‘Landowners’ slaves,’ united in their opposition to gamoroi and succeeded in expelling the latter. But killyríoi and dêmos did not stop there: they established democracy and granted citizenship to the erstwhile slaves. Gelon could not hope to ride the waves of popular dissent if he wanted to remain a tyrant. He could, on the other hand, find out an alternative way to appease the exiled gamoroi and the grassroots dêmos without detracting too much either from his authority or financial resources: recalling the gamoroi to serve as an aristocratic sub-Council while enlisting the dêmos as rowers in his reinvigorated navy. Syracuse offered the prerequisite material in ample terms. The city was well-supplied with timber that needed processing and a growing dêmos that needed effective supervision. Timber made for a large fleet that could, at least on paper, could go mano a mano against the Carthaginian rivals;1670 male commoners made for an ambitious force of rowers ready to carry Gelon’s plans into practice;1671 and the polis itself made the capital of Gelon’s new centralised polis-arkhê, or polis-empire.1672 The political and administrative engineering

1669 Herodotus, Histories, 7.155.

1670 There are a lot of ambivalences surrounding what magnitude of the eventually large navy to posit as might have been built under Gelon’s reign and that of his successor, Hieron. Corretti, for one, argues that Gelon seems to have made minimal use of his fleet, and posits Hieron’s reign as the one during which the overall enlargement took place. It appears but certain that Gelon, at any rate, at least lay the groundwork of the new navy for Hieron to consummate its growth: A. Corretti, “Forniro 200 triremi …” (Hdt., 7,158,4): Per un riesame della tradizione antiche sulla marineria siceliota’, in Guerra e pace in Sicilia e nel Mediterraneo antico (VIII–III sec. a.C.): Arte, prassi e teoria della pace e della guerra. Atti delle quinte giornate internazionali di studi sull’area elima e la Sicilia Occidentale nel contesto Mediterraneo, Erice, 12–15 ottobre 2003, ed. by Maria A. Vaggioli and Chiara Michelini, (Pisa, 2006), pp. 419-421.

1671 Ibid, pp. 416, 421; Giuseppe Mafodda, La Monarchia di Gelone tra pragmatismo, ideologia e propaganda, (Messina, 1996); De Angelis, Archaic and Classical Greek Sicily, pp. 186.

1672 Following a line of thought that was initially paved by Hansen and later taken up by de Angelis, we claim that this new type of territorial-polis inaugurated a novel sort of relationship between the leading
of Gelon, however, also included large population transfers, which had a conspicuous aristocratic element, in addition to what Mafodda calls a type of suaoikismos to his newly crowned Syracuse. Expanding the polis’ tax base with the rank-and-file additions of other poleis’ gamoroi, Gelon created an overflow of funds that allowed him to pay his mercenaries and engage in a civic and religious building program. With material benefits accruing to their miserable lot and their insubordinate elements sold into slavery, dêmos momentarily chose to turn a blind eye on Gelon’s accosting them their erstwhile political gains. Gamoroi, likewise, were offered not only military and administrative offices for their loyalty but also a share of any spoils that could be extorted from either other eastern Greeks or Carthaginians, which would flow into Gelon’s increasing tax base. Finally, the economy of Syracuse itself would prosper with an ever-increasing number of goods, slaves and mercenaries imported from Rhodes to Pithekoussai. In increasing the social basis of material benefits from warfare and creating a subordinate body of proto-philo of gamoroi, Gelon cemented his rule with the dêmos’ political and gamoroi’s material losses.

Second, Gelon had to generate a self-perpetuating politics of antagonism to vindicate his employment of unprecedented numbers of mercenaries. An obedient mercenary force, it

**polis** and the myriad of its dependencies. Although its formation was not consummated at this time, this new type would exert a formative impact on the tyrants of fifth and fourth-century Sicily for decades to come: Hansen, *Polis*, pp. 55, 130; de Angelis, *Archaic and Classical Greek Sicily*, pp. 102. 1673 The historical tradition, archaeologically confirmed in the case of Megara Hyblaia, about the transplantation of a not insignificant proportion of the farmers of conquered Megara Hyblaia and Leontinoi is a case in point. Despite the fact of the obscurity of details, the resettlement policies that Gelon adopted in the forced abandonment of Megara Hyblaia, for example, indicate that the Syracusan population at the end of this period could largely have comprised of the resettled citizens of other poleis: cf. *Ibid*, pp. 182.


1675 The large force of cavalry that is alluded to in later historical tradition to accompany Gelon’s army might have been made up of this swollen body of aristocrats. The body of 2,000 *hippeis*, enormous by ancient Greek standards, may have absorbed the swollen ranks of Syracusan aristocrats: Robert E. Gaebel, *Cavalry Operations in the Ancient Greek World*, (Norman, 2002), pp. 82.

1676 Gelon set a precedent in filling the administrative ranks with his family and friends. The appointment of Hieron as Gela’s tyrant and Glaukos of Karystos as that of Kamarina may, for all we know, just be the tip of the iceberg. Further given the large-scale population transfer that was running amok of the old social order, Gelon needed an echelon of representatives who could hold popular discontent under control: Gianfranco Adornato, “Delphic Enigmas? The Γέλας ανάσσων, Polyzalos, and the Charioteer Statue”, *American Journal of Archaeology*, vol. 112 no.1, (Jan., 2008), pp. 52.

1677 Both de Angelis and Mafodda give a number around 10,000 as highly plausible. For putting this number into historical perspective, de Angelis has given a rough-and-ready estimate of 15,000-24,000 Syracusans and an order of 100,000 for all the cities conquered under Gelon’s reign: de Angelis, *Archaic and Classical Greek Sicily*, pp. 183, 184; Giuseppe Mafodda, ‘Da Gelone a Dionigi il Grande’, in *La Sicilia dei due Dionisi: atti della settimana di studio, Agrigento, 24-28 febbraio 1999*, ed. By Nicola Bonacasa, Lorenzo Braccesi and Ernesto de Miro, (Rome, 2002), pp. 445.
goes without saying, was often the only buffer that stood between tyrants and their enemies. It is highly likely that Gelon was made to observe that fact himself when he received the news of Hippias’ successful repulse of the Peloponnesians in Athens. He needed to build an army without losing face as one who subjected his citizens under the yoke of non-citizen soldiers.

This clash between the armed non-citizen retainers of the tyrant and the Syracusan citizens was shed of its political rigor when Gelon gave citizenship to his loyal mercenaries at some point between 485 and 480. The Carthaginian presence to the west of the island offered plenty of room for the creation of an everlasting enmity supervening any logical inference that the conscription of mercenaries was made primarily against politai and not against any enemy without. On Sicily there was, as we saw above, three large ethnicities. By the advent of the fifth century the eastern and southern Sikels were absorbed to a large extent within the expanding poleis as bondspersons, slaves, artisans and the like. Carthaginians, on the other hand, commanded the western side of the island and used it as a base of maritime operations dominating the western Mediterranean commerce. Besides, despite the fact that we do not have any contemporary Carthaginian histories to draw a more balanced picture, what limited textual evidence we have does permit a reading that the Carthaginians were quite at ease with a policy of live and let live, and did not care much about what transpired beyond the borders of their Greek neighbours that lived adjacent to their territory, Selinous. And while it is to be granted that they may have grown increasingly hostile to the eventual conquest of eastern Sicily and that their ties of animosity to Selinous stretched back to the first quarter of the sixth century, it is equally certain that the Carthaginians were far from being fully committed to a counter-offensive against the expanding borders of Syracuse. Gelon may not have actually thought that he could subjugate the Carthaginians but that did not stop him from conjuring an ideological image of an arch-enemy whose culture, politics, religion, etc., was alleged to embody everything that was anti-Greek.

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1679 For an overview of the earlier tensions largely created by south-western Greeks’ attempts to found additional apoikoi at the western end of the island, see de Angelis, Megara Hyblaia and Selinous, pp. 155-157.

1680 Diodorus’ historical account, for one, portrays the initial outbreak of hostilities as one that took place between Theron of Akragas and the Punic-Greek army assembled by the Carthaginian general Hamilcar. Gelon, according to that interpretation, entered the fray only when Theron was in danger of defeat. Yet, if our reading of Gelon’s reinforcing the Syracusan navy is correct, then his late arrival would turn into a perspicacious pretext of a conflict whose potentiality was long brewing in the 480s: Diodorus Siculus, Library, 11.20.5.

1681 That the later historical tradition took an active part in the creation of this myth, however significant, is largely beside the point that Gelon and Hieron were, in all likelihood, zealous promoters and initiators of this mythmaking. It is a telling possibility, as argued recently by Bosher, that there is a good chance that Aeschylus’ Persians might have been performed for the first time at Syracuse under the auspices of Gelon’s successor Hieron. After all, the Phenicians formed the backbone of Persians’ maritime
a politically overarching yardstick of ‘barbarianism’ as the Persians were. Never the less, the Phoenician basis of Persians’ navy as well the Carthaginians’ domination of the western Mediterranean waters meant that they were as approximating a proxy as Sicilian Greeks could find. Indeed, the very existence of the historical tradition that the Persians made an agreement with the Carthaginians in order to subdue the eastern and western Greeks once and for all, which survives in Diodorus’ Library, seems compelling enough for us to argue that the collective stigmatisation of the Carthaginians had begun quite early on. For better or for worse, the instigated enmity of the Carthaginians would not subside, petering out only centuries later when they emerged as the losing side at the conclusion of the Second Punic War. Third, Gelon, in all likelihood, took notice of the fact that his, and eventually Syracuse’s, fortunes ran in parallel lines with those of the mainland Greek poleis. Immemorial ties, commercial, political, social and cultural, not only between apoikoi and metropoleis but also between apoikoi and any major player of the Greek world was crucial to keep the political order of things as they were. Certainly, the Sicilian poleis had long been integrated into the larger Greek nexus of cultural, economic, political and social exchange at the end of the sixth century. Triggering a political snowball that would keep on gathering momentum prowess and the latter’s defeat at Plataia would be rendered incomplete without the Gelon’s victory over the former at Himera: Kathryn Bosher, ‘Hieron’s Aeschylus’, in Theatre Outside Athens: Drama in Greek Sicily and South Italy, ed. by Kathryn Bosher, (Cambridge, 2012).

Jonathan Hall’s claim that Gelon’s victory at Himera did not inspire the invention of a momentous myth of fierce resistance against the overarching barbarian, as it did in the case of mainland Greeks and Xerxes, appears predicated on an implicit eastern-Hellenocentrism and an unrealistic expectation that a polished mythos of victorious struggle would be delivered off, as it were, the assembly line. On the first note, to the Sicilians that coalesced under Gelon and Theron against the Carthaginians the war they successfully waged was the definitive military effort against a non-Greek opponent. Gelon and Hieron’s continuous attempts at sewing traditional, yet novel, mythoi into the mythical fabric of Greek politics, such as Aeschylus’ Aetnaeae, were, in that sense, not bereft of a material basis in the collective consciousness of Sicilian Greek poleis. Further, we ought to remember that the transformation of Persians into the archetypical barbarian itself was a conscious product of definitions, redefinitions, alterations and ascriptions that spanned over decades prior to its first comprehensive literary rendition in Herodotus’ Histories: Jonathan Hall, Hellenicity: Between Ethnicity and Culture, revised edition, (Chicago, 2005), pp. 172-189; de Angelis, Archaic and Classical Greek Sicily, pp. 189; for a similar approach to ancient Greek mythmaking as an incessant dialectic between local and pan-Hellenic mythoi in the context of the Messenian traditions, see Luraghi, The Ancient Messenians, pp. 47.

Diodorus Siculus, Library, 11.20.1; it goes without saying that there are many scholars who find such a scheme impractical if not unrealistic. Harrell, for example, claimed that the information has all the makings of a piece of Deinomenid propaganda, with which I largely concur: S. E. Harrell, ‘Synchronicity: The Local and the Panhellenic within Sicilian Tyranny’, in Ancient Tyranny, ed. by S. Lewis, pp. 124, 130-133.

One of the most extravagant and prestigious aristocratic pastimes that the families of the Sicilian tyrants enjoyed was the partaking of pan-Hellenic competitions. And, having made a name for themselves in the breeding of pedigree horses, the tyrants aimed for the highest glory in which could bask only those that were stupendously rich to hire a rider and a team of four horses for the chariot race: “The wealth and grandeur of these tyrants were brought home to the Greeks in the motherland by their splendid victories in the chariot races, as, for instance, the one in 490 of Theron’s brother Xenocrates to whom Pindar dedicated his sixth Pythian ode; two years later Gelon won an Olympic victory of which the great, column-like bronze statue of the charioteer, part of a lost chariot-group, still stands at Delphi.
throughout the fifth century, however, was the espousal of the Peloponnesian League as the leading power that was most congruent to the idea of a prospering and expanding Syracuse. Hiring mercenaries with Peloponnesian origins, sending to and receiving shipments regularly from Sparta and her allies, establishing ties of xenia with the poleis of Lacedaemon were all parts of a play in line with whose script Sparta and Syracuse built, slowly but surely, a congenial rapport not unlike the one that had already been established between Syracuse and Corinth. Even proposing to throw down the gauntlet in the face of the second Persian invasion, the self-made Gelon made his intentions quite clear: the Syracuse of his reign was not merely a member of the Greek world, it was one that aspired to its leadership.

By 481, Gelon’s forces had captured Syracuse and the tyrant had made the polis his capital. Growing in tandem with the army of Theron, the tyrant of Akragas, Gelon’s forces enlarged their zone of control. As the two armies attained effective domination over the eastern and southern Sicily, the Carthaginians grew increasingly wary of the hostile forces increasingly prowling about their borders. A confrontation was set to take place at Himera in 480, which was won by the Syracusan-Akragantine alliance, leading to a delineation of the respective spheres of political influence. Gelon’s attempt at centralisation was the first of its kind that was to take place on the Sicilian soil. But, then, it was more: by defeating the Carthaginians, Syracuse showed that it was well on its way to become a territorial polis with an armed force to be reckoned with. Manning the triremes were root and branch dēmos whose lack of political voice would turn into a divisive issue within the ranks of the oligarchs themselves. By contrast, dēmos of the non-allied poleis would learn the hard way the risks involved in

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1685 Herodotus’ story of Lacedaemonians making an appeal to Gelon on behalf of all the allied cities to aid them against the Persians in the impending war fleshes out this sketch of reciprocity that weaved a tight-knit international coalition of interests. The fact that Lacedaemonians, as the leaders of the mainland Greek coalition, saw Gelon as the natural address of any proposal of alliance speaks to the equivalent bargaining position of the two poleis. In the event, this rough equivalency would be overridden by Gelon’s demand to assume the leadership of the Greek alliance. Still the military force that he promised the Lacedaemonians comprising of 200 triremes and 20,000 hoplites, even when the due allowance for Herodotean over-exaggeration is made, shows the extent of the military capacity that was later assumed to be within his reach. Herodotus, Histories, 7.158-163.

1686 Bettalli has traced the origins of a company of mercenaries to Arcadia which may have been accompanied by other Lacedaemonian mercenaries that had a well-fitting repute of formidable warriors: Bettalli, I mercenari nel mondo greco, pp. 98, 148-153.

1687 Although the territorial size of the post-Himera Syracuse, which included Kamarina, Megara Hyblaea, Leontini, Katane and Naxos, was nowhere near its fourth-century apex, which, in fact, is listed by Hansen and Nielsen as the largest Greek polis that ever existed with an astonishing 12,000 square kilometres, it was still a considerable heavyweight by the ancient standards with an estimation to the order of 4,330 square kilometres: Herman Mogens Hansen and T. H. Nielsen, An Inventory of Archaic and Classical Poleis, (Oxford, 2004), pp. 72; de Angelis, Archaic and Classical Greek Sicily, pp. 105.
drawing the ire of a tyrant. The socio-political significance of the mercenaries would also grow, crystallising into one of the basic features of Sicilian poleis. Finally, an additional antithesis to pan-Hellenism was generated in the aftermath of the battle of Himera: Carthage. The Herodotean tradition could portray the eventual defeat of the Persian Empire in 479 as divine retribution and poetic justice, but they would be hard put to do so in regard to the events that materialised on the other side of the Mediterranean. Thence would arise an ideology and politics of liberation which portrayed the Greeks as the agents of divine will against soft, puny, devious, untrustworthy barbarians.

4.5 The Second Transformation of the Essential Copy and Conclusion

The culminating effect of the Cleisthenic reforms and Themistocles’ later guiding of the Athenian navy’s rise to prominence on the eastern side of mainland Greece in addition to the creation of a broad coalition of oligarchic interests with Sparta leading the vanguard in Peloponnese flooded the soil of late archaic Greek poleis with clashing zones of influence. To be sure, this flood of ideas also provided the timber for the creation of the archaic Greek image of the Noah’s Ark, effectively sheltering a number of Greek monarchs and tyrants especially but not solely on Sicily. The combined military and economic strength of Athens and Sparta, however, towered heads and shoulders above the rest of the Greek poleis, which made them fitting, if bizarre, bedfellows at the wake of Persians’ second casting of the shadow of their empire on them. The deployment of this united front also wrought profound change in regard to the respective incorporations of phusis and nomos into political, philosophical and poetic language. The residual discursive elements that had already been construed by the first half of the sixth century including the building up of a privileged ethos of service in the citizen-army, the public rendering of political deliberations at the boulê and the inversion of the politics of suspension to beam its searchlights at the politically ambitious members of the dêmos risked crumbling down as they began to be pinned down by an unprecedented pressure emanating from the expanding Persian Empire. Sufficient as it was to prevail over territorial neighbours in small to medium scale wars and skirmishes, there was simply no way for the quantified ideals of census classes to wrangle with the sheer numbers and material welfare of the Persians that built pontoon bridges over Hellespont and drank rivers dry with equal ease. It was at that point that the conception of nomos acquired an additional veneer as carrying the will of dêmos writ large. Elaborated continuously throughout the course of the fifth century

1688 A fitting case in the context of Euripidean tragedy can be glimpsed through a crisp fragment from one of his lost plays: “I know small states which have honored the gods and yet have to obey larger states that are ungodly, because they are overwhelmed by a greater number of spearmen.” Euripides, Bellerophontês, F. 286, 10-12.
with *dēmos-kratos*\(^{1689}\) that was immortalized in the bronze set of Harmodius and Aristogiton’s commemorative statues\(^{1690}\) and with the waning prerogatives of the Spartan dyarchs, which appears akin to the ichor-bleeding Homeric Aphrodite in a religiously overcharged community, setting up an ideological plaque to tyrannicide on its own terms, the relationship of *nomos* to demotic power would herald the political ascendancy of *dēmos*. The shift from the earlier census-class army to the Athenian citizen army, or the higher inclusion of Spartan helots and *perioikoi* within their fighting force, was, it goes without saying, in some ways quantitative. When the Athenian and Plataian contingents bludgeoned the Persian task force at Marathon, for one, the Athenian army may have resembled the mobilized force that had scored two massive victories against the Chalkians and Euboeans roughly a decade and a half ago. By the time of the Second Persian Invasion, however, the conceivable horizon of military conscription itself seems to have vanished as we begin to flip through pages that are etched with previously unthinkable numbers. Athenians’ commissioning of 200 triremes,\(^{1691}\) adding up to a grand total of 40,000 soldiers for the navy alone, or the major Spartan expeditionary force accompanied by 35,000 helots with a 7:1 ratio between helots and Spartiates,\(^{1692}\) disregarding the *perioikoi*, loom as a larger-than-life transformation compared to the former census-levies. The spread of citizen levy through the grassroots small farmers and wage-labourers was also conducive to the relaxation of the census requirements for election to boulê and minor offices. Re-designating Agora and Pnyx as the hubs of democracy wherein laws would be passed and decisions concerning the whole community would be made, the publicity of political deliberation would augur a novel understanding of formal proceedings that were

\(^{1689}\) Raaflaub and Cartledge’s marking of the compound term as distinct in its demotic significance from the earlier *isonomia* should be kept in mind while setting the scene for this historical change: Pindar, *Pythian*, 2.86-88; Kurt A. Raaflaub, ‘The Breakthrough of Demokratia in Mid-Fifth-Century Athens’, in *Origins of Democracy in Ancient Greece*, pp. 112; Cartledge, ‘Democracy, Origins of: Contribution to a Debate’, pp. 158.

\(^{1690}\) First sculpted by Antenor and erected on the Athenian Agora only to be hijacked by Xerxes’ forces during either one of their two sacks of Athens, a second statutory group was sculpted by Krítius and Nesiotes and was commemoratively placed on the plaque upon which Antenor’s group used to stand. For the travails of the statutory group within the larger context of Classical and Hellenistic Athenian politics, see Azoulay, *The Tyrant-Slayers of Ancient Athens*; for an elaboration on the aristocrats’ potential role in the creation of the anti-tyrannical tradition, including the commissioning of the statutory group, see Forsdyke, *Exile, Ostracism, and Democracy*, pp. 132.

\(^{1691}\) Herodotus, *Histories*, 7.144.

\(^{1692}\) The numbers and their interpretation proved a hotbed of disagreement for the modern scholars. While some have inclined to downsize the numbers on the basis of Herodotus’ penchant for using inflated digits others have argued for their plausibility compared to other strands of contemporary evidence. For a prolonged critique of the sceptic account, see Peter Hunt, *Slaves, Warfare, and Ideology in the Greek Historians*, (Cambridge, 2002), pp. 31-40; Extrapolating the whole Spartan and helot populations from the numbers given by Herodotus, Dillon and Garland offer 40,000 and 120,000 as likely candidates for each respectively. Dillon and Garland, *The Ancient Greeks*, pp. 208; Thomas J. Figueira, ‘Helot Demography and Class Demarcation in Classical Sparta, Helots and Their Masters in Laconia and Messenia*, pp. 220; Herodotus, *Histories*, 9.10.1, 9.28.2, 9.29.1.
open to one and all so long as one had the credentials to be an Athenian citizen. With transparency and publicity would originate a democratically-handled and procedurally-delineated postulation of accountability. As the terms of service were specified so would the auditory mechanisms that could dishearten any officeholder from acting like the ‘gift-swallowing basileis’ of Hesiodic yore. The political rupture that was occasioned by the waxing political significance of dēmos would negate any oligarchic branding of hoi polloi as the ever-unruly enemy within. Thankfully, the Persians offered an appetising a target as any other to direct the ideological efforts at the engraving of the new friezes with images of gigantomachy with its reinvigorated contestants of Olympic gods and goddesses (Athenians) and Giants (Persians as the archetypical tyrants).

These revisits of the older themes, in their artistic, poetic and political representations alike, would denote another qualitative shift in their novel results: the recognition of material wealth as the latent key to realize all de jure political grants. When the newly conscripted Athenian thêtês and their social counterparts elsewhere turned from the campaign season to take their respective administrative places within the demes qua “poor-man’s boulê” they came to notice the formal allowance that was made to their election of boulê and minor office hardly conveyed any practical implications given their continued residence on the small farmsteads. The potentiality of holding councillorship was worlds apart from the requisite ownership of either slave or wage labour to turn it into an actuality. As yet there was no public pay for

1693 “Persuasion was built into the system: in the assembly individual citizens volunteered to engage in open, competitive debate before the voting, sovereign audience; in court litigants were compelled to speak for themselves before the same audience. Verbal combat in the assembly and courts could be intense: personal fortunes, political careers, lives, or the welfare of the community often hung in the balance.” Harvey Yunis, ‘The Constraints of Democracy and the Rise of the Art of Rhetoric’, in D. Boedeker and K. Raaflaub (eds.), Democracy, Empire, and the Arts in Fifth-Century Athens, (Cambridge, Mass., 1998), pp. 230; for an archaeological and historical reconstruction of the chaotic, to the modern eye of course, jumble of activity that was the Athenian Agora developing through the fifth and fourth centuries, see Gottesman, Politics and the Street in Democratic Athens, pp. 26-43.

1694 There was no lack of enemies to be exorcised from the hearts of minds of either the Athenian or the Spartan citizen bodies. The widely diverging political track record of the two mega-poleis, indeed, had already turned into a cause for concern for their respective citizens. The Spartan foray into the Athenian politics in 507/506 was momentous in creating an almost unbridgeable gulf between the two: “The interventions [of Sparta], actual or proposed, after 510 must all have seemed to the bulk of the Athenians to be aggressive attempts to gain control over their internal affairs. We should take this into account when trying to understand the attitude of Athenians towards Sparta in the fifth century.” Ste. Croix, The Origins of the Peloponnesian War, pp. 167.

1695 Osborne, Demos, pp. 87.

1696 There is not a large body of literary evidence to bring home the plight of wage-labourers that were drawn hither and thither to eke out a living but a later passage taken from Menander’s Dyskolos, ‘Bad-Tempered Man’ offers a valuable late fourth century glimpse into the ideology of large farmers and their conception of the hired ‘hands’; the smitten Sostratos’ only hope to impress the miser of a father of his lover is to turn up to be a farmer himself: “He is as bad as can be. | He has this farm that must be worth a cool | Two talents; yet he goes on farming it | Alone; he has no man to work with him, | No servant of his own, no labourer hired | From the vicinity, no neighbour even, | But just himself, alone.”
either political or judicial office, and there were to be none for some time to come, publicly-sanctioned methods of shoring up some coin, i.e., sharing war loot both animate, i.e., slaves, and inanimate, would begin to emit an intoxicating scent for thêtes.\footnote{Menander, Dykoslos, in The Plays and Fragments, trans. by Maurice Balme, (Oxford and New York, 2001), 326-332.} If forestalling a more-than-likely third Persian invasion was part of the rationale of the Aegean offensive that was launched without missing a beat in the Plataea’s aftermath,\footnote{1697} so was the forceful appropriation of the Satraps’ wealth who were pictured above all as perched atop mountains of coin. With the political bestowal of eligibility for officeholding recognized for what it actually was, i.e., a token appreciation of the vital role thêtes began to play in the formation of Athenian thalassocracy,\footnote{1699} a whole range of imperialist activities such as manning cleruchies\footnote{1700} and crowding the mercenary armies of foreign monarchs would come to be seen as politically more palatable.\footnote{1701}

Money-making required specialization and a concentrated...
profession of any kind, ranging from seasoned infantry to the manufacture of pottery, was hence deemed to offer the brightest of prospects for the hitherto uninitiated non-aristocrat. Surely, all this monetisation of the means of class struggle did not proclaim the dulling of political perspicacity as they continued to be on the lookout as the eupatridae came butting heads time and again. It was the lay of the archaic Greek land that the political empowerment of the masses rested upon forging its own opportune moments to lay a claim when the intra-aristocratic tug-of-war reached a point at which the eupatrid cohesion was at its nadir. All the same, monetisation of the political chains that withheld the cashing in of the officeholding rights of thêtes still dispelled a lot of illusions of what it meant to exercise kratos in the polis.

The widespread realization that nomoi enshrined the political rights and duties of all concerned enacted an ideological ground of discursive equilibrium where the monetized set of qualifications for the wielding of political power was set alongside a sebasteion of effigies that were to be commemorated throughout a calendar year packed with rituals and festivals. The ever-growing spread of cults and mysteries involved in attaining perpetual bliss in the hereafter and dramaturgical reinterpretations of Homeric and Hesiodic myths were two of the most conspicuous tracts through whose channels the abstract qualities of public accolades would be restated. Thanks in large part to a continuous process of selective interpretation discarding, modifying and creating muthos of old and new the reciprocity of the ‘ruling and being ruled in turn’ would be sanctified irrespective of its material reverberations. A larger ruling body ruling over a growing population of diverse ethnic, cultural and religious leanings half of the sixth century we can turn to Hybrias’ popular song which emanated an ethos strictly oppositional to the one we saw, for example, in Hesiod’s Erga: “My wealth is a stout spear, a sword | And a fine shield, protector of my body | With them I plough, with them I reap, | With them I press sweet wine from the grape. | With them in hand I’m called master of slaves. | All those who dare not bear spear, sword | And fine shield to protect their bodies | Bend their knees before me in fear | And hail me as their master and their great king.” Cited in Waterfield, Xénophon’s Retreat, pp. 81-2; Ober, The Rise and Fall of Classical Greece, pp. 137.

1702 The monetisation in question depicts, of course, the legalisation of the material qualifications that were set in kind rather than in coin. Still, one ought to remember not only that it was quite a facile thing for a community that was largely made up of wage-earners and small farmers to convert the set property qualifications into monetary terms. To that end, Ste. Croix has demonstrated a while ago that a barley-standard was in wide circulation in the pre-coinage Athens. Besides, the ancient Greeks had no specific word for money and the common word they used for it chrêmata was underpinned by a conception that viewed money mainly as a chrêma, or a tool: Sitta von Reden, Exchange in Ancient Greece, (London, 1995), pp. 173; Ste. Croix, ‘The Solonian Census Classes and the Qualifications for Cavalry and Hoplite Service’, pp. 33-40.

1703 Contra: “It would be a strange and sorry thing if the gods took more account of our gifts and sacrifices than our souls and whether there is holiness and justice to be found in them. Yes, that is what they care about, I believe, for more than about these extravagant processions and sacrifices offered year by year by states and individuals who may, for all we know, have sinned greatly against gods and men. The gods are not venal, and scorn all these things, as Ammon and his prophet told us.” Plato, Second Alcibiades, in Plato, 149e8-150b4.
needed effective mechanisms to sharpen the thrust of new elements that were in tune with the ruling democratic ethos while weeding out the rest. And with an increased accentuation of the instrumentality afforded by the age-old ramblings about phusis novel forms of artistic representation would emerge to give new outlets to political, ethical, cultural, etc. discussions. This active interest shown in the remaking of phusis elevated the sphere of mythmaking to be a result of dêmos’ collective effort. Heeding to no dictate supposedly originating from divine precepts, except when the contrary was considered to be apposite for the upholding of relations of domination, the demotic Kirke at the ebb of the sixth century dared to barter the limits of her prerogatives with those of Zeus. The demotic nadir of phusis, as such, corresponded to the apogee of its pretextual use to naturalise the subjection of women, slaves and non-Greeks as the receptacle of the officially-sanctioned relations of exploitation greasing the old machine of social and economic reproduction.

Succeeding his father Darius to the throne of the Empire in 486, Xerxes initiated a mass logistics programme that was to ensure the safe passage of his army to Greece. The Herculean effort of raising, training, transporting and sustaining a force that is estimated by modern scholars to comprise of approximately 80,000 soldiers, stirred the Greeks into action and was the motivating force behind a conference of Greek states in 481. Resolving to form the Hellenic League, the members agreed to put all enmities aside, to send delegations to coax the neutral states to join the alliance, and to collectively punish all the states that had ‘medized.’ The second meeting of the Hellenic League took place in 480 with hardly any encouraging news from the neutral states. If it was Spartiate courage that was based on the thorough economic and social exploitation of helots that carried the day at Thermopylae; it was equally the self-conscious anti-tyrannism that pushed the sails of the triremes rowed by Athenian thêtes at the Battle of Artemisium. Once the delaying tactics were abandoned for an all-out struggle at Salamis, Themistocles would, again, coax and cajole the other strategoi to force

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1704 “We must certainly do not forget that even the Athenian democracy, more highly developed and more firmly rooted than any other known to us from the ancient world, was a dictatorship by a minority of the population (though not a small minority, as sometimes alleged), and that at the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War there may well have been more than a hundred thousand slaves in Attica.” Ste. Croix, The Origins of the Peloponnesian War, pp. 44-5.

1705 Three quarters of a century separates the first ever encounter of Greeks with a non-Greek invader from Gorgias’ memorable baptism of the struggle against ‘the barbarian’: “Trophies erected over fallen barbarians call for hymns of praise, while those erected over fallen Greeks call for lamentation.” Gorgias, F. 5b DK; cf. “Fear (conscious and subconscious) of the “others” may also have persuaded Athenians to overlook some of the class and status inequities that existed among themselves.” Ober, Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens, pp. 6.


1708 Herodotus, Histories, 7.145-146.
the Persians into the narrow straits that would cancel out the enhanced manoeuvres of Persian ships to turn the battle into easy pickings for the Greek fleet.\textsuperscript{1709} Dispelling the air of superiority with which Xerxes had hoped to subdue his inferior enemies, the remnants of the Persian army that was left behind following Xerxes’ flight back home would be overcome once and for all at Plataea in 479. In defeating the numerically superior and materially richer Persians, the democratically imbued Athenian polity that arose upon the extortion of the surplus value produced by small farmer-producers, and the Spartan polity that completely victimized the caste made up of the old Messenians and Laconians prevailed over political configurations in setting themselves apart as ideals to be aspired. With the formation of the Peloponnesian League mostly complete and the Delian League nearing the discussions that would finalize its formation, the political dissemination of the class-system idealized respectively by Athenian \textit{eupatridae} and Spartiates would expand to a scale hitherto unknown to Greek \textit{poleis}. The desperate vying of the two Leagues for political supremacy that would come to epitomize the remaining part of the fifth century, was encapsulated, in more ways than one, in \textit{thêtes}’ resistance to the ingenious methods of extortion devised by the Athenian \textit{eupatrids} and helots’ unending defiance of the cruel simplicity that adorned their exploitation by the Spartiate masters.\textsuperscript{1710}

The mainland Greece of the archaic age saw innumerable changes in regard to settlement patterns, social hierarchy, political structures, poetic expressions, forces and relations of production, and so forth. From archaeological evidence shedding light on the ebb and flow of mercantile connections to the \textit{ostraka} found with Themistocles’ name on them dated to pre-480, the rise and fall of religious customs, philosophical conventions, poetic traditions among many others prove that the Greeks producing and reproducing this vibrant world did not take anything as absolutely frozen, imponderable, or unintelligible by definition. Can anything other than this maelstrom be expected from a conglomeration of societies comprising of highly self-conscious individuals constellating their travails with anything that was regarded as natural, divine or historical? \textit{N omos} and \textit{phusis}, two concepts that followed historical complexification in tow, were likewise subject to this maelstrom of change. In attempting to trace a mere bundle of historical developments that occurred across the Greek archaic age through the explicit lines of relations of production and domination, we emphasized the point that the Classical Age was neither the beginning of the systematic study of anything deemed pertinent to these two overarching themes nor did it have a limited number of poetic, philosophical, political, etc., interpretations available to it. Applying the maxim that a \textit{tabula}

\textsuperscript{1709} Herodotus, \textit{The Histories}, 8.62.2.
rasa is rarely, if ever, the origin of any social structure to a corner of intellectual history, the social context we have attempted to sketch indicates that the particular significances adopted by both terms can only be elaborated if the determinate material grounds upon which they rise is mapped out. And mapping out their rise have allowed us to construe the Greek archaic age as one in which the stirrings of the Athenian, Spartan and Syracusan working classes have saturated a politico-social topography that is otherwise too easily wed to idealistic vicissitudes. In short, as the working classes of the three ‘superpoleis’ sprang into different courses of political participation, the duality of nomos and phusis began to take on new layers of ascribed significations, moving from an initial historical clash between the ruling class and their disgruntled retinue towards one that involved rowers and light infantry as much as pilots and hoplitai. Let us see what the relations of production and reproduction ushered in with regard to the duality’s conception in the era of the classical polis.

CHAPTER 5

OLD SKINS ARE SHED, HENCE THE NEW

5.1 The Setting of the Political, Dramatic, Philosophical and Social Stages

The first quarter of the fifth century marked the transition to a plethora of political, social, cultural, economic, philosophical etc., termini that, combined with the erstwhile stirrings of *historiè* or ‘critical inquiry,’ make it the rightful beginning of the classical period. In interesting ways, the period resembled its immediate precedent: *plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose*. Politico-social rifts that characterised either the mainland, Sicilian or Aegean Greek *poleis*, for one, was not about to narrow down as the spoils of the offensive against the Persians was distributed among the rank-and-file soldiers. The oarsmen of the Athenian *polis* knew that the day was won at Salamis thanks in large part to the part they played; the helot and *perioikic* light and heavy infantry, respectively, that had swollen the ranks of the Spartan phalanx was likewise made to realise that they had an undisputable say in how the fortunes of their *polis* ebbed and flowed. And while we noted the heavy reliance of the Syracusan tyrants on large mercenary forces in the previous chapter, and despite the fact that he fared no better than his predecessors in that regard, Hieron’s rising navy also indicated to all and sundry Syracusans that their sanction had to be taken if Syracuse was to grow into a veritable maritime force in her own right. Navies, one and all, had come to bear a degree of

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1714 That is not to say, of course, that the Athenian levies did not exhibit a similar social composition that was either lightly or heavily skewed toward lower classes via their recruitment as light infantry. With the ever-present addition of slave attendants to the picture, the Athenian levies, especially general ones, begin to resemble the *polis* more and more on account of its social composition as we move further into the fifth and fourth centuries. Hans van Wees, ‘The City at War’, in *Classical Greece*, pp. 85-86; van Wees, ‘The Myth of the Middle-class Army: Military and Social Status in Ancient Athens’, pp. 45-71; Trundle, *Greek Mercenaries*, pp. 120.
significance not unlike that of the armies within a period of twenty-five years. With even the perennial landgrazer Spartans trying their hand in the novel game of naval dominance, the 470s saw the prows of triremes slowly chipping away the old ideal of gentleman-farmer soldier, whose absentee landlordism had served as the main line of demarcation between the propertied few and the unpropertied mass. By the end of 460s the politics of exclusively upper-class martial solidarity would undergo a series of transformations along three separate pathways in Athens, Sparta and Syracuse.

The period also saw the completion of some of the first surviving masterpieces of tragedies with an ever-increasing number of technical innovations. Transplanting the sixth-century stage onto a plane of self-conscious experimentalism, Aeschylus and his fellow dramatists managed to create a politically-imbibed form of expression which did not get the jitters when facing the overarching Homeric poems of yore. Appeasing and chastising in equal measure, the medium indeed became the message with the continued efforts of the fifth-century dramatists. Aristotle wrote the first surviving ancient Greek treatise of literary criticism with an explicit focus on fifth-century tragedians and comedians, whereas Plato drew heavily from the on-stage expeditions of the latter in his attempts to provide his two ideal communities with a mythological basis of legitimation. There is no way of gauging, of course, the mean attendance level, let alone the social composition of the spectators; regardless, we operate on secure grounds in claiming that both tragedy and comedy was seen, in terms of form and content

1715 In the end, increased prominence of navies and the emergence of the politics of empire-building both played into the hands of the archaic Greek maxim, “those who contributed militarily to the polis should have political rights, or even political power.” Lisa Kallet-Marx, “The Fifth Century: Political and Military Narrative”, in Classical Greece, pp. 180.

1716 “The bulk of the crew consisted of oarsmen, recruited from among anyone willing to serve for pay, whether citizen, metic, or slave. Among citizens, this meant primarily the thetes, the lowest property class, who needed the money and were not liable to other forms of military service. A large navy would need to draw not only on citizens, but on metics and on manpower recruited abroad (Xenophon Hellenica 6.2.12). Rowers might bring their slaves to row on the same ship and earn them extra wages (Thucydides 7.13.2). Citizen rowers were usually outnumbered by foreigners and slaves. In the navy of Corcyra as many as 8 in 10 were slaves (Thucydides 1.55.1), and while the Athenians were in principle capable of manning a fleet with citizens only, their crews, too, were normally ‘bought rather than homegrown’, and made up largely of metics and slaves (Thucydides 1.121.3, 143.1–2; 3.16, 18; 7.63.3).” Van Wees, ‘The City at War’, pp. 92.

1717 The debate on women’s attendance at the City Dionysia, not to mention that of non-citizens, is still as murky, for example, as it was in the day of Victor Ehrenberg. On that point, Jeffrey Henderson has made a case for the plausibility of women’s and non-citizens’ presence in the Periclean theatre of Dionysius based on his estimations that the theatre could accommodate 17,000 spectators which is roughly thrice the number that could be seated in the Pnyx. Au contraire, given that the number of Athenian male citizens during the latter half of the fifth century is pinned down to fluctuate around 30,000 there is no indication that the relatively higher capacity of the theatre can be taken as an unequivocal signal for either women’s or non-citizens’ participation in the Great Dionysia. Jeffrey Henderson, “Women and the Athenian Dramatic Festivals”, Transactions of the American Philological Association, vol. 121, (1991), pp. 136-137.
alike, as hugely important public businesses. From the *Capture of Miletus* of Phrynichus to the *Birds* of Aristophanes we have an adamantine chain of public import which was assigned to the compilation, narration and presentation of sacred and profane stories of various colouring. Homer and Hesiod, in Herodotus’ famous dictum, may have given the Greeks their cherished myths but the fifth-century dramatists arguably gave them more: a cultural space of creative rethinking that could revive Agamemnon as either the sturdy fortress of Greek interests, or as a run-of-the-mill ordinary man, albeit invested with extraordinary powers, that was torn apart between the prospects of sending the assembled Achaean home or sacrificing his dear daughter. The almighty cowering in terror, unparalleled defiance basking in the glory of its divine-forged fetters, redress invoked on the transgressor with a barely masked parable, all were within the plenum of possibilities that this essentially Athenian medium afforded to its playwrights and audiences. The monumental rebuilding of the Athenian acropolis that was sacked during the two Persian invasions would also begin in earnest and would gather enough steam by the 450s to offer a redefinition of Greek monumental architecture itself. If the geographical focus of our brief foray invites a reading of Athenocentrism into it, then we beg to differ: paving of novel cultural avenues in this period and before did not separate Athens from Syracuse or Sparta. Syracusans, for one, had begun to display a knack for comedy no later than in the last quarter of the sixth century. Indeed, from what we can gather, their dramatic tradition would be further entrenched in the following quarter of the fifth century as Hieron came to appreciate its power in labelling his political spoils with an aura of sacredness. Recalling the eternal echoes of one of the most famous dictums of Shakespeare, Hieron’s cordial relationship with drama suggests that no *faute de mieux* rapport can be established between the early fifth-century forms of tragedy and the demotic polity of Athens. The Spartan schedule of religious festivals, processions and ceremonies may not have triggered the exploration of new cultural media in the likeness of Athenian tragedy. But the ever-growing import attributed to careful observation of religious festivals, even surpassing, at times, the need for pan-Hellenic or Peloponnesian self-defence, suggests that their stricter adherence to religious practices might have had a lot to do with contemporary socio-political difficulties that arose from the growing estrangement of poorer homoioi from plutarchs to an extent that

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1719 For an interpretation of Athenian drama as only a version of institutions found more generally in the Greek world, which, however, seems to bend the stick in the completely opposite direction without much persuasion, see P. J. Rhodes, “Nothing to Do with Democracy: Athenian Drama and the *Polis*”, *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, vol. 123, (2003), pp. 104-119.
Fleets with increasingly growing numbers, festivals with splendour and glamour offered aplenty and majestic buildings that towered above poleis sound all-too-remarkable also in regard to the swollen waves of monetary inflows on which they necessarily had to ride. Ironically, the Athenians and Syracusans of the early fifth century did truly make virtue of that necessity in creating a bloated number of political and social dependencies that would serve as a steady source of income. Athens depended upon the consolidation of its hegemonic position of the Delian League that was founded as an anti-Persian coalition between the Ionian Greeks and the leading poleis of the mainland. Allies’ financial contribution to the Athenian revenues was not, of course, the only avenue of income that was available. With an inflated number of slaves working the mining area in Thorikos and a nucleation of metoikoi who led the way in art and craft production, Athens had a growing base of quasi-monopolies on pottery, silver-coin, olive oil, etc., which were exchanged for grain supplies in general and wheat in particular. The home-grown industry was, however, not even sufficient to cover either the expenses linked to the commissioning of a vigilant fleet or the annual costs of repairs of ships and reimbursements of sailors who needed their wages to make ends meet. Similar economic developments also induced Hieron to cement his hold over the Syracusan esthloi who functioned as a viable tax base for the tyrant. Accommodating the further expense of the wages of his mercenary corps, Hieron prolonged Gelon’s policy of turning Syracuse into the grain supplier of Peloponnesian states in order to keep at bay the ravenous dēmos and slaves whose likely coalition would spell disaster for his interests. Likewise, the precariousness of the Spartan economy is laid bare if the curtain of mystery enveloping the polis is somewhat lifted. The tradition about the iron laws of the fifth-century Spartan autarchy to the contrary, the Spartans that were involved in the overseas operations after Plataea have all the makings of an increasingly exploitative force trying to carve out new sources of income in order to alleviate the rising economic pressures at home. Naturally, austerity and sameness did wonders in ideologically blunting the edges of increased disparity in wealth. But neither sussitia nor agôgê

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1720 Often overlooked, the practical necessities which informed the tight-packed religious calendar of the Spartans exerted such a decisive influence on ritual observations that their own brand of the Rabelaisian carnivalesque had strict social supervision at its heart: “On the level of social function, it is surely not a coincidence that the three most important festivals at Sparta fell in the order Hyakinthia (late spring/early summer, lasting three days), Gymnopaidiai (midsummer, lasting three to five days), and Karneia (late summer, lasting nine days). Whether by accident or design, the temporal placement of these festivals, in combination with the necessity of being present in Sparta to celebrate them, limited both the duration and the distance of Spartan military expeditions during the height of the campaigning season.” Michael A. Flower, ‘Spartan Religion’, in A Companion to Sparta, pp. 429-430; R. Parker, ‘Spartan Religion’, in Classical Sparta, pp. 162.
nor any other measure sufficed to assuage the social ills that plagued those whose landholdings did not produce the contributions prerequisite for citizenship. Sparta was seated on a volcano of discontent and the prôtoi, or the ‘primuses,’ knew that socio-political palliatives, such as the promise of re-bestowal of citizenship or the assuming the upbringing dues of the children of hypomeiones, would not do the trick of making the déclassé bite the bait of homologia. The homoioi needed the conquest, or the settlement of Spartan garrisons which amounted to the same thing, of new lands so that the population transfers and inflow of income would deter the hypomeiones from ever deigning to liaise with helots and fed-up perioikoi. For the homoioi who had grown increasingly weary of the fact that clock was ticking against their interests, no avenue of adventurism was deemed too much. After all, the Spartans were in line to be the first ones in attempting to create an Aegean empire.

An eventful period of transition also laid the groundwork of philosophical speculation as it was to take definitive shapes over the course of the first half of the fifth century. Absorbing the Parmenidean element of to hen with a sharper eye for all the socio-political and cultural differences of varying poleis, the atomists, Anaxagoras, Empedocles and the first wave of what would later come to be called sophistai conceived new elements, and, at times, novel epistemological outlooks, that inaugurated a momentous proliferation of philosophical contemplation. Whilst rendering the microscopic world at least conceptually more lucid with an a priori attempt to introduce movement to a realm of changeless entities, atomists, for one, would rethink the Homeric concept of moirâ through a novel understanding of anagkê that presided over celestial and earthly universes. With a tip of the hat to Pindar’s dictum that ‘nothing prevails over anagkê,’ Democritus and Leucippus would reconceive the rapport between the immaterial and material to make room for an overarching force whose ever-expanding limits jeopardised the minuscule, be it politai or poleis. Anaxagoras’ recognition of the material strand of hylozoist inquiry in his postulation of the immutable four elements, likewise, would speak to a rethinking of divine and mortal proportions. Divested from their erstwhile whirlwind motion on the command of the cosmic nous, the Anaxagorean dialectics

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1721 Differences in wealth among the Spartiates are observable, to be sure, from as early on as the fragments of Alcman. With the movement from archaic to classical Sparta those differences appear to have assumed, however, an abysmal character as a rugged element of hierarchization came to prevail over whatever remnants of equalitarian ideology survived in the context either of susstita or agôgê. As shown by Hodkinson, among others, the claims to equality that were on tatters by then could only be referred to the most outward aspects, e.g., dress code and burial, of a citizen body from which dropping out was as frequent as it was traumatic. Alcman, F. 17; Herodotus, Histories, 6.61.3; Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, 1.6.4; Stephen Hodkinson, “Social Order and Conflict of Values in Classical Sparta”, Chiron, vol. 13, (1983), pp. 253f; Stefan Link, “Durch diese Tür geht kein Wort hinaus” (Plut. Lyk. 12.8) Bürgergemeinschaft und Syssitien in Sparta”, Laverna, vol. 9, (1998), pp. 90-95.

1722 Herodotus, Histories, 4.146.3; Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, 1.6.4, 4.108.7.
between amalgamation and alienation would embrace the ever-present reality of conflagration. Bypassing the rhetorical limits of philosophical speculation to endow the *logos* with an unperturbed facet of prophetic insight, Empedocles would also attempt a reconciliation between the material elements and immaterial intelligence. At the side of a composite nothingness the prophet-philosopher posited fragmentary beings. Reciprocally linked, the two ends would convey the fathomable limits of divinely inspired inquiry as the Parmenidean *to hen* was provided with a circular course of change. As the transmutation of elements and their compositions came to reside at the heart of philosophical investigation, regularity of cosmic change would come to encompass even conflagration as a single, albeit more decisive, step along the road.

While these philosophers continued the earlier tradition of generating a lineage of select pupils, or disciples in the case of Empedocles, a different breed of thinkers was also coming to its own. Hailing from the four corners of the ancient Greek world, this group was marked by occasional visits to Athens, during which they avowed to educate the children of wealthy families who aspired to political careers. The *paideia* in question had two prominent features: a concentration upon the cultivation of rhetorical skills, the fulfilment of which served as the rite of passage into male citizenship,\(^\text{1723}\) and a price tag that dangled about the prized commodity. Political empowerment of the sons of *aristoi* was not, in other words, regarded as a lifelong quest or as a part of an aristocratic education that combined a certain measure of inherited excellence with entrenched ties of *xenia* to the aristocrats of other *poleis*.\(^\text{1724}\) Anyone with some coin to spare and willingness to heed was welcomed by these philosophers who only needed a minimal supply of untapped potential to alleviate the political capacity of their students. Maliciously heaped together as members of the same tradition by Plato and later commentators, the *sophistai* construed distinct strategies to wrangle with questions pertinent to epistemology, theology, cosmology, justice, power, good, punishment, etc., as a means of devising novel ways for their pupils to go about conducting their political and judicial business successfully. Promoting the rise of a new type of rhetor-politician, who, incidentally, was more times to none a member of the old *eupatridae*, these philosophers held the Athenian politics of the second half of the fifth century at least philosophically under their sway. Yet, with renown came scorn as the defenders of the old-guard were increasingly brought to view *sophistai* as swindlers who made an art of chicanery while gorging themselves on their


misguided pupils’ fortunes. The ideology of inherited excellence, diligently rethought and re-poeticised by Pindar as we saw in the previous chapter, apparently had a lot of life left in it.

5.1.1 Introducing the Dramatis Personae

Athens in the immediate aftermath of the battle of Plataea had all the makings of a polis with widespread social disgruntlement. The city was sacked twice by the Persians, the Athenian thêtès had borne the brunt of the naval defence of Hellas and the Themistoclean reforms of 487/6, although necessary for the sake of blowing off some social steam, hardly managed to address the economic issues haunting the Athenian majority. The war against Persians, moreover, was raging on as the Persian presence in the Aegean was far from over. In a desperate last-ditch attempt to reverse their fortunes, the Persian fleet made a last stand at Mycale.1725 The Greek fleet was commanded by a Spartan to be sure, but Athenians formed the backbone of the naval force that managed to overpower the Persians yet again at the battle of Mycale in 479. Retrospectively, this confrontation was the last one that was directly related to the initial Persian invasion but the Greeks manning the triremes had no way of knowing that,1726 or did they? Themistocles and Kimon were the two most prominent politicians as Athens emerged unbowed after the second Persian invasion. Themistocles was, of course, the man of the hour as he fought fiercely for the building of the Athenian navy, the introduction of naval pay, abandonment of the city twice in addition to having actively forestalled the Spartan attempts to prevent the building of the Athenian Long Walls1727 which ran from Athens to Piraeus thereby creating an unassailable stronghold so long as its maritime supply routes remained open. In short, there were a lot of good reasons for the historical tradition to portray Themistocles’ position as basically undisputable. And yet, the aristocratic faction of the Athenian esthloi, if battered, was certainly not broken under Kimon’s leadership. Themistocles, in that vein, was not without fervent opposition despite the ingenuous military tactics he devised and the peerless foresight with which he acted. Now, the historical tradition about Themistocles puts a heavy emphasis on how devilishly perspicacious and clever he was. His goading of Xerxes into the tight straits of Salamis1728 as well as the delaying tactics he used to outmanoeuvre the Spartan ‘request’ of the Athenians not to build the Long Walls1729 are just two examples that bear traditional testimony to this archetypical Sisyphus of his day.

1725 Herodotus, Histories, 8.131-2.
1727 Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, 1.90.1-91.7; Strabo, Geography, 9.1.15.
1728 Herodotus, Histories, 8.83; for a recent evaluation of Themistocles’ indirect discourse as it was reported by Herodotus, see Vasiliki Zali, ‘Themistocles’ Exhortation before Salamis: On Herodotus 8.83”, Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies, vol. 53, (2013), pp. 461-485.
1729 Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, 1.90.1-91.7.
And if we adopt a sceptical approach to the historical tradition, the Spartan interference of Athenian affairs, not to mention the undiminished opposition by Kimon and his supporters to his demotic policies would permit us to claim that Themistocles had the force of circumstance to teach him how things stood. Succinctly put, whether we accept the tradition as it is or not, we need to allow that Themistocles understood the precarious situation that he was in. He needed the Athenian lower-class dēmos’ support to maintain his political position in the pending showdown with Kimon and he knew that at the absence of further political reforms, which was effectively barred by the aristocratically-inclined esthloi, the only disposable means of doing so was to keep thêtēs on triremes plain and simple. Commissioning a fleet that would achieve a level of readiness to answer any call for deployment anywhere in the Aegean, in its turn, required wherewithal. The post-Mycale Athenians may have had a booming economy and deep pockets but they were not deep enough to accomplish such a tall order; thence, the summachia that we commonly call today the Delian League. Neither Themistocles nor the rank-and-file Athenians, naturally, knew at the time that it would take almost two decades for the Persians to reassemble their forces in a bid to Aegean dominance. Indeed, the Persian threat was all too real for the Ionians as in the case of Milesians whose city would never recover from its devastation by the Persians in 494. Still, we have historical reason to believe that continued operations against the Persians was only one-third of the total benefits that would accrue to the Athenians if such a summachia was forged.

We noted in the previous chapter that the Athenian dependence, sparked as it was by interannual variability in crop yield and a soaring census, on imported grain would become increasingly acute during the fifth century. Athens’ population quickly recovered from the losses endured during the Persian Wars. The productivity of the Attic land allowed, despite

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1730 Potts’ database of Athenian naval activities pegs the average number of ships in active commission across 480-322 to an average of 58 with an approximate average time of 8.3 months that each fleet spent at sea. Although there appears to be additional room for further honing of these estimations, it need be admitted that they are in keeping with the those provided by Plutarch: 60 ships on average for 8 months per year: Potts, *The Athenian Navy*, pp. 14; cf. Plutarch, *Pericles*, 11.4.

1731 “A limiting factor in the scale of trade (particularly in nonessentials) was the ability of a community to pay for imports in cash or kind. The resources of most poleis stretched little way beyond their land and those labouring on it ... Faced with recurring food shortages through excess population (as opposed to poor harvests), the medium-term solution generally lay in exporting people rather than importing food. Not so with Athens. Although the quantities are disputed, for much of the fifth and fourth centuries, Athens was able to sustain a substantial and recurring import bill for grain (mainly wheat) needed to support a population anywhere between 50,000 and 100,000 greater than the ‘carrying capacity’ of Attica (at most 150,000) ...” Paul Millett, ‘The Economy’, in *Classical Greece*, pp. 40; for an extensive list of many of the imported goods that were to be purveyed on the stalls of the Athenian Agora as documented in contemporary tracts of the fifth and fourth centuries, see Edward M. Harris, ‘Workshop, Marketplace and Household: The Nature of Technical Specialization in Classical Athens and its Influence on Economy and Society’, in *Money, Labour and Land*, pp. 77-80.
the partial development of farming techniques and utensils throughout the fifth century, a carrying capacity that was around 135,000. Citizen population appears to have kept its increasing trend as citizenship was then still granted to any child either one of whose parents was a certified Athenian. Further, there was an increasing flocking of Greek and non-Greek artisans to Athens to ply their trade in the favourable circumstances that the polis offered. This accelerated growth of the Athenian population including an increased supply of slaves only hastened a process that was basically inevitable: Athens needed to secure a sturdy route of grain from northern shores of Euxine to Bosporus and the Aegean. Indeed, the eventual filling up of the Attic landscape made the establishment of maritime routes a practical necessity for keeping the Athenian population well-fed. The potential material benefits of a maritime alliance were the third, and arguably the most important, reason that enticed the Athenians to take a leading part in its foundation. Vibrant as it was, various Athenian industries, as we noted above, did not suffice by themselves to carry the load of a fleet with unprecedented numbers. The Athenian liturgical system of trierarchia was set up so that each member of an approximately 1,200 Athenian super-rich families would assume the responsibility for paying all the associated expenses of a trireme for about a year.

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1732 Fifth century Greek agriculture saw two technological inventions, the dikella (two-pronged hoe) and Olynthus or hopper rubber mill which might have played a part in enabling a more intensive cultivation of olive trees and vine. Curiously, no trace of either innovation has been found, according to de Angelis, thus far in the excavations on Sicily. But, then again, given the low levels of population density and the usage of carrying capacity, perhaps that is only to be expected. De Angelis, *Archaic and Classical Greek Sicily*, pp. 284 n. 339; cf. Rafael Frankel, “The Olynthus Mill, Its Origin, and Diffusion: Typology and Distribution”, *American Journal of Archaeology*, vol. 107 no. 1, (Jan., 2003), pp. 18.

1733 Peter Garnsey, *Famine and Food Supply in the Graeco-Roman World*, pp. 104, 273; Moreno revised Garnsey’s estimations by calculating that a 75 per cent dependence on imported grain rather than that of a 50 per cent, par Garnsey, was necessary to feed the entire Athenian population during the last third of the fifth century: Alfonso Moreno, *Feeding the Democracy: The Athenian Grain Supply in the Fifth and Fourth Centuries BC*, (Oxford, 2007), pp. 32-33; for a recent evaluation of Garnsey’s estimations, see David M. Pritchard, “The Physical Parameters of Athenian Democracy”, *Antichthon*, vol. 53, (2019), pp. 33-55.

1734 Pritchard has recently pegged the possible population of Attica in 432/431 at 370,000 with 60,000 politai, 180,000 of their dependents, 20,000 metic, 60,000 dependents of metics and 50,000 slaves. That leaves, almost two-thirds of the Athenian grain demand to be met by the imports from elsewhere. This can be compared to Garnsey’s earlier figure of 250,000 Athenians just before the outbreak of the Second Peloponnesian War: Garnsey, *Famine and Food Supply in the Graeco-Roman World*, pp. 90; Waterfield, *Creators, Conquerors, and Citizens*, pp. 207-208.

1735 “From tribute the Athenians received about 400 talents of silver annually, known from inscribed stelae recording a required dedication, or quota, to Athena, beginning in 454 when the treasury was moved to Athens (a decision that had larger political and religious significance). But they also deprived cities of their wealth in other ways, for example, by appropriating land and either making it sacred to Athena, to whom rents were then due, or settling on it Athenian citizens who retained their Athenian citizenship but lived and farmed the land of the allied city.” Kallet, ‘The Fifth Century: Political and Military Narrative’, pp. 178.

1736 Van Wees, ‘The City at War’, pp. 91-92; Ober, *Democracy and Knowledge*, pp. 255; Matthew R. Christ, *The Bad Citizen in Classical Athens*, (Cambridge, 2006), pp. 146-170; some fifth and fourth century sources also attest to trierarch’s oft-resorted talk about how prodigiously they purchased ornaments for their triremes which seems to have functioned in legal cases as a means to show their
additional burden of *choregeia* to cope with, the plutarchs had to have permanent sources of income so that they would not start groaning when the tax-officials came knocking. Enter the *summachia*: only a handful of allied *poleis* had a fleet to partake of the League’s operations, whereas the others made up for their absence via direct cash payments. Estimated by the Athenian *eupatridae* Aristides,\(^{1737}\) which earned him the nickname ‘the Just,’ the gross domestic yield of the lands that were possessed by the cash-contributing *poleis* was rigorously assessed and declared thereby creating an annual flow of cash to channel to rowers as cash payments, shipwrights as commissioning costs, etc. Moving further into the century, the monetary contributions of the allies increased on such a scale that it overshadowed the gross income generated by the Athenian home industry. Persian retreat from the Aegean had created a political lacuna with economic benefits to be filled, and the Athenians were only too happy to oblige.

The Aegean’s transformation into a springboard of Athenian dominance, however, was as unpalatable to the Spartan sentiments as was its employment as a Persian facilitator. In fact, the Spartans were the first *polis* to attempt to hegemonize the anti-Persian phalanx. In 478 Spartans led a counter-offensive under the leadership of the regent to the Agiad throne Pausanias against some of Persia’s steadfast allies such as Cyprus and Byzantium. Although the details surrounding the exact Spartan naval contribution to the fleet of the Hellenic League remain murky, Thucydides’ reference to a Spartan provision of twenty ships, given their earlier nominal contributions to the Greek fleets in Salamis for example, appears confirmable.\(^{1738}\) This was a big step for the Spartans who had never taken to the seas, as far as the historical record allows, throughout the archaic period. The Spartans had, of course, a major shipyard at Gytheum in south-eastern Peloponnese and they maintained maritime commercial ties with Sicily to the west and Samos to the east. Yet, to operate a fleet was, as we saw in the Athenian case, risky business. Requiring not only a steady cash inflow but also a trusty source of oarsmen, naval operations went against more or less everything that the binary socio-political structure of Sparta stood for. The Peloponnesian *summachia*, in the end, was only a defensive alliance that did not allow the Spartans to collect cash payments from other member *poleis*. Even the addition of *perioikoi* to their conscription structure, moreover, had the signs of a sporadic halfway measure that would only be adopted in full and emergency levies. *Helots* and *perioikoi*, non-*homoioi* one and all, could not be given the reins, load, stock and barrel to triremes whose crews were made up 85-90 per cent by the *thètes*, *douloi* and *metoikoi* in commitment to the safeguarding of public good: Lysias, *Defence against a Charge of Taking Bribe*, 10; Demosthenes, *Against Polycles*, 7.

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\(^{1738}\) Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War*, 1.94.1-4.
With the deck heavily stacked up against them, the question is why did they take the trouble? The short answer would be that they practically had to. All the ensuing bravado aside, the loss of a minimum of 300 Spartiates at Thermopylae on top of the other casualties at Plataea and Mycale meant not only that Sparta had to act parsimoniously in sending out regiments but also that the *homoioi* could not afford additional rifts cleaving their ranks. By 470s the originally rather equalising *klêroi* had come to mean less than nothing in the face of agglomeration of plots in the hands of the Spartiate plutarchs. Synonymous with an ever-increasing number of *hypomeiones*, the growing inequality of wealth could only be addressed either by population transfers to overseas colonies or by re-admission of a number of *hypomeiones* back into the ranks of *homoioi*. In principle, at least, the Spartans could do both provided that they had vacant and productive lands. In practice, however, there were some serious difficulties. Spartans, for one, never established a tradition of *apoikia* as did the Corinthians or Euboeans. Indeed, the ordinary ties between *metropolis* and *apoikoi* are conspicuous in the historical traditions about Sparta by their absence. Barring any drift towards a colonising expedition, the only alternative was to relieve the social pressures at home by sending away some of the poorer *homoioi* as Spartan garrisons that would ensure that pro-Spartan factions retain the upper hand in the adjacent *poleis* thereby generating a steady source of income. This interpretation also allows the creation of a hermetic space on which the ensuing actions of Pausanias and his force can be contextualised.

Our three main historical sources covering this period, Herodotus, Thucydides and Plutarch appear to convey a sense of innuendo about Pausanias and his activities while he was operating in Byzantium. Thucydides opines that having defeated the opposition in the *polis*, Pausanias acted tyrannically and arrogantly to his fellow Greeks. Herodotus likewise complains of tyrannical and exploitative behaviour that justly wrought the ire of Byzantines. Both accounts converge in a portrayal of Byzantines asking the members of the Greek coalition to dismiss Pausanias of his leadership position and petitioning the Athenians to lead the League in Sparta’s stead. Corresponding to a defining moment in the early Classical period, the

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1739 *Metoikoi’s* military responsibilities would steadily expand until its apogee during the Second Peloponnesian War. Regiments made up entirely of metic hoplites, as in the military force that excursed into the Megarid in the first year of the war, and cleruchies garrisoned by metics would then come to be perceived simply as the order of the day. Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War*, 2.31.1; Dillon and Garland, *The Ancient Greeks*, pp. 206.

1740 Though there were some exceptions to that rule of thumb, such as the foundation of Taras in southern Italy in c. 706: Buckley, *Aspects of Greek History 750-323 BC*, pp. 63.

1741 Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War*, 1.95.

1742 Herodotus, *Histories*, 5.32, 8.3.

leadership of the Hellenic League was consensually taken from Sparta’s hands into those of Athens. The two histories, in that vein, stigmatise Pausanias on account of a list of generic ills such as tyrannical disposition, undiluted avarice, rapacious behaviour, etc., and ask us to accept the transfer of power by token of characteristic flaws alone. To my mind, they ask for too much. Indeed, Thucydides’ narrative enlivens when the unseated Pausanias returns home to undergo trial on a variety of minor and major charges. Found guilty of the minor charges alone, he is relieved of his duty as commander of the Greek force in Byzantium and released without further actions. One ought to take a break at this point to put things into historical perspective. Pausanias was the nephew of Leonidas I and was a member of the senior Agiad line. Not being in the direct line of succession, he was chosen as the regent for Leonidas’ son Pleistarchus who was underage when his father fell at Thermopylae. He was also a highly successful stratēgos that commanded, albeit with a large dose of tactical resourcefulness that was provided by Themistocles, the Greek forces to a string of victories from Salamis to the Byzantium. Here was an accomplished military commander that led the largest Greek force ever assembled for the better part of a victory against a great force suddenly making a habit of tyrannising fellow Greeks who had just been delivered from the yoke of another tyrant. Recalling that the charge of tyranny served as a stock charge to deface enemies in the classical Greek world, it appears fitting to venture into the commercial import of Byzantium. 

Byzantium served as the customs of any merchandise that was travelling between the Euxine and Aegean. Conveniently located on opposing banks of the strait, the polis overlooked any commercial activity potentially with a customs house regulating a taxing scheme. When the polis was liberated by the League’s forces, the leading citizens of the Ionian poleis might have asked the League leadership for a return to the pre-Persian customs regulations which was more beneficial to them either through lower customs duties or a redistributive measure that reimbursed a coalition of Ionian poleis who provided arms and soldiers for the protection of the city. Herodotean and Thucydidean accusation of tyranny, we contend, had to do with

1744 Modern scholarship has tended to view the charge of Medism as a trumped-up one in comparison to the other insinuation, i.e., fomenting a helot insurrection. P. Oliva, *Sparta and her Social Problems*, (Amsterdam and Prague, 1971), pp. 146-152; K.-W. Welwei, (1974), *Unfreie im antiken Kriegsdienst I. Athen und Sparta. II. Die kleineren und mittleren griechischen Staaten und die hellenistischen Reiche*, (Wiesbaden, 1974), pp. 122 n. 7.


Pausanias’ readjustment of taxing scheme with sole regard to the Spartan needs.\textsuperscript{1747} His arbitrary monopolisation of customs duties is, of course, basically out of the question for the widespread resentment it would have caused not only among the Ionians but also among the mainland Greeks. Yet, what is certainly within the historical limits of conception is a temporary lifting of taxes to weaken the hold of the Ionians on trading activity that necessarily had to pass through the strait. Once the Ionian domination over the area was relaxed, Pausanias may have thought, he would have been able to re-introduce an acceptable tax rate. Pausanias was looking to create a new zone of influence that could absorb a given supply of hypomeiones if the need arose and he realised an excellent way of doing that while pre-empting the Athenian ascendancy in the Aegean. Having clashed early and often with Themistocles to gain an appreciation of what to eventually expect from the Athenian side, Pausanias might have lifted the duties to show the Ionians, in the case that the Athenians would muster enough to challenge his authority, what the Athenians were after. As it played out, however, the Byzantines were the first to file an official complaint to the League and with the potential backing of other Ionian poleis managed to sway the non-Peloponnesian members of the League to divest Pausanias of his command. The Athenians reintroduced the duties in addition to potentially pocketing a rate as the return of their protective services and their historians carefully covered their tracks as the ones who brought down a tyrant.\textsuperscript{1748}

Our interpretation also explains why Pausanias was tried and promptly acquitted from all the major charges with which he was indicted. Indeed, if Pausanias’ tinkering with the Byzantine taxing system was part of a larger plan to create an outlet that could have supported the payment of economic and social dividends, then his actions could only be conceived of as a crystallisation of the outlook of a portion of the homoioi who regarded the perennial social issues as necessitating urgent action. The things got even more interesting when Pausanias was released. Herodotus’ charge of pro-Persian behaviour, again a theme that served as an explicit reference to tyranny, is made following a blank spot after which the regent is canvassed as returning to Byzantium and getting betrothed to the daughter of Megabates, who had been positioned there earlier by Darius as the commander of the anti-Athenian offensive.\textsuperscript{1749} Thucydides, however, fleshes out the Herodotean bones of this story by a curious

\textsuperscript{1747} I drew heavily from Russell’s reading of the episode in conceiving this reconstruction and think that it could manage to fill the historical lacuna that is exposed by the typical resort of Thucydides and Herodotus both to Pausanias’ alleged tyranny. Thomas James Russell, \textit{Byzantium and the Bosporus: A Historical Study from the Seventh Century BC Until the Foundation of Constantinople}, (Oxford, 2017), pp. 58-64.

\textsuperscript{1748} “A charge of tyranny allowed Athens to disguise her own imposition of a revenue-raising system on the strait as the expulsion of a pro-Persian tyrant, and later to depict this extortion as a benefaction to her loyal allies.” \textit{Ibid}, pp. 63.

\textsuperscript{1749} Herodotus, \textit{Histories}, 5.32.
A reference to a “plot with the helots.” Concocting a ‘plot’ with the helots was, of course, considered as the dictionary definition of attempting to subvert the Spartan polity. What might have triggered such drastic action if we are to take Thucydides at his word? Following the thread of thought that we have construed thus far, Pausanias’ indictment and acquittal showed that his supporters were sufficiently numerous to prevail over his opponents. Perhaps Pausanias had overplayed his hand when he lifted the taxes at the strait. At any rate, he accomplished half of the task he set out for himself: forcing the Athenians to exemplify what they took the ‘liberation from the Persians’ to be. The political chasm that separated Spartans from Athenians had widened alarmingly quick. There were some clashes of tactical employment of units at Salamis and Plataea but they appeared to have been partially patched up as the Greeks emerged victorious in both battles. Once the counter-offensive lost its initial surge to be replaced by a permanent anti-Persian coalition, however, Spartans certainly did not have any illusions about the rise of potential challengers to their hegemony on the Greek mainland. The attempted placation of Themistocles, failure though it proved to be in the end, showed two things: that the Spartan weariness of the growing political and military strength of the Athenians had passed the threshold of direct intervention; and that the Athenians were resolute to raise the stakes. When Pausanias returned to Sparta empty handed as a result of Athenian daring the scene was set: the Athenian pursuit of imperialistic ambitions has posited the two sides on a collision course. Pausanias, as we indicated above, had considerable support even after his trial. He was still regarded as a figure worthy of emulation as one of the four heroes of the Second Persian Invasion. His regency also meant that his supporters among the wealthy homoioi could cut their ties to him in case the popular Spartan perception of him turned sour. Further, Pausanias, as our interpretation of the historical lacuna surrounding his actions at Byzantium indicates, had a commendable grasp of the precarious situation that he and Sparta had to recover from. Pausanias and co. may have agreed that the risks of fighting an enemy with a nonpareil naval force was not something that their stretched socio-political order could carry the burden of. The Spartans could not wage a war on two fronts and hope to strike a swift victory: they needed to secure their flanks if they were to commit a full levy

1750 “They [the Spartans] also received reports that Pausanias was involved in some intrigue with the Helots, and this was in fact so: he was promising them emancipation and citizenship if they would join in revolt and help him carry out his whole design.” Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War*, 1.132.21-25.

1751 I fully agree, on that point, with Cinzia Bearzot’s argument that the particular diarchic combinations of the fifth and fourth century Sparta should be seen within the general context of the different oligarchic factions among the homoioi rather than one of personal differences alone. On top of Bearzot’s arguments, I claim that the opposition between pacifistic imperialistic policies, as in the pairs of Archidamus, Callicratidas and Agesipolis versus Sthenelaidas, Lysander and Agesilaus, should be traced further backwards in the historical timeline by including, for one, the exploits of Pausanias the regent: Cinzia Bearzot, ‘Spartani ‘ideali’ e Spartani ‘anomali’”, in *Contro le ‘legge immutabili’. Gli Spartani fra tradizione e innovazione. Contributi di Storia Antica 2*, ed. by Cinzia Bearzot and Franca Landucci, (Milano, 2004), pp. 3-32.
against the Athenians. Meditating on the extension of Spartan franchise to helots, in that vein, becomes quite appreciable. Though lacking the details of what the reform programme could have entailed, we may postulate the introduction of a new ekklesia or a local administrative system comparable to the deme infrastructure of Athens both of which would signify the bestowal of token political rights to helots. With a not inconceivable addition of minimal redistribution of land for the sake of enfranchising the trustworthy among the hypomeiones and giving minimal additional breathing space to the poorer homoioi who found it increasingly difficult to meet the stipulated sussitia contributions, such a programme would address virtually all the perennial socio-political issues that emitted the venomous air of political dissent.

Such a measure, however, would also be the first of its kind in forging a ‘horrific’ political tie between the despised Chandala and venerated Brahmin of the Spartan society. We posit two avenues of interpretation which would not force us out of the historical context. First, Pausanias may have never resorted to meditating about the potential enfranchisement of helots but could have merely been straitjacketed as a medizing-helotising rogue par excellence. Alas, this construal could not account for why Thucydides, the most reliable of our historical sources, deemed it worth the trouble to add insult to injury. Thucydides had, of course, his sympathies firmly, but not uncompromisingly, in the side of aristocracy and, as such, might have seen even a partial enfranchisement of helots as the end of the world. But an unconfirmed allusion to a helot plot could also give the wrong idea to any tyrannically-inclined member of the Athenian eupatridae who had the capacity of setting up an alliance of douloi and thêtes as a social catalyst for his rule. Further, given the frequently-referred Spartan insistence of keeping their political clashes from prying eyes, we do not see how Thucydides could have made up the ‘helot episode’ entirely on his own. Additionally, we know from the historical record that a full liberation of serfs in Argos and a partial enfranchisement in Sikyon made

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1752 Our interpretation of the surviving evidence generally agrees with Cartledge’s earlier statement of his position to the effect that it is likely for Pausanias to be implicated in an abortive helot uprising of c. 470. As to the particulars, however, our account differs from his in regard to canvassing Themistocles and Pausanias in concerted action against the respective dominant classes of their poleis. Cartledge, Sparta and Lakonia, pp. 184-185.

1753 Aristotle, Politics, 1270a15-b6, 1271a26-37, 1272a12-16.

1754 Alternatively, it is quite possible, as Massimo Nafissi underscored, for Pausanias to actually have adopted Persian manners and paraphernalia as a measure of adding woe to the tribulations of the vanquished. His ‘cultural’ Medism during his generalship in 478/477, on this view, could be interpreted as “l’esibizione del γέρας che è stato riconosciuto allo stratego, e che manifesta a tutti la superiorit del vincitore sul vinto.” Though the fifth-century Spartiate aristocratic culture might have played a certain part in animating Pausanias’ contrasting behaviour, we think that it is far from being the only factor that ought to be projected onto the plane of historical causality. Massimo Nafissi, ‘Pausania, il vincitore di Platea’, in Contro le ‘legge immutabili’, pp. 69; cf. Kallet-Marx, Money, Expense, and Naval Power in Thucydides’ History 1-5.24, pp. 40-42; Russell, Byzantium and the Bosporus, pp. 61.
such a coalition of interests not without historical precedent.\textsuperscript{1755} It is on those grounds that we propose to conceive this episode through an alternative lens, one that can allow sufficient room for the enfranchisement thesis.\textsuperscript{1756} To that end, it appears quite likely that the initial acquittal of Pausanias might have been a closer call than the latter would have liked. His acquittal from capital charges, i.e., Medism, was balanced, after all, with his conviction on minor charges. Pausanias may have conceived the idea of helot enfranchisement as a decisive counterweigh serving the needs of desperate times. Only a reformed Spartan polity could have allowed the \textit{homoioi} to keep the Peloponnesian allies on a short leash while trashing the overambitious Athenians without any delay. Then again, losing some of his notable Spartan ‘partners in crime’ might have induced Pausanias to take the high road. Either way, Pausanias’ promises of freedom and citizenship to helots prompted immediate, but panicked, response from the Spartans as they summoned the regent home post-haste to submit to trial only this time to find him guilty of all major charges.\textsuperscript{1757} Forewarned about the foregone conclusion to his impending trial, Pausanias sought refuge in the temple of Athena Chalkioikos, ‘Athena of the Bronze House,’ but his enemies walled him in and waited for his eventual succumb to starvation. As he drew nearer to a starving death, however, his enemies dragged him, contrary to all unwritten pan-Hellenic codes speaking to the sanctity of suppliants, from the shrine and threw his corpse into a pit that was reserved for the criminals. Clad in stock themes of drama as it is, the whole episode suggests that Pausanias was never without support from the ranks of ephors and \textit{homoioi} who saw the perilous socio-political ruptures in Sparta as making no measure too drastic.

5.1.2 Syracuse and the Last Chance for Evading the ‘Collision Course’

Roughly about the same time Hieron I, Gelon’s brother and successor, was cementing his regime via an expansion of the Syracusan navy which would come to play an increasing part in the goading of the Sicilian and Magna Graecian \textit{poleis} to keep in line. We do not have any exact numbers but the increased significance of the Syracusan navy is supported by the historical evidence of Hieron’s victory off Cumae at 474.\textsuperscript{1758} It appears highly likely, therefore,

\textsuperscript{1755} Herodotus’ unduly embellished account of the democratization of Argos’ polity is commendably shorn of its glamour by Terry Buckley, who, in the end, argues that a moderate democracy eventually replaced an oligarchic regime. Herodotus, \textit{Histories}, 6.83; Buckley, \textit{Aspects of Greek History} 750-323 BC, pp. 230.

\textsuperscript{1756} Hodkinson, ‘Was Sparta an Exceptional Polis?’, in \textit{Sparta: Comparative Approaches}, pp. 431.

\textsuperscript{1757} I do not see the persuasive forte in Hornblower’s argument that it is likely for the ephors to have indicted and convicted Pausanias on grounds of suspicion alone. True as it is that fifth century Sparta saw a qualitative change in the relationship between ephors and dyarchs, murdering a regent and war-hero was not something that the Spartiates are portrayed, at least in the historical tradition, as resorting to every so often. Hornblower, \textit{The Greek World} 479-323 BC, pp. 11.

\textsuperscript{1758} Both Corretti and de Angelis lean toward regarding Hieron as, contrary to Herodotus’ assertions, the actual founder of the Syracusan navy: Corretti, ‘“Forniro 200 tiremi …” (Hdt., 7,158,4): Per un
that Hieron saw naval operations as a measure that would serve his interests in materially benefiting the dèmos no less than in annexing territories which could have been utilized as a potential destination for certain undesired proportions of Syracuse’s growing population. Continuing his predecessor’s policy of mass transplantation of citizens, Hieron transferred the populations of Naxos and Katane to Leontinoi, turning the latter into a veritable taxing basin. Diodorus further claims that Hieron encouraged the repopulation of Naxos and Katane whose new population would comprise, interestingly, of 5,000 Syracusans and 5,000 Peloponnesians. We have no way of knowing the social or ethnic origins of the motley mainland Greeks who settled in Katane and the imprecise designation, ‘Peloponnesians’ does not exactly help to shed light on the question. But we know that Hieron kept, just like Gelon before him, a large mercenary force and promoted their permanent settlement within Syracuse’s territory. It would hardly be an exaggeration, on this view, to claim that the 5,000 Peloponnesians were mercenaries whose economic and social fortunes at their respective poleis were hardly appealing. The granting of klêroi to mercenary-colonists was further reinforced with the political and cultural measures Hieron took in order to strengthen his rule. In regard to politics, it has been argued that Hieron did not find it felicitous to rule within the constraints imposed by Kharondas’ laws. We have attempted to work out a modicum of details of this supposedly mixed polity in the previous chapter and thus do not find grounds to object that for a tyrant like Hieron, who appears to have been in his element so long as he ruled in discretion, what little scope was offered by Khardondas’ laws in the way of checks and balances could have proved insufferable for the tyrant. To rob dèmos and gamoroi of the precious little political rights that they drew from Kharondas’ code could only be realised, however, in exchange for a combination of continued economic security and politics of extortion. Naval service resolved, at least momentarily, the plight of the poorest sections of the Syracusan politai and that of the menial labour whose landholdings did not suffice for the

1759 Diodorus Siculus, Library, 11.49.1-2.
1760 Following its repopulation Katane, according to Strabo, was renamed Aetna: Strabo, Geography, 6.2.3.
1762 The refoundation of Katane also had a political import in embellishing Hieron as the oikistês of a new polis whose population, as Kathryn Morgan points out, was expected to be “personally beholden to its founder.” Hieron, as it turned out, was buried at Katane and thus served to propagate the legitimation of the Deinomenid rule even in his death: Kathryn A. Morgan, Pindar and the Construction of Syracusan Monarchy in the Fifth Century B.C., (Oxford and New York, 2015), pp. 59.
1763 Braccesi and Millino, La Sicilia greca, pp. 51.
leisurely life of the yeoman-farmer. Military actions against other eastern Sicilian poleis also promised material gains to the Syracusan hippeis who made up, as we had occasion to observe, one of the largest cavalry forces among the Greek poleis of the day. And if the carrot would fail there was always the stick, or in this case the mercenaries.\textsuperscript{1764} When the dust had settled on the revised polity of Syracuse there appeared to be only one volatile social element within the politai who could reverse the fortunes of the Deinomenid tyrants: the mercenaries.\textsuperscript{1765}

Hieron also invested heavily on a cultural programme that allowed a conception of his reign that was homologous to that of the Athenian Peisistratidae.\textsuperscript{1766} Many of the Deinomenids of Hieron’s day partook, for example, of Olympic games to promote their status against other family members.\textsuperscript{1767} Commissioning none other than the celebrated Pindar to compose epinician odes for their victories,\textsuperscript{1768} Deinomenids hoped to justify their tyrannical reign by recourse to a revamped set of olden themes including inherited excellence, divine genealogy, etc., so that the ideological basis of their rule remained firm. This attempt to recycle some of the earlier Homeric muthoi with a novel emphasis on the enlightened authority of the birth-elite was also cemented with frequent resort to drama as a means of momentary subversion of the political hierarchy and ideological immortalisation of the most majestic acts of Gelon and Hieron. The homegrown talent of Epicharmus, for one, strikes one as a highly successful anticipation of the works of the foremost member of Athenian old classical comedy,

\begin{footnotesize}
1764 Cf. “As with the cavalry, there was a tension between the military need for such specialist light infantry and the social and cultural obstacles to its creation. Greek pride in close combat, and contempt for missile warfare as effeminate, meant that citizens of hoplite status could hardly be asked to train as archers or peltasts. Employing poorer citizens in these roles would have meant giving them the kind of formal military status which hoplites, for political reasons, liked to reserve for themselves. To play the part that some citizens would not play, and others could not be allowed to play, a city therefore needed to recruit outsiders.” Van Wees, ‘The City at War’, pp. 89; Xenophon, \textit{Hipparchius}, 1.9; \textit{De Re Equestri}, 2.1.

1765 Diodorus gives a staggering number of 7,000 as the mercenaries that were located at this time in Syracuse alone. Presuming that the number refers to fighting man alone, Richard Evans has estimated a number exceeding twenty thousand as a likely sum of all the active and retired mercenaries in addition to their families. Diodorus Siculus, \textit{Library}, 11.76.1; Evans, \textit{ Ancient Syracuse}, pp. 72.

1766 The homology is, of course, drawn in terms of its effects on the class struggle and not as a psychologistic comparison between the two ‘enlightened despots’: “Moreover, the dramatization of the heroic myths most cherished by the aristocracy in a form that insists on their general human relevance enhances the collapse of class frictions which emerges as the primary goal of Peisistratos’ cultural politics. Indeed, it is perhaps not too much to say that the will to humanize, to universalize the sufferings specific to a ruling elite is the founding ideological gesture of the new tragic form. Failure to recognize this quest for the essentially human and universal as profoundly ideological lies at the core of most discussions of the politics of the Greek tragedy …” Rose, \textit{Sons of the Gods, Children of Earth}, pp. 189.


1768 Pindar, \textit{ Olympians} 1-3; \textit{ Pythians} 1-3; for a recent book-length study of Pindar’s role in the legitimation of the Deinomenid tyranny, see Morgan, \textit{Pindar and the Construction of Syracusan Monarchy in the Fifth Century B.C.}
\end{footnotesize}
Aristophanes. Authors of numerous plays, we have extensive fragments of, unfortunately, only one of Epicharmus’ works, *Odysseus Automolos*, ‘Odysseus the Deserter.’ Never the less, recent works that attempted to bring together all the extant fragments of his works have underscored two key themes of what survives from this prolific comedian: a conscious aversion of the high-flung and lofty style of heroic language and a banalisation of Homeric heroes who, in all likelihood, thought and acted like Syracusans of the early fifth century.\(^\text{1770}\)

We have also touched briefly upon Aeschylus’ reception in Syracuse in the previous chapter. The argument that our first ever extant tragedy, the *Persians*, might have been produced initially at the behest of the tyrant Hieron may strike some as uncongenial to the generally presumed concomitance between the growth of democracy and that of drama. For what it is worth, Aeschylus travelled to Hieron’s court at least twice\(^\text{1771}\) and certainly did not have any compunction about writing his *Aetnaeae* at the tyrant’s behest. The discussion about the possibility of the *Persians*’ premiere at Syracuse has also begun to be reconsidered by the experts.\(^\text{1772}\) Thus, for all we know it is very likely that the play could have indeed been produced by Aeschylus with an equal regard for the Athenian as well as the Syracusan audience. The play is the thing, to be sure. But we need to note an additional historical point before making any generalised assertion about the meaning of the play.

The Athenians took the helm of the recently founded Hellenic League in 478/7. Carefully devising a contribution scheme that was to be implemented by all League members, the Athenians built a treasury on the island of Delos in which was pooled together the payments made by the member states. Even that achievement of a massive first step in their assumption of Aegean hegemony, however, was not enough to afford a momentary respite to the ongoing political struggle between Themistocles and Megacles’ son Kimon. Themistocles had no time to spare in outmanoeuvring his political opponents in order to persuade the Athenians that a hand-to-hand struggle with the Spartans was inevitable. It was no surprise, as such, to see him stand up against the Spartan attempt to gain control of the Amphictyonic Council which

\(^{1769}\) For a learned survey of what has been gleaned from Epicharmus’ fragments in regard to the Syracuse of his day, see Andreas Willi, ‘Challenging Authority: Epicharmus between Epic and Rhetoric’, in *Theater Outside Athens: Drama in Greek Sicily and South Italy*, ed. by K. Bosher, (Cambridge, 2012), pp. 56-75.

\(^{1770}\) *Ibid*, pp. 71.


\(^{1772}\) Kathryn Bosher, ‘Hieron’s Aeschylus’.
overlooked the running of the Delphic sanctuary and thus possessed political prestige.\textsuperscript{1773} Having clashed with Themistocles for the third time, the Spartans resolved to knock him off the Athenian politics for good. The Athenian representative of the Spartan interests was Kimon who had established ties of \textit{xenia} with notable Spartans and was not afraid to lay bare his pro-Spartan attitude as was evident from his naming his son Lakedaimonios.\textsuperscript{1774} An advocate of keeping up the pressure on the Persians, Kimon was elected \textit{stratêgos} plenty of times to continue to wreak havoc on the Persian fleet and would put the finishing touch himself on the anti-Persian offensive at the battle of Eurymedon c. 469.\textsuperscript{1775} By the beginning of 460s, however, the complexion of Athenian politics had changed completely. At the end of a relatively silent decade, if for himself and not for others, Themistocles was ostracised in 471. And for a politician and military commander who had led the Athenians to victory on many an occasion in the previous two decades, all we have in the historical tradition about this episode is unreflective remarks and moralising testimonia. A grand \textit{volte-face} if quite a bizarre one. Indeed, the only direct inference that can be made on the basis of the historical tradition is that Kimon’s rise meant Themistocles’ eclipse.

Kimon, archetypical pro-Spartan that he was, knew that Athenians’ continued leadership of the League was, in and of itself, a grave injury of the Spartan interests for the majority of \textit{homoioi}. From the battle of Mycale to Pausanias’ summary indictment and execution, the Spartans were pursuing policies that, in their eyes, would hinder the Athenian ascendancy. An essentially Athenian League in the Aegean would exert the wrong kind of influence, i.e., democratic, to the Peloponnesian \textit{poleis} whose polities were not as immutable as the Spartan tradition made hers to be. Further, tight-pressed as they were between helots and \textit{hypomeiones}, the establishment of Athenian dominance in the Aegean would effectively mean the closing off of the Ionian \textit{poleis} as potential locations for the transfer of Sparta’s excess population. The Spartans could afford neither prospect. A helot insurrection, it goes without saying, was the \textit{bête noire} of the Spartan \textit{homoioi}. Pausanias’ attempted reform of the Spartan polity was altogether different; after all, even he, the Medizing renegade of the historical tradition that he was, did not see an armed helot insurgence as a viable course of action. Bequeathing token socio-political benefits on helots as a carefully planned out tinkering of the polity was one thing, armed helots attempting to topple the \textit{homoioi} was another. Likewise, Sparta needed conflict-ridden areas in the Aegean and Ionia for the sake of deploying surplus soldiers, e.g., \textit{hypomeiones}, \textit{periikoi}, etc., and thereby alleviating the stifling socio-political air at home.

\textsuperscript{1773} Plutarch, \textit{Themistocles}, 20.
\textsuperscript{1774} Plutarch, \textit{Kimon}, 16.
\textsuperscript{1775} \textit{Ibid}, 13.
Kimon thought, in all likelihood, that the estrangement between the two poleis was still salvageable, but he needed to get rid of the incorrigible Themistocles in order to do that.

There are three nodal points in the historical tradition about Themistocles between 479 and 470: his ostracism in 471/0, his move to Argos and the Athenians’ submission to Spartans’ charges of his Medizing activities. There is hardly any textual evidence to substantiate the first node except for displays of overreaching arrogance and shameless megalomania. Indirect references to the historical context, on the other hand, provide ample grounds for reflection. We know that Pausanias, relieved from his command of the League’s forces, was active in Peloponnesus throughout this period. It also appears certain that Themistocles sudden distance from the anti-Persian offensive can only be explained by a time-consuming struggle of comparable import. Can bridging the gap between Sparta and Athens through aiding an attempt to reform the Spartan polity be conceived as such a momentous undertaking? The evidence in support of this construal is hardly illusory or irrelevant. Thucydides’ account, which is incomparably better than either the Plutarchan gallery of parables or the Aristotelian hotchpotch of passing remarks, of Spartans’ indictment of Themistocles on grounds of Medizing right after the conclusion of the investigation looking into Pausanias’ Medizing is conventionally conspicuous. Thucydides, moreover, jots down the interesting point that Themistocles had moved to Argos and was spending his time in exile by galloping around the Peloponnesus. The very fact that the Spartans chose to hound an exiled Themistocles whose days of glory appeared to be long over suggests that the latter’s travels in the Peloponnese were far from being touristic ones. While it is true that the homoioi used to have a bone to pick with Themistocles, it appears equally veritable that Themistocles’ supporters were largely fighting a rear-guard action against Kimon’s side. Themistocles did not interest himself in the petty squabbles of the anti-Persian offensive for he was after a bigger game: Sparta.

There was a clear separation in Athenian law between ostrakismos and atimia or ‘loss of honour,’ i.e., the complete withdrawal of citizenship. Ostrakismos, as we observed in the

1777 Powell conveys that it is almost certain for Themistocles to have committed himself to persuading the northern Peloponnesian states to form a phalanx against Sparta. He does not follow that thread, however, toward a conclusion of linking his acts with those of Pausanias as one of concert. Powell, ‘Sparta’s Foreign – and Internal – History, 478-403’, pp. 297.
1778 Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, 1.135.
1779 “A special category of judicial exile was denoted by a different term, atimia, which in the archaic period meant literally ‘loss of honor,’ and resulted in loss of protection from the community. A person sentenced to atimia could be killed by any member of the community, and the killer was not required to provide compensation. … The result of such a sentence was that the person subject to atimia was compelled to flee the country in order to avoid being killed. Thus a sentence of atimia was effectively
previous chapter, was a temporary ban on of Athenian citizenship that did not spell anything like the confiscation of property, enslavement of family members, the granting of immunity to any murderer of the offender, etc. Put differently, the ostracism of Themistocles did not involve any trial of treason on grounds of suspected medismôs. Yet, as E. M. Carawan has persuasively shown, a postulation that Themistocles was tried before his eventual ostracism can be made on the basis of a converged reading of Diodorus and Isocrates’ Areopagiticus. Such an elaboration posits that the Areopagus intended to try Themistocles on charges of either medismôs or embezzlement, but was bypassed by a combined effort of Themistocles and Ephialtes to change the venue to the Council of the Five Hundred. Treason was, of course, a capital charge and has thus been considered as falling within the jurisdiction of the Areopagus. Embezzlement was also regarded as a serious, if not a capital, offence. If Carawan is right and Themistocles and Ephialtes managed to overturn the venue for either one of these offences, then this would go on to show that a big blow had been dealt to Areopagus’ authority roughly a decade before the attested dates of Ephialtes’ reforms. This interpretation would also have

a sentence of exile. Often the family of the person subject to atimia was included in the sentence.” Forsdyke, Exile, Ostracism, and Democracy, pp. 10.


1781 Diodorus Siculus, Library, 11.54-55; Isocrates’ Areopagiticus, not to mention the author of the hypothesis to that work, constructs an explicit polarity between Solon and Cleisthenes who benefited the whole city with their more moderate constitution and the leading politicians who came after them that escaped the self-wrought indignities that their undiluted polity gave rise to only by a hair. Given Isocrates’ un concealed favour of aristocracy and his purpose of advocating a return to the ‘ancestral’ Areopagus, Osborne’s critique that not a single Athenian author names Ephialtes as a leading figure of Areopagus’ reform does not seem persuasive. It is not that the Athenaios Politiai’s authority is absolute. The point, rather, is that combined with the clear allusion to Ephialtes and Pericles in the Politics as working in tandem to curb the political power of aristocratic institutions and with other historical minutiae, there emerges a rather genuine-looking portrait of a politician who might have been a close confidant of Themistocles: “Ephialtes and Pericles reduced the power of the Council of the Areopagus, and Pericles introduced payment for service in the courts; in this way each successive leader of the people enlarged the democracy and advanced it to its present scale.” Aristotle, Politics, 1274a7-10; cf. Forsdyke, Exile, Ostracism, and Democracy, pp. 167; contra Robin Osborne, ‘When Was the Athenian Democratic Revolution?’, in Rethinking Revolutions Through Ancient Greece, ed. by Robin Osborne and Simon Goldhill, (Cambridge, 2006), pp. 17.

1782 The indictment of medismôs at the trial can be inferred from Athenaios Politiai: Aristotle, The Athenian Constitution, 25.3; cf. Diodorus Siculus, Library, 11.54-3-5.

1783 … while the competence of the Areopagus to try cases of treason or conspiracy as well as of embezzlement or bribery uncovered at euthynai of elected officials lasted into the early fifth century, it no longer had sole jurisdiction: both cases also involve the actual or potential intervention of a popular tribunal.” Martin Oswald, Language and History in Ancient Greek Culture, (Pennsylvania, 2011), pp. 239; on dokimasia and euthenia, see Diane Harris, ‘Freedom of Information and Accountability: The Inventory Lists of the Parthenon’, in Ritual, Finance, Politics: Athenian Democratic Accounts Presented to David Lewis, ed. by Robin Osborne and Simon Hornblower, (Oxford, 1994), pp. 213-226; Ober, Democracy and Knowledge, pp. 156-157; for examples of magistrates sentenced to pay fines for the breach of their office, see IG 11 34.36-37, 55.6-10, 61.36-39, 71.29-31; Marcel Piérart, “Les euthynoi athéniens”, L’Antiquité Classique, vol. 40 no. 2, (1971), pp. 526-573.
the further benefit of Areopagus’ later in absentia trial and conviction of Themistocles for treason. Filling another historical lacuna between Themistocles’ ostracism, the production of Aeschylus’ the Persians and Ephialtes’ reforms of 462, Pericles’ rites of passage could thus be seen as part and parcel of a greater struggle between the two sides of the Athenian upper classes.

It has been suggested by Cartledge, among others, that a postulation of Pausanias and Themistocles engaging in a joint effort to reform the Spartan polity is historically not inconceivable.\textsuperscript{1784} We would like to take this argument one step forward. We purport that the two figures, who had known each other since the first Persian invasion at the very least, coalesced in Argos, a polis with a recently democratized polity in addition to being the perennial enemy of Sparta, and reached an agreement on a course of action to reform the Spartan polity. Having observed above that the rigid class structure of the Spartan polity meant that its downward spiral of growing inequality of wealth necessitated the carving out of additional territories, and that the Athenian military investments also required the creation of new sources of revenue, we think it highly likely that the two figures could have come to an understanding over the scope of possible political reforms to be enacted in their respective poleis. Minimal land redistribution and limited expansion of franchise in Sparta would be counterbalanced with an elimination of property requirement for holding office and the potential introduction of office pay in Athens. The main benefit of such reforms would be that Sparta and Athens would not necessarily be at loggerheads anymore.\textsuperscript{1785} The recent history of the two poleis, often rivalrous and at times bloody though it was, was still amenable for the issuance of a common policy that would result in the domination of the larger Greek world by the two Leagues. Sparta would collect the social fruits of a more equalising distribution of kléroi and would thus have nothing to fear from the rising influence of the Athenian polity in addition to having a tighter control not only over its servile population but also over its allies.

\textsuperscript{1784} Cartledge, \textit{Sparta and Lakonia}, pp. 184-185; for a recent reading of the historical tradition about the two figures in their post-Plataea careers along the lines of ill-advised attempts to unite Greece under the pan-Hellenic banner with emphasis on the collective memory emanated by the famous Serpent Column, see David C. Yates, \textit{States of Memory: The Polis, Panhellenism, and the Persian War}, (Oxford, 2019), pp. 45-60.

\textsuperscript{1785} It is conceivable, in that vein, that Yates’ pan-Hellenic moment may have found able spokespersons in Themistocles and Pausanias who resorted to that ideological element in order to mask the social dimensions of their activities. Yates, however, does not follow that thread, arguing instead that the historical tradition about the ensuing actions of the two ‘elites’ can be taken at face value in incriminating their tyrannical motives: “In each case, these elites leveraged their panhellenic fame and standing, both of which were products of the Persian War and its commemoration, to move beyond the constraints of their home states and ultimately to threaten their very existence. We may doubt that either Pausanias or Themistocles could have made good on their frankly outlandish promises, but the mere fact that such allegations were widely believed suggests that there were at the time real concerns that runaway elites could actually undo the successes for which they claimed exclusive credit.” \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 58.
whose relations with Athens could otherwise prove increasingly difficult. To the Athenians, likewise, would accrue not only material benefits from their allies but also social ones which would be occasioned by a more inclusive franchise and a less skewed income distribution. With the additional hypothetical gain of establishing new zones of control at the expense of the Persian Empire, we think that the two figures began to work in earnest towards the implementation of the reforms.

It is highly likely for Themistocles and Pausanias to have worked in tandem towards the creation of an anti-Spartan north-Peloponnesian coalition which included the recently democratised poleis of Argos, Elis and Mantinea. The synoecism of Elis and Mantinea, not to mention their drift away from the aristocratic polity, was a cause for major concern in Sparta. Elis, despite not possessing a large territory or army, controlled the sanctuary of Olympia and hence was the informal organiser of the Olympic games. Its synoecism, as such, meant that now it had more reasons to diverge from the official policies of the Peloponnesian League which would become an alienating factor especially in the period between 420 and 400. Mantinea, on the other hand, was not in the control of any pan-Hellenic shrines but it was one of the largest poleis of Arcadia with Tegea. And with Mantinea on board, Tegea would also find common ground with the other northern Peloponnesian states to oppose Sparta; thus would commence a string of military confrontations that would take the better part of the two decades 470-450.

Our interpretation of this episode is also juxtaposed rather nicely to the production of Aeschylus’ the Persians, which brings us to the full circle of the 470s. Pericles was the chorêgos of Aeschylus’ play which celebrated Themistocles’ ingenuity and Aristides’ bravery in the overcoming of the Persian resistance at Salamis and Psyttaleia. In regard to

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1786 Herodotus, Histories, 6.75; Strabo, Geography, 8.2.2; Buckley, Aspects of Greek History 750-323 BC, pp. 230.
1787 Although it is evident from the play that Aeschylus’ praise of Themistocles was rather made via latent insinuations, no Athenian that was in attendance during the play’s performance could have mistaken the implicit recipient of one of the most memorable adages in the play, which portrays god’s wrath and a certain ‘Greek man’s’ guile as equivalent counterweighs, with someone else. It is fitting, in that vein, to recall that, “In contrast to plays with mythological, or, from a Greek perspective, chronologically remote, plots, in a play dramatizing recent events the playwright’s choices would not be bound to be the audience’s primary guide in the recollection or reception of these events.” Poulheria Kyriakou, The Past in Aeschylus and Sophocles, (Berlin, 2011), pp. 28; Aeschylus, Persians, 361-362.
1788 Aeschylus’ emphasis on Psyttaleia has drawn the attention of many scholars to make sense of its curious juxtaposition to the great naval victory at Salamis. A variety of explanations have been offered from a more enacting a more balanced plane of praise that would accommodate both the democratic supporters of Themistocles and the aristocratically-inclined followers of Aristides to a practical appreciation of the military warfare that required a combined effort of army and navy to counter the two-pronged attack of the Persians. For references and their specificities, see Kyriakou, The Past in Aeschylus and Sophocles, pp. 27 n. 24.
the historical context, it is apt to recall that Themistocles was a highly likely candidate for ostracism during the play’s production, and that super-rich Athenians could volunteer for choregia which was a special type of annually consigned liturgy that entailed the covering of all the production costs of a trilogy of plays and an additional satyr-play that was staged at the end. In his early twenties when he was elected chorēgos of Aeschylus’ play, Pericles was, of course, only a typical eupatrid with heaps of coins to his name. Issuing an explicitly political lineage uniting the figures of Themistocles, Aeschylus, Pericles and, potentially, Ephialtes, therefore, appears counter-intuitive. And yet, the benefit of hindsight provides us with a later trilogy, incidentally the only surviving one, namely the Oresteia, which has all the makings of a thoroughly political play with direct links to the reform struggles at the end of 460s. The dramatic progression of the trilogy from divine-infused cleansing of pollution to an Areopagus qua the Athenian court of final appeal appears as an explicit celebration of dēmos’ courts which were, by then, able to hand down just judgements. Areopagus was, of course, not just any court; it was the bastion of the eupatridae. Its privileged social exclusivity, however, was largely shed as a result of Ephialtes’ reforms in 462. Bluntly put, Aeschylus’ trilogy celebrated an Areopagus that had lost its secure footing among the members of the wealthiest class in Athens. Aeschylus, however subtle in his tributes and reprimands he was, had an intimate knowledge of where to press and pinch in order to bring his point home to his Athenian audience. The question is, can his line of democratic insight, the excavating of which does not seem to require overstretched readings of his plays, thus be taken as an indirect testimony to his pro-democratic stance? We will attempt to address that issue readily but for the present purposes we argue that both the forging of ties between Pericles and Aeschylus by

Peter Wilson’s re-appraisal of the institution of choregia with an emphasis on the function of the more ‘intimate’ ties of public generosity that it served has proved influential in revising the historical appreciation of the former as the epitome of the banishment of clientelist ties from the classical Athenian polis. Obligatory, and at least partially etatized to be sure, liturgies including choregia still made sufficient allowance for the Athenian super-rich to make sure that a modicum of loyalty would ensue the successful undertaking of the publicly allocated mission. Overspending with an eye on either the success of one’s chorus in a competition or on keeping the crew of a trierarchy-backed trireme safe are two historically-attested measures that were deemed capable of building different forms of dependency and were perceived by their liturgists as such. Peter Wilson, The Athenian Institution of the Khoregia: The Chorus, The City and the Stage, (Cambridge, 2000), pp. 123-130.

W. G. Forrest and Ste. Croix were among the first scholars to draw a political lineage between these figures: “Themistokles is directly praised in the Parsae; Themistokles was the refuge of 470; Themistokles’ successor, Perikles, who had already been chorēgos for the Parsae, shared with Ephialtes the responsibility for the measures of 462 and for the alliance with Argos, both of which Aeschylus certainly favours in the play.” W. G. Forrest, “Themistocles and Argos”, Classical Quarterly, vol. 10, (1960), pp. 236; cf. Ste. Croix, The Origins of the Peloponnesian War, pp. 183-185.

Uninformd of the specifics as Cicero’s later synopsis of the import of Areopagus may seem to be, it appears fitting that he chose to assess the council’s significance against the backdrop of Themistocles’ military achievements, portraying the latter as of fleeting influence. Although he forgot to add that the ‘ancestral tradition’ which was upheld by the council’s members was leaning heavily in favour of the hard-nosed eupatridae, it seems that Cicero had no misgivings about what the council politically stood for: Cicero, On Obligations, 1.75; cf. Cicero, The Republic, 1.43.
an associate of Themistocles, e.g., Ephialtes, and Themistocles playing an influential part in Pericles’ upbringing are within the realm of historical possibility. Further, it is well-nigh certain that Themistocles had a large group of confidants and associates who could have shared, if our above interpretation rings true, a knowledge of the reforms he deigned to put into practice. Minimising retrojection as much as we can, we thus see the original sin that was committed by Pausanias and Themistocles for what it was. Having realized that an all-too-likely confrontation of the two summachoi could only be averted if a policy of relatively equal distribution of wealth would be enforced in the two poleis, they had dared to stir up a horns’ nest. A sense of historical irony is not hard to be found at the conclusion of the lives of these two former heroes: Pausanias died a ‘Medizer’ as his tempering with Spartan polity triggered the hollowing out of even the most kata phusin, or ‘natural,’ of unwritten customs, whereas Themistocles, having been informed in advance of the fate that would befall him if he returned to Athens, took refuge in the cohorts of the Great King.

While Pausanias’ and Themistocles’ brief partnership in Argos came to an abrupt end, the fleet of the Hellenic League was busy eliminating poleis, Greek and non-Greek alike, which were perceived to be disrupting the flow of the Aegean trade. From the subjugation of the Aegean Island of Scyros to that of the Euboean polis of Carystus, the Athenians showed that the anti-Persian aims of the original pact could have been interpreted in diverse ways. It did not take long for their allies to notice the change. Naxos was the first member polis to revolt around 471 which brought about a swift and cruel response from the Athenians: “This was the first allied state to lose its freedom—something quite contrary to Greek norms which would subsequently happen to the others one by one.” The Athenians used their own fleet to forcefully bring round an unwilling, if founding, member of the League back into the fold by subduing it to be a subject-ally. What did that status entail? The building of an Athenian garrison, surrendering of the Naxian fleet and the imposition of phoros-payments with the potential addition of a more democratic and pro-Athenian polity to name just the bare essentials. If this episode appears to validate an interpretation that seven years was all it took for the League to start encroaching on its own members, we need to recall two facts in order to better contextualise it. Naxos was considered strategically highly important since it was used as a base of operations by the Persians twice in 500 and 490. The ever-present Persian threat, moreover, was, however diminishing, still far from over and the allies took full notice of both of these points in their protests, implicit or explicit, of the Athenians’ subdual of Naxos.

1792 Plutarch, Themistocles, 23.
1793 Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, 1.98.2, 1.98.3.
1794 Ibid, 1.98.4.
1795 Herodotus, Histories, 5.28-34, 6.96.
The realisation that Persian claims to Aegean dominance had turned into an empty shell dawned upon the majority of the allies only when the League forces achieved a massive victory against the Empire at Eurymedon in c. 469. With a perceptible shift in the Aegean balance of power many of the small allies attempted to default on their *phoros*-payments since, to them at least, the League was founded as an anti-Persian coalition and given that there were no Persians to be found around the Aegean after Eurymedon, its primary purpose could be regarded as having been accomplished. But many of the bigger partners of the League did not see it that way. To Athenians the pact was a signed and sealed manifestation of their Aegean hegemony, and a hegemony that was built by the combined fleets of a handful of large member *poleis* at that.\(^\text{1796}\) As far as they were concerned, the small states were now reaping the harvest of a secure and commercially more vibrant Aegean without even bothering to take their share of military expeditions, and thus had no grounds for complaint. The ship-building allies, on the other hand, clearly were no free-riders and their opinions mattered. Sadly, we do not have any direct historical evidence to gauge their discontent with Athenians’ actions in the aftermath of Eurymedon. The historical lacuna can be partially filled, however, by recourse to Thucydides’ narrative of the Thrace-ward exploits of the Athenians. The citizens of Thasos, a minerally well-endowed *polis* in the region, who had grown restless at the idea of continuing to share a proportion of the profits derived from its mine and trading posts with the Athenians, revolted in 465.\(^\text{1797}\) The Athenians also had the guts to commit an additional sacrilege by sending 10,000 citizens to found an *apoikos* at the *Ennea Hodoi*, or ‘Nine Ways,’ thus announcing their imperialistic claim to Thrace for all to hear.\(^\text{1798}\) Kimon was sent along with the Athenian fleet to overcome the Thasian resistance and to fix any difficulties that might arise during the *apoikos*’ settlement. After a lengthy siege in which Thasos managed to hold out for almost two years, the Athenians broke through and imposed a set of punitive terms that was a harbinger for things to come. The Thasians were to bring down their city walls, surrender their fleet, pay an indemnity, accept the re-imposition of *phoros*-paying status and, on top of it all, surrender their trading posts and mines to the Athenians. Prompting many a sour remark in the later historical tradition for their increasingly imperialistic behaviour,\(^\text{1799}\) by 462 Athens

\(^{1796}\) A number of suspicions have been aired by Ste. Croix with respect to the narrative contours which are utilised by Thucydides in his recounting of the supposed keenness that was shown by the allies to change to tributary status: Ste. Croix, “The Character of the Athenian Empire”, pp. 17 n. 1.


\(^{1798}\) Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War*, 1.100.3.

\(^{1799}\) Diodorus’ remarks may be seen as putting words in the lips of the allies, but that is no reason to suspect that it does not portray a sentiment that was shared by many of the League members as they saw the terms that they would be subjected to if they were to revolt and fail like Thasos did: “For generally the Athenians’ power was much increased and they did not use the allies fairly, as they had previously, but ruled them in a violent and overweening manner. Many of the allies were unable to put
was already at the precipice of major socio-political transformation. But a broader account of the episode is prerequisite to any attempt to make inferences.

5.1.3 Hoi Homoioi at the Ropes at Mt. Ithome and Ephialtes’ Reforms

In the early 460s Sparta was busy reaping the winds of insurgency that had been sown by Themistocles and Pausanias. Herodotus’ reference to the five battles that were fought by Spartans against their former northern Peloponnesian allies includes any confrontations between the two sides before 465.\textsuperscript{1800} Given that the battles of Plataea, Ithome and Tanagra can be, more or less, securely dated to 479, 465/4 and 457,\textsuperscript{1801} the two remaining contests should be chronologically places between 479 and 465. It has also been suggested that the relative absence of Tegeans from the confrontations resulted from their cold reception of a synoecised Mantinea which would not be easy for them to patronise over as it used to be. And, once Arcadia was divided, Spartans practically had only the Argives to contend with. That is until the greatest earthquake in recent memory convulsed Laconia in c. 465.\textsuperscript{1802} With its epicentre near Sparta itself, the earthquake killed a sizeable proportion of the homoioi and non-citizens,\textsuperscript{1803} laid waste to the nucleated poleis and forced a complete transformation of the Spartan polity. The devastation was so consummate that a large number of surviving Laconian helots\textsuperscript{1804} viewed the earthquake as a divine sign of resistance and began a revolt in earnest. The homoioi and their loyal subjects had to act quickly and they managed to issue an

\textsuperscript{1800} The five contests in question were, first, this one at Plataea; second, the battle of Tegea which they fought against the Tegeans and Argives; third, the battle of Dipaees where their opponents were all the Arcadians except for the Mantineans; fourth, the conflict with the Messenians which took place near Ithome; and finally the battle of Tanagra which was fought against a combined force of Athenians and Argives.” Herodotus, \textit{Histories}, 9.35.

\textsuperscript{1801} For the dating of the battle of Tanagra, which is crucial for reconstructing the chronology of the revolt, see Walter Lapini, \textit{Commento all’Athenaion politeia dello Pseudo-Senofonte}, (Florence, 1997), pp. 286-287; Walter Lapini, “Tisamen di Elide (Herod. 9.35.2),” \textit{Studi Italiani di Filologia Classica}, vol. 14, (1996), pp. 154-156.

\textsuperscript{1802} Plutarch, \textit{Kimon}, 16.5; Diodorus Siculus, \textit{Library}, 11.63.


\textsuperscript{1804} I am in complete agreement with Cartledge’s argument that there are no reasons to suspect that the hostility of the Laconian helots to the Spartiates was less than that of the supposedly ethnically more homogenic Messenian helots. Indeed, we need to grant that the Laconian helots were the first attackers to descend on the Spartan villages if Plutarch’s notion that the Eurypontid Archidamus’ vigilant last-minute assembling of the army saving the day is to have any truth to it: Cartledge, \textit{Sparta and Lakonia}, pp. 187-188; Plutarch, \textit{Kimon}, 16.
emergency levy that called every surviving Spartan to arms against the Helot insurrection.\footnote{461} With the addition of the Messenian helots to the ranks of the insurgents, however, the Spartiates had to hold out against a determined and numerous foe whose rediscovered Messenian ties would create a large ethnic bulwark. Having repulsed the first waves of helot and perioikoi invaders,\footnote{1806} the homoioi attempted an offensive but were pre-empted by the insurgents who built a ramshackle citadel on the unassailable Mt. Ithome.\footnote{1807} Finally coming to realise that the revolt had all the makings of a long-term insurgency, the homoioi enacted a political programme that would attempt to lighten the economic load of the poorer Spartiates and perioikoi. Potentially involving the minimum enfranchisement of a loyal number of hypomeiones, the measures were also aimed at the permanent addition of the perioikic helots to the Spartan phalanx.\footnote{1808} Given that the principal aim of the Spartiates during this time of rampant social turmoil was to recover from the drastic drop of the Spartiate population, the dating of various repopulation measures such as exempting the Spartiate fathers of three children from susstita dues or increased financial aid that were lent to the private maintenance of mothakes who were boys born to the families that were demoted to hypomeiones, is also likely. The main obstacle that hindered a sustained population growth, however, was the inequality inherent to the klēroi system itself. We have reasons to suspect that there was increased discrepancy in landholdings that suggest a further distortion of an already highly unequal polity.

The Spartan polity, as we observed in the previous chapter, rose on the shoulders of a continuously widening material gap between poorer and richer homoioi. Indeed, our interpretation of the travails of Pausanias and Themistocles has underscored the need for finding palliative remedies to this growing discrepancy which, in turn, fanned the flames of Spartan expansionism. Antecedent to the great earthquake the Spartiates, in fact, were getting

\footnote{1805} Terry Buckley suggests that an interpretation of a passage taken from Isocrates’ Archidamus can vindicate a dating of the battle of Dipaea to 465 where an almost certainly exaggerated Spartan force that had dwindled to one line of phalanx would prevail against the unorganised invaders. Isocratic drama aside, it appears certain that some kind of violent engagement took place within Sparta itself and Herodotus, therefore, may be viewed as referring to this conflict in the passage. Buckley, Aspects of Greek History 750-323 BC, pp. 232; Isocrates, Archidamus, 99.

\footnote{1806} We concur with Luraghi on his argument that the rapid-fire success at incapacitating the Spartans enjoyed by the rebels can be taken, along with archaeological and historical evidence, as validating a considerable level of perioikic participation, often in the form of the revolt of entire perioikic communities as was the case with the perioikoi of Thouria and Aethaea, in the rebellion: Luraghi, The Ancient Messenians, pp. 205-206; Cartledge, The Spartans, 138; for the military training of the perioikoi, who, by this time, were bedrock features of the Spartan phalanxes, see Ducat, ‘La Société spartiate et la guerre’, pp. 43.

\footnote{1807} For the import of the rebellion in greasing the mills of the creation of a particularly Messenian polity, see Luraghi, The Ancient Messenians, pp. 182-188.

ready for another bout of expansionism: this time at the expense of the Delian League, or as it increasingly came to be known the Athenian arkhê, ‘empire.’ Thucydides refers to a discreet alliance between the oligarchs of Thasos, which was to revolt from the Delian League in 465, and Sparta. By the midway point of 460s the time-hallowed Spartan caution and recalcitrance was about to be thrown to the wind. As the dust settled on Helots’ attempted invasion of Sparta two things became equally clear: many of the troublemaker hypomeiones and helots had vanished into thin air, thus curtailing the need to find new land that could absorb what surplus population was deemed movable; but then the numbers of the homoioi were potentially hit even harder, which turned the very maintenance of the klêroi system into a tall order. The timing was ripe. In the leadership of King Archidamus the homoioi could engage in a thoroughgoing reform of the land distribution system. After all, there, presumably, was many vacant lots whose occupants had died either in the earthquake or while fighting the helots. Technically, those lots could be assigned either to the numerous hypomeiones or to perioikoi or even helots who chose to side with the homoioi rather than the insurgents. What the Spartiates instead did was to attempt to turn this doubly-distorted landholding system into a new socio-economic equilibrium.

The numbers we have of the Spartan levies that were conscripted at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War, inaccurate approximations as they are, indicate that the Spartiate proportion of the Spartan phalanx was a far cry from what it was at the time of the second Persian invasion. We do not have the details but it is historically conceivable that a new cohort of Spartiate plutarchs had come into being either through sheer luck or rapacious behaviour. The vacant lots could have passed down on direct descendants whose inheritance of property was otherwise conditional upon the satisfaction of various criteria. Equally, the richer survivors of the earthquake could have shored up additional pieces of klêroi as they had well-established ties with perioikoi and helots that made them promising candidates to ensure the immediate subsistence of the Spartan polity. The polity with its exacerbated oliganthropia

1810 Morris and Powell’s contention that the Spartiates risked everything every time they went to war in the fourth century can be extended to cover the post-Ithome period of the fifth century as well. The greater buoyancy of the Spartan polis at this time was not, after all, a result of endorsing a different polity but one that had the benefit of a larger number of homoioi at her disposal. Morris and Powell, The Greeks, pp. 389.
1812 Either way, Hodkinson’s construal of the earthquake as giving rise to an exacerbation of the socio-economic inequality in Sparta via the homoioi’s rediscovery of their winning ways in the ultra-expensive Olympic four-horse chariot race seems compelling. With a concentration of wealth in their hands, the plutarchs found the talk of homonoia a little too distasteful to their liking: Hodkinson, Property and Wealth in Classical Sparta, 303-333; Christesen, ‘Sparta and Athletics’, pp. 552.
did indeed survive, but at the cost of Spartans running the risk of allowing a precious glimpse into their mysterious system to their perceptive adversaries.\textsuperscript{1813} With the helots based on Mt. Ithome Spartans decided to issue a call to their Peloponnesian allies as well as other prominent Greek poleis; the latter included the Athenians.\textsuperscript{1814} The Athenians, in their turn, were divided between the pro-Spartan faction of Kimon, who had served at the helm of the Delian League since the beginning of the 470s to ensure that his yoke-fellow policies proportioning the Aegean and mainland Greece into two spheres of influence,\textsuperscript{1815} and a demotic faction who saw the Spartans’ increasingly hostile behaviour toward the Athenian interests as headed in the direction of violent struggle. By this time Pericles’ political coming of age had largely been accomplished.\textsuperscript{1816} With Ephialtes at his side, the two eupatridae and their supporters fiercely opposed Kimon’s pleas to send a task force to aid the Spartans.\textsuperscript{1817} The dêmos, however, voted in favour of Kimon’s motion and resolved to send a force of 4,000 hoplites to be led by none other than the latter himself.\textsuperscript{1818}

To the eyes of the mainland Greeks the Athenians of 460s were siege experts capable of blockading even well-supplied poleis. The Spartans, on this view, might have seen the Athenians as potential saviours more than they did the arriving Boeotian, Corinthian, etc., regiments. Never the less, whatever feigned cordiality the two sides showed to each other was quickly taken over by uncompromising animosity. The Athenian dêmos had resolved to send the relief force in early 463. The Spartans resolved to send it back after mere months. What had happened? None of our historical sources offer a reconstruction of the events that surpasses a barebones sketch. Many a historical expert however, has opted for taking the references of Thucydides, Plutarch and others to the Spartans’ growing fear of the revolutionary spirit of the Athenians\textsuperscript{1819} at its face value and thus claimed that the Spartan

\textsuperscript{1813} Cartledge agrees with Aristotle’s positing of oligananthropia as one of the chief causes of the eventual Spartan downfall. To our eyes, however, oligananthropia was only the surface of a set of problems that were rooted, as Daniel Stewart appears to have touched upon, in the chafing of an already too narrow polity of plutarchy: Cartledge, Sparta and Lakonia, pp. 263-264; Stewart, ‘From Leuktra to Nabis, 371-192’, pp. 378; cf. Ste. Croix, The Origins of the Peloponnesian War, pp. 331.

\textsuperscript{1814} Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, 1.102.1-3; cf. “When the Messenians revolted c.465, some allies helped Sparta, but perhaps not all. Plataia and Athens sent forces, but of the Peloponnesians only Aigina and Mantinea are known to have assisted the Spartans …” Roy, ‘Sparta and the Peloponnesian from the Archaic Period to 362 BC’, pp. 362.

\textsuperscript{1815} Plutarch, Kimon, 16.10, 17.1.

\textsuperscript{1816} Still, it needs to be added that Pericles’ astonishing streak of 14 years of successive generalship from 443-429 was still some way off by that time: Rosalind Thomas, ‘The Classical City’, in Classical Greece, pp. 66; Vincent Azoulay, Pericles of Athens, trans. by Janet Lloyd, (Princeton and Oxford, 2014), pp. 31.

\textsuperscript{1817} Plutarch, Kimon, 16.9.

\textsuperscript{1818} Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, 2.27.2; Ste. Croix, Origins of the Peloponnesian War, pp. 178; Morris and Powell, The Greeks, pp. 293.

\textsuperscript{1819} Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, 1.102.3; Diodorus Siculus, Library, 11.64.2; Plutarch, Kimon, 17.3; Pausanias, Guide to Greece, 4.24.6.

463
dread of Athenians making an alliance to overturn their polity was the driving factor behind the clash.\footnote{We do not deny, in that vein, that phycologial factors did have an impact on the Spartan headquarters giving the Athenians their marching orders. Never the less, the unsurpassable rift that was occasioned by their decision to send the Athenian relief force back home appear to warrant a more multi-dimensional approach than mere phycologism, which was espoused erstwhile by Ste. Croix: “the ordinary Athenian hoplite…may well have been shocked when he arrived in Messenia and found that the revolting “slaves” of the Spartans were Greeks, the majority of them Messenians, who had never lost consciousness of the fact that their ancestors had been citizens of the polis of Messene, and were now fighting for their freedom and the right to be “the Messenians” once more.” Ste Croix, Origins of the Peloponnesian War, pp. 179; cf. Buckley, Aspects of Greek History 750-323 BC, pp. 233; Cartledge, Sparta and Lakonia, pp. 189; Luraghi, The Ancient Messenians, pp. 185-187; Thomas J. Figueira, ‘The evolution of the Messenian identity,’ in Sparta, pp. 233; Powell, ‘Sparta’s Foreign – and Internal – History 478-403’, pp. 299; for a discussion of the main explanations adopted by the modern scholars, see E. F. Bloedow, “Why did Sparta rebuff the Athenians at Ithome in 462 BC?”, Ancient History Bulletin, vol. 14 no. 3, (2000), pp. 89–101.} I do not find the textual evidence compelling enough to support such an interpretation. Kimon was a trusty, battle-proven eupatridae that the Spartans could rely upon in a polis that was growing increasingly antagonistic toward Sparta. Scheming against Athens was not tantamount to alienating the most trustworthy of the Athenians. On the Spartan side the problem with the dismissal of the Athenian troops was not that they could ill-afford to estrange a former ally; what remained of that alliance was already in tatters long before 463. The issue was rather that the Spartans would thus announce their imminently hostile intent loud and clear which would deface the political purchase of any pro-Spartan policy in Athens for the foreseeable future. The mere fact that Kimon had managed to persuade the dêmos to send the task force suffices in itself to show that the majority of the Athenians could actually be swayed into thinking that Sparta was no threat to the Athenian interests. There was a steep price to pay when sending the relief force home, and it was facing an Athens that was unified in its opposition to Sparta in the near future. On that note, we claim that the Spartans had solid reasons to risk alienating their foremost Athenian supporter. It is a definite possibility that the 4,000 troop-strong Athenian force included a significant number of fervent adherents to the demotic policies of Ephialtes and Pericles. Would it be stretching the limits of historical interpretation to posit that the troops also had a share of Ephialtes and Pericles’ handpicked hoplites who were to act as revolutionary ringleaders among the attackers? We incline to argue to the contrary. Ephialtes and Pericles could have envisaged that a falling out between Kimon and the Spartans would give such a boost to anti-Spartan policies that they would be able to gather enough votes to ostracise Kimon. Coupled with the comprehensive reforms that they appear to have been working on when Kimon was at Ithome, we thus interpret the Ithome episode as a successful first step of a masterplan.

Having found plenty of political space to outmanoeuvre their opponents, Ephialtes and Pericles proposed a reform bill that was to undermine not only the social exclusivity of the
Areopagus but also its juridical purview. The motion lifted all property qualifications for election to Areopagus hence disarming the *eupatridae* of what had been one of their principal institutions. With the additional transfer of the judicial authority of Areopagus to *heliaia*, as the court of first instance, or more specifically to the multiple *dikastèria* that specialised on different cases of offenses, this would give way to its demotion to the status of a council with the token authority of judging cases of homicide. By instituting office pay for service in the *dikastèria*, moreover, Pericles and his supporters would manage to ensure that the former would be populated by the grassroots *dèmos* hence replacing the *eupatrid* judicial authority with that of *politai*. The encroachment of *dikasteria’s* judicial sphere on that of Areopagus had, of course, been going on since 470s. Further, our confirmation of Carawan’s

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1821 Kurt Raaflaub interprets the reform programme as one that was offered to *thêtes* in exchange for their increased participation in the general and expeditionary levies: Raaflaub, ‘Athenian and Spartan *Eunomia*, or: What to Do with Solon’s Timocracy’, pp. 416-417.

1822 Aristotle, *The Athenian Constitution*, 25.1-2; Diodorus Siculus, *Library*, 11.77.6; Plutarch, *Kimon*, 10.8, 15.2; I reject Raaflaub’s proposal to pick Ephialtes’ and Pericles’ reforms between 462 and 450 as a more suitable date for the introduction of the four census classes to the Athenian polity. Focusing a little too extensively on the windfall of profits that were tapped by the Athenians in the aftermath of the second Persian invasion largely by the token of the successes they had in establishing and running a maritime empire, Raaflaub’s feasibility check skirts around the question of how to deal with the explosive social context of the Solonian reforms if no attempt was made by the latter to allay the socio-economic fears of all the lower-class Athenians who were to make it clear, in half a century’s time, that they would rather be tyrannised over by a man of unbridled tomfoolery than squashed by their aristocratic compatriots. Whether their allusive designations were put into place by Solon or else, the invention of the census classes was a necessary intervention in a society in which the ideology of aristocracy of birth was fast deplete with only that of an aristocracy of wealth on offer as a suitable replacement. Political inequality was made to partially crumble so that the abysmal economic conditions through which the majority of the population had to wade could keep up the pretense of having obtained inter-class sanction: *contra*, Raaflaub, ‘The Breakthrough of *Démokratia* in Mid-Fifth-Century Athens’, pp. 130-131, 140.

1823 On the historical development of *heliaia* among other Athenian courts, see Martin Ostwald, *From Popular Sovereignty to the Sovereignty of Law*, (Berkeley, 1986), pp. 47-77; Carawan, “*Eisangelia* and *Euthyna*: The Trials of Miltiades, Themistocles, and Cimon”.

1824 “Such legal powers as were lost by the Areopagus were transferred to the Heliaea founded by Solon, now re-empowered and also known as the Dikasteria or (People’s) jury courts. These were courts of first instance, not only of appeal, presided over in a purely supervisory sense by one or other of the Board of nine Archons, and staffed by jurors who were also judges. Court sessions were held on between 150 and 200 days each year, and the jurors assigned—by lot—to any one court were drawn from the annual panel of 6,000 citizens who had. put their names forward and also been selected by lot. Thanks to a proposal of Pericles in the 450s—and this is his one indisputable contribution to the new Ephialtic dispensation—all such judge-jurors were paid a small per diem for performing judge-and-jury service.” Cartledge, *Democracy*, pp. 86-87; Waterfield, *Creators, Conquerors, and Citizens*, pp. 209; though I agree with the overall sentiment of Rose’s claim that the crisis of 462/1 was mainly occasioned by “an internal split within the hegemonic class over the form in which their hegemony should be exercised,” I still think it inadvertent to relegate the *dèmos* to the status of a mere bystander. Although the politics of *arkhê* had not come to be established fully by that around, it still had come a long way from being a hypothetical construction. And with each trireme sent to escort merchant ships or to patrol the Aegean waters, the part played by *thêtès* in the making of the Athenian imperial bounty was beginning to shine with additional conspicuousness. Rose, *Sons of the Gods, Children of Earth*, pp. 263-263.

1825 A debate as regards to the class constitution of *dikastèria* has been going on for the better part of the last decade. In contradistinction to Hansen’s continuous warnings against taking *dikasts* and *dèmos* as rough terminological equivalents to one another, a lingering penchant for utilising the terms synonymously still appears evident in many other scholarly works. Stressed as I have the aristocratic
hypothesis has shown that popular courts had already gained the upper hand in this conflict by the time of Themistocles’ ostracism. Although its jurisdiction had already been largely stripped of its formal privileges, however, Areopagus was still a bastion of aristocratic identity, and would remain so well into the fourth century, owing to the census requirements that were kept in their place to regulate election of its jurors. The earlier elimination of census requirement for archonship had brought about the offices’ fall from the graces of aristocratically-inclined eupatridae. The demotic coalition, on this view, knew that its aiming was true in ‘robbing’ the aristocratic privileges of the court. As the tidings of what happened at Ithome reached home, the anti-Spartan fervour reached its apogee and the Athenians chose Kimon as the ‘winner’ of the ostracism of 462/1. Careful deliberation appeared to have won the day but now Ephialtes and Pericles had to reap the crop of contempt that they had sown for more than a decade. With the Areopagus’ ‘regress’ into popular obscurity and Kimon’s ostracism, Ephialtes and Pericles had managed to knock two of the firmest impediments to their dēmos-friendly politics of empire-building. All the indications are that the two politicians and their supporters had to anticipate a retaliation from the Kimon’s side who could not possibly concede the losses that were accosted to them by their opponents without attempting a backlash. Whether as a result of chance or diligent machinations, bias that was on display during the earlier borrowings of the concept of dēmos by some of the archaic poets, and thus concurring as I am with the gist of Hansen’s later painstaking studies of the term, I do not think that there is a need for a digression on the topic. In the form of a succinct contrast, dikasts as the members of dikastêria appears to have been the right usage for any pro-democratic Athenian of the fifth and fourth centuries, whereas dēmos was rather used as a pejorative term by any critic of democracy to designate the same body of jurors. Mogens Herman Hansen, ‘Demos, Ekklesia and Dikasterion: A Reply to Martin Oswald and Josiah Ober’, in The Athenian Ecclesia II A Collection of Articles 1983-9, (Copenhagen, 1989), pp. 213-218; Mogens Herman Hansen, “The Concepts of Demos, Ekklesia, and Dikasterion in Classical Athens”, Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies, vol. 50, (2010), pp. 499-536; cf. Alan L. Boegehold, “Aristotle’s Athenaion Politeia 65,2: The “Official Token””, Hesperia, vol. 29 no. 4, (Oct.-Dec., 1960), pp. 393-401.

For interpretations of Ephialtes’ reforms as the actual inauguration of democratic politics at Athens, see Christian Meier, The Greek Discovery of Politics, trans. by D. McLintock, (Cambridge, MA., 1990), pp. 82-84; Raaflaub, ‘The Breakthrough of Démokratia in Mid-fifth-century Athens’, pp. 105-154.

That is not to say, of course, that Kimon and his upper-class supporters did not favour the maintenance of the Athenian arkhē. If anything, Kimon worked just as tooth and nail in order to turn the Aegean into the Athenian backwater as Pericles later would. The difference between the two figures was, in that sense, one of appreciating the true extent of the Spartiate opposition to their imperialist policies: “An aggressive imperialist thrust was thus initiated as early as the second third of the fifth century. No Athenian leader could afford to resist it if he wished for the support of the people. In this context, Kimon repressed the revolts of the allies as regularly as did Pericles after him. It was Kimon who was in charge of the lengthy siege of Thasos in 465–463 and also he who decisively promoted the development of cleruchies, the Athenian garrisons that were installed in allied territories. Apart from a few minor disagreements, the political leaders clearly shared in common the conviction that the empire constituted the guarantee of Athenian sociopolitical stability. There may have been disagreement about the methods to be adopted, but there was none where the principle was concerned: the empire was vital for Athens, so, if necessary, the allies had to be repressed by force.” Azoulay, Pericles of Athens, pp. 56.
however, when anti-demotic aristoi retaliated they managed to murder Ephialtes and thence permanently knocked one of their most influential opponents off the political arena. 1828

Aeschylus would later reminisce about 461, calling the days when political conflicts broke out in the open as polis’ drawing ever closer to the verge of civil war. Ephialtes’ death may have soothed the oligarchically-inclined upper classes’ yearning for vengeance but it did not occasion a desired return to the status quo ante. Though the details are lost, Pericles managed to brave the storm by fomenting and riding the anti-Spartan feeling that guided the conclusion of an alliance with Argives, whose reinvigorated interests in the Peloponnese was a thorn on the Spartiates’ side. Athenians’ growing influence in the mainland also occasioned further secessions from the Peloponnesian League as Megara joined the former’s side due to a number of unaddressed injuries. Megara’s secession jeopardised the retaliative plans that were concocted by the dominant anti-Athenian faction of Spartiate plutarchs. Sparta’s concealed, yet ever-present, threat to invade Attica depended upon the passage of its armies through the Isthmus that linked Peloponnesus to Attica. Given that Isthmus was largely controlled by Corinth and Megara, a territorial rift between the two poleis that was sufficiently large to cause a rapprochement between Megara and Athens effectively meant that Sparta, whose lack of a formidable navy was recurrent, could not move in and out of Peloponnesus at her whim. Roughly in the same year c. 460 the rebels on Mt. Ithome and the Spartan coalition who were laying siege to the palisade fortress grew tired of half a decade of fighting and declared stalemate. 1829 The Spartiates accepted the demand of their ex-helots to be granted safe-passage to a settlement with the condition that they would not settle in Peloponnesus. The Athenians took the initiative and encouraged the rebels to settle on Naupactus, a recently captured small polis that was strategically located on the Gulf of Corinth, hence the moniker, albeit somewhat ill-fitting, the Naupactus Messenians. 1830 Sparta’s loss was Athens’ gain. The addition of Naupactus Messenians, who had an intimate knowledge of the Spartan way of living and war-

1828 Aristotle, The Athenian Constitution, 25.5; Diodorus Siculus, Library, 11.77.6; Plutarch, Pericles, 10.7-8.
1829 By Thucydides’ reckoning the stalemate was called after ten years of open hostilities, i.e., in 455, but given the increased participation of Spartans in battles against the northern Peloponnesian coalition, we concur with Cartledge’s claim that a date around 460 appears more plausible. We diverge from Cartledge’s appraisal, however, in regard to his taking the possible ebb of the rebellion at 460 as a sign that the damage dealt by the earthquake to Spartan demography was not dramatic. The increased Spartan hesitancy to any long-distance entanglement in 450s by itself, shows that the disruptive effects of the earthquake lingered. Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, 1.103.1; Cartledge, Sparta and Lakonia, pp. 195.
making not to mention of the geography of Messenia and Laconia, and Megarians to the broad anti-Spartan coalition was nothing short of disaster for the homoioi. Yet, the picture was even bleaker for the Corinthians. The Megarian alliance with Athens meant that Corinth had lost her power to patronise her neighbour to the north. Likewise, the settlement of the rebels of Mt. Ithome at Naupactus was more than likely to disrupt Corinth’s flow of trade with the western Greeks, which would falter the polis’ political prominence significantly.

The Spartiates, as our reconstruction has attempted to convey, needed no convincing to take the lead in an all-out anti-Athenian military effort. But they had vastly diminished resources and a massively upset social equilibrium that occasioned a need to pick their battles carefully. The waiting game was on. As the Corinthians came knocking for the employment of the Peloponnesian League’s armies against the insolent Athenians, the Spartans utilised a number of delaying tactics to evade direct commitment. Recalling that their wars against the anti-Spartan upper Peloponnesian states would only peter out by the midpoint of 450s, they might have wanted their Peloponnesian and Theban allies, e.g., Corinth and Thebes in the main, to absorb the initial shock of the conflict against the Athenians. An unresolved political situation at Peloponnese would strike fear at the hearts of any Spartiate commander who deigned to take a regiment to the Isthmus when the Argives could outflank them. Sparta needed, as such, to tie up all the remaining loose ends prior to taking up any military commitment to the north. A good appreciation of the Athenian military, economic and political prowess, would definitely indicate that the combined strength of Corinth and Thebes would suffice only to keep the Athenians at bay. And without additional political fissures popping up among the members of the Delian League it was practically certain that even the success of a fully defensive scheme would have been in doubt.

The Athenians skipped no beat after the conclusion of their alliance with Megara and their settling of the Naupactus Messenians. Quickly declaring war on Aegina, a large island polis to the south of Attica that had been a sore spot of Athenian claims to naval domination owing to its large fleet, in 458, they began a siege that was to take more than two years to bear fruit. Making ever-increasing use of the armies of the Delian League, Pericles and his associates knew that what little comradery was left among the allies was in risk of complete evaporation as a result of Athenians’ increasingly imperialistic motives. Moreover, there was hardly any enticing economic gain to be reaped from an Athenian expansion into Boeotia and Isthmus. Indeed, even the conquest of Aegina, which clearly was motivated at least in part by its

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1831 For a review of all the historically documented travails of the Naupactus Messenians against the Spartans during the Peloponnesian War, see Luraghi, The Ancient Messenians, pp. 188-194.
promise of material benefits, could be seen as making a part of a grand strategy to reverse the Peloponnesian control on the Isthmus and Boeotia. The so-called First Peloponnesian War (460-445) can thus best be interpreted as an Athenian attempt to pre-empt the Spartans by extending their zone of influence into the Isthmus which, to their eyes, would stimulate further secessions from the Peloponnesian League. Before carrying on with the notable changes that were made to the respective polities of the two poleis, however, we need to revisit the dramatic and philosophical avenues that were rediscovered and modulated roughly in this period.

5.2 Aeschylus and the Conception of the Classical Tragedy

The date of 458 is especially opportune for constructing a historical kaleidoscope through which to peer the making of the Athenian tragedy. 458 was the year in which, as we had occasion to observe above, the great trilogy of Aeschylus, the _Oresteia_, was produced. Ancient tragedy is a dramatic form that began to take a definitive shape in the second half of the sixth century. Likely to have gathered some formal momentum in the relatively tranquil years of Peisistratid tyranny, a triad of plays plus a satyr-play written and produced, at least early on, by the same playwright was staged in a competition against three other ‘trilogies’ at the venue of Great Dionysia to crown a winner who had his, and his chorégos’, name inscribed in an honorary stele. The formal structure of the early plays is credited as having only one actor and a chorus with the possible addition of mute extras to fill the stage. The relatively simple form of the early plays was cemented with plain presentation which did not even have the luxury of a backcloth to serve as a background. Aeschylus was born in 525 to a world of tragedy that, as such, was quite primitive in regard to the narrative, formal and technical media it could utilise to build relations of artistic representation between myth and reality. When he died in 456 the tragic stage had undergone a complete transformation thanks in large part to the formal, narrative and presentational innovations that were pioneered mainly by himself and Sophocles. 

1832 Following that traditional postulation would be, of course, in contrast to Connor’s elaborate argument of pinning the formalisation of the popular Dionysian revels down as a conceivable part of the Cleisthenic reforms. Agreeable as it is, Connor’s construal of the likely origins of Dionysia as rooted within the Athenian popular culture, however, does not enhance the fragmentary allusions to Cleisthenes’ reforms that were made by the later historical tradition without ever insinuating the ascription of the introduction of City Dionysia to him: cf. W. Robert Connor, “City Dionysia and Athenian Democracy”, _Classica et Mediaevalia_, vol. 40, (1989), pp. 7-32; W. Robert Connor, ‘Civil Society, Dionysiac Festival, and the Athenian Democracy’, in _Demokratia_, pp. 224. 

Aristotelian *Poetics* credits Aeschylus with the addition of the second actor to tragedy and we have no reason to disagree.\(^{1834}\) Inaugurating a development toward a more complex narrative structure in addition to a more compelling utilisation of polyphony and dialogical form, the increase in the number of actors on the stage meant that more than a paltry allusion to everyday verbal exchanges could began to be afforded.\(^{1835}\) Naturally, tragedy never shed its formal links to the Homeric monologue of conveyance or ordinances as exemplified in plenty by the part played by the famous Euripidean messengers in the latter’s late plays. With the invention of the second actor, the chorus was liberated to partake of an agonistic element that had figures of authority on one side and those of dissent on the other. Agon’s development into a basic building block of tragic progression shed new light on the contradictions inherent to the ruler’s structures of authority, whereby his or her *pathos* became more distinguishable.\(^{1836}\) Announcement of events, in that vein, was partially necessitated by formal requirements that were not strictly unsubvertible but nor were especially welcoming to potential transgressors. The dramatic custom of not staging violent action, for one, was an effective scarecrow that is challenged only once by the iconoclast Sophocles in the total corpus of 32 plays that survive, with potential emendations, from the fifth century. As violence, at times bloodcurdling, was an integral part of their pre-historic myths and everyday lives, however, the Greek tragedians surpassed this predicament by on-stage annunciations of off-stage death and macabre that was usually made by royal heralds, informants, chorus, etc. By the first staging of Aeschylus’ the *Persians*, we see that the addition of the second actor is already made and a faint resemblance, albeit largely stiff and solemn, established between tragedy’s representation of verbal exchange and the ordinary transactions that we may fathom as taking place in the contemporary Athens.


\(^{1835}\) I am in substantial agreement with Lukács’ earlier point that the exploration of the myriad of possibilities entailed by the dialogic form was congruent with the articulation of novel democratic measures onto the Athenian polity. Despite differing on the historical warrant with which he postulates art as following in the footsteps of contemporary politics, his emphasis on the dialectically-conceived creative capacity of form and matter seems sufficiently well-rounded to recall: “Thus in introducing the second actor, Aeschylus accomplished something more than a formal innovation. The new dramatic conflict in dialogue revealing the profoundest essence of personality with a richness of sense and sensibility had its origin undoubtedly in the unfolding of Athenian polis democracy. Aeschylus’ genius lay “simply” in his discovering the maximal literary expression for the maximal revelation of life.” Georg Lukács, ‘Preface’, in *Writer and Critic*, pp. 21.

\(^{1836}\) “We might tentatively conclude that the invention of the second actor amounted to an indirect subversion of the authoritarian pattern of a chorus dominated by their sovereign. By bringing new perspectives to bear on the pathos of the ruler, the second actor facilitated the transformation of the chorus, normally the representative of the demos, from a sympathetic appendage swept up in the suffering of the ruler to an oppositional voice, deferentially questioning or openly challenging the ruler’s version of reality.” Rose, *Sons of the Gods, Children of Earth*, pp. 190.
Continuing the thread of double-hermeneutics that we attempted to establish in the previous chapter, we propose a four-pillar reconstruction of Aeschylus’ world of tragedy. The pillars in question are the thematic relationship established between the political struggles of Athens in the first half of the fifth century; a narrative and stylistic focus on the theme of ‘judgement’; a metanarrative of temporal procession as typifying social progress; and relative moral modification of Homeric characters. As a dull disclaimer that needs to accompany any purported examination of the thematic, narrative, stylistic, etc., elements of the Aeschylean tragedy, it needs to be stressed that we only have seven surviving plays from a total corpus that well exceeded ninety, and, hence, forced to make these observations on the basis of the extant evidence alone. Disclaimers aside, Aeschylus’ surviving plays offer vibrant testimony to the conception of a playwright that was not only interested in the political problems and bread-and-butter issues of his day but was one that was willing to take sides when it mattered. The chronologically earliest of his surviving plays, the *Persians*, produced for and won the first prize in the City Dionysia in 472, is not alone in attesting to a barely concealed rapport with the looming ostracism of Themistocles. To elaborate, the two narrative nodes of the play, Xerxes’ insistence on overstepping the boundaries inherent to his earthly authority and the divine retribution that chases him from the shores of Salamis to his capital in Susa, is forged by the ingenuity of a commander whose bait of desperate retreat was swollen whole by the hubristic Great King. For anyone who survived to tell the tale of Salamis the

1837 Our analysis of all those purported pillars is drawn against the background of Vernant’s fine formulation of classical Attic tragedy as a problematisation of reality in dramatic terms. But our debt is most significant in our probes beneath the theme of judgment: “although tragedy, more than any other genre of literature, thus appears rooted in social reality, that does not mean that it is a reflection of it. It does not reflect that reality, but calls it into question. By depicting it rent and divided against itself, it turns it into a problem.” Jean-Pierre Vernant and Pierre Vidal-Naquet, *Myth and Tragedy in Ancient Greece*, trans. by Janet Lloyd, (New York, 1988), pp. 33.

1838 For an account of dramatic characterisation in the classical Attic drama that appears to offer more in the way of structured silences than anything else, see Pomeroy, *Goddesses, Whores, Wives, and Slaves*, pp. 99, 102-103.

1839 Poetry, politics and vivid entertainment are three core values that were upheld by the tragedians of the classical Greek poleis. A medium that was conceived to mediate a myriad of images to different recipients, we do not hold, unlike many of the scholarly commentators, that more than a line of salt can be drawn between poetic enrichment and political entrapment that were aimed at by the foremost tragedians whose plays survive to this day. Analytical categories have their purposes so long as they are not interpreted as mutually exclusive. Unfortunately, the debate on whether Greek tragedy was essentially political or Dionysian seems to have been grounded upon just that sort of dichotomic understanding. In any event, for a fully public medium such as tragedy to run in either completely politicized or poeticized circles would be unfathomable given the dramatic tradition that preceded it: “Wer einen Zugang zur tragische Dichtung der Griechen sucht, muss von den materiellen und geistigen Verhältnissen ihrer Umwelt ausgehen,” and *vice versa*. H. Kuch, ‘Introduction’, in *Die griechische Tragödie in ihrer gesellschaftlichen Funktion*, (Berlin, 1983), pp. 7; cf. Griffin, “The Social Function of Attic Tragedy”; J. J. Winkler and F. I. Zeitlin, (eds.), *Nothing to Do with Dionysios?*, (Princeton, 1990).
name of that resourceful commander was the same with the one who was a viable candidate to be ostracised on charges of medismôs merely months later by his beloved Athenians.\textsuperscript{1840}

Neither the absence of Themistocles’ name from the play nor the possibility that the play may well have graced the court of Hieron of Syracuse prior to its premiere before the Athenian audience need to vindicate an objection to the notion that the play was directly related to the political changes that were afoot.\textsuperscript{1841} Three arguments can be purported to bring that point home. First, despite our lack of total numbers we know that historical events were largely underrepresented on the Athenian tragic stage. The fact that a well-known playwright, and one who fought at Salamis at that, chose to stage a historical episode at that juncture, therefore, should be taken as at least suggestive of an overt link to the memory of the great commander who had saved the day by using all the tricks of his trade. Second, the persuasively argued possibility that the play might have been staged first in Syracuse and only then in Athens does not translate into an automatic cancellation of any attempt to commemorate Themistocles’ feats. We had occasion to touch upon Hieron’s interest in cultivating homegrown dramatic talents to let his dêmos vent some of their accumulated socio-economic pressure. The play’s focus on the successful commander who righted the wrongs committed by an atrocious King, could have been, for all we know, a desired effect for Hieron in that it showed his awareness of the natural constraints to human authority. Third, the play’s covert homage to Themistocles was a basic necessity as Aeschylus needed to make allowance not only for the dramatic but also the political conventions of his day. Portraying living individuals, for one, was a faux pas in the context of Attic tragedy. Likewise, anything more than direct insinuations to the victorious deeds of Themistocles would, chances are, backfire given that Kimon’s policies were the order of the day. And yet, no Athenian needed the commander’s name in order to grasp whose memory the play invoked. In his Suppliants, believed to be produced c. 463 as a part of a trilogy that won the first prize, Aeschylus, likewise appears to have revisited the Danaid myth as a barely obscured reference to the recently consolidated Argive political power in central Peloponnese that resulted from the latter’s crushing victories against the minor Mycenae and Tiryns in early 460s. The myth was well-known as a genealogical charter of the royal Argive line to speak to the run-of-the-mill Athenian’s growing sense of anti-Spartan

\textsuperscript{1840} Cf. “Now Aeschylus’ Parsae, produced early in 472, comes as near as a tragedy could to mentioning a living individual, in its reference to the message of Sicinnus, the slave of Themistocles, in lines 353-63 (cf. Hdt. VIII.75). And the very fact that the play celebrates the victory of Salamis, at that particular time, makes one inclined to regard it as a deliberate attempt to remind the Athenians of the debt they owed to Themistocles - who was probably at that very moment a likely ‘candidate’ for the ostracism to which he fell victim. If one wished to support Themistocles, and prevent his ostracism, could one do so more effectively than by tactfully reminding the Athenians of his finest hour?” Ste. Croix, The Origins of the Peloponnesian War, pp. 185.

\textsuperscript{1841} Hornblower, The Greek World 479-323 BC, pp. 21.
sentimentality. Additionally, Aeschylus’ dramatic depiction of Pelagus as the righteous ruler who was willing to risk his polis’ safety to give shelter to suppliants might have been seen as homologous to a defence of Athens’ political position in giving aid to the anti-Spartan Peloponnesians. Admitting that in the case of Suppliants and the Persians a smidgeon of hermeneutic stretching is necessary to draw such conclusions, int the case of his Oresteia we appear to have an Aeschylus who did not need anyone else to put words into his own mouth. The Oresteia is a play about contemporary events in three senses: in the celebration of the reformed structure of Areopagus, in the overt contrast it draws between Athenian legal practices and those that are employed elsewhere, and in its emphasis on the necessity to cement an Argive-Athenian alliance. With the reforms of Ephialtes, Pericles and their supporters the Areopagus, as we saw above, lost its judicial position as an ultimate court of appeal pertaining to any major case in addition to its extra-judicial powers. The sole juridical area that remained under its authority was, in fact, cases of homicide. Orestes’ divine-guided flight from Argos to Athens in Aeschylus’ rendition, is one that culminates in the courtroom of Areopagus whose members listen to both the defender, i.e., Orestes, and the prosecution, i.e., the Erinues, in order to make an impartial institutional judgement for all eternity. In magnifying the sole area of jurisdiction that remained in Areopagus’ hands, Aeschylus appears to have voiced his political preference without relent.

A narrative and stylistic concentration upon the theme of judgement is another pronounced feature of Aeschylus’ surviving tragedies. In the Persians, for example, divine retribution is portrayed as a rectification of an imbalanced political equilibrium whose restitution is seen by all and sundry as the deliverance of just deserts. The workings of divine judgement are also a prominent feature of the Seven Against Thebes. Propagating the Homeric narrative line of

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1845 Though the point was aptly noted by Pomeroy et al., they followed that observation by an elaboration of Eumenides as a play that was written to appease the Athenian liturgical class by embellishing the only sort of trial that remained within the Aeropaus’ purview with a measure of sanctity. Far from endorsing such a reading, I view the political trust of the trilogy as one of celebrating the establishment of the moderate democracy. Pomeroy et al., A Brief History of Ancient Greece, pp.185.
1847 Cartledge, Democracy, pp. 85.
1848 To Vernant and Vidal-Naquet’s eyes, a clash of different notions of dikê is a pronounced feature of the Attic fifth century tragedy. To those of mine, however, Aeschylus’ focus on the theme of judgment flows through the veins of political ontology much more than the allowance that appears to have been
the genealogical transmission of sins, the playwright’s narrative gaze hovers above the two sons of Oedipus, Polynices and Eteocles, whose deplorable fate had been signed and sealed in the blood of their grandfather which was spilled by Oedipus. This rather unidimensional conception of judgement as the divine re-imposition of cosmic balance takes on an altogether complex narrative and stylistic stratification, however, in Prometheus Bound, the Suppliants and most conspicuously in Oresteia. The nexus of justice in Oresteia, to grasp the nettle, composes three levels of judgement that are hierarchically and socially interwoven. Operating at the first level are immutable verities of the order of the Seventh Commandment, for example, whose breaking generates its own terrestrial or, if no one of the victim’s line is willing, celestial agents to rain calamity on the perpetrator until the road to redemption is walked. Agamemnon’s sacrifice of his daughter Iphigenia leaps the narrative to another concentric circle with a longer radius, meaning Clytemnestra’s murder of Agamemnon, occasioning her killing at the hands of Orestes whose matricide comes back to haunt him as his sisters are not willing, for whatever reason, to avenge their mother death. In another play it is Prometheus whose poaching of interdicted divine gifts to humans causes his incarceration on top of the Caucasus. The judgment that materialises on this level, as such, is not beaconed by a deliberative faculty at least making an effort to sift seed from chaff.

On the second level, however, deliberation begins to serve as the handmaiden of judgment. Prometheus steals fire because he deliberately judges that its eventual punishment would have been outweighed

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1849 For a synoptic statement to the effect, which is prophetically voiced by the Chorus that is made up of old men of Argos, the following can be given: “I differ from others, alone in my thinking: | it is the impious deed | which later on begets | more deeds that resemble their own parentage; | for to houses upright and just | fine children are destined for ever.” Aeschylus, Agamemnon, 757-762.


1851 Then again, what to make of Clytemnestra’s cold-blooded murder of spotless Cassandra? Can the act be taken as caused in the main by the shameless unloyalty displayed by Agamemnon in bringing a slave-concubine to his hearth? No, Aeschylus, after all, seems to build a minor pathos of the enslaved daughter of Hecuba whose share of poverty and forceful subjugation following the fall of Ilium is exacerbated by her death at the hands of Clytemnestra. Rose picked up this trial a while ago, claiming that Cassandra’s verbal negation of wealth can be regarded as an implicit recognition by the playwright that the “fundamental economic divisions remained intact,” even when “democracy permitted the démos to protect itself better from aristocratic exploitation.” Rose, Sons of the Gods, Children of Earth, pp. 225; cf. Ste. Croix, Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World, pp. 72-73; Aeschylus, Agamemnon, 772-780.

1852 This does not dwindle the weight of the cosmic tension that is felt by any protagonist who is about to pass the judgment. Aeschylus’ squeezing of Agamemnon between circumstance and divine justice is, for one, a telling example of how strongly that tension presses down on humans: “Fate will be heavy if I do not obey, heavy as well | if I hew my child, my house’s own darling, | polluting her father’s hands | with slaughter streaming from a maiden | at the altar: what is there without evil here? | How can I desert the fleet | and fail the alliance? | Why, this sacrifice to stop the wind, | a maiden’s blood, | is their most passionate desire; | but Right forbids it. So may all be well!” Ibid, 206-217.
by granting a fighting chance to humans among whose ranks would rise one to topple the tyrant Zeus’ reign. The narrative impasse between Prometheus and Zeus’ agents is not one of simple intransigence versus persuasion; it owes its origin to the deliberative force that had empowered Prometheus’ act and thereby made it a crime to the unthinking force of Zeus. For Prometheus the stealing of fire was the closure of the deliberative process that stipulated his judgment, the judgment that ending the tyrant’s reign was worth the trouble. For Zeus the stealing of fire was mere robbery with no extenuating circumstances, which only prods him send those endeared by Prometheus in order to persuade him to foretell his prophesy. The hierarchy of sapience, on this view, runs from the possessor of the deliberative faculty to the frozen ideal whose set of universal maxims cannot pierce through the armour of determinacy to reach the particulars of the event. As with Prometheus, so with Orestes. In the Agamemnon, the first play of the trilogy, we have an already committed original sin which is to be repaid in full by Clytemnestra and Aegisthus’ joint effort to bring down Agamemnon. With the deed done, begins the waiting game. In the Libation Bearers, Orestes sides with Apollo and vengeance after careful reflexion and despite his mother’s desperate appellation of lex talionis to her side. A standstill is then reached because the deliberative faculty of Orestes does not find willing listeners in Erinyes whose élan vital is to mete out unthinking punishment to the offender. In the company of an all-too-worldly Apollo, the metaphysical representation of the faculty of deliberation itself, Orestes, in the Eumenides, begins his voyage from Argos to Athens where a court with an unbiased jury is already established to hand down just verdicts. Athens is fitting for Orestes’ trial not because his plead is granted to be found innocent there; it is appropriate because it is there that collective hearing will have promised justice as its own judgmental award.

1853 I concur with Rose’s construal of Agamemnon of the play as a tyrant whose power feeds off from a conglomerate of aristocratic patriarchy that is duly corrected despite not putting a definitive end to the chaotic bloodletting. Rose, Sons of the Gods, Children of Earth, pp. 224.
1854 Aeschylus, Libation Bearers, 924; cf. Agamemnon, 1425-1430.
1855 Cf. Plato, Laws, 866d8-e5.
1856 Can the Argos of Aeschylus’ Eumenides be taken as analogous to the tragic representation of Thebes as the antipode to that of Athens as a place of reconciliation and recovery for conflicted personalities, e.g., Oedipus? The antimony between the two spatial configurations offers interesting food for thought, as such, in that unlike Athens, Thebes remained a narrow oligarchy for the better part of the fifth century, growing further apart from its Attic rival from the First Peloponnesian War onwards. For the tragic antipode between Thebes and Athens, see Froma I. Zeitlin, ‘Thebes: Theatre of Self and Society in Athenian Drama’, in Nothing to Do with Dionysus?, pp. 130-167, especially 144-150; Pierre Vidal-Naquet, ‘Oedipus Between Two Cities: An Essay on the Oedipus at Colonus’, in Myth and Tragedy in Ancient Greece, pp. 329-359; cf. Charles Segal, ‘Frontières, étrangères et éphèbes dans la tragédie grecque: réflexions sur l’œuvre de Pierre Vidal-Naquet’, in Pierre Vidal-Naquet, un historien dans la cité, ed. by F. Hartog, P. Schmitt and A. Schnapp, (Paris, 1998), pp. 87-109.
The third level is where things get especially interesting. At the top of the deliberative hierarchy rests the liaison between deliberative human collectivity and divine authorisation. Two routes lead out of the judgmental deadlock that we have encountered at the second level. One route takes us to Prometheus’ harsh punishment as Zeus cannot possibly fathom what might have occasioned the former’s insurgence. Recalling a point that is often missed in the popular renditions, Prometheus’ torment only begins when Zeus finally accepts his dedication to stand by his deed. There is no politics of negotiation when one’s adversary is the king of Olympus himself. Yet, the dialectics of empowerment can also be seen as working against Zeus in that his authority makes him blind to the tyranny of his own rule thereby making him vulnerable to Prometheus’ prophecy. Overturning the divine hierarchy is thus Prometheus’ endowment with the deliberative faculty which warrants the eternal torment that he is made to suffer. The second route out of the judgemental impasse, on the other hand, brings us back to the case of Orestes. In *Eumenides*, Orestes’ trial is not one that is dry as dust, far from it: he has Apollo as a witness and Athena herself as a presiding member of the jury. Apollo has, of course, been the guiding force of his actions, with Pylades, right from the outset. Indeed, whenever Orestes’ doubts about committing matricide reaches a point of incapacitation Apollo is there, by proxy of Orestes’ god-fearing friend, Pylades, to resolve the *krisis* qua judgment. Once Orestes’ trial at Athens is concluded with the satisfied promise of a collective hearing of the two sides of the debate but without the closure of a decisive verdict, then Athena takes up the role of a juror herself and casts the deciding vote in order to break the deadlock. Put differently, the judgment at the highest deliberative level does not merely summon divine authorisation to its side in order to tip the scales toward the giving of an irrevocable verdict; it effectively equalises mortal and immortal deliberation in regard to the part they play in the making of the verdict. Orestes walks free because Athena, somewhat ironically, deliberates that male procreativity is superior, at least in her case, to that of female. With the rationale behind the verdict explained, judgment turns into justice and *Eринuеs* accept to transform from vindictive primeval beings into protective hubs.

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1860 Raaflaub, ‘The Breakthrough of *Dêmokratia* in Mid-Fifth-Century Athens’, pp. 117.
1861 “It is my business in this case to give my judgment last; and I shall cast this vote of mine for Orestes. I do so because there is no mother who gave me birth, and I approve the masculine in everything—except for union with it—with all my heart; and I am very much my father’s: so I will set a higher value on the death of a woman who killed her husband, a house’s guardian. And Orestes wins even if in the judgment he has equal votes.” Aeschylus, *Eumenides*, 734-740.
1862 The dialectical interplay between the old gods, i.e., *Eринuеs*, and new, Apollo and Athena, is a driving *topos* of the entire play. Narrative’ movement from clash to compromise, as such, needs to be viewed as the poetic enactment of a more level divine horizon wherein the primordial and contemporary notions of justice can reign in unity: *Ibid*, 169-177, 731-732.
The third structural feature of Aeschylean tragedy is the construction of a metanarrative which translates temporally adjacent events into a discourse of socio-political progression. It seems rather clear that the trilogy of *Orestes* serves as a prime example of this feature. But before moving on to that case, we can look into other surviving plays and fragments which might lend support to our hypothesis. The plot of the *Suppliants*, for example, seems to follow a course through which a transformation from the primitive doctrine of justice, ‘might makes right,’ to a collective parley and counsel is realised. If we take the play, as is generally assumed, as the first in a connected trilogy, with resonances from the antecedent events leading up to the just grounds of Danaids’ escape from Aegyptus’ sons, who had forced the former to be their wives, and the second and third plays potentially covering Pelasgus’ hard-fought military triumph against Aegyptus’ forces, such an ordering would culminate in a subtle movement away from the right of the mighty, thus lending voice to a view of temporal movement as one of political progress. In the likely event that the *Prometheus Bound* initially formed the second part of a trilogy of *Prometheia*, which would have been followed by *Prometheus Unbound*, and preceded by a first play narrating the event of Prometheus’ stealing of fire, there would be another clear testimony to the metanarrative links between temporality and socio-political advancement. The *Prometheus Bound* ends as Prometheus’

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1864 An altogether different construal of the play as centred upon the unrightful supplication of Danaus, on behalf of the Danaids, to Pelasgus who is induced, in the end, to arbitrarily circumvent the procedures stipulated by his polis’ nomoi in offering shelter to the supplicants without consulting his people has been provided by Gottesman. A trenchant critique of extra-institutional politics that is assumed to often being hinted at by curious wordplay, in that sense, is seen as the political message that the play was aimed to convey. Needless to say, the Danaids’ frightful exodus from Egypt barely deserves a mention in the context of a such a structuralist reading of the play that focuses on a tripartite typology that is allegedly utilised by any dramatic representation of supplication from Homer onwards, i.e., suppliant-pursuer-defender, rather than gracing that structure with the specifics of the mythological case at hand. Pelasgus’ ultimate death in the war against the invading Egyptians can, of course, be taken as a warning against the ills of not biding one’s time in communal deliberation. And that warning can definitely be stretched to cover the ground of a steadfast adherence to following the guidelines of institutional politics, which is a point, after all, that is exemplified aplenty in *Oresteia*. In order to realise such a dramatic leap, however, one ought to address the Aeschylean politics of morality which dictate that just deserts will be served to those who use force in order to appropriate what is not rightfully theirs, e.g., the Danaids: Gottesmann, *Politics and the Street in Democratic Athens*, pp. 86-94; Apollodorus, *The Library of Greek Mythology*, 2.1.
1865 Papadopoulou has argued, in that vein, that the democratic Argos in the play can be seen as a dramatic conjuring up of Athens of the playwright’s time: Papadopoulou, *Aeschylus: Suppliants*, pp. 71-72.
1866 For a discussion on the *Promêtheis*, i.e., ‘Prometheus plays,’ of Aeschylus and difficulties concerning the identification of the other plays that belong to the same trilogy as *Prometheus Bound*, see Ian Ruffell, *Aeschylus: Prometheus Bound*, (London, 2012), pp. 16-18.
1867 The play, and the connected trilogy, is the one whose authenticity and attribution to Aeschylus is most frequently debated. We concur with Mark Griffith’s analysis of the subject, in that vein, in taking the internal checks of the play, i.e., vocabulary, rather than the unquestioned ancient ascription of the play to Aeschylus as substantial evidence for its provenance. Our agreement with the method he adopts does not entail, however, that the internal evidence of the play is conclusively in favour of its non-Aeschylean authorship. On that note, we think it apt to recall not only that a comparison can be made
cataclysm begins. There is no respite, only sorrow. The audience has the benefit of foreknowledge to see the carrying out of sentence as alluding to a one-way street of a narrative structure with an endless beginning. The glimmer of hope is still there in the play, however, in Prometheus’ frequent boasts about the tyrant getting what is coming for him. And with the passing of ‘eternity’ between the second and the third plays, the gap between Prometheus’ omen and Zeus’ prerogative is bridged by the half-mortal Heracles. Climbing to the top of the mountain to shoot down Zeus’ eagle and free Prometheus from his vile torment as a part of his Ten Labours, Heracles shows that Prometheus’ faith in humanity was not misplaced. The command of the tyrant Zeus is broken by a mere mortal, albeit one that is fathered by none other than the tyrant himself. By overriding the tyrant’s punishment, Heracles’ deed turns into a harbinger of an age of justice in which no wrong, regardless of how powerful the offender may be, goes unanswered. The moral, needless to add, is that overruling is self-effacing. Naturally, the collection of plays that attest most clearly to a convergence of mythical temporality and socio-political progress, is the Oresteia. Working within a clear time frame that commences with the return of Agamemnon from Ilium and concludes in the verdict of innocence given by the Athenian jury trying Orestes, the play signifies a clear movement from pre-historic to ancestral temporality. The temporal and emotional distance the audience has for the fall of Ilium is carefully interwoven with a glimpse into the incomparably closer ancestral time by which the juridical authority of the Areopagus of passing verdicts on homicide is established. The lack of the endearing aspects of Erinues’ primitive notion of justice to the Athenian demotic politai of 450s is further brought out in sharp contrast to the political and temporal investment that they have made in reforming an institution whose initial flaws were not congruous to a contemporary reality. The physical voyage of Orestes from Argos to Athens serves, in that sense, as a journey that was metaphorically homologous to the with only six other surviving plays, but also that language alone cannot be viewed as capable of deciding the issue. There is a need to account, in that sense, for the tragic power of the play, which appears unmistakably Aeschylean, in order to approximate to a more balanced verdict on the play’s authenticity. Mark Griffith, The Authenticity of Prometheus Bound, revised edition, (Cambridge, 2007), pp. 15-16; cf. H. Lloyd-Jones, “Zeus, Prometheus and Greek Ethics”, Harvard Studies in Classical Philology, vol. 101, (2003), pp. 49-72.  
1868 For the prophecy, see Aeschylus, Prometheus Bound, 771-774, 871-873.  
1869 “Eumenides finally brings an end to the ancient cycle of violence we see continued in Agamemnon and Libation Bearers. As the trilogy moves from Argos, in the first two plays, to Delphi and Athens in Eumenides, so too it moves historically from the earliest generation of the house of Atreus to the trial of Orestes on the Acropolis, where the mythical past borders on the audience’s present.” Paula Debnar, ‘Fifth-Century Athenian History and Tragedy’, in A Companion to Greek Tragedy, ed. by Justina Gregory, (Malden, MA., 2005), pp. 10; that transgression of temporal limits can be extended to political ones as well, as in Rose’s commendable attempt to build a political kaleidoscope through which Pindar’s invention of the theme of inherited excellence is aptly democratised by Aeschylus as one whose ideological rays of benediction washes each and every member of the Athenian dêmos. Rose, Sons of the Gods, Children of Earth, pp. 255.
political development from the primitive origins of ‘tit for tat,’ to a delicately deliberated verdict made by an unbiased collectivity.1870

The narrative enactment of a modified mythical space whose synchronisation with contemporary reality engenders a thorough modification of the Homeric and Hesiodic portrayal of characters, divine and mortal alike, is the fourth dramatic feature of the surviving Aeschylean plays. The narrative space that is built by Aeschylus to accommodate a reworked set of Homeric and Hesiodic characters has no origins, of course, in a dramatic tabula rasa. Signalling a difference of degree rather than one of complete inversion, Aeschylean characters would not feel out of place if they were to be dramatically transplanted into either the Homeric or the Hesiodic universe. But that need not mean that the two dramatic universes could peacefully coexist, anything but that in fact. Aeschylus’ moral modification of myths and characters can thus be analysed through three interrelated lenses: political hierarchy, commonality and intimations of a more sophisticated knowledge of the non-Greek world.

The Homeric and Hesiodic ties between moral qualifications and hierarchical ordering of characters are weak and often conspicuous by their absence. We have observed in the previous chapter that many of the epithets of the most powerful male members of Homeric and Hesiodic Pantheon are not congruent to even a partial transcription on the scales of justice. Yes: the unconscious mechanism of repression and release speaks to the bestial metaphors through which a series of ‘mountings,’ ‘showers,’ ‘ploughings,’ etc., are expressed. The carnal releases of sexual energy, however, do not trigger any moral qualification of it in the explicit sense of condonement and confinement. The poet shrugs his shoulders when faced with an ulterior morality and simply utters “‘tis the way of the world.” So, no: however relevant a psychoanalytic reading of the deeds exhibited by some distinct occupants of the Homeric hierarchical pyramid may seem to be, mere intimations do not confer a self-conscious sense of moral ordering.1871 There is a vibrant politics of morality, by contrast, in the Aeschylean

1870 Alternatively, that voyage can be reconstructed, as Rose did, as one from undeserved penury to pious plenty which is portrayed as a socially inclusive benediction of the guardian spirit-turned-Erinues. Contrary to how Agamemnon flouts his spoils, including Cassandra, around, and to how Clytemnestra builds a net of plots and deceits to maintain what economic and political riches she desires to maintain, Orestes never employs divine injunctions as a measure to whitewash his actions, only ever determined to reclaim what properly belongs to him without excess. Ibid, pp. 250; cf. G. M. Kirkwood, A Study of Sophoclean Drama, (Ithaca, NY., 1959), pp. 34; Wood, Citizens to Lords, pp. 47.

1871 The evidently unhistorical kernel of Freud’s earlier attempts to come to terms with the recurrent theme of incest as it emerges in the classical Attic tragedy has been picked apart into its exclusively phallocentric and inattentive elements aptly by commentators including Juliet Michell, Luce Irigaray and Jean-Pierre Vernant. Freud might have realized that he was due to pay a steep price in exchange for building his elaboration of the play into a definitive statement of the muthos itself. But his recognition of the fact still appears to have fallen short of an admission that his complex displayed a discernible mythmaking quality of its own, sacrificing the historical modifications of muthoi on the altar of
dramatic universe. Aeschylus does not diligently excavate careful insinuations with a narrative chisel; he philosophises with a hammer in not only calling a spade a spade but also in taking delight in portraying its downfall. Aegyptus’ tyranny smashes into splinters when countered by Pelasgus in the *Suppliants*. While it is true that abuse breeds abuse and cruelty springs from cruelty, there is no inkling of a proto-phenomenology here: the unjust is beaten down by the just with the stick of verbal condemnation. Pelasgus’ verbal rebuke of the impetuous herald of Aegyptus lays the groundwork for the military repulsion of the categorically unjust in the later plays of the trilogy. There is no dialogical principle at work here, only an incessant clash of two sets of demands, one with law-abiding justice at its side and the other with might to substitute for it. Prometheus’ defiance of the king of the gods and goddesses for his tyrannical rule, likewise, abides by the erection of a new yardstick of moral values, creating a topsy-turvy political hierarchy through which the boundless divine prerogative of the tyrant is taken away. Prometheus re-sets the political order by desiring justice whereby the absence of moral element in the kingship of Zeus is rejected as inherently unjust. The political dethronement of the tyrant is but a matter of time, for Prometheus’ rightful defiance has proved the moral bankruptcy of his rule from the outset. The reordering of the political universe is most pronounced in the *Oresteia*. When Orestes reaches Athens and supplicates Athena to set his things aright, the figure of Athena does not merely signify a restitution of the old order. The old order in which unthinkingly enforced morality is branded as immorality plain and simple, is, in fact, effectively swept away by the collaborative rendering of judgment. *Erinues*’ acceptance of their re-allotted jurisdiction and Zeus’ condemnation of Prometheus to an eternity of torment both speak to a revolutionised political hierarchy whose auspices permit


1873 Aristophanes, for all his penchant for comic exaggeration, appears to have conceived this point clearly in a direct quip to Aeschylus’ Prometheus made in his *Birds*: Aristophanes, *Birds*, 1545-1548.

1874 Prometheus’ underscored foreknowledge and defiance should be seen in the light of that attempt to create a novel understanding of justice: “[Prometheus speaking] I swear: the blessed one’s president [Zeus] will yet have need of me, | tortured though I am in strong fetters round my limbs, | to reveal the new plan through which | he is to be despoiled of his sceptre and prerogatives. | He will not charm me | with honey-tongued spells | of persuasion, anymore than I will ever cower | beneath harsh threats and give this information away, | before he loosens me from cruel bonds | and is willing to pay penalty for | his torture.” Aeschylus, *Prometheus Bound*, 168-176.
the existence of primordial despots only so long as their rule is bridged to a new conception of morality.

To claim that the Aeschylean dramatis personae always exist within the tight-knit fabric of the mythical world is only a truism if one does not elaborate on the theme of existence. To that end, the Homeric characters also appear, superficially at least, to lead communal existences. The whole epic of the *Iliad*, after all, is set in an assembled war camp that houses the Achaean. Odysseus’ mansion in the *Odyssey*, similarly, seems always brimming with guests both wanted and unwanted. At a deeper level of hermeneutics, however, the Homeric universe, in dramatic terms, is very sparsely populated. In the mortal universe, for example, Homer creates dramatic islands, e.g., Achilles’ tent, Andromache’s spinning wheel and Penelope’s room which offer a measure of solace in its dramatic remoteness. Solitude is ever-near to the leading Homeric heroes and heroines. As Achilles retreats from the battle due to Agamemnon’s overreaching avarice, his tent is dramatically re-structured into an inviolable space. And if Achilles’ famous wrath dreads Agamemnon’s peacemakers when they are being sent to the former’s tent, it is just as certain that they are frightened of the prospect that their visit may be viewed as a sacrilege of the sacerdotal sanctity of tranquillity. Penelope’s room is just as dramatically uninvincible as Achilles’ tent. Indeed, even the full realisation of the fact that they are played for a fool with all the talk of threading a new gown, the impetuous suitors, veritable scum of the earth that they are, never for once insinuate infringing the dramatically sacred limits of Penelope’s room. And in the immortal universe the dramatic islands turn into proper continents. Practically every Homeric god and goddess works against the others behind the scenes because the immortal space is vast whilst a roll-call of Homeric, and even Hesiodic, divinities pegs them only to a number in low double digits. From the dramatic tremors frequently sent by Poseidon’s to Odysseus’ fortunes in direct violation of Zeus’ orders to Hephaestus’ ruse of catching Ares and Aphrodite red handed, Homeric immortals cannot cope with the unbounded extent of their spatial configurations. Hera’s ability to beguile Zeus does not only speak to the ability of Sleep to overcome one and all; it also stipulates a dramatic distance which allots a completely separate spatial existence when the consummate trickster manages to enthral the king of Olympus. Without those dramatic islands there is no tension and hence no narrative movement toward the resolution of any core conflict. No such dramatic island can be found in Aeschylus’ reworking of myths. Solitude is a mayfly’s dream in the

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world of both *Oresteia* and *Prometheia*. The royal retinue of Xerxes in the *Persians*, for example, wail and whimper together.\textsuperscript{1878} Even the ghost of Darius, unlike those of Achilles and Aias that appear before Odysseus in the *Odyssey*, makes a public cameo appearance, chastising his son *in absentia* for having overstepped his mortal limitations.\textsuperscript{1879} Orestes’ pangs of conscience which are felt in his brief solitary moments are alleviated only when the journey to Athens’ Areopagus is complete. Apollo’s accompaniment of Orestes in his voyage may appear reminiscent, to be sure, of Athena’s guidance of Odysseus in the *Odyssey*. Yet, the play’s dialectical tension between universal, i.e., unfeeling and indefinite, justice and particular, i.e., alive and definite, judgement is solved only when Apollo rests the case in the hands of Areopagus.\textsuperscript{1880} Athena’s appearance as the presiding jury is telling: the dialectical movement absorbs Athena’s rationale as an additional propeller of communality in its juridical sense.\textsuperscript{1881} There are no baits or ruses to set up. Unlike the Athena of *Odyssey*, *Oresteia*’s Athena has all the makings of a *demiourgos*, i.e., ‘public worker.’\textsuperscript{1882} Aeschylus’ Apollo qua the barrister-educator of Orestes\textsuperscript{1883} and the Homeric Apollo of the silver arrow, likewise, are worlds apart. Indeed, even the mere shadow of solitude is to be conjured away from the Aeschylean tragedy. Prometheus’ lonely torment only begins when the banter between him and Zeus’ agents end. Technically, it is an artificial suspense created for dramatic effect and, hence, no solitary existence that is inaugurated, for instance, by the vindictive Hesiodic loop. Further, even the appearance of the lonesome torment is dramatically whiskered away when we recall that it is for the ensured communal existence of humans that Prometheus’ serves his sentence. Ironically, the only extended solitude that we have in Aeschylus’ extant plays is one in which no introversion can be presumed to take place. Prometheus’ resolution is firm, his keenness for his deed sharp, he does not mind an eternity or two of infernal torment for he

\textsuperscript{1878} Aeschylus, *Persians*, 533-597.  
\textsuperscript{1879} Ibid, 680-841.  
\textsuperscript{1880} “[Apollo speaking] I have come both to give you evidence—for this man [Orestes] is legally a suppliant and refugee at my heart, and I am his purifier from bloodshed—and to support his case myself. I am responsible for the killing of his mother. You [Athena] must bring this case to trial and determine it with the best knowledge that you have.” Aeschylus, *Eumenides*, 576-581.  
\textsuperscript{1881} “The real cessation of the cycle of violence in the *Oresteia* comes when Athena establishes the Areopagus as a court of law. It takes an Olympian to restore order, but she does so with the help of mortals. Aeschylus does not offer an idealized Athens, but he does lend authority to the origins of an Athenian institution by moving it into the past and associating with heroes and gods.” Debnar, ‘Fifth-Century Athenian History and Tragedy’, pp. 11.  
\textsuperscript{1882} Aeschylus, *Eumenides*, 680-710.  
\textsuperscript{1883} Orestes’ education turns into a *topos* most clearly in the final play of the trilogy, *Eumenides*. Sufferings and the orders of a *sophou didaskalou*, or ‘wise teacher,’ have caused Orestes to attain *epistemai*. His education is homologous, as aptly demonstrated by Rose, to the political education that the Athenian *dēmos* had received under the harsh tutorship of tyrants and oligarchs: *ibid*, 276, 278; Rose, *Sons of the Gods, Children of Earth*, 256.
rests easy in the knowledge that humanity’s communal resourcefulness also replenishes as his life force does each day.\textsuperscript{1884}

The transforming dimensionalities of dramatis personae can also be observed in the context of the deepened knowledge that Aeschylus exhibits about the non-Greek peoples. Although only two of the surviving plays, namely, the \textit{Persians} and the \textit{Suppliants}, appear to bear direct relevance to this point, we argue that minutiae derived from the other plays can also be used to vindicate this point. The \textit{Suppliants}, for one, forges a powerful antagonism between the conscientious and rule-abiding Argives and the unconstrained primitiveness of Aegyptus.\textsuperscript{1885} This dramatic space of ethnic differentiation condenses variegated Hellenic spatialities and temporalities to expulse what is deemed to be incongruent to communal norms and shared values, i.e., alien. Finding an interesting counterpart in the tyrant Zeus of \textit{Prometheus Bound}, Aegyptus’ dramatic contrast to Pelasgus is significant in two main aspects: the explicit canvass his herald’s incomprehension of the customs of other lands; and a proto-dialectics that serves to vindicate the bestowal of narrative superiority on Greek customs as opposed to those of others.\textsuperscript{1886} We had occasions above to observe that the conception of judgment at the first and second levels of Aeschylean universe are incompatible. In the plays that focus on the preconceived polarity between the Greek and the non-Greek that incompatibility is explored to stress an incapacity of the second level judgment to grasp the validity of that of the first level. Aegyptus’ herald cannot conceive the Argives’ own judicial sphere because, for whatever reason, his impaired understanding impedes the confirmation of any customary code that is dissimilar to his own.\textsuperscript{1887} We see the same intrinsic incapacity in the \textit{Persians}, which

\textsuperscript{1884} “I knew, of course, this message he [Zeus] urged on me, but there is nothing unseemly in an enemy suffering badly from enemies. | And so let the double fiery flare be hurled against me, | and the heaven be convulsed by thunder and wild winds’ fury; | and may their blast shake the earth | from its foundations, roots and all, | and an ocean-wave’s surging tumult | block the orbits of the heavenly stars. | May Zeus hurl me down bodily sheer into dark Tartarus | in cruel spirals of compulsion— | killing me will be wholly beyond him.” Aeschylus, \textit{Prometheus Bound}, 1040-1052.

\textsuperscript{1885} Pelasgus’ admonish of Aegyptus’ herald, who attempts to seize the daughters of Danaus by force, is one of the most memorable instances of this stark contrast: “You there! What are you doing? What kind of mentality makes you insult this land of men, of Pelasgians? Do you imagine you’ve come to a city of women? You must be a barbarian with your excessive contempt for Greeks; and with your many mistakes you’ve done nothing correct.” Aeschylus, \textit{Suppliants}, 910-915.

\textsuperscript{1886} That element is brought out in full force in Pelasgus’ argument with the Herald and in the final assurance given by the former to the suppliants to the effect that they have all the Pelasgians to vouch for their safety: \textit{ibid}, 910-965.

\textsuperscript{1887} A reciprocal incomprehensibility knits together the sides to the battle of with between Pelasgus and Herald, boiling down, in the end, to a difference of religious observance. That hint of reciprocity is anything but substantial, however, if we recall that Aegyptus’ forceful marriage of Pelasgus’ daughters to his sons was the original sin that eventuated the flight of the Danaids. \textit{Ibid}, 921-923; cf. Apollodorus, \textit{The Library of Greek Mythology}, 2.1.4-5; K. Paul Bernarowski, “The Danaids’ Threat: Obscurity, Suspense and the Shedding of Tradition in Aeschylus’ \textit{Suppliants}”, \textit{The Classical Journal}, vol. 105, no. 3, (Feb.-March, 2010), pp. 193-212.
qualifies as a play that signifies the Greek re-discovery of the non-Greek in all its idiosyncrasies. Xerxes’ fashioning himself after gods and even attempting to overreach immortals’ own limitations themselves by fettering and lashing waters causes concern for every member of the royal retinue. Yet only when the news of complete ruin is brought home does the injustice of the invasion dawn on the dramatized Persians. Indeed, arguably even then the realisation that their customs may, after all, be defunct is only partial: Xerxes could not succeed simply because of his arrogant persona. By contrast, the very appearance of Darius’ ghost in the play hints that personal flaws hardly have any say in the matter for father, who had no flair for hubris as his son does, had also failed where his son did. The cause of the failure, in that vein, is the same dramatic incomprehension that the political structure of the Empire is seriously at fault which is further embedded by an incapacity to learn from other polities. In short, the gist of the tragic ebb and flow in all the three examples, i.e., the Suppliants, Prometheus Bound and the Persians, is that the Greeks have adapted what elements from non-Greek states seemed conducive to their own respective polities. Herodotus’ exclamations of the martial weakness of soldiers who are used to eating from the palm of the tyrant is homologous to Aeschylus’ portrayal of primitive helplessness when an attempted invasion comes crashing down. The Aeschylean re-establishment of socio-political equilibrium, in that vein, is a conscious allusion to the recent Athenian past whose resonances of the sixth-century tyranny was not lost on a eupatrid playwright who had spent more or less the first twenty years of his life as a subject of the tyrant Hippias. The incomprehension between the dramatic typologies of righteous Greek and tyrannical barbarian is also occasioned by a rhetorical movement toward a dialectical elucidation of socio-political issues. The proto-dialectical vein through which this exchange of cultural motifs is established is, of course, very raw in the sense of its rather automatic leaps between political impasses and their,

1888 Darius’ ghost chastises the imprudent hubris of his son as the bloom of irreverent arrogance that had led to the unmaking of the Persians’ fortunes: “My son achieved this in the ignorance of rash youth, in his hope to contain the flow of sacred Hellespont with bonds like a slave, Bosphorus the divine stream. He tried to alter the crossing, and by throwing hammered fetters over it, he achieved a great pathway for a great army. A mortal man, he thought to master all the gods—it was folly!—and Poseidon with them. A sickness of the mind possessed my son—what else? I fear, my huge and hard-won wealth may soon be plunder for the first men who come.” Aeschylus, Persians, 743-751.

1889 A cloud of political curiosity momentarily shadows the thinking of the Queen when she finds it difficult to grasp that men who “call themselves no man’s slaves or subjects,” were able to overcome the combined strength of the Persian army: ibid, 241-245.

1890 Herodotus, Histories, 5.78; for the insight that Herodotus may have deigned to shed on contemporary political situation in Athens via a detour of the events of 506/505, see Richard Fernando Buxton, “Instructive Irony in Herodotus: The Socles Scene”, Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies, vol. 52, (2012), pp. 559-586; cf. “That [the extreme climactic conditions in Greece] is one reason for the more warlike nature of Europeans. But another cause lies in their customs. They are not subjects of a monarchy as the Asiatics are and, as I have said before, men who are ruled by princes are the most cowardly. Their souls are enslaved and they are unwilling to risk their own lives for another’s aggrandisement.” Airs, Waters, Places, in Hippocratic Writings, ed. by Geoffrey E. R. Lloyd and trans. by J. Chadwick and W. N. Mann, (London, 1978), 23.
more often than not, martial solution. The trumping card of citizen-army, in that vein, denotes
the superiority of the arguments used by the unnamed cunning commander of the Greek fleet
at Salamis and Pelasgus. Despite the fact of acknowledging the non-Greek as a pillar of the
narrative structure, Aeschylus utilises that pillar only by its token of negation of the essentially
better Greek social and political arrangements. The typologies are there to be sure, it is just
that they resemble stiff icons more than they do living individuals.

5.2.1 The Early Atomists, Empedocles, Anaxagoras and Protagoras
Analogous to the Aeschylean revolution of Athenian tragedy, different strands of Greek
philosophy developed significantly during the course of the fifth century. The early atomists,
Empedocles of Akragas, Anaxagoras of Clazomenae and the group of thinkers that are ill-
advisedly lumped together as sophistai built distinct systems of philosophy that altered the
course of philosophical speculation for the rest of the Classical period and beyond. The cluster
of thinkers except the sophistai took the Parmenidean to hen and the phusiologoi’s enquiry
into the natural elements to their hearts. Yet, they often diverged markedly in their
commencement of philosophical speculation no less than they did in the conclusions that they
drew from the premises from which they set out. Given these pronounced distinctions, we
would like to pick apart the arguments that can be gleaned from their surviving fragments by
attempting to sort them out along five strands: physics, epistemology, ontology, ethics and
politics.

None in our group of thinkers took the Parmenidean core set of logical maxims without giving
it a physical twist. Democritus and Leucippus of Abdera, perhaps the two philosophers whose
interest in physics ranked above all else in contradistinction to the others, adopted the
Parmenidean to hen as a logical insight on the material world. Conceiving the material
universe as a plenum made up of bodies and void, they claimed that the bodies in question
also comprised, in their turn, of conglomerates of physical bits whose smallest part would be
an atomos, or ‘indivisible.’ The atoma do not have any qualities in and of themselves; they
are merely the smallest pieces of matter which cannot be divided any further. The things made
up by the accumulations of atoma, on the other hand, certainly exhibit particular qualities that
separate them from one another. What about change and movement of specific conglomerates?
At the level of Parmenidean logic, ‘what is’ is changeless and never in motion for either change
or motion, as we saw in the previous chapter, would make to hen simultaneously a being and,
if time is infinitely divisible as Parmenides and Zeno claimed, a not-being for the simple fact

that movement itself would negate the immutability of to hen. On the level of natural phenomena, however, both change and motion of matter certainly take place without end. The atomists solved this dilemma by strict adherence to the Parmenidean logic: if what is cannot ‘not be,’ then the existence of the void is logically stipulated.\footnote{Aristotle, Physics, 213b4-22 = DK 67A19; cf. “There is no reason for thing to exist than for no-thing to exist.” Democritus, F. DK 68B156 = Plutarch, Against Colotes, 1109a7-8.} The logical vindication of the void, however, does not validate the changelessness of to hen which is why all generation, destruction, etc., is rendered deceptive.\footnote{This negative derivation of the shiftless Parmenidean Being from the negation of the hypothetical argument of the non-being of to hen stretches, as argued by Badiou, is a categorical feature of the later account of Parmenides’ thought in Plato’s Parmenides. Although a prolonged engagement with that dialogue takes place in the following chapters, I still would like to note that negative derivation appears just as much an aspect of Parmenides’ surviving fragments on Being as they are of Plato’s later rendition: Badiou, Being and Event, pp. 32.} With the dubbing of the sensory realm as illusory, authenticity turns, of course, into being the exclusive possession of logical deductions. Never the less, the logical refutation of the motion of physical bodies is not the equivalent of their physical refutation and therein lay the second atomist twist: if the phenomenal appearance is such that there is a bodyless extension between different matter then this interval between the non-adjacent bodies is unreal. Beginning with a plausible application of the Parmenidean to hen to the material universe and thus arguing that the indivisible piece of matter does not possess any qualities, the atomist train of thought thus created atoma as a logical touchstone with which to work out any matter’s claim to authenticity.

The early atomist basic doctrine of logically impossible movement was also propelled towards explaining phenomenal motion strictly on grounds of the traits that are brought together when a conglomerate is formed. To that end, the early atomists claimed that there are different forms and shapes of atoma that, when compounded, necessitate the rise of a definitive set of phenomenal qualities for each object.\footnote{Aristotle, Metaphysics, 985b4-20 = DK 67A6; cf. Lucretius, On the Nature of the Universe, 2.334-521.} Depending on the shape, arrangement and position of different conglomerations, the early atomists went on, each and every fathomable matter exists in the natural world. Yet, the existence of phenomenal matter is only temporary for atoma cannot merge permanently with other atoma and thereby generate compound atoma. Further, in the light of the fact that how the three basic qualities converge in the case of particular matter also defines its necessary motion, the unobservable motion of any original atomos is enshrined as natural.\footnote{Aristotle’s point that Democritus and Leucippus did not specify what kind of motion is natural to different types of atoma should not be taken as tantamount to a deduction that they did not postulate randomness as the type of movement at the original state of uncompounded existence. The fact that no inference cannot be made on the original movement at that stage of the formation of physical universe did not bar Leucippus from asserting that, “Nothing occurs at random, but everything happens for a
in vain and always preordained, including the additions to and subtractions from its set qualities that are caused by different matter coming to collide with one another. It is perhaps interesting to note that this highly developed microphysical speculation stipulated the total effacement of sense-perception as illusory and unreal. At any rate the mere relativity of sense impressions was taken by the early atomists as a direct testimony to their untruth.\textsuperscript{1896} The case of Protagoras of Abdera, however, suffices to give an equally curious yet widely different direction to the same perceptual premises from which the early atomists began their enquiry. Protagoras of Abdera, the earliest and arguably the most influential member of the so-called Sophistic vogue, set out from the basic observation that all sense impressions are relative. But instead of turning to the Parmenidean \textit{to hen} as a potential source to elaborate his thoughts, perceptual relativism induced Protagoras to espouse any material thing that left an impression on the senses as intrinsically true. Reversing the order of atomist movement from logical certainties to phenomena, Protagoras derived a moderate epistemological scepticism and a utilitarian ethics from the assured genuineness of the material world.\textsuperscript{1897}

Empedocles embraced the Ionian \textit{phusioiologi}’s theory of material substances while rejecting their bestowal of the hylozoist status of primary substance on any one of them thus becoming the pluralist pioneer of an equal understanding of the four elements, e.g., earth, water, fire and air. He argued that these four \textquoteleft roots\textquoteright had an equally valid claim to existence and thus rejected half of Parmenides’ argument in that \textit{to hen}, according to the latter, had a claim to totality in its existence.\textsuperscript{1898} Granting real existence to the four elements, however, did not impede him

\textsuperscript{1896} Sextus’ whole testimonia should be taken as a reliable guide to the sensory scepticism espoused by the early atomists. But for a synoptic account of the polarity they propounded to exist between unreal perceptual \textit{episteme} and genuine logical \textit{episteme}, the following fragment can be given: “There are two kinds of knowledge, one genuine, the other bastard. To the bastard kind belong all the following: sight, hearing, smell, taste, touch. But the other kind is genuine and is far removed from the bastard kind.” Sextus Empiricus, \textit{Against the Professors}, 7.139.1-4 Bury = DK 68B11; cf. \textit{In reality we know nothing; for the truth is hidden in an abyss.} Diogenes Laertius, \textit{Lives of Eminent Philosophers}, 9.72.10 Long = DK 68B117.

\textsuperscript{1897} Plato, \textit{Cratylus}, 385e4-386a4 = DK 80A13.

\textsuperscript{1898} \textquoteright For all these things–the flash of fire, earth, sky, | And sea–are one with those portions of themselves | Which have separate existence in the midst of mortal things, | And they, if strongly suited for blending, have likewise | Been made by Aphrodite to resemble and cleave to one another, | But if hostile, they draw far apart from one another, especially | In their birth and their blending and the moulding of their forms, | In no way accustomed to union, and filled with misery | Under the influence of strife, because it was responsible for their birth.” Simplicius, \textit{Commentary on Aristotle’s ‘Physics’}, CAG IX, 160.28-161.7 = DK 31B22.
from utilising the rest of Parmenides’ argument that what is not cannot be. The four elements pervaded all the things in the world and delineated their differences in accordance with their respective proportionality in each matter. With the admission of change, generation and destruction made possible as a simple movement between the material things and the four constituents, Empedocles also confirmed, contrary to the early atomists, the Parmenidean non-existence of void or non-being while postulating movement as mere shifts between the existent objects and former existents which have dissolved into the four elements.

If the material objects are to be distinguished solely along the lines of their respective proportions of the four constituents, Empedocles conceived of two additional transformative elements which were to unite the four elements into particular things and divide the things into the four elements. Love and Strife are the two eternal moving principles that move ever in tow. Love moves different things towards unity while Strife moves similar things towards disunity. Not every movement is dictated by the elemental course set out either by Love or Strife. Earth, for instance, has a natural downward movement. Yet, Love and Strife have an important role to play in anything that involves the formation of things. His relative confirmation of sense impressions also translated into Empedocles’ conception of Love and Strife as acting out without terminating one another. At its extreme, Love’s capacity to unite the dissimilar things, for one, combines all the elements into an indistinct gigantic mass. Strife’s full reign, on the other hand, the elemental mixture is completely siphoned off to create distinct concentric circles of elements. Purporting a cosmic cycle that shifts from the domination of Love to that of Strife, Empedocles cemented the eternal existence of the four elements while bestowing temporary existence on any phenomenal compounds made out of them.

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1899 “For there is no way for what-is-not to be born, | And for what-is to perish is impossible and inconceivable, | Since wherever it is planted at any time, there it will always be.” Ps.-Aristotle, On Melissus, Xenophanes, and Gorgias, DK 31B12.

1900 “Listen now to a further point: no mortal thing | Has a beginning, nor does it end in death and obliteration; | There is only a mixing and then a separating of what was mixed | But by mortal men these processes are named ‘beginnings’. Aëtius, Opinions, 1.30.1 Diels = DK 31B8.

1901 Once the formation is finalized, however, the two constituent principles largely shed their generative capacity, hence becoming material forces within a material universe: “From this point on, there is no place for any other god who is concerned with anyone at all, anywhere. The reign of the Olympians is abolished. Cypris has neither flesh nor bones; she is a presence of Love in organisms, a translation of the law that governs the course of the universe.” Jean Bollack, ‘Empedocles: Two Theologies, Two Projects’, in The Empedoclean Kosmos: Structure, Process and the Question of Cyclicity, ed. by Apostolos L. Pierris, (Patras, 2005), pp. 50.


1903 Aëtius, Opinions, 5.22.1 Diels = DK 31A78; Empedocles, F. 19.9-14 Waterfield = DK 31B21; Sedley argues that a secondary cycle between cosmos and sphairos can be extrapolated from the surviving fragments of Empedocles’ poem. Though his interpretation is rather compelling, I am far from being entirely convinced that such a secondary cycle can be completely wrenched away from the
Anaxagoras conceived an original state of the world that hold every element that would later constitute any object in such small proportions that their combination denoted a state of unity. Granting undifferentiated infinitude to the original mixture, Anaxagoras posited unqualified ‘seeds’ that were placed within the latter. Only with the addition of Nous qua the rational divider can these primordial seeds be fashioned into separate things as Nous begins a rotational movement that divides the mass into respective things. Naturally, the Anaxagorean conception of seeds allowed room for the maxim that ‘everything is in everything,’ which was simply another way of confirming that existent things could only originate from the original mixture. Rejecting the Parmenidean impossibility of creating plurality from singularity by postulating a movement from plurality to plurality in its stead, Anaxagoras allotted a certain share of Nous, which was unique in not partaking of any other thing, to animate beings whose particular nous was not to be confused, however, with the cosmogonic element.

An overview of the particular strands of epistemology that were adopted by each respective thinker can shed a more comprehensive light on what kind of philosophical tendencies emerged from the philosophers’ forays into nature. On that note, we posit degrees of scepticism as the main dividing line between the philosophers with full scepticism denoting an understanding of sensory impression as unreality, moderate scepticism analysing sensory data to conceive intelligible patterns in the physical universe and empiricism as taking sense impressions at their face value. Our brief survey of the philosophical explanations of natural phenomena that have been offered by the fifth-century Greek thinkers has shown that the Eleatic, Pythagorean and Heraclitan aversion of experiential world has largely carried its momentum well into the Classical period. Moderation in regard to the distrust shown for experiential reality, however, appears to have left its mark in virtually all the avenues of philosophising that we visited. The early atomist rejection of the authenticity of sense impressions, for one, may be seen as a direct continuation of Parmenidean arguments; but, we


Anaxagoras, F. 1 Waterfield = DK 59B1.

Anaxagoras, F. 11 Waterfield = DK 59B9; Schofield discerns ordering and rotation as the two core functions of the divine Nous: Schofield, An Essay on Anaxagoras, pp. 59.

“Since there are numerically equal portions of the great and the small, it follows that everything is in everything. It is impossible for there to be in isolation, but everything has a portion of everything. Since there is no smallest part, it is impossible for there to be isolation, nor is it possible for anything to exist by itself; the original state of things still persists, and all things are together now as well. For there is a plurality of things present in everything, and in everything that is being separated off, however large or small it may be, there are equal portions.” Anaxagoras, F. 8 Waterfield = DK 59B6; cf. Aristotle, Physics, 187a23-b7; Schofield, An Essay on Anaxagoras, pp. 103.

ought to keep in mind that their conception of void was based, in the end, on the observation of phenomena in motion and change. Remarkable in its distinctions from the Parmenidean philosophy, the early atomist postulation of shape, arrangement and position of different atomata dictating a necessary course of natural motion, serves as a sublime apogee of this line of reasoning.

The moderate scepticism of early atomists was rather similar to the epistemology of Empedocles. For Empedocles, sensory data, by itself, did not suffice to attain knowledge. Without the aid of the reasoning faculty sense impressions could not be stipulated into an intelligible pattern of philosophy. This did not mean, however, that a full scepticism was the order of the day. The philosopher necessarily relied on sense impressions in order to adapt the Parmenidean arguments to the motion and change that were readily observable in the material world. Empedocles knew the stakes. If he was to introduce the reality of motion, generation, destruction, etc., into his system then he would need to redefine a material basis by which such change could be accommodated. The material basis in question was, of course, the four elements equally appropriating, and hence dividing, the exclusivist existence of the Parmenidean to hen. With a naturalism that went beyond the earlier Ionian hylozoism, Empedocles posited four natural elements whose partaking of eternity could only be matched by the combining and separating principles of Love and Strife. The Hesiodic reminiscence in their naming aside, Empedocles’ moving principles served as the explicit recognition that change and motion themselves were eternal. The derivation of their substance from the elements may be conceived as part-and-parcel of a logical ordering of natural reality. Never the less, Empedocles appears to have objected to such full-fledged logocentrism by postulating the two limits to the complete dominations respectively of Love and Strife. So long as the four

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1909 We do not concur, in that vein, with Taylor’s reading of ‘identification’ of thought and perception into the epistemological fragments of the early atomists. Atomists’ positing of an entirely passive perceiver on whose mind physical experience is imprinted indicates, as he himself notes, that their shunning of sensory-data was guided by a theory that appears to have privileged the structure of thought over the processing of experience. Such partiality toward the causation of any mental state seems more in tune with a disparagement of perception. C. C. W. Taylor, ‘Commentary’, in *The Atomists, Leucippus and Democritus: Fragments*, ed. by C. C. W. Taylor, (Toronto, 2010), pp. 205.
1910 “Nor let it force you to take from mortal men the flowers | Of fair-famed honour. If you happen to speak more than is holy, | Have no fear, and then seat yourself on the heights of wisdom. | But come, consider by whatever means it takes to make anything clear. | Think not that sight is ever more reliable than what comes to hearing, | Nor rate echoing hearing above the pores of the tongue, nor keep | Your trust from any of the other organs by which there is a channel | For understanding, but use whatever it takes to make things clear to the mind.” Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Professors*, 7.125.7-14 Bury = DK 31B3B; cf. *Ibid*, 7.123.3-10 = DK 31B2; McKirahan, ‘Assertion and Argument in Empedocles’ Cosmology’, pp. 179.
1911 Empedocles, F. 14, 15 Waterfield = DK 31B9, 31B23.
elements retained their permanence so did change and motion keep their primacy. A priori logical deductions were hence merged with a quasi-scientific observation of things whereby the four elemental roots were to be posited. A definite prerequisite to philosophical knowledge, in that vein, was underscored as derivable only from perception itself.

The only adherent to an epistemological position that could be regarded as full scepticism of perception was Anaxagoras. Perpetuating the Parmenidean line of logocentric thought with an emphasis on logical deductions that were to be the alpha and omega of his philosophical investigations, Anaxagoras attempted to generate a straw-man image of the material world. It is possible to see, in that sense, the whole Anaxagorean philosophical endeavour as a successful attempt to diverge material observation from contemplative speculation. His argument of ‘everything in everything,’ may be taken as a speculative application of logical inferences into the realm of sense impressions. It seems equally defensible, however, to posit an implicit utilisation of experiential observation in working backwards from Anaxagoras’ postulations to his premises. ‘Everything in everything,’ may have all the trappings of a complete apriorism of the order of the Empedoclean ‘from like to like,’ but it also appears to speak to the use of the argument from probability. Presaging an indistinct original mass conveys an a priori construal of a receptacle to hold together a minute proportion of all that there is. But it also indicates that the conception of the original mixture, as such, is implicitly linked to an assembly of material observations gleaned from the sensory reality. There must be precedent investigative glimpses darted at natural phenomena for the respective probabilities of any thing’s basic proportional structure to be opined. The curious Anaxagorean argument that an infinity of worlds might, for all we know, have been created from the original mixture should be analysed in conjunction with other evident forays of the thinker into the argument from probability. There are two sides to this interesting speculative coinage. On

1913 “It is Love that forms compounds out of different elements and that keeps those compounds together; it is Strife that causes the compounds to dissolve and hinders the elements from combining. It is the interaction of Love and Strife that accounts for the overall development of the cosmos. In fact, both Love and Strife are necessary, and equally necessary, for the phenomenal world to function as we know it, at all levels.” Richard McKirahan, ‘Assertion and Argument in Empedocles’ Cosmology’, in The Empedoclean Kosmos, pp. 172-173; for a more ontologically conceived argument to the same effect of postulating the material existence at the interstices of Love and Strife, or sameness and difference, see Apostolos Pierris, ‘Omoion Homoio and Dine: Nature and Function of Love and Strife in the Empedoclean System’, in The Empedoclean Kosmos, pp. 199, 201.


1915 “For by earth we see earth, and by water water, | By ether the divine ether, and by fire destructive fire, | By love love, and strife by cruel strife.” Aristotle, On the Soul, trans. by Fred D. Miller Jr., 404b13-15 = DK 31B109.

1916 “Since that is how things are, it is fitting to think that there are many different things present in everything that is being combined, and seeds of all things, with all types of forms, colours, and flavours, and that humans and also the other animals were compounded, as many as have soul. Also that there are poleis that have been constructed by humans and works made, just as with us, and that there are a

491
one side, the simple fact that the probability is there for the philosopher to voice suggests a self-conscious attempt to overcome the limitations inherent to logical deductions. On the other, Anaxagoras’ qualification of the argument by opining that if any other world was to be generated from the original mass then it would basically be the same with ours, looks to be a desperate aim at ironing out the empirical differences. Combining the two sides, it appears evident that even when the Anaxagorean philosophy is conceived strictly within its own historical context, the empirical impetus does not appear to be completely wrenched away from the core epistemological premises.

Protagoras was the leading adherent to the philosophical revaluation of sensory experience. To him philosophical knowledge could be gathered only from what is already ‘out there.’ The relativity of perceptions did not hold back the philosopher from positing experiential reality as the beginning of philosophical investigations. Indeed, instead of negotiating an ideational compromise between naturalism and logocentrism, Protagoras ascribed reality to any and all the sensory experience that was sifted through the channels of perception. From the universalizable impression of brokenness conveyed by the stick half prod into water to the supposed inherently justness of any custom, Greek and non-Greek, of upbringing, Protagoras appears to have espoused an understanding of perception that was intimately linked with knowledge. Although precious little survives from his works to flesh out any reconstruction the relationship he postulated to exist between perception and knowledge, we think it is highly likely that Protagoras’ conception of the rapport approximated to a limited epistemic relativism that recognised the reality of the material world despite not making any allusions to the authenticity of the thing in itself.

The fifth-century epistemological revaluation of sense impressions was coupled with a naturalisation of ta onta as it came to be stripped of its hylozoist and logocentric trappings. Our investigations in the previous chapter have shown that the erstwhile Ionian philosophical

sun and a moon and other celestial bodies for them, the most useful of which they gather together into their household and utilise. I have said this about the separation off, because there would be separation off not only for us but also anywhere else.” Anaxagoras, F. DK 59B4A; cf. Epicurus, Letter to Herodotus, 45; Epicurus, Letter to Pythocles, 88 ff; Lucretius, On the Nature of the Universe, 2.1054-1076; Cicero, The Nature of the Gods, 1.53.

1917 Plato, Theaetetus, 151e8-152c6; this rendition should be compared to the rather obtuse extrapolation of Aristotle to cover all the epistemic polarities in order to turn Protagoras’ brand of relativism into one of boundless application. Given that we ponder upon a construal of Protagoras’ limited epistemic relativism below, we would like to cite Aristotle’s remark for now: “Then again, if contradictories are all simultaneously true of the same object, the obvious consequence is that everything will be one. The same thing will be a ship and a wall and a person, if it is possible to either affirm or deny any attribute of anything, as those who argue as Protagoras did are bound to. After all, if a person is taken not to be a ship, then obviously he is not a ship; but if the contradictory is true, it follows that he also is a ship.” Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1007b18-25 Ross = DK 80A19.
probes into original substances had triggered an avalanche of logocentric responses by Parmenides, Zeno, Heraclitus and Pythagoreans. In the classical period the respective constraints of these two strands of contemplative speculation were attempted to be overcome by novel re-conceptualisations of *ta onta* along the developed lines of technical knowledge and expertise. The early atomists, for one, revisited *ta onta* along the lines of a purely speculative microphysics that attempted to posit *atoma* as an undifferentiated minuscule building block of everything that exists. Introducing a sense of uniformity to the primary constituent, the ontology of the early atomists conceived space and time as basic dimensional extensions of compounds that were made up of temporarily juxtaposed *atoma* alone. There was an ontological impasse, however, in construing *atoma* as unqualified in its basic structure. For if no qualification is to be assigned to any *atoma* how could an allowance be made for the different varieties of motion which underscored the distinct qualities of compounds that are comprised of the same uniform *atoma*? A theoretical reconciliation was made by ontologically conceding the properties of shape, arrangement and position as inherent to *ta onta*. The basic constituent, in other words, would have to be equally identical to partake of every existent and distinguishable to set each compound apart from the others. With the further reinforcement of the ontological border separating *atoma* from the existents by epistemologically conferring a status of unreality to the latter, the early atomist *ta onta* turned into a veritable generator of change and difference that sprang, at the level of real existence, solely from the atomic properties.

The early atomist homogenisation of *ta onta* was tinkered along more naturalist lines by Empedocles’ theory of four elements. The postulation of *atoma* as the basic constituent had, of course, managed to divest a large part of empiric reality from the all-encompassing *logos* of Parmenides, Zeno and Heraclitus. The epistemic status of sense impressions, however, remained largely in doubt despite this decisive step. In positing the four elements as an ontological substitute for the unqualified, albeit basically distinct, *atoma*, Empedocles not only carried the naturalism of the ingrained features of *ta onta* to a philosophical height that could not be fathomed by the earlier Ionian *phusiologoi*, he also created an empirically intelligible order of things that fitted rather well with the remaining parts of the Parmenidean argument.

1919 “The opinion of Leucippus, Democritus and Epicurus on the first principles was that they are numerically infinite, indivisible and atomic, and that nothing can happen to them because they are ‘solid’ and have no void in them. That is, they said that these atomic bodies (which were separated from one another in the infinite void, and differ from one another in shape, size, position, and arrangement) are in motion in the void, and that as they overtake one another they collide, and that while some rebound in random directions, others become entangled, if their shapes, sizes, positions, and arrangements are comfortable, and stay together, and so bring about the generation of compound entities.” Simplicius, Commentary on Aristotle’s *On the Heavens*, CAG VII, 242.18-26 = DK 67A14.
The four elements were endowed with naturally distinct properties. The compounds made up of the four elements, moreover, were dissimilar due to the discernible properties of the four elements and the respective proportions of the latter that they came to possess in equal measure. By bestowing ontological primacy to Love and Strife along with the four elements,\textsuperscript{1920} Empedocles confirmed that change and motion would continue so long as \textit{ta onta} endured in its rightful place, that is for ever.\textsuperscript{1921} Put differently, having granted an equal ontological footing to rest and change of the constituent, Empedocles managed to create a pluralist proto-merger of mind and nature with no antagonism in between.

Empedocles’ relative naturalisation of \textit{ta onta} would not find a willing recipient, however, in the case of Anaxagoras. Anaxagoras’ conception of \textit{Nous} as the ultimate dispenser of the original mixture spelled, in fact, the explicit superiority of mind over matter as it was due, in the main, to the \textit{dunamis} of the former that the creation of the latter was occasioned.\textsuperscript{1922} The reminiscence of his principle of ‘everything in everything’ to the early atomist postulation of indistinct \textit{atoma} was counterbalanced with the positing of the primal mass which was bereft of any movement and consigned to nothingness were it not for the rotational movement inaugurated by \textit{Nous}. The cosmic Mind of the Anaxagorean universe assigned an order of ontological existence that flowed from \textit{Nous} to nature and not the other way around. The original mixture may appear homologous to the Empedoclean reign of Love that united all the different things within a mass of indistinction. Alas, that appearance is deceptive in that the Anaxagorean mixture is but a cosmogonic receptacle whose act of creation can only be instantiated by the cosmic mind.\textsuperscript{1923} Unlike the Empedoclean reciprocal movement between

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\textsuperscript{1921} “One after another the roots [the four elements] prevail as the cycle goes around, | Fading into one another and increasing as their appointed turn arrives, | For they are just themselves, and by running through one another | They become men and all the other kinds of creatures, | Now being brought together by love into a single orderly arrangement, | Now being borne asunder by the hostility of strife, | Until they grow together as one and the totality is overcome. | Thus, in that they have learnt to become one from many | And turn into many again when the one is divided, | In this sense they come to be and have an impermanent life; | But in that they never cease from alternation, | They are for ever unchanging in a cycle.” Empedocles, F. 22 Waterfield = DK 31B26; cf. F. 19 Waterfield = DK 31B21.

\textsuperscript{1922} “Mind decided about the combining, the separation, and the dispersal of all things. Mind ordered all things that were to be (the things that formerly existed but do not now, the things that are now, and the things that will be in the future), including the present rotation in which the heavenly bodies, sun, moon, air, and earth are now rotating and being separated off (their separating off being a product of this rotation).” Anaxagoras, F. 10 Waterfield = DK 59B12; cf. F. 14 Waterfield = DK 59B13.

\textsuperscript{1923} A translation of Anaxagorean cosmic \textit{Nous}’ revolutionary movement into political idiom can be realized by drawing partially from Daniel Graham’s interpretation of Empedocles’ Love and Strife as social concord and discord respectively. Though I agree neither with his Aristotelian interpolation of natural movement into the Empedoclean cosmos, nor with his superimposed ethics of the desirability of attaining the union of elements, what social dimension can be extracted from Graham’s interpretation of Love and Strife still seem much more fluid than any socio-political construal of the Anaxagorean primordial dispensation. There is no forcing the cat back in once she is out of the bag in the Anaxagorean
creation and destruction, in Anaxagoras we have a singular act of cataclysmic creation whose possibility of generating different worlds in different spatio-temporalities is practically conceived as the generation of mere epiphenomena that would bear a one-to-one resemblance to Anaxagoras’ world in all its aspects.  

We are largely in the dark in regard to what Protagoras may have written concerning *ta onta*. The few fragmentary evidences and testimonia we have do not appear to warrant, in that sense, the drawing of any conclusions comparable to what can be gleaned from the fragments of the others. What we have, largely in the form of Platonic dialogues in which words are put into the mouth of Protagoras or his impersonators, however, seems to lend its support to the Empedoclean naturalisation of *ta onta* and reciprocity built between nature and mind. Protagoras’ moderate scepticism regarding the existence of gods, for one, can be taken as an indirect testimony to his opposition to the Anaxagorean *Nous*. The status of reality that is allocated to sense impressions, in that vein, can be stretched to cover the ontological status of the existents as well. But the precious little that has survived from his works does not offer compelling grounds for sliding toward any philosophical direction.

In regard to the ethical ruminations of their surviving fragments, our group of fifth-century philosophers largely display a vacillation between the exclusive privilege attending those who continuously reflect on what lies beyond the realm of emanations and an entrenched responsiveness to the relativism of cultural values. The early atomists argue, for instance, that any rumination on the elusive realm of reality is infinitely more rewarding than any keenness on the universe of fleeting impressions. Taking up the earlier ethical theme of working toward the true bliss in philosophical knowledge, the early atomists’ disparagement of the sensory experience finds a natural ally in the superior ethics involved in moving beyond the experiential. Though spearheaded by an understanding of education as capable of *phusiopoiein*, i.e., ‘making nature,’ the philosophical state of true *eudaimonia* still require a cosmology. Likewise, a division of the society along the class lines is just the natural order of things. Daniel Graham, ‘The Topology and Dynamics of Empedocles’ Cycle’, in *The Empedoclean Kosmos*, pp. 238-239.

1925 “Regarding the gods, I am not in a position to know either that they exist, or that they do not exist; for there are many impediments in the way of such knowledge, particularly the intrinsic obscurity of the topic and the brevity of human life.” Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, 9.51.
1926 “It is fitting for people to regard the soul as more important than the body, because whereas perfection of soul corrects physical worthlessness, physical strength in the absence of reasoning does nothing to improve the soul.” John of Stobi, *Anthology*, 3.1.27 Wachsmuth/Hense = DK 68B187; cf. Democritus, T. 37 Waterfield = DK 68B159.
stout devotion to move beyond hic et nunc appearances to what is semper natural. Anaxagoras’ logical refutation of the authenticity of sense impressions follow a train of thought that is similar to that of the early atomists. Although an ethical bridge can be canvassed to link the cosmic Nous and the earthly nous in which partake all the animate beings, no ethic of shared communality can be gleaned from the extant fragments of Anaxagoras. While it is possible, in that sense, that a homology between the cosmic and earthly minds can be sketched, it is just as likely that the homology in question would be quite truncated. The realised dunameis of the cosmic Nous, as we saw above, is reminiscent of a cosmogonic act of creation which is completely beyond the capacity of the earthly nous. The gist of the matter, in that vein, is whether the extant testimonia allows us to posit an ethical tie between the potentialities of cosmic and earthly mind given that Anaxagoras, with hardly any pretension of an Empedoclean prophet-philosopher, as a mere partaker of the earthly mind has managed to conceive the workings of the Nous. Anaxagoras’ own work, on this view, offers ample evidence, despite his own careful demarcation of the potentialities afforded by the two types of mind, to argue that an ethics of commonality can indeed be posited as operating between the thinkers whose reflections shed the light of authenticity on any phenomena. Increasing the social inclusiveness of the earlier Eleatic and Pythagorean communities, this ethics of commonality opened up sufficient room to house different strands of philosophy.

The ethics of Empedocles’ philosophy, bungled as the surviving fragments are, also appear to provide a solid ground for an accentuation of a commonality of a similar kind: that which occurs among an enlightened group of philosophers with a prophet-philosopher guiding them. To anyone with an intimate knowledge of his verses and those of the poetic traditions of the archaic age, Empedocles gives the impression of a thinker thoroughly steeped in the rhetoric of prophetic utterances. Potentially having taken his cue from Parmenides’ and Heraclitus’ surviving works, Empedocles has produced a poetic masterpiece of a journey that prods its reader to take heed of what the sage has to say. And the sage in question has a lot to say about everything. A reworking of the Pythagorean theory of reincarnation and a list of

1927 “Similar are nature and education. For teaching transforms the rhythm of human being, and thus creates nature.” (Hê phusis kai hê didakhê paraplêsion esti. Kai gar hê didakhê metarhûsmoi ton anthrôpon, metarhûsmousa de phusiopoiei). Democritus, F. DK B33; cf. Rose, Sons of the Gods, Children of Earth, pp. 341.

1928 For his probes into our inbred perceptual deficiencies, see Sextus Empiricus, Against the Professors, 7.90.3-4; Theophrastus, On the Senses, 27-28 Stratton = DK 59B21, 59A92.

1929 “In the end as prophets, singers of hymns, healers, and leaders | They come among the men of this world, | And then they spring up as gods, highest in honour.” Empedocles, F. 3 Waterfield = DK 31B146; cf. F. 35, 36 = DK 31B115, 31B117.
abstinences that promote his following of the sage’s hollow footsteps are the main features of a paideia ethics. The Empedoclean theory of reincarnation, for one, serves as a guideline to induce respectable behaviour which can only be inculcated by the sage who holds the hand of his pupils until they can attest the philosophical truth themselves. The proto-monasticism of Empedocles’ ethical teachings signify, of course, a step toward a higher degree of social inclusiveness in that, unlike the cultic aspects of Pythagoreans, the master’s transcription of his inspired insights into verses connote a reach of his teachings that are much more extensive than oral communications within a closed circle. The Empedoclean proto-monasticism, in that vein, is potentially open to all the pupils who are sufficiently inspired by the master’s teachings to receive an education. For the non-aspiring or the bemused, however, the rocky road of Pythagorean transmigration remains ever-open. Likewise, the Empedoclean list of sanctioned behaviour, regulating a wide range of habits from eating to procreation, serves as a trail of treats that educate the pupils in the specifics of the enlightened walk of life. The paper trial of sanctions and abstinences, again, call out to anyone who is willing to put them into practice with no wows of silence or secrecy required. Empedocles’ ethics, in that vein, seem to work as a paideia of inspired self-help in an ethical universe in which esoterism and puzzlement, in the cases of Pythagoras and Heraclitus for example, was rampant. For the Empedoclean ethics Thomas More’s dictum “The road to heaven is equally short from all places,” appears indeed to hold true.

Empedocles’ paideia ethics brings us ever closer to the Protagorean ideal of education. In more ways than one, Protagoras, and his fellow ‘sophistai,’ brought about a watershed in the

1930 Sextus Empiricus, Against the Professors, 9.129.2-3, 9.129.5-10; Aulus Gellius, Attic Nights, 4.11.9.4 = DK 31B136, 31B137, 31B141.
1931 “All the potions there are that ward off ills and old age | You shall learn, since for you alone will I fulfil them all. | You will halt the energy of the untiring winds which blast | The earth with their gusts and wither the fields, | And again, if you want you will bring back compensatory winds. | After dark rain you will make dry heat, seasonable for men, | And after the dry heat of summer, to nourish the trees, | You will make streams, which flow through the aither. And you will bring out of Hades the energy of a man who has died.” Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, 8.59.5-13 = DK 31B111; cf. Empedocles, F. 5 Waterfield = DK 31B38.
1933 Empedocles, F. 1, 2 Waterfield = DK 31B112, 31B114.
1935 The time and energy that would be saved up by that continence was designed to be allotted to the attainment of the knowledge of gods and the principles of the natural universe: “Prosperous is the man who has gained the wealth of divine thinking, | Wretched is he who cares not for clear thinking about the gods.” Empedocles, F. 40 Waterfield = DK 31B132; for an explanation of Empedocles’ preaching of abstention from meat, see Sextus Empiricus, Against Professors, 9.126-130.
archaic understanding of paideia. There was no public education in Athens in the archaic period and that remained the norm for the better part of the classical period. Archaic understanding of the Athenian paideia, for what we can make out based on the limited historical evidence we have, was a private one that entailed a genteel upbringing based on mousikê, the reading and recitation of Homeric and Hesiodic works in addition to what lyric, iambic and melic poetry might have been found close at hand. The part that was assigned to the tutor in that social milieu was merely one of stimulating the transmission of the time-honoured ideas to the children of the wealthy aristoi. From Sappho’s circle of young maids to the listeners of Tyrtaeus’ verses, this pattern of naturalisation of the traditional values became part-and-parcel of what the fourth-century thinkers would dub the ‘old education.’ Essentially a selective communication of the essentials of the aristocratic way of life, there was no initiative that was allocated to the tutor’s purview and no chance of the grassroots démôs to offer a similar upbringing to their children. That changed when Protagoras and his ilk took Athens by storm in the second half of the fifth century.

There were four main sources from which drew the paideia that was offered by Protagoras to aspiring pupils: the relativism of ethical judgments, an ethics of utility, the teachability of virtue and the commodification of education. As we had occasions to observe above, Protagoras achieved everlasting fame for his moral and epistemological relativism. Positing the individual subject as the producer of sense impressions no less than as that of moral judgments which might entail any such perception, Protagoras conceived a level space of

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1938 Although remarked with an aplomb of ambiguity in regard to who its designated historical recipient might be, Lefebvre’s attempt to clear some debris between two divergent conceptions of language, i.e., language as a language-object of the sacred literature and language as a social object that owes its genesis to Athens’ becoming a commercial centre, still appears to fit in rather well with our emphasis on the role played by Protagoras’ works in the transformation of the aristocratic paideia in the fifth century: Lefebvre, Le langage et la société, pp. 351.

1939 A collection of essays on the conception of mousikê in the classical Athenian polis can be referred in relation to a wide range of topics from the politics of the new education to the cultic undertones of the old one: Penelope Murray and Peter Wilson (eds.), Music and the Muses: The Culture of ‘Mousikê’ in the Classical Athenian City, (Oxford, 2004).

1940 “The fissures that seemed to be opening up in Athenian society in the last third of the fifth century—under pressure of rapid social and political change, the intellectual revolution centred in the city and the escalating effects of the claustrophobic conditions of war—famously found one of their clearest expressions in terms of ‘old’ and ‘new’ visions of paideia, and of mousikê as a core element of paideia.” Penelope Murray and Peter Wilson, ‘Introduction’, in Music and the Muses, pp. 4-5.

1941 The Man-Measure thesis brings this unity of empirical and moral conception under the aegis of apprehension. If a person’s perception of any given thing can be shown to depend on the circumstances at all times, then one can conclude that moral judgments no less than experiential ones are subject to a limited relativity of one’s bodily or mental states: “What he [Protagoras] declares, then, is that matter is in flux, and as it flows additions arise continuously in place of what flows out, and the senses are reconstructed and altered in accordance with the stages of life and all the other conditions of bodies. He says also that the reason principles (logoi) of all phenomena subsist in matter, so that matter, so far as depends on itself, is able to be all things that appear to all. And men, he says, apprehend different things at different times in accordance with their differing dispositions; for he who is in a natural state
epistemic capability on which every subject had an equally valid claim to knowledge. Beholden, in all likelihood, to the two Persian invasions in creating a cultural encounter with the non-Greek par excellence, Protagoras’ moral relativism spelled out the beginnings of a proto-anthropology that was to move beyond, slowly but surely, the Herodotean old curiosity shop of exotics. Coupled with an insistence on the rhetorical side of value judgments, Protagoras derived an understanding of mores from a culturally enlarged logicism itself. Partially anticipating the ‘Five Modes of Agrippa,’ Protagoras built a tripod of moral antagonism upon which stood the promise of relativism. These antagonisms were, intra-species disagreements, inter-species dissimilarities and argument from parts and wholes.

The first step in the direction of the Protagorean moral relativism was an incongruence arising from personal needs and tastes. A certain medication can bring chronic sufferers of acute hyperallergy a much-needed respite while being little more than a sleeping pill to many others. Likewise, the medication in question may soothe the symptoms popping up in the majority of human patients but induce little comfort in the case of hyperallergic felines, thence the second step of Protagoras’ relativism of mores. Finally, a surface balm may quieten an otherwise agitated area in one’s forearms despite occasioning disastrous results when applied to eyes. The combined result of these three strands is the maxim that ethics are inherently incommensurable. This understanding of ethics as incommensurability, however, creates a fissure in the ethical prowess of paideia for how can one be thought how to pick a better option when it is granted that there is no ‘better’ to be picked? Protagoras’ response is nothing short of brilliant: by choosing the one that promises more utility to be gained.

apprehends those things in matter which are able to reappear to those in a natural state, and those who are in a state contrary to nature the things that appear to those in an unnatural state.” Sextus Empiricus, Pyrrhonie Hypotyposes, 1.216-219.


1943 Protagoras’ response to Socrates’ inquisition in Plato’s Protagoras on whether he calls things that are not beneficial for anyone ‘good’, hence attempting to insert a degree of commensurability into his thesis, is the clearest exposition of this ethics of incommensurability: “Not at all,’ he [Protagoras] said. ‘I know of many things which are harmful to humans, food and drink and drugs and a thousand other things, and of some which are beneficial. Some things have neither effect on humans, but have an effect on horses; some have no effect on cattle, or on dogs. Some have no effect on any animal, but do effect trees. And some things are good for the roots of the tree, but bad for the growing parts, for instance manure is good if applied to the roots of all plants, but if you put it on the shoots and young twigs it destroys everything. Oil, too, is very bad for all plants and most destructive of the hair of animals other than man, but in the case of man it is beneficial to the hair and to the rest of the body. So varied and many-sided a thing is goodness, that even here the very same thing is good for the outside of the human body, and very bad for the inside.” Plato, Protagoras, trans. by C. C. W. Taylor, (Oxford and New York, 1996), 334a3-c6.
The Protagorean utilitarian ethics appears to have divided the actions into private and public ones. In the realm of private dealings reigned personal tastes and preferences that could be honed by paideia but never forged from scratch. Public dealings, on the other hand, offered greater scope to paideia that would thus have the distinctive features of an upbringing in public weal. What action serves whose interests? Whose interests have a better claim to be answered? What other claims are there and why must they remain pending? All sides of a public debate can be defended appealingly by Protagoras, some more compellingly than others. Yet, there is always a higher stake to be separated from the others that requires prioritisation and deliberation. Protagoras promised his students both: as a successful outcome of their paideia the pupils would learn how to develop arguments for all the sides of a public issue in addition to pick the argument that offered the attainment of the highest utility. All the Platonic obtuse bemusement to the contrary, there was a clear and operational yardstick against which all the political decisions could be measured out against and it was the utilitarian ethics that dictated which course of action to follow. Uprooting ethics from the archaic soil of aristocratic aretê caused havoc within the ranks of the oligarchically-inclined aristoi who favoured the old education with its perennial ties to the prerequisite of large landholdings providing ample material comfort for leading a genteel life. Protagoras, however, gave the injury a further twist: he planted the uprooted ethics on the productive soil of technê.

The upper-class Athenian resentment of menial labour has never become a stock feature of the Athenian dêmos tout court. Dramatic inequality in wealth, despite the fact that the drama in question is never of a remotely similar scale to the one that springs in modern societies just because the general level of wealth was incomparably lower in the ancient ones, was the order of the day in classical Athens even when the material benefits of the Athenian arkhê was distributed rather evenly and hence promoted a lower-class living that was more humane than in other times. The discrepancy in question necessitated that at least 85 per cent of the

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1944 Zeus’ decision to equally distribute justice and political conscience on each citizen in Protagoras’ recount of the muthos of Prometheus in Protagoras, is the central source from which I assembled this re-construal together. Our closest analysis of the arguments that surface in that speech takes place below, which is why we just touch upon some of the essentials here. Ibid, 320c8-323a5.

1945 Despite his lack of differentiation between epistemic and moral relativism, albeit with a roundabout touch that appears to incline toward the former, Adorno’s castigation of modern bourgeois relativism by juxtaposing it to the straitjacketed caricature of the money-grubbing sophist seems to suffer precisely from standing oblivious to this relation between social utility and epistemic perspectivism: “Relativism, no matter how progressive its baring, has at all times been linked with moments of reaction, beginning with the sophists’ availability to the more powerful interests. To intervene by criticizing relativism is the paradigm of definite negation.” Adorno, Negative Dialectics, pp. 37; cf. Adorno, Minima Moralia, pp. 65.

1946 Cf. Waterfield, Why Socrates Died, pp. 158.

1947 I agree with Ober’s emphasis on the viability of an aetiological reading of the temporal succession of events from the pro-democratic revolution of Cleisthenes to the erstwhile attempts in the 480s to
Athenian dêmos work as thês or a ‘hired labourer,’ thus sweating and toiling on another’s account. To some lower-class Athenian, be it a man or a woman, who had, if any, barely enough land to feed one, and hence needed to work, often in more occupations than one, in order to feed her family all the talk about sense and sensibility was, as it is today, mere rubbish. The ‘respectable’ woman who never saw daylight except for in tightly-regulated festivals and funerary processions or the gentiliuomo who started whimpering at the prospects of a sunburn or whitened forearms were upper-class fantasies that fell on deaf ears for the rest of the population. For the privileged 15 per cent, however, the ideals certainly spoke to a certain ideal and, what is more, they spoke true.

Technê, according to the upper-class interpretation, was strictly separate from and inferior to aretê. Aretê denoted virtuous excellence whilst technê was taken to signify mere professional expertise. Aretê designated the apex of a life devoted to the practice of what the modern scholars call the ‘virtue ethics’; technê, on the other hand, was the acquisition of some menial skill that, however laborious, was no end in itself and was, in fact, learned for the earning—horrors!—of money. As far as the upper-class Athenians were concerned, there was no profundity, no ethics and no telos to the practice of technê but only one callous activity that was made for the sake of an equally callous cash payment. Protagoras’ paideia lit this house of fantasies on fire. For the kindling, he utilised his brand of moral relativism: if there is no naturally superior interpretation of excellence, then there can be no jibe at presumed inferiority. For the tinder, he substituted his utilitarian ethics which trumped over virtue by the token of the expedience of the public weal. And for the lighter, he brandished a novel conception of aretê as teachable excellence that was to haunt the aristocratic hearts and minds

found an oversees arkhê. A socially up-to-date and politically rigorous set of reforms were, of course, insufficient in and of themselves in translating the rising tide of thêtes’ rising military potency into a string of victories that was necessary to inspire the awe of potential allies. Still, on the face of it, any watershed of mining profits would hardly cause a final push in the direction of an arkhê had those social and political conditions not materialised in the first place. Ober, “I Besieged That Man”: Democracy’s Revolutionary Start, pp. 100-101.

1948 “Close on two-thirds of the civic population either owned no land at all or else not enough for them to live off; most citizens owned plots of land less than one hectare in area (that is, less than 2.5 acres) and were consequently forced to engage in other activities, as craftsmen or as wage-earning agricultural laborers, in order to make a living. So only a fraction of the citizen population lived off its land, a number that corresponded to the number of those who, in the fifth century, belonged to the census class of zeugitae. To these should be added a tiny elite composed of large-scale landowners, such as Cimon and Pericles—probably no more than one thousand individuals in all—who owned estates of over 20 hectares (that is, 50 acres), which were in many cases run by specialized managers.” Azoulay, Pericles of Athens, pp. 69; A. Bresson, L’économie de la Grèce des cités, vol. I, Les structures de la production, (Paris, 2007).

1949 Pomeroy, Goddesses, Whores, Wives, and Slaves, pp. 73.

1950 For a glance at the aristocratic stigma stamped on paid labour through the looking glass of mercenary service, see Trundle, Greek Mercenaries, pp. 19-21.

for the rest of the classical period and beyond.\textsuperscript{1952} As the fire roared and the building burned to a cinder there emerged, for the first documentable time in the ancient Greek history, a truly novel understanding of a commodified \textit{paideia} that promised an acquisition of its excellence to anyone who could afford it.\textsuperscript{1953}

It has been a stock feature of modern investigations into the fifth-century Greek philosophy to highlight its impact on the initial postulations of medicinal theories. The corpus of medical works that are attributed to Hippocrates and the unknown members of his school exhibit, at times, a generic awareness of various tenets of Empedoclean, early atomist, Anaxagorean and Protagorean thought. From their postulation of the four primary liquids of the body to an understanding of acute diseases as resulting from serious departures from their ideal proportions, the Greek doctors that contributed to the compilation of the medical treatises appear to have drawn a substantial amount of insight from the philosophical tracts of their day. Such a relationship, however, cuts both ways. As the Greek doctors theorised the logical bases supporting their empirical practise using a philosophical set of arguments that were available to them, so did the philosophers who, in their turn, took aid from the empirical lynchpin that underscored the practice of the doctors. The theory of the four bodily liquids,\textsuperscript{1954} for example, while paying abundant homage to the Empedoclean cosmogony, may also have influenced the relative naturalisation of \textit{ta onta}. The nexus of such an exchange between philosophical speculation and medical practice, however, has a degree of complexity that would pale any simple conception of prolonged professional banter. To that end, we propose to analyse three potential strands of epistemic reciprocity that are quite likely to have informed the philosophical rethinking of \textit{paideia} as a teachable and, by extension, purchasable excellence: a rejection of the accustomed practice, a stress upon the performance of \textit{aretê} rather than its theory and a modified understanding of the relationship between the pundit and the client.

\textsuperscript{1952} “Now this intention [of practicing corrective punishments so that the offenders will not violate the \textit{nomos} again] shows his belief that excellence [\textit{aretê}] can be produced by education; at least his aim in punishing is to deter. Now this opinion is shared by anyone who administers chastisements either in a private or in a public capacity. And everyone chastises and punishes those whom they think guilty of wrongdoing, not least your fellow citizens, the Athenians; so according to this argument the Athenians are among those who think that excellence can be trained and thought." Plato, \textit{Protagoras}, 324b9-c5; cf. Robin Waterfield, \textit{Why Socrates Died: Dispelling the Myths}, (New York and London), pp. 62, 161.

\textsuperscript{1953} It is conceivable that Protagoras’ lost \textit{Megas Logos} was in tune with converting his readers to his averred standpoint on different matters pertinent to \textit{paideia}. Unfortunately, the only fragments that are attested to that work are practically too general to make any inferences: “Protagoras said, in the work entitled \textit{The Great Speech}, ‘Teaching requires natural ability and practice,’ and ‘In learning, one must start from early youth.’” \textit{Anecdota Parisiensia}, in \textit{The Greek Sophists}. 1.171, 31.

\textsuperscript{1954} The author of the Hippocratic treatise \textit{On the Nature of Man} postulates that the four constituent substances, namely, blood, phlegm, yellow bile and black bile, oblige any doctor to treat his patients on account of the divergence that their bodies display from the natural equilibrium of the elements of wetness, dryness, coldness and hotness. \textit{The Nature of Man}, in \textit{Hippocratic Writings}, 3-4; cf. \textit{The Seed}, in \textit{ibid}, trans. by I. M. Lonie, 3.
A common feature in the Hippocratic works is their pronounced enmity frequently shown to peddlers of elixirs, witchdoctors, soothsayers, exorcists, etc., or any and all medical non-professionals.\textsuperscript{1955} To the ancient medical professional, there was a key ingredient that set his practice apart from the wishful swindler donning the clothes of the village soothsayer: a knowledge of causality pertinent to the development of any disease.\textsuperscript{1956} The professionalisation of the medical knowledge was heralded with a complete classification of types of disease, body and professional advice.\textsuperscript{1957} Mapping out what had hitherto been viewed as \textit{terra incognita}, the medical professionals identified symptoms, ranks and potential treatments for the sake of guiding their healing methods. Symptoms, for one, varied depending on the type of disease and patient. What has been identified as a consumptive diarrhoea differed from gastritis not in regard to the acuteness of its symptoms but also in their very range. With the recognition of diverse symptoms came the classification of each disease’s stages of expansion and contraption. Telling the difference between a disease that was on permanent regress, i.e., full recovery, one that gave an indecisive temporal interval without completely loosening its sting, i.e., partial recovery, and one that gave a momentary temporal respite before striking out in full and hence instigating the moment of \textit{krisis}, i.e., likely non-recovery, each stage was identified for its discernible features that required sorts of medical intervention. The variegated types of treatment that were deemed fitting for each respective stage of acuteness informed the rise of a typology of medicaments and surgery, which acted as preventive medicine either in consumptive cases or in others where the prescribed medication failed to do its work.

\textsuperscript{1955} One of the clearest instances of such admonish was occasioned when the author of \textit{The Sacred Disease} began his treatise on epilepsy with a thorough deconstruction of any claim to knowledge on the part of those who purported that there is a divine element to the disease: “By such claims and trickery, these practitioners pretend a deeper knowledge than is given to others; with their prescriptions of ‘sanctifications’ and ‘purifications’, their patter about divine visitation and possession by devils, they seek to deceive. And yet I believe that all these professions of piety are really more like impiety and a denial of the existence of the gods, and all their religion and talk of divine visitation is an impious fraud which I shall proceed to expose.” \textit{The Sacred Disease}, in \textit{ibid}, 3; cf. \textit{Regimen in Acute Diseases}, in \textit{ibid}, 8; cf. M. Laura Gemelli Marciano, ‘Empedocles’ Zoogony and Embryology’, in \textit{The Empedoclean Kosmos}, pp. 375.

\textsuperscript{1956} Transforming \textit{to aition} from ‘that which is responsible’ into a rather impartial ‘cause,’ Greek doctors of the classical age posited natural causes against the fickleness of chance, which was deemed more of an excuse for unsuccessful practitioners of medicine rather than an actual factor in any attempt to treat curable cases: “The majority of plants and preparations contain substances of a remedial or pharmaceutical nature and no one who is cured without the services of a doctor can ascribe his cure to chance. Indeed, upon examination, the reality of chance disappears. Every phenomenon will be found to have some cause, and if it has a cause, chance can be no more than an empty name. The science of medicine is seen to be real both in the causes of the various phenomena which occur and in the provisions which it takes to meet them, nor will it ever cease to be so.” \textit{Science of Medicine}, in \textit{ibid}, 6; cf. \textit{Airs, Waters, Places}, 22; \textit{Regimen in Acute Diseases}.

\textsuperscript{1957} That variegation of pathological knowledge appears to have been influential in creating the tradition of medical Empiricism which focused on the particularities that were on offer in any case rather than on theoretical generalisations. Medical empiricism, in turn, would give way to philosophical scepticism beginning from the third century: R. J. Hankinson, \textit{The Sceptics}, (London and New York, 1995), pp. 8.
The analysis of diseases and their compartmentalisation into different typologies also informed a need to classify different types of humans. Thanks in large part into a broadening knowledge of climactic, geographic and demographic features of territories that were bordering the classical Greek world, the Greek doctors used the analytical tools of their trade to draw comparisons and contrasts between different types of bodies. Some bodies were deemed more prone to intestinal diseases as a combination of a variety of factors, such as the prevalence of the eastern winds, lack or excess of humidity, the warmness of the spring water in supply, etc., whereas others were typified as more susceptible to pneumopathy as a result of average climactic conditions, the mountain ranges skirting the territory in question, etc.

Each typology bred a distinct set of factors to be kept in mind when a course of treatment was to devised. The lack of moderate temperatures, for instance, would trigger a less-than-optimal balance of the bodily liquids and thereby give more room for the development of acute diseases. Conceived alongside a not irrelevant measure of xenophobic chest-beating, a state of elemental balance, one that concerned bodily liquids, combined with extremes in climactic averages, and other factors, e.g., the availability of water from high grounds and hills, etc., was deemed to be closest to a disease-free natural condition. Different deviations from the equilibrium condition, in their turn, translated into the development of pathologies the recovery from which was regarded as the restoration of the former. As diverse types of disease and body came to be classified more and more as representatives of analytical archetypes, the professional advice of the doctors also began to be guided by a documented history of the disease and its development in individual cases.

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1958 *Airs, Waters, Places* is the tract that focuses on the factors leading to the emergence of different constitutions most unequivocally. From particular aspects concerning astronomy to meteorology, nothing should escape the inquisitive gaze, the authors argue, of the doctor if he wants to be of full service to his patients: “If it should be thought that this is more the business of the meteorologist, then learn that astronomy plays a very important part in medicine since the changes of the seasons produce changes in diseases.” *Airs, Waters, Places*, 2; cf. *Aphorisms*, 1.17.


1961 “The small variations of climate to which the Asiatics are subject, extremes both of heat and cold being avoided, account for their mental flabbiness and cowardice as well. They are less warlike than Europeans and tamer of spirit, for they are not subject to those physical changes and mental stimulation which sharpen tempers and induce recklessness and hot-headedness. Instead they live under unvarying conditions. Where there are always changes, men’s minds are roused so that they cannot stagnate.” *Airs, Waters, Places*, 16.

1962 “Luxuriance and ease of cultivation are to be found most often when there are no violent extremes, but when a temperate climate prevails.” *Ibid*, 12.


1964 “It is not enough to say ‘cheese is harmful because it produces pain if much of it is eaten. One should know what sort of pain, why it is produced and which organ of the body is upset. ... Some can eat their fill of it without any unpleasant consequences and those whom it suits are wonderfully strengthened by it. On the other hand, there are some who have difficulty digesting it. There must, then, be a difference in their constitutions and the difference lies in the fact that, in the latter case, they have something in the body which is inimical to cheese and this is aroused and disturbed by it. Those who have most of
The Hippocratic works functioned as a veritable memory-bank or a proto-pathological institute from which a practitioner could ask for specific guidelines.\textsuperscript{1965} Setting up a record of precedents was nothing short of crucial; without the availability of such references the doctor had to rely on memory and personal contacts alone. The problem was, in that vein, twofold. First of all, the completely transparent relationship between doctor and patient afforded minimal margin of error given that any misstep or misapplication on the part of the doctor was immediately observable for the patient and his or her family. Recalling that the patients who could ask for professional medical service were, by and large, the upper-class Greeks of their respective poleis, any transgression of what little room for error that the doctor had would be duly punishable by a set of penalties that were equally incapacitating.\textsuperscript{1966} And as a modification of the solemn words of wisdom that was etched by the author of the renowned \textit{Aphorisms} would declare, ‘for art is long and memory short,’\textsuperscript{1967} the documentation of precedents was a practical necessity for the successful practice of any Greek doctor. Secondly, medical vocation was an intensely competitive profession due to the incomparable substantiality of the risks and rewards involved. A mistreatment of a powerful individual could have serious repercussions for the doctor who had given the treatment no less than for any other that was unfortunate enough to practice around the same whereabouts. Contrariwise, fortunes could be made and advisory positions to kings and tyrants could be held on the groundwork laid by successful medical practice.\textsuperscript{1968} To those of the profession who shared in the individual practitioner’s stakes of veneration and mortification there was one clear route out of the predicament: to establish medical schools. Medical expertise was to emanate from a few centres of practical and theoretical schools whose students were to keep the teachings of their tutors close to their

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\textsuperscript{1965} For a programmatic statement of the objects and scope of medicinal study, see \textit{Epidemics}, 1.23; for particular case studies of diverse patients, see \textit{ibid}, 1, 3.

\textsuperscript{1966} The authors of the Hippocratic treatises often noted that medicinal professionals were no miracle-workers and, hence, should not be poured scorn if they fail to induce recovery in a case in which the disease is considered consumptive: “A man who thinks that a science can perform what is outside its province, or that nature can accomplish unnatural things, is guilty of ignorance more akin to madness than to lack of learning. Our practice is limited by the instruments made available by Nature or by Art. When a man is attacked by a disease more powerful than the instruments of medicine, it must not be expected that medicine should prove victorious.” \textit{The Science of Medicine}, 8; cf. \textit{Aphorisms}, 7.87.

\textsuperscript{1967} \textit{Aphorisms}, 1.

\textsuperscript{1968} The paradigm historical case of the well-heeled doctor is, of course, Herodotus’ rendition of the fortunes of Democedes of Croton. Once a captive of Oroetes who, afterwards, was captured by Darius’ troops in their hunting of the former in Sardis, Democedes eventually became the court physician to Darius. Of course, the sudden spike in his fortunes should not be taken as coming out of the blue as his fame had spread throughout the Aegean even before he came to be captured by the Persians. His lucrative public employment in Aegina and later by Polycrates the tyrant of Samos are two Herodotean testimonies to the effect that doctors with good reputations were a highly-prized and vaunted commodity in the classical Greece. Herodotus, \textit{Histories}, 3.129-132.
chests. The concentration of medical *paideia* along those spatial lines, in that vein, served as a stimulant to secrecy and exclusiveness that deterred any attempt to forge lines of professional commonality.\(^{1969}\) By the beginning of the second half of the fifth century, however, some influential doctors had already committed themselves to writing treatises of theoretical reflections on medicine as well as practical reports of precedent treatments. The corpus grew as it offered a unique chance for practicing doctors to refer the treatment of their patients to past instances without necessarily infringing on the authority of the medicinal schools.

*Paideia’s* transformation into Protagoras’ teachable and commodified excellence was realised roughly at the same time as the emergence of a considerable part Hippocratic corpus. Yet, there were important distinctions between the development of the two traditions of commodified teaching along the lines of their respective degrees of social exclusivity and the financial rewards they promised to the prospective pupils. Protagoras did not establish a school or operated under the authoritative auspices of one. He was a *metoikos* that offered to teach a thoroughly reworked understanding of *aretê* to a largely distant citizen-body in return for a fee. There was no artisanal tradition to guard the transmission of the trade’s secrets or to supervise a price range for the goods produced. Protagoras created a respectable trade of his own as he plied it. Anyone could partake of his private lectures and public discussion provided that he was willing to pay and to banter without turning the verbal exchange into one of monology. Neither the making of pretty coin nor a collection of aspiring pupils was ever given. The lack of an artisanal institution thus worked against the material interests of the tutor who had to work with ad hoc material valuations. Later Platonic rebukes of heavy-hitting sophists fleecing their customers to the contrary, there was no guarantee at all that the Athenian super-rich were to fill out the queues waiting for Protagoras’ services.\(^{1970}\) The relatively increased degree of social inclusiveness, in contradistinction to the established practice of the medicinal schools, is hence very likely to have played a part in the eventual popularisation of the new *paideia* of commodified excellence.

\(^{1969}\) “Holy things are revealed only to holy men. Such things must not be made known to the profane until they are initiated into the mysteries of science.” *The Canon*; cf. *Decorum*, 18.

\(^{1970}\) “Now, generally speaking, you will find that no one of the so-called sophists has accumulated a great amount of money, but that some of them have lived in poor, others in moderate circumstances. The man who in our recollection laid up the most was Gorgias of Leontini. He spent his time in Thessaly when the Thessalians were the most prosperous people in Hellas; he lived a long life and devoted himself to the making of money; he had no fixed domicile in any city and therefore paid out nothing for public weal nor was he subject to any tax; moreover, he did not marry and beget children, but was free from this, the most unremitting and expensive of burdens; and yet, although he had so great an advantage toward laying up more wealth than any other man, he left at his death only a thousand starters.” Isocrates, *Antidosis*, in *Isocrates, in III Volumes*, ed. by T. E. Page, E. Capps and W. H. D. Rouse, and trans. by George Norlin, (Cambridge, MA., 1929), 155-157; cf. Plato, *Hippias Major*, 282b5-c8; Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics, 1218b20-25; Aristotle, *The Art of Rhetoric*, 1355a18-21.
A line of division between the two understandings of paideia can also be drawn on account of
the relative discrepancy in the promise of material gain that they respectively seem to have
offered to their aspiring candidates. Growing rich from the teachings of Protagoras was, unlike
the successful pupils of Hippocrates for instance, considerably difficult if not impossible. For
one, no public pay for office was introduced until the end of 450s. To open up a practice
was similarly difficult for the simple reason that rising numbers of metoikoi sophists with ever-
expanding renown had begun to flock to Athens during the second half of the fifth century.
Protagoras’ teachings, as such, had little purchase for those that were keen on embarking on a
political career in order to take their part of the growing Athenian affluence. In contrast to the
medical professionals who had a steady supply of patients, Protagoras’ prospective patients
would need the enhancement of the democratic procedures in order to seek professional aid
for their entrenched aristocratic preferences.

The political reflections of our group of philosophers appear to have adhered to a similar line
of demarcation between democratic and aristocratic politics. The political philosophy of the
early atomists, or what fragments survive from such an outlook, seem conducive to the
adoption of an avowed distance from politics at all levels. The democratisation attempts that
had surfaced in many a polity by the 450s may have exerted an influence, in that sense, on a
politically-imbibed account of ontologically stipulated atoma. With too many speculative gaps
and hardly any compelling testimonia to fill them, however, such an interpretation remains
necessarily conjectural based on the state of current literary evidence. The political aspects of
Anaxagoras’ philosophy, on the other hand, provide a more fertile historical ground for
modern elaborations. Insistently drawn as a figure that was in the company of Pericles by the
later commentators, Anaxagoras’ cosmic Nous might be taken as metaphorically marching to
the drumbeat of an homage to Pericles as the rightful primus inter pares. Indeed, given that
Anaxagoras’ need for influential friends appears historically persuasive in the light of his fair
share of controversial doctrines, his ontological predication of earthly nous upon the creative
acts of the cosmic Nous might have carried an explicit note of approval of Pericles’ policies.

1971 Buckley, Aspects of Greek History 750-323 BC, pp. 245.
1972 This dilemma between the sophists’ offering their services to the sons of the Athenian rich,
newcomers and old ones alike, and their speaking to a profound sense of democratic politics is
perceptively observed by Rose: “The relation of the Sophists to the class divisions of Athens is rather
complex and explains in part the almost universally negative view preserved of their educational role:
there was something about them to offend every class sooner or later. As we noted earlier, the general
thrust of their anthropology was egalitarian, and most Sophists are associated with a pro-democratic
perspective. … On the other hand, their large fees and foreign status precluded their serving the demos
directly. Whatever their sentiments, they served the interests of those who had money, and accordingly
they seem to have been distrusted by the demos pretty early.” Rose, Sons of the Gods, Children of Earth,
pp. 310-311; cf. W. K. C. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, III. The Fifth-Century Enlightenment,
If we continue that train of thought and posit an equally-shared *nous* as an allusion to democratic politics, then a readily available cosmogonic sanction for democracy appears as a consequential conclusion to the Anaxagorean philosophy. Anaxagoras was not oblivious to the fruits of democratic politics. He theorised which was in some ways quite an against the grain philosophy within the milieu of one of the most tolerant historical examples of ancient Greek *poleis*. Yet, if we grant the historicity of his close relationship with Pericles in addition to his alleged banishment from the city on charges of impiety at a time when scapegoating was running wild, then it seems warranted to claim that Anaxagoras might have recognised that he needed powerful friends in order not to get capsized in a bout of anti-*metoikoi* bout of demotic fervour.

Empedocles’ political philosophy appears, on the other hand, fittingly Akragantine. His self-styled prophetic stature, for example, strikes one as a thoroughly politicised understanding of the sage and his retinue that would seem quite appealing to the Sicilian tyrants who had a fair share of courtiers that were eating from the palm of their hands. His relatively equalitarian conception of *paideia*, however, seems to speak to a practical, yet equivocal, support of democratic politics. The divine inspiration of the philosopher-poet is, to be sure, readily observable for all to see. And still, the written transmission of his inspiration goes against the idea of a closed-sect of disciples jealously guarding the mysterious teachings of their master. There was no fortified monastery of the Empedoclean philosophy; but there certainly was a prophet-philosopher who preached his following in the ways of virtuous living. And if the two features appear deeply contradictive, that is a sign of the times in the fifth-century Sicilian *poleis* instead of Empedocles’ own bemusement regarding what to make of politics of his day.

The most emphatic taking of political sides surfaces, of course, in the later, and mainly Platonic, representations of Protagoras and his philosophy. We have observed above what a cataclysmic force was unleashed with Protagorean rethinking of *paideia*. The material fortunes of the new education, as we ventured on to claim, were directly related to the entrenchment of democratic politics as only that could give the political impetus to the upper-class Athenians to take the benefits promised by Protagoras’ educational programme seriously. Protagoras, if we are to confirm the later philosophical tradition about his teachings, was the first to recognise that democracy and his commercialised *paideia* went hand in hand. Equally gifted in mythmaking and storytelling alike, he turned into a fervent adherent to the rational voicing of all the arguments so long as they abided by the rules of democratic governance. The political benefits offered by such a programme, provided that political reforms would consolidate the move towards democracy, were nothing to be belittled. To the *eupatridae* it provided the
rhetorical keys to a demotic outlet wherein the claims to political leadership could safely be staked. To the non-\textit{eupatridae} it afforded the rhetorical tickets to gain admission to a political arena that hitherto had been dominated by the notable members of the \textit{eupatridae}. And to the grassroots \textit{demos} it presented a significant chance to recognise the sides of any debate in order to gauge them in conjunction with their pledged benefits, material or otherwise, to themselves. Yet, the Protagorean adjustments to the political balance sheet did not offer comparably equal socio-economic gain for all; indeed, for the aristocratically-inclined members of the upper-class it threatened, at least superficially, to take more than it promised to give.

Under closer scrutiny, the socio-economic gains and losses of the \textit{eupatridae}, in regard to the Protagorean programme, appears to take a conclusive tilt in the direction of gains. But first, a brief foray into the historical context. The Athenian economy rested on exports of artisanal products, olive oil in addition to the security of the Aegean afforded by its fleet in the fifth century. In return, the Athenians imported grain, Aegean delicacies and other luxuries that were shipped from various emporia in the Mediterranean. The perennial pattern of aristocratic profits derived mainly from absentee landlordism that had remained largely in its preeminent place. Yet, the rapid steps towards the creation of the Athenian \textit{arkhê} stimulated an aristocratic branching out that involved shareholdings of the richer veins of the Laurium mines, cutlery and shield sweatshops, sponsorships of maritime expeditions, etc.\textsuperscript{1973} A significant portion of this new pattern concerned the ownership of or investments on proto-industrial small to medium-scale foundries that specialised in the manufacture of utensils, intermediate goods, furniture, etc.\textsuperscript{1974} The rediscovery of the profit to accumulate from these expanded avenues of industrial production has encouraged many modern historians to argue for a renaissance of making a quasi-capitalistic fortune on relatively industrialised strands of production in the fifth-century Athens. The monopoly industrialists, or, at least, their most politically conspicuous ones, however, have been shown to have sprung largely from the ranks of the old landholders. In short, there is precious little historical evidence to warrant a reading of the

\textsuperscript{1973} Later during the first half of the fourth century, Xenophon would offer his readers with the words of economic wisdom to the effect of publicly owning the slaves that toiled away in the mines and other proto-industrial enterprises in Laurium, which, he believed, would prove a steady source of income for all the Athenians: “Even today there are plenty of men in the mines hired out in the same way. If my proposals were put into practice, the only novelty would be that the state would imitate those private individuals who have arranged things so that their ownership of slaves is a permanent source of income for themselves, and would acquire state-owned slaves, up to the level of three for each citizen.” Xenophon, \textit{Poroi}, 4.16-17; following Xenophon’s thread, Osborne has argued that the slave-driven exploitation of silver resources was “the most important Athenian resource, exported in substantial quantities.” Osborne, \textit{Demos}, pp. 111.

\textsuperscript{1974} “In Athens, we hear more often of medium-sized workshops with a dozen or so slaves than we do of large ones, such as the shield-making factory owned by the father of the speechwriter Lysias, to which 120 slaves were attached. Larger workshops, large enough to count as factories, did not generally appear before the Hellenistic period.” Waterfield, \textit{Creators, Conquerors, and Citizens}, pp. 193.
more frequent references to industrial activities in the contemporary documents as bearing testimony to the rise of a new non-epatrid entrepreneurial class. The money-grubbing rags to riches demagogue of the post-Periclean politics was another one of those oligarchically-inspired myths that surfaced for the first time during the last quarter of the fifth century.

But even if one were to grant, for argument’s sake, that a sizeable number of nouveau-riches was added to the ranks of the Athenian super-rich in this period, there does not necessarily arise an intra-elite conflict as a result of such a social reshuffling of the eupatrid deck.

There are two core issues that induced the cohesion of the super-rich against a democratically coalesced thêtes: their liability to the same liturgical payments and their profiting from the economic consolidation of the Delian League. With eupatrid origins or otherwise, the Athenian super-rich were subject to the paying of different liturgies. On occasions we have observed above that the liturgies in question covered choregeia and trierarchia, which served as indirect taxes to redistribute wealth in the form of dramatic competitions and triremes respectively. Excepting the emergency eisphora, whose application in the fifth century is as much a question of endless scholarly debate as any other topic, there was no economically redistributive direct taxing of the Athenian rich until at least the first quarter of

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1975 Harvey’s response to Osborne’s attempt at providing a politically sensitive re-construal of the aristocratically charged sukhophantes qualifies as an excellent example of how the itineraries of these expressly oligarchic muthoi are kept alive by some of the modern scholars. Taking statistical frequency as definitive can only be realised if one willingly turns a blind eye to the clear-cut class lines whence sprang practically all the fourth-century testimonia we have to the (ab)uses of the concept in question. Harvey can daze with his tour de force on the quantitative frequency with which the term appears within Demosthenes’, Aeschines’ or Isocrates’ corpus. What he cannot do is to match that skill with the congruent one of source criticism, starting with the acknowledgement that those examples operate on an aristocratically redefined plane of application such as they are. David Harvey, ‘The Sykophant and Sykophany: A Vexatious Redefinition’, in Kosmos, esp. pp. 110-112.

1976 “While Pericles was a champion of the people the constitution was not in too bad a state, but after his death it became much worse. It was then that the people first took a champion who was not of good repute among the better sort, whereas previously it was always men of the better sort who were popular leaders.” Aristotle, The Athenian Constitution, 28.1; cf. 28.3-5; Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, 2.65.10-13; Plato, Gorgias, 515e; Polybius, Histories, 9.23.6.

1977 Ober, Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens, pp. 199; the quantitative difference in expenditure that was obliged by the two respective forms of liturgy is pinned down by Millett to a striking range between 1/6-1/2 in favour of trierarchy: “The trierarchy was the most expensive liturgy, costing as much as one talent; the cheapest (providing a chorus for Panathenaea) came to 300 dr. In the middle range, the average festival liturgy cost between 1,200 and 3,000 dr.” Millett, Lending and Borrowing in Ancient Athens, pp. 68.

the fourth century. In addition, economically cumbersome as it were, even the fourth century eisphora was tailored in line with the general interests of the upper-class Athenians. Liability for eisphora, for one, was wider than the liability for trierarchy, which continued to be the heaviest burden on the members of the liturgical class on whom it fell.\textsuperscript{1979} And liturgies were a super-rich-friendly measure that conferred political prestige on the benefactors and introduced a measure of social spread of the risks involved in the building and maintaining of the arkhê.\textsuperscript{1980} Although the political prestige that the liturgists drew from their assumption of individual liturgies came to be viewed especially positively in the fourth century, we have no historical grounds to suspect that the fifth-century liturgists were perceived drastically differently. Compelling evidence can be given of various upper-class litigants proudly mentioning their past shares of liturgies as service rendered to the benefit of the Athenian polis. The catch is, of course, clear: the erstwhile liturgist subtly demands preferential treatment as the just return for all the financial trouble he had previously underwent on behalf of the entire polis. We have no surviving courtroom speeches that were written in the fifth-century with commentary on the issue of liturgies that is comparable to the speeches written by Demosthenes or Aeschines. What little dramatic evidence there is concerning the question of the political stature of the liturgists, however, appears largely conducive to our reading. If our interpretation is correct, moreover, it would mean that the fifth-century liturgists coped equally with an economic burden that was assigned by lot if no one was found willing. Political prestige is, of course, fine and dandy, but it can hardly make up for the financial loss which, in all likelihood, could strike a liturgist multiple times due to the overgrown size of the navy.\textsuperscript{1981} How did the upper-class Athenians cope with that situation?

‘To cope with’ does not even come close to describe the profits that the Athenian super-rich derived from their polis’ arkhê. An Aegean that was largely secure from outside, i.e., non-Athenian, interference was a veritable gold mine to be exploited.\textsuperscript{1982} We have seen how rapaciously the Athenians behaved in the case of Thasos in regard to the possession of its mine


\textsuperscript{1982} Seemingly evident as it is, Kallet-Marx’ reminder that the imperialistic side of the Athenian arkhê rose only with the fall of the initially collaborative ethos of the Delian League should be recalled in this historical context. Although the instances of Athenians’ bossing and pushing around their erstwhile allies was to increase dramatically over the second half of the fifth century, the hitherto untapped potential of the commercial gains that were on offer thanks to the establishment of Athenian hegemony was to benefit, albeit differentially, all the Aegean allies of Athens: Kallet-Marx, \textit{Money, Expense, and Naval Power in Thucydides’ History} 1-5.24, pp. 9-10.
and *emporia*. The point is, Thasos is only a single example which is conspicuous for it shows an early Athenian response to an open defiance of their interests. The Aegean held many promises for an overzealous upper-class that was in dire straits to make each profitable opportunity count. From the timber of the eastern Thrace to the wheat and grain of the northern Euxine, the Athenian upper-class created a commercial empire whose public speakers and military profiteers were largely one and the same. Naturally, the Athenian *thêtès* also drew material benefits from the *arkhê*1983. They settled on illegally-appropriated cleruchies,1984 they received daily pay for their rowing the triremes and they gained access to a steady supply of relatively affordable grain among others. But the profits reaped by their upper-class compatriots were ostentatious not only in their magnitude but also by the token of the fact that they were made possible largely by the efforts of the *thêtès*.1985 Rank-and-file *thêtès* manned and guarded the cleruchies, not to mention their absorption of the initial damage if any insurrectionary wave besieged them. *Thêtès* oared the triremes that patrolled the Aegean and those that were launched in case any naval confrontation against allies or enemies was set.1986 And they were the driving force behind the established security of the supply lines of grain which they paid for with their rowers’ wages.

The Protagorean commodification of *paideia* served each and every Athenians’ interests. Lament as they did the passing over of the ‘old education,’ the *eupatrid* Athenians found out that they had the most to gain from a public debate system that secured their socio-economic claims. Perhaps the time-hallowed aristocratic privileges took a blow as a result of the opening of the political floodgates to all the newcomers whose pockets were deep enough to afford the

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1984 “What exactly was a cleruchy? It was composed of Athenian citizens who were installed, as a garrison, on a portion of the allied territory that had been confiscated for their use. The cleruchs, who retained their original citizenship, had to remain, under arms, in the lands that the allies cultivated for them and from which they received the income. So these were not peasant-soldiers, but soldier-landlords of the occupied territory. In all likelihood, they did not become owners of the land but simply enjoyed the usufruct, in the name of the city of Athens as a whole. Azoulay, *Pericles of Athens*, pp. 74; A. Moreno, ‘The Attic neighbour’: The cleruchy in the Athenian Empire’, in *Interpreting the Athenian Empire*, ed. by John Ma, N. Papazarkadas, and R. Parker. (London, 2009), pp. 213-214; Buckley, *Aspects of Greek History 750-323 BC*, pp. 278; Ober, *Democracy and Knowledge*, pp. 62; Potts, *The Athenian Navy*, pp. 32; for a clear case of the extortion of rent in cash by the Athenian absentee landlords in the wake of a retaliation that was invoked by a rebellion one can refer to Thucydides’ rendition of the end of the Mytilenean episode: Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War*, 3.50.1-3; cf. IG I1, 66; Kallet-Marx, *Money, Expense, and Naval Power in Thucydides’ History* 1-5.24, pp. 144-145, with bibliography.
Protagorean paideia. Yet, they more than made up for the growing size of their number by sharing an economic pie that was infinitely larger compared to the one they used to gorge themselves on in the pre-Persian Wars period. Non-eupatridae, who had climbed the economic ladder thanks in large part to the economic expansion of the Athenian arkhê, similarly, took a liking to the new system that allowed their translation of economic gains into political ones. As the Thucydidean Peloponnesian War drew near, the allies of the Athenians found themselves even more domineered by the hegemon which goes on to show that Pericles’ famous antebellum speech, full of the Thucydidean flavour as it is, largely conveyed the naked truth in pointing out that the Athenians ‘simply cannot afford to let go of the Empire.’  

1987 So, the upper-class coalition between the eupatrid and non-eupatrids stood to gain the most of the commodified paideia, but what about the dêmos?

It appears that the Athenian dêmos found the prospects no less enticing. They were the ones who were to be placated by the most notable of the eupatridae even when they were to be scolded from the bêma at the Pnyx.  

1988 The richest individuals in Athens were to take turns in trying to persuade the dêmos that their motions promised more tangible benefits for their lot. Purely at the rhetorical level or not, a political bridge was built, at least on paper, between the most and the least affluent sections of the Athenian society.  

1989 And with the later institutionalisation of public pay that de jure dunamis became a de facto potencia as those who could make the journey from their respective demes to Athens flocked in ever-increasing numbers into the assembly meetings.  

1990 It is just that despite being crowned the true victor of the Athenian polity, the dêmos played a game with the simplest of rules at least in relative

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1987 Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, 2.41-2.
1988 For a synoptic or a detailed interpretation of the inward-facing architectural idiosyncrasies of the Athenian Bouleuterion, which is located on the western side of the Athenian Agora and Pnyx, one can resort, respectively, to Ober or Camp. Ober, Democracy and Knowledge, pp. 199-205; John M. Camp II, The Archaeology of Athens, (New Haven, 2001).
1989 “Pay for office or jury service from the 450s BC was supplemented from 410/9 for five years by the diobelia (but in 405/4 grain was handed out instead of the two obols), in the fourth century by assembly pay, and from the 350s by the theorikon, ostensibly a grant to pay for festival tickets. Rowing in the fleet and work in the dockyards brought substantial cash benefits to thousands of Athenians, particularly in the fifth century, when the Athenians maintained a large fleet. Finally, mutual support between ordinary citizens linked by kinship, proximity of residence or friendship, and exemplified in the interest-free loan, was a defence against poverty, hardship and the personal patronage of the wealthy that was irreconcilable with democratic ideology.” Garnsey, Famine and Food Supply in the Graeco-Roman World, pp. 80.
1990 Those projects would be financed, of course, largely by the upper-class Athenians’ commercial profits as well as the phoros-payments that were to become a hallmark feature of the Athenian imperial economy towards the beginning of the Second Peloponnesian War: “The grand total of allies’ contributions after 425 can be said with some certainty to have been at least 1,460 talents and perhaps as much as 1,500 talents; this coincides with Aristophanes’ figure, which included the income from domestic sources. It was this massive sum of allied money – 75 per cent of Athens’ total revenue – and the uses to which it was put that were the main sources of economic prosperity for the Athenian poor.” Buckley, Aspects of Greek History 750-323 BC, pp. 284; cf. Aristophanes, Wasps, 660.
economic terms: in that game the political winner took precious little. In its proper historical context, however, even a marginal improvement of the economic condition can appear worlds apart from a steady state.\textsuperscript{1991} No famine or serious food shortage gripped the Athenian population so long as the arkhê remained in its domineering place.\textsuperscript{1992} The proto-industrialised mass production of many goods led to a drop in the prices of many artisanal goods, some of them hitherto considered luxuries. And Athens had a booming number of slaves\textsuperscript{1993} whose surplus labour was to be creamed off in order to be exchanged with anything else. The Athens of the second half of the fifth century was many things including being a polis with rampant inequality in wealth and with a steady undercurrent of oligarchic underground who temporarily shelved their claims to political power before striking out in full force towards the end of the century. But it was no land of paupers. Indeed, with the exception of mining slaves, the very epitome of misery if there ever was one, the exploits of arkhê improved the economic conditions of the grassroots Athenian politai considerably. And if they had to die in ever increasing numbers to secure that empowerment, then it at least offered a chance to die for something that was actually meaningful.

5.2.2 The Third Transformation of the Essential Copy

The widespread political, social, cultural, philosophical and economic transformations that were brought about during the second quarter of the fifth century inaugurated a throughgoing change in the respective conceptions of nomos and phusis. In some ways the period saw the entrenchment of the earlier postulations that had surfaced in the immediate aftermath of the second Persian invasion. In others, however, the alterations that the understanding of the terms underwent were nothing short of a complete subversion. On the side of continuation can be enumerated the solidification of monetisation, the obscuration of the ethics of the old education and a culmination of nomothetic polity. Monetisation, as we argued in the previous chapter, was an indispensable part of a developed understanding of citizenship. The second quarter of the fifth century marked a notable intensification in the number of financial

\textsuperscript{1991} Cartledge, Democracy, pp. 111.
\textsuperscript{1993} Dillon and Garland estimate a rather astonishing minimum of 95,000 slaves, 35,000 of whom toiled in industrial occupations, while Pritchard has more recently suggested a modest 50,000 in Attica in 432/431. Based on the historical allusions to price of slaves, bordering on an eye-watering 200 dr, we are more inclined to follow Pritchard in his extrapolation of Thucydides’ reference to the 20,000 slaves who escaped from their Athenian masters to the Spartans fortified at Decelea in 410s. Dillon and Garland, The Ancient Greeks, pp. 188; cf. Pritchard, “The Physical Parameters of Athenian Democracy”; Demosthenes, 27.9, 18; 41.8; David Pritchard, Public Spending and Democracy in Classical Athens, (Austin, 2015), pp. 84-85; cf. Waterfield, Creators, Conquerors, and Citizens, pp. 207; for an assessment of Mogens Hansen’s demographic work over the last forty years, whence originate all the recent demographic estimates, see Ben Akrigg, ‘Demography and Classical Athens’, in Demography and the Graeco-Roman World, ed. by C. Holleran and A. Pudsey, (Cambridge, 2011), pp. 37-59.

514
transactions carried out around the Aegean and Tyrrenian. Having laid the groundwork of the *arkhê*, the Athenians expanded their trading network to a wide area that stretched from the Euxine to Rhodes and beyond. The continued Syracusan naval dominance around the Sicilian and Tyrrenian waters, likewise, wove a commercial network of trading partners that were to be added to the well-established maritime ties between the Peloponnesian *poleis* and Syracuse. With commercial expansion came a relative shift towards proto-industries providing mass production of various goods to be exchanged for other ones. The escalation in commercial and productive activity proved a central impetus for the development of a more material understanding of *nomos* that threatened to turn, from the aristocratic standpoint, even the most time-revered institutions into demotic ones as the Areopagus of yore, for instance, came to be filled by the root-and-branch *dêmos* through the profane mechanism of lot. The Spartans were not equally adept as either the Athenians or the Syracusans in building a maritime empire, but that did not prevent them from trying to impede the Athenian intentions first at Byzantium and then at Thasos. They recognised just as well as anybody else that an establishment of Athenian hegemony in the Aegean would send socio-economic tremors across the Peloponnese. And the wars they had to wage against the northern Peloponnesians would show that their predictions rang true. With Pausanias the regent’s death before the fulfilment of his ambitious project of an enlarged Spartan polity, the richer *homoioi* came to embrace a heightened degree of austerity that appears to speak to the great wall of commercialisation with which the Spartan *polis* was surrounded.

Monetisation also triggered an avalanche of reappraisal of the customary ideas beginning with the old education. Strictly aristocratic, the archaic understanding of *paideia* was a combination of *mousikê* that did not appear conducive to the materially enriched upper-classes and tyrants’ need for keeping *dêmos* politically in check while partially distributing the economic benefits. Spartan ideal of *agôgê* included, which was the only example of anything resembling a public education, the old *paideia* was in the political reserve of either the *homoioi* or eupatridae.

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1994 Those financial transactions obviously included dealings in slaves and the hiring of mercenaries. Indeed, as purported long ago by Ste. Croix, mercenaries especially were a driving force in bringing about widespread monetisation for being the first large-scale example of hired labour; Ste. Croix, *Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World*, pp. 182; Trundle, *The Greek Mercenaries*, pp. 2.
1995 “Anyone with any sense could see that radical changes were likely, and perhaps inevitable. The old citizen-state ideal was one of self-sufficiency, to guarantee its autonomy and freedom from external influences. This ideal, however, was far more realistic when it was first formulated, some two hundred years before Socrates was born; by the middle of the fifth century, it was well out of date. Short of a radical austerity drive and a drastic culling of the population, Athens was never going to be self-sufficient again. The simplest of economic factors – shortage of grain, timber and minerals – had driven the city to acquire a maritime empire, and the bell could not be un-rung.” Waterfield, *Why Socrates Died*, pp. 185.
1996 “The institutional threat of the Sophists' advanced education available for any males who could pay for it was twofold. Within the established ruling class it threatened the system of interfamilial alliances.
but the establishment of the maritime empires challenged that monopoly to the benefit of the \textit{demos} who, more than any other social group, bore the brunt of the empire-building. Protagoras of Abdera lunged at the old aristocratic education without giving them any quarters. By the watershed of the Persian Wars the old education had, of course, already turned strictly into an aristocratic ideal with no practical ramifications. Protagoras’ teachable and commodified \textit{paideia}, on this view, can be seen as bringing that process to its logical conclusion: an education that is congruent to a more democratically-inclined politics. Such a view, however, not only puts the horse before the cart but creates a caravan of horses that are attempted to be pulled by their carts.

As our historical probes have indicated, the democracy’s entrenchment in Athens was far from being a foregone conclusion. Indeed, the \textit{eupatridae} with demotic views, from Themistocles to Ephialtes and Pericles, fought tooth and nail to consolidate the political part of \textit{demos} while curbing the socio-political prerogatives of their fellow aristocrats.\footnote{Paul Cartledge, ‘Fowl Play: A Curious Lawsuit in Classical Athens (Antiphon XVI, frr. 57-9 Thalheim)’, in \textit{Nomos}, pp. 44.} It is often said that there was no party politics in the ancient Athens and that is largely true. But that should not be taken to mean that there were no political lines of division. A borderline of conflicts was drawn with eye-watering fines, ostracisms and murders, that foretold doom for any \textit{eupatrid} that dared to enclose on the political land that was owned by the aristocratic status-quo. Protagoras fought a decisive battle, in a different vein, against that old political status-quo and was duly haunted by the Athenians of aristocratic credo beginning from the last third of the fifth century. But, in the end, he, and his fellow \textit{sophistai}, emerged as the creators of a commodified \textit{paideia}. The new \textit{paideia} accounted for each and every side of a political debate. Geared towards unearthing the rational kernel behind the flurry of arguments, it introduced an ethics of public utility to replace the anachronized virtue ethics. With rhetorical skill and demotic parlance rising to the prominence of political practice, \textit{phusis} began to be regarded, by the large numbers of Athenians potentially for the first time, for the ideational receptacle that was just as capable of being moulded, if not more, as \textit{nomos}. Indeed, Protagoras’ philosophy and Aeschylean tragedy shod novel light on the two terms without necessarily pitting them against one another. Theoretically at least, \textit{phusis} and \textit{nomos} were just two of the rhetorical armaments that was serviceable to any side of the political debate. Both Protagoras and Aeschylus were sufficiently perspicacious, however, to realise that their arguments could thrive only within a
social milieu in which the démos’ import assigned to the kratos of law-making trumped over any blue-blooded appreciation of phusis. In setting up the sides of any political debate Protagoras and Aeschylus thus actively made their preferences known: theirs was to be a world in which Prometheus was the archetypical saviour of humanity and not its Hesiodic plague and an Areopagus stripped of its aristocratic exclusivity would take the blessing of an Athena whose vote, although decisive, was only one among many. True as it was that nomos was just as plastic a conception as phusis it still afforded a chance philosophically or poetically to bring that plasticity to the fore while ensuring the consolidation of the politics of public weal.

The nomothetic understanding of politics was crucial in inducing an expanded conception of nomoi. By the second quarter of the fifth century there had already been materialised, of course, the shift from the archaic thesmos to nomos.1998 From the Cleisthenic reforms onward, indeed, the Athenian démos had grown significantly conscious of the political power that it could wield if the material prerequisites were somehow satisfied. The material benefits reaped from the Athenian arkhê and the political potency that was involved in motions such as the divesting of the Areopagus’ aristocratic prerogatives spelled out the kratos involved in law-making as clearly as it possibly could. The grassroots Athenian may not have realised that the empire-building policies of Themistocles were conducted not only to continue to draw the démos’ support for their aristocratic factions but also to disarm the likely Spartan response to their ambitious ventures. But any Athenian politai certainly comprehended the extent of the material affluence to be reaped as a result of the policies that they along with the pro-demotic eupatridae put into motion. As the First Peloponnesian War began to loom on the horizon, the majority of the Athenian démos were ready and willing to safeguard the interests of their arkhê against a coalition of fellow Greeks.

If these features can be regarded as intensification of certain economic, social, political and cultural processes, there were others that appear to have surfaced at this period without any comparable precedents. The inception of dramatic mythmaking, the coinage of philosophies of micro substances and the substantiation of a politics of hegemony were three such developments that bore notable results for the historically determinate conceptions of nomos and phusis. We have analysed some key aspects of the Aeschylean tragedy as it brought currents of dramatic rethinking to the shores of popular culture through a medium, to whose development he dedicated a good portion of his life. Naturally, the ancient Greek myths had always been veritable containers of stories for the mythmakers to transform, re-invent and

1998 Wood, Citizens to Lords, pp. 36.
rethink. No rhapsode ever told his stories without adding to or subtracting from and embellishing or streamlining them. Further, the poetic creation of novel vantage points was never distant from the verses of the foremost members of the storytelling tradition. Pindar’s attempt to fuse ancient myths with the un-Homeric doctrine of inherited excellence, as we observed in the previous chapter, was one such comprehensive transmutation that was utilised to celebrate the Olympic victors no less than their aristocratic, and at times allegedly divine, forefathers. The surviving plays of the Aeschylean corpus, however, speak to a larger-than-life endeavour that transformed the whole structure of the Homeric and Hesiodic myths. From the Danaids’ salvation by the civilised Argives to Orestes’ innocence proved by the Athenian Areopagus, the Aeschylean myths attested to contemporary political sentiments. What is more, they actively took sides when introducing an unmistakable measure of spatio-temporalisation to their plays. Producing a dramatic medium that was much more democratically-inclined than its predecessors in regard to the stylistic, narrative and presentational options that were available to it, Aeschylus brought home the idea that nothing is timeless enough to escape from the socio-political domain of change encompassing thousands of Athenian politai and metoikoi. There is no denying, to be sure, the fact that dramatic representation also played a vital role in the sixth century Athens as exemplified by Peisistratus’ driving of an awe-inspiring Athenian woman qua Athena herself to the Agora. Never the less, turning the whole structure of dramatic representations into a kaleidoscope for peering at the contemporary reality was an achievement of Aeschylus and his fellow dramatists.

The microphysics of the early atomists, the micro substances of the Anaxagorean original mixture, or the Empedoclean four elements partaking in every existent were all parts of a philosophical dialogue that took place between philosophers who noticed the social and natural landscapes of the archaic Greece upheaved and a number of upper-class philosophical aficionados that sprouted from that upheaval itself. Atoma’s construal as the smallest indivisible particle of any object or the smallest material substances assembled in an indistinct mass waiting for the operation of the Anaxagorean cosmic Nous may have testified, in all likelihood, to a lot of things. Indeed, a divine dispenser presiding either over the early atomist physical plenum of matter and void, i.e., non-being, or practicing her wont through the Anaxagorean Nous are just as likely candidates for an allegoric allusion as either the spread of democratic polities levelling the perennial political differences between the upper-class and lower-class citizens or the steady expansion of the Athenian empire which was to turn into a political umpire of everything that went around in the Aegean. The philosophically demonstrated need to revisit and thoroughly revise the earlier Eleatic and Ionian conceptualisations, however, appears to indicate a shared commitment to rethink the wide-
ranging socio-political changes in terms of physics, epistemology, ontology and ethics. There were numerous nuances to the newly painted philosophical vistas that took their colouring, at least partially, from the contemporary events. But the abandonment of the Ionian hylozoist enquiry in addition to the absolute primacy of the Eleatic and Heraclitan logos suggest that a driving force away from the archaic relative immutability of phusis had indeed grown was not uncommon among the philosophers.

The politics of empire-building was another decisive factor that exerted major influence on the different conceptualisations of nomos and phusis. The building of the Athenian arkhê was, of course, reminiscent, at least in its territorial ambitions, to the earlier building of the Spartan hegemony in the Peloponnese. That reminiscence was largely marginal, however, in the political status it assigned to the allies and in the notable difference of degree that accompanied the extortion of allies’ resources. The Peloponnesian summachia, as noted above, had a bicameral council that made decisions that concerned the common interest of the allied states without necessarily enforcing the will of Spartans on the latter. None of the allies, even the major ones such as Thebes and Corinth were, of course, willing to test the Spartan patience unnecessarily. The Spartans, after all, were the recognised hêgemones of the League. Still, the governance of the League provided ample opportunity for the other poleis to spur and cajole the Spartans to the policies that they preferred. Further, Argives always remained a thorn on the side of the Spartans that relaxed the hold that the latter exercised on the disaffected allies, which was vital in the creation of the political common ground whence sprang the anti-Spartan northern Peloponnesian coalition of the 460s and 450s. By contrast, the Delian League had a distinctive Athenian hue right from the beginning that would only become more pronounced as the half-century mark drew nearer. From their intransigent claims to the naturally well-endowed Thracian shoreline to the iron will they displayed in regulating the mercantile shipping at Bosporus, the Athenians did not hesitate to employ the League treasury and fleet for punitive expeditions and preventive measures. At the Athenian eupatrid leaders’ beck and call was a new rhetoric of rightful hegemony, a rhetorical licence that was prompted by the homonymous ideology of pan-Hellenism to counter any allegation of using the funds of an anti-Persian League to politically enslave other Greeks.1999 Championing Athens as the natural

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1999 Cf. Cartledge, *The Greeks*, pp. 13; the main propagator of those allegations, the abounding contradictions of whose account has been laid bare by Ste. Croix, is, of course, none other than Thucydides himself. Voiced either in the third person of allied speakers accusing the Athenians for enslaving fellow league members or in that of the historian who is charging at the same rhetorical flank, the indictment is one that never falls far from the tree of Thucydides’ own political convictions: Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War*, 1.68.3, 1.69.1, 1.121.5, 1.122.2, 3.10.3, 3.13.6, 3.63.3, 4.86.1, 7.57.7; cf. Ste. Croix, “The Character of the Athenian Empire”.

519
protector of the Ionian Greek interests, this new branch of politics fused the might of the arkhê with the right to rule, hence inaugurating an understanding of phusis as a serviceable set of tailored-made conventions. Finding its most sublime expressions in Plato’s later portrayal of Gorgias and Callicles’ views on justice, the politics of imperial hegemony made use of this conventionalised stipulation of phusis in order to fill the vacuum between arkhê and ethics.

5.3 The First Peloponnesian War and the Egyptian Expedition

The First Peloponnesian war has been called as one “essentially between Sparta’s allies and Athenians,” and with good reason. Whether we take 460 or 455 as the date for the end of the rebellion at Mt. Ithome, the Spartans were still largely held back from participating in full force. In fifteen years of continuous fighting the Spartans, in fact, ventured out of Laconia only twice. If the mending of homoioi population, which was shaken to its roots, gives half the reason for Spartan reluctance, the other half needs to account for the raging success with which the Athenians waged the war. The Athenians, allied with the Megarians and the Thessalians whereby they gained access to the much-needed Thessalian cavalry, garrisoned a sizeable force of their hoplites in Megarid and thus blunted the ever-present Spartan threat of the invasion of Attica. They lost a battle at Halieis in the Argolid, but managed to scrape out a victory against the Peloponnesians at the sea-battle of Cecryphaleia. But the first major battle of the war took place at Aegina between Athens and their allies from the Delian League and Aeginetans and their supporters from the Peloponnesian League. The Athenians won the major sea-battle, capturing seventy ships and began laying siege to Aegina. The Athenian forces were spread thin as it was, but to give the whole picture of their stretch we need to touch upon one more frontier in Egypt against the Persians.

The Egyptians had revolted from the Persians a while ago and called Athenians to send military aid. The Athenians responded by sending a huge force, if Thucydides’ account is to be confirmed of 200 triremes to campaign against Artaxerxes, who had assumed the throne after the death of Xerxes. This overstretched condition of the Athenian army enticed the Corinthians, the leading Peloponnesian ally of Sparta, to attempt to exploit it by sending three

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2000 Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, 2.41.
2002 Arguably, that full force was never to be regained. A 50-60 per cent thinning out of the Spartiate numbers, as estimated by Figueira, separated pre from post-Ithome level of homoioi population: Figueira, ‘Helotage and the Spartan Economy’, pp. 581; Figueira, “Population Patterns in Late Archaic and Classical Sparta”, pp. 177-179, 181-187; Hodkinson, Property and Wealth in Classical Sparta, pp. 417-423.
2003 Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, 1.105.1.
2004 Ibid, 1.105.2.
2005 Ibid, 1.104.2.
hundred hoplites to Aegina as a relief force while calling on their allies to attack the Megarid, which, in their estimate, would be defended by a meagre Athenian force. The Corinthian calculations were largely true: the 200 triremes in Egypt and a naval force to the order of 100 triremes patrolling around and laying siege to the island of Aegina amounted to a staggering 60,000 soldiers that could not be counted on for the defence of the Megarid. Their calculations were wide of the mark, however, in not accounting for the reserve age-classes that the Athenians could conscript in an emergency levy. The oldest and the youngest age-classes, those between ages 50-59 and 18-20, respectively, were the only remaining ones in Attica. They were the ones on whom the Athenians relied to defeat the Corinthians and their allies that were invading the Megarid. And the reserves accomplished the unlikely, after two indecisive engagements they routed the Corinthian force and thus ensured that the Megarid would remain, for now at least, safely in the Athenian hands. By 458 the Athenians had proved emphatically that they could repulse any Peloponnesian force that did not include the Spartans. The Corinthians needed the recognised leader of the Peloponnesian League to step up and organise the defence. Their window of opportunity came in 457 when Phocis launched an invasion of Doris, the supposed mother-people of the Spartans. The Spartans were still recuperating from the combined damage wrought by the earthquake and the rebellion at Mt. Ithome, but when faced with the prospect of the potential repercussions of letting fly the Phocian insult to their ancestral polis they resolved to take decisive action.

Phocis and Doris lay in central Greece to the north of Peloponnese. The Spartans needed, as pointed out above, to pass through the Megarid to reach the invaded Doris but they could not do so as the Athenians had already blocked the Isthmus. Nor could they ask the Corinthians to transport them to the other side of the gulf with their fleet as the latter was engaged with the Athenians and, moreover, was on the losing end. The only chance of the Spartans to move through the Isthmus was for the Athenians to come and meet them in full force. Whether it was for their recent success against the Peloponnesians or a widespread willingness to put a

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2006 Emergency levies were a type of general levy that differed from expeditionary levies on grounds of the total number of age-classes it comprised. Expeditionary forces were constituted, in that vein, with a more equal spread between the three highest property classes and the rest, whereas general levies relied mainly on thêtes conscripts with little to no land to their name. Hans van Wees, ‘Mass and Elite in Solon’s Athens: The Property Classes Revisited’, in Solon of Athens, pp. 373; Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, 2.31.1, 3.16.1, 3.91.4, 4.90.1; Xenophon, Hellenica, 2.4.43, 4.4.18; for an outright rejection of the possibility of any kind of universal levy, including in naval service, until at least 387/7 one can recall the earlier arguments that were penned by Ste. Croix. Though quite meticulous on the count of his recording of all the relevant historical passages, Ste Croix’s argument to the effect that the availability of such terms as pandéméi or panstratia need not signal the conscription from all census classes does not appear to cut ice when the historical episodes in question are accounted for: contra Ste. Croix, ‘The Solonian Census Classes and the Qualifications for Cavalry and Hoplite Service’, pp. 18.

2007 Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, 1.105.4-106.2.

quick end to the defence of the Megarid, Spartans found their enemies eager to meet them in a hoplite battle. At the battle of Tanagra c.457 an Athenian and allied force of 14,000 hoplites and light infantry met a Peloponnesian force of 1,500 Spartans and 10,000 Peloponnesian allies and was duly defeated in a bloody conflict. The engagement showed three things: the Spartans were still quite some ways off from the pre-earthquake levels of military levies; the Spartiates could not afford to let the Athenians have a grip on the Isthmus as that meant an effective blocking of the cornerstone of the Spartiate military policy against Athens, i.e., the threat to invade Attica; the Athenians had to refrain from engaging the Spartans in a hoplite battle given that their phalanx, relatively depleted as it was, still managed to break the former’s forces. If the Spartans thought that Tanagra would take the initiative away from the Athenians, however, they were wrong as it took the Athenians only two months to engage in another decisive battle, this time against the Boeotians. At the battle of Oenophyta the Athenians defeated Boeotians to assume a hegemonic political position in the central Greece. This was followed by the capitulation of the Aeginetans whose navy was surrendered to the Athenians as they became a phoros-paying ally. The Athenians rounded off this major offensive by capturing Chalcis in central Greece, burning the main Spartan shipyard at Gytheum and defeating Sicyon, an important Peloponnesian polis, in battle.

In the years between 460-456, the Athenians achieved a string of military victories that allowed them not only a significant measure of comfort in forestalling the impending Spartan invasion of Attica but also notable hegemonic prestige as they managed to build a land empire in central Greece. This land empire in central Greece was, however, a risky venture in more than one way. The need to keep a constant military presence in newly established garrisons, for one, was financially costly and strategically unwise, as it necessitated the stretch of the Athenian forces. The unwanted attention drawn to the Athenian military presence in non-allied poleis was another drawback of maintaining a land empire with no reliable allies to fall back on. Furthermore, the potential benefits, material or else, hardly measured up to the risks that were necessarily involved in the establishment and maintenance of a land empire. Maritime
trade, as we saw above, was the cornerstone of the Athenian *arkhê* and no territorial expansion inland was going to change that. The *phoros* that was collected from the allied *poleis* was only a part, albeit a very consequential one, of the financial rewards that the Athenians reaped from their Aegean *arkhê*. The other part was, of course, the steady flow of goods and services in various directions but mainly to Athens whose Piraeus had grown into the commercial entrepôt of the Aegean. The benefit of hindsight allows, in that vein, to view Aegina’s subdual as a part of the masterplan of securing the Aegean as well as ridding Sparta from one of her most navally competent allies. Territorial expansion in the direction of either Boeotia or Megara, however, did not appear to have promised anything of note to the Athenians. Indeed, there does not appear to be a material drive in either the invasion of Boeotia or the reinforcement of Megara, which leads us to think that the choice was largely politically and strategically motivated. For all we know, the Athenians were looking for an opportunity to counterbalance the steep price that was involved in the strategic subdual of Boeotia and Megara: their shot at hitting the jackpot came in the form of an Egyptian distress call that brought them to Memphis.\textsuperscript{2012}

The Athenian relief force to Egypt seems to have all the makings of a formidable mercenary army.\textsuperscript{2013} Officially, they were sent there to redress the wrongs committed by the Persians against the Egyptians, but all the parties involved knew that all the talk about poetic justice and rightful vengeance aside, there was one central motive as to why the Athenians accepted the Egyptians’ call: money. The Egyptian royalty and nobles had a lot to offer materially to a capable mercenary army that could shield them against their Persian overlords. The Greeks, moreover, had established a bridgehead on the Egyptian shores at Naucratis roughly a century ago. One of the busiest *emporia* in the eastern Mediterranean, Naucratis served as a hub of

\textsuperscript{2012} By taking his cue from Garnsey’s elaborations and Psammetichos’ later gift of an immense 30,000 medimnoi of corn to the Athenians in 445/444, Hornblower has construed the expedition as one that might have been geared towards the securing of a dependable grain route. Although that interpretation appears to suit what circumstantial historical evidence there is, I am more inclined to see Euboea and northern Euxine as the principal targets from which the Athenians aimed, at the time, to derive the benefits of stable imports of grain. Hornblower, *The Greek World 479-323 BC*, pp. 29-31.

\textsuperscript{2013} Trundle has not inadvertently generalized that point to one that encompasses the naval warfare in the classical age in its entirety. Having led the pack in assembling the largest fleets to date, the Athenians can be seen, as such, as the erstwhile demonstrators of the socio-economic benefits of employing the lower-class citizens as the backbone of the naval corps: “The importance of money and pay to fifth- and fourth-century naval warfare was never underestimated. Thucydides and Xenophon make this only too clear in their accounts of the unfolding events of the Peloponnesian War. Athenian, Persian and Spartan beliefs that the Great Peloponnesian War hinged on the amount of daily wages of such men must imply that many rowers followed, or were likely to follow, the fleet that paid the most money per day. In the fourth century, forensic speeches illustrate well the woes of Athenian trierarchs, or ship commanders, having to pay better wages to hire and retain the best crews, even from amongst Athenian citizens. The image of naval warfare is of a very mercenary and capital-intensive system of supply and demand.” Trundle, *Greek Mercenaries*, pp. 40, 165.
culture and commerce that was to serve as a central zone of Greek influence in Egypt until Alexander’s foundation of Alexandria. The sheer size of the Athenian force comprising of about 40,000 soldiers, however, prods us to dig deeper in regard to other potential reasons that might have stimulated such a desperate commitment.

The Egyptian expedition was launched either in 460 or 459. This was a time of social contempt with intra-eupatrid and inter-class tensions still running wild. Though it appears somewhat abated by 458, as we saw above in our analysis of Aeschylus’ Oresteia, we think it historically conceivable that the retaliations between the supporters of Pericles and Ephialtes and their enemies were far from being over by 460. Thucydides’ historical reconstruction of the timeline is as lacklustre as any other foray he makes into the history of the First Peloponnesian War. But any hypothetical reconstruction of the period needs to make enough historical room to accommodate the fact that approximately 40,000 Athenians were shipped out to Egypt at a time of intensive social strife. Yet, such an interpretative room would also need to explain the additional fact, evident to the educated eye as it is, that at least 36,000 of that 40,000 had thêtes origins. What could have prompted such a socially-skewed pledge at such a time? I hypothesise two potential reconstructions with Pericles and the Athenian dēmos as the leading political elements. First, despite the impossibility of knowing to what extent, the murder of Ephialtes had surely outraged the grassroots dēmos who knew that the traditionally eupatrid Areopagus would not be humbled without the support of him and his associates. Indeed, given that Ephialtes was one of the driving forces behind the increased social inclusiveness of Areopagus and the increased juridical scope of heliaia, it appears almost certain that one side to the Aeschylean theme of Athenians at the verge of civil war can be identified as thêtes tout court. Of course, we cannot overlook the historical part that might have been played by Pericles and co. in the riding of that anti-aristocratic wave. Still, the idea of Pericles and his supporters leading a popular insurrection appears highly unlikely given that Pericles was the undisputed leader of the Alcmaeonidae. The growing class-consciousness of the Athenian thêtes, moreover, had already been on display in the ostracization of Kimon who had led the Delian fleet to successive victories only to fall prey to the demotic opposition after his dismissal by the Spartans from Mt. Ithome. On that note, despite the point that Pericles’ role in the affair appears undeniable, the fact remains that it took just one blunder for the dēmos to knock a political heavyweight, whose aristocratic penchant was well-known, off the Athenian stage. To that end, we argue that it might have been the case that the growing unrest and unease of thêtes following the murder of Ephialtes gave way to a current of anti-aristocratic feeling that threatened to erupt into a full-fledged class warfare. Pericles and his followers, aware of the prospect of civil war that could have been precipitated by the increasingly-violent conflicts,
might have, in turn, utilised their demotic credit to devise a proposal that would restore the socio-political equilibrium: to send the ringleaders of the rebellion along with their followers with promises of material and social benefits to a suicide mission in Egypt. Second, Pericles may be conceived as organising riots against the aristocratic murderers of Ephialtes but seeing that the social situation was about to get out of control, he may have planned the Egyptian expedition that would take the hyperpolitised politai away from the Athens. Either way, the sending of the 40,000 soldiers signified that the anti-democratic sting of the Athenian politics was nowhere near having been extracted by the 450s. The eupatridae, pro-democrats and anti-democrats alike, made a high risk/high reward scheme to pacify the imminent threat of civil war. If the fleet was to return having accomplished its mission in Egypt, then the whole complexion of the Athenian politics would have changed drastically as a result of the erstwhile thêtes’, now in a substantially better economic position, homecoming.

In the actual course of events, though, Megabazus gathered a large army and defeated the Egyptians, then drove the Greeks out of Memphis. The Greeks retreated to the island of Prosopitis and managed to hold out for a year and a half. In 454, Megabazus thought of draining the canal whereby the Greek ships would become completely useless, and then crossed over to the island to capture it, defeating the Athenian force out of Egypt once and for all. Reminiscent of a later ‘disappearance’ of 2,000 Spartan helots without a trace, the initial force of 200 triremes in addition to a significant part of a relief squadron of 50 ships vanished with their crews into thin air. The loss of manpower, not to mention the expenses involved in the building of the fleet, was a heavy blow to the making of the Athenian arkhê. Indeed, even if we were to take half of Thucydides’ numbers as promising a more realistic estimate, the total damage done to Athens would be practically comparable to the Sicilian disaster of 413, itself viewed by many modern historians as the main reason behind the ultimate Athenian capitulation in 404. Additionally, the Persians’ victory also dealt extensive damage to the Athenian hegemony in the Aegean as it worked as a stimulant for the Persian fleet to creep ever closer to the Aegean. Having noticed the risks involved, the Athenians resolved to

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2014 John K. Davies, Democracy and Classical Greece, 2nd edition, (London, 1993), pp. 117 ff; Donald Kagan, The Fall of the Athenian Empire, (Ithaca, 2013); a critical evaluation of certain strands of modern scholarship that continue to tread the explicitly pro-aristocratic pathway that was first opened up by Thucydides can be found in Tim Rood, “Thucydides, Sicily, and the Defeat of Athens”, KTEMA: Civilisations de l'Orient, de la Grèce et de Rome antiques, vol. 42, (2017), pp. 19-39; for an analysis of Thucydides’ and Xenophon’s respective takes on the magnitude of the Sicilian disaster and the scope that was given to it as one of the main reasons behind the ultimate Athenian downfall, see Breno Battistin Sebastiani, “The Coups of 411 and 404 in Athens: Thucydides and Xenophon on Conservative Turns”, Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies, vol. 58, (2018), pp. 490-515.
transport the League treasury from Delos to Athens in c. 454.\footnote{The date is derived from the inscription of the first phoros quotas (aparchai) that were audited by the Athenian logistai in 454/453: IG I\textsuperscript{1} 259; Morris and Powell, The Greeks, pp. 296; for a brief overview of the treasury’s transfer and its historical significance, see Loren J. Samons II, “Athenian Finance and the Treasury of Athena”, Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte, vol. 42 no. 2, (1993), pp. 129-138.} Although it is clear that all the League members involved in the offensive incurred heavy losses, arguably it was only the Athenian thêtes that had bet and lost everything; then again, they probably did not have much to lose to begin with. Practically, they were oarsmen turned mercenaries whose landholdings, if there were any, did not suffice to allow a rosy existence. In other words, the eupatridae cannot be fathomed, regardless of how one looks at the historical episode, to have possessed the entire political initiative in sending the fleet. Although a ruse might have been hatched out either by the whole or a part of the eupatridae to rid Athens of their most troublesome lower-class contingents, that scam needed to find willing listeners at the brink of complete social exasperation for it to be practised. By the end of the first thirty years of the Athenian empire-building endeavour, in that vein, social and material inequality was still so stifling that even a suicide mission looked captivating to the root-and-branch Athenian thêtes.

The Athenian upper classes, on the other hand, had a world to win as their masterplan achieved resounding success. To rid Athens of at least 16,000 commoners, many of whom belonged to thêtes, not counting the extra loss of the rowers of the relief squadron, signified two things: the political distance that the upper-class Athenians were willing to go in order to preserve the socio-economic status-quo; and a notable change in what the upper-class Athenians conceived of as the politics of arkhê. To repulse a sizeable number of insurgent thêtes at any time was, of course, a grand enterprise for the upper-classes of any ancient Greek poleis. But to achieve that feat in such a time of breathable social conflict was basically a miracle work. Hard-pressed as they were to find a way out of the impending class warfare, the Athenian aristoi trumpeted the formation of an emergency phalanx that comprised singularly of the upper-classes for the sake of defending the socio-economic status-quo. The noteworthy likelihood of losing the fleet in case things would take a turn for worse was not something that deterred the upper-classes; it was that prospect that persuaded the formation of the exclusive upper-class phalanx in the first place. Many of the upper-class Athenians knew that the temporary loss of manpower would have been decisive in coordinating the defensive against the Peloponnesians. Spartans were well-known for the success rate that their troops enjoyed when facing odds that were not in their favour, but it is quite conceivable that a sizeable addition to the Athenian phalanx at Tanagra could have sufficed to turn the tables. And with the loss of the Megarid the Athenians would lose the incentive in the war to the Spartans, leaving the latter free to pass the Isthmus...
at will. In the end, the Athenian upper-classes knew that bargaining away their fleet and thêtes would effectively mean bargaining away the hopes of holding on to the Isthmus and Boeotia. Indeed, it would take only a single blow to overturn all the strategic gains that the Athenians had reaped through the military successes they enjoyed earlier during the war.

The Athenians did not bow down before without giving a fight. By the end of the 450s, the military conflicts between the members of the Delian League had largely dwindled to a low ebb. This gave the Athenians enough room to address the issue of Persian influence that was slowly but surely gaining a political foothold within the poleis of the Asia Minor shoreline. Perhaps their victory against the Greeks in Egypt in addition to their notice of the rising frequency of revolts among the members of the Delian League had emboldened them to make a renewed bid at Ionian dominance. Ironically, this would give the Athenians as valid a pretext as any other in tightening the hegemonic screws on their allies. Enticed by the prospect as they were, however, the Athenians could not leave their flank open to the Spartans while engaged in full with the Persians. Luckily, the pro-Spartan Kimon had returned to Athens by 451 allowing the Athenians to employ his services in order to make a five-year truce with the Spartans that would run between 451-446. Making sure that they had nothing to fear from the Spartans, the Athenians sent the League’s fleet to Cyprus under the command of none other than Kimon himself. By the end of 450, the League members won two resounding victories against the Persians at sea and on land, despite losing Kimon in one of them, which gave the impetus to the Persians’ need to cease hostilities. The sides reached an agreement over a peace treaty in c. 449 that prevented the Persian ships from entering the Aegean and limited the Persian armies to a distance of three-days’ march from the coast of Asia Minor. By the conclusion of their truce with the Athenians in 446 the Spartans, however, had already made inroads to spring back at the Athenians. Following a roundabout course that saw them fighting the so-called Social War as they defeated the Phocians and liberated the sanctuary of Delphi from their control, the homoioi bid their time waiting for a moment of glaring Athenian weakness. The moment came in c. 457 when a united force of Boeotians, Euboeans and Locrians prevailed over the Athenians who hastily retreated from their strongholds in Boeotia.

The battle of Coroneia was only the beginning of a string of catastrophes that were threatening to overwhelm the Athenians. Seeing how quickly the Athenians abandoned their interests in Boeotia, the Euboeans began to revolt in earnest from the Delian League. Euboea was, of course, not only strategically indispensable for the Athenians, but also economically so given

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its perennial large shipments of grain that soothed any portent of a grain shortage in Attica. Having decided that they had played the waiting-game for long enough, the homoioi resolved to send the Spartan troops to invade Attica and ravage its lands. Strolling through the Isthmus as a political change of heart brought the Megarians back into the Peloponnesian fold as a result of the Social War, King Pleistoanax and his soldiers laid waste to the Attic territory whilst Pericles and the Athenians stood watching. The battle of Tanagra had worked its spell, the Spartans found the Athenians spellbound behind their Long Walls and not coming to engage them in full-force. Yet, contrary to the expectation of virtually every modern historian, the Spartans did not press home their advantage; and, in the event the Spartans reached an agreement with the Athenians to cease hostilities and thus started their homeward march. Having evaded the immediate Spartan threat, the Athenians returned to Euboea and promptly smashed the revolt to send a univocal message to all the potential insurgents within the Delian League.

The First Peloponnesian ended with the agreement of the Thirty Year Peace between the Athenians and Spartans and their allies in 446/5. Declaring the division of mainland Greece and the Aegean into two distinctive spheres of political influence, the two sides made a list of all their allies and swore to forbid any formal interference in the affairs of any of the poleis allied to the other side. This did not amount, of course, to a wholesale political carving of mainland Greece into two opposing spheres. Argos in Peloponnesus and Thessaly are just singular examples of numerous poleis and regions that were not formally tied to either side. But it did express the de facto establishment of the so-called ‘dual hegemony’ that coronated Sparta and Athens as the undisputed leader of Peloponnesus and the Aegean respectively. The First Peloponnesian War ended precisely where it began with the Athenians holding on to their arkhê and the Spartans preserving their Peloponnesian hegemony which seems to warrant an assessment to the effect that nothing had changed in socio-political terms; nothing, that is, except everything.

The glaring lacunae of the historical record, reaching a new level of obscurity with the return of Kimon to Athens, can be filled with many things, but not with a measure of permanence. We have argued above that the alleged land-empire of Athens was economically unviable and strategically futile. Neither Boeotia nor the Megarid, to reiterate the first point, were territories brimming with natural resources that were sorely needed by the Athenians. No silver mines or forests dotted either region to make up for the military investment ensuring their subordination to the Athenian interests would require. Strategically, the closing up of the Isthmus was a significant gain to be sure, but it required a further spread of the Athenian forces to defend
Attica which would, at any rate, continue to be exposed to the Boeotians. Further, a well-coordinated insurrectionary effort that could be instigated either by the Persians or the Spartans would necessitate a decisive military response which would cause an additional stretch of the Athenian forces that had already been spread thin. In any event, so long as the Spartans found willing allies in the Boeotians and the Ionian Greeks found theirs either in Sparta or Persia, any Athenian landward expansion would not mean anything other than a ball and chain.

The total destruction of the Athenian fleet in Egypt made that dead weight unbearable for the majority of Athenians whose ranks were decimated by the Persians. We propose to conceive, in that vein, the entirety of the affairs that took place between the Egyptian expedition and the signing of the Thirty Year Peace through the looking glass of Athenian and Spartan class politics. As what little remains of the fleet returned from Egypt, an interesting motif of ‘overreaching’ began to form into a steady cornerstone of the Athenian politics. Of course, by then the Athenians had been hounded by their fair share of troubles topped by the defeat at Coronae and the ensuing Spartan invasion of Attikē. Discouraging as they were, however, neither of the upsets was of the order of the Egyptian disaster. To the liturgical class and the lower classes, the losses in coin and men, respectively, were irrecoverable. A hint of a silver-lining that was to be found by the Athenian upper-classes in this catastrophe, as we observed above, was that it effectively stripped thêtes from the presence of those who might have built a collective memory of resistance to the anti-democratic members of the liturgical class in c. 461/0. This good tiding that had its origins in the Athenian class struggle, which appears to have been at the brink of turning into an all-out class warfare, also found a hospitable address in Sparta. Still struggling to overcome the joint effort of northern Peloponnesians in addition to the damage wrought by the rebellious helots at Mt. Ithome, the homoioi could set their sights on Athens only by 455. Yet, when they did, their effort, as we saw above, proved consequential despite the fact that they could muster only 1,500 Spartan soldiers for the confrontation at Tanagra. On that note, the relatively low number of the Spartan regiment appears to suggest that the Spartans could spare only a relatively small number of troops without risking the demolition of the socio-political status-quo at home. War against the northern Peloponnesian poleis and the destruction caused by the great earthquake had taken its toll on the numbers of the homoioi. Their skirting around the Attic border after having settled their accounts in Doris showed that they were under direct orders to not to get entangled in a military confrontation with the Athenians. The likelihood of losing a substantial part of the 1,500 soldiers appears to have acted as an effective deterrent to the richer homoioi who had built a tradition of heroism out of the necessary sacrifice of 300 homoioi at Thermopylae approximately just twenty-three
years ago. When Kimon proposed the five-year truce, the Spartans did not have a lot to ponder upon.

In Thucydides’ account, Kimon practically appears out of the blue in 451 to begin negotiations with the Spartans and, consequently, to resume hostilities with the Persians. In Thucydides’ account, Kimon practically appears out of the blue in 451 to begin negotiations with the Spartans and, consequently, to resume hostilities with the Persians.2018 I find it perplexingly convenient for Kimon to arrive precisely at the hour of need to launch the two-pronged politics of dual-hegemony. To that end, an interesting passage in Plutarch affords a precious historical light with which our scepticism can be reinforced.2019 Plutarch relates that while he was serving his sentence of ostracism Kimon heard that a battle between the Athenians and the Peloponnesians was about to take place at Tanagra. He took an armed retinue and rushed to the battlefield before the two sides came to blows. Offering to take his side among the hoplitai of his Athenian tribe, Kimon received a cold shoulder from the notables who doubted his willingness to assist a group that certainly included a significant number of those that had casted the ostraka with his name on. Kimon understood their reluctance and parted ways despite leaving his retinue behind to fight valiantly. In the event his retinue managed to keep his promise in the defeat and thereby disgraced the commanders who had scorned Kimon’s assistance. Having returned to their home, the Athenians resolved to credit Kimon in a more sympathetic light and Pericles, who sensed their changing sentiments, proposed a motion to recall Kimon from his ostracism and was supported in a landslide vote.

There is no way of double-checking the truth of Plutarch’s account. From what we can make of other parts of his Life of Kimon, he appears to have relied heavily on the fourth century historian Ephorus, who, in his turn, drew largely from Thucydides. But there is no remark, latent or otherwise, to such an episode in Thucydides, which leads us to conjecture that Ephorus may have had access to a different work that covered the period. Historiographical nuances aside, Plutarch’s rendition of Kimon’s rushing aid to the Athenians has all the wrappings of a feelgood story with the deject eupatrid setting aside his differences with his ancestral polis only to be blatantly turned away by those who, finally, take note of his patriotism to cut his ostracism short. When all is said and done, Plutarch, following the historical tradition pioneered by Thucydides, was aiming at the creation of a lopsided contrast between the old eupatrid with their ulterior motives and the new parvenues with their barefaced demagoguery.2020 We thus reject the prelude to Kimon’s reconciliation with the

2018 Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, 1.112.2-3.
2020 The point is explicitly brought home by Plutarch at the end of the passage in the following manner: “And this just goes to show how in those days quarrels were conducted with civility, feelings were
Athens as a rhetorical flurry to what comes next: namely, Pericles’ proposal to recall Kimon. There is no historical implausibility of such a motion. The emergency lift of all the ostracism-related sentences before the second Persian invasion, as we saw in the previous chapter, is only the most famous example of overturned ostracisms. Further, Thucydides’ silence about the episode can be persuasively explained as a conscious attempt of him to whitewash Pericles of any decisions that could have been regarded as flawed by his contemporaries. Not that there was anything wrong in exonerating a fellow eupatrid from the standpoint of Thucydides, himself a eupatrid and an important Athenian stratêgos who would be ostracised during the Archidamian War to boot. Kimon was, however, the very epitome of Laconophilia in his day. And the fact that Thucydides’ masterpiece was concerned essentially with the making of the Peloponnesian War from the Athenian point of view assured that any insinuation to Pericles’ personal placation of Kimon would occasion distaste among the readership.

In historical terms, Kimon’s return would certainly help Pericles and his associates to scrape together a truce that would afford them a precious time frame in which they could restore their naval supremacy in the Aegean. The homoioi, likewise, would certainly welcome a breather to recover from the earlier losses their number had incurred and to cement the post-Ithome social status-quo that was grounded upon the vastly transformed social basis of klêroi ownership. Retrospectively, the social and strategic gains that the Spartiates collected from the five-year truce, moreover, can be proven to have been quite tangible. The Spartans, after all, had basically just to waltz in through the Isthmus once the Boeotians defeated the Athenians at Coroneia. For the Athenians, however, there does not seem to be any direct benefit except one: the consolidation of their Aegean hegemony. Indeed, though in complete darkness as to the respective numbers of the armies that clashed at Coroneia in c. 447, Thucydides’ remark that the Athenian hoplites were routed by the Boeotians who were initially sent to exile by the Athenians only to come back with a vengeance shows that the Boeotian force in question, despite the addition of the Euboean and Locrian exiles, was not a full levy. This was quite a reverse in the fortune of the Athenian hoplites who had managed to defeat

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moderate, and people had no difficulty in restraining them if the public good was at stake; even ambition, which is the most dominant and powerful human emotion, used to be subordinate to national emergencies.” *Ibid*, 17. Interestingly, the withering away of the outdated commonplace that the death of Pericles brought in a watershed moment of change from an old-style democracy with an embedded element of philia to a new one that had no ties with the old aristocratic networks of political power is still far from being finalised. Even to the extent that there was a political vacuum that resulted from the partial sweeping aside of old philia by the acceleration of the democratic reforms during the final third of the fifth century, it was mostly filled with the hetaireia which functioned as private organisations centred around oligarchically-inclined leaders: Azoulay, *Xenophon and the Graces of Power*, pp. 182-183; cf. Mogens Herman Hansen, *The Athenian Democracy in the Age of Demosthenes: Structure, Principles, and Ideology*, (Oxford, 1991), pp. 283.
handily a Boeotian army at its full force while being stretched to the limit roughly a decade ago. And given the full-scale offensive they conducted against the Persians, the inference becomes well-nigh certain: there was no substantial reinforcement that was sent to aid the Athenian forces at Boeotia between 451-447. The Athenians had given up the idea of establishing a land empire long before the agreement of the Thirty Years Peace. The question is, of course, precisely how long?

5.3.1 The Athenian Class Struggle and Pericles’ Politics of Arkhê

We argued above that a reinterpretation of the Egyptian expedition along the lines of the development of the Athenian class struggle can be made without stretching the limits of historical revision. Continuing that thread of thought, we aver that the defeat at Tanagra, with its clear demonstration of the strategic futility of trying to blockade the Isthmus, was the point at which the upper-class Athenians forfeited the idea of strategically pre-empting the Spartans. The revision of the Athenian politics of arkhê was conceived at this period as the upper-class Athenians, possibly by the leadership of Pericles, were made to see that no territorial buffers would be unsurpassable for the trio of the potential allies, Sparta, Boeotia and Persia. The upper-class Athenians realised, however, that retreating from the Megarid was conducive to the Spartan threat of invading Attica. Needless to add, an invasion of Attica would hit every Athenian, but not equally. Diversification of the networks of profit, a measure that had been implemented by the upper-class Athenians for some time, would meliorate the potential losses that the ravage of their farmlands would result in.\textsuperscript{2021} As the Athenian hegemony at sea was further consolidated at the beginning of the 490s, moreover, the commercial opportunities that had been available for the upper-class Athenians would increase. The accumulated social outcome of the diversification of commercial and industrial channels of profitmaking, in that vein, was the reinforced socio-economic position of the Athenian upper-class who stood to lose relatively little in the likely event of a Spartan invasion. Their politically assailed condition, to be sure, was another matter.

The Long Walls certainly protected the lives of thêtes that lived in the Attic demes, but the same could not be said of what meagre, if any, landholdings they had.\textsuperscript{2022} Spartans were no...
experts at siege-craft as was attested by their calling upon the Athenians to Mt. Ithome. They more than made up for that deficiency, however, by thoroughly pillaging the farms that dotted the countryside of their enemies. When the Spartans invaded Attica for the first time in c. 447, the smoke that went to the skies heralded the loss of a harvest of grain. The Athenians had, of course, anticipated that likelihood and built a nexus of commercial partnerships which allowed them a steady supply of grain from the northern Euxine.\textsuperscript{2023} The abundance of imported grain, never the less, did not exactly spell salvation for those \textit{thêtes} that either did not have any income from land or saw the produce of their small farmsteads went up in flames during the Spartan invasion. Furthermore, the growing number of \textit{metoikoi} meant that the Athenian population had swollen well beyond the carrying capacity of the Attic land by the 440s. True as it was that daily payment was offered to the rowers,\textsuperscript{2024} the naval campaigns were off the table for a considerable part of autumn and winter at the very least. If the Athenian \textit{thêtes} were to eke out a living then they were to be provided with additional large-scale employment opportunities.

The Athenian upper-class, divided, as always, between the pro-democratic and pro-aristocratic factions with Pericles and Thucydides son of Melesias, respectively, to lead them, devised a threefold scheme that comprised of economic and political measures. First was the enlargement of \textit{mistophoria}, i.e., ‘public payments,’ to cover an extended of political and juridical offices. Naturally, Pericles and Ephialtes had already set a precedent in their introduction of public pay for \textit{dikastêria} in c. 461. The measures that were adopted roughly a decade later, however, entrenched the \textit{mistophoria} system that would now involve payment for regular \textit{boulê} meetings.\textsuperscript{2025} We have observed in the previous chapter that many offices that were de jure open to the poorest census class were de facto closed in the sense that the Attic countryside. Whether they owned little or no land, the \textit{thêtes} in question were uprooted from the wage-earning opportunities that had hitherto been afforded by the social milieu of their residence. Demeaning and exhortative with respect to the dictates of the prevailing aristocratic ideology to be sure, those employment opportunities, be it a particular type of sharecropping or unqualified manual labour, still provided an economic safety net which those \textit{thêtes} would be hard put to find in Athens. On top of the lack of accommodation and access to hygienic facilities, what little benefit Azoulay accords to city-dwelling vanished in a puff, robbing the upper classes from their agricultural profits and lower classes from their lives. And, no: when push came the shove, Pericles was not able to carry the \textit{ekklêśia} for more than a few months: \textit{ibid}, pp. 39; cf. Dillon and Garland, \textit{The Ancient Greeks}, pp. 7.

\textsuperscript{2024} \textit{Ibid}, pp. 85.
\textsuperscript{2025} The public payment scheme did not cover all public services. Attendance at the \textit{ekklêśia}, for example, was not to be remunerated until the end of the fifth century. And the 2 obols that were initially paid for the irregular dicast and \textit{boulê} service was merely a third of what a skilled menial worker earned as a daily wage, i.e., one drachma. One would be very hard put, in other words, to eke out a living with the aid of \textit{misthos} alone. \textit{IG} I\textsuperscript{1} 474-479; Aristotle, \textit{The Athenian Constitution}, 27.4; Plato, \textit{Gorgias}, 515e; Plutarch, \textit{Pericles}, 9.2-3; Azoulay, \textit{Pericles of Athens}, pp. 80; Ober, \textit{Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens}, pp. 81.
vast majority of thêtes possessed neither the land nor the slaves or non-slave farmers in abundance that would allow them to forego their daily share of farming even after the Cleisthenic reforms. With the ushering in of a token payment, the social inclusiveness of both boule would increase albeit rather marginally given that the initial level of daily payments was quite low. The core feature of mistophoria, needless to add, was the financial enticement it offered to the elected members of thêtes since they would now have an additional incentive to partake of the governance of their polis. Adding the pay for heliaia to the picture, the political as well as the judicial kratos of the Athenian dêmos began to be truly exercised only after the Periclean reforms. The anti-democratic scions of eupatridae, with Thucydides leading the pack, offered fierce resistance to the institution claiming that Pericles was creating a viable profession for vagrants and beggars at the expense of the richer citizens. The Thucydidean opposition, in fact, would go on to become an aristocratic tradition of scornful rejection of mistophoria and one of the first measures implemented by either of the two oligarchic regimes at the end of the century would be the cancelling of office payments. Yet, there was a quorum to be filled for heliaia, which, in effect, meant that mistophoria, significant as it was, would not suffice in solving the bread-and-butter issues of many of the lower-class politai. Pericles did not take long before addressing the issue with the greatest building programme of the ancient Greece.

Pericles commissioned the great Athenian architect-sculpture Phidias to draw plans of a magnificent temple that was to become the crowning jewel of the Athenian Acropolis. In 447 works started on the temple that would later be dubbed Athena Parthenos, i.e., ‘Athena the Virgin’ or simply the Parthenon, which was to house a gold and ivory statue of Athena. But that was not whole: a temple dedicated to the Athenian Nikê and the Propylaea, the

2026 There is no way of knowing the precise ratios of thêtes and the slaves they owned. Rather, all the guesstimates have a tendency to be propelled towards clarifying whether the slave-ownership of thêtes had developed into a significant factor due to the commercial benefits that were reaped by the fifth-century Athenian arkhē. In a telling find an inscription testifying to the sale of the properties of the Hermokopidai in 415 lends countenance to Aristotle’s later statement to the effect that the ox was the poor man’s slave. Inscribed prior to the emergence of the devastating financial effects of the Sicilian expedition, the record of a pair of oxen sold for half and two-thirds of the mean price for a slave can be taken as a useful indication of the fact that the relative enrichment that was brought in by the success of the imperial venture did not quite have a levelling impact on the discrepancy of income that separated the late fifth-century zeugitai from the majority of thêtes: Meiggs and Lewis, Greek Historical Inscriptions, no. 79; cf. Michael H. Jameson, ‘On Paul Cartledge, ‘The Political Economy of Greek Slavery’, in Money, Labour and Land, pp. 171.

2027 Cf. Ps. Xenophon, Constitution of the Athenians, 3.7.

2028 Cf. Cartledge, Democracy, pp. 87; Buckley, Aspects of Greek History 750-323 BC, pp. 324.

2029 And pecking at the notion of payment for holding office were none other than some of the prime examples of anti-democratic sentiment such as Plato and Isocrates: Plato, Republic, 565a5; Isocrates, Areopagiticus, 54; cf. Gottesman, Politics and the Street in Democratic Athens, pp. 3-4.

2030 For the conception and development of the mythological background against which that image was drawn, see Junker, Interpreting the Images of Greek Myths, pp. 182-184.
A monumental gateway to the Acropolis, would round off the Acropolis project that would take decades to complete. So, that was one annual social problem solved: the lower-class Athenians would have sufficient material opportunity to maintain and, potentially, even improve upon their lot.²⁰³¹ But how exactly would the wages be financed? Therein lay the rub: Pericles had set a masterplan into motion which, he hoped, would produce enough material fruit for the funding of the building programme.²⁰³²

Following the two decisive Athenian victories against the Persian in Cyprus in late 450s, the Athenians postponed all payments of phoros indefinitely in order to decide on an Aegean policy that was believed to be common to all the Greeks. At the same time Pericles proposed what is commonly referred to as the Congress decree, stipulating to hold a Panhellenic Congress at Athens to which were invited the representatives of all Greek poleis.²⁰³³ Formally, the Athenian call was made to provide a new mandate for the Delian League by unifying all the interested Greek poleis under a common banner that was reminiscent of the old Hellenic League. The commitment was necessary, as the Periclean argument goes, to rebuild the Athenian Acropolis which had borne the brunt of the Second Persian Invasion. Turning the Athenian Acropolis into the religious heart of Greece, the formation of the new League would, therefore, spell the sanctification of the Athenian hegemony. A new mandate and the addition of new members would, of course, necessitate the issuance of a new tribute-list which was to be stored in the newly built treasury of the Delian League, located in the temple of Athena Parthenos itself! The Spartans, along with the majority of the Peloponnesian poleis, were none too happy at the prospect of becoming a tribute-payer whose phoros would be used to build the Athenian fleet itself.²⁰³⁴ It is hardly surprising, as such, to see that they led an uncompromising opposition that proved to be the end of the project. Clairvoyant as ever, Pericles took the failure of the formation of the pan-Hellenic coalition as a tacit political sanction for the continuation of the Delian League. Further, as Athens was the rightful

²⁰³¹ For putting things into perspective, one can recall the numbers of total beneficiaries who had supported the initial phoros-assessment of the allies made by Aristides as it is mentioned in the Athenaiou Politieia: “In accordance with Aristides’ proposal, they provided ample maintenance for the common people, so that more than twenty thousand men were supported from the tribute, the taxes and the allies.” Aristotle, The Athenian Constitution, 24.3.
²⁰³² Osborne has drawn attention to a latent clash in the classical Attic drama between the intensified exploitation of silver mines in Thorikos area and the old exploitation of stoneworkers in the quarries that dotted the Attic landscape. With an ever-increasing body of slaves flocking to the shafts that meandered Laurium, it is quite conceivable that the old eupatridae who did not own any shares in the mining enterprises would cold-shoulder those who did. Still, one ought to add that the shareholders of the silver mines need not have any non-eupatrid origins by default. Osborne, Demos, pp. 125-126; Meikle, Aristotle’s Economic Thought, pp. 162.
²⁰³³ Plutarch, Pericles, 17.1.
²⁰³⁴ On the necessity of collecting phoros in cash for the building and maintenance of the Athenian naval domination, see Kallet-Marx, Money, Expense, and Naval Power in Thucydides’ History I-5.24, pp. 56.
hegemon of the League it could, Pericles argued, use the League funds however it wished. A decree proposed by Pericles in c. 449 was passed to make immediate use of an enormous 5,000 talents and a subsequent use of 3,000 talents to finance the massive rebuilding project. According to Pericles, the allies had paid their **phoroi** for protection and the Athenians were free to do anything they wanted with the collected sum so long as they delivered on their promise.

Thucydides and his supporters threw their weight against the building project, arguing that it was synonymous to making waste of an indispensable source of revenue. They brought charges against Phidias on grounds of suspected embezzlement of the gold decorations that were to be put on the cult statue of Athena, which was sculpted by Phidias himself. And Thucydides led his pack in bringing multiple lawsuits against Pericles to discredit him; that is, until 442 when the Athenian **dêmós** sided with Pericles to send his **eupatrid** rival to exile. Pericles had won the hearts and minds of the Athenian **dêmós** by equal parts enticement and enforcement. The launch of his majestic Acropolis project could only be realised if the Athenian fleet were to exercise unquestionable command over the Aegean. The **thêtès** were to man the triremes during the campaign season to patrol the Aegean and discourage any potential insurrection and to continue the building of the Acropolis buildings when they returned home. Undoubtedly, the maintenance of the hegemonic Athenian fleet was a basic necessity to goad

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2035 The numbers are in keeping with what little historical evidence there is concerning the total annual number of **phoros**-payments. Thucydides’ remark on the Athenians receiving 600 talents from the allies at the outset of the Peloponnesian War and Xenophon’s estimation of 1,000 talents as the grand total of every source of income that the Athenians had in 431 appear to rhyme with the alluded material cost of the Acropolis rebuilding project. Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War*, 2.13.3; Xenophon, *Anabasis*, 7.1.27; for a later case of the social distribution of the economic benefits arising from any such large-scale building project one can resort to the construction of the Erechtheum: “There were many noncitizens present on those public building sites, as can be deduced, with very little risk of error, by extrapolating from the construction accounts relating to another Athenian temple, the Erechtheum. The accounts preserved are those for the years 409/8 and 408/7 B.C., but the actual building had commenced as early as 421. In 408, the building site employed 107 individuals, mostly stonemasons and carpenters. Their legal statuses varied considerably, since epigraphists have worked out that there were definitely 23 citizens, 42metics, and 20 slaves among them. All the various components of the Athenian population were thus represented on the building site.” Azoulay, *Pericles of Athens*, pp. 79; Austin and Vidal-Naquet, *Economic and Social History of Ancient Greece*, pp. 276-282; Chr. Feyel, *Les artisans dans les sanctuaires grecs à travers la documentation financière en Grèce*. (Paris and Athens, 2006), pp. 322-325; Ober, *Democracy and Knowledge*, pp. 203-204.

2036 The most widespread benefit that the Athenian empire offered to its subjects was, however, economic. Most obviously, by guaranteeing protection against Persian privateers and against the ordinary pirates that have historically infested the Mediterranean in the absence of a strong naval power determined to suppress them, the Athenians created the baseline conditions for peaceful trade. Smaller states no longer needed to fear predation by larger states, or raids on their ships or coastal settlements by pirates—which was an endemic problem when there was no power strong enough to keep piracy down to a minimum.” Ober, *The Rise and Fall of Classical Greece*, pp. 201; cf. Kallet-Marx, *Money, Expense, and Naval Power in Thucydides’ History* 1-5.24, pp. 66; Kallet-Marx, ‘The Fifth Century: Political and Military Narrative’, pp. 180-181; Waterfield, *Creators, Conquerors, and Citizens*, pp. 177.

the allies into keep paying their phoroi. At least just as assuredly, the sustainment of the Athenian socio-economic status-quo hinged on the continuance of the Athenian naval dominance. Alas, the postulated remedies to thêtes’ economic predicament created problems of its own. The soaring numbers of the Athenian city-dwellers created a social impediment to the effective distribution of the material benefits of the arkhê. Fortunately, Pericles was not quite out of political ideas to bypass this issue. This time the measure would involve a stricter regulation of citizenship’s conferral.

In 451 Pericles proposed a law to the effect that citizenship to be bestowed only on children whose fathers and mothers both were Athenian. While the precedent law deemed it sufficient for only one of the parents to be Athenian in order to grant citizenship to the child, the new motion inaugurated a rigid regimentation of the citizen numbers. Indeed, one of the first actions taken by the supervising public officials after the motion’s passing would be to write a significant number of former citizens off the grain dole lists that were used to regulate the distribution of grain which was imported by issuing emergency liturgical taxes whenever a shortage of grain was foreseen to descend on the Athenian population. Citizenship, it goes without saying, had already become a social and political privilege after the institution of the public pay and the previous spread of lot as the preferred tool for electing boulestes. The economic bonus, such as the eligibility for the grain dole, the marginally better daily wage of citizen rowers and the enlarged arrangement of the Pnyx with public pay, were all tangible benefits that could have functioned as the telling difference between starvation and survival. Economics was, of course, not all there was to the new citizenship law. The creation of an additional layer of social privilege functioned as a viable political bridge that united the lower-class and upper-class Athenians against the non-citizens, metoikoi included.


2039 Plutarch, Pericles, 37; Pomeroy, Goddesses, Whores, Wives, and Slaves, pp. 66. An additional motivating factor for the law’s passing has been discerned by various commentators as curbing the aristocratic ties of exogamy: Richard Seaford, Reciprocity and Ritual: Homer and Tragedy in the Developing City-State, (Oxford, 1994), pp. 214; Vérilhac and Vial, Le mariage grec, pp. 53-60.

2040 That emergency measure was, however, as infrequent as the risk of food shortage was perennial. There are only three attested cases of gratis grain distribution from 455-400, whose absence was partially made up, more times to none, by public pays and military wages: “Secondly, as far as we know, grain was handed out to Athenian citizens only in 445/4 (the gift of Psammethicus), 424/3 (a wartime crisis), and in 405/4 (the final crisis of the war). The Athenian practice was to give the ordinary citizens not grain, but money to buy grain, whether in the form of payment for office, jury service, attendance at the assembly, service in the fleet, the diobelia (two-obol payment), or the thorikon (festival tickets).” Garnsey, Famine and Food Supply in the Graeco-Roman World, pp. 131.

2041 Potts’ argument that the motion can be regarded as an anti-thetic one is as patchy as the conjecture he makes in order to buttress it: if the majority of the Athenian crews are assumed to have had thetic backgrounds then it is a given that they had the highest likelihood of eloping with non-Athenian women.
Solon’s ambitious measures to transform Athens into an artisanal and commercial centre, the city had come to house ever-increasing numbers of metic craftspeople and artists. The first generation *metoikoi* were liable, as observed in the previous chapter, to pay the *metoikion*, but the second generation, provided that their immigrant mothers or fathers had married citizen partners, would be exempt from paying the taxes in addition to benefiting from the rights accorded to *politai*. Following the consolidation of Athens’ Aegean hegemony, the *polis* grew into a regional centre of commerce and production, industrial, artisanal and artistic alike, offering numerous employment opportunities to those that were down the artisanal pecking order in other *poleis*. When the Athenians passed the new citizenship law of Pericles in 451, the main social result was an instant revaluation of citizen men and women, regardless of their class origins, as potential marriage partners that offered more in the way of social and political benefits. Needless to add, this revolution was accompanied by a corresponding exclusion of ‘mixed-blood’ groups from the citizen-body. Ever-trenchant against stirring up significant economic problems for the Athenian upper classes through a redistribution of land, Pericles and his associates thus modified citizenship along the lines of ethnic exclusivism in order to create a bond of commonality between them and the lower classes.

The refurbished political unity of the Athenian *politai* served as the political ruse compromising the class concord of citizen *thêtes* and non-citizen *banausoi*. Should Pericles be regarded as oblivious to this side of his citizenship law? We think not. In fact, we claim

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2042 A study of the demographic distribution of 366 metics whose residence within Attic demes are identified has shown that a light concentration on *astu* and Piraeus can be inferred from the available evidence. That does not spell, of course, anything against the grain with what can be deduced from hints of historical testimonia to their mainly artisanal occupations: David Whitehead, *The Demes of Attica, 508/7 – ca. 250 B.C.*, (Princeton, 1986), pp. 83-84.


2047 Lane brings out another potential cause of the law as curbing the Athenian upper classes’ tendency to form inter-*poleis* marriage ties which might have accreted so much negative baggage by this time that the law’s passing was facilitated with the shared blessing of the pro-democratic lower and upper classes: Lane, *Greek and Roman Political Ideas*, pp. 102.
that the motion was completely soaked in the perennial terms of the Athenian class conflict on the basis of the interpretative historical thread that we have followed up till now. The rise and fall of Ephialtes had set a historical precedent for Pericles: taking the bull of class conflict by its horns, or even the mere appearance of it, was to be sealed off as a *jeux interdits* for the *eupatrid* hegemons of the Athenian politics. Ephialtes was murdered by his fellow *eupatrids* to be sure. But the swollen threat of class warfare was in danger of spiralling out of the *eupatrid* control to swallow whole the Athenian upper classes. The Egyptian expedition was a desperate last-ditch attempt to divest the Athenian *thêtes* from its revolutionary power. The roughly simultaneous effort of creating a so-called land empire was geared towards the enactment of a safety measure that would hinder the Spartans from invading the *Attikê*. With the loss of a considerable number of troops in Egypt, however, the Athenians did not have nearly enough manpower to garrison Boeotia and the Megarid while retaining their naval supremacy against the Persians, whence the sad realisation of the inevitability of Attica’s invasion. It certainly did not take a genius to augur that Spartans’ invasion of Attica would incur most of its damage on the livelihoods of *thêtes* who lived in the western demes of *Attikê* with little to no landholding, thus necessarily needing to toil on the farmsteads of their richer compatriots. The coalescence of large numbers of lower-class Athenians within the *polis*, robbed of their meagre livelihoods, emitted the imminent danger of full-fledged class warfare against which all the upper-class alarms needed to be sounded off. The imperial overreach of Athens was an ideological fantasia that allowed the Athenian upper-classes to pull themselves up, at least politically, by their bootstraps. With a sphere of either direct or indirect political control that cast a hegemonic blanket from northern Euxine to Rhodes, the overextension of limits had served as a cornerstone of Athenian polity ever since the founding of the Delian League. Yet, Thucydides’ commending attribution of the notion as a steady and commendable pillar of Periclean policy becomes neither anachronistic nor hollow if we graft it unto the branches of the Athenian class struggle.

Pericles’ cautionary tales against overreaching were voiced for discouraging any eruption of full-blown upper-class infighting. The tale had more than an ounce of truth as the events of 461/0 had showed compellingly. The Athenian upper classes could afford a cut in the profits they collected from their absentee farmsteads around *Attikê*. They could even allow a

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2048 I fail to see how Ober differs from the historical purveyors of the medicine of due measure in his postulations of a “productive equilibrium between the mass and elite” before and after the Second Peloponnesian War alike. Only if the equilibrium in question is construed as one that was ensured by a combination of dramatically increased attrition of Athenian lower classes and ‘squandering’ of Athenian finances, whose losses triggered an avalanche of oligarchic opposition, can one hope to offer an impartial rendering of Athens during the last third of the fifth century. Ober, *Democracy and Knowledge*, pp. 257.
cautionary diversion of the funds appropriated from the League treasury to build artificial ponds of minimal redistribution of wealth in the form of enormous building projects and *mistophoria*. But they certainly could not tolerate disruptive internal strife that would wreak havoc within their ranks. Taking charge of the popular opinion in ostracisms was one thing. Crucial as it is in the colouring of the Athenian polity with the brightest of demotic hues, however, it was largely toothless on account of its holding of the properties and citizenship of the ostracised in reserve. If there was no bite to *ostrakismos*, that had a lot to do with leaving the door of aristocratic reconciliation ever-open. Instigating the murder of *eupatrid* leaders or pogroms, on the other hand, was unreasonable for its self-destructive impact on the politics of class relations. Ephialtes’ murder and Kimon’s exoneration were two sides of the same coin of class politics; the terror of civil war, on this view, would be banished with the virtuous appeasement on the other.

Needful as it was, the strengthening of the Athenian class structure via economic and political measures could not be realised without ensuring the imperial revenue channels that flowed through the Aegean. Aware of the problem, the Athenian *eupatrids* began to give an extra turn to the politics of hegemonical extortion that would be intensified by quasi-imperial decrees, direct interventions in the polities of other *poleis* and economic measures that would further water the mills of the imperialist revenue schemes. There are three imperial inscriptions that have been securely dated to the first half of the 440s which show that the *eupatridae* did not slow down in their policy of empire-building following the rejection of Pericles’ proposal to establish a new Hellenic League. A strong-armed manifestation of Athenian gunboat diplomacy can be seen, for one, in the case of Colophon. Estimated to be a three-talent *phoros*-payer in the first assessment period (454-450), the *polis* suddenly drops out of the taxing of the tribute list in 450/449 and reappears only in 447/446 with a shrink in its *phoros* assessment to one-and-a-half talents. The drop from a higher level of *phoros* to a lower one, in addition to the absence in collection for three successive years have been taken as suggestive of a potential rebellion from the Delian League, violently supressed and redressed by the settlement of an Athenian cleruchy.\(^{2049}\) Such an interpretation can be brought to the limit of historical certainty thanks to the survival of a Colophon decree that appears more vindictive than corrective: “and I will not revolt [from the Athenian people either] by word or deed, [neither I myself nor will I be persuaded to do so by anyone else], and I will love the [Athenian People and I will not] desert and [I will not subvert] democracy [at Colophon – neither] myself nor will I [be persuaded] to do so [by anyone else].”\(^{2050}\) A curious mélange of enforced political conversion

\(^{2049}\) Buckley, *Aspects of Greek History 750-323 BC*, pp. 190.

\(^{2050}\) ML 47 = AE 219, pp. 115.
to democracy and a severely curtailed isegoria, the decree lays bare the great lengths that the Athenians were willing to go in order to ensure the undisrupted operations of the League. Historical information is insufficient to flesh out what kind of polity was in existence in Colophon before the revolt, and, as such, we have no way of knowing whether there was an element of popular support for the latter. Historical substantiation is not altogether lost, however, if we take note of a few minor, albeit telling, differences of the decree from what had hitherto been the case. In the inscription, for example, there is no reference to the allies of the Athenians which was a clause that had been adopted in the Erythrae decree of c. 452. Although we cannot extend the sample time frame due to the availability of epigraphic evidence, which turns into an avenue of historical interpretation only in the late 450s, the shift from the explicit mention of the Delian League to Athenians plain and simple is indicative of how the Athenians interpreted their effort to put down the rebellion. This difference between the Erythrae decree and the more overtly imperialistic decrees of 440s can be brought out in its full contrast in comparison with the other surviving epigraphic evidence. On that note, the Chalcis decree of c. 446 is a relevant piece of epigraphical evidence that maintains the clear line of demarcation between loyalty to Athens and her allies: “… I will not revolt from the people of Athens by any means or device whatsoever, neither in word nor in deed, nor will I obey anyone who does revolt, and if anyone revolts I will denounce him to the Athenians, … and I will be the best and fairest ally I am able to be and will help and defend the Athenian people, in the event of anyone wronging the Athenian people, and I will obey the Athenian

2051 Of course, the Athenians had institutionalized, if we are to confirm Ober’s earlier account, isegoria, or ‘equal opportunity of speech’ (at the ekklesia), as a core tenet of their brand of democracy barely a decade ago when the aristocratic privileges of the Areopagus were culled. Although the sense of irony that springs from their imperial policies is not lost on us, it is more than likely, as such, that it was lost on the majority of contemporary Athenians. Ober, Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens, pp. 78-79; for a more formalist, and apriorist, conception of the term in conjunction with eleutheria and isótês, see Mogens H. Hansen, ‘The Ancient Athenian Ideal and the Modern Liberal View of Liberty’, in Demokratia, pp. 92-93; cf. Ps. Xenophon, Constitution of the Athenians, 1.12; Wallace, ‘Revolutions and a New Order in Solonian Athens and Archaic Greece’, pp. 66; contra Wood, ‘Demos versus “We, the People”: Freedom and Democracy Ancient and Modern’, pp. 121-137.

2052 It is clear from the inscriptions that a conflict broke out in Erythrae between the League loyalists and Medizers in c. 453/2. Having gained the upper hand in the conflict, the Medizers set up a pro-Persian tyranny and revolted from the League. The Athenians, in their turn, smashed the rebellion, superimposed a democratic polity and planted a garrison in the polis. Perhaps related to the disaster that befell the Athenian fleet in Egypt, the Athenians issued minute regulations that would ensure their firm hold over the polis. The democratic boulê that the Athenians instituted, for example, was to be aided by the phourarch, or the ‘garrison commander,’ and the polity itself would be supervised by the Athenian epikopoi, i.e., ‘overseers.’ It is hardly an exaggeration, therefore, to say that having revolted against the League, Erythrae would be politically transformed in sole accord with the Athenian interests. Cf. Buckley, Aspects of Greek History 750-323 BC, pp. 187-188.
people.** 2053 In short, the decree allowed the Athenians to effectively be the judge, jury and executioner overlooking the Chalcidian internal affairs. 2054

The politics of hegemonic extortion and bullying tactics that the Athenians adopted in order to forcefully bring around their recalcitrant allies went hand in hand. Tightening up the collection of the estimated phoros, in that vein, served to curb whatever excuses could be fashioned by the allied poleis for their missing payments. The so-called Cleinias decree, for instance, was an attempt to ensure the smooth collection of phoros through the enactment of a mechanism of identification tokens which were to be stamped on a phoros-recording tablet. 2055 But even more conspicuously imperialistic than all these decrees is the Coinage Decree that has been scrambled together from various surviving inscriptions which have been found in the allied poleis. 2056 The decree stipulated that the Athenian silver coinage was to be imposed on all the allied poleis in addition to ordering all the mints in the latter to be closed down. 2057 If the order was to find disobedient recipients, the decree goes on to add, “[The Athenians are to see to] this, if the cities themselves are not willing.” 2058 Naturally, the substitution of other poleis’ coinage with the Athenians silver coins was never complete. 2059

Upper-class Athenians were no buffoons to have a go at a veritable fool’s errand. They knew

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2053 ML 52. 21, 26 = AE 78, pp. 44. The agreement of the Athenian boulê was, of course, explicitly stated as a precondition for any political change in Erythrae a few years back. Neither the tone, nor the insistence of the document, however, can compare to the Chalcis decree: cf. ML 40, AE 216 A, pp. 113.
2054 The wide berth that the Athenians gave themselves through the decree can be observed also in the case of the amendment to the Chalcis decree: ML 52 = AE 78 pp. 45.
2055 ML 46; AE 190 pp. 102-103.
2056 AE 198 pp. 105-106; for the benefits involved in creating standardised weights and measures in addition to a standard coinage, see Ober, *The Rise and Fall of Classical Greece*, pp. 204.
2057 Figueira has persuasively shown that the response of the allies to the decree sprang from anything but a firm obedience. In fact, there was no closing down of the local mints in defiance of what was clearly viewed as an imperialistic prerogative: Thomas J. Figueira, *The Power of Money: Coinage and Politics in the Athenian Empire*, (Philadelphia, 1998); for a survey of the two different attempts at nailing down the possible date of the decree, with the majority of scholarly opinion stacking up for its placing in mid-century as opposed to 420s, see Kallet-Marx, *Money and the Corrosion of Power in Thucydides*, pp. 205-213.
2058 ML 45; AE 198 pp. 105-106; for a comparison with Thucydides’ wording of the treaty imposed by the Athenians upon the Samians as a result of their rebellion in 440/39, see Azoulay, *Pericles of Athens*, pp. 53; Raaflaub, *The Discovery of Freedom in Ancient Greece*, pp. 118-122.
2059 There were a small number of coins that continued to be in use throughout the Athenian arkhê. The electrum coins of Cyzicus, for one, was one such popular species. Never the less, Buckley’s dependence on the Cyzican electrum coins as clear indication that the Athenian coinage decree was largely ineffective is not as compelling as it looks. The extant finds of Cyzican electrum dated to this period shows, to be sure, its unhindered utility. The Athenians, however, did not have any access gold mines and may thus have found it conducive to their commercial interests to allow the Cyzican mint its operation. The coinage of silver coin, by contrast, was altogether different as we have not come across any silver coin heaps that was not produced by the Athenian mint and dated to this period. We agree, therefore, with Azoulay’s remark that the Athenian reluctance to interfere with the operation of the Cyzican mint is highly likely to show that the Athenians only considered silver mints to level a challenge against their commercial hegemony. Buckley, *Aspects of Greek History 750-323 BC*, pp. 194; Azoulay, *The Tyrant-Slayers of Ancient Athens*, pp. 188.
that the full-operation of the Athenian mint and the silver mines of Laurium were two of the foremost ventures that kept the Athenian imperial economy going. The economic prerogatives of the allies were wrenched away, as such, in order to turn the silver coinage circulating around the Aegean into an Athenian monopoly.2060

With the vigilant dissipation of the clouds of insurgence that were hovering above many allied poleis, the Athenians appeared primed for an eventual large-scale confrontation with the Peloponnesians. The upper-classes had introduced ethnic separators to drive successful political wedges within the ranks of the Athenian lower classes, proposed decrees that would ensure the tightened grip of the Athenian commercial monopoly on the Aegean and directed the windfall of imperial phoroi to channels which largely fed the root-and-branch Athenian thêtès. As far as they were concerned, the Spartans were welcome to invade Attica anytime they wanted. As for the Athenian thêtès, the vast increase of the social and political benefits associated with citizenship as well as the expanded means of money-making appear to have earned their reliable trust on the politics of arkhê. As the Athenian empire steamrolled through the political authority of her allies, however, an ever-increasing number of dissident poleis came to wait for an opening for a coordinated attack. The opportunity came when the Athenians were called to arbitrate a local dispute between Samos, her largest ally with a formidable navy to boot, and Miletus over the possession of Priene.

Samos was arguably the most powerful of the three-remaining ship-suppliers that did not send phoros and they made quick work of the Milesians. The Milesians, however, brought their dispute to the purview of the Athenians, the rightful hegemon of the Delian League whose word would be final. The Athenian agreed to the Milesians’ request and asked the parties involved to submit the matter to the Athenian hands for arbitration.2061 Compliance with the Athenian ‘request’ was, however, the furthest thing off the Samian eupatrids’ mind that resulted in a flat rejection thereof. The Athenians could not afford to lose face when facing the most daunting of their allies and they thus sent a task force with such rapidity that the Samians were caught completely off-guard. An expedition of 40 ships with Pericles in command subdued the island, swapped the current oligarchy with a democratic polity, took 100 hostages, half of whom were men and the other half boys from the oligarchic families, then took their

2060 There can be no assuming away, of course, the function of the instrument as an additional means of inducing political domination over the allies: Austin and Vidal-Naquet, Economic and Social History of Ancient Greece, pp. 326; cf. Thomas R. Martin, Sovereignty and Coinage in Ancient Greece, (Princeton, 1985), pp. 206; Figueira, The Power of Money, pp. 556; Kallet-Marx, Money and the Corrosion of Power in Thucydides, pp. 217.
2061 Plutarch, Pericles, 25.1.
leave after leaving a garrison behind. The case appeared closed with relatively little punishment involved as the Samians retained their independence, their walls and their navy unlike many previous examples in which that measure of restraint was not displayed by the Athenians. The Samians, however, decided to answer that restraint with an attempt at the total subjugation of the Athenian presence on their island.

Seeking allies in the mainland, the Samians extended an offer of cooperation not only to the Samian oligarchs who had abandoned their island but also to the Persian Satrap of Sardis, Pissouthnes. They then gathered a force of 700 mercenaries, moved to Lemnos to release all the Samian hostages, crossed to Samos under the cover of night, overran the Athenian garrison and began a revolt in earnest from the Delian League. Further, as if to declare their resolution in unequivocal terms, they deposited the captured Athenian garrison and magistrates with Pissouthnes. Seeing that the Aegean wind had started to blow in an anti-Athenian direction, Byzantium also revolted and the Athenians were suddenly overcome with the terror of a pervasive rebellion in the eastern Aegean. The Persians, of course, took advantage of the widespread discontent in order to foment and lead an Aegean rebellion by their naval proxy, the Phoenicians, who managed to divide the huge fleet that the Athenians had sent to restore their control over the island. Samians also invited the Spartans and the Peloponnensians to the anti-Athenian fold, as the full commitment of the Persians to the war would only be given if they were to be joined by the Spartans. The Spartans had a ramshackle fleet to say the least, and hence needed the cooperation of their allies, Corinth foremost among them due to her significant naval force, to agree to the idea of an anti-Athenian offensive. For whatever reason, the Corinthians, however, rejected the Spartan proposal as well as persuading the majority of the Peloponnensian allies to subscribe to their standpoint and thus blocked any help that could have been sent to the Samians. An Athenian fleet of 160 triremes was joined by a combined 55 triremes from Lesbos and Chios and after an enormously dear siege that took nine months, the Samians finally capitulated. This time there was hardly any trace of leniency in the terms of agreement: the Samians, having fallen from the good graces of the Athenians, were to pull down their walls, surrender their fleet, pay a full indemnity in periodic installations and give hostages to the Athenians. All things considered, the Athenians appear not to have pressed home the advantage of the evident helplessness of the Samians. Indeed, if anything, they were welcomed back as the most powerful of the Athenians’ allies provided that they were willing to cooperate. Having seen the end of the Samian revolt, the Byzantines also decided to put

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2062 Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War*, 1.115.4-5; Plutarch, *Pericles*, 25.3.
2064 *Ibid*, 1.40.5; AE 64, pp. 40.
2065 Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War*, 1.117.3; AE 64, pp. 40.
down their arms and thus returned to the phoros-paying subject-ally status. And with that ended the biggest scare that the Athenians had to face before the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War.

5.3.2 The Peloponnesian League From 440-431

The 430s saw the creation of growing political rifts between Sparta’s major ally, Corinth, and Athens. As they would be happy to remind the Athenians of the fact in their disputes throughout the 430s, the Corinthians had often been the primary obstacle between the Spartans and a full-fledged invasion of Attica ever since Cleomenes’ proposal to reinstitute Hippias as the tyrant of Athens back in 506. Indeed, with the signal exception of the open hostilities between the two sides in the First Peloponnesian War, there were not any overdue causes for disagreement that could pit the two frequently against each other. It is also highly likely that the abating of the Corinthian tempers, which had flared up during 450s, was caused primarily by their observation of the disarming aspects of commercial disruptions when facing the overwhelming Athenian armies. Although the Athenian naval hegemony had its centre in the Aegean, and thus had no direct control over the commercial routes that criss-crossed the Ionian Sea, the Athenian blockage of Isthmus had proved highly effective in unsettling the bulk of commercial activities that were taking place in the Gulf of Corinth. The partial recuperation of Sparta from the heavy demographic, economic and social damage incurred as a combined result of the great earthquake and the helot rebellion, as demonstrated by their willingness to side with the revolting Samians despite the express stipulations of the Thirty Year Peace, restored a measure of security that the Corinthians were not happy to part with in the case of an all-out war. This reluctance slowly evaporated when the Athenians began to show interest on a former Corinthian apoikos conveniently located on the shores of the Ionian Sea, Corcyra.2066

The episode began with a political dispute in Epidamnus, an apoikos of Corcyra, in 435. The democrats of the city had seized power but the oligarchs, taking aid from other poleis, began to lay siege to the polis instead of bowing out. The democrats then applied to the Corcyraeans, their mother city and itself a democratic polity, to take their side in the conflict but the Corcyraeans refused the offer2067 which led the democrats of Epidamnus to seek the counsel

2066 Ste. Croix labelled the Corinthians, mainly as a result of the intransigence they showed in the Corcyraean episode and later, as the prime instigators of the Second Peloponnesian War. Though we agree with that nexus of aetiology, we think it apt to recall that by this time the Athenians and Peloponnesians had been waiting for such a long time to pounce at each other that even a relatively minor issue of the order of the Megarian decree could have proven capable of creating a wildfire. Ste. Croix, The Origins of the Peloponnesian War, pp. 78.

2067 Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, 1.24.5-7.
of the Delphic oracle to learn whether their handing over their *polis* to Corinth would be a just decision. The oracle agreed and the Corinthians were happy to comply.\textsuperscript{2068} Although we are largely in the dark concerning the potentially long-lasting quarrels between Corcyra and Corinth, the military expedition that was launched by the latter indicate that they were looking for viable ways to open hostilities. In the event the Corinthians sent a task force that captured Epidamnus but was then besieged by the Corcyraeans.\textsuperscript{2069} Refusing to back down from their military commitment, the Corinthians, in turn, resolved to send a relief force along with a group of colonists that were to settle on Epidamnus to convert the city into a veritable Corinthian colony.\textsuperscript{2070} The Corcyraeans, having seen the matter spiral slowly out of their control, brought the matter to the Peloponnesian League and received the backing of Sparta and Sicyon to offer generous terms in order to end the conflict. The Corcyraeans were willing to submit the matter to mutually agreed arbitrators with the sole condition of Corinthians’ relinquishing of their claims to Epidamnus and their recall of their troops, not forgetting to add that they would seek allies elsewhere if the Corinthians would not agree to their terms.\textsuperscript{2071} The Corinthians responded by sending 75 triremes and 2,000 *hoplitai* to Epidamnus but were thoroughly trashed by the Corcyraeans at the battle of Leucimme in 435. The Corcyraeans also gained control of Epidamnus in the same day and thus brought the matter to a close; or so they thought, for the humiliated Corinthians had unfinished business to attend to.\textsuperscript{2072}

Having received the news of the Corinthians building a new fleet and hiring mercenaries for launching a renewed attempt at subduing them, the Corcyraeans sent an embassy to Athens in 433 to seek an alliance. In their turn, the Corinthians, having gotten wind of the rapprochement, sent an embassy of their own to dissuade the Athenians from taking the side of the Corcyraeans. For the Corinthians, keeping Corcyra out of the political reach of the Athenians was a question of necessity. Corinth had its fortunes growing in tandem with those of the Sicilian Greeks. Any interruption of the commercial links between them and their western partners, as such, could have proven deeply convulsive for the Corinthian interests. Furthermore, the Corinthians knew that Corcyra had a mighty fleet of her own, which could be utilised, in the case of a potential alliance, by the Athenians to blockade the Gulf of Corinth. To those ends, while it is true that the Corinthians solemnly wanted to punish the Corcyraeans for their earlier misfortunes, it is just as assured that they could ill-afford the prospect of an agreement over even a limited *summachus* between Athens and Corcyra.

\textsuperscript{2068} Ibid, 1.25.2-3.
\textsuperscript{2069} Ibid, 1.26.
\textsuperscript{2070} Ibid, 1.27.
\textsuperscript{2071} Ibid, 1.28.
\textsuperscript{2072} Ibid, 1.29.
For the Athenians, a *summachus* with the Corcyraeans was the final step in a long way of preparations that was trodden to minimise the risks involved in the impending collusion with the Peloponnesians. Corcyra’s large fleet would be a valuable addition to that of the Delian League. Strategically located adjacently to the entrance to the Gulf of Corinth, Corcyra would also increase the Athenian sphere of influence in the region that was on the wax ever since the settlement of rebelling helots in Naupactus. Aware of the imminent threat of the Peloponnesian invasion of Attica, Pericles and his fellow *strategoi* were on the lookout for strategic avenues to counter the possible policy of *epiteichismos*, i.e., the building of a long-term fortification, that would wreak permanent havoc on the Athenian landholdings. To be sure, the expansion of the campaign season toward perpetual warfare may be largely seen as a Macedonian invention. But the Athenian *strategoi* had experienced that the Spartans were fully capable of committing themselves to a round-the-clock effort when it mattered. Indeed, the siege of Mt. Ithome had shown particularly clearly that no rules of naval campaigning applied to land warfare when the Spartans were hell-bent on accomplishing something. The Athenian *strategoi* knew full well what lay in store for Athens in the upcoming few years. They also realised that their alliance with Corcyraeans would inevitably result in hastening that possibility despite the fact that Corcyra was not listed among the allies of either Athens or Sparta, and the Athenians, as such, were not violating the terms of the Thirty Year Peace. In the end, an *epimachia*, or ‘defensive alliance,’ was agreed between the sides to explicitly prevent the arising of Corinthian complaints that the conditions of the Thirty Year Peace were broken. The Athenians also sent a small fleet of ten ships to Corcyra in order to pre-empt the Corinthians from engaging in any naval operations against the Corcyraeans. Ten ships would, of course, hardly suffice to tip the military balance in Corcyraeans’ favour. But the star-studded *strategoi*-retinue that commanded the fleet, namely, Diotimius son of Strombichus, Proteas son of Epicles and, most importantly, Lacedaemonius son of Kimon, who had assumed the Spartan *proxenia* after the death of his father, ensured that the blame would fall on the Corinthians if the latter forced any engagement on their own. This additional measure, however, did not suffice to hold back the Corinthians from pressing ahead with their task force of 150 ships. Only when the winner of the first naval engagement was clear enough did the Athenian ships join the fray. But when the Corinthians, the victors of the previous engagement, were about to sail out to engage the allied force again, they saw that a supplementary Athenian squadron of twenty ships was approaching. Increasingly weary of their precarious situation, the Corinthians accepted the Athenian offer to retreat unhindered provided that they would

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2074 Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War*, 1.44.1.
2075 *Ibid*, 1.45.1-5.
make no attempt on Corcyra. Yet, for all its import in causing the widening of the political chasm between Athens and Corinthians, the Corcyraeans episode was not the only Peloponnesian ground of complaint that ultimately gave way to the violation of the Thirty Year Peace.

Potidaea, a *polis* in the Thraceward region, was another major bone of contest between the Athenians and Corinthians. Athens always had a large political investment in the minerally and naturally richly-endowed parts of Thrace. By the 430s, the Athenians had grown bold enough to found two colonies, Brea in early 430s and Amphipolis in 437/6, on the Aegean coast in order to extract direct profits from the area and to halt the eastward advance of Macedonia under King Perdiccas. Listed in the Thirty Year Peace as an ally of Athens despite being a *apoikos* of Corinth, Potidaeans had recently seen their relations with Athenians sour owing to the Athenian demands for sending over hostages to the Athenians, to decline to receive the Corinthian magistrates that were sent yearly and to pull down the part of the city walls that looked in the direction of Athens. Seeing that the Athenian intransigence that they were facing could spell disaster for their interests, the Potidaeans resolved to send two embassies, one to Athens and the other to Sparta. The embassy to the Athenians would function as a final attempt at placation whilst the one to Sparta, accompanied by Corinthian delegates, silently worked out a compromise with the Spartans. The Spartan authorities promised that they would invade Attica in the likely case of an Athenian attack to Potidaea. In direct violation of the terms of the Thirty Year Peace, but true to their long-held convictions, the Spartans and Corinthians thus lay the snare that, once sprung, would spell the end of the uneasy peace.

When the Athenian task force of a thousand hoplites and thirty ships under the command of Archestratus made its way to Potidaea it encountered an out-and-out revolt with a sizeable mercenary army of 1,600 hoplites and 400 light infantry that had grown out of the pockets of the Corinthians. The Athenians responded by sending an additional force of 2,000 hoplites and 40 ships led by Callias, fought and won a battle against the Potidaeans, mercenary troops and their Peloponnesian supporters and began a siege of the *polis* that would take two years to bear fruit and prove a large drain on the Athenian, i.e., League, treasury. From the standpoint

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2077 Brea’s foundation is also of signal import in testifying to how the *apoikoi* and cleruchies functioned to bring a measure of economic comfort to some of the hard-pressed *thêtes* finding it increasingly difficult to carve out a living in Attica. Azoulay, *Pericles of Athens*, pp. 74; IG 13 46, 43–46 = ML 49, 39–42; cf. Thomas J. Figueira, *Athens and Aigina in the Age of Imperial Colonization*, (Baltimore, 1991), pp. 59-60.

2078 Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War*, 1.60.1.
of the Peloponnesians, the re-imposition of the Athenian yoke on Potidaea was the last straw in a succession of injuries that necessitated taking the matters into their own hands. Pretexts and immediate causes of complaint aside, however, both the Athenian and Spartan upper classes had begun to conceive the high possibility of eventual military confrontation virtually half a century ago when the Hellenic League fell into disuse. In the event the Peloponnesians would signal out two further grounds for violating the Thirty Year Peace; namely, the Athenian political subjugation of Aeginetians and the ban from engaging in any commercial activities in Athens that was put on the Megarians. Both sides knew, of course, that asking the Athenians to renounce their claim to Aegina, or the Spartan demand for the Athenians to send Pericles to exile, were tantamount to a formal declaration of war. In other words, the sides were primed for the final showdown that would take, with an intermittence period of a five-year truce, twenty-seven years to complete. But when bells rung for the final Athenian defeat at Aegospotami in 404 two factors would have proved decisive in breaking the deadlock. One of them was the Persian gold, which would then become one of the perpetual catalysts for Greek ventures overseas that was to be the desperately sought-after promise of the exotic Orient until Alexander managed to finally tap into it in 330s. The other, however, was a veritable bombshell as any other: Syracuse.

5.3.3 Syracuse During and After the Deinomenid Reign

The age of the fifth-century Sicilian tyrants came down with a thundering crash during the second quarter of the fifth century. The first to go down was Thrasyboulos, the son of Hieron I of Syracuse. He became the third Deinomenid tyrant of Syracuse in 467, terrorised the all and sundry Syracusans using the mercenary troops that was in his pay, confiscated land without rhyme or reason, killed and exiled opponents and supporters alike and was finally ousted even before the passing of a year. The Emmenid tyrants of Akragas fared no better. In fact, Theron’s son Thrasydaeus had already set a precedent of outrageous tyrannical behaviour back in the later years of 470s. The watershed fall of the Sicilian tyrants was followed by a period of re-emergence of the clans, i.e., the archetypical feature of oligarchic politics.

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2079 A cause of injury, to be sure, the Megarian decree hardly sufficed to lay waste to the economy of Megara. Aristophanes’ later testimony to the contrary, the Megarians were not renowned for their production of any specialty goods and had access to the two Corinthian ports that allowed sending and receiving shipments from either way of the Gulf. All in all, it is thus fair to say that Aristophanes’ portrayal of Megarians as devastated from the effects of the Athenian ban is more than likely to speak to his aim at exaggerated comic effect. Aristophanes, *The Acharnians*, 729-835; cf. Buckley, Aspects of Greek History 750-323 BC, pp. 319.

Notwithstanding the extrapolations of Aristotle and Diodorus Siculus from what seems to be the order of the day during the last quarter of the Sicilian poleis to those of the half-century mark, recent studies have shown that the phratries had made a comeback through this earlier period. Indeed, the oligarchic elements of conspicuous consumption, such as large mansions, continued success in Olympic games and elite burials are all attested in this period, which is another way of saying that democracy of the Athenian type was a phantom at least until the 430s.

The archaeological evidence is also supported by what we can establish from the historically most lucid case of Syracusan polity. Following the toppling of Thrasyboulos’ tyranny, all the exiles returned to the polis and reclaimed their property. One of the first discussions held by the reassembled citizen-body was the status of those who were granted citizenship by the Deinomenid tyrants. The old politai, comprising of gamoroi and killyroi alike, formed a political phalanx against the newcomers and attempted to divest their rights of citizenship. Issuing stricter regulations of election for officeholding, the old citizens stymied the emergence of civic rights of the new ones which resulted in a civil war. The mercenary side,

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2081 Aristotle, Politics, 1303a-h2; Diodorus Siculus, The Library, 11.72.2-73, 76.1-2; Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, 7.33.1: 55; 58.1. Robinson, for one, is one of the influential adherents to Finley’s taking the historical tradition at its face value. On the question of Sicilian poleis and their respective polities, we side with Rutter and de Angelis in arguing against an a priori retrojection of what was partially brought out in Syracuse after her successful fending off of the Athenian invasion to an umbrella generalisation that had taken root no later than 460s. A deeper scrutiny allows us, in that sense, to recall that there is no historical correlation, let alone causality, between the toppling of tyrants and establishment of democracy: Robinson, Democracy beyond Athens, pp. 67-88; Moses I. Finley, Ancient Sicily, 2nd edition, (London, 1979), pp 58; contra N. K. Rutter, ‘Syracusan Democracy: ‘Most Like the Athenian’”, in Alternatives to Athens, pp. 137-151; de Angelis, Archaic and Classical Greek Sicily, pp. 207.


2083 Large atrium houses found at Himera and large sumptuous mansions of Selinous, for example, have both been dated to the period after Hieron. For Selinous, see D. Mertens, Citta e monumenti dei Greci d’Occidente: Dalla colonizzazione alla crisi del V secolo a.C, (Rome, 2006), pp. 324-328; for the differences in housing at Himera, see Lisa Nevett, House and Society in the Ancient Greek World, (Cambridge, 1999), pp. 132-133.

2084 For the documented Olympic victors from the Sicilian poleis with reference, see de Angelis, Archaic and Classical Greek Sicily, pp. 201-202.

having lost the conflict, took their leave and joined the mercenaries that had already formed a large congregation in Zankle. After a glaring lacuna in the historical record, we then stumble upon a peculiar Tyndarides who gave money to the poor whereby he gained their support to make a bid at tyranny in 454/3. Then the Syracusan *kaloikagathoi*, seeing that Tyndarides’ promise of land redistribution would spell the end of their collective reign, took the matter into their own hands and slew Tyndarides, creating an irreparable fissure between the *dêmos* and themselves. The pervasive civil-unrest was patched with the institution of *petalismos*, a distant successor to the Athenian *ostrakismos*, that allowed the *dêmos* to send any tyrannically-motivated notable to a five-year exile if a stipulated quorum was filled. The measure proved an effective check on the political ambitions of *kaloikagathoi*, but the vacuum that materialised by their removal hardly spelled the beginning of a democratic regime in Syracuse: “Although democratic institutions probably were introduced, they were nevertheless overrun by aristocratic influence.” This latent aristocratism of the Syracusan polity with an expanding mass of lower classes could only be masked by the politics of imperialism that would enable the material gains to trickle down to poor citizen-soldiers and rowers. Carthaginians’ refocus on their North African interests provided the Sicilian *poleis* with a valuable room for economic growth, whereas Sikels attempts to found *poleis*, such as the one led by Ducetius, gave them an incentive to conscript large numbers of citizens. Syracusans defeat of Ducetius in the 440s functioned, in that vein, as an implicit measure towards achieving a more equalitarian distribution of wealth at least in relative terms. With a navy that was growing in numbers and a commercial fleet that created an ever-expanding nexus of maritime connections, the political instability of the island into the 420s was counterweighed by the re-establishment of the Sicilian quasi-imperial hegemony which took decades to ensure after the death of Hieron.

The reignited flame of Syracusan imperialism in the 420s enveloped the territories from Gela to Naxos, which had once been united under the Syracusan banner at Gelon’s time. With its re-established hegemonic status among the Sicilian *poleis*, Syracuse acted as a powerful arbiter

2088 Berger, *Revolution and Society in Greek Sicily and Southern Italy*, pp. 39; for a very Thucydidean recent construal of the Syracusan polity as constituting a twin democracy with that of Athens, see Ober, *The Rise and Fall of Classical Greece*, pp. 219.
for the perennial socio-economic issues that divided many poleis along the lines of social class. Increasingly aware of the Athenian imperialist ambitions that were expressly on the hunt for gaining a Sicilian foothold ever since the beginning of the 430s, Syracusan upper-classes issued a call to all the Sicilian Greeks to attend to the Congress of Gela in 424. Formally organised to defend the Sicilian autonomy, the Congress, in fact, served as a Syracusan attempt at the recognition of her unassailable leadership of the Sicilian politics. Perhaps the majority of the upper-class citizens of Sicilian Greek poleis knew that Leontinian democrats’ summons to the Athenians for military aid after emerging victorious from their struggle against the oligarchs was a pretext that the Athenians exploited for the sake of turning a sizeable part of Sicily into their imperial backyard. It was at least just as equally clear, however, that the Syracusans were offering to organise the anti-Athenian defence as a means of furthering their political grip on the Sicilian poleis. And the Syracusans’ preferred methods of ideologically mustering the Sicilian defence corps was through the creation of a Sicilian identity that was discernible from those of the mainland Greeks. Succinctly put, there were two imperialist projects clashing on the eastern Sicilian soil, one of them Athenian and the other Syracusan, the latter of which was amply demonstrated by the Syracusan annexation of Leontinoi in 422. As was often the case, an ‘outsider’s’ threat at invasion would do the trick of many poleis jumping from the frying pan into fire, and Syracuse would emerge from the Athenian invasion as the unquestioned oligarchically-leaning hegemon of Greek Sicily. But why did the Athenians deigned to undertake the tall order of a conquest of eastern Sicily in the first place? We need to put the respective Athenian and Spartan economic, social and military strategies during the so-called Archidamian War (431-421) into the larger historical context in order to answer that question.

5.3.4 The Archidamian War: Fact and Fiction

It has become a proper academic convention to pay respects to the icon of Pericles whose prophetic strategic insight allowed the Athenians to survive the Peloponnesian onslaught

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2092 De Angelis, Archaic and Classical Greek Sicily, pp. 204.
2094 Leontinoi’s representatives had authenticated the claim of their polis to independence at the Congress of Gela. The enrolment of new persons in the citizen registers, however, triggered demands of land redistribution that could only be granted by a more democratic polity. Understandably not taken in by the prospect of losing their socio-economic privileges, the upper-classes of Leontinoi summoned Syracuse’s help for blocking the demands of the lower class. The Syracusans re-established ‘law and order’ and Leontinoi again became a Syracusan dependency. Berger, Revolution and Society in Greek Sicily and Southern Italy, pp. 26.
between 431 and 428. A recent spread of critical voices aside, this modern myth of Pericles’ defensive war overlooks two core features of Athens in the last years of Pericles’ political activity. First, the Athenians were very active during the naval campaign season of all those years and, in fact, managed to ravage the Peloponnesian coastline, putting settlements to torch and pillaging the poleis nearby the shores. The upper-class Athenians had taken their lesson from the teachings compiled under the heading of the First Peloponnesian War. They knew that meeting even a significantly depleted Peloponnesian phalanx could prove disastrous for their political interests in Athens. Upper-class Athenian kaloikaigathoi, literally ‘beautiful and noble ones,’ needed thus to provide the thêtes with military avenues that were adequately secure to consolidate the smooth working of the extortive economic ties of arkhê. The burning of the Peloponnesian coastline was deemed to be one such endeavour. Strategically, it introduced a certain measure of caution into the Peloponnesian military forays into Attica. The Spartans had vivid memories of their first-hand experience of the rebellion on Mt. Ithome, which had univocally demonstrated what to expect from helots if they were left but momentarily unattended. Indeed, their memories were daily rejuvenated as the Naupactus Messenians came to assume leading grassroots positions within the Athenian army. The ex-helots knew the Spartan habits, not to mention the Laconian and Messenian landscapes, better than anyone else and had a debt to pay the Athenians thereby making them the perfect running partners for the latter. Probably more gullible in regard to the strategic acumen they exhibited in their first couple of invasions of Attica, the Spartans grew increasingly cognisant of the fact that it would take the construction of an epiteichismos in order to press their tactical advantage home. No such commitment could be made, of course, when the Athenians were steadily exposing the chinks on their armour. The Athenians’ frequent naval expeditions to the Peloponnesian shores was one highly effective way of doing that. And coupled with the twice-yearly invasions of the Megarid by the Athenian troops, which followed at the heels of the Peloponnesian retreat from Attica, the Athenians were constantly reminding their opposition that a fully-committed offensive was practically out of question.

2096 Kagan hails Pericles as having plausibly envisioned a return to the status quo of 445, while Azoulay renders the class affiliations displayed by his policy of the abandonment of the Attic khôra as having played to the hand of the perennially disadvantaged lower classes as against those of the upper classes. Donald Kagan, The Archidamian War, (Ithaca and London, 1996), pp.25; Azoulay, Pericles of Athens, pp. 39.

So, the Periclean strategy against the ‘enemies without’ in the first few years of war borrowed both defensive and offensive elements from the ancient Greek *strategoi*’s guidebook to warfare. But what about the ‘enemies within’ that the Athenian upper-classes need to wrangle with in order to keep the extortive social, economic and political institutions intact? We have built our interpretation of the First Peloponnesian War along the lines of the observation that the invasion of the Megarid and Thebes made sense only as attempts to pre-empt the impending inundation of Attica by the Peloponnesian soldiers. To that end, the first sighting of the Spartan troops approaching from the Isthmus to Attica back in 447 was a direct result of the failure of those attempts. When the first Peloponnesian invasion of Attica that took place during the Peloponnesian War broke out in 431, the effects were largely the same, the results altogether different. At the level of effects, we can enumerate the total loss of harvest crops, meaning the livelihood for some and additional profits for others, the razing of private buildings in the farmsteads and public *deme* buildings to the ground, the sheltering of all *deme*-dwellers behind the Long Walls of Athens, the overcrowding of all public places in Athens including those of the temples among others. All more or less the same as those that followed the invasion of 447. The results of the invasion, however, include no Athenian capitulation but a new tidal wave of rhetorical and ideological flurry epitomised most memorably in the assembly oration that was put in the mouth of Pericles by Thucydides prior to the outbreak of hostilities.\footnote{Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War*, 1.140-4.} To those that had grown increasingly distraught and restless by the ‘duck and cover’ part of the war strategy of the Athenian upper-class, Pericles would then be pictured as offering a rationale of imperialism that consisted of three interlocked arguments: the *arkhê* is beneficial to each and every Athenian and thus those that sacrifice their lives for it are sacred to the Athenian cause; giving in to the Peloponnesian demands would spell the end of the *arkhê*; thus we need to crowd behind the Long Walls to make sure that we are not in a position to surrender.\footnote{“We must not let anger at our losses draw us into a pitched battle with the Peloponnesians, who far outnumber us. If we win such a battle we shall have to fight them again in no smaller numbers, and if we fail we shall lose our allies too: they are the source of our strength, but they will not acquiesce in our control if we are short of the means to enforce it. Do not mourn the loss of homes and land, but save your mourning for the loss of lives. Property is the product, not the producer of men. If I thought I could persuade you, I would be telling you to go out and destroy your property with your own hands, to show the Peloponnesians that there will be no surrender on this account.” *Ibid*, 1.143.21-30.} We do not know if there is any truth to the historical tradition that portrays Pericles as enjoying the close company of Protagoras and Anaxagoras. We do know, however, that if Pericles or his upper-class compatriots made use of these arguments, then it shows that the Protagorean *paideia* ethics as well as the Anaxagorean undifferentiated mass had found a distinguished follower in the person of the great *eupatrid*.\footnote{Ibid, 1.143.21-30.}
For Pericles, there was nothing inherently right or just in the defence of the Athenian *arkhê*. The *arkhê* was built by the efforts of the three earlier generations of Athenians and, as such, did not have anything divine or heroic about its origins. It was the grand outcome of a mainly economic and cultural transaction that had surfaced in the aftermath of the second Persian invasion. The parties of the transaction were the Athenians and the Ionian Greeks. In exchange for the measure of security and non-Persian cultural environment that was afforded to them by an alliance that was spearheaded by the Athenians, the Ionian Greeks offered *phoros* payments and a willing, more often than none, adherence to the League’s policies. The neutralisation of the Persian claims to the Aegean brought about a period of stable economic growth that profited all the allied *poleis* but, obviously, not to the same extent. Coupled with the *phoros* payments accruing to their coffers, the Athenians were the primary beneficiaries of Piraeus’ growth into the commercial heart of the Aegean. The construction of the Athenian *arkhê*, on this view, was just one potential outcome among myriads of others, realised by the tooth-and-nail workings of the Athenian enterprise and rationalised by its *eupatrid* spokesmen. But once built, analogous to the Protagorean side-picking in favour of a particular argument, it had to be defended for the bundle of political, social, economic, cultural, etc., advantages that it embodied. The historical fact that the Athenians were the ones to take the initiative, as such, had nothing special about it except to grant the Athenian citizen-body the right to protect their interests. The mass of citizens, in that vein, were to be guided by a group of expert statesmen who would distribute them the particular tasks that were necessary for the defence of the *arkhê*. Put differently, Pericles and co. were to act not unlike the Anaxagorean cosmic *Nous* giving particular means to all in order to serve the Athenian interests. It was just that, and therein lay the rub: the Athenian interests that were to be served were thoroughly cracked along class-ridden lines.

The *deme*-dwellers that flocked together to the temples and other public buildings of Athens were largely condemned to the status of urban paupers. When the Spartan troops receded, they went back to their *demes* to find the charred remains of whatever grains they had sowed and the crumbling walls of what was once their abodes. To endure the flood for a year was something that they could condone if not wholly approve of. To suffer a veritable succession of torrents, however, was nothing short of asking them to bear Prometheus’ cross and even Prometheus, one might add, knew that his torment was going to end someday. There was no such solace to be found in the case of the Athenian *deme*-dwellers, except for a rhetoric of

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2100 Speculative though it is, Garland’s estimate that by 432 the population of the *deme* of Piraeus equalled that of the *astu*, i.e., the town of Athens itself, offers some scope for imagination concerning the *deme*’s position within the larger Athenian politics: Garland, *The Piraeus*, pp. 60; cf. Lysias, *Against Philocrates*, 12; Roy, “The Threat from the Piraeus”, pp. 194-196.
patriotic duty and an economic promise for their children to be yearly honoured as war orphans. When the Athenian upper-classes devised the strategy of not meeting the Peloponnesian phalanx with that of their own, they knew that they were condemning a sizeable proportion of the lower-class citizens to socio-economic despondency. By 430 there was an alarming increase in destitution and pauperisation that triggered a plague that would beat down on the Athenian population, with ebbs and flows, till 426. It appeared that the lower-class deme-dwellers were in risk of being physically spirited away no less than they were economically.

Some modern estimates have argued that the plague, which, incidentally, has been identified as typhoid fever, carried off a third of the Athenian population. Thucydides later recounted the memory of those days as epitomised by a complete loss of morals in whose stead arose a coldblooded survival instinct that had no share of scruples. Thucydides is, of course, no Plutarch, which is another way of saying that historical accuracy of the former’s work is much more persuasive than those of the latter. In his treatment of this historical episode, however, Thucydides appears to have lit his historiographical Icarus wings on fire in order to don the robs of the upper-class preacher. To be sure, the plague had hit many upper-class Athenians with Pericles himself succumbing to it in 428. Whatever division remained between the zeugitai and thêtes, for one, was fast evaporating, thanks in large part to the relative betterment of the material condition of thêtes and the devastation wrought by the plague.

2101 Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War*, 2.47.3-54, 3.87; cf. 6.12.1, 26.2, 1.23.3; Cartledge, *Sparta and Lakonia*, pp. 203.
2102 “In 1995, digging for a new subway stop in Athens, archaeologists discovered a mass burial of about 90 skeletons, all in a jumble, apparently victims of this plague. Study of their dental DNA suggests they died of typhoid fever, spread by fecal contamination, which was certainly abundant in the crowded city. Diseases, however, undergo rapid evolutionary change, and it is likely that the plague that Thucydides describes, the inspiration through the ages for many literary elaborations, has long ceased to exist.” Morris and Powell, *The Greeks*, pp. 22; cf. Robert J. Littman, “The Plague of Athens: Epidemiology and Paleopathology”, *Mount Sinai Journal of Medicine*, vol. 76, (2009), pp. 456-467; Waterfield, *Why Socrates Died*, pp. 141; Ober, *The Rise and Fall of Classical Greece*, pp. 215.
2104 “In other respects too the plague was the beginning of increased lawlessness in the city. People were less inhibited in the indulgence of pleasures previously concealed when they saw the rapid changes of fortune—the prosperous suddenly dead, and the once indigent now possessing their fortune. As a result they decided to look for satisfactions that were quick and pleasurable, reckoning that neither life nor wealth would last long. No one was prepared to persevere in what had once been thought the path of honour, as they could well be dead before that destination was reached. Immediate pleasure, and any means profitable to that end, became the new honour and the new value. No fear of god or human law was any constraint.” Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War*, 2.53.1-11; cf. Lucretius, *On the Nature of the Universe*, 6.1272-1286.
Still, it does not take an enlightened sagacity to fathom that the plague must have preyed mostly on those that were packed like sardines in close public quarters with barely sufficient foodstuffs and with even less access to hygienic facilities.\textsuperscript{2106} It has been suggested quite a while ago that two of the tragic plays of Sophocles and Euripides that are dated to mid-420s, namely, \textit{Oedipus the King} and \textit{Hippolytus} display a thematic convergence on the questionability of the allegedly divine laws,\textsuperscript{2107} a sentiment that is shared in the present work. Contrary to the dramatically represented divine evils that visit the upper-class human protagonists with disarming alacrity, the historical plague of Athens wrought its wrath on those sections of the Athenian lower-class that were most impoverished by the upper-class strategy of leaving Attica for the Peloponnesians to roam free.

The worst part of the lower-class Athenians’ predicament was that there was no conceivable end to the Periclean strategy which, in the end, meant that they were constantly exposed to the plague-bringing arrows of Homeric Apollo.\textsuperscript{2108} When during the upsurge of the plague in 429, the lower-class Athenians, having seen their fellows die like flies, resolved to revoke the generalship of Pericles, this consideration, as brought out by Thucydides, along with other more religious ones, is hence more than likely to have played its part.\textsuperscript{2109} The lower-class Athenians knew that no willing ear would listen to their groans and moans as they were to be the first victims to be carried off by the plague.\textsuperscript{2110} The minds that were digging out the


\textsuperscript{2106} Indeed, Thucydides admits as much when he discloses that the newcomer roundabout deme-dwellers were the ones that suffered the most when the plague set in: “The suffering was made yet more acute by the influx from the country into the city, and the incomers suffered most of all. With no houses of their own, and forced to live in the huts which at that time of year were stifling, they perished in chaotic conditions: the dead and the dying were piled on top of each other, and half-dead creatures staggered about the streets and round every fountain, craving for water. The sanctuaries in which they had encamped were full of corpses—people dying there were not moved …” Thucydides, \textit{The Peloponnesian War}, 2.52.1-8. For an altogether different interpretation of the social significance of Pericles’ strategy that appears to be in dire need of shedding its preconceived equation of Attic landowners with the \textit{zeugitai}, see Hanson, ‘Hoplites into Democrats: The Changing Ideology of Athenian Infantry’, pp. 297.


\textsuperscript{2108} Kagan, \textit{The Archidamian War}, pp. 70-71.

\textsuperscript{2109} Thucydides, \textit{The Peloponnesian War}, 2.59-65.

\textsuperscript{2110} On that note, I harken back to Sartre’s brief analysis of the Black Death as the full display of the defining antagonisms of class relations which only realizes what is already socio-historically determined in the particular constitutions of specific class societies. As undeveloped as the social differentiation of urban quarters depending on the class background of the inhabitants was in the Athens of 420s compared to the late renaissance England, we seem to operate, with the aid of contemporary allusions to the desperate plight of the poor, on a relatively secure hermetic space in interpreting the resemblance on an apparently supra-historical level: “What is the source of this human efficacy [in obliging the peasants to take concerted action] in the pestilence? It is the fact that its place, its scope, its victims, were determined ahead of time by the government; the landowners took shelter in their castles; the crowding together of the common people is the perfect environment for the spreading of the disease.
imperial channels through which flowed the phoros to the Athenian treasury and the ones that set up urban zones of contamination were those of the one and the same Athenian upper classes. Daily-fees trickled down the cup of arkhê to be sure; death, however, showered upon those whose economic lot were improved by those mere trickles. The withdrawal of Pericles’ generalship thus forebode the bitter tidings that were waiting in store for the Athenian upper-classes if they would not find an alternative means of carrying the war to the Peloponnesians. The solution was as simple as it was daunting: carving a beachhead in the eastern Sicily that would allow the opening up of a new front as well as providing some productive Lebensraum.  

Leontinoi was the first polis to summon the Athenians, as we saw above, in 427. Led by the eminent Gorgias of Leontinoi, 2112 the embassy asked the Athenians to side with them against the overweening Syracusans who had begun, yet again, to menacingly eye other Sicilian poleis. Taken by the storm of Gorgias’ rhetorical displays, 2113 if we are to believe Plato, the Athenians were only too happy to act on their treaty of alliance with Leontinoi and Rhegium, which was recently renewed back in 433/2. 2114 The Athenians, needless to add, would not fully commit themselves to the Sicilian front until 415 at the earliest. Then again, what was the The Black Death acts only as an exaggeration of the class relations; it chooses. It strikes the wretched, it spares the wealthy.” Jean-Paul Sartre, Search for a Method, trans. by Hazel E. Barnes, (New York, 1968), pp. 163 n. 9.

...tumultuous poleis of Sicily. No such inference can be made, however, if one accounts, as does Sansone in his recent study, for the formal and narrative development of the classical Athenian drama beginning with Aeschylus. Though it is likely that the formal structure of the legal debates had stimulated the rhetorical refinement of the sophistai of Sicilian poleis, historical evidence seems sufficiently robust concerning a similar elaboration of political and judicial techniques of debate in Athens at roughly the same time. In any event, nothing bars us from plausibly claiming that rhetoric evolved from a combination of legal disputes and drama both. David Sansone, Greek Drama and the Invention of Rhetoric, (Malden, MA., 2012), pp. 117-224; cf. Morris and Powell, The Greeks, pp. 309-310.

2114 ML 63, 64.
point of this larger-than-life endeavour that would strain the Athenian economic and demographic resources that were already under considerable duress? The answer, we argue, can convincingly be given if the class dimension of Athenian politics is accounted for. There were two main factors that made a direct military intervention to the Eastern Sicily a beneficial one for the upper and lower-class Athenians alike: the opening up of a large living space and the potential spread of the Peloponnesian armies that such a manoeuvre would induce.

The upper-class Athenians’ resolution to stand by while the Peloponnesians invoked their yearly terror on the eastern Attica meant, as we pointed out above, the permanent loss of the livelihood that was farmed at the plots that were located there. The thêtes that were registered in the regularly invaded demes, therefore, endured the worst part of the ordeal as they were reduced practically to the status of urban paupers. Now, we need to recall that most of those thêtes were engaged in the production of grain that was then exchanged for something else. When there was a long-term disruption of the total Attic production of grain, the price of the staple would increase since Athenians produced a significant proportion of the total amount of barley they consumed. Indeed, despite the ever-increasing dependence of Athens on the grain imported from the northern Euxine as we move deeper into the second half of the fifth century, the Attic, or Euboean for that matter, production of grain was just as crucial as the imports owing to the swollen Athenian population. The upper-class Athenians would not experience, of course, any difficulty in paying higher sums in exchange for their wheat consumption. The lower-class Athenians, however, would have to allocate a larger part of their daily wages to the procurement of foodstuffs. In short, the economic loss of those who saw the farms of their demes pillaged would also accrue, albeit not to the same extent, on those Athenians that came from different demes with similar class origins. The need to create a viable Lebensraum elsewhere, on this view, would address the economic and social ills that bogged down many a lower-class Athenian.

Sicily had, of course, come a long way from the establishment of the first apoikoi back in the seventh century when the newcomers found a pristine land that had all the makings of the Homeric evergreen island of Polyphemus. At each other’s throat, in the eastern part of the island alone, were mercenary armies, slaves, small but locally well-connected gamoroi and the poor killyrioi and that without making mention of all the distinctive traits of particular poleis. To the Athenian lower classes that were tight-packed right next to each other in small, if any, plots of land, Sicily could have appeared as still retaining its Homeric fairy-tale hue. Retrospection indeed shows that the island’s appeal was not lost on those who would volunteer in vast numbers for the Sicilian expedition in 415. And despite the fact that the historically-
attested numbers of citizens taking part in the earlier excursion does not compare with those of the latter, we think it conceivable that a not insignificant part of thētes would also volunteer at this time provided that the Congress of Gela had not taken place. In the end, even the promise of sufficient landholdings to produce wheat would be alluring to the members of a class who considered wheat an element of fine cuisine throughout the relatively affluent fifth century.

On strategic grounds, a large expedition to eastern Sicily would cut Corinthians and Spartans from their Sicilian trading partners and would thus deliver a heavy blow to the economies of both poleis. Sparta, of course, nothing to fear in the way of potential grain shortages given its abundance of productive land in Laconia and Messenia, in addition to the lowered levels of carrying capacity that was utilised owing to the toll of the great earthquake and the helot revolt. Corinth, however, was altogether dependent on her maritime trade networks and her major commercial allies were the poleis of Greek Sicily. A sizeable military investment of Athens in the eastern Sicily, as such, would force the hand of Corinth and Sparta, whose most potent ally, after all, were the Corinthians, to divert their forces which regularly invaded Attica to a possible naval operation to retaliate at the Athenians. Once they took to their ships, however, they would prove easy pickings for a peerless Athenian fleet. The Athenians knew what their strong suits were, and in inciting the Peloponnesians to a naval offensive they were utilising essentially the same tactic that the Spartans were employing on them.

From the Spartans’ point of view, the first couple of years were equal parts discouraging and promising. Their recognition of the fact that the Athenians would not offer a pitched battle boosted their morale and enthusiasm as they were free to burn and pillage eastern Attica at their whim. Yet, Athenians’ evasion of a military confrontation also meant that the Peloponnesian initiative could only work if they could exert sufficient economic pressure on the Athenians through the scorching of their lands. A couple of years in, and the fact became evident to the Spartans as it was to anyone: there would be no Athenian offers of peace if their Aegean maritime network remained untouched. The Spartans, as we argued above, had neither the manpower nor the wherewithal to construct a fleet to disrupt, let alone challenge, challenge the Athenian supremacy at sea. It thus seemed that the Peloponnesians could do little else other than to play the waiting-game and hope that some of the members of the Delian

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2115 Ironically, Spartans’ continued invasion of Attica also caused the transplantation of erstwhile Attic farmers onto the quasi-professional ground of war making, thereby creating an additional surplus of soldiers that were not reluctant to get back at the Peloponnesians as they were the ones whose acts had led to the evaporation of their capacity to derive income from land. Trundle, *Greek Mercenaries*, pp. 19.
League would eventually revolt as the Samians and Byzantines did roughly a decade ago. All that planning changed when the plague hit the Athenians.

To the ever-pious Spartans the plague was a divine sign of the justice and nobility of their cause of liberating the enslaved Greeks from the Athenian yoke. Religious sentiments aside, the Spartans could not bring themselves to invade Attica for a third consecutive time during the campaign season of 429. Instead, they sent their troops to Chalcidice in order to gain some foothold in north-west Greece which was vital for the Athenian interests and began a siege of Plataea, an Athenian ally in Boeotia, for the sake of creating a viable corridor for their Boeotian allies. The campaign season of 428 had all the makings of signalling a return to the old strategy of a planned invasion of Attica under the leadership of Archidamus. But that changed drastically when the Spartans got the word that the Mytileneans were attempting to wrest the control of Lesbos from Athens which had led to the rapid Athenian response of sending out a fleet. Mytilene was one of the two major poleis on Lesbos, which remained as one of the two independent ship-supplying poleis after the suppression of Samos’ revolt. An oligarchically ruled polis, the Mytilenean oligoi coalesced with those of other minor poleis on the island against Athens and the democratic Methymna, the other major polis of the island, in case it would take the side of the Athenians. Mytilenean oligarchs still needed time to prepare when the word of their impending insurrection reached the Athenians and thus, they were forced to begin their rebellion earlier than they had intended. Initially having sent a force of forty ships to the island, the Athenians managed to blockade the harbours but could not move in to sweep the rebelling Mytileneans. With ties of a potential insurrection with Spartan aid already in existence since the Mytileneans’ earlier attempt at forging it, which had not come through, back in 431, the Mytilenean oligoi applied the Spartans for help and were asked to make their plea in Olympia to all the members of the Peloponnesian League. Having done the task set for them by the Spartans, the Mytileneans were promised that they would be backed with a two-pronged Peloponnesian attack, the first one being the yearly invasion of Attica to create a diversion and the other the sending of a naval task force that would aid the Mytileneans. The Peloponnesian allies of the Spartans, however, found it embarrassingly difficult to muster the resources to carry either part of the plan into action. No

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\[2116\] Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War*, 2.71-78.

\[2117\] The distinction is crucial for only by its introduction can we explain, *malgré* Thucydides, the spectacular failure of the eventual Spartan aim at making a *sortie en masse* against the Athenians via arming the lower-class Mytileneans: Ste. Croix, “The Character of the Athenian Empire”, pp. 4f.

\[2118\] Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War*, 3.3-6.

invasion of Attica materialised in 428 and the promise of a relief force could only be meagrely delivered in the following year when the Spartans commissioned a naval force of forty ships.

The Athenians were anticipating a potential Spartan intervention and decided that it was time to raise the stakes by sending an auxiliary of 1,000 *hoplitai* to ensure that the building of the Athenian siege walls that would blockade the Mytileneans once complete would be finished prior to the arrival of any Peloponnesian force.\(^{2120}\) In the event the arrival of the relief force proved too late as the Athenians had already gained the control of the *polis* when the former made its way to the island. Having run out their food stocks, the Mytilenean oligarchs decided that the only way of lifting the siege was to break out of the blockade in order to force the Athenians to a hoplite battle. Given their tiny numbers, however, they could not hope to field a hoplite force that would be evenly matched, at least quantitatively, to that of the Athenians. The solution was simple: give heavy armour to the commoners, who had been used as light infantry in the previous skirmishes.\(^{2121}\) And yet, simple as it was, the solution backfired: when the Mytilenean commoners received and donned their hoplite armour, they refused to carry out the tasks set out for them by the oligarchs and threatened to surrender the city to the Athenians by an agreement without their participation which would essentially prove their expendability to the Athenians. Seeing that their interests would be lost for ever if they did not take decisive action, the Mytilenean oligarchs agreed to put up with any terms that the Athenians could throw at them. The terms were demeaning indeed: the Athenians could do anything they wanted with the Mytileneans provided that they gave a hearing to an embassy that would be sent, in due course, by the Mytileneans to Athens; there would be no imprisonment, enslavement or murder of any Mytileneans until the return of the embassy from Athens; meanwhile the Athenian forces could enter the city and construct a garrison. The Athenians then sent about 1,000 Mytileneans who were considered to be the primary suspects in the organization of the revolt. The Peloponnesian reluctance at overseas military and economic commitment proved to be the end of the Mytilenean oligarchs. But the relief expedition that was sent by them to the Mytileneans,\(^{2122}\) too little and too late as it was, was a clear indication that they were primed for taking a bigger role in challenging the Athenian *thalassocracy*. There was no challenging the Athenian naval hegemony, and thus no chance of

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\(^{2120}\) *Ibid*, 3.18.

\(^{2121}\) As a rough-and-ready comparison, Pritchard has recently suggested that in regard to prosperity, the Athenian hoplites came from the upper 30 per cent around the earlier phase of the Second Peloponnesian War: David M. Pritchard, *Athenian Democracy at War*, (Cambridge, 2019), pp. 36-43.

\(^{2122}\) The Athenians were circumspect in their taking note of this first sighting of a Peloponnesian squadron in the Aegean. Clairvoyantly, they deduced from the unlikely appearance of the Peloponnesian fleet that the revolt had been planned for a long time. This inference, according to Thucydides, was crucial in resolving to chastise the Mytileneans with the heaviest punishment of an ally to date at the conclusion of the first round of discussion in *ekklêsia*. Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War*, 3.36.2.
putting an end to the war on their own terms, unless the Spartiates were fully committed to lay
their aversion to build a fleet to rest. And if a stimulus to embark upon that endeavour was
made available by the Athenians’ desperate upward re-assessment of phoros lists in 425,2123
the Spartans would still require more in the way of enticements to risk disrupting the very
social core of their polity.2124 A possible Athenian expedition to Syracuse, in that sense, would
function as an additional incentive for the Spartans to attempt to find new means in taking to
the seas. As the events unfolded, the Athenians actually laid bare the stakes involved in naval
supremacy as loudly and clearly as they could but not in any straightforward way that would
have been foreseen by the Spartans.

The Athenians initially responded by sending of a twenty-ship force to Leontinoi’s call for aid
in 427. Largely undertaken, in Thucydides’ view, as a means to prevent the import of Sicilian
grain to Peloponnese and as an initial survey of the eastern side of the island to see if there
was any feasibility to its conquest,2125 this force was reinforced with an additional forty-ship
fleet in the winter of 426.2126 At the side of the Leontinians, the Athenians assessed the political
waters of eastern Sicily while defending the former from the risk of a Syracusan invasion. By
the calling of the Congress of Gela in 424, which put an end, at least momentarily, to the
ongoing conflicts in Sicily, and the consequent return of the joint task force to Athens, the
grassroots Athenian thêtes were already infatuated with the idea of conquest. Indeed, the
banishment of Pythodorus and Sophocles, and the fining of Eurymedon, who were the three
admirals commanding the expedition, was occasioned, according to Thucydides, by the belief
that they could have easily achieved territorial gains which they failed to accomplish in the
event.2127 And yet there were significant political and strategic benefits that appear to have
sprung largely as unintended consequences of the Sicilian expedition.

In their frequent rounding off of Peloponnesus, the Athenians, with Demosthenes the foremost
stratêgos among them, noticed the strategic importance of Pylos that lay on the west coast of
Peloponnese, overlooking the island Sphacteria. Somehow having conceived the idea that an
epiteichismos that was to be built on the island would prove a steady source of worry for the
Spartans, Demosthenes persuaded the reluctant generals, Sophocles and Eurymedon, to give

2123 IG I1 71; Benjamin Dean Meritt and Allen Brown West, The Athenian Assessment of 425 B.C.,
(Athens, 1934); cf. Plutarch, Aristeides, 24.3; Aeschines, On the Embassy, 175; Aristophanes, Wasps,
656-660.
2124 A fully sceptical discussion regarding the question of authenticity that has been hovering above the
re-assessment, including Thucydides’ rather awkward omission of it, can be gleaned from, Kallet-Marx,
2125 Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, 3.86.
2126 Ibid, 3.115.5.
2127 Ibid, 4.65.
it some thought. Now this, as argued recently by some scholars, was not some lucky find as Thucydides would have us to believe.\(^{2128}\) We have often noted the strategic importance of the Athenians having the Naupactus Messenians by their side. In virtually all the historically-attested cases of Athenians’ building of garrisoned forts, i.e., *epiteichismoi*, we can retrospectively see the hand of those ex-helots that had a profound understanding of the Spartan worries. It is highly likely, in that sense, that the location of the *epiteichismos* in question was counselled by the Naupactus Messenians to Demosthenes, who, in his turn, examined the physical features of the location and evaluated the potential outcomes of a military investment.\(^{2129}\) In all likelihood, Demosthenes eventually warmed to the notion and asked the fellow *strategoi* to support him in his endeavour to fortify the place. Sophocles and Eurymedon, however, saw the effort as an ineffective wild goose chase and committed themselves only to the building of a makeshift fort that took six days to complete, leaving Demosthenes on the island with only five ships to carry on with the defence. When the Spartans heard of the fortification on Pylos, they quickly recalled the main Spartan force, whose invasion of Attica was stopped dead in its tracks, and issued a call to their Peloponnesian allies in addition to their *perioikoi* that lived in areas adjacent to Pylos to congregate at Pylos as quickly as possible. Also summoning the sixty ships that they had earlier sent to Corcyra, the Spartans began to make the final preparations for a coordinated attack by land and sea that would easily repel, or so they thought, the hastily-built and thinly-manned fortifications. Demosthenes, however, had anticipated a large military commitment on Spartans’ part to overtake the island and called on Sophocles and Eurymedon to aid him against the combined Peloponnesian force.\(^{2130}\)

It took three days of continuous fighting between the assailing Spartan ships, whose attempts to land troops near to the fortifications were constantly upset, and the defending Athenians and Messenians who repulsed one wave of ships after another.\(^{2131}\) Then the Athenian relief force, which totalled to fifty ships, sailed in from Zakynthos and battered the Spartan ships that had been blockading the island. As the Spartan ships hastily backed water, they left a force of about 400 Spartans, 120 of them *homoioi*, practically stranded and at the mercy of the Athenian troops. The fighting then dragged on with the Athenians unable to press home the advantage that they had in having cornered the small Spartan force on the nearby island. When the word of the unfinished success at Pylos reached the Athenians, they called the *ekklēsia* to an emergency meeting. Cleon and Nicias mounted the *bêma* in a battle of rapier-sharp wits.

\(^{2130}\) Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War*, 4.8.
\(^{2131}\) *Ibid*, 4.11-14.
that ultimately led to the proclamation of the former to the effect that given the opportunity he could defeat the Peloponnesian forces and capture the Spartans who were left stranded on the island in no time. Nicias did not take any convincing. Seeing that his opponent was bluffing in order to sway the démos, he invited Cleon to take the helm of an emergency fleet that was to ship out to Pylos immediately. The démos agreed and thus Cleon found himself suddenly in the leadership of the Athenian forces at Pylos.\footnote{Ibid, 4.27-28.}

After a succession of Spartan attempts at rescuing their trapped compatriots on the island, Cleon ordered the burning of the swath of forest under whose cover the Spartans waged their guerrilla warfare and finally managed to break the will of the Spartan troops.\footnote{Ibid, 4.36-38.} For the first time in recent memory, the Spartans expressly chose not to return their home ‘on a shield’ and were taken prisoner.\footnote{On the topos of machomenon apothanein, i.e., ‘to die fighting,’ in Xenophon’s Hellenica with regard to its ideological implications for the vindication of the Spartan hegemony, see Andrew G. Scott, “Leadership, Valor, and Spartan Death in Battle in Xenophon’s Hellenica”, Ancient History Bulletin, vol. 29 no. 3-4, (2015), pp. 115-134.}

Following the capture of their stranded force, the Spartans immediately offered generous terms for the former’s safekeeping in Athens, which included the Athenians keeping Pylos and the cessation of the invasions of Attica until further notice. Additionally, the Spartans immediately began to work on a peace treaty that conceded all the possessions that were added to the Athenian territory throughout the war as well as recognising the Athenian hegemony in the Aegean and assuming full responsibility for the violation of the terms of the Thirty Year Peace. Thousands of Athenian and Spartan lives were lost since the beginning of the war in 431, but it only took the capture of 120 homoioi to break the Spartan resilience that had carried the Peloponnesian League thus far. Why did the Spartans find the prospect of peace so enthralling?

Three reasons are well-nigh certain to have played their parts in the Spartans’ sudden yearning for peace: the class origins of the captured homoioi, the dwindled numbers of homoioi and the overall impact of the Naupactus Messenians in igniting the insurrectionary flame of the remaining Messenian and Laconian helots. To begin with, it has been argued in other modern analyses that the homoioi prisoners of the Spartans could have belonged to the families making up the Spartan oligarchy within oligarchy. Such an interpretation would definitely make the perplexing docility that the Spartans exhibited after their capture easier to conceive. The Spartans, to reiterate, were a rigid class society that preyed on the ideology of sameness and homologia, ‘unity of opinions,’ that masked the class-ridden cracks covering the socio-
economic landscape of their territory. Indeed, it was those cracks, as we saw above, that threatened to swallow whole a supposedly homogenous Sparta right after the Second Persian Invasion through the 470s. Pausanias’ attempt to introduce pervasive changes to the Spartan polity, in that vein, was a circumspective remedy to bridge the yawning chasm that had come to materialise between the richer homoioi, the poorer homoioi and the recently demoted hypomeiones. The economic deck was, of course, reshuffled after the great earthquake and the ensuing rebellion of helots. But the change was largely cosmetic given that there were no redistribution of land or modification of polity to accommodate the new set of circumstances. Behind the crude veneer of Spartan self-same austerity thus lay a world of stratified layers of luxury that just had to find more concealed ways of making their distinguished social position known without raising other homoioi’s eyebrows. If there was a good number of gennaioi, i.e., ‘well-born,’ homoioi among those that were captured by the Athenians, then this would certainly lead us a long way toward giving a viable explanatory thrust for the sudden emergence of Spartan submissiveness.

Another aspect that appears more than likely to have factored in the Spartan resolution to seek peace is the steady fall in the Spartan numbers that might have hit a demographic low in the aftermath of the earthquake.\(^\text{2135}\) Coupled with the sussitia contributions that continued to be a prerequisite for the preservation of the homoioi status, the widening discrepancy in wealth and landholdings led to an acute fall in the numbers of the Spartiates. Necessary as it was, at least from the standpoint of the later historical tradition, the sacrifice of 300 homoioi along with king Leonidas had hardly budged the political composition of the Spartan society. In a time-span of two generations, the potential loss of 120 homoioi, who, to rub salt into the wound, had willingly surrendered to their enemies, proved devastating enough to hang out the white flag. If the respective social backgrounds of the captive homoioi exerted an influence on breaking through the Spartan intransigence, an equally forceful impact was impressed thereon as a result of the dwindling number of the Spartiates. To be sure, there was always a need for attaining a high-degree of social cohesion between the richer and poorer ranks of the homoioi.

\(^{2135}\) “In 480 there had been a rough total of 8,000 Spartiates of military age. In 425 the potential loss of about 120, albeit men of high social status, caused the Spartans to sue for peace. Moreover, even though these men had surrendered to save their skins, they, unlike the men who for one reason or another had failed to die at Thermopylae, were neither ostracized socially nor made to feel compelled to commit suicide. Similarly, the two Spartan commanders who refused to obey orders at Mantinea (5.72.1) were merely banished. Finally, since at Mantinea five sixths (5.64.3) of a full Spartiate call-up amounted to only about 3,000 men, the total number of Spartiates of military age had dropped by a little over half in about two generations.” Cartledge, *Sparta and Lakonia*, pp. 219; the gaps within the Spartan phalanx at the battle of Mantinea were filled with a mixture of perioikoi. For the associated rise in their numbers, see Figueira, ‘Helotage and the Spartan Economy’, pp. 583; cf. Jean Ducat, ‘The Perioikoi’, in *A Companion to Sparta*, pp. 603.
That need, however, was further intensified with the Naupactus Messenians’ siding with the Athenians.

The Naupactus Messenians took a decisive role in the crushing defeat of the Spartans at Pylos. Their knowledge of the Doric language, Spartan customs, respective sizes and locations of helot communities, among other things, made them irreplaceable allies for the Athenians.\(^\text{2136}\) The point that is often overlooked about them, however, is that the Naupactus Messenians were also potentially invaluable allies to any Messenian and Laconian helots that were looking for ways to disabuse the Spartans of the socio-economically exploitative basis of their polity.\(^\text{2137}\) The *homoioi’s* permanent concession of Pylos to Athenians was, therefore, nothing short of a heavy blow to the stability of the rigid class hierarchy of Sparta. To fan the flames of the perpetual Spartan fears of a helot revolt,\(^\text{2138}\) the Athenians followed their victory at Pylos with an equally key triumph at Kythera, an island to the south of Laconia.\(^\text{2139}\) Immediately, they began to harass the Laconian *poleis* on the southern shores and terrorised the Spartans into thinking that they were about to construct other *epiteichismoi* around Laconia. It has been argued that, in hindsight, this campaign was the closest that the Athenians would ever get to a total victory against the Peloponnesians,\(^\text{2140}\) and with good reason: the disgruntled helots were brought ever nearer to the precipice of insurgence with the addition of each fortification that dotted the Laconic landscapes. There were lots of helotic communities that lay either to the west of Mt. Taygetos or on the eastern and southern shores of Laconia, whose ties to the Spartiates depended on their perpetual supervision and oppression by the nearby perioikic communities as well as by the potential helot overseers that saw to their communities’ loyalty to the *homoioi*. The insertion of an Athenian-backed group of ex-helot freedmen preying on the Spartans using the same guerrilla tactics that were once used to terrorise them was something that tilted the Peloponnesian balance of power decisively against the Spartiates.

The key Athenian successes at Pylos and Kythera was followed through with an attempted coup in Megara. The Megarid, as we saw above, was crucial for permanently disabling the


\(^{2137}\) The point was perceptively noted by Cartledge in his earlier study: Cartledge, *Sparta and Lakonia*, pp. 208; Luraghi, *The Ancient Messenians*, pp. 189-190.


\(^{2140}\) Buckley, *Aspects of Greek History* 750-323 BC, pp. 347.
Peloponnesian threats of Attica’s invasion. Having liaised with the democratic faction in Megara, the two Athenian strategoi, Demosthenes and Hippocrates, moved on to carry their plans into motion and managed to gain control of Nisaea, the main port of Megara. Indeed, the complete wrenching away of the Megarid from the Peloponnesians was thwarted only by the immediate reaction of Brasidas, who fortuitously was in Corinth at the time as he was preparing for his mission up north. The prospects of losing the Megarid was a heavy blow to the Spartan strategy of winning the war in and of itself. Disheartening as it was, however, it was not a catastrophe of the order of either Pylos or Cythera which served as two beacons of revolt that were largely operated by the ex-helots themselves. The sudden release of peace doves, as such, was a basic necessity to mend the potential rise of further social divisions among the homoioi when facing a doppelganger of an enemy. Appease and plead as they did, the Spartans could not bring the Athenians around to agree to a peace treaty. As far as the Athenians were concerned, the reins were now in their hands to take advantage of the Spartan recalcitrance. By 424, it had become increasingly clear to the Spartiates that they needed to gain additional bargaining chips to entice the Athenians into releasing their captives. The creation of a new theatre of war in north-eastern Greece would be the first step in that attempt to regain the advantage.

Thucydides’ first mention of the Spartiate military genius Brasidas surfaces in his account of the Spartan attack at Pylos. There Brasidas is portrayed as valiant and foolhardy in equal parts as he tries to open up the gangway through which the rest of the Spartans could enter the Athenian fortification. Born a mothakes, in a short period Brasidas displayed outstanding enterprise and daring to be epitomised as the very definition of the self-made Spartiate who would take the initiative away from the Athenians in the closing years of the Archidamian War. Brasidas was elected as the leader of a motley band of fighters, including a significant number of reliable helots and Laconian mercenaries,2142 that the homoioi resolved to send to Thrace in order to gain a viable foothold against the Athenians. Thucydides appears to make much of the Spartan decision to send just a ramshackle regiment instead of a proper army and with good reason. Indeed, given that this is the first time in the Peloponnesian War in which we observe a Spartan force with a sizeable helotic element, we need to ponder briefly upon

2141 Given the explicit tone of admiration in Thucydides’ portrayal, we think that retrospection is certain to have played its part in the latter’s rendition of this episode. Brasidas, after all, was the Spartiate who commanded the meagre troops that managed to wrest Amphipolis from the Athenian hands. Given that the Thucydides the historian, the stratêgos of the relief force that was sent by the Athenians to ensure that Athens retained Amphipolis, was banished as a result of his failure to reclaim the polis, we think it conceivable that Thucydides may have expressed his admiration by toning up Brasidas’ role in the affairs between 424 and 421.

2142 He gives the total numbers of 700 helots and 1,000 Laconian mercenaries who were enrolled in Brasidas’ army at the time: Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, 4.80-81.
the class structure of the Spartan society as it came out of the Pylos crisis with notable injuries. The aforementioned Spartan need to reinforce the appearance of social homogeneity, in that vein, cut both ways: the cohesion between the different ranks of homoioi was to be solidified with a certain measure of loyalty that would be ingrained within the cohorts of perioikoi and helots who were to make up the bulk of Spartan forces as was necessitated by the diminishing numbers of homoioi. Not unnaturally, the Spartiates utilised the time immemorial tactic of carrot and stick to impress a devoted uniformity on their non-homoioi partners. But the lengths that they were willing to go warrant us in discerning them as desperate measures that were intended for desperate times.

On the side of ‘stick’ rank foremost a macabre of an event that Thucydides dates to 425/424. As Thucydides relates, having seen the gutting Spartan defeat at Pylos and the permanent construction of an epiteichismos with a full Athenian and ex-helot garrison, the Spartiates’ perennial suspicions of helots reached its apogee whereby they resolved to nip the flower in the bud. They announced that 2,000 of the most rigorous helots that volunteered would be granted their freedom. After the selection of the volunteers the homoioi conducted their customary sacrifices, paraded the selected helots and escorted them out of the polis. The two thousand helots were never to be seen or heard of again, much like the oarsmen that rowed the 200 Athenian triremes to Egypt, practically vanishing into thin air. Thucydides recounts the tale as a telling sign of the eternal Spartan custom of mistrust and mistreatment of the helots. And he is largely in the right that the Spartiate vigilance and cruelty with which their helots were treated were bywords for the Spartan mirage: largely but not totally. Thucydides relates a parable of an event that plucks a harmonious tune with the preceding affairs at Pylos, but gives no reason why such an episode transpired precisely at this time. Although the homoioi were excessively vindictive in punishing the helots and might have developed a collective sadism in plunging into acts of excessive brutality such as maiming them for sport, they were also extremely calculative and subtle in assessing the risks and rewards of any foray that they collectively engaged in. The mass murder of 2,000 of the physically most distinguished helots, regardless of how secretly it would be undertaken, could, in all events, prove the spark that would ignite a full-blown helot revolt of the order of Mt. Ithome. Helots, after all, had families and friends who would start asking questions about that fantasia of a land in which the freedmen helots were alleged to gallop over hill and dale, never to return.

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2143 The liquidation was realized, according to an educated guess made by Plutarch by the infamous krypteia: Plutarch, Lycurgus, 28.6; cf. Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, 4.80.
2144 On how compatible such a drastic measure was with the maintenance of a largely agricultural economy that was based on the extortion of the surplus product of helots, see Hodkinson, Property and Wealth in Classical Sparta, pp. 421-422.
Further, there appears to have been precious little in the way of rewards that would be reaped as a result of such a drastic action. Perhaps the obedience of helots would momentarily be ensured, but with a steep price to pay: the heightened degree of repression would induce the helots to get back at the Spartiates by devouring them raw at any moment when they glimpsed a window of opportunity. The Spartiates needed to take away the incentive of insurgence out of helots’ hands, not to give them extra ones. Henceforth, we need to construe a more viable interpretation if we are to take Thucydides at his word.

The 2,000 helots, a suspiciously round number to begin with, may have been just a blanket quantity that was assigned to the ringleaders of a helot rebellion that had begun when the news of the Spartan defeat at Pylos reached the Messenian and Laconian helot villages. It is highly likely, as we noted above, that the sudden outpour of the Spartan pleas for peace might have sprung from a combination of facts. That mixture of factors, on this view, also needs to incorporate the equally likely emergence of a helot revolt whose stirrings could have been noticed by the perioikoi and helot-overseers. The Spartiates were shaken not only with the capture of the 120 homoioi but also with the first currents of a revolt that could have proved to be a second Ithome if drastic measures were not taken. One such measure was the immediate cessation of hostilities with the Athenians since the Spartiates knew that they could not wage a war on two fronts. Another measure was the organisation of battues that were to comb through the hotbeds of helotic insurgence to apprehend all the suspected ringleaders that would then be made an example of. The punishment would, of course, be in accord with the crimes committed in order not to alienate other helots any further. 424 thus marks the highly likely materialisation of a failed helot revolt that could only be averted by the complete diversion of military assets that were to be employed against the revolting helots rather than the Athenians.

But why did Thucydides attempt to temper with the events via a commonplace conjecture that the Spartan suspicions of helots had swelled for no other reason than their intrinsic hatred?

We have underscored a number of reasons in Thucydides’ recount of the events that took place at Mt. Ithome following the Spartiate’s call of Athenians for aid. Plausibly, the same train of thought can be purported to exist with respect to the case of the potential helot revolt of 424. The most likely aetiology lurking behind Thucydides’ pregnant silence is that the Athenian forces stationed at Pylos may have sent a covert branch of their forces to stir up rebellion in the helotic communities to the west of Mt. Taygetos. To be sure, the Athenian force at Pylos

Cartledge appears to hint at such a possibility without giving it express sanction, pointing out the doubtlessness of the fact that “this ‘necessary’ measure was to some degree exceptional, and a reflection of the critical post-Pylos situation in Lakonia.” Cartledge, *Sparta and Lakonia*, pp. 211.
was assembled in a rather ad hoc manner without giving much thought to the exigencies of an *epiteichismos* defence. But the presence of Naupactus Messenians in the Athenian force is, as we have observed above, is practically assured. It appears that the Athenians, moreover, were not expecting to score a quick victory which may have induced them to seek additional tactical manoeuvres that would spread the Spartan forces besieging Pylos. Rough-and-ready as tactics went, a small band of ex-helots would know when and where to strike while the majority of the Spartan forces were engaging the Athenians. Thucydides was as a much historian as he was a *stratēgos*. To find him potentially playing dumb, therefore, is not unimaginable in any way. And our interpretation has the further benefit of elucidating the possible reasons that gave way to Spartiates’ first attempt to use the ‘carrot’ following their dramatic use of the ‘stick.’

In 424, Brasidas moved to the Thraceward region with a force that comprised of helots and mercenaries. Thucydides opines that the force was not properly Spartiate because there were influential *homoioi* who were not keen on the success of Brasidas, hence sending him away on what they saw to be a fool’s errand. By contrast, we argue, on the basis of our adumbration of the events of 425, that the reason that Brasidas was offered such an ill-fitting military outfit was because of *homoioi*’s pressing need to address two issues.2146 The first was as practical as any other: the transfer of a capable force of helots away from the Peloponnese. Brasidas’ manoeuvre took hundreds of potent helots to north-eastern Greece and thus moderated the alarming social pressure on the Spartan polity after the crushing of the potential revolt of the previous year. The second, on the other hand, was largely ideological: the reintegration of helots into the cohesive social phalanx. At the end of the helotic road to redemption lay the promised land of the *homoioi*, a land in which the ex-helots, having toiled through their fair share of troubles, would be re-incorporated as valuable second-class citizens into the Spartan citizen-body.2147 The incessantly depleting *homoioi*, made heavier reliance on helots as a vanguard force, just like it made the Spartan phalanx to comprise largely of *perioikoi*, a practical necessity. The ever-present threat of vindictive punishment could work many a wonder, but inducing the downtrodden to put their necks on the line for the first-class citizens was not one among them. There was nothing peculiar, as such, in the helot-heavy company of

2146 Powell has emphasized the first factor as obliging the Spartiates to ship out a considerable number of notable helots who had more than a sneaking suspicion about what might have befallen the missing 2,000 of their compatriots. We purport, *au contraire*, that just as chief a concern was to rectify the deteriorating socio-political situation in Sparta. Powell, ‘Sparta’s Foreign – and Internal – History 478-403’, pp. 311.

2147 The same argument can be made, of course, concerning the Laconian mercenaries who formed the backbone of Brasidas’ army. Even if Thucydides does not refer to the social or ethnic composition of the mercenaries, there is nothing inherently implausible about the conception that it may have been made up, at least partially, by the indignant *hypomeiones*. Helots were not the only social ingredient that were bossed around by the Spartiates and a steady source of dissatisfaction with the Spartan polity, as we observed above, was the continuously growing numbers of *hypomeiones*.
Brasidas. With the further advantage of the case with which the homoioi could snap out of the loss of a force that was made up of helots and commanded by a mothakes Spartiate in case the things went awry, the Spartans appear to have had little to lose and a bundle of benefits to gain.

Brasidas was aware of the present political situation in Macedonia. King Perdiccas of Macedon, another strange bedfellow of the Athenians, had grown increasingly restless in the face of the growing imperial power of the Athenians. He was particularly agitated about the Athenian colonies of Brea and Amphipolis that laid claims to a strategically important part of the Macedonian territory. Largely as a result of those grievances, Perdiccas secretly sent a call to Sparta for aid in a potential revolt, to which the latter agreed readily.2148 Marching through Thessaly into Chalcidice, Brasidas first managed to persuade the oligarchically-minded few of Stagira and Acanthus to join his side in the liberation of the Greeks from the slavery imposed by the Athenians.2149 But the true aim of his attack was the precious Athenian polis of Amphipolis. In the winter of 424/3, Brasidas’ force managed to take the polis by surprise. Amphipolis’ loss caused the exile of Thucydides the Historian, whose force could not reach the polis quickly enough to reinforce it prior to the Spartan attack.2150 Brasidas also displayed admirable resourcefulness in constructing triremes on River Strymon and in winning over other cities, such as Athos and Torone, to his cause of liberation.2151 His call to Sparta for the sending of more troops for the sake of continuing his operations in the area, however, would not find willing recipients.2152 To the homoioi, Brasidas had accomplished the mission for which he was sent to the region: the gaining of a bargaining chip. The ‘liberation’ of Amphipolis, not to mention other poleis, was just one such asset that the Spartiates could offer to the Athenians that would prod them to reconsider their offers of peace. Causing further damage to the Athenian interests in the region would only fuel the fervency of the Athenian upper-class warmongers. And the release of the homoioi from Sphacteria could only be brought about if the Spartans were to prove their willingness to confirm the Athenian territorial claims that would make the dual-hegemony thesis more than an empty promise.

The richer homoioi knew that it would take a lot more than a paltry offence at Chalcidice to liberate the Greeks from the overarching Athenian arkhê. Precisely, it would take a naval force

that could hold its own against the Athenian fleets in order to foment rebellion in the Aegean and to challenge the Athenian control over the vital trade routes linking Athens to the major grain producers to the north. With their meagre financial resources and the penchant for social implosion inherent to their polity, the only feasible course to follow in building a fleet was to accept the Persian gold. Needless to add, the Persian funding could only be exchanged for something immensely valuable in return: the sanction of the Empire’s claims to the poleis of Asia Minor. The indecisive colouring that was displayed by the Spartiate correspondence with the Great King, which did nothing less than flabbergast the latter, was the expression of a vacillation between the talk of liberation and the walk of re-enslavement. Fortunately for the Ionian Greeks, the ‘talk’ prevailed at this time. With no thoroughgoing liberation taking anytime soon, the Spartans knew that they had to walk the tightrope of bittersweet placation in order to entice the Athenians with their offer of armistice. The moment came after the Athenian loss of Amphipolis as the bellicose eupatridae experienced a reverse in their fortunes in addition to the one that was incurred at the end of the brief offensive against the Boeotians. The sides agreed to a one-year armistice, which the Spartiates hoped would prove sufficient in breaking the willpower of the Athenian dēmos to keep up the war effort. Indeed, judging by a tentative reconstruction of the chronology of the surviving tracts of drama that are more securely dated to this period, the appeal for peace certainly appears to have gained significant ground. But Brasidas’ efforts had triggered a torrent from the ocean of discontent in Chalcidice, thus recommencing hostilities even before the year was passed.

In 422 the hostilities broke into open once again owing to Brasidas’ receival of two minor poleis in Chalcidice, Scione and Mende, the citizens of whom wanted to leave the Athenian arkhē for good. The Athenians responded by tasking an army led by Cleon to regain the control of the region. Mende quickly had a change of heart and turned back to the Athenian fold, whereas Scione was captured by the Athenian task force. The big fish at the centre of the power-play was, of course, Amphipolis, which was to see a flurry of skirmishes and set-piece hoplite battles that resulted, in the end, in a decisive Spartan victory. The third defeat that the Athenians experienced in a short while was exacerbated by the loss of Cleon, one of the most

2155 The most discernible voice in the dramatic chorus appealing for peace was, of course, the comic playwright Aristophanes. Concluding with the memorable Peace in 421, his dramatic output in the latter half of 420s exhibit an ever-increasing concentration on the largely interwoven themes of odes to peace and the vilification of those public figures that were generally regarded as its primary opponents. Aristophanes’ sentiments, moreover, were also shared by the great tragedian Euripides, whose dramatic production between 425-415 show an ever-increasing interest in the horrors of war, a perennial tragic theme to be sure, but clearly rethought and reworked through the contemporary lens of Euripides.
enterprising of the Athenian strategoi following the death of Pericles. Although Thucydides gave no quarters to the memory of the politician/general, creating the myth of a parvenu demagogue bringing the age of old virtuous politicians to a crashing close instead,2157 Cleon’s decisiveness and resourcefulness would be sorely missed during the Sicilian expedition.2158 The total effect was one of dissuasion: so long as the Spartans were willing to abide by their naval hegemony and give back their possessions that they had lost in the closing years of 420s, the Athenians were keen on releasing the homoioi from Sphacteria. No less grounds for seeking peace were there for the Spartans: their foray into Chalcidice was partially intended to smooth out the differences between them and the Athenians to ensure the safe return of the captured homoioi. Additionally, the Spartan rebuff of the Athenian forces approaching to lay siege to Amphipolis came at a terrible price: the death of Brasidas. Brasidas had played a central part in the Spartan politics of the period that was akin to the role of Cleon among the upper-class Athenians. The most influence mothakes of his time until the rise of Lysander, he drew, as Thucydides insists, the persistent resentment of the richer homoioi who saw him as an impetuous upstart that could get carried away by the intoxication of his successes to conceive the Spartan polity in a different light. Indeed, Brasidas had achieved all his exploits by relying on joint force of helots and Laconian mercenaries with hardly any help from the Spartiates other than the bestowal of the funds that made the hiring of the mercenaries possible. Brasidas thus had to rely on his persuasiveness to cajole the Chalcidean poleis to support his troops with financial contributions and rations. And seeing that he managed to maintain the loyalty of his soldiers, who, at the end of the day, did not owe to Spartans much else besides their perpetual humiliation, Brasidas may have grown increasingly suspicious of the whole pretence of meritocracy that was supposed to drive the Spartan social hierarchy. But that is as far as historical speculation can take us. Brasidas may have had the appearance of someone who could potentially pull the subversive strings of the Spartan polity. But his loss evaporated a pillar of Spartan influence in Chalcidice in addition to clearing the path for other Spartiates to pursue a policy of peace with the Athenians without outside interference.

2157 Thankfully, we have epigraphic evidence that Cleon’s father, Cleainetus, had already been a chorégos in 460/459. Further, given that Cleon was married to the daughter of Dikaiogenes, an Athenian eupatrid of particular distinction, it seems clear that Thucydides’ anguish at the politician’s social background was a typical case of tradutore traditore. IG II² 2318, l. 34; J. K. Davies, Athenian Propertied Families 600–300 B.C., (Oxford, 1971), no. 8674, 3773; Hornblower, The Greek World 479-323 BC, pp. 150; Kallet-Marx, Money, Expense, and Naval Power in Thucydides’ History 1-5.24, pp. 138; this can be contrasted to Kagan’s marching to the drumbeat of the conventional, and essentially oligarchic one might add, polarity: Kagan, The Archidamian War, pp. 130; contra Rose, Sons of the Gods, Children of Earth, pp. 339.
The Peace of Nicias, as it came to be dubbed, was agreed in 421 heralding the advent of half a century of concord and prosperity on the condition that the two sides abided by its stipulated terms. A renunciation was made on the Spartan side as they swore to give back Amphipolis, whereas the other Spartan-controlled poleis in the area that were not currently besieged by the Athenian troops were not to belong to the either alliance except for continuing to pay phoros to the Athenians. The Athenians were to grant safe passage to the Spartan troops that were besieged in the other poleis but were otherwise free to do as they wished with the latter and their populations. Panactum, a fortress on the Athenian border that was seized by the Boeotians was also to be given back to the Athenians along with the captured Athenians who were under the Boeotian custody. In return, the Athenians were to return the poleis that they had wrested away from the Spartans, which included Pylos and Cythera, the two sore spots that had brought the Spartans close to the edge of defeat. Finally, all the prisoners of war were to be returned. Following their agreement on the terms of the peace, the two sides moved on to agree on a separate treaty of a fifty-year alliance which stipulated that if a disagreement regarding the actions of their other allies was to occur then the dual hegemons could take the matter in their own hands.

A quick glance at the terms of the treaty allows one to make a particular observation: the two sides had taken scarcely any regard of the respective desires of their allies. Now, for the Athenians this disregard of their allies did not amount to any change of heart in regard to their policy of arkhê. To their eyes, the fellow members of the Delian League had been consigned to the status of mere subject-allies ever since the fall of the Periclean attempt to re-establish the Hellenic League in c. 450. The injury caused to Sparta’s allies in the Peloponnesian, however, was a blatant one. Corinth and Thebes, the former the most influential formal ally and the latter an informal but an equally significant one, stood to lose much as a result of the cessation of hostilities. For the Corinthian side, no redress of the Athenian transgressions in Corcyra and elsewhere was made by the Peloponnesians, not to mention the inactivity concerning the continued existence of the thorn of Naupactus that lingered on as a principal impediment to their regional sovereignty. The Athenian attempts to secure a permanent beachhead on the coast of eastern Sicily, moreover, had demonstrated that Corinth’s commercial links with the Sicilian poleis were endangered by the Athenian designs concerning the island. Likewise, the Boeotians had come to expect a reprisal against the constant Athenian attempts to interfere with their polity, but were told to give up the possessions that they had taken from the Athenians by force instead of receiving any tangible recompense for their

2159 Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, 5.18-23.
efforts in thwarting the Athenian schemes in the Megarid. With the two of their major allies desperately trying to violate the stipulated terms of the Peace of Nicias, the Spartans attempted to feign ignorance of any machinations that their allies could carry out. As the Athenians frequently came knocking to demand the immediate delivery of Amphipolis and other strategic poleis, they found the Spartans finger pointing at their allies and pleading innocence. The Athenians, in their turn, forestalled giving back Pylos and Cythera to the Spartans. Having already returned the prized Sphacteria homoioi to the Spartans, the Athenians waited for the restoration of Amphipolis to their control but the Spartans failed to deliver the polis whose citizens had decided to stay out of the Athenian arkhê. In the end, they only removed their troops from the city without making the necessary political arrangements for the transfer of power to the Athens which outraged the Athenians as a single clear of violation of the treaty’s terms.

What may seem like an overindulgence shown by the Spartans to the transgressive behaviour of their major allies was in fact the expression of a socio-politically cornered homoioi whose consolidation of their position could only be realised if political vacillations playing the Athenians against the Corinthians and Boeotians were successful. The core problems that the Spartans faced were threefold: the growing power of Thebes as the quasi-hegemon of Boeotia, the possible formation of an anti-Spartan coalition of northern Peloponnesian poleis, and the economic and social havoc wrought by the guerrilla warfare waged by the Naupactus Messenians. Thebans were certainly not fond of the Spartan strong-arming that relegated all the allegedly outstanding demands of her allies to the diplomatic dustbin. The homoioi had indeed acted like the imperialistic Athenians in agreeing to terms without counselling their allies. The subsequent attempts at goading the allies only heightened the sense of injury as the Spartans had no traditional rights that were conferred on them by the League members to boss them around. The Boeotians had shown, time and again, that they could hold their own against the Athenians and thus took a decisive step forward in signalling their distaste of the Spartan patronising by making a ten-day truce with the Athenians. Thebes’ domination of the mainland Greek poleis after the battle of Leuctra was, of course, still some way off when Boeotians began to make strides towards the realisation of a hegemonic policy of their own. But their clear defiance of the Spartan supremacy in not returning Panactum to Athens, for example, plainly demonstrates that they had already grown quite self-conscious of their political influence. This had two main effects on the Spartan politics: the pressing need to appease the Boeotians, and the materialisation of a political rift between Sparta and Athens.

2161 Ibid, 5.32.5.
In regard to the first effect, we have observed above that the Spartan polity at the time was basically on the ropes, and hence that the Spartans could not afford to embitter the Athenians any further. As the Athenians grew impatient at what they regarded as a display of Spartan reluctance to fulfil their end of the bargain, however, the Spartans came to depend even more on the goodwill of the Boeotians. With unprecedented political pressure came the sighs of desperation which gave way, in the winter of 420/1, to the Spartans’ imploring of the Boeotians to consent to give Panactum back to the Athenians. The Boeotians agreed on the condition that the Spartans approve a treaty of alliance separate from the Peace of Nicias. The Spartans intended to use Panactum as an asset to be bartered for Pylos and, thus, they conceded to the Boeotian demands knowing full well that it was in complete violation of the terms they agreed to with the Athenians. Yet, when the Boeotian forces retreated from Panactum, they razed the fortification to the ground, leaving the Spartan embassy that made its way to Athens in the spring of 420 to demand Pylos’ return in a precarious position. According to Thucydides, the Spartans were willing partners in the offence which is explicated by a subversive ‘laconism’ that was put into the mouths of the Spartan embassy. But all jests aside, the implicit Spartan condonement of the Boeotian insult is indicative of one thing, namely that the Spartans were willing to estrange the Athenians to the limit. And that limit was drawn at the boundaries separating the Spartans from the anti-Spartan detractors from the Peloponnesian League.

The thirty-year peace treaty that the Argives agreed with the Spartans was about to end in 420. There were no appeals that were made by the Argives to the Spartans to extend the treaty whence sprang an additional measure of Spartiate anxiety. Distraught by the Spartans’ exploitation of their interests, the Corinthians, weary of the prospects of the dual-hegemony exercising its political power over all the poleis of the mainland Greece, approached the Argives to sway them into levelling a challenge against the Spartan hegemony. In the meantime, other northern Peloponnesian states had also begun to show signs of being fed up with all the Spartan prods. Mantineia, for one, had gorged on a large Arcadian territory during the Archidamian War, which led the Mantineans to expect a reprisal from the Spartans once the immediate threat from Pylos and Cythera was over. Being the first polis to secede from the Peloponnesian League since the Megarians in c. 460, the Mantineans were followed by the Eleans who had recently clashed with the Spartans about the possession of Lepreum and its

2162 Ibid, 5.39.3.
2163 Ibid, 5.42.
2164 Ibid, 5.27.
2165 Ibid, 5.29.1.
Even more alarming was the joining of the Corinthians and Chalcidians in Thrace to the Argive alliance. By contrast, those who chose to remain on the side of the Spartans were Boeotians, Megarians and Tegeans, with the first two not joining the Argive phalanx mainly because of their dislike of the democratic Argive constitution whilst the Tegeans were not enticed by the prospect of joining an alliance that had the Mantineans, with whom they recently had a bloody battle, in its ranks. For all intents and purposes, Peloponnese appeared firmly divided into two camps yet again, which worried the Spartans tremendously as they came to expect the Athenians to side with the Argives. The ongoing frustrations came to a head during the Spartan embassy to Athens in 420 as we highlighted above. Alcibiades, in his first appearance in a Thucydidean light, outplayed the Spartans as he sensed the anti-Spartan sentiment pervading through the city and heartened the Argives, Mantineans and Eleans to send envoys to Athens in order to persuade them to join the Argive alliance. Throwing caution to wind as they heard the news of an Argive and Athenian alliance in the making, the Spartan envoys made another appearance at Athens and declared that they were entitled to deal with all the thorny issues between the two sides. Alcibiades, however, had different plans. Realising that the demos could be converted to the pro-Spartan side, he devised a stratagem that managed to ruse the Spartan embassy and manipulated the Athenians into thinking that the Spartans were merely playing them for a fool. The Athenians showed their indignance by showing the door to the Spartans and hastily moving on to the discussion of the Argive alliance. And yet, in true Thucydidean manner, an earthquake stalled their voting, which gave Nicias, the architect and the prime supporter of peace, ample time to avoid the impending split between the two sides. Nicias’ reception in Sparta, however, was as cold and uninspiring as it could possibly be: the Spartiates refused to renounce their separate peace treaty with the Boeotians and did not manage to offer anything new in regard to either Amphipolis or Panactum. The rebuff proved to be the final straw as Alcibiades led the way in reaching an agreement on a peace treaty that made the Argives and Athenians defensive allies for 100 years. However one looks at it, the expanding size of the Argive alliance meant that the Spartans could only survive their onslaught by playing it extremely safe.

The political pressure that was exerted by the formation of the Argive alliance was also exacerbated by the centripetal force that was emitted from Pylos and Cythera to all the helots.

2166 Ibid, 5.31.1-5.
2167 Ibid, 5.31.6.
2168 Ibid, 5.32.3-4.
2169 Ibid, 5.43.
2170 Ibid, 5.44.2-45.
2171 Ibid, 5.46.
2172 Ibid, 5.47.
of Laconia and Messenia. Arguably having played a larger part even than that of the return of Sphacteria homoioi in the conclusion of the peace talks, the epiteichismos and their ex-helot inhabitants were brought to the fore via the insistent Spartan requests for the removal of the Naupactus Messenians from Pylos to elsewhere. The Athenians finally gave in to the Spartan demands in the summer of 421 by removing the helots to the island of Cephalonia but that was before the Boeotian recalcitrance shown at Panactum.\textsuperscript{2173} As the Argive alliance undertook its first mission to conquer the pro-Spartan Epidaurus the ex-helots came to be sorely missed. Indeed, the Athenians could only allay the fears of the Argives concerning their negligence by restoring the original Messenian and helot garrison of Pylos. Spartan’s loss was Athenian’s gain. Spartans could only partially regain the initiative with their defeat of the Argive alliance at the battle of Mantinea in 418. Even granting that the Spartans managed to scrape out a brilliant victory during the hard times,\textsuperscript{2174} it still needs to be noted that by now Peloponnesus and not Attica was the main theatre of operations. The Spartans may have restored their hegemonic status in the Peloponnese but they had made little headway towards the restitution of what little semblance of social equilibrium their polity previously had.

5.3.5 The Sicilian Expedition and the Oligarchic Underground at Athens

By 415, the Athenians were ready to set sail into possibly the most ambitious effort of the Peloponnesian War: the subdual of Syracuse with an ultimate aim of Sicily’s conquest.\textsuperscript{2175} It took two years of incessant fighting, the death of many notable eupatrid strategoi and tens of thousands of Athenian soldiers as well as the complete drain of the Athenian finances to overturn the notion that Athens could create a viable backyard out of Sicily. The Thucydidean emphasis on the political exploits of Alcibiades to the contrary, the stirrings of the expedition first surfaced, as we observed above, in 420s which were to abate only by the unanimous decisions taken at the Congress of Gela. In the event the Congress did not offer a permanent resolution to the ongoing inter-poleis conflicts and Leontinoi, the original caller of the Athenian aid, was dismantled by the Syracusans in 422. The Syracusans did not bridle their territorial ambitions, however, as they made a pact with Selinous to add Segesta to their landholdings in 416. Turning to the Athenians in response,\textsuperscript{2176} the Segestaeans found a willing partner that did not need any convincing. There were as many factors that enticed the

\textsuperscript{2173} Ibid, 5.35.7.
\textsuperscript{2174} The victory, moreover, was achieved against a coalition that had to endure a split between the Mantineans and Eleans which costed the Argives about 3,000 hoplites: Ibid, 5.62.
\textsuperscript{2175} “Their [the Athenians’] real reason was the ambition to dominate the whole of Sicily, but they also had the decent pretext of a desire to help their own kinsmen and the allies they had already acquired.”
\textsuperscript{2176} Ibid, 6.6.
Athenians to dare the excursion as there were concerning the Syracusan territorial expansion but those factors can be summed up with a focus on the economic front.2177

On the economic level, the Athenian expedition was geared towards the immediate reaping of the material benefits which were promised by the Segestaeans to the Athenians, the creation of an additional productive living space and the cementing of a grain route that would be of immense service if the Spartan invasions of Attica were to begin anew. Initially, the Athenians were lured by the material benefits that were promised by the Segestaeans. The Segestaeans claim that they could pay for the expedition solved the problem of the foreseeable budget drain that would be caused by laying siege to Syracuse. Sieges, as we have observed above, were the dearest affairs in ancient Greek warfare and this time would be no different. The Athenians were, of course, aware that the Segestaeans’ claims could end up amounting to little more than mere sham. So, they sent an embassy in 416 to check on the Segestaeans claims and when the envoys returned with sixty talents, given by the Segestaeans as a parting gift, and reports of an incomparable affluence in 415, the Athenians were quick to let the issues pertaining to tentative costs of the military commitment to sort themselves out.2178 In actuality, the Athenians were conned by the Segestaeans. The sixty talents that were given as a pledge of other material rewards to come, as luck would have it, were authentic, but the rest of the show, with silver platters and majestic jewellery, were parts of just a single set that was handed over from one family to another as they housed the Athenian delegation.2179 Once the parts of the first expedition arrived in Segesta, they saw for themselves that the trail of traits was nothing
but a ruse. Never the less, there was no impediment to the Athenian forces making their way back home as they came to realise the specifics of the plot that was concocted by the Segestaeans. Losing face would have been a possible outcome of a retreat, but that was not anything that the Athenians were not in the slightest used to. Indeed, Nicias himself, if according to Thucydides, begged his fellow strategoi as well as the Athenians themselves to return to Athens immediately without getting more stuck in the Sicilian quicksand. And yet, the Athenians committed even more financial resources and manpower to the expedition rather than cut the funds that were allotted to it, let alone recall their fleet. The Segestaean promises could have been exposed for the sham that they were, but the Athenians had compelling reasons to hold on to their grandiose schemes about Sicily.

We have scrutinised the details of what made the creation of additional Lebensraum in the eastern Sicily particularly appealing for the Athenians. The gist of the matter was, of course, the soaring numbers of the urban poor that had turned into a burning issue in the pre-Sphacteria period of 431-425. Athenian upper classes knew that the outbreak of hostilities with the Spartans was a matter of time given their resolution to participate in the Argive alliance. This time around they did not have any homoioi captives to stop the Spartans dead in their tracks as they would come to consider the possibility of renewed invasions of Attica. Religiously embellished as it was, the Spartans had a clear appreciation of the devastating effects that were caused by their erstwhile invasions of Attica at the beginning of the Archidamian War. Thus, they saw the need for recommencing with the invasions in order to thwart the Athenian military commitment to operations commanded from their dread epitheichismos around the Peloponnesse. Provided that they necessarily would endure such an ordeal, the Athenian upper-classes resolved to surpass the impending pitfalls by stimulating a large investment that was propelled towards gaining a workable foothold in the eastern Sicily. The main problem with such a military venture was that it would take a substantial proportion of the Athenian forces from the main theatre of the Peloponnesian War, i.e., mainland Greece and the Aegean. In short, the lower-class dedication to the notion of carving out productive farmsteads of their own in Syracuse and its whereabouts endangered the excessive division of the Athenian forces. The eupatrid group led by Nicias knew that if they were to encourage the lower-class ambitions beyond a certain point, then the Sicilian expedition could prove to be suicidal which

would leave Athens primed for a defeat. Once the cat was out of the bag, however, Nicias could not hope to tame the territorial ambitions of a citizen-body that had to endure the plague from 430-426.\textsuperscript{2182} Other \textit{eupatrids} with the charismatic daredevil Alcibiades to lead them, knew that it was worth any price to channel the perpetually repressed socio-economic desires of \textit{thêtes} toward an alternative course of territorial expansion if the Athenians were to clash with the Spartans once again. Nicias attempted to win the war; Alcibiades endeavoured to win the \textit{thêtes}. Thucydidean premises aside, the division between Nicias and Alcibiades was not one that originated from a timeless polarity of ‘caution vs. adventurism’\textsuperscript{2183}; it was one that largely stemmed from the different courses of action that were proposed by two \textit{eupatrids} to resolve a class dilemma: How to make sure that the \textit{thêtes} were economically abreast from the impending disasters that were to be wrought by the Peloponnesians without jeopardising the safety of the Athenian \textit{arkhê}. To Nicias and his upper-class retinue, the solution was a simple one that included minimal commitment to a new front. Envisaging no long-term socio-economic reconciliation between the Athenian classes, Nicias argued that the safekeeping of the Athenian commercial hegemony in the Aegean was to be deemed of more import than anything else in holding out against the Spartans. The \textit{phoros} and maritime revenues were, of course, flowing into the Athenian treasury in large abundance. The core class predicament, needless to add, was how unequally those revenues were distributed among the rank-and-file Athenians. On one side was the Athenian upper-classes with the \textit{eupatrid} super-rich to lead the pack, absentee farmers one and all, with diversified landholdings and proto-industrial ventures to boot, practically smeared with the imperial cash flows while not paying any other tax than the liturgies, which, financially burdensome as they were, were irregularly assigned and surely not debilitating.\textsuperscript{2184} On the other was the Athenian \textit{thêtes}, packed behind the Long Walls like veritable livestock, having to eke out a living with their daily share of menial labour.

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{2182} Hence the rhetorical import that the motif of an \textit{eros} for the expedition that \textit{enepese}, i.e., ‘attacked,’ the Athenian \textit{demos} bore for Thucydides. On trial in Thucydides’ rendition might have been the longstanding opposition of Periclean coldblooded deliberation and Alcibiades’ passionate rousing. To take that outlook as a class-neutral representation of that historical episode, however, is nothing less than to commit oneself to the rebuilding of a socially jaundiced account which does not take any account of the material necessities that the lower-class Athenians had been struggling with ever since the plague began chipping away their meagre resources: Thomas F. Scanlon, “Thucydides and Tyranny”, \textit{Classical Antiquity}, vol. 6 no. 2, (Oct., 1987), pp. 286-301; Steven Forde, \textit{The Ambition to Rule: Alcibiades and the Politics of Imperialism in Thucydides}, (Ithaca, N.Y., 1989), pp. 31-37, 39, 66, 119; Thucydides, \textit{The Peloponnesian War}, 6.24.3, 6.31.6, 7.28.3; cf. Kallet-Marx, \textit{Money and the Corrosion of Power in Thucydides}, pp. 44-46.


\end{footnotesize}
if there were any, of rowing the ships and manning the walls, and doing all that in return for
the sharing of the crumbs of imperial profits that were falling down from the upper-class’
lion’s share. The perspicacity of Alcibiades and his adherents lay in their understanding of the
fact that the reaping of the imperial revenues was not by themselves nearly enough to ask the
thêtes for another bout of abject misery. In short, the thêtes have had enough of the ‘trickling
down.’

What was essential for Alcibiades, in that vein, was the insurance of the continued support of
the thêtes to the war effort. Only if the lower-class Athenians were willing to form the
phalanxes and row the boats could the upper-class strategies be put into practice. Further, the
rules of the game of attrition that was played by the thêtes were exceptionally harsher
compared to that played by the Athenian upper-classes. If there was to be a second act to the
Peloponnesian War, then it would have to be performed on a stage that was more equally-
proportioned between different classes unlike what had hitherto been the case. Landholdings
and grain supplies were the two dimensions on which stood this relatively more equalising
notion of the Athenian arkhê. The enclosure of Syracusans’ farmsteads would moderate the
economic squeezing of the thêtes thereby affording a higher return for all their toil and boil.

Just as important was the creation of a steady supply of grain, which would be invaluable in
the likely circumstance of further invasions of Attica. That measure would partially eliminate
the reliance of thêtes on the grain from the northern Euxine provided that its maintenance was
secured. Only with these socio-economic barriers firmly in their place could the Athenian
upper-classes hope to wage another war against the Spartans for the sake of preserving their
arkhê. Alcibiades’ sentiment, however, was not shared by many eupatrids that had become
increasingly notable in regard to their distaste for various democratic benchmarks.

The oligarchic underground had never been, of course, completely swept away by the demotic
polity of the post-Periclean period. Highlighted by comic exaggeration in the surviving plays
of Aristophanes, e.g., the Acharnians, the anti-democratic ethos of Athenian oligarchs found

Ever oblivious to the decisive political boots that were filled by the Athenian thêtes before and
during the Archidamian War, Ian Morris has suggested that the Athenians could have overcome the
internal limits of their polis by establishing a national empire only if they had avoided the singular
mistake of setting sail to Sicily. It is a discouraging spectacle to see the passing remarks on the lower
classes making up the vast majority of the Athenian citizen-body never amounting to anything more
than mere lip-service in the context of modern elaborations of particular large-scale policy decisions
that were ratified at the ekklêsia. Thucydides had a class-related reason to distort the expedition as sheer
folly of the feeble-minded Athenian thêtes, to be sure. But it appears that some of the modern
commentators do not fall short of the social standard that was erected by that great historian. Contra Ian
democratic measures and habits of conspicuous consumption that supposedly exposed the
democracy at its worst, such as public pay, election by lot and frequent audits, to their
chagrin. Therefore, when Alcibiades’ side set out to support an expedition that would involve
heavy expenditure and offer little material gain following hard on the heels of their grassroots
work in the creation of the democratically-inclined Argive alliance against the Spartans, they
found an intransient oligarchic opposition facing them. Nicias and co.’s plan to make a cameo
appearance in Sicily with the least possible amount of commitment gave a sublime expression
to this political position. Subtle and diligent as they were, however, the oligarchs did not
account for what the thêtes were in need of before they were ready to leave their Attic
landholdings to the Spartans’ whims. In the event the thêtes sided resolutely by the proposed
dict of Alcibiades, showing yet again that they were conscious of where their socio-economic
interests lay. Faced with the landslide support of Alcibiades’ motion, the only path that was
left for the oligarchic upper-classes to thwart the commitment was to indict Alcibiades using
the perennial aristocratic politics of tyranny. Right before the day on which the first
Athenian rowers and marines were to jump their boats a political scandal convulsed Athens.
Hermes, or vertical blocks of road markers with Hermes’ face engraved on top and an erect
phallus moulded down below, were mutilated by a group at around midnight. Now, herms
were considered a particularly democratic piece of religious art, which gave rise to a steady
set of suspicions that only an impetuous group of anti-democratic aristocrats could have been
responsible for their defacing. Conveniently, an aristocratic faction began to voice
incriminations of another eupatrid group to the effect that the latter were making a public
chicanery of the deeply prized Athenian possession of Eleusinian Mysteries. Mysteries, as
their modern name suggests, was an enigmatic cult about which we know next to nothing apart
from later insinuations. Never the less, the cult appears to have a relatively socially highly
inclusive membership structure that welcomed all the Athenians with scarce any regard of
their ethnic, class, religious, etc. origins. To publicly mock their teachings, and in aristocratic
sumposia no less, was hence considered to be a strictly oligarchic undertaking. The target

2186 James Davidson, *Courtesans and Fishcakes: The Consuming Passions of Classical Athens*,
2187 Waterfield interprets the mutilation of herms as greasing the mills of the democratically-oriented
upper classes who were afraid of a possible liaison between Alcibiades and Peisander. Enticing as it
may seem, the postulation of an oligarchic coup led by Alcibiades does not seem to afford, however,
the prerequisite hermetic space concerning why Alcibiades did not return to Athens either in 411 or 404
provided that he was inclined to establish an oligarchic regime. Waterfield, *Why Socrates Died*, pp. 98.
2188 Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War*, 6.27.
2190 For a discussion of all the politically subversive and isolated characteristics of the sympotic space,
which served as a breeding ground for aristocratic hubris, see Ezio Pellizer, ‘Outlines of a Morphology
of all this innuendo was none other than Alcibiades, the nephew of Pericles and a prominent member of the Alcmaeonidae. Accusing Alcibiades of having violated the basic codes of the Mysteries in addition to harbouring ambitions of tyranny, his opponents attempted to discredit the whole expedition. In hindsight, the main thrust of the whole scheme appears to have been the initial stigmatisation of Alcibiades, which would be followed through by a summary trial condemning him either to banishment or death. With the loss of their dear-departed leader, who was expected to be appointed by the dēmos as one of the strategoi of the expedition, Nicias would be afforded a lot of political room to sway his soldiers whilst his supporters would work their magic in attempting to dissuade the Athenians from keeping up their commitment to the expedition. Alcibiades, however, managed to partially shed the aspersions of tyranny that had been cast at him by appearing before the dēmos and arguing that it was only fair for him to be judged now rather than later in absentia. Though he was momentarily victorious, Alcibiades was forced to leave the business essentially unfinished as his upper-class opponents succeeded in persuading the dēmos to postpone the case for there was a lot of ground to cover before making such a serious allegation. There were a lot of loose ends, as such, when the first Sicilian expedition set sail with the huge army that comprised three strategoi, namely, Nicias, Alcibiades and Lamachus, 134 triremes, 5,100 hoplites and more than 1,000 light infantries.

The tangling of some of the loose ends came when the Athenian fleet arrived in Italy. Rhegium, one of polis at the southern tip of Sicily to which the Athenians were allied, refused to join their side. Afterwards the Athenians learned that the supposedly bottomless coffers of Segestaeans pooled, in fact, only thirty talents that could be given in assistance to the war effort. These setbacks encouraged Nicias to insist on pursuing his timid interpretation of the task that was allotted to them in verbatim as making an agreement, regardless of how it was achieved, between Selinous and Segesta and then to return home. Alcibiades retorted with a policy of diplomacy that would entice Messina to side with Athens thence affording the latter a chance to gain a foothold in Sicily. Finally, Lamachus advised a course of direct engagement with the Syracusans, exploiting the element of surprise to the full. Backed by Lamachus to break the deadlock, Alcibiades had only one shot to deliver on his pledges to find Sicilian allies that could tip the balance in Athens’ favour. And even though he failed to bring

2192 Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War*, 6.44.
around Messina, his luck held out in the gaining of Catana as an Athenian base of operations. This did not amount to anything significant, however, as the thêtes in Sicily did not appear in his defence when the Athenians summoned him to face trial in Athens. Disheartened by the prospect of suffering heavy punishment, Alcibiades escaped the Athenians while they were in Thurii and eventually made his way to Sparta. His oligarchic upper-class opponents leaped at the opportunity to indict his actions, which appears to have held sway on the ultimate Athenian decision to condemn him to death in absentia. With Alcibiades conveniently out of the picture, Nicias spent the precious first couple of months with hardly any effort toward engaging either Syracuse or Selenus while his opponents were busy making preparations for the impending siege. In fact, so incapacitating was Nicias’ recalcitrance that when the Athenian forces finally began their offensive it was a result of a failed Syracusan attempt to rid Sicily of the Athenian base in Catane once and for all. Indeed, his decision not to put Lamachus’ plan of the direct invasion of Syracuse into practice as well as his fainthearted commitment to the siege were two of the most important factors that gave the Syracusans all the time they needed to rectify their defensive deficiencies.

It took two years of fighting for the Syracusans to prove victorious. Even when they had completely lost the element of surprise, the Athenians came alarmingly close victory. During the campaign of 414, for example, the Athenians almost managed to complete their circumvallation of Syracuse which was decisive in bringing all the other Sicilian poleis to their side.

Losing Lamachus in the battle of the Syracusan second counter-wall, however, marked a disastrous turn in their fortunes. Now in sole command, Nicias slackened the effort at circumvallation, expecting the Syracusans to surrender their polis at any time, whilst Gylippus, a Spartiate who was sent with four ships to organise the Sicilian defence, made his way first to Thurii, and then breezed through the Athenian blockade with an army of 3,000 hoplites that he had recruited in Himera before moving on to Syracuse.

Gylippus immediately set about carrying his defensive plan into action and forced the Athenians to fight their way for the control of the second Syracusan counter-wall. After a couple of relatively

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2197 Ibid, 6.60-61.
2199 Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, 6.63.
2200 Ibid, 6.103.3.
2201 Ibid, 7.1; one should also note, as Trundle did a while back, in regard to how Gylippus relief force is depicted by Thucydides, that the latter portrays the Peloponnesian soldiers who flocked from Arkadia, Messenia and other regions in Peloponnesus, as driven by kerdos, i.e., ‘gain,’ alone. Often contrasted with the public good of the polis, kerdos acted as the literary counterweigh to the ideal of hoplite-citizen which was rapidly fading away as the end of the Second Peloponnesian War drew nearer. For a painstaking study of all the epistemic avenues from which set out the modern forays into the concept, see Morris, ‘Hard Surfaces’; cf. Trundle, Greek Mercenaries, pp. 42; Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, 7.57.9-10.
insignificant Athenian victories the Syracusan force under Gylippus’ command finally succeeded to wrest the control of the second counter-wall away from the Athenians. To be sure, the initiative now laid with the Syracusans as they finally managed to create a corridor through which supplies could be brought to their polis. Yet, this was only the first defeat of the Athenians against a handful of victories that almost managed to put paid to the Syracusan defence. Nicias, however, showed that he had none of either Lamachus’ or Gylippus’ resilience as he sent an urgent letter to the Athenians, accentuating the precarious situation he was in, and bluffed for a final time in demanding that the Athenians either recalling him and his remaining force or despatching notable reinforcements. Back in 415, he had bluffed by overstating the military and financial commitment that it would require to invade Syracuse only to be outbid by a démos that was more than willing to raise the stakes. This time would be no different: the Athenians resolved to send a relief force that comprised of Eurymedon and a squadron of ten ships to set sail at once and a more substantial force to be send in the spring under the leadership of Demosthenes. From the outset, Nicias had wanted to convince the Athenians that their effort was futile, that Syracuse could not be conquered, that no staunchness, regardless of the expenditure involved, was going to change that. Indeed, for all the strategic inaptitude, sloth and indecisiveness he managed to display during the first phase of the campaign, Nicias deserves to be canvassed as the foremost obstacle hindering the potential success of the Sicilian expedition. Unfortunately, for the Athenian thétēs at least, the second phase of the war would involve no fewer disheartening missteps by that stratēgos than those that were committed during the earlier one.

Meanwhile, the Athenians had made an enemy of one of their most important stratēgos whose aptitude in bringing the war to the Athenians would spell disaster for the Athenian interests. Alcibiades did not take long before persuading the Corinthians and Spartans to use a highly successful Athenian tactic to bring the Athenians themselves to their knees. The Peloponnesians were to permanently occupy and fortify Decelea in Attica, thus completing the devastation of the Attic land which would prevent it from being farmed once the waves of invading Spartans receded. It was around this time that the main Athenian relief force, commanded by Demosthenes, shipped out with sixty Athenians and five Chian ships, 1,200

2202 Ibid, 7.16; for an analysis of the mismatch between the requested chremata and the trophe that was sent in return by the Athenians as hinting at more than mere wordplay but an unwillingness on the part of the latter to commit any more resources to the effort other than the bare essentials, see Kallet-Marx, Money and the Corrosion of Power in Thucydides, pp. 107-110.
Athenian hoplites in addition to hoplite regiments from the islanders.\footnote{Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, 7.20.} This decision has been regarded, by the majority of modern historians, as an initial example of dêmos’ violation of Pericles’ maxim ‘do not overextend.’\footnote{Cf. Ps. Xenophon, Constitution of the Athenians, 2.1; for a tracing of the Thucydidean notion against the backdrop of mythical, mainly Homeric, narrative, see Rosaria Vignolo Munson, ‘Thucydides and Myth: A Complex Relation to Past and Present’, in Oxford Handbook of Thucydides, ed. by Ryan K. Balot, Sara Forsdyke and Edith Foster, (Oxford, 2017), pp. 257-266.} Perpetuating the historical tradition that was initially set on its tracks by Thucydides, this interpretation focuses on dêmos’ oblivious state in regard to the sheer size and resources of Sicily which would prove a juicy bone that many rapacious rulers had already choked on.\footnote{Kallet-Marx, Money, Expense, and Naval Power in Thucydides’ History I-5.24, pp. 203; Jacqueline de Romilly, Alcibiades, (Athens, 1995), pp. 85-104; Athanassios Platias and Constantinos Koliopoulos, Thucydides on Strategy: Grand Strategies in the Peloponnesian War and their Relevance Today, (Oxford, 2017), pp. 19 ff; Forde, The Ambition to Rule.} Juxtaposed to the supposed astuteness of Nicias, the dêmos’ obtuseness takes on almost a Herodotean colouring, with the impertinent avaricious dêmos finally put into its rightful place by the divine titis as it turns out to be incapable for heeding the counsel of its eupatrid betters. Dramatized? Perhaps so; but no less than the essentials of the historical account we are dealing with.

The Athenian thêtes did not have any illusions about the perennial fights that had been battering their numbers on and off since 431. If anything, their numbers had served as the grindstone on which the spear-won arkhê of Pericles had been sharpened. But not only that: many of them had vivid recollections of how they were left to the mercy of Asclepius, the curer of plagues, during the plague of 430-426. And the Spartan epiteichismos at Decelea was an accident waiting to happen hence possibly triggering another spell of shortage, if not outright famine and disease. Alcibiades knew that the Athenian polity could not fight off the social pressure that would be exerted by a fortification built practically right around the corner from Athens. The lower-class Athenians from the eastern Attic demes had never grown completely accustomed to seeing the clouds rise from the scorching of their fields while they had to carry on with their life of sublunar poverty in Athens.\footnote{Cf. Ps. Xenophon, Constitution of the Athenians, 2.14-16.} But now they were under the danger of losing permanently what little solace remained in their potential use of the land once the invaders returned to their respective poleis. Grain doles and imports, highly sporadic as the former was, were all good and well for the upper-classes who had the wherewithal to afford them. For others, however, they were just another overpriced drain for the blood-soaked drachmæ they earned while fighting battles on land and at sea. There was no regularised taxing of the upper-class Athenians, as we noted above, at least prior to the first quarter of the fourth century. And yet the lower classes were taxed regularly through levies and cleruchies at
potentially the heaviest rate possible: that of mass decimation. The lower classes did not heed the warnings of Nicias because, as far as they were concerned, there was no viable livelihood for the recruited thêtes to return to. What appeared to the Athenian upper classes as a basic lack of decorum gave the impression of a biting lack of bare necessities to the lower classes. The thêtes appreciated fully the price to be paid in return for ensuring their sustenance; the problem was they had already begun to pay that price when the Spartan masons had arrived at Decelea.

The second attempt at the invasion of Sicily ended in utter failure in 413. Gylippus had already invoked terror within the Athenian ranks with his energetic prosecution of warfare on land and at sea prior to the arrival of Demosthenes’ force. Demosthenes’ quick appraisal of the situation made it clear that the remaining forces of Nicias were barely strong for a final push. Trying to re-implement Lamachus’ original plan of a quick strike at the valuable spots of the enemy fortifications, Demosthenes organised his forces for the capture of the third Syracusan counter-wall in order to complete the circumvallation and starve the polis out. His night raid on the third counter-wall failed, however, due to his troops’ inexperience with night skirmishes.2209

By the end of the night battle, the Athenian hopes of the conquest of Syracuse were replaced by the goal of survival. The Athenians had plenty of opportunities to retreat when the Syracusans were least expecting. Nicias, however, was to prove what an odd-choice of a stratêgos he was by delaying the command, on interpretations of augury, until the Syracusans had mustered enough soldiers and plucked sufficient courage to block all their possible routes. The closing days of the Sicilian expedition make for a depressing reading. As they had to endure one harrowing experience after another, the tens of thousands of soldiers were splintered into bits until practically none were left from the regiments that arrived at Thurii a couple of years ago. The Athenian lower classes that participated in the two expeditions had made the ultimate gamble: their lives for self-sufficiency that was to be sought elsewhere. They gambled and they lost.2210 Yet, neither them nor many of the upper-class Athenians may have realised at the time that losing such an immense number of soldiers and resources effectively meant the exhaustion of the Athenian arkhê. Surely, the death throes of the empire would go on for about nine more years. But, that, as we expound below, had just as much to do with the Athenian resilience as it did with the Spartan socio-economic enervation. In the

2210 “This proved the most significant occurrence in the whole of this war, and, it seems to me, in the whole of recorded Greek history—unparalleled triumph for the victors, and unparalleled disaster for the vanquished. This was, as they say, ‘total annihilation.’ Beaten in every way on every front, extreme miseries suffered on an extreme scale, and army, fleet, and everything else destroyed, few out of all those many made their return home.” *Ibid*, 7.87.5-6; cf. Plutarch, *Nicias*, 27.2-3.
end, the joke was on the upper-classes. In ending the charade by their own terms, and with their own lives one might add, the thêtes brought about an end to the democratic pretensions of the politics of arkhê, serving as the harbingers of a new Athenian democracy in which the old political polarities were reinvented with full rigour.

5.3.6 The Decelean War, the Four Hundred and Divided Loyalties

The modified Athenian politics of arkhê took all the battles of the Decelean War (413-404) and two oligarchic coups to be brought to daylight. The Spartiates may have expected quick results from their full-time invasion of Attica for the financial blows that were dealt to the Athenians were nothing short of excruciating. Athens had lost, for example, most of the revenues that it had hitherto derived from the silver mines at Laurium. Under the constant threat of Spartan raids, Thucydides reports, more than 20,000 slaves, or andrapodon, ‘man-footed thing’, to be exact, most of them skilled workers, managed to escape from the mining area including those toiled in the nearby proto-industrial workshops. The revenue levels of the mines would reach, in fact, the pre-Decelean levels only towards the fourth quarter of the fourth century. Likewise, the permanent occupation of Decelea disrupted the operation of the Euboean grain route, one of the most important trade routes that the Athenians had. The Athenians arranged the food supplies to be brought by the more expansive sea route, thus evading the immediate possibility of experiencing food shortages. Combined with the full-time loss of the fruits of their landholdings in the western Attica, however, this measure put an additional upward pressure on the food prices which were to be coped with the root-and-branch thêtes as they derived their income from singular avenues. Finally, the Athenians had to introduce full-time guard duty on the Long Walls to discourage the Spartans from making any attempt on Athens. In response to those fluctuations to their annual cashflow, a hitherto spared instrument of introducing eikoste, or a 5% tax on all commercial activities, was resorted to by the Athenians. Replacing the imperial phoros system with round-the-clock doses of cash injection in order to keep the maritime finances afloat, eikoste served as the expression of the dire material need in which the Athenians had found themselves. In addition to entrenching the channels of imperial economic extortion, the maritime tax had the added benefit of widening the social base of commercial revenue by adding the xenoi into the taxing

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fold. Required, until then, to be liable for an egalitarian share of the standard of material support to the Athenian *arkhê*, the non-citizens who engaged in commercial activities of any sort were now asked to bear a heavier burden.\(^{2215}\) Cognisant of the trade-off between ensuring the faithful backing of their non-citizen neighbours and digging ever deeper into their pockets, the Athenians were prompted by the alacrity of their financial situation to choose the lesser evil. For if recovering from the deep financial trouble that they were in the throes of following the disaster in Sicily was the condition to be satisfied were they to continue waging the war, that condition’s corollary was the harder squeezing of their tight grip on the Aegean commercial network. For better or for worse, the Athenians knew that their defeat on Sicily effectively meant that they were to remain, from then onwards, on the defensive. The Peloponnesians, however, were comfortable in biding their time, waiting for the Athenians to capitulate without having to commit their resources to a particularly dear siege affair that would be largely ineffective owing to the well-maintained maritime commercial network of the Athenians. Toward the end of 410s, however, many of the *homoioi*, including King Agis, came to share the opinion that a rapprochement with the Persians to secure the funds that would allow the challenging of the Athenians’ Aegean hegemony was worth the humiliation to be endured by conceding to the Persians’ demands.

The continually renewed attempts at securing Persian funding had, of course, nothing new about them. The Spartans had been trying to achieve it since, at least, the latter half of the 420s, whilst the Athenians tried to prevent them by agreeing to a treaty with the Persian King in 424/3.\(^{2216}\) Although its details are rather murky, this treaty appears to have kept the Persians from encroaching on the eastern Greek *poleis* for about a decade. With the destruction of the Athenian fleet in Syracuse, however, the Spartans began to fathom the possibility of investing heavily on an Aegean fleet,\(^{2217}\) the running costs of which would be afforded by the Persians. And this time around, they found willing partners in the satraps of the Asia Minor. The change in the satraps’ attitude was occasioned by an Athenian interference in the politics of succession of the Persian satrapy of Lydia. Tissaphernes, the satrap of Lydia, was awarded his satrapy by Darius II for capturing Pissouthnes, the former satrap of the region who had revolted from the empire at some time between c. 420 and c. 415. Tissaphernes, however, did still have a formidable enemy to challenge his authority, Amorges the son of Pissouthnes, who had somehow continued the rebellion following his father’s capture and execution. Amorges, just


\(^{2216}\) ML 70.

\(^{2217}\) The fleet was to comprise of 100 triremes, would be ready for operation in 412 and constructed with the pooled resources of the League members. Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War*, 8.3.
like his father, was allied to the Athenians, which was as just a cause as any, in the eyes of Tissaphernes, to damage their interests in Ionia and the Aegean. What could have enticed the Athenians to meddle with the Persian power-politics? The answer lies, of course, in the uneasy relationship that had been established between Athens and Persia that was to be discarded when the Persians recognised the momentous damage that was wrought on the Athenian naval supremacy by the complete loss of the Sicilian expedition.

Over the first half of the 410s, the Athenians came to regard Pharnabazus, the satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, and Tissaphernes with increasing suspicion. Pharnabazus, for one, was actively seeking ways to expand the Persian political influence over the Hellespontine area in order to lure the polis that were paying phoros to the Athenians into an agreement with the Empire that would be financially more beneficial for them. Similarly, Tissaphernes had the inherent flaw, in the Athenian eyes, of being the foremost agent of Pissouthes’, with whom the Athenians had an amicable understanding, demise. The Athenians were, of course, at least partially responsible for bringing about the falling out in the relationship when they continued to support Amorges against a Tissaphernes that had the backing of the Great King himself. Yet, the greater perspective of Ionian politics show that the Persians were also hunting for new political opportunities that would give them a chance to win over the poleis of the Asia Minor. The moment came when the Sicilian expedition turned into a catastrophe for the Athenians as Darius commanded him to exploit the Athenian weakness to goad the poleis of his satrapy to the Persian camp.2218

For their turn, the Spartans could either begin to cooperate with Pharnabazus or Tissaphernes, as both were actively seeking to enlist the Spartans as allies against the Athenians. Alcibiades, reported by Thucydides to have been playing a double-game of his own, understood the Spartans’ indecision and persuaded them to work with Tissaphernes. By this time Alcibiades had already overstayed his welcome in Sparta and was looking for a means of rehabilitating himself in the eyes of the Athenians. He knew, of course, that the Persian gold would prove decisive in breaking the deadlock between a militarily battered Athens and a financially strained Sparta. To his thinking, according to Thucydides, the Athenians first had to realise what a terrible mistake they had committed in estranging the Persians in order to throw caution to wind by heralding him as the saviour that could bring the Persians around in withdrawing their support to the Peloponnesians. To that end, Alcibiades had already endeared himself to Tissaphernes, giving valued counsel to the effect that he should support the Spartans without

2218 Ibid, 8.5.5.
making any large investment. Alcibiades agued, in that vein, that a financially empowered Sparta would be just as menacing, if not more, as the Athenians had been for the interests of the Empire. Tissaphernes needed both sides to be weakened so that he could restore the Persian sovereignty over the Greeks of the Asia Minor. And thus, Tissapherenes began his puppet-playing of the Spartans who had sent their fleet to Chios in 412 in order to incite rebellion. The plan worked in persuading Chios, the largest ally of Athens in addition to being the sole remaining autonomous ship-supplier, to revolt.²²¹⁹ Seeing that their Aegean arkhê was in serious danger, the Athenians voted for the use of the 1,000-talent reserve fund that had been put aside to be used in case of an emergency. The Spartans followed their success at Chios by blazing a trail of revolt that eventually came to encompass Erythrae, Clazomenae, Teos, Miletus, Lebedos, Erae, Methymna and Mytilene.²²²⁰ And yet, the Spartans were not able to deliver the coup-de-grâce to their Athenian rivals when the forces of the latter were spread thin. Indeed, Alcibiades’ skill of persuasion appear to have worked its magic on an unsuspecting Tissaphernes who decreased the cash flow to the Spartans until they had barely any initiative in continuing the anti-Athenian offensive.²²²¹

Having managed to put out a convincing display of the marvels that could be accomplished with the aid of the Persian coin, Alcibiades set the second phase of his plan to motion: he negotiated with the officers of the main Athenian fleet based at Samos the possibility of exchanging the financial support of the Persians with the overthrow of Athenian democracy.²²²² The upper class officers of the fleet readily agreed to the proposal and began a secret correspondence with the oligarchically-minded Athenian kaloikagathoi who did not take much convincing to side with them. The upper-class Athenians had begun to amass veritable heaps of political complaints concerning the démos’ irresponsible waste of the arkhê’s resources a long time before the events of 412. Among other things, the impoverished state of the industrial profits drawn from the deme of Torikos, the permanent domiciliation of the Attic population behind the Long Walls who needed to be granted at least subsistence doles to keep them from revolting and the perpetual loss of the profits from their landed estates were all the blunders that were made by the lower classes who dared to squander the imperial resources to chase dreams. The cost-effective operation of the rebuilt navy in addition to a more upper-class oriented pursuit of foreign policy was thus deemed necessary for the members of this class who had suffered ‘the worst’: “The wealthiest Athenians, who were the

²²²⁰ Ibid, 8.14-23.
²²²¹ Ibid, 8.46.5.
²²²² Ibid, 8.47.
most imposed on, now began to conceive great hopes of getting the government into their own
hands and also of defeating the enemy.”

The *hetaireia*, or ‘aristocratic clubs,’ had begun to serve as hotbeds of oligarchic congregation
since the beginning of 420s at the latest. Originally conceived as something akin to dining
groups or fraternities that would allow the building of various aristocratic networks that
spanned Athens, the *hetaireiai* fed off from the increasing upper-class dissatisfaction with
democracy to grow into oligarchic headquarters at the end of the Sicilian expedition. When
Peisander, one of the two *strategoi* of the main Athenian fleet at Samos, returned to Athens to
inform the fellow oligarchically-minded Athenians of the plans they had conceived with
Alcibiades, he thus made the *hetaireiai* his first stop. At Peisander’s behest, the groups
came to display a more political hue approaching the modern think-tanks in disseminating
propaganda about the intrinsic deficiencies of the Athenian democracy and the possible
courses of remedy. Coupled with their role in publicising the news about the promise
that was allegedly made by the Great King to finance Athenian ventures provided that the
Athenians were willing to give an oligarchic twist to their democratic polity, the *hetaireiai*
hence became the primary oligarchic block giving way to the events of 411. As Peisander left
Athens to negotiate an agreement with Tissaphernes, waves of oligarchic terror started to seize

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2223 *Ibid*, 8.48.1; we agree with Cartledge’s point that Thucydides endorsement of the ‘mixed’ polity of
the Four Hundred indicates the character of the established regime to be, at best, a moderate democracy:
Cartledge, *Democracy*, pp. 163.

2224 Though I remain sceptical as to his depiction of Pericles as having turned his back completely on
the old aristocratic politics of backroom forums of *symposia*, I agree with Ober’s portrayal of Athenian
lower classes as growing increasingly suspicious of the *hetaireiai* as hotbeds of anti-democratic plotting
from 440s at the latest. A rhetorical tactic that was often employed by the prosecutors of individuals
belonging to certain voluntary associations, e.g., *nautai*, *sussitoi*, *homotaphoi*, etc., was to liken the club
in question to a *hetaireia*, thus indicting it as a locus of anti-democratic activity: Ober, ‘Political
and the Street in Democratic Athens*, pp. 47-49.

2225 On a conception of *hetaireia* as the groundwork upon which rested the entrenched patronage
networks of the fourth century Athens, see Barry S. Strauss, *Athens after the Peloponnesian War: Class,
pp. 160.


2228 One of the foremost examples of the oligarchic treatises that came to be circulated widely within
the upper-class circles around this time was the *Athenaion Politeia* that used to be attributed to
Xenophon. Fortunately surviving to this day, the work functions as a veritable treasury of all the
temporary political images that were brought to adopt a distinctly oligarchic resonance. Superficially
denoting only the rather scot-free good order, *eunomia*, was, for one, made to shine with an oligarchic
consistency, which informed the author’s maxim that if one wants to establish true *eunomia*, then he or
she needs to place the elite in charge so that no allowance is made to the “crazy people to speak their
minds or participate in the ekklêsia.” Ps.-Xenophon, *Athenaion Politeia*, 1.8-9; cf. Meier, *The Greek
with Solon’s ‘Timocracy’*, in *Solon of Athens*, pp. 392-394.
the Athenian dêmos. From the assassination of key democratic politicians, such as Androcles,\textsuperscript{2229} to the forceful suppression of the mass-participation of grassroots Athenians in the meetings of boulê and ekklesia,\textsuperscript{2230} the oligarchs created an unbridled climate of terror that wiped the political slate sufficiently clean for the return of Peisander. In the event Peisander returned empty-handed from his talks with Tissaphernes as the latter made exorbitant demands, including the recognition of the Persian claims not only to the Ionian poleis but also to those of the Aegean islands, which would boil down to the dismantling of the Athenian arkhê. Having lost their chief argument in support of the proposed modifications of democracy, the oligarchs decided to press on with their plan for subverting the polity.\textsuperscript{2231} All the same, the evaporation of the bargaining chip of the promise of Persian gold was tantamount to losing the meek acquiescence of the dêmos to their political programme. To surpass that predicament, the oligarchs conceived of a three-pronged plan to secure their political authority without endangering any backlash from the lower classes: the rapid enactments that would turn the Athenian polity into an essentially oligarchic one, the conversion of the respective polities of the allied poleis into oligarchic ones and the consolidation of their power over the fleet at Samos. The first step of the plan was the easiest one given the measure of artificial social tranquility that was forcefully seeped into the Athenian polity through the combined efforts of hetaireiai. All Peisander had to do when he returned from his round of negotiations with Tissaphernes was to condone the passing of the oligarchs’ political programmes, which was advertised as signalling just the ‘adoption of a different type of democracy’: “The conspirators had prepared the ground with a public manifesto, to the effect that there should be no state pay for anyone not on military service, and that participation in government should be restricted to a maximum of five thousand, those to be the citizens most capable of serving the state with both property and person.”\textsuperscript{2232} With acts of full-fledged repression and terrorism to boot, the oligarchs forcefully stripped the dêmos of all the signal gains which had taken decades, if not centuries, to be accomplished.\textsuperscript{2233} From now on only obedient rower and soldier thêtes would be qualified for public pay. Economic empowerment, in other words, would follow in the footsteps of unquestioning military servitude, whence would stem, according to the plans of the oligarchs, a mass of servile citizen-soldiers not attempting to overreach their natural boundaries. Through their illegal suspension of the use of graphê paranomon, or the

\textsuperscript{2229} Thucydides, \textit{The Peloponnesian War}, 8.65.
\textsuperscript{2230} \textit{Ibid}, 8.66.1-2.
\textsuperscript{2231} \textit{Ibid}, 8.63.
\textsuperscript{2232} \textit{Ibid}, 8.65.3.
\textsuperscript{2233} By contrast, Forsdyke has argued that the leaders of the Four Hundred engaged only in selective assassinations in order to destabilise the democratic regime with scarce any resort to mass executions. The topos of mass terrorization, according to her interpretation, came later to be established mainly as a result of the combined effect of the two oligarchic regimes on creating an Athenian political tradition of anti-oligarchism. Forsdyke, \textit{Exile, Ostracism, and Democracy}, pp. 186-190.
The prosecution of unconstitutional motion, the oligarchs forced, in 411, the ekklēsia to pass a motion that stipulated the elective mechanisms of the new polity. The proposal authorised the present oligarchic members of the ekklēsia to choose five men as presidents, who, in their turn would elect 100 others, all of whom would choose three more in addition to himself hence making up a total of 400 boulestes that would act as the utmost political power summoning the ekklēsia of Five Thousand as they saw fit. So, the establishment of the infamous Four Hundred had went on smoothly as it was planned, but what about the other measures?

The alterations that were designed to be made to the polities of the allied poleis necessarily needed to begin with Samos. In the 430s, as we have seen, the Samians were notable for a sizeable oligarchic element within the citizen-body and the Athenian oligarchs hoped to rely on whatever remnants of that section still survived. In order to make inroads to the Samian politics, however, the upper-class officers had to cohere the whole fleet under the banner of their oligarchic political programme. Except that it was not to be so; the Athenian thētes grew furious at having been played for a fool twice by the oligarchs. To their eyes, they had only agreed to the proposal of limited constitutional change that was to be made in return for an ensured steady inflow of the Persian gold. Now, they had neither. The Athenian polity was made to undergo a complete rewind to the significantly aristocratic Solonian one whereas even that was not deemed sufficient guarantee for the admission of Persian hegemony over the entire Aegean. The thētes, or what Thucydides pejoratively calls nautikos ochlos, i.e., ‘naval mob,’ refused to stand by idly while the oligarchs set about their attempted conversion of

2235 Potts is certainly right when he argues against the anachronistic abstraction of the rank-and-file Athenian rowers from the nexus of material needs in order to portray them as staunch defenders of the democratic regime on principle. Exist as they may, such principles have a penchant for taking a nose dive when played against issues of material benefits, and the Athenian rowers do not seem to have fared any loftily when there arose a likelihood of tapping into Persian money despite the apparent trade-off of letting the oligarchs partially ‘amend’ their city’s democratic politeia. To stretch such a momentary privileging of economic interests over political ones in order to take the appearance of a principle on its own right, i.e., ‘the Athenian rowers could settle for any kind of oligarchy provided that the pay was right,’ however, is a desperate attempt to write off any considerable degree of political consciousness that modern examination can afford to the ‘nautikos ochlos.’ For all we know, despite Alcibiades’ knack for pulling darics out of his hat when the cash flow was particularly tight on the Athenian end and ever-rising number of Spartan triremes on the horizon, the Athenian rowers, citizen and non-citizen alike, did not give way to any oligarchic restoration following the fall of the Four Hundred. A modicum of source criticism, which begins with a reminder about the social and political outlook of Thucydides, seems quite warranted before endeavouring to ascertain any abstract principle that may have been etched in the hearts and minds of the Athenian thētes on Samos: Potts, The Athenian Navy, pp. 204; cf. Kallet-Marx, Money and the Corrosion of Power in Thucydides, pp. 267-270.
2236 Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, 8.48; for a later variation on the term as ochlokratos, i.e., unbridled ‘mob-rule,’ see Aristotle, 1304a, 1327a; Polybius, The Histories, 6.57; cf. Van Wees, Greek Warfare, pp. 200; Vincent Gabrielsen, Financing the Athenian Fleet: Public Taxation and Social Relations, (Baltimore, 1994), pp. 108-109; Potts, The Athenian Navy, pp. 87-91.
all the allied democratic poleis into oligarchies. Whether it was due mainly to bread-and-butter issues as Thucydides claims, or to a combination of elements that included the safety of their friends and family in Athens as well as their higher valuation of democratic polity as we contend, the thêtes took the matter into their own hands. Renouncing the initial declarations of their former officers, the thêtes elected new strategoi, Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus, recalled Alcibiades from his exile, and began a revolt against the Athenian oligarchs in earnest. Without the backing of the fleet, the Athenian oligarchs were sitting ducks amid a citizen-body that had recognised their failure to make good on their pledges for what it actually was. Terror could invoke momentary helplessness to give a false hope of social tranquillity, but that was a wildcard to be used sparingly and with a plethora of other socio-economic devices to substitute for the appropriation of political rights. With nothing tangible remaining in their socio-economic arsenal to coax the démos, the Athenian oligarchs turned to the oligarchic polity par excellence to entrench the changes they made to the constitution: Sparta. It was at this juncture that Alcibiades, if we are to follow Thucydides, concocted a masterplan that would effectively divide the Athenian oligarchs into two groups: the maximalists and the moderates.

The maximalist oligarchs, headed by Peisander, the initial proposer of the regime of Four Hundred, Phrynichus, who was an avowed enemy of Alcibiades, and Antiphon who was one of the coup’s masterminds, aimed at nothing less than the establishment of the oligarchic boulé as the sovereign power of Athens, whose membership would be permanent and accountable only to the numbers of its own. If there was to be an ekklesia of Five Thousand out of an estimated citizen body of 30,000, then it was to exist in name alone as any political check upon the power of the Four Hundred was regarded as inconceivable. Nothing appeared impermissible to the maximalists: they were prepared even to reach an agreement with the Spartans provided that it would oblige them to lend their weight to safeguard their interests. The moderates, on the other hand, were a completely different matter. Led by Theramenes,

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2237 Buckley, Aspects of Greek History 750-323 BC, pp. 403.
2238 Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, 8.75-76.
2239 Ibid, 8.81-82.
2240 Ibid, 8.68.1.
2241 Ibid, 8.68.3.
2242 Athenaios Politeia hails the Five Thousand as “those that brought the greatest benefit to the polis by means of their property and persons,” which, in turn, is interpreted, correctly from our standpoint, by van Wees as a steady number comprising the three highest property classes. This sum total of hippeis and hoplitai were liable to pay the war tax and form the phalanxes, which meant, for the oligarchs at least, that they had a natural claim to exclusive political entitlement. Aristotle, The Athenian Constitution, 29.5; cf. Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, 8.65; van Wees, ‘Mass and Elite in Solon’s Athens: The Property Classes Revisited’, pp. 374; Hans van Wees, ‘The Myth of the Middle-Class Army: Military and Social Status in Ancient Athens’, in War as a Cultural and Social Force, pp. 57.
2243 Mogens Herman Hansen, Three Studies in Athenian Demography, (Copenhagen, 1988), pp. 27.
this group supported only a reformed constitution that would allow a governing body of Five Thousand as potentially the sovereign political power in Athens. Advocating a limited return to the Cleisthenic property-qualifications, Theramenes and his cohorts conceived of a polity that would not attempt to divest either *hippeis* or, more importantly, *zeugitai* of their political rights. Theramenes’ ideal of a return to the hoplite polity of Cleisthenes was, of course, much more receptive to a potential rapprochement with the forces in Samos. When a delegate comprising of the members of the Four Hundred visited Samos to ensure that the constitutional change was only brought about to improve Athens’ fighting chances against the Spartans and that the Five Thousand would eventually get their turn in the government, Alcibiades retorted on behalf of all the Athenian forces at Samos that a liaison could only be realised if the Four Hundred were to be immediately replaced with the original *boulê* of 500. Not forgetting to add that Athens’ safety had to be the foremost consideration of any Athenian oligarchs, Alcibiades’ proposal struck home in effecting the creation of an anti-maximalist group who had grown increasingly distasteful of the oligarchic bullying but previously did not have any viable recourse to supporting Peisander and co.

Resulting in the main from the recognition of their precarious political position, the maximalist oligarchs began a secretive correspondence with none other than King Agis of Sparta. Rebuffed by Agis at first, who had hoped that he could pit the democratic and oligarchic sides against each other to wear them down to such an extent that Athens would fall prey to a single blow, the maximalists were not to be deterred as they made a practical habit of offering terms to the Spartiates. Initially undertaken with at least a hint of subtleness, the widening rift between the oligarchs and the fleet induced more overt safety measures to be implemented, such as the building of a fortification at Eetioneia, a part of Piraeus. Increasingly conspicuous in regard to the unbridled panic they exhibited, the fear that the maximalist oligarchs would betray Athens to the Spartans rather than bow out proved decisive in uniting the grassroots *dēmos* with the moderate oligarchs against their rule. And those fears proved largely true, given that the preferred destinations of the fleeing oligarchs when the Four Hundred were finally overthrown was none other than Agis’ side who was stationed at Decelea. In fact, the collapse of the Four Hundred had largely to do with the sighting of a Spartan naval squadron,

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2244 Theramenes, as portrayed by Xenophon, would summarise, in 403, his political beliefs during his trial for resisting the authority of the brutal Thirty Tyrants in the following words: “To run the polis in company with those, who are able to serve it with their horses or with their shields, is the polity that I previously conceived the best, and I do not change my opinion now.” Xenophon, *Hellenica*, 2.3.48.

2245 Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War*, 8.86.

2246 Ibid., 8.89.1-2.

2247 Ibid., 8.70.2.

2248 Ibid., 8.90.2.
which was thought to head towards a Piraeus that was imagined to be betrayed by the extreme oligarchs. In the event the Spartan squadron evaded Athens and made its way to Euboea to incite a rebellion that would jeopardise a notable part of the grain imports that the Athenians relied upon.\textsuperscript{2249} The moderate oligarchs, seeing the need to act urgently, initiated a partial restoration of the Cleisthenic polity which allowed a more socially inclusive governance structure than the one that was adopted by the extreme oligarchs. Only those of \textit{zeugitai} census and above were eligible to vote in the \textit{ekklēśia} under the moderately oligarchic polity. Possibly also involving the discard of the election method of lot, the new polity was perhaps fitting for the Athens of Cleisthenes’ day but it certainly did not answer many demands of the \textit{thētes} upon whom the upper-classes had come to depend heavily.\textsuperscript{2250} Indeed, however resourceful they were, the moderate oligarchs did not have the necessary means to swat away the Spartan threat which could be fought off only with the full commitment of the Athenian fleet.

The Athenian fleet did not experience any difficulty in putting down the Euboean revolt. With the return of Alcibiades and the reinvigoration of the naval hegemony of the Athenian fleet came, in fact, a string of key victories, e.g., Cynossema and Abydus,\textsuperscript{2251} that were to be capped off with a stunning victory achieved against the combined Peloponnesian fleet at the battle of Cyzicus in the spring of 410.\textsuperscript{2252} Having been robbed of their bloated confidence at sea, the Spartans sued for peace, possibly offering as generous terms as they did when they were faced with the disaster at Pylos about fifteen years ago.\textsuperscript{2253} The Athenian \textit{dēmos}, led by the victorious \textit{thētes}, was determined, however, to see their effort through to the end. In the summer of 410 the regime of Five Thousand was dismantled and replaced by a polity that was invested with even more democratic features than the one that was torn apart by the Four Hundred.\textsuperscript{2254}

\textsuperscript{2249} \textit{Ibid}, 8.95.
\textsuperscript{2250} And that despite Thucydides’ explicit commendation of the moderately oligarchic constitution: “And now for the first time, at least in my lifetime, the Athenians enjoyed a political system of substantial and obvious merit, which blended the interests of the few and the many without the extremes, and began to restore the city from the wretched situation into which it had fallen.” \textit{Ibid}, 8.97.2.
\textsuperscript{2251} Diodorus Siculus, \textit{Library}, 13.45-47; Xenophon, \textit{Hellenica}, 1.1.4-7.
\textsuperscript{2252} Diodorus Siculus, \textit{Library}, 13.50-51; Xenophon, \textit{Hellenica}, 1.1.11-18.
\textsuperscript{2253} Diodorus Siculus, \textit{Library}, 13.52.
\textsuperscript{2254} Accompanying the political shift toward the more democratic regime was the emergence of a reinvented tradition of tyrannicide which was developed on a legal basis via the passing of the decree of Demophantus. Demophantus’ decree stipulated that that all the Athenian citizens were to swear an oath in July/August 410 to the effect that they would personally see to the punishment of any tyrannically motivated individuals. As argued by Vincent Azoulay, the spirit of that decree appears to be captured in Andocides’ (400/399) speech \textit{On Mysteries}: “The oath shall be as follows: ‘I shall kill, by word and deed, by vote and by my own hand, if I can, anyone who subverts the democracy at Athens, and anyone who holds any office after the democracy has been subverted, and anyone who sets himself up to be tyrant or helps to set up the tyrant. If anyone kills him, I shall consider that man pure [\textit{hosion}] in the sight of gods and divinities, because he has killed an enemy of the Athenians [\textit{polemon tôn Athēnaiōn}] […]. If anyone dies while killing or attempting to kill any such man, I will reward [\textit{eu poiēsō}] both him and his children, just as Harmodius and Aristogiton and their descendants […].’” All
Mainly preoccupied with breaking the combined Peloponnesian and Persian stranglehold over Ionia and Caria, the Athenians focused on fighting off the Peloponnesian threat to the Hellespontine region, which was turned into a main theatre of war by the Spartan Mindarus following the Spartans’ increasing disillusionment with Tissaphernes. Seeing that Tissaphernes had little intention in the way of fulfilling his end of the bargain, the Spartans approached Pharnabazus in order to renew their attempt of tapping into the Persian gold. Their approach to the Hellespontine region had the further advantage of keeping the Athenians on their toes. Losing their control over the Hellespontine region would spell the end of their grain routes that linked them perennially to the northern Euxine. With the realisation of the fact that the grain routes which were necessary for their survival were jeopardised came the Athenian concentration on the region in the years between 410 and 407.

Pharnabazus, unlike Tissaphernes, was fully invested in ensuring the success of the Peloponnesians, ordering and financially supporting the construction of the new fleet. The Athenians, however, lead an inspired offensive effort that included a decisive victory over Pharnabazus at Abydus in the winter of 409 in addition to their recovery of Byzantium and Chalcedon in 408. By the end of 408, the Athenians appeared to have achieved a complete reversal of their fortunes as their continued success against the Peloponnesians encouraged Pharnabazus to lead them to a round of negotiations with the Great King himself. Accompanied by the evident thinning of the Peloponnesian forces whose Sicilian squadrons had returned to Syracuse in anticipation of an imminent Carthaginian attack, the Athenians could, to all appearances, easily attain the establishment of a close approximation to the pre-Sicilian expedition status quo ante. Never the less, the appearances, as ever, turned out to be deceptive. There was to be no agreement between the Athenian and Persians. If anything, Darius came out of the negotiations with a vengeance to recommence with the anti-Athenian offensive, appointing his younger son, Cyrus, to the satrapy of Lydia, Greater Phrygia and Cappadocia, who would also assume the command of all the Persian forces in the west. Cyrus, in his turn, agreed to a treaty with the Spartans, promising to make full use of a vast

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Athenians shall swear this oath over unblemished sacrifices in the customary manner before the Dionysia [pro Dionisii] [...].” Andocides, On Mysteries, 96-98; Azoulay, The Tyrant-Slayers of Ancient Athens, pp. 65.

2255 Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.1.24-25.
2256 Ibid, 1.2.15-17.
2257 Diodorus Siculus, The Library, 13.66.1-4; Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.3.2-7.
2258 Ibid, 1.3.8-9.
2259 Xenophon, Anabasis, 1.9.7.
2260 We concur with Buckley’s argument that the fact of Xenophon’s usage tas sunthekas in his account of the agreement would mean, in all likelihood, the signing of a formal treaty that granted the Persians the right to collect tribute from the Ionian poleis while not encroaching on their autonomy in exchange
500 talent treasury which was granted to him by his father to be utilised generously if the Spartans were to accept their tribute-collection demands from the cities of Ionia and to wage the anti-Athenian war to the best of their capacities. Lysander, a mothakes nauarchos, i.e., 'admiral,' that would go on to leave his mark as the vanquisher of the Athenians’ Aegean hegemony, was, in turn, sent by the Spartans to lead the fleet that the Spartans would ever built to complete victory. With a large navy, an excellent nauarchos and steady financing, the Spartans were primed to put their strategic plans into action. Lysander’s first months of commanding the reinvigorated Peloponnesian navy was capped off with a victory against a counter-intuitive attempt made by Alcibiades in leading his fleet, against the express orders of Antiocbus, to battle and defeat. The defeat frightened Alcibiades as he expected serious backlash from the Athenians, and hence encouraged him to flee Athens for the last time.

Lysander’s energetic leadership of the campaign, however, was brought to an abrupt end as he was replaced by another mothakes, Callicratidas as nauarchos in the summer of 406. The succession between the two admirals-in-chief was anything but smooth. Xenophon’s underscored polarity between the experienced Lysander and the clueless Callicratidas, relevant though it may have seemed to its author, does not explain the animosity that was shown by the former as he sent the Persian funds back to his benefactors in order to make sure that Callicratidas would have a hard time prodding his sailors to keep rowing. Cyrus’ cold shoulder to the newly appointed nauarchos, not to mention the cold reception that was given by king Pausanias to the exploits of Lysander, moreover, shows that it is highly likely that the hostility between the two mothakes was much more than personal. To fill the lacuna, Buckley has argued for an interpretation that allowed hermetic room for possible behind-the-scenes clashes between anti-Persian and pro-Persian factions of the richer homoioi that may have been boiling ever since the agreement over the Peace of Nicias in 421. Lysander, according to this elaboration, was the foremost military representative of the pro-Persian faction that held no bars in their aim to defeat the Athenians whereas Callicratidas was the military spokesperson of those that argued against leaving the Ionian Greeks at the mercy of the Persian Empire. In

2261 Diodorus Siculus, The Library, 13.70.3; Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.4.3; 1.5.2-3.
2262 Hodkinson, Property and Wealth in Classical Sparta, pp. 355-356.
2263 Diodorus Siculus, The Library, 13.71; Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.5.11-15.
2264 The post, unlike that of the stratêgos, could only be held yearly and, hence, was prone to constant vacillation between different candidates: Philip Davies, ‘Equality and Distinction within the Spartiate Community’, in A Companion to Sparta, pp. 494-495; on the Spartan strategeia as a career avenue compensating for its lack in ephoria, which, again, could be held only annually, see Stephen Hodkinson, ‘Warfare, Wealth, and the Crisis of Spartiate Society’, in War and Society in the Greek World, ed. by J. Rich and G. Shipley, (London, 1993), pp. 155-157.
the end, the core division of the two sides boiled down to their respective conceptions of the Spartan hegemony. To Lysander and his supporters, dual-hegemony was only an expression of a meek pusillanimity that barred the Spartans from leaping at the opportunity of building an overseas empire of their own. To Callicratidas’ group, by contrast, the notion of dual-hegemony spoke to a restriction of the overambitious aims of the bellicose components of both policies thus enabling a more stable inter-polis political hierarchy deterring any pretenders, e.g., Thebes or Persia, from attempting to ‘jump the queue.’

I agree wholeheartedly with Buckley’s points but think they need to be stretched even further in order to encompass the socio-economic aspects of the Spartan polity towards the end of the fifth century. On that note, the waning years of the Peloponnesian War saw a clear intensification of the inequality of wealth that had been a cornerstone of the Spartan polity. With an ever-increasing supply of mothakes, who either had Spartiate fathers and helot or, more likely, hypomeiones mothers, the dwindling of the homoioi population became evident for all to see. A clear indication of the widened economic cracks was the increasingly perioikic and helotic social composition of the Spartan phalanxes. By the end of 410s, as such, the drop off in the numbers of homoioi had already become noticeable, foretelling some of the curious events of the fourth century wherein the need for the safekeeping of the Spartiates would trump over the ‘ancestral customs’ time and again. The Spartan commitment to the construction of large fleets, however, threatened to rewrite the socio-economic charter that breathed life and limb to this heavily-skewed polity of disparaging inequality. It was one thing to pack a phalanx of 15-deep with mothakes, hypomeiones, perioikoi and helots, which would have been bizarre but not implausible one bit. To man a fleet of 100 triremes, however, would require more or less 20,000 sailors that would comprise largely of rowers with relatively small contingents of marines. Tolling the bells of the Spartiate adaptation of the Athenian politics of arkhê would prompt a total reconstruction of the belfry of socio-economic inequalities that needed to be as firm as possible to underpin such ambition. Both sides understood what was at stake if the Spartans were to be enrolled on the payroll of the Persians; they differed solely on what to make of it.

King Pausanias had inherited a tradition of live and let live that was adopted by the likes of Pleistoplanx and Archidamus, among others. Their actions, as portrayed by Thucydides, Xenophon and Diodorus, exhibit a clear pattern of staying away from any political liaison with the Persians. Persian funding was necessary, of course, to make the Athenians yield their arkhê. Equally necessary, however, was the diversion of those funds to build a Peloponnesian navy that had the military capability to divest the Athenian control over the Aegean. The
homoioi could only have a token presence among a crew of 200, while the rest was to be made up of demoted Spartiates, their children, helots and possibly slaves. Those non-Spartiates would have to quench their thirst for material gain by 4 obols per day,\textsuperscript{2265} while the homoioi would reap a full harvest of ‘benedictions’ from their Persian paymasters.\textsuperscript{2266} And with scarce any improvement introduced in regard to their socio-political rights, the non-Spartiate rowers would be practically asked to build an empire of their own while having no share in it apart from the daily wages. Further, even granting that the Peloponnesian challenge to the Athenian naval hegemony would be successful, what use could the Spartiates make of the fruits of their brand-new empire? The answer was clear to Callicratidas and Pausanias: the homoioi that were lucky enough to be befriended by the members of the oligarchy within oligarchy would secure momentous profits while the others would be even more hard put than they were before in holding out to their eroding landholdings. Possibly leading to the escalation of social conflicts, at a time when the memories of Pylos and Cythera still haunted the Spartiate memory, this perversion of an already distorted socio-economic system would endanger nothing less than a total overhaul of the Spartan polity. Likewise, the rich homoioi’s getting richer could only be ensured if the tacit approval of the Persians would be continuously reproduced through a meek foreign policy acknowledging the latter’s material superiority. In the unlikely event of a falling-out between the partners, the Spartans would be hard pressed to wage desperate wars not only against the Persians but also against any upstart mainland polis that refused to stand by the Spartan hegemony. In short, Sparta could not come to possess the Athenian empire without thoroughly ‘Atticising’ her polity in regard to both her enemies within and without.

The Eurypontid King Cleomenes, Lysander and the homoioi of their ilk, contrariwise, claimed that no exhaustive reworking of the Spartan polity was necessary in order to reap the benefits of the Athenian arkhê. For one, the Spartans had established an amicably working relationship with the Persians who did not display, for now at least, any penchant for alienating their only dependable allies in mainland Greece. And with the solidified backing of the Persian royal family, the Spartans would not have anything to fear from even a coalition of mainland poleis who had maintained their membership of the Peloponnesian League for the undoing of the Athenian arkhê and not for its replacement by an empire of someone else. Likewise, the fact that they could always rely on their perioikoi and mothakes meant, according to them, that the glaring inequality of wealth between the upper-class and lower-class Spartans could be sugar-coated with social and economic palliatives to retain the semblance of ‘sameness.’\textsuperscript{2267} An ever-

\textsuperscript{2265} Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.5.7.
\textsuperscript{2266} Ibid, 1.6.7.
\textsuperscript{2267} “This egalitarian and economic explanation is vindicated by the custom of private sponsoring of the education of mothakes, boys whose fathers had lost citizenship. In sharp contrast to the brutal demotion
increasing number of obedient mothakes assigned to leading offices was the leading social remedy that had been in circulation for a long time. Brought up by the financial backing of the homoioi that contributed their sussitia dues on behalf of their demoted families, the candidates who passed the harrowing ordeals of agôgê would take their places as second-class homoioi to dare what the regular homoioi could not. Brasidas, Lysander and Callicratidas were only some of the primary members of this special branch of Spartiates who, as we saw above in the case of the latter two, were deemed sufficiently distinguished to fight out the intra-class battles of the richer homoioi. In a polity which had put an everlasting scorn on the modern idea of upward vertical mobility, even such a semblance of sameness, which was exchanged for devout obedience, would grant significant solace to a multitude whose families could not keep on paying their monthly contributions. Economically, the richer Spartiates would attempt to conceal the rising polarity by amplifying their pretense of frugality and austerity.

We have argued above that the historical tradition of Spartan austerity was largely a fifth-century invention that did not speak to even a partial commitment to erase the perpetual divergencies in wealth of different social classes. Naturally, the myth had dimensions of reality some of which can be inferred, for example, from the lack of fifth-century Olympic victories to follow those of their sixth-century precedents. To that end, the ideological attempts to mask the rising social awareness of disparaging differences of wealth was not a novel endeavour of the homoioi that surfaced during the last quarter of the fifth century. What was certainly novel at that time, however, was that a myth of anti-coinage popped up through the combined efforts of the mythmaking homoioi. From the sixth century onwards, the Spartans were one of the few poleis that could rely heavily on an economy of barter where payments in kind would be observed as frequently as payments in coin. Still, this does not mean that there was no coin in circulation within Sparta; to the contrary, we have noted in the previous chapter that exports of fine pottery to Samos and other destinations continued well into the fifth century, albeit with decreased regularity. Leaving the feelgood stories of praiseworthy Spartiate children taking umbrage at the corruptive influence of coins aside,2268 the Spartiates appear to have never turned substantially away from the notion of a monetised economy. Their economic transactions were not as monetised, to be sure, as those that took place in Athens; then again, few other poleis’ were. The fact that they did not collect phoros payments from their allies,
likewise, meant that the Spartiates had meagre incentive to launch any economic programme towards a monetised economy. All of that would change with the introduction of Persian gold to the Spartan politics.

It did not take long for the whole economic complexion of the Spartan society to change once the Persian gold made its way to Lysander. Hoarding and sumptuary expenditure both had a renaissance that wiped off any trace of the celebrated Spartan austerity. The richer homoioi then began to reaffirm particular consumption patterns that would grant them a measure of social distinction without drawing the opprobrium of the poorer Spartiates as well as the lower classes of the Spartan society. To the poorer homoioi went the daily 4 obols that was generously bestowed by Cyrus to Lysander’s troops. 4 obols per day was not nearly adequate, of course, to make one even remotely approximate to the stipulated sussitia contributions. Never the less, it was a much better rate than any non-Spartiate could previously earn, and, what is more, now there were plenty of imported goods that made the earned coin actually mean something. Continually flowing into Sparta in ever-increasing abundance, the callous nexus of cash payment threatened to invert the entire social system which had hitherto functioned significantly on the basis of payments in grain. To reiterate, unlike the Solonian census-classes, there was no monetised property qualification in Sparta. Property in land, for one, was not alienable except in cases of default concerning the monthly contributions, which translated, at least on paper, into a strict social division of demoted ex-Spartiates and their families and the regular homoioi. Lysander’s breaking open of the economic floodgates spelled the end of a social system that had attempted to naturalise the differences in landholding as an ancestral custom that divided the homoioi from the rest of the caste system. Having perceived the social threat that was lurking behind the inundation of Sparta with the Persian gold, both sides of the homoioi, the imperialistically-minded as well as the subscribers of the idea of dual hegemony, devised an ideological smokescreen to mask the increasing

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2270 One such acceptable mode of behaviour, as attested by the *Lakedaimonion Politeia*, was to supply extras for oneself and one’s messmates at the sussitia. The infamous black broth’s replacement by wheaten bread ranks foremost in a long list of examples: Lipka, *Xenophon’s Spartan Constitution*, 5.3.
2271 We agree with van Wees’ view that the ban on foreign currency was induced, at least partially, by a need of an anti-expansionist faction of the Spartiate plutarchs to curb Lysander’s influence who had begun to be hailed as the saviour of the Ionian poleis from the overreaching tentacles of the Athenian arkhê. We differ from his construal, however, in regarding the measure not only as ad hominem but also as an ideological attempt to mend the broken fence of social division. Prominent as he was, Lysander, after all, cannot be possibly seen as the only beneficiary of the Persian money that was threatening to turn the Spartan economic system into a veritable flotsam. However ineffective it was, the ban, on this view, was an abortive economic attempt to give the politics of homonoia a one last shot: cf. Van Wees, ‘Luxury, Austerity and Equality in Sparta’, pp. 209-210; Françoise Ruzé, ‘The Empire of the Spartans’, in *A Companion to Sparta*, pp. 324-325.
monetisation of the socio-economic transactions. How do you fight off a peculiar, if not alien, force that is developing in leaps in bounds? Why, by scapegoating it of course!

Simple and shrewd to the utmost, the measure that was implemented by the *homoioi* to cope with the ‘corruptive influence’ of the cash economy was to declare that all currency except the iron was banned from all transactions. Iron currency could not be moved in bulk in great quantities, which meant, coupled with the elimination of all coinage made of more precious metals, that expenditures would be capped by an artificial ceiling. To substantiate, if a Chalcidian wine was sold for 5 drachmae per chous which is the equivalent of 30 obols in silver coinage, and if a 1:200 ratio is stipulated for the rate between iron and silver currency, an individual would have to carry 6000 iron obols in order to purchase it. Naturally, the historical tradition dates this apparently effective measure to the Lycurgan customs, which, in the works of the later moralists especially, was to be turned into an ancient manifestation of the ‘zen road.’ Yet, archaeological evidence of coin heaps as well as the aforementioned commercial lines between Sparta and other *poleis* prove that the tradition of iron currency was a later addition to the Lycurgan corpus. In the light of the fact that the last quarter of the fifth century was a particularly productive period of mythmaking, we concur with Hans van Wees’ and Stephen Hodkinson’s dating of the ban on non-iron currency to the years following the agreement between Cyrus and Lysander. As intelligently conceived as it was, the ban quickly fell into disuse owing largely to the continued flow of Persian funds that enriched each and every Spartan that was on the Persians’ payroll.

5.3.7 The Battle of Arginusae and the Arginusae Eight

It was at this point that Callicratidas imposed his authority on the fleet and subsequently managed to capture Delphinium, the Athenian base of operations on Chios, Teus and Meythmna. Moving on to fight Conon who had a smaller force at his disposal, he defeated the latter and blockaded his forces in the harbour of Mytilene. Seeing that Conon’s forced were

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2272 Lipka, *Xenophon’s Spartan Constitution*, 7.5-6.
2273 A ratio that is considerably higher than the ratio stipulated by Hodkinson for the later classical period, 1:1800, appears to be the ratio that fits the illustration of afforded by Xenophon as the attested Spartan silver/iron exchange rate: Xenophon, *Lacedaemonian Constitution*, 7.5; cf. Hodkinson, *Property and Wealth in Classical Sparta*, pp. 164; for an overview of the classical ratios of exchange, ranging from 1:100 to 1:480, see Thomas J. Figueira, ‘Iron Money and the Ideology of Consumption in Laconia’, in *Sparta: Beyond the Mirage*, ed. by Anton Powell and Stephen Hodkinson, pp. 162 n. 11.
in desperate plight, the Athenians commissioned a relief force, with an eventual total of 150 ships, to conduct an anti-Peloponnesian offensive while helping the stranded forces of Conon. Not willing to give up the siege of Mytilene despite having realised that the Athenians were coming at him in full-force, Callicratidas left 50 of his ships, whose numbers had by now reached 170, to continue the blockade while he sailed with the rest of his fleet to the Arginusae islands to meet the Athenians force head-on. The resulting Athenian victory at the battle of Arginusae in 406 was significant in many respects, not the least of which was the death of Callicratidas and a heavy blow that was dealt to the Spartan claims to naval prominence. Shattering the Spartan confidence yet again, the Athenian victory induced the Spartans to engage in another attempt to make peace with Athens which would be in vain.\textsuperscript{2277} The defeat also made it clear that any rift between the Persians and Spartans could have disastrous effects for the anti-Athenian endeavour. The Spartans would take that lesson to heart and would circumvent the ancestral custom when the Cyrus’ envoys demanded the restitution of Lysander to the post of nauarchos as a prerequisite for their continued financial support. Now, the Spartan law explicitly stated that the office of nauarchos could not be conferred on the same Spartiate twice. This hardly proved to be a problem for the homoioi, however, as they appointed Lysander as vice-admiral to Aracus while emphasising that the former would be the de facto nauarchos.\textsuperscript{2278}

From the Athenian side, the victory at Arginusae was a mixed blessing. On one hand, the Athenian fleet had successfully defended its Aegean hegemony against the largest Peloponnesian fleet ever assembled. The Peloponnesian fleet was still far from being completely destroyed, but the victory was still a major one in demonstrating the Athenian supremacy at sea. For a brief moment at least, the Athenians might have truly believed that their grain route was finally secure and that they had a good likelihood of winning the last phase of the war against the combined forces of Persia and Peloponnesians. But the outcome of the engagement was not all roses and sunshine. Ranking first in the list of woes was an acute shortage of manpower. Having realised that even a full levy would not be enough to gather enough politai and metoikoi to man the ships, the Athenian upper-classes concocted a risky plan that could have ended up jeopardising their class rule: calling the Athenian slaves to row the boats in return for freedom and citizenship.\textsuperscript{2279} The Athenians had, of course, relied on

\textsuperscript{2277} Aristotle, \textit{The Athenian Constitution}, 34.1.
\textsuperscript{2278} Diodorus Siculus, \textit{The Library}, 13.100.8.
\textsuperscript{2279} Aristophanes, \textit{Frogs}, 33, 191, 693-694; while it is true that the slave component of the Athenian fleet had been on the rise since the laying of the foundations of the Athenian arkhè, I concur with Amit that the largest contribution that was made to it by the end of the Peloponnesian War still came from the part of the citizens: M. Amit, \textit{Athens and the Sea: A Study in Athenian Sea-Power}, (Brussels, 1965), 607.
their slaves as oarsmen in ever increasing numbers for quite some time.\textsuperscript{2280} The promise of citizenship to entice the full slave population, however, was entirely new. This had the further benefit of steadying the Athenian finances which were in such dire straits that the Athenians resolved, during 406, to melt down some golden statues of Athena Nike on the Acropolis in order to mint some golden coins.\textsuperscript{2281} Yet, a disaster struck the Athenians and their plans of steadily tapping into this potential. As the Peloponnesian fleet began to back water, the Athenian admirals ordered to chase them instead of hurrying off to help the Athenian sailors on two dozen wrecked ships.\textsuperscript{2282} The admirals later attempted a rescue mission, to be sure, but only when it became crystal-clear that the Athenian forces had emerged victorious. The rescue mission failed to save even a single sailor from the capsized ships thereby turning the victory into quite a bitter one. As the tidings of the engagement reached Athens, they created an uproar as even the bodies of thousands of sailors, the majority of whom were \textit{thêtes}, could not be reached. The Athenian generals had taken ill-advised care of their \textit{thêtes}, in whose absence no engagement could have been won, and the \textit{dêmôs} was ready to punish that capital offence.\textsuperscript{2283}

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\textsuperscript{2280} Drawing mainly from Pausanias, Raaflaub argues that the Athenian tradition to offer manumission to slaves could be traced back even to Marathon. With the emergence of the large-scale naval warfare, however, the measure came to encompass incomparably larger proportions of the total slave population. Raaflaub, ‘Athenian and Spartan \textit{Euonomia}, or: What to Do with Solon’s Timocracy?’, pp. 412; Pausanias, \textit{Description of Greece}, 1.32.3; cf. 7.15.7; 10.20.2; cf. Hunt, \textit{Slaves, Warfare, and Ideology in the Greek Historians}, pp. 26-28.

\textsuperscript{2281} Aristophanes, \textit{Frogs}, 720.

\textsuperscript{2282} Diodorus claimed that a failure to recover the Athenian dead instead of that of a rescue mission for the living shipwrecked was the main cause of the eventual Athenian repugnance. Interestingly, both accounts concur on the import that the actions of a grief-ridden group of friends, some of whom might have participated in the engagement, relatives of the lost \textit{thêtes} bore in swaying the public opinion to convict, whether as a result of the rowers’ attempt to pin the blame of recovery on him or not, the generals for their neglect of duty towards the shipwrecked Athenian rowers. This distressful signal of an Athens that had already turned into an ‘ochlocracy,’ a term that indicates more about Strauss’ political leanings than its conduciveness to the historical scenery, is the one that I focus in partially sidestepping the issue of the proportion of the living to the dead that were left to the mercy of the waves: Diodorus Siculus, \textit{Library}, 13.101.4; Barry S. Strauss, ‘The Dead of Arginusae and the Debate About the Athenian Navy’, in \textit{Nautiki Epithewrisi}, (2004), pp. 40-67, retrieved from: \url{www.barrystrauss.com/articles.html}; Potts, \textit{The Athenian Navy}, pp. 119-123; cf. Gottesman, \textit{Politics and the Street in Democratic Athens}, pp. 131-135.

\textsuperscript{2283} Peter Hunt links \textit{dêmôs’} decision to chastise the generals as prompted by their decision to offer citizenship to the slave rowers. As politically bothersome, at least to the non-rowing citizens, as such an offer was, it was not out of proportion to either the magnitude of the sense of relief or that of anger that resulted from the fainthearted victory. My historical reconstruction of the literary tradition is more in keeping, in that sense, with Luca Asmonti’s construal of the generals’ condemnation against the background of the seething distrust between \textit{thêtes} and \textit{nauarchoi} that had reached critical heights especially in the aftermath of the Sicilian expedition. A broader realignment of social and political power, and not one of impulsive backlash against a hastily fashioned prerogative, was the order of the day: Peter Hunt, “The Slaves and the Generals of Arginusae”, \textit{The American Journal of Philology}, vol. 122 no. 3, (Autumn, 2001), pp. 359-380; Luca A. Asmonti, “The Arginusae Trial, the Changing Role of \textit{Strategoi} and the Relationship between \textit{Demos} and Military Leadership in Late-Fifth Century Athens”, \textit{Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies}, vol. 49, (2006), pp. 1-21.
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Out of the eight admirals that commanded the fleet at Arginusae only six returned to Athens, for the remaining two had fled in fright of what lay in store for them, to make their case in the usual post-office audits. The δῆμος, however, had no intention of following the formal channels of indictment in prosecuting those who were just as responsible in the loss of the Athenian shipwrecked as were their enemies. Possibly in direct contradistinction to all the formal stipulations, the δῆμος tried the eight generals in a summary ekklēσia meeting, who were condemned to death in a single vote, thence creating the fabled ‘Arginusae Eight.’

Why would the δῆμος show such intent in following a highly irregular procedure that would, if anything, rid them of some of the most skilled strategoi around?

The majority of modern elaborations on the episode have demonstrated a preference for following the aristocratically-inclined historical tradition. To those ends, they have reconstructed the event as showing two things in the main: the unreasonable impetuosity of the Athenian δῆμος and the feebleness of the Athenian laws when facing the ‘angry mob.’ Now, there is a certain hardship in trying to find any other signal cases in the recorded events of the surviving histories that appears comparable to the verdict of Arginusae trial to allow the fleshing out of the myth of an excessively impetuous δῆμος. To be sure, there are some famous exemplars of what may be taken as volatile decision making, e.g., the case of Mytilenean debate. But that event also shows that δῆμος was just weighing off the options available to it and was, in the end, following rational arguments that were made by Cleon and Diodotus. Indeed, the Mytilenean debate seems an excellent example of the lengths that the δῆμος was willing to go in overturning regular procedures for the sake of abnegating a decision that could end up having disastrous effects. And if one is adequately emboldened to stick the caption of ‘irrational gambler’ to the relief force that was sent to Sicily, we have argued above that Pericles’ strategy of cowering behind the Long Walls was no less unreasonable in condemning the lower classes to urban pauperism than the alleged irrationality of δῆμος. The inherent feebleness of the Athenian laws, on the other hand, was shown first and foremost by the Four

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2284 The provisional nature of the statement might seem self-defeating but it is still necessary. With the modern appraisals of the formal proceedings of the trial still hanging in balance following Azoulay’s recent attempt to question the blind faith put in the apologetic renderings of Xenophon and Plato alike by the majority of modern commentators, it seems more than likely that the later fourth-century aristocratically-inclined accounts of the event afforded a rhetorical leap from immoralism to illegality for the sake of clinching a historical revision of the highest order. Given the amount of apologetic faith that is stored by both authors in the legalist argument, it appears that the trial, as it is explained in Plato’s and Xenophon’s works, has more to promise in regard to its authors’ ideological premises than concerning the historical details of the occasion. Azoulay, Xenophon and the Graces of Power, pp. 100; Gottesman, Politics and the Street in Democratic Athens, pp. 138-139; F. Skoczylas Pownall, “Shifting Viewpoints in Xenophon’s Hellenica: The Arginusae Episcope”, Athenaeum, vol. 88, (2000), pp. 502-505 with reference; contra Hansen, The Athenian Democracy in the Age of Demosthenes, pp. 237-238.

2285 Diodorus Siculus, The Library, 13.101; Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.7.1-35.
Hundred and their supporters as they managed to upturn a polity that took centuries to hone in a short span of time. Indeed, the sheer extent of the oligarchic ‘modifications’ of the Athenian polity that were made by the Four Hundred reflected that word and substance of law could both be swept away by oligarchs ruling over a terror-stricken population. The contravention of the customary and legal regulations, on this view, was not a bombshell that upheaved Athens without any historical precedent. And if dèmos did not make a habit of following irregular procedure, it was mainly because it recognised that irregularity breeds discretion, which was another byword for tyranny.

The condemnation of the Arginusae Eight to death was as concise and precise an expression as any other of the class divisions with which the Athenian society of 406 was riven. The thousands of sailors that were whiskered away by the waves made up approximately one-sixth of the total Athenian force that partook of the battle. This was not a minor debacle; it was a disaster for a lower-class majority who had acquired a taste for separating the two thanks in large part to the events of the Sicilian expedition. There was not anything that was particularly sweet about the victory in class terms; the victory gave only a momentary respite to a battered multitude of rowers who would be asked, in all likelihood, to jump on the ships in the nearest future. At the end of the day, the Athenian thètes knew that they would be the ones to row Athens either to victory or defeat. For a class on whose members was taken the main toll on human life of the war that had taken the better part of the last quarter of a century, the multitude of thètes were just as irreplaceable as their celebrated stratègoi. It was a drastic measure to be sure. But the Athenians were making it clear, through the punishment they inflicted on the admirals, that their lives mattered just as much as the next stratègos regardless of whether there was an arkhê or not.

The Spartans did not take long to recover. Appointed nauarchos once again at the behest of Cyrus, Lysander hurried off to Sardis to ask for the King’s money, again. Cyrus explained in detail that all the funds that were allocated by the King to the anti-Athenian offensive were spent, but he still provided Lysander with enough coin to pay his sailors. Cyrus’ grant of money did not suffice in itself to consummate the naval effort, but just then Lysander appeared

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2286 Waterfield makes a similar observation to an altogether different effect. By captioning the whole episode as one that resulted in a loud and clear measure of scapegoating, he appears to skirt the thorny question that rests at the heart of the event: what measure of comfort remained for grassroots thètes who survived Arginusae only to be levied again for the impending confrontation at Aegospotamoi if the stratègoi were to keep on deeming it of higher import to chase fleeing ships rather than to save shipwrecked comrades? ‘First time a tragedy, second time a farce’ was a dictum that the Athenian thètes had grown to know too well. Waterfield, Creators, Conquerors, and Citizens, pp. 255.

2287 Xenophon, Hellenica, 2.1.11-12.
to have hit the jackpot, according to Xenophon’s rendition, Cyrus was recalled to the Persian capital to account for a recent example of his increasingly overambitious behaviour.\footnote{Ibid, 2.1.8-9.} Before his voyage, Cyrus summoned Lysander, told him not to engage the Athenian fleet until he had a substantial superiority in ship numbers and then, “he gave out to him all the tribute from the \textit{poleis} that personally belonged to him, and gave him the surplus money that he had.”\footnote{Ibid, 2.1.14.} This huge injection of Persian money proved to be enough to commission the force that would deal the decisive blow to the Athenians at the battle of Aegospotamoi in the summer of 405.\footnote{Diodorus Siculus, \textit{The Library}, 13.105.6-7; Xenophon, \textit{Hellenica}, 2.1.21-29.} 

As the first act in a veritable comedy of errors, the Athenians sent relatively inexperienced \textit{strategoi} to command their force that was to intercept the Peloponnesian fleet threatening the Hellespontine grain route. Lysander, knowing that the loss of the grain supply would finally break the Athenian resolution, had managed to move his forces to the area in order to find a safe anchor spot that would allow him to strike at the most opportune time. He was not to be disappointed. The inexperienced Athenian \textit{strategoi} temporarily had to offload the sailors to pillage the nearby shoreline settlements for food and supplies, leaving the secure anchor spots and thus their flanks exposed. Seeing that their careless manoeuvres were headed in the direction of utter disaster, Alcibiades, who was resting in his castle that was within the region, visited the \textit{strategoi} to counsel them more caution in picking their anchorage spots. But his advice was scoffed at as the obtuse ramblings of a traitor. A catastrophic defeat of the entire Athenian force, whose admirals practically ‘succeeded’ at being taken completely unawares, thus made up the dramatic \textit{katharsis} of the final act of the play. After the battle of Aegospotamoi, the Athenians knew that it was only a matter of time before the Spartans would press home their advantage by a coordinated invasion of Agis’ forces at Decelea, those of Pausanias from Peloponnes and the fleet of Lysander. The impending surrender came in 404 when the Athenians realised that they could not survive the severe shortage of food. After 27 years of recurrent warfare, the Athenians gave up the politics of \textit{arkhê}, pulled down their Long Walls, accepted the oligarchs that had gone into exile when the regime of Four Hundred expired and gave their entire fleet but for a token number of triremes to the Peloponnesians. Every Athenian knew that a steep price was to be paid for the loss of their \textit{arkhê}; but what would appear to be even more dear than that was the price of Athens’ survival. Against the express wishes of the Corinthians and Boeotians, the Spartans did not raze Athens to the ground. They realised that a meek Athens controlled by a puppet regime of oligarchs would be more serviceable as a means of counterbalancing the rising power of Thebes. That puppet regime of oligarchs, in their turn, would leave an everlasting imprint on the Athenian polity as
the bloodiest intermittence that has taken place in the period between 506 and 322. It is fair
thus to hypothesise a correlation between the material benefits of arkhê and the fortunes of the
Athenian democracy. But before we move on to an analysis of that conception through the
looking glass of fourth century history, we should reflect on how drama and philosophy fared
in the Athens of the last quarter of the fifth century.

5.4 Sophocles and the Tragedy of the Agon

The last thirty years of the fifth century was a period of signal developments in drama,
philosophy and rhetoric. Athens, ever-vibrant with its diverse and numerous populations,
housed, permanently and temporarily alike, some of the figures that would become household
names of tragedy, comedy and philosophy. Indeed, the self-conscious gaze of Aristotle’s
literary and philosophical criticism classified the leading figures of the era, including
Sophocles, Euripides, Aristophanes, Gorgias, Hippias and Antiphon, as archetypical examples
of their respective branches of dramaturgy and philosophy. With their advancement in each
domain of learning were added novel building blocks to the dramatic and philosophical
conceptions of nomos and phusis which in turn would seep into political and cultural nuances
that had not been exposed to such influences. Beginning from the sphere of tragedy in our
attempt at unravelling those permutations, we propose to focus the Aristotelian tragedian par
excellence, Sophocles.

A eupatrid that appears to have won his first dramatic competition in his mid-thirties against
Aeschylus, Sophocles was a prolific playwright that introduced numerous formal, narrative
and thematic renovations to tragedy in his long career. As it is our continued plight with the
numbers of surviving plays from other dramatists, so with Sophocles in that we have only
seven plays to link us to the great tragedian from a corpus of possibly more than 120. Still, we
are not completely in the dark as various patterns pertaining to form, narrative structure and

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2291 A correlation that is posited with explicit resort to the benefit of hindsight should not be taken, of
course, as an endorsement of unilinear causality of the type ‘the Athenian democracy was honed and
stabilised because of the tangible gains drawn from the empire.’ No: the Athenian politics of arkhê, as
we observed time and again, obliged the paragons of different factions within the upper classes to devise
a functioning political balance not only among themselves but also with the lower classes on whose
blistered bottoms the Athenian empire was to be found and cemented. Then again, only with the imperial
economic benefits could the Athenian class structure be stabilised along the lines that were most
amenable to the upper-class interests. To my eyes, following that multilinear correlation appears to be
the only way out of the rather superficial impasse between the ‘imperially afforded stability’ thesis,
such as Finley and Raaflaub, and its detractors, e.g., Ober: Finley, Politics in the Ancient World, pp.
106; Raaflaub, ‘Equalities and Inequalities in Athenian Democracy’, pp. 149; Pomeroy et al., A Brief
History of Ancient Greece, pp. 162; contra Ober, Democracy and Knowledge, pp. 73-75; David M.
Pritchard, Public Spending and Democracy in Classical Athens, pp. 52-90; for a recent re-evaluation of
the stability theses along Ober’s lines, see Matthew Simonton, “Stability and Violence in Classical
characters can be discriminated under scrutiny. In regard to his formal introductions to classical tragedy, two features readily come to mind: the ushering in of the third actor and the movement away from the trilogy form towards the micro-dramatic unity of the single play. Aeschylus, as we noted in our examination, is often credited with the addition of the second actor to the dramatic action hence creating a more dynamic dialogical exchange of opinions than the more unilinear monologue. The employment of the third actor, in turn, is attributed by Aristotle to Sophocles which allows an exponentially larger set of dialogue options to be discovered. Dialogue seems considerably enriched with internal and external elements in Sophocles’ surviving plays compared to those of Aeschylus, even to the point of having a life of its own. As the epistemic possibility of a dialogic option is exhausted, another concentric dialogue replaces it with a set of opportunities of its own. Dialogically conceived to a fault, the Sophoclean characters are never missing either words or, by extension, a set of deeds that is available to them. The words are still spoken out loud and clear, to be sure; but the Sophoclean dialogue is infinitely more intuitive and introvertive in its constant weavings to and fro between the individual’s choices and his or her allotted fate. From Aias’ scrutinising walk of shame leading to the secluded spot where it would all end in the Aias, to Oedipus’ excruciating final confrontation of the prophecy of Tiresias in the Oedipus the King and to Neoptolemus’ discovery of his better self as he cannot bring himself to trick Philoctetes in the Philoctetes, examples abound the Sophoclean plays where the leading character is never bereft of logos. Compared to the Aeschylean dramatic universe, Sophocles seems to replace the ever-present public existence of the dramatis personae with the keeping of the leading character in perpetual company of the word. For better or for worse, the Sophoclean dialogue has the characteristic of a self-critical omen that is restructured with the filling of each dialogical node.

A more profound understanding of the link between logos and dialogos also appears to inform an accentuation of the event as the formal compass whose use is prerequisite for the discovery of the uncharted lands. This fathomlessness of the Sophoclean event feeds directly from a shedding of the Aeschylean form of trilogy. The Aeschylean form, as we observed above, was a composite of events that displayed an intricate and multi-level movement from primacy to sociality. In Sophocles that formal quality is reversed to dramatically build an intertwined form of adjacent events that rise to a crescendo as the playwright closes down unrealised dialogical possibilities. The deed, in that sense, has a primordial quality within it, something that

2292 Aristotle, Poetics, 1449a18-19.
2293 Sophocles, Aias, 813-865.
2294 Sophocles, Oedipus the King, 1183-1188.
2295 Sophocles, Philoctetes, 839-842.
surpasses the bounds of mere temporal succession to a deep esotericism of the act that is
donned with religious and even cult denotations.\textsuperscript{2296} Temporal succession, on this view, is no
harbinger of ever-steady clarifications in the Sophoclean universe; it is barely an appendix to
the event whose revelatory potential serves as the \textit{clé de voûte} of the whole dramatic
enterprise.\textsuperscript{2297} It is the same primordial resonance of the deed that structures the entirety of the
play in Antigone’s destined burial of her brother Polyneices in the \textit{Antigone} and exhumes the
Sophoclean grounds for Electra’s limbo of overflowing feelings in the \textit{Electra}.\textsuperscript{2298} Indeed,
even when formal leaps between an initial event of definitive import and a later culmination
that is intrinsically tied to the former is conceived, for example, in the formal links between
Oedipus’ inadvertent killing of his father Laius and his intentional unwrapping of his destiny,
that pre-eminence of the deed still holds true. Oedipus’ fall into the status of a blind pauper in
the \textit{Oedipus the King} and Aias’ suicide that serves as the dramatic acknowledgment of not
being able to right the wrongs already committed in the \textit{Aias}, are only two of the more renown
instances of death that breeds a certain measure of intelligibility to elaborate all the side-
events. There is a hierarchical positing of various deeds in the Sophoclean tragedy. And
staying aloof from the rest of the dramatic deeds is a singular event that has a flicker of
cathartic potential that is capable of rendering all the other events that are structured around it
with meaning.\textsuperscript{2299} Take the background event of Ilium’s destined fall in the \textit{Philoctetes}, for

\textsuperscript{2296} That existential significance of the Sophoclean deed certainly encompasses what Rose dubbed as
an endeavour of exploring the social ramifications of the old birth-elite who had experienced a severe
trauma of institutional displacement. That sentiment of loss of a golden lineage, however, is only a
single, albeit crucial, dimension of the acute sense of distress that is conveyed by the nauseating post-
traumatic existence, however brief, of an Aias or Antigone whose attempts to latch on to an anchor of
politico-semantic certainty is emptied of its content by the overwhelming force of conventions. And yet
during that briefest of fleeting existences those protagonists manage to rectify a primordial wrong, to
the point of cauterising their own ingrained wrongness that is incongruent to their times as well. Indeed,
Sophocles’ diverging conceptions of words that had traditionally conveyed a sense of ‘inherited nature,’
as aptly demonstrated by Rose himself, indicate aplenty that the Sophoclean critique cuts both ways.
Therefore, if we are to conceive, à la Rose, of Sophocles’ surviving plays as relaying the grounds of an
ideological counteroffensive against the democratic vogue, then, we need to recognise that the
counteroffensive in question was also directed against some of the core socio-political elements of the
supposed golden age of the aristocracy of birth. Cf. Rose, \textit{Sons of the Gods, Children of Earth}, pp. 269-
270; Sophocles, \textit{Antigone}, 37-38, 523, 61-62.

\textsuperscript{2297} Lukács’ earlier probe into the dramatic relationship of causality between chance and necessity
within the scope of Balzac’s \textit{Lost Illusions} offers an interesting way of rethinking the structural pre-
eminence of the Sophoclean event. Somewhat stretched to the limits in its consignment of secondary
importance on all the other events that flout around the core deed, Lukács’ approach still appears capable
of being articulated into Sophoclean terms. The poetic transaction between over- and under-
determination in relation to the threads knitting together leading and side events serves, in that vein, as
the alpha and omega of Sophocles’ building of the nexus of causality: “Romeo’s and Juliet’s love must
end in tragedy and only this necessity nullifies the accidental character of all the happenings which are
the immediate causes that bring about, stage by stage, this inevitable development of the plot. It is of
secondary importance whether such happenings taken by themselves, are motivated or not, and if the

\textsuperscript{2298} Sophocles, \textit{Electra}, 341-368.

\textsuperscript{2299} Cf. Kirkwood, \textit{A Study of Sophoclean Drama}, pp. 83 ff.
one. Ilium is prophesied to crumble before the Achaeans; but only if the bow of Philoctetes is recovered. And yet, the bow in question is a weapon that had supernatural qualities, even making it possible for an incapacitated cripple of an old man to survive in the midst of a prehistoric environment. So, Odysseus the son of Sisyphus conceives of a plan to beguile the old man using a notable young Greek the memory of whose father invokes trustworthiness and dependability in any hearer, Neoptolemus and Achilles respectively. Persuaded by the conniving Odysseus to deceive Philoctetes to drop his guard momentarily so that he and his partner in crime can nab the magical bow, Neoptolemus goes through a self-critical rollercoaster of emotions that culminate in his wholesale rejection of Odysseus’ ruse. Let Troy be damned if its conquest calls for the son to sully the memory of his truthful father. Does that powerful objection spell anything other as univocally as the secondary hierarchical import conferred on the background event? We think not; in fact, Neoptolemus’ rejection of the Odysseus’ scheme has the whole narrative force behind it to wash the background event in a new interpretative light. Troy’s fall is granted to transpire only if the son lives up to the ideal set up by his father thus breaking with the unidimensionality of Odysseus to answer the calling of his better and incorrupt self.

The substantive changes pioneered by Sophocles concerning the narrative structure follow closely in the footsteps of his alterations of the tragic form. A conception of the dramatic universe as one of permanent flux, a politics of subversion and a rethinking of the human condition are the three main elements of the narrative structure that seem to be in evident contrast to the Aeschylean pillars of the tragic narrative. To begin with, the dramatic universe

2300 Sophocles, Philoctetes, 66-69, 113.
2301 “[Odysseus speaking] You [Neoptolemus] are your father’s son. | I was young once as well, and I was slow with speech, | but | I had a ready hand for deeds. | But now that I have gained the experience, | I see that in the human world it is your speech | and not your deeds that manage everything.” Sophocles, Philoctetes, in Oedipus the King and Other Tragedies, trans. by Oliver Taplin, (Oxford and New York, 2016), 94-99.
2302 Ibid, 1396-1401.
2303 Even for a play that appears awash with his innovations, Sophocles’ introduction of Neoptolemus’ into the plot stands out from the rest of the novelties by dint of its sheer force. Thanks in large part to Dio Chrysostom’s surviving study of all the three renditions of the muthos of the end of Philoctetes’ agony, we know that Aeschylus had chosen to stray from the Homeric narrative by replacing Diomedes as a more neutral recruiting agent by the wily Odysseus whose enmity with Philoctetes was intended, in all likelihood, to impart additional bite on the entire confrontation. Euripides, on the other hand, appears to have included both Diomedes and Odysseus as the leaders of the embassy from the Achaeans who vied with another embassy from the Trojans for gaining the support of the hitherto neglected Philoctetes. By shuffling the roster with the addition of Neoptolemus and the omission of Diomedes, Sophocles managed to create a double drama that centred upon the characters of two uncompromising chest-pounders who were to rediscover the lost voice of reason again, hence seeing the value of having one’s heart in the right place: Kirkwood, A Study of Sophoclean Drama, pp. 36-39.
of Sophocles’ plays is always essentially incomplete. Oedipus appears, in both the *Oedipus the King* and the *Oedipus at Colonus*, as the archetypical embodiment of this structural absence in the plot. Strategically placed at key spaces, the absent shines with an admirable constancy in both episodes of Oedipus’ trials and tribulations. On that note, the narrative threads that interweave the dramatic layers of storytelling are twofold: one mechanical and the other cosmic. The mechanical absence that cements the strife-ridden nexus of dramatic universe functions as a riddle whose transmutations envelopes the whole development of the plot. Oedipus’ restless enthrallment with the murder of Laius in the *Oedipus the King* is an ever-swelling tide of a question that needs to be asked: ‘Am I responsible?’ Contrariwise, Oedipus’ atonement in the *Oedipus at Colonus*, which seems to be one that purges Antigone who is accompanying her as well, is one whose fulfilment hinges in the first place on his dropping of the responsibility of his deed at least partially on the doorway to Olympus, hence in ditching, so to speak, the question. Either way, the narrative sequence is clear: the voicing or withholding of the question serves as the mechanical springboard that catapults the protagonist to a higher sphere wherein repression and release are even more reluctant to be divested of their dialectical unity. Take Antigone’s defiance of Creon’s orders, for example. In that case, we have a protagonist whose resolution to follow her beliefs stands heads and shoulders above the antagonist who is ever doubtful and unsure despite his steadfast conviction to punish any insubordination. By resolving the main dilemma of her existence, Antigone has passed the Sophoclean limits of bad faith thereby reconfiguring the whole narrative structure which moves on to challenge the unconsummated resolve of Creon. Whether Creon has any intention to state the question on his own, and in the event he certainly does not, the

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2304 Can that measure of incompleteness be viewed as a narrative interplay between the dissatisfaction with the contemporary democratic norms and glimpses of utopian projections? It can, though only by taking note of how stratified both rejection and projection function in the Sophoclean universe. Sophocles’ protagonists are troubled sleepers in regard to their shattered expectations and the remedies they offer to patch the latter alike. As we emphasise below, the existential chips are never entirely fallen in the Sophoclean universe. Cf. Rose, *Sons of the Gods, Children of Earth*, pp. 271.

2305 Clytemnestra’s protests against his line of inquiry indicate that the question had already been asked and answered in her case before Oedipus even begins to have a glimmer of his fate. Sophocles, *Oedipus the King*, 1054-1056, 1060-1062, 1066-1067.


2307 Can this be taken as a clear signal of a dramatic regression to the so-called Homeric phenomenon of ‘double-causation’? No: Sophocles’ Antigone is a heroine whose evocations of gods and phusis are the respite of someone who realises that, for better or for worse, she is on her own in choosing to do the gods’ work. Divinities used to observe the scales of fate and act accordingly; now it is the humans who do that: cf. Waterfield, *Why Socrates Died*, pp. 43; for a recent study on human fault and responsibility in Homer, see Andrew Porter, “Human Fault and “[Harmful] Delusion” (ατη) in Homer”, *Phoenix*, vol. 71 no. 1/2, (Spring-Summer, 2017), pp. 1-20.
riddle is to be solved. Haemon and Eurydice have seen the intrinsic truth of Antigone’s deed, thus creating novel spaces of meaning within the reconfigured dramatic world. Having no such determination to face the question head-on, Creon is only spurred by the total loss of all the existents of his erstwhile universe of prerogatives to recognise the emptiness of a bad faith, to which he was formerly devout, for what it is: a snare that kept him grounded in a sphere of non-dialectics.

The narrative utilisation of the mechanical springboard gives, however, only half of the layers of significance that circulate around the tragic worlds of Sophocles. Shedding the spatio-temporally determinate layers of existence is, of course, a precondition for reaching even a semblance of meaning that appears to offer a safe harbour in a treacherous sea of semantic and existential flux. Neoptolemus must solve the riddle of whether Troy is worth his exploitation of his father’s memory in the Philoctetes. In a similar manner, Electra needs to face her narrative demons in the Electra, torn as she is between an unfaithful murderer of a wife and an avowedly just matricide of a son. The narrative resolution of the first layer of meaning carries either the protagonist or the antagonist, on whose shoulder weighs down the burden of un-self-critical limbo of meaninglessness, faithfully to his or her final destination, which, more times to none, is a temporally meaningful death. Yet, the ever-shifting layers of meaning invite the protagonist to rest on a Procrustean bed of signification only momentarily. It shortens and elongates the protagonist while the semantic and existential cosmic flux lingers on. The moral revival of Philoctetes in a veritable second life granted to him via the ghost of Heracles and the parallel reinvigoration of Oedipus in his final spiriting away in the Oedipus at Colonus give the same momentary respite to the protagonists and their close companions, Neoptolemus and Antigone respectively, who aided them in their micro-cosmic quest to attain meaning. The cosmic quest to achieve semantic and existential certainty, however, is permanent in a dramatic world whose layers of significance are perpetually ephemeral. There is no Homeric ‘hero’s death’ or Aeschylean grasp of the root causes of calamity in the Sophoclean world of drama; there are only hubs of meaning which are drawn together as the micro-cosmic manifestations of a constellation of questions to the order of the metanarrative. ‘Is there anything existentially in accord with nature?’ is the cosmic query of the Antigone, whereas

2308 Sophocles, Antigone, 1033-1048, 1105.
2309 Cf. “And when, inevitably, his capitulation proves to be too late, and everything tumbles around him … Creon is completely, pitifully shattered. The kosmos which ends the play is filled with his repentance and self-recriminations. Where Antigone was shaken by the chorus’s severity but recovered because she still had a conviction to sustain her, Creon has nothing left and collapses.” Kirkwood, A Study of Sophoclean Drama, pp. 52.
2310 Sophocles, Electra, 88-120; Kirkwood, A Study of Sophoclean Drama, pp. 36.
2311 Her last dirge before her entombment depicts Antigone as approximating ever-closer to answering that question in the negative in lamenting her fate: “What ordinance of the gods have I transgressed? |
that of the *Oedipus the King* and *Oedipus at Colonus* is ‘Is there a necessity to crime and punishment as the divine-ordained allotment of destiny?’ Rub one’s eyes and scrutinise as closely as one can, either way, there is no clear answer.\textsuperscript{2312} On one level, Antigone’s burial of Polynices is a declaration to the effect that there is a lofty layer of primal rapport between the respective *phusis* of natural and human worlds.\textsuperscript{2313} On another, her willing acquiescence to her just deserts, as ordained by Creon, show her to be still as helpless as before when facing the force of circumstance.\textsuperscript{2314} The narrative apex of Oedipus’ story, likewise, is a crucible of significances. His elevation to saintly status, for one, purports him as a figure whose meek acceptance of divine punishment serve as a redemptive understanding of the first order that turns the cosmic wheels. Still, Oedipus remains, by and large, a tragic figure *par excellence* as he keeps on fumbling with the part he took in the fulfilment of his earlier destiny even when he is affronted by Creon for the last time.\textsuperscript{2315} All of that point towards a Sophoclean understanding of cosmic flux as an everlasting ingredient to the dramatic existence of the protagonists who live and die without attaining a permanent glimmer of meaning.

Sophocles’ narrative structure is also in harmony with his politics of subversion that fill each mythological nook and cranny. Of course, the subversion in question is not a linear one by which a mechanical substitution takes place between the authority figures and their replacements. Far from it: it denotes the dramatic introduction of a permanent measure of restlessness to the semantic, spatial, filial and customary modes of political hierarchy that had served as a Homeric pillar of narrative. On the semantic field, we see the problematisation, akin to the one we observed in regard to the Protagorean testimonia, of anything to which the protagonists are expected to have grown accustomed. *Oedipus the King* is the foremost example of this semantically heightened sense of interplay between truth and discovery, which successfully underscores the spatio-temporally determinate aspect of customary truth claims. The play is permeated with the language of exposing, elucidating, unearthing, finding. Indeed,

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1. Why should I look to Heaven any more | For help, or seek an ally among men? | If this is what the gods approve, why then, | When I am dead I shall discern my fault; | If theirs the sin, may they endure a doom | [No worse than mine, so wantonly inflicted!" Sophocles, *Antigone*, in *Antigone, Oedipus the King and Electra*, trans. by H. D. F. Kitto, (Oxford and New York, 1994), 921-927.
2. \textsuperscript{2312} Oedipus’ portrayal of his actions as those of a passive plaything of gods may appear to avow an understanding of such iron laws of necessity but his curse upon Polynices and Eteocles elicits that the contrary can indeed be argued just as rigorously: “It [the Athenians’ driving him away from his refuge] can’t be for my person or my deeds, | since, rest assured, you’d find my acts lay more | in passive suffering than active doing, | were I to tell you of my mother and my father – | which is what frightens you, I have no doubt . | And yet how was I evil in my essence, | when what I did was to retaliate at being harmed, | in such a way that, even if I’d acted knowingly, | I still would not have qualified as bad?” Sophocles, *Oedipus at Colonus*, 265-273; cf. 1348-1395.
Oedipus’ self-ascribed task of finding the root cause of the plague is one that is geared towards the attainment of genuine knowledge. A knowledge that would alleviate the suffering of the whole Thebes it is true; but one that promises the most to a guileless Oedipus. Virtually every dramatis personae in the play is informed, at least partially, of Oedipus’ destiny except for Oedipus himself. Tiresias has, of course, the benefit of having augured the propheesy himself. Never the less, neither Iocasta nor Creon experience the difficulty that Oedipus has in solving the riddle. Ironically, Oedipus, the actor if not the author of the destiny, has the least inkling of its enunciations. Oedipus’ travails, in that vein, have the appearance of a painful quest after knowledge, an attempt, as playfully brought out in the open by Sophocles in lines 413-415 and 924-926, to know, denoted by *oid* words meaning ‘know,’ where, ‘pou,’ he belongs. Oedipus is the ‘swollen foot’ only to the clueless onlooker, signifying essentially the protagonist himself, who, on a deeper level of significance, does not belong to that order of misleading appearance but to an altogether distinct self-critical existence. In insatiably thirsting after the *aletheia*, Oedipus throws an existential gauntlet to his own phenomenal political authority, sacrificing it whole to reach *apokalypsis* or disclosure. An

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2317 Oedipus’ failure to logically deduct his origins from a mixture of the three prophesies that float around the narrative structure as the plot develops has obliged Voltaire, for example, to object to the dramatic structure of the play almost two and a half centuries ago. If we come to share a similar sentiment, we argue that it owes just as much to Sophocles’ self-conscious attempt to exaggerate the tragic effect of the unfolding of Oedipus’ destiny as it does to the lingering Marxian aftereffects of enlightenment rationality. Voltaire, *Letter on Oedipus*, Letter 3.

2319 For a different interpretation with a focus on Sphinx’ riddle and Teiresias’ prophecy, see Segal, *Oedipus Tyrannus*, pp. 36, 111.

2318 Our re-construal of the Sophoclean *aletheia* may appear to lend itself willingly to a Heideggerian reading of the term qua *Unverborgenheit*, i.e., ‘unconcealedness.’ Given the rather confined space that is allocated to the hermeneutic circle wherewith he elucidates the term, however, we hastily add that the appearance in question signals barely anything more than a surface accord. Penetrative as it is in the case of the use of *aletheia* in Sophocles’ *Oedipus Turannos* and Heraclitus’ fragments, Heidegger’s appraisial falls flat with respect to the subtle semantics that are afforded to the term in other contemporary examples such as Euripides’ *Iphigenia at Aulis* or Pindar’s odes. Succinctly put, unlike Heidegger, I do not thirst after a monolithic understanding of the word that could be heralded as *aletheia par excellence*: cf. Heidegger, ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’, pp. 35; Heidegger, *Being and Time*, pp. 256-272; Heidegger and Fink, *Heraclitus Seminar 1966/67*, pp. 161-162; for a trenchant critique of Heidegger’s “mythologizing” of Greek centred upon his reading of *aletheia*, see John Caputo, “Why Aletheia Is Not a Greek Word”, in *Demythologizing Heidegger*, (Bloomington, 1993), pp. 21-29.

2320 Contrary to the conventional scholarly practice I do not dwell on the two Aristotelian categories of *peripeteiai*, i.e., ‘reversals of fortune,’ and *anagnoriseis*, i.e., ‘discoveries,’ mainly because I conceive them as rather ill-fitting as well as circumscribing even in the exclusive context of Sophocles’ surviving plays. Postling, as I have done, an existentially denoted *ergon* as the central building block of his dramatic enterprise, both *peripeteiai* and *anagnoriseis* appear to veer toward auxiliary qualities that does not refute Aristotle’s ascription of pre-eminence of the *muthos*, i.e., ‘plot,’ of tragic plays. Coupled with the evident discrepancy between Aristotle’s overarching theory and the narrative structure as it is displayed in the surviving plays, however, the Aristotelian definitive statement appears to founder on
existential measure of closure is only afforded if the semantics of political authority is reflected upon whereby its rejection is consummated. The plague that threatens to destroy Thebes is only a physical manifestation of the iron in the soul of Oedipus, who wills to go through the ordeals because what he misses in regard to his part in Tiresias’ prophesy disturbs him incessantly to remind that his political power is only a semblance. The visitation of the plague on Thebes certainly sets the stage in Oedipus’ quest after knowledge; but the quest reaches its climactic nodes only when Oedipus will to enquire completely supplants his earlier interest in overcoming the plague. Divested of its customary appurtenances, political authority is only a temporally-sanctioned concentration of communal will with no rhyme or reason inherent to it. Put differently, the Sophoclean semantics of subversion proclaims what is prefigured a priori: political authority is an empty receptacle of signification that is only filled so long as its beneficiaries choose to invest it with meaning.

Accompanying the semantics of political subversion in the Sophoclean dramatic universe is a spatial delineation of the authority conferred on dramatis personae. Sophoclean protagonists often experience a full climax in defying the extension of the three-dimensional determinateness of their antagonists’ political authority. Oedipus’ final confrontation with Creon and the latter’s subsequent dismissal by Theseus, who reminds him that the customs of Thebes are binding for the Thebans alone, is an archetypical example of this spatial delineation. We would like to revisit the Philoctetes, however, to expound on this structural feature in the context of a play that is just as interesting as Oedipus at Colonus. The Sophoclean Lemnos in the play has all the making of a state of nature that is conceived at the absence of

the rock of its own uncanny universalism, which hardly facilitates anything but a schematic ordering of the plays as we have them: “Reversal and discovery together will evoke either pity or fear—just the kind of actions which, according to our basic principle, tragedy offers an imitation—and will serve to bring about the happy or unhappy ending.” Aristotle, Poetics, 1452a39-1452b3; for the difficulties attached to the conventional renderings of the two terms, not to mention the other elusive couplet, eleos kai phobos, i.e., ‘pity and fear,’ see Kaufmann, pp. 64-67, 49-56.

The eventual dropping out of the topos of plague from the narrative trust of the play has been observed by Segal who points out that it is simply forgotten even before the midpoint of the tragic action: Segal, Oedipus Tyrannus, pp. 50.

Tiresias’ prophecy animates Oedipus’ spirit of scrutiny in regard to the shaky foundations upon which his political authority is set: “You may be king, | but I still have an equal right to make reply. | I also have this power because I am no slave | to serve your beck and call: I am Apollo’s. | So do not write me down in Creon’s list. | And since you have insulted me as blind, now listen: | you have your sight, yet you do not see the truth | of how the place you’re at is bad, or where you live, | or who they are you share your home with.” Sophocles, Oedipus the King, 408-413.

Sophocles, Oedipus at Colonus, 895-1043.
either the Hesiodic or biblical embellishments.\textsuperscript{2326} True as it is that the old Philoctetes has a remnant of the Hesiodic age of gold in his magical bow, he exists in a manner completely fitting to the copper age as he crawls around in search for his prey and lives in caverns by his lone self.\textsuperscript{2327} Living from hand to mouth with no benefits of civilisation to boot, Philoctetes is the only inhabitant on a vast and dramatically pre-historicised island; but he is an inhabitant never the less. Leading a rueful lament of an existence as he is, Philoctetes knows that he has every right to answer evil with evil. With his bow ever at the ready, he proves that the Achaeans, however little did they know in the event, turned his Lemnos into an alter vista of the island of the Homeric Kirke with scarce any rights granted to the trespassers. Naturally, Sophocles subtly concealed this potentially violent clash between the overlords of the domain and transgressor under the rubric of Odysseus’ subterfuge which leads Neoptolemus’ personal attempts at placating Philoctetes. Indeed, the few daring forays of even a crewmember of Odysseus’ ship to the cave of Philoctetes can only be undertaken under the guise of merchant who has no affiliations with the Achaeans.\textsuperscript{2328} And yet, the ruse is never complete due to Neoptolemus’ constant vacillations on the moral worth of playing his part in the ploy. Odysseus’ \textit{leger-de-main} is no simple attempt to rob the divine treasure of Philoctetes to ensure the coming about of the foretold prophecy of Troy’s fall; it is the symbolic encroachment of the Achaeans’ political authority on the borders of Philoctetes’ domain. The divinely-forged bow, as such, serves as Philoctetes’ \textit{vademecum} of a sceptre, showing the aspiring trespassers what the likely outcome of their inability to distinguish one spatial determination from another would be. The political authority of the Achaeans does not permeate to other spatial configurations which is another way of saying that a full-fledged relativity of political customs is allotted a significant place within the narrative structure of the \textit{Philoctetes}.\textsuperscript{2329}

\textsuperscript{2326} While Rose reconstructs the scene with a dose of Protagorean anthropology, I attempt to do so by focusing on the dramatized Lemnos’ anthropological and political qualities that resemble a timeless state of nature. Rose, \textit{Sons of the Gods, Children of Earth}, pp. 274-280.

\textsuperscript{2327} “And if I need to fetch water, | or, with frost upon the ground in wintertime, | I had to break some firewood, I simply had | to crawl along and manage for myself. | Then there’s no fire, and I must strike with stone on stone | until the hidden spark appeared and caught – | and that has kept me going all along.” Sophocles, \textit{Philoctetes}, 291-296.

\textsuperscript{2328} Sophocles, \textit{Philoctetes}, 542-626.

\textsuperscript{2329} This conflict between natural solitary needs and communitarian interests, embodied in the characters of Philoctetes and Odysseus, respectively, is hinted at by Rose who, then, uses the polarity as a springboard for his positing of Sophocles on the spectrum of the ‘sophist’ debate on \textit{phusis} and \textit{nomos}. Persuasively argued as it is, that leap to a contrast between the demands of nature and society cannot be vindicated with scarce any reference to the dynamics of the Achaeans’ earlier trickery of Philoctetes. Philoctetes’ earlier abandonment to the whims of nature, moreover, convey a negative image only of that dramatically located warband qua society without insinuating that just about any society is made up of selfish individualists who claim to work in the interests of the community. Cf. “Odysseus’ ethical views and terminology of survival are consistently juxtaposed to those of Philoktetes and gain much of their pejorative or ironic color from the implicit contrast to the grimness of the reality or necessity that
The Sophoclean relativity of political customs grows in tandem with the frequent attempts to challenge and, at times, invert social authority. Sophocles’ reflections on filial relationships, part and parcel of his portrayal of socially entrenched hierarchies, offer some of the most notable instances in which this inversion is occasioned. Electra’s explicit rejection of Clytemnestra’s mention of Iphigenia’s sacrifice as the just vindication of her murder of Agamemnon, for example, turns the Aeschylean narrative on its head. Indeed, in Aeschylus’ dramatic rendition of the myth, as we analysed above, the serving of justice follows an uneasy, yet unilinear, course of progression towards the ultimate terminus of a verdict that is communally rendered. This progressively conceived temporal dimension is especially evident in Aeschylus’ portrayal of the direct diffusion of crime as the perpetration of the first cardinal offence propels a clear reversal of roles between the perpetrator and the agent of justice who will disabuse the former from his or her everlasting pangs of conscience. By contrast, there is no linear transmission of the miasma of bloodletting in Sophocles. Oedipus’ inadvertent murder of his father in the Oedipus the King or Electra’s reflection of the crime committed by her mother in the Electra speak to the emergence of a different sense of justice that has no tendencies of developing towards an ideal through time. With a reconceptualization of miasma that is more in accord with the primordiality of the event, the socially sanctioned authority conferred on diverse age-classes loses the vital channel that links it to an immutable notion of justice. This loss of the distinctly proportioned social authority in accordance with different age classes finds one of its most sublime expressions in conditions Philoktetes’ struggle to survive.” Rose, Sons of the Gods, Children of Earth, pp. 307, 316, 319.

Sophocles, Electra, 560-580.

Segal has dubbed the temporal procession that is exhibited in Sophocles’ Oedipus the King as one of “circular movement,” that is “governed by oracles.” Although I agree with that take on the centrality of oracles within the narrative framework of the play, I think it plausible to add that the ontological prominence of the deed as it is portrayed in Oedipus Tyrannus and other surviving plays appear potent enough to function as a centripetal force gathering all the oracles within the nexus of significance. Segal, Oedipus Tyrannus, pp. 63.

Perhaps it does, from the God’s-eye view at least. But arguments from silence aside, we do not have a lot to support a portrayal of Sophocles as having firmly believed that “only the gods can afford the long view.” Rose’s compelling arguments to the contrary, even the gods of Sophocles appear to partially suffer from the myopia that weighs down on the entire dramatic universe. Athena’s words of caution spoken to Odysseus are not ones that are uttered by a goddess with omnipotent impunity, they are those of someone who feels a guilty-pleasure in seeing that her mischievous scheme held true. Though he did not appear to have explicitly endorsed what Rose calls the new anthropology of Aeschylus, Sophocles appears, in that sense, to have shared, perhaps despite himself, a simple sense that, his age was one of the children of earth and not that of the sons of gods. Rose, Sons of the Gods, Children of Earth, pp. 268-270, 271; cf. Vernant and Vidal-Naquet, Myth and Tragedy in Ancient Greece, pp. 33; Charles P. Segal, Tragedy and Civilization: An Interpretation of Sophocles, (Norman, 1999), pp. 51; Sophocles, Aias, 118-120,126-135.

Against Clytemnestra’s invocation of her filial authority, Electra denounces any pretense to sociality with a rebuke of the contemporary order: “Then let me tell you, though you’ll not believe it: | I am ashamed at what I do; I hate it. | But it is forced on me, despite myself, | By your malignity and wickedness. | Evil in one breeds evil in another.” Sophocles, Electra, 617-621.
Antigone’s overt defiance of Creon’s authority in the *Antigone*. Indeed, Antigone gives no quarters to any custom pertaining to the mechanical bestowal of any social authority on grounds of either sex or age-class. In direct contradistinction to the Aeschylean docile heroines, Sophocles’ Antigone is a firebrand and scallywag in equal measure. Evading Ismene’s attempts to appelle her to assume the ‘sensible’ social position of a submissive girl and those of Creon to goad her using the social power of his guardianship with equal rigour, Antigone refuses to serve as the missing piece that would complete the dramatic universe of her antagonists. No hierarchy of age or sex is sufficiently sacrosanct to measure with the inherently just practice of natural rights. Conceived, once again, at the dialectical interstices of disclosure, Antigone’s rebelliousness is dramatically epitomised in the event of Polynices’ burial, which allows the rethinking of all the socially ascribed authority positions.

All these elements of dramatic subversion combine into one imposing battering ram with which the clay feet of the colossus of the politics of convention are crushed. Naturally, Sophocles, an influential *eupatrid* that had lived through his fair share of political convulsions in Athens of the second half of the fifth century, was not oblivious to etymological or political ties between the forming of conventions and the passing of laws. Indeed, in the figure of Sophocles we have no obscure onlooker that observed the various political turmoil in his *polis* from the side-lines, but an active participant that actively sought, much like Aeschylus and Solon before him, to take sides in the struggles of his day. His position of treasurer in 443/2 and *stratēgos* in the Samian campaign of 441/0 are not the only examples of a vibrant political career. Infinitely more interesting, in that vein, is Aristotle’s argument that Sophocles held the office of *probouloi* who served as a 10-men group of special commissioners to oversee the ‘smooth’ transition to the oligarchic rule of the Four Hundred. What little historical

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2334 Antigone’s last lines in the play function as the crystalline expression of by whose authority she chooses to abide in contradistinction to that of the lawless and impious contemporary rulers: “O city of Thebes where my father dwell, [O gods of our race,] [Now at last their hands are upon me!] [You princes of Thebes, O look upon me, | The last that remain of a line of kings! | How savagely impious men use me, | For keeping a law that is holy.” Sophocles, Antigone, 937-942.

2335 Ismene’s admission that she does dishonour to the sacred laws of Heaven through her inaction against the *polis*’ laws unveils the cosmic resonances of the clash between the prerogatives of earthly authority and the unflinching justice accorded to divine providence: *Ibid*, 78-79; cf. Kirkwood, *A Study of Sophoclean Drama*, pp. 120.

2336 Creon’s frantic reign of terror has a clear-cut rationale to support it: if his kingly authority is beset by a young girl, then the age-old hierarchy of reverence between the ruler and ruled as well as men and women is violated: “Down to Hell! Love there, if love you [Antigone] must. | While I am living, no woman shall have rule.” Sophocles, Antigone, 525-526.

2337 Androtion, FGrHist 324F38.

2338 “When Sophocles, for instance, was asked by Peisander whether he had concurred with the decision of the rest of the Advisory Board [*probouloi*] to put the Four Hundred in power, he admitted that he had. ‘Well,’ asked Peisander, ‘didn’t it strike you as a bad thing to do?’ ‘Yes.’ ‘So this thing that you did was bad?’ ‘Yes,’ said Sophocles, “but it was the best available option.” Aristotle, The Art of Rhetoric, 1419a25-29; cf. Rose, Sons of the Gods, Children of Earth, pp. 327-328.
elements we have of the exploits of Sophocles clearly thus indicate that he was just as much
an armchair dramatist as Thucydides was an ace of a historian. On that note, we propose to
weave all the threads of the Sophoclean politics of subversion in an attempt to combine the
dramatic narratives of three plays, whose dating are relatively secure, with the contemporary
events in Athens.

The first play is whose dating is one of the more, albeit not entirely, established ones is the
Antigone, conceived to have been produced in c. 441. The Samian revolt, as we observed
above, was a huge scare for the Athenians that prompted a radical response in order to re-strike
the delicate hegemonic balance in the Aegean. To reiterate, the Samian revolt was only the
third and the largest step in a wave of anti-Athenian revolts that threatened the Athenian arkhê.
As the Athenians wore down the Samian rebels following a nine-month siege, they enacted
wide-ranging reforms to their polity, effectively creating a democracy out of a previously
oligarchic polis. Now, Antigone, as we noted above, is the foremost Sophoclean play that
exhibits the levelling of a dramatic challenge of all the conventional claims of the unjust ruler
to occupying the very top of the social and political hierarchy. Of course, Sophocles’ plays are
never hard put to display political and social clashes, often of the violent kind, between
characters that assume different hierarchical positions. Aias’ insubordination to the leading
individuals of the Achaean war party in the Aias is only one of the many memorable instances
in Sophocles’ plays in which the conventional ladder of social and political authority is riddled
with the dramatic holes. Yet, Antigone’s subordination is qualitatively more radical as she
comes closest to asking the cosmic question that hovers above the play. Trumpeting socio-
political conventions to march to the drumbeat of phusis, Antigone leaves no stone unturned
in filling her ideological arsenal to bring down Creon who is attempting to rule in spite of the
nature’s dictates. Given the core features of our analysis of the play, we think that these
features can be taken as spelling a celebration of the empire’s exploits in baptising the putting
down successive revolts. As a eupatrid member of the Athenian upper-class, Sophocles
grasped that the safekeeping of their political, economic and social interests was dovetailed to
the maintenance of the Athenian arkhê. The nature that reigns supreme in the ideologically-
motivated utterances of Antigone serve, in that sense, as the girdles that support the
construction of Athenian garrisons and the exile of the anti-Athenian local notables in equal

2339 For an influential account that makes a convincing case for the dating of the play to 438, see R. G.
Lewis, “An Alternative Date for Sophocles’ Antigone”, Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies, vol. 29,
(1988), pp. 35-50; for a more recent confirmation of Lewis’ date, see William B. Tyrrell and Larry J.
Bennett, Recapturing Sophocles’ Antigone, (London, 1998), pp. 3 n. 8; for a review of the traditional
dating, see Mary R. Lefkowitz, The Lives of the Greek Poets, (Baltimore, 1981), pp. 81-82.
2340 Sophocles, Aias, 89-118.
measure. It is apt to note that, in that vein, that the City Dionysia housed delegates from all the allied poleis that watched the dramatic performances after having given their phoros-payments. The message to any such delegates that came to the festival of 441 from allied poleis which had revolted in the previous years would be quite clear: ‘do not tempt nature.’

This narrative and thematic focus on the subversion of political authority viewed through the lens of the duality of nomos and phusis is also visible, with key additions, in the second play that we would like to put into historical perspective, the first-prize winner of the City Dionysia of 409, the Philoctetes. Produced only two years after the demise of the Four Hundred, this play was written when the Athenian arkhê was on the mend, with the thêtes taking the chief role in defending the empire from the Peloponnesian fleet that was assembled thanks in large part to Persian money. This context affords us two valuable interpretive avenues. If we follow in the footsteps of Aristotle’s Sophocles, who took an active part in the building of the regime of the Four Hundred, then the play might be conceived possibly as an apologia or as a means of gratitude that is offered to the dêmos who chose to bury the hatchet after the fall of the oligarchs. Philoctetes in the play is a solitary figure whose plummeted morale after years of solitary scavenging has a viable dramatic sparring partner in his yearning after the company of the truthful Achaeans, e.g., Achilles. His distaste of human company has a compelling justification in Odysseus’ and Agamemnon’s erstwhile treatment of him as an unserviceable burden to be thrown overboard. That treachery which had left him at the mercy of the prehistoric wilderness, as such, functions as the dramatic basis for the distance he exhibits towards human affairs. When confronted with an individual who brings back pleasant memories of frank friendships in the persona of Neoptolemus, he lets bygones be bygones even to the point of entrusting his magic bow, the sole reason for his survival, to the newcomer. Credulous to a fault, he realises the mistake he had made only when the trick is consummated and all he can do in protest is to heap insults on his gullibility. And yet, his candour and hardships occasion a multi-faceted self-examination of Neoptolemus. With his gaze introverted and his resolution unsure, Neoptolemus finally understands that in tricking Philoctetes he was betraying his better nature. That, however, leads to no ‘happily ever

2341 Sophocles, Philoctetes, 926-963.
2342 Philoctetes’ gratitude to Neoptolemus following his decision to give the magic bow back to its rightful owner despite the threats darted at him by a shaken Odysseus show that no trickery was befitting for an offspring of the blameless Achilles: “I grant you that [that he has no cause for anger at Neoptolemus] You have displayed] your inborn nature, son, your pedigree: ] no bastard son of Sisyphus, but offspring of Achilles, ] the man who had the highest reputation when alive,] and has so still among the dead.” Ibid, 1312-1316; for a construal of the friendship between Philoctetes and Neoptolemus as expressly heroic despite the wily attempts of Odysseus to maleducate the former, see Rose, Sons of the Gods, Children of Earth, pp. 321; cf. Kirkwood, A Study of Sophoclean Drama, pp. 178; Sophocles, Philoctetes, 874, 971, 1014-1015.
after’ as Philoctetes’ regaining his supernatural bow spells that the prophesy of the fall of Troy will never come true. Divine intervention is, of course, as effective a way as any other in surpassing such mythical difficulties and thus a vision of Heracles in introduced to fit the bill. Now, the explicit interplay between Lemnos as the realm of unbridled phusis and the war camp of the Achaeans as that of straightforward nomoi perhaps does not find an Aeschylean dialectical reconciliation in the rather un-Sophoclean ending of the play. There are no juries to render verdict upon and no divine or royal retinue to draw lessons from the event to put the finishing touches to the Philoctetes. There is, however, a hint of forced reconciliation between phusis and nomos as Philoctetes accepts to use his bow and quiver in the service of the Achaeans to bring about the fall of Troy in exchange for his wholehearted re-admission to the civilisation. What does that tell us about the potential political semantics of the play itself?

Again, keeping in mind that the reception of the play was a huge success in granting Sophocles another one of his first-prizes, and that the events of 411, partially mended as they were, had not receded into oblivion in the memory of any of the Athenians who experienced them first hand, we argue that no hermeneutic overstretch is required to claim that Sophocles conceived the play in complete conjunction with the contemporary events. There are two basic similarities, in that vein, between the dramatic figure of Philoctetes and the historical figure of Aristotle’s Sophocles: the overt parallels between dramatic and historical treads that knot their political position and the force of circumstance which afford justificatory shelter to both. Philoctetes, as we noted above, is duped twice by his companions in the play: the first one when he is left behind by his former comrades-in-arms and the second when Neoptolemus successfully swindles him to part way with his bow. In terms of the political upheavals of the late 410s, the first deception might have embodied a subtle reflection on Sophocles’ initial aid in founding of the regime of the Four Hundred. If the Aristotelian reference holds even a grain of truth by token of either words or deeds of Sophocles to the effect that the establishment of the Four Hundred was the lesser evil in an Athens distraught by the lingering effects of the Sicilian expedition, then it is highly conceivable that Sophocles would want to clear the air by conveying that the regime, despite being of his making, was certainly not of his ilk. The

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2343 Ibid, 1396-1401.
2344 Ibid, 1410-1472.
2345 “Farewell, sea-encircled land of | Lemnos, send me | on a fair and faultless voyage, | where strong fate conveys me, | and the good advice of comrades, | and the all-subduing godhead | who has brought these things to pass.” Ibid, 1464-1468; cf. Rose, Sons of the Gods, Children of Earth, pp. 326.
2346 We ought to recall another one of Aristotle’s testimonies to the tragedian’s views on character-building in order to bring this point home. Retorting to the claim that his dramatic characters were not in tune with those of his contemporary society, Sophocles averred that the point was not to draw them as they were: “If the objection is that something is not true, then perhaps it is something that ought to
second deception, on the other hand, may have harkened back to a latent reprisal on Sophocles between 411 and 409 for his services to the Four Hundred. The historical tradition about Sophocles portrays him as the most successful Athenian tragedian of all time with more than twenty victories in the City Dionysia. And it is quite possible, in that sense, that either a bestowal of the dramatic honours on someone far less deserving, at least to Sophocles’ eyes, or, worse yet, an untypical objection to his participation in the event would not be lost on the great tragedian. Naturally, this part of our interpretation is purely speculative in that the details of any such episode, if actually in tune with the happenings, are lost on the basis of current evidence. Provided that we confirm Aristotle’s testimony, however, there does not seem to be anything inherently contradictory with respect to the emergence of such an incident. Philoctetes’ eventual coming to terms with the Achaeans, on this view, can be viewed as a barely-concealed offering of peace that is given by Sophocles to the Athenian dēmos.

The third play whose traditional dating bears interesting results for our relocation of Sophocles’ tragedies within the political timeline of Athens is the final play of his career, Oedipus at Colonus, which, in fact, was produced by his son posthumously in 402/1. The writing of the play has a solid terminus ante quem of 405 for Sophocles died in that year. This leaves us a brief historical window for the play’s conception that is likely to have been brought about around the string of victories that culminated in the major victory at Arginusae. That event was crucial, of course, in that it allowed a final solace to the Athenians whose fortunes would take a rapid turn for the worse in the following couple of years. Accompanying the restoration of their confidence in their naval superiority, however, was the immediate backlash of dēmos who saw their strategoi’s betrayal of their trust in the image of drowning sailors as tantamount to treason. Oedipus at Colonus is a play that has the Sophoclean understanding of redemption at its heart.2347 The fulfilment of Teiresias’ prophecy in Oedipus the King has reduced the former king of Thebes to a blind beggar who travels with his daughter Antigone from one polis to another in search of a place to call home. Continuously hounded by the ever-vigilant Creon, who informs the citizens of every poleis he sojourns of the taint he carries with

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2347 Even his choice of dramatic space speaks to an unconcealed Sophoclean endeavour to hark back to the establishment of the regime of Four Hundred and possibly to the part he played in priming the political setting for the oligarchic watershed. Colonus, after all, was the meeting place of the oligarchs who deigned to liquidate democracy back in 411. As Lowell Edmunds noted a while ago, this focus on a space of clear political division through the lens of overcoming of discord can be taken as a direct allusion to the recent historical conflicts that the Athenians had to endure. Lowell Edmunds, Theatrical Space and Historical Place in Sophocles’ “Oedipus at Colonus”, (Lanham, MD., 1996), pp. 88-94.
him which can only abate if he returns to his ancestral Thebes,²³⁴⁸ the two finally make their way to Athens, which has all the features of being a realm of civilisation. Offered a new home that they were seeking by King Theseus, who rebuffs Creon, as we saw above, that the laws of his domain have compulsory force over the aliens just as much as over the Athenians,²³⁴⁹ Oedipus finally sheds his travails and is thereby turned into a saint whose shrine will continue to benedict the Athenians for their generosity and goodwill for all eternity.²³⁵⁰ If we grant that the play was written after the execution of the Arginusae Eight, then the dramatic alliance between Theseus and Oedipus, which affords the latter a more civilised final abode than Thebes, might be conceived as a reminder to the Athenian dēmos to use and abuse their strategoi more sparingly. Sophocles would realise, in that sense, that the miserable end of the Arginusae Eight was, at least partially, of their own doing. By not attempting to rescue the sailors of the capsized ships in time, the strategoi in effect sealed their fate which was then brought to fruition by the dēmos’ proclamation. Likewise, Oedipus’ harrowing trials dramatized in Oedipus the King are clear to have originated, in part, from his recklessness and impetuosity despite the fact that his allotted fate caused his family’s initial attempt to expose the new-born. Violence is the easiest of resorts to chastise those who have had a definite taste of collective misfortunes. The plague that beset the Thebans in Oedipus the King and the loss of thousands of sailors to the depths of the Aegean, possibly in addition to the respective parts played by the eight strategoi during the rise and demise of the Four Hundred, are two such collective calamities whose dissipation is attempted, on one side, by causing further injury, and, on the other, by giving a chance of redemption to the offender. If this interpretation holds water, then Sophocles’ ingenious subtlety would be further rewarded by the lower-class Athenians as the play was produced in 402 or a year after the overthrow of the Thirty Tyrants, as we analyse below, in 403.

Our effort to fill out the historical details of these three plays that make up roughly half of the seven surviving tragedies of Sophocles suggest that the playwright constructed a stratified set of significations to provide ample political space for the habituation of the potentially explosive duality of nomos and phusis. Sophocles’ dramatic rendition of phusis is not one that timelessly trumps over human norms and conventions. It is something that is partly casted off when the inexorably just, truthful, frank, etc., protagonists are overcome by the necessity,

²³⁴⁸ Sophocles, Oedipus at Colonus, 728-800.
²³⁴⁹ “You [Creon] travelled to a place that cultivates the ways | of justice, and which settles everything | in keeping with the law; and there you have discarded | all that land’s authority by mounting this intrusion, | so as to take whatever you might want, |and make expropriations using force. You must have thought my city | was devoid of men, or else enslaved, | and must have rated me at next to nothing.”
Ibid, 912-918.
which springs from the results of their earlier deeds, to enter the sphere of commonality once again. From Antigone’s coming to terms with her punishment in Antigone to Aias’ suicide to purge all miasma of his deed in the Aias, the conciliatory politics that is inserted by Sophocles to regulate the relationship between nomos and phusis often leads to the death of the protagonist who, ergon kai logon, had borne the aegis of nature. The aegis-bearer’s death, however, does not spell a complete erasure of any trace of phusis. In dying with a compromised ethos of kata phusin acts, the protagonists cause a seismic revolution of the hitherto jaundiced understanding of the antagonists cowering behind nomos itself.\textsuperscript{2351} Antigone’s execution grinds the whole appearance of nomothetic commonality of Creon’s household into dust. In a similar vein, Aias’ suicide causes a signal change in putting an end to Menelaus’ and Agamemnon’s vile exploitations of their political authority.\textsuperscript{2352} In dying with a partially conceded adherence to phusis, the protagonists make sure that the antagonists enact a corresponding change to the nomos-upholding attitude of the antagonists in order to live well. An ethos of artificially constructed commonality is denoted by the etymological link between nomos and nêmein, ‘to control’ or ‘manage,’ which appears to have illuminated this Sophoclean conception of the politics of aristocratic negotiation. There was nothing, through Sophocles’ lens, that was readily abhorrent in sharing the political power with thêtes so long as they recognised the merit of having the aristocrats around. With their more intimate appreciation of the lot of humans and their more lucid understanding of politics, not to mention their sizeable finances which made any politics of empire-building plausible in the first place, the aristocrats were essential to ensuring the wellbeing of the democratic Athens. To a master of irony, the troubling manifestations of that relationship were never lost. The Sophoclean canvassing of the human condition is the most evident sphere in which the ironic interplay between the two sides of the politics of compromise is revealed in full.\textsuperscript{2353}

\textsuperscript{2351} For a rather truncated interpretation of Aias’ plight in the play that draws heavily from the ‘greatness in limitation’ thesis, see Kirkwood, A Study of Sophoclean Drama, pp. 47.

\textsuperscript{2352} In favour of such a politically strong reading of Aias’ suicide are the further knots of the dramatic thread that lie momentarily dormant so that their eventual consummation once the Atridae will have reached their homes is invested with an additional fire of divine recompense. In more than one way, in fact, does the vindictive hostility and self-seeking cynicism of the Aias’ Agamemnon resemble the scheming irreverence of the same figure in Iphigenia at Aulis whose pangs of conscience, albeit substantial, pale in comparison to the sentimental abyss into which is Clytemnestra flung in her weariness at the prospect of the sacrifice of her daughter: cf. Ibid, pp. 107-109.

\textsuperscript{2353} I do not agree with Kaufmann’s blanket generalisation of the epistemic blindness exhibited by Sophocles’ Oedipus in Oedipus Turannos as a veritable sketch of conditio humana tout court. His trenchant criticism of Freud’s overlooking the particularities of the play to the contrary, Kaufmann’s post-Nietzschean scales of grief and release appears to play the same categorical tune in spelling out the existential connotations of Oedipus’ blindness with a cast of treading the middle ground between a timeless opposition between voluntarism and fatalism. “Man’s radical insecurity,” might have indeed scarred the Sophoclean tragic worlds with the same instrument with which the playwright made his baby Oedipus’ feet pierced in the play. That instrument, however, was one that appears to have been created in self-conscious recognition of the supposed ills that he dramatically associated with any contemporary shift toward the culling of the eupatrid influence within the Athenian politics. When all
It has been argued three decades ago by Peter Rose that the Sophoclean characters are distinct from the Aeschylean ones in their almost complete alienation from their respective societies. The alienation in question encompasses many facets of commonality, including politics, morality, legality, etc. Sophocles’ protagonists display, as the argument goes, veritable mental, and at times physical, e.g., Philoctetes, chasms that rob them of any element of publicity that the Aeschylean dramatis personae, as explained above, are known for. With the physical and mental Entfremdung from the society arise a politics of naturalised exclusivism that is distinguishable for the scorn it heaps on the conventions upon which democratic politics are grounded. I concur with Rose’s emphasis on the substantial alienation of the Sophoclean protagonists from their socio-political environment. I diverge from his reading, however, in arguing that a politics of abuse is skilfully woven by Sophocles into the silver thread of alienation to show that Entfremdung cuts both ways.

The political alienation of Sophoclean protagonists is brought to the fore in all the surviving plays. Antigone, Philoctetes, Oedipus the King and Oedipus at Colonus, to name just a few examples, all have protagonists that are spirited away from their societies on the basis of moral, political, physical, etc., estrangement. Antigone’s desperate plight to bury her brother whatever the cost, Philoctetes’ bare existence that is deemed a better prospect than the potentially beguiling company of others and Oedipus’ passionate thirst after knowledge that jeopardises his entire political authority indicate that a dramatic rift between the protagonists and antagonists is preconceived by Sophocles. Closer scrutiny, however, entails interesting results concerning the root factors that are purported as having occasioned such a socio-political rupture. It takes three components to prompt an alienation in the Sophoclean dramatic universe: the aristocratic rejection of the dêmos’ political authority, the abuse of political power by the supposedly nomos-abiding dêmos and the eventual breaking apart of the political

is said and done, the ‘man’ that Kaufmann unquestioningly follows Sophocles in fashioning into a timeless construct is one that begins his story with assuaging the fears of the terrified Thebans only to lose interest, gradually but clearly, in lifting the veil of plague. Sophocles’ Thebans manage to lift themselves by their own bootstraps just when the intra-class fissures popping in the political universe of the ruling class is mended. Kaufmann, Tragedy and Philosophy, pp. 134-137, 148ff.

“But perhaps the most remarkable difference between the Aeschylean and Sophoklean protagonists is the latters’ sense of their profound isolation and alienation from the community of which they were once a part ... Even when, within the dynamics of the play, the chorus are partisans of the protagonists, as in the Ajax or Trachiniae, the dramatist is at pains to underline the incapacity of the chorus to understand what is at stake for the protagonists. Despite the fairly open hostility of the chorus of the Agamemnon, Klytennestra, like Agamemnon himself, functions as if she is in control and fully capable of communicating with the chorus. Sophoklean protagonists are isolated from that automatic domination of the social and political hierarchy that is so characteristic of Aeschylean heroes.” Rose, Sons of the Gods, Children of Earth, pp. 269; R. P. Winnington-Ingram, Sophocles: An Interpretation, (Cambridge, 1980), pp. 305-306; Segal, Oedipus Tyrannus, pp. 119-120; Kaufmann, Tragedy and Philosophy, pp. 145-146, 294-295.
ideology. Having analysed the first component in our probe into the aristocratic politics of compromise, we move on to an equally chief factor. The Sophoclean antagonists appear to have a penchant for building castles of decrees in sand. These dramatic castles cannot be secured against the rising tides of phusis for they contravene none other their own claim to political legitimacy. Creon in Antigone is a cardboard sketch of a tyrant that fancies instead of governs. Similarly, Odysseus in Philoctetes is a carbon copy of Creon in overreaching the political power invested in him without having the slightest whiff of justification about his designs. Oedipus’ fate is, of course, the harshest tyrant of all who grants no respite to the protagonists except a measure of full-closure about his unbearable travails. The nomos in these imbalanced, topsy-turvy dramatic worlds has no embedded characteristic of equidistant governance about it; it is a plaything of arbitrariness embodied in the person of tyrant-like antagonists. Sophoclean nomos that emerges at the dramatic points of krisis is self-effacing because its practitioners have turned it into an arbitrary tool of punishment to be utilised against their detractors. It is against this cardinal sin that the forces of phusis is summoned. With the loss of legitimacy goes the ideological pretence of lawfulness: what is there to be gained from an unlawful and chaotic application of nomos? If the aristocratic objection to the tyrant qua démos’ political authority is a primary cause of the instantiation of the dramatic crack between nomos and phusis, another equally significant one is the severing of the ideological chain between dikê and nomos. When justice is transformed into a hollow phrase without any substance, then nomos, be it issued by oligarchs or thêtes, is turned into mere prerogative potentially overthrowing all the conventions that grant its ideological power.

Furthermore, the resolution of this bind through the dramatic intervention of phusis-abiding protagonists does not function as an attempt to reverse the dynamic of power between nomos and phusis. Sophoclean tragedy does not operate at a level that regards the reciprocity between the concepts as one that is reminiscent of a zero-sum-game. A mere replacement of nomos by phusis would be tantamount to evince an equally repulsive set of dictates as that of either Creon or Odysseus. Self-conscious as ever with respect to the political resonances that would be emitted by any such dramatic substitution, Sophocles had all his protagonists to acquiesce to their inevitable fates. While it is true, in that sense, that Sophocles’ Aias appears to wield the almighty power of phusis in his attempt to scorch the Achaean war camp, whose leaders had liaised with the subterfuges of Odysseus in robbing him of the deceased Achilles’ armour, it is just as clear that Athena’s perplexing visitation of him is guided by the attempt to blunt the edges of that ideological weapon. Aias manages to bring about a thoroughgoing revision of the just borders that the users of nomos always need to abide by to be sure, but only at the
price dropping his *phusis*-infused claims for good. Again, Aias dies so that his community can live better than before with the aid of a re-constellated legitimacy of *nomos*.

However one looks at it, there is no Arendtian immutable *conditio humana* in the dramatic worlds constructed by Sophocles.2355 Neither the intricacies of the aristocratic power-play nor the demotic aspects of governance find a steady state that is free of the socio-political flux in those universes. Author of polities and tragedies alike, Sophocles’ plays bear the distinctive marks of an influential political career that has potentially grown in tandem with his dramatic victories. Having experienced and, at times, partaken of his fair share of political turmoil ranging from the reforms of 461 to the fall of the Four Hundred, Sophocles did not manage to telescope the ongoing political conflicts of his day to a mythical universe in which blueprints and prescriptions abound. He knew, in that sense, that the golden age of the Athenian *arkhê* had nothing particularly mythical about it: it depended on the realisation of proportional equality that dictated the redistribution of material, social and political benefits in accordance with their due. The due measure, as such, is the dramatic yardstick that is continually erected by the playwright to strike an aristocratic balance between *nomos* and *phusis*. Vacillating between the two synchronised pendulums are all the determinate configurations of human existence, laughing at the face of any timeless ideal that inclines towards either direction. The set of dramatic existents are thus ever-prone to take a different colouring based on their relation to the event, opening and foreclosing interpretative avenues. A dynamic conception of the socio-political equilibrium, therefore, is the only measure of dramatic comfort in the Sophoclean dramatic universes that are permeated by flux.

5.4.1 Euripides and the Tragedy of New Beginnings
The dramatically ensured emergence of the socio-political equilibrium finds another highly enterprising dramatist in the person of the third of the great Athenian tragedians, Euripides. A contemporary of Sophocles, whose death succeeded that of Euripides by mere months, Euripides closed the golden age of the classical Athenian tragedy. The historical tradition concerning his popularity in the Athens of the second half of the fifth century seem to pale, if victories in the Great Dionysia are to be any judge of it, somewhat in comparison the

2355 That point has been prudently brought home by Segal in the context of his discussion of the oracle that was uttered to Oedipus by Pythia’s priestess, forming the springboard through which the protagonist was to leap at his tragic existence in Thebes: “The Sophoclean oracle is not an interior voice that proclaims a universal and inevitable destiny; it belongs to a religious institution in a society that has prophets and believes in mantic utterances from the gods. Nor does Oedipus assume that the fulfilment of the oracle is inevitable. He immediately takes steps to avoid it.” Segal, *Oedipus Tyrannus*, pp. 42; cf. Kirkwood, *A Study of Sophoclean Drama*, pp. 33; Badiou, *Philosophy and the Idea of Communism*, pp. 65, 67.
admiration enjoyed either by Sophocles or Aeschylus. But the basic fact that the Athenians and the upper-class citizens of the poleis in which the plays of Euripides were performed recorded many more of his plays than they did of the other two dramatists indicate that Euripides’ canonisation was no less secure than those of the others. To gauge Euripides’ cultural influence on his compatriots, however, one would need to account for many other things including Aristophanes’ dramatic competition between him and Aeschylus, in which Sophocles does not participate because he died during the play’s writing, in Frogs and Aristotle’s dubbing of Euripides as the “most tragic of the poets.” Moreover, the renown he achieved was reaped largely as a combined result of all the technical-presentation, narrative and thematic changes that amounted to a wholesale revolution of the tragic medium of his day. On that note, it appears fair to say that just as Aristophanes is often bestowed the double accolade of being the leading member of the Old Comedy and the initiator of the Middle Comedy, Euripides deserves a comparable recognition for all his efforts in creating basically a new dramatic medium.

Euripides’ technical innovations turned the erstwhile barebones stage into one that required a steady bit of engineering expertise. We do not have any contemporary allusions to who may be accorded the honour of introducing either ekkukléma or mêchanē for the first time to the Athenian theatre. Still, there is hardly any cause for worry in regard to the dramatist who made the most use of it. Euripides’ plays were technical marvels that used mechanics to render the supernatural qualities of divinities visible. Dioscuri in Helen, Artemis in Hippolytus, Helios in Medea, Athena in Ion and Suppliant Women, Apollo in Orestes are just some of the notable examples of how frequently Euripides made use of mêchanē, a device to set supernatural personae on the top of the platform of skênē, to employ the divine effigies in resolving a narrative deadlock. His utilisation of ekkukléma, or an extension platform that rolled off-stage events, particularly dead bodies, on to the stage, was no less regular to the extent that Aristophanes chose to use the mechanism to pour additional ridicule on his

2356 Aristophanes, Frogs, 830-1533; I follow Halliwell in taking his brief allusions to Sophocles’ recent death as evincing a reconstruction of the timeframe in which the production of the play precedes the playwright’s death by a narrow margin: ibid., 76-82, 787-794, 1516-1519. For an altogether different approach, which, unfortunately, does not seem to allow sufficient room for interpreting Aristophanes’ comic treatment of Sophocles as an afterthought, see Kaufmann, Tragedy and Philosophy, pp. 231-232.
2357 Aristotle, Poetics, 1453a28-29.
2359 Euripides, Helen, 1642-1686; Hippolytus, 1281-1140; Medea, 1317-1413; Ion, 1551-1618; Suppliant Women, 1182-1232; Orestes, 1626-1690.
Euripides who found himself besieged by numerous angry Athenian women in *Women at the Thesmophoria*.\(^{2360}\) There were two driving forces behind this Euripidean favour of the ‘special effects’ of classical tragedy: to surpass narrative impasses and to flabbergast the audience in twisting the resolution in quite an against the grain manner. If Aeschylus’ characters are publicly talkative and the Sophoclean dramatis personae are never stripped of their veneration of *legein*, then those of Euripides are viable chatterboxes. Banter is the heart and soul of the Euripidean drama. Often stuck in the midst of veritable battles of wits, the Euripidean protagonists and antagonists excel at working out their sparring partners to the full effect. *Agônes*, or ‘formal debates,’ in the Euripidean universe are often quick-tempered, e.g., Iason vs. Medea in *Medea*, Pentheus vs. Dionysius in *Bacchae*, etc., but always rationally argued.\(^{2361}\) The Euripidean Orestes is worlds apart from the Aeschylean one in being a *rhêtor* pure and simple. There is no Apollo to serve as his attorney, no *Erinues* that pester him until the settling of the old accounts and no ‘Apollo commanded me so,’ to be resorted first and foremost in his defence. No: The Euripidean Orestes is ready to swat away the accusations of Tyndareus by relying on the persuasive force of his arguments alone. He killed Clytemnestra because in murdering her he purged Greece of an infamy that would have led, if left unpunished, to every wife contemplating the murder of her husband with impunity.\(^{2362}\) Iocasta’s lack of respect to her marriage bed was the deed that proved her undoing, which leaves Orestes as just a humble and obedient servant of Apollo. Unlike the Aeschylean Orestes, Euripides’ Orestes does not emanate endless shame and dejection; if anything, he is proud of his act and shows that pride in abundance in winning his *agônes*. The *mêchanê* is there when the better agonist outduels his opponent but is punished none the less due to the hierarchically superior position of the latter. When Hippolytus’ pious showcase of his innocence against his father’s accusations to have seduced his wife fails to bring around Theseus,\(^{2363}\) leading eventually to Hippolytus’ death, Artemis, for example, appears at the end of the play to announce his father that the only wrongdoer in the whole debacle was himself.\(^{2364}\) The last laugh does not always belong to the deserving side as it does to Hecuba in *Hecuba*, and the *mêchanê* is there, as such, to redeem the wronged protagonist.

\(^{2360}\) Aristophanes, *Women at the Thesmophoria*, 94.

\(^{2361}\) Euripides, *Medea*, 446-622; *Bacchae*, 431-519.

\(^{2362}\) ‘The acts for which you [Tyndareus] say I deserve to be stoned actually make me the benefactor of all Greece. Here is my argument for this. If women are going to be so brazen that they murder their husbands and then find protection from their children by using their breasts to seek mercy, they’d be making little of killing their husbands for any old grievance. Although what I did was terrible, as you insist, I did put an end to this practice.‘ Euripides, *Orestes*, in *Orestes and Other Plays*, trans. by Robin Waterfield, (Oxford and New York, 2001a), 563-571.


\(^{2364}\) *Ibid*, 1281-1440.
Euripides’ breaking of the agonistic standstill is quite atypical in diverging from the traditional narration of myths. His reconstruction of the myth of *Argonautica*’s final part in *Medea* and his totally novel interpretation of the results of Agamemnon’s crime in *Iphigenia at Aulis* are only two of the many memorable instances in which Euripides gave a new lease of life to traditional legends. Unfortunately, we do not have any complete rendering of the *Argonautica* before the celebrated work in the Hellenistic period that is attributed to Apollonius of Rhodes.2365 Luckily, the hermetic darkness is not all-encompassing and we have bits and pieces of the myth gleaned especially from Pindar’s *Pythian 4*.2366 The fact that Pindar cuts the story short without making any mention of the days Medea and Iason later spent in Corinth in an epinician ode suggests that the macabre ending of the myth was not lost on his contemporary listeners. We do not know to what extent the pre-Euripidean myth had its darker side intact by the time it began to turn into one of the favourite themes of the playwright. And it has been argued that the Euripides might have invented the most horrific event in the play: that of the deliberate infanticide. The myth has, of course, the appearance of being a very complex one, with the gist of its pre-Corinthian part being that the Argonauts, in the leadership of Iason, could not have accomplished the deed of obtaining the golden fleece of Colchis without the divine-induced help of the Colchian princess Medea. Sacrificing her royal power and her family, as one tradition goes as far as portraying her as laying the ruse that would entrap her brother who had been leading the pursuit of the fleeing Argonauts, to help Iason bring back the golden fleece to his native Corinth, Medea chooses to stay with Iason to build a new home and family. While in Corinth, however, some dissatisfactory occurrences give rise to a falling-out and Medea is left defenceless by the person for whom she had sacrificed so much. It is to this part that Euripides creatively turned in order to transform its existential quarrels into his bread and butter.

To Iason’s eyes, his relationship with Medea in Corinth is not a veritable bliss. Corinth, as canvassed by Euripides, is a xenophobic society that does not grant citizenship to foreigners or the children either one of whose parents is not of Corinthian stock.2367 Historically speaking, in that sense, Euripides’ Corinth in the *Medea* is the Athens at the outset of the Peloponnesian War in 431 with Pericles’ law of citizenship firmly entrenched. A decade spent with Medea


2366 Pindar, *Pythian 4*.

2367 Euripides, *Medea*, 591-592; one can refer to the following work on this xenophobic perspective that is more than likely to held sway over Euripides’ contemporary audience: Edith Hall, *Inventing the Barbarian*, (Oxford, 1989), pp. 172-181.
has given the couple two boys who, thus, have no rightful claim to the Corinthian citizenship. This begins to change when Creon, the king of Corinth, offers the hand of his daughter, Glauce, to Iason. From Iason’ perspective, the offer is nothing less than a blessing: he can use the benefits of his royal position to make sure that Medea and their two children can live the most fruitful lives they can. Alas, from Medea’s standpoint Iason’s infidelity is an unmitigated treachery of all the sacrifices she had made for him. The return she gets for all the dangers she braved, crimes she committed and scorn she drew from her family and the politai of her polis is to be betrayed for what she regards as a simple thirst after money and power. But Euripides’ Medea is not the wailing widow of King Darius in Aeschylus’ Persians. She is a crafty warlock of a woman who is not afraid to face the consequences of her actions. Thus, she prepares a poison, steeps one of her majestic robes in it and sends her with Iason as a gift for Glauce. The unsuspecting princess puts on her robe to be consumed by its poison, whose father also falls prey to the trap as she tries to save his daughter, whilst Medea embraces her children for the last time before killing them, hence completing her scheme for taking revenge on the fraudulent Iason. Now, the play was performed at a time when misogyny was just as rampant as xenophobia. That is to say, the deed of Medea pierced the contemporary sensibilities on many levels, as it dared to stage the story of a foreign murderess successfully turning the dramatic tables on her former lover. But before we analyse what this iconoclasm spells for the narrative structure of Euripides’ plays, we need to address the final act of the play which houses the only, yet crucial, use of méchanè.

Consummating the infanticide that is assured to bring Iason to his knees, Medea appears in a chariot that is drawn by dragons, which is given to her by her grandfather the Sun, to put the finishing touches on the play’s bitter conclusion. Of course, the divine aid in question defies all the laws of the space and time continuum as well as those of the mythological Corinth in equal measure with one fell stroke. To that end, the divine intervention that was made

2368 Euripides, Medea, 446-464.
2369 Ibid, 467-520.
2371 The influence of the Euripidean interpretation of the myth can be gleaned directly from the later The Library of Greek Mythology questionably attributed to Apollodorus. In a section of that work, the author uses Euripides’ version of the story as the traditional one about the later history of Medea. Apollodorus, The Library of Greek Mythology, 1.9.28.
2372 Suggestive of the overall impact of that use of méchanè at the ultimate scene of the play is how Pasolini utilised a background voice in order to render his picture complete in Medea. Indeed, all the questions pertaining to his employment of a variety of cinematographic techniques aside, that scene, arguably, is the one that has the most Euripidean flavour in the entire picture.
possible by the technical application of the *mêchanê*, manages to create a shock effect that shatters the whole politico-moral pillars of the contemporary Athenian society whose wives, especially those of the upper class, were expected to live and die under the roofs of their houses of chastity without ever encroaching on any gendered space that was closed to them, including, for most of the time, the *andreion*, or the ‘male’s room’ in which *sumposia* were held. Another one of Euripides’ most memorable employments of shock effect to twist a myth that certainly enjoyed more renown than the final bits of Medea and Jason’s journey takes place at the end of *Iphigenia at Aulis*. Now, given that the play is a veritable Euripidean masterpiece, which was rendered its due in Michaelis Cacoyannis’ faithful modern adaptation to cinema, in addition to being one of the last two surviving plays, the other being the *Bacchae*, to win the Great Dionysia in 406, we will ask the reader’s indulgence in pondering upon the narrative and thematic revolutions that the play promise. Besides those elements the play also features one of the most tragic applications of the shock effect that is realised with no application of either *ekkuklêma* or *mêchanê* but with a simple reliance on the good old Aeschylean method of messenger-play. Iphigenia, finally at peace to sate the craving of the bloodthirsty tyrant-*basileis* of the Achaeans, despite her father’s desperate, yet Janus-faced, attempts to persuade his comrades to do otherwise, makes her way to the altar of sacrifice which is located on the top of a nearby mountain ridge. Clytemnestra, distraught and dishevelled to see her dear daughter taken off to the altar, waits for the tidings that she expects will prove to be her undoing. When a messenger who was present during the sacrifice appears before her in her tent, however, she is not carried away by grief but by joy as the messenger reports that Iphigenia was replaced by a deer at the moment when the strike was delivered by some miracle. Needless to add, nobody knows where exactly Iphigenia was conjured away, but the solace that is heralded by the fact that it is not her blood that has splattered the altar is a no less significant for that matter. Even when he was resorting to the formal aspects of the old non-technical days, Euripides, was hence reviving the old myths in completely different forms.

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2373 An interesting comparison can be drawn between Euripides’ concentrated employment of the technologies of stage and Brecht’s great innovation of *Verfremdungseffekt*, or *V-Effekt*, that was explicitly designed to tear the veil of familiarity that he believed to have been cast over by the classical playwrights for the sake of dismantling the dramatic illusion that was thereby created. Needless to add, I am far from confirming Brecht’s insistence on interpreting the psychic absorption of the spectator as the sole quality of bourgeois theatre from Aeschylus to Thornton Wilder. Though his critique of early twentieth century bourgeois theatre was as penetrative as it was profound, Brecht appears to have missed the point that even at their most aristocratic, the ancient Greek playwrights were full of substantial socio-political promises that often took downright defiant overtones to some of the most taken-for-granted aspects of the prevailing class rule. For a rather jaundiced and normative synopsis of the formal features of ancient Greek tragedy that can be viewed as roughly corresponding to Brecht’s *V-Effekt*, see Kaufmann, *Tragedy and Philosophy*, pp. 416-419; cf. Bertolt Brecht, *Kleines Organon für das Theater, Versuche. Mit einem 'Nachtrag zum Kleinen Organon*', (Frankfurt, 1960), sec. 42 ff.

Indeed, the formalism of Euripides was conceived in line with a completely dialectical relationship that was posited to exist between form and narrative.

This multi-level reciprocity functioned as a breeding ground of the Euripidean core narrative features: triangular dialogue options, a transitivity between minor and major *agônes*, a preference for dramatizing quotidian events and a metanarrative adherence to demotic politics. Euripides’ *dramatis personae*, as we observed above, are quarrelsome and loquacious to a fault. Indeed, litigation is such an ingrained element of the dramatic interplay between different characters that it appears apt to dub it as a veritable part of Euripides’ conception of human condition. An oft-interesting way of observing this bedrock trait is the progression of dialogue in successive triangles which, at times, precede and succeed the central *agônes*.

These triangles are characteristically made up of two debating sides who brandish their arguments in the company of a third person who turns into a debating partner for the winning side at a later stage in the play. With a hastened movement between different triangles, the Euripidean tragedy takes the dramatic understanding of debate to an altogether supreme level. The Aeschylean public figure of Orestes, as we saw above, had an argumentatively scot-free passage from the murder of Clytemnestra to his final acquittal before the Areopagus. Although we do not have a Sophoclean rendition of the myth, our analysis suggests that if there ever were such a version, then, chances are, it would have been a tragedy in which the murder of Clytemnestra would serve as the event, spraying alpha and omega of the whole play with its conflictual set of significations. Contrariwise, Euripides’ Orestes is a character who practically debates his way out of the psychological and social predicaments that arose owing to his murder of Clytemnestra. Squeezed into a tight space between two minor *agônes*, the formal debate of the play is only one among many despite the fact of it being the one that builds the aetiological context of the deed most clearly. With a dazzling procession of triangles that at times leave out the protagonist or antagonist, the formalism explicit in the narrative structure begins to encompass the whole myth. In short, function appears to follow the form of triangular debates in the extant plays of Euripides.

Directly related to this narrative feature of triangular debates, is a high degree of transitivity between the formal debate and the minor *agônes*. The interrelation between the various *agônes* in a single play is not one of dialogical progression, *par* Aeschylus, or a hierarchical ranking of the primal deed above all others, *par* Sophocles; Euripidean debates interlock as separate

2375 For the core set of features of agon within the dramatic universe of Euripides, see Michael A. Lloyd, *The Agon in Euripides*, (Oxford, 1992), pp. 3-6.
nodal points in a nexus of aetiology that induce a discernible movement away from the
traditional narrative. Agamemnon speaks out with such rigour and clarity against his
lampooning brother that the minor agônes succeeding the formal debate shows a self-doubting
Menelaus that finally gives in to the argumentative force of Agamemnon’ exclamation, “I want
to share with you in wisdom, not in folly.” Likewise, even when a veritable shouting match
appears to have replaced the major agônes in a play as in Bacchae, the outcome of the
exchange of different vignettes, one made by impious Pentheus and Dionysius himself, is
particularly important for giving direction to the narrative vicissitudes. Indeed, the transitivity
does not bend even when the major agônes has failed to signal an indubitable winner as in the
one that is occasioned in the Phoenician Women. As neither Eteocles nor Polynices
manages to gain the upper hand in the formal debate, Iocasta’s equidistant arbitration between
the two warring brothers to the effect that they should both drop their hostile claims takes on
a key signification that is akin to a prophesy as in the myth of The Seven Against Thebes
which culminates with the brothers killing each other. Converging with or diverging from the
traditional rendering, the narrative nexus of interlocked debates does not budge from its
dominating place. The adding of the rationalist flavour to the unmitigated hatred between
Polynices and Eteocles or that of an Athenocentric one to Creon’s ban on the customary burial
of Polynices in the Suppliant Women is realised using the same mortar and pestle of
intertwined agônes exhausting every causal framework beneath each dialogue option in order
to offer the most appealing one to the audience as the dramatic vindication of Euripides’
interpretation.

Euripides attempted to wed his interlocked generation of triangular debates with a more
quotidian approach to characterisation and interaction that had its feet planted firmly in the
goings-on of the Athens of his day. That accentuated quotidianism can be analysed at three
different levels: dialogue, narration of sentiments and dramatic action. In regard to its ties to
the semantics of narration, the Euripidean quotidianism speaks to an endeavour to put
everyday words and expressions into the mouths of various dramatis personae. Even at their
most philosophic turns, the Euripidean characters merge their ideas with quite run-of-the-mill
phrases or insinuations that are practically worlds apart from either the Aeschylean stern and
lofty phrasebook or the Sophoclean legein that is ever on the prowl to excavate hidden
meanings and truths. The words of wisdom darted by Theseus at the Theban messenger to
convey a righteous belief in Athens as the custodian of timeless Greek codes in the Suppliant

2377 Euripides, Iphigenia at Aulis, in Bacchae and Other Plays, 407.
2378 Euripides, Phoenician Women, 446-635.
2379 Ibid, 1658-1659.
Women, the verdict of Demophon to keep the Heraclidae safe and sound in Athens, which express a similar attitude of sanctimonious moral superiority in Children of Heracles and the insults heaped on Phærus by his only son at the end of the agônes of Alcestis are all examples that shine with a constancy in terms of privileging the everyday against the exotic or ungraspable. In characterisation, Euripides thus appears to have brought the stage ever closer to the commonplace, to the point of trivialising their whole tragic substance. Mannerisms, puns, quips, etc., all feel vibrant and alive in Euripides as they had never before. With the banalisation of tragic dialogue emerge detailed self-styled adumbrations of temperaments and emotional states and disturbances. Euripides’ characters not only converse like proper late fifth-century Athenians, they also exhibit a high degree of self-awareness that stems from a preconceived semantic commonality bringing all the Athenians together. The simple eloquence of the Euripidean Heracles who is moments away from having slaughtered his wife and children in Heracles Furens or that of Agave who innocuously carry the severed remains of her boy on a bier just beside her in the Bacchae are memorable instances of this translucency of the Euripidean sensus communis. To that end, if one of Euripides’ characters makes a logical deduction or picks up a clue while enduring his or her share of tragic existence, the train of thought is almost completely verbalised ad nauseam. Medea’s honest plea to her waiting ladies to bestow upon her their silence which is the only way, as she explicitly states, for a person that is doubly handicapped, i.e., in being a woman and a foreigner, throws all the aspects of her thinking into the open. And in one of the most memorable dramatic jibes of the surviving examples of classical drama, Euripides take a direct shot at the Aeschylean recognition scene between Electra and Orestes as it is depicted in the Libation Bearers. Ridiculing the Aeschylean Electra’s counter-intuitive affirmation of a lock of hair, the cutting of which is a sign of intense grief, and footprints in the cave as clear hints of her brother’s presence in the alcove, Euripides’ Electra rationally refutes that two

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2381 “No, don’t be so stupid. You should appreciate that we humans are beset with troubles, and that life a struggle. Some men prosper now, some later, some in the past. Only the gods live a life of ease, in that they receive worship and honour from the unfortunate who hope to prosper, and are glorified by the fortunate who fear death. Anyone who appreciates this should put up with being wronged with relative equanimity, not with anger, and should commit only wrongs which will have no repercussions.” Euripides, Suppliant Women, in Euripides and Other Plays, 549-557.

2382 Euripides, Children of Heracles, 237-250.

2383 “Damn you and that wife of yours! The two of you can go and grow old childless, as you deserve, even though your child is living. For you will never again enter any building where I live. And if I’d had to get town-criers to announce my rejection of your hearth, my ancestral home, I’d have done so.” Euripides, Alcestis, in Heracles and Other Plays, trans. by Robin Waterfield, (Oxford and New York, 2003a), 734-739.

2384 Euripides, Heracles, 1340-1395.

2385 Euripides, Bacchae, 1217-1300.

2386 Euripides, Medea, 215-264.

2387 Aeschylus, Libation Bearers, 183-211.
locks of hair belonging to a man and a woman can ever be the same and that there can be no footprint on rock.\textsuperscript{2388} The jibe can, of course, be taken as an implicit metapoetic impulse against the recognised limits of the tragic medium.\textsuperscript{2389} Yet, the introduction of the rationally conveyed basic analysis of the evidence also shows that the Euripidean Electra is construed as someone who does not need either footprints magically appearing on rock or locks of hair humming with a similarity to her own hair in order to separate seed from chaff. Indeed, the addition of the Old Man that stole away Orestes himself into the fold thereby turning the couple into a triangle is more than sufficient for Electra to make out who stands before her.\textsuperscript{2390}

The quotidianism of the Euripidean dialogue and the lucid scrutiny of thoughts and sentiments of his dramatis personae also run hand in hand with his narration of tragic action. Eventful as always, the receptacle of Greek mythologies has afforded Euripides with myriads of extraordinary actions to be alluded to on the stage, ranging from Heracles’ voyage into the underworld to rescue Admetus’ wife Alcestis, who had offered her life to Death for the life of her husband,\textsuperscript{2391} to Medea’s exploits with the Argonauts, which shatter all the filial relations she erstwhile had. Contrary to either the aloof pronunciations of Aeschylus or the sublime layers of signification of Sophocles, however, the dramatic rendition of those supernatural quests in Euripides display no dose of intrigue or suspense. In response to Admetus’ curious disbelief of his having fought and beaten Death, Heracles merely jibes, “[I fought him] Right by her [Alcestis’] tomb. I ambushed him and seized him.”\textsuperscript{2392} Likewise, her nurse depicts Medea, who after all is a foreign princess, as a typical wife who ought to delight her husband in everything she does, because “This is what keeps a marriage intact more than anything, when a husband can count on complete support from his wife.”\textsuperscript{2393} Euripides’ rendition of Heracles and Medea respectively as a gluttonous and clumsy wrestler and a loving wife may not seem to relay its shock effect to a modern audience. For the contemporary Athenian audience, who were more used to seeing the solemn side of the mythological characters on...
tragic competitions, except for the satyr-plays that is, however, the opposite was certainly the case. Indeed, even when he was not essentially shaping a characteristic trait from scratch but only giving it more tragic substance, Euripides managed to create stratified meanings of banality which set him apart from the rest of the dramatic competition. Tempering with a Homeric figure of indecisiveness epitomised in the character of Agamemnon, for example, Euripides managed to flesh out a straw-man of a persona into a *basileus* torn between the safety of her daughter, the surety of the Achaean enterprise and the security of his own leadership. It is not the words of a man who is only dithering and pusillanimous like a one-dimensional cardboard figure that Euripides puts in the mouth of Agamemnon when he talks with her for the last time to hear her willing sacrifice. Far from it; Euripides’ Agamemnon is someone whose profound care for his daughter fights a desperate battle against the bloodthirsty Achaecans who had assembled at Aulis in response to the call of Agamemnon and Menelaus. Calling off the war effort against the Trojans means scores of cutthroats will be on the loose for pillaging the Argive land of the *basileus* whose promise of war booty and revenge were not delivered. Euripides’ Agamemnon needs to ask her daughter to be a willing sacrifice *malgré soi*.

By characterising Heracles, Medea and Agamemnon among dozens of others as personae who acted, talked and felt just like any ordinary Athenian of his day, Euripides created dramatic universes that were conceived through the lens of the demotic politics. Naturally, the interpretation of various political aspects of Euripides’ plays depends upon the dates proposed for his surviving plays in accord with later testimonia. On that note, we would like to concentrate upon four of his plays, namely, *Alcestis*, *Medea*, *Trojan Women* and *Iphigenia at Aulis* the dating of which are more secure than others to attempt to shed light on three traits that we think to be essential to the politics of Euripidean tragedy: an adherence to the politics of non-violent confrontation, an implicit political hierarchy in whose accord material benefits are to be proportioned and a defence of a politicised ethics. The *agônes* in the Euripidean corpus almost always exhibit a tendency to take a turn toward fisticuffs. Produced in 438 after the putting down of the final wildfire of revolt before the Peloponnesian War, Euripides’ *Alcestis* is a myth of a king, Admetus, whose allotted time has come, the culmination of which can be postponed only if he manages to find a willing replacement to die in his stead. Having

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2394 The only surviving example of a satyr-play is Euripides’ *Cyclops*, which transposed the Homeric cave of Polyphemus to a wild abode of homosexual fantasy from which Odysseus attempts to survive. As later portrayed by Tony Harrison’s drama, *The Trackers of Oxyrhynchus*, the choice setting appears to have spoken to a sense of pre-industrial idyllic existence of fifth-century audience. Euripides, *Cyclops*, in *Heracles and Other Plays*; Tony Harrison, *The Trackers of Oxyrhynchus*, (London, 1990).

failed in his appeals to his father, Pheres, and mother, Admetus is saved by Alcestis who is then taken away by Death.2396 Once his wife is ferried away, however, Admetus comes to realise that he could not live the remainder of his life while Alcestis was wandering alone in the underworld. Luckily, with the supernatural aid of Heracles, who visits the couple’s mansion moments after the passing away of Alcestis, the verdict of Death is overturned thence rewarding Alcestis with a new lease of life.2397 The formal debate of the play is occasioned when his father the former king brazenly visits Admetus but finds an antagonised enemy of a son, who finishes his rebuke with the claim that he would disown the old man if he could.2398 In regard to the play’s historical context, the play was written in the aftermath of the joint Samian and Byzantine rebellion whose spread was barely controlled. Euripides’ everlasting bond between Alcestis and Admetus can, in that sense, be conceived as the one tying Samos and Athens together within the politics of arkhê.

The fact that the potential loss of Samos would have been a heavy blow to the maintenance of the Athenian empire was no secret. In fact, that is what, according to Thucydides, enticed the Byzantines to begin a revolt of their own in the first place.2399 Euripides, in that vein, is quite likely to have shared the sentiment that the Athenians and Samians needed each other if the commercial profits of the empire were to be reaped together. On a macro-political level, the politics of non-violent confrontation functions as the rhetorical force that drives the constituents of the empire to remain ever faithful to their leader. Euripides, ever attentive to the opinions of all the sides of a debate, has embodied the threat to the unity of the loving couple in the personae of Pheres and his wife, who would not forego the overripe fruits of their old age for the sake of their only son.2400 That older couple, on this view, can be regarded as the dramatic representation of the Samian oligarchs, whose yearning for their better lot under Persian authority was decisive in the materialisation of the revolt. The fact that the marital bond between Alcestis and Admetus is re-established at the expense of that between Pheres and Admetus shows that no diplomatic ties is hallowed enough to discourage the essential safekeeping of the empire. On a micro-political level, the Euripidean notion of the common defence of interests issues a call to the Athenian dêmos to take up their arms in order to put

2400 “[Pheres speaking] Don’t die for me and I won’t die for you [Admetus]. You enjoy being alive–do you think your father doesn’t? By my calculations, we spend a long time down below, while life is short but sweet. At any rate, you fought shamelessly against death, and you’re living now beyond your appointed time because you condemned her (pointing to ALCESTIS) to death. And do you then accuse me of cowardice–you, the ultimate coward, who proved worse than the woman who died for you, her fine young husband?” Euripides, *Alcestis*, 690-699.
the *eupatrid* plans geared towards securing the *arkhê* into practice. The bond of affection between Alcestis and Admetus is sentimentally significant for both. And yet, therein lies the catch: their connection is crucial only for Alcestis, the whole meaning of whose sacrifice dawns on Admetus only when she is gone.²⁴⁰¹ There is a political dimension to this sentimental hierarchy and it is the naturalisation of the distribution of unequal material benefits of the empire between the upper- and lower-class Athenians. Of course, Admetus comes to regret his initial decision to ask his wife for the sacrifice, but the suggestive poetics of his remorse is not consummate. We do not know if his mourning of Alcestis would cause him to be in the depths of self-effacing despair. But we do know that he regards the loss of Alcestis as final, meaning that, the choice to live or die lays essentially with him, which is certainly much narrower than the psychological torrents that had fed into the making of Alcestis’ decision. Heracles’ supernatural rescue mission is only the roundabout confirmation of the fact that it is only the side that finds itself hung on the lower rung of political hierarchy that needs divine intervention to see the daylight again.

As with Pheres, so with Heracles. The two ethical border-guards fencing the arena which is to be populated by the political sides show that no infringement of the entrenched politics of empire is to be tolerated. Alcestis’ death is as much a sacrifice as it is a trial for the playwright to exhibit the supernatural lengths to which he is willing to venture in order to recapture the bond of fondness that resides at the heart of the play. Heracles’ narration of his voyage to the underworld may seem banal in the utmost, but his action is not. Inventing a rather comic pretext for Heracles to attempt Alcestis’ rescue as a road to redemption that needs to be trodden by the former as a reprieve for all the recklessness that he had unknowingly displayed in the morning house, Euripides appears to have stretched his mythmaking skills in order to draw a line of ethico-political supervision. Heracles’ superhuman effort finds an interesting counterpart in Admetus’ heaping of abuse on his father in the *agônes*. Pheres’ rejection of his allotted role as the most fitting candidate for his son’s survival jeopardises the entire political hierarchy of the play. In labelling Pheres’ distance to his son’s travails as a significant factor in priming Alcestis’ sacrifice, Euripides uncovers an additional layer of aetiology whose reconciliation with the narrative is realised by Admetus’ banishment of his father from his home. Pheres and Death are the two characterisations, as such, that function as ethical thresholds whose setting is thoroughly politicised.

²⁴⁰¹ His emotional breakdown beside his dying wife’s deathbed aside, Admetus admits as much when he solemnly remarks that he had full foreknowledge of Alcestis’ bargain with dead well before its eventuality. *Ibid*, 420–422.
Peered through the lens of the Athenian politics of *arkhê* and class, *Medea* is a play which dares to show the foreseeable consequences if the Euripidean politics of non-violent confrontation is discarded out of hand. Produced in the first year of the Peloponnesian War, the play takes place after Iason makes up his mind to marry with Glauce. Now, the play offers some of the most glaring tragic depictions of the Athenian women’s lot in the existing dramatic corpus. Medea’s embitterment is not a Euripidean rendition of the Sophoclean Antigone’s rightful indignation: it is more. In her talks with her handmaidens, Medea dares to vivisect Iason’s grotesque act of infidelity in order to lay bare the twin pillars that hold its dramatic justification together: misogyny and xenophobia. Indeed, Medea has a lot to opine on the sexism inherent to the classical Corinthian society which is skilfully telescoped to the mythological prehistory. Physical domination, socially constructed misogynist laws and customs, and gendered social spaces are all intellectual termini in Medea’s memorable tour de force. But Euripides has the nerve to venture even further. Characterising an Iason who attempts to whitewash his infidelity solely on the grounds of Medea’s insensibility, Euripides substantiates the main dramatic conflict of the play with a large dose of politics of gender. In other words, the enactment of Medea’s tragic mirror image in Iason shows the audience that Medea was not daydreaming when she began to recite her dirge on the sexist bulwark that rejected her intrinsically just socio-political demands. The crime of infidelity that Iason commits against Medea is political to the full extent of the word. In leading the Argonauts to

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2402 Can the articulate outspokenness of a Euripidean Medea, Hecuba or Clytemnestra be taken as a historical sign of a vogue of anti-misogynist discourse on women’s political participation, whose participants could have been men and women alike, that may have convulsed Athens during the latter half of the Peloponnesian War? We concur with Rose in arguing that it can, albeit qualitatively: leaving Euripides’ heroines aside we do not have much to go in reconstructing the scope of any such debate. Rose, *Sons of the Gods, Children of Earth*, pp. 358; cf. Pomeroy, *Godesses, Whores, Wives, and Slaves*, pp. 107-108.

2403 “Of all creatures that have life and reason we women are the most miserable of specimens! In the first place, at great expense we must buy a husband, taking a master to play the tyrant with our bodies (this is an injustice that crowns the other one). And here lies the crucial issue for us, whether we get a good man or a bad. For divorce brings disgrace on a woman and in the interval she cannot refuse her husband. Once she finds herself among customs and laws that are unfamiliar, a woman must turn prophet to know what sort of man she will be dealing with as husband – not information gained at home. … When a man becomes dissatisfied with married life, he goes outdoors and finds relief for his frustrations. But we are bound to love one partner and look no further. They say we live sheltered lives in the home, free from danger, while they wield their spears in battle – what fools they are! I would rather face the enemy three times over than bear a child once.” Euripides, *Medea*, in *Medea and Other Plays*, trans. by John Davie, 230-251.


2405 “The fact is that you women have reached the point where you think your happiness is complete when love smiles on you but, should some misfortune mar that love, you take all that is good and beautiful in life and turn it into grounds for bitter hatred. There should have been some other means for mankind to reproduce itself, without the need of a female sex; this would rid the world of all its troubles.” Euripides, *Medea*, 569-575.
success, Medea has benefited the entire polis of Corinthians.\footnote{\label{ftnt:2406}Ibid, 476-487.} Further, in bearing her lot as a simple non-citizen wife of a notable Corinthian, she complied with the politics of gender as it was practised in Corinth. As she stripped herself of her former political authority and social privileges, Medea attempted, in effect, to de-characterise herself.\footnote{\label{ftnt:2407}Medea’s desperate reprisal of Iason’s ‘good tidings’ bring out how selflessly she had devoted herself to her husband’s whims that she has practically become a person bereft of the benefits of her former life: “Where am I to turn now? To my father’s house that I betrayed together with my homeland when I came here? Or to Pelias’ wretched daughters? A fine welcome to their home would they give me, the woman who caused their father’s death! No, this is how things stand: my own family at home now have cause to hate me, while, to please you, I have become hated by the very people who should have had kindness from me, not harm.” Ibid, 503-509.} The disarming docility of the proud sorceress is not an act, it is a testimony to the storms she is willing to brave in order not to transgress the borders of Euripidean consensual politics, latent political hierarchy and politicised ethics. By threatening to send her and her children to exile, Creon crosses over the border that separates demotic debate from violence.\footnote{\label{ftnt:2408}Ibid, 549-554.} By menacing her as the uncomplacent author of his own actions, Iason promotes the hyper-politicisation of Medea, who, seeing that even her abject lot is not enough to stop any attempt at squeezing it further, refuses to play by the rules of pervasive socio-political hierarchy anymore. And by chastising her protests as coarse ingratitude for all the ‘civilising’ benefits she is preconceived to have reaped from being a part, albeit a second-grade one, of a Greek polis, Iason and Creon kindle the flames that would go on to cause the ethics of due measure to be burned to a cinder.\footnote{\label{ftnt:2409}Ibid, 535-539.}

\textit{Medea} is a play of political hyper-polarity dramatically rediscovered. It is a tragedy that shows that there is no permanent winner, at least in dramatic terms, of any political debate. If any agonistic side dares to turn any disagreement, public or private, into an antagonism, then a new politics of might makes right, a socio-political hierarchy redistributing the lots and a reconceived politicised ethics will rise to fill in the vacuum that had been created by their former counterparts. Harbouring no chimeras what so ever in regard to what a momentous collective effort would be required of dèmos if Athens was to prevail against the Peloponnesians, Euripides built a veritable political blueprint that was just as impressive, if not effective, as Pericles’ strategy of ‘do not overreach.’ The so-called tragic essence of the play, on this view, is not a dramatic manifestation of the perennial evils besetting social reality, but an actual social predicament that stems from a definite class society which is located in a particular spatio-temporal configuration.\footnote{\label{ftnt:2410}Contra, H. D. F. Kitto, \textit{Greek Tragedy}, revised edition, (London and New York, 2013), pp. 250.}
Euripides’ Trojan Trilogy including *Trojan Women* is another play that displays the dialectic interplay between the tripod supporting his demotic politics. Produced in 415, the same year in which the main Athenian fleet commenced the Sicilian expedition, the play focuses on the persona of Hecuba, the widow of Priam, king of Ilium, who has seen her fortunes, and those of her city, plummet as Priam is butchered while supplicating.\(^{2411}\) Troy is in flames and Hecuba herself is assigned as a household slave to none other than Odysseus of the many wiles.\(^{2412}\) Contrary to her depiction in *Hecuba* whose protagonist is a byword of resilient ingenuity, the Hecuba of *Trojan Women* is characterised as someone who sees what little solace has remained in her hands slowly slip away owing to the efforts of the vengeful Achaeans. Surrounded by a group of Achaeans who do not need any reason to be provoked into rubbing salt to her wounds, even Hecuba’s self-conscious false hopes and delusions are subject to scrutiny and dissipation by her enemies. Herded off like cattle to Odysseus’ ship, Hecuba’s journey in the play is a veritable storehouse of nightmares as she comes across her daughter, Cassandra, but while trying to soothe her incoherent ramblings sees her dragged off to Agamemnon as his slave.\(^{2413}\) Cassandra’s descending ever deeper into insanity, in fact, is only the beginning of Hecuba’s woes.\(^{2414}\) Stumbling upon Andromache, his daughter-in-law and the widow of Hector, and her son, Astyanax, to be informed that another daughter of her, Polyxena, was sacrificed as a grave offering to the dead Achilles,\(^{2415}\) Hecuba is pressed even harder as she experiences Achaean soldiers ripping Astyanax off his mother to be duly thrown from the towers of Troy.\(^{2416}\) And to top it all, her rational arguments against Helen, as the latter tries to weasel out of her responsibility in turning Troy into a slaughterhouse for Trojans and Achaeans alike, falls on the deaf ears of Menelaus who turns down Hecuba’s offer to summarily execute Helen once and for all.\(^{2417}\) Yet, even that is not the entire reckoning that lays in store for Hecuba as she sees her dear city devoured by flames that were lit by the Achaeans before finally making it to Odysseus’ ship.\(^{2418}\) What is there to be salvaged from such a figure that is battered endlessly...

\(^{2411}\) Euripides, *The Trojan Women*, 17-19


\(^{2413}\) *Ibid.*, 408-422.

\(^{2414}\) Cassandra’s eroticised vengefulness seeking to palm Agamemnon off through willy submission for the sake of unleashing her tragic fury is clad with an additional layer of contrast in Sartre’s adaptation of the play. In facing the pressing need to bring out the full play of woes to the light of a French audience that had severed its intellectual ties to the Homeric conception of a tragic existence to the extent that it lost its appetite in looking for any tragic element behind the atrocities committed over the course of the Second World War and the Algerian War, Sartre appears to have amplified that clash between the erotic and the cathartic at the expense of the cruel subtlety with which Euripides had sublimated the dramatic revaluation of the old muthos. Jean-Paul Sartre, *The Trojan Women*, in Three Plays: *Kean, Nekrassov, The Trojan Women*, trans. by Ronald Duncan, (London, 1982).

\(^{2415}\) Euripides, *The Trojan Women*, 621-622.

\(^{2416}\) *Ibid.*, 725-726.


by the vicissitudes of her fortune in order to record the potential political echoes of the play? As it turns out, there is quite a lot.

Hecuba wails her way out of the overarching misery by prophesying a politics of future which will overpower even the sheer necessity that seep into the most revengeful acts of the Achaeans. Always displaying a forward-looking element in her laments, Hecuba paves the way for the emanation of a new politics that will purge the Achaeans for their share of all the atrocities committed after the fall of Troy. There are three levels to this politics of the future as it surfaces in the words of Hecuba: a pre-political divination that is most evident in Cassandra’ proclamations; a politics of rationality in which the oppressed grows into being the oppressor; and a partial glimpse into a politics of future and what it promises to the two warring sides at the end of the play. The mythological background of the play informs us that Apollo punished Cassandra for having spurned his advances with a curse that would prevent anyone from ever believing the true prophesies she utter.2419 In Euripides’ hands, this curse would come to function as the bread-and-butter of a Cassandra whose premonitions are as true to life as they are nitty-gritty. Giving an essential summary of all the tribulations that Odysseus will endure in his voyage back Ithaca, Cassandra knocks off the first column of Euripides’ demotic politics: if the Achaeans are intent on resorting to the ‘rules’ of warfare to subjugate the Trojans who had been beaten down, then violence will breed viciousness to create a modified form of politics of antagonism.2420 Cassandra knows the place where Agamemnon will be at his most vulnerable, which is why she will accompany her master willingly back to Mycenae in order to precipitate a train of events that will destroy Agamemnon’s house.2421 Cassandra’s auguries function as the pre-political declaration of the dawn of a new political horizon, redressing the former wrongdoers with a flurry of punishments. Realising that this hazy horizon promises only the end of the hitherto subscribed politics of consent and thus nothing with respect to the new politics which will eventually take its place, Hecuba invokes gods or as she calls them ‘fickle allies,’2422 in order to seal the doom of the old polity. With the prophecy of the fall of the old political order foretold, Hecuba is guided to her second sojourn, this time with Andromache and Astyanax. Empowered by Cassandra’s frantic omens, Hecuba attempts to lift Andromache’s spirits by offering her a self-conscious measure of false hope.2423

2420 Euripides, The Trojan Women, 428-444.
2421 “Farewell, my mother. Do not shed a tear. O my dear fatherland and my brothers beneath the ground and our father who begat us, it will not be long before you greet me. I shall come among the dead as a victor. I shall have laid waste the house of the sons of Atreus, the men who destroyed us.” Euripides, The Trojan Women, trans. by James Morwood, 458-462.
2422 Ibid, 471.
2423 “Dying and living are very different things, my child. The former is nothing, but while there’s life, there’s hope.” Ibid, 632-633.
But when this remedy fails to do its work, she moves on to herald a rational ordering of due punishment that is to be realised through purposeful human action alone. Conveying that dwelling on the past mistakes will get Andromache nowhere, Hecuba’s re-enactment of the socio-political hierarchy is thus based on a levelling of former differences via the just visitation of the offenders. No ‘fickle allies’ are needed to bring this new hierarchy to fruition, just careful planning and coldblooded execution. The attempt to create this new socio-political hierarchy is momentarily stopped dead in its tracks, however, with the killing of Astyanax, leaving Hecuba nowhere else to turn to but anagê who rules supreme over divinities themselves. This setback proves only fleeting, however, as Hecuba makes her most effective appeal to Menelaus’ reason as she parries Helen’s attempt to vindicate her actions blow by blow. No divinities or myths can escape from the rationalist scorn of Hecuba as she lunes at every lousy pretext that Helen devises in order to whitewash her actions. There is only one winner of the agônes of The Trojan Women as recognised by Menelaus himself. And yet, the victor’s glory is deceptive: notwithstanding his vows of stern judgment, Menelaus resolves to transport Helen back to Mycenae wherein her trial will take place. As always, Hecuba proves a quick-study in conceiving this respite for what it is: an indication of possible reconciliation, for, as she laconically notes, “Once a lover, always a lover.” And yet, Helen’s return to Mycenae is not without any consolation. Being a chaotic force in her own right, Helen can undermine the Mycenaean polity so that a harbinger of destruction, e.g., Orestes, can tear it down.

As she heralds the advent of a new socio-political hierarchy that will be construed in accord with the rationally propounded distribution of just deserts, Menelaus’ scorn of her argument for the immediate execution of Helen, in addition to the final burning of Ilium, Hecuba’s character develops into that of a genuine prophetess. Laying another one for every piece of deity, morality and scruple that has been ditched by Achaeans to exercise their every whim on the Trojans, Hecuba projects the stirrings of a new ethics to her society of the future where the wrongs of the Achaeans will finally be righted. The new political horizon is hence

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2424 “No, my dear child, forget about Hector’s tragedy. Your tears will never save him. Honour your new master, seduce your husband into loving you for the way you behave. And if you do this, you will give pleasure to all your friends and you may bring up this son of my son to prove Troy’s greatest support, so that the children to be born from your blood may found Ilium anew and the city can still exist.” *Ibid*, 698-705.
2428 “So my suffering was all that concerned the gods—that, and Troy too, the city they picked out for their hatred. All our ox-sacrifices were in vain. Yet if god had not turned the world upside-down, we would vanish into obscurity. We would never have given men to come the inspiration to sing us in their song.” *Ibid*, 1240-1245.
substantiated as one of a total subversion of the political hierarchy as it came to emerge after
the fall of Troy. The legend of Troy, located within this new ethical plane, belongs to the
Trojans just as much as it does to the Achaeans. In contravening virtually every time-honoured
convention, the Achaeans have pillorised themselves as the guilty party that is significantly
responsible for creating the epic cataclysm. Paris’ judgment may have occasioned the
commencement of the hostilities, but their conclusion which bred equal enmity is the making
of the Achaeans alone.

Conceived along the lines of our narrative reconstruction, *The Trojan Women* is a play in
which Hecuba builds upon Medea’s groundwork, which annihilated the whole project of
consensual and hierarchised ethico-politics without necessarily emanating anything to take its
place. Hecuba makes good on the Euripidean promise that the triangular procession of *agônes*
is ceaseless. Solving each ethical and hierarchical dilemma alongside a conception of the
politics of future, Hecuba’s final glance at the burning Troy is one that is darted at the
smouldered remains of the politics of sheer domination as it was practised by the Achaeans.

Written in the sixteenth year of the Peloponnesian War, by which point the Athenian
commitment to the war effort had increased exponentially, *The Trojan Women* is a play that
elaborates on the theme of demotic politics and reminds the root-and-branch *dêmos* that no
political lacuna, if dug without providing any replacement, will ever remain unfilled. Having
taken note of the increased oligarchic activity in the *polis’* underground *hetaireiai* in the years
420-415, Euripides might have conceived that the sumptuous Athenian investment in the
Sicilian expedition had all the makings of a political force that could either make or break the
Athenian polity. If the Athenians were to be ready for the second Peloponnesian onslaught,
then the ongoing political injuries, e.g., pro-democratic Alcibiades and his supporters versus
oligarchic upper-classes, needed to be mended. In the event Euripides’ prognoses proved
largely true with a twist: *dêmos* proved too powerful a counterweigh for the oligarchs to
meddle with.

The last of the Euripidean plays in our list, *Iphigenia at Aulis*, was staged posthumously after
406 to win the last first-prize of the playwright’s career. This was a time when the Athenians
had appeared primed to make a comeback after the turbulent years of oligarchic rule in 411/0.
Coupled with *Bacchae*, the play made a pair that would captivate the Greek artists for the rest
of the antiquity and beyond. The myth of the stranded Greek fleet whose leaders had to
propitiate Artemis and her seer Calchas to be granted safe passage with the accommodating
favourable winds was, to be sure, a Hesiodic one that was quite well known in the antiquity as
the *katexochen* embodiment of the ultimate sacrifice. The Hesiodic narrative of the
mythological events, however, is not only dull but also had an unequivocal ending as Iphigenia was transformed by Artemis into Hecate right at the moment of her sacrifice to bring forth the favourable winds. All of that changed when Euripides set about working on the myth. Having previously altered the ending of the myth in his *Iphigenia among the Taurians*, to the effect that Iphigenia was not sacrificed at the altar but was spirited away at the last possible instant to an uncomfortable abode amid the Taurians, Euripides brought all his tragic enterprise on this later interpretation of the events at Aulis. Ubiquitous in its forebodings, Euripides’ demotic rendition of the myth comprised the final step in his dramatization of contemporary Athenian politics. With a pronounced take on the ever-shifting political ground of demotic politics, Euripides purported a retrojected multi-level democracy in order to come to terms with the most tragic of events.

There are three interlinked levels at which the tragic workings of the Euripidean democracy can be seen: intra upper-class, inter-class and filial. The conflicts among the foremost members of the Achaean upper-class, personified in the characters of Agamemnon and Menelaus, make up the first sphere in the play’s narrative structure encompassing myriads of political agonisms. Menelaus, the party that was most offended by Paris’ abduction of Helen, is implicitly characterised, in that vein, as initially eyeing any opportunity to make inroads to *dēmos* in order to overcome any political barrier to the recovery of Helen. Agamemnon, on the other hand, is depicted as a character who had learned it the hard way that ascertaining the safe return of Helen is not worth any price when Calchas asked for the sacrifice of his dear daughter for the unpropitious winds to subside. On that note, Menelaus’ rapport with the Achaean army serves as the tiebreaker that retains its role until the *agônes* of the play. Summoning the voice of reason in his aid, Agamemnon constructs a jetty of rationalism to withstand the appeals of his brother to sacred ties of friendship and brotherhood. And the voice makes an immediate impact. When a messenger appears before the two siblings to announce that Iphigenia, accompanied by her mother, Clytemnestra, are making their way to the Achaean camp, Menelaus has a change of heart as he sees the feebleness of his brother who is practically out of his wits in regard to recouping the situation. Deciding to throw in

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2433 “When I saw tears falling from your eyes, I pitied you, I myself shed tears for you in my turn, and I withdraw the words I spoke before. I am not your enemy. No, I am putting myself in your position. And I advise you not to kill your child and not to prefer my interests to yours. For it is not right that you should sorrow while all goes well for me and that your child should die while my family looks on the light of day.” *Ibid*, 476-484.
his lot with his brother, Menelaus swallows his pride and risks losing face rather than losing a brother. Agamemnon’s promise to the seer of Calchis, as well as the ruse he had prepared for his daughter who was announced to be wed to Achilles at Aulis, reconfigured the basic premise of consensual politics: a word once given has bound the upper-classes, especially with the addition of Odysseus and Achilles, to keep it for the sake of not disturbing the skewed political equilibrium any further. Filial crises, however significant they are, do not comprise the intra-class conflicts as portrayed in the play. The understanding between the brothers, as such, is not sufficient in and of itself to call off the impending sacrifice of Iphigenia. With the addition of the volatile characters of Odysseus, Achilles and the religiously-backed Calchis into the upper-class fold, Euripides has shown that once a rectification of consensual politics is set to be conceived, its failure can only result in an alteration of even a more radical hue. Odysseus’, Achilles’ or Calchis’ names are no vignettes to be kept in mind, they are symbolisations of Euripides’ insight that a failed political reform will generate an even more sweeping one in its stead. If either Odysseus or Achilles is dubbed as the leader of this possible emendation, then the Achaean army or the Myrmidons are to be conceived as anticipated harbingers of the act. Typically supposed to be at the beck and call of their war chiefs, the Achaean army qua démos has grown increasingly agitated as a result of all the pointless waiting around thereby turning into a political actor in its own right.

There are many Euripidean allusions, here and elsewhere, to unscrupulous demagogues having their way with a fickle démos who do not know how to tell apart genuine kaloikagathoi leadership from mere tub-thumpers. Yet, one would be hard put to find a corresponding dramatic allowance for the power of the démos in other surviving plays of Euripides. The démos, coupled with the demagogue par excellence, “the vile son of Sisyphus,”2434 is a political force to be reckoned with in Iphigenia at Aulis. It is the equipoise that weighs heavily in all the considerations of Agamemnon and Menelaus, who are characterised as the leading members of the pan-Hellenic upper-class. Indeed, the lack of the basileis’ total sway over démos is the upshot of the entire tragic turn that when the brothers finally reconcile, they cannot bring themselves to stand up against the force of circumstance.2435 Euripides does not give us the details concerning how the démos was riled up in the first place, but the intra-class politics between the three basileis, i.e., Agamemnon, Menelaus and Odysseus, show that virtually every side of the debate recognised the tremendous political power that the Achaean soldiers held in their tight grip. There is nothing to hold back Odysseus from prodding the

2434 Ibid, 524.
2435 “[Agamemnon speaking] I detest the type of brothers’ bond which leads to bitterness for both of them. However, we have come to a point where necessity dictates our fortunes. We must carry out the bloody murder of my daughter.” Ibid, 510-513.
dēmos once again to act if the sons of Atreus prove unwilling to make good on their promises of spoils. For Agamemnon, what is even more frightening than the forced sacrifice of his daughter despite him, in fact, is that the biggest army that Hellas has ever seen would then be practically without restraint. The Achaean upper-classes had tempered with the socio-political hierarchy by calling all Greeks to assemble into a formidable army, but once the army comes into being, les jeux sont fait: only if they are placated can the lower classes be expected to harness the benefits of the war without deigning to change the political hierarchy again.

In quite a similar manner, Achilles’ offer of using his Myrmidon army in order to prevent Iphigenia’s sacrifice from happening shows that the failure of the old ties of political hierarchy is permanent. Indeed, even when Achilles explicitly appears to rely on the old political hierarchy, it turns out that his Myrmidons are one of the most adamant regiments in their support for the carrying out of the sacrifice. The intra-class relations between the Achaean basileis may have been permeated with the cracks occasioned by the imminent sacrifice. Those between the lower and upper-classes, however, remain largely the same: the army has assembled for the sake of spoils and plunder, and not for bringing back Menelaus’ depar-departed Helen. Coupled with the impending loss of politics of consent, the possible toppling of the socio-political hierarchy leaves the brothers with only their immediate family to repair the damage done by Agamemnon’s word to Calchas. Yet, this will prove to be the hardest of accomplishments as Clytemnestra’s accompaniment of Iphigenia begins to shake the entire filial ethics down to its roots.

Filial relationships in the context of Iphigenia at Aulis are conceived as intertwined with intra upper-class conflicts. Agamemnon’s initial rift with Menelaus, as we observed above, is not one that is determined only on grounds of filiality. True as it is that the hierarchy of affinity, with Iphigenia trumping over Menelaus, has its say in making Agamemnon falter from his pledged course of action, the other cause of the alienation between the two basileis is a clash of interests with one side ready to risk it all for reaping the rewards of the expedition while the other not managing to bring himself to play with such high stakes. The reconciliation of Menelaus and Agamemnon, in that vein, is the mending of a menacing upper-class rift and a patching of the old family bonds in equal measure. Clytemnestra and Iphigenia’s distance from

2436 “Don’t you [Menelaus] think that he [Odysseus] will stand in the midst of the Argives and speak out the oracles which Calchas revealed, saying how I promised to make the sacrifice to Artemis and then lied about it? Will he not then carry the whole army with him and tell the Argives to kill you and me and next slaughter the girl? And if I escape to Argos, they will come there, destroy the city and raze it to the ground, Cyclopean walls and all. Such thoughts torment me.” Ibid, 528-535.

2437 Ibid, 1352-1354.
Agamemnon as they come to learn of his ruse, however, is filial in the main. Indeed, the breach of the filial trust serves as the tragic catalyst of the whole play. If Iphigenia’s disarming innocence displayed during the reception scene gives a further dramatic pathos to the preconceived sacred ties between the father and daughter, it is Clytemnestra’s headstrong rejection of Agamemnon uncustomary setting of the sacrificial plot that serves as a sentimental empowerment which gives the final confrontation between Clytemnestra and Agamemnon its whole tragic essence. Clytemnestra insists on following the ancestral custom for she believes in him. Only when the old slave-informant of Agamemnon hatching Agamemnon’s plot to the unsuspecting Clytemnestra and Achilles despite all the risks involved are the appearances shed. With the failure of the ruse begins Clytemnestra to ratiocinate like a clockwork, seeing the whole point to Agamemnon’s charade as a basic dilemma originating from class conflict: Agamemnon cannot turn on his word because “He is something of a coward and is too fearful of the army.” The cowardice in question, of course, is a psychologism dramatically invented to bridge Agamemnon qua basileus to Agamemnon qua father of Iphigenia. Clytemnestra knows that the preservation of the class politics of the Achaean army necessitates the sacrifice of her daughter for the simple fact that the life of one girl is not too steep price to pay for the grassroot soldiers who had left their homes and families to venture into the unknown in order to reap material benefits. Her attempt to coax Achilles to take her side with his Myrmidon army, on this view, is the tacit acknowledgment that the ethics of filiality do not offer her secure footing to wrest away her daughter from the hands of the Achaeans. Achilles is to withstand the démos’ uproar whilst Clytemnestra faces Agamemnon for the last time.

The last confrontation between Clytemnestra and Agamemnon is one wherein a full replacement for the old filial ethics is offered in the way of menacing revenge. Agamemnon has breached the most sacred of familial ties by cowering in presupposed sexual superiority, political right and pan-Hellenic necessity. Not a single shred of the old ethics remains by the time he finishes giving his account of how things stand. Yet his stirring of the primordial force of necessity is fashioned by Clytemnestra into the building block of a revolutionised ethics of evening the old scores. Indeed, a full compilation of the old scores, commencing with Agamemnon’s ‘winning’ of Clytemnestra by killing her former husband, Tantalus, and

2438 Ibid, 630-676.
2439 “No, by the sovereign goddess of Argos. You [Agamemnon] go to arrange what needs to be done outside, while I look after everything indoors and see to what is needed for brides at their wedding.” Ibid, 739-742.
2440 Ibid, 1012.
2441 Ibid, 1133-1134.
2442 Ibid, 1269-1274.
concluding with Clytemnestra’s reconciliation to him in their marriage despite everything is what the queen is after in his quest stack up all the wrongs that have been committed to her by her husband. Perdition has been long in its reckoning. Iphigenia’s imminent sacrifice, the final drop in the chalice, dramatically shows that the time is nigh for Agamemnon to begin reaping what he had sown for so long. Agamemnon himself has unleashed the cosmic force of necessity in rebuking the closest members of his filial circle. And it is only fair to expect anagkê to cut both ways. In dramatically conceiving this veritable stampede of anagkê, Euripides has reinvented the whole narrative structure of the myth into one that is construed in line with a tragic parallel drawn between dêmos and Clytemnestra. Agamemnon’s original sin of heeding to Calchas’ prophecy forged a new political tie between him and the lower-class soldiers of the Achaean army while severing a predominantly ethical one that had hitherto existed between him and Clytemnestra. Without the share of spoils that were promised to them, the incurred hatred of dêmos transforms into a cosmic force that can be stirred to wreak havoc on political hierarchy of the tragic world that was presided over by the sons of Atreus. The broken bonds of filiality, on the other hand, engender an equally annihilating cosmic force that portends to re-constellate the entire ethical universe conceived through the upper-class kaleidoscope. The agents of the two forces of necessity, dêmos and Clytemnestra, hence create a new dramatic world in which their voices and demands will be heard. To that end, the invention of Agamemnon’s bygone offences against Clytemnestra and her family unites with one of the most memorable twists made to any one of the surviving instances of Greek tragedy to herald the dawn of a new political world.

Euripides resolves the dilemma between the politics of the Achaean war camp and the ethics of filiality by a thorough rethinking of the myth’s end. Iphigenia’s sacrifice proves a significant catalyst in coalescing all the previously estranged upper-class parties, i.e., Agamemnon, Menelaus and Achilles, in their opposition against the act, except one, the wily Odysseus. Even in their reinvigorated phalanx, however, the upper classes of the Achaeans cannot hope to thrive against the hordes of soldiers that were promised blood, be it that of Agamemnon’s daughter or of Hector. If blood and coin can be dramatized to course through the same veins, then why bother with whose body is meandered through by those veins? That helplessness of the upper-classes is part-and-parcel of Euripides’ characterisation of Odysseus, who is intimated to know where the upper-class consensual politics is at its weakest and exploits its endlessly. Euripides’ Odysseus leads an existential poetics of absence whose inherent meaninglessness, to the upper-class defenders of the old politics and ethics at least, serves as

2443 Ibid, 1146-1163.
2444 Ibid, 1362-1366.
the touchstone that renders all the facets of the new socio-political configurations with lucid signification. Achilles, Agamemnon and Menelaus are all existentially free to shield Iphigenia from harm. Yet, this freedom is never exercised in that dramatically determinate instance. In the end, the tacit approval of the three characters of Iphigenia’s sacrifice suggest that they confirm the realism inherent to the démos’ political standpoint: it does not matter whose blood is spilt so long as it grants the Achaeans a safe passage to their all-too-material glory. It matters to Clytemnestra, however, as démos’ gain was her loss.

Clytemnestra does not accept her share of existential bad faith. She is arguably the most tragic of all the characters in the play owing to her rational scepticism of the story of gods stealing Iphigenia to an unknown ‘somewhere.’ She was once one the most credulous of the play’s personae, but once stripped of her everlasting espousal of the ethics of filiality, only doubt remains.2445 Doubt and an all-encompassing grief that will enact a katharsis to purge the universe of all the ethical stain surfaced by the acts of Agamemnon. Clytemnestra’s unbeliev is the dramatization of the incredulity that Euripides expected from his audience who would regard the feelgood ending of his rendition as offering only a measure of false hope. Clytemnestra refuses to believe Iphigenia’s conjuring away because, coupled with the event’s evident irrationality, she deems Agamemnon’s violation of filial ethics sufficient in having chimed the end of the old ethics. That bell cannot be unrung. In the end, Iphigenia’s survival does not change the larger scheme of things; Clytemnestra’s resolve for becoming a driving force of the new ethics is untouched. But it does significantly change one thing: the divine intervention to impede Iphigenia’s sacrifice serves as Euripides’ dramatic sanction of the ethics of filiality. Ever-attentive to all the social and political upheavals surfacing in the human realm, the divinities make their preference known for the virtue ethics of the aristocratic upper-classes. Unbound by the imposing political force of the démos, Artemis authenticates the truth of Clytemnestra’s claims by stopping Iphigenia’s ordeal. The fact that Clytemnestra is too preoccupied with her grief to notice the smile of the goddess is a dramatic necessity that is to set her tragedy to be set on its track. Clytemnestra cannot give up her grief that is to carry her toward the conclusion of her travails with her killing by her son Orestes. Euripides, however, has no such predicament to account for. Indeed, his invention at the end of the myth denotes, if anything, his willingness to stretch the acknowledged limits of mythmaking through making his political preferences known. The metapoetic nuance given to the Aeschylean recognition scene in his Electra thus finds an equally interesting counterpart in the metapolitical

2445 “O my child, which of the gods has stolen you? | By what name can I call you? How can I be sure | that this story has not been made up to console me | so that I can lay to rest | my cruel grief over you?”

Ibid, 1614-1618.
conclusion of *Iphigenia at Aulis*. Hecuba’s multi-layered ordeal of a creative endeavour reaches a programmatic narrative structure with the vanishing of Iphigenia. Needless to add, the poetics of the play do not offer a set of commandments that were etched in stone. Still, the political essence of the play is relatively as clear as it gets: a partially modified virtue ethics is to be wed to a democratic polity in order to attain the level of political power of the Athenians, who appeared primed, even in 406, to overcome the Peloponnesians.

Our analysis of the core set of technical and narrative features of Euripides’ surviving plays have touched upon the thematic innovations of the playwright at various points. To put the whole debate in the context of the Euripidean pattern, if any, of interpretation of the *nomos* and *phusis* duality, we propose to unite the technical and narrative traits in regard to what they convey about the duality in practice. Three thematic attributes, namely, mechanics of dissent, characterisation of the commonplace and ethico-politics of the future, elucidate how the duality was dramatically conceived through the Euripidean lens. We have seen how the shock effect emanating from the use of *ekkuklêma* and *mêchanê* at key points function within the dramatic universes of Euripides. Flabbergasting the audience into a trance-like state to agree to the controversial twists and turns, Euripides is a master illusionist who knows that a dry rendering of the unconventional can only be hoped to do its trick in a veritable masterpiece of a play like *Iphigenia at Aulis*. There are two levels of this employment of the mechanics of dissent that appear to have a direct bearing on the duality’s conception: a banalisation of divinities and a profanation of myths. The Euripidean gods and goddesses are cut from the same cloth as the ordinary characters except for their appearance above the *skênê*. They are omniscient as exemplified by the opening monologues usually rendered by them; but that makes them ordinary storytellers. They are omnipresent as they manifest in the unlikeliest of places; but then again, so do Euripides’ mortal dramatis personae. And they are omniscient in regard to the tricks they manage to pull on the mortals; but equally capable of beguilement are the tricks and ruses of the non-divine characters. In short, in giving his divinities the benefit of mechanics, Euripides took away their idiosyncratic otherworldly aura. There is no Aeschylean Athena responding to Apollo’s appeal to judge a guilt-stricken Orestes effectively breaking the deadlock on the verdict and no Sophoclean Athena heaping confusion on a volatile Aias to go berserk on the Achaean’s cattle in the Euripidean universe. With the creation of an almost self-same pattern of divine introduction and fantastic ending, Euripides realised a metapoetic turn towards the human in all its aspects that was to be the be-all and end-all of tragedy. By attaining this hitherto unexplored degree of realism in the portrayal of

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2446 Euripides, *Bacchae*, 1-63; *Alcestis*, 1-36; *Hippolytus*, 1-58; *The Trojan Women*, 1-47; *Ion*, 1-82.
immortals, Euripides managed to fashion interpretative moulds that would serve as divine icons whose plastic essence would be elucidated by the actions of human agents. Further, the Euripidean mechanisation of divinities functioned as the dramatic catalyst of re-forging all the myths with a more flexible alloy. From *Alcestis* to *Iphigenia at Aulis*, this thematic flexibility is often in display, sometimes more reluctantly, as in the case of *Alcestis*, but often wholeheartedly, e.g., *Medea, Hecuba, Iphigenia among the Taurians*, etc. It is a self-explanatory truism that atypicality makes the classical Greek tragedy. The atypicality in question in Euripides’ plays, however, is one that boils down to a genuine reinvention of entire myths. When the banality of the immortals is ascertained, it is but a dramatic step to wrest the supposedly most timeless of their parts from particular myths. What does this Euripidean practice of the mechanics of dissent bode for our duality?

Two things in the main: a dramatic emphasis on the transition from one spatio-temporal modification to another and a heightened sense of the internal contradictions permeating both conceptions. Euripides’ building of a discernible pattern of mechanisation shifts the dramatic focus from either a temporal progression towards betterment, *par* Aeschylus, or the deeper meaning of a particular set of dualities, *par* Sophocles, to the everlasting movement that takes place from one determinate construal to the other. We had occasions above to observe that the Euripidean triangles of mediation construct narrative links between the beginning and end of any given play. The quarrelsome essence of democratic politics, likewise, posit a dazzling transition from one understanding of *nomos* and *phusis* to the next. When the Four Hundred wanted to consolidate their political power, for example, they struck right at the heart of democratic politics by cancelling *graphe paranomon*, thereby allowing a watershed of oligarchic measures to be passed without any hint of dissent. Politically, they were just cementing their hold on the Athenian legal system by legalising that any motion could be passed so long as it was proposed and voted in favour by the members of the Athenian upper-classes. Metapolitically, however, they were exposing the limitation of their own oligarchic rule as one that could be just as easily discarded by their political opponents so long as the latter were to win back the support of the *demos*. The shifting fortunes of democratic politics made sure that as long as a modicum of consensual political debate and a virtue ethics remained in their place, so would the travails of the polity keep to a steady course despite momentary setbacks and open clashes. Further, the excavation of the links between different conceptions of the duality also afforded an elaboration of the spatio-temporally determinate structure of the two conceptions. For the dramatic understanding of *nomos* this was nothing

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new. From at least Aeschylus onwards, on the Athenian dramatic stage were produced many plays, including the trilogy *Oresteia* and Sophocles’ *Antigone*, that portrayed the human making and remaking of laws. For the dramatic depiction of *phusis*, however, Euripides’ invention was nothing short of revolutionary. *Phusis*, conceived as divine-sanctioned due political measure for Aeschylus and socio-politically dynamic counterpart of *nomos* for Sophocles is turned at Euripides’ hands into an attempted naturalisation of oligarchic politics *tout court*. Sophocles’ profound dramatization of the interplay between the two concepts has induced a movement towards Euripides’ attainment of a higher degree of thematic self-consciousness which divested *phusis* from its allegedly prehistoric roots: *tout comprendre c’est tout pardonner*. Bloodstained Medea’s rescue by her grandfather Helios and Iphigenia’s evaporation on the altar of sacrifice are just two of the most conspicuous of dramatic instances wherein the limits of tragic interpretation is stretched to demonstrate how infinitely extendable the concept of *phusis* itself can be. And when an infanticide is commendably vindicated in its proper social context, there does not remain much of an offense that can be branded as *para phusin*. In disabusing *phusis* of its intoxicating ideology, Euripides laid bare the political gist of the notion: a summary straitjacketing of spatio-temporally determinate *nomoi* as immutable, inexorable and impeccable.

Euripides’ characterisation of the commonplace is a narrative trait that also speaks to a political commitment to the selection and interpretation of themes with an emphasis on the transitional quality of particular dualities and the internal contradictions exhibited by their components. A semantic level and a farcically conceived level of rhetorical display combine to bring home this thematic unity of the duality. In regard to semantics, there are no almighty soliloquys or grandiloquent intimations of the Aeschylean order in the Euripidean dialogues and monologues featuring divinities. Indeed, the Dionysius of *Bacchae* is just as much an apparent lover of side-splitters as he is of just retribution. And if this gregarious side of Dionysius is to be thrown overboard as only too-fitting for the divine patron of drama, then there are the tenpenny truisms that are often offered by the more solemn members of the Parthenon such as Thetis. At any rate, it is a telling measure of the Euripidean dramatic self-consciousness that he chose to draw tragic authority from Aeschylus’ Athena herself when he wanted to grant

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2449 “You [Pentheus] who are eager to see what you should not, eager to seek what should not be sought, Pentheus I say, come out in front of the house. Let me see you dressed in female get-up as a maenad, a bacchant, so that you can spy on your mother and her company. You look like one of Cadmus’ daughters.” Euripides, *Bacchae*, 912-917.
an additional degree of authenticity to his *dea ex machina*. Against the backdrop of this banality of divinity, Euripides drew the incessant rounds of debate that gauged rhetorical prowess on relatively equal grounds as that of divine ordinances. To be sure, once the divinities start exhuming the ordinary roots of their hierarchically superior prerogatives all the human quarrelsomeness dwindles to nothing. All the same, Euripides has managed to embellish the concluding monologues of divinities with sufficient hints of self-criticism to suggest that the significance of rhetorical ability was not lost on them. When Athena, for example, opines that “The gods may be thought to take their time, but in the end they are not without power,” or Artemis tries to justify her inaction in letting Cypris have her way with Hippolytus, the immortals seem not so exempt from resorting to rhetoric as a way of proving their scot-free existence.

On levels of semantics and the pervasive rhetoric both, the Euripidean dramatic worlds facilitate the profanation of myths thereby bringing down *phusis* from its hitherto occupied lofty heights. Dramatically purported demotic conception of semantics and rhetoric have always served, of course, as explicit needs for democratic law-making. But this sense of self-critical continuity in the understanding of *nomos* had not been translated hitherto into the dramatic construal of *phusis*. The Euripidean banality of divinity, as such, managed to create a commonplace semantics and rhetoric that would bring the understanding of *phusis* ever closer to that of *nomos*. Putting the expressions and phrases of the Athenian *dêmos* in the mouths of his divine dramatis personae, Euripides made them akin to his spectators. Likewise, when he set about locating the divinities within the dramatically conceived world of rhetoric, Euripides attained a nadir in his characterisations of otherworldly aloofness thus building a roster of divinities that were much more readily familiar to the root-and-branch lower class Athenian of his day. The upshot of all this thematic watering down of the divine aura was a typification of the dramatically characterised immortals in line with the words and deeds of the everyday Athenian. With the accustomed custodians of the so-called *kata phusin*

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2451 “Long ago I saved you, Orestes, when I pronounced upon the equal votes on the hill of Ares. And this will be the established principle—that when the votes are equal the defendant is acquitted. Now carry your sister away from the land, son of Agamemnon. And you, Thoas, do not be angry.” Euripides, *Iphigenia among the Taurians*, 1469-1473.


2453 A shamefaced attempt at pleading innocence at best, Artemis’ self-justification is made to Theseus, Hippolytus’ father, who refused to believe in the pledges of his pious son and branded him as the seducer of his wife hence causing his son’s death. The gist of Artemis’ exclamation, in that sense, is her tacit acknowledgment of having failed a devout follower without even lifting a finger: “What a calamity has burst upon you—and has brought me grief as well! The gods do not rejoice when pious men die. It is the bad on whom we wreak utter destruction, on their children, house and all.” Euripides, *Hippolytus*, 1339-1342.

2454 This can be contrasted to Segal’s apt remark on the mysterious ways of divinities that appear to work strictly behind the scenes in *Oedipus Tyrannus*, which, incidentally, can be expanded to cover the
ordinances dramatically demoted to the status of Athenian strategoi, whose democratic accountability was certainly more pronounced than their vested privileges in office, the semantics and rhetoric of phusis began to be elaborated on a par with those of nomos. Although gods and goddesses appear above the skênê in the Euripidean world, their utterances and ratiocinations are simply on the same level with those of humans. In short, Euripides gave a semblance of supernaturality to the dramatic understanding of phusis through his use of mechanics but took its full price in exchange: the semantic and rhetorical ground of its idiosyncratic aura.

The Euripidean tragic dissipation of the divine aura was further entrenched with the thematic variations that were informed, as we saw above, by an emphasis on a ethico-politics of the future. Even at their most battered, the Euripidean protagonists manage to trail new pathways towards a new polity that will redress the wrongdoers of the present for the atrocities they committed. This silver-lining of thematic forward-looking finds many trenchant adherents from Admetus in Alcestis to Agave in Bacchae and Hecuba in The Trojan Women. By taking some of the most unilinear of Homeric myths and investing them with an interpretative measure of heterodoxy that is sanctioned by the actions of the divinities themselves, moreover, Euripides has leapt to a metapoetic level where the customary is defaced through the use of its foremost sentinels. An ethics and politics of the corrective is at work when Helios’ chariot steals away Medea from the Corinthians’ wrath or when Artemis issues a last warning to Thoas to call off his pursuit of Iphigenia and Orestes in Iphigenia among the Taurians. Amounting to a wholesale dramatic reconstruction of a new polity through reprisals occasioned by the ethical and political overdue comeuppances of the antagonists, Euripides’ reinvention of myths draws no illusions from the politics of supposed golden ages. When the alleged kata phusin traditions are trampled underfoot, it is through reinvigorated and rethought nomoi that the cosmic balance is to be reinstated. The present is but a fleeting dramatic moment in the Euripidean universes at crisis, which does not allow its inhabitant to temporarily endow themselves with even a shred of existence in meaningful assuredness. Indeed, existence itself is to be re-temporalized and hence reconfigured by tragic attempts to wade through all the present insignificance to create a new semblance of meaning anew. The Euripidean world of Iphigenia’s Aulis or Medea’s Corinth are worlds devoid of permanent layers of significance, empty ethico-political receptacles that have nothing to promise their inhabitants except making it abundantly clear that any creative response to their emptiness would need to begin from

majority of Sophocles’ surviving plays: “For all its concern with prophecy and oracles, the Oedipus has a startling modernity precisely because these supernatural elements are not only kept in the background but are also hidden and mysterious.” Segal, Oedipus Tyrannus, pp. 53.
observing their consummate effacement. With no dramatic inspiration to be plucked from the old ethics and politics, the tragic transition to new horizons spells the spatio-temporalisation of phusis. No metapolitics adorn the oligarchic conception of phusis as supra-existential safe havens of significance. For what it is worth, the Euripidean phusis of the old world has nothing intrinsically appealing about it let alone an inbred existential configuration. Indeed, divested of all of its vestments of oligarchic politics and virtue ethics, it is just an empty container to be pushed around by the upper classes to justify their class hegemony. Euripides might have predicated the politics of his plays upon a dramatically conceived link between democratic politics and aristocratic ethics, but his tragically portrayed ebbs and flows of apparently the most fervent observers of immutable phusis sufficed, in and of itself, to occasion the end of the supposedly supra-class dramatic conception of the duality. It was against this definitive rupture that the Old Comedy rallied behind the old aristocratic ideal through the creation of a medium that dared to rid itself of the mythological garments altogether.

5.4.2 Aristophanes and the Comedy of Retro-Projections
The second half of the fifth century was the heyday of what was commonly called in antiquity as the Attic Old Comedy. Relatively younger in its introduction to the yearly programme of the City Dionysia, becoming an official part of the festivities only in 487/6, compared with tragedy, comedy’s constant reformulation and renovation from its traditional roots, as argued by Aristotle,2455 in phallika, or ‘phallic processions,’ to its eventual form that is displayed in the surviving plays of Aristophanes took decades, if not centuries, to accomplish. Our collection of thousands of fragments surviving from other notable comic playwrights, including Eupolis and Cratinus, may be regarded as offering precious food for thought concerning the development of the genre, but their promise is largely tantalising. To that end, crucial as it is to heed John Wikins’ warning that Aristophanes “should surely not be read in a cultural vacuum,”2456 we still need to recognise that any modern interpretation of the vicissitudes of the Old Comedy necessarily needs to begin from a thorough analysis of the Aristophanic plays. Aristophanes is not exceptional, of course, solely by the token of the complete survival of some of his plays. The Aristophanic comedy was, and still largely is, considered as the acme of the classical Athenian comedy in the Classical and Hellenistic worlds of antiquity. Having the further benefit of kicking off his dramatic career in the early 420s, at which point comedy had already become an entrenched member of the yearly dramatic competition including the one in Lenaia, Aristophanes had a prolonged and productive

2455 Aristotle, Poetics, 4.1449a10-13; Cartledge, The Greeks, pp. 196.
dramatic calling that spanned from 427 to mid-380s. With more than forty plays, eleven of which survive to this day, Aristophanes recreated numerous comic worlds that were conceived at the crossroads of actuality and fantasy. The genuine politics of the Peloponnesian War, apprehended through the lens of hard-pressed Acharnians, for one, was counterbalanced with the dramatic invention of a personal breach of the Periclean ban on the Megarians from the commercial hotspots of Athens by an Athenian who was fed-up with all the Periclean nonsense. In a similar vein, although the corruptive philosophical and educational influence of the sophistai with the curious addition of a Socrates as their leader was all-too-real, it could not pierce through the armour of unreality that was donned by a Pheidippides who, having received his education from the sophistai, would demonstrate to his father that the weak argument could indeed prevail over the stronger by smacking the credo in his face. Offering a dazzling repertoire of frequent comic crossovers between those two dramatic levels, Aristophanes constructed a politics of the absurd that protracted the shock effect which was further solidified with each comic link that was added to the narrative chain. And yet, that overpowering procession between the real and unreal emit discernible political overtones in their respective postulations of nomos and phusis whence the Aristophanic elaboration of the absurd attains its complete meaning. We propose, in that vein, to focus on two dramatic spheres with respect to their main formal and narrative aspects for the sake of unearthing any ramifications that the Aristophanic comedy may have for the duality.

In our analysis of the surviving Euripidean works we have attempted to underscore the crucial import that the use of ekkuklêma and mêchanê has for the formal and narrative dimensions of the Euripidean tragedy alike. That feature is no less pronounced in the case of Aristophanes. Indeed, the use of the two mechanisms by Aristophanes at key junctures can be conceived as building a dramatic pattern. Three strands, often converged, of the utilisation of stage mechanics, on this view, can be regarded as making up the formal girdles of the Aristophanic comedy: a metapoetically construed critical intertextualism, a reversal of roles of some of the most basic attributes of gender and democratic politics, and a metapolitically produced comic ‘elsewhere’ that is to be sought beyond the realm of dramatic appearances. In regard to the metapoetics of critical intertextualism, we propose to focus on Aristophanes’ Euripides who

2457 Aristophanes, Clouds, 1320-1330.
2458 Those overtones were oligarchic in the main. His advocacy of the restriction of franchise and the paternalist attitude he showed towards the lower classes are two pillars of his dramatic creed, which was not entirely devoid of any sentiments sharing the poor politai’s lot. Ste. Croix, The Origins of the Peloponnesian War, pp. 357.
2459 All those three strands are somehow related to the playwright’s political preferences and his endeavour to bring his fellow citizens around. Interestingly, there is hardly any scholarly consensus on the political dimensions of Aristophanic plays even when they bound with the topoi extracted from the contemporary socio-political universe. Cartledge, Democracy, pp. 129-130.
is one of the veritable punchlines of his ridicule. There are other genuine Athenians, to be sure, that function as stock targets for Aristophanes’ comic arrows, including Socrates and Cleon. In the context of the politics of Athenian theatre, however, Euripides appears to top Aristophanes’ list of the ‘mockables,’ who is derided often for his slothfulness, pusillanimity, misogyny and quibbling word-chopping among other things. Aristophanes dramatic derisions of Euripides are made, of course, with an economy of crudeness. Never ridiculing the tragedian either for his political or ethical overtones of his plays, Aristophanes subtly strikes him as a pathos of ease and luxury who tries his best to appease his spectators through waxing rhetoric, not unlike the archetypical demagogues. The dialogue between Dikaiopolis and Euripides in The Acharnians, for instance, fits this bill perfectly.2460 Making hardly a single overture on the ethico-political insights of Euripides’ plays, Aristophanes pictures him rather as a big-wig of an artist who has “renounced the use of his legs”2461 because of his lethargic temperament, lives in a daydream of detachment, speaks in archaic verses and leads a veritable roster of servants to boot. Aristophanes’ Euripides is, in fact, so preoccupied with the pursuit of his muse that he cannot even make contact with ordinary people by himself, being rolled out of the stage on a couch by using the ekkukléma instead. Similarly, in another one of his surviving plays that has settled on the ‘stifling misogynism’ of Euripides for its subject, Women at the Thesmophoria, Aristophanes again uses the ekkukléma to roll, this time around, out Euripides’ desired aide-de-camps, Agathon, to defend him as the two try to clean the tragedian’s name by illegally entering the women’s-only festival of Thesmophoria.2462

This use of some of the most preferred formal methods of Euripides to draw him in a comically pathetic light is also stressed by another one of core formal attributes of Aristophanes’ comedy: palimpsest.2463 In his application of palimpsests, Aristophanes appears to thread a fine line between a hotchpotch of tragic utterances to add substance to any topos and a dutiful reminding of the reader that he is the puppet master of entertainment in his plays. Dikaiopolis’ adaptation of the Euripidean line from Telephus, “For I this day must seem to be a beggar - | Be who I am, but not appear to be,”2464 to convey his need to be dressed as a beggar in order to persuade his compatriots to cease the war effort, for instance, builds a bridge of intertextuality to reinforce the topos of peace that is attempted to be restored between the Athenians and Peloponnesians while showing that the comic twist given to the lines effectively

2461 Ibid, 412.
2462 Aristophanes, Women at the Thesmophoria, 94-95.
2463 For a detailed study of the Aristophanic use and abuse of this formal tool, see Gina May, Aristophanes and Euripides: A Palimpsestuous Relationship, (Canterbury, 2012), unpublished Ph.D. dissertation.
2464 Aristophanes, The Acharnians, 440-441.
coronates Aristophanes as the master of the comic world.\textsuperscript{2465} This relationship between \textit{topoi} and comic \textit{dunamis} is brought out in the open most clearly in the battle of the wits that takes place between the souls of Aeschylus and Euripides as the two summon all of their tragic competence to savour the title of the greatest dramatist of the underworld that is offered by Hades himself. By engaging his two comic puppets on the stage, Aristophanes concentrates his humorous forays on what he conceives to be the foremost flaws of the two dramatists. Against Aeschylus’ brooding silences he posits, for one, Euripides’ blatant verbosity; while countering esoteric openings of the former’s plays with the crystalline yet shallow introductions of Euripides.\textsuperscript{2466} The intertextuality that is established on the level of this palimpsest-heavy dialogue structure thus forges reproduced poetic links between comedy and tragedy while metapoetically showing the blemishes of the tragic medium as was practiced by Euripides among others.

Now, the historic Euripides poured, as we observed above, quite a lot of demotic content into his formal, narrative and \textit{topoi} preferences. Indeed, all the Aristophanic quips aside,\textsuperscript{2467} the Euripidean tragedy was a menacing source of worry for many oligarchically inclined members of the Athenian upper-classes who saw the dramatic harbinger of a new ethics and political hierarchy as implicitly purveying the poison of class struggle. Aristophanes’ comic canvassing of the dramatic opposition between the heroic \textit{ethos} of Aeschylus’ plays and the democratic \textit{ethos} of Euripides’, as such, was no chance occasion featuring two of the foremost tragedians. The comic nexus that unites the characterisation of Euripides whose preconceived aristocratic lifestyle is denoted by the self-conscious use of \textit{ekkuklêma} itself in \textit{The Acharnians} of 425 and that of the same figure as a sore loser of the dramatic competition in \textit{Frogs} of 405,\textsuperscript{2468} can be seen, therefore, as the building of a larger-than-life figure that exhibited all the stereotypical faults of demagogues. Perhaps initially thought out as nothing more than a lazy and feminine

\textsuperscript{2465} On the conventional construal of the Aristophanic theme of \textit{eirênê} in his \textit{Peace} and other plays, one can still resort to Ehrenberg’s old dictum: “Peace is realised in what seemed to the poet, and to the majority of the people, its most important aspect: as the necessary condition for the farmer’s tranquil work and for the religious obligations and festivals which were part of the normal life of Greece.” Victor Ehrenberg, \textit{The People of Aristophanes}, (Oxford, 1951), pp. 56; Kagan, \textit{The Archidamian War}, pp. 341. Aristophanes, \textit{Frogs}, 859-870, 937-950.

\textsuperscript{2466} One of the most memorable of Aristophanes’ witticisms is the rebuke that is invoked, somewhat cryptically, by Euripides’ defence of his characters all speaking the same as the clear sign that his “writing was democratic.” In response to this enthusiasm shown for the intrinsic value of the democratisation of dramatic dialogue, Dionysius flatly retorts, “Don’t pursue this line, old chap. | It’s not a direction of argument that promises well for you.” We do not know if the quip had a historical basis in Euripides’ alleged spending of the last years of his life in Macedon or was simply a daring Aristophanic confession of oligarchic inclinations which is certain to have played a part in the play’s conception following the effective destruction of Athens’ military capacity at Aegospotamoi in 405. Aristophanes, \textit{Frogs}, in \textit{Frogs and Other Plays}, 952-953.

\textsuperscript{2468} Aristophanes, \textit{Frogs}, 1471.
figure of a demotic tragedian, by 405, Aristophanes had already transfigured his Euripides into a *bête noire* whose memory had to be chased away. This dramatic transition was thus geared towards the making of a character whose repute had grown in tandem with that of the Athenian lower classes. On that note, the twenty years between 425-405 were significant in building up the democratic resilience of the Athenian lower classes, who had grown highly conscious of the fact that the maintenance of the *arkhê* owed as much to their efforts and sacrifices as it did to the strategic commands of the strategoi. Even with its manpower verging on depletion after the battle of Aegosopotami, the Athenian lower classes formed such a formidable political phalanx that the oligarchs could only overturn democracy with the direct help of the Spartans. This meant that the Aristophanes’ comic ties between the unreal and real had developed significantly in regard to the characterisation of Euripides. As with Aristophanes’ Euripides, so with his Creon.

The Aristophanic process of the dramatic transformation of Creon was much more lickety-split than that of Euripides. A relationship that purposefully started off the wrong foot by Aristophanes as he vilified the politician in his *Babylonians* of 426, which incurred official backlash from Creon, the real-world hatred between the two historical figures had reached an alarming point by 424 when an officially discouraged Aristophanes would not relent from asides or mumbled, yet intelligible, derogatory comments. Contrary to the consummation of his comic recontextualization of the genuine achievements of Euripides, Aristophanes produced a speedy delivery of his final dramatic characterisation of Creon. This haste was prompted by the meteoric rise of Creon to the highest echelon of the Athenian democratic leaders following the death of Pericles. As he proposed to increase the jury pay in 429, Creon had become an appealing target for the Athenian comedians to hone their anti-democratic wits. And yet, the military and democratic *kudos* of Creon continued to grow by leaps and bounds when he captured the stranded *homoioi* of Sphacteria hence dispelling the Spartan myth of ‘either with your shield or on it,’ once and for all. This bout of military success was largely brought out, as we noted above, by the use of Naupactus Messenians who managed to stretch the Spartan forces to the utmost so that any blow that was to be delivered with the rest of the Athenian forces could spell the end of the Spartan polity. Now, the increasing political self-consciousness of the Athenian lower classes was, by itself, a major cause of worry for the Athenian oligarchic upper classes; but when Athens came to resemble, politically if not spatially, a genuine refuge for many of the democratically-inclined lower classes of different ethnicities, the sense of aristocratic urgency was riled up. The surviving Aristophanic plays

allow us, in that vein, to argue that Aristophanes distinguished to chief factors that served as
a rallying cry for the swelling democratic tide: the Peloponnesian War and the crooked
democratic influence exerted on the thêtes by certain members of eupatridae in particular and
the Athenian upper classes in general. Aristophanes’ comic focus on the theme of peace
warrants, of course, a more detailed discussion which we attempt below, but we would still
like to point out, for the erection of an analytical signpost, that the theme mainly functioned,
in Aristophanes’ universe, as a fantastic panacea to remedy all the significant economic and
social evils that the Athenian society was swamped with. From the disruption of trade to the
‘most disturbing’ bits of misogyny, nothing escaped the fantastic reach of eirênê as it was
comically construed by playwright. Those evils were partially brought about, if we attempt to
follow that train of thought, by the upper-class agitators who had stirred enough trouble
between the Spartans and Athenians to turn them into perennial enemies. The topos of eirênê,
as such, was a fantastically conceived remedy for a realistically comprehended evil: the
disruption of the oligarchic socio-political equilibrium. If the inverted mechanics of Euripides’
plays was a formal reordering of the dramatic universe showing that comic licence was on
Aristophanes’ side to reinvent a hierarchy of intertextuality, the reversal of political, social,
religious and sexual roles was another girdle of this reinterpretation of the dramatic link
between the unreal and real.

At the highest degree of abstraction, the Aristophanic reversal of roles is overarchingly
variegated. Ranging from the sphere of poetics, with frequent clashes between tragedy and
comedy, to gender, with regularised crossovers between ascribed roles and attributes, and
politics, Aristophanes’ structures of reversal seep into virtually every element of presentation
and narration. This constant to and froing that takes place between preconceived roles and
actual practices retains a micro-physics of power relations that restructure the dramatic
universe in accord with the playwright’s political premises. The dramatized inversion of the
relationship between the father and son of the Clouds, Strepsiades and Pheidippides, for
instance, speaks to a social sentiment that takes the hierarchical familial rapport as inherently
natural. On similar grounds, Aristophanes fantasises about an all-women’s ekklésia that was
occasioned by a gender coup in his Assembly Women in order to direct the interplay between
reality and fantasy towards the mending of real social problems via unreal instruments of
gender politics. The comic crosses of intertextual or intersexual origins, in that vein, function
as a double entrenchment of the prevailing socio-political hierarchy.

The Aristophanic plays formally commence with an informal introduction that skilfully posits
narrative signposts to be followed as the spectator is to comprehend the dynamics of fantasy
as they are implemented in any particular play. Those dynamics often convey a narrative framework of discontent vexing the lives of the protagonists. Strepsiades’ bickering about a world in which even slaves and children turn their attention away from their masters and fathers to money’s reign in Clouds or Dikaiopolis’ reminiscing of the good old antebellum days wherein he used to lead a self-sufficient existence without ever coming to learn the meaning of words such as buy and sell are building blocks of disgruntlement that fashioned into being a desperate social need to be addressed. Indeed, even at his most fantastic, as when he portrays a Dionysius making his way to Heracles to ask for counsel on which dramatist to bring back from the realm of Hades, Aristophanes manages to erect a few recognisable signs of discontent, such as a quip made by Dionysius’ slave, Xanthias, to his master with a clear allusion to the battle of Aegospotamoi. Likewise, when the birds of Athens are portrayed as taking to flight from their dear Athens to build a more liveable community elsewhere, Aristophanes leaves no doubt about the grounds of their expedition when he makes Euepides complain about the Athenians that they “Sit in the courts and whine throughout their lives,” in his Birds. The narrative groundwork that is made up by these signposts serve as the restructuring of reality along retrojective dramatic lines thereby making up the first level of the comic attempt to restore the old class, gender, ethnic, etc., hierarchies.

This dramatic clinching of the core social problems of real world is made simultaneously with the configuration of the resolutions that are purported to be realised in the realm of fantasy. The use of analytical categories of reality and fantasy do not do justice to the constant interplay between the two worlds that is pronounced by the use of authentic persons, places and events contrary to the representational bias towards the employment of myths in the surviving plays of tragedians. The back and forth between Hoopoe and Leader in the Birds on account of the deceptive allure of the sophists, for example, follows a comic pattern that can only be unearthed by putting it into perspective in comparison with the comic abuse of the sophists in other plays. By transplanting the signposts of disillusionment that map out the contemporary reality on the productive soil of fantasy, Aristophanes attains a higher degree of reordering of the dreamscapes that run alongside the dramatization of the real world. Praxagora’s leadership of the women who are to wrest the control of ekklesia away from their dim-witted husbands, or Lysistrata’s guidance of all the women suffering from the effects of the Peloponnesian War to a sex-strike serve as the narrative beacons of those topsy-turvy universes in whose

2470 Aristophanes, Frogs, 1-35.
2471 “Oh misery me! If only I’d served in that sea-fight – | I’d tell you to go and get stuffed, I really would!” Ibid, 33-34.
conjunction all the role reversals are to be apprehended. Praxagora and Lysistrata’s explicit distrust of their all-women compatriots, for example, dramatically verify the playwright’s misogynist stereotyping of women as consumptive sex-addicts while reordering the comic rendering of the dramatic possibilities: the women shall reject their sexual instincts or grab hold of political power before you, i.e., the ignorant démos, shall comprehend the benefits of eirênê. There is no purely inter-class, intertextual or intersexual role-reversal in the Aristophanic universe. Euripides’ donning of womanly attire and manners in Women at Thesmophoria is not only a comic punishment for the playwright who had unleashed feminine passion against masculine heroic ethos at various points in his plays. It is a comic castigation of the demotic politics unveiled by Euripides’ plays who is portrayed twice in the play as the son of a vegetable monger mother and hence as a downgraded citizen. Indeed, Aristophanes seems quite self-conscious in his depiction of women who had decided that they were harried enough by Euripides’ insults, which is indicated, for example, in his insinuation that there might, after all, some substance to the supposed Euripidean characterisation of women as serial adulterers.

There is nothing inherently contradictory about Aristophanes’ impetuous, overindulgent and oversexualised rendition of the Athenian women who prove to be the boon of the oligarchic doves and bane of Euripides in equal extent. Indeed, even the tacit approval by the Leader of the vulgar obscenity thrown by Kinsman at women does not need to be explained away as working against the apparent narrative thrust of the play. No dramatic justification is obliged by Aristophanes’ seemingly incoherent attempt to defend the Athenian women from the supposed attacks of Euripides by vilifying them even further with his own brand of sexual politics of drama, because the Euripidean harassment of women is merely a topos of the play. Aristophanes has no interest in portraying women as the epitome of chaste sensibilities or resolute moderation against the alleged Euripidean norm because he is not preoccupied with

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2473 Incidentally, we conceive this narrative element as key in regard to the elucidation of the largely Aristophanic myth of Euripides’ alleged misogyny. Although the interplay between the creation of dramatic female characters in the works of the two playwrights looms larger than a mere hinting at any polarity, Aristophanes’ heroines appear to have spoken to a qualitatively more conventional sense of upper-class heterosexual sensibilities than those of his older contemporary: “It is difficult to understand why Euripides had the reputation of being a woman-hater in his plays: perhaps no other great poet has ever created so many superior women who put to shame the men surrounding them.” Kaufmann, Tragedy and Philosophy, pp. 17.


2475 Aristophanes, Women at Thesmophoria, 386, 455-456.

2476 Ibid, 392-398.

2477 “Don’t be surprised, we’ve always known there’s only one thing worse | Than utterly shameless women, and that’s–well, just more | women, that’s all.” Ibid, 531-532.
women at all. The frequent reversals of gender roles, on this view, have a strange running partner in the structural verbal sexploitation of women and effeminate men whose travails are rendered even more obscene as a Lysistrata or a Praxagora is taken from their ranks to serve as the dramatic epitome of the voice of reason. In terms of the dramatic form, the topoi of either sex-strike or Euripidean branding of women can be resolved in accord with the comic harmony as the actual causes of breaking out of hostilities on either end are simply wished away. Aristophanes’ reality is as messy as ever, thus obliging the playwright to prune all the offshoots of contemporary reality on the comic stage by creating a hypertrophy of the in-between that turns into a veritable human condition possibly despite the playwright’s aristocratic intentions. The perpetual reversibility of roles, in that vein, function as a formal magnification of the social ills in direct proportion to that of their fantastic resolution, thus allowing a return to the antecedent eunomia whose socio-political inconsistencies are then elucidated rather than resolved.

The third formal quality of Aristophanic comedy, the metapolitical conception of a fantastic elsewhere is construed in direct relation with the role-reversal in its political and gender overtones. The bird-city of Nephelokokkugia, or the so-called ‘Cloudcuckooland,’ might be the most memorable instances wherein a dramatically conceived utopos is trumpeted as the place to be for all the birds that are fed-up with the Athenian politics. Often times, the fantastic elsewhere is not so brought out in the open as in the Birds. The respective utopos of Lysistrata, the Acharnians and The Knights, for instance, oblige the reader to creatively work out the details of that elsewhere that are not offered so straightforwardly. Still, an in-depth analysis of those three plays affords us with a plausible definition of the formal structure of the Aristophanic utopos as a retrojective correction of the real world conceived as a megalonomia. Taking our theoretical cue from David Konstan, we posit megalonomia as a structural hypertrophy in which the hyperbolically conceived social norms and conventions are dramatically magnified not necessarily for the betterment of the social world. Further, we claim that Aristophanes decided to undertake this transformation of the social world into megalonomia for the sake of reaching a partial retrojective resolution of the dramatic epiphenomena they produce. The comic exaggeration of the ills besetting the social world, in that vein, serve the purpose of spelling out a socio-political remedy whose hyperbolic interpretations form the heart and soul of the play. There are no logical rhymes to be followed

Konstan defines his neologism as follows: “Finally, a fantastic place may be characterized by hypertrophy with respect to the laws, a tendency to exceed all limits. The distinction here is quantitative rather than qualitative. The order of things is not better, it is simply grander, a magnified world without boundaries in which the rules give scope for ambition and desire. It is a type particularly suited to satire.” David Konstan, Greek Comedy and Ideology, (Oxford, 1995), pp. 34.
in expounding the coherence of the proposed resolution. Indeed, what little hints that appear
to have been dropped to induce such an inference lead, if anything, to logical dead ends and
distorted historical facts. On that note, the comically purported solution to the wide-ranging
social problems can only be scrutinised by following the narrative threads that lead to it despite
the occasional witticisms heaped at such avenues of interpretation by the playwright.

Lysistrata’s attempt to organise a pan-Hellenic abstention from sex that is to be centred at the
Athenian Acropolis offers a fitting place to begin our analysis between its megalonomia and
the comic resolution thereof. Although there is hardly any build-up to the main plot of the
play, its beginning is scattered with remarks that Lysistrata and her comrades seize the
opportunity as a desperate last-ditch inducement for their husbands to agree to a non-
intermittent peace. Indeed, the frequent jibes at women’s stereotypic lack of self-control of
their carnal desires, which is exacerbated as the narrative develops, is a clear reminder to the
audience that the women of Lysistrata can abide by the rules of their sex-strike for only a
limited span of time. Now, there are two head-scratching absurdities that the introduction to
the play immediately establishes: the unsatisfied conditions that would make a sex-strike
plausible and the stifling degree of peer pressure and official supervision of the Athenian
women that would hinder even the conception of such a plot. The first absurdity is logical: the
members of the opposite sex have to be around for any sex-strike to be successful.\textsuperscript{2479} The
Athens of 411, however, is a place in which the Peloponnesian War rants and raves on more
than one fronts. Put simply, many of the conscripted husbands of the pan-Hellenic women
partaking of the sex-strike are hypothetically nowhere near Athens. The second absurdity is
social: it is generally accepted, though the jury is still out, that the ‘respectable’ Athenian
upper-class women were not even expected to attend to the Great Dionysia let alone hatch the
plot of a sex-strike to impede the warmongers. For Aristophanes, these dramatic loopholes do
not cause any interpretative concern. The second difficulty is solved, for instance, thanks to
the absurdity inherent to the comic universe. The idea of women engaging in organised
political action is what is supposed to make the story so humorous in the first place. Adding
the idea of women trying to do the impossible in abstaining from their pressing predilection
for sex, and we have a carnivalesque side-splitter for the ages. Resolving the first knot,
however, is only attempted in a roundabout manner as Lysistrata provides historically
compelling reasons for the making of the peace with the Peloponnesians. Even taking the
instant success of the sex-strike with most of the male citizens abroad as granted, however, the

\textsuperscript{2479} Ste. Croix has noted an additional absurdity: how can a sex-strike be organised in a slave society in
which wealthy men are free to purchase sex practically at their own whim? Ste. Croix, \textit{The Origins of
the Peloponnesian War}, pp. 233.
historical ‘facts’ of Lysistrata do not appear to have much of a verisimilitude with respect to the actual Athenian history. Kimon’s relief force sent to aid the Spartans besieging Mt. Ithome was, of course, a genuine historical event. But so was its disheartening result when the Spartans kindly asked the Athenians to march home. Again, the truth of Lysistrata’s claim that the Spartans were influential in the ousting of Hippias in 506, rings hollow when coupled with her silence of the subsequent Spartan invasion of the Athenian Acropolis. When all is said and done, the only historical fact that is unquestionable in the dramatic premises from which Aristophanes sets out in the play is that a peace had to be supported by both sides, and even that hardly amounts to anything more than a simple truism.

In 411, the Spartans were far from tilting towards peace. In fact, by that time they had the Athenians on the ropes. Slowly giving way to a two-pronged attack that destroyed Attica and endangered their Aegean hegemony, the Athenians were dreadfully searching for ways to entice the Spartans with an offer of temporary truce that would have allowed them precious time to regain their footing. That included, as we have seen above, even the sending of formal delegations to the Persian satraps in order to lure them away from financially backing the Peloponnesians. Furthermore, the oligarchic underground had begun to practice illegal operations to arouse fright and terror on the pro-democratic root-and-branch of the Athenian dēmos. Those operations also included, as observed previously, an ideology of anti-democracy that was to be propagated by the most trenchant members of the oligarchs, such as Peisander and Antiphon. Aristophanes’ Lysistrata was produced at such a conjuncture, probably for Lenaia. Although we do not have sufficient historical evidence to surmise anything with certainty, the core topoi of the play as well as its narration makes it quite likely that the play functioned as more than a mere plea for eirênê with all its frequent anti-democratic remarks. The political vacuum that emerged after the assassination of democratic leaders and the terrorisation of dēmos might have been attempted to be filled ideologically by a comic representation of all the social evils of contemporary democracy which were to be mended by a fantastically achieved peace. Indeed, the magnification and the consequent overturning of some of the major democratic conventions offers interesting food for reflecting on the Aristophanic relation between reality and fantasy. But we have to move backward a bit in time in order to see how another comic plea was made roughly fourteen years back from the production of Lysistrata to flesh out our working hypotheses.

2480 Aristophanes, Lysistrata, 1144-1145.
2481 Ibid, 1149-1157.
The *Acharnians* was produced in 425 when the Athenians were in dire straits trying to fend off the last torments of the plague. Still a way off from the grand success to be achieved at Sphacteria that would reverse their fortunes in the ongoing war, by now the Athenians had endured intermittent twice-annual invasions of Attica for three years, the absence of which was more than made up for by the devastation wrought by the plague. Battered as they were, however, the Athenians were far from being broken, even managing to muster enough troops to send to Leontinoi to test the waters to see if they could carry the full Athenian fleet. With a number of tactically adept strategoi to boot, the Athenians were still brimming with confidence that they could reclaim the initiative. And yet, Aristophanes managed to write a play pleading for peace that subsequently won the first-prize at Lenaia in the midst of such hawkishness. Why did Aristophanes take such an apparently inopportune moment to make his case for *eirênê* known? Historical conjuncture gives half the answer to that question whereas the other half is provided by the narrative structure of the play. Aristophanes’ *Babylonians*, which was produced just a year before, had perched above a singeing ridicule of Cleon and his politics that had triggered official complain made by the stratêgos himself to the effect that the *polis* was slandered before foreign guests contrary to the inscribed Athenian law and custom. The seriousness of the allegation is not in doubt if we take Dikaiopolis’ own allusion to it on behalf of either the producer or the writer.2482 Likely to have been subjected to the harrowing process of an *eisangelia*, by which were tried only serious offence against *polis* or the public weal, Aristophanes appears to have overplayed his hand that could ended up having disastrous consequences for the playwright. In the event Aristophanes’ trial was rejected by the *boulê* but the tarnish in the reputation and the petrifying scare continued to haunt the playwright at least until the death of Cleon in 422. Given that Cleon was one of the foremost advocates of continuing the Peloponnesian War, it appears but a small step to claim that Aristophanes conceived his play as a dramatic retort at the politics of his hated rival. On a deeper social level, however, the play appears to speak to the Periclean anti-adventurist sentiment in economic terms, which meander through the narrative.

The *Acharnians*’ plea for peace is conceived essentially in economic and class terms. Dikaiopolis, an old farmer and our protagonist, is one of the thousands of Acharnians that have been incarcerated behind the Long Walls ever since the first Peloponnesian invasion of Attica was occasioned back in 431. Dikaiopolis, as we noted above, had supposedly never come to

2482 “I’ve personal experience now, after what Cleon did to me on account of last year’s play. He dragged me into the Council Chamber, made all sorts of trumped-up charges, spewed out a torrent of sewage – I very nearly perished in the flood of filth. So this time [to the Chorus] could you please, before I speak, let me dress up to look really wretched and downtrodden.” Aristophanes, *The Acharnians*, in *Lysistrata and Other Plays*, 378-383.
learn the meaning of words such as ‘buy’ and ‘sell,’ prior to his forced move to Athens. Once the emergency measures were enacted and he moved to Athens, however, he learned the meaning of those words in addition to that of ‘being ripped off,’ as he was expected daily to pay ever-steeper prices provided that he could find willing sellers of what he was looking for in the first place. In those topsy-turvy conditions, even procuring something at exorbitant prices was a source of happiness. Deciding that he was fed-up with the shortages and price tags accompanying the war, Dikaiopolis argues against the warmongers at the Agora but is reported readily by the sycophants to the authorities as slandering the city’s reputation. Having gotten wind of the news, the market officials go to the area of commotion and defend the war effort against the ‘beggar’ who dares shoot arrows of criticism to it. Declaring that only a trial could settle the dispute, the officials call upon the famous Athenian stratêgos Lamachus, who, along with other jingoists, summon Dikaiopolis to make his case before the Athenian jury forthwith. Dikaiopolis then makes his way quickly to Euripides’ mansion to acquire some props that would allow him to put on a show of misery at the trial to sway the minds of his fellow citizens into desiring eirênê again. Dikaiopolis, however, is no choker even when faced with an imposing stratêgos, and he makes it clear that he had his share of non-ending duty at the front-lines for a meagre three obols a day since the beginning of the war, whilst the strategoi and his ilk had the ‘luckiest roll’ of their lives in being continually elected to generalship whereby they gorged themselves on the blood and spoils that had been spilled by their lower-class compatriots. But as he is put off yet again by the meddling warmonger-demagogues, he revolves to make a personal peace with the Peloponnesians. Opening a personal market wherein the rapacious Athenian customs officials have no authority, he gains immediate access to all the goods that are offered at reasonable prices, even Megarian girls for sale with the stock male obscenities to embellish the offer, as Megarians and Thebans flock to his stand to recall the cling of coin once more. In the end, Dikaiopolis reaps such a conspicuous economic gain that he manages to persuade the other Athenians to share in his yearning for peace once again, encouraging him to stand with his luxuries in flat contrast

2483 Aristophanes, Acharnians, 264-390.
2484 Ibid, 410-480.
2485 Ibid, 599-607; cf. “Since rowers and marines were not normally subject to a compulsory levy, they had to be offered pay, or at least subsistence, as an inducement to serve. The normal rate was at first two, later three, obols per day, which amounted to a subsistence income; for lengthy and remote expeditions a double rate of a drachma a day applied. The introduction of pay for hoplites and their servants (Thucydides 3. 17. 3) at the same rate as rowers soon followed, perhaps in the mid-fifth century. When cavalry were established, they too received pay, as well as a state loan towards the cost of buying and feeding a horse. Pay for mercenaries and allies continued, of course, at the same rates as citizens: normally 3 obols (Thucydides 5. 47. 6), sometimes a drachma (Thucydides 7. 27. 2).” Van Wees, ‘The City at War’, pp. 107.
2486 Aristophanes, Acharnians, 608-617.
2487 Ibid, 624-626, 719-915.
against a Lamachus who is called for stratêgos duty again.\textsuperscript{2488} Making a supposedly historical case in favour of the mellowing of the tension-ridden relationship between the Athenians and Peloponnesians, the play ends with the citizens’ celebration of Dikaiopolis as the foremost among their numbers.\textsuperscript{2489}

There are three intersections at which the narrative of the play appears to feed directly from the dramatized correspondence between reality and fantasy: the hints that are scattered throughout the play in regard to Dikaiopolis’ class origins, the agônes between Lamachus and the protagonist and highlighted economic benefits of peace. Comic exaggeration aside, Dikaiopolis is a self-proclaimed farmer who appears to have had minimal experience with monetary transactions while he farmed his lands in Acharnia. As we have been arguing all along, however, all this talk about ‘farming’ is certainly relative in that those Athenians who did not have to work in menial tasks, i.e., not entering the daily nexus of cash payment, were only the ones that had sufficient landholdings to feed them and their families.\textsuperscript{2490} Most of the time those landholders were absentee landlords who resided in the city while their farms were supervised by managers who were tasked with organizing their workforce that was made up of both free and slave Athenians. The fact that Dikaiopolis is described as having his residential estate in Acharnia does not endanger the coherence of this historical picture: whether he is pictured as living at the deme centre of Acharnia or in an estate adjacent to his landholdings, he is a genteel farmer whose reminiscence of the good old days of farming appears to hold only an ounce of comic truth.\textsuperscript{2491} At this initial level of dramatic intersection, there is only a slight narrative movement towards the magnification of debunk wartime conventions as Dikaiopolis’ apparently zeugitai mentality of ancestral farming does not have anything particularly contradictory about it given its well-entrenched status of contemporary Athenian upper-class ideology. At the second grade of narrative intersection, however, the absurdity of the wartime rules surface with full vigour when our genteel farmer encounters Lamachus.

Dikaiopolis’ confrontation with Lamachus enacts a full aristocratic politics of absurdity by building two interrelated ideological arguments that are distorted without delay. The first one

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{2488} Ibid, 1073-1077.
\item \textsuperscript{2489} Ibid, 1198-1237.
\item \textsuperscript{2490} Needless to add, a more fervent case of official anti-banausic ideology is Sparta. Even then, however, that ideology, as it is canvassed by Herodotus and Plutarch, appears implicitly to have spoken to a concern that ever-growing numbers of hypomeiones felt the need to step into the nexus of cash payments towards the end of the fifth century. Cartledge, \textit{Sparta and Lakonia}, pp. 157; Pomeroy, \textit{Goddesses, Whores, Wives, and Slaves}, pp. 71; Herodotus, \textit{Histories}, 2.167.2; Plutarch, \textit{Agesilaos}, 26.5.
\item \textsuperscript{2491} Aristophanes, \textit{Acharnians}, 29-34; cf. von Reden, ‘The Well-Ordered Polis: Topographies of Civic Space’, pp. 186-188.
\end{itemize}
is the total withering away of the notion of genteel farmer whose sole occupation is the production of his lands. Dikaiopolis exhibits an uncompromising upper-class attitude at various points during and after his conversation with the strategoi. His constant scoff at the paltry three-obol daily pay could have rung true for only the members of his audience with zeugitai, hippeis or pentakosiomedimnoi class origins. To elaborate, his belonging to thêtes can only be fathomed if we grant that his pronounced self-sufficiency makes the size of landholdings approximate to the dividing line between thêtes and zeugitai. And, as we have claimed all along, that dividing line was a yawning one in creating a dependent multitude of at least 85 per cent of the Athenian population while leaving off the rest to carry on with their pursuit of happiness. Further, all the analytical niceties aside, in Dikaiopolis we have a figure of a man who certainly does not regard it indecent to poke fun at his attempt to procure ‘props’ of a piteous garb and walking stick that would make him look like a beggar to inspire compassion in the jury members who are to try his case. Even when the socio-economic background of our farmer is narrowed down to the three census-classes, however, we are still some way off from exhausting all the narrative channels that were used to animate Aristophanes’ character. Indeed, Dikaiopolis strikes one as a very enterprising rustic given that his opening of a personal marketspace is followed with a ready dose of entrepreneurship that sees our former ‘farmer’ as engaging in economic transactions left and right. A flair for enterprise shown by a professed rustic is, of course, one of the comic role-reversals that would be socially tantamount to dramatize a trout growing lungs and legs once thrown ashore. And yet, it is more. Dikaiopolis is a character who has a veritable storehouse of goods that he can barter away if he deigns to acquire any Megarian ‘porkers’ or Theban goods. Phalerum whitebait or Attic poetry, one an unmistakable Athenian delicacy and the other one of the polis’ prized exports, are the two things that immediately spring to his mind when Dikaiopolis is about to acquire some Theban goods.2492 Sharpening the rapier wit that he displayed in scorning soldiers’ daily wage of three obols, this dramatic substance that is given to Aristophanes’ character show him in a different socio-economic light as someone whose loss of income from his landholdings has been offset by material gains that were reaped from elsewhere. There is something socio-economically shivering about the notion of some farmer who can barter away a ready supply of Phalerum whitebait and Attic poetry in the sixth year of the Peloponnesian War and it cannot be assumed away by a formalist adherence to the Aristophanic role-reversals. If we grant that there is a crass economic contradiction in depicting a hard-pressed genteel farmer to be in the possession of some of the Athenian bywords for luxury, then it can be logically deduced that Dikaiopolis was characterised as an

2492 Aristophanes, Acharnians, 902-903.
enterprising member of the Athenian upper-classes who can be fathomed to have begun to branch out his investments much earlier than the inception of the war. But, then again, what can be made of his socio-economic jibes that are hurled at Lamachus to the effect that the strategoi pluck the spoils of the war while the others harvest their lot of misfortune?

Dikaiopolis’ socio-economic criticism is a concentrated lampoon of democracy that is guided by the second narrative thread of Aristophanes’ aristocratic politics of absurdity: the distorted distribution of economic benefits of the arkhē is a persistent feature of democracy because there is nothing particularly politically equalising about it. That argument is brought home by a combination of fact and farce. On the side of facts remain the steadfast Dikaiopolis, who commits himself to an all-out offensive after he braces the erstwhile brawny onslaught of Lamachus. Inviting the stratēgos to shed his imposing shield and helmet as he reminds the latter that “We’re not having a trial of strength here,” Dikaiopolis then brandishes a flurry of arguments that draws attention to his main argument that he and not Lamachus is the model citizen here. Having contrasted the constant ordeals he had to endure in the front-lines to his opponent’s armchair generalship, which has only benefited himself with a steady presence in the official pay queue, Dikaiopolis explicitly argues that the issue at hand is social and not personal. On the flip side of farce is an increasingly enfeebled Lamachus, who meekly retorts to Dikaiopolis’ arguments by pointing out that he was democratically elected to office and so were his fellow strategoi. Now, the dynamics of fantasy as they are invoked at this juncture are twofold: Dikaiopolis’ strength in numbers and Lamachus’ tacit concession of all the rhetorical initiative to his opponent. In regard to the first dynamic, Dikaiopolis has justice on his side because his claims are integrally social, encompassing a much larger proportion of the Athenian population who are more offended by the political ethos of the ruling class than those procedural reasons that can dramatically summoned to aid Lamachus’ arguments. The “grey-headed men” serving in the front-lines for the 3-obols per day, which was also the lower

2493 Ibid, 591.
2494 Ibid, 595-597.
2495 Aristophanes’ stock references to triobolon in his surviving plays has been connected perspicuously by Ste. Croix to an oligarchic satire of the dicastic and other forms of public pay. We fully concur with his argument and analyse that thread below: “Another way in which Aristophanes reveals his political opinions is in his attitude to the jury-courts, in which, during the last generation only, many poor Athenians had become able to serve, owing to the institution of dicastic pay by Pericles. Aristophanes evidently disliked this situation, and he makes a number of references to the ‘triobolon’ and to dicastic pay generally – which in itself was not in the least funny, except of course to a member of the upper classes, who disapproved of it to the extent of thinking it a fit subject for satire. (It is not the working class in this country who make jokes about the ‘dole’ or about alleged scroungers who live like fighting-cocks on social security payments).” Ste. Croix, The Origins of the Peloponnesian War, pp. 362; Aristophanes, Acharnians, 375-376, 676-718; Knights, 259-265, 307-311, 897-898, 1145-1150; Clouds, 207-208, 602, 1004; for a focused reading of the numismatic elements, including that of the triobolon, in Aristophanes’ Wealth, see Robert L. Tordoff, “Coins, Money, and Exchange in
range of what the sailors usually received over the final quarter of the fifth century, comprise an infinitely larger group than the mere handful of strategoi who are paid three drachmae per day, i.e., six times that of a regular soldier, for lollygagging in Thrace and Sicily. The apparently reasonable roots of that argument are quite hollow, however, in that the “grey-headed men” who are excluded from the material benefits accruing to the stratēgos rank in the lower thousands. Put differently, our genteel farmer, belonging to either one of zeugitai or hippeis, represents a comparatively larger section of the Athenian upper classes which were historically not as numerous as Aristophanes made them out to be. In short, the politics of absurdity is part-and-parcel of the first dynamic because Dikaiopolis fends off the arguments of the super-rich by resorting to a demagoguery of his own. Angling as he was for laying the dramatic groundwork of an aristocratic compromise between the richer and poorer sections of the Athenian upper-class, Aristophanes sniffed out no incoherence to hinder the equal social scorn he poured on the beggar’s pay of three obols and that of stratēgos of three drachmae.

The unequal sharing of the political and material benefits of the empire appears to have imbibed the second dynamic. Aristophanes’ Lamachus is a scarecrow of a character that is to be pushed and shoved to his heart’s content. Divested of his martial superiority, he is a mere no one who cannot blabber anything coherent against Dikaiopolis claim that there is no socio-economic equality to the election of strategeia. Indeed, there is only one weapon in Lamachus’ argumentative arsenal that can be brandished to counter the main argument of Dikaiopolis: that the socio-economic inequality between the grey-headed men and the flourishing young strategoi is democratically-sanctioned. By taking a decisive step in the direction of this side of the rhetoric interplay, we enter the realm of farce epitomised by the feeble-minded indecisiveness of Lamachus. Three adjacent argumentative points are voiced, in that vein, by Dikaiopolis to show that the only thing to be secured by the members of his class if the war effort is kept up is unparalleled misery: his personal experiences, the similar experiences of other members of his class, taken in its age and economic significance alike, and the bail-out measures that were implemented to save the super-rich so that they could perpetuate

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2497 The daily pay for the Athenian sailors during the Ionian War was half a drachma, whereas that for the sailors who participated in the Potidaean and Sicilian campaigns was one drachma: Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, 8.29.1, 8.45.2; cf. 3.17.4, 6.8.1, 6.31.3.
2498 For various theses concerning the daily pay of the Athenian trireme crews, concerning which Potts argues that a full drachma payment was the order of the day throughout the Peloponnesian War, see Potts, The Athenian Navy, pp. 209-210 with bibliography; cf. Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.5.4-7.
2499 Aristophanes, Acharnians, 595-597.
2498 Ibid, 599-606.
their economically and socially discriminatory practices for the entirety of the war.\textsuperscript{2500} Lamachus’ only response to those three points, however, is an increasingly embarrassing attempt to take shelter in the exclamation of the magic word ‘democracy.’\textsuperscript{2501} At the end of this lopsided chastisement of a debate, democracy’s transformation into a systemic political sanction conferred on rampant socio-economic inequality is complete. Aristophanes has his Dikaiopolis wield the sacred argumentative sceptre of dèmos’ interests for the sake of banishing away a dramatized demagogue \textit{par excellence}. The fantasy world of aristocratic peace is to prevail over the real world of democratic belligerence if the proportional inequality of democracy is to be positively mended.

Consummating this narrative bridge between the reality and fantasy of the play is the play’s ending. The play’s conclusion offers a full resolution between a dramatically victorious \textit{eirênê} and socially reunited Athenian upper classes. Proving to be a huge success, Dikaiopolis’ unbarred personal market stand lures the Athenians one and all who realise that there is nothing enticing in turning down the offer of peace. Gathering the numbers on their side, the peacemakers see off a deject Lamachus who is sent to lead a force that is to repel a group of Boeotians who are trying to exploit the momentary advantage as the Athenians revel in their reclaimed luxury. By the play’s ending, Aristophanes’ aristocratic politics of absurdity is made to reach its comic conclusion in a twofold manner. First, the role-reversal between private and public space, which was first brought out in the open when Dikaiopolis decided to agree to a personal peace with the Peloponnesians, is resolved by the peaceful affluence of the private space ridding itself of the public prominence of warmongers. Historically no less implausible than Lysistrata’s organisation of a sex-strike, the shock effect of the comically authenticated superior benefits of even a de facto impossible private peace illuminates the extent of the material gains to be gathered if peace is restored. There is no attempt at negotiating a public peace at the end of the play, because there is simply no need to. The drawing of the comic contrast between a privately enacted return to sumptuary festivities and a publicly enforced war that supposedly entrenches the socio-economic inequalities is, if anything, the main achievement of the plot. True to his comic rendering of a \textit{megalonomia} of the social world, the ending pronounces Aristophanes offer of the two viable alternatives: to follow the demagogues to sink ever deeper into the depths of proportional inequality or to endorse an aristocratic reconciliation stripping the political powers of the three obol beggars and three drachma demagogues in equal measure.

\textsuperscript{2500} \textit{Ibid}, 608-617.
\textsuperscript{2501} \textit{Ibid}, 598, 607, 618.
The absurd culmination of the role-reversal between private and public space is endowed with further economic incentives that are provided by the private peace. Aristophanes concludes the play with a feast for the ages, serving not only as a dramatic celebration of the prospect of peace but also as a restoration of the economic plenty that was once within the reach of Dikaiopolis. Now, Dikaiopolis’ highly likely zeugitai or hippeis social origins have been highlighted above. But to bring that point home, the gargantuan catalogue of delicacies from hare’s meat to sausages were all upper-class fancies whose magical manifestation does not lend substance to any hypothetical lower-class participation in the feast. Although the economic shortages of wartime make up a large part of the ideological aetiology behind the play’s commemoration of eirênê, the alleviation of those shortages serve the refined needs of only our group of genteel farmers. Dramatically juxtaposing the economical rations of wartime to peacetime’s realm of plenty fuels, to be sure, Aristophanes’ comic rendition of the megalonomia of the contemporary world. Indeed, the contrast between the eating of locusts and that of pigeon’s meat seems hardly in need of any contextual elaboration. And yet, a return to luxurious living can only be heralded for those that have the means to afford it in the first place. To that end, Lamachus’ dramatic ejection from the feast is telling in that it reinforces the social binary between the proponents and exponents of war, culling the former even when the demagogue in question is a eupatrid.

Aristophanes’ brand of comic harmony is never full. Dramatic reconciliation, as it is construed in Lysistrata and the Acharnians, puts a considerable part of the comic universe at the fringes of its measure of harmony. The two comic defences of eirênê, with fourteen years of intermittent war to separate them, converge on this exclusion of hawks be they eupatridae or thêtes. But the thematic convergence and its narration is not limited to that. The political aims with which the two plays were written have all the makings of an offering of peace to the eupatrids to reconsider their political position and to reunite with the other upper-class Athenians to push the three-obol ‘beggars’ out of the political arena. In the Lysistrata, this is achieved with the hermeneutic double-play between male and female citizens, and the focus of comic attention on the upper-class Athenian women. Whereas that play’s eirênê promises

\[2502\] Ibid, 1100-1140.

\[2503\] We have often noted the growing Athenian dependency on imported grain moving further into the fourth century. A tapestry of widespread dependence that is plausibly woven by Ober can be resorted to situate Athens within the big picture: “Unless we are willing to assume that fourth century BCE Greece was much more agriculturally productive than nineteenth century CE Greece … if we adopt Hansen’s figures, we must suppose that a substantial part of the fourth century Greek mainland population was fed from food imported from abroad. Something like 0.7–1.2 million Greeks, i.e., roughly a quarter to a third of core Greece’s population in the fourth century BCE, thus may have lived on grain imported (e.g.) from the western Mediterranean, from the Bosphorus/Crimea, or from North Africa.” Ober, The Rise and Fall of Classical Greece, pp. 86.
a settlement between fantasy and reality that is conceived mainly along the lines of a reconciliation between the sexes, the eirêné of the Acharnians is much more forthcoming in playing an aristocratic tune that is to be followed in order to walk the upper-class tightrope between three-obol and three-drachma earners. Dikaiopolis’ quest to regain peace, in that vein, involves a politics of aristocratic entrenchment, which was to be attained by returning to a pre-Ephialtes status quo ante with no demagogues or politically empowered thêtes. Aristophanes’ fantastic elsewhere is a retrospective politics of aristocratic reconciliation that dramatically inverts the real world to envision a fantastic safe passage to the politics of the yesteryear. With the forging of the dramatic links between megalonomia and eunomia, the aristocratic programme of reform slowly begins to emerge, appearing in full bloom in the Knights of the comic playwright.

Produced in the Lenaia of 424 and went on to win the first-prize in the competition, the Knights strikes one as a thoroughly political play. Indeed, a core theme of the play is a restoration of the Athenian democracy to what it was in the glorious days of Marathon and Salamis. Of course, this political proposal is somewhat concealed under the micro-dramatic representation of the Athenian dêmos as a (Mr.) Demos being the head of a single household, i.e., the polis, and aided by three servants: the recently purchased Paphlagon, ‘Blusterer,’ who serves as a clear stand-in for Cleon; Demosthenes the stratêgos; and Nicias. But this micro-dramatization does not touch the political substance of the play as there is no clash between men and women, par Lysistrata, or the public and private, par the Acharnians, to occupy the centre stage in the play. Instead of taking up a domestic theme suitable for comedy, Aristophanes seems to have built the strife-ridden dramatic universe of his play by focusing on the cleavages between the social classes making up the polis in the main: thêtes, by far the largest class of the polis who, still, cannot be equated with Athens; the eupatridae with their strategoi and demagogues; and hippeis or the members of the second wealthiest upper class in Athens. The narrative structure of the play follows the typical formal lines of Aristophanes’ plays with a predating social clash convulsing the universe into two dramatic camps, a protagonist deciding to take the matter into his or her hands and find an outlandish panacea to fantastically cure the sumum malum. In the case of the Knights, the preconceived social clash is one that rifts Paphlagon from his fellow servants. Loathsome, mischievous and coaxing in equal parts, Paphlagon is a thorn on the side of Demosthenes and Nicias who see their counsel thrown into wind as the

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2504 Aristophanes, Knights, 781-785, 1334.
sweettalking new servant wheedles his way into Demos’ good graces. Demosthenes and Nicias, who, incidentally, appear to have been portrayed with historical accuracy if Thucydides was any judge of it, try to conceive a feasible plan to rid themselves of Paphlagon, even including suicide. Deciding to drink themselves to inspirational oblivion, later on the two resolve to steal the oracles that are in Paphlagon’s possession. Nicias commits the deed and Demosthenes does the interpreting: a succession of democratic leaders is to be followed by Paphlagon’s ultimate fall. The order of succession portrays three peddlers, namely, a dealer in oakum, Eucrates, a seller of sheep, Lysicles, and the most irksome of all, the leather-seller Paphlagon. There is a minor disagreement between the two servants concerning who is designated by the oracle to oust Paphlagon, but eventually they settle on Demosthenes’ interpretation that the ‘usurper’ will possess an extraordinary art: a seller of sausages! And just as assured, a sausage-seller, Agoracritus, happens to pass by the Agora at that very moment. Increasingly suspicious of the activities of his fellow servants, Paphlagon discovers the missing set of oracles and promptly accuses the two of treason. Seeing that they could not brave the storm alone, Demosthenes calls upon the Hippeis for assistance who respond by manhandling Paphlagon and accusing the latter of manipulating the political system to his own benefit. The roughing up of Paphlagon clears the way for Agoracritus to impress the dēmos as the desired political change cannot be brought about by brute force alone. The key to the whole enterprise is to show that Agoracritus can not only match but also surpass Paphlagon in shamelessness in word and deed, in addition to being deferent to his betters and having a taste for the gutter as a familiar haunt.

In the first contest Paphlagon’s character rears its ugly head as he does not regard himself as of the same ilk of dēmos. Although he possesses a paltry family income earned from industry at best, Paphlagon mocks Demos even as he caters to his wishes and considers him as his own guileless son. Paphlagon’s despising of Demos does not entice, however, Agoracritus, who sees the latter as a father figure, never to be crossed. Hated by the Hippeis and the super-rich for his Janus-faced antics, Paphlagon’s display of eye-watering abuse is

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2506 For Nicias’ deeply pious and reluctant outlook, for example, see Aristophanes, Knights, 13, 30-35.
2507 Ibid, 84, 812-813, 818.
2508 A curious link between the Aristophanic jibes at the alimentary obsession of the Athenian masses, e.g., in lines 214-216, and a corresponding aristocratic critique of the ‘gluttonous essence’ of contemporary radical democracy has been brought out by Azoulay: “According to him, culinary gratifications and demagogy went together, transforming the Athenians into unscrupulous swine.” Azoulay, Xenophon and the Graces of Power, pp. 69-71; cf. Pauline Schmitt Pantel, La cité au banquet. Histoire des repas publics dans les cités grecques, (Rome, 1992), pp. 229-230.
2509 Aristophanes, Knights, 447-449.
2510 Ibid, 346.
2511 Ibid, 713.
2512 Ibid, 725-726, 1216.
Having shown that he is not wet behind the ears in matching Paphlagon’s excellence in unflinching shamelessness, Agoracritus gets ready for the second contest which is temporarily delayed as the Hippeis sing a prolonged paean of Aristophanes. Taking the entire parabasis, the praises fashion a political link between the Hippeis and the comedian, who is saluted as someone exceptionally praiseworthy, “because [Aristophanes] despises the same people that we do and dares to say the just things.” The Hippeis dramatically function, in that vein, as the bridge between poetry and politics, just like Cleon does in the Acharnians. The politics of that dramatic bridge portrays Aristophanes as a middle figure who occupies the middle ground between the super-rich despisers of the demagogues and the Athenian lower classes. As the parabasis is concluded, the Sausage-Seller returns from the meeting of boule, in which he and Paphlagon addressed the councilmen. Managing, yet again, to go mano a mano with his adversary, Agoracritus manages to sway the councilmen into agreeing that the profits made from the selling of cheap sprats occasion a larger sacrifice than Paphlagon’s offer of one-hundred bulls, thus trumping over his opponent by doubling his proposed amount. This victory before the boule results in a fit of rage of Paphlagon, who trades insults with the newcomer until Demos makes his first appearance in the play. Then a contest of appeasement begins with both sides vying for the favour of the old curmudgeon. To Paphlagon’s attempt at successfully subverting the entire comic conceit of the play by reminding Demos that he was the one that led the forces at Pylos, Agoracritus responds by voicing the only critique of dêmos until the very end of the play. Making his intentions clear that he is tasked with improving and not flattering Demos, the Sausage-Seller then uses the shameless tricks up his sleeve by producing a cushion for Demos’ behind, shoes for his feet, a thick winter cloak among many others in quick succession. Agoracritus’ excessive concern shown for his health leads to his growing on Demos, who takes note of Paphlagon’s failure to display similar caring resourcefulness. Seeing that his sway over Demos is slipping through his fingers, Paphlagon then resorts to the big guns and implores the former to recall the prophesies and oracles in his possession. Yet, Agoracritus manages to

2513 Gottesman, Politics and the Street in Democratic Athens, pp. 82.
2514 Aristophanes, Knights, 510.
2515 Bartlett, Against Demagogues, pp. 262.
2516 “More precisely, Aristophanes must fall somewhere between the upper-class loathers of Cleon and the low-class man who will displace him; Aristophanes can speak the language—can anyone doubt that he has mastered the language?—of both the justice-loving Knights and the vulgarity-spewing Seller. But this is to say that he cannot be equated with either, even as he somehow encompasses them both.” Ibid, pp. 263.
2517 Aristophanes, Knights, 656.
2518 Ibid, 743.
2519 “For you | Are like boys who are the object of love: | You don’t accept those who are noble and good gentlemen | But give yourself to lamp-sellers and shoe menders | And leatherworkers and hide-sellers.” Ibid, 736-740.
outbid the competition once again by tapping on to a treasure house of oracles that are argued to be older and thus better than those of Paphlagon. Scoring another victory over his opponent in the contest of oracles, Agoracritus gets ready for the final contest while Demos has a heart-to-heart with the Hippeis. Touched by Hippeis’ point that he behaves like a tyrant when he raises up a leader for the sake of benefits only to turn him down after a while when those promised benefits wither away, Demos gives indications for the first time that he is not so fond of either the Sausage-Seller or Paphlagon. And yet, when it comes down to deciding between the two demagogues, Demos makes his decision on the basis of their respective baskets of promise alone. With Paphlagon’s downfall additionally sanctioned by a Pythian oracle, Agoracritus finally dons the mantle of leadership.

Following the second parabasis, the Sausage-Seller makes his final appearance as a completely new man, capable of even crafting the panacea to cure the evils of the dramatic world. Thanks to his labours on a miracle that is more divine than human, Demos, it appears have been boiled in a special mixture to shed his old skin and become young again as he was in the days of the second Persian invasion. Criticised by Agoracritus as having acted quite foolishly in his former senescence, Demos takes up the theme of political reform and enacts three measures to reinvigorate himself: the navy is to be maintained at all costs and the thêtes-rowers will be paid on time; the hoplitai will remain registered as they were, not allowed either to climb up or fall down the ladder of census-class; and no bearded youths will be allowed to make public speeches. Then an embodied Peace treaty appears to announce a thirty-year eirênê, permitting Demos to return to his fields. The beginning of Sausage-Seller’s first citizenship does not involve a formal change of the polity. With a largely re-ruralised citizen-body that does not have either the means or the willingness to partake of the governance of their polis, the running of Athens’ day-to-day affairs will once again be in the hands of her most-deserving citizen, i.e., the Sausage-Seller. The maintenance of the navy is, of course, a tacit recognition by Aristophanes that the tapping of thêtes’ martial capacity was a basic necessity even back in the glory days of Marathon and Salamis. Whatever is deemed a necessity for the safekeeping of the arkhê, as such, will remain in its rightful place while the rest of the democratic institutions are to be discarded to make sure that Demos does not rediscover his old senile ways. To those ends, heliaia, the democratic courts frequently renounced by Aristophanes as the driving force of the whole Athenian litigiousness, will be

2520 Ibid, 1111-1150.
2521 Ibid, 1264-1315.
2522 Ibid, 1335.
2523 Ibid, 1375-1380.
2524 Ibid, 1394.
permanently closed. Thus a personified peace and a démos led by a capable person work in tandem to bring the contemporary politics of decay to an end.

Three topoi are crucial in putting this play into dramatic and historical perspective as constituting a straightforward account of the Aristophanes’ retrospective politics of aristocratic reconciliation: the historical necessity of retaining the arkhê; the dramatic equation of Cleon and democratic war making; and the politics of upper-class coalition which is needed to ensure that the fantastic solution will purge the dramatic universe, potentially offering insight as to the content of proposed solution to the ongoing social conflicts. In regard to the politics of arkhê, there are many historical dimensions to Aristophanes’ relentless vilification of Paphlagon qua Cleon. Those dimensions are dramatized to fit in the tight space of domestic framework. When the Sausage-seller outwits Cleon in producing a cushion for the backside of Demos or shoes for his feet, the allusion is definite that Aristophanes drives at exposing Cleon’s lip-service to a more equal sharing of the imperial profits. If we recall that it was the same ‘bottoms’ that had carried the Athenian fleets to many a resounding naval victory, including that of Salamis, it is thereby rendered more lucid that Dikaiopolis’ jibes at Lamachus in the Acharnians still stand. As it is portrayed by Aristophanes, the main flaw in the character of Cleon is that he only ever seeks ways for self-advancement and never for anything that would do permanent good to Demos. The building and maintenance of the Athenian naval empire, however, is not something that can be reduced to the politics of Cleon alone. Manipulative though his demagoguery had been, Cleon, hence, cannot be censured with respect to his measures that were adopted for safeguarding the empire. Now, dismissive as he was, Aristophanes was not completely blind to how things stood for the Athenian démos in the real world. The maintenance of the arkhê was not enough in affording a self-sufficient living to the grassroots thêtès. Aristophanes had seen how the plague had carried off numerous lower-class citizens and experienced first-hand what a volte-face that disaster had induced by the token of allowing the Periclean ‘do not overreach’ to be seen in a different class light. The fact of the matter was, if the Athenians were not to ‘overreach,’ then the thêtès were to keep on gorging themselves on Hades’ overripe pomegranate in swarms. That fact was recognised by Cleon regardless of his personal motives, which, in turn, obliged Aristophanes to concede its import even at the steep cost of protruding through the comic conceit of his play. Indeed, Paphlagon’s mention of the leadership he displayed at Pylos sublimes Aristophanes’ self-

2525 Ibid, 1316-1318; cf. Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, 1.77.1.  
2526 Aristophanes’ derogatory comments on the blistered-bottomed thêtès who were mockingly called by him as to chuppapai, or ‘yo-heave-hoers,’ show him as a steady rider of the oligarchic bandwagon of contempt for the ‘naval mob.’ Aristophanes, Wasps, 908-909, 1118-1119; Knights, 784-785, 1366-1368
critical portrayal of the demotic actions of the *stratégos*. No less cognisant of the fact that the needs of the *thêtes*, who were the architects of the Aristophanic golden age just as much as Themistocles and Kimon were, had to be catered to, Aristophanes needed to cleave away the ‘adventurist’ bits of Cleon’s imperial aggrandisement from the ‘peace-making’ politics of double-hegemony. Never the less, this was a clear dead-end at least in the real world since it was precisely the crumbling of the idea of double-hegemony that served as the driving factor behind the two Peloponnesian wars. The reign of peace and prosperity in the ideal world had to be dramatically settled with the keeping of the *arkhê* in order to resolve the double-bind that the politics of real world had worked Aristophanes into. Paphlagon would be the key to that settlement as he was to be turned into a personification of contemporary war.

Produced at a time when the Athenian belligerence had reached its early apogee after the intoxicating success achieved at Pylos, the play is the most reluctant among the three that we have analysed in its defence of *eirênê*. Indeed, on the play’s dramatic surface peace appears to be an afterthought, making only cameo appearances without any crystal-clear motivation. Digging a bit deeper, however, is all that it requires to illustrate that peace, after all, is a central *topos* of the entire play. On closer scrutiny, Paphlagon is seen for the veritable epitome he is of all the root causes of social conflicts whose emergence are stimulated by the worsening senility of Demos. Skilfully catering to the whims of the tyrannical Demos with an endless set of promises and prophesies, Paphlagon is someone who has managed to alienate his fellow servants, i.e., *strategoi*, the *Hippeis* and the oligarchic super-rich from his household, i.e., the politics of Athens. The severed ties between the social classes do not, however, manifest their impact solely in the context of Athenian politics of class. Serving as the backdrop to the whole dramatic plot, in that vein, is the string of expansionist manoeuvres undertaken by the Athenians since the ebbing of the plague. The initial Sicilian expedition, military intervention at Corcyra and the signal success at Sphacteria were all interconnected events of the heights of ‘decrepitude’ that the *dêmos* reached to put even the maintenance of *arkhê* at risk. Now, we have not touched upon the socio-economic significance that their naval empire had for the upper-class Athenians in our survey of the *topos* of *arkhê* above. But it should be clear that Aristophanes, being a perspicuous observer of the Athenian history and a member of upper classes to boot, had no qualms with the notion of an overseas empire. Indeed, his dating of the

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2527 “Let’s first point out that it is just that the poor and the *dêmos* have more power than the well-born and the rich, for this reason: The *dêmos* sail the ships and bring power to the city. Helmsmen, and stroke-callers, and ships’ captains, and prow-men, and shipwrights—these are the men who bring power to the city much more than the hoplites and the well-born and the rich. Because that’s how things are, it seems right that everyone is allowed to take part in governance, by lot and in elections alike and that any one of the citizens may utter what he deigns.” Ps.-Xenophon, *The Athenian Constitution*, 1.2.

686
ancestral days of Athenian glory to the Second Persian War dramatically functions as a latent acknowledgement that the embarking of the same strategoi and démos that had won the war against the Medes upon the politics of empire-building was golden in and of itself. Although a direct comic attempt to sift the maintenance of the empire from the chaff of Cleon-driven expansionism does not surface in the play, we argue, based on the results of our analysis thus far, that the whole dramatic housekeeping in the play serves as a replacement for the safekeeping of the Athenian arkhê. There are two historic and dramatic benefits in adopting such an interpretative stance. First, this strand of interpretation allows us to put all the respective servant characters in the play in a context. On that note, the comic line of demarcation between the three characters are not equally proportioned. Demosthenes, for one, is portrayed just as slavishly as Paphlagon with respect to his undying readiness to heed Demos’ every command. The historic Demosthenes was, of course, the initiator, as we observed above, of the entire episode at Sphacteria, which Cleon was to conclude. Demosthenes’ depiction as an unhappy camper is thus not a result of the growing absurdity of Demos’ wishes but one that originated from a bout of jealousy that arose from his contest with Paphlagon who wins all the recognition that was due to him.2528 Succinctly put, Demosthenes is of the same ilk, qualitatively if not quantitatively, as Cleon. The other servant, a thinly-disguised Nicias, however, is a different matter. Throughout the play Nicias is canvassed as a pious, cautious and indecisive servant who is exploited, perhaps despite his better nature, by the more enterprising Demosthenes.2529 To be sure, he and Demosthenes are eager accomplices in recruiting the Sausage-Seller as a rival for Paphlagon, offering the grand title of archelas, i.e., ‘ruler of the host,’ to the latter.2530 All the same, the tie of kalokeia that is purported to exist between Demos and all its servants,2531 appears to fall short by quite a margin in the case of Nicias. The characterisation of Nicias, for one, does not exhibit any overt reference to his slavish political position vis-à-vis Demos. Indeed, the only use of the word doulos in the play is put in the mouth of Demosthenes who reports that the master has bought a new slave for the household.2532 And, given the silent recession of Nicias to the dramatic background as the play gains steam, we think it highly likely that Aristophanes aimed for a latent contrast in his

2528 His starry-eyed complaint of Paphlagon’s brazen robbing of every one of their due recognitions, with an explicit reference to Pylos, in the prologue bring this point out clearly: “Paphlagon snatches whatever any one of us has prepared and gives it as a gift to our master. Just the other day when I’d kneaded a Spartan barley cake in Pylos, he ran past me as brazenly as ever, snatched it and served it up himself – the very cake that I had kneaded!” Aristophanes, Knights, 52-57.
2529 That toning down of the critical demeanour was noted by Ste. Croix roughly half a century ago: Ste. Croix, The Origins of the Peloponnesian War, pp. 361.
2530 Aristophanes, Knights, 164.
2532 Aristophanes, Knights, 44-45.
characterisation of the top three Athenian strategoi of his day. The maintenance of the oikos qua arkhê, as such, elucidates this comic differentiation between the three servants with two of them hand-picked demagogues and the other finding it increasingly difficult to act against the grain.

The second main benefit of taking Demos’ oikos as a dramatic arkhê is the almost instant appearance of the personified Eirênê following the Sausage-Seller’s rise to power. Aristophanes provides no dramatic justification for the making of peace once the ascendancy of the Sausage-Seller to the top-dog of Demos is complete. Indeed, except for a brief mention of the allowance it makes for Demos to return to his Attic fields, there is not much of either a dramatic build-up or reflection on the aftereffects of the final agreement. Peace, on this view, is something almost automatically granted once the Demos finally relieves itself of the deadweight of Paphlagon’s policies. The dramatic personification of peace is thus the divine sanction on the ousting of Cleon and his politics. To Aristophanes, defanging Cleon was never to be equated with the defanging of the arkhê. As far as he was concerned, the political reforms enacted by the Sausage-Seller would fantastically herald the restoration of the status quo ante between the Athenians and Peloponnesians. That former status quo, however, could only be reinstated if a coalition of upper-class Athenians was to be formed, whereby the fantasy of peace would be turned into reality.

Aristophanes conceived of no possible return to the social and political status quo of 470s. By 424, the Athenians praxis of politics had changed so considerably that the emergence of no Sausage-Seller could change the fact. The comic invention of boiling Demos to revive its perceptive youth was a dramatic recognition of that the reality that the ‘golden age’ had gone for good. What remained for the advancement of the polis’ interests was a second-best solution: ridding Athens of Cleon. Cleon might not have been the alpha and omega to all the socio-political evils that were flooding the Athenians through the 420s, but he was the root factor of the most important of them. He heeded Demos’ commands to stretch the limits of the Athenian treasury for the sake of turning the war into a more profitable enterprise not only for the upper classes but also for the thêtès. Aristophanes, as a member of the Athenian upper-class, had every right to make his protagonists scorn the three-obols that were daily paid to the

2533 Ibid, 1394; 805.
2534 Aristocratically conceived internal harmony would thus feed into the making of a perpetual peace and vice versa. Aristophanes’ understanding of peace can be seen, in that vein, as an anticipation of Xenophon’s later encomiums of peace which were to be hailed as the chariot that would carry the Athenians to their post-Salamis domination over the Aegean: Xenophon, Poroi, 5.2-3, 5.5-6.
2535 Bartlett, Against Demagogues, pp. 271.
oarsmen. For the thètes, however, no such right was in existence. Further, even that significant movement toward a more equalitarian sharing of the spoils of war was not enough. The thètes had no intention to eke out a beggarly existence behind the Long Walls if the war was to continue. That restlessness triggered Cleon into action and that action, in its turn, tagged him as the most damaging of the upper-class demagogues. If there ever was a side of personal vendetta in Aristophanes’ doing all he can to strip the lustre off Cleon, it was only as an afterthought. In as much as the boiling of Demos was a fantastic solution to an outlandish dramatic problem, the ousting of Cleon and co. from the Athenian politics was a realistic resolution to a chief run-of-the-mill issue. Aristophanes knew that the first measure to be adopted was to divest thètes from its upper-class supporters if their politico-economic avarice was to be curbed. With the breaking of the liaison between the upper-class demagogues and lower classes, another aristocratically-inclined faction of the Athenian upper classes would take up their role as the rightful leaders of dèmos. That was the genuine essence of the comic boiling of dèmos, whose shedding of his old skin epitomised the dismissal of the most pauperised sections of the thètes from the political arena. ‘Go back to your farms,’ may have rung true for those who had enough landholdings to return to, but it was nothing short of a patronising intimidation for the rest who were not nearly as ‘lucky’. The Eirênê of Aristophanes was enacted by the aristocratic upper-classes and for them, which necessitated the making of an upper-class coalition that would discourage any of their numbers from making inroads to the thètes. Of course, the main problem with this plan was that Cleon was not alone in desiring the continued expansion of the war effort, reaching ever deeper into the pockets of the upper classes to keep the thètes occupied with chasing dreams of an invasion of Sicily or eastern Thrace. Indeed, with the rise of Demosthenes, Hyperbolus and Alcibiades, among others, who plied their strategeia at the beck and call of thètes, Aristophanes’ retrospective politics of aristocratic reconciliation would remain the fantasy that it always had been.

Aristophanes realised that his age was that of aristocratic debasement. A silver narrative thread runs through his surviving works which has a core set of contrasts between Themistocles, Aristides and Aeschylus of the old and the Pericles, Cleon and Euripides of the new. Having taken to heart the Euripidean dramatic emphasis on the maelstrom of political, social and

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2536 It seems that the annual invasions of Attica by the Peloponnesians have somehow missed Garnsey when he posited the collapse of the Athenian empire as the driving force behind the Attic farmers’ introduction of more intensive methods of production in the fourth century. The permanent loss of tribute and a significant part of revenues from commercial taxes have surely played their part in bringing about a more intensive agricultural scheme. Then again, also proving an impetus of the highest order was the simple fact that the raids of the Attic farms from the Spartan fort at Decelea had stopped. Garnsey, *Food and Society in Classical Antiquity*, pp. 27.
ethical thoroughgoing change that were besieging Athens through the last quarter of the fifth century, Aristophanes invented his own dramatically conceived brand of retrospective politics in order to fantastically solve the social discrepancy between demotic megalonomia and aristocratic eunomia. This comic transition between reality and fantasy was realised by picking out a select few stand-ins that would fight off the social evils in order to re-enact a dramatic space of comic harmony. The distance that was to be trodden between real disharmony and unreal harmony obliged the playwright to rethink the comic duality of nomos and phusis in order to douse the land and dreamscape that he painted with a measure of practicality. That re-elaboration took three steps to complete: a particularised magnification of the discord between contemporary nomoi and a violently abstracted nomos; a comic dialectics of melt-and-freeze of an idealised phusis; and a re-constellation of nomoi along the lines provided by the vacillating phusis. A dramatic hiatus between the protagonists and their enlightened understanding of nomos prefigures the entire Aristophanic universe. Nomos should be there, according to the Aristophanic heroes and heroines, to leave nothing to be desired. Connoting a revered quality of potentially ancient custom, nomos ought to breathe life into a social harmony which is supposed to glue the whole comic universe together. At a step away from this retrospective abstraction rests, however, the bunch of lousy and abysmal nomoi which have nothing particularly ideal about them. Not to speak of their failure to bring the community together in line with hallowed customs, the spatio-temporally determinate nomoi beleaguer the customary girdles maintaining the entire dramatic community. The conventions of wartime, with its tight regulations of customs and conscription, for one, shakes the dramatic community down to its very roots, endangering even the most traditional of hierarchies between public and private space, and the sexes respectively. Likewise, an Athens where decadent nomoi prevail induces the communal flight of the birds and the comic journey of Strepsiades and Pheidippides with equal eagerness. The ken that is on display of all the Aristophanic dramatis personae in sniffing out the decadent nomoi suggests that they have a profound appreciation of what abstract nomos should be. With the dramatic kaleidoscope of ideal nomos firmly in its place, Aristophanes comically bloats the blunders of determinate nomoi hence creating larger-than-life worlds. Pheidippides’ beating of his father in the Clouds, the Chorus of the old Acharnians’ aversion to parley with anyone liaising with the Spartans in the Acharnians, or Paphlagon trashing his two fellow servants and throwing them away from the household of Demos in the Knights are all conceived through this vein of amplification. The comic shock effect of this aggrandization is the dramatic elimination of the barriers of temporality that are presupposed to exist between the abstract and determinate nomos. Lysistrata and others’ renunciation of sex, Praxagora and other Athenian women’s taking the political power into their own hands are comically a-temporalized breaches of some of the
supposedly most fundamental of ancient Greek conventions and norms. When the dramatic conception of *nomos* is divested from its determinate roots, it turns into a free-floating signifier, ready to be imbibed with any purely ideational ingredient. And that ideational element, typically in the case of Aristophanes, is forged in the dramatic blacksmith that serves only the upper-class interests. Through his selective rendering of *megalonomia*, Aristophanes aggrandised the class signifier of his protagonists into an existential condition unto itself. Not a single non-upper-class Athenian is fit to don the garb that is tailored for the Aristophanic protagonists; and one of the least favourable conditions of the Aristophanic *bestia nera* that is jeered endlessly is exclusively ethico-economic: the vegetable-selling mother of Euripides and letter-tanning business of Cleon.2537 Brimming with an Aristophanic ethics and politics of aristocracy of birth, the hitherto empty signifier of fully abstracted *nomos* allows its enactor a measure of dramatic violence that can continually be traced to its origins in the politics of class.2538 But how can the spatio-temporal dimension be taken away from the understanding of *nomos* in order to construe a truncated view of it? By the way of discrediting the contemporary *nomoi* through the looking glass of eternal sameness.

There is always something that is seriously awry with the comic worlds of Aristophanes and it has to do with a violently abstracted set of contemporary *nomos*. The abstraction in question is made on the comic level of absurdity to mask the creative endeavour that serves as the *élan vital* of the dramatic effort. That creative attempt involves the poetic substitution of a contemporary social problem that is magnified to encompass the whole universe with an

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2538 Azoulay’s synoptic rendering of the tradition of the *eupatrid hêgemones* to parvenu demagogues, as it is portrayed by the author of the *Athenaion Politeia*, can concisely be projected onto many of Aristophanes’ surviving plays in which the aristocratic sentiment is clearly shared: “Up until the death of Pericles, the people’s leaders belonged to the group of the “well-born” (*eupatrides*), the respectable men (*epieikeis*); the leaders of the *dēmos* all belonged to the traditional Athenian elite, whose fortunes were based on the possession and exploitation of land. The death of Pericles, it is claimed, opened the door to “demagogues,” whose wealth was founded on craft activities: Cleon owned a tannery, Hyperbolus was a producer of lamps, and Cleophon made lyres. It was a switch from wealthy people to nobodies. This sociological evolution resulted in consequences that were catastrophic for the city. The new politicians corrupted the people not only symbolically, by their uncouth language and their undisciplined way of addressing the Assembly, but also materially, by introducing new civic wages for the poorest citizens.” Azoulay, *Pericles of Athens*, pp. 128; for a rather recent continuation of that presupposed polarity between the landed wealth of the old and the industrial wealth of the new super-rich, see Forsdyke, *Exile, Ostracism, and Democracy*, pp. 172; cf. David Rosenbloom, “From *Pôneros* to *Pharmakos*: Theater, Social Drama, and Revolution in Athens, 428-404 BCE”, *Classical Antiquity*, vol. 21 no. 2, (October, 2002), pp. 283-346.
eternalised polarity between male and female, public and private, immortal and mortal, etc.
The contemporary bone to pick in comic terms is taken from a list of *topoi* that superficially
conrate only moral qualities: peace, marital harmony and filial concord. On the level of
poetics, Lysistrata desires just to liquidate all strife as her name suggests, and Strepsiades
basically wants to have a re-connection with his son. That surface is mostly protruded,
however, with the topography of the ever-shifting politics of class and sex. Lysistrata’s
daredevil attempt to unite all the upper-class notable women whose husbands partake of the
Peloponnesian War is comic and pathetic to equal degree. It is comic because the women of
the mainland Classical Greek *poleis* are deemed by the playwright to be incapable of
overstepping their ingrained limits, which banned the upper-class Athenian women, at the very
least, from the rigidly marked zones of free inter-sexual engagement, ranging from the
*andreia*, and usually the first floor, of the household to pretty much all the public spaces from
Agora to Pnyx. And it is pathetic because it is an astonishingly frank testimony to the perennial
upper-class worries concerning the capabilities of the women living in their households. To
reiterate a point that we have defended all-along, the lower-class women did venture into the
conventionally most masculine of spaces, Agora included,2539 to ply their trades and look for
additional employment that would allow them a living that was somewhat less akin to a hand-
to-mouth existence.2540 There was nothing inherently impossible, in that vein, for the Athenian
women, especially those with *thêtes* backgrounds, to wrest the political power away from the
male citizens.2541 The Athenian Agora was on the same way, archeologically as well as
ideologically, to the *bouleutherion* on the Acropolis. Ironing out the contemporary socio-
political inconsistencies with a replacement of them by the eternalised ideological products of
the Athenian dominant class simultaneously initiated an amplified narrowing of contemporary
political participation and a broadening of allegedly the most supra-temporal of political
horizons.2542 Whether he conceived it as a self-conscious metapolitical notion or not,

2539 Pomeroy has taken Xenophon’s fictional account of a strictly no-women agora at its face value,
only to be corrected, later on, by the Rotroff and Lamberton in their influential study of women in the
Athenian Agora. Plying upper-class sensibilities is, of course, the bread-and-butter of Xenophon, but to
take those sentiments for reality itself is an altogether different matter: “In Xenophon’s fiction, Socrates
sits in an Agora devoid of women and engages a fellow citizen in discussion of this situation as if it
were the natural order of the universe. If we could transport ourselves to the Stoa of Zeus in 410 B.C.,
however, the real-world spectacle around us would be quite different, and less strange and alienating
than this fictional one.” Susan I. Rotroff and Robert D. Lamberton, *Women in the Athenian Agora*,
of Socrates*, 2.7.7-10.


2541 For some concise pointers regarding the aristocratic ideology of Agora as a mingling place for all
sorts of *agoraios ochlos*, see Millett, ‘Encounters in the Agora’, pp. 218 ff.
Aristophanes’ phusis is Janus-faced. The eternal recurrence of the same was an ideological by-product of the sad upper-class realisation in the day of Aristophanes, as it is in ours, that nothing social ever stays exactly the same. Having a full grasp of the fact, Aristophanes comically conceived the rejuvenating boiling of Demos in the Knights and the Dionysian concession of the outmoded Aeschylean portentous grandeur in the Frogs through the same lens of multilinearity. If the social ills surrounding the contemporary Athens are to be fantastically conjured away by retrojecting their comic rumination into an idealised ground-zero of social existence, a phantasmagoria of dramatic projections are to be invited to the realm of potentiality through the back door of comedy. Chockfull of their share of contemporary injustices, the Athenian birds flock into found a polis that would lend social comfort to the entire ‘race’ of birds; but attempt to do it by ‘starving out’ the divinities of their accustomed proportion of prayers.2543 Creating a comic hedge maze in order to attempt to connect the determinate social issues to their fantastically desirable outcomes in the Nephelokokkugia, Aristophanes thus stripped the lustre of nomos and phusis to equal effect. Likewise, the poetically de-masculinised ekklêsia of the Assembly-Women posed an ultimate challenge to the customary male prerogative of political power as it became the dramatic centre of a role-reversal of the highest order.

The comic disequilibrium between the abstract and determinate nomos, as we saw above, provides a considerable part of the dramatic momentum of the Aristophanic plays, as the protagonists attempt to write off discordant nomoi, and their adherents, to regain the comic harmony at the end. That comic harmony, however, is never conceived as a final burial spot alongside a poeticised set of kata phusin icons. ‘Accordance with nature’ is an intrinsically knotty qualifier in Aristophanes’ comedy. To be sure, the disputatious nomoi are hammered on the anvil of phusis by Aristophanes to make them more palatable to the Athenian upper classes. And yet, that anvil is a shapeshifting poetic invention that is equally capable of producing the ideological weapons that are capable of bringing about the end of the upper classes’ socio-economic privileges. In short, the retrospective politics of reconciliation resonate through the comic void of Aristophanic worlds as it creates prospective avenues of a

2543 To colonise an intermediate aerial sphere between the earth and sky, stylized, of course, as the realm of mortals and gods, respectively, to block the upward passage of prayers, thence forcing the hand of divinities to grant them their wishes, is the counsel given by Peisetairos to Hoopoe. Playing the tune of an old mythological theme that is most explicitly portrayed in the Homeric Hymn to Demeter, Aristophanes’ dramatic conception still manages to afford a significant breath of fresh air in that the dramatis personae in his play is ordinary birds, whereas in the Homeric Hymn Demeter herself successfully blockades the gathering of prayers by other divinities: “Their [the birds’] private space. | Because the sky revolves, and everything | Traverses it, it’s called the celestial sphere. | If you could colonize and fence it off, | You’d turn this sphere into a global city. | You’ll lord it over men—they’ll be your locusts! | And you’ll starve the gods, just like the siege of Melos.” Aristophanes, Birds, 180-186.
politics of the future. That transition between the past and future is never comically played out to the full. At the end of each of his surviving plays is a false measure of settlement, conveying that the outlandish resolution provided by Aristophanes has achieved the impossible in retrospectively correcting the contemporary nomoi and prospectively announcing a future politics of euonmia. In strict contrast to the tragically discernible Euripidean movement towards the politics of future, Aristophanes’ comic presentation of the ‘time to come’ is just a partial corrective of the present state of the society to return to a steady state social equilibrium. Aristophanes knew that virtually no amount of poetic reflection would make either the lower-class or upper-class Athenians to confirm that such a steady state could be rationally conceived. The last quarter of a century provided ample evidence that the only eternally recurring sameness was the constantly incomplete ideological reproduction of class and gender relations, and no decade of the rosary was going to change that. For better or for worse, Aristophanes admitted that Euripides’ forward-looking politics of tragedy was an insightful advancement over the Sophoclean elucidation of the politics of Panathenaean compromise: Alea iacta est. If a partially reversion to a more proportionately equal sphere of Athenian politics is to be realised, then a wantonly picked phusis will not suffice even for the pulling of the comic trick. No: a creative act of poetically reinvented phusis is necessary for wallowing through the mediocre conceptions of phusis that are ill-fitting for the present configuration. In as much as the Athens of 420s was a time of Cleon, Demosthenes and Nicias, it was also a time of Aspasia and the builders of the re-monumentalised Periclean Acropolis. When Praxagora and her women compatriots gained the control of the Athenian ekklesia the intended shock effect also spoke to patriarchal sensibilities that the male citizens’ exclusive prerogatives were latently demurred more menacingly than ever before. Likewise, the Sausage-Seller’s meteoric rise to political prominence conveyed a sentiment that was shared by all the non-demotic members of the Athenian upper classes. Swinish in his education and skittish in his manners, the Sausage-Seller is not only the best bet of Athenian aristocrats to partially turn back the political clock, it is their only viable bet to persuade a congregation that is mostly made up of likeminded Sausage-Sellers! With the inverted realism of the play still managing to tuck at the strings of contemporary class and gender scares walloping the aristocratic daydreams, Aristophanes conceived the comic harmony promised by his plays to be multilinear in its forward-looking pronouncements.

The closing of this hermeneutic circle of comic interplay between reality and fantasy is Aristophanes’ poetic attempt to approximate the patched contemporary nomoi to a superficially stable phusis. Mending the principal shortcomings of contemporary nomoi is hence stylised as catapulting the decadent comic world into a future of self-realising prophecy.
The first major step toward the re-establishment of comic harmony, in that vein, is an act of fundamental import, a deed that can potentially set the tone for a return to the politics of the golden age. Insistently repeated appeals to the Demos to oust Cleon in the *Knights*, *Lysistrata* and other Greek women’s tooth-and-nail fight, despite their presupposed addiction to sex, to force their husbands’ hand into agreeing a peace in *Lysistrata* and the burning of the house of sophistry in the *Clouds* are all comic events of the first order that foreshadow a political path to be followed if the things and words are to be made to revert to their original significance. That return, as we have underscored above, is always, however, partial with respect to the promise it makes and the political potency it promotes alike. A full-blown socio-political chasm splits up the Aeschylean Clytemnestra of *Agamemnon* and *Libation-Bearers* from the Euripidean Clytemnestra of *Iphigenia at Aulis*, with none of its portends particularly encouraging from the standpoint of Aristophanes. It is that chasm that informs the projective part of Aristophanes’ *phusis*, always looking ahead even at its most vulgar and reactionary. His conception of *phusis*, therefore, is a summons to an inherently contradictive retrospective feature, a call for taking the right course of action despite the explicit admission that a return to a specific time frame is out of the question. Realising that the comic medicine he purveys mends and mortifies to equal extent, Aristophanes constrained his entire dramatic framework to workable limits with little to no regard to the politics of the long-haul. Yet, he had an excellent understanding, as we pointed out above, of what he desired in the long-run. A cancelling of all the office and public pay except for the daily payments to soldiers, a re-ruralisation of the Athenian δῆμος who would not have sufficient time to attend the political meetings and a restoration of the old-time aristocratic *ethos* that obliged *thêtès* to heed rather than command were all parts of a far-flung political programme mixing newer elements with older forms. But those aspirations could wait, whereas the casting out of Cleon, Euripides or ‘sophists’ could not. It is to the latter that we now turn to for the sake of wrapping the watershed of intellectual advances in the field of rhetoric, ethics and politics prior to the reign of the Thirty Tyrants.

5.4.3 The So-Called *Sophistai*

First, the readily-apparent: there is no late fifth-century philosophical movement that can be labelled with the pejorative tag ‘sophist.’ Instead, there are a number of influential thinkers that flocked, often temporarily, to Athens in ever-increasing numbers while differing considerably from each other in regard to their respective philosophical outlooks. There are some socio-economic attributes that may warrant any attempt to converge them as birds of the same feather. Their charging of their customers, usually with immodest prices, predisposition for bringing novel philosophical as well as religious knowledge that had been garnered in their
travels and the recognisable impact they had in the growth of the dramatic, rhetorical and historical studies, for example, are all shared traits that can be viewed as bringing the thinkers together. At the opposite end of these socio-economic similarities, however, are the philosophically divergent, and at times opposing, elements that were inherent to their teachings. Protagoras’ relativism of revalued sensory-experience, for example, did not find any willing adherents in Gorgias, Prodicus, Hippias, Antiphon or the author of the famous *Dissoi Logoi*. Gorgias’ steadfast enthusiasm in the epistemology and ethics of persuasion, likewise, was supported only by the *Dissoi Logoi*, while falling on deaf ears in the case of others. All the same, the sophists come to exert a significant influence on the upper-class Athenian intellectual circles, having a combined effect of precipitating an ideational leap in philosophical speculation. A principal *topos* of that leap, as the traditional argument goes, was the elaboration on the duality of *nomos* and *phusis*, effectively making up a later stage in the development of some of Protagoras’ ideas. Protagoras’ ignition of the inquisitive philosophical spirit was, of course, not, as we observed above, the equivalent of Aeschylus’ Prometheus robbing Zeus’ fire for all eternity. Indeed, harkening back to some of the most contemplated themes, Protagoras reworked a philosophical framework, which, in turn, was modified by the later sophists. Although we are out of luck in mostly having bare fragments of and testimonia to their work, we also have a couple of complete treatises such as Gorgias’ *The Encomium of Helen* and the *Dissoi Logoi*. And, combined with a careful analysis of the Platonic and Aristotelian mentions of their views, the analysis of this last philosophical vogue of the fifth century can be attempted without depending on educated guesses alone. To that effect, we propose to bring three themes to the fore in conjunction with their discernible relationship to the duality: an epistemology of persuasion, a moral relativism that is divested of its Protagorean utilitarian roots and a rethinking of the pre-politics of ‘might makes right.’

Gorgias of Leontinoi’s surviving works and fragments is the place to start in scrutinising the philosophical *topos* of the epistemology of persuasion. The *logos* is the primary building block of all that remains of Gorgias’ works. It is a promise to put belief into context given that our cognitive rapport with the natural world is assumed to be not one of steady knowledge but of shifty conviction. Standing by the epistemological relativism of Protagoras, Gorgias pointed out that the reliability of the senses in disclosing information about the external world is inherently questionable. That epistemological scepticism, however, did not give way to a utilitarian decision-making along the Protagorean lines, but to a dubbing of *peithô*, i.e., ‘persuasion,’ as the arbiter of the classification and comprehension of the sensory data. Naturally, the personification of *peithô* had a veritable literary tradition of its own that stretched back, as we saw in the previous chapter, to Hesiod at the very least. True to the
philosophical and dramatic speculation of his day, however, Gorgias had no thought to spare on the goddess Peithô herself instead concentrating solely upon persuasion as a social phenomenon. Now, as the ultimate court of appeal in the verification of formed beliefs, peithô had significant power to either confirm or reject the experientially spelled epistemological ties between the observer and observed. The cognition of an external stimuli, in other words, did not suffice in and of itself to validate the experience as a true belief. Instead, the truth of any experience was considered to be something that was gauged by the result of its baptism at the agape maw of the beast of persuasion. Naturally, when the rendering of epistemological judgments is conferred on the skill of persuasion alone, deception turns into a highly foreseeable outcome of the socialisation of beliefs beside verification. That is not to say, of course, that the logos is intrinsically manipulative. But provided with sufficient rhetorical capability, any person, Gorgias included, could overturn judgments that actually corresponded well to the external stimuli. There is nothing to suggest, at least in the extant works, fragments and testimony, that an ethics of some sort would effectively hold back any wheeler-dealer from charming an unsuspecting audience into accepting the beliefs of the wrong, i.e., non-corresponding kind. When communication replaces cognition with its rather dependable set of empirically verifiable judgments, rhetoric displaces ethics as the agent of peithô. On top of the perennial lack of any experimentalism that would serve as a testable and modifiable yardstick in the context of epistemological reflections, this coronation of persuasion as the clé de voûte of social existence spoke to the creation of an analytics and economics of logos that would swat away any ethical rumination on the uses and abuses of political power. Caution is needed, of course, in building any philosophical bridges between Gorgias’ epistemology of persuasion and an absence of any ethical element therein, which can be logically inferred. Indeed, the very fact that Plato, later on, would turn this equation into the bread-and-butter of the rhetorical roots of his Gorgias is a significant cause for concern that is aimed at such an elaboration. All the same, the surviving works of Gorgias does not appear to encourage any reconstruction of his epistemology as displaying an ounce of ethics.

2544 “The spoken word is a mighty lord, and for all that it is insubstantial and imperceptible it has superhuman effects. It can put an end to fear, do away with distress, generate happiness, and increase pity.” Gorgias, The Encomium of Helen, 8 Waterfield.

2545 Sextus Empiricus, Against the Professors, 7.65.1-86.11 = DK 82B3.

2546 In one of the most memorable parts of the dialogue, an outspoken Gorgias finally has enough of the starry-eyed obtuseness of Socrates that induces him to render a full account of what he understands as peithô: “I’m talking about the ability to use the spoken word to persuade—to persuade the jurors in the courts, the members of the Council, the citizens attending the Assembly—in short, to win over any and every form of public meeting of the citizen body. Armed with this ability, in fact, the doctor would be your slave, the trainer would be yours to command, and that businessman would turn out to be making money not for himself, but for someone else—for you with your ability to speak and to persuade the masses.” Plato, Gorgias, trans. by Robin Waterfield, (Oxford and New York, 1994), 452e1-10.
The Encomium of Helen is a grand rhetorical attempt to exculpate the original sinner *katexochen* of Greek mythology, Helen. Built upon the preconception that the natural limits of human cognition and memory oblige most people to make convictions the arbiters of their minds, Gorgias persuades the listener that Helen was abducted either by force or words or love, all of which exonerate her from any culpability.\(^{2547}\) The rationale behind the tripod of arguments is simple: if Helen was captured by physical force, coaxed by Paris into leaving Mycenae or enraptured by the Cyprian, then, it shows her subjection to a power that was superior to hers despite her divine ancestry. And if either fate, gods or necessity is to blame, then Helen’s lot has nothing tainted to it. In the end, all the three arguments boil down to the rhetorical consecration of *phusis* and *anagkê* as trumping over any *nomos*, manifesting the divide between the realm of necessity and that of human free will.\(^{2548}\) No warrant can be taken from this rationale, however, to conceive Gorgias as constructing a strict polarity out of the duality for the simple reason that the work is written as a display speech. Indeed, Gorgias makes it abundantly clear that he intends the treatise as a demonstration of the irresistibly persuasive force of rhetoric, thus choosing one of the most scorned heroines of Homeric myth in order to show that *even* her can be portrayed in an entirely different light if his rhetorical powers are summoned.\(^{2549}\) Indeed, this point is brought out clearly in another surviving work of Gorgias, *Defence of Palamedes*, which is a defence of the allegedly second most clever Greek in the Achaean army against the framing that was crafted by Odysseus.\(^{2550}\) No rhetorical forays are made, in that work, to espouse *phusis* as the ultimate judge of human affairs. Based entirely on arguments from probability, Gorgias’ causal links that are put into the mouth of Palamedes make mention of *phusis* only once, and that as a backside against what is crucial in


\(^{2548}\) “For it is the nature of things, | not for the stronger to be hindered by the weaker, | but for the weaker to be ruled and drawn by the stronger, | and for the stronger to lead and the weaker to follow. | God is a stronger force than man | in might and wit and in other ways. | If then on Fate and on God one must place blame (*anatheteon*) | Helen from disgrace one must free (*apolyteon*).” *Ibid*, 6.

\(^{2549}\) “It is the part of one and the same man | both to speak the needful rightly | and to refute [what is said not rightly; | it is fitting, then,] to refute those who rebuke Helen, | a woman about whom univocal and unanimous | has been the testimony of inspired poets, | and has the ill omen of her name, | which has become a memorial of misfortunes. | For my part, by introducing some reasoning into my speech, | I wish to free the accused from blame (*pausai tês aitias*), | and, by revealing her detractors as liars and showing forth the truth, | to free her from ignorance (*pausai tês amathias*).” *Ibid*, 2.

\(^{2550}\) There appears to have been a renewed interest in fifth-century Athens in the mythical figure of Palamedes. In addition to providing a fertile mythological ground for dramatic rethinking, the *muthos* also served, as shown persuasively by Luca Soverini, as a means for the class of Athenian traders whose prominence had soared significantly during the rise of the Athenian *arkhé*. On the transformation of the myth, see Luca Soverini, *Il sofista e l’agorà. Sapienti, economia e vita quotidiana nella Grecia Classica*, (Pisa, 1998), pp. 66-80; Leslie Kurke, *Coins, Bodies, Games, and Gold: The Politics of Meaning in Archaic Greece*, (Princeton, 1999), pp. 249-253; for an investigation of the aristocratic backlash to the mercantile reinterpretation, see Azoulay, *Xenophon and the Graces of Power*, pp. 159, 160.
carrying out a death sentence is not that it will bring the accused’s life to an end, which is
preordained by Phusis at the moment of birth of every mortal, but the possibility of not having
ascertained the verdict as fairly and justly as obliged. Otherwise, the only phusis that can
provide shelter to Palamedes is rationality. Capable of elucidating the lack of motives,
meditation and concerted action which were necessary to bring out such a correspondence
between Priam and himself, leading eventually to a treason, concisely spoken rational
inference is hence the only plausible means of defence as it was conceived by Gorgias. So,
glancing at rhetorical display speeches one and all, ought we just say that no substantial link
was construed to exist between persuasion and phusis? Nothing could be further from the truth
at least at what we claim to be a meta-rhetorical level of the speeches.

There are two core attributes of the surviving display speeches of Gorgias: an interest in
beating his adversaries through persuasion at their own game and a careful design of speeches’
aetiological structure to convey the clearest case of persuasion in espousing even the most
heterodox of interpretations. Gorgias’ display of his rhetorical prowess by turning the tables
on even the most formidable of opponents by using their own tools of trade against them is
most explicit, of course, in his Peri tou Mê Ontos e Peri Phûseos, ‘On Not-Being or on
Nature.’ Fashioned against Parmenides and Zeno’s logocentrism, in the reported bits of the
tract, Gorgias is made to rely completely on an inverted logic for the sake of ‘proving’ that
not-being or nothing does exist. Conceived at the top of a vantage point that is reciprocal
to the full, if Plato’s later Parmenides was any impartial judge of it, the treatise shows a rather
interesting attempt by Gorgias to rhetorically logicise even the arguments of the two
logocentric thinkers par excellence. Rhetorically, this curious piece illustrates a trenchant
objection to the view that philosophical views cannot be the subject of measurements that are
tempered at the blacksmith of rhetoric. Peithô reigns supreme, in other words, not just at the
speaker’s bêma in Pnyx or the courtroom of heliaia but also in an entirely philosophical
context wherein the issue is not gathering of votes to pass a motion or verdict. But therein lay
the whole rub of the Gorgias’ rhetoric: his understanding of persuasion was not just one strand
of thought among other more prominent ones. Gorgias might have been influential in stripping
the divine vestments of peithô, but the de-deified garbs that was provided by him in return

2551 Gorgias, Defence of Palamedes, in The Greek Sophists, 1.
2552 Gorgias, On Not-Being or On Nature, in The Greek Sophists = Sextus Empiricus, Against the
Mathematicians, 7.65-76; for a summary discussion of the modern philosophical interpretations of esti,
i.e., ‘being,’ as it takes place in the work, see Edward Schiappa, “Interpreting Gorgias’ “Being” in On
2553 Needless to add, the vestments in questions would never be entirely shed. Isocrates’ testimony to
the yearly sacrifices made to the goddess in a speech that was written in 350s shows that the contrary
was indeed the case: Isocrates, Antidosis, 249-250; cf. Pausanias, Guide to Greece, 1.22.3.
made it the essential enterprise in any thought-related activity taking place in the social world. Differently put, in the hands of Gorgias, philosophy was turned into just another defence speech that was geared toward the garnering of votes. What is there to do when every ideational activity is deemed a rhetorical arena in which even the uninitiated can try to prove their mettle against the grandmasters? Basically, to pick some of the foremost members of the trade in order show that even their ideas can be devalued. And, if the rhetorical structures of the surviving speeches allow such an elaboration, to claim that The Encomium of Helen or Defence of Palamedes were not created in a rhetorical vacuum appears but a short step to take. Coupled with our knowledge that there were quite a number of showpieces of rhetoric that surfaced in the last quarter of the fifth century, it appears highly likely that both speeches were designed to showcase Gorgias’ talent of persuasion against some other well-known rhetoricians. On a meta-rhetorical level, however, the intertextualism seems to offer only a partial success in relocating Gorgias’ speeches within the general topography of his threading the path between epistemology and ethics. Whether intended as rhetorically competitive tracts or not, there is a clear shift in the aetiological nexus that becomes evident as one moves away from The Encomium of Helen to Defence of Palamedes.

The nexus of causality is qualitatively different in Helen’s apologia because, in contrast to the defence of Palamedes, the deed is done and the guilty verdict is given. Helen’s defence, in other words, can only be taken retrospectively and subtly for the offence is already committed, obliging the speechwriter to discard arguments from probability. To be sure, there are implicit allusions to an apparent set of probability arguments in The Encomium to suggest that no qualitative leap is necessitated by the mythological framework of Helen’s deed. The three-pronged reliance on fate, divinities and necessity, for instance, show that Gorgias may not have deemed it compulsion to change the rhetorical bearing of his speech in accord with the reading of a different compass than that of Defence of Palamedes. Yet, that tripod of a justification is not an idiosyncratic apology of a particular case, it is the most universal, and hence the most abstract, of defences that can be summoned to whitewash any offence. Indeed, the trio of fate, immortals and necessity can be called upon to aid even an encomium of Paris, whose abduction of Helen was similarly adorned with a prophecy foretold, a choice made on Mt. Ida and the irresistible tide of compulsion that made Paris wrench Helen away from her home. Regressing infinitely in comparison with the causal structure it posits from Hecuba’s rationalist indictment of Helen in Euripides’ The Trojan Women, Gorgias disarms his whole rhetorical enterprise as he constructs a causality that is strictly enforced by supernaturality. Mythology needs to speak to the contemporary sensibilities concerning the historical tradition in order to turn into a plausible piece of ideology. Neither Helen nor Paris can be rhetorically
posted as having existed at a spatio-temporal configuration when *nomoi* did not provide the basic regulations of social existence. Homer and Hesiod’s accounts of the myth, regardless of their differences regarding the bearers of the ultimate responsibility of Helen’s abduction, demonstrate that the event was cataclysmic because it contravened the sacred *nomoi* between hosts and guests, not to mention that between the husband and wife. Although both Homer and Hesiod knew the mythological tradition of the judgment of Paris, neither of them attempted to put the blame entirely on the shoulders of either Paris or Helen since they were conceived as a composite part of the social universe in which they existed. With his adoption of the aetiological triad, Gorgias, on the other hand, constructed Helen as a *pre-political* figure that existed lonely by herself and the immortals. Gorgias’ *phasis* is not something of an everlasting beacon whose light always has to be followed. It is the expression of the finalised rhetorical movement toward a pre-political existence with no sociality to immerse oneself in.

The moral relativism that has inaugerated this transition towards a pre-politics of crude violence informs the conception of the political stick that, on a surface level at least, can be made to bend either way of the class spectrum. On a more historically informed level, however, the conception can be viewed to have grown in tandem with an oligarchic politics of power-play wherein the political betters are rhetorically reinforced by the alleged natural necessity. Fate, gods and necessity are the three main wildcards of the oligarchic side to that power-play, functioning as the pillars upon which the determinate socio-political hierarchy of any ancient Greek class society stood. As with the Aristophanic outlandish solutions to real social problems, so with Gorgias’ rhetorical knots that are untangled through the persuasive capability of the spoken word. On one side the promise of social reconciliation via the adoption of the measures that are assured to bring about the comic harmony; on the other a politics of *peithô*, whose failures are resolved with a rhetoric of *kata phusin* pre-politics. And yet, just like the Aristophanic Janus-faced politics of comedy, Gorgias’ *phasis* is something that incessantly works against itself. If there is nothing to the ideology of pre-political *phasis* other than an a-socially conceived existence, that goes on to show that the appellation of *phasis* is a clear indication that the ruling ideology itself is on the ropes. Reminiscent of the sweet nothings that were ‘whispered’ into the ear of Clytemnestra by Euripides’ Agamemnon when he realised that his daughter had been spirited away,2554 any decisive rhetorical movement towards the ‘eternal dictates of nature’ is an implicit upper-class acknowledgment of the growing vulnerability of its ideological flanks. Gorgias may have realised that an ever-entrenched defence of the all-encompassing aristocratic *phasis* against the perpetually

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2554 “My wife, we may be happy for our daughter’s sake. For I tell you truly, she lives among the gods. You must take this little baby [Orestes] and go off home, since the army has its voyage in prospect. And farewell. It will be a long time before I return from Troy and greet you again. May all go well with you.” Euripides, *Iphigenia at Aulis*, trans. by James Morwood, 1620-1625.
enfeebled *nomos* was a rhetorical admission that the upper-class thinkers were digging the last line of their ideological defence to hold off the lower classes. Even granting that he did, however, that does not appear to have sufficed in enticing him to attempt to create a rhetorical equivalent of Aristophanes’ prospectively and enigmatically dramatized politics of future. Indeed, there was no dialectical interplay between an omnipresent pre-politics of oligarchic force and its potential uses by the formerly subjugated to settle the political score. As the Athenian *thêtès* were to show in 403, a tyrannical return to the pre-politics of Gorgias could never be fashioned into a miracle worker that would wave a magic wand into reuniting a deeply divided citizen-body. Gorgias’ overriding resort to the aristocratic politics of *phusis* expressed that the upper classes themselves were primed for reaching for Benjamin’s ‘emergency brake.’

Prodicus’ extant fragments and testimonia display quite a different set of characteristics than those of Gorgias in regard to the rhetoric of the duality. There is not much to go on, unfortunately, in attempting to draw a comparison between Gorgias’ epistemological prominence granted to *peithô* and anything remotely similar to it in Prodicus’ fragments. Naturally, given that Prodicus made a living of the examination, classification and teaching of spoken words, finding a well-deserved place as a reformer in Greek linguistics as well as rhetoric for his compilation of the first ancient Greek dictionary, his preoccupation with *logos* does not seem to be qualitatively any different from that of Gorgias. Whether he adorned his teaching of public speech with something similar to Gorgias’ adoration or not, Prodicus appears to have taken a genuine interest for nit-picking words etymologically and setting up linguistic rules.

In regard to the question of moral relativism Prodicus, likewise, does not seem to have supported the Protagorean view through a linkage between epistemological and moral scepticism. Indeed, what little testamentary evidence we have appears to promote the opposite conclusion as it shows Prodicus as a thinker who saw the potential use of instruments, such as wealth, as depending entirely on the *phusis* of their possessor. The *phusis* in question was not some frozen entity, never to be improved upon. Notwithstanding the apparently static view of human character when it is espoused as a *phusis*, Prodicus

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2556 Plato, *Euthydemus*, 277e-278a; *Protagoras*, 339e-341c.
2557 “[Socrates reports] The young man asked him [Prodicus] under what circumstances he thought wealth was bad or good, and Prodicus replied as you did just now: ‘It’s good for people who are truly good, who know when to use their property, but it’s bad for the worthless people, who lack this knowledge. And the same goes for everything else as well: the nature of things is bound to depend on the nature of their users …’” Ps.-Plato, *Eryxias*, 397e3-9 Burnet = T7 Waterfield.
emphasised that *aretê* could be thought thereby showing that a stagnation of the former can indeed be impeded.

An ethics of hardship, contrary to the evident stupor evinced by Gorgias’ extant works, is a distinguishing feature of Prodicus’ fragments. Xenophon’s story of the ‘choice of Heracles’ is as good a starting point as any other in elucidating this theme. As a backdrop to Xenophon’s rendition of Prodicus’ story, we ought to recall that by the end of the fifth century Heracles was well on its way to turn into a philosophically reinvented figure that was used by Socrates and his later Cynic followers as a gushing spring of *aretê.* This rediscovery of Heracles informed a lot of contemporary issues including the ascetic understanding of *aretê* which was prized as the only good that was final, i.e., not designed for procuring something else. Posited as an up-front challenge to the caricature of sophists as travelling and swindling merchants of *aretê*, sage-like endurance was a motif that was deemed worthy of being followed in its physical and sentimental reverberations. But given that we expound these points in greater length in our elaboration of the Cynic movement below, it ought to suffice that Heracles was probably a bone of contest between rival philosophical traditions already by the time Prodicus visited it. Indeed, Prodicus’ work, as relayed by Xenophon, pulls all the expected strings in any contemporary philosophical foray into the tragic hero of the yore. The philosophical insight he appears to draw from the figure, moreover, has all the makings of an anticipation of the later Cynic views, which are, at times, still regarded as an explicit rejection of the ‘sophist vogue.’

Portraying the hero as still in the flower of his youth, Prodicus makes Heracles encounter two women of superhuman stature with one oversexualised and brazen in her conduct and the other solemn and forthright. The first woman introduces herself as *eudaimonia,* or ‘happiness,’ which, as she is wont not to forget, is turned into *kakia,* or ‘vice,’ in the slurs of her decriers. The second woman is not named, but may be called as virtue personified in the light of her teachings. The two women combine to incite Heracles into adopting the way of life that they expound, with the first proposing a life of easy pleasure and the other promising toil and hardship that would make the travails of the young man the stuff of legends that will impress all Greeks. In the end, Prodicus does not exactly spell out which way Heracles was bound to go; then again, the answer to the dilemma was a crystal-clear one for every auditor of his tale. The hero of the Ten Labours with its magnetic impulse would not be outdone by a mere

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2558 For a similar sentiment expressed by Socrates in defence of his *praxis* of philosophy against the celebrated sophist Antiphon who accuses him of being a teacher of *kakodaimoneia,* i.e., ‘misery,’ see Xenophon, *Memoirs of Socrates,* 1.6.
temptress, promising a transitory happiness what would nick every grain of greatness that was to be the due proportion of the hero provided that he accepted the tasks handed over to him by King Eurystheus.

The inferences that can be made on the basis of this story for our dyad of nomos and phusis is twofold: an ethics of hardship that is potent to expand the borders inherent to any phusis and a politics of communal struggle obliging every politai to partake of his or her fair share of economic and social toil and boil. Conveying a virtue ethics with an emphasis on the aspect of endurance that would come with the territory of every virtuous decision taken, Prodicus brand’ of non-relativist ethics carved out a peculiar niche for itself at a time when the murky waters between the Manichean ends largely remained uncharted. We do not know what kind of ideal, if any, Prodicus posited as the ultimate benchmark in conjunction with which all actions were to be judged. Yet, it is well-nigh certain, as many of Plato’s and Xenophon’s respective testimonies attest, that he conceived of ethical development as an improvement of one’s character that was not always accompanied by happiness and glory. In a way, such an ascetically interpreted ethics could be seen as drawing from a different source than nomoi, since they are but fleeting social markers that are ever-exposed to the ‘natural elements.’ Prodicus’ stress upon the communal share of hassle that is the apportioned due of anyone deigning to live in a polis, however, canvass phusis as aligned with nomos in guaranteeing that no free-riders or lollygaggers will ever disturb the level surface of social existence.

There is an explicit contrast in the respective sketches of social existence as they are purported by Eudaimonia and Aretē in Prodicus’ rhetorical account. On that note, the most alluring of Eudaimonia’s promises is that of a carefree existence with no share in the public responsibilities of various sorts, hence allowing a smooth and leisurely sailing that will never be disturbed with the tides of economic and social toil. Eudaimonia has no fantasy, however, about allowing Heracles to eat from the palm of her hand. If Heracles is to shed all his troubles concerning social existence, then the fruits of the labours of all others are to be fleeced by the invisible hand of Eudaimonia to be bestowed upon the hero.2559 Eudaimonia offers no social benediction, as with all benedictions, that would grant a Garden of Eden to the whole community but a personal one, offering to transform the hero into the perpetual beneficiary of the biblical story of the Good Samaritan.2560 The desire of Eudaimonia, on this view, is to

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2559 Alternatively, Eudaimonia’s appeal to Heracles’ parentage and nature can be taken as an implicit admission that they can only be fulfilled if the hero would partake of his share of communitarian toils, divesting himself of the tyrannical pleasures which were promised by Kakia. Rose, Sons of the Gods, Children of Earth, pp. 312; DK 84B227.
mould Heracles into a *turannos*, dominating and extracting the lives and labours of others. With others to fight the battles and farm the lands in his stead, Heracles dons the *himation* of the Athenian genteel farmer who, as in the case of Aristophanes’ Dikaiopolis finds nothing particularly appealing in the foot-soldier’s daily pay of three obols. In response, *Aretē* argues that nothing in the realm of mortals ever comes without backbreaking toil and effort, obliging the hero to partake of his allotment if he is to live up to his own expectations in benefiting not only his family and community but the whole Greece. Toil and sweat, according to that interpretation, are not drudgeries to be avoided at all costs but a measure of mortal sanctity that is sprinkled on any abstractly extant individual to make him or her pertinent to social existence. If *Eudaimonia*’s offer is one that is designed to mould a tyrant out of Heracles, that of *Aretē* is one that is propelled towards forming him into a Hesiodic farmer.

Against Gorgias’ pre-politics of might Prodicus appears to have conceived a politics of communal struggle to subdue any evil, be it natural or human. *Nomos*’ allotted role within this political framework seems to be one of ensuring that communal bonds will hold out in weathering any thundering spectacle. Juxtaposed to his non-relativist virtue ethics of *askesis*, this political outlook allowed Prodicus to occupy a peculiar space with respect to his postulation of *phasis* within the general sophistic tradition. Mutable and improvable in its personal reverberations, Prodicus’ *phasis* corresponded to a constantly ameliorated state of social affairs in which no tyrannical pretenders will ever dare to rely on arguments from nature for the sake of ideologically reproducing their class domination. This inherently shifting concept of *phasis*, however, was not accepted by Hippias of Elis, another of the most notable of the *sophistai*.

The snippets of surviving testimonial information about Hippias’ views are unusually thin, even for a ‘sophist’. Indeed, leaving Platonic dialogues aside there is not much to go on about any strand of his philosophy with a disconcerting lack of any fragments in order to speculatively engage in reconstructions. Plato’s dialogues featuring him offer, however, an avenue of interpretation that needs to be trodden while taking note of the occasional distortion and frequent irony that are their trademark attributes. Although Plato does not allude to any of

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2561 “In the first place, you will not be concerned with wars or public responsibilities, but rather your constant concern will be what food or drink you can find to suit your taste, or what sight or sound might please you, or what scent or touch might delight you; which beloved’s society might gratify you most, how you may sleep most softly and how you can achieve all these objects with the least trouble. And if there is ever any suspicion of a shortage of any of these benefits, you need not fear that I shall involve you in any physical or mental effort or distress in procuring them; you shall enjoy the fruits of other people’s labours, and you shall refrain from nothing from which you can derive any advantage. For I grant my followers permission to draw benefit to themselves from all quarters.” Xenophon, *Memoirs of Socrates*, in *The Greek Sophists*, 2.1.24-25.
his epistemological arguments, he offers plenty of hints concerning Hippias’ ethical and political ideas. On that note, Hippias’ virtue ethics operates on a rhetorical ground of strict opposition between nomos and phusis while his politics appear to have espoused an ideology of pre-political nomos that ranks above each spatio-temporally determinate nomoi. What little doxographic evidence remains of his writings allow us to claim that Hippias built his ethical conceptions on a polarisation of the duality. Claiming that the scope of nomoi is intrinsically narrow in comparison to that of phusis, he comprehended biological and political relationships mainly along the supposed lines afforded in accordance with nature. Now, the extant testimonia to Hippias’ works do not give substantial hints in fleshing out that idealised notion of phusis. But accompanied by another passage from Xenophon’s Memoirs of Socrates, we can argue that there are only two core features setting apart dikaion phusikon, i.e., ‘natural law,’ from nomoi: a mythology of divine origins whence phusis is argued to have sprung; and a retributive eschatology that is capable of rectifying, unlike everyday laws and conventions, any wrong committed against them. The rhetorical attempt to trace the dikaion phusikon to their supposedly immortal origins served to give them undeniable sanction in the face of fleeting contemporary nomoi. That practical side apart, however, when a divine genealogy is purported as the ultimate source of dikaion phusikon, it obliges phusis to revert to Gorgias’ violently abstracted nomos, presupposed to have existed before the inception of time and space but in fact just another set of fleeting nomoi that are employed to give eternal sanction to the existing relations of production and domination. Hippias appears indeed to have accounted the inherent absurdity of claiming that a set of nomoi were to be disconnected from the rest just because they purportedly had divine roots to hold them always in their rightful place. If the persons who make up the communities that are expected to be legally beholden to their immortal masters engage in an ever-soaring number of activities in contravention of dikaion phusikon, this proves not a lack of mores or a dégénérescence swamping the contemporary society but a clear recognition of the fact that the usefulness of the nomoi in question have expired a long time ago, to be replaced with another set. In Hippias’ terminology, if a dubitably god-given law is observed to be broken it means that it is not god-given at all.

2562 “Very many of those present [at the symposion in the house of Callias] agreed with these remarks of Prodicus’. And then the wise Hippias said, ‘Gentlemen, I regard you as all related, all akin, all fellow citizens–by nature, not by convention. For like is by nature akin to like, but convention, a tyrant over mankind, ordains many things by force contrary to nature.” Plato, Protagoras, trans. by C. C. W. Taylor, (Oxford and New York, 1996), 337c5-d3.

2563 “Hippias objected [to a momentary conclusion drawn by Socrates]. ‘How can one regard laws or obedience to them as a serious thing when the very same people who enacted them often repudiate and alter them?’ Xenophon, Memoirs of Socrates, in Conversations of Socrates, trans. by Robin Waterfield, (London, 1990), 4.4.14.1-4.

2564 Ibid, 4.4.18-19.
undermines the measure of fixed sanctity that is attempted to be grafted onto the former. Belaboured to the full, hence bidding farewell to its rhetorical aura, *phusis* is exposed as an empty catchphrase that is employed in order to describe an imaginary, either in part or in full, historical society as the ideal model to be duplicated. That duplication is conceived to take place along the lines of a set of proscriptions that define how social existence is to be realised within certain constraints. This movement from description of an ideal state of social existence to a bundle of proscriptions in abidance with which the *politai* will ideologically eternalise their present obliges the erection of a firm barrier against the rise of any prescriptive mode of thought. Neither Euripidean nor Sophoclean nor Aristophanic drama participates in this world of the eternal present. Bedevilled by the spectre of the incessant changes enacted to the spatio-temporally determinate present, Hippias and Socrates took solace in the creation of an empty universal, binding all the individuals together with nothing other than the threat of inter-generational punishment. If there is no promise of either personal or social benefit to be reaped by keeping the association tight with *phusis*, then there is also the stick to goad any unwilling person through Golgotha.

Translating his brand of virtue ethics into political signposts, we see that Hippias’ antagonistic understanding of *nomos* and *phusis* may have served an aristocratically-inclined pre-politics of Gorgias’ kind. A recession in moral enforcement to the zero-degree of inter-generational punishment spells, of course, a clear bearing for the political landscapes which might have been crisscrossed with socio-economic distinctions abstracted in compliance with Hippias’ understanding of *phusis*. Now, there is not much of interest, at least philosophically, in Plato’s two dialogues that feature Hippias heavily and in fact were named after himself. That is, apart from the rather overdone opposition between Hippias the materialistically-minded rascal and Socrates as the ascetic sage redefined. Needless to add, we know that this opposition was a stock feature of Plato’s stern chastisement of the sophists who were often labelled as self-styled merchants of political knowledge. From Gorgias to Prodicus and Hippias, partially excepting Protagoras, all the foremost *sophistai* were portrayed, either at one dialogue or many, as having made a pretty coin from all their incoherent and shallow soothsaying. Still, Hippias might just be the most bludgeoned among all the Platonic sketches of sophists given his boisterous and profiteering attitude regarding his fully commercialised teaching.

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2565 “[Socrates and Hippias conversing] ‘Isn’t it a custom everywhere to honour parents?’ | ‘Yes, that too.’ | ‘And that parents should not copulate with their children or children with their parents?’ | ‘I don’t think that this is a god-given law like the others, Socrates.’ | ‘Why not?’ | ‘Because I observe that some people break it.’ | ‘In point of fact they break a good many other laws. But those who transgress the laws laid down by the gods pay a penalty which no man can escape in the way that some transgressions of man-made laws escape paying the penalty, either by escaping detection or by the use of force.” *Ibid*, 4.4.19.
Possibly having drawn the unabating ire of Plato due either to his frequent brags or peerless avarice, Hippias might have carried the transition from teaching of virtue as a communitarian ideal in exchange for relatively modest fees to its logical conclusion of a strict commercialism designed to rip off any up-coming candidates. And even if we grant the benefit of doubt to Hippias via a recourse to Xenophon’s more distanced depiction of him in his Memoirs, the fact still remains that he envisioned his political postulation of *phusis*, in direct relation with some of the theses in both *Hippias Major* and *Minor*, as obliging a wide-spread approbation to a second-best political alternative that is provided by the contemporary *nomoi*. Whether he conceived an aristocratic *phusis* mainly on grounds of profit-making or political convictions, Hippias’ oppositional understanding of the dyad appears to have induced him to a halfway movement towards a politics of uniform consent. Obedience to *nomoi* made the citizen-armies invincible in war and the *polis* bursting with civic pride at times of peace in equal measure. The upholding of social concord is of utmost importance at all times regardless of how it is ensured. If the ideology of *dikaion phusikon* fails to trigger the fail-safe of obedience to the contemporary *nomoi* as the only means to secure a harmonious social existence, then so much the better. The first-best solution to any socio-political impasse was, however, in the exclusive purview of *phusis*, measuring out each social action against its timeless dictates.

Hippias’ *phusis* also had an element of politics of subversion ingrained within. An understanding of *phusis* as constituting the top of the legal pyramid, which could serve as the court of appeal pertaining to any allegedly illegal verdict, was a significant ideological instrument in staving off any drift towards the practice of either aristocratic or democratic prerogatives. Speaking to an aristocratic need for creating impediments against the rise of disastrous results that were often brought to the fore by the ‘tyranny of the majority,’ *phusis* functioned as the touchstone of justice condemning the jurors of the Arginusae Eight and the Mytilenean debate with equal rigour. Reminiscent of Sophocles’ Antigone and her uncompromising rejection of the *para phusin* prerogatives issued by her uncle, Creon, Hippias’ political notion of *phusis* appears to have delineated two spheres justice and punishment: one that drew its justification *dia doxan*, i.e., ‘from the appearance [of things],’

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2566 Plato, *Hippias Major*, 282a-e.
2567 Hippias’ approval of Socrates’ political view that victory at time of war and prosperity in peace can only be ascertained by the citizens’ ever-uptight obedience to laws in Xenophon’s dialogue is a roundabout confirmation of the place of the rhetorical *topos* within his antagonistic framework between *nomos* and *phusis*: *Ibid*, 4.4.15-18.
and the other that had the inerasable label of *di‘aletheian*, i.e., ‘of truth,’ impressed upon it. This view, despite the fact that its most developed form can be seen in the works of Antiphon on which we will ponder presently, gave an element of last instance alacrity to Gorgias’ pre-politics of might. That hint at the transformation of *phusis* into a blanket concept of pre-political justice, contradictory as it was, would be fully consummated in the works of the lone Athenian among the prominent sophists, Antiphon.

Antiphon’s surviving fragments are in a much better state than those of Hippias. With the addition of the *Papyrus Oxyrhynchus*, which was unearthed in Egypt in 1910s, to other testimonia, Antiphon’s political philosophy and ethics afford us arguably the most comprehensive picture of the duality comprehended by one of the most significant thinkers of the time. To begin with his take on the epistemology of persuasion, Antiphon argued that senses are our only window into physical reality whose experiential inputs are then to be processed through the workings of language. Now, contrary to all the ‘sophists’ that we have examined thus far, Antiphon divided reality into *ousia* and *kata nomon*, i.e., ‘artificial,’ effecting a change in the understanding of *phusis* which was thence to be equated to *ousia*. To elaborate, Antiphon regarded *phusis* as being in direct harmony with the substance or essential ingredient of any existing thing, thus designating wood and iron, for example, as the essential elements of a wooden bed and an iron sword respectively. The relation between *phusis* and *ousia*, according to this view, was one of an in-built correspondence that did not change by the formal composition of the thing. A bed that was fashioned out of wood, to recount Aristotle’s famous example, still had wood as its substantial ingredient which was argued to be testified by the rather absurd example of a buried wooden bed putting out a shoot that was ordained to grow into a tree and not a bed. The gist to the argument is, of course, that the appearance cannot append the essence of any given thing, being inherently constrained by its accidental or *kata nomon* properties. This gradual hierarchy enacted between accidental and essential features speaks to an order to existence that harkens back to Xenophanes and Heraclitus’ views on the actual grade of being that is concealed from the scope of the ordinary

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2569 “Some people take the nature and substance of any natural thing to be its primary component, something which is unformed in itself. They say, for instance, that wood is the ‘nature’ of a bed, bronze the ‘nature’ of a statue. Antiphon cites as evidence the fact that if you bury a bed and, as it rots, it manages to send up a shoot, the result is wood, not a bed. He concludes from this that the arrangement and design of the bed, which are due merely to human convention, are coincidental attributes, and that the substance is that which persists throughout, however it is affected.” Aristotle, *Physics*, trans. by Robin Waterfield, (Oxford and New York, 1996), 2.1.193a9-17.
sens-perceptions. Coupled with an understanding of words as inherently deceptive, the mutually exclusive worlds of essence and appearance oblige the cultivation of a nous that is capable of following the unseen precepts of phusis in order to govern the operation of the body which has little to no immunity to all the leger-de-main of external reality. With this epistemology of hidden substances unearthed only by the scrutinising mind of the philosopher in abidance with nature’s precepts comes an ethics of kosmopolis that is conceived at the interstices between the consummately abstracted nomima, i.e., ‘particular customs,’ and phusis.

The so-called cosmopolitanism, to be sure, was one of the pillars of Stoic ethics and politics in addition to that of Cynics before them. But Antiphon’s blanket abstraction of phusis that crossed over boundaries of ethnic, political, religious and linguistic barriers was certainly a precursor of the notion’s later developments. Just like the basic division of the world into seen material things and unseen essential substances, Antiphon split the social realm into a polarity of particular determinate societies and universal natural existence. Incorporating questions of spatio-temporal adjacency into the determinate world, Antiphon pointed out that the degree of respect shown by any member of a specific community toward the particular norms and conventions regimenting other societies bears a negative correlation with the distance in time or space which distinguish one society from another. At this determinate level of social existence, there are myriads of nomima that are diversely issued and promulgated, sometimes by the citizen-body and oft-times by the oligarchic upper classes alone. Given this partial promulgation of their authority, the sanctions arising from any person’s breaking of their stipulations are subject to the intrinsic limitations of perception: no harm no foul. And if nomina are peered through the lens of phusis tout court, one’s best-bet is just to comply with their lot so long as anybody’s watching, but to disregard them if not. There is nothing, in other words, that is ethically attractive about the concept of justice unless it is interpreted solely as expediency. At a higher level of abstraction, however, Greeks as well as non-Greeks are parts of the same species, sharing physiological as well as certain psychosomatic functions with one

2570 “People believe what they see with their eyes more than they do those things the evidence for whose genuine existence comes from what is unsees.” The Suda s.v. atta, 1.397.15-17 Adler = Waterfield, F. 15.
2571 “No single thing uttered by someone has a single meaning, and neither is it one of those things which a far-seer with his eyes nor one of those things which a far-knower knows with his mind.” Galen, Commentary on Hippocrates’ ‘On the Doctor’s Workshop’, 28B.656.14-15 Kühn = DK87B1 = Waterfield, F. 16.
another.2573 Within this sphere of indeterminate existence, *phusis* serves as unflinching guidelines illuminating the only naturally truthful path for a *nous* to traverse. Based on a postulation of a self-regimented system of legality which is continuously reproduced by the demands of *phusis* which are deemed to be anagkaia, i.e., ‘necessary,’ the universal level of existence informs the meting out of punishments *di’aletheian*, redressing the evil committed irrespective of both the prescriptive determinate *nomoi* and any social agreement. There is always a foul when the crime committed is against *phusis*.2574 Ethics, then, has two faces according to Antiphon’s formulation: one extroversive, interested in the keeping up of the appearances of justice; and the other introvertive, keeping the individual always in line with *phusis*’ precepts. Whatever benefit may accrue or loss accost to any person from the deceptive sphere of *nomos* is often of no import and always contrary to *phusis*, whereas any gain or injury that originates from the realm of *phusis* makes the difference between an individual’s freedom or thraldom.

Antiphon’s ethics is a veritable world unto itself that is made up of victimless crimes and damning innocence. There was a full ethical spectacle in his *On Truth* from what can be gleaned from the passages that were relayed through the *Papyrus Oxyrhynchus* that have been analysed above. Qualitatively distinct from either Gorgias’ or Prodicus’ attempts to flesh out a zero-degree rhetoric and ideology for the class rule of those that have fate, divinities and necessity on their side, Antiphon de-socialised justice and ethics as he philosophically built a universe of atomistic existents, whose only communal ties are those pertaining to an artificial and arbitrary notion of social existence. Expedience aside, there is not a single reason to keep a community of individuals together. Keeping out of other’s way is the only viable course of action provided that the more *nomoi* there are, the more *para phusin* one’s selfhood becomes. Justice, then, is only an empty pretence that serves the ignorant interests of those who have…

2573 “… We recognise and respect [the laws of nearby communities], whereas those of communities far away we neither respect nor revere. In this, however, we have become barbarised towards one another, whereas in fact, as far as nature is concerned, we are all equally adapted to being either barbarians or Greeks.” *Papyrus Oxyrhynchus*, in *The Greek Sophists*, 11.1364.

2574 “[Col. 1] Justice, then, is a matter of not breaking the laws and customs (*nomima*) of the city in which one is a citizen. So a man would make use of justice most advantageously for himself if he were to regard the laws as important when witnesses are present, but, when on his own without witnesses, the demands of nature. For the demands of the laws are adventitious (*epitheta*), but the demands of nature are necessary (*anangkaia*); and the demands of the laws are based on agreement, not nature, while the demands of nature [col. 2] are not dependent on agreement. So if a man transgresses the demands of law and is not found out by those who are parties to the agreement, he escapes without either shame or penalty … If, on the other hand, a man – *per impossibile* – violates one of the inherent demands of nature, even if all mankind fails to notice it, the harm is no less, and even if everyone is aware of it, the harm is no greater. For the injury which he suffers is not a matter of appearance (*dia doxan*) but of truth (*di’aletheian*).” *Ibid.*
not the slightest inkling about the voice of *phusis*. And yet, Antiphon’s *phusis* is not some ideological measure of last resort to whitewash any drift towards the pre-politics of might.

Fortunate as we have been with the lucky recovery of *Papyrus Oxyrhynchus*, we are largely in the dark concerning exactly what edicts were posited by Antiphon as *kata phusin* except two: a pleasure and a reciprocity principle. Antiphon appears to have endorsed a Hedonistic calculus at some point in claiming that what is in accord with *phusis* can do naught else but bring pleasure to its practitioner. Grounded on a rationale that the advantages prescribed by nature bring freedom and, therefore, cannot be the cause of either pain or sorrow, this hedonistic calculus leads Antiphon into a curious opposition to Prodicus’ defence of a proto-ascetic standpoint in his rendering of the choice of Heracles. Unfortunately, the passage from which that interpretation of a pleasure principle can be derived is tantalisingly short.2575 The only thing that might be gleaned from the utilisation of the idea by Antiphon, hence, is an equation of emotionally and corporeally desirable states with the fulfilment of *phusis*’ precepts. However irrelevant it might seem, that point takes on an altogether significant colouring when we account for Antiphon’s foray into the rule of reciprocity as a primary trait of acting in conformity with *phusis*.

To Antiphon, laws have to be inherently beneficial to those who comply with them. If I incur an intense amount of pain or displeasure as a result of my compliance with *nomoi*, then there is no question that the human-made laws and conventions in questions detract from *phusis* to the full. It is never possible, of course, for *nomoi* to be directly aligned with *phusis*; indeed, all they can ever hope to do is to provide minimal legal grounds for the community to stay united without barring in the least the compliance of individuals with *phusis*. To what extent a particular *nomos* undermines *phusis* is, however, variable, hence making it subject to the two litmus tests, one of which, i.e., the hedonistic calculus, have been touched upon. To that end, the intensity of the psychological or corporeal suffering increases in proportion to two things: perpetrator’s reliance on unnatural *nomoi* to effect punishment and sufferer’s innocence in not having caused any prior injury to the other party. Recalling Antiphon’s atomistically conceived understanding of social existence and justice, the *para phusin* qualities of any deed can be analysed only if the perpetrator and the victim are imagined to exist in a full vacuum. There are no social, political, religious, etc., roles that are not dropped in order to step into this

2575 “[col. 4] But the ‘advantages’ which are prescribed by the laws are shackles upon nature, whereas the advantages prescribed by nature make for freedom. It is not the case that things which bring pain can be properly claimed to benefit man’s nature more than things which bring pleasure; nor indeed is it the case that the things that bring sorrow are more advantageous than the things that produce enjoyment. For the things that are truly (*tôi alêthei*) advantageous ought not to harm us but help us.” *Ibid.*
violently abstracted level of bare indeterminate existents. From socially constructed filial to legal ties, each are casted away to gauge the accordance of any action with phusis, which is another way of saying that the particularity of action itself is discarded. When any parents mistreat their children or when a legally appointed Athenian torturer that plies his ‘trade’ on a slave in order to make him spit out truthful confessions under duress, on the ground level of bare existents we have only an offender, however he or she may proclaim to have derived her authority to punish, and an offended, regardless of his or her erstwhile injuries caused to other persons. Justice being what it is, i.e., an empty signifier with no authoritative capacity to bestow, any wrong committed at this level only adds additional links to the chain of unnaturality thereby pronouncing the alienation from natural accord. Further, given that the calculus of pain and pleasure give the same reckoning that justice is never on the side of the nomos-abiding sufferer, it just remains to add that nomos has but an empty claim to make in allowing the communal existence to flourish. With no socially assigned roles permitted to concretise his hypothetical existents and a circular calculus working as a testimonial backdrop to boot, Antiphon delivers the final blow to nomoi via a recourse to the ancient lex talionis.

Divested of all the social vestments, only a single connection lingers between the perpetrator and victim, that of retaliation. Postulating an understanding of justice as ‘do no harm to anyone who has not harmed you first,’ Antiphon attempts to bring home the defunction of nomoi by evincing that no eye-witness had ever been injured by any alleged perpetrator before giving the additional evidence to turn the latter into a convict. Just like in the example of the executioner, there are no personal ties of injustice linking either the deliverer of the verdict or that of the punishment to the condemned party. And if communally dispensed justice cannot abide even by the most fundamental of the premises from which it sets out, then it is but a hollow pretext in causing further estrangement from phusis itself. For better or for worse, Antiphon telescopes all the intricate and interlocked dimensions of social existence into a music box wherein the everlasting waltz to whose tune an abstract set of perpetrators and victims appears to dance mechanically. Even the tiny figures of a music box, however, never

2576 Ibid, col. 5.
2577 “If some assistance accrued from the laws to those who give up their rights in such ways, and disadvantage to those who do not give them up, but put up resistance, [Col. 6] then obedience to the laws would hold some advantage; but as it is, it is clear that justice in accordance with the law does not give adequate assistance to those who give up their rights in such ways, since it leaves the sufferer and the doer to act, and not even when the act has been committed is it in any position to prevent the sufferer from suffering or the doer from acting. When justice is introduced to effect punishment, it is no more particularly on the side of the sufferer than the committer of the act.” Ibid.
2578 “So these, then, are plainly no small harms, both that which he suffers and that which he commits; for there is no way that the justice of this procedure can be reconciled with the principle that one should do no harm if one has not suffered it beforehand. No, either one or the other of them is just, or both are unjust.” Ibid.
remain exactly at the same spot as they previously were. To overcome that problem, Antiphon devises the clever trick of carrying his selectively violent abstraction to the full, not even sparing a single fleeting remark on how exactly a principle of retaliation or a pleasure and pain calculus can be fathomed to occupy either a practical or a political place within his completely levelled hypothetical space. In practical terms, pain thresholds are established to differ from person to person, and even if Antiphon did not take note of that, despite the fact that one does not need modern laboratory equipment to ascertain it, the punitive redress is always a rough approximate to the wrong committed in the first instance. Likewise, caring not a whit about how an everyday person like Demosthenes’ Ariston, for example, could hope to retaliate at the goons of *eupatrid* Conon, Antiphon’s approach to the practicalities of *phusis*-backed justice manage to create an aristocratic farce out of a tragedy of social existence.

The politics of this aristocratic farce were equally disconcerting as their ethical implications were for those who knew how to separate atomic existents from the Athenian society of living and breathing individuals at the end of the fifth century. Antiphon’s cosmopolitics of *phusis* was a step of the most disorienting kind for the rhetoric of democracy that was already under concerted attack from all oligarchically-inclined quarters after the decision to execute the Arginusae Eight. Pan-Hellenic myths aside, no overt espousal, philosophical, dramatic, historical or rhetorical, of *phusis* had reached the height of abstraction that was achieved by Antiphon in his endorsement thereof as a be-all and end-all of all things. To be sure, Gorgias, Callicles and Hippias did have considerable impact in preparing the groundwork for a full-fledged opposition between *nomos* and *phusis*. Still, their veneration of *phusis* always had, as we have seen above, at least a modicum of dialectical transitivity between the two concepts as they were not after some absolute truth, just approbation. Indeed, even Gorgias’ and Hippias’ rhetorical regress to the zero-degree of pre-politics of might have entertained a likelihood, albeit minimal, of being accepted by anti-aristocrats of various social backgrounds. The root-and-branch Athenian dēmos, after all, had a good inkling, if there is any historical substance to Pericles’ funeral oration transmitted by Thucydides, of the tyrannical semblance of the political power they practised. Antiphon’s conception of *phusis* spoke, however, an entirely different political language. Attempting to create two *kosmopoleis* side-by-side, one for the oligarchs and thêtes each, Antiphon constructed a metapolitics of *phusis* that followed a course of strict social exclusionism. *Phusis* was the indefatigable king of both *kosmopoleis*, but with one signal difference: while it served to sanctify the calculus of pleasure and pain as well as the Nietzschean politics of immediate retaliation in the *kosmopolis* of oligarchs, it used the

same arguments to haunt any democratic reflection that could threaten the reign of \textit{phusis} in the \textit{kosmopolis} of \textit{thêtes}. With material resources and political connections to ask for the due return of any wrong that was supposedly committed against them, the \textit{eupatrid} oligarchs and their supporters were to reap all the material and social fruits of nature that was simply their due. A blessing for the oligarchs was a terrible curse for everybody else. In dropping all their means of legal and political recourse, all the members of the Athenian \textit{dêmos} generally, and those belonging to \textit{thêtes} especially, were asked to renounce all the relatively equalising benefits of social existence, giving up every semblance of equality that they had acquired over the course of centuries so that they could obediently partake of an existence in accord with \textit{phusis’} precepts. Reminiscent of Agamemnon’s gamble in Euripides’ \textit{Iphigenia at Aulis}, Antiphon offered a ‘chance’ to \textit{thêtes} to redeem themselves through a salvation in \textit{phusis}, effectively saying that ‘you need to break your backs labouring so that \textit{phusis} can prosper.’ Although we remain somewhat averse to attempt the historically synchronisation of Antiphon the sophist with Antiphon the mastermind of the oligarchic regime of the Four Hundred as Thucydides dubs him, the difference between the two historical figures appears to verge on slim to none indeed. With the opening of the philosophical rift between the two \textit{kosmopoleis}, it only remained for Plato to confer his authority on the two cities of \textit{ploutos} and \textit{penia} that was deemed to be a standard feature of all the Greek \textit{poleis}.\footnote{Plato, \textit{Republic}, 422e-423a; cf. Graham, ‘The Topology and Dynamics of Empedocles’ Cycle’, pp. 237-238; Pomeroy et al., \textit{A Brief History of Ancient Greece}, pp. 239.}

The pioneers of rhetorical and philosophical that left their respective marks on the ideational landscapes of Athens of their day can be conceived as the individual parts of a general tradition only as much as the Ionian philosophers of the sixth century could fit the blanket description of \textit{phusiologoi}. Our investigation of some of their surviving snippets has shown that there were many epistemological, ethical and philosophical issues of prime import that diverged the thinkers in question. Never the less, the accumulative philosophical effort of Gorgias, Prodicus, Hippias and Antiphon was momentous in developing the duality in three ways: deepening the philosophical recognition of the increased quality of ethnological knowledge; inducing the inception of an ethically more nuanced philosophical understanding; and abstracting both terms to the full. In different ways, all the extant works and fragments of the four thinkers exhibit a notable expansion in the storehouse of anthropological knowledge that can perhaps be more fairly called exotica. Naturally, the last quarter of the fifth century was a time that saw the rise of Herodotus’ momentous \textit{Histories}, a vast collection of curiosities offering the closest thing that the Greeks of the late fifth century had to an insider’s account of Egypt, Medes, Scythia, Lydia, etc. With the knowledge of land and its people came an
acquaintance with their laws and customs. Having fused a peerless imagination with suspense and intrigue of the first rank, Herodotus portrayed the blood-soaked customs of Messagetan tribes and the fantasy realm of Babylonian temples with equal vividness. Coupled with the turning of the Ionian and Aegean poleis into backwaters of the Athenian arkhē, all these literary and political achievements gave rise to a larger perspective on nomos. From that larger vantage point, the Greek nomoi appeared uncanny and idiosyncratic just like the laws and conventions of other communities. Naturally, from the sixth century onwards, the Greek thinkers were always intrigued by the questionable authenticity of sense-perception. But the literary and historical compilation of the nomoi of the non-mainland Greeks and non-Greeks alike caused a qualitative leap with respect to the translation of this epistemological debate into a more ethical and political language. With an increased self-consciousness in seeing how bizarre some of the Greek customs could have appeared to non-Greek peoples, the four thinkers followed the philosophical thread to its end, hence stylising nomoi as temporary and insecure. Gorgias and Hippias’ resort to the epistemological relativism had as much to do with the broadening geographical, political and ethnological horizons as it did with the waves of socio-political turmoil engulfing various Greek poleis at the end of the fifth century. Likewise, Antiphon’s epistemological dualism that celebrated the mind as the rightful governor of body was an attempted inversion of the camera obscura in order to relegate physical phenomena, and socially determinate nomoi, to a second-order existence. As their political awareness of the peculiarity of Greek customs and ways of life rose, so did their philosophical distance from the nomoi that were deemed inherently shifty and replaceable. Yet, with each further step away from the politics of nomoi, the three thinkers, excepting Prodicus, dug deeper into a rhetoric of peithō, showing that the taking of the consent of messes still loomed large in the oligarchic agenda despite all their bravado about being spokesmen of phusis qua the king of eupatridae and thêtæ alike.

The addition of various novel philosophical sketches, such as the proto-askesis of Prodicus, was closely linked to their philosophical escape from nomoi. Discarding the Protagorean utilitarian grounds of ethics probably as it spoke to a public weal as a civic ideal to be upheld, the four figures ventured ever deeper into ethical woods. Returning with some novel reckonings and notions, they built individual blocks of a turn-of-the-century ethics that struck a more harmonious tune with all the developments in political and ethnological knowledge. Gorgias’ and Hippias’ respective attempts to breathe a fresh air into the Protagorean ethical relativism was relatively side-tracked as the two figures could not manage to find a

2581 Herodotus, Histories, 1.215-216, 1.178-200.
replacement that would take the place of Protagoras’ proto-utilitarianism. In Prodicus, however, an ascetic brand of virtue ethics was made to take the mantle of the old relativism in order to construe a dependable ethical measure that would glue the lower and upper-class politai together. In a world that was steadily convulsed with ethical innovations and modifications, Prodicus’ askesis filled the lacuna that was created by the dismissal of Protagoras’ calculus of utility. Put differently, an ideology of natural hardship and endurance was to justify the socio-economic domination of the commoners by the upper classes. To Antiphon, however, Prodicus’ poison of askesis had no notion of the aristocratic due measure that would keep it ideologically afloat from the politics of class as it promised so little for all the great displays of self-effacing fortitude it asked. If phusis was to reign, then it was to reign alone. Sweeping all the pretences aside, Antiphon posited a hedonistic calculus in utilitarianism’s stead, consigning naturality to all acts that either maximised pleasure or minimised pain whilst weeding out the rest as guided by artificial nomoi and hence para phusin. Arguably for the first time in the history of the Greek political thought, the duality was ethically shaped to fit a unilinear dualism between an eternally supreme phusis and perpetually detracting nomoi. With a gradually conceived class subjugation running from the Athenian super-rich to hippeis to zeugitai, and, finally, to thêtes and their slaves, Antiphon’s political pyramid of pleasure functioned as a veritable re-enactment of the Binding of Isaac, only this time there was no Jehovah to save Isaac qua all the material and social gains of thêtes.2582 And if the commoners were too pugnacious to stand by their nomoi, which, after all, was a more realistic expectation than its alternative, Antiphon had an additional marvellous bout of preaching to the effect that one ought to follow nomoi only when spied on. Now, what was there to do for thêtes when nobody was looking? To slack of a bit when ploughing the fields or polishing off the shields perhaps. There was no Platonic ring of Gyges2583 to be found by any thêtes; oligarchs, needless to add, were an altogether different matter. The Four Hundred as well as the Thirty Tyrants were the brainchildren of oligarchs meeting behind closed doors in aristocratic symposia.2584 Antiphon knew that phusis could exist only where law was silent; why beat about the bush rather than ensure the consummation of that silence?

2584 A suggestive linking of one Erasistratos who was one of the leaders of the Thirty in 404/3 to another Erasistratos who figured as one a notable man of the hour for the oligarchs during the coup of 411 through familial ties has been discerned by Cartledge. Occham’s razor or no, it is highly probable, not to mention historically necessary as it has been noted by Simonton in his attempt to draw the oligarchs’ political learning curve, that the two oligarchic groups had long-lasting communal relations between them: Matthew Simonton, Classical Greek Oligarchy: A Political History, (Princeton, 2017a), pp. 281 ff; cf. Cartledge, ‘Fowl Play: A Curious Lawsuit in Classical Athens (Antiphon XVI, frr. 57-9 Thalheim)’, pp. 60.
That complete silence of *nomoi* could only be attained at the highest level of abstraction. *Nomos* and *phusis* had hitherto always been conceived as bearing the marks of spatio-temporal determinateness. And in a way Antiphon was no different: construing *phusis* as the panacea for all the evils that the Athenian oligarchs were facing in the last decade of the fifth century, he aimed at the heart of the democratic polity. To inaugurate an oligarchic rule of the most vindictive kind, he had to philosophise a hypothetical experiment that pitted a resplendent and overarching *phusis* against a despondent and downgraded *nomos*. Within that strictly binary framework, the political benefits of social existence were bestowed only on those that had the requisite bare existents to carry out their whims. Antiphon’s tale of the two *kosmopoleis*, with *thêtes* turned into the *kata phusin* handmaidens of the oligarchs was, of course, an actual product that the whole philosophical effort was propelled towards. Still, that higher level of ‘cosmopolitan’ abstraction also promised to give the oligarchs a taste of their own medicine when the fortunes of the Athenian democracy was to turn for the better. Indeed, try as he might to construct a closed-circuit of a political philosophy, Antiphon showed that the creation of a democratic underground in minds as well as behind closed doors had nothing inherently improbable about it. A tactical retreat was all it took to revive the political offensive and that higher level of abstraction intertwined with myths of Athenian autochthony and traditions of anti-tyrannism would serve in key capacity in ensuring that.

5.5 The Fourth Transformation of the Essential Copy and Conclusion

By the end of the fifth century a fifth major shift in the significations ascribed to *nomos* and *phusis* had taken place in line with the travails of the Athenian democracy, Spartan oligarchy and Syracusan vacillation in between the two regimes. With its practically translucent means of mythmaking and ideological reproduction and its accumulated material benefits from the

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arkhê, the Athenian democracy promoted the rise of a number of dramatists that played a key part in providing the terms with more refined and elaborated meanings. By the end of the 420s, at the latest, the changing political environment in Athens also stimulated the rise of oligarchic hetaireia and a rhetorical-philosophical movement which drew its insight mainly from the teachings of the travelling ‘teachers of political excellence’ and Sparta herself. The momentary setback after the fall of the Four Hundred did not suffice in definitively ending the oligarchic underground as they made their preparations for a final confrontation that loomed in the near future.\textsuperscript{2586} The social ground of all the political stability that was achieved by the Spartan oligarchs was a strictly upper-class coalition based on material interests in defeating the Athenian arkhê and salvaging its remnants to create an even larger hegemonic polity. That polity would allow the homoioi to erect additional territorial buffers against the lower classes the extension of whose reach to some of the top military offices showed that by then Sparta was well on its way toward becoming a polis of hypomeiones, naodamôdeis\textsuperscript{2587} and mothakes. Those Spartans were to fill the mercenary armies that served on lands as diverse as Asia Minor, Cilicia and Sicily. On top of a projected steady inflow of the material benefits that were to accrue following the imminent toppling of the Athenian arkhê, the homoioi and their adherents imagined that the expansion of their zone of control would allow them to direct the course of socially discontent non-homoioi toward greener pastures that were to be sought elsewhere. Well, they imagined wrong. With no attempt to redistribute land or realise wide-ranging changes in polity, the growing Spartan fascination with the accumulation of gold and silver coins ensured that the chasm of disparity in wealth would border on socially suffocating levels as the Spartans sank ever-deeper into the Persian and Athenian pockets. Halfway measures of an absurd kind, e.g., the elimination of all foreign currency except the local iron, could work in the outlandish realms of Aristophanic comedy, but it could not work out a similar trick in the context of a rigid class society. All the reinventions of the Lycurgan ancestral customs aside, the fact remained that it took only four years for the Spartans to assemble a huge mercenary force, in excess of 10,000 soldiers who were mainly Spartans, to stake all the goodwill between their polis and the Persians in an attempted usurpation of the Persian

\textsuperscript{2586} For two examples of fourth-century stipulations against any associational infringement of laws, see IG II\textsuperscript{2} 13.61.13-14, 1263.43-45.

\textsuperscript{2587} Literally meaning the ‘new damos,’ the naodamôdeis were ex-helots that were freed for their aid to the Spartiates in achieving signal success. Although that promise of freedom becomes more pervasive as we draw closer to the liberation of Messenia in 369, the practice appears to have been well entrenched during the last quarter of the fifth century. Brasidas’ motley expeditionary force, and its successful exploits despite the odds, might have induced the Spartiates to frequently resort to dependable groups among their helot stock who would compensate for the dwindling numbers of the homoioi. Ducat, Les Hilotes, pp. 160-161.
The Spartans may not have realised at the time that the tolling bells of 404 cried their demise, at least without the Persian backing, as much as it did that of the Athenians, but their grasp of the crux of the matter was not long in coming.

We might have given the wrong idea in pronouncing the direct and indirect impacts of Athenian and Spartan polities respectively, as a tacit relegation of Syracuse to the footnote of the late fifth century Greek history. If so, the actual historical picture was the complete opposite. The Syracusans were influential in altering the course of the Peloponnesian War by their spirited defence of their polis against the invading Athenians. With a policy that was squeezed between the oligarchic gamoroi and demotic killyrioi, the Syracusans overcame the Athenian threat with a reinvigorated vigour and confidence in their war making capacities. Yet, for all their military success the Syracusans had barely a ramshackle hotchpotch of polity with the accentuation of socio-economic distinctions on one hand and the promise of a seemingly equal political participation on the other. Indeed, the rapid success achieved by the invading Athenian forces until the building of the third counter-wall with the help of Gylippus testified equally to the relative lack of clear political guidelines to organise a defence and the Athenian skill in besieging polis despite the spending of the precious first four months of the expedition on chasing butterflies. For all we know, if the Athenians were not to recall Alcibiades or had Nicias followed Lamachus’ strategy of laying a shock siege on Syracuse, the Syracusans would be left in a tight spot. With none of the social issues, such as the settlement of the mercenary armies and answering the call of the dēmos to enact measures toward democratization, the last fending off of the Carthaginians in the 400s was followed by the outbreak of political turmoil that eventually led to the rise of a tyrant, Dionysius I in 405. Still retaining their old ties to the mainly oligarchic poleis of Peloponnesus, the tyrannically governed Syracuse would house the first attempts of creating philosopher kings and enlightened despots as the realm, with its non-gamoroi dēmos forced into quiescence, turned into an apple of the eye for some of the foremost thinkers of the day including Plato himself.

And that at a time when the Spartan demography was seriously shaken largely thanks to the attritional casualties over the course of the Peloponnesian War: “A likely size-range for the enōmotia [platoons] indicates a whole army smaller by 22–9 percent. This decline had been restricted to the Spartiates, now 45 percent fewer and only 38–41 percent of the army (50 percent at Plataia). This shows the lingering effects of the much earlier earthquake and revolt. Population decline had necessitated a major army reorganization. … If one does not correct Thucydides, his smaller Spartan army at Mantinea would mean that the continuing damages from earthquake and revolt amounted to c.71 percent of total Spartan manpower.” Figueira, ‘Helotage and the Spartan Economy’, pp. 582-583.


As the respective social, political and economic Archimedean standpoints changed so did the comprehension of *nomos* and *phusis*. A socio-politically induced focus on the transitions in their signification, a complete materialisation of the class dynamics that were identified to have underlain them and a dramatically and philosophically driven attempt to bridge them to the realm of violent abstraction were the three utmost comprehensive changes pertaining to the understanding of *nomos* and *phusis*. The shift of focus from the meanings that were ascribed to the terms to the modifications of those meanings was a pronounced feature of the dramatic and philosophical attempts to map out the contemporary material and ideational universe. To be sure, a movement of a similar kind can also be detected in the surviving tragedies of Aeschylus and fragments of Protagoras. Unlike the overt temporal progression that is heavily featured in the Aeschylean plays, however, the formal changes and narrative re-inventions that were realised by Sophocles, Euripides and Aristophanes, concentrated on the crises of the old world whose death always heralded the birth of a new one that was directly related to it. The dramatic essence of that relation, and *not a telos* of social reconciliation which may be presaged at its likely outcome, was the rub of almost all the tragedies that were produced by Sophocles and Euripides. And even the comic harmony that was partially restored at the end of Aristophanes’ plays simultaneously exhibited retrospective and prospective qualities to take account of the social reality with a touch of comic certainty. There was nothing innately stable within either the Athenian or Spartan socio-political sceneries during the last quarter of the fifth century. When either the epistemology of ‘persuasion unleashed’ of Gorgias or Hippias or the wild role-reversals of the Aristophanic worlds tacitly hinted at ridding the ideational space of all the allegedly changeless essences of ancestral *nomoi* they were not, therefore, at odds with the ebb and fall of socio-political fortunes. *Nomos*, then, was conceived of something of a leaky vessel, continuously filled with political content that it never managed to contain. With that introduction of spatio-temporal determinateness to the sphere of philosophical speculation came the re-configuration of the duality with an explicit aim of spelling out a politics of future through which the contemporary social issues would be resolved. If the ideology of class domination was needed to be reproduced without end in order to sustain its effects, then a continual critique of the contemporary *nomoi* would not do. Only with the addition of a similarly rethought *phusis* could the political shortcomings of *nomoi* could be mended. That dynamic dyad was capable of making allowance for every vacillation in the political struggle, functioning as a fine-tuned transmitter of retrojective critiques of the current society with projective proclamations regarding how the political transition in question could be marshalled with causing the least amount of unwanted swerve. Never the less, that introduction of the element of dynamicity to the dramatic and philosophical conception of *phusis* required a stricter pegging of the two terms on the particular class realities of the
contemporary *poleis* so that the political Maginot line would not have to be continuously redrawn.

The politics of class had always been the heart and soul of the duality since its earliest documented inception in the works of Homer and Hesiod. By the turn of the fourth century, however, *nomos* and *phusis* had begun to be conceived of more and more in conjunction with the relations of production and domination. Possibly caused by the social upheavals that surfaced in quick succession in Sparta and Athens alike, the turn-of-the-century dramatists and philosophers came to reconsider the two concepts more in class terms than before. From the social roots of Antigone’s summons of *phusis* in her defence against Creon to those from which stemmed Demos’ turning away from Paphlagon, the current strains in the relationship between the aristocratic upper classes and the demotic lower classes were often portrayed in barely-concealed vocabularies of class politics. Neither Gorgias and Hippias’ respective renderings of the pre-politics of might nor Aias’ tragic denunciation of the backhanded politics of the Achaeans in addition to everything that went along with it needed any transcribers to an Athenian audience that had seen irresistible torrents of spring sharpen as well as blunt the political domination of the oligarchic upper classes. Nose to the grindstone was *à l’ordre du jour*. And so was the hyper politicisation of the two terms that began to function as ideological mouthpieces of the politics of class. Leaving the intricate double hermeneutics of drama aside, it was at this time that *phusis* went through a genuine aristocratically-driven renaissance. Thucydides’ brief but key forays into the workings of *phusis* when the *nomoi* were temporarily shelved, as in the Corcyraean civil war of 427, for example, displayed that his sights was mainly on the democrats of the *polis* for a rhetorical and historical target practice. Likewise, the time immemorial *phusis* of Gorgias and Hippias never oscillated away from the oligarchic touchstone of the pre-politics of might. The most explicit advocate of *phusis* as the shiftless corrective of unnatural *nomos* was, of course, Antiphon. Antiphon’s philosophical attempt to de-socialise existence in order to hypothetically posit a *tabula rasa* of full-fledged oligarchic


2592 Cf. “Thucydides points out to his reader how, under the conditions of civil war, the various category distinctions that sustained the polis in more peaceful times—rich and poor, free and slave, male and female, religious and secular, just and expedient, public and private—were at once proclaimed with special vehemence in words and suffered utter collapse in practice. It was only when the ordinary social rules were suspended, and political consensus shattered, that the unitary polis was revealed in all its diversity: the interests of the citizen men were seen to be inextricably bound up with those of women and slaves; religion, politics, and law appeared as part of a single system, driven by some deeper impulse.” Josiah Ober, ‘Political Conflicts, Political Debates, and Political Thought’, in *Classical Greece*, 114; that ‘deeper impulse,’ it goes without saying, was in conjunction with a frozen postulation of the ‘human nature’ which was to be guided and goaded by oligarchic *hêgemones*. Ste. Croix, *The Origins of the Peloponnesian War*, pp. 12; Cartledge, *The Greeks*, pp. 128-129.
class domination was the rhetorical equivalent of Philoctetes’ defence of his preordained rights in the state of nature. With a blanket rejection of all social binds except the ones whence would accrue the most pleasure and the least pain to those who needed no nomoi to serve as checks on their whims, Antiphon concluded the transformation of phusis into a peculiarly oligarchic conception. Although he managed to block the rise of any hermeneutic movement towards a democratic politics that fed off from his comprehension of the duality, Antiphon’s theoretical leap to the metapolitics of abstraction laid bare an ideational sphere that could be utilised by democrats no less than oligarchs.

The Manichean ethics of Antiphon was the moral pillar that supported a fully abstracted level of atomic existence. Two ideational totems adorned that plane that had supposedly renounced all its ties to the real world: a nomos whose stirrings always bode ill for any righteous attempt at following the dictates of human nature and a phusis whose call needed to be answered first at all times. Of course, reasoning away the particularities of spatio-temporally determinate social existence was a timeless trick that had constantly been employed by the upper-class thinkers to create a slate that was clean only in so far as it allowed the unconstrained socio-economic reign of the propertied upper classes. The early atomists’ micro-physics of necessity and Eleatics’ reduction of all the determinants of actual physical existence to a telescopic world that marched to the drumbeat of an almighty logos are only two of the foremost instances wherein this aristocratic predisposition was displayed. In a way, Antiphon’s philosophy, as such, was a translation of the epistemological terms of that debate into a jargon of ethics and politics. But it was more: the rigid binary between the thêtes who were assigned to merely instrumental status of material existents and the oligarchic upper classes who were to make the most fitting use of their ‘hands’ in order to reach the maximum amount of pleasure at any given time was a slap in the face for all the democratically-inclined politai in reminding them that they themselves were para phusin. A consistent feature of ancient Greek ethics and politics was the distinction of friend from foe. At this high level of violent abstraction, however, the designated class foe was rejected even from any chance of partaking of community. This erection of the rigid class barrier between the upper and lower classes, therefore, was influential in taking the bull by the horns. From the end of the fifth century onwards all the sides of the class struggle had access to higher levels of ideological abstraction that could be utilised in order to whitewash the hegemony of the class they belong. It is still a telling feature of the classical Greek politics, never the less, that most, if not all, of the attempted abstractions that followed that train of thought was made by the leisurely upper classes and not by the thêtes.
CHAPTER 6

A PHILOSOPHICAL MIDWIFE DELIVERING A NEW WORLD OF MORALITY

6.1 The Thirty Tyrants and the Two Political Ruptures in Athens and Sparta

The Spartan policy in dealing with the poleis that were formerly allied with the Athenians was to set up “decarchies,” i.e., boards of ten-men that were selected locally from the pro-Spartan stock to handle all the basic governance.2593 For the Athenians, however, they were willing to make an exception: a board of thirty that was made up of a combination of moderate and extreme oligarchs, some of whom were recalled, like Critias, from their self-enforced banishment to Sparta. After their establishment the Thirty appointed five-hundred magisters and minor officials from a short list of a thousand in addition to ten governors of Piraeus, effectively wrenching it away from the rest of the polis.2594 To keep their tight control over Athens the Thirty also decreed that they were to be guarded by three hundred armed attendants at all times. Keeping up the appearance of favouring moderate changes to the polity, which, incidentally, is a curious remark that is made by the Athenaios Politeia in the light of the following list of changes,2595 they displaced Ephialtes’ and an otherwise unknown Archestratus’ laws on the Areopagus, cancelled off the Solonian laws on census-classes, some of which were still in practice, and public pay and disbanded heliaia.2596 With a nauseating employment of the slogan of a return to patrioi nomoi,2597 the Thirty thus curbed the

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2593 A wide range of estimates concerning the drop in the Athenian population resulting from the Peloponnesian War has been offered. Waterfield, for example, settles for a relatively high 220,000 which had dropped from a pre-war level of 335,000, whereas more recently Akrigg has opted for 140,000 and 250,000 respectively. Notwithstanding that high degree of variation, however, it is almost certain that only 20,000 citizens, and that according to the most optimistic estimate, belonged to the leisure classes, condemning the rest, slaves included, to menial work in perpetuity. Waterfield, Why Socrates Died, pp. 21; cf. Ben Akrigg, Population and Economy in Classical Athens, (Cambridge, 2019).


2596 Xenophon, Hellenica, 2.3.12; Aristotle, The Athenian Constitution, 35.2; Robin Osborne, ‘Vexatious Litigation in Classical Athens: Sykophancy and the Sykophant’, in Nomos, pp. 100.

2597 That slogan was, of course, a stock feature of the Spartiate attempts to keep the Peloponnesian states too divided to oppose the political interests of their hegemon in unison. That punchline also afforded some key space to dismantle any democratic polity on the basis of a shamefaced incongruence with ancestral norms, which was discerned by Ste. Croix as a chief component of the Spartiate’s Peloponnesian policy in the fifth century. Ste. Croix, The Origins of the Peloponnesian War, pp. 98; cf.
democratic rights of the thêtes one by one until they gave the finishing touches to a barebones remnant of the previous democratic polity. Taking the political control of the polis solved, however, only half of the problem. The Thirty needed to generate a cash inflow to finance the soldiers in their pay check and given the loss of phoros-payments, they could rely only on internal funding to keep an increasingly restless dēmos firmly in its place.\textsuperscript{2598} A reign of terror was soon invoked to answer the material needs of circumstance, arbitrarily confiscating the properties of the upper-class Athenians who had not declared their everlasting support for the policies adopted by the Thirty and summarily executing those who tried to resist.\textsuperscript{2599} The death toll soon reached an astonishing fifteen hundred, which became the oligarchic counterweigh, at least in the works of the self-conscious aristocrats, to the infamous democratic decision to execute the Arginusae Eight.\textsuperscript{2600}

With an increased political volatility that risked eruption into full-fledged civil stasis, Theramenes, a moderate democrat, took the initiative in leading a dissident minority of the Thirty into coalescing with the thêtes. Realising that murdering Theramenes and his supporters would only rile up the masses further, the hard-nosed members of the Thirty Tyrants attempted to appease the dēmos by enacting minimal constitutional changes, proposing to broaden the number of citizens eligible for officeholding to three thousand. And yet, they delayed the publishing of the register for the Three Thousand, who were then arbitrarily hand-picked from their most ardent supporters, showing that they had no intention to follow their words by deeds.\textsuperscript{2601} Came winter time, and seeing that the political winds in Athens were about to blow into the faces of the oligarchs, those democratically-inclined notable politai that were exiled by them and led by Thrasybulus flocked to Phyle to organise an armed resistance against the Thirty. The Thirty needed to act decisively and they did so as they passed two motions in quick succession that excluded Theramenes from the citizen-body, effectively allowing his summary execution.\textsuperscript{2602} Disarming everyone except the Three Thousand, the Thirty then sent envoys to

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\textsuperscript{2598} The selling of the dockyards, which had costed 1,000 talents to build, for the paltry sum of 3 talents should be regarded as a politically and symbolically motivated act rather than as a step along the road of the Thirty’s fundraising campaign. Those dockyards, one would do well to remember, housed the thousands with the thetic origins who had built the fleets that had spearheaded the dēmos-led foundations of the Athenian arkhē. In discarding the dockyards, the Athenian oligarchs were severing the territorial links that used to unite Athens and Piraeus under the canopy of the democratic political consensus: Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, 8.90 ff; Xenophon, Hellenica, 11.4.10 ff; Aristotle, The Athenian Constitution, 44.8; Isocrates, Areopagiticus, 66; cf. Jim Roy, ‘The Threat from the Piraeus’, in Kosmos, pp. 192-194.

\textsuperscript{2599} Isocrates, Areopagiticus, 67.

\textsuperscript{2600} Aristotle, The Athenian Constitution, 35.4.

\textsuperscript{2601} Ibid, 36.2.

\textsuperscript{2602} Ibid, 37.1.
the Spartans to ask for help against the men from Phyle. As the Thirty and their followers got the worse of a military skirmish with the exiles, the dêmos threw its weight in favour of the latter and a reconciliation between the two sides took place in 403/2 after a failed initial attempt. There were two nodal points to the whole reconciliation scheme: no one was to be held responsible for the past deeds unless he was a member of the Thirty, the Ten, the Eleven or a governor of Piraeus and even then a conviction needed to be passed by a legal examination; and any oligarchically-inclined citizens that actively supported the Thirty and was thus afraid of democratic backlash was granted safe passage to Eleusis retaining the same political privileges, except for officeholding in the polis, and private property as before. Constituting the first recorded amnestia, from the verb mnesikakein, i.e., ‘to not recall the injury,’ the settlement of the ongoing political differences was a momentous step toward for a return to democracy that needed to politically include the rank-and-file thêtes in order to weaken the pronounced class antagonisms.

The politics of inter-class reconciliation was also cemented by changes implemented to the legislative system. By a string of decrees in 403, the Athenians rescinded their law-making capacity, which would, thence, be entrusted to a commission of nomothetai. Any change to nomoi, on this view, could be undertaken exclusively by that commission whose members would oversee the unobstructed operation of all the Athenian laws. By contrast, remaining within the legislative purview of the ekklesiâ was the vote on decrees (psêphismata), the impact of which was limited to emergencies and short-term measures. To curb the rise of a technocratic elite the Athenians, moreover, decided that the nomothetai were to be appointed by lot from amongst the 6,000 jurymen who served in the heliaia. Followed in 392 by the introduction of the assembly pay for the first time, legislative refinement, therefore, was to

2603 Cartledge sides with the claim that the pro-Spartan character of the Thirty was evident from the start: Cartledge, Sparta and Lakonia, pp. 230; cf. Ps. Xenophon, Constitution of the Athenians, 1.9.
2607 The officials are not to utilise an unwritten law in any case. No decree of either the boulê or the ekklesiâ is to be more authoritative than the law. It is forbidden to make a law for an individual if the same law does not extend to all Athenian citizens and if it is not voted by six thousand citizens, in a secret ballot.” Andocides, On Mysteries, 1.87.
guard the democratic polity against any breach of the boundaries between *nomoi, psêphismata* and *graphe*\(^\text{2609}\).

While the Athenians were busy tending to the political wedges that were driven by Lysander and his Athenian collaborators, the Spartans were preoccupied with salvaging whatever they could from the dismantled Athenian *arkhê*. There was a major rift within the Peloponnesian League, however, that barred the Spartans from committing fully to mopping up the Aegean. Seeing their proposal for the destruction of Athens turned down by the Spartans in order to effect the rise of a puppet oligarchy whose strings would be gripped by the latter, Corinthians and Thebans refused to abide by the Spartan orders not to accept the Athenian refugees that were exiled by the Thirty.\(^\text{2610}\) Naturally, the erstwhile cracks in the League were occasioned, as we noted above, no later than in the late 420s when the Spartans tried to impose the Peace of Nicias on their unwilling allies. Creating suspicions that the *homoioi* actually favoured the re-establishment of the dual hegemony to dominate their Peloponnesian allies,\(^\text{2611}\) the Corinthian cold-shouldering of their hegemon had taken on a more avid hue by the end of the Peloponnesian War. Similarly, the Boeotians saw Lysander’s establishment of the regime of the Thirty in Athens as a direct challenge to their consolidated hegemonic position in central Greece. And exacerbating all these justified worries was the employment of decarchies, harmosts and permanent garrisons of Spartan troops that were established at each strategic location to ensure the steady levying of a tribute over 1,000 talents per year from the former subject-allies of Athens.\(^\text{2612}\) With the Spartan sweettalk of *eleutheria* exposed for the mere scam that it had always been, the Thebans, Corinthians, Megarians, Argives and Eleans combined to give refuge to the Athenian exiles to begin to thwart the Spartan plans in earnest.\(^\text{2613}\) The Thebans, moreover, did not stop there, encouraging and supporting Thrasybulus’ offense against the Thirty in the winter of 404. Having gotten wind of Thrasybulus’ attempt, king Pausanias called upon the Peloponnesian allies to mobilise their forces but when he approached Attica, he saw the Theban and Corinthian forces refraining from throwing their lot with the Spartans as they did not see any justice, or expediency, to the military intervention.\(^\text{2614}\) The political structure of the League was in shambles, with the


\(^{2610}\) Diodorus Siculus, *The Library*, 14.3.5-7; Xenophon, *Hellenica*, 2.3.2.

\(^{2611}\) Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War*, 5.27.

\(^{2612}\) Diodorus Siculus, *The Library*, 14.10.2.


\(^{2614}\) “For these [the Corinthian and Theban contingents] said that they would not be keeping their oaths if they were to make an expedition against the Athenians who had not breached the treaty. But they did
Spartans following all the hallmark procedures of empire-building and their foremost allies none-too-pleased about being left completely out of the loop of material and political benefits. And then a largely unexpected enmity between the Spartans and their Persian benefactors replaced the perennial cordiality which had won the war for the Spartans.

Lysander’s relation with Cyrus was the main building block of the close affinity between the Spartans and Persians that brought the Peloponnesian War to an end. Lysander was the leader of the Aegean offensive carving the Athenian zones of control piece by piece until delivering the finishing blow at Aegospotamoi. By the Athenian surrender at 404, Lysander had built a dense network of oligarchies and decarchies that owed personal allegiance to him who had toppled the old pro-Athenian regimes. Led by a harmost, i.e., ‘controller,’ that looked after the maintenance of the Spartan interest, those decarchies were the most locally hated elements of the entrenched Spartan political control over the Ionian and Aegean poleis. When the Athenians finally waved the white flag, the expectation in the former subject-allies of the Athenians was to be finally rid of their decarchies. The Spartans had different plans. There was no heroizing homecoming for Lysander. In fact, the military architect of the Spartan victory was recalled clandestinely, and one might add humiliatingly, to his polis to be snubbed constantly by the senior king Pausanias. Now, Plutarch, as always, makes the falling-out between the two figures as one of scornful jealousy that was occasioned by Pausanias and his followers’ increasing suspicion regarding the motivations of Lysander in building a personal network of harmosts and decarchies qua confidants. Having analysed a Plutarchian exegesis of practically the same essence in our foray into the historical tradition about the clash between Pleistoanax and Brasidas, we stand by our earlier reconstruction of that line of thought and argue that the episode between Pausanias and Lysander was practically a continuation of the same pattern. To that effect, Lysander wrested the control of the Aegean poleis away from the Athenians while leaving the Ionian Greeks to the Persians’ control. With the sole exception of possible internal autonomy, the signing of the so-called Treaty of Boiotios in 407 between the Spartans and Persians thus recognised the Persian demands to collect tribute from the Ionian Greeks. The faction headed by Lysander entertained, in that vein, the notion that a dual-hegemony of a different sort, with Sparta as the undoubted master of mainland Greece as well as the Aegean islands and Persia as that of Asia could replace the post-479 dual-hegemony that comprised of the Peloponnesians and Athenians. Certainly, an important reason of their

this because they knew that the Spartans wanted to make the Athenian territory their own undisputed possession.” Ibid, 2.4.30.
2616 Plutarch, Lysander, 21.3-4.
evincing of the modified dual-hegemony thesis may have been to use the material benefits of the arkhê to craft some remedy for the jeopardising leaps in the inequality of wealth that was then plaguing the Spartan society. The faction led by Pausanias had, however, a good appreciation that the formation of a dual-hegemony with the Persians would impede any large-scale population transfers to Ionia, Phrygia, Lydia, Cilicia, etc., that would do wonders to relieve some of the social pressure in Sparta. Those population transfers could take the form either of the sending of mercenary armies, who were made up of non-homoioi Spartans and other Peloponnesians, or the constructing of additional overseas garrisons. Either way, the homoioi, according to their view, needed to act decisively in turning the Asia Minor into their own backyard so that the impending eruption of the social tensions in Sparta could be stalled. Henceforth, the main bone of political contest between the two sides was envisioning new ways of addressing the Sparta’s socio-economic ills while gathering the fruits of the Athenian arkhê. In the event Pausanias’ side had the final word in devising a new course of enlargement for the Spartans to follow.\footnote{2617}

6.1.1 Spartan Foreign Policy Before and After Cunaxa

Cyrus was recalled in the spring of 405 to the Persian capital Susa to give a report of his later travails.\footnote{2618} In his last meeting with Lysander, Cyrus is portrayed by Xenophon as donating all the funds of his satrapy to the Peloponnesians’ anti-Athenian offensive. Once he made his way to Susa, he saw the passing away of his father Darius and was quickly absorbed in the often-violent Persian politics of succession. Yet, Cyrus could not wrest the throne away from his older brother Artaxerxes, and that despite his mother’s personal campaign on behalf of her younger son. In the stifling atmosphere of suspicion that engulfed the royal court, the spirited clash between the two sides finally gave way to an indictment on Cyrus of plotting to have his brother assassinated, which was made by Tissaphernes the satrap of Lydia among others. Only his mother’s influence could secure Cyrus’ eventual release and ensuing re-assignment to his former command in Asia Minor to serve, this time around, Tissaphernes who was appointed as the satrap of Caria.\footnote{2619} In his Anabasis, Xenophon canvasses Cyrus in the years 404-401 as making the final preparations for a coup that was to be launched against his older brother the king. Clandestinely inciting the susceptible politai of the Ionian poleis to rebel, garrisoning his troops in those poleis to offer security and subtly gathering a mercenary force in thousands were all parts of those preparations.\footnote{2620} The ultimate piece of the puzzle was, however, a direct appeal for aid made to the Spartans in return for all the goodwill Cyrus had shown to them in

\footnote{2617} Ibid, 23.5-6.
\footnote{2618} Xenophon, Hellenica, 2.1.8-9.
\footnote{2619} Plutarch, Artaxerxes, 3.
\footnote{2620} Xenophon, Anabasis, 1.1.6-9.
their war against the Athenians. Xenophon, the dutiful supporter of Laconophilia that he was, opines that the Spartiates took no convincing in honouring their side of the bargain.\footnote{Cyrus, having sent envoys to Sparta, appealed to them to be the same sort of friends to himself as he had been to them in the war against the Athenians. The ephors, thinking that his appeal was reasonable, ordered Samius, their nauarchos at the time, to help Cyrus in whatever way he wanted. Indeed that man enthusiastically carried out whatever Cyrus asked of him.” Xenophon, \textit{Hellenica}, 3.1.1.} We suspect that there was more than a simple barter of favours was at play in the Spartans’ decision.

Having estranged their Peloponnesian allies, the Spartiates knew that their flanks would not be secure if they were to fully commit themselves to an anti-Artaxerxes campaign. Perennial questions pertaining to the dwindling Spartiate numbers sufficed, in and of themselves, to deter any sending of large contingents to chase a dream elsewhere. And to top it all, the \textit{homoioi} most likely had a good grasp of the odds that were stacked in favour of Artaxerxes with all his vast resources, which effectively turned Cyrus’ endeavour into a suicide mission. And yet, notwithstanding all their talk of never leaving any assistance unreturned, the \textit{homoioi} must have realised that anything short of an all-out Peloponnesian support of Cyrus’ campaign would achieve precious little other than drawing the ire of the legitimate Persian king. All these reasons indicate that only if the opportunity was too good to pass by would the Spartans undertake any part in such a fool’s errand. And it indeed was, offering signal gains on three respective fronts: economic, social and political. Economically, the Spartiates appear to have grown very fond of the Persian gold, which allowed them to return to their old ways of sumptuous expenditure. Perfunctory ideological attempts to curb the socially adverse impact of increased luxury spending to the contrary, the Spartiates had found an economic safe harbour in the depths of the Persian pockets. Alas, as they were getting primed to rediscover their winning ways in the pan-Hellenic four-horse chariot competitions as well as regaining their exquisite taste for the contemporary avenues of conspicuous consumption,\footnote{The most notable example is the dominating string of victories in the Olympic fourhorse chariot race achieved by wealthy Spartiates from the 440s to the 380s: a phenomenon made possible by the increasing size of their landed estates and involving massive expenditures on horse breeding and on commissioning victory monuments ... The kudos of Olympic success gave chariot owners international prestige and advanced some of them into prominent political and military positions. It posed such a threat that King Agesilao II attempted to discredit the sport as a womanly activity by persuading his sister Kyniska to enter her own chariot team.” Hodkinson, ‘Sparta: An Exceptional Domination of State over Society?’, pp. 49; Hodkinson, \textit{Property and Wealth in Classical Sparta}, pp. 307-333; Christesen, ‘Sparta and Athletics’, pp. 551; van Wees, ‘Luxury, Austerity and Equality in Sparta’, pp. 215; Plutarch, \textit{Agesilao}, 20; Xenophon, \textit{Hellenica}, 6.4.11; Xenophon, \textit{Agesilao}, 9.6; Xenophon, \textit{Hiero}, 11.5; cf. Plato, \textit{Alcibiades I}, 122d.} they needed to issue additional social mechanisms to check the social disaffection that their luxurious customs would otherwise give rise to. Luckily, steadily tapping into the Persian funds offered a way out of that predicament as well. Enabling a heightened adoration of

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\footnote{\textit{Cyrus}, having sent envoys to Sparta, appealed to them to be the same sort of friends to himself as he had been to them in the war against the Athenians. The ephors, thinking that his appeal was reasonable, ordered Samius, their nauarchos at the time, to help Cyrus in whatever way he wanted. Indeed that man enthusiastically carried out whatever Cyrus asked of him.” Xenophon, \textit{Hellenica}, 3.1.1.}
\end{footnotesize}
euergetism, from *euergeteo* or ‘do good acts,’ that had always served as a *clé de voûte* of the Spartan polity.\(^{2623}\) Persian money afforded an effective a buffer against social strife as any other hence the primary social benefit of siding with Cyrus. Euergetism was, of course, a common feature of all the classical Greek *poleis* of the fifth century as it was to be in the fourth.\(^{2624}\) Having no regularised taxing scheme that would strike a more balanced distribution of wealth at the cost of risking the permanent estrangement of the upper classes,\(^{2625}\) many Greeks of that time found a viable compromise in the workings of euergetism, allowing the benefactors to reap the full socio-political benefits for their occasional sharing of the super-rich’s lot.\(^{2626}\) The benefits in question would range from favourable treatment of their claims in legal cases to appointments to prized offices such as *stratēgos*. As the material benefits of *arkhē* that were allowed to trickle down to the lower classes were in risk, at all times, of evaporating when juxtaposed to those that were reaped by the upper classes, the Athenian *liturgos* or Spartan *mothakes* became entrenched social features of virtually any turn-of-the-century *polis*. The Spartiate need to sink deeper into that bed of social comfort was, however, highlighted by an additional alacrity that resulted directly from the diminishing numbers of the *homoioi*.

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\(^{2623}\) Ranging from the *sussitia* contributions of the wealthy *homoioi* to their lending of their hunting dogs and horses to the poorer Spartiates and, ultimately, to their funding of the private elements of *mothakes*’ upbringing, *euergetism* has served as a cornerstone of the fourth-century Spartan polity: “These deployments of private wealth necessarily affected citizen relationships. Many former *mothakes* surely lived their adult lives with a lasting obligation to their patron foster-brothers; poorer members of the *sussitia* and hunting parties surely felt indebted to their wealthier messmates or hunting companions. Many of the small-group public *koinōniai* of Spartiate life will hence have embodied unequal social relationships.” Hodkinson, ‘Sparta: An Exceptional Domination of State over Society?’, pp. 47; Hodkinson, *Property and Wealth in Classical Sparta*, pp. 356-358; cf. Ste. Croix, *The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World*, pp. 206; Xenophon, *Hellenica*, 6.4.10-11; Xenophon, *Lacedaemonion Politeia*, 5.3.

\(^{2624}\) The shift from public allotment of liturgies to an emphasis on the private donations of the super-rich who were to answer the call of their *polis* in short notice as it materialised in the turn-of-the-century Athens, for example, coupled with the creation of additional offices, e.g., the water commissioner, were pointers to a more non-democratic future that awaited this modified understanding of euergetism. Cartledge, *Democracy*, pp. 225.

\(^{2625}\) Its partial claims to prompting economic redistribution notwithstanding, *eikoste* was a form of indirect tax whose workings, if anything, exacerbated the ills of an income distribution that had already been heavily skewed. No proportionality, let alone progressive scaling, guided the pegging of the lump-sum 5% that would be collected from any commercially active city-dwellers. With a sizeable metic population whose access to the purchase of landed property was subject to its official requirements, *eikoste* impeded what little upward social mobility there was on offer. In short, *eikoste* was a measure to keep the growth of the middle classes in check so that no economic incentive would risk the corrosion of the age-old political liaison of the Athenian non-thetic population.

\(^{2626}\) Garnsey’s four pillars of euergetism in antiquity still offers the most concise description of the myriads of ways through which the euergetists benefited from their ‘good deeds’: (I) No motivation of altruism drove euergetism; (II) speculators sprang from the same class that produced euergetists; (III) inbuilt limits governed the scale of euergetism; (IV) euergetism was at best a palliative, offering nothing in the way of a permanent solution to a definitive problem. Garnsey, *Famine and Food Supply in the Graeco-Roman World*, pp. 82-84; cf. *IG II* I 1262,12-15; Aristotle, *Politics*, 1321a; Ste. Croix, *Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World*, pp. 76.
When Lysander’s, who was another mothakes to lead the Spartan navy as nauarchos, attempt to build a personal network of Aegean decarchies was blocked by Pausanias and his Spartiate supporters, the numbers of the homoioi had reached a fifth century low in lower thousands. The well-oiled Spartan gears of downward social mobility, in other words, were producing an ever-growing size of hypomeiones whose return to the ranks of homoioi bordered on slim to none. Add the rising numbers of helots who had not given up their vigilance in waiting for the most opportune moment to strike at the homoioi, and suddenly Xenophon’s dramatized account of the non-Spartiates lurking around the corners of Sparta’s Agora to devour the members of the master-class raw begins to glow in a more realistic light. We have noted above that in winning the war with the Persian coin, the Spartiates had lost what minimal grip they had on their polity. Lysander’s establishment of decarchies was a final shot at recovering that grip. To that end, we argue that the decarchies in question might have been established in order to absorb sizeable proportions of the discontented Spartans whose aversion to coalescing with helots was rapidly withering away. However true the Spartiate reluctance to engage in sending the ‘delinquents’ to settle apoikoi may be, both Brasidas’ motley task force that was sent to the Thraceeward region and the non-homoioi oarsmen who rowed Lysander’s fleet to victory amply demonstrated that formal colonising enterprises were not the only way of relieving a significant part of the Spartan social pressure. By 404, the size of the hypomeiones and mothakes detractors had swollen so much that the homoioi faction that authorised Lysander to salvage whatever he could from the Athenian empire deemed it inevitable to carve out territories of potential settlement to which the influential non-Spartiates could be sent.

There are two main advantages of espousing our attempt to locate the setting up of decarchies within the general framework of the Spartan polity. The first one is that it allows us to iron out some inconsistencies in the historical tradition, whereas the other one is concerned with some of the historiographical shortcomings of Xenophon’s rendition. The Peloponnesian War ended with the Athenian surrender in 404 but it took two years for the Spartiates to dismantle Lysander’s decarchies that dotted the Aegean islands to incapacitate the archê. Naturally, the Spartiates were not oblivious to the grievous injury that was occasioned by their safekeeping of the decarchies to their propaganda of liberation. And yet, only by early 402 did the ephors...

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2627 The slippery road to the propertyless poor that awaited a vast number of declassed Spartiates is laid out in full at key points in Aristotle’s Politics. Unlike what Hodkinson portrayed as a case of ill-informed innocence, I concur with Lipka, in that vein, that Xenophon’s evasion of using the more fitting penêtes for the Spartan poor points out to a more wilful manipulation of the essentials of the polity he admired: Aristotle, Politics, 1270b6, 1271a30, 1294b23, 24, 26, 29; Lipka, Xenophon’s Spartan Constitution, pp. 163, 6.5; cf. Hodkinson, Property and Wealth in Classical Sparta, pp. 23.

2628 Xenophon, Hellenica, 3.3.4-6.
made up their minds to finally dismantle the locally despised elements of their hegemony.\footnote{Ibid., 3.4.2.}

We argue, in that vein, that the two-year gap that separates the end of the war from the discarding of decarchies can only be explained by a shift in the foreign policy that was endorsed by the Spartiates. The decarchies were requisite, albeit locally despised, elements if the Spartiates aimed to prepare the territorial groundwork for their impending transfers of the disillusioned non-Spartiate groups. Whether Pausanias was truly intent on destroying Lysander’s reputation or not, he could not respond to the upstart’s weaving a nexus of personalised dependencies by a decisive blow to the decarchies. By 403, however, Cyrus had returned from Susa to prepare for his final gamble for the Persian throne. The meeting of Cyrus with the Spartiates obliged a careful manoeuvring of the Spartan foreign policy toward a large-scale military confrontation with the Persians. Pausanias and the rank-and-file Spartiates dropped off their policy of decarchies for they were promised something that was even more suitable to their interests: sharing an imperial hegemony over the Ionian Greeks with Cyrus. Deciding to commit whatever resource they had to Cyrus’ side, the Spartans pulled down their decarchies in 402 and began to muster the troops that would be needed for another offensive.

In regard to the historiographical advantage of our interpretation, it needs to be kept in mind that Xenophon was no partial observer that he sometimes made himself to be. An admirer of the Spartan polity, to the extent that he handed over his two sons to be brought up in accord with the strict rules of the agôgé, and a close confident of king Agesilaus to boot,\footnote{As Cartledge concisely puts it, “Xenophon was both subjectively a comrade and objectively a client of Agesilaos.” Cartledge, Agesilaos and the Crisis of Sparta, pp. 140; cf. Hodkinson, Property and Wealth in Classical Sparta, pp. 342.} Xenophon distorted and, at times, completely assumed away historical events that would speak ill for his largely unblemished Spartan friends.\footnote{“Of course Xenophon cannot be trusted to give the whole truth, even as far as it was known to him, in the way Thucydides or Herodotus can. It is well known that he altogether fails to mention – as subjects too painful for him to recall – the liberation of the State of Messenia and its reconstruction as an independent entity, under Theban auspices, in 370-369; the building of the great fortified city of Megalopolis at about the same time …” Ste. Croix, The Origins of the Peloponnesian War, pp. 151.} Indeed, combining a comparatively recent find of the history provided by the Oxyrhynchus Historian and Diodorus’ Library one can historically locate events of huge import that are otherwise unattested in Xenophon’s Hellenica. Further, given that any agreement over a combined hegemony of the Spartans and Persians over the Ionian Greeks would significantly tarnish the Spartan claim to ensure the liberation of the Aegean and Ionian Greeks, it appears highly likely that Xenophon may have chosen to keep whatever insider’s account he had about any potential connection to himself. The diplomatic benefit to be reaped by this pseudo-offensive against the Persians leads us to the potential political gains that the Spartiates were pursuing in forming their liaison with Cyrus. A

\footnote{Ibid., 3.4.2.}
campaign against Artaxerxes might have been offered in response to the Spartan, Peloponnesian and Aegean critics of their increasingly imperialistic behaviour that would be concealed with the pretext of throwing the gauntlet to the ancestral enemy of all Greeks.\textsuperscript{2632} Of course, the benefit of hindsight allows us to see the attempt for the utter failure that it was in uniting virtually all the notable poleis of mainland Greece against the Spartans. Still, the glowing pan-Hellenic sentiment that adorns Xenophon’s rendition of Agesilaus’ anti-Persian offensive and the growing appeal of the notion of a Greece united under an imperial banner against its old enemy to all the aristocratically influenced thinkers of the fourth century, finding its most sublime expression in the surviving works of Isocrates, bear different, yet equally important, testimonies that the politics of pan-Hellenism was well on its way to become an actual force at the turn of the century.\textsuperscript{2633} With shifting their sights on the ‘liberation’ of the Ionian Greeks, the Spartiates were taking the first step towards the final showdown between Alexander and Darius III in the late 330s. Never the less, the reaping of all those benefits hinged on achieving the impossible in taking the consent of their Peloponnesian allies for an all-out offensive.

Sparta’s former \textit{primus inter pares} status among the Peloponnesians paled, however, in comparison to the imperial mantle that the Spartans strived to don following their victory in the Peloponnesian War. Neither a modified idea of dual-hegemony nor a partial pan-Hellenic offensive against the Persians in the Asia Minor had anything particularly appealing for the Sparta’s former allies. As the Athenian threat was dealt with, the Thebans had thought that the green light was on to pursue their hegemonic aspirations by creating a central Greek confederation that would be led by them. Clearly, the Spartiates had, however, no intention of allowing the rise of such a hegemony that could act as a balancing counterweigh to nullify their schemes. To add insult to injury, the \textit{homoioi} did not offer any share to either the Thebans or the Corinthians of the spoils that they had harvested in the form of Persian gold and \textit{phoroi}.

\textsuperscript{2632} Xenophon’s portrayal of Agesilaos planning to sacrifice at Aulis, like an Agamemnon incarnate against an ancient enemy, is a tell-tale sign that indicates the ideology at work in the Spartan expedition. Xenophon, \textit{Hellenica}, 3.4.3; cf. “Panhellenic ideology was to have a long history (see p. 217). The slogan, ‘freedom of the Greeks,’ was used and abused over the next 300 years: by Greeks against Persians, by Spartans against Athenians, by the Macedonian king Philip and his son Alexander, and even by the Romans. This underscores the potency of the ideology; cynical, and hypocritical, yes, but with enduring value as a justification for aggression and conquest. And it was crucial in shaping Greek history in the fifth century, as well as for the birth of historiography.” Kallet-Marx, ‘The Fifth Century: Political and Military Narrative’, pp. 173-174; Raafaub, \textit{The Discovery of Freedom in Ancient Greece}, pp. 166-202; Cartledge, \textit{The Greeks}, pp. 59 ff.

\textsuperscript{2633} Despite the cruciality of the close relationship between pan-Hellenism and aristocratic ideology in the early fourth century and onwards, there has been precious little acknowledgement of the fact and even less of sustained in-depth studies that attempt to excavate the transforming particularities of that relationship: Ober, \textit{Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens}, pp. 254-255; Azoulay, \textit{Xenophon and the Graces of Power}, pp. 93-94.
collected from the Aegean poleis alike. The Thebans and Corinthians, or the Eleans, Argives, Megarians and Mantineans for that matter, had no illusions to spare with respect to the idea that a Spartan arkhê could be established only at their expense. Indeed, the notion of ‘equal partnership’ that the Spartiates entertained made no allowance for any sort of equalising sharing of benefits whereas it certainly promised the contrary in regard to toils. The Peloponnesian allies had to follow the Spartans wherever they would lead without getting any due return, hence showing the true colours of the imperial re-arrangement that the Spartiates were attempting. When the Thebans foiled the Spartan plan of establishing a puppet regime in Athens, an eventual confrontation between the two sides was set.

In 401, the Spartans invaded their former ally Elis due to a set of grievances that had been accumulated since the 420s. Emerging victorious from the struggle, they imposed harsh terms on the Eleans who needed to consent the setting up of a garrison and a harmost to oversee the congruence of the policies they adopted with those of the Spartiates. The Boeotians and Corinthians made their disapproval ring loud and clear by not sending their set quotas of troops to man the Peloponnesian garrison but decided to take no further action. That reluctance was to be swiped off by two factors that exposed the Spartan ambitions that were driven towards nothing less than the establishment of a mainland and overseas arkhê: the growing Spartan presence in Thessaly and the outbreak of an all-out Spartan offensive against the Persians. At least since the 420s, the Spartan fascination with the natural resources of the region occasioned an ever-growing military presence in the area that was signalled by the founding of the Spartan apoikos of Heraclea in Trachis in 426. By the end of the 400s, however, the Spartans had grown sufficiently confident to carry out a three-pronged attack against the major Thessalian centres at Larissa, Pharsalus and Pherae. In Larissa, for example, they were active in leading a war against the King Archelaus of Macedon. Additional clues to the same effect can also be gleaned from Diodorus who conveys that a Spartan garrison had been installed in Pharsalus and from Xenophon as he opines that an alliance was forged between the Spartans and Lycophron of Pherae around the same time. This steady rise of

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2634 “The ‘liberation propaganda’ which the Spartans now officially resuscitated was therefore so much window-dressing, and the undeceived Boiotians and Corinthians significantly refused again to contribute contingents to the League force (3.2.25). A weak and cautious Athens, however, did follow the Spartans’ lead, and the campaign, which extended over two years, was brutally successful.” Cartledge, Sparta and Lakonia, pp. 232.
2635 Xenophon, Hellenica, 3.2.21-22.
2636 Diodorus Siculus, Library, 14.34.1
2637 Xenophon, Hellenica, 3.2.29.
2638 Ibid, 3.2.25.
2639 Diodorus Siculus, Library, 14.38.4-5.
2640 Ibid, 14.82.
2641 Xenophon, Hellenica, 6.4.24.
the Spartan influence in the region, coupled with their *apoikos* in Heraclea which was used as a local base of operations against the Thebans, was a major cause of concern for the Boeotians who had fought off a similar Athenian expansionism throughout the course of the Peloponnesian War. Spartans were largely free to indulge their whims in Peloponnesus, but to attempt to plant the seeds of that politics of hegemony on the central Greek soil was to issue a direct challenge to the Thebans who wanted no political obstacles within what they saw as their zone of control. On top of all these injuries that were done to them in their backyard was an increasingly imperialistic Spartan foreign policy that had begun to wreak havoc in Asia.

401 was also the year in which Cyrus, backed by the Spartans’ active military support, commenced his rebellion from Artaxerxes. Accompanied by a large force of Greek mercenaries, with Spartans making up its bulk, Cyrus devastated the lands through Anatolia, seeking a military confrontation with his older brother to settle their differences for all time. Immortalised in Xenophon’s *Anabasis*, the march down the country was finalised in the battle of Cunaxa in 401, which resulted in the death of Cyrus and the beginning of the retreat of the remaining Ten Thousand Greeks back to Greece, hence the name ‘march up the country.’ At the side of Artaxerxes throughout the whole falling-out between him and Cyrus was Tissaphernes, to be rewarded for his loyalty with Cyrus’s satrapy and the *poleis* of Ionia at the end of the conflict. Financially stretched to his limit in attempting to contain Cyrus’ political and military forays, the first measure that Tissaphernes adopted to extort his allotted due was to demand the Ionian *poleis* to be his subjects economically as well as politically. Many of the *poleis* in question had supported Cyrus’ rebellion and thus they were reasonably afraid of potential reprisals that would be wrought on them if they were to accept Tissaphernes’ authority. Instead of accepting Tissaphernes’ demands the *politai* of the Ionian *poleis*, therefore, sent envoys appealing to Sparta for their aid against the Persians. Considering Tissaphernes’ demands as a serious breach of the Treaty of Boiotos, the Spartiates despatched a force that was led by Thibron to organise a defence against any possible military manoeuvre by Tissaphernes. Seeing that their final ultimatum to Tissaphernes was unheeded, the Spartans openly declared war on Persia, which was to be spearheaded by Thibron’s forces in 400 and by those of Dercylidas from 399-397. Perhaps the Spartans were overenthusiastic in creating an eastern front right at a time when the fruits of their mainland affairs were ripe for the picking. Then again, one of those fruits that they awaited them at home was a revolution

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2642 *Ibid*, 3.1.3.
led by a certain Kinadon who aspired to patch the most socio-economically inequalitarian aspects of the Spartan polity.

Leader of a close circle of revolutionaries, Kinadon, as it is recounted by Xenophon, led an informer that was tasked by the Ephors to uncover the conspiracy to the Agora in Sparta. Asking his confidant to count the homoioi who were at the Agora at the time, Kinadon then replied that he counted on 4,000 remaining passers-by ‘allies’ against the 40 Spartiate ‘enemies’ to realise his plan. Kinadon then guided the informer through the streets of Sparta in order to demonstrate that the facts on the ground were not any different there compared to those in the Agora. As the informer brought the news to the Ephors, they apprehended and questioned Kinadon to find out who else belonged to the tight-knit group of the conspirators. In response, Kinadon claimed that his confidants were just a few trustworthy individuals whereas his potential accomplices numbered in the tens of thousands, including the majority of helots, hypomeiones, perioikoi and naodamôdeis, who were lurking in shadows to devour the Spartiates even raw at the first possible opportunity. Now, Kinadon, according to Xenophon, was himself a hypomeiones who had his fill of being perpetually regarded as an inferior to his Spartiate compatriots. Although we are largely in the dark concerning the political programme of his conspirators, the fact that the episode is uneasily relayed by a reluctant Xenophon, coupled with the increased numbers of notable commanders of hypomeiones origins towards the turn of the century, evince that the frying pan of Spartan polity had grown hot. Their jumping into the fire of an anti-Persian offensive, as such, was a basic necessity for the homoioi who had to open up all the safety valves if they wanted to keep the political ambitions of the non-Spartiates in check.

The first three years of the war saw partial gains on the Spartan side as they managed to wrench away the Troad from Pharnabazus and reinforced Thracian Chersonese on the Western side of the Bosporus. By 397, the politai of Ionian poleis called upon the Spartans to attack the Persians in Caria, arguing that any major blow that was to be struck there would force the hand

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2645 *Ibid*, 3.3.4-11.
2646 For a modern estimate of the Spartiate/ Helot ratio in the later classical era which shows that Xenophon was not dramatically off the mark we can follow Ober: “Based on the estimated populations of Laconia and Messenia … there may have been something like 40,000 adult male helots, which would mean (at the high point of Sparta’s citizen body and counterfactually assuming equitable distribution) about four or five helot families for each Spartan citizen.” Ober, *The Rise and Fall of Classical Greece*, pp. 140.
2649 For an evaluation of the specifics of Xenophon’s rendition of the conspiracy, see Cartledge, *Sparta and Lakonia*, pp. 267-270.
of the Persians to accept the autonomy of the Ionian Greeks. Intrigued by the proposal, the Spartiates dispatched Dercylidas with a large force to invade Caria, who was, however, disheartened by the prospect of facing the combined forces of Pharnabazus and Tissaphernes whereby he made a truce with the Persians. The terms of the truce dictated that the Ionian poleis were to be autonomous and all the harmost and Spartan garrisons in Ionia were to be removed. Needless to add, the truce was an uneasy one as neither side skipped a beat in preparing for an escalation of the conflict. The major worry that the Spartan offensive had caused for the Persians was that it showed that a successful coordination between a formidable navy, which was inherited from the Athenians, and army was able to strike deep within the Persian territory in Anatolia. Pharnabazus had fought against the Athenians before and had an intimate appreciation that the best way to break the resolution of the Spartan forces was to beat their navy that was located in Rhodes. Claiming that the Spartans would be toothless without the lines of communication maintained by their navy between mainland Greece and Asia Minor, Pharnabazus persuaded Artaxerxes to authorise a programme geared towards a major naval rearmament, in addition to recruiting Evagoras, the ruler of Salamis in Cyprus. The support of Evagoras was crucial in that he knew the perfect nauarchos that would lead the reinforced Persian fleet against the Spartans: Conon. One of the two strategoi out of the Arginusae Eight who had escaped from the capital punishment, Conon was appointed as the admiral of the fleet that was to deal incapacitating damage to the Spartan invasion through his victory at the battle of Cnidus in 394.

In 397, however, the Spartiates were brimming with confidence that they could entrench their political and economic control over the Ionian Greeks. As they got wind of the commission of a new Persian fleet, the Spartans intensified their efforts in Asia Minor. Summoning extra forces from their allies in the Peloponnesian League, the Spartiates appointed the newly enthroned King Agesilaos, who was supported by Lysander, to lead a reinvigorated anti-Persian expedition. Agesilaos was the first Spartan king ever to campaign in Asia Minor, living up to his reputation as he caused considerable injury to Pharnabazus’ satrapy in 396 and 395. Culminating in the devastating defeat of Tissaphernes’ strengthened army at the battle of Sardis in 395, Agesilaos’ successful strategy led to the execution of Tissaphernes who was to be replaced by Tithraustes, the Grand Vizier himself, by order of Artaxerxes. Artaxerxes sent Tithraustes with an offer of peace to the effect that the Ionian poleis were to be autonomous and the Spartan forces were to sail home, thereby proposing a return to the status

2654 Diodorus Siculus, *Library*, 14.80.7. 738
The offer was to serve, in fact, as a touchtone to gauge the honesty of the declared fundamental aim of the Spartans, i.e., the liberation of the Greeks of Asia Minor. Agesilaos responded that he needed time to reflect on the terms and to relay them to the authorities in Sparta, but then immediately attacked Pharnabazus’ forces as the newly appointed joint commander of the army and the navy. Additionally, Agesilaos ordered the building of a fleet of 120 triremes that were to be constructed by the island and coastal *poleis.* It appeared that it was too late to fold by conceding the Ionian Greeks their much-yearned autonomy: the Spartiates intended to make full use of their incentive that allowed them to reap significant booty and carve out new spaces to which their surplus population could be transferred as auxiliary troops. Alas, the territorial expansion of the new *arkhē* caused great concern not only for the Persians but also for the mainland Greeks, building bridges of cooperation to rid themselves of the Spartan empire.

It was in 396 that the Persians made the first inroads to the mainland Greeks by sending Timocrates of Rhodes with coffers of gold to persuade the four principal enemies of Sparta: Thebes, Corinth, Athens and Argos. The formation of the Quadruple Alliance almost certainly followed hard on the heels of a massive blow that was dealt to the Spartan hegemony at seas through Conon’s achievement at bringing about the revolt of Rhodes, their main naval base, from the Peloponnesean League in 396. As things stood, the coalition needed little convincing to form into an anti-Spartan phalanx but material incentive was always welcome. By 395, the Athenians had already begun to entertain hopes of regaining their *arkhē* now that the Spartan attempt at building a naval empire of their own had utterly failed. Notwithstanding the loss of their navy, however, the Spartan military strength still made them the clear hegemon of the mainland *poleis.* It remained for the Athenians, as such, to bury their long-overdrawn hatchets with the Boeotians since only with their aid could they hope to level any challenge against the Spartan domination. The impending rapprochement came about when the Athenians resolved to respond to a Boeotian appeal for aid in an imminent Spartan attack that was expected to take place in their territory. Having successfully goaded their allies in Western Locris to levy taxes on a disputed piece of land, which was also claimed by Phocians, the Boeotians answered the Locrian appeal for help as the Phocians descended upon them. In their turn the Phocians petitioned to the Spartans for aid and the latter were only too-happy to oblige given the wrongs and insults they were made to suffer by the Thebans. The

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2655 Xenophon, *Hellenica*, 3.4.25.
2656 Ibid., 3.4.28.
2658 The agreement is wrongly dated in Xenophon, *Hellenica*, 3.5.1-2.
2659 Xenophon, *Hellenica*, 3.5.5.
Thebans, then, applied to the Athenians for help and jointly defeated the army of Lysander, killing its commander, which was ordered to wait for the reinforcements that was led by Pausanias but chose to leap at the first opportunity to break out the hostilities in what was to become the first engagement of the war, the battle of Haliartus in 395. Managing to defeat one Spartan force under the command of Lysander and rout another that was led by Pausanias, the signal successes that were scored by the coalition forces caused the recall of all the Spartan troops from Asia Minor. What little hope was still entertained by the Spartiates as to the keeping of their naval and overseas arkhê dissipated in an ephemeral puff as Conon and Pharmabazus’ forces smashed the Spartan fleet into splinters at the battle of Cnidus.

6.1.2 The Corinthian War

The Spartan defeat at the battle of Haliartus in 395 marked a humiliating beginning for the Spartiates to what would come to be known as the Corinthian War of 395-386, named after Corinth as most of the actual fighting took place around that polis. By 394, the Quadruple Alliance had become a rallying point for all the dissident mainland Greek poleis that were fed up with the imperialist politics of Sparta, spreading its wings to cover Locrians, the majority of Thessalians, Euboeans, Chalcidians and Acarnanians among others. Intending to meet the Spartans on their own Lacedaemonian soil, if Xenophon is to be followed, the news of their resolution caused great distress in Sparta that could only be relieved by recalling all the troops that were campaigning against the Persians. Realising that Agesilaos and his army’s retracing of their steps would take more time than they could afford, the Spartiates despatched a task force to meet the coalition forces in Nemea. The hastily assembled Spartan forces somehow managed to carry the day, thus buying precious time for Agesilaos’ force to return from the anti-Persian expedition. The news of the Spartan defeat at Cnidus incited the winded army of Agesilaos to a signal victory against the anti-Spartan coalition at the battle of Coroneia in 394. Impressive as they were, however, the two victories that were achieved by the Spartans did not suffice to ease their worries. Indeed, the whole point to the Theban and Corinthian participation in the coalition was to trap their enemies within the limits of their own polis. With the Isthmus blocked and the two Corinthian ports to its either side sealed off, the Quadruple Alliance had achieved its main aim of bottling up the Spartans in the Peloponnese. Although they did not manage to bring the Spartiates to their knees by defeating their armies

2660 Ibid, 14.81.2; Xenophon, Hellenica, 3.5.8-15.
2661 Diodorus Siculus, Library, 14.81.2-3, 83.1.
2662 Diodorus Siculus, Library, 14.83.4-7.
2663 Xenophon, Hellenica, 4.2.12.
2664 Diodorus Siculus, Library, 14.83.2; Xenophon, Hellenica, 4.2.16-23.
2665 Diodorus Siculus, Library, 14.84.1-2.
in Lacedaemon, the anti-Spartan phalanx had devised a highly effective strategy that disabused the Spartans from any lingering imperialistic ambitions. In fact, even the Spartan hegemony in Peloponnesus did not seem as secure as it once did.

In 393, following their victory at the battle of Cnidus, Conon’s fleet sailed around the Aegean to bring down any Spartan garrison and harmost that still remained in place, then ravaged the coasts of Messenia and Laconia to give the Spartans a taste of their own medicine. They captured Cythera and built a garrison there, reanimating the horrid spectres of the Peloponnesian War that had haunted the Spartan imagination for decades. Around the same time Pharnabazus visited the leaders of the coalition in the Isthmus, injecting another dose of Persian money after having seen that his earlier injection was worthwhile. With the money, the Corinthians commissioned a new navy and the Athenian Iphicrates’ mercenary force was permanently garrisoned in Corinth to repel any Spartan attack from 393-389, managing to achieve signal victories against the Spartan hoplites including the rout of 391. Arguably much more significant than enabling Corinth’s reinforcement was, however, the Athenians’ use of the Persian funds to rebuild their fortifications including the vital Long Walls. They also had the further benefit of having Conon as the nauarchos of the Persian fleet, who used it to re-establish the Athenian control at strategically key points in the Aegean. At least just as discouraging for the Spartans was the news that Corinth and Argos managed to form an isopoliteia, or ‘political union,’ establishing ties of common citizenship so that they could effectively put up against the waves of Spartan invasion. That political union, agreed either in 393 or 392, spelled disaster for Sparta. The Spartans had worked long and hard to impede any such rapprochement between the two principal poleis of Peloponnesus for the sake of realising their policy of divide et impera. With their tides of fortune running to a low ebb, the Spartiates, hard-pressed at all sides, realised that the only way out of the current situation was to placate the Persians to make them withdraw their financial support from the coalition members. In 392, Antalcidas was sent with a proposal of peace making no mention whatsoever

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2666 Ibid, 14.84.4-5; Xenophon, Hellenica, 4.8.8.  
2667 Ibid, 4.8.9, 4.8.12.  
2668 For the Corinthian revolution that is preceded the formation of the union and the later events, see ibid, 4.4.2-5; Diodorus Siculus, 14.86.1-2; Oxyrhynchus Historian, 7.2-3; Plutarch, Agesilaus, 21; cf. Michael Whitby, “The Union of Corinth and Argos: A Reconsideration”, Historia: Zeitschrift für alte Geschichte, vol. 33 no. 3, (3rd Qtr., 1984), pp. 295-308; Françoise Ruzé, ‘The Empire of the Spartans’, pp. 336.  
2669 At one point in his Hellenica, Xenophon claims that the union took place in 392. At another, however, he portrays the two poleis as already having united into a single one by 392, which may be taken as indirect evidence of a slight tempering with the dates on his part. Xenophon, Hellenica, 4.4.6; cf. 4.8.13; for the significance of the union for the Spartans, see Cartledge, Sparta and Lakonia, pp. 241.
of the Ionian Greeks’ demands of politico-economic autonomy. Tiribazus was highly content with the offer that the Spartans had come up with but had to relay it to Artaxerxes so that a decision could be made. Meanwhile, the Spartans called a peace conference to discuss the potential concessions that they were willing to make to the individual members of the Quadruple Alliance, but there was no success at the negotiations since the Athenians were ready to give another try to the restoration of their Aegean empire, also finding it irksome that the Spartans gave out the Ionian Greeks so quickly. News on the Persian front were not encouraging either: Artaxerxes was not willing to forgive or forget the Spartan treachery of supporting his usurping brother and hence rejected the proposal. Replacing the pro-Spartan Tiribazus with Strouthas with clear instructions on how to aid the Athenians against the Spartans.

Having seen the failure of their generous proposal, the Spartans broke out the hostilities once again in Asia Minor, sending out Thibron with a task force. This time around, however, there was no major victories to be achieved by them as Thibron’s army was wiped out by that of Strouthas. Thibron’s replacement did not much of a success either, as he along with twelve other harmosts were ambushed successfully and killed by the troops of the Athenian Iphicrates. Iphicrates’ success was no chance occurrence. As they constructed a formidable fleet of their own with the Persian money, albeit not to the extent of their fleets of the previous century, the Athenians were building up their forces to lay the groundwork of a second Aegean archê. To that end, the Athenians made alliances with the Byzantines and Chalcedonians, thus levying a 10 per cent tax on all ships passing through the Bosporus. Moreover, they forged additional alliances with the two Thracian kings and reclaimed Lesbos, which served them as a spring-board to collect tributes from the poleis of Asia Minor.

If there was to emerge a second Athenian archê, then there was no question that it would be, again, an anti-Persian one, which became evident when the Athenians allied themselves to King Evagoras of Salamis in Cyprus, and to Akoris, the ruler of Egypt, both of whom had revolted from the Persian Empire. These clear signals of a second Athenian empire that was in the making brought the Persians to their senses as Artaxerxes saw that a reinvigorated Athens was much more capable of laying the Persian interests in Ionia to rest than Sparta ever

2670 Xenophon, Hellenica, 4.8.14.
2671 Andocides, The Peace.
2672 Xenophon, Hellenica, 4.8.17.
2675 Gabrielsen, Financing the Athenian Fleet, pp. 146-169; Potts, The Athenian Navy, pp. 51-52.
2676 Xenophon, Hellenica, 4.8.25-30.
2678 Aristophanes, Wealth, 1178.
was. Believing that the time was ripe, the *homoioi* made another approach to Artaxerxes, sending Antalcidas, the *nauarchos* for 388/7, to partake of negotiations on a peace treaty. Primed to let bygones be bygones, Artaxerxes agreed to an alliance with Sparta, which allowed the latter to impose the terms they wanted on the coalition members, on the condition that he would take undisputed control of all the Asiatic Greeks. Also reappointing Tiribazus to his former post with clear instructions to aid the Spartans in any way he can. This shift in the Persian foreign policy reinvigorated the funds and resolve of the Spartans as they sent Antalcidas with 80 triremes, accompanied by 20 triremes from their ally, Dionysius the tyrant of Syracuse, to block the Athenian grain route passing through Hellespont. The Athenians could not respond in time to the Persian threat as their grain ships were captured, repeating Lysander’s *coup de grâce* of 404, hence starving the Athenians into yielding. Following the partial restoration of their imperial fortunes in the 390s, the Athenians had become the de facto leaders of the Quadruple Alliance and their submission sufficed in breaking the steadfastness of the remaining coalition members to continue fighting a war that they had little hope of winning. With their resolve shaken, the Greeks complied to attend a meeting held by Tiribazus at Sardis to disclose the terms of the peace that was proposed by the Great King. According to the terms offered, all the Ionian *poleis*, including Clezomenae, were to belong to the Persians and all the other *poleis*, those on the mainland and in the Aegean alike, were to be made autonomous with the exception of Lemnos, Imbros and Scyros, which were to be possessed by the Athenians as they were beforehand. Now, the rub of the whole proposal lay with the interpretation of ‘autonomy’ that was to be entrusted to the safekeeping of the Persians and Spartans almost everywhere. Realising that the clause would be used to drive home the Spartan advantage by enforcing a return to the status quo ante at the end of the Peloponnesian War, which would spell the breaking-up of the Boeotian League and the end of the Argive-Corinthian unity, the leading powers of the coalition initially rejected the Spartan demands. But when Agesilaos reached Tegea with the Peloponnesian army, the Thebans were goaded back into their scornful subjection, and the Argives and Corinthians, for their part, dissolved their union. The Spartans and Persians were the main beneficiaries of the peace, whence its alternate, but equally fitting, names: the King’s Peace or the Peace of Antalcidas. The Spartans had secured their hegemony on the mainland, to be sure, through

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2680 Xenophon, *Hellenica*, 5.1.25.
2684 *Ibid.*, 5.1.34.
2685 That point is aptly brought home by Ste. Croix as he argues that the peace can be captioned as ‘*einen der tiefsten Tiefpunkte aller Zeiten,*’ for the Greeks only if one accounts for the Spartan enthusiasm in the entire enterprise: Ste. Croix, *The Origin of the Peloponnesian War*, pp. 161.
their dissolution of the Boeotian federation whose ascendancy had imperilled their claims following the demise of the Athenian arkhê. And yet, the political and military power of Thebes would continue to grow whilst the numbers and the social inclusion of the homoioi would begin to verge on critically low levels.

6.1.3 The Theban Ascendancy and the Battle of Leuctra

The Boeotian League was restored in 447, following the defeat of Athens at the battle of Coroneia. Divided into eleven constituencies with administrative powers, a 660-strong federal boulê served in legislative capacity with each constituent providing sixty members. Eleven Boeotarchs, one from each constituency, were also annually elected with full executive powers. Thebes comprised four of these administrative communities, thus providing 240 members to the federal boulê allowing its citizens effective leadership of the federal League. The Peloponnesian victory at the end of the Peloponnesian War had created a lacuna of pollical power in central Greece, a lacuna that the Thebans in particular were overjoyed to fill in. It was against this ascendancy of Theban hegemony in central Greece that the Spartiates resorted to a nit-picking manipulation of the clause of autonomy as it was stipulated in the Peace of Antalcidas. To the Spartiates any polis constituting the Peloponnesian League was by definition autonomous, whereas all the other poleis, especially the democratic ones, that coalesced into similar federations, the Boeotian League included, was an attempt to distort the natural status quo. The first Peloponnesian state that was made to suffer in accordance with this cynical interpretation was Mantineia. The four or five villages that had united under the banner of a democratic Mantineia in the aftermath of the Peloponnesian War were ordered to de-synoecise as a punitive measure for the disloyalty they had showed during the Corinthian War. Also imposing a pro-Spartan oligarchy to handle all the political affairs in Mantineia, the Spartiates followed their liquidation of the Mantinean democracy with an order that was made to the citizens of democratic Phlius to take back their oligarchic exiles, which eventually led to the imposition of a narrow pro-Spartan oligarchy, supported by a garrison, after a siege from 381-379. In 382, a new link was added into this pattern of ‘autonomy abused’ with the Spartan expedition against the Chalcidian League, which had grown significantly under the leadership of Olynthus. The Olynthians could only held out until 379, being forced, in the end, to relinquish its own League and to join that of the Peloponnesians instead. And yet, these blatant acts of imperialism paled in comparison to what the Spartans were doing in Thebes.

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2687 Xenophon, Hellenica, 5.2.1-7.  
2688 Ibid, 5.2.8-10; 5.3.10-17.  
2689 Ibid, 5.2.11-24; 2.37-3.1-9; 3.18.20, 26-27.
The *homoioi* had made sure to restore the extreme pro-Spartan oligarchs at Thebes prior to their imposition of the terms of the Peace of Antalcidas on the Thebans. The Spartans did not have to wait for long to harvest the fruits of this clairvoyant move. In 382, while Phoebidas was leading his troops supposedly against the Chalcidian League he made a sudden sortie into the Thebes and managed to seize and garrison Cadmeia, i.e., the fortified citadel of Thebes. Having concocted a scheme with one of the restored extreme oligarchs, Leontiadas, Phoebidas set up a narrow oligarchy that was to be led by the latter. In direct violation of the terms of the peace, this crudely imperialistic act seemed outrageous even to the Laconophile Xenophon who was otherwise so assiduous in justifying the actions of the Spartiates. In the event the only solace for the majority of Thebans was that 300 notable anti-Spartans numbering among their citizen-body managed to escape and was granted refuge in Athens. Also around this time was the refoundation of Plataea by the Spartans, which had been demolished in 427 by themselves on grounds of its alliance to the Athenians. Completing their subjection of Boeotia to their interests was the insertion of garrisons and harmosts in the Boeotian *poleis* which were to support the superimposed pro-Spartan oligarchies. By 379, Xenophon was able to write that, “the Thebans and other Boeotians were completely under their [the Spartans’] power … and their *arkhê* seemed now at last to have been truly established.”

In 379 a plot came to a head that was designed to overthrow the Spartan polemarchs who were appointed by the *homoioi* to replace the former Boeotarchs. Phillidas the secretary of the polemarchs, liaised with the Theban exiles and two Athenian *strategoi* to liberate Thebes from Spartan yoke. Managing to assassinate the polemarchs and Leontidas as well as rousing the Thebans to revolt, a combined force of Athenian and Theban troops lay siege to Cadmeia where a 1,500-strong Spartan garrison was posted. Caught without any supplies to withstand the siege, the Spartan harmost surrendered with his troops and was granted safe, albeit chastening, passage back to Sparta. The Spartans had other strongpoints that dotted the Boeotian *poleis* and, thus, were not back to square one with the loss of Thebes. But, then, Thebes had to be recovered if the dissident Peloponnesian *poleis* were to concede their subjection to the Spartans. Therefore, the expedition of King Cleombrotus in 378 did not surprise anyone even though he managed to achieve very little during the sixteen days he spent in Boeotia. Having left behind Sphodrias with a third of his army and the requisite funds to

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2682 Xenophon, *Hellenica*, 5.3.27.
hire a mercenary army, the only positive to be taken from Cleombrotus’ excursion was, in fact, the successful intimidation of the Athenians into a condemnation of the two strategoi who had helped bring about the Theban revolution and a declaration of neutrality. Even that rather minimal gain was to evaporate, however, before long due to a ravenous act that was done by the forces that were left behind by Cleombrotus.

In 378, Sphodrias with his motley force of Peloponnesians and mercenaries attempted to seize Piraeus by force but could not overcome the Athenian resistance. Merely four years after the initial invasion of Cadmeia, this event led to a shower of protests from the Athenians who wanted Sphodrias and whoever else had premeditated on the plan with him to be made an example of by the Spartiates if they were truly earnest about keeping the peace in order. King Agesilaos, however, made it his business to ensure that Sphodrias would be acquitted with barely any blemish from the charges of treason for the basic reason that he had attempted to further the Spartan interests. The Athenian response was swift: they ratified that the King’s Peace was broken by the Spartans and they pushed through Spartiate criticisms to make an alliance with Thebes and other poleis that resulted in the rise of the Second Athenian League in 378/7. Exactly one hundred years had passed from the formation of the first Athenian League with the avowed aim of ridding the Aegean from the Persian threat. Now it was the Spartan imperialism that the bulk of the mainland poleis wanted to be liberated from. Seeing that the Spartiates would have their hands full with the burgeoning Athenian League, the Thebans began their reconstruction of the Boeotian League. The Spartans were hard put to contain the coterminous resurrection of the Athenian and Boeotian Leagues, but they managed to muster a task force led to two invasions of Thebes, commanded by Agesilaos, in 378 and 377 and one aborted attempt in 376 that was directed by Cleombrotus. All those attempts failed, however, to conquer Thebes and hence inadvertently fanned the flames of Theban zealosity. In 378, the famous Sacred Band of Thebes was formed as the elite corps of the Theban army, playing a significant part in the Theban trashing of Spartan troops twice in 378/7. This military and political resurgence of Thebes also encouraged the moderately democratic notables of other Boeotian poleis to flock together to Thebes, whose support, together with that of the dêmos of their respective poleis, were crucial in restoring the relatively

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2694 Ibid, 5.4.15-18.
2695 Ibid, 5.4.19.
2696 Ibid, 5.4.20-33; Xenophon, Agesilaos, 2.21-22.
2697 Diodorus Siculus, Library, 15.29.7.
2698 Trundle has taken, convincingly from our standpoint, the formation of the Theban Sacred Band as a signal case of the early fourth century movement away from armies made up of amateur citizen-soldiers towards the professionalisation of the core of citizen levies. Hiring of mercenaries and creation of elite regiments of full-time soldiers, according to that interpretation, are the two tenets through which that development transpired. Trundle, Greek Mercenaries, pp. 94, 131.
democratic polity of the Boeotian League. Concerned with the failed obsession displayed by the *homoioi* in their dealings with the Boeotians, Sparta’s remaining allies in the Peloponnesian League advised them to knock the wind off the revitalised imperial ambitions of the Athenians by a successful repeat of the starvation policy of 405/4 and 387/6. This time around, however, the Athenian fleet met them and, subsequently, won a decisive victory at Naxos in September 376. The Athenians followed through their naval victory in the following year by sending their fleet around the Peloponnese and thus gained control of Corcyra, winning another splendid triumph at Alyzeia. Those two years gave a much-needed breathing space to the Thebans who managed to unite all the Boeotian *poleis* once again under the aegis of the Boeotian League. By 375, the reestablishment of the federal League was complete with a modified polity that gave the Thebans increased political power as its recognised hegemon. From then on, there were to be only seven Boeotarchs instead of eleven, but the Thebans retained their rights in electing four of them. Additionally, as the federal *boulê* of the League was held in Thebes, with all the male *politai* of the eleven constituencies allowed to attend its meetings, the executive as well as legislative power of the Thebans had soared dramatically largely as an unintended result of the Spartiates’ brazen imperialism.

The Thebans were experiencing a military renaissance as they came to rely heavily on novel set-piece tactics that made equal use of heavy and light infantry in addition to cavalry contingents. The first fruit of these tactical renovations was the devastating defeat they inflicted on the Spartan garrison at Orchomenus in 375. On top of their success at the battle of Tegyra was added the Theban offensive against Phocis, the steadfast ally of the Spartans in central Greece. By that time the Spartans were on the ropes: they were defeated handily twice by the Athenian fleet and failed to score a single resounding victory against the Thebans, losing their allies in Thessaly due to their incapacity of sparing any troops to relieve them against the armies of Iason of Pherai, who was allied to the Boeotians. The Athenians were, likewise, feeling the pressure of the material drain that was caused by their increasing engagement in continuous naval operations. Bereft of the *phoros*-payments that had fuelled

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2699 Xenophon, *Hellenica*, 5.4.60-61.
2700 *Ibid*, 5.4.64-66.
2701 By the early fourth century, most of the bigger mainland *poleis* had already created medium to large size cavalry contingents. In the case of the Athenian cavalry the numbers reached an immense 1,000 despite the dearth of grazing land by the beginning of the Second Peloponnesian War. Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War*, 4.55.2; van Wees, ‘The City at War’, pp. 87-88; Morris and Powell, *The Greeks*, pp. 387.
their exploits in the latter half of the fifth century, the Athenians were increasingly weary of
the Theban militarism that had begun to make quick work of the supposed Spartan juggernaut.
When Artaxerxes came knocking for a renewal of the King’s Peace in order to hire a Greek
mercenary army, the idea was welcomed, as such, by the Athenians and Spartans alike.2705
Acknowledging the Athenian hegemony over the members of their new naval League, the
Spartans hoped that this cooperation would deter the Thebans from trying to expand their zone
of control. There was nothing implausible about the plan itself but its practice was a different
matter. When a clash over Zakynthos and Coreya caused a quick souring of the relationship
between the two new allies, the Thebans leaped at the opportunity. Overwhelming the two of
their main pro-Spartan rivals in the central Greece, Plataea and Thespiae, in quick succession,
the Thebans then shifted their sights on Phoci in 371.2706 Finally made to recollect their
thoughts on what actually was at stake, the Athenians and Spartans were petitioned, again by
Artaxerxes’ agents, to renew the peace for a second time largely because the commander of
the Persian troops in Egypt himself had revolted in the same year. The renewal meant, to the
Spartans and Athenians both, a curbing of the rising Boeotian power. To that effect,
Cleombrotus led a large Spartan force north to Phoci, ready to strike at Boeotia if the Thebans
were to reject the offered proposal. There was no alteration with respect to the use of the
autonomy clause, which, again, would serve to justify a forced break-up of the Boeotian
League. The Boeotians were, however, clearly not impressed with the daring that the Spartans
showed after their major defeats at the hands of the Theban phalanx. The tensions came to a
head when Epaminondas, the leading Theban partaking of the negotiations, demanded ‘the
Thebans’ to be replaced by ‘the Boeotians’ in the document thereby demanding the political
authority over the League to be recognised. Initially scorned by Agesilaos, Epaminondas
replied in kind by insinuating that if the mainland polis were to be free and autonomous, that
would also comprise the polis in Laconia and not only those in Boeotia.2707 Agesilaos
considered the Thebans out of the loop, as they moved on to agree to the renewal with the
Athenians. To force the Thebans back into the loop was, of course, the business of
Cleombrotus and his army. In the event, however, the Spartans suffered a backbreaking defeat
at the hands of Thebans at the battle of Leuctra in 371 that would be saluted, centuries later,
by Pausanias as the “most famous of all those won by Greeks over Greeks.”2708

2705 Diodorus Siculus, Library, 15.38.1; for a possible Spartan appeal made to the Great King that might
have triggered the attempt to renew the treaty, see Philochorus, FGrH328, F 151.
2706 Xenophon, Hellenica, 6.3.1, 3.5.
2707 Plutarch, Agesilaos, 28.
2708 Pausanias, Guide to Greece, 9.13.11.
A slaughter of four hundred homoioi, including Cleombrotus, at Leuctra sufficed to bring down the Spartans to their knees.\textsuperscript{2709} The four hundred that were killed made up a third of the Spartiates, whose loss of the Sphacteria homoioi back in 425 had also brought them to the precipice of submission. This time, however, there was no ransom to be paid either for their dead or for their Peloponnesian hegemony.\textsuperscript{2710} Little did they know that the defeat at Leuctra effectively spelled out the end of the Spartan days of glory. Having been reduced to a second-rate power, the Spartiates, from then onwards, would watch the ascendancy of the Theban power only from the sidelines. Indeed, the Athenians were to tacitly acknowledge the fact when they called their allies as well as those of Sparta for a third renewal of the King’s Peace in the aftermath of Leuctra without bothering to invite the Boeotians whose branding as the public enemy was thereby complete.\textsuperscript{2711}

It did not take long for the aftershocks of the Spartan defeat at Leuctra to start convulsing the Peloponnesian League. First was the overthrow of the pro-Spartan oligarchs by a combination of démos and democratically-inclined upper classes in various poleis of import including Corinth, Mantinea, Tegea, Sicyon, Argos, Elis and Achaea. As the stasis was brought to an end with the victory of the democratic factions, the second step followed whereby anti-Spartan coalitions were formed within the Peloponnese. A re-synoecised Mantinea, an enlarged Elis and a primed Argos then formed an Arcadian League, bringing the Spartan hegemony over the Peloponnesians to a crashing close. Also adding Thebes to their alliance, who was invited following an earlier Athenian refusal,\textsuperscript{2712} the central Peloponnesians issued a direct challenge to the Spartiates who, unfortunately, did not have the means to comply. In the winter of 370/369, the combined forces of Thebans and Arcadians, under the leadership of the two brilliant Theban strategoi, Epaminondas and Pelopidas, broke through the ramshackle Spartan

\textsuperscript{2709}“In other words, the proportion of Spartiates in the morai had fallen catastrophically since the Battle of the Nemea River in 394, and before the Battle of Leuktra the total number of Spartiates cannot have exceeded 1,500 compared to the 8,000 of a century earlier. No doubt poor generalship and inferior tactics contributed largely to the Spartan defeat. But the adverse effect on morale of this tiny and shrinking handful of Spartiates dominating a League force of perhaps 10,000 hoplites (Plut. Pelop. 20.1) should not be overlooked. Even Xenophon does not hide the fact that some of the allied troops were actually pleased with the result (6.4.15).” Cartledge, \textit{Sparta and Lakonia}, pp. 251; Paul Cartledge and Anthony Spawforth, \textit{Hellenistic and Roman Sparta: A Tale of Two Cities}, 2nd edition, (London and New York, 2002), pp. 5.u

\textsuperscript{2710} This time around, the salvage operation was one that famously led by Agesilaos’ pardoning of tresantes, or ‘tremblers’ who escaped from battle, that ordinarily lost their citizenship to be perpetually treated as outcasts. Sêmeron ean katheudein, or letting the laws to ‘sleep for a day,’ as Plutarch’s Agesilaos would put it, was, as such, whence any benefit was deemed to be derived: Plutarch, \textit{Agesilaos}, 30.4; on the tresantes, see Jean Ducat, ‘The Spartan ‘tremblers’”, in \textit{Sparta and War}, pp. 1-55; for a recent evaluation of Plutarch’s account vis-a-vis that of Xenophon, see Susan G. Jacobs, \textit{Plutarch’s Pragmatic Biographies: Lessons for Statesmen and Generals in the Parallel Lives}, (Leiden and Boston, 2017), pp. 241-243.

\textsuperscript{2711} Xenophon, \textit{Hellenica}, 6.5.1-2.

\textsuperscript{2712} Diodorus Siculus, \textit{Library}, 15.61.3.
defences to invade the Peloponnese for the first time since the Late Geometric Age. Strengthened by the *periöikic* communities of northern Laconia, the Thebans invaded the Spartan heartlands, menacing the core *poleis* of Sparta herself and laying waste to the surrounding territory. The Spartiates could do naught in return. Indeed, despite occasionally showing signs of life as in the so-called Tearless Battle of 368, any pretension to hegemony that the *homoioi* could have entertained after 371 was dissipated once and for all by Epaminondas’ liberation of Messenia in 369. Proving to be the final nail in the coffin, the loss of more than half of the total number of helots in Sparta, not to mention the crucially important *perioikoi*, was the undoing of the Spartan polity with its braggarts finally humbled for all their talk of aeons of continuity. Thereafter, all the Spartiate politics would be propelled towards the regaining of Messenia, a dream that was never to be realised.

6.2 Aristophanes and the Attic Middle Comedy of Universality

Bringing our historical survey to a close at the fall of the Spartan hegemony, we would like round off our account by focusing on the dramatic, philosophical and legal tracts that survive from this period in regard to their espousal of the duality of *nomos* and *phusis*. Unlike the case for the previous century, the lone surviving dramatic work, in fact one of the late comedies of Aristophanes, the *Wealth*, does not encourage any attempt to work out a pattern of interpretation. Never the less, given the distinct formal and narrative qualities of the play, we think it not unwarranted to try to put it into the general perspective of the Aristophanic comedy and its development over the years. It is fitting, in that vein, that however stylistic its theme may seem, the play was written at a time when the Athenian fears of grain shortages had become practically perennial, obliging an ever-increasing resort to euergetism-cum-

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2713 And those *perioikoi* were not only armed to the teeth largely owing to the Spartiates increased military dependency on their numbers but also resentful of the discrepancy between their allotted military and socio-political roles: “The increase in Spartan military activities in the fourth century up to Leuktra implies a concomitant increase in the numbers of the *perioikoi* having to serve in the military. As Spartiate numbers declined, a greater share of the military burden would have to be carried by those communities who had little say in the scope or direction of military activity…” Daniel Stewart, “From Leuktra to Nabis, 371-192’, in *A Companion to Sparta*, pp. 377; for a possible concomitant increase on the *homoioi*’s military reliance on mercenaries, see Ellen G. Millender, “The Politics of Spartan Military Service”, in *Sparta and War*, pp. 235-66.


2715 A telling sign of the times was the creation of the office of *sitophulakes*, i.e., ‘grain wardens,’ who supervised all the transactions involving grain to prevent stockpiling and speculative profits. We do not know when the office was instituted or its initial competence, but from *Athenaion Politeia*’s testimony we can make out that an expansion of their official capacity was made to cover any breaches of a law of coinage that was passed in 375/4: “Their duties were to see that unground grain was put on sale in the market at a fair price, that millers sold barley meal at a price corresponding to that which they paid
patronage in contradistinction to the secure grain supplies of the fifth century. Indeed, produced in 388, the Wealth is not only the lone extant example of the so-called Attic Middle Comedy, the successor of the Old Comedy, it is also a play that was staged little more than a year before the Spartans would hold off the transport ships carrying grain to bring down the fierce Athenian resistance.

Formally, the Wealth is distinguished from the surviving examples of the Old Comedy by a diminish in the chorus’ prominence and a shift of the comic focus away from the travails of the protagonist. In the earlier plays of Aristophanes, the chorus always serves as a fundamental comic force that drives the development of the whole plot. In Lysistrata, for example, the two choruses of old Athenian men and women function no less as the comic channel through which the rowdy pathos is displayed as in the play’s parodos, than as the dramatic counterweigh to Lysistrata’s arguments in the agônes. Similarly, in the Assembly-Women, the chorus of Praxagora’s associates exploit the comic effect of the role-reversal involved in the idea of women’s assembly and expose the metapoetic flanks of the play with equal rigour. In the Wealth, however, the chorus’ role appears to have shrunk to a rather lackadaisically connected parodos and the occasional interlude songs. Coupled with a discernible lack of comic pathos with scarcely any concentration on the chorus as the vibrant exhibitor of any significant role-reversal, Aristophanes seems to have retained the chorus only as a minimal adherence to the ties of formality between the Old and Middle Comedy.

This movement away from the principal tenets of the Old Comedy is even more pronounced in the undermined comic attention on the play’s protagonist, Chremylos. Now, the protagonists of the Old Comedy were distinguishable, as we observed above, by their larger-than-life qualities. Both Dikaopolis in the Acharnians and Strepsiades in the Clouds are inventive, daring and exuberant protagonists that are capable of blurting out the most otherworldly solutions to the social problems that they face. Enterprising and foolhardy in equal parts, the agreement of one to a personal peace with the Peloponnesians and the sending of other of his

2716 Garnsey, Famine and Food Supply in the Graeco-Roman World, pp. 148; on the fifth-century democratic opposition to the overt forms of patronage, see ibid, pp. 85; cf. Ober, Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens, pp. 228-229; for the passage from a more democratically acceptable to a downright aristocratic historical construal of euergetês as the Aristotelian charientes, i.e., ‘the gracious,’ over the course of the second half of the fourth century, see Vincent Azoulay, ‘Isocrate et les élites: cultiver la distinction’, in La cité et ses élites, pp. 23-28; cf. Azoulay, Xenophon and the Graces of Power, pp. 28-29, 47-48; Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics, 1127b31, 1128a15, 31; Politics, 1267a1, 1297b9.

layabout son to the school of sophistry to learn how to make the weaker argument prevail over the stronger resonate with a hum that echoes through the comic universe. In a similar vein, there is never a dull run-of-the-mill moment with either Lysistrata or Praxagora, who break through many of the allegedly timeless conventions of Athenian social and political life in attempting in order to stand the topsy-turvy goings-on in reality once again on their feet. Aristophanes’ old protagonists are not just the focus of the entire comic attention of the plays, they are the effigies in which all the outlandish reversals manifest themselves to partially resolve their impasses through the dramatic movement between realistic retrojection and fantastic projection. By contrast, Chremylos is a weary quotidian protagonist that exhibits a measure of anaemia even at the moments at which his uncanny shine is brightest. The distance between the old protagonists and Chremylos, on this view, appears to be twofold: a characterisation of the ordinary and a division of the comic potential with side characters.

Chremylos is a sombre old man that is disillusioned with the world. There is nothing about his characterisation that is notably remarkable or out of proportion. Indeed, he is, if anything, made-to-measure with as quotidian a fabric as any other to fill a supra-historical typology. Always the follower and never the initiator of the plot twists, Chremylos is someone whose brief flashes of any hint of pathos quickly evaporate in the dust of ordinariness that engulfs it. His contrast with the old Aristophanic protagonists is stark. Indeed, one would be hard put to find anything of a Trygaios in the Peace or of the two old men in the Birds in him. On one side are the protagonists who dare to do the impossible, on the other a brittle old man who just visits an oracle. To be sure, there is something of the old Aristophanic flavour in an entirely run-of-the-mill character being confronted by an extraordinary turn of events, acting on the oracle’s words to inadvertently find out that the beggar he had been following was none other than Wealth personified. Still, the reminiscence is but a flicker of the emboldened decisiveness and initiative that was shown by Lysistrata or Trygaios. Irresolute moderation, in fact, is the most explicit trait that of the character that is brought out in the open at various dramatic nodal points. Ensuring Wealth that he is no miser or libertine that would squeeze him either way, Chremylos’ portrayal of himself as a wavering supporter of moderation, for example,

2718 Waterfield’s characterisation of the Middle Comedy as a comedy of manners that had lost its sting may be a little too sweeping, but it is not entirely without reason. Coupled with the eradication of historical topos, which we are about to analyse, Wealth, for instance, strikes one as a representative of typologies rather than one that offered a rich world of particularisms. Waterfield, Creators, Conquerors, and Citizens, pp. 140.


2720 “It’s because you’ve [Wealth] never known anyone in-between. | Now that’s the sort of person I am myself: | I’m as fond of being frugal as anyone else, | But I’m also fond of spending, when times are right. | [Taking Wealth’s arm] Let’s go indoors. I’d like to introduce you | To my wife and only son: the
stands in avid contrast to Lysistrata’s resolute rallying of the striking women whose willpower cannot possibly compare to her own.

Chremylos is not only the most unmemorable and ordinary of Aristophanes’ protagonists, he is also someone on whom the comic attention appears quite unwilling to be fixed. At any rate, Karion, i.e., Chremylos’ slave, has a practically equal share of the dramatic focus that he does not shed through the entirety of the play. Combined with the firm initiative that is exhibited by the relatively more exaggerated characterisation of Karion, Chremylos appears even more dull. In a sense, Aristophanes’ equal allotment of comic attention to the two characters seems to work in tandem with a similar proportioning of comic features. To an indecisive, sombre and bland Chremylos is contrasted, as such, an unbendable, livelier and wittier Karion who seems much more suitable than the former for a comparison with the protagonists of the Old Comedy. And yet, there is not a trace of pathos to suggest that Aristophanes aimed to use Karion as a spring-board to leap at a fundamental role-reversal between the master and slave. Indeed, many a time has Aristophanes used that reversal to bring all the dynamic dimensions of fantasy and reality into play in his earlier plays and in none of them did he settle for either a watered-down simplification of its comic potential or shift away from the protagonist to a side character. Take Dionysius and Xanthias, for instance, who also has a sustained presence throughout the play like Karion but never attempts to encroach upon the dramatic initiative of his master. Even at his most enterprising, Xanthias displays the qualities of being a sidekick that helps to bring out comic motifs and perpetual social contrasts but never as the thrust of the dramatic action. In the characterisation of Chremylos and Karion, however, Aristophanes seems to have aimed at attaining an inverse division of the accustomed attributes of a protagonist that pronounces the mischievous irreverence and jocular assertiveness of the slave rather than the indecision that incapacitates his moderation embodied of a master. It is often noted, in that vein, that the master-slave duo of the Wealth looks forward to Menander’s generic duality of resourceful and active slave and mundane and passive master that became one of the stock typologies of the New Comedy. Correct as it is, we claim that in toning down the elements of the absurd that had always been a noted feature of his earlier protagonists, Aristophanes took a dramatic leap toward a quotidian realism. The Wealth, on this view, belongs, at least on that count, to the New Comedy much more than it does to the Old.

son I love | More than the world—apart from you.” Aristophanes, Wealth, in Birds and Other Plays, 244-250.

Phyrrhias in Dyskolos, Parmenon in Samia or Onesimos in Epitrepontes, among others, are all memorable examples of Menander’s typology of enterprising and energetic slaves. The surviving parts of all these plays can be examined by resorting to Menander, The Plays and Fragments.
The narrative qualities of the play are just as distinct from those of the earlier Aristophanic plays as are its formal merits. The ostensible moralism of the play and a reduction of historical topoi are two of the most discernible traits that set the Wealth apart from the playwright’s earlier narrative structures. There is a curious Victorianism to the theme of the perpetual discrepancy between social justice and material wealth that is mostly absent in the earlier plays. The preaching of overt moralism has never been the driving force of comic potential in the Old Comedy, but it appears to be so in the case of the Wealth. On that note, the comic motifs of the play are morally subverted only at one point when the Old Woman appeals to Chremylos for bringing the Young Man who was her gigolo before Chremylos restored the eye-sight of Wealth. Insinuating, thus, that the Young Man managed to free himself from the tight grip of poverty when Wealth was made to differentiate between the good and evil, Chremylos turns the Old Woman into a butt of his gibes potentially because of her supposed sexual shamelessness. And yet, even then, the movement back to the scurrilous Aristophanes of old is only partial. Initially chasing away the Old Woman with a flurry of abuse, Chremylos later tells her that he managed to persuade the Young Man to be her lover once again. Pulling at the strings of comic harmony, to be sure, the settlement is no less banally moralistic than the earlier scene between the Just Man and Informer. There does not need to be, in that vein, a one-to-one correspondence between the material loss of the Old Woman and gain of the Young Man for Aristophanes to drive home a two-pronged humour that was at once traditionally sexual and cotemporally moralistic.

An even more interesting narrative novelty of the Wealth is its practically complete dropping of any evident ties to contemporary reality. Restoring the eye-sight of Wealth so that he can proportion everyone’s just deserts in accord with the goodness they exhibit is, of course, a universal theme in and of itself. No amount of diligent nit-picking would suffice, in fact, to excavate a similar generic plight that is located as the dramatic focus of the whole narrative in the earlier plays of Aristophanes. The inter-generational conflict between Strepsiades and Pheidippides in the Clouds or that of inter-sexual origins Lysistrata and the Chorus of Old Man in Lysistrata may seem generic on a surface level, but deeper down, they are anything but. The clash between the father and son in the Clouds is just a moral epiphenomenon, albeit

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2722 Though a point that is made long ago by Ste. Croix bears interesting food for thought. He argued, in that vein, that the rich are never vilified head-on in any of the surviving plays of Aristophanes. And despite our inclination toward offering a more balanced exegesis of the plays, an embedded structure of equality between morality and wealth is not incongruous to our premises. Ste. Croix, The Origins of the Peloponnesian War, pp. 360.

2723 Aristophanes, Wealth, 1003-5, 1023-1024.

2724 Ibid, 1200-1201, 1071-1075.

2725 Ibid, 802-958.
the focus of the comic exaggeration, of a historically determinate socio-political problem: the decadent influence exerted by the *sophistai* on the rank-and-file Athenian *dēmos*. Aristophanes’ Janus-faced reconciliation of the dramatic conflict, i.e., the incineration of the sophists’ club, is a comic solution that is offered for a historical problem. Lysistrata’s threat of dissolving the relation of reproduction functions, likewise, as an outlandish answer to a biting historical question: how to rid the Athenians of the adverse socio-political effects of the war? In his earlier plays, even when he appears to be at his most moralistic, Aristophanes seems to have never committed himself to sacrifice spatio-temporal determinateness on the altar of empty universalisms. In the *Wealth*, however, not only does he guide the dramatic action from the blanket vantage point of a god’s-eye-view, he also divests the play from any *topoi* that could be instantly identified in its relation to contemporary reality. There is no Paphlagon qua Cleon, no Socrates as the jumbled-up headmaster of the ‘Sophist Business School’ and no Euripides ‘please save me from women’s wrath!’ in the comic world of the *Wealth*. Furthermore, there is hardly any contemporary equivalent of the earlier pillorising of Pericles’ Megarian Decree, or half-hearted recognition of Cleon’s achievement at Sphacteria either in the play. The compound effect of these narrative novelties is a changed comic *ethos* that is occasioned by the leaving of the rich world of Athenian particularity with its vivid vibrancy for the sake stepping into a world of broad categorisations and somewhat dimmed universal colours. No allusion to the specificities of Athenian foreign policy or institutions of *paideia* surfaces in the play whose comic nodes are permeated rather with comfortable typological contrasts between the rich and poor. Indeed, with hardly any historical exegesis that needs to be undertaken in order to make sense of the delicate humour of the play, the *Wealth* appears more Aesopian than Aristophanic.2726 But perhaps that is only to be expected from a playwright who had seen the step-by-step submersion of the Athenian maritime *arkhē*, which had left behind a *polis* with a swollen population and not nearly enough annual grain yield.

Produced a couple of years before the effective end of the Corinthian War that was brought about by another Spartan blockade of the Athenian grain routes, the *Wealth* as a representative of the Middle Comedy, if the play bore even a modicum of the distinctive features of genre’s development, is a politically toothless play. Neutral to a fault, the perpetual hesitation of Chremyllos seems to have spoken to a shift in the playwright’s temperament from impulsive and vindictive iconoclasm to still waters that do not appear to run deep. If there is a subtlety

2726 Again, this attribute of the Middle Comedy makes it more akin to Menander’s New Comedy rather than to Aristophanes’ earlier plays: “If Old Comedy is civic, New Comedy is domestic. The setting may be urban, but it can be any Greek community.” Jones, *The Epicurean Tradition*, pp. 7.
in the play, then it is not a multi-faceted that is equivalent of the old comic interlock between retrojection and projection. Even megalonomia, the bread-and-butter of the early Aristophanic comedy, is pruned and reduced to a stylised opposition between Poverty and Wealth, signalling, at times, both socially and metapoetically a humbled state of affairs wherein the Sophoclean force of circumstance seems to have prevailed over the comic universe. There is nothing inherently fantastic, for one, in the wish list of the Young Man in return for gratifying the sexual needs of his older lover, which, after all, is clearly intended for comic effect. In a similar tone, Hermes’ plan to leave the Pantheon of poverty to start living in the mortal realm of plenty appears to have functioned as a metapoetic aside to a former rendering of the theme in the Birds. The universal plenty is so irresistible that the divinities volunteer to partake of it even at the price of renouncing their immortal prerogatives. If the universal wealth that is labelled by the Priest as the root factor of the sudden emptiness of temples, which is occasioned by individuals focusing more on doing good deeds to benefit from Wealth’s aids than on prayers and sacrifices, is quantified somewhat in accord with the wish list of the Young Man, then the tale is indeed one of ‘how the mighty has fallen.’ With the bringing down of the imperial realm of plenty is reduced the immortal sphere of fantasy to a morally moderate material existence.

The nomos and phusis of the Middle Comedy operate on a chafed space of material prosperity. Receded to the limits of bare existence that would culminate in outright starvation twice in twenty years, not to mention the frequent shortages of grain and pulses, the relative poverty of the 380s seems to have induced a comic rethinking of the two terms that were more congruous to the socio-political configuration of their day. In that sense, the reconfiguration in question was one in which the liturgical class had grown ever more politically resilient against their share of cumbersome annual expenditures for they had no access to the material benefits of the arkhê that used to render them economically buoyant. Naturally, the oligarchic upper classes were given a once in a lifetime opportunity when they were afforded the amnestia of 403, dropping any charges on any ties they might have been alleged to have with the Thirty

2727 “[]Old Woman listing the requests of her lover] Not much: he always felt so terribly shy. | He’d ask, perhaps, for twenty silver drachmas | To buy a cloak, and eight to spend on shoes. | He’d urge me to buy small dresses for his sisters, | Or a little shawl as a present for his mother. | And maybe four months’ rations of wheat as well.” Aristophanes, Wealth, 981-986.
2728 Ibid, 1146.
2729 “[]The cause [of the Priest’s sudden misery] is universal wealth. Before, | When wealth was scarce, a merchant, say, would come | To sacrifice in thanks for crossing the seas. | Or someone would come in thanks for being acquitted. | As priest I often joined in the feasting too. | But now the temple’s empty. Nobody comes – | Except the many who need to defecate.” Ibid, 1178-1184.
2730 Ibid, 1112-1116.
2731 Lysias, Defence Against a Charge of Subverting the Democracy, 16; Lysias, On the Olive Stump, 21.
Tyrants. Clearly, a driving force of that compromise was the need to have access to the resources of the upper-class oligarchs in order to build a viable material groundwork that would support a re-established democracy. Office pay, public pay for court and assembly service, daily reimbursement of soldiers and sailors, etc., were all requisite expenditures that the Athenians lower classes simply did not have the means to afford. On top of that was the yearly price to be paid for the import of wheat and barley, whose Attic output could not cover the entirety of the Athenian population. With the rediscovery of their economic significance, the oligarchic upper classes began to seek new ways of re-affirming their social and political superiority in laying the foundations of a polity of democratic euergetism. Preferential treatments in courtrooms, officeholding and honorary tributes were all benefits that would accrue to the euergetists who never tired of reminding the démos that they were the ones who took on the role of chorēgos a couple of years back and funded the grain dole before that.

Indeed, it was at this time that the Athenian landscapes, imaginary as well as physical, began to be filled with the effigies of the upper-class beneficiaries. For better or for worse, the lonesome days of the statue group of Harmodius and Aristogiton within the sacred space of the Athenian Acropolis were over by the end of the fifth century. Gradually to be packed tight with the busts and life-size sculptors of the benefactors, public and ritual spaces started to transform in line with a more clear-cut division between the upper and lower classes.

6.2.1 The Three Moralists

The collapse of the Athenian imperial fortunes occasioned a dramatic turn from the rich particularity to empty universality. Instantiated in the case of the Wealth as the moralistic contrast between the benign poor and vile rich, other universals that were deracinated from their spatio-temporal determinateness could also have been dramatically conceived. Odes to

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2732 Misthoi were necessary in order to keep a tight leash on the oligarchic aspirations of the Athenian liturgical class. The so-called “etatization of the gift ethic” was one of the most crucial political features of fifth-century Athenian democracy that safeguarded a shade of pretence of a mutually-consented social alliance between the lower and upper classes. By taking away the aristocratic avenues of patronage spending out of the purview of the liturgical class, the system of public payments facilitated the moderation of the terms of the Athenian class warfare as it curbed the growth of aristocratic ties of personal dependence without threatening them outright, thence turning it into a permanent target of aristocratic vilification: Louis Gernet, The Anthropology of Ancient Greece, trans. by B. Nagy, (Baltimore, 1981), pp. 334; Azoulay, Xenophon and the Graces of Power, pp. 44-46, 89.

2733 And that is without even touching upon the speculative profits that were derived by the same class of ‘benefactors’: “As grain commissioners they [members of the elite] they raised grain-purchase funds and sought emergency food stocks, as private individuals (of officials) they themselves put up money or cut-price grain. However, euergetism, the public generosity of the wealthy, was an institution devised by the rich in their own interests. As the grain stocks of the community were in their barns, they could time their release to suit themselves; that is why the same class produced euergetists and profiteers. But in addition, through euergetism and the performance of unpaid public services, the few competed with one another for office, prestige and honour – and avoided the less attractive alternative of financing necessary expenditures through regular tax-payments to the civic treasury.” Garnsey, Famine and Food Supply in the Graeco-Roman World, pp. 272.

757
peace, harmony, i.e., relations of production or reproduction consented to by the subjugated, between classes and the sexes, etc., were all ideals that could offer some ideologically universal purchase if they were stripped of their historical roots. For what it is worth, the violent abstraction of Antiphon seems to have already endorsed by Aristophanes in the Wealth who chose not to stir up the euergetists’ nests not because there were not any later-day Creon or Demosthenes of 380s but for the simple fact that those few notables could by now make and break the material basis of the Athenian polity. The nomoi were effectively put to sleep with the loss of the Athenian empire, whereas the phusis, thereafter, was to be sought only in the evergreen pastures of abstract moralism. Aristophanes might have been the first to dramatically account for the transformation of the material basis on which the duality was conceived, but he was not the only one. A trio of influential moralists were to carry the conception of the dualism to a terminus of morally construed universalism. It is to that trio that we now turn.

On the surface, at least, Isocrates, Antisthenes and Xenophon are as diverse figures as any other with the only tie uniting them being their everlasting impact on the literary and philosophical traditions. The foremost speechwriter of his time, Isocrates made up for his lack of rhetorical eloquence with his plethora of written works that were designed particularly for the purposes of persuading young and old to adopt his teachings. Promising the key to leading a practically beneficial public life, he petitioned rulers, their sons and other notables in hopes of making them follow the policies that he trumpeted. Although they certainly would not qualify as philosophically nuanced showpieces, his works are of remarkable import, brimming as they are with frequent gibes and exclamations heaped at the defenders of the ideas that he conceived to drag down the entire Greek world. The moralism of Antisthenes may not appear to have any Isocratic element ingrained within it. But take away Isocrates’ focus on the written word and you would come practically face-to-face with the core traits of Antisthenes’ philosophising. A devoted pupil of Socrates, and the tutor of the famous Diogenes of Sinope if we confirm the historical tradition, Antisthenes commenced on his sagacious learning from where Socrates had left it off. A zealous scoffer of everything that had the human-made tag of convention on it, he trampled underfoot what he viewed as the

2734 A shift from the fifth-century politics of publicity stunts to the fourth-century pamphleteering has been discerned by Gottesman who portrayed Isocrates as one of the spearhead figures of the latter vogue. Rather than indulging in public theatricalities of any sort as their predecessors did, the fourth-century politicians took advantage of elite networks, e.g., symposia, in addition to other public channels of dissemination, e.g., barbershops, workshops, etc., for the sake of giving wide berth to the logopoioi, i.e., ‘gossip-mongers,’ whose skills in tale-spinning had then begun to be utilised for one’s own ends: Gottesman, Politics and the Street in Democratic Athens, pp. 83 ff.

2735 Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, 6.21; Aelian, Historical Miscellany, 10.16; Jerome, Against Jovinian, 2.14.
most unnatural of the Greek customs, pointing out that living a better and more natural life was within their reach. Xenophon, an Athenian hippeis turned mercenary commander that was to live most of his days supporting and justifying Agesilaos’ policies, was another highly curious figure who adapted what he believed to be his philosophical master’s, i.e., Socrates, wisdom on everyday issues. A literary talent in his own right, he engaged in historical and creative writing, e.g., in Hellenica and Cyropaidia, that allows us to posit him as a borderline figure between Thucydides and Plutarch, he purveyed his morals with a subtlety and assiduousness that appears to have consciously mimicked the stratified philosophical readings of Plato’s works. If he did not have the fanatic zest of Antisthenes, he, all the same, shared his fascination with morality, sketching a morally conceived universe that was to remedy some of the most biting of the myriad of social and political issues in the contemporary Greek world.

But all their individual traits aside, our trio of moralists were united by three political and philosophical threads that permit us to attempt their weaving into a common nexus with respect to their respective understandings of the duality: a practical understanding of philosophical logos that was to aid its practitioner in telling the difference between right and wrong; a politics of anti-democracy which was deemed to be too muddied and fickle to be meddled with; and a defence of a politico-religious salvation that was to be attained through the practice of specific policies of either public or private realms.

Although not afraid to classify himself, at times, as a fellow sophist, Isocrates was hard put to differentiate himself from the rest of the pack by a trenchant insistence that his own brand of philosophy was neither futile nor superficial. Arguing that definite sciences, i.e., geometry and

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2736 A self-acknowledged owner of horses that numbered hunting among one of his favoured aristocratically-inclined pastimes, Xenophon’s hippeis social background is largely accepted. Xenophon, Anabasis, 3.3.19; Azoulay, Xenophon and the Graces of Power, pp. 2 with reference; for estimations of wealth that was commanded by the Athenian hippeis around the turn of the century, see Glenn Richard Bugh, The Horsemen of Athens, (Princeton, 1988), pp. 52-55.

2737 Celebrated as ο χαριεστατος Ξενοφών, or ‘the most graceful Xenophon’ by none other than the compiler of everything bohemian, Athenaeus, Xenophon was never short on admirers who constructed models after his eloquence often to the point of adopting the historian’s name or those of his works, as in the case of Arrian’s Anabasis: Athenaeus, The Learned Banqueters, ed. and trans. by S. Douglas Olson, (Harvard, MA., 2009), 10.421b, 11.504c; Arrian, Anabasis, in Alexander the Great, trans. by Martin Hammond, (Oxford, 2013), 1.12.3; Sarah B. Pomeroy, Xenophon Oeconomicus. A Social and Historical Commentary, (Oxford, 1994), pp. 14.

2738 That is not to say, I hasten to add, that I evince an agreement with Leo Strauss’ grotesquely anti-historical canvassing of Xenophon as a cryptic benefactor of humankind whose nuggets of ‘anti-tyrannical’ wisdom can be unearthed only by an erudite scrutiny. Oblivious as to the state of the early fourth-century literary world of Athens in regard to its monopolistic appropriation by anti-democratic critics, Strauss’ attempt to centre the literary ventures of Xenophon around the theme of lifelong persecution borders on self-effacing hermeneutics that has been aptly viewed as “a form of interpretative delirium,” by Vincent Azoulay: Azoulay, Xenophon and the Graces of Power, pp. 6; Wood, Citizens to Lords, pp. 5 n. 3; contra: “I have not tried to relate his thought to his “historical situation” because this is not the natural way of reading the work of a wise man.” Leo Strauss, On Tyranny, (Chicago, 2000), pp. 25.
astronomy, were only worth studying so long as it is conceded that they bear no relation to the garnering of practical knowledge. Isocrates scorned the rest of philosophical activity as futile speculative filibustering that concerned itself with obscure truths that were to remain concealed. Futility of an overeducation in definite sciences, as such, was conceived as something akin to the detraction of true philosophy’s ingrained universality when a full-fledged practicality threatened to temporalize the sage. Writing forensic speeches, for example, was something that was only good for court procedure and had nothing contemplative about it, producing, in fact, useless documents once the courtroom is left. Isocrates, Antidosis, 47-50.

Philosophy, on the other hand, denoted an activity that is held in high esteem in all societies because of its abstract universalism. Usefulness in civic affairs was, of course, a crucial promise of the Isocratic brand of philosophy; but only in so far as it honed the natural endowments of any pupil by frequent forays into the realm of philosophical universals. One such universal was phusis itself, highlighting the allegedly inert socio-political superiority of an aspiring candidate, such as Timotheus, whose wisdom can be cultivated to reach an even higher level. Neither Isocrates nor any other ‘sophist,’ contrary to what he may claim, however, was a miracle worker. There was no shortcut to virtue for an individual who had an unquestionable dearth of natural aptitude. The usefulness of philosophical episteme could be tapped into only by those who showed at least a modicum of natural ability.

To deliberate on and speak about our own affairs needs to be promised, in word and deed, by any activity that claims to philosophise about things. Divested of that usefulness, there is nothing particularly desirable in engaging in philosophical activity: Alcmeon had claimed that there were two primary constituents and Empedocles retorted that there were four; either way, all they were doing were to pull juggler’s tricks with scarce any personal or social profits to

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2739 Isocrates, Antidosis, 47-50.
2740 The allusion, ours as well as Isocrates’ is, of course, ironical. Isocrates mentioned Timotheus, one of the five strategoi that commanded the Athenian fleet in a campaign against Byzantium in 357 to be fined enormously when the attack failed for a lack of coordination, as a case of an outstanding nature whose proud stature could not be bent even were his life depended on it. Timotheus thus functioned as a stand-in for Isocrates who conveyed that his pompous distance from the démos is not indicative of anti-democratic leanings but of a natural superiority in philosophical aptitude: “When I would speak to him in this wise [counselling courtesy and attention in his dealings with the démos], he would admit that I was right, but he could not change his nature. He was a good man and true, a credit to Athens and to Hellas, but he could not lower himself to the level of people who are intolerant of their natural superiors.” Ibid, 138; cf. Azoulay, Xenophon and the Graces of Power, pp. 162, 163.
2741 “For ability, whether in speech or in any other activity, is found in those who are well endowed by nature and have been schooled by practical experience. Formal training makes such men more skilful and more resourceful in discovering the possibilities of a subject; for it teaches them to take from a readerier source the topics which they otherwise hit upon in haphazard fashion. But it cannot fully fashion men who are without natural aptitude into good debaters or writers, although it is capable of leading them on to self-improvement and to a greater degree of intelligence on many subjects.” Isocrates, Against the Sophists, 14-16.
2742 Isocrates, Antidosis, 266-268.
be derived. A true study of logos, as dictated by Isocrates, needs to delve into the intricacies of the spoken word just as much as into the cultivation of the reasoning capabilities, emotions and imagination so that a truly educated person could follow on his earlier studies which had prepared him for the higher studies and reap the tangible benefits that would accrue on him from his participation in the civilised life. In short, the natural sciences as well as the primary elements of the aristocratic paideia were useful only in so far as they tamed the body and soul, whereas the speculative strands of natural philosophy were considered to be a waste of time plain and simple.

Xenophon’s postulation of virtue, or rather his portrayal of Socrates as espousing his notion of virtue, as the knowledge of what is good for oneself runs in parallel lines with the Isocratic definition of logos as practical episteme concerning deliberation and its delivery. Famously, the Platonic Socrates was made to deny the existence of akrasia, i.e., ‘lack of willpower,’ which, if granted, would jeopardise the fundamental equation between knowledge and rightful judgment. People can definitely be wrong about something, but that would boil down, in the end, to an intellectual error and not to any weakness of willpower. This ‘moral egoism’ was diligently duplicated by Xenophon who makes his Socrates mouth, at various points, an espousal of the norms of traditional morality with an emphasis on a conception of knowledge as the know-how related to those tenets and their realisation. As entrenched an ethical convention as any other, ‘harming one’s enemies and benefiting one’s friends,’ surfaces, for example, multiple times in Xenophon’s portrayal of Socrates who explicitly points out that the sage is someone who can be an efficient guide to tell one’s friends apart from his or her enemies. It is the principal job of any philosopher, on this view, to use his or her logos, i.e., ‘discourse,’ to provide the pupil with practical waypoints to be followed in one’s daily life.

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2743 Ibid, 268-270.
2744 Isocrates, Nicocles, 5-7; for a similar accentuation of the faculty of speech as the catalyst behind our leap from bestial existence to one of civility, see Isocrates, Antidosis, 273; Panegyricus, 48.
2745 Isocrates, Panathenaicus, 26; Antidosis, 265.
2746 Ibid, 253-255.
2747 Plato, Protagoras, 352b-e, 355a-357e, 358b-d; Meno, 77b-78a; cf. “He [Socrates] used to say that not only justice, but all the other moral virtues were wisdom. Just actions and any others proceeding from a virtuous motive were truly good; those who knew how to do them would choose to do nothing else, and those who did not understand them could not do them, and, if they tried to, failed. Thus it was the wise who performed truly good actions: those who were not wise could not, and, if they tried, failed.” Xenophon, Memoirs of Socrates, 3.9.5-6.
2748 “Socrates’ claim that no one is willingly false/deceitful, understood as the claim that no one is willingly ignorant, is not the claim that no one chooses to be ignorant. Rather, it is the claim that no person who is ignorant would – or, perhaps better, should – endorse or welcome being in this condition, were it revealed to them.” Verity Harte, ‘Plato’s Politics of Ignorance’, in Politeia in Greek and Roman Philosophy, pp. 149.
2749 Xenophon, Memoirs of Socrates, 2.3.8-10, 2.6.33-50.
2750 Ibid, 3.3.7-18, 4.7.8-9.
If that measure of practicality is shed, moreover, the philosophy is diverted from its original interest in human problems towards an inquiry into divine matters whose secrets can never be discovered.\textsuperscript{2751} The philosophical \textit{logos}, therefore, is strictly an education into the most expedient and just courses of action that are to be adopted within the realm of human affairs.

True to his master’s teachings, at least in regard to adhering to the former’s aversion to written tracts, Antisthenes’ philosophy can only be gleaned from bits and pieces that are attested in the later tradition. What we have in the way of testimonia appear, however, to encourage a reading that practical enticements guided his philosophy. On that note, Antisthenes’ teachable virtue is founded in action, which does not require a whole lot of learning to be grasped.\textsuperscript{2752} No banal barter is occasioned by the transmission of virtue, sufficient instead is only a willing pupil who is ready to put the teachings of his tutor into practice.\textsuperscript{2753} An education in self-sufficiency is thus the root-and-branch of Antisthenes’ wisdom whose hallmark feature is an emphasis on self-sufficiency. The wise person is someone that is unperturbed by his or her lot of daily trials and tribulations, capable of living a life that is virtuous even if the world comes crashing down on him or her. Keeping one’s soul sated, in that vein, is the primary condition of wisdom provided that when it is fulfilled there would hardly be any injury accosting to the virtuous who knows that wealth and property are but greedy despots who can never quench their immortal thirst.\textsuperscript{2754} Henceforth, only by an education in virtuous self-sufficiency that is to be practiced throughout one’s lifetime can the philosophical wisdom be truly possessed.

Democracy, to move on to the second point, was considered by Isocrates as a type of polity that gave vent to the worst characteristics that the multitude was known for: fickleness, irresolution, not observing the due measure and irreverence towards the age-old institutions. Isocrates’ \textit{demos} is inherently shifty, wrapping the most deserving of upper-class \textit{politai} around their finger so that they can force them to carry out their whims.\textsuperscript{2755} With no rhyme or reason on how to conduct their affairs, \textit{demos} cannot hold the same views about the same question on any single day, which goes on to show how hopeless it is to try to wed good governance, piety, moderation, justice and virtue with democratic polity.\textsuperscript{2756} Of course,

\textsuperscript{2751} “But nobody ever saw Socrates do, or heard him say, anything that was heretical or irreverent. He did not discourse about the nature of the physical universe, as most other philosophers did, inquiring into the constitution of cosmos (as the sages call it) and the causes of the various celestial phenomena; on the contrary, he pointed out the foolishness of those who concerned themselves with such questions.” \textit{Ibid}, 1.1.10-11.
\textsuperscript{2752} Diogenes Laertius, 6.10-14.
\textsuperscript{2753} Xenophon, \textit{Symposium}, 4.34-44.
\textsuperscript{2754} \textit{Ibid}, 3.8, 4.34-44.
\textsuperscript{2755} Isocrates, \textit{Nicocles or the Cyprians}, 13-16.
\textsuperscript{2756} Isocrates, \textit{On the Peace}, 50-53; 57-64.
democracy was not a *sumum malum* that was to be eradicated from the face of the earth. The glory days of the Athenian *arkhê* showed aplenty that the contrary indeed could be the case. Yet, there were to be set up some ground rules that were, then, to be observed at all times for democracies to work. First off was the official condonement of inequality in wealth and property. It was only *kata phusin* for some individuals to grow rich while the others lived from hand to mouth.\(^{2757}\) Levelling out the socio-economic disparities would not suffice in binding the lower and upper classes into a single cohesive unit. Circumstances dictated the lot of individual men and women and meddling with the natural order had never done anyone good. If something needed to be done in order to provide a higher degree of social inclusiveness in political affairs, that was to follow the principles which were evinced by Solon long ago to the effect that every Athenian needed to have a profession.\(^{2758}\) There was a perpetual need of stables to be cleaned, hooves forged, fields farmed, roads paved, triremes manned, etc. Diversify the professions so that you can nip social conflict in the bud. While the lower classes were busy filling up their assigned quotas along the lines of the ‘natural’ division of labour, those that were noble by birth and blue-blooded ‘by profession’ would seat themselves on the Areopagus so that the exceptional virtue and sobriety would reign supreme in the most excellent *boulê* of all Hellas.\(^{2759}\) Isocrates’ *phusis* is never fond of political interference and the destruction of the institutions of forefathers was a sacrilege of the highest order.\(^{2760}\) And what was the social benefit that was deemed to worth paying such a steep price? Just that *hoi esthloi* and *kakoi* would be given the same honours.\(^{2761}\)

‘No lot, no dishonourably achieved political equality’ is the Isocratic slogan that is cried loud and clear as one flips through the pages of, for instance, *Areopagiticus*. Democracy’s inherent unnatural flaws make it the best political option only for the lowest of the low, with no aristocratic blood running through their veins or coin to their names. In short, the only good *nomoi* are those that bear the mark of aristocratic approval, which always dictates where the natural course of things would flow. With that twisted logic locked firmly in its domineering space, Ephialtes’ reforms became a betrayal of the ideal Cleisthenic polity,\(^{2762}\) and the ‘oligarchy within oligarchy’ of Sparta was coloured with the brightest hues of democracy.\(^{2763}\)

\(^{2757}\) Isocrates, *Areopagiticus*, 35.  
\(^{2758}\) *Ibid*, 44-46.  
\(^{2759}\) *Ibid*, 37; cf. “[Socrates speaking] For as you were speaking, it occurred to me that, in the first place, no two of us are born exactly alike. We have different natural aptitudes, which fit us for different jobs.” Plato, *Republic*, 370a9-b2.  
\(^{2761}\) Isocrates, *Areopagiticus*, 21-23.  
\(^{2762}\) *Ibid*, 50-51.  
Xenophon’s adoption of oligarchy as the most efficient and workable polity was much more subtle than was Isocrates’. Intricately interwoven into his historical narrative, the political loyalties of Xenophon require meticulous nit-picking that is geared towards unearthing certain patterns. Those patterns that we propose to enact as signposts guiding our survey are three in number: a pejorative conception of commercialised trades, an implicitly teleological moralism and a politics of moderate oligarchy that is epitomised in the figure of the Spartan King Agesilaos. Based on his surviving works, we can say that Xenophon was one of the most outspoken advocates of the aristocratic anti-banausic outlook. According to his view, manual labour is depreciative because it takes away the bodily strength and intellectual rigour of its practitioner. Leading to deterioration in constitution and contemplative ability, banausic activities function as the touchstone that renders the final verdict on whether someone is potentially suited for philosophical activity or not. His scornful attitude towards commercialised trades, however, also covers the teachers of intellectual advancement who turn their noble calling into a banal economic barter. The stock gibe at the sophistai, namely, that they asked for exorbitant prices for the teaching of intellectual enlightenment about which they, in fact, knew nothing, is as frequently used by Xenophon as it is by Isocrates. Contrary to the sophist commercialism, the intellectual bond between the tutor and pupil can only be one of mutual friendship. A friendship that sees the tutor as the midwife of the knowledge that is tucked away in the pupil’s soul, to utilise one of Plato’s favourite analogies, whose recollection would bring its possessor ever closer to the philosophical ideal of virtuous living. Proposing to sell wisdom, à la sophistai, is not the equivalent of the teaching of it. If anything, the callous offer to sell wisdom to anyone who is willing to pay, regardless of his or her convictions and intrinsic philosophical worth, detracts from the nobility of the endeavour in

2764 “So Xenophon, like many of his class [of leisured landowners], was being trained to be more of an absentee landlord than a hands-on farmer. He was able to discourse at length about the generosity of the soil and about how to manage the workforce, but he left the skilled work to his foreman and labourers, who were all slaves. The land provided him with a good living, allowed him to practice his horsemanship and gave him the opportunity to hunt – these were its main advantages.” Waterfield, Xenophon’s Retreat, pp. 39.

2765 “[Socrates speaking] Now, we agreed that it is impossible to master all branches of knowledge, and we concur with our countries in rejecting the so-called manual crafts, because they seem to ruin people’s bodies and soften their minds.” Xenophon, The Estate-Manager, 6.5-6; for a brief evaluation of this aristocratic topos in the works of Xenophon and Aristotle, see Jennifer Tolbert Roberts, Athens on Trial: The Antidemocratic Tradition in Western Thought, (Princeton, 2011), pp. 86-88.

2766 “The sophists’ intention in lecturing and writing is to deceive others for their own gain; they do no one any good at all. There has never been in the past nor does there exist now a knowledgeable sophist; in fact, they are all perfectly happy to be called sophists, which to a right-thinking man is a term of reproach. My advice, then, is to be wary of the instructions offered by sophists; but not to disregard the considered opinion of philosophers. For whereas sophists hunt wealthy young men, philosophers are prepared to associate with everyone, and they place neither too much nor too little weight on men’s fortunes.” Xenophon, Cynegeticus, 13.7-10; cf. On Hunting, 13.9; Memoirs of Socrates, 2.7.1-7; contra Isocrates, Antidosis, 155-157.
making it appear akin to that of simple street vendors.\textsuperscript{2767} For an activity or instrument to be judged good or bad it needs to be useful for some task for which it was specifically honed.\textsuperscript{2768} And if the only point in enriching one’s wisdom is to sell it piece-by-piece to someone with pockets full and either intellect or willpower dim, then the sophists can be viewed as purveying just another technê, a manual profession like any other, but befool their audience into thinking the opposite.

The criterion of usefulness ranks high in Xenophon’s philosophical writings. A yardstick against which any activity, philosophical or otherwise, can be measured, usefulness of an action forms a philosophical tandem with the use value of material instruments. Any teaching, not excluding philosophy, operates on a plane of teleological calculus with an avowed final benefit to be reaped whose attainment makes the whole enterprise worthy of undertaking. In menial crafts the train of thought follows rather predictable lines: a cobbler produces shoes to be worn using the hide of animals that are needed to be tanned in the tannery, whose hunting falls on the professional hunters that collect the hides without wreaking excessive damage.\textsuperscript{2769} Thus, a natural division of labour permeates the entirety of the contemporary relations of production, whose well-oiled working order is ensured by everyone sticking to what they do best kata phusin. Yet, it is one thing to skin hides and tan them, and something altogether different to cultivate reason which acts in leading capacity over body and soul. The distinction may seem evident to us, but it certainly did not look that way to Xenophon’s Socrates. Positing definite sciences as useful only in so far as they primed the mind to step into the universe of higher paideia,\textsuperscript{2770} Xenophon ordained a hierarchy of usefulness that eventually leads to the most useful knowledge of all: his rendition of Socrates’ philosophy. Geometry is practical only

\textsuperscript{2767} “[Socrates speaking] A man who sells his favours for a price to anyone who wants them is called a catamite; but if anyone forms a love-attachment with someone whom he knows to be truly good, we regard him as perfectly respectable. In just the same way, those who sell wisdom at any price to anyone who wants it are called sophists; but if anyone, by imparting any edifying knowledge that he possesses, makes a friend of one whom he knows to be naturally gifted, we consider that he is behaving as a truly good citizen should behave.” Xenophon, \textit{Memoirs of Socrates}, 1.6.12-13.

\textsuperscript{2768} “Everything is good and fine in so far as it’s well adapted for its purpose, and bad and contemptible in so far as it’s ill adapted.” \textit{Ibid}, 3.8.7-8; cf. 4.6.7-11.

\textsuperscript{2769} “It follows that the same things are assets if one knows how to make use of them, and are not assets if one doesn’t. For instance, pipes are assets in the hands of someone who knows how to play them adequately, but someone who doesn’t might as well have useless stones.” Xenophon, \textit{The Estate-Manager}, 1.6.9.

\textsuperscript{2770} It has recently been argued that the polyphonic qualities of Xenophon’s \textit{Memorabilia} and \textit{Cyropaidia} suffice to confirm that he adopted democratic polity as the only viable constitution to allow philosophical education. Interesting on count of the interpretations it offers on some aspects of the works in question, I fail to find it persuasive that such a revision can be attempted without any discussion of the more oligarchic elements that surface in the context of Xenophon’s other works. By contrast, I purport that a thorough reading of all his surviving treatises show that Xenophon was as much a democratically-inclined thinker as his dramatic Socrates was. Benjamin McCloskey, “Xenophon’s Democratic Pedagogy”, \textit{Phoenix}, vol. 71 no. 3/4, (Fall-Winter, 2017), pp. 230-249.
to a certain extent that it allows its practitioner to measure correctly the area and volume of a
given two-dimensional plane and three-dimensional object respectively. Anything beyond that
is unserviceable abstractionism that robs those interested in it of precious time that could have
been devoted to the learning of more useful things.\textsuperscript{2771} Astronomy, likewise, is expedient in
that it teaches one how to discern seasons of the year, day and night, and the location of
constellations which can be used to triangulate one’s bearings. But move beyond the threshold
of practicality, and you will be side-tracked by delving deeper into a sort of knowledge that
has outlived its usefulness.\textsuperscript{2772} The telos of all intellectual activity is the knowledge of good
and bad, a zenith that is designed to govern all the judgments to be made once the benumbing
freshness of its air is inhaled. As with relations of material production, so with those of
intellectual production. A ladder of hierarchy distinguishes which abstract labour is more
useful than others as well as informing its eternal guardian to kick away any commercially-
mined pretenders who purvey self-styled \textit{mirabilia} and do not teach philosophical
knowledge. Following the natural order of social reality more than suffices to discern which
calling is momentarily more useful in boosting the intellectual capability of the pupil to the
optimal degree so that he or she can finally thread the most illuminating path.

This combination of anti-commercialism and teleological moralism finds its most sublime
exemplar in the Xenophon’s Agesilaos. An interesting choice for a self-proclaimed man of
piety if we account for Agesilaos multiple instances of laying the ancestral laws to sleep for a
day,\textsuperscript{2773} Xenophon posits the supposedly law-abiding monarchy of that king as practically
virtue incarnate. Unlike the democracies and oligarchies established elsewhere, his reasoning
goes, Agesilaos willed his polity though the most turbulent of times owing to his
sheer determination and Socratic understanding of politics as making the ruled better.\textsuperscript{2774} The fact
that the emergence of those political and diplomatic tensions was at least partially
of his own

\textsuperscript{2772} Xenophon, \textit{Memoirs of Socrates}, 4.7.3-5; cf. Cicero, \textit{The Republic}, 1.15-16.
\textsuperscript{2773} Plutarch, \textit{Agesilaos}, 30.4, 31.3-32.5, 34.4-5.
\textsuperscript{2774} “Something else I applaud in Agesilaus is that he did not think that rulers should pride themselves
on their relative wealth or on having a greater number of subjects than the next ruler, but on being better
people and on having better people under them.” Xenophon, \textit{Agesilaus}, 8.4.
\textsuperscript{2775} “In the whole \textit{Hellenica} only thirteen Thebans are named, and the great achievements whereby
Sparta was transformed from a world power to a Peloponnesian wrangler scantly treated. He wholly
omitted the refoundation of Messene which took from Sparta the products of the serf labour that
sustained the military caste, and the foundation of Megalopolis, which became a bastion of
independence from Spartan domination. These were matters too painful to recount.” Rex Warner,
apportion any blemish on the policies that were adopted by the King and his oligarchic retinue. What makes his Agesilaos, and Cyrus of the Anabasis one might add, both *phusikos* rulers was that they always inspired stability and trust even at the most disconcerting of times. And waging desperate wars in dire-straits against overpowering foes certainly qualifies as an archetypical example of hard times. It has been noted, in that vein, that Xenophon’s depiction of the retreating Greek mercenary army in the Anabasis has a certain ‘*polis* on the march’ quality about it. We concur with the analogy but think that it needs to be expanded to cover Agesilaos’ travails. From the death of Cyrus at Cunaxa to their march up to southern Euxine and finally to Phrygia, the fortunes of Xenophon’s Ten Thousand are portrayed as having always been at the mercy of their commanders. When the conciliatory Clearchus and all his fellow generals are butchered to a man, for one, Xenophon steps up to propose a plan and to choose the interim commanders who will see to its being carried out. Likewise, his dramatized offer of the scheme to the rank-and-file soldiers is one through which the panic roaming within the ranks is aptly dispelled. In short, Xenophon is there for his soldiers at all times to correct their faulty rapport with other commanders and show them the way out of any predicament. Leading by a combination of reverence toward the divinities, virtuous deliberation and conduct toward his friends, i.e., the soldiers, and crafty deception against his enemies, the dramatic Xenophon is a larger-than-life character without whose helping hand the soldiers would be hard put not to be decimated. Now, Xenophon was roughly in his late 20s when he participated in Cyrus’ expedition; and if the magnified dramatic role assigned to the young ex-hippeis seems largely surreal, it is because the work is more fiction than fact.

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2776 “Of all the successors of Cyrus the Elder, no Persian was a more natural ruler and none more deserved to rule.” Xenophon, The Expedition of Cyrus, trans. by Robin Waterfield, (Oxford and New York, 2005), 1.9.1; bringing out this quality of his multi-faceted literary output, Azoulay also includes Socrates and Cyrus the Elder in Xenophon’s list of ideal *philanthropoi*, or ‘lovers of humankind,’ whose deeds made them historical models worthy of emulation, Azoulay, Xenophon and the Graces of Power, pp. 10, 192; cf. Xenophon, Memoirs of Socrates, 1.2.60; Xenophon, Agesilaus, 1.22; Xenophon, Cyropaidia, 8.7.25.

2777 “Xenophon’s corpus is traversed by multiple temporalities mixed up and layered over each other, with no other organizing factor than the melancholic quest for a stable power. Disappointed with the present, Xenophon continually looked longingly to other times and places.” Azoulay, Xenophon and the Graces of Power, pp. 277.

2778 Austin and Vidal-Naquet, Economic and Social History of Ancient Greece, pp. 380; Simon Hornblower, “‘This was Decided’ (edoxe tauta): The Army as *polis* in Xenophon’s Anabasis—and Elsewhere’, in The Long March: Xenophon and the Ten Thousand, ed. by Robin Lane Fox, (New Haven, 2004), pp. 243-263; cf. “Socrates was not only a transitional figure himself, but passed this on to his followers, including Xenophon, who came to see the army’s [the Ten Thousand’s] experiences during the retreat from Babylonia as reflecting a general retreat from the supposed certainties of the fifth century to the relativism of the fourth.” Waterfield, Xenophon’s Retreat, pp. 47, 147.


2780 Waterfield, Xenophon’s Retreat, pp. 146.

2781 His half-hearted admission that he might be seen as somewhat wet behind the ears on account of his age when trying to rally the troops clearly functions as a dramatic *topos* that adds a touch of realism into the enthusiastic reception of his pep-talk: Xenophon, The Expedition of Cyrus, 3.1.22-23; for the
The historical Xenophon might have played a significant part in the arduous backtracking following the defeat at Cunaxa, but it is almost certain that he did not became the steady figure of authority that he makes himself to be.

Even for an edified practical philosopher whose ties to the historical Socrates are underscored, the dramatic Xenophon is an idealised persona, a firm bulwark against any sway of the multitude of soldiers to impractical courses of action and a sage of a commander whose perspicacity is peerless. His persona is dramatized because so is the stage on which the action plays out. The dramatic Xenophon is the Aristophanic Sausage-Seller historicised, speaking the same language as of Demos qua the army with a crystal-clear knowledge pertaining to the latter’s needs and the possible courses of addressing them. The other commanders that cajole and compel the army into blind alleys are later day echoes of Paphlagon whose overriding influence needs to be curbed so that the voice of reason emitted by the dramatic Xenophon can be heeded by the soldiers. This transformation of the historical narrative into a dramatic one is rounded off with frequent asides, made in dramatic dialogues by Spartan soldiers and commanders against the Athenians and their polity as well as by the dramatic Xenophon who often digresses to assert personal convictions, that serve as the topoi through which the dramatized action orients itself within Xenophon’s historical universe.

apologetic nature of the entire work with a focus on the fourth chapter, see Azoulay, *Xenophon and the Graces of Power*, pp. 95-97.

2782 Xenophon, *The Expedition of Cyrus*, 3.1.3-7.

2783 The historical Xenophon, on the other hand, was an Athenian oligarch that appears, in all likelihood, to have actively supported the building of the regime of the Thirty Tyrants, which included fighting for them as cavalry, if his fervency began to dim when their reign of terror began. For the ties of historical Xenophon to the Thirty Tyrants, see Matthew A. Sears, *Athens, Thrace, and the Shaping of Athenian Leadership*, (Cambridge, 2013), pp. 113-114; cf. Roberts, *Athens on Trial*, pp. 86; contra Ron Kroeker, “Xenophon as a Critic of the Athenian Democracy”, *History of Political Thought*, vol. 30 no. 2, (Summer 2009), pp. 197-228; for the political flocking of the rank-and-file Athenian hippeis to oligarchic ideals following the Athenian defeat, see Bugh, *The Horsemen of Athens*, pp. 120-153.

2784 “[Xenophon speaking] But now it’s time to put these ideas into practice, because the enemy may appear at any moment. Those of you who think these ideas are sound should ratify them as soon as possible, so that they can become a practical reality. But if anyone, even an ordinary soldier, can think of a better way to go about things than this, let him explain it to us without fear. For our survival is the common concern of all.” Xenophon, *The Expedition of Cyrus*, 3.2.32; this heart-to-heart with the dêmos can be compared to one of dramatic Xenophon’s later rebukes thereof in which he demands their deference to the leaders that they themselves have chosen instead of deigning to take any matter into their own hands: *ibid*, 5.7.29-30.

2785 “Well,” said Chrisiphus [a Spartan mercenary], ’what I’ve heard is that you Athenians are skilled at stealing your public funds, even though the thief runs an enormous risk, and that in fact most of the stealing is done by your best men—that is, if your best men are actually the ones who are chosen for political power. So it’s you who should show us well you were brought up.” *Ibid*, 4.6.20-21.

2786 “But I think you should start by giving some thought to electing generals and company commanders, as quickly as possible, to replace those who have died. I’m sure this would help the army enormously, because without leaders—if I may be permitted a generalization—nothing ever comes out right or good in any sphere, and certainly not in warfare, where, as is generally acknowledged, discipline makes for survival and lack of discipline has often in the past has been responsible for loss of life.” *Ibid*, 3.1.38.
The poetic rendering of the ‘war camp in crisis,’ as such, is a direct allusion to the preconceived shiftiness of democratic politics and the magnified role of the dramatic Xenophon is an embodiment of the aristocratic ideal that a firm counterweigh is needed to even out the inherently disruptive tendencies of the lower-class démos. And if this dramatic interpretation of the historical work appears a bit like an overstretch, then there is the figure of Xenophon’s Agesilaos to bring our point home.

Xenophon’s Agesilaus manifests all the qualities of the dramatic Xenophon of the *Anabasis*. An unflinching respect of laws, a natural aptitude for hoodwinking his enemies and a supra-historical veneration of all his pan-Hellenic friends are some of the core traits of Xenophon’s rendition of his character. An indomitable character to ensure the continuity of an unbroken, albeit heavily battered, line of ancestral kingship, he acts as the Socratic ideal in the flesh in his dealings with all. Naturally, having no daydreams of the Isocratic kind about attempting to purport the Spartan polity as the most democratic of all, Xenophon does not hint at a canvassing of his Agesilaus as a *primus inter pares*. No: Agesilaus is a *princeps tout court*. Never the less, in emphasising his relentless attempts to improve upon the conduct of his socio-political inferiors, he manages to develop a historical character that appears analogous to his dramatic portrayal of himself in the *Anabasis*. Ever at the ready to take the initiative and fill any vacuum of political authority at times like the Cinadon conspiracy of early 390s and the devastating defeat at the battle of Leuctra in 371, Agesilaus is a re-historicised commander of the Ten Thousand who did not let his *polis* to be inundated with the approaching tidal waves of social contempt. Standing at the top of a hierarchical pyramid, he translated his ‘natural’ political superiority into a facilitation of building up intra-and-interclass cohesion even when the rigid class basis of the Spartan polity had crumbled for good following Epaminondas’ liberation of Messenia. All the manual and intellectual variants of the natural division of labour lead, therefore, in the end, to an oligarchic polity that is strictly divided along class lines, with the inferiors looking up to their socio-political betters for regimentation, protection and supervision. Sacred as they are, even the oldest of supposedly

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2788 *Ibid*, 1.17; this knack for deception can be compared to Cyrus’ similar aptitude as displayed by his shamefaced concealing from his mercenary troops that they are moving against the Great King and not against some unimportant adversary: Xenophon, *The Expedition of Cyrus*, 1.3.1–6.
2790 “Both the country and the lineage of Agesilaus also merit joint acclaim because the community never let envy of his ancestors lead them to attempt to put an end to their rule and the kings never lusted after more power than they originally received at their accession. That is why, as is apparent, no other government – whether it was a democracy, an oligarchy, a tyranny or a kingship – has enjoyed unbroken continuity, while this one alone, his ancestral kinship, has had a continuous existence.” *Ibid*, 1.4.
2791 Xenophon, *Hellenica*, 3.3.3.4.
ancestral *nomoi* can be bend to serve the political purposes of the King, whose reign is deemed *phusikos* for his steadfast safekeeping of the Spartan class divisions.

No less subtle and infinitely harder to uncover than Xenophon’s oligarchic leanings is the anti-democratic philosophical standpoint of Antisthenes. We do not know if a virtue can be made of the necessity of relying heavily on Diogenes Laertius later compendium of testimonia, but if there is any substance to that work then Antisthenes would clearly appear as a philosopher who aimed to build a community of few good men that were to stand up to the impositions of the uncouth and uneducated *demos*. An obtuse Manicheism that engulfs the social world into the erudite and virtuous few, and feeble-minded and evil multitude may be seen politically harmless in and of itself.2793 Indeed, a projection onto the first centuries of the spread of Christianity could allow one to see a certain moralistic affinity between Antisthenes and Stylists. Yet, when coupled to a teaching that “the wise man will conduct his duties as a citizen not in accordance with the established laws, but according to the laws of virtue,”2794 there seems to be more to the Cynic creed than a simple moralism would suggest. On that note, the apocryphal letters might not convey a sense of wholehearted reliability but they are clearly suggestive of how the tradition saw the first Cynic as a choosy converser who “would talk only to those whom he knew about nature, reason, and truth, but avoided other people, having no time for beasts and children, who … cannot understand the words of a Cynic.”2795 Naturally, we do not know to what extent Antisthenes subscribed to the oligarchic politics of the Athens of his day. All we can say, in that vein, is that the surviving evidence of his teachings clearly discourage any attempt to portray Antisthenes as a democratically-inclined philosopher, rather indicating a firm distance between the Cynic and the democratic politics of Athens from 445-365.

With respect to the third thread of our survey of the three moralists, the first thing to note is a clear disclaimer: there was no well-defined distinction between the public and private realms in the classical Greek world. There was, instead, an overarching public space that enveloped almost every sphere of social existence with the signal exception of cults and respectable upper-class women’s zones of control in their domicile. Then again, even those spheres were in full communication with the norms and conventions that were produced and reproduced publicly. Alcibiades’ alleged defamation of the Eleusinian Mysteries was shocking for it dared to uncover the secrets of a self-enclosed public creed that promised spiritual benefits to those

2793 “It is better to fight with a few good men against all who are bad than to fight with a multitude of bad men against a few who are good.” Diogenes Laertius, 6.11.
2794 Ibid, 6.10.
2795 28, *Diogenes the Dog to the so-called Greeks, a plague on you’, in Diogenes the Cynic."
who had managed to persevere through their prescribed rites of passage. The sensibilities that were injured in the act were private ones only in so far as the Mysteries were a publicly well-recognised closed sect of faith. In a similar vein, the upper-class women that lived out their lives mostly within the confines of women’s quarters of their abodes did not lead out a monastic existence but a largely all-female one with their children, maidservants, familial relations and so on. In short, if any private sphere assigned to spirituality or ‘the second sex’ existed in the classical *poleis*, then that should be conceived more along the lines of socially exclusive publicity. With our three moralists, however, the notion of politico-religious salvation seems to speak, at least in the instances of Xenophon and Antisthenes, to a sharp sense of divide between the two realms.

The idea of salvation espoused by Isocrates the speechwriter is one that is political to the brim. Now, Isocrates had a fundamental understanding of the socio-economic problems that were ripping apart the contemporary social reality of his day. Greek *poleis* at each other’s throats, a rising tide of vagabond mercenaries that threatened to ‘de-stabilise,’ i.e., destroy the upper-class domination over relations of production, whole polities and political revolutions that followed one another in quick succession were all disheartening parts of a social reality that appeared even shiftier than it was for most of the fifth century. To that end, he knew that all those issues were intertwined as the socio-economically subjugated lower classes of the mainland Greek *poleis* began to find their calling in being soldiers of fortune in ever-soaring numbers. With the rise in their numbers materialised an effective but dear political recourse for tyrants, oligarchs as well as democratically-governed [*politai*] who could hire those mercenary armies in order to eliminate rivals, secure social consolidation or initiate political revolutions. With the fire of revolution rekindled in the oxygen-rich atmosphere of large-scale socio-economic disgruntlement, what little semblance of political stability remained would vanish into thin air, signalling that a turn towards the radical forms of government, e.g., the Thirty Tyrants, could indeed be in the reckoning. The prognosis followed hard on the heels of diagnosis. An oligarch with no delusions to spare with respect to the socio-economic basis of his class’s political hegemony, no land redistribution, equalising taxing scheme or social

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2796 “For who would desire a condition of things where pirates command the seas and mercenaries occupy our cities; where fellow-countrymen, instead of waging war in defence of their territories against strangers, are fighting within their own walls against each other; where more cities have been captured in war than before we made peace; and where revolutions follow so thickly upon each other that those who are at home in their own countries are more dejected than those who have been punished with exile?” Isocrates, *Panegyricus*, 115-117; van Wees argues, on the contrary, that Isocrates had a tendency to exaggerate since no wholehearted replacement of the citizen armies by mercenary troops took place until the end of the classical age. Van Wees, ‘The City at War’, pp. 88; *contra* Harvey F. Miller, “The Practical and Economic Background to the Greek Mercenary Explosion”, *Greece and Rome*, vol. 31 no. 2, (1984), pp. 153–60; Trundle, *Greek Mercenaries*, pp. 46.
reform crossed Isocrates’ mind as a desirable remedy that could be adopted in response to the problems he was grappling with. What was to be done when thousands of armed and dangerous mercenaries were on the move to find their new paymaster? Why, to give them a holy cause to kill and be killed in the name of, swelling their ranks with non-mercenary thêtes who were beginning to fall out of the economic loop of course! And to whom else but the Persians could one turn to for the sake of filling the coffers of holiness with blood and gold in equal measure? The extortive and exploitative freedom of the Greek upper classes could only be ensured if the Persians were to be enslaved under the cruel yoke of phusis.

The root cause of the problem of mercenary armies, or the ‘common enemies of mankind’ as he would put it, was their lack of any landholdings whence would accrue a steady source of income to them. In the light of the fact that the carrying capacity of most of the Greek land had been reached by the second half of the fifth century, no public grants of unoccupied lands could be made to the unpropertied lower classes in the fourth century. Settling the mercenaries elsewhere, therefore, was a requisite measure to be endorsed if the mercenary boom was to abate without tinkering with the aristocratic social equilibrium. Bread-and-butter considerations dictated, thus, as always, the course that the ideology of sacred war and sacred profits was to take against a supposedly ancestral foe. To that effect, Isocrates vilified the Persians as the natural inferiors of the Greeks, servile and pusillanimous in equal measure, whose lands and wealth, in addition to those of any other ‘barbarians,’ were

2797 Isocrates, On the Peace, 46–47; cf. Ps. Xenophon, Constitution of the Athenians, 1.5; Waterfield, Xenophon’s Retreat, pp. 81.
2798 Lin Foxhall’s and Robin Osborne’s independent studies of landholding in Athens have purported that while 7.5-9% of the politai owned some 30-35% of the land of Attica, some 20% of the citizens had little to no landholdings. Needless to add, these figures offer virtually nothing about the ownership structure of the more productive land, whose almost certain skewedness, as we observed in the previous chapters, leaves a lot to be desired in the starry-eyed conclusion of Morris: “the basic point is clear: landholding was unusually egalitarian in Classical Athens.” Ian Morris, ‘Archaeology as a Kind of Anthropology (A Response to David Small)’, in Democracy 2500? Questions and Challenges, ed. by Ian Morris and Kurt A. Raaflaub, (Dubuque, IA., 1998), pp. 236; Foxhall, ‘Access to Resources in Classical Greece: The Egalitarianism of the Polis in Practice’, pp. 209–220; Robin Osborne, ‘Is it a Farm? The Definition of Agricultural Sites and Settlements in Ancient Greece’, in Agriculture in Ancient Greece, ed. by Berit Wells, (Stockholm, 1992), pp. 22–27; cf. Ober, The Rise and Fall of Classical Greece, pp. 91.

2799 «The fourth century BC became an age of specialization and of professionalization in war. Both year-round warfare and specialist forces opened new avenues of service for mercenaries. The literary sources recorded a boom in the number of Greek mercenaries in this period and this has been called the Greek mercenary explosion of the fourth century BC …” Trundle, Greek Mercenaries, pp. 7; Ober, The Rise and Fall of Classical Greece, pp. 226; for Isocrates’ scornful depiction of the mercenaries as planomenoi, i.e., ‘roamers,’ and its socio-political implications, see ibid, pp. 111; Paul McKechnie, Outsiders in the Greek Cities in the Fourth Century BC, (London and New York, 1989), pp. 90.

2800 Isocrates, Panegyricus, 150-151.

2801 «And, mark you [the Athenian dēmos], it will be possible for us to cut off from the region of Thrace enough land so that we shall not only have abundance ourselves but shall also be able to furnish adequate
practically theirs for the taking. The motley Ten Thousand of Xenophon had ‘demonstrated’ that even a haphazardly built Greek force with no civic loyalties or moral ideals driving it was capable of bringing the Achaemenid reign to an abrupt end. Isocrates offered to patch those tears with the ideologies of re-establishing the internal concord of the mainland poleis and bringing the war to their doorstep of their natural enemy. The Greeks were to mend the political fences that divided the social classes via their forming up a phalanx, whose specifics were rather unimportant. Athens, or the ‘school of all Hellenes,’ was initially picked to lead the united force in a holy war against the barbarians whose resources would be appropriated so that the material basis of the domination of the upper classes at home could be cemented.

And when Athens failed to marshal the divine mission that was preordained for her, then the honour to serve as the handmaiden of necessity was conferred on otherwise the least likely candidate: Philip of Macedon. Necessitas non habet legem. The king who had wrenched away the prized Amphipolis from the Athenians through force and intrigue was thence transformed into the most likely saviour of all Greeks. There is no contradiction in the sway from one pole of the pendulum to the other: what mattered most was to unite all the Greeks against the Persians. And since the Athenians evidenced to be ill-fitting candidates, it was only natural for Isocrates to turn to their bête noire. Branded as the mother of all evils, the wide-spread poverty swamping the mainland poleis was to be rectified through the attainment of a spirit of concord. That harmony in unity would be employed, in its turn, to bring down the inferior barbarians whose opulence would be taken over by the Greeks who were naturally more qualified to possess such riches.

means of subsistence to those of the Hellenes who are in need and, because of their poverty, are now wandering from place to place.” Isocrates, *On the Peace*, 24.

2802 “Every one agrees that these [who took the field with Cyrus and Clearchus] was as complete a victory in battle over all the forces of the King as if they had come to blows with their womenfolk, but that at the very moment when they seemed to be masters of the field they failed of success, owing to the impetuosity of Cyrus.” Isocrates, *To Philip*, 90-91; cf. *Panegyricus*, 145; for a recent reading of the nuanced part that the Ten Thousand played in the formation of Isocrates’ idea of pan-Hellenic campaign as the panacea of all social evils, see Azoulay, *Xenophon and the Graces of Power*, pp. 115-116.

2803 Cf. “[Socrates speaking] Then when Greek fights barbarian or barbarian Greek we shall say they are at war and are natural enemies, and that their quarrel is properly called a ‘war’; but when Greek fights Greek we shall say that they are naturally friends, but that Greece is sick and torn by faction, and that the quarrel should be called ‘civil strife’.” Plato, *Republic*, 470c4-10.


2805 Isocrates, *To Philip*, 122-123; *Panathenaicus*, 77-78.

2806 “In truth, however, it will be found that I turned to Athens first of all and endeavoured to win her over to this cause with all the earnestness of which my nature is capable, but when I perceived that she cared less for what I said than for the ravings of the platform orators, I gave her up, although I did not abandon my efforts.” *Ibid*, 129-130.

2807 “What I have to say on these points is simple and easy: It is not possible for us to cement on enduring peace unless we join together in a war against the barbarians, not for the Hellenes to attain to concord until we wrest our material advantages from one and the same source and wage our wars against one and the same enemy. When these conditions have been realised, and when we have been freed from the poverty which afflicts our lives – a thing that breaks up friendships, perverts the affections of kindred
This permanent cure to the social strife that was besetting all the mainland poleis of his day was further reinforced with Isocrates’ naturalist ideology of just war.\footnote{2808} Claiming that the contemporary enmity that was felt toward the Persians had ancient roots that could be traced back to Homer’s depiction of Troy’s conquest,\footnote{2809} Isocrates evinced that the political and material profits that were to be reaped from an anti-Persian war would be equally sacred.\footnote{2810} Politically a successful all-out offensive against Persia would prove the natural superiority of the Greek communities by uniting all Asia under their own aegis. And economically, the lands and riches of the Persians would be used to alleviate the permanent suffering of the Greek lower classes. He may have rhetorically contrasted mortal wealth and immortal fame in his speech addressed to Philip,\footnote{2811} but Isocrates knew full well that economic benefits of the expedition far outweighed the possible satisfaction of any ideological pretexts such as the redressing of the old injuries committed by the Persians more than a century and a quarter ago to the Athenians. Branding the Persians as natural inferiors to the Greeks, thus, functioned as the vindication for canvassing the arbitrary subjugation of the Achaemenid Empire as a return to the natural order of things.

Having been a hippeis turned mercenary against Persia, Xenophon would fit in well with the Isocratic ideal even had he not written the Anabasis. But as the author of the most influential first-hand account of the expedition of the Ten Thousand, he sore to the rank of a literary idol that was to be kept close at hand, as we saw above, for the speechwriter.\footnote{2812} Xenophon had no sympathy to share with the Medes. His account of the travails of the mercenary army is crisscrossed with disparaging remarks that are, at times, voiced even by Cyrus himself.\footnote{2813} Snowballing into a picture of the archetypical Persian as a soft, unendurable, glamorous showpiece of a soldier,\footnote{2814} Xenophon appears to have signed and sealed all the stereotypes by into enmity, and plunges the whole war and strife – then surely we shall enjoy a spirit of concord, and the good will which we shall feel towards each other will be genuine.” Isocrates, Panegyricus, 173-174.\footnote{2808} “… second only to the war which we carry on in alliance with all mankind against the savagery of the beasts, that war is the most necessary and the most righteous which we wage in alliance with the Hellenes against the barbarians, who are by nature our foes and are eternally plotting against us.” Isocrates, Panathenaicus, in Isocrates II, 163.\footnote{2809} Isocrates, Panegyricus, 159.\footnote{2810} “For this war is the only war which is better than peace; it will be more like a sacred mission than a military expedition; and it will profit equally both those who crave the quiet life and those who are eager for war; for it will enable the former to reap the fruits of their own possessions in security and the latter to win great wealth from the possessions of our foes.” Ibid, 182.\footnote{2811} Isocrates, To Philip, 134-135.\footnote{2812} And not only for Isocrates we might add. From Gorgias to Lysias, the foremost orators of the time spoke in a similar vein that pitted the battle-hardened virtuous Greeks against the delicate Persians: Morris and Powell, The Greeks, pp. 428; Waterfield, Xenophon’s Retreat, pp. 206.\footnote{2813} “[Cyrus speaking] The enemy army is vast and as they advance they will raise a terrific clamour. As long as you are not put off by this—well, as for the rest, I feel ashamed when I think how feeble you will find the people of this land of mine to be.” Xenophon, Anabasis, 1.7.4.\footnote{2814} Ibid, 3.1.20-22, 3.2.25-26.
the authority of his personal experiences to be entrusted to Isocrates’ safekeeping. The crusader mentality that was adopted by the speechwriter, however, does not seem to have spoken to any similar sentiment shared by Xenophon. Philosophically more nuanced than Isocrates despite having had his share of blood and glory, Xenophon strikes one as having purveyed a personal road of moral freedom that did not have anything to do with holy wars and massacres. Having experienced the watershed of nomoi in two bouts of oligarchic rule in 411 and 404, as well as having played a part in the second episode’s making, Xenophon rendition of Socrates’ philosophy cries a higher calling that can be answered only by the odd mixture of being in the world but not of the world. Socrates was the perfect example, at least to Xenophon’s eyes, that nomos could be turned into a political noose through which the heads of even the most advanced philosophical minds of the time could have been compelled to put.

If Socrates’ execution-cum-suicide was a rich manifestation of the truth of the timeless dictum that “Ye cannot serve God and mammon,” then the alternative was the philosophical mélange of the teaching of a practical logos and teleological moralism that ultimately led to a philosophy of salvation within. Climaxing ultimately in the philosophical terminus of self-knowledge, the contemplative life of the sage was one of a self-reflexive paideia whereby the community that was comprised of him and his interlocutors, young and old alike, intellectually grew through the ties of loving friendship. Divided into three stages, the quest after self-knowledge tasked each participant with a set of introvertive questioning that was to be initiated by the sage who, then, would step away to observe if the seeds of philosophical doubt that had been sown in his or her interlocutor would take root. Beginning with a meticulous analysis of the customary paideia itself that would never be completed in full, leading, then, to an unsettling confrontation with some of its foremost adherents and, ultimately, to a self-effacing certainty that was spiritualised in the personal to daimonion, the road to self-knowledge was beset with constant temptations and difficulties. The accustomed Athenian paideia of 420s and 410s, which are when most of Xenophon’s and Plato’s Socratic dialogues take place, was one that was burned to a cinder largely by a combination of the material benefits of the arkhê and the relentless efforts of the sophists. Assuredly, Protagoras had already realised an epistemological rupture in regard to the conception of paideia by the 430s. With the later sophists that rupture was carried to its historical acme as the rhetorical, ethical and political shifts gave way to a type of moral relativism that sought to anchor itself to everlasting maxims for a measure of stability. The flux and insecurity that was ushered into the politics of the

2815 Matthew, (6:24).
archê with Nicias’ phoney peace, the Sicilian expedition and two oligarchic coups also exacerbated that philosophical sense of vacillation.

Hoping to have a secure footing in that rocking and leaky boat of contemporary morality was Xenophon’s Socrates who devoted his life to an unending criticism of some of the most accustomed pillars of the sophistic paideia. His scrupulous scrutiny of the contemporary mores began with a denunciation of the sophistic educational catchphrases as often defunct and almost always hollow. Growing in parallel with the early aporic dialogues of Plato, Xenophon’s sketch of Socrates’ trial and defence, not to mention other fragments of his teachings, demonstrate a philosopher who did not hesitate to admit his lifelong critical inquiry into the sophistic paideia and its principal shortcomings. The first step in the long road to self-knowledge, therefore, was a critical analysis of the contemporary nomoi. Having excelled at that quest of critical social inquiry, the philosopher became a self-entitled expert of contemporary paideia, ready to put the knowledge he had garnered to test. To reiterate, the achievement of that grade of expertise did not spell the consummation of the quest of self-knowledge but merely its beginning, allowing the philosopher to share his autodidactically conceived doubts and conclusions within the foremost philosophical circles of his day.

The subsequent face-to-face encounters between the philosopher and other self-proclaimed experts on social affairs served as the spring-board whence a leap from a personal to a communally-sanctioned expertise could be made. Socrates’ dialogues with Antiphon on the subject of material gains derived from the teaching of philosophy or those that feature him and Hippias on the question of the existence of natural laws are examples of a novel understanding of paideia wherein the supposed expert is taken to task for his unaccounted

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2816 We do not know, in that vein, whether the more outspoken Socrates of Xenophon or the more subtle Socrates of Plato is to be preferred as a historically more accurate depiction. Chances are, the jury will always be out on that subject. Still, Guthrie’s point to the effect that a non-sceptical reading of both accounts can be warranted on the grounds of the inherent complexity of the figure’s philosophical views still seems to hold water: “He [Socrates] was a complex character, who did not and could not reveal every side of himself equally to all his acquaintances, since by reason of their own intellectual powers and inclinations they were not all equally capable of observing and appreciating them. If, then, the accounts of, say, Plato and Xenophon seem to present a different type of man, the chances are that each by itself is not so much wrong as incomplete, that it tends to exaggerate certain genuine traits and minimize others equally genuine, and that to get an idea of the whole man we must regard them as complementary.” W. K. C. Guthrie, Socrates, (Cambridge, 1971), pp. 9.

2817 “I admit it,” said Socrates, ‘at least where education is concerned; people know that I have made a special study of the matter. But when health is at stake, people listen to doctors rather than their parents, and when the Assembly meets, all Athenians listen, as you know, to those speaking the best sense rather than to their relatives. Don’t you, after all, elect as military commanders – in preference to your fathers, in preference to your brothers, and yes, even in preference to yourselves – those who you think know the most about military matters?” Xenophon, Socrates’ Defence, 20.

2818 Xenophon, Memoirs of Socrates, 1.6.

2819 Ibid, 4.4.
preconceptions and unjustified convictions. Digging ever deeper into the philosophical chasm between doxa and episteme, Socrates chides and charms his expert interlocutors just as Xenophon did in the portrayal of the philosopher at work in his turn. Designating episteme as knowledge that can render full account of the minute twists and turns in its conception, the philosopher laid bare the exposed flanks of his interlocutor’s arguments through a double-hermeneutic that is driven forward by the accumulation of all the aporoi. Unintelligible at first, the back-and-forth of reciprocal ratiocination, then, slowly begins to form itself into a recognisable constellation, though the proceedings are still raw and are, as such, merely hinted at. These constellations indicate the philosophical nodal points of Socrates’ thought, excavating a more comprehensive picture than was possible at the first stage of the attainment of self-knowledge. Working against the reductionism of the old Milesian natural philosophers and that of the contemporary sophists with their stock forays into the relativism of nomoi, Xenophon’s Socrates evinced that any human’s control over his or her environment was still far from being complete despite all the notable technological advancements. The celebration of human domination over nature, originating from sophistic as well as dramatic sources, therefore, was deemed premature given that no philosophical probe had been made beneath the appearances in either the material or social world.

Beneath the world of appearances lay a governing mechanism controlling the natural world as much as the decisions we make. Every judgment that is made belongs, on this view, to the province of reason, presiding over any particular strand of decision-making. Combined with his previously highlighted denial of akrasia, this emphasis on reason brings around a conception of philosophical knowledge as one that is directly related to the development of the reasoning capability. With no quarter given to any excuses of enfeebled willpower, every decision made at every second of our lives is brought back, no matter how small or seemingly insignificant, under the purview of reason. Every critical and circumspect step along the philosophical road, thus, involves the accomplishment of a more profound understanding of self-knowledge. And as self-knowledge increases, involuntary servitude to nomoi recedes, eventually unto oblivion. One of the major constellations within the philosophy of Xenophon’s Socrates is thus the notion that the learning of the intricacies of reason frees one from the

\(^\text{2820}\) Instead of contradicting this point, Xenophon’s frequent interjections to clear the air at the end of the dialogue to hold the hand of the reader in drawing the ‘right’ conclusion should be taken as an indirect confirmation. One is always hard put to find philosophical definitions that are voiced by Socrates; and if we are to stay true to the Platonic depiction of elenchus, Xenophon’s interjections should be taken largely as inadvertent extrapolations. Ibid, 4.4.25, 4.3.13, 4.6.11.

\(^\text{2821}\) For the sophists’ take on the technological developments and their social ramifications, see W. K. C. Guthrie, The Sophists, (Cambridge, 1971), pp. 79-84.

\(^\text{2822}\) Xenophon, Memoirs of Socrates, 4.2.24-29; cf. Plato, Alcibiades I.
slavish tethers of ignorance that are otherwise imposed on him.\textsuperscript{2823} Exposing the sophistic rumination for what it actually was, i.e., a rhetorical substitution of the erstwhile natural determinism with a relativist one that was equally ignorant of its roots, Socrates, then, levelled his criticisms at nomos itself, usually the main conditioning element of the society of the fourth-century Athens.

At the final rung of the ladder of this self-critical revolution in philosophy was the fulfilment of the promise of self-knowledge. Fully recognising, or nomizein,\textsuperscript{2824} that nomos of the contemporary society can indeed be bankrupt in regard to many of its customarily acknowledged pronouncements, Socrates’ self-knowledge allows him to reconceive the entirety of the social relations through taking aid of the philosophical constellations that he had earlier induced. From sophists’ modified conception of the traditional paideia to the worship of divinities, nothing escaped from that tide of philosophical subversion that managed to fill the inferential vacuum it created with the cultivated reasoning capability at all times. As Xenophon’s Socrates took the bull of contemporary reality by the horns, he needed to resort to a higher spirituality that would vindicate his trenchant attack on nomoi. To daimonion,\textsuperscript{2825} or the ‘divine,’ hence, is the deification of the subversive reasoning capacity that invited the community of thinkers to seek their salvation not in the dictates of contemporary nomoi but in those of plusikos logos, i.e., the reason in accord with nature. By recalling the divine to his aid, Socrates was fusing his creative reinterpretation of nomos as one of conservative devotion in lieu of oligarchic subversion. Oneiromancers use dreams to project the future, whereas ornithomancers read omens from the flight patterns of birds. And if forecasting anything on the basis of unreal simulations of mind or physical movements of irrational creatures was not regarded as sacrilegious, then, neither could lending of an ear to the voice of the divine who accompanied only those that have achieved a high degree of self-knowledge.\textsuperscript{2826} With the completion of the forging of the philosophical link between the politics of aristocratic subversion and a conception of rational mind as the natural governor of the whole physical and social reality, Xenophon’s Socrates turned into a divine messenger. Unfortunately, his divine inspiration did not assuage when the worst atrocities committed by the Thirty Tyrants

\textsuperscript{2823} Xenophon, \textit{The Estate-Manager}, 1.16-23; cf. Plato, \textit{Hippias Minor}, 376a6-7, b5-6.

\textsuperscript{2824} Incidentally, that word also signifies someone’s not ‘duly recognising’ the city’s gods and goddesses, which pertains, of course, to Socrates’ indictment. Cartledge, \textit{Democracy}, pp. 177.

\textsuperscript{2825} The relevant passages in Xenophon’s corpus are the following: Xenophon, \textit{Socrates’ Defence}, 12-13; \textit{Memories of Socrates}, 1.1.2-5, 4.3.12-13, 4.8.1, 4.8.5-6, 4.8.11; \textit{Dinner-Party}, 8.5.

\textsuperscript{2826} “[Socrates speaking] But whereas others state that it is birds and utterances and chance meetings and oracles which forewarn them, I call it divine, and I think that in using this description I am being both more accurate and more devout than those who ascribe the power of the gods to birds. Furthermore, I have evidence to show that I am not attributing things falsely to God: I have often told friends what God has advised and I have never been found to be wrong.” Xenophon, \textit{Socrates’ Defence}, 12-13.
were still lingering in the Athenian air, with some of his close associates having played significant parts in the making of the reign of terror. The price that was to be paid for having purveyed his moral salvation with its clear political implications was his drinking of hemlock, showing, once and for all, that for the lower-class dēmos even nomos in considerable flux was better than no nomos, i.e., aristocratic prerogative, regardless of whose divine authority it evoked.

Xenophon’s politico-religious conception salvation also appear to have spoken to the moral priorities of the first Cynics. Prefiguring the later Epicurean notion of ataraxia as a Socratic model to be emulated, Antisthenes and Diogenes stipulated a thorough repudiation of contemporary nomos which was evinced by the latter’s maxim paracharettein to nomisma, ‘deface the currency/mores.’ 2827 There are three dimensions to this rejection of contemporary nomos: an ascetic worldview, a cosmopolitan construal of a community of amoralists and an inversion of the social hierarchy that stems from the inner convictions. 2828 Contrary to the understanding of askesis displayed by some of the sophists, the concept was a basic building block of the Cynic morality. Making up the first stage of rejection of the contemporary nomos, it was practical and dramatic in equal parts. Practical because it showed that Cynics did not spew dishonest gibberish while they gorged themselves at the tables of aristocratic beneficiaries. 2829 A trenchant devotion to askesis was also serviceable as it always emitted a shock effect, discomforting the most habitudinal of daily observances and poking holes at the contemporary ideals that wed virtue and opulence. 2830 Consigning any desirable external factors to the dust heap of useless conventions pecking at the Socratic fortitude of the philosopher, the early Cynics dismissed the material boons of living in a society as they saw any formation of a relationship that was prerequisite for drawing those benefits as unnatural limitations that needed to be broken free from. Provided that the easiest course of disfiguring the nomisma was to reject its most conspicuous godsend, e.g., a slave 2831 or a cup to drink

2828 In conceiving these three dimensions, I partially drew from Moles’ three Cynic ‘states.’ The first state is centred around the virtue of the self-sufficient individual, whereas the second and third, respectively, are the building of a Cynic community and an “elastic and an ever-expanding state.” J. L. Moles, “The Cynics and Politics”, in Justice and Generosity: Studies in Hellenistic Social and Political Philosophy, ed. by A. Laks and Malcolm Schofield, (Cambridge, 1995), pp. 141-142.
2830 “It was in this way too that Diogenes used to praise his master Antisthenes, as though he were reviling him; ‘This man’, he said, ‘turned me from a rich man into a beggar, and made me live in a storage-jar rather than a spacious house.’ This was better expressed than if he had said, ‘I am grateful to him because he turned me into a philosopher and a man of consummate virtue.” Macrobius, Saturnalia, 7.3.21.
2831 Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Eminent Philosophers, 6.55; Stobaeus, 4.19.47; Aelian, Historical Miscellany, 13.28.
Antisthenes and Diogenes were living illustrations of the idea that there was nothing contradictory in being philosophically rich without having a single obol. The moral of the story of their lives was not that the sage could be a bare-footed beggar, but that he or she must be one in order to make physical discomfort and spiritual ataraxia his home without needing anything else. Being the most forceful of necessities, poverty and constant hardship gave the candidate the harsh schooling in Cynic virtue which shone brighter as it distanced itself further from the material comforts. Claiming that the despising of riches, reputation and pleasure was the key to overcoming their opposites, the early Cynics drew from their common denunciation of social comforts an idealised community of sages who did not need any external benefits to facilitate their quest after virtue.

The dismissal of material and social boons was the stepping stone on which the amoralist community of the early Cynics gathered. Having grasped the fundamentals of the ‘shortcut to virtue’ by their shunning of each device and custom that they were not in absolute need of, Antisthenes and his followers flocked into a community of the unprivileged who had nothing but scorn for all the show and pomp of contemporary society. Holding virtue to be teachable, as we observed above, their community of the wise offered the prospective candidates as well as the Cynics themselves constant opportunities to undertake their training in virtue. Sweeping all the elements of the contemporary paideia aside, including the recital of Homeric epics and anything about the natural sciences, the early Cynics focused their teaching on living in full harmony with nature. Provided that phusis venerated hardship in addition to incessant mental and physical exertion, they pruned every outgrowth related to pleasure so that they could re-stamp the remaining trunk of morality as phusikos. To them, Heracles and Socrates were the philosophical ideals to strive for, ever invulnerable to the vicissitudes of fortune and zealous in their unquenchable thirst after the truth beyond the conventional values. A perpetual scorn and calmness combined, in that sense, in the soul of the early Cynics who had no obeisance to show to tyrants and no time to lose for groans and moans for the simple

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2832 Jerome, Against Jovinian, 2.14; Gnomologium Vaticanum, 185; Simplicius, Commentary on the ‘Encheiridion’ of Epictetus, 32.
2833 Gnomologium Vaticanum, 182.
2834 “Diogenes said that poverty aids us to philosophy of its own accord, for what philosophy attempts to persuade us by means of arguments, poverty compels us to in very deed.” Stobaeus, 4.32.11.
2835 Codes Ambrosianus Graecus, 409.
2836 Stobaeus, 4.29.19.
2838 A geometer accused Diogenes of being uncultivated and ignorant. ‘You’ll have to forgive me’, he replied, ‘for not having learned what Cheiron never taught Achilles.’ Stobaeus, 3.31.118.
2839 Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Eminent Philosophers, 6.39; Tertullian, To the Nations, 2.2.
2841 Some also ascribe the following story to him; on seeing him washing vegetables, Plato came up to him and quietly remarked, ‘If you paid court to Dionysios [the tyrant of Sicily], you wouldn’t need to
gathering of the riches of the world of illusions. Volunteering to abide only by the naturalism of the most imminent kind without any pretences or embellishments, the Cynic community thus functioned as an uncompromising corrective against every customary notion and practice, emphasising the natural freedom of the unaffiliated sage instead of growing rich on other persons’ alms.\textsuperscript{2842} A modicum of food and sex sufficed to keep the Cynic well-prepared for anything that the \textit{Tuche} deigned to throw at him or her. And the community of beggar-sages were the perfect place to start for anyone who was looking for a place to shed his or her travails to instantiate a return to the unadorned \textit{phusis}.

The third, and final, dimension to the Cynic denial of contemporary \textit{nomos} was the philosophical enactment of a personal plane of freedom that provided the most natural existence to all its participants. The fulfilment of the conditions of the Cynic \textit{paideia} set free the aspiring candidate from all the conventional bonds of society, seasoning his or her achievement of mental and physical detachment with a measure of tranquillity. This measure of \textit{ataraxia} grew hand in hand with the naturalisation of the inversion of all the relationships that were perceived strictly as \textit{kata nomon}. The Cynic could be intent on hounding the conventional roles that were ascribed to, for example, master and slave\textsuperscript{2843} or the tyrant and his subject,\textsuperscript{2844} but he could do naught but chide a young man who somehow seemed to cross the hollow threshold of heterosexuality with the most commonplace pep-talk of acting contrary to nature.\textsuperscript{2845} In any event, \textit{phusis} was to be the sole guide of the naturalistic bliss that was to be on offer by the Cynic ideal. It does not take, contrary to what has recently been argued,\textsuperscript{2846} to adopt a Heideggerian position in condensing the Cynic \textit{phusis} into being in order

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\item be washing vegetables’, to which he replied in the same calm tone, ‘Yes, and if you washed vegetables, you wouldn’t need to be paying court to Dionysios.” \textit{Ibid}, 6.58.
\item \textsuperscript{2842} “Tell me, my friend, when Diogenes was exiled to Athens, or when he was sold by the pirates and came to Corinth, was there anyone else in those days who showed greater frankness of speech than Diogenes? Well then? Or was there anyone else among the men of that time who was freer than Diogenes? Than this man who governed Xeniades, who had purchased him, as a master governs his slave?” Musonius Rufus, 9, pp. 49, 3-9.
\item \textsuperscript{2843} “It was in this way that Diogenes was set free by Antisthenes, such that he said thereafter that he could never be enslaved by anyone. So how did he react when he was captured; how did he behave towards the pirates? He didn’t call any of them master, did he? And here I’m not speaking of the name, because it isn’t the word that I fear, but the state of mind expressed in the use of the name. … And think how he conducted himself when he was offered up for sale! Did he look for a master? No, but for a slave.” Epictetus, \textit{Discourses}, in \textit{Discourses, Fragments, Handbook}, trans. by Robin Hard, (Oxford and New York, 2014), 4.1.114-116.
\item \textsuperscript{2844} Plutarch, \textit{Timoleon}, 15; Plutarch, \textit{On Whether and Old Man should Engage in Affairs of State}, 1.783cd; Diogenes Laertius, \textit{Lives of the Eminent Philosophers}, 6.50
\item \textsuperscript{2845} “One day he saw a young man behaving in an effeminate manner. ‘Aren’t you ashamed’, he said, ‘that you should have worse intentions for yourself than nature had? For nature made you a man, and yet here you are, forcing yourself to become a woman.” Diogenes Laertius, \textit{Lives of the Eminent Philosophers}, 6.65.
\item \textsuperscript{2846} Gideon Baker, “Cynical Cosmopolitanism”, \textit{Theory & Event}, vol. 21 no. 3, (July 2018), pp. 607-626.
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to evince that the cosmopolitan moralism of Cynics informed a complete refutation of the politics of *polis*. Anyone would find it difficult to reconstruct an internally cohesive Cynical moral framework in regard to the rapport it appears to establish with the *polis*. Indeed, even if we were to attempt to throw the spotlight solely on the three frequent *topoi* of the Cynic ‘paradigm’ of morality, i.e., *autarkeia, parrhesia* and *anaideia*, ‘self-sufficiency,’ ‘bold-speech,’ and ‘shamelessness,’ respectively, we would still need to account for all their gradations which are on display in the current testimonia. To put it bluntly, a qualitative chasm separates Cicero’s Diogenes who saw the brittleness of gods’ alleged potency in the fortunes of the wicked and that of Diogenes Laertius who rebuked prospective parents for not sacrificing to the gods in the hope of their child will turn out to be a good one.\(^{2847}\) It is the ingrained element of hyper-individualism of Cynic moralism that prompts their reconstruction of the polarity between *nomos* and *phusis*. With the wedding of cosmopolitanism to an understanding of *phusis* that appears to be no less uncompromising than socially opportunistic, *nomos*, and *polis*, by default, turn into overarching mechanisms of overregulation, creeping in through the backdoor of the avowed simplicity of *phusis*. The personal freedom qua salvation heralded by the Cynic concept of cosmopolitanism,\(^{2848}\) as such, partially promotes an animalistic state of existence that may appear reminiscent of Heidegger’s notion of ontological primordiality, but is otherwise definable by its clear allegiance to the natural world rather than humankind.\(^{2849}\)

The leading expounders of the three morally-driven philosophies that we have scrutinised brought about a watershed of conceptual maelstrom that was centred around the duality and its modified interpretations. We propose the setting up of an analytical tripod to put those hermeneutic permutations into political and historical perspective. An idealisation of non-demotic politics is the first element that formed the nucleus of convergence between the principal tenets of the three philosophies. All of our moralists, including Diogenes, had lived through the harrowing experiences of the rise and fall of the Thirty Tyrants in Athens, the conclusion of the Corinthian War with Athens’ submission and the battle of Leuctra sealing the end of Spartan hegemony for ever. On a different level, the moralists also experienced the execution of the Arginusae Eight as well as that of Socrates and Agesilaos’ clear swerves from

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\(^{2848}\) Malcolm Schofield discerned, almost thirty years ago, that the Cynic freedom was exclusively individual (as against communal), moral (as against political) and internal (mental). We are mostly in agreement with his postulation of these pronounced traits. Malcolm Schoefield, *The Stoic Idea of the City*, (Cambridge, 1991), pp. 51-52.

the alleged ancestral tradition of Sparta. Now, all our moralists, excepting Diogenes, were members of the Athenian upper classes some of whom, like Xenophon or Isocrates later on, had actively supported the ascendancy of the oligarchic regimes. Their common shunning of the political hustle and bustle of the polis as well as their practically constant vilification of fickle democracy was thus underpinned by a self-conscious class element that saw the dēmos as a mob of layabouts hardly in possession of any deliberative faculty. Isocrates’ dēmos is always a deterrent to the re-establishment of social harmony that needed to be settled elsewhere to regain concord, and Xenophon’s historical works provide plenty of examples wherein the irrational mob was to be goaded and beguiled into taking the ‘reasonable’ course of action. Likewise, the early Cynic opposition between the virtuous few and illogical multitude seems to have spoken to a preconception that the dēmos’ deliberative faculty is internally constrained. Stamping the philosophical coinage of the irrational mob with their moralist authority, the thinkers attempted to naturalise the socio-economic rift between them and the lower classes with the aid of counter-examples.

Yet, the years from 395-371 also showed how brittle the once indefatigable Sparta had become, and given the hitherto idealised position of the latter as the archetypical example of the immutable patrios politeia, the three moralists had a hard going of excavating any historical examples to validate their premises. Xenophon attempted to bridge that gap between eternal political insights and ill-fitting historical circumstances with his works of fictional history including Anabasis, Agesilaos, Cyropaidia and, yes, even Hellenica. His history of all Hellenes, in fact, is a privatised history of Lacedaemon plain and simple, with the political and military initiative in the hands of the homoioi even when disaster was to follow.\(^{2850}\) Isocrates, in a similar vein, attempted to build fictional universes whereby, first, the Athenians and, then, the Macedonians were picked as the military vanguard redressing all the social evils that their societies were suffering from, by attacking Persia! In the event Alexander son of Philip did eventually attack and subdue the Persians but not a whiff of social concord was introduced to the mainland poleis as its result. The last moralists to choose to voluntarily lose their bearings in the frictional woods were Antisthenes and Diogenes, who claimed that only an unmitigated ascetism could suffice to bring the phusis back in. Reinventing the Herculean fortitude and amor fati as the foundation of moral naturalism, the early Cynics fought their rear-guard battle against the ever-encroaching social reality by initiating a philosophical retreat to comforting solace of selfhood itself.

A personalisation of the duality was another feature that the three moralists had in common. The frictional woods that they ventured ever deeper into allowed not only the long-lost ideals to be emulated and put into practice with thoroughgoing modifications, it also allowed the three moralists a novel plane of re-interpretation whereby the duality’s transformation into dichotomy would be consummated. Nature never speaks for itself and the cases of the moralist rethinking of phusis fared no different. To Isocrates, phusis simply called for a return to the natural division of labour in both its productive and reproductive senses. If born a legitimate child of a hippeis parents, for instance, a son, and not a daughter, was free to seek his calling. Neither the profession of stratêgos nor that of philosophos was out of reach of such a child. For a child born to thêtès parents, however, an interpellation was made directly from phusis, ordaining the deferent continuation of father’s occupation. To Xenophon, likewise, phusis conveyed a socio-political sense of making way for the one’s hierarchical betters. Phusis was not there to be challenged, it was there to be mimicked without pestering questionings. Offering a steady ideal to model oneself after, phusis informed the substantial difference between the philosophical expert and layperson just as much as that between the virtuous commander and any rowdy foot soldier. Excellence was something that could be transmitted only through the moral ties of loving friendship and not a commodity to be dangled about the face of rich young men to nick their money. The difference between the language spoken by the respective conceptions of phusis of Isocrates and Xenophon was one of dialect only, with the economic grammar and hierarchical syntax, among other things, practically the same.

To Antisthenes and Diogenes, contrariwise, an otherworldly language of phusis had made itself heard; that of a return to bestiality. On surface, the ‘natural’ relations of production and reproduction could not creep in the sphere of Cynic ataraxia even when trumpeted by tyrants and philosophers with most renown. But dare to dive a little deeper and you would see the internal contradictions straight away. Neither Antisthenes nor Diogenes ever renounced either transacting with sex-workers or their calling in teaching the aspiring candidates the road to freedom. Antiphon’s hyper-sensualist phusis did not, of course, shoot off its hedonistic sprouts from the Cynic ground of askesis. But for all their verbal befriending of hardship and scorn for conventional pleasures, the thing stands that the beggar needed money, crudely as well as euphemistically with respect to the historical tradition of Diogenes. And on a higher level of abstraction, the hyper-individualism of the early Cynics formed into a fitting couple with the other moralists’ personal dichotomisation of the duality. What was to be considered nomos? Nothing other than all politically enforced deviation from phusis, of course! But, then, who exactly was to be regarded as more phusikos, the beggar-sage that made a virtue of necessity

2851 Xenophon, Memoirs of Socrates, 3.5.23; cf. Azoulay, Xenophon and the Graces of Power, pp. 79.
or the opulent upper classes from whose pockets came the alms that would feed them as well as any slave women that was to please the Cynics at the brothels? In the end, the Cynic *askesis* was social and political to the full and Aristophanes’ multi-faceted role-reversals in either *Lysistrata* or the *Assembly-Women* were much more re-stamping or defacing of the social *nomisma* than was the creed of the Cynic cosmopolitanism.

The frictional re-discovery of hyper-individualised universals gave way to the development of the third basic feature in the works of the three moralists: the politico-philosophical postulation of a rational mind naturally governing the entire natural and social universe. With barely any trace of the cosmic *Nous* of Anaxagoras or the Love and Strife of Empedocles, the three thinkers conceived their rational mind in a self-styled vacuum of morality. Yet, their severing of the philosophical ties uniting their conceptions to those of the early thinkers does not suffice to regard their moralist teachings as having emerged from a *tabula rasa*, far from it. Just as the Cynic hyper-individualism was a politico-philosophical child of its times, in fact, so were the particular understandings of the rational mind that were conceived by the moralists. Comprehending the social turmoil besetting his *polis* as a veritable micro-cosmos of the issues besetting all the Greeks, Isocrates’ rational mind enabling a return to *phusis*, i.e., Athenian and Macedonian expansionism against Persia, for example, conveyed a sensible message only to its spatio-temporally determinate aristocratic listeners who had seen the short-lived success of Agesilaus’ Persian offensive and the material plenty that came from it. His anti-Persian politics of *phusis*, as such, was geared towards a re-elevation of the social composition of Greek *poleis* along aristocratically-conceived political lines that were to be guarded by ideologically reinvigorated upper classes who were perceived as the rightful bearer of *phusis’* aegis. Succinctly put, Isocrates’ rational mind, rendered operational via the communal efforts either that of Athenian or Macedonian upper classes in historically determinate terms, operated on a plane of *phusis* re-deified. His return to *phusis*, on this view, appears to be an interesting anticipation of ‘*deus lo volt*,’ which was to be summoned again centuries later. That division between the microcosm and macrocosm was also taken up as a *topos* in Xenophon’s portrayal of Socrates’ conception of a rational mind naturally governing the movement of celestial and terrestrial bodies, and of a human reason as the natural ruler of human will that had parted its ways with *akrasia*. The rational mind, according to that view, occasioned all the daily occurrences in the realm of nature, filling the vacuum of political power that historically beset all the mainland *poleis* after the defeat of Athens in the Peloponnesian War. To be sure, that vacuum had partially been brimmed with the Spartan hegemony until 371. But the years from 404-386 were no less socially convulsive, as we emphasised above, than they were the previous 27 years, leaving only 15 years for the Spartan hegemony to be at relative ease, and
that, we need to add, with an unchecked rise of the Theban power. His philosophical understanding of the macrocosmic rational mind and microcosmic reason allowed Xenophon to imbue that gap with an ideological return to *phusis* which was to be conceived through the rose-tinted spectacles of Socrates and Agesilaus. His melodious relationship with Critias, Alcibiades and others, not to mention his unabated public chastisement of the Athenian *nomoi* after 403, had stigmatised Socrates with the everlasting brand of the ‘sympathiser of oligarchy.’ And nobody could have any doubts as to what kind of polity was preferred by the Spartan Agesilaus, dotting as he did virtually all the Ionian *poleis* with pro-Spartan oligarchies after his momentary defeat of the Persians. The bridging between the rational mind and reason, thus, seeped into the clear notion of *phusis* which was regarded as an eternal, intelligent and trustworthy ideal to be upheld politically as well as philosophically in contradistinction to the ephemeral, inane and unreliable construal of *nomos*.

The dichotomised relationship between *nomos* and *phusis* was also a pillar of the early Cynic creed. Hyper-individualistically conceived as the key to moral salvation, Cynics’ partial return to bestiality served as the part-and-parcel of their road to freedom qua *phusis*. Within this Manichean universe of virtue and vice there was no ascription of rational governance, just like in Isocrates or Xenophon, to any polity. The other two moralists had made their political preferences clear in elucidating an idealised return to aristocratic polity in Athens. Antisthenes and Diogenes, on the other hand, did not have to advance any political proposals to make the workings of the contemporary society more natural. It sufficed, from their ‘revolting’ end of the bargain,²⁸⁵² to have a steady supply of the Athenian upper classes around so that there would be no shortage of almsgivers or public brothels that would be shouldered by their funds. And if there were any democratically-inclined upper-class politicians, rhetoricians and philosophers around, then the Cynics were there to pester and round them up for all eternity as undignified bigwigs of unnatural *nomos*. *Kosmopolitês* was not a notion that complemented the contemporary democratic *politis*. It was a negative ideal that attempted to displace *nomos* from any political, legal or philosophical sphere wherein its effects had been deemed *para phusis*.²⁸⁵³ With nature philosophised into the ever-faithful watchdog of intellectual hierarchies, it was but a step for the kings, tyrants and oligarchs to vindicate their prerogatives

²⁸⁵² “La révolutionnaire veut changer le monde, il le dépasse vers l’avenir, vers un ordre de valeurs qu’il invente; le révolté a soin de maintenir intacts le abus dont il souffre pour pouvoir se révolter contre eux.” Sartre, *Baudelaire*, pp. 62.

²⁸⁵³ A recent positive reading of the concept has been made, which, unfortunately, is grounded upon a curious interpretation of a single passage in Diogenes Laertius (6.72). To that end, I do not find the attempt persuasive in the least as it appears to skirt around the political dimension of the Cynic relationship between *kosmopolis* and *polis*. Christopher Paone, “Diogenes the Cynic on Law and World Citizenship”, *Polis: The Journal for Ancient Greek and Roman Political Thought*, vol. 35 no. 2, (2018), pp. 478-498.
with an undiluted nod to phusis. But its negativity did not stop there: their philosophical cosmopolitanism was conceived alongside a complete rejection of any sort of political participation. Indeed, except for re-stamping some of the crudest aspects of relations of production and reproduction that surfaced in the Athens of their time with their timeless brand of naturality, the early Cynics appear not to have engaged in any politically subversive activity. Their contempt, raging as it was, was geared towards the defacing of contemporary social values, among which ranked the customary censure on public eating and masturbating. In regard to the politics of nomos, however, neither Antisthenes nor Diogenes had any words of Cynic wisdom to parley other than a firm rejection of any activity of the sort as slavish and unworthy. The catch, to which the early Cynics cannot be imagined as oblivious is, of course, that the political participation was a material and political necessity for those of thētes who could make the round-trip from their abodes to Pnyx. Materially, the public pay kept them afloat at a time when the Athenian commercial ventures, and, industrial enterprises, by extension, had taken a serious blow following the demise of the arkhē. And politically, it was the demotic rights and duties whose toppling ranked foremost in the oligarchic agenda, as the events of 411 and 404 had demonstrated. The Cynic kosmopolis had nothing to offer to any of the contemporary thētes, but it could promise the moon to the politai-turned-beggars who could set sail on the boats that were made of the most phusikos of moral timbers. An eternity of economic, social and political degradation for one day of philosophical bliss was hence the ‘bargain’ that was on offer at the Cynic stalls.

6.3 Plato in the Context of the Early Dialogues of Search

Towering above the three moralists with all their political and philosophical re-conceptualizations of the duality was Plato, the foremost creator of the myth of Socrates and the philosophically gifted transmitter of his thoughts. Plato brought an end to a stage of philosophical rumination on the dyad with a flurry of crescendos that still appear to resonate, via its intellectual successors, somehow in the air of early 2020s. In order for us to attempt to draw a workable philosophical framework detailing all his views on nomos and phusis, and given the plethora of images and insights he managed to work with in his dialogues, we propose to produce a quadripod of an interpretative scheme that can be leaned on throughout our politico-philosophical exegesis. Plato’s rendition of Socratic morality and his mainly ethical works make up the first resting point of the quadripod, consisting mostly of the early so-called aporetic works Apologia, Charmides, Laches, Lysis and spearheaded in the direction...

2854 For the fourth-century variegation of misthos that bred types which were more in tune with the predominantly euergetic state of affairs, e.g., trophē-assistance, see Schmitt Pantel, La cité au banquet, pp. 174; Alain Bresson, La cité marchande, (Bordeaux, 2000), pp. 253-257.
of epistemology whose basics are outlined in *Meno* and *Protagoras*. The second resting point is constituted by the later works with a discernible epistemological focus, *Theaetetus, Sophist, Parmenides* and *Phaedrus*, whereas the third is formed by dialogues with a cosmogonic flavour, relatively short in number but impactful in the insights they offer: *Timaeus, Critias* and *Phaedo*. Finally, this reconstructive effort is rounded off by the works in which a complete political philosophy is merged with all the philosophical elements espoused in the other dialogues in the *Laws* and *Republic*.

In regard to the Platonic transformation of the duality, the early dialogues can be conceived as laying the philosophical groundwork of later postulations. Displaying the basic tenets of the Socratic *elenchus* to the full, the three so-called dialogues of search, i.e., *Charmides, Laches* and *Lysis*, tackle a definitive question of the order ‘What is sôphrosunê?’ ‘How can andreia be defined?’ ‘How far can the outlines of philia be clarified?’ In those dialogues Socrates dons the mantle of the perceptive inspector, challenging the self-proclaimed possessor of the virtue in question through inductive reasoning. If someone claims to be capable of teaching any virtues for a modest sum, then he or she should be equally capable of providing a definition of the quality that he is willing to transmit. A *logos*, or ‘account,’ that is guided solely by truth is thereby turned into a natural expectation that follows from any self-styled entitlement. Any analogy, circular reasoning, or exemplification will not do; analogies can be overturned, circular reasoning exposed and examples nullified via resort to contrasting cases whereby the pretence of expertise in the taught quality is revealed as null and void. Too broad or too narrow a definition will not do either. A definition needs to be concise and precise, making just adequate allowance for the characteristics of the universal virtue with all its particular nuances. Whenever his interlocutor looks like he is about to get lost in vicious circles or move beyond the scope of their inquisition, Socrates is there to hold him by his hand to reconsider his train of thought and retrace his steps if necessary. *Elenchus* is, however, no mere gymnastics of thought to introduce the newcomers to the grand stage of philosophy or to enact models in questioning to be imitated by the seasoned philosopher’s pupils. No: the *pathos* of overmatch between the Platonic Socrates and his interlocutors may have been concealed under the debris of dialogic interplay, but Socrates has the sole dramatic incentive

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2855 Plato, *Charmides*, 161c3-4.
2856 Socrates’ lunge at Charmides assertion that he considers himself to be self-controlled is a typical example of the Platonic rationale that beacons the former’s *elenchus*: ‘“Well,” I [Socrates] said, ‘I think I know the best way to conduct the investigation into this issue. Clearly, if you do possess self-control, you can form some thoughts about it. After all, as one of your attributes—if it is one of your attributes—it must make itself perceptible to you, and on this basis some thoughts would arise in you about what self-control is, or at least what sort of thing it is. Don’t you think so?”’ Plato, *Charmides*, in *Meno and Other Dialogues*, trans. by Robin Waterfield, (Oxford and New York, 2005), 158e9-159a4; cf. *Laches*, 190c5.
that there is in these works. When sniffing a definition that lives up not only to his formal but also political standards, the Platonic Socrates is the one to harness all the philosophical energy towards that conclusion. While it is true that he is often swamped in pathos-ridden self-critical episodes of his own, which are duly corrected by his interlocutors, it is just as clear that he always retains the rhetorical and philosophical initiative of elenchus. Critias’ attempt to define sôphrosunê as ‘doing what pertains to oneself,’ for instance, provides Socrates with a barebones sketch to improve upon, who tactfully beacons the two young future oligarchs, Critias and Charmides, towards a partially formed premise upon which the definition of self-control needs, à la Socrates, to be predicated: sôphrosunê is to know one’s limitations and to act accordingly.\textsuperscript{2857} On a similar tone, in Laches Socrates is portrayed as taking up the elenchus following the beginning of a sketch of andreia as he carries on with his pondering upon Nicias’ idea that courage is knowledge of what is and is not frightening in every rationally courageous action.\textsuperscript{2858} Mining the ideational deposit to the limit, Socrates, then guides his interlocutors towards a partial conclusion that a concern for psuche is the only way to attain true happiness which can only be brought about by an achievement of all the virtues in their unity.

Those two early dialogues, on this view, show Socrates at his philosophic best in successfully, if only partially, delivering the ideas that his interlocutors are reasonably expected to endorse but not aware of, fitting the bill of Plato’s analogy of him as a midwife of thoughts perfectly.\textsuperscript{2859} Maieutic in the full sense of the word, Socrates soothes the birth pangs and dissipates the false alarms of his interlocutor so that he can deliver a workable notion which is far from mature but nor completely embryonic. What survives the elenchus, in that vein, is a basic glimpse of the Platonic truth, resting at the midway between mere sophisms and full definitions. To reiterate, there is a qualitative difference between Socrates’ partial definition either of sôphrosunê in Charmides or that of andreia in Laches and the ‘knowledge of knowledge’ combined with the ‘knowledge of good and bad’ leading the practitioner to true happiness or courage as only a part of virtue\textsuperscript{2860} that is espoused in the later dialogues. But,

\textsuperscript{2857} “[Socrates speaking] It follows, apparently, that self-control isn’t knowing what one knows and what one doesn’t know, but is only knowing that one knows and that one doesn’t know.” Ibid, 170d1-3; cf. Waterfield, Xenophon’s Retreat, pp. 188.
\textsuperscript{2858} “[Nicias speaking] No, Laches, I don’t call an animal or anything else courageous if it’s too mindless to be afraid of threats; I call it ‘fearless’ and ‘irrational.’ … No, fearlessness and courage aren’t the same thing. In my opinion, courage and thoughtfulness are qualities possessed by very few people, whereas boldness, daring, and fearless recklessness are commonly found in men and women and children and animals.” Plato, Laches, in Meno and Other Dialogues, 197a7-b2-6.
\textsuperscript{2860} Naturally, this point is brought out in full at the beginning of Socrates’ final foray against Nicias: “I wonder whether you [Nicias] and I mean the same thing by this. Personally, in addition to courage,
then again, the glass is half-full with something stronger than what the dramatics of Socratic self-criticism conveys.\textsuperscript{2861} Precisely how ‘strong’ that substance is comes about more vigorously in the context of Plato’s examination of friendship in \textit{Lysis}. Formally, that dialogue is different compared to the other two in that it does not exhibit the properties of being a maieutic one, i.e., Socrates is the one that uses \textit{elenchus} to investigate the ideas of his own. No structural change is, however, occasioned by that formal change in the structure of examination. Indeed, given that Plato would later come to elaborate thinking as an internal dialogue,\textsuperscript{2862} Socrates’ self-examination in \textit{Lysis} does not appear to necessitate an alteration in the philosophical tone. And just as assured, the usual procedure of nose to \textit{elenchus’} grindstone is followed verbatim as \textit{philia} is stripped of its unessential qualities one by one without even so much as touching some partial deductions. The idea that what is good in a person is attracted to what is good in another, for instance, which appears to allude to Empedocles’ principle of ‘like to like,’ is one such deduction that anticipates the belief that only good men can ever succeed in forming genuine friendships with one another.\textsuperscript{2863} And if a reciprocity of amicable sentiment is posited to bridge the natural apathy between two good persons, then the missing piece of the definition of \textit{philia} becomes evident for all to see: a knowledge of good is prerequisite to flesh out the argument that the rational desire is always felt for something good, thus defining human friendship as a desire for the good that is expressed through a relationship with another person.\textsuperscript{2864} What is essential to true friendship, in that vein, is that it seeks the good in a person not as a means to a further end, but as an end in and of itself.\textsuperscript{2865}

It is a commonplace in the modern philosophical tradition to note that the three dialogues of search end in \textit{aporia}, an impasse that is often dramatically played out by a momentarily helpless Socrates begging the indulgence of his interlocutors for not having achieved anything of note. And there is a definite qualitative gap that separates \textit{Lysis’} early rumination on \textit{philia}, for one, from the rather complete account given of it in \textit{Phaedrus}. But the \textit{aporia} can be seen as an essential quality of the dialogues only if we naïvely choose to believe in the possibility of a possible end to the quest after definitions. Crystal-clear definitions are a mirage \textit{tout court} in the Platonic universe. To be sure, the dramatic Socrates of the later dialogues is much more

what I mean by ‘parts of excellence’ are self-control, justice, and other similar qualities. Do you agree?’ Plato, \textit{Laches}, 198a8-10.
\textsuperscript{2861} Plato, \textit{Charmides}, 175d-e.
\textsuperscript{2862} Plato, \textit{Theaetetus}, 189e, \textit{Sophist}, 263e-264a, \textit{Philebus}, 38e.
\textsuperscript{2863} Plato, \textit{Phaedrus}, 255b; cf. \textit{Laws}, 837a.
\textsuperscript{2864} On this interpretation of friendship, see G. X. Santas, “Plato on Friendship and Familial Love in the \textit{Lysis} and the \textit{Republic},” \textit{Philosophical Inquiry}, vol. 6, (1984), pp. 1-12.
\textsuperscript{2865} Plato’s qualification of the difference between the truly loveable object and its mere reflections is a fitting example of this understanding of friendship as the loving of the goodness of another as a final good: Plato, \textit{Lysis}, 219c8-d5.
sweeping in his assertions and pronounced in his views than his earlier manifestations. The epistemic priority of definition is, however, only a rhetorical *topos* that is used by Plato to place his Socrates in a nest of viable viewpoints. These points of view are three in number: the espousal of aristocratically conceived virtues, a philosophical preference for theoretical over experiential knowledge and a guiding principle of expertise differentiating expert from fallible knowledge. The adumbration of *sôphrosunê* in the *Charmides* is a clear example of the aristocratic denotations that are ascribed to the terms that Plato tackles. Meaning self-control in its simplest sense, in its historical context the term was conceived to have an aristocratic baggage that propelled its meaning towards the observance of due measure. Plato’s emphasis on knowing one’s limitations and abiding by them spoke, in that sense, to a thinly-disguised aristocratic *ethos* that was frequently utilised by the euergetic upper classes to remind the *dêmos*, in court and *ekklêsia* speeches alike, of the benefactions that the latter received thanks to their goodwill. And *Andreia* in *Laches* and *philia* in *Lysis*, perhaps, did not have the overtly aristocratic denotations that *sôphrosunê* had. But Plato’s selection of dramatis personae in *Laches* itself appears to be an ironic allusion to the ultimately miserable fates of the two *strategoi*. The historical Laches died at the battle of Mantinea shortly after the breakdown of the Peace of Nicias in 418, whereas Nicias passed away on Sicily in the harrowing days of 413. To the Athenian upper-class oligarchs, both cases, as we observed above, were clear breaches of the ideal of twin hegemony, with the Sicilian expedition hailed as the crown jewel of *dêmos*’ perpetual irrationality. The peculiarity in Plato’s selection of Nicias and Laches as the principal characters in a dialogue about courage appears thus to have aligned more with a *double entendre* than simple irony. In plain terms, the historical Nicias had a reputation to ‘uphold’ as a coward despite the intellectual acumen he displayed in partaking of Socrates’ *elenchus*, but the Athenian lower classes had no less of a deriding renown, at least to the oligarchic upper classes, in regard to their irrational fearlessness that was branded as animalistic and unthinking in the dialogue by Nicias himself! Ever the master of historical and political irony, Plato, thus, handed out an unforgettable aside to the pusillanimous upper-class bigwigs and warmongering lower classes with one fell swoop.

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2867 Lycurgus’ chastisement of the nonchalance that was shown by the Athenian *choregoi* and horse breeders who dared to summon the aid of their previous liturgies to their defence in *helaiata* to the effect that only those that fulfilled their allotted public expenses in the form of maintenance of battalions and ships were entitled to such special consideration appears to be a case in point in suggesting how acknowledged the conferral of public gratitude in return for the services rendered was to become in the latter half of the fourth century: Lycurgus, 1.139-140; cf. Ober, *Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens*, pp. 231, n. 57.
we ought to recall that the *philia* in *Lysis* which was conceived at the interstices between homoerotism and intellectual education was a notable feature of aristocratic *paideia* that had managed to withstand the sophistic watershed despite having its fair share of dissidents.\textsuperscript{2868} The Platonic development of the *aretē* in all the three dialogues, therefore, was one that was mainly conceived through the aristocratic lens.

That lens was rubbed clean with an emphasis on theoretical knowledge that was to be taken over experiential sapience. Directly tied to the so-called ‘Socratic fallacy’, which denotes the Platonic argument that one cannot be presumed to know anything about a concept until he or she can provide a workable definition of it, this preference of theoretical knowledge informed a dualistic worldview that divided the class of theoreticians from that of practitioners. Jostling against unauthentic friends and courageous *strategoi* with equal relentless, Platonic Socrates attempted to mend the corrigible ways of his interlocutors with hardly any experience in either generalship or being Lysis’ friend. Socrates may be neither, but he has a wildcard that could trump over both types of entitlement, i.e., publicly and personally sanctioned: a theoretical understanding of the balance between universals and particulars which is needed to be struck by a definition that can have a rough resemblance to those *per genus et differentiam*. Appearances to the contrary, the dialogical movement toward the aporetic ends, therefore, is not one that is instantiated by an equal philosophical or rhetorical partnership. Socrates is the one to begin and conclude, albeit unsatisfactorily, the eristic enquiries because he ranks heads and shoulders above, despite his momentary shortcomings, his interlocutors on the ideational and educational hierarchy.\textsuperscript{2869} Nicias and Laches might have been some of the most veteran commanders to be found around, but in terms of their ideational prowess they were as green as the next foot soldier that was completely wet behind the ears. With that accentuation of expertise surfaced a novel construal of excellence that wrested its hierarchical status on grounds of theory rather than practice.

### 6.3.1 The Last Days of Socrates and the Cosmogonic Turn

In the three dialogues that we have examined, the Platonic Socrates is canvassed as the living example of Plato’s philosophical *praxis*, unsettling convictions of his interlocutors just as much as those of his own. Working with a notion of excellence that functioned to seal the

\textsuperscript{2868} “Athenian homoeroticism was largely an upper-class phenomenon. Any society that represses its women as much as ancient Athens did runs the risk of forcing its members to find other outlets for their sexuality.” Waterfield, *Why Socrates Died*, pp. 56; for a recent rather impressionistic rejection of the notion of upper-class homoeroticism in classical Athens, see Bartłomiej Bednarek, “Ancient Homophobia: Prejudices Against Homosexuality in Classical Athens”, *Humanitas*, vol. 69, (July, 2017), pp. 47-62.

philosophical rift between theory and practice, Plato’s thought then began to flow in two different courses that ultimately teamed up in his political utopias. Though still conceived within the wider sphere of morality and ethics, the two trilogies, according to our conception, that followed hard on the heels of the dialogues of search interlocked with two different strands of philosophical speculation that did not display, at least superficially, a lot in common: cosmogony and epistemology. As we will later attempt to assemble the two strands within the general framework of Plato’s political philosophy, we would like to commence with a probe beneath the two levels of cosmogony that we purport to exist in the Platonic dialogues. A personalised cosmopolitanism of an ethics of justice and holiness is the earlier stage in Plato’s cosmogony, fleshed out in the works *Euthyphro*, *Apologia* and *Crito*, whereas the second stage exhibits an understanding of cosmos as crafted and governed by divine intelligence, as shown in the works *Timaeus*, *Critias* and *Phaedo*. Plato’s conception of justice is an ode to Socrates who had lived and died a philosopher before his gifted pupil was to reach his intellectual flourish. There are three core features in regard to the philosophical elucidation of justice and piety that are on display in the former set of the three early dialogues: a revaluation of expert knowledge, a rationalised morality and a philosophical hierarchy enacted to encase the distinction between divine intelligence and mortal deliberation.

The notion of expertise as it is brought out in *Euthyphro*, *Apologia* and *Crito* is built by dramatic Socrates abiding by the same dialogical principles as of the earlier dialogues of search. His interlocutors are, again, men of action in self-styled possession of expert knowledge in the main, a Euthyphro who is prosecuting his father for homicide, Meletus prosecuting Socrates himself on charges of impiety and corrupting the Athenian youth and Crito who is a philosophical follower of Socrates and a law-abiding citizen of Athens to boot. Socrates assumes the role of catalyst at times overtly, by definition in *Apologia*, and at others latently, through his driving force in *elenchus* in *Euthyphro* and *Crito*. But despite these points of similarity with the formal qualities of other early dialogues, the trilogy on justice and piety also shows peculiar traits that set them apart from the rest of the pack. A politics of exposure and rather frequent remarks on Socrates’ *daimonion* are two such aspects that appear to have factored in Plato’s honed understanding of expert knowledge. On that note, *Euthyphro* and *Apologia* have all the makings of being dialogues of accusation wherein the roles between defendant and plaintiff are thoroughly reversed. Euthyphro’s main predicament in the dialogue that was named after him is to find a religiously-compelling vindication for his indictment of his father, which is attempted to be achieved through the adoption of a fundamentalist sort of self-justificatory hermeneutics. To him, there is nothing annoying about a son prosecuting his father since Zeus himself who is “the best and most just of the gods,” is believed to have
“imprisoned his own father because he had unjustly swallowed his sons; and the latter too had castrated his father for similar reasons.”2870 ‘If the king of the divinities did it, then there is nothing wrong in me doing it,’ is, then, the naked reasoning behind Euthyphro’s act. Plato knows that if Socrates were to concede the point, then he could not be expected to provide a compelling defence of philosophical profundity that is rendered in the Apologia. But while a partially consummated elenchus would decry the interlocutor’s points of view without hinting at the philosophical convictions of the protagonist, Euthyphro’s Socrates is quite outspoken in pouring ridicule on his opponent before the formal elenchus kicks off.2871 And once the elenchus commences, Socrates leaves no philosophical stone unturned in objecting to every attempt made by his interlocutor to define holiness. In contrast to the partial eristic gains that were achieved in the dialogues of search, Socrates does not allow his interlocutor to leave with a shred of positive philosophical insight except for the rather stolid, albeit significant, argument that holiness is a species of justice.2872 Divine approval, serving the divinities, pleasing or gratifying the gods and goddesses are all Euthyphro’s arguments that are battered through with the ram of Socratic elenchus.2873 Similarly, it appears, in more ways than one, that Socrates’ ‘cock to Asclepius’2874 had already been given at the time of his accusative defence against the prosecution as it is portrayed in Plato’s Apologia. Corrupting the young, or the first indictment which is dramatically voiced by Meletus, is effectively struck down by Socrates’ success in showing the latter as a clueless sycophant of an ‘expert’ in education who does not have an ounce of truth to his pretences.2875 Also torn down with a vengeance is the charge that Socrates had been introducing new deities to the polis, brought home with an emphasis on the premise that an interest in supernatural matters is tantamount to a belief in the supernatural itself. In the end, the about-face is flawless: Socrates manages to show that not

2871 “Then do you think that there is really a civil war among the gods, and fearful hostility and battles, and so on – the kind of thing described by the poets and depicted by fine artists upon sacred artefacts, not least upon the Robe at the Great Panathenaea which is brought up to the Acropolis, covered in decorations of that kind? Are we to say that it’s all true, Euthyphro?” Ibid, 6b8-c5.
2872 Ibid, 12c9-d4.
2873 Ibid, 7a-11b; 12e-14b; 14b-15a; 15b-16a.
2874 Plato, Phaedo, 118a7.
2875 Azoulay appears to have fleetingly picked up this tactic of table-turning in his brief discussion of Socrates’ attempt at refuting the charges made against him. Whether on behalf of self-proclaimed benevolence or ill-will, spiritual education became a matter of public debate just as soon as it crossed over the tightly regulated space of aristocratic symposium. Questioning the educational expertise of the accusers might have seemed palatable to the political motivations that were furthered by Plato’s Apologia; but they were largely beside the point as on trial was not the adeptness of the public persecutors but the political promises that were held aloft by Socrates’ teaching which clearly ran counter to the prevailing democratic ethos: “Athens at the time was still affected by the oligarchic episodes of the end of the fifth century in which some of his disciples had participated: the city could not handle the dual allegiance and political betrayal to which the Socratic charis was likely to lead.” Azoulay, Xenophon and the Graces of Power, pp. 99.
him but his accusers are guilty as charged of both corrupting the young and defying the genuine morality. And at both junctures the case is made with a transformed understanding of expertise that is capable of arguing its way out of any charge by sole reliance on the notion of praxis.

Socrates admits that he has welcomed all the youngsters who wanted to mingle with him as a result of his reputation for exposing the faulty ways of the self-proclaimed teachers of wisdom. He also acknowledges to having been preoccupied with celestial bodies and their properties, tacitly evincing the view that an armchair philosophy of education or religion cannot have any claims to expertise. Adeptness in an affair requires any candidate to adapt him or herself to the contours of practical life. Distinguishing aptitude from inaptitude, as such, is taking an overriding interest in the intricacies of the social endeavour in question. Socrates’ conversations with the young, his attempts to elaborate upon their views on morality and virtue, his preoccupation with the physical features of the celestial bodies and his visits to oracular shrines are all parts of a philosophy of living well that have allowed him to condense his practical knowledge into theoretical receptacles that had been moulded after the simultaneous events of teaching and learning. And for someone that has scarcely put in any effort to matters either mortal or social to dare to accuse him of impiety or injustice should be regarded as a blasphemy by anyone with a modicum of intelligence.

Arguing that true expertise can only be in the possession of a diligent and relentless few, Socrates brings the first part of his cross-examination of Meletus’ views to a close on a high note. Having postulated that the expert knowledge about good and evil are in the common possession of the majority, leaving only a tiny few who are deemed able to spoil the whole bunt, Meletus shows that he had never genuinely been interested, practically and theoretically alike, in either the Athenian youth or their education: “It would be a singular dispensation of fortune for our young people if there were only one person who corrupted them, while all the rest had a beneficial effect. Well then, Meletus, you’ve given ample proof that you have never bothered your head about the young; and you make it perfectly clear that you have never paid the slightest attention to the matters over which you are now indicting me.” Plato, Apology, in The Last Days of Socrates, 25b9-c4.

And, unfortunately, he had a lot to atone for despite what he might have believed. His relation to the leaders of the Thirty Tyrants, his haunting of the foremost political and intellectual supporters of the establishment of a more demotic regime in Pericles and Protagoras, his trenchant rejection of the new education regardless of its increased social inclusivity are all dimensions to the philosopher as his activity was sketched by Plato and Xenophon: “By 399 Socrates had been tolerated for a generation. He was not prosecuted in the immediate aftermath of the fall of the Thirty. But by returning to his critical conversations after the democratic restoration, as if nothing had transpired that concerned him in any way, Socrates seemingly refused to acknowledge that his highly public questioning of basic democratic ideals had played a part in precipitating a frightful stasis. By ancient standards, at least, Athenians were remarkably tolerant of critical public speech. But it was a fundamental tenet of the democratic regime that men who chose to speak in public on matters of political moment were
prosecutors, who, in fact, prosecute the genuine piety, justice and morality about which they know next to nothing.\textsuperscript{2879} The Nietzschean point that it was Socrates himself, and not the Athenian \textit{dēnos}, who condemned the philosopher to death rings true to this day, and so does the Platonic revaluation of all values that followed closely on the footsteps of Socrates’ death.\textsuperscript{2880} But, contrary to Nietzsche, a new morality, regardless of how overreaching it was, can hardly make adequate allowance for all the dimensions of the Platonic revaluation. Plato’s Socrates, in that vein, became an embodiment of what true expertise would consist of. Unwavering in his commitment to a moral education of the young and old and peerless in his theoretical prowess which he used to elaborate on his daily conversations, Socrates served as the personified touchtone of the Platonic understanding of expertise. Moving beyond both the alleged sophist ideal of commercialised rhetorical competence and the \textit{phusiologoi}’s perception of universe as essentially made up of matter,\textsuperscript{2881} Plato coronated philosophical aptitude as the key to genuine expertise.

There are two core features of this modified understanding of expertise which are brought into clear daylight in Plato’s \textit{Crito}: a political partiality toward expert knowledge rather than the majority opinion and an ascription of higher philosophical significance to \textit{psuchē} compared to \textit{sōma}, i.e., ‘body.’ Retorting to Crito’s argument that acquiescing to his punishment could be taken as a tacit admission of his guilt,\textsuperscript{2882} Socrates points out that the only advice worth taking is that of a true expert as opposed to all the opinions of the rest put together.\textsuperscript{2883} It is true that Socrates has a reputation to behold, but not one that concerns any of the laypeople who are prone to fall for the verdict that was to be passed on him. His willing acceptance of capital punishment, on this view, is precisely the act that will show him standing firmly by his reputation as a sage in the eyes of those that are intellectually erudite enough to separate seed from chaff. Philosophical expertise thus has its own standards to live and die by, not paying responsible for the effects of their speech, whether intended or not. Although Socrates had studiously avoided speech-making in the Assembly, the Agora was a public place; speech in the Agora that had public effects was subject to public censure.” Ober, ‘Political Conflicts, Political Debates, and Political Thought’, pp. 130.

\textsuperscript{2879} Socrates’ turning the table of judgment on his ‘Old Accusers’ by an explicit unveiling of their sheer ignorance about all the matters under discussion ricochets to his prosecutors who are just as oblivious as the former: “They [the Old Accusers, including Aristophanes] would be very loath, I fancy, to admit the truth: which is that they are being convicted of pretending to knowledge when they are entirely ignorant.” Plato, \textit{Apology}, 23d9-e1.


\textsuperscript{2881} Plato, \textit{Apology}, 19d9-20c4; 19b1-d8.

\textsuperscript{2882} Plato, \textit{Crito}, in \textit{The Last Days of Socrates}, 44b6-d5.

\textsuperscript{2883} “[Socrates speaking] Ought we to be guided and intimidated by the opinion of the many or by that of the one – assuming that there is someone with expert knowledge? Is it true that we ought to respect and fear this person more than all the rest put together; and that if we do not follow his guidance we shall spoil and impair that part of us which, as we used to say, is improved by just conduct and ruined by unjust?” \textit{Ibid}, 47c10-d6.
heed to any other moral yardsticks. In the event the ‘other yardstick,’ however, was nothing other than dêmos’ verdict ratified by a majority vote, only to be scorned by Socrates himself as he responded by proposing an exceptional reward for himself that was clearly intended as a backhanded insult hurled at the capital charges that he was facing.\footnote{2884 Plato’s apparent retreat to the sphere of ethics is, therefore, only a tactical one. In political terms, Socrates’ feigned acceptance of his punishment is the last moment of glory of the philosopher who demonstrates just how pathetically devoid of reason the legal and political proceedings in a democratic polis whose constituents offer a chance even to convicts awaiting execution to escape punishment by circumventing precisely those laws. Socrates does not bite: he realises that if he attempts to run away, he will only play to the hands of the plaintiffs who would spend no time in justifying his death sentence.\footnote{2885 "[Athenian Laws speaking] Just consider, what good will you do yourself or your friends if you breach this agreement [between Socrates and the Athenian laws] and fall short in one of these requirements. … You will confirm the opinion of the jurors, so that they’ll seem to have given a correct verdict – for any destroyer of laws might very well be supposed to have a destructive influence upon young and foolish human beings." Plato, \textit{Crito}, 53a9-b1, b9-c2; Alan Boegehold, ‘Resistance to Change in the Law at Athens’, in \textit{Demokratia}, pp. 210-212.} That tactical retreat is followed by a hierarchically posited philosophical dualism between soul and body.\footnote{2886 While the ruining of the body would make a life unworthy to live, Socrates argues, the ruination of the soul is a much more debasing prospect for one only entails corporeal suffering that is never as obdurate as the suffering of the soul. Soul’s suffering, in that vein, is consummated in the next world whose judges, i.e., the dramatized ‘Laws of Hades,’\footnote{2887 For a comparison between the ‘pseudo-eschatology’ that is evinced by the \textit{muthos} of fallen souls in \textit{Phaedrus} and the truly eschatological Empedoclean cosmic cycles, see Anré Laks, ‘Empedoclean Cosmic and Demonic Cycles’, in \textit{The Empedoclean Kosmos}, esp. pp. 276.} are quick studies to discern those with reputations of unjust behaviour. And with that mention of the other world, we cross the threshold to an eschatological philosophy of death that would only be elaborated in the later works.\footnote{2888}}

Growing in unity with that eschatological turn is the rationalisation of religious beliefs, converting them to a subsection of genuine \textit{episteme}. Differing from the dialogues of search, the three dialogues on justice and holiness in general, and \textit{Apologia} in particular, are not building blocks of a defence of the Socratic philosophy as it was comprehended by Plato. They are documents of accusation of the entire political, juridical, religious and philosophical

\footnote{2885 \textit{Ibid}, 54b3-d1.}
\footnote{2886 \textit{Ibid}, 54b3-d1.}
façades of the *polis* of the days in which the dialogue was written, conveniently telescoped to the spatio-temporal configuration of Socrates’ condemnation and execution.\(^{2889}\) Socrates is fully committed to the philosophical trenches that he had managed to dig, tooth and nail, over half a century of thirsting after genuine knowledge.\(^{2890}\) He is committed to an ideal that is dramatized in the figure of Apollo and his oracle belonging to whose service is infinitely more compelling than one that caters to the needs of a bunch of bigots and buffoons.\(^{2891}\) His philosophical activity is a blessing free of charge to and not a punishment for the *polis*,\(^{2892}\) to be rewarded with public recognition and gratitude instead of being put on a trial.\(^{2893}\) And if the Athenians are reluctant to be thankful of the activities of this ‘gadfly’\(^{2894}\) that had made it his business to correct their fallacious ways, then *to daimonion* is there as a supernatural benediction that seeps an element of spirituality to all his acts. Although brief, the reference to the divine sign in the *Apologia* has notable politico-philosophical import. Now, Euthyphro had earlier warned Socrates that mention of his *daimonion* could put off the Athenians at court or other public proceedings for it might be seen as intentionally put forward to offend religious sensibilities.\(^{2895}\) Socrates, however, would have none of that, coming clean as he does with the exclamation that it is the divine sign “that debars me from entering public life.”\(^{2896}\) In other words, his detachment from political life is divine sanctioned, and rightfully so, he goes on to add, given *dêmos’* careless predilection for executing anyone that attempts to halt its blatantly senseless policies dead on its tracks. Hence the ultimate verdict on the democratic politics: “A true champion of justice … must necessarily confine himself to private life and leave politics

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2889 I, for one, conceive, in accord with Waterfield and Cartledge, Socrates’ conviction as one that fully satisfied the contemporary requirements of formal proceeding and justice. The chasm between the political, ethical and judicial notions of the classical Athenian society at the turn of the century and those of ours cannot be assumed away for the sake of purporting a melodramatic image of the death of the philosopher. Cartledge, *Democracy*, pp. 179.


2889 Likening himself to a Achilles incarnate in regard to his braving the danger of capital punishment to pursue his calling, Socrates delivers a tour de force that builds an explicit hierarchical differentiation between loyalty to *polis* and to god’s commands: “This being so, it would be shocking inconsistency on my part, gentlemen, if when the officers whom you chose to command me assigned me my position at Potidaea and Amphipolis and Delium, I remained at my post like anyone else and faced death, and yet afterwards, when God appointed me, as I supposed and believed, to the duty of leading the philosophic life, examining myself and others, I were then through fear of death or of any other danger to desert my post.” Plato, *Apology*, 28d10-29a1; Waterfield conceives the oracle as a fiction of Plato which was instantly recognised by Xenophon due to his intimate knowledge of Socrates himself. According to his interpretation, the two philosophers, then, consciously transposed the motif to a full-blown *muthos* owing to its serviceability for their own philosophical aims. Waterfield, *Why Socrates Died*, pp. 11; cf. Malcolm Schofield, ‘The Noble Lie’, in *The Cambridge Companion to Plato’s Republic*, ed. by G. R. F. Ferrari, (Cambridge, 2007), pp. 138-164.

2889 The material gibe is, of course, intended at the sophists: Plato, *Apology*, 31a9-c4.


2889 Plato, *Apology*, 31d4-5.
alone. Put differently, the spiritual ban on engaging in institutionalised politics that is evoked by his daimonion is further reinforced by his experiential knowledge about the workings of the Athenian democratic politics. Overriding in its irrationality, the democratic politics of Athens is thus rectified by a rationalised understanding of religion that harkens back to Xenophanes’ earlier fragments on one rational god. Forming the main strands of this rationalised religion are the early stirrings of an inherently just and orderly universe of the immortals who also take a keen interest in the social affairs of the mortals’ world.

That rationalised universe serves as an ideal for any contemporary socio-political arrangements to be modelled after, showing that an innately more just and good alternative polity to democracy is within the realm of possibilities. Plato’s introduction of the Laws of Athens as a dramatic character in the Crito, as such, is a deification of the Athenian nomoi who provided the comfortable conditions of Socrates’ upbringing, enabling him to voluntarily pursue his own calling and question the root-and-branch Athenian démos with respect to their ungrounded customs and customary ways of thinking. The purpose of this deification is twofold: to vindicate that a philosophy of living well can be expected to abide by the contemporary laws and conventions only if the practitioners of nomoi themselves manage to establish justice and goodness as the two pillars upon which all their judgments will stand and to lay the foundations of an alternative philosophy of death if the judges fail in that task. Now, the foremost aim of the philosopher, as Socrates puts it, is “not to live, but to live well.”

To live well, we ought to add, in accordance with the dictates of aretê which are unveiled, as we saw above, by the true philosopher who has devoted his life to a study and improvement of contemporary mores and morality. Nomos, according to that view, exists in order to facilitate the delivery of the prospective sage from his or her self-proclaimed cocoon of ignorance, which is unconsciously shared by the politai one and all, allowing him or her to spread his or her wings that will badger and overwhelm the circle of interlocutors around him or her. With the butterfly beginning its hither and tither, it is up to laws to keep it safe and sound provided that it does not deign to approach on areas that are strictly designated as ‘no flight zones.’ There are no zones that are permanently closed down for flights of criticism or change within a democratic polity, to be sure; still, the very fact that nomoi have mainly the irrational démos for their master does not bode well for the prospects of any politico-philosophical improvement along aristocratic lines. And just as the démos is the master of the Law of Athens, so is the latter that of the philosopher regardless of how much of a genuine expert he or she

2897 Ibid, 32a1-3.
2898 Plato, Crito, 48b5.
2899 Kierkegaard, Philosophical Crumbs, 237.
may be. The butterfly’s plight, on this view, is to persuade the moths to congregate elsewhere and in alignment with different biocultural permutations.\(^{2900}\) Yet, given that moths are drawn to light just as much as \(dëmos\) to demagogues, the only end that awaits the butterfly as it attempts to fly closer to the congregated moths is to be burned out alive. For any butterfly that is reasonably wary of that prospect contemporary \(nomos\) is a vindictive tyrant.\(^{2901}\) And the guidance it provides, just like the unwavering loyalty it expects, is absolute. There is no middle ground in the tirade of Law of Athens, one either is a slave of it, i.e., a citizen, or an itinerant outsider that gallops around to find the polity after his or her own heart.\(^{2902}\) But for all the rhetorical chest-beating that the dramatized \(nomos\) commits itself, the historical backdrop that Plato draws against exposes the Achilles’ heel of the Athenian democratic \(nomos\) that is straightforwardly brought about in the context of the Apologia.

The legal rapport that is established between the butterfly and the guiding tyrannical vapours qua \(nomoi\), however, is reciprocal. Either democratically or oligarchically conceived, \(nomos\) cannot transgress its own boundaries thereby transforming into tyrannical prerogatives. In the event, however, Socrates had been the only steady obstacle in the way of that conversion on two separate accounts would have been etched in recent memory. In his ill-advised digress on how his \(daimonion\) prevents him from participating in political affairs, which is choke-full of risks at any rate, Socrates recounts an interesting episode on the \(paranomon\) trial of the Arginusae Eight. To reiterate, the eight \(strategoi\) who had led the Athenian fleet to victory at Arginusae in 406 were recalled to Athens to undergo trial for treason for their failure in rescuing capsized Athenian sailors that totalled to more than two thousand. Knowing what

\(^{2900}\) Plato, Crito, 52a1-4.

\(^{2901}\) We think it to be fairly certain that the imperative tone in which the tirade of Laws of Athens is delivered by Plato was far from being a chance occurrence. Move a couple of decades back from the possible dates assigned to Crito, and one would encounter a Thucydides already putting the charge of tyrannical behaviour into the mouth of his Pericles voiced against a shifty \(dëmos\) at the outset of the Peloponnesian War. There was something about the portrayal of \(dëmos\) qua tyrant that spoke to the fourth century aristocratic sentiment. What Plato did was to cap all the previous aristocratically-influenced writing with a brilliant insight: ‘rant and shout all you want, \(dëmos\) will not see the truth in genuine expertise, but change the \(nomos\) and you can tyrannise over the former tyrants themselves’: ‘[Laws of Athens speaking] Then since you [Socrates] have been born and brought up and educated, can you deny, in the first place, that you were our child and slave, both you and your ancestors? And if this is so, do you imagine that your rights and ours are on a par, and that whatever we try to do to you, you are justified in retaliating? Though you did not have equality of rights with your father, or master if you had one, to enable you to retaliate, and you were not allowed to answer back when you were scolded or hit back when you were beaten, nor to a great many other things of the same kind, will you be permitted to do it to your country and its Laws, so that if we try to put you to death in the belief that it is just to do so, you on your part will try your hardest to destroy your country and us its Laws in return? … [Do you not realize] That you must either persuade your country or do whatever it orders, and patiently submit to any punishment that it imposes, whether it be flogging or imprisonment?” Plato, Crito, 50e2-51a7, 51b4-7.

\(^{2902}\) Ibid, 51d.
kind of reception that they would get full-well, two of the strategoi fled elsewhere, whilst the other six were condemned en bloc contrary to the express commands of legal procedure. According to Plato’s account, Socrates was the sole voice of reason among the frenzied boulesteis who made the illegal decision to try and condemn the strategoi in a summary trial. Now, Socrates then moves on to deliver an additional account of another illegal act that he refused to implement despite being goaded by the oligarchs during the reign of the Thirty Tyrants. So, in a sense, the two accounts cancel each other off to pronounce one essential truth: that Socrates was the only guardian of nomos when practically everyone else around him were stacked in the side of tyrannical prerogative. On a deeper level of historical and political idiosyncrasy, however, the two examples do anything but balance each other out. Plato had no illusions about the fact that the reign of the Thirty Tyrants can at best be defined as a temporary state of exception where the force of law was substituted with brute force. The historical case of the Thirty tasking Socrates and four others to fetch Leon of Salamis from his home for execution was thus only a personal account that was basically l’ordre de jour for an oligarchic regime that did not have any pretence of legality about it. Indeed, Plato’s Socrates concedes as much when he remarks that the event was one among many others of similar nature, thus hinting at the unlawful basis of the regime. The democratically constituted boulê that made the decision to illegally condemn the strategoi to death in a summary trial, on the other hand, was anything but a state of oligarchic exception with hardly any claim to legal legitimacy. Démos’ pushing the political envelope beyond the consented constraints of legality, thus, made the act a true exemplar of the essence of democratic discretion, temporarily shelving legality so that an atrocity of prime order could be committed with the common consent of all. Plato recognised the point, noting that the illegality of the act was recognised later by all. Seen

2903 “It so happened that our tribe Antiochis was presiding when you decided that the ten (sic) commanders who had failed to rescue the men who were lost in the naval engagement should be tried en bloc; which was illegal, as you all recognized later. On this occasion I was the only member of the executive who opposed your acting in any way unconstitutionally, and voted against the proposal; and although the public speakers were all ready to denounce and arrest me, and you were all urging them on at the top of your voices, I thought that it was my duty to face it out on the side of law and justice rather than support you, through fear of prison or death, in your wrong decision.” Plato, Apology, 32a10-c3; Waterfield, Why Socrates Died, pp. 118.

2904 Forsdyke appears to have missed this point when she contrasted the oligarchic reign of terror with the democratic moderation of the utilization of paranomon decrees. Apart from that, however, her comparison of the two historical cases seems to the point: “If we turn, however, to the events of the oligarchic revolutions at the end of the fifth century, we find a stark contrast between the oligarchs’ administration of justice and the justice meted out by the democrats. Whereas the oligarchs murdered and banished citizens en masse without trial, the democracy, after restoration, held regular trials and showed remarkable tolerance toward its political opponents.” Forsdyke, Exile, Ostracism, and Democracy, pp. 181.

2905 “This [the fetching of Leon of Salamis] was of course only one of many instances in which they [the Thirty] issued such instructions, their object being to implicate as many people as possible in their crimes.” Ibid, 32c7-10.

2906 Ibid, 32b5.
in that light, the full force of Socrates’ almost blind obedience to nomos at the end of Critio is revealed. Plato’s Socrates defers to the tyrannical edicts of the Law of Athens despite having seen that the presupposed reciprocity between democratic laws and citizens is broken with the most horrendous of acts. Socrates could not escape from his punishment, in that sense, because his drinking of the hemlock was the ultimate victory against the tyrannical nomoi of his polis, showing his resonating refusal to play a part in the democratic plot. With the vaporisation of the essential relationship between the politai and nomos, the Law of Athens was exposed for what it actually was: a tyrant. And in choosing to die by the word of the tyrant, Socrates managed to dissipate any lingering doubts about the political legitimacy of the democratic nomos. As the irrationality of democratic polity was fully exposed, degrading deliberative providence of the most renowned of the instances of collective rule, all that remained for Plato was to rationalise the workings of divine providence itself. An interplay that was brought out in full in the context of cosmogonic works that form a trilogy of their own: Timaeus, Critias and Phaedo.

6.3.2 Plato’s Cosmogony and Cosmology in Later Dialogues

When examined superficially, there is not much of a basis of convergence between the full-fledged account of cosmogony rendered in Timaeus and the surviving parts of Critias, and the immortality of the soul that is argued by Plato as the core philosophical element of Phaedo. In contrast to Timaeus’ and Critias’ concentration on the ‘crafting’ of the world, in Phaedo we have an elaboration of some of the major rudiments pertaining to the hierarchical superiority of soul over body. We think, however, that a clear back-and-forth between the core arguments of the works can be postulated to exist on persuasive grounds. To that end, the thematic difference of the dialogues need not discourage us from attempting to construct a politico-philosophical bridge to posit the works under the canopy of a morally and politically construed cosmogony. On that note, we conceive of four principal highways of interrelationality that appear to be capable of uniting the dialogues by token of their relation to the socio-political issues that Plato tackled with: a teleological purport of heavens and the life after death; a comprehension of psuchê as the principle of motion governing the body; an ethical depiction of afterlife as offering the chief objective of life, i.e., to become like god; and an argument from design that predicates the orderly perception of heavens.

2907 For a more conventional reading of the whole episode as demonstrating Socrates’ devotion to the spirit of nomos, if not to its application in his trial, see Ober, ‘Political Conflicts, Political Debates, and Political Thought’, pp. 130-131.
Timaeus has a pattern of explanation of natural phenomena that is built entirely along teleological lines. Plato’s cosmos is one that was produced by a demiourgos, imposing order on natural flux for the simple fact that order is better than chaos in all its dimensions. Of course, there had been other philosophical accounts, like that of Anaxagoras as we analysed above, that predated Plato’s while postulating a roughly similar cosmic intelligence to stabilise a chaotic pre-existence. But given that Plato’s artificially built order covered not only an initial dispensation of the elements in flux but also ensured a stable existence thereafter for all things animate and inanimate, it appears rather evident that the difference in the teleological ordering of the universe between Plato’s and Anaxagoras’ respective accounts was not one of mere degree. There is perpetual orderliness, according to Plato’s view, to the incessant movement of the celestial spheres with their faultless constancy, translating into a regularity of the natural affairs of our own sphere. Translating that measure of regularity into concord and harmony that can be grasped by the workings of human reason and intelligence, Plato combined his conception of cosmos with a partially modified Parmenidean logic to occasion a divide between things that always exist but never come to be and others that come to be but never exist. Inherent to the ‘always is,’ was considered an intelligibility by the rational faculty, pitted against the ‘never is,’ which can only be the subject of unreasoning sensations. Further, given that all existing objects can be preconceived to have been created by some cause, Plato, then, asserted that our universe is also created by some divine artificer. As our natural universe has an orderly functioning of its own, moreover, it is evident that the divine demiurge has acted through sheer goodwill in creating order out of chaos by fashioning all the pre-existent cosmic material into a mould that was a duplicate of an eternal model that had been created before. Given our brief probe into the rationale beneath the cosmogonic teleologism as it is espoused in the Timaeus, the driving force of Plato’s argument can be seen for what it is: the organisation of the universe is so concordant that neither its creation nor its maintenance can be viably explained as a chance event of the Empedoclean kind. No: a rational mind has created the universe and continues to govern it in accord with an original model, voluntarily selecting what is best with respect to the principles of unity, beauty and simplicity. That chain of teleological reasoning which informs Plato’s teleological inferences can be seen, for example, in his induction from visual experience, affording us with a measure of visibility of night and day, seasons, etc., thereby allowing us to conceive of numbers in addition to concepts

2908 “[Socrates speaking] Our starting-point lies, I think, in the following distinction: what is it that always is, but never comes to be, and what is it that comes to be but never is? The former, since it is always consistent, can be grasped by the intellect with the support of a reasoned account, while the latter is the object of belief, supported by unreasoning sensation, since it is generated and passes away, but never really is.” Plato, Timaeus, in Timaeus and Critias, trans. by Robin Waterfield, (Oxford and New York, 2008), 28d7-28a4.

2909 Jones, The Epicurean Tradition, pp. 52-53.
such as time thus leading, ultimately, to the inquiry into the physical workings of the universe. Through that development of our inquisitive capacity, we, then, manage to take a firm step towards philosophy in general, the greatest boon that was ever bestowed upon the mortals.\textsuperscript{2910} Assuming that the gods purposefully granted the benefit of eyesight to us, which follows from the maxim of ‘no existence without causally-informed creation,’ so that we can observe the rational revolutions in the celestial sphere, the final niche in the rationale is filled with a moral: we need to tune our revolutions of thought to the natural model that is provided by the heavens above.\textsuperscript{2911}

The teleological cosmogony of Plato involves nothing less than a complete ex-temporalisation and ex-spatialization of the element of chance itself.\textsuperscript{2912} Indeed, no multiplicity of atoms forming into a vortex by pure chance, as the early atomists might have believed,\textsuperscript{2913} or chance meetings of some of the early bodily parts that were created at the universe’s inception, thereby generating ‘Bull-headed man-nature creatures,’\textsuperscript{2914} as Empedocles argued, can be admitted into this teleologically comprehended cosmos. Interestingly, that purge of arbitrariness from cosmogony also appears to have informed Plato’s philosophy of dying well as it was elucidated in the \textit{Phaedo}. Dramatically set in the last round of philosophical discussions between Simmias, Cebes and a Socrates who is patiently waiting for his apportioned share of hemlock, the dialogue sharpens the erstwhile philosophical hierarchy between \textit{psuchê} and

\textsuperscript{2910}“It follows from what I’ve been saying that sight is enormously beneficial for us, in the sense that, if we couldn’t see the stars and the sun and the sky, an account such as I’ve been giving of the universe would be completely impossible. As things are, however, the visibility of day and night, of months and the circling years, of equinoxes and solstices, resulted in the invention of number, gave us the concept of time, and made it possible for us to enquire into the nature of the universe. These in their turn have enabled us to equip ourselves with philosophy in general, and humankind has never been nor ever will be granted by the gods a greater good than philosophy.” Plato, \textit{Timaeus}, 47a-b3.

\textsuperscript{2911}“That is, the gods wanted us to make a close study of the circular motions of the heavens, gain the ability to calculate them correctly in accordance with their nature, assimilate ours to the perfect evenness of the god’s, and to stabilize the wandering revolutions within us.” \textit{Ibid}, 47c2-6.

\textsuperscript{2912}On that note, we agree with Sedley’s positing of Plato’s understanding of chance in a primordial aetiological sphere that precedes the formation of any \textit{tecnê}, the upholding of justice included: “Nature and chance are causally primary, craft is derivative from them. Thus at the theory’s very heart lies the principle, here making an early appearance prior to Aristotle’s celebrated use of it, that craft is posterior to and derivative from nature. What nature starts, craft merely steps in to imitate or enhance.” David Sedley, ‘The Atheist Underground’, in \textit{Politeia in Greek and Roman Philosophy}, pp. 342.


\textsuperscript{2914}Empedocles, F. 61; we accept Inwood’s point that Plato’s and Aristotle’s respective rejections of Empedocles’ earlier appeal to chance events and random causation can be taken as secondary proof concerning Empedocles’ status as the best-attested classical example of a non-teleological account of the origins of humankind. With the dislocation of chance, Plato, and Aristotle after him, conjured an illusion of a perfectly rule-governed universe in tune with the natural \textit{telos} of the species: Brad Inwood, ‘Commentary’, in \textit{The Poem of Empedocles}, pp. 73.
To Plato’s Socrates, death at his philosophically enlightened stage seems a welcome prospect, a release from constant distractions of the body to a higher existence wherein the pitfalls of corporeality will not disturb the still waters of contemplation. Having lived and preached a life that shunned carnal pleasures and material wealth as serious drifts from the philosophical endeavour throughout his days, Socrates has reached an erudition in knowledge that makes him feel already half dead. And what half-life remains with him yearns for the final retreat of the soul from the internal limits of the body. When all is said and done, the body is just a composition of inaccurate appurtenances, dragging the investigative part of the soul ever-deeper into the realm of appearances. A growing detachment from the body and any kind of physical contact is, hence, a prerequisite to attain philosophical erudition. That prerequisite detachment is, however, only half of the bill that is promised by Plato’s modified understanding of the duality between the body and soul as it is purported in the *Phaedo*. On that note, a pronounced hierarchisation of the dyad is brought forth by Plato in his depiction of *psuchê* as indestructible. According to his rendition, the soul necessarily needs to partake of eternity in order for it to attain the comprehension of the corporeal state to ideas that are much more accurate than simple perceptions. There are times that Plato appears to be quite the master of putting the logical cart before the empirical horse, and his arguments for the immortality of the soul fares no different. Soul’s immortality unequivocally shows, in that vein, that bodily existence is only an adjunct to an eternal subsistence. Precious as it is, the fleeting corporeality is only a last chance to exhibit one’s worthiness to partake of the road to freedom that will begin anew at the person’s death. Whether the chance is leaped at or not, the soul continues its journey through the realm of essences, reaping what it had sown during its brief sojourn on the earth. And yet, just as Plato’s cosmogony is wedded to cosmology by his trenchant claim that there can only be a divine cause for the circular regularity in the motion of celestial bodies, so does a similar teleology inform the state of pure existence that the deserving philosopher is able to reach at the moment of his or her death.

Plato’s teleological philosophy is as much an aside to the old *phusiologoi* as it is to the *sophistai* as well as the demagogues who, in turn, fill the minds of the gullible *demos* with unphilosophical gibberish. The soul’s undisputed governance of the body as it is canvassed in the *Phaedo* evinces a hermeneutic resonance in the sphere of cosmic phenomena along the

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2915 Cf. “[Socrates speaking] In my view physical excellence does not of itself produce a good mind and character; on the other hand, excellence of mind and character will make the best of the physique it is given.” Plato, *Republic*, 403d2-4.


2917 “Surely the soul can reason best when it is free of all distractions such as hearing or sight or pain or pleasure of any kind – that is, when it leaves the body to its own devices, becomes as isolated as possible, and strives for reality while avoiding as much physical contact and association as it can.” *Ibid*, 65c4-8.
lines of a conception of regularity as stemming from divine origins. Macrocosmically, Plato construes regular and orderly behaviour as a clear indication of forces beyond mere chance and necessity. In cosmogonic and cosmologic terms both, the world-soul is constituted from sameness, being and difference. Sameness and difference make up the two revolutions that keep it in a perfectly regular condition. There is intelligence to the judgments that the world-soul makes about its three constituents in regard to the material objects it encounters. In terms of aetiology and eschatology, likewise, everything is governed by a cosmic intelligence, arranging things in an orderly manner, whose workings can only be discerned by theorising alone. Microcosmically, sameness, being and difference also constitute the human soul though the mix is less ideal than it is in the case of that of the world soul. Again, similar to the world-soul, the human soul has a pair of mental revolutions despite the apparent measure of irregularity that is inherent to it. The primary distinction of the world soul from human soul is, of course, that when the latter is bound to human bodies that results in a state of constant disruption in the revolution of our minds due to the adverse effect of sensations. Because of that, our primary goal should be to devote ourselves to a life of theory which is the only viable way of becoming as much like the world soul, i.e., god, as possible, approximating to the ideal of perfectly regular mental revolutions. Plato’s cosmogonic and aetiological teleology introduces, therefore, a carefully thought-out hierarchy between the soul and body whereby the former is trumpeted as the rational ruler of everything bestial in us.

Now, to this point there does not seem to be much of a development in Plato’s understanding of the duality of body and soul. But that is only because we have refrained thus far from venturing into the crux of his elaboration: the celebrated theory of forms is concocted by Plato to aid him in his attempt to philosophically prove the existence of an afterlife. Socrates needs to convince his interlocutors that his joy at his imminent death is neither unphilosophical bravado nor the vainglorious sage displaying a disinterest in living itself. He mainly draws from two arguments to do that, an argument from opposites and his famous theory of recollection. His argument from opposites plays on the theme of dialectical relativity of qualifiers, signalling constant multilinear movement between the opposites. When a thing becomes smaller, for example, it only does so in comparison to an initial frame at which it was larger and vice versa. That universal process of change also informs the dialectical opposition between the living and dead, which, in turn, indicates that souls continue to exist after death. In short, the processes of change and generation can only be conceived to exist if we take it for granted that actual ideas denoting the qualifiers have a separate existence than all the relativistic output of sensory experience. Similarly, his theory of recollection is predicated on the presupposed existence of clear concepts, such as equality and difference, which are taken
to form an upper echelon of rational reference that we resort to every time when we conceive similarities or dissimilarities of any kind. Either way, the actual predicate is a developed theory of forms that Socrates had earlier confirmed at the introduction to his happiness at his approaching death. The forms have a distinguished order of existence that can only be glimpsed theoretically without the aid of any sensory data; in fact, the less interruption from the senses there is, the better. Appertaining to an undiluted existence that is apprehended, again, along the absence of change, the forms exhume a realm of ideational purity that constitutes the theoretical basis of all the empirical evidence from which we glean in our daily lives. We perceive an object as either big or small not because we give free rein to epistemic relativism, but for our incessant harking back to the eternal forms themselves, grasping what is entailed in the notion of equality or difference without ever having been instructed in their specifics. And yet, our empirical grasp of the notions can carry us only so far as to the doorstep that separates the realm of ever-dubitable empirical cognition from that of the assured epistemological certainty of the things in themselves. To open that door to the realm of abstract perfection we need not only to live by the principles of Socratic teaching, but also to die by them. With the theorisation of the realm of forms, the circle is complete: Plato had made his Socrates consent to the tyranny of the Law of Athens in Crito, now he has built a tyrannical regime of first-order existence to replace the overreaching nomoi. Socrates’ death connotes the passing away of the old democratic configuration of moral existence, with the rational part of the soul swinging the censer and holding the sceptre that heralds it as the ruler of the actual order of existence.

Cosmic teleology goes hand in hand with the higher order of existence promised to the souls of the worthy in the afterlife. In Timaeus and Phaedo both, Plato’s philosophy has a lot to offer to the prospective students who are willing to adhere to his principles. His protreptic myths of reincarnation and afterlife at the end of Timaeus and Phaedo, respectively, show Plato at his best in promising compensations and punishments with equal aptitude. In Timaeus’ version, which is predicated upon the tripartite division of the soul as it is explained in the Republic and Phaedrus, only those who endeavour to cultivate the rational part of their souls by engaging in philosophic contemplation are merited to bask in the light of god’s likeness. A life that is in tune with the dictates of reason which appear to have drawn especially from the sôphrosunê of Charmides, according to Plato’s metempsychosist myth in Timaeus, is one that

2918 Ibid, 65d-66b.
2919 “[Socrates speaking] … We are in fact convinced that if we are ever to have pure knowledge of anything, we must get rid of the body and contemplate things in isolation with the soul in isolation.” Ibid, 66e1-3.
has managed to reach the ultimate level of affiliation to the heavenly region.\(^{2920}\) Another life that was spent in the tight grip of bodily appetites is, contrariwise, bound to remain as “mortal as a man can be.”\(^{2921}\) Not satisfied with this rather simplistic duality, Plato then moves on to render a more detailed account of migration of souls that are graded in conjunction with how much of the intellect of the person was applied to the learning of true knowledge. Woman, as Plato’s elaboration goes, were former men who were reborn women as a result of the unmanly and immoral lives they had, whereas the stargazers were to reborn as lightweight birds due to their hare-brained insistence on making observations personally before forming inferences concerning the celestial bodies.\(^{2922}\) With the additions of land animals as the reincarnation of the crudest of all men who closeness to the ground stem from the mindlessness they exhibited through their lives and aquatic creatures as the reincarnation of the most ignorant and dumbest men, who were deemed undeserving even to breathe fine air, to the motley animal farm,\(^{2923}\) the moral is complete: the more detached a life is spent from any effort to attain philosophical knowledge, the more inhuman the soul will become. And if Plato’s myth in Critias is a little too embittered, then there is Phaedo’s more picturesque punishments that wait just around the corner. In Phaedo’s more explicitly eschatological terms, the wise and disciplined soul that had not heeded the corporeal appetites can grow accustomed to the invisible world of the afterlife with ease, finding his or her way to divine company and guidance to participate in its natural state.\(^{2924}\) Those others that had led unruly lives at the behest of carnal pleasures, however, write and struggle for all their powerlessness until they are finally overcome with the force of circumstance to serve their time, sometimes never to return.\(^{2925}\) Worse yet, if the unruliness had reached a climax of certain impurity while the body was still alive, then the soul is spurned and avoided by all, roaming alone in complete isolation until its allotted time of punishment has passed.\(^{2926}\) Even at his most forgiving, Plato was still a stern headmaster, setting up numerous eschatological haywires that meandered through his teachings, giving it an unmistakable zest.

\(^{2920}\) Plato, Timaeus, 90e4-91a1.

\(^{2921}\) Ibid, 91b7.

\(^{2922}\) Ibid, 90e7-91a3; 91d8-e2.

\(^{2923}\) Ibid, 91e2-92a9; 92b-c4.

\(^{2924}\) Plato, Phaedo, 108c4-6.

\(^{2925}\) “Those [of the newly dead] who are judged to have lived a neutral life set out for Acheron, and embarking in those vessels which await them, are conveyed in them to the lake; and there they dwell, and undergoing purification are both absolved by punishment from any sins that they have committed, and rewarded for their good deeds, according to each man’s deserts. Those who on account of the greatness of their sins are judged to be incurable – people who have committed many gross acts of sacrilege or many wicked and lawless murders or any other such crimes – these are hurled by their appropriate destiny into Tartarus, from whence they emerge no more.” Ibid, 113d5-e5.

\(^{2926}\) Ibid, 108b5-c3.
Plato also managed to construct an eternal guardian that would watch any trespassers of the moral guidelines had been articulated every so often. His argument from design, or the fourth and final quality of his cosmogonic and cosmological writings in our list, served as the final measure prompting the divide between earthly tremors and heavenly solace. Looking at the stars, Plato’s Socrates saw the workings of an impeccable creator, a ‘public worker,’ which is the literal meaning of *demiourgos*, who had produced a masterpiece of a universe by relying solely on eternal models and imperfect pre-existing material. That public worker was a benevolent geometer god that had to wrangle with his own share of necessity as the material that he was provided with was entirely chaotic. Despite the odds, however, the unnatural artificer partially prevailed over necessity in crafting a universe that was infused with a soul that allowed it to stand on its own.  

What Socrates conceived while gazing at stars and planets, on this view, was a steady conviction that our cosmos is the only world there is which has been designed. Regimented by a conductor that has fashioned the best of all possibilities given the limitations he faced in regard to his working material, the universe glowed in all its awe-inspiring splendour, dazing the lay onlooker and enticing the philosophically-inclined with its rays of brilliance. Any trace of chance creeping into this scheme of interpretation would prevent Plato from doing justice to the work of that divine intelligence. No: a full acknowledgment of his design was the only way to give full credit to the demiurge while utilising that poetic credit to persuade the young upper-class Athenians to follow in Socrates’ footsteps. Looking at his looming sip from the cup filled with hemlock, Plato’s Socrates, likewise, observed a moral universe behind the appearances, a universe in which a genuine gadfly of a philosopher would be made to feel at home with hardly any public prosecutors to butt heads with or orders to be stationed at another front. His Athens had proven to be a steady source of agony and ecstasy alike, but his true bliss was to come after his execution. Just as Socrates had triumphed over Meletus’ charges on moral grounds, so does the Law of Hades trump over the Law of Athens no matter how pre-eminent the latter is supposed to be. Plato’s demiurge in *Timaeus* was a god that was subject to the natural law of necessity, providing other historical subjects thereof, i.e., Plato’s fellow philosophers and pupils, with a clear model to emulate. Unlike the capricious divinities of Homer, the Platonic demiurge was an entity who acted rationally and had a curious interest in geometry. Growing in the likeness of gods and goddesses, thence, became an ideal to be philosophically purveyed to the Athenian young.

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2927 There are many accounts of the creation of the universe in Plato’s dialogues, including the famous Myth of Er in the *Republic*, that differ on many points regarding the condition of the universe following its generation. In *Statesman*, for instance, the cosmos is, again, depicted as a living entity, whereas in *Republic* it is not referred to as one. Further, contrary to its rather self-sufficient portrayal in *Timaeus*, the cosmos of *Statesman* was one that began to recede to primordial chaos after the depart of its divine ‘helmsman.’ Plato, *Republic*, 616c; *Statesman*, 273b; *Phaedo*, 108e.
And even if *Phaedo* does not feature any divinity that resemble *Timaeus’* demiurge, it did not hesitate to render a picturesque account of the incorporeal bliss that was imagined to await its holy occupants. Striving to become god’s moral avatar on earth was, therefore, singled out as the worthiest of earthly occupations which cut both ways in regard to its links to the relations of production and reproduction.

In terms of morality, Plato’s bringing god back into the mortal realm of aspirations heralded a novel understanding of social existence in which humans could attempt to follow the Platonic guidelines for partaking of a higher degree of morality. Plato’s moral scheme of gifts and penances was sufficiently straightforward for the rank-and-file Athenian population who were having a rough time dealing with all the socio-economic insecurity that had not been the case before. Though we do not know to what extent, if any, Plato extracted the philosophical ideas of transmigration and immortality of soul from the contemporary teachings of either Orphism or Pythagoreans, it is clear that by weaving the two threads together onto his moral tapestry he might have managed, for the first time, to wrest the notion of rational god away from the ethical possession of cults. That was no minor solace: in a historical setting in which the Athenians were increasingly powerless to cope with either the Spartans or Thebans, Plato’s clear-cut ethical universe showed, despite its assuredly limited readership, that there still was a moral ideal to hold on to. With their solid wealth and military power vanishing from sight, the Athenians came to treasure any hope, however small or false, as in the case of Isocrates’ plead to Philip, that appeared to fortify the brittle position of their *polis*. That included any moral reinforcement that would re-forged the chains that linked the Athenian upper classes to their lower-class compatriots. It was unfortunate that Plato’s moral universe did ask for a steep price from the rank-and-file *thètes* to deliver its intoxicating promises: an unshakable loyalty to the Athenian upper classes.

Plato’s geometer god took back what moral solace he offered to the Athenian lower classes with a high socio-political interest. Based on ethically equalising premises, his theory of

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2928 “But those who are judged to have lived a life of surpassing holiness – these are they who are released and set free from imprisonment in these regions of the earth, and passing upward to their pure abode, make their dwelling upon the earth’s surface. And of these such as have purified themselves sufficiently by philosophy live thereafter altogether without bodies, and reach habitations even more beautiful …” Plato, *Phaedo*, 114b9-c5.

2929 Plato’s ideal programme of anti-democratic reform, as aptly noted by Barry Strauss, also fuelled his endeavour to rewrite some of the historical nodal points through which the cultural ethos of the early fourth-century Athenian polity was formed. Recounting a twisted tale of the fierce Athenian opposition to the Persian invasions with no mention of the crucial naval engagements at Salamis and Artemisium served that end of assuming away the historical part that was played by triremes and their rowers for the sake of entrenching the aristocratic culture of hoplites: Plato, *Laws*, 707b-d; Barry S. Strauss, ‘The Athenian Trireme, School of Democracy’, in *Demokratia*, pp. 318-319.
recollection, as we will reflect on presently, or his rethinking of the immortality and transmigration of soul, were all in tune with political needs of the fourth century polis which was shifting notably towards being a paradise of euergetism.\textsuperscript{2930} By the end of the fifth century, the upper classes were already well on their way to become the dependable beneficiaries of their dēmos. As the arteries of imperial profit came to be severed, grain doles and liturgies began to shine with more conspicuousness for the upper and lower classes alike. In return for the good deeds they had previously rendered on their poorer compatriots the super-rich and the other upper-class Athenians who shouldered the economic burden came to expect certain privileges in regard to all the public affairs they conducted.\textsuperscript{2931} If they were summoned to give an account of their exploits, such as heavy-handing their fellow citizens or encroaching on the boundaries of their lands, at heliaia, they appeared with a speech that was written and sold by any one of the most-renowned speechwriters of their day, spelling it out, however subtly, that the services they had undertaken for the love of their polis did not warrant any such backhanded treatment. It was mostly to their listeners that the core equalising principles of the Platonic morality were addressed. And while the Platonic sermon had a certain levelling effect on the contemporary understanding of morality, it promised its blissful afterlife only for those souls who had devoted their bodily existence to the pursuit of philosophical knowledge, wilfully growing ever-distant from their bodies in order to curb its pejorative influence.\textsuperscript{2932} To the vast majority of thêtes, who had to no other option than to engage in paid menial labour, at times in a variety of occupations, the prospect of being reincarnated as fish or earthly beasts or serving their allotted penitence in the otherworld was the Plato’s equalising change in morality, forsooth. Knowing full well that the majority of the dēmos had to carve out a living in what seemed to him as unintelligent and disrespectful occupations, Plato took the archaic morality, re-stamped it with irrational animalism and formed a strictly upper-class Orphism whose Sermon on the Mountain promised only the most limited of the spiritual gains to those who had not unwrapped their bestiality for whatever reason.\textsuperscript{2933} As far as he was concerned,


\textsuperscript{2931} Josiah Ober has aptly shown the intrinsic relationship between past liturgies and general tenor of the surviving legal defences of the rich Athenians that came to be established as a chief attribute of the fourth-century Athenian courtrooms: Ober, \textit{Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens}, pp. 231-234; Paul Millett, “The Rhetoric of Reciprocity in Classical Athens’, in \textit{Reciprocity in Ancient Greece}, ed. by C. Gill \textit{et alii}, (Oxford, 1998b), pp. 239-251 with reference; for a recent assessment of the historical dimensions of reciprocity in classical Greece with focus on the concepts of philia and charis, see Tazuko van Berkel, \textit{The Economics of Friendship: Conceptions of Reciprocity in Classical Greece}, (Leiden and Boston, 2019).

\textsuperscript{2932} Cf. Wood, \textit{Citizens to Lords}, pp. 72.

\textsuperscript{2933} Socrates’ drawing of the explicit contrast between mechanical and contemplative lives in his revaluation of genuine philosophy is a fitting case to illustrate this point: “For when they [second-rate
there was nothing substantial to hold back the lower classes from devoting their intellectual energy entirely to a life of erudition, giving the shortest possible answers to the calls of nature that were of a more bestial kind. But to those sizeable parts of the Athenian society who saw the three-obol payments on military campaigns or public service as veritable life-savers, a world of differences seemed to separate their material existence from following the Platonic ideal of developing the rational part of the soul. Plato’s cosmogony and cosmology made up only one part of his mature philosophy, having grown in tandem, as we partially saw above, with a multi-faceted epistemology that split sapience into actual knowledge and true or false belief. It is to the socio-political ramifications of that division that we now turn.

6.3.3 Plato’s Epistemology in Earlier Dialogues
Plato’s epistemology always fought its battles simultaneously on two fronts: against pro-democratic epistemological relativism of the old philosophers and the commercialised moral relativism of many of the later sophists. Forming the first step in his rumination on and classification of various branches of knowledge, in that vein, were Plato’s early and middle dialogues that had an interlocutor who had his feet philosophically wet, sometimes significantly more than a younger and more unsure picture of Socrates. Protagoras and Gorgias are not only two of the most recognisable examples of such dialogues, they are also prominent in elucidating the course that Plato’s own epistemology had taken by the time he wrote Meno and Symposium. We propose, in that vein, to focus on three epistemological pillars that Plato appears to have erected in the first two dialogues to be developed later in the remaining two. The pillars in question are: a presupposition of the layperson’s inability to concede political expertise to his betters; a preconception of the formal defunction of the sophist education; and an emphasis on the moral bankruptcy that is espoused by some strands of the sophist teachings. Plato always had a score to settle with the sophists, degrading as they were the whole aristocratic tradition of paideia, not to mention their detraction from the publicly recognised value of the philosophers of the yore. To his eyes, paideia was there to be leisurely pondered upon in an amateurish manner without a view to acquiring it as a technê, or a skill or proficiency, to be passed on to others in exchange for coin. 2934 Centred upon the

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2934 Socrates’ chiding remark to young Hippocrates who asked for his help in arranging a meeting with Protagoras in order to discuss his hiring as a professional teacher to the effect that one should be ashamed to present oneself to the polis as a sophist is substantiated by his following separation of gentlemanly and professionalised pursuits: “But then perhaps that isn’t the sort of study you expect to
theme of the teachability of *aretê*, his *Protagoras* is dotted with snide quips and subtle puns at the sophists who had not even come to realise that the proficiency that they offered could not be taught to an arrogant and ignorant Athenian *dēmos*. His argument goes like this: the Athenians have a penchant for sending their rational faculties to work only in matters of purely technical expertise, such as sending for the expert builders when they set out to construct a building or for carpenters when they commission a new fleet. When it comes to matters of political import, however, the Athenians act no better than null-headed ignoramuses leaving the *bêma* to anyone who ventured to voice his incoherent rumblings, be he rich or poor, noble or lower-class, *banausoi* or artist, etc. Further muddying the waters of *aretê* is the fact that even the foremost supposedly democratic politicians of the day, e.g., Pericles, were not able to personally succeed in seeing to the transmission of their understanding of political excellence to the closest members of their families. In the event only thing that a hard-pressed Pericles could do to curtail the derogatory influence of Alcibiades on his younger brother was to ship the latter away so that the ‘corruption’ would not spread. So, if neither the low-born democrats nor their blue-blooded peers are able either to recognise or to transmit political *aretê*, then it is clear that excellence, contrary to what Protagoras argues, cannot be taught. Whether dutifully rendered or not, Protagoras’ response to Socrates’ arguments constitutes the peerless summit of philosophically elaborated democratic thought among all the works that survive from the classical age.

Protagoras fuses his rumination with a demotic rendition of Prometheus’ travails, heralding the figure, just like Aeschylus had done, as the benefactor of all humankind. Skipping its details, the *muthos* presents a Prometheus who had to steal Hephaestus’ skill in working with fire and all other *technai* that Athena possessed in order to hand them over to humans so that they could have a fighting chance against the beasts all of which were better endowed to partake of the earthly food chain.2935 All those practical *technai* sufficed in allowing humankind to provide food, but was signally inadequate for ensuring their survival against the prowling beasts. Thinking that strength in numbers was the solution, humans, then, flocked into settlements and began founding *poleis*.2936 Their lack of any political *aretê* threatened, however, to crumble the shaky foundations of the newfound *poleis* as the humans began to treat each other with disdain and injustice. Seeing that the only entities that were akin to their

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creators were about to be wiped out from the entire cosmos, Zeus ordained Hermes to bring conscience and justice to the humankind, which were to be the foundation edicts governing the organisation of poleis. Not satisfied with the prospect of creating a select few of experts, moreover, Zeus ordered Hermes to apportion his gift of aretê on all the recipients equally, branding out anyone who was deemed not to have a share in conscience or justice as a plague to be brought down immediately.2937

Now, there are two levels of argument that should not be overlooked in Protagoras’ conclusion of the myth. On the first level rests Protagoras’ argument from incongruence: there is nothing congruent between political, which needs to be understood as everything relating to the affairs of the polis, aretê and all the other areas of technical expertise. Unlike skills in carpentry or construction, just and conscientious governance pertains to all. A politai is someone who not only lives in a polis but has an active voice in the formation of its politeia, or the bond of rulership bringing together all the dwellers on whom citizenship was conferred.2938 And such a common concern cannot be left to the purview, however benevolent, of a select few. Just as it is only fair to expect from experts in arts and crafts to form educated opinions in regard to specificities of how their trade should be carried out, so with the grassroots démós who daily reproduce their ties of politeia with their polis, whereby they grow adept in figuring out just how to make the best of the political relationships that they establish with the other politai. On a more ontological level, on the other hand, political aretê is the divine source of all the other technai which are firmly predicated upon the concordant living of a group of individuals.2939 If politike aretê is lost, then démós is lost, leading eventually to the demise of polis itself. Political aretê indicts us with responsibility not only to act more conscientiously and justly toward other citizens, but also to set up a system of corrective justice that makes it the common business of all citizens to act as rational judges of each other. The administration of justice in a polis in which all citizens are acknowledged to partake of political aretê does not function retributively as in the cringing souls of the wrongdoers who shout at the top of their lungs to those souls whose bodies have been wronged to be granted redemption from their suffering in Phaedo.2940 As an integral part of the political aretê, justice needs to be administered equally

2937 Plato, Protagoras, 322c4-9.
2938 Ibid, 322d1-5.
2939 “So that, Socrates, is why when there is a question about how to do well in carpentry or any other expertise, everyone including the Athenians thinks it right that only a few should give advice, and won’t put up with advice from anyone else, as you say—and quite right, too, in my view—but when it comes to consideration of how to do well in running the city, which must proceed entirely through justice and soundness of mind, they are right to accept advice from anyone, since it is incumbent on anyone to share in that sort of excellence, or else there can be no city at all.” Ibid, 322d5-323a4; cf. Wood, ‘Demos versus “We, the People”: Freedom and Democracy Ancient and Modern’, pp. 130.
2940 Plato, Phaedo, 114a5-b7.
by all, sharing the burden in judging and being judged in turn. Democratic administration of justice, in other words, is an education itself in political *aretê*, promoting social existence with signposts of prescription and proscription. And if our rendition, thus far, of Protagoras’ account has made his response to Socrates seem like an entirely abstract answer to just as abstract a question, we are happy to report that Plato’s Protagoras partially queried the material relations of production themselves in his attempt at substantiation.

Protagoras’ own brand of *paideia* is built upon a continuous education in politics whereby the individual is set about a steady course of development from cradle onwards. Having argued that each citizen has a claim to possess a certain modicum of political *aretê*, Protagoras attempts to render his argument lucid by giving the example of the steady course of education that is imposed on the Athenian youth. Beginning with the teaching of every word and deed that is deemed to be worthy of emulation as soon as “a child can understand what is said to him,” the aspiring citizen is then sent to school to receive the standard components of aristocratic *mousikê* whereby their minds as well as bodies are trained to be in the best condition as they possibly can be. If, however, the young citizen is not given his due share of civic education, then, this should redound on the material means of his or her family and should not be taken as an indirect implication of a lack of aptitude or interest in political affairs. Just look at how the wealthiest make their children slug through every brick in receiving the longest education of all, Protagoras argues, to confirm that political *aretê* is considered vital at least as much as it is regarded as the common property of all. Rounding off his argument with an ad hominem response to Socrates’ initial argument of a similar substance, Protagoras retorts that even the most gifted of politicians might end up having politically witless sons, which, like a professional aulos player’s son growing to be a hopeless aulos player, does not refute anything. Besides, Protagoras does not forget to add, a certain bare minimum of talent on account of one’s exhibited political *aretê* in the context of a democratic society would suffice to make him shine the brightest of all in a society wherein a total democratic education of the

2941 “For no one punishes a wrongdoer with no other thought in mind than that he did wrong, unless he is retaliating unthinkingly like an animal. Someone who aims to punish in a rational way doesn’t chastise on account of the past misdeed—for that wouldn’t undo what is already done—but for the sake of the future, so that neither the wrongdoer, nor anyone else who sees him punished, will do wrong again. This intention shows his belief that excellence can be produced by education; at least his aim in punishing is to deter.” *Ibid.*, 324a9-c2.


2943 “[Protagoras speaking] The people who are best able to do it [to grant a proper comprehensive schooling to their children]—I mean, the wealthiest—do this especially, and their sons begin to go to school at the earliest age and stay there the longest.” *Ibid.*, 326c5-9.

kind could not be fathomed. As Protagoras contextualises, giving concrete examples of how abstract dimensions of excellence can only superficially be ascribed to goodness and evil, Socrates retracts his steps to a higher level of abstraction which is not interested in the democratic politics of this polis or that of any other but in the most indeterminate definitions of all the cardinal virtues. Parrying Protagoras’ attempt to unify all virtues as respective parts of an all-encompassing aretē, he leaps back to the aristocratic sôphrosunē as the most significant virtue of all. To demolish Protagoras’ understanding of the distinctions between virtues, he reverts back to the original position of epistemic certainty, arguing that if someone knows the right thing to do, then, he or she necessarily does it irrespective of the circumstances.

In its historical context, Protagoras’ utilitarian moral and epistemological relativism is one that has made the necessary theoretical allowance for the democratic politics of the Athens of his day. Instead of purporting that each person has an absolutely equal grasp of political aretē, Plato’s Protagoras postulated a citizen-body that is made up of individuals all of whom are highly interested in achieving a better grasp of political excellence. Plato made his Socrates concede that point, despite initial protests to the contrary, by making him move from an erstwhile rejection of the teachability of aretē to one that admitted it while questioning the contents of such an education. Perhaps that was because of the younger age of Socrates in the dialogue, but, then again, Plato would not come to turn his back fully on the Protagorean argument even in his most developed political works. Also noting that it is well-nigh certain for all the citizens to attain such an understanding provided that they are all given similar opportunities in education, Protagoras dared to undermine some of the most entrenched roots of the aristocratic mousikê. Divested from one of the most significant ideological elements of their political domination over the Athenian lower classes, the upper-class Athenians needed to consolidate their political hegemony via a recourse to a rethinking of timeless truths and absolute goodness.

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2945 “But all the same they [all the aulos-players in a musically democratic society] would all be competent players, compared with people who can’t play at all. And, similarly, as things stand, you must realise that even the wickedest man who has been brought up in a society governed by laws is a just man, an expert in this sphere, if you were to compare him with men without education, or courts, or laws, or any coercion at all to force them to be good…” Plato, Phaedo, 327c3-d2.
2946 Ibid, 332a4-334a2.
2947 Ibid, 352a1-357e8.
2949 Farrar has elaborated the Platonic absolute as a therapeutic absolution and I have no grounds of contest with her on the point. Her argument of the ‘dislocation of history’ appears in need of being carried further, however, to the context of socio-political relationships: “To release his listeners and readers from conventional beliefs, and open our minds to the possibility that what the absolute standpoint legislates is both superior and feasible, Plato deploys a strategy which Myles Burnyeat has
inroads to such abstract ideals as we observed above. Their skill in philosophy, however, was nowhere near that of Plato, whose reinterpretation of moral and epistemic certainty opened up the doors to a whole new educational universe in which the euergetist super-rich and oligarchically-inclined upper classes were to feel at home. Flabbergasted when facing the more adept and democratic Protagoras, Plato’s Socrates would postulate a full-fledged educational philosophy against the superficiality of sophistic rhetoric in *Gorgias*, portraying Gorgias himself as just another layperson whose teaching imperilled the bringing down of the entire aristocratic upper-class to his level of non-excellence.

*Gorgias* begins with a typical Socratic questioning of a self-proclaimed expert on account of the specificities of his expertise. So, Socrates asks what in effect is the product of rhetoric is.\(^{2950}\) Mowing down on his interlocutor’s answers until he gets at the root of the problem with the aid of a rather clear definition, Socrates, then, presses home his advantage by arguing that there is an unsurpassable contrast between conviction and education which exposes the fatal flaw of rhetoric: its superficiality. Gorgias had bestowed the entire moral initiative on his sparring partner by admitting that rhetoric is just an agent of persuasion with hardly any pretence to moral education,\(^{2951}\) and Socrates employs that emphasis on persuasive prowess to charge his opponent’s flank with the assertion that the rhetoricians have no expert knowledge on the issues they address.\(^{2952}\) As Gorgias regresses ever deeper in the depths of his amoralist revel in the superficial instrumentality of rhetoric, Socrates drives the trust of his argument forward by showing precisely whose instrument it is: power politics.\(^{2953}\) An antagonistic conception of the relationship between the relative values of the external world and the inbred certainty of one’s inner life, and a secondary antagonism between power over others and *sôphrosunê* are, then, brought forward by a Socrates to sweep away what little moral grounds remain beneath the feet of his interlocutor. By the end of the first round, Socrates has managed to wrest away any claim on the part of rhetoric to expertise, allowing him to deny the status of *technê* to it when Polus, or Socrates’ second interlocutor, takes over. At that point, all that remains for Socrates is to deliver a final blow to the effect that a rhetorician does not need,
despite Gorgias’ initial definition, to have any knowledge of right and wrong to serve its purely instrumental purposes. Portraying a polis’ lawcourts and assemblies as the only possessors of the knowledge of right and wrong, which they use to render just judgments, Socrates shows that rhetoric is, at best, an unintelligent mimicry of that branch of knowledge. If persuasion is the sole aim of rhetoric, then it is granted that it can exert its power solely on people’s beliefs without having the slightest hint of what can be epistemically true or wrong. Now, there are two inversions at work up to this point. A rather simplistic rejection of the epistemological relativism of Gorgias and co. is the first transposition, whereas another ironic refutation of the deliberative powers of the perennial dispensators of justice, i.e., dêmos, is the second.

When Gorgias, and subsequently Polus and Callicles, concede Socrates’ point that no episteme can ever be the production of rhetoric, they allow the latter to make quick work of the epistemological relativism that had been used by Protagoras to evince that every citizen, no matter how poor or destitute, can have a claim to a certain degree of political excellence as a constituent body of politeia and thereby of polis itself. With the mythical and contemporary ‘proofs’ that he employed to show that every citizen made it his business to have a share in the political aretê, Protagoras had argued that the differences in particular epistemic accounts was not as much a drawback as it was a stimulant to hammer in justice and civic conscience ever deeper on the fertile soil of democratic politics. Grounded upon a utilitarian basis that accommodated all politai to develop collectively by their continuous struggle to hand down just judgements and pursue rationally deliberated policies, Protagoras had fertilised that soil with fitting seeds of moral relativism. His understanding of moral relativism, from what we can make out from the surviving evidence, was not an a-temporalized atomism of the ‘whatever floats your boat’ sort. Just as the reaching of relative epistemic certainty was a collective endeavour ever-prone to amelioration, so was, in fact, the attainment of relative moral certainty which was conceived in its own historically determinate context.

2954 Ibid, 461b2-466a5.
2955 In a more commercial vein, he can also be viewed as practically plying his trade without the benefit of purveying timeless certainties à la Plato: “For a Protagorean there is no truth as such, to be told, but only each person’s opinion, an opinion that can be manipulated. And this is enough. Protagoras only needs to instill in his pupils a sense of the immense value of his teaching, and a desire to pay a high price. His narrative will succeed if it makes each potential pupil want to study with him and then, when he does, to feel that he is gaining something of supreme value.” Rowett, ‘Relativism in Plato’s Protagoras’ pp. 195.
2956 Denyer appears to approximate to an analogous construal of Protagoras’ Man-Measure thesis as one that clears the roads to a collective deliberation on all the issues that affect any part of the politai instead of putting up ideological roadblocks of falsehood at every political transaction par Plato: “In consequence, the moderate version of Man-is-the-measure allows collective opinions about the just, the honourable and the holy to be criticised, not indeed for being false, but for being harmful. Therefore someone who is expert in what benefits and what harms, and who is expert also in controlling collective opinions, can do a city a great service by replacing true but harmful opinions with other opinions that
severing the philosophical bond between epistemological relativism and any claim to a
gradually conceived epistemic certainty. Plato’s Socrates attempted to scorch that fecund
earth of democratic politics once and for all. As the trio of Gorgias, Polus and Callicles
swallowed his bait rope, hook and all, by shedding any claim, however relative, to epistemic
certainty, Plato began pulling the strings to make them dance to a tune that he himself had
composed. That tune was conceived at the interstices of the two remaining epistemological
criticisms of the sophist education: its formal and moral decrepitude. On formal grounds,
Plato’s Socrates had already chastised, albeit faintly, the Protagorean panache for delivering
lengthy lectures with mythic and poetic embellishments instead of quick yes-or-no answers
that were more aligned to the dialectical progression of the Socratic elenchus. As will
become clearer in our analysis of his Meno, Plato’s attribution of midwifery to Socrates in
regard to his capacity to deliver abstract qualities whose possession predate the formation of
the body, elenchus can only function when Socrates is absolutely free to impose the strands of
his brand of thought on the un tarnished intellect of his interlocutor. Any digression from the
main questionnaire, via the rendering of muthos or else, disrupts elenchus’ multilinear
processing of thoughts, and, thus, can only be resorted by hitting the inquisitive road of the
Platonic Socrates. Timeaus’ ‘likely account’ of world’s creation and the transmigration of
souls, or the story of redemptive justice that rounds off Phaedo, may be speculative and
digressive to the full, but they involve parentheses that lend mythological credence to
Socrates’ arguments. When Protagoras, on the other hand, dares to employ muthoi or
lengthy answers to cast his arguments within the armour of mythology, Socrates becomes
restless and does not hesitate to intimidate his opponent back into re-adopting his own line of
inquiry. His steamrolling through the brittle arguments offered by his trio of interlocutors in
Gorgias thus show a Socrates who pounces with a vengeance at the lacklustre argumentative
defences that were set up by other foremost sophists. If persuasion is the only guide of

are less harmful but no less true. If girls think killer heels fashionable, then killer heels are fashionable. Even so, it is better for the girls’ feet if you make them think that flats are fashionable instead.” Denyer, “The Political Skill of Protagoras”, pp. 167.
2957 Plato, Gorgias, 465b1-e2.
2958 Plato, Protagoras, 334c7-335c7.
2959 And that when there is something to say about the clear Platonic discrepancy between epistemic truth and ethico-political falsehood. Gennaion ti hen pseudomenos, or ‘noble lie,’ and pervasive falsehoods function as the cement with which Plato’s Kallipolis and Magnesia are built. There is a clear rift between Plato’s aretē and aîtheia and it is not one of socio-political unimportance. Granted that there are some conventions that even the philosophical license of falsification does not sanction, e.g., homosexuality, the name of virtue still reigns supreme in any consideration about the purchase of truth. Robert Wardy, ‘The Platonic Manufacture of Ideology, or How to Assemble Awkward Truth and Wholesome Falsehood’, in Politieia in Greek and Roman Philosophy, pp. 126; cf. “Ignorance – the involuntary lie/falsehood – is what one should hate. Lies – voluntary falsehoods – can and will be used by the city’s rulers without qualm, at least in the appropriate circumstances …” Verity Harte, ‘Plato’s Politics of Ignorance’, pp. 144; Ober, The Rise and Fall of Classical Greece, pp. 60; Rose, Sons of the Gods, Children of Earth, pp. 355 with reference.
rhetorical education, then there is a certain truth to the Aristophanic stock jeer at the sophists that their activity consisted only of ‘making the worse argument prevail over the stronger’. His Socrates manages to evince, in that vein, that facing a true method of philosophical enquiry the later day sophists scampered off to their true abodes: material gains and power politics. And if his smashing of his interlocutors’ arguments in *Gorgias* does not seem to intertextually rebound on those of Protagoras, his augury at the end of the dialogue suggests otherwise.

A discernible *topos* of *Gorgias* is the trio’s repeated attempts to recompense persuasion’s lack of moral education with an emphasis on the overriding effects of its instrumentality. Callicles takes this stress a couple of steps ahead by projecting an all too likely courtroom appearance for Socrates in the near future. Socrates’ unmitigated scorn in depicting rhetoric as not even a field of *technē* but a mere knack at flattery, the argument goes, will eventually come to haunt him if he will ever feel the need to sway the mind of *dēmos* in the courtroom. Of course, Plato’s incessant movement on the memory lane is illuminating in and of itself. But the home stretch of *Gorgias*, which exhibits a Socrates leaping from simple asides to the unthinking acts of *dēmos* to a thorough demolition thereof, seems to have spoken to more than just a sense of historical witticism. What we have in the form of a rewound augury and a *muthos* summoned to sustain it signals, in that vein, a thorough chastisement of Protagoras’ account of an equalising allotment of political *aretē* to all the *politai*. “A doctor being prosecuted by a cook before a jury of young children,” is the image that is conjured by Plato’s Socrates when he envisions a trial of him which would be “quite possible” to arise in the near future with charges of ruining the youth. He is portrayed as a doctor because he is an expert on what ails the mind and soul of *dēmos*, but instead of attempting to soothe it with palliative appeasements like Paphlagon had done in the *Knights* he chooses to prescribes a harsh

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2961 One of the most memorable passages in the Platonic corpus of this equation of persuasion to flattery is vented by none other than Aspasia, or Pericles’ metic wife, in the funeral oration that is put into her mouth almost certainly as a clever quip against Thucydides’ earlier rendition of the oration given by Pericles to commemorate the Athenian fallen in the first year of the Second Peloponnesian War. Wreaking havoc on all the major democratic sentiments at one go, Plato’s Socrates, then, darts his inquisitive irony at the heart of the natural division between *ta onta* and *ta dogmata kai psêphismata*: “The effect of their [funeral orators’] praise on me, Menexenus, is to fill me with feelings of my own nobility. I stand there entranced each time, as I listen, and feel that I have suddenly become taller, more noble, and more good-looking. … And this aura of impressiveness doesn’t just last until the day after tomorrow; the speech, and the voice of the speaker, so take me over that it’s not until three or four days later that I come to my senses and realise where I actually am – up to that point I have regarded myself, to all intents and purposes, as inhabiting the islands of the blessed, such is the skill of our orators.” Plato, *Menexenus*, in *Gorgias, Menexenus, Protagoras*, ed. by Malcolm Schofield and trans. by Tom Griffith, (Cambridge, 2010), 235a8-c5.


2963 Ibid, 521d.

2964 Ibid, 521e.
medicines and even a harsher diet. He is, then, prosecuted by a cook because the individuals who have made up and trumped up the charges have no inkling what so ever of the ills and wells of dèmos, having a claim to expertise in an entirely different, if any, field. And the jury comprises of ‘boys’ because the majority who constitute the democratic juries and assemblies have scarce any expertise in any field, let alone in one of the most difficult to acquire, i.e., political aretê. In other words, the anticipated helplessness of Socrates in the court was to be one that materialised because of dèmos’ own incapacity to justly govern its own political affairs. Plato’s Socrates does not mince words. He is the one and only true practitioner of politics in a polis that is made up of irreverent school children and their sweet tongued headmasters whose combined lack of political aretê will prove the undoing of the polis. In short, there is no substance to the Protagorean claim that the majority of the customary administrators of justice have any share in political aretê. And if the epistemological relativism of the Protagorean kind is shown to have no internal ties to the utilitarian civic calculus that it appears to have endorsed, then all that remains for Plato to do is to give the sophistic education one final push, on account of the presupposed bankruptcy of its moral relativism, to drop it off the philosophical precipice.

Callicles’ rather obtuse brand of power politics serves as the bread-and-butter of the moral crusade that Plato’s Socrates wages against the trio of his sparring partners. Polus had partially foreshadowed Callicles, to be sure, when he claimed that the exercise of power over others that is promised by rhetoric is a route to happiness regardless of how justly or unjustly one exercises that power. And yet, Callicles goes further: Power over others is good for oneself, according to him, simply because it allows one to pander to one’s whims. While Polus’ utility for Plato’s purposes, on this view, was to assert that immoral behaviour could lead to more happiness for the agent than upright behaviour, Callicles functions as giving the screw another turn by arguing that self-indulgence is happiness epitomised unlike the moral warrens through which the ‘decent citizen’ needs to pass. Then, to add insult to injury, Callicles introduces his dry-as-dust version of morality as a simple nod to the ‘might makes right.’ Upholding that virtue and moral goodness are more praiseworthy guides in one’s life than a simple adulation of power is thereby turned into Socrates’ quest. Resorting to the so-called principle of the Sovereignty of Virtue, Socrates maintains that virtue, even when falsified to the brim, always

2965 “There may be one or two others, but I think I’m the only genuine practitioner of politics in Athens today, the only example of a true statesman. So because moral improvement rather than gratification and pleasure is always the reason for my saying anything, and because I refuse to take the subtle route you’re [Callicles] recommending, I’ll be tongue-tied in the court.” Ibid, 521d-e.

2966 Ibid, 469c6-9.

2967 “[Callicles speaking] In my opinion, that’s what natural right is – for an individual who is better (that is, cleverer) to rule over second-rate people and to have more than them.” Ibid, 490a8-10.
makes the agent happier than vice. According to this interpretation, *aretê* is the final good whose loss cannot be made up by a combination of other non-moral goods.\(^{2968}\) A thesis that is not to be half-heartedly prescribed, he argues that true happiness can only be brought about by steady harmony between inner valuation and outer practice, which makes us capable of withstanding even the most worrisome reversals of fortune. Presaging the moral education in the Book of Job, he believes that the formation of the inner bulwark of virtuous fortitude is the key to genuine happiness which can be retained even when death and gloom corners the agent to a low ebb of sentimental existence. Of course, by giving those examples of torment and disaster Socrates hints at a gradual assessment of other goods beside virtue which can complement the happiness of the agent. Physical health, comely looks and fitness in body, sufficient wealth and social status are all auxiliary goods that can add on to the moral foundations of an agent’s happiness.\(^{2969}\) These things are deemed to be good, however, only so long as they do not interfere with the fundamental concern of leading a moral life. Succinctly put, provided that I have virtue I would still count as happier without having any of the other goods than any other campers whose possession of any combination of the latter is offset by their lack of the former. Then comes the ultimate coup: turning the Protagorean claim that everyone has a comparable share of political *aretê* in them, Socrates argues that despite what people may say, in the end they all believe that morality is the chief component of happiness.\(^{2970}\)

Bridging the formal condemnation of the sophist rhetoric as unintelligent persuasion to its moral condemnation is the final step in the proto-epistemological venture that Plato undertakes in *Gorgias*. Socrates’ concluding myth of the judgment in the afterlife forms Plato’s final jostle against sophist teachings as he reinvents some of the basic strands of aristocratic pre-sophist morality for it to shed its light on a completely moralised postulation of social existence. Harkening back to *Phaedo’s muthos* of retributive justice that is administered in the afterlife, Socrates argues that it is common knowledge for a Greek that, once dead, any mortal who has led a mortal and god-fearing life will depart to a carefree dwelling in the Isles of the Blessed while all the others that lived godless and immoral lives will be herded to “the place of

\(^{2968}\) "Whenever we must choose between exclusive and exhaustive alternatives which we have come to perceive as, respectively, just and unjust, or, more generally, as virtuous and vicious, this very perception of them should decide our choice. Further deliberation would be useless, for none of the non-moral goods we might hope to gain, taken singly or in combination, could compensate us for the loss of a moral good. Virtue being the sovereign good in our domain of value, its claim upon us is always final.” Gregory Vlastos, *Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher*, (Ithaca, 1991), pp. 210-211.

\(^{2969}\) Plato, *Gorgias*, 467e-468b, 477a, 499c-500a.

\(^{2970}\) “[Socrates speaking] I was right, then, when I suggested that doing wrong is held by everyone, including you and me, to be less preferable than suffering wrong, and the reason I was right is that doing wrong is in fact worse than having it done to you.” *Ibid*, 475e.
retribution and justice, which is called Tartarus.” He, then, goes on to add that there was a *nomos* in the age of Cronus and Zeus to the effect that living judges were to pass judgment on the living people at the day of their fated death. From that convention sprang a fountainhead of problems related to the administration of justice, however, as the prospective dead began to appear at the court of the final hour having donned their most dashing attires and on their most commendable behaviour. Seeing how comely the judged were, those who judged them could do naught but pass crooked judgments, subverting the sacred equilibrium between action and retribution. Informed of the snowballing missteps that had become a basic attribute of the final judgment, Zeus, then, deigned to take the matter into his own hands. From now on, the living would not know the exact hour of their fated death, obliging them to be optimally prepared for the eventuality at all times if they cared about their trials and tribulations in the afterlife. Besides, the judged were to appear before the court naked so that the judges would see their worth for what it actually was, diminishing the likelihood of any distortion of the judgmental capability. And, as a final measure to ensure the passing of the fairest verdicts, Zeus ordained three of his half-mortal sons, Minos, Rhadamanthys and Aeacus, to take over the position of the judges of the final hour from run-of-the-mill mortals once they are dead.

Speaking to a stern sense of moral culpability, Plato’s replacement of the moral relativism of the later day sophists with an ethical certainty of his own evinced an understanding of philosophy that had to sweep rhetoric out of the way as a potentially demotic rival of note so that he could replace it by a sophistry of his own. Expertise in *aretê*, political or otherwise, is in the hands of the gods and demigods, and not in those of ordinary individuals despite what Protagoras had declared. A communal passing of judgment, just like a public deliberation on policy, could only lead to chaos and confusion with none of the judges having more of an intrinsic worth than the judged when gauged according to the timeless scale of virtue. As *Apologia* and *Phaedo*, among others, had made it abundantly clear, expertise in morality was the fruit of a lifetime dedication and not of half-hearted lip-service that was the only thing that could be attained by a community of menial labourers. Zeus’ conferral of sole juridical capability in regard to matters pertaining to soul’s journey to afterlife on his sons functioned as Plato’s loud and clear propagation against the supposed benefits of democratic polity. If it was to be granted that expertise in any area was within the reach of the only a few individuals,

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2972 Plato, Gorgias, 523c1-d4.
2975 “[Socrates speaking] So farmers and other tradesmen are a long way from knowing themselves. It seems they don’t even know what belongs to them; their skills are about what’s even further away than what belongs to them. They only know what belongs to the body and how to take care of it.” Plato, Alcibiades I, in Plato. Complete Works, 131a8-131b8.
then it was equally certain that fewer still could have any viable entitlement to the most important expertise of all: that of virtue. In short, Plato’s crusade against the sophists was not only moral, it was also political down to its roots. As he saw it, the moral corruption of his day was in direct relation to the political dégénérescence that often saw the naturally exclusive positions of leadership and subservience be politically swapped and always observed a moral sloth that would set in as a result of this tearing of the sacred barriers between the commoners and aristocrats. This three-pronged attack on what he branded as unknowledgeable sophistry would carry Plato further into the realm of proto-epistemology until he began to fight his anti-sophist battles in his later dialogues in explicitly epistemological terms. To that end, we carry on with a historical and intertextual analysis of his *Meno* and *Symposium* before taking the leap to his later epistemological trilogy.

Plato’s *Meno* begins as a typical dialogue of search. True to his avowed epistemic priority of definition, Socrates converts Meno’s initial inquiry into the teachability of *aretê* into the basic question, ‘What is *aretê*?’ Possibly finding the question as one that was a bit more than he could chew, Meno refrains from addressing the question directly and gives particular examples of *aretê* instead. Not satisfied with the roundabout answers that he gets, Socrates, then, asks Meno to at least pronounce what is common to all those examples. Never the less, Meno’s attempts to provide plausible answers to that inquiry fails miserably as his responses, e.g., “What else could it [*aretê*] be other than the ability to rule men?” is too broad and narrow simultaneously. Leading step-by-step to an imminent state of aporia, Meno finally conveys that *aretê*, which is conceded to comprise justice as a subspecies, is the ability to procure things of good nature for oneself. His inability to make allowance for any single subspecies of *aretê*, however, leads to another round of circularity in which the aporia manifests itself. That is but a mere semblance of an inconclusive ending, in fact, as Meno, then, musters his argumentative skill to challenge Socrates with a difficult paradox. Why does Socrates insist on defining anything when he, by definition, ought to either know it or not? If he knows the definition prior to its search, then there is no need to enquire, i.e., the so-called ‘paradox of enquiry,’ whereas if he does not know it, then, there is no certainty that he can recognise it

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2976 Cf. “Plato assumes that ignorance of the true good is the main reason for the moral corruption of his time. The rhetoricians claim to know the greatest human good. Their answer to this fundamental question is nonetheless completely wrong, according to Plato. By means of persuasion rhetoric is, however, able to mislead people in this important matter. Thus, in attacking rhetoric, Plato fights against the very roots of evil.” J. Tenkku, *The Evaluation of Pleasure in Plato’s Ethics*, (Helsinki, 1956), pp. 61-62.


2978 *Ibid*, 73c.

2979 *Ibid*, 78c.
when he finds it, i.e., the ‘paradox of recognition.’ Plato’s answer to that paradox is nothing short of enacting a metaphysical epistemology of the first order: we only seem to ‘learn’ everything to which, in fact, we have prior access to. Knowledge is not something that can only be self-consciously possessed; we can also know things without recognising that we know them. Wedded to the Platonic doctrine of the immortality of the soul, the theory of recollection stipulates that all the things that we come to learn in a lifetime are pieces of an *episteme* that has been acquired in an unspecified antecedent spatio-temporality. Using an experiment with a slave who had received no formal education in geometry to ‘prove’ that the right kind of questioning can elicit recollection of the germane truths, Socrates shows that the more repeated the enquiry becomes, the more secure will the anchor of knowledge transfix itself upon the ground of certainty. With the constant operation of reason as their vigilant guide, true beliefs, or the vaguely recalled pieces of *episteme* previously collected, as such, can be anchored into certain and self-conscious *episteme*.

Plato’s ideal of *episteme* is based on an inflexible three-class hierarchy that confers epistemological truth in relation to which rung is occupied by any piece of learning. Our minds are filled with the teachings of various traditions, such as those of the proponents of the old aristocratic *mousikê* or sophists. Teachings, however, are not pieces of knowledge, and so long as they remain unanalysed by a philosophically educated ratiocination, they are liable to be constituted only of beliefs, true or false. As the experiment with the slave is supposed to show, *elenchus* upsets the traditional teaching by discerning true pieces of belief from others, thereby leading to a state of *aporia*. Knowledge lays buried beneath this surface level of mere...

2980 “[Meno speaking] And how will you search for something, Socrates, when you don’t know what it is at all? I mean, which of the things you don’t know will you take in advance and search for, when you don’t know what it is? Or even if you come right up against it, how will you know that it’s the unknown thing you’re looking for?” *Ibid*, 80d6-10.
2981 “Given, then, that the soul is immortal and has been incarnated many times, and has therefore seen things here on earth and things in the underworld too—everything, in fact—there’s nothing that it hasn’t learnt. Hence it isn’t at all surprising that it should be possible for the soul to recall what, after all, it also knew before about excellence and about everything else. For since all nature is akin and the soul has learnt everything, there’s nothing to stop a man recovering everything else by himself, once he has remembered—or ‘learnt’, in common parlance—just one thing; all he needs is the fortitude not to give up the search. The point is that the search, the process of learning, is in fact nothing but recollection.” *Ibid*, 81c4-d6.
2983 *Ibid*, 85c.
2984 “As long as they stay put, true beliefs too constitute a thing of beauty and do nothing but good. The problem is that they tend not to stay for long; they escape from the human soul and this reduces their value, unless they’re anchored by working out the reason. And this anchoring is recollection, Meno, my friends, as we agreed earlier. When true beliefs are anchored, they become pieces of knowledge and they become stable.” *Ibid*, 97e-98a; on the Platonic postulation of reason as the catalyst of the cooperation between the different parts of soul’s dynamic system, see Burnyeat, ‘Justice Writ Large and Small in *Republic 4*’, pp. 223.
2985 Plato, *Meno*, 82e, 84a.
appearance and requires steady questioning to be unearthed. But as the recovery of true beliefs is intensified with constant scrutiny, we begin to conceive permanent epistemological standards qua definitions which are reliable on a higher level of abstraction. As we move closer to the attainment of genuine *episteme*, we, thus, begin to enact a stable epistemological state that is not disturbed by any particular determination. That state will only be reached by a few philosophers, however, given that only they can devote themselves to a lifelong occupation of self-critical questioning. In other words, though there is a certain epistemological equality in Plato’s claim that all learning is recollection, that recollection can only be achieved under the reliable supervision of a philosopher who has made it his business to convert true beliefs into *episteme*.

Even at this rather early stage, Plato’s epistemology packs a powerful punch against the sophist epistemological relativism and its ties to Protagoras’ democratically postulated moral relativism. One of the sets of traditional teaching that have been elicited at the absence of continuous epistemic reprisals is that of the sophists with its novel educational focus on persuasiveness. Meno and his slave in the dialogue can thus be conceived as dramatic representations of latter-day sophists and the contemporary *demos* respectively. On one side is the self-important master of teachings who fails on every test of his capability to provide definitions of the moral goods that he offers to teach. On another is the *thêtes* whose mind is a veritable hotchpotch of beliefs, ranging from shadowy inklings of geometric precepts to the worst kind of sacrilegious smoke and mirrors. Left to their own devices, the two mingle in a democratic *polis* to give rise to the worst epistemological abomination of all: a *demos* that wobbles in its epistemic filth of false beliefs which are further entrenched by the demagogue intellectuals and the *sukophantes* with whom they were in league,2986 who only seek the riches to be drawn from the people of means. In abstract, the theory of recollection may seem to speak to a sense of democratised epistemology. But taken in relation to the portrayal of sophists along the lines of purveyors of the poison of false beliefs as in *Gorgias*, it immediately becomes evident that Plato’s three-staged hierarchy of *episteme* displays the least of its political allegiances to democracy. Philosophers refine scientific knowledge, whereas a backslide from knowledge to beliefs is occasioned by sophistic education. A democratic regime, on this view, is a veritable heap of epistemological blunders as the lower classes never

attain *episteme*, thus, growing pretentious and wary at the sight of those who actually have reached a state of epistemic certainty whilst the upper classes pamper those false offshoots of belief by devising new strategies to placate the former. With the educationally subpar lower classes running ever-deeper into their labyrinths of self-conceit and the educated upper classes trailing a close second behind them with their espousal of epistemological relativism, Plato’s Athens has the makings of a democratic jungle. And if that common epistemic debasement of the *dēmos* is just one side of Platonic epistemology, the other side is made up of the rejection of any drift from the ideal of moral certainty between the philosopher and his pupil as it was portrayed in the *Symposium*.

A commonplace misconception that is frequently stated in modern evaluation of *Symposium* is that it is a work only about *erôs*, i.e., ‘love.’ We purport, to the contrary, that the dialogue is about philosophical assent just as much as it is about *erôs*. Indeed, combined with the insights that we have gleaned from his other epistemologically oriented dialogues, we think that Plato elaborated his theory of love as it is portrayed in the dialogue as a clear alternative to the sophist commercialisation of education. Love, as it slowly emerges in Aristophanes’ speech as each symposiast takes his turn in delivering an encomium of Erôs, understood both as a god and as all the dimensions of procreative desire, is a longing for happiness, a bliss that we falsely promise to ourselves as a reunion with what we psychologically and physiologically lack and thus deem to be in need of.2987 Further, it is intrinsically related to beauty, which is brought in the open initially by Agathon. Besides its psychological, physiological and philosophical qualities, *erôs* is also physical sex *tout court*. Epitomised in the speech delivered by Alcibiades, it is an insatiable force, always hungry for more, potentially leading to the enslavement of its possessor, as exemplified by Alcibiades’ avid confession of his slavery to Socrates.2988 Sandwiched between these diverse accounts is Socrates’ encomium slowly gaining some steam before it reaches its crescendo. Socrates begins his exposition with a questioning of Agathon’s arguments. Pointing out that if Erôs’ subject is beauty, then Erôs itself cannot be beautiful, aiming at the concession that love and beauty, though innately connected, are not the subject of one another.2989 Socrates, then, resorts to the Mantinean priestess Diotima who, according to him, had thought all he knows about love. There are different dimensions to Erôs as it is relayed by Diotima, but a few *topoi*, conjoined to Socrates’

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2987 Socrates’ expansion of the Aristophanic deficiency model of love into a cosmic principle of epistemic order ranking different varieties of knowledge has been noted by Lukács in a penetrative earlier comparison of Socrates’ and Charles-Louis Philippe’s respective deficiency models: Georg Lukács, ‘Longing and Form’, in *Soul and Form*, trans. by Anna Bostock, (London, 1974), pp. 94-95.


2989 *Ibid*, 201a-b.
preamble, have never the less been discerned: love is an assimilation of a desire to possess
goodness permanently\footnote{Ibid, 199e, 200a-e.}; a desire for happiness beacons all our actions and love is but a
particular manifestation of this universal force\footnote{Ibid, 204e-205e.}; procreation is a subspecies of the creativity
that is inherent to us\footnote{Ibid, 206a-207a.}; wanting something for ever is a covert signal that we covet
immortality itself.\footnote{Ibid, 206a-207a.} Plato finds our creative urge rather easy to illustrate by mentioning
examples that range from artistic and legislative production to the instinctive desire to bear
and raise offspring. Besides, our yearning for immortality can also be extrapolated from our
reproductive desire, which is interpreted by Plato as a drive to outlive oneself that is common
to all humankind.\footnote{Plato, Laws, 721c3-6.} Likewise, *eudaimonia*’s universality, at least among the Greeks of his
day, is an axiomatic thought for Plato, understood mainly as the concord of one with one’s
soul. Diotima’s philosophy, in that vein, seems more in tune with a vindication of the so-called
deficiency model of love. The basic building block of Diotima’s entire account is that loving
affection can be transferred from one object to another more sublime one whereby an elevation
through various stages can be realised ultimately with a view of absolute beauty. There are
four principal stages to this scheme of ascendancy: physical beauty, mental beauty, the beauty
of intellectual quests and beauty itself. Elevation at each stage is realised with an act of
intellectual generalisation, just as when one occupies the first stage, he or she can grow a
rational appreciation of the same features that makes the beloved beautiful which can also be
found in other people. On a mental level, the occupant’s conception of beauty is expressed in
activities and institutions which eventually may lead to a generalisation of their own beautiful
features that can be found, again, in other activities and institutions formed by other peoples
in other *poleis*. Finally, we generalise the kind of beauty at the third stage to partake of
philosophical activity whereby *episteme* is turned into the subject of loving itself. As the
individual moves up the ladder, he or she is steered by a guide who facilitates the ascent in
addition, possibly, to make sure that no backsliding occurs. If it is confirmed that the guide’s
principal role is to promote the lover’s ascendancy at every stage by rational argument, then,
the guide would be viewed as an overt stand-in for Socrates. Ever ready to help his ‘lover’ in
shedding his false beliefs and in turning the right ones into pieces of *episteme*, Socrates thus
serves as the hob of *erōs* until the lover can finally transfer the object of his love to knowledge
itself.
Love being an expansive affair, capable of colouring every fibre of being with vivid touches of inspiration, there is a sentimental logic to the theory of ascendancy as it is postulated by Plato’s Socrates. In a certain sense, Socrates functions as the Archimedean standpoint in bringing erôs to philosophical fruition by helping his lover to strike the equilibrium between reason and emotion.\(^{2995}\) His conception of leaps from a lower to higher stage, as such, involves rational and emotional sublimation, not a clear overcoming of emotions _per se_. The sublimation in question, however, spiritual as much as philosophical with love leading us out of the foggy marshes of bestiality. By the climbing up of each rung we adorn our existence with a _daimôn_-like quality, eventually stripping ourselves of all the fetters of animality and reaching the state of sagely unperturbedness that was exemplified by Socrates in _Phaedo_.

Now, these insights may not appear to have much relevance to our topic; but given our earlier observation of Plato’s strict opposition to sophistic _paideia_ we are inclined to argue that the contrary indeed might be the case. To that end, we have seen, time and again, that one of Plato’s stock criticisms of sophists was their full-fledged commercialisation of the educational rapport between the teacher and pupil. Juxtaposed to his discreet chiding of the epistemological relativism of sophistic education in _Meno_, Plato’s restoration of the bond of erôs between the genuine philosopher of _aretê_ and his student functioned as a double aside to the moral and philosophical traits of his opponents’ brand of _paideia_. Morally, sophists had transposed the old aristocratic ties of upper-class education without attempting to fill the lacuna with anything other than material exchange. And yet, the nexus of immediate cash payment in return for the riches of a successful political career could only vindicate the amoral empowerment that was promised by the _Gorgias_’ trio to their prospective students with scarce any appeal to those whose interests were not piqued at the expectation of becoming full-time demagogues. Plato needed to forge a philosophical bond between the tutor and pupil in order to distinguish his epistemological and moral education from the mere ‘teaching’ of the sophists.\(^{2996}\) His conception of the genuine philosopher as the headmaster who would pull the erôs that was felt by his students out of the mire of bestiality offered him both.\(^{2997}\) It fitted the bill epistemologically as the philosopher was to function as the firm fountainhead of _aretê_. Having attained the knowledge of the Platonic forms, the Platonic philosopher was qualified to separate knowledge from belief so that he could facilitate his pupil’s ascent. Further, given

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\(^{2995}\) Cf. Plato, _Republic_, 440c.

\(^{2996}\) A similar thread of the underlying reasons for Xenophon’s Socrates’ recurrent resentment of _misthos_ has recently been proposed by Azoulay. Indeed, so trenchant the author’s pillorizing of cash payments is that Socrates, at _Memorabilia_ (1.6.13), is even made to loath the one who accepted _misthos_ as _pornos_, or ‘male prostitute,’ who did not have a shred of virtue to his name: Azoulay, _Xenophon and the Graces of Power_, pp. 107-108.

\(^{2997}\) The educational purposes of Plato’s Socrates that promoted his creation of the loving friendship between philosopher and his pupil is hinted at by Waterfield: Waterfield, _Why Socrates Died_, pp. 57; cf. Azoulay, _Xenophon and the Graces of Power_, pp. 232-233.
that love was one of the topics that the youth found the most fascinating, he would separate
himself from the rest of the pack by fusing erôs with paideia. And the moral benefit of his
philosophy of education was no less tangible. As he replaced the sophists’ commercialised
relation between philosopher and his followers by the bond of erôs, Plato managed to de-
democratise the sophist community of education. Whether they charged their customers low
or steep prices, and the literary evidence, as we noted above, is inconclusive on that question,
sophists in general and Protagoras in particular had occasioned a democratisation of
philosophical knowledge which had hitherto been monopolised by closed sects and quasi-
cultic fraternities. To be sure, not only material means but also the allocation of time held back
most, if not all, of the thêtès to participate in any sophistic education. For all the others,
however, the sophistic transformation of the aristocratic mousikê actually meant something as
they came to invest their funds in the new paideia. Showing all the signs of a socio-political
betterment of one’s lot, the educational philosophy of sophists partially eroded the rigid class
binaries between different sections of the upper-classes. As the new education began to eat
into the hallowed barriers between different parts of the Athenian upper-class, it brought them
ever closer to the democratic sentiments of the lower classes since it was with them that any
liaison was to be bonded. Plato’s erôs philosophically negated this likelihood of a movement
toward democratisation in the diffusion of political expertise as it reverted to the old
aristocratic ideal of a closed circle of philosophers.2998 In giving the lover’s bond to the
philosopher and his followers, Plato attempted to rewind the educational clock to the pre-
sophistic period in which aristocratic propriety had trumped over considerations of cash
payment.

6.3.4 Plato’s Epistemology in Later Dialogues

With the completion of our analysis of his proto-epistemological works, we can move on to
an exegesis of some of the core tenets of the Platonic epistemology as it was demonstrated in
the trilogy of Theaetetus, Sophist and Parmenides, a collection to which we would like to add
Phaedrus as it appears can be taken as a development of most of the themes in Symposium.
There are four main epistemological strands that are brought forth within the general
framework of these four dialogues: a firm rejection of the ‘Protagorean’ thesis that knowledge
is perception and a portrayal of sophists as producing ragbags of unintelligent perception and

2998 Azoulay aptly brings out this explicit contravention of the democratic norms that underpinned the
courtly proceedings of the turn of the century Athens in the context of Xenophon’s recounting of
Socrates’ defence speech: “In terms of content, the philosopher’s alleged benefits could not appear as
real charites in the jurors’ view. Far from working toward the common good, the knowledge Socrates
dispensed created a circle of devoted followers who were detached from the city and even the familial
mischievous *logos* in exchange solely for material gain; a revised confirmation of the Parmenidean logic; a thesis that true judgment, by itself, does not suffice to sway the minds of the people towards truth; and a rejection of any branch of *logos* to give an account of the composition of true judgments, i.e., the theory of forms, which can only be formed through hair-splitting contemplation. *Theaetetus*’ first step in the construction of Platonic epistemology is Socrates’ thorough rejection of epistemic and moral relativism that he attributes to Protagoras. And a similar nit-picking refutation also takes place, though in that case no single sophist appears to be aimed at, in *Sophist* and somewhat more unobtrusively in *Phaedrus*. In an interesting manner, Socrates’ first epistemological terminus in *Theaetetus* is a supposed repudiation of Protagorean epistemic relativism and Heraclitan flux. In neither of his renditions does Socrates attempt, however, to do justice to either one of the theories. To him, Protagoras’ Man-Measure theory seems to promote an astounding leap from limited epistemic relativism to full-blown epistemological scepticism. Limited epistemic relativism, as we have noted above and as initially confirmed by Socrates, informs a perspectivist theory of being that is sated with the internally circumscribed argument that something is that way, e.g., hot or cold, big or small, etc., to me simply because that is how it appears. Epistemic limitations themselves can result from historical experiences, cultural variations, climatic attributes and so on. To illustrate, an Athenian commoner’ conception of oligarchy is assured to have changed drastically for the worse following the two bouts of oligarchical coups in 411 and 404. Similarly, on a more biological and biocultural level, respectively, jaundice can induce a specific set of perceptual modifications that is uncommon to an unjaundiced person and culturally available avenues of collective interpretation can bring about the formation of otherwise oxymoronic linguistic combinations such as ‘hot snow.’ All those perceptions qualify as pieces of knowledge but only limitedly, for their claim to knowledge itself is determined by all the configurations seeping into social existence.

To a jaundiced person, visually experiencing things like an unjaundiced person is an abnormality, but that does not mean that a classification ordering different stages of perceptual certainty cannot be made. Classified into gradual epistemic receptacles, it turns into a possibility to gauge how weak a particular claim to knowledge is. And with the variegation of multi-cultural, multi-climatic, etc., experience comes about the enrichment of *episteme* itself, showing that there is nothing intrinsically at fault with a jaundiced Siberian not only seeing but feeling fresh snow differently than how a Greek does. Epistemic distinctions between different times, places and

This should be compared to the maximalist relativism which is initially purported by Theaetetus to be aptly refuted by Socrates’ arguments from certainty: “Very well, then: it seems to me that a person who knows something is perceiving the thing he knows. The way it looks to me at the moment is that knowledge is nothing but perception.” Plato, *Theaetetus*, trans. by John McDowell, (Oxford and New York, 2014), 151e1-3.
persons are not of abstract origins between timeless truths and wrongs, they spring from the existential determinateness with which every living and breathing human is endowed.\(^{3000}\) Put differently, appearance being internally free from indeterminate errors, there is no obstacle in the way of a weak claim to knowledge that is based on perceptions alone. On that note, we do not have any indications, including the postulations in the context of Plato’s Protagoras, that Protagoras utilised this fairly limited relativism as a spring-board to a maximalist understanding of epistemological relativism, which is what Socrates spins out from his modest beginnings. Putting Protagorean relativism and Heraclitan flux side by side, Socrates fashions an inverted Berkeleyan relativism according to which an object can never be perceived the same by two people or even by one person at different time intervals. Leaping the epistemological barrier between knowledge and truth with equal haste, he, then, extends the Protagorean epistemic relativism beyond the limited realm of experiential appearances and transforms it into a no-holds-barred relativism: there are no wrong beliefs for the person who believes them.\(^{3001}\) At that point it is but a theoretical step to the complete dismantling of Protagorean relativism by making the old sophist self-efface his arguments through a double-pronged backtrack via the nullification of qualified knowledge and expertise. If no epistemological fences demarcate belief from knowledge, Socrates argues coyly, then others can argue that Protagoras’ perception of things, experiential as well as theoretical, is wrong and the great sophist could do naught but agree. And if everyone is entitled to make claims to knowledge, he goes on to add, then, there can be no experts but since Protagoras claims to be one, then either his Man-Measure theory or his expertise is to be registered as philosophical rubbish.\(^{3002}\)

Now, the plausibility of Plato’s entire premise hinges on the congruity of the Heraclitan flux to Protagorean epistemic relativism, which are effortlessly grafted on to one another by Socrates in the dialogue. We think it fairly certain that Plato realised the basic incongruence between the two theses.\(^{3003}\) There is practically nothing in the doxographical tradition to validate that Protagoras’ limited epistemic relativism animated either a metaphysics of flux or

\(^{3000}\) Cf. “[Socrates speaking] It’s still deficient on the question of dreams and diseases, including madness, and all the cases in which one is said to mis-hear or mis-see or mis-perceive in some other way. Because you know, no doubt, that in all those cases the theory we’ve just been expounding [his rendition of Protagoras’ Man-Measure] is by common consent thought to be refuted, on the ground that we certainly get false perceptions occurring then, and, so far from its being the case that the things which appear to anyone actually are, it’s quite the contrary: of the things which appear, not one of them is.” *Ibid*, 157e2-158a4.

\(^{3001}\) *Ibid*, 171b8-c3.

\(^{3002}\) *Ibid*, 161d3-162a1.

\(^{3003}\) That interpretation is supported by Plato’s foray into the Heraclitan metaphysics of change by using his own metaphysics of rest with a distinctly Parmenidean hue in *Theaetetus: Ibid*, 183a9-b5.
a cosmogony of a primary element to lend philosophical credence to his arguments. There is
a qualitative difference between the Heraclitan understanding of experiential mutability as a
smokescreen, despite it being all we have, of a deeper cosmic order and harmony, and the
Protagorean insistence on the compilation of sensory-experience only after which can we
engage in comparisons and classifications. And that difference boils down, in the end, to a
disagreement on whether social existence is to be guided by eternal cosmic truths or by simple
collection of all perceptions without disparaging any so that perceptions can be classified into
determinate receptacles of knowledge. In short, in contrast to the Heraclitan divine
production of laws of nature and their dissemination by sage-philosophers, Protagoras posited
episteme as produced collectively by human agents. Why in the world, then, did Plato aver
that such a philosophical incongruence is to be patched in order to banish the lingering spectres
of sophists from the field of epistemology once and for all? We think that the answer is to be
sought in the other parts of his later trilogy of mainly epistemological works: by introducing
Heraclitus’ metaphysically conceived notion of change into the Protagorean universe, Plato
attempted to even the odds as he came to rely heavily on the premises adopted from the
Parmenidean logic.

In a certain sense, Plato’s theory of forms appeared to be perfectly in tune, from its conception
in Phaedo at the latest, with particular strands of Parmenidean logic. Parmenides’ to hen was
concomitant, in that vein, to Plato’s strict philosophical ordering of appearances, their
particular and universal features, and forms themselves. Occupying the lowest rung of the
ladder to episteme, material objects in their determinate singularity or totality did not pertain
to any ideational refinement except for when their particular properties were abstracted onto a
higher realm of theory. In other words, an epistemic rift diverges appearances from ideas
which are deemed capable of forming a higher conceptual unity. And yet, Parmenides’
monism was incapable of supporting the plurality of forms that Plato began to conceive in his
middle dialogues. Parmenides’ to hen was indivisible and unbounded, thus, it did not support
a construal of a relation of likeness or unlikeness that was to be posited if Plato wanted to
promote a pluralist reading of the Forms. In his Parmenides Plato put these definitive
debates into the mouth of the aging philosopher and Zeno who instructed a younger and

3004 Heraclitus, F. 27, 28, 29 Waterfield = DK 22B107, 22B55, 22B7.
3005 “Those who speak with intelligence must stand firm by that which is common to all, as a state stands
by the law, and even more firmly. For all human laws are in keeping of the one divine law; for the one
divine law has as much power as it wishes, is an unfailing defence for all laws, and prevails over all
laws.” Heraclitus, F. 12 Waterfield = DK 22B114.
3006 For a taste of Plato’s own metaphysically conceived antithesis between rest and change, see Plato,
Statesman, 269d5-270a10.
3007 Plato, Theaetetus, 185c9-d3.
immature Socrates on the logical challenges of the partaking relation whose metaphysical qualities had not been fully explained in the middle dialogues that we have so far examined, i.e., *Phaedo* and *Symposium*. The first set of arguments in the dialogue thus materialise in Zeno’s hasty attempt at the logical validation of the Parmenidean monism as its espousal is deemed to result in less absurd outcomes than its alternative, i.e., pluralism. Socrates, in response, objects to Zeno’s second premise that “Nothing can be both unlike and like,” by a logical elaboration of the theory of forms. Feeding off from two principles that he had propounded in *Phaedo* and *Republic*, namely, the theories of causality and separation, Socrates tries to logically vindicate his conception of the partaking relation. On grounds of causality, he claims that things that are X are so only by virtue of their partaking of the X. On grounds of separation, he argues that the X by itself is, at least in so far as it is separable from the things that partake of it. By his theory of separation he conveyed that unlike things are unlike by their partaking of a distinct form of unlikeness, whereas likeness is induced by partaking of a distinct form of likeness. The catch is, of course, that if the two theories are confirmed, then it becomes clear that sensible things can partake of likeness and unlikeness without giving rise to a logical contradiction. As he had previously explicated in his *Phaedo*, objects can be simultaneously both taller and shorter, as in Simmias’ being shorter than Phaedo but taller than Socrates, which is another way of experientially proving that sensible things can at the same time be like and unlike one another. This point leads to Socrates’ claim that in as much as they exhibit contrary properties, sensible things are impure. But if the principle of impurity is to be confirmed in the context of sensible things as an ordinary part of quotidian experience, it is to be rejected *tout court* in conjunction with the forms. With the combination of the impurity principle of sensible things and the purity principle of forms, the rise of a principle of non-identity is occasioned, evincing that no form is identical to any sensible object. Sensible things can partake, for instance, of equality and inequality simultaneously, but equal itself is not unequal and, hence, equal cannot be identical to any perceptible object. As this brief summary of the arguments that Plato makes his Socrates voice suggests, his chief bone to pick with Zeno was to confer a qualified epistemic existence to sensible things, which does not border on the unqualified admission of forms as indivisible, indestructible and non-sensible. Even a new-born baby, as he argues in *Phaedo*, or a slave lacking education in geometry, in *Meno*, can conceive the material impressions of some of the immutable forms

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3009 Plato, *Parmenides*, 128e-130a; *Phaedo*, 100c4-6, 100d7-8, 100e5-6, 101b4-6.
3010 Plato, *Phaedo*, 75c11-d2, 100b6-7; *Republic*, 476b10, 480a11.
3013 Ibid, 75b9.
such as equality, sameness and difference. Sensible things and their properties, on the other hand, are ever liable to alteration, and, thus, are needed to be swept away from the realm of pure forms as only the passive recipients of the partaking relationship. Now, these points were completely incongruent to the limited epistemic relativism that was adopted by Protagoras. And in the light of the fact that fighting Protagoras on his own grounds would oblige Plato to make theoretical allowance for his structure of determinateness, Plato appears to have conceived of an easier way of fusing Heraclitan metaphysics with Protagorean epistemic relativism so that he could defend his theory of forms by conceding minimal groundwork to sense-experience. Even when drawn into the field of metaphysics, however, Protagoras’ epistemic relativism could not be displaced forthwith without dealing with its foremost aide-de-camps first: moral relativism.

We have seen, in the context mainly of our analysis of Gorgias but also in those of his other dialogues, that Plato’s supposedly fatal blows to the ‘sophistic’ relativism displayed a flair for settling the accounts on moral grounds. Never the less, Plato never appears to address, until Theaetetus at least, the utilitarian basis of Protagoras moral relativism. In that work, however, he finally rallies his arguments to tie up that loose end. Offering Protagoras the benefit of a limited version of moral relativism to the effect that whatever is deemed just in a polis or by a religion is so for that polis so long as the nomos continue to hold it to be so, Plato shows that he is capable of grasping that the moral worth of a judgment is dependent mostly, if not entirely, on the conventions and conditions whence it stems. Now, responding to the argument, for once, on the grounds of utility, Socrates remarks that utility itself is a standard that requires expertise. Even when gauged on the basis of the public benefit, some laws and conventions are prone to more advantageous than others, and expert statesmen, who can erect that yardstick, are hence obliged to take political matters into their own hands. Socrates, as he subsequently makes clear, has no truck with views that deny justice its Platonic status as a free-floating objective form, with which he does not need to meddle anyway given that the judgements rendered on the basis of utility need always to account for the expert opinion. In other words, rhetoric is fine and dandy so long as it tacitly adopts a modicum of utilitarianism which is sufficient to wed it to the anti-democratism of technocracy. Unfortunately for Plato, his argument can, again, be exposed to conceal just as much as it reveals. Justice’s ideational status as an objective form becomes, in fact, one of the key issues

\[3014\] Ibid, 76d6-e6.
\[3015\] Plato, Theaetetus, 166a2-168c2.
\[3017\] Plato, Theaetetus, 170a4-b7, 172a1-b8.
in separating rhetoric from true philosophy if one attempts to build the bridges of intertextuality connecting *Theaetetus* to *Sophist* and *Phaedrus*. To that end, there are two core issues that undermine the moral relativism of sophists in the face of Platonic moral certainty: their unknowledgeable rhetoric and the fact that judgments, even true ones, cannot qualify as *episteme* so long as they remain untouched by repeated philosophical enquiries.

*Phaedrus*, like *Symposium*, has a thematic centre on *erôs*, this time with a more explicit homoeroticism as the dialogue is concerned with the relationship between *erastes*, i.e., the older lover, and *eromenos*, i.e., the younger beloved. In the earlier dialogue, as we observed above, Plato had postulated the levels of the lover’s ascent as synonymous with the journey of the rational soul that acknowledges philosophy as its sole guide. In *Phaedrus*, by contrast, the uses and abuses of rhetoric are intertwined with the main strands of Plato’s educational philosophy that turn the treatise into one of epistemological interest. First raised immediately after the palinode, the assessment of the value of rhetoric, then, turns into a major consideration of Plato. Plato’s initial move is to extend the concept significantly so that, in the end, it covers almost all written and oral presentations, public as well as private. Immediately after that, Socrates remarks that he and Phaedrus should look into precisely what makes good and bad rhetoric. Initially attempting to settle with the rather Manichean idea that the truth is the only criterion of good rhetoric, Socrates, then, moves on to consider two different cases. One of the examples is that of an immoral orator who functions as a stand-in for the trio of *Gorgias* in using rhetoric to persuade his way through the heart of *dêmos*. Socrates finds the second case to be more promising in its potential yields, possibly due to the fact that the first case has been aptly investigated elsewhere. A philosophically savvy but rhetorically clumsy orator, as such, makes up the second case, as he is envisioned to run into the brick wall of persuasion despite having attained the truth of any matter. Even if it is watered down to a sole concern with persuasion, rhetoric might have a major part to play in the dissemination of knowledge. But Plato is not prepared to overturn the disparaging judgment on rhetoric that he earlier rendered in *Gorgias*, stating that without any glimmer of truth, rhetoric will only be a ‘knack.’ So, in what follows Plato appears to be primed to reconsider his earlier position if, and that is a big if, rhetoric can be shown to have gained an understanding of infallible philosophical truth, distinguishing it from mere empirical

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3019 *Ibid*, 257e-258c, 261a, 261d-e.
knack.\textsuperscript{3024} Waiting for such a rethinking, however, proves futile as Plato retraces the circular logic that he had earlier mapped out in his \textit{Gorgias}.

Persuasion, according to Socrates, is a deceptive skill in swaying one’s audience into confirming the opposite sides of a case. Now, plausible deception can only aim at things that are closely affiliated with one another, not obliging the audience to take big leaps of faith. But if a successful persuasion qua deception is to be made without deceiving oneself, then, the orator must know in advance precisely how the two related things in question differ from one another. The recognition of that gradual difference can only be made, however, if the orator knows the truth of any given thing. A bond of knowledge between the orator and the subject, on this view, needs to prefigure the formation of any rhetorical relationship between the orator and his audience. But if the orator has already a firm grasp of the matter before he attempts to persuade his audience, then it is readily evident that he is an expert himself. Put differently, rhetorical expertise can only work if it follows closely on the footsteps of accumulated rigorous philosophical enquiries.\textsuperscript{3025} Rhetoric that is bereft of any earnest claim to truth is no expertise, whereas truthful oratory can only be achieved by the philosopher who, unlike the sophists, has worked constantly on separating belief from knowledge. No modification is made in \textit{Phaedrus} to the thesis that Plato had already averred in \textit{Gorgias}, just an entrenchment to the effect that only a rhetorician fully embedded in truthful \textit{episteme} can become a successful deliverer of orations, regardless of how deceptively he makes use of that power. This explicit tie between knowledge and rhetoric also surfaces in the context of \textit{Sophist}, which, essentially, is an attempt to define the archetypical sophist himself.

The upshot of the first part of \textit{Theaetetus}, as well as \textit{Phaedrus}, was that knowledge lies not in unthinking sensation but in the field of judgment. Mere experiencing is something that even babies and animals can do. A rational person, by contrast, utilises common conceptions such as sameness, equality and differences which are ingrained components of our immortal souls.\textsuperscript{3026} If \textit{episteme} cannot be false, which is readily granted in the second exposition of

\textsuperscript{3024} This interpretative thread is drawn against a background that was set up by Barber as a part in his contrast of tragic fallibility with the watertight truth that is attributed by Plato to philosophy: “The affinity of both tragedy and democracy for fallibilist view of human nature and human knowledge tied them together politically in the ancient world; just as the affinity of philosophy and aristocracy for virtue or excellence \textit{(aretê)} made them natural allies against the parity of democracy.” Benjamin R. Barber, ‘Misreading Democracy: Peter Euben and the \textit{Gorgias},’ in \textit{Demokratia}, pp. 364; \textit{contra} J. Peter Euben, ‘Reading Democracy: “Socratic” Dialogues and the Political Education of Democratic Citizens’, in \textit{Demokratia}, pp. 327-359.

\textsuperscript{3025} “[Socrates speaking] In that case, my friend, it looks as though a person who doesn’t know the truth, but has restricted his research to opinions, will come up only with a ridiculously unsystematic form of rhetorical expertise.” Plato, \textit{Phaedrus}, 262c7-9.

\textsuperscript{3026} Plato, \textit{Theaetetus}, 185c9-d3.
Theaetetus, then, perhaps, it can be synonymous to true judgment? Socrates, however, would have none of that as he quickly goes on to refute any correspondence between true belief and knowledge, by giving the example of a lucky true judgment. But even more to the point than the second part of Theaetetus is how the Stranger is made to define the sophist in Plato’s later dialogue with the same name. Plato provides six definitions of the sophist, all of them pejorative, which can be grouped along three lines: a wholesale as well as retail vendor and producer of unknowledgeable teachings on aretē, which condense definitions (I), (II), (III) and (IV); a professional of pleasing antagonisms and quarrelsomeness, and a self-proclaimed sapper of doxa hindering the grasp of episteme. Having touched upon his diatribes against sophist commercialism on our scrutiny of his earlier dialogues, we think it apt to focus on the last two strands of Plato’s critique. In regard to their professional garrulosity and commercialised prattling, Plato claims that there are two types of a debate, one made with surgical precision as in the litigations at heliaia and the other just an unsystematic and finnicky eristic with the sole aim of earning money. Primed to use any opportunity to nag the presupposed politico-philosophical incapacity of dēmos, Plato does not forget to add that the sophist turns his quarrelsomeness into a successful commercial enterprise because he cleverly embellishes his rhetoric with stylistic and popular nuances. In other words, rhetoric has a lot of financial promise not only because of the lure of the sophist deception but also due to the enfeebled intellect of the grassroots dēmos and their upper-class demagogues. And with respect to the so-called purging effect of the sophist teachings, Plato claims that the only therapy that can be delivered by the latter is one that is grounded upon fraudulent wisdom that can do naught but refute by using cunning arguments. In contradistinction to the eristic therapy of sophistic rhetoric, Platonic philosophy is capable of purging the soul of any and all undesirable elements. Coupled with his understanding of ignorance as involuntary mindlessness, Plato uses this element of katharsis as the true self-critical therapy of the soul that is heralded by elenchus. Scientific knowledge stands guard on both ends of Plato’s argument in Sophist, casting the philosopher’s arguments with an alloy of therapeutic certainty. Never the less, as Plato’s concession to the appeal of sophist teachings to the dēmos clarifies, a theoretical devaluation of sophist eristic as strictly involving shifty arguments from probability does not suffice to grant the epistemological victory to the allegedly genuine

3027 Ibid, 201a7-c8.
3028 Plato, Sophist, 223b1-9, 224c10-d4, 224d5-e5.
3029 Ibid, 226a1-3.
3030 Ibid, 231b3-10.
3031 For some key fourth-century examples that number within both those types with a certain tendency to linger on, see P. J. Rhodes, ‘Enmity in Fourth-Century Athens’, in Kosmos, pp. 144-161.
3032 Plato, Sophist, 228d1-3; cf. Plato, Philebus, 22b2-22b8; Harte, ‘Plato’s Politics of Ignorance’, pp. 152.
philosopher. Indeed, as the third section of *Theaetetus* shows, only with the disenchanted use of persuasion can the philosopher hope to convey his truthful messages to all.

*Theaetetus*’ third part features three unsuccessful attempts to provide an understanding of a *logos*, which is supposed to yield knowledge when added to a true judgment of a thing. As a sort of a preamble to his home stretch, however, Plato takes us into an interesting journey that entails a statement and criticism of what is called Socrates’ Dream. Socrates appears to propound, at least initially, a thesis that separates compounds from their constituent elements in order to claim that although the former can be the subject of a *logos*, hence rendered knowable, the same cannot be applied to their principal elements. This goes on to show that knowledge has a basis in unknowable elements, a point which is then vehemently castigated by a volte-face Socrates. Despite the fact that there is little academic agreement over how to interpret Plato’s digression, we would like to venture an explanation to the effect that the thesis, combined with the rest of the third section, is an attempt to deliver a final blow to the two principal epistemological rivals of Plato, the sophists and *phusiologoi*. To that end, the first kind of *logos*, which is a standard statement, fails since it adds nothing to true judgment. A *logos* that is more akin to a definition is also rejected since it involves the discerning of either the elements of a thing or the essential mark that separates the thing in question. Of course, knowing a thing’s elements is not the same as knowing the elements themselves which is why the suggestion of producing a *logos* on the basis of a thing’s constituent elements fails. Moving on to the final proposition, Plato then constructs a dilemma: if the knower of the thing is to mark the distinguishing aspect thereof, a simple judgment about it would not suffice as a *logos* if not supported by an additional judgment of what divides it from other things. That leaves us with only one option: the would-be knower of the thing needs to know its distinguishing feature in order to attain its knowledge; but, then again, that is just a circular dead-end. Disheartened by the outcome, Socrates, then, admits that his attempt

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3033 Plato’s ridicule on the court proceedings in the democratic Athens as the bread-and-butter of sophistic eristic with scant any view to truth seems a case in point in demonstrating his pejorative view of arguments from probability: “They say that in the lawcourts no one has the slightest interest in the truth of these things, but only in making a plausible case; and since it is probability that enables one to do that, then this is what someone who plans to be an expert orator should concentrate on. In fact sometimes, they say, you shouldn’t even mention what actually happened, if it is improbable, but make up a plausible tale instead, when prosecuting and when defending. Whatever kind of speech one is giving, one should aim for probability (which often means saying farewell to the truth), because rhetorical skill depends entirely on one’s speeches being infused throughout by probability.” Plato, *Phaedrus*, 272d8-273a1.  
3034 Plato, *Theaetetus*, 201c9-d5.  
3035 *Ibid*, 201d10-c5.  
3037 *Ibid*, 203e2-5.  
at midwifery failed for this time and bids farewell to the gifted Theaetetus. We are left, however, with a matter-of-factly summary of an epistemological dilemma,\(^{3039}\) which can be solved only with an intertextual analysis of the dialogues in question.

Plato’s metaphysics of recollection and the epistemic certainty of the theory of forms are the twin pillars upon which need to rest any attempt to contextualise the final part of *Theaetetus*. As we have observed above, recollection can only gush forth with the aid of the Socratic *elenchus* guiding the un-self-conscious knower through the mires of perception and wrong belief. Seen in relation to the doctrine of the immortality of the soul, the recollection thesis constructed a metaphysical glass floor that Plato could rely one whenever he came to be asked to make additional room for the socio-cultural relativism of sense-experience. That glass floor could only support, however, a bare minimum of abstractions that appeared to have no links to spatio-temporal determinateness. And, indeed, as singularities continued to be heaped on it, the glass floor began to crack risking the dismantling of his whole epistemological enterprise.

Further, not finding the old branches of hylozoist philosophising palatable, as shown by his espousal of some of the theses of the early atomists in *Timaeus*, Plato realised that any concession made to the constituent elements would necessarily overburden his scheme. Take either Anaxagoras’ unmixed or Empedocles four primary elements and two forces of unification and separation, for example, and the baggage of recollection suddenly starts to feel onerous. Ushered in with elements were combinations and permutations, bridging the gap between abstraction and concretisation. And yet, as the chasm between matter and idea narrowed, Plato’s metaphysics of comprehension started to lose its allure. Plato’s response was simple: kicking the primary elements off the epistemic ladder. Philosopher’s ascent is always inductive; one cannot afford to tarry long at a particular level of abstraction lest the philosophical bliss escapes him or her. Uncanniness and idiosyncrasies need to be thrown overboard so that the philosopher can voyage to his or her paradise of abstraction without unnecessary hindrance. For better or for worse, Diotima’s *logos* necessitates the recession of any singular lover into the oblivion of generalities.

Plato’s movement away from historical determinateness was further reinforced with his theory of forms. Once acquired, the knowledge of the Platonic forms functioned as the skeleton key to all the facets of concrete existents. Those existents were ideationally conceivable, however, only so far as they were the passive participants of the partaking relationship. In accord with his strict hierarchy between sensation, belief and *episteme*, Plato’s conception of material and

\(^{3039}\) "So it would seem, Theaetetus, that knowledge is neither perception, nor true judgment, nor an account added to true judgment." Plato, *Theaetetus*, 210a10-b1.
social existents faded away in comparison to the truest strands of knowledge qua forms. Plato realised that for things to epistemically exist on their own, they needed to be stripped of their formal shell. So, through a grand table-turning he disbanded any kind of non-philosophic logos as irrational swindle, to be outmanoeuvred on epistemological and moral grounds by his notion of aretē. Logos, according to him, added nothing to the true beliefs that were divided from episteme as unexamined and irrational. Worse yet, it detracted from the nobility of the philosophical endeavour via its demotic construal of epistemological and moral relativism. Incapable of marching to the eternal drumbeat of the Platonic forms, sophistic logos was, thus, dismantled without salvaging any part of it. Protagoras’ limited epistemic and moral relativism had offered a world of socio-political gain to the relatively worse-off members of the Athenian upper classes, who had to make inroads to dēmos in order to tap into the socio-economic benefits. Noticing the jeopardy entailed in that turn towards more demotic politics, Plato built a terracotta army of philosophical forms for the sake of cutting the ground beneath the feet of Athenian democrats. Having cemented moral and epistemological groundwork on which his Kallipolis was to rise, he set about building it.

6.4 Plato’s Political Philosophy, the Fifth Transformation and Conclusion

Plato’s dialogues brought about a revolution in the fourth-century politico-philosophical conception of nomos and phusis. And the locus classicus of that revolution is in the two of his longest and mainly political works, Republic and Laws. A series of changes separate, of course, the earlier work from the later, akin to the moral and epistemological refinements that we have observed in the context of his other dialogues. Never the less, as André Laks has persuasively argued almost three decades ago,3040 those changes do not add up to a complete rethinking of the core tenets which had been adopted by Plato in his conception of the Republic. If any reorientation can be purported to exist between the two works, then, one needs to confirm that it was to be one generally of the preferred method of how the desired social, economic and political revolutions will be brought about rather than of the substance of those revolutions.3041 The later-day ideal Magnesia of Laws can, in that sense, be viewed as a more down-to-earth one than the earlier Kallipolis, but that does not spell any transmutation of the


3041 “A city of that kind [of the kind postulated in the Republic] – I don’t know if its inhabitants are gods or a number of sons of gods, but if that is how they pass their days, then they live lives of great happiness. In our search for a social and political system, we need look no further than this for a model; we should keep a firm hold of it, and do everything we can to find one as like it as possible. The one we have made a start on today, were it to come into being, would come pretty close to immortality, I imagine, and would come second in terms of unity …” Plato, Laws, 739d7-5.
strictly aristocratic soil on which her feet are planted.\textsuperscript{3042} On that note, proposing to comprehend the two works as complementing each other, we claim that the Platonic ideal polity serves as the very \textit{eidos} of goodness communalised that is to be approximated by a series of alterations made to the contemporary \textit{nomos}, understood as laws, conventions as well as customs, with a naturalistic-corporatist rhetoric of playing one’s apportioned economic, social and political role.\textsuperscript{3043} That final rung of the hierarchic ladder, ideationally and politically alike, consists of a citizen-body economically appropriating the surplus labour of slaves, \textit{metoikoi} and non-guardian \textit{politai} whilst socio-politically acting as the ever-vigilant guardians of a nomothetic order that is heavily permeated by a reworked culture of education, governance and division of labour.\textsuperscript{3044} Whether that polity is to be enacted by a resettlement of an old one, as in Kallipolis, or be the foundation of a new \textit{polis}, as in Magnesia, the political prescription is the same: a ruler class that is carefully selected from the ranks of the naturally best men and women bringing their numbers as well as those of the ruled to the line, whilst the ruled sate themselves with being safely out of poverty’s way.

As Socrates’ and the Athenian’s interlocutors would remind them both every so often, there are many things in their account on the polity to be endorsed that were against the grain of norms and conventions of their day. Those unconventional aspects can be gathered along four lines in their relation to the duality: a de-traditionalized understanding of \textit{nomos} and \textit{phusis}; a spiritually purveyed politics of \textit{kaloikagathoi}\textsuperscript{3045}; a socially inclusive ideology of ennoblement; and a metaphysics of consent. To being with, there are no eternal voices of either

\textsuperscript{3042} The transition can be observed in the development of the intersexual physical education programme from the \textit{Republic} to \textit{Laws}. On that note, while there is a remarkable change in the tone of the radicality that was purported by Plato on the question of female physical exercise in the context of the two works, such as married women exercising clothed rather than naked, the spirit of the Platonic sexual equality remained largely intact in that education of females runs, unlike the contemporary situation in most of the mainland Greek \textit{poleis}, in parallel lines to that of males. Plato, \textit{Laws}, 833d-834d; cf. Pomeroy, \textit{Goddesses, Whores, Wives, and Slaves}, pp. 118; for an analogous interpretation of the political continuity in the two dialogues with respect to the attitude they veer towards in questions pertinent to the admission of dramatists into the \textit{poleis}, see Kaufmann, \textit{Tragedy and Philosophy}, pp. 31-33.


\textsuperscript{3044} “Slaves and masters can never be friends. Nor can scoundrels and honest men, even if they are declared to be equal in terms of public recognition, since equality between people who are not equal – and the absence of any sense of proportion – amounts to inequality. Either of these things will fill a state with civil unrest.” \textit{Ibid}, 756e10-757a5; for a study of the Platonic understanding of the relationship between guarding and ruling, see Alexander Long, ‘The Political Art in Plato’s \textit{Republic}’, in \textit{Politieia in Greek and Roman Philosophy}, ed. by Verity Harte and Melissa Lane, (Cambridge, 2013), pp. 22, 28.

\textsuperscript{3045} \textit{Kaloikagathoi}’s semantic development from the connotations of riches derived preferably from landed wealth to denotations of being rich plain and simple, e.g., in Plato and Aristotle, has been traced by Ste. Croix: Ste. Croix, \textit{The Origins of the Peloponnesian War}, pp. 372; the historical origins of the compound has been traced as far back as the second half of the fifth century by Bourriot: Félix Bourriot, “\textit{Kaloi kagathoi}, \textit{kalokagathia} à Sparte aux époques archaïque et classique”; for a synoptic historical assessment with a modern twist, see Adorno, \textit{Minima Moralia}, pp. 184-185; Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer, ‘Notes and Sketches’, in \textit{Dialectic of Enlightenment}, pp. 194.
customs or nature in the political universes of Plato. Traditions are there to be upturned for the simple fact that they have been demonstrated, repeatedly, to be defunct. True to the soul, if not the words, of Aristophanes, Plato’s political philosophy shows that he recognised the need to reconstruct the two terms since no turning back the clock to an aristocratic ethos of the yore would be feasible by the 370s. With the death of the old world announced loud and clear at Leuctra, Plato saw that no Isocratic odes to the virtuous Areopagus would do the trick of ridding the Athenian polity of its democratic elements one and all. No: nomos and phusis was to be emptied of their remaining toxic content so that they could be refilled in accord with the socio-political needs of his day. In conjunction with nomos, this de-traditionalization required the erection of the eternal yardstick of goodness whose eidos was deemed to be the main constituent of aretê. In its political context, goodness was viewed by Plato as heeding the dictates of the philosophically educated rational part of the soul. In abiding by the commands of the rational part of the soul, the individuals who made up the polis would ensure that their acts would occasion the salvation of their polis, just as much as it would herald the complete katharsis of their souls. That therapeutic purge of the contemporary nomos was to function as the spring-board whence the Platonic philosophy would dawn on the horizon of all politai, and not just on the select few who had devoted their lives to mastering its nuances. Plato’s eidos of Goodness was not of the personalised order of the early Cynic cosmopolitanism; it was a civic ideal that promised public benefactions. In order for that scheme of communal salvation to work, it was necessary as a first step that nomos should be reconceptualised along the lines of aristocratic reverence. Pruned for their inconvenient reverberations were the democratic plasticity and internal mechanisms of accountability of the contemporary nomos. If nomos was to be designated as the firm political spokesperson of the eidos of the Good, then it was prerequisite for it to be turned into a frozen set of dictates beyond any substance.3046 No measure of democratic mutability would risk the bending and shifting of laws, conventions and norms in the Kallipolis,3047 and what little notion of it remained in Magnesia was to be quickly buried in the quicksand of indoctrinating education.3048 Nomos of the Platonic universe

3046 “Change, we shall find, is for all things (apart from outright evils) by far the most dangerous, whether it’s the seasons, the winds, the body and its diet, or the soul and its habits. That is pretty well true for everything – not true in some contexts but not in others – apart, as I have just said, from things which are downright evil.” Plato, Laws, 797d8-e3; Badiou, Being and Event, pp. 26.
3047 Plato, Republic, 378b1-379c1.
3048 Capturing as it is the spirit with which Xenophon relayed Socrates’ memoirs, Waterfield’s connection of the acute oligarchic yearning after the rediscovery of patrios politeia and a nostalgia of a return to the paideia of old seems even more fitting in the case of Plato’s philosophy: “Sophists no longer found rich and ready audiences for their teachings, as fathers reclaimed the right to indoctrinate their sons in society’s traditional standards. Many Greek states were involved in the attempt to stabilize their constitutions by having them written down for the first time; this was often cast grandiosely as a search for ‘our ancestral constitution.’ Writers pandered to popular adulation of the past with a spate of local histories, at the same time Xenophon and his fellow Socratics were attempting to pin down Socrates, the man for whom philosophy was interaction and the living world. Deliberate archaizing
was to serve as the unbending stick of eternal Goodness, which made it imperative for it to be conceived as the abstraction of every ideal that the ruler class was to stand for.\textsuperscript{3049}

As with nomos so with phusis. Plato knew that his political blueprint could turn into reality only if a selective reordering of everything that had previously been branded phusikos was undertaken. And yet, working against some of the most embedded notions of the aristocratic politico-philosophical tradition itself, Plato could not rely on his adeptness at table-turning to recast the moulds of ideological permanence. To liquidate the contemporary nomos was not concomitant to rethinking the elements to which were ascribed the most entrenched accolades of naturalty by the contemporary beneficiaries of the relations of production and reproduction. Plato’s de-traditionalization, as such, ushered in a bringing down of many of the old icons of phusis, leaving in its wake only the stepping stones which were regarded as serviceable for the new political order he envisaged. Gone with the wind were the old aristocratic sacredness of phusis, exclusively masculine promiscuity among other things.\textsuperscript{3050} As he waded through the remnants of his surgical operation of cleansing, Plato saw that the old aristocratic attribution of timeless immutability to phusis would simply not do for his new ideal polity.\textsuperscript{3051} First came the negation, as the Socratic midwife clipped the evil outgrowths of contemporary notion of phusis, and, only afterwards, the affirmation.\textsuperscript{3052} Plato’s polity was that of aristocratic phusis

categorized art, literature and rhetoric, while others turned their backs on the present so thoroughly that they wrote fanciful utopias, such as Xenophon’s The Education of Cyrus the Great or Plato’s Republic, where good order prevails under the rule of reason and law, where concord is guaranteed because everyone knows his place in society and sticks to it.” Waterfield, Xenophon’s Retreat, pp. 193; one needs not look anywhere else but to Magnesia in order to comprehend what an idealised construction of such unanimity could spell out in practice: Garnsey, Thinking about Property, pp. 15; cf. Gottesman, Politics and the Street in Democratic Athens, pp. 200.

\textsuperscript{3049} Cf. “νόμον διαμερίσας δῶον ὁ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῷ γεγραμμένος, ὁ δὲ ἄγραφος, ὃ μὲν ἐν ταῖς πόλεις πολεμούμεθα, γεγραμμένος ἐστίν. ὁ δὲ κατὰ ἐκ γνώμονας στόχος ἄγραφος κάλεσαν· οὖν τὸ μὴ γυνικὸν πορεύεσθαι εἰς τὴν ἁγορὰν μηδὲ γυνακείου ἁμάτων περιβάλλεσθαι. ταῦτα γάρ οὐθές νόμος κοιλίᾳ, ἄλλ’ ὄμος οὐ πρᾶττομεν διὰ τὸ ἄγραφον νόμο κοιλίεσθαι. τοῦ ἄρα νόμῳ ἐστὶν ὃ μὲν γεγραμμένος, ὁ δὲ ἄγραφος.” Diogenes Laertius, 931-938

\textsuperscript{3050} Dragged in their place, however, was a certain sort of sexism that branded any homosexual relationship as strictly unnatural: Plato, Laws, 836c1-d1, 841c6-e4.

\textsuperscript{3051} I find it hard to grasp exactly what is entailed by Farrar’s dubbing of Thucydides and Plato as ‘realists’ about human nature. If that brand of realism is conceived in tandem with steady contemplations about constructing an oligarchic elsewhere, at least in the case of Plato, with relations of production and domination fashioned in accord with the supposed dictates of the absolute reason, then I accede. Short of anything of that admission, and we would not grant the necessary bit of self-consciousness to Plato, and Thucydides by extension, with respect to his class position. Farrar, ‘Putting History in its Place: Plato, Thucydides, and the Athenaios Politeia’, pp. 34.

\textsuperscript{3052} This can most clearly be seen in the case of Plato’s attitude to women. Crossing the apparent threshold of misogynist politics in order to breathe life into a postulation of a non-patriarchal class rule, Plato responded to the contemporary social problems of his day with a radical negation of the current intersexual relations whereby he situated the traditional air of sexism in its own historical particularity. An infinitely more radical proposal than those offered by the cosmopolitan ethics of the early Cynics, Plato’s rejection of the supposedly extemore benefits of patriarchy showed the lengths he was willing
re-politicised. Whether deemed seriously at odds with the political sensibilities of the new ruling class or not, the old kata phusin words and deeds that did not seem to function in harmony with the new polity were to be cast aside. And in their place rose a set of new ‘naturalities’ that could bend in the direction of the reconfigured force of circumstance.

Those new naturalities in addition to the conventionalities had a golden string to whose pulls the citizens needed to respond voluntarily and insistently as in the grim image that Plato portrayed in his Laws. In his exposition of that image, Plato had conceived humans as marionettes on strings, owned by gods. Only the golden string of rational thought, his story goes, tug us gently in the direction of divine reason. Legislators’ main task, on this view, was to attune the rational thought’s pull upon us which was, in turn, to regiment pleasure and pain to the tugs at the golden string. With respect to nomoi, this translated into the creation of a new code of laws, conventions and customs ruling over the life of the individual from birth to death. Plato’s ideal paideia would leave no stones unturned in inculcating any citizen with a set of rights and duties that regimented every sphere of existence. From governance to the upbringing of youth and from the economic division of labour to the public view of poetry each and every nomos was to be rethought in the light of the necessities occasioned by the maintenance of the new polity. Contingent upon the political benefits they promised, the novel nomoi modelled after the ideal set were to be consecrated by fusing it with a spiritualised conception of the old kaloikagathoi. Beauty and goodness had always served, to be sure, as one of the central building blocks of aristocratic ideology. Indeed, from Herodotus onwards, many of the foremost aristocratically-inclined writers of the classical age resorted to the concept as if it were something of a commonplace in attempting to vindicate their political

to go for the sake of creating a phusis that was more attuned to his philosophical ideals. Rose, Sons of the Gods, Children of Earth, pp. 350-360; contra Ellen M. Wood and Neal Wood, Class Ideology and Ancient Political Theory: Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle in Social Context, (Oxford, 1978), pp. 145-171; Pomeroy speaks of a further division within the guardian class between the sexes, with males forming a higher subdivision than females. And though she is in the right in doing so, given, if nothing else, Plato’s explicit focus on the reproductive capacity of female guardians, we still think that Plato’s utopian vision had a certain radical quality about it: Pomeroy, Goddesses, Whores, Wives, and Slaves, pp. 115-116; on women’ capacity to become guardians, see Giuseppe Cambiano, ‘Devenir homme’, in L’homme grec, ed. by Jean-Pierre Vernant, (Paris, 2000), pp. 160-161; on a re-construal of the actual position of the Athenian women within their society, see Claude Mossé, Politique et société en Grèce ancienne. Le “modèle athénien”, (Paris, 1999), pp. 28-40.


3054 Plato, Laws, 1.644d-645b; cf. 732e4-7, 803c2-8.

3055 “So what kind of activity is dear to god and attendant upon him? Only one kind, based on one long-standing principle – that like is dear to like, so long as it observes measure or due proportion. Things that lack measure are at odds both with each other and with things that do possess measure. Now, in our eyes it will be god who is the measure of pretty well all things (don’t let anybody try to tell you it is “man”). And for the person who is going to be dear to such a being, it is essential that he himself, to the best of his ability, becomes as like to god as he can.” Ibid, 716c1-d1.

views and declarations. Speaking to a reinvented archaism that the statesmen of old were always the crème-de-la-crème of what the polis had to offer, oligarchically and aristocratically-oriented upper classes were expected to rally around the concept in hopes of digging a last line of defence of their time-hallowed prerogatives. With the conception of the Platonic theory of forms, however, this notion began to take a definitive turn toward spirituality. Plato’s guardian class as it is portrayed in the Republic or Critias is not an outmoded yearning for a bygone golden age that had never materialised. Naturally, its portrayal in both cases display a certain pathos of nostalgia in enacting a well-ordered community of uptight citizen that resembles the ideal anarchic communities in not needing preambles or written codes to function like a well-oiled machine. That machine also appears capable of functioning with updated gears as indicated by Plato’s conception of the guardian class in Critias. Heralded as an original community of ideal citizens, the Athenian guardian class had served the purpose of inverting the encomiastic tradition that the Athenians were generally pictured as having grown highly fond of. His aim in introducing the Athenians as the leaders of an anti-Atlantean alliance which was formed due to the rapacious expansion of a pre-historic Atlantis does not see, however, to have spoken to a sense of uncritical eulogy. Indeed, coupled with his clear ridicule of the Athenian encomiastic tradition by canvassing Aspasia of all people as delivering a Periclean funeral oration in Menexenus, on top of the fact that Critias, or a dramatized version of the reckless leader of the Thirty Tyrants, a construal of the motif along the lines of a stern critique of the recent Athenian ventures seem to be much more compelling. On that note, Critias’ dramatic destruction of Atlantis by divine wrath might be viewed as a sermon against the Athenian penchant for relying heavily on the navy to gain the material and social benefits of arkhê that is corroborated elsewhere by a staunch anti-naval moralism. Plato acknowledged that the stirrings of a second Athenian empire could only bode ill for putting his political blueprints to practice. There were two political measures that Plato adopted for the sake of pre-empting any return to the politics of arkhê: a thorough

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3058 “But when the divine portion within them [the Atlantians] began to fade, as a result of constantly being diluted by large measures of mortality, and their mortal nature began to predominate, they became incapable of bearing their prosperity and grew corrupt. Anyone with the eyes to see could mark the vileness of their behaviour as they destroyed the best of their valuable possessions; but those who were blind to the life that truly leads to happiness regarded them as having finally attained the most desirable and enviable life possible, now that they were infected with immortal greed and power.” Plato, Critias, in Timaeus and Critias, trans. by Robin Waterfield, 121a9-b8.

3059 Ibid, 121b9-c5; Plato, Laws, 704a-707c; cf. Ps.-Xenophon, Constitution of the Athenians, 1.2; Lysias, Against the Corn Dealers, 14; Aristophanes, Peace, 165; Aeschines, Against Timarchus, 40; Aristotle, The Athenian Constitution, 16.9.
reworking of the political offices superintending the operation of nomos and a spiritualisation of the banes and boons of his aristocratic polity.

Plato’s guardian class, to finish the train of thought we began above, was one that was to serve in full capacity in turning a historical polis into an ideal one through the close supervision of the Platonic nomos, whose enactment needs to be undertaken by the few philosopher-kings,\textsuperscript{3060} and the monopolisation of the means of warfare.\textsuperscript{3061} Filling the lacunae that was left over by the sweeping aside of the old laws and conventions by the earlier torrents of aristocratic negation, the new nomos would enact an unprecedentedly close scrutiny and censure of all the knots of human existence so that the regime’s maintenance would be secured.\textsuperscript{3062} Plato’s guardians act in juridical and executive capacity, leaving legislation to the purview of the philosopher-kings, in order to mend any socio-political crack that may jeopardise the unity of the citizen-body. And if the combined executive corps of guardians and auxiliaries appear to resemble the oligarchy within oligarchy and homoioi of Sparta in general, the similarities are more substantial than apparent. Combined with the auxiliaries, the Platonic guardians exercise full political control over the workforce that is ideally made up of unqualified slaves and artisan immigrants. Nomoi’s enactment and enshrouding the polis with an ideology of mutually exclusive class divisions that had ‘nothing new’ about them are the lot of philosopher-kings, who are the only ideologically undeceived party in an entire citizen-body that is herded like cattle.\textsuperscript{3063} Seeing to their execution and acting in juridical capacity in filing official complaints against any guardian or auxiliary that appears to have mishandled his or her mandates, contrariwise, are the business of the guardian class, programmatically deluded for the sake of building an oligarchic fantasy. Closely following on the heels of the demolition of any democratic means of accountability, Plato’s guardian class acts as the permanent

\textsuperscript{3060} We follow Rose in postulating that many of the equalising measures, e.g., abolition of marriage, institutionalisation of communal upbringing, etc., only apply to the guardian class. Indeed, it appears that so far as the rest of the population of his ideal poleis were concerned, Plato considered the satisfaction of their group interests to be rather irrelevant to the safekeeping of his communitarian ideals so long as the guardian class was to retain its socio-political role. Rose, \textit{Sons of the Gods, Children of Earth}, pp. 355.

\textsuperscript{3061} In his creation of a military class that was tasked exclusively with the duties of external defence, Plato appears to have displayed a crystal-clear historical understanding that a monopolisation of the instruments of violence were prerequisite for culling the democratic vogue of political participation. Guarding the territory of Kallipolis against external and internal enemies both, Plato’s guardians serve as the ideological medicine to remedy the evils of an Athenian polity that had come to rely heavily on naval supremacy by the advent of the fourth century. For a focused reading on the different facets allotted to the guarding capacity of Kallipolis’ guardians, see Alexander Long, \textit{‘The Political Art in Plato’s Republic’}.

\textsuperscript{3062} Plato, \textit{Laws}, 801e9-d5.

\textsuperscript{3063} “The rulers are those we must, but cannot gull: for if they are to be autonomous philosophers in control, they would be obliged to take themselves in, all the while without compromising their lucid cognition. Square the circle.” Wardy, \textit{‘The Platonic Manufacture of Ideology, or How to Assemble Awkward Truth with Wholesome Falsehood’}, pp. 134.
upholder of law and order against any threat that might occasion instability. Theirs is a falsely enlightened rule. By having cultivated the rational part of their souls according to the edicts of the philosopher-kings, they act as the earthly embodiment of divine reason, partaking of their public office despite the fact that their natural abode is skyward. And the edicts they follow and carry into effect are the public manifestation of the philosopher-kings’ benevolence in believing that salvation is the common concern of all politai. In rational relation with their accumulated philosophical expertise of aretê and the eidos of Goodness, they exercise the will of the rational god, ensuring that their executive and judicial power is appropriately used to turn the social existence into earthly paradise. And Plato does not pull any punches in warranting that their commitment to safeguard the regime of the kaloikaigathoi is absolute. His attempt to safeguard that devotion leads Plato to create a new phusis from scratch.

Communalisation of property, institutionalisation of communal upbringing of babies, cancellation of any marriage ties, equal physical and mental education of the sexes, etc., are just some of the radical nomoi that Plato offers so that Kallipolis’ polity remains untouched by any drift away from goodness. And even though there is an unmistakable difference between the political prescriptions of Republic and Laws, the distinction is largely one of grade and not quality. When the Athenian proposes the equal upbringing of sexes to his Spartan and Cretan interlocutors, and gets a conceivable warm response in return, for example, it appears rather clear that Plato postulates the dramatic changes in the nomos as an approximation to the ideal that he had already set out for his readership in Republic. When laws such as these that are capable of shaking the relations of domination, in production and reproduction alike, to their roots are deigned to be enacted, then, there arises a need to reinvent the useful icons of phusis. With a veritable flurry of ideological encirclement, Plato attempted to lend political

3064 “Acquiescence falling well short of active connivance in delusion is already anathema to the philosopher taking a stand against sophistry on the grounds of truth. The trouble with philosopher-kings isn’t so much that they must dirty their hands; rather, the scandal resides in the need to sully their minds with an ideological cloud.” Ibid, pp. 133; Harte, ‘Plato’s Politics of Ignorance’, pp. 145; Rose, Sons of the Gods, Children of Earth, pp. 369.

3065 Cf. “Yet Plato is himself far too much a Sophist, far too imbued with their analyses of social existence and education to fit simply into so narrow a category. Broadly speaking, I would say that Plato constantly exploits for his own ends all the ambiguities of the term phusis without acknowledging that there are potentially fundamental conflicts in these usages.” Rose, Sons of the Gods, Children of Earth, pp. 351.

3066 Plato, Republic, 460e; cf. Laws, 804d.

3067 Plato, Republic, 459d10-460b4.

3068 And if there is an apparent rift between the maintenance of a goodness reincarnate of a polity and the nexus of perpetual deception engulfing it, that is because Plato’s ideal is essentially good only for himself qua the philosopher-king: “Callipolis is, however, neither realistic nor democratic. It is undemocratic because a few experts rule without consulting the other citizens and it is based on systematic deception (the Noble Lies). It is unrealistic because it assumes the existence of general political experts.” Ober, Demopolis, pp. 144; cf. Ober, The Rise and Fall of Classical Greece, pp. 233-234; Schofield, Plato, pp. 292-309.
and spiritual credence to the revolutionary changes to *nomos* that he had proposed. From the *muthos* of metallurgical essences\(^{3069}\) to the ideological emphasis on the educational inculcation of beliefs and norms, Plato recreated *phusis* with a peerlessly self-conscious honesty that rings true even in the world of 2020s. With the layers of hierarchical layers of governance, economic and sexual division of labour, the production and reproduction of ideology, etc., validated in accord with the dictates of philosopher-kings, or philosopher-legislators, Plato rested easy with the expectation that it would only take two to three generations for his reinvigorated *muthos* to work its wonder.\(^{3070}\) As far as any layperson was concerned, the polity of his or her *polis* was in alignment with the timeless ordainments of divine reason. And if he or she was not judged to exhibit properties fitting for a gold or silver substance, then none but lady fortune was to be blamed for his lot that was dictated by a course imbued with a fair share of toil and drudgery.\(^{3071}\) Qualitatively, however, that toil and boil never bordered on those that were allotted either to the slaves or the non-citizens whose lack of socio-political rights made their existence a highly precarious one.

In a sense, Plato’s combination of guardians and auxiliaries was analogous to an enlarged body of Spartan *homoioi* who saw to every nook and cranny of social, economic and political organisation that was to keep the *polis* abreast as a hegemond of mainland Greek politics.\(^{3072}\) They issued levies, made alliances, declared wars, organised events of religious or cultural import, among other things, which conjoined to turn their class rule into one, to their eyes at least, of a natural fact. Yet, there was a signal difference between Plato’s polity and that of Spartans: the status of the *perioikoi*. Unlike the Spartiates, Plato was willing to grant citizenship to the possessors of brass and iron metals provided that they complied to their

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\(^{3070}\) Though I fail to understand the congruence of his analogy between the ‘Marxist principle’ and Plato’s rigidification of the oligarchic class structure, this economic basis of Plato’s ideal *poleis* is noted by Burnyeat: ‘From top to bottom the ideal city instantiates the Marxist principle ‘From each according to their ability, to each according to their need,’ where ‘need’ covers all and only the requisites for their allotted social function. And even if we do not agree ourselves with the Marxist formulation, we can surely understand it as a recipe for a just social order, which I take to be what Plato is talking about when he speaks of justice in the city.’ Burnyeat, ‘Justice Writ Large and Small in *Republic* 4’, pp. 216; cf. 225.

\(^{3071}\) When Plato’s Socrates avers that there is nothing new about his *muthos* of metallurgy, he attempts, as observed by Wardy, nothing less than a full-fledged naturalisation of the element of mass deception that he attempts to introduce to Kallipolis: “Yes: precedents for both mythological components of the Lie are plentifully attested. No: metallic souls are a synchronic recasting of Hesiodic diachronic ages, and the hybridisation of the two stories is unprecedented. Plato is making up ideology. Plato is making as if to make up ideology. The disclaimer ‘nothing new’ is not superficial play: no ideology can ever afford to confess its novelty outright, since that is to invite critical reflection on the part even of conservatives, let alone anyone chary of an established or embryonic status quo.” Wardy, ‘The Platonic Manufacture of Ideology, or How to Assemble Awkward Truth and Wholesome Falsehood’, pp. 137.

assigned parts at the lower rungs of the new division of labour. Plato had seen the mighty Spartiates fall from apparently being the undeniable masters of all Greece in 404 to a second-grade backwater in 371. Drawing heavily from the causes of that downfall, Plato noticed that only with a body-politic that encompassed more than just the super-rich of a polis could he breathe a life of plausibility to his brainchild. But, then, there was more than just a need for enlarging the citizen body that he elicited from that historical episode. An easily distortable regime of hereditable property and an ill- advised sole occupation in war making were two of the pitfalls that Plato had to surpass in order to give his ideal creation a fighting chance in the real world. By 404, as we saw above, the numbers of the Spartiates had verged on dangerously low levels which had all the makings of a recipe for disaster given how outnumbered by the helots, hypomeiones and perioikoi they were. And if attrition was one principal cause of the dwindling, their inheritance scheme was another. Taking that lesson to heart, Plato dared to overturn phusis in advocating, at least for his guardian class, for an abnegation of private property. With consummate public ownership of everything including eugenically bred progeny preached to his guardians and auxiliaries, Plato donned the robes of the geometrician god of Timaeus as he calculated an ideal number that was to be sustained at all times. Juxtaposed to the non-slave and non-guardian ownership of all landholdings, the result of his motions was the maintenance of a minimum number of citizens who lived off the produce of numerous slaves who, again, were considered public property. Likewise, scooping up any ideology of steady warmongering, Plato showed that his construction was not akin to that of a military superpower. To be sure, the male and female citizens of both Kallipolis and

3073 “If one of their [the guardians’] own children has traces of bronze or iron in its make-up, they must harden their hearts, assign it its proper value, and degrade it to the ranks of the industrial and agricultural class where it properly belongs: similarly, if a child of this class is born with gold or silver in its nature, they will promote it appropriately to be a Guardian or an Auxiliary. And this they must do because there is a prophecy that the State will be ruined when it has Guardians of silver or bronze.” *Ibid*, 415b9-c6.


3075 Cf. Plato, *Critias*, 110c-d, 112d-e. There is no positive ideal of communal ownership of property that Plato purveys. And the negative ideal of an absence of property stretches only so far as the Platonic guardians and the auxiliaries are concerned. Barring the slaves, of course, the producers of Kallipolis are perfectly able to reap the fruits of their labour while also providing the latter for their betters for their consumption. As for Magnesia, it fares little better concerning the abolition of private property and the establishment of communal property in its place: Garnsey, *Thinking about Property*, pp. 6-7, 10 ff; Wood, *Citizens to Lords*, pp. 73.

3076 The Guards who govern and control the city do not collectively own, work, and enjoy the fruit of the resources of the community. The only material resources to which they have access are provided by others: they receive payment (misthos) towards their livelihood from the rest of their citizenry, and they are provided with housing in the form of barracks, in return for their services to the city. This is in effect a tax regime.” Garnsey, *Thinking about Property*, pp. 12; cf. Jeremy Waldron, *The Right to Private Property*, (Oxford, 1988), pp. 7.

3077 Female ‘watch-dogs’ of Plato’s Kallipolis are pictured as partaking of the same duties and responsibilities as their male compatriots: Plato, *Republic*, 452a2-3; cf. “‘Then if men or women as a sex appear to be qualified for different skills or occupations,’ I said, ‘we shall assign these to each accordingly; but if the only difference apparent between them is that the female bears and the male
Magnesia were formidable fighters that had proved their mettle in having braved the rigours of compulsory conscription. Just as important as their military duties, however, was the exercise of their educational, legislative, juridical, and productive, at least for those who were not cut out to become guardians and auxiliaries, responsibilities. Nothing appears to be further of the mind of Plato as turning his ideal city into a veritable ‘military camp’ that the classical Sparta was.

An enlarged citizen-body, an abolition of private property from the reach of the guardian class and a theoretical cleaning up of any veneration of continuous warfare were all parts of an ideology of ennoblement which propagated that all the citizens of Plato’s ideal poleis were righteously working towards approximating to the eidos of Goodness itself. Ruled by genuine philosophers, the lower-class politai were to reap the material and political benefits on the condition that they were to conform the socio-economic roles that were ascribed by the guardians on them. Needless to add, the guardians and auxiliaries themselves were the rock upon which the stability of the entire polis depended. Liaised by the bonds of socio-economic needs and the political ‘golden string,’ the lower and upper-class citizens were to consolidate their stratified hegemony over the non-citizens who had to bear the yoke so that the leisure time that was necessary for the citizens’ undergoing the multi-step public education could be created. Their allotted public service never comprised of anything related to material

begets, we shall not admit that this is a difference relevant for our purpose, but shall still maintain that our male and female Guardians ought to follow the same occupations.” Ibid, 455d8-e3.

The only type of individuals that need not apply to the Platonic ideal poleis for a job opportunity were those that fancied polupragmonein, or ‘being a busybody.’ Specialisation on the assigned professions is the cement holding together Kallipolis and Magnesia. And if justice for one is to do what one’s phasis was born and developed for, then it is only phusikos for meddlers to be relegated to the status of perpetual outsiders. Ibid, 433a5-9, 433d4-5; cf. Kaufmann, Tragedy and Philosophy, pp. 18; Rose, Sons of the Gods, Children of Earth, pp. 363; Trundle, Greek Mercenaries, pp. 148; Wood, Citizens to Lords, pp. 58 ff.


Plato, Republic, 416d3-417b5. It needs to be added, in agreement with recent commentators, that Plato proposed only a partial form of abolition to swipe off the accumulation of private property from the reach of the guardian class whileswiping it into those of the artisans and unskilled labourers who were not obstructed from transactions in it. For an interpretation of the Plato’s proposal as a type of limited negative communism, see Melissa Lane, Plato’s Progeny: How Plato and Socrates Still Captivate the Modern Mind, (London, 2001); Lane, Greek and Roman Political Ideas, pp. 166-167; on some of the notable examples of the traditional mistaking of limited abolition for a comprehensive one, see Garnsey, Thinking about Property.

“If we are somehow to escape the attack which you say threatens us, we must define these philosophers who we dare claim should be rulers. When they stand clearly revealed we shall be able to defend ourselves by showing that there are some who are naturally fitted for philosophy and political leadership, while the rest should follow their lead but leave philosophy alone.” Plato, Republic, 474b1-c3.

“[Socrates speaking] So we must choose from among our Guardians those who appear to us on observation to be most likely to devote their lives to doing what they judge to be in the interest of the community, and who are never prepared to act against it.” Ibid, 412d9-e2.
production of any goods, thus making the combination of guardians and auxiliaries the clear beneficiaries of the new educational philosophy qua indoctrination. And when public service was to be conceived more along the lines of menial tasks, as in the case of citizens of brass and iron metals, the profession that they excelled seemed definitely more rewarding, materially and mentally, than those most tedious and repetitive errands that were to be allotted to the slaves, immigrants and non-guardian citizens.

That ideology of ennoblement was to be brought forth principally by the revolutions of nomos. At the beck and call of the guardian class who derived their power from them and other more divine sources, nomos was to attain an aura of invincibility that could not be provided by the old understanding of almost completely mutable laws, conventions and customs. Plato’s ideal nomos was the changeless epitome of a philosophical ingenuity which had paved the road to goodness for an actually existing polis to tread. There were not there to be amended or tempered with, but to be affirmed wholeheartedly and practiced without complaint. All of the citizen denizens of Kallipolis and Magnesia were the living and breathing exemplars of the Platonic notion of praxis. Whatever knowledge they learned as being suitable for their respective capacities was acted on immediately, thus turning the philosophical ideal of the public-spirited sage into reality. There was one crucial element, however, that got lost in that translation from idea to practice: sage’s role as the gadfly of everything conventional. Plato’s prescribed laws of his ideal poleis did not have any blemish that was to be mended, or any inconsistency that needed to be ironed out, which made any endeavour to metamorphose into a political gadfly a very inadvisable one. With the strictest form of a surveillance regime that was ever conceived, at least among the surviving works and fragments, in the classical antiquity, Plato created a suffocating dystopia. Paling even the phyiological tremors that the poorer homoioi were subjected to as a result of Sparta’s heavily skewed regime of downward mobility, Plato’s demand of impeccable observation of his ideal nomos occasioned his politai’s turning into mere automata, to be kept in working order so long as they served their purpose. Any defiance, however minute, was, by contrast, punishable by the severest of penalties, effectively dismantling any automaton which was deemed to drag its feet too long

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3083 Ibid, 39510-d3; 401d4-402a4; cf. Plato, Laws, 653b1-c3.
3084 Ibid, 948c10-d2.
3085 Needless to add, the pervasiveness of the ruling ideology is ensured first and foremost by the guardian class by a clever combination of fiction and deceit. Still, only if that dissemination is successful in compelling the non-guardians to consent to their allocated socio-economic roles can the polis became kala: Plato, Republic, 459c9-d1.
3086 Cf. Kaufmann, Tragedy and Philosophy, pp. 18-19.
before toeing the line. In the end, the joke was on Plato: The Laws of Athens had spoken true in *Phaedo* when she had ordained that any citizen who chose to live within the polis was her slave. Perhaps he had managed to eradicate any trace of naturalist hylozoism from his ideal polity, but Plato’s erection of an even more overarching interpretation of nomos in its stead connoted an interesting shift from Heraclitus’ celebrated maxim to one of ‘Nomos is the father of all, and king of all.’

At the right hand of that king, as it were, was a re-substantiated phusis, which did little else other than consecrating the ground on which the new king was to stride. Heralding the advent of an age wherein all the crimes one committed and duties one accomplished were to be judged along the scale of goodness, Plato’s phusis operated on a metaphysical level of socio-political surveillance. With the temporally indefinite ostracism of the element of Tuche from his idealised universe, Plato bestowed a god’s eye view to his phusis so that it could act as the metaphysical harbinger of a rational god’s divine blessings as well as penances. Of course, this metaphysics of justice had always been a signal component of Plato’s construal of the sovereignty of good. Indeed, from the grotesque sights that are offered by the muthos at the end of *Phaedo* to the soul’s solitude in observing, albeit inferentially, the divine goods and evils to be reaped as a result of the actions it commands on earth in the Myth of Er, Plato was an expert on merging the afterlife with earthly existence. Now, to depict that merger as one that displayed more interest in chastisements rather than compensations would not be fair. After all, Plato, as we observed above, had a grand philosophy of erôs that he preached as a rocky road to soul’s genuine freedom. Love, if conceived along the lines of the theory of forms as defined in *Symposium*, has no ‘labour lost’ in that it is the satisfiable expression of an all-too-human yearning after everlasting bliss. Similarly, one’s acting in line with the precepts of the divine reason in all of his or her social affairs is one that is geared towards the fulfilment of one’s striving to partake of Goodness, viewed as the eidos capable of elucidating all the others.

Further, qualified as a completely public endeavour that aims at reaching the common metaphysical salvation of all, a political existence in the service of goodness is the

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3088 “Indeed, “each does his own specialized job and strictly avoids interfering in the specializations of others” is the primary principle of justice in the most famous work of Greek political philosophy, Plato’s *Republic*. In Plato’s ideal state, that principle leads inevitably to the absolutist rule of philosopher-kings, who are described as perfectly and uniquely competent expert rulers. The philosopher-kings are supported by the auxiliary guardians, specialists in violence who enjoy a monopoly on the legitimate use of force, both internally against rule-breaking locals and for purposes of external warfare.” Ober, *The Rise and Fall of Classical Greece*, pp. 17.

3089 The alternative to the intensified reign of Plato’s nomos was civil strife which would humble, in the end, the demotic sentiments as shown by the Thucydidean example of the civil war in Corcyra. Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War*, 3.84; cf. Ober, ‘Political Conflicts, Political Debates, and Political Thought’, pp. 117.

magic needle knitting together all the forms under the canopy of polis. That measure of appeal was counterbalanced, however, with an equally metaphysical measure of appal which can be discerned in the context of all the eschatological muthoi that we have analysed above. Er’s momentary sojourn at the crossroads of upper and underworld, for one, is a picturesque testimony to the great lengths that Plato was to go in order to make sure that his metaphysics of experience would successfully appall the social existents. And if the overt attribution of thinghood to Plato’s ideal politai seem a little too sweeping, then we need to recall that the only measure of existential comfort that was granted to them was the ever-present threat of physical and mental torment in case they attempted to sever their sacred bonds to polis.

As the after-physics of social existence began to inundate the physics of existentiality, the spectacle on the stage came to be an inverted one. With forms and generalities taking their leave of the entirety of the intellectual existence to be put on exhibit as the new icons of an old world, the intellect collapsed in on itself, transmitting only parking tickets and palms instead of continuing the creative thread of elenchus. His acerbic self-examinations eventually lead Plato’s Socrates to a plane of politico-philosophical certainty, throwing the only light of intelligibility that accorded with Goodness on every beaten track of intellectual endeavour. Plato’s philosopher-king is a king tout court.3091 And his nomos ensured that it would remain as such, putting paid to the eventuality of any faltering on the basics or minutiae of what bore the brand of divine reason. As the pillory closed in on the intellectual existence, the foremost carriers of what Plato saw as the second aspect of earthly existence began to break away from the leashes that had stranded it ever since the Athenian defeat in 404. With an understanding of that second aspect as material labour and its chief practitioners as thêtes, Plato could do naught but assume them away from his ideal polis. In regard to their political capability, there are no thêtes in Kallipolis; but rising in their stead is a curious combination of slaves and non-guardian politai.3092 And if an argument from silence seem a little biased, then perhaps we ought to recall Plato’s assertion that the relationship between material labour and citizenship was to be viewed as mutually exclusive in any well-ordered polis.3093 In short, any thêtes were

3091 “[Socrates speaking] The next question is this. If philosophers have the capacity to grasp the eternal and immutable, while those who have no such capacity are not philosophers and are lost in multiplicity and change, which of the two should be in charge of the state?” Ibid, 484b4-8.
3092 “There is another class whose services we need – those who have no great powers of mind to contribute, but whose physical strength makes them suitable for manual labour. They market their strength and call the return they get for it their wages, and in consequence are usually called wage-earners.” Plato, Republic, 371d5-7.
3093 “We should make some provision for the remainder of the population – the skilled workers – as follows: in the first place, let none of our countrymen be found among those who work in skilled trades, nor be the servant of any of our countrymen. It’s a skilled enough occupation, one demanding at the same time long practice and the study of many branches of learning, for a man who is a citizen to preserve the good order of the city as a whole and make it his own – it’s not something he can do in his
to be enslaved in order to turn aristocratic abstractions into reality.\textsuperscript{3094} It is a curious reminder that it is highly likely for both Republic and Laws to have been written in the interval from 378-355, which denote a timespan in which the Athenian thêtes and slaves were to man the ships, again, for their last attempt at regaining the empire. As the historical significance of thêtes waxed, wane did their ideational import in Plato’s castles in the sand. It appeared that the only sphere into which Plato’s phusis could not penetrate would, once more, be the maker and breaker of the Athenian fortunes. Possibly, his enslavement of thêtes was the way of the philosopher in getting back at his historically determinate present which had proved to be a consummate trickster.

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\textsuperscript{3094} Plato, Republic, 493e-494a.
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CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

‘One defines oneself by his or her project’ has been one of the two guiding maxims of this study, with ‘social reality is a totality that encompasses all the dimensions of existence’ the other one. We have attempted to open up an existentialist dialectical horizon into the totalising projects with which the ancient Greek communities engaged in intra and inter-polis struggles, leaving a trial of reminiscences in their wake. The theoretical constructs that we have evinced in a post-Sartrean vein have been identified as speaking to the particular ways of organising social reality by the collective groups of the poleis in question into polities elucidating the formal limits of class struggle. Ever prone to being rethought and redrawn, those limits obliged their social constituents to continually come up with novel political constellations and strategies in order to fulfil the collective projects that they had created. Peisistratus hiring an exceptionally tall woman to pose in armour as Athena and post-plague Athenian thêtes blowing in a gale force wind to unfurl the sails of their triremes to the land of Cyclops may strike one as operating on two different levels of creative totalising projectivity. And yet the fact that we are inclined to make more historical allowance for the genius of an eupatrid but not for a collective citizenry whose sacrifice at Salamis had allowed the transformation of the fifth century BC mainland Greece into a classical age speaks volumes for all the facets of the preconceptive thinking that quietly seeps into many strands of contemporary historiography. By almost unquestioned adherence to texts of overtly aristocratic encodings, many orthodox classicists have made the necessity of working with limited and partially modified historical material into the virtue of reproducing an aristocratically-driven history. Written by non-democrats one and all, the ancient Greek histories that survive, however, have their fair share of structured silences and repetitions that speak to, when assembled together, a different social reality whose foundations had never been as firm as the reconstructed colonnades of a Parthenon or Erechtheum would lead us to believe. Historical texts, just like monumental temples, ‘know’ infinitely more than they let on. And the central condition for tapping into that knowledge is to self-consciously historicise the past by recording silences as well as transmitted shouting matches, patterns of chastisements as much as those of endless eulogies,
and the lower classes’ projects to re-make their existential situation no less than that of those
of their upper-class counterparts. For only once those connections are made can the full
existential situatedness of dead actors whose being-in-the-world witnessed no less of a
negotiation, often violent, between their projects and those that were imposed on them. Sartre
says somewhere in his vast study of Flaubert that the decisions that parents make for their
children become the destinies of the latter. And as he did with Flaubert, so I have tried to do
in the case of the lower classes of ancient Greek universe, interpreting each line of the
surviving dramas, histories, philosophical and practical tracts, etc., as operating on a plane of
double hermeneutics, one utopian à la Bloch and other timely à la Marx. And the results I have
obtained through my studies have shown that destiny, in those centuries through which the
Greek poleis flourished just as much in our time, is never a tirade but always a dialogue in
which the actions of all agents matter to the fullest extent.

The ancient Greek universe is a temps perdu in the core Proustian sense. We have no way of
either reproducing, for they would precisely be ‘reproductions,’ the vibrant artworks or rewrite
Homer's epics or even Aristophanic comedies that would read with the same timeliness,
homeliness and fascination as their originals. In short, we have no way of retrieving that world.
Whether we like it or not, our world is one of cybernetic implements, virtual realities, Hotel
Bonaventura, “A Few Words To Sing,” catalogue events and prefabricated plastic feelings in
which we are daily dipped via a number of communicative media. Personified by a perpetual
thirst after any kind of meaning that is not stamped by the benevolent authorities, in whose
face the culture industries of the yore would pale into insignificance, we stumble on and on
for the sweet melody of sirens. Even were they to sing, however, chances are, we would not
hear it. For not only have we grown accustomed not to feel with our body, triggering the timely
rebuke of Soyinka’s tiger, but we have also distanced our being-in-the-world from any self-
conscious re-totalisation of times past, which presses down on our shoulders with the
unintelligible words of a Wittgensteinian lion. The joke is on us: giving voice to our limitless
adherence to the principle of identity, zoos have become the actual truth content of our cities,
giving the lie to our stimulated experiences that are never lived as much as acted out. We have
“low intensity”3095 Vietnams raging all over us, but we are afraid to call them lest we realise

3095 ‘An infinite low-intensity world war waged against the criminally indulgent numbers of the urban
poor’ might strike one as a statement worthy of a corny pulp-fiction – except that it is anything but.
Thanks to Mike Davis’ illuminating account of Pentagon’s doctrines of urban warfare in his Planet of
Slums, we know who is allotted the role of the Little Red Riding Hood in today’s adaptation of
Perreault’s classic: Mike Davis, Planet of Slums, (London, 2006), pp. 205; for a parallel with some of
the overseas military expeditions that have been headed by the US since the First Gulf War, see Danilo
Zolo, Terrorismo umanitario: Dalla guerra del Golfo all strage di Gazza, (Reggio Emilia, 2009), esp.
pp. 13-14.
that the time of Nixon and Thatcher has passed for the worse. It is no bombshell to realise that the fine line between surveillance and oppression, today, is thinner than ever, leaving not many of us aghast at the prospect of a raid at dawn that promises to return the favour of any public insinuation to not to ‘toe the line.’ Still, broken as we are, we manage to cling on to something, finding solace sometimes in dusty old tomes and in others in literally chasing butterflies or re-enacting events of the old. But the memory with which we wade through our plastic present risks throwing us off the loop even when we are at most ease. And as often as we hear hardcore Yes-Men blurt out an abrupt ‘you are chasing a dream’ at those who have had experiences of party organisations and collective struggle, never do we hear anyone admonished for chasing one’s memories. Still, is not that precisely what one tries to do when reading Che’s Bolivian Diary or listening to Ravel’s Concerto for Left Hand, that is, to feel the acuteness of that phantom pain once more?

We are never completely listless in the presence of past totalising projects. Our feeling in their presence is that of an Ivan Ilyich condemned to live on as he is, with a pain in the side and nothing beside ‘an average happiness’ to vouch for his existence. We are born into a digitised world, live as merry digits and die even merrier with the faint glimpses of meaning upon which rise our islets of personality. But take away that death, and everything becomes sticky with the substance that once laid bare his Geworfenheit to Roquentin. Ivan Ilyich needs to be brought down with a terminal illness suddenly and needlessly so that he can work out a rhyme or reason to his lived experience. A life that is spent climbing to the top of a career or creating a happy family plays no part in structures of significance if one dares unveil its prepondering mythologizing element of careerism. Ivan Ilyich’s is a tragedy, whereas that of Roquentin is a farce; then, what of ours? Marx forgot to add, but Sartre did not: third time a nausea. While the entrapment of our Proustian memory is what is comforting, those sparks of projective difference is what perpetuates our nausea. And as long as we defer to the formally sanctioned guidelines which organise our reality on our behalf, prescribing indexes of hexis for the ‘public good,’ without ever bothering with the others who suffer from the same ‘precondition,’ this path between agony and ecstasy will continue to be trodden.

For a generation whose condemnation to freedom has practically become a maxim, the sentence on our becoming digitised has proved an easy pill to swallow. ‘What’s the harm in it?’ ask our interlocutors, ‘that if you are always traceable, logged-in to a network of you own

3096 Eco, Faith in Fakes, pp. 80.
3097 “Faut-il parler, comme nos amis deleuziens, de “société de contrôle”, essentiellement différente de “société de souveraineté”? Je ne le crois pas. Le contrôle se changera en terrorisme d’État pur et simple au premier tournant un peu sérieux des circonstances.” Badiou, De quoi Sarkozy est-il le nom?, pp. 15.
free choice, sending and receiving messages and e-mails hourly? The harm in it is this: our connection to other beings-for-themselves is an exacerbation of the phantom pain whose pangs reminds us that the totality of nothingness engulfing our lived experience is never absolute. Noting the passage of time and building temporalities on the basis of one’s structures of signification and in accordance with one’s existential projects has long been a labour for humans who have been hard at work to make their present count. When a ‘last seen …’ dutifully pops up on the screen of one’s messaging services re-throwing one into the nothingness of digital blackouts, that lost time, a time, to be precise, that is _perdu_ because it was not utilised for the collective production of a totalising project, is begun to be seen seated as the judge, jury and executioner for all the moments in which one was absent from that endeavour. A moment-by-moment gust of being-toward-the-world which is gushed from the presence of a Meursault looking at a barren Algerian landscape, which had been bled dry, as Sartre and Fanon were there to remind us, partially by the willing quietism of other _pieds noirs_ like himself, may still grace us with accolades of existence, showing yet again that it is our refusal to be reduced to the status of objects that makes us human. But that is a far cry from a genuine encounter with our phantom limbs the identification of which can only be realised in and through the formation of the Sartrean groups. In the end, those two projective horizons, Marxian dialectical materialism and existentialism, remain as steadfast against our projective capabilities as they did for Sartre and de Beauvoir. And with the recognition of the fact that lightening the existential load is out of the question, dawns the precondition of any post-Sartrean totalising project that can only offer a situation of rediscovery of one’s memories if he or she is to juxtapose those glimpses to the centuries-long suffering of butchered, de-socialised and de-humanised millions around the world.

Ours has been an attempt at rethinking totalising projects along the lines of relations of domination, production and reproduction within different ancient Greek settings the better to see the truth content of our time. And a substantial content we have managed to find. Torn across tens of thousands of unpropertied _thêtes_ and a select number of _eupatriae_ and _hippeis_, the Athenian _polis_ of arcaic and classical ages has been shown to have never been one of calm winds and following seas for her citizens. And for an age whose occupants have often been on the receiving end of aprioristic fantasies of the most uninformed kind, i.e., the Nietzschean Presocratic birds of prey, the cradle of the Heideggerian depth ontology with the level of disclosure that was allegedly attained by the works of Parmenides, Heraclitus, etc., the lower-class ancient Greeks that we have conceived from an existentialist dialectical viewpoint appear anything but passive receivers of aristocratically-inclined myths and legends whose creators argued for Zeus’ parentage of _Dikê_ only when they saw their own ideals of
class justice scampering off willy-nilly. Giving the axe to Pericles can be reconstructed as having played the part of a signifier in a myriad of second-degree semiological systems in the surviving texts of Thucydides, Plutarch, etc. Ockham’s razor, however, would oblige us to take the shortest route to providing an explanation, which, in this case, would be that the grassroots Athenians were fed up with all the failed promises of their beloved stratēgos whose fall was to mark a temporal limit in the later aristocratic de-codings, e.g., Isocrates, Xenophon, etc., of the history of the fifth-century Athenian polis. With their attempts at de-coding their immediate past, those writers have shown the true colours of the ongoing class struggle in which they actively participated. We, on the other hand, with the comfort of millennia to separate our totalising projects from that of the Athenians of the last third of the fifth century, organise those textualities into a historical totality without explicitly caring for the ideological shoots that sprout from those grounds of re-organisation. And yet, the class struggle of our times is waged on no less existentially continuous terms than it was at the time of the late fifth-century Athenians. Re-coding those textualities as we self-consciously are, we revive the ancient Greek universe in a number of ways, at times with overt ideological agendas, e.g., the blockbuster 300 and Victor Davis Hanson’s Why the West Has Won, and, at others, with more delicate political seasonings, e.g., Donald Kagan’s trilogy on the Peloponnesian War. But if the West’s ‘winning’ of anything can viably be shown to have snowballed from Salamis onwards, then, that would mean, on a textual level at least, that so potent is the classical Greek achievement is considered to be that it is tried to be transformed from a re-organised past bundle of social realities into an eidolon to keep alive the hopes of the contemporary ruling classes. Succinctly put, they re-structure the past in order to continue their structuration of our present. I refuse to abide by the ground rules of any such re-collection of human potentialities, past and present, to fit in the neat moulds of the capitalist mode of production. Wilde was wrong, each man does not kill the thing he loves, sometimes we just plain reject to kill even if it means living with an existential phantom pain thereafter. And on that note this Proustian recollection of the ancient Greek universe has served, first and foremost, the end to rethink the extent of human potentialities that is willingly accorded by the totalities of today by which we are incessantly made.
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APPENDICES

A. CURRICULUM VITAE

PERSONAL INFORMATION

Surname, Name: Oktaykan, Can Berk
Date and Place of Birth: 5 April 1988, Izmir
Marital Status: Single
email: jean.matto@gmail.com

EDUCATION

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WORK EXPERIENCE

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<td>Bilkent University</td>
<td>Teaching Assistant</td>
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</tbody>
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FOREIGN LANGUAGES

English C2, French C2, Italian C2, German B2, Latin and Ancient Greek

CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS


B. TURKISH SUMMARY / TÜRKÇE ÖZET


kendisi için de özdeği üzerinde çalışarak nesneleştirmek durumundadır. Köle’nin emeği özdeği nesneleştmesinin dolaylarından ve ancak bu dolaylardan ki insanı gizligü üretici eylem olarak somutlanabilisin. İşte bu dolaylar silsilesinin zamanlar-arası, veya diyakronik, bir ölçekte ulaştırılması Hegel’ci diyalektiktir. 


Ancak Hegel’in tarihelleştirildiği bu felsefi çözümleme aynı zamanda ann tarihinde çözümlenin de felsefesidir. Söyle ki, Lukács’ın deyimiyle Almanya’nın Prusyalığı tarihi dönemmede tarih-psikoloji bir çözümleme anlayışında konulmuş tüm geçmiş anlara kendi anının gözünden bakıyor. Hegel yalnızca tarihsel arızaların felsefesini felsefesine dönmemesi için tarihleştirmesini önlemede, yurttaşılmak ve hatta bu yurttaşılmaların tarih felsefesi üzerine derslerinde kısmen de olsa şablonlaştırılmıştır.

Denilebilir ki, ego ile özdek arasındaki temel üretim ilişkisi sınıflı toplumlarda yani basamaklar arasında temel üretim ilişkilerinde başlangıçtan gelen ekonomik merkezci bir yandan da tarihleştirmesi, veya tarihın oluşumda bir temseldir Ego yaratmıştır. Tarihsel anların ilişkilerini üzerine yaptığı vurguya şüphesiz olarak Marks’ın diyalektik özdekillerde merkezci bir konuma ulaşacak olan Hegel, mutlak idealizminin bu yönüyle de Marks ve Engels’in bitimsiz olarak özdeki karşı savlar üretme gerekini saymış aday olacakları bir figür olacaktır.

Yazar çalışmanın üçüncü bölümünü işte bu üç diyalektik maddeyi yapmış olan Sartre ve Jameson sonrası bir varoluşsal diyalektikte nasıl çözümlenebileceğini ayırmıştır. Yazar Sartre sonrası varoluşsal özdekillinin merkezine gerekşim kavramını yerleştirerek bu üç

sonraki dönemde Akdeniz ticaretine damga vurmaya başlayacak olan bir tekelin oluşumundaki ilk adımları atmışlardır.


Bir de kavranımsal gereksinilere göz atmayı deneyelim. Öncelikle, kavranımsal gereksinimleri deneyimsel olarak altanlardan ayran temel unsurların sınıflarla tümleyici projeleri ışığında sürekli yeniden üretimi olmaları ve bunun sıkılıkla toplulukun genel çıkarlarını karşımasına alarak gerçekleşiyor olmasıdır. Deneysel gereksinimlerin karşıştırl toplumsal içerikleri çok zamanlı bir kapsama bu içeriklerin sınıf-yoğunluklu yorum biçimlerince

Geride bırakılmışımız Attikê’den tarihi mikrofilminde yaklaşık 400 yıl ileri sardığımızda kazı tamamlanmış mezarlık alanlarının sayıca önemli bir artış yaşamıştır. Antik mezarlık alanları ve yerlerindeki durum, bunu onların kendi üretikleri muthoslara inanmaya başladığının ve böylelikle dönüşüm yetisini yitirdiğinin habercisidir. Dönüşüm yetisini kaybetmiş tümlemimler ise değişen bireylerin oluşturduğu sınıfsal bütünlerine zamanlı çözümler sunamaz ve bu nedenle üretim ilişkisel yükünü kaldıramaya başlar. Önceki tarihsel örneğimizi bir de Arkaik çağ kaleydoskopundan inceleyerek bunu açmaya çalışalım.

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tarihçilerin de ifade ettiği gibi, bu siyasi iş birliğinin kültürel bir dışavurumudur. Yönetimi ele geçirmek için bir hileye başvurmakta imtina etmesiyle tarihi bir Odysseus’u andran Peisistratos diğer aristokratik hizipler tarafından polis’i bir kez daha terk etmeyi zorlandığında dönüşünü bir arabanın düzgini kimlerindecba en uzun boylu ve tanrıça Athena görünümü Atinalının zirhını kuşanmış olarak yurttaşılar selamlamasıyla yapmıştır. Herodotos’un ‘tanıdım bütün halklardan daha akıllı olan Atinaların nasıl olup da bu tongaya düştüğünü anlayamam da …’ diyerek aktardığı bu olay Herodotos’un zamanındaki tıranlık karşısında aristokrat sınıf ideolojisinden besleniği kadar başka bir kaynaktan da beslenir: 540’lardaki Peisistratos’un veya 480’lerde Themistokles’in kendi iktisadi ve toplumsal çıkarlarını koruyan politikaları nedeniyle sınıfal birิน arınlığının aristokrasinin sürekli sınıfta solunumu kısmitli kişileri destekleyerek göstermiş olan Atinalı alt sınıflar gerçekliği. Bireylerin oluşturduğu grupların toplumsal varoluşlarını eski Yunan örneklerinde de diğer herhangi bir örnekten daha az gözlemlenebilir değildir. Peki birey ile kolektif arasındaki böyle kültürel değiş tokuşlar toplumsal diyalektik kuram için nasıl bir düzenleme oturabilir?

Bu belirlenim ilişkisinin derinine inmek için belki de Spinoza’nın eylemin indirgenemezliği savunusunu yeni bir dolayda sokmanın faydası olabilir. Sözü geçen dolayda iki boyutlu; doğal belirlenim ile beşerî belirlenim arasındaki açı ve ikincisinin toplumsal değer yönteminde oynadığı rol. Eylem indirgenemez olabilir ancak bu onun olumsal olması ile eş anlamlı değildir. Üretici eylem oluşturulmuş toplumsal varoluşlarını eski Yunan örneklerinde de diğer herhangi bir örnekten daha az gözlemlenebilir değildir. Peki birey ile kolektif arasındaki böyle kültürel değiş tokuşlar toplumsal diyalektik kuram için nasıl bir düzenleme oturabilir?

Kategorik imperative Kant’ın dünyasında doğal ve ahlaki olarak ikiye ayrılan belirlenen bir bütün halinde tutan kilit taşıdır. Eğer eleştirel uslamlama yordamına sentetik a priori yargıların varlığı kantlanabilᲢyorsa bu demektir ki insanın hiçbir koşula koşuldu değildir ve gözelemenebilir davranışların bir bütünü olan deneyimsel kişiliğin yanı sıra bir de ahlaki yargıların hakikatine ulaşılan ve davranış izlediği buna göre ayarlayabilir bir de kavramlaşmış kişiliğine varır. Bu özetin işığında diyebiliriz ki Kant’in insani skolastik liberum arbitrium indifferantiae’ye yalnızca sentetik a priori yargıların farkına varabildiği ölçüde sahiptir. Bu kavrayış ve bunun beslediği edimler olmaksızın birey her gün iki defa doğru zamanı gösteren bozuk saat gibi heteronomisini aşabildi ancak asla otonom özgürlüğe erişemez. Spinoza’çı potencia’nın yeleme içinklinin Kant’taki karşılığı özegliğini karşılaştığı tümcel ahlak projelerine itaat etmeke bulan Prusyalıdır. Fichte belki Kant’ın idealizmini kendisinin bile tasına taşınan esas Ego seviyesine yükseltmiş olabilir ve böylece Kant’ın felsefi düşmanlığını kazanmış olması da şüphesizdir; ancak, şu da söylenmelidir ki, her ne kadar Fichte ve Schopenhauer kendi farklı yollarında özgün hedeflerle yönelmiş olsalar da kullanıkları arac Kant epistemolojisinin ta kendisidir.
Peki ya Schopenhauer’ın ‘hür irade inancı insan özütünden beslenen boş bir varoluşsallık savunusun safatasından ibarettir’ minvalindeki bu aşık idealist zirvenin Kant sonrası dönemdeki durağuna varoluşsal diyalektik tarafından nasıl karşı çıkmalıdır? Örneğin Spinoza ile birlikte monist bir bilgi betiminden harekete eylemin indirgenememe özelliği savunmak yeterli midir? Elbette hayır; Kant ve Schopenhauer’ın taviz vermeden çizdiği bilisel ayrırm doğanın bilgisini toplum bilgisinden ayıran en önemli özelliklerdendir ve öyle ya da böyle özdekların öncülüğünü savundan yola çıkan bir varoluşsal diyalektik varlığın dış dünyanın bir parçası olarak maruz kaldıği doğal belirlenimi önemsemek ve bunun toplumsal-tarîhsel temellerini incelemekle yükümlüdür. Doğa her zaman bir beşeri eylemler bütünür diye düşündü Lukács ve ancak bu yönelimlerdi ki doğanın bilgisi ile toplumun bilgisi arasında diyalektik açıdan bir alışveriş mümkün olabilirsin.


Hatırlarsak Heidegger’deki Sein ve Dasein ayrımı tam da varlığın kendisinde saklı olan konuları yer ve zaman belirleniminden kaçınarak gün ışığına kavuşturmasında belirginleştirecek. Ona göre aletheia yalnızca gerçek anlamına gelmez, gelenek-dışı bir etimoloji bağlı ile Varlık’ın perdesizlenmesini de ifade eder. Varlık’ın temel sorunsallarına deneyimlenenler yoluyla ulaşılamaz, ancak bizim hakikatten ne kadar uzaklaşmış olduğumuzu anlamamızza

yaşamak değil bu baskı, doğa-dışı, köle ahlaklığı ve benzerlerinin tabletini kırp bunun yerine erk istencini serbest bırakın bir ahlak sistemi inşa etmektir. İnsanı tarifleyen durmaksızın erke ulaşma ihtiyacını taşımasıdır. İnsan biyolojisinden fizyonomisine varıcaya kadar her tür özelliğinde bu güdüye en etkin yanitları türetilmek için evrimleşmiştir. Ancak erke yönelmiş istencin ahlaki izleğini savunan tarihteki her asil sınıf için bir de bu istencin ters yüz olmuş halini vaaz eden bir ruhban sınıfı peyda olmuştur. Aslında her iki sınıf da aynı temel gereksinimin karşılanmasına yönelmiştir: Asillerin doğal güdülerinin zincirini çözerek yaptıkları erk avını rahipler kendileri de dahil herkesin erk istencini ebedi mahkumiyete çarptarak gerçekleştirebilirler. Ancak zinslerine hayranlık duyan bir aristokrasi ve bunun çevresini kuşatmış bir 'pigmeler' sınıfı ancak rahiplerin asilleri kendi erk işini reddiyle başlayan ahlak sistemlerinde esir almış ahlakı reddetişi feda edişini tamamlamak için takip etmektedirler. Ancak Aristokratların hayranlık duyan aristokrat basına durosnun וז ile zinsin reddetmek için bir ahlak sistemini inşa etmek zorundadır. Nietzsche'nin verdiği yanıt yalnızca herhangi bir ahlak manzumesi yazmak olmayacaktır; aksine, onunkisi kendi erk istencile en barışık, değerler ve mülksüzleri adeta tango adımlarıyla dans edercesine yöneten, kırılmaz ve suç işlemez geç sanayi kapitalizminin aristokratik sinifinin ahlakı tablosu olacaktır.


Edinilmiş gereksinimlerin bu çetrefilli içeriğini bir de şu ana dek birkaç düğümünü incelemiş oldugumuz tarihsel iliğini takip etmeyi sürdürerek anlamayı deneyelim.

Peisistratos’un oğlu Hippias’a devrettiği tiranlığı Sparta’ya, birlikte M.Ö. 510’da son veren Atinalılar böyle bir deniz imparatorluğu kurmaya Ayrıca bunu güçlendirmeye ve korumaya ayyrır. Arkhê’nin tüm Atinalıların yaşıltalarının iktisadi ve toplumsal yönlerine verdiği katkıyı muazzamdır elbette; ancak, diğer birçok konuda olduğu gibi arkhê’nin oluşumunda da üst sınıflar için en önemli konu mülksüzlerin ve işçilerin veribilecek en az siyasi ve toplumsal tavizde, iktisadi taleplerinin karşılanmamasını ikame etmektir. Atinalıların Ege üzerindeki hakimiyet istenci artıca ve belli anlarda bir anakara Yunan imparatorluğu bu tarihi izleyen yüz yılı Ege’ye hâkim bir denizimperatörü olma zorunluluşunu güçlendirecek ve korumaya ayırır. Arkhê’nin tüm Atinalıların yaşantılarının iktisadi ve toplumsal yönlerine verdiği katkı muazzamdır elbette; ancak, diğer birçok konuda olduğu gibi arkhê’nin oluşumunda da üst sınıflar için en önemli konu mülksüzlerin ve işçilerin veribilecek en az siyasi ve toplumsal tavizde, iktisadi taleplerinin karşılanmamasını ikame etmektir. Atinalıların Ege’deki hakimiyet istenci artıca ve belli anlarda bir anakara Yunan imparatorluğu bu tarihi izleyen yüz yılı Ege’ye hâkim bir denizimperatörü olma zorunluluşunu güçlendirecek ve korumaya ayırır.

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Ve başta Sparta olmak üzere anakara Yunanistan üzerindeki diğer önemli poleis’lerle birlikte, ön plana çıkmış olma zorunluluğu sonucunda Sparta’nın başını çektiği Peloponnesia Ligi ile Atina ve müttefiklerinin birlik-teşkilat sistemi ile Arkeada’nın tüm Atinalıların yaşantılarının iktisadi ve toplumsal yönlerine verdiği katkıını muazzamdır elbette; ancak, diğer birçok konuda olduğu gibi Arkeada’nın oluşumunda da üst sınıflar için en önemli konu mülksüzlerin ve işçilerin veribilecek en az siyasi ve toplumsal tavizde, iktisadi taleplerinin karşılanmamasını ikame etmektir. Atinalıların Ege’deki hakimiyet istenci artıca ve belli anlarda bir anakara Yunan imparatorluğu bu tarihi izleyen yüz yılı Ege’ye hâkim bir denizimperatörü olma zorunluluşunu güçlendirecek ve korumaya ayırır.

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