PREDICATION IN ARISTOTLE’S CATEGORIES: A RESPONSE TO PLATO’S THEORY OF FORMS

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES OF MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY

BY

ZEYNEP DURAN

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS IN THE DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY

OCTOBER 2021
Approval of the thesis:

PREDICATION IN ARISTOTLE’S CATEGORIES: A RESPONSE TO PLATO’S THEORY OF FORMS

submitted by ZEYNEP DURAN in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Philosophy, the Graduate School of Social Sciences of Middle East Technical University by,

Prof. Dr. Yaşar KONDAKÇI
Dean
Graduate School of Social Sciences

Prof. Dr. S. Halil TURAN
Head of Department
Department of Philosophy

Assist. Prof. Dr. Refik GÜREMEN
Supervisor
Department of Philosophy

Examinining Committee Members:

Assist. Prof. Dr. Saniye VATANSEVER (Head of the Examining Committee)
Bilkent University
Department of Philosophy

Assist. Prof. Dr. Refik GÜREMEN (Supervisor)
Middle East Technical University
Department of Philosophy

Prof. Dr. David GRÜNBERG
Middle East Technical University
Department of Philosophy
I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.

Name, Last Name: Zeynep DURAN

Signature:
ABSTRACT

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DURAN, Zeynep
M.A., The Department of Philosophy
Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Dr. Refik GÜREMEN

October 2021, 159 pages

This study aims to provide a textual evidence to the idea of reading the Categories of Aristotle as a criticism of the Platonic Theory of Forms, by means of Metaphysics, A, 9, 990b22-991a8 and Alexander’s commentary on it (88,5-95,2). According to the main examples of this reading from the contemporary literature, the predication theory of the Categories, conceiving being as “being something” and holding the idea that “being is said in many ways,” denies the Platonic predication theory that is expounded by the participation relation between a particular and a separate Form. The passage in the Metaphysics, where Aristotle argues against the Theory of Forms, gives the impression that Aristotle’s critique is based on his understanding of being as articulated in the Categories. Alexander’s explanatory comments support this impression by expanding these critiques considerably, in the same line with Aristotle. Holding the aforesaid two ideas of the Categories, Alexander criticizes the Theory of Forms for not explaining essential features of things and different sorts of being. As the Categories makes no reference to Plato or the Theory of Forms, I claim that this passage can serve as a direct support for this philosophical exegesis of the Categories.
Keywords: The Categories, Theory of Forms, Alexander of Aphrodisias, predication, being.
ÖZ

ARİSTOTELES'İN KATEGORİLER’İNDE YÜKLEMELME:
PLATO’NUN FORMLAR TEORİSİNİNE BİR YANIT

DURAN, Zeynep
Yüksek Lisans, Felsefe Bölümü
Tez Yöneticisi: Assist. Prof. Dr. Refik GÜREMEN

Ekim 2021, 159 sayfa

Bu çalışma, Aristoteles’in Kategoriler adlı kitabı Platoncu Formlar Teorisinin bir eleştirisi olarak okuma fikrine, Metafizik A. 9, 990b22-991a8 pasajı ve pasajın Afrodisyaslı İskender’e ait şerhi (88,5-95,2) vasıtasıyla metinsel delil sunulmasını amaçlamaktadır. Bu okumanın çağdaş literatürdeki başat örneklerine göre; varlığı “bir şey olarak varlık” şeklinde anlayan ve varlığın “türülü türülü söylendiği” fikrini savunan Kategoriler’deki yüklemleme kuramı, bir tikelin kendisinden ontolojik olarak bağımsız bir Forma katılması şeklinde izah edilen Platoncu yüklemleme kuramına karşı çıkmaktadır. Aristoteles’in Formlar Teorisine itiraz ettiği söz konusu Metafizik pasajı, Aristoteles’in eleştirisinin, Kategoriler’de dile getirilmiş olan varlık anlayışına dayandığı izlenimini verir. İskender’in şerhi ise, bu eleştirileri Aristoteles ile aynı doğrultuda ve büyük ölçüde genişleterek anılan izlenimi destekler. Kategoriler’in yukarıda bahsedilen iki fikrini de savunan İskender, Formlar Teorisini şeylerin özsel özelliklerini ve varlığın farklı türlerini açıklamadığı için eleştirir. Kategoriler’de Platon’a ya da Formlar Teorisine herhangi bir referans verilmemesinden dolayı, Kategoriler’in anılan felsefi yorumuna bu pasajın doğrudan bir metin desteği sağlayacağı iddia edilmektedir.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Kategoriler, Formlar Teorisi, Afrodisyaslı İskender, yüklemleme, varlık.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I want to express my deepest gratitude to my adviser Assist. Prof. Dr. Refik Güremen who has been the essential part of this study. He is the one who came up with the main claim of the thesis and encouraged me to pursue it. I felt secure in every step that I had to take, due to the guidance by his meticulous suggestions and critiques. Besides, he has been a great role model for me in dealing with the ancient philosophy texts.

I would also like to thank the precious members of the examining committee, Assist. Prof. Dr. Saniye Vatansever and Prof. Dr. David Grünberg for letting my defense be in a warm atmosphere, and for their valuable comments, questions and recommendations. Their perspective gave me insight for further ideas.

I am sincerely thankful to the professors of the Department of Philosophy for their intellectually stimulating classes. I thank my family and friends for their unconditional support. Lastly, I am definitely indebted to my own life experiences, which bring me to the gate of philosophy over and over.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The *Categories* of Aristotle, unlike his other treatises, does not tell us anything about why it is written and what it is about. It neither mentions any other philosopher’s name nor any related account. Accordingly, it has been the subject of much controversy among scholars regarding its authenticity and the precise subject that it deals with. Disagreements on its content in particular has led to several readings.

According to one widely shared view, Aristotle in the *Categories* posits a predication theory of being by appealing to linguistic phenomena.¹ In this view, the *Categories* reflects Aristotle’s understanding of reality. In line with this reading, some contemporary scholars propound that the *Categories* incorporates a critique of the Platonic metaphysics, since there is an anti-Platonic side to Aristotle’s ontology in the *Categories*. In particular, the predication theory expounded in this treatise attests how Aristotle denies the Theory of Forms (“TF” from hereafter).²

The aim of the present study is to support this very reading. To this end, I start in chapter 2 with giving an outline of the predication theory in the *Categories*. My purpose in this chapter is to explicate very briefly what Aristotle understands

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² In this study, the term “Theory of Forms (TF)” denotes the mainstream understanding of the Theory that we mostly find in the middle-term dialogues of Plato. Accordingly, no terminological or philosophical distinction is intended when the terms “Plato” and “Platonists” are used throughout the study. They are used interchangeably - without giving any special or historical meaning to the latter one – so as to refer to the thinker(s) who embrace this prototypical version of the Theory (Likewise, the terms “Platonism” and “Platonic” express the ideas we find in the TF).
from predication and what ideas and assumptions we can find behind his theory of categories. Two of Aristotle’s philosophically most fundamental ideas, namely, the idea that “being is said in many ways” and that “being is always being something” will play a crucial role in understanding the ontology in the *Categories*. While “being something” points out to the “essential beings” that are subject for essential predication by their species/genus; “being is said in many ways” tells us that the way non-substantial beings (accidents) *are* is different from the way essential beings (substances) *are*.

After that, chapter 3 will introduce the main arguments, from the contemporary scholarly literature, about how the *Categories* is to be read as a response to Plato’s TF. There are diverse examples of this reading from various aspects, beginning from the ones which touch only briefly on the subject to the large-scale discussions. I present their principal ones by analyzing their problem areas.

It comes out that there are two distinct ways of reading the *Categories* as a criticism of TF: Firstly, the predication theory of the *Categories* can be considered as a solution to the philosophical problems, which the TF also deals with but fails to provide convincing explanations. We will see how the answers of the *Categories* differentiate from the answers of the TF to some problems that both accounts have the claim to solve. Secondly, the predication theory of the *Categories* can offer solutions to the problems of the TF itself. In this regard, the account in the *Categories* can be conceived with respect to not allowing the difficulties of the TF brings about.

The arguments from the literature, then, will be classified in chapter 3 according to which approach they belong. They will be divided accordingly and be held in the context of six problems. Although these six problems are closely related with each other, each will clarify the different aspects of this reading. Moreover, this classification, hopefully, will help the reader to have a clear idea of the discussions in the literature in a simple and straightforward framework.
Now, although the contemporary reading of the *Categories* as a criticism of Plato’s TF works in a more or less coherent way and makes good sense as a philosophical exegesis of the text, it lacks any direct support from the text itself, given that Aristotle makes no reference to Plato or the TF in the *Categories*. My principal claim in the present study is to show that such a direct (or at least a “more” direct) support can be found in Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*, A, 9, 990b22-991a8 and in Alexander of Aphrodisias’ commentary on it. In this short passage, Aristotle expounds his criticisms of the TF mainly for being an inconsistent account regarding the existence of Forms of things other than substances. It is interesting to see the affinities between Aristotle’s arguments in this *Metaphysics* passage and his ontology as in the *Categories*. Although the *Metaphysics* is thought to belong to Aristotle’s later ontology, both Aristotle’s terminology in this passage and the way that he addresses the problems of the TF give the impression that his critique is based on his understanding of being as articulated in the *Categories*. Alexander’s commentary strongly supports this impression by expanding the critiques of the TF in the same line with Aristotle. The several problems he points out about the TF and the unstated assumptions behind his comments suggest that he also appeals to the predication theory of the *Categories* in his commentary. Hence, Alexander’s passage can reasonably be considered as a valuable example, from the era of the first philosophical commentaries, of appealing to the account of the *Categories* in the critique of the TF.

Consequently, my claim in this study is that, read particularly in light of Alexander’s commentary on it, *Metaphysics*, A, 9, 990b22-991a8 lends a textual evidence to the idea of reading the *Categories* as a criticism of the Platonic TF. Thereby, it is aimed to support textually this philosophical reading in the contemporary literature.

To this end, my chapter 4 is designed to reveal the account of the *Categories* lurking in the background in Alexander’s commentary on *Metaphysics*, A, 9, 990b22-991a8. We will see that in his reading of this passage, Alexander
develops two main critiques of the TF by appealing to the two fundamental ideas of the *Categories* mentioned above: The TF does not allow essential predication and makes everything accidental. Thus, the TF cannot explain essential features of things unlike the *Categories* ("being is always being something"). On the other hand, the TF also fails to explain the non-substances (i.e., qualities, quantities, etc.) by not distinguishing different kinds of being from each other ("being is said in many ways").

Moreover, in his arguments about the non-substantial beings in the TF, Alexander sticks to the idea that different sorts of things (e.g., a man and his color "white") cannot be subject for universals of the same nature (i.e., substantial Forms). This idea, indeed, is the necessary conclusion of the two assumptions at issue: If being is being something, and being is said in many ways, then, every particular is an instance of its peculiar universal kind in its own category. Therefore, we expect the TF’s substantial Forms to be predicated of substantial things only. They cannot be the universals of non-substantial things. The TF, according to Alexander, falls into this category mistake.

In the conclusion chapter, after making a general overview and then reviewing Alexander’s position, I will try to relate the critiques of Alexander to the TF with the six problems from the literature expounded in chapter 3. This relation will suggest that these problems are in fact different aspects of the two main critiques that Alexander develops against the TF in his commentary on *Metaphysics*, A, 9, 990b22-991a8. In other words, the two issues Alexander points out about the TF can be followed through these six problems. Consequently, I hope that Alexander’s passage would serve as a support for contemporary readings regarding the critical relation between the *Categories* and the TF.³

³ There are other scholars who underlined and recognized the influence of the *Categories* in Alexander’s commentary on the *Metaphysics*. See, for instance, M. Griffith’s remarks on M. Rashed who is referred to have “interpreted Aristotle’s *De Anima* and *Metaphysics* through the lens of the *Organon*, and especially the *Categories.*” Michael Griffin, “The Reception of Aristotle’s Categories, c. 80 BC to AD 220” (PhD diss., Oriel College, University of Oxford, 2009), 5. Madigan also thinks that Alexander’s reading the *Metaphysics* is influenced by his reading of the *Categories*. See Arthur Madigan S. J., “Alexander on Aristotle’s Species and
CHAPTER 2

THE PREDICATION THEORY IN THE CATEGORIES

The verb “kategoriein” in Greek is translated as “to predicate,” meaning “to maintain or assert something of something.” It is accepted that the account in the Categories suggests a predication theory of being. That is, predicating something of another thing (in a linguistic subject-predicate form) reveals something about the thing that is subject for this predication. Indeed, it is something that already belongs to it. Hence, predication is a matter of ontology in addition to being a matter of language. Assuming that the structure of language reflects the structure of reality, predication as a linguistic phenomenon is thought to reflect the world as it is.5

This chapter aims to explain the predication theory as it is depicted in the Categories, together with its fundamental concepts and underlying assumptions. Hence, the first five chapters of the Categories are of interest. Since in the next chapter the account will be elaborated in the context of several philosophical problems, here it is considered sufficient to provide a general framework.6

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4 It is originally used in the legal contexts to accuse someone by attributing a crime or like; see Hamlyn, “Aristotle on Predication,” 110.


6 All references to the Categories are to the text translated by John L. Ackrill, Aristotle, Categories and De Interpretatione (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963).
2.1. The Notions of Synonymy, Homonymy and Paronymy

In chapter 1 of the *Categories*, Aristotle explains three notions, corresponding to different relations that beings might have with each other, by using the criteria of name and definition (*logos*). He defines the homonymous things as sharing a common name, while the definition of being (*logos tês ousias*) that corresponds to this single name is different for each. He gives the example of a man and a picture. They are both called “animal” (*zoon*). But their peculiar ways of being “animal” is different. One is called “animal” due to being a man, the other is so called due to being a picture (1a1-6). Thus, we say that a man and a picture are *homonymously* “animal”.

Synonymous things, on the other hand, do not only share the same name but they also admit same definition that corresponds to the name. Aristotle’s examples are man and ox. They are both called “animal”. And they are animals in the same sense, that is, the definition of their being animal is the same for each (1a6-12). In other words, “animal” is the common and the true answer to the questions “What is a man?” and “What is an ox?” Thus, we say that a man and an ox are *synonymously* animals; because they are both animals by the same definition.

Aristotle explains paronymy shortly: “When things get their name from something, with a difference of ending, they are called paronymous.” For instance, “grammarian” comes from “grammar”, and “brave” from “bravery” (1a12-15). Thus, if the name of a thing is derivative in this way, it is said to be *paronymous*. This, however, is to be understood as an ontological derivativeness, not etymological: Something gets its name from another thing *paronymously* if there is a certain ontological relation between the two. We call something paronymously X due to its having something that share the same name except the ending. That we call Socrates *paronymously* brave after bravery hinges on the fact that Socrates has bravery (We do not say that “Socrates is bravery”).

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7 The term *zoon* in Greek means animal, picture or other artistic representation; *Ibid.*, 71.

So, the exact relation between the names “brave” and “bravery”, the abstract noun and its adjectival form, seems to denote two distinct beings as we will see in chapter 2 of the *Categories*.9

2.2. Two Kinds of Predication

Aristotle uses two phrases “being SAID OF a subject” (*legesthai kath’ hypokeimenou*) and “being IN a subject” (*en hypokeimenoi einai*) (1a20-1b9) that seem peculiar to the *Categories*.10 However, there is no definition of the SAID OF relation11, and the definition of the being IN relation is not thoroughly helpful.12 Yet, they are commonly accepted to correspond to two kinds of predication: “essential (*per se/synonymous*) predication” and “accidental (*per accidens/homonymous*) predication”.

For Duerlinger, even if Aristotle does not explicitly say so, his examples and statements in the *Categories* can be read as his first attempt to distinguish what is essential from what is accidental for a particular thing. Duerlinger calls being

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9 Wolfgang-Rainer Mann, *The Discovery of Things: Aristotle’s Categories and Their Context* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 47 and 55. There are, however, objections to this ontological understanding of paronymy. According to these objections, paronymy does not have such an ontological nature, since it is something different from the dichotomy of synonymy and homonymy. *Ibid.*, 41 n.7.


11 The term “relation” refers to predication relation between a subject and predicate.

12 “By ‘in a subject’ I mean what is in something, not as a part, and cannot exist separately from what it is in” (1a24-25). For Studtman, that the word “in” occurs within the definition brings two possibilities: Either “in” means the same as Being IN and so the definition is circular; or it has another meaning that is undefined. Paul Studtmann, “Aristotle’s Categories”, *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Spring 2021 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), accessed September 1, 2020, [https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2021/entries/aristotle-categories/](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2021/entries/aristotle-categories/).
SAID OF relation as “predication”\textsuperscript{13} and being IN relation as “inherence.”\textsuperscript{14} Loux also states that there is an agreement on that the \textit{Categories} involves two kinds of predication: “strong or essential predication” and “weak or accidental predication.”\textsuperscript{15}

Aristotle explains the two kinds of predication by appealing to the criterion of name and definition. In the case of being SAID OF relation, Aristotle says that:

…if something is said of a subject both its name and its definition are necessarily predicated of the subject. For example, man is said of a subject, the individual man, and the name is of course predicated (since you will be predicating man of the individual man), and also the definition of man will be predicated of the individual man (since the individual man is also a man). (2a20-24)

By SAID OF relation, then, we assign both the name and the definition of a thing to another. When we say that “Socrates is a man”, we predicate “man” of “Socrates” as a subject. He is called by the name of “man” but also “man” is the answer to the question “What is he?” (2b29ff). In other words, whatever it is to be a “man” is also true for Socrates. This is to say that the definition of the predicate, “man”, can be truly said of the subject, “Socrates”.

For Aristotle “a definition is a phrase which signifies the what-it-is-to-be \textit{(to ti \textepsilon\n e\textit{nai})}” \textit{(Topics, 101b38). “… a definition is said to be an account of what something is \textit{(tou ti esti)} \textit{(Posterior Analytics, 93b30). Hence, the definition of something gives information regarding its essence.} \textsuperscript{16} Then, man is the essence of Socrates. We say that Socrates is \textit{essentially} man. If so, Socrates and the species man are synonyms (3a35-b1). We can call both synonymously man as they have

\textsuperscript{13} Aristotle uses the verbs being SAID OF \textit{(legesthai)} and being predicated of \textit{(kategoreisthai)} interchangeably. I, too, use them so.


\textsuperscript{16} Duerlinger, “Predication and Inherence in Aristotle’s ‘Categories’”, 193.
the same name and the essence. In short, the predication of “man” of an individual man denotes an essential predication.

Being SAID OF relation, then, is held between a thing and its species or genus. But it is also held between species and genus. Species is subject for the genus (2b17-19). The essential classification of things according to their natural species and genus requires that there are SAID OF relations in every level, in order for the things to have the same definition. Accordingly, the SAID OF relation has transitive feature. That is, when x is SAID OF y, all other things that are SAID OF x will also be SAID OF y. Man is SAID OF an individual man, animal is SAID OF man, therefore, animal is SAID OF individual man (1b10-15). Consequently, there emerges family trees of the particulars under which they are located. Individual man is said to be a member of its kinds, namely man and animal.

When it comes to being IN relation, Aristotle says:

> But as for things which are in a subject, in most cases neither the name nor the definition is predicated of the subject. In some cases there is nothing to prevent the name from being predicated of the subject, but it is impossible for the definition to be predicated. For example, white, which is in a subject (the body), is predicated of the subject; for a body is called white. But the definition of white will never be predicated of the body. (2a27-34)

So, what distinguishes the two predications from each other is the criterion of definition. The definition of the things that are IN a subject is not predicated of the subject unlike being SAID OF relation. Thus, these beings are not the things which belong to the essence of the subject they are predicated of.\(^\text{17}\) When we say that “Socrates is white”, we still predicate “white” of Socrates as a subject. He is called by the name of “white,” but what white is is not the same with what Socrates is. While white is a color, Socrates is a man. The definition of white color, cannot be applied to Socrates, but only the name, “white”. Therefore, the color white does not belong essentially to Socrates, but it is only accidental to

\(^{17}\) *Ibid.*, 194.
him. Socrates is accidentally white. Consequently, the being IN relation denotes accidental predication.

In the example of “Socrates is white”, since “Socrates” and “white” share the same name but not the definition, we say that Socrates and white are homonymously white. But, in being IN relation, the name of the predicate does not always apply to the subject. In fact, mostly being IN relation brings out paronymy (2a27-29). When we call Socrates brave, we ascribe “bravery” to Socrates, but we do not say that “Socrates is bravery.” The name of bravery does not apply to Socrates but its derivative form does. So, Socrates is called paronymously brave after the bravery he has. Socrates is brave, because the bravery is IN him.¹⁸

In short, according to the Categories what is predicated of a particular thing can be understood in two ways. Being SAID OF relation refers to the essence of a thing, while being IN relation is concerned with its accidents. Thereby, it can be said that SAID OF relation determines what a thing is, the latter tells us how a thing is.¹⁹

2.3. Classification of Being

Aristotle presents ten categories of being in Chapter 4 (1b25-2a4): substance, quantity, qualification, relative, where, when, being-in-a-position, having, doing, being affected.²⁰ These ten different categories (substance and the nine non-

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¹⁸ According to this difference, these cases of being IN relation can be called homonymous predication and paronymous predication. But they are also used to refer the accidental predication in general as against essential/synonymous predication. See Hamlyn, “Aristotle on Predication,” 115-116 and Maxwell John Cresswell, “Aristotle’s Phaedo,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 65, No. 2 (June, 1987): 140-141.


²⁰ Aristotle, in fact, divides what he calls “of things said” (ta legomena) into ten. This statement of him leads to the interpretation that this tenfold distinction is of words, not of things. However, it is argued that these are also the distinction of beings. Firstly, Aristotle’s examples suggest ontological and not linguistic items; his examples of substance are “man” and “horse”, or of quantity, it is being “four-foot”… Secondly, according to the De Interpretatione (16a3) Aristotle
substance categories) are accepted to represent the highest kinds (*summa genera*) of *being*. That is, *being* reveals itself in these different categories, rather than being a single highest kind. Accordingly, instead of *being*, these categories are accepted as the ultimate predicates of the subjects in Aristotle.\(^{21}\)

However, Aristotle explains the predication relations among another division of *being* in Chapter 2 of the *Categories*. The two kinds of predication, being SAID OF and IN, by cutting across each other, brings out a fourfold classification “of things there are” (*ton onton*) (1a20-1b9). It is generally accepted that being SAID OF relation distinguishes universals (species and genera) from particulars; whereas being IN relation distinguishes substances from non-substances (accidents). Accordingly, they form the four modes of being: primary and secondary substances; individual and universal non-substances.\(^{22}\)

**Table 1. The fourfold division of being in the Categories.**\(^{23}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Not IN a subject</th>
<th>Not SAID OF a subject</th>
<th>SAID OF a subject</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primary substances</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Individual man</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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is thought to embrace a realist theory of meaning according to which words represent concepts as real items independent of our minds. See Studtmann, “Aristotle’s Categories.”

\(^{21}\) Ackrill, *Aristotle, Categories and De Interpretatione*, 80; Studtmann, “Aristotle’s Categories.”

\(^{22}\) Aristotle uses the terms “primary” and “secondary substances” only, but he does not give a specific name for the two classes of the non-substantials. He also does not use the term “universal” (*katholou*) in the *Categories*. The term “particular” (*kath’ hekaston*) appears only once (at 2b3).

It can be said that Aristotle’s theory of predication in the *Categories* hinges on the ontological relations among these four classes of being. It, on the one hand, explains the relation between particular instances and their universal kinds (species and genus) within each category (horizontal relations); on the other hand, the relation between substances and other nine categories of non-substances (vertical relations).

(1) *Primary substances* are neither IN a subject nor SAID OF a subject (1b3-4), but everything else are either SAID OF or IN them as subjects (2a34-35). Because of that, they are called “primary substances.” They are substances “most strictly, primarily, and most of all” since they are subject for everything (2a11-12, 2b15-17). They are also individual and numerically one (3b12-13). Aristotle’s examples are an individual man or individual horse (1b4-5). Thus, it is natural to think that the primary substances are sensible particulars belonging to natural kinds. 24

Even though Aristotle does not say so explicitly, it is agreed in literature that the primary substances are *ultimate* or *basic* subjects. That every kind of being is either SAID OF or IN them and they are not predicated of anything further makes them ultimate subjects of predication. They are subject for everything but there is no further subject for them. In other words, they are the things that underlies everything (the *substrata*). Therefore, it is accepted that there is nothing more simple or basic underlying them in the ontology of the *Categories*. 25

Aristotle points out the importance of primary substance by saying that “if the primary substances did not exist it would be impossible for any of the other things to exist” (2b3-7). This statement, which is interpreted variably by scholars, basically shows that universals for Aristotle do not enjoy a kind of

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24 Studtman, “Aristotle’s Categories.”

ontological independence (as in the case of Plato’s Forms). On the contrary, their existence depends to be instantiated by primary substances.

(2) Secondary substances “are said of a subject but are not in any subject. For example, man is said of a subject, the individual man” (1a20-22). Aristotle explicitly calls them species and genus of primary substances (2a14-19). They are SAID OF their members but not IN them. They are predicated of many things (3b17-18) and hence they are universals.26

So, they are kind universals of the sensible particulars. Aristotle calls them “substances” (in a secondary sense), because they reveal the primary substance. They give us the elements of a formula which can be truly and essentially said of the primary substances, by answering to the question “What is it?” If we want to know the what-ness of an individual man, we should appeal to his species and genus, namely “man” and “animal” (2b29-33). The assumption underlying seems to be that every being is located in a “fixed family tree.” Stated otherwise, everything necessarily belongs to a species and genus. Hence, the question “What is X?” takes us on a direct line above X in its family tree, from the infimae species27 to the genus.28

In 3b15-16, Aristotle says that secondary substances signify a “such” (poion ti).29 The term can be understood as a “kind” or “character of substance.”30 On the

26 Aristotle defines universal in the De Interpretatione (17a38): “I call a universal that which is by its nature predicated of a number of things.”

27 The lowest level natural kind that is only SAID OF particulars.

28 Ackrill, Aristotle, Categories and De Interpretatione, 75.

29 Translation is of Sirkel. Sirkel, “The Problem of Katholou (Universals) in Aristotle,” 17 n.22. Ackrill uses the term “certain qualification” for poion ti.

30 Ackrill, Aristotle, Categories and De Interpretatione, 88.
other hand, he uses “this something” (*tode ti*)\(^{31}\) for the primary substances (3b10). A primary substance is a “this” because it is individual and numerically one. It is also “something” because, again, it necessarily falls under a certain kind (a “such”). The term “something” can be thought as a “placeholder” for predicates carrying the species.\(^{32}\) An individual man is “this man”, that is a particular instance of the species “man”. An individual horse is “this horse” that is a particular instance of the species “horse”. This framework suggests that secondary substances are essential features of the primary substances. In other words, being a member of a certain kind essentially determines what a primary substance is.\(^{33}\)

In addition to their function as predicates, secondary substances are also subject for being SAID OF and being IN relations. As it is mentioned above, species are subject for the genus (2b17-19). Genus “animal” is SAID OF species “man”. Moreover, Aristotle says that;

>[A]s the primary substances stand to everything else, so the species and genera of the primary substances stand to all the rest: all the rest are predicated of these. For if you will call the individual man grammatical it follows that you will call both a man and an animal grammatical[.]. (3a1-5)

\(^{31}\) Translation is of Sirkel. She underlines that the literal translation of *tode ti* is “this something”, “where *tode* is demonstrative and *ti* picks out a certain sort of thing,” but it is generally translated as a “particular” or an “individual.” Sirkel, “The Problem of Katholou (Universals) in Aristotle,” 16 n.21. Ackrill, on the other hand, prefers the statement “a certain this.”

\(^{32}\) Loux, *Primary Ousia: An Essay on Aristotle’s Metaphysics Z and H*, 29. Loux puts species in the place of the term “something” because the species is more informative than the genus (2b33-34).

\(^{33}\) Studtman, “Aristotle’s Categories.”
Thus, secondary substances are also subject for being IN relation. If an accidental property is IN a primary substance, it means that it is also IN the species and genus of this primary substance.34

(3) Individual non-substances are the ones that are IN a subject but not SAID OF a subject. Aristotle calls them individual and numerically one. They are “in something not as a part, and cannot exist separately from” what they are in. The individual knowledge of grammar IN the soul and individual white IN the body are Aristotle’s examples for these beings (1a23-25, 1b6-7).

Individual non-substances are not substances but exist IN substances. Hence, they are called accidents, properties or accidental properties. As accidents are not essential part of a substance, they are dependent on a substance for their existence. Since substances do not depend on them in the same way, substances are said to enjoy ontological priority over accidents in the Categories.35 Besides, as they are not SAID OF a subject, they are mostly thought to be particulars (as being SAID OF relation is thought to distinguish particulars from universals). Thus, they are accepted as the particulars in the category of non-substances.

However, there is not an agreement among scholars about the exact nature of them. There are mainly two sides in this controversy: Traditional view, which is ascribed to Ackrill, asserts that the inseparability condition (“…cannot exist separately from what it is in.”) and their being numerically one and individual make them non-recurrent beings that are peculiar to their primary substances. According to that view, what is inseparable from Socrates is “this white,” not color white. Therefore, even though both Socrates and Callias are called white, each whiteness is accepted numerically distinct from one another. “This white” of Socrates depends on Socrates in order to exist, while “that white” of Callias depends on Callias in order to exist. Hence, individual non-substances are unique

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34 For Perin, this is the reason of that species and genera are substances. Not because being SAID OF the primary substances, but because being the subject of being IN relation makes them substances. See Perin, “Substantial Universals in Aristotle’s Categories.”

particular instances of their universals. Thereby, they are called “tropes” in contemporary debate.\textsuperscript{36}

Owen, on the other hand, does not think so. He, labelling this as “dogma”, understands the inseparability condition as following: a non-substance needs \textit{some substance or other} to exist, not a \textit{this} substance in particular. He translates the statement as “Z is in something…and Z could not exist without \textit{something} to contain it.” So, “this white”, is only a determinate property, a determinate shade of white, a vanilla white for instance, but not something unique to its possessor. It is still individual and particular in the sense that it is not SAID OF anything further, anything less general.\textsuperscript{37} White is SAID OF vanilla white, but that vanilla white is the lowest level determinate shade of white. There is no more specific shade under vanilla white for it to be predicated of. This is what makes it determinate and particular. Therefore, an individual non-substance is not unique to its primary substance. A determinate shade of white, vanilla white, perfectly can be IN more than one subject. It is, then, something recurrent and repeatable.\textsuperscript{38}

The details of this debate are out of the purposes of this study. But it must be said that the authors that are referred in the next chapter for their interpretation of the \textit{Categories} as a critique of the TF assume the traditional view where it is


\textsuperscript{38}That is why Moravcsik calls the individual non-substances of Owen “atomic universals”, not particulars. Moravcsik, “Aristotle on Predication,” 87.
relevant. Indeed, taking individual non-substances as particular instances of
universal non-substances, instead of determinate properties that seem ambiguous
in being particular or universal, is more helpful for my present purposes. In
particular, the mediated aspect of being IN relation, which I address below,
works better with the assumptions of the traditional view and also helps better to
solve its difficulties. For that reason, I will also follow the traditional position.

(4) *Universal non-substances* are the beings both SAID OF a subject and IN a
subject. For instance, knowledge is IN the soul and it is also SAID OF
knowledge-of-grammar (1a29-1b3). They are accepted as universals, being
species and genus of the particular non-substances. They are also non-
substances, dependent beings, as they exist by being IN substances.

Thus, Aristotle suggests that particulars in the category of non-substances are
also subject for essential predication as their species and genus are SAID OF
them. Thereby, there emerges family trees of the particulars in every category
(both substance and non-substances). Just like an individual man is a member of
its universal kinds (i.e., “animal” and “man”), a particular white is a member of
its own universal kinds, namely “color” and “white”. Hence, an individual white
is said to be an individual by virtue of being an instance of whiteness (being
“something”).

2.4. “Being is Always Being Something”

An inference from what has been said is that Aristotle holds to the idea in the
*Categories* that “being is always being something.” The horizontal relation in the
table (SAID OF relation) reflects the essential relation between particulars and
their species/genus in each category of being. Therefore, particular things are
said to be what they are by being a member of their natural kinds.

This is, in fact, the “essentialist” interpretation of “to be.”39 Although Aristotle
does not explicitly say so, it is accepted that this is one of his assumptions in the

**Categories.** Matthews, for instance, calls it “Aristotle’s principle” in the *Categories* that “everything that exists is a something or other.” The relation between Socrates and humanness, or “this white” and “color white” is not something between two independent separate things. Both individuals are by belonging to their corresponding universal kinds: Socrates is an individual by being a “human”, while “this white” is an individual by being “white”. *Being is* only possible by “being something.”

### 2.5. Mediated Aspect of Being IN Relation

Even though Aristotle does not make this point explicitly, some claim that the being-IN relation depicted in the *Categories* has a mediated aspect. Indeed, this view grounds Aristotle’s examples in a coherent way and makes us understand better the difference between essential and accidental predication.

Grafton-Cardwell distinguishes direct and mediated aspects of the predication as following: It is a direct predication when a certain predication relation holds without appealing to another predication relation. It is a mediated predication when a certain predication relation holds in virtue of another predication relation.\(^{41}\)

As being IN relation is held among four beings (primary and secondary substances, individual and universal non-substances)\(^{42}\) mediation aspect of being IN is related with more than one case. What is important for the present purposes is the being IN relation between a universal non-substance and a primary

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\(^{40}\) Matthews, “Aristotelian Categories,” 148-149.

\(^{41}\) Patrick Grafton-Cardwell, “Understanding Mediated Predication in Aristotle’s Categories,” *Ancient Philosophy*, Vol. 41, 2 (Fall 2021): 447-449. Therefore, for Grafton-Cardwell, mediated predication can be the case for both being IN and SAID OF relations.

\(^{42}\) Aristotle says that individual non-substances are IN universal substances (“individual white is IN the body,” 1a27-28), universal non-substances are IN the universal substances (“color is IN body,” 2b1-2) and universal non-substances are IN primary substances (“color is IN individual body,” 2b1-2).
substance in particular.\textsuperscript{43} That is, how a universal non-substance is instantiated by a primary substance and in what way it differs from the instantiation of a secondary substance?

As it is explained above, universal non-substances are predicated of the primary substances by being IN them. In other words, their predication mechanism is different from the other universals, namely universal substances. While secondary substances are SAID OF primary substances, universal non-substances are predicated of them in their own peculiar way. In that regard, Aristotle says that “colour is in body and therefore also in an individual body; for were it not in some individual body it would not be in body at all” (2b1-3). So, he seems to endorse the view that universal non-substances are IN primary substances as well as their particular instances (individual non-substances).

Grafton-Cardwell explains this peculiar way of being IN relation between a universal non-substance and primary substance as follows: There is one sense of being IN relation in the \textit{Categories}, but it works in two ways (direct and mediated) among different kinds of being. As primary substances are ultimate subjects, all other things are either IN or SAID OF primary substances as subjects, that color is IN body implies that it is also in a particular body. According to the mediation theory, the only direct being IN relation in this predication can be between Socrates’ individual whiteness and Socrates, because here the predication holds in an immediate way. Individual whiteness is simply and directly IN Socrates. But, that “color white” and “color” (species and genus of Socrates’ individual whiteness) are IN Socrates holds only by virtue of two

\textsuperscript{43} The traditional view on the nature of individual non-substances prevents non-substantial universals from being IN particular substances because of the inseparability condition. As only individual non-substances are inseparable from their possessors, universal non-substances are not present IN a particular substance. “This white” is IN Socrates, but “white” is not IN Socrates as there could be “white” without being IN Socrates. That is why Ackrill calls “compressed and careless” when Aristotle says that “colour is in body and therefore also in an individual body” (2b1-2). Ackrill, \textit{Aristotle, Categories and De Interpretatione}, 74, 83. Mediated aspect of being IN relation supports traditional view by allowing such a relation.
other predications: (1) Socrates’s individual whiteness is IN Socrates and, (2) the color white is SAID OF the individual whiteness of Socrates.\textsuperscript{44}

Then, an individual non-substance is said to have a mediating role between a universal non-substance and a primary substance. The instantiation of a universal non-substance IN a primary substance does not occur directly but through the individual bit of non-substance which is IN the primary substance. For Jones, this mediating role points out the exact difference between the instantiations of two kinds of universals, substances and non-substances. Although Socrates as primary substance instantiates both whiteness (universal non-substance) and man-ness (secondary substance), they are not predicated of him in the same way. While the instantiation of man-ness is Socrates himself, whiteness is instantiated as “individual whiteness” IN Socrates. Since individual white is IN Socrates, we call him white and, therefore, universal white is IN Socrates too.\textsuperscript{45}

This explanation to the being IN relation underlies the fact that different kind of universals are particularized in their peculiar ways. What it globally tells us is that Aristotle accounts for different sorts of being (substances and non-substances) by distinguishing two types of universals and their different kind of predication mechanisms. We can say, then, that the \textit{Categories} assumes that (1) there is no one unique and common predication mechanism for different sorts of being; and this implies that (2) different sorts of being cannot be accounted for by reducing all to one and the same kind. These bring us to the idea that “being is said in many ways.”

\textsuperscript{44} Grafton-Cardwell, “Understanding Mediated Predication in Aristotle’s Categories,” 449-451.

\textsuperscript{45} John, R. Jones, “Are the Qualities of Particular Things Universal or Particular”, pp. 162-163. Other scholars also seem to ascribe a kind of mediation aspect to the being IN relation: Duerlinger suggests a similar view that being IN relation has four senses in the \textit{Categories}. Except for that the individual non-substances are IN the primary substance, other three (individual non-substance is IN secondary substance, universal non-substance is IN primary and secondary substances) have derivative character. Duerlinger, “Predication and Inherence in Aristotle’s ‘Categories’”. Moravcsik states that “general attributes are indirectly inherent in particular substances” while defending Ackrill’s position against Owen. Moravcsik, “Aristotle on Predication,” 87. Allen also interprets the statement of Aristotle that “color is in individual body” (2b1-3) as “the ‘in’ here is not the technical ‘in’ of presence, but an ‘in’ derived from it.” R.E. Allen, “Individual Properties in Aristotle’s “Categories”,” 35.
2.6. “Being is Said in Many Ways”

In the *Categories* Aristotle does not discuss the concept of being. But, he tells us later in the *Metaphysics* that being is not the same for each kind of categories. Being is said in as many ways as there are categories (Δ, 7, 1017a22-30). He says that “…just as *is* (to estin) also belongs to all of them [the categories], but not in the same way, but to one in a primary way and to the others in a derivative one…” (*Met.*, Z, 4, 1030a21-22).46

Loux also argues that when Aristotle rejects the view that “being is a genus” in his other works, he means to deny that being corresponds to a single nature or character. For him, there is no “being a being” or “being a thing.” Instead, he embraces the view that “being applies homonymously.” His theory of categories, although accepted as his earlier ontology, clarifies this principle. Hence, the meaning of “to be” varies among the categories.47

Therefore, we can conclude that, substances and non-substances do not exist in the same way.48 Frede states that “being something essentially is one kind of being, being something accidentally is another kind of being which presupposes the first one.”49 Indeed, the predication theory of the *Categories* suggests that a primary substance *is* what it is as being a member of its kind, a particular non-substance *is* what it is, in addition to be a member of its own kind, by being IN a substance.

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46 Following the convention, the “*Metaphysics*” is abbreviated as “*Met.*,” and, “*Nicomachean Ethics*” as “*NE.*” in this study, where relevant.


48 Accordingly, being a non-substance is also not the same for nine non-substantial categories. Being a quality is different from being a quantity. See Michael Frede, “Categories in Aristotle,” in *Essays in Ancient Philosophy*, ed. Michael Frede (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 48. For the present purpose I content myself with referring to the difference between substantial and non-substantial beings.

Then, the being of a thing is a matter of its being a certain kind of thing (i.e., its essence). For a primary substance “to be” means to be a substance, for a particular quality “to be” is to be a quality. Loux argues that, in the *Categories*, each category represents the highest kind of a distinct sense of being. If things are members of their lowest-level kinds, the transitivity feature of the SAID OF relation requires that the category itself is SAID OF this particular. Thereby, the particular member of a category is what it is in this sense. Substance is SAID OF Socrates, since the infimae species “human being” is SAID OF Socrates at the bottom level. Then, for Socrates “to be” is “to be a substance”. Anything in the category of substance exists as a substance. Likewise, quality is SAID OF individual white, since the infimae species “white” is SAID OF individual white. Then, for an individual white “to be” is “to be a quality”. Anything in the category of quality exists as a quality.\(^{50}\)

Thus, if Aristotle in the *Categories* posits each category as a distinct mode of being, things in this world are what they are by belonging to these categories. An individual man is always an instance of a universal substance. An individual white, likewise, is always an instance of a universal non-substance. Since being has these different senses according to the distinct categories, then, Aristotle seems to explain this categorical difference by appealing to different sorts of beings (universals) and predications (SAID OF and being IN).

CHAPTER 3

READING ARISTOTLE’S CATEGORIES AS A RESPONSE TO PLATO’S THEORY OF FORMS

This chapter focuses on reading the *Categories* as a critique of Plato’s TF. According to this philosophical exegesis, the predication theory in the *Categories*, which is presented in the previous chapter, can give more convincing answers to some philosophical questions than the TF does.

I will give the primary examples of this reading from the contemporary scholarly literature by dividing them into two. The first half of the chapter tries to understand the predication theory in the *Categories* as an alternative account to the problems that the TF claims to solve. It is assumed that both Plato and Aristotle dealt with the same problems in the context of their predication theories. The second half aims to see the solutions of the *Categories* to the problems of the TF itself.

This is not, admittedly, an unquestionable distinction. As Dancy puts it, Aristotle’s solutions to some philosophical problems might not be separated from his criticism of Plato’s own answers. Moreover, this list of problems do not exhaust all the problems that Aristotle recognizes in the TF. These are exclusively the ones related or can be related with the *Categories*. They constitute the main points about how the *Categories* denies the Platonic metaphysics. Lastly, some repetition will be inevitable since it is the same one account to be offered as a solution to all of the six problems.

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51 This comment of Dancy is about the question “What are the substances?” in particular. See Dancy, “On Some of Aristotle’s First Thoughts About Substances,” 338.
3.1. Categories Positing Alternative Accounts to the Problems that the Theory of Forms Claims to Solve

3.1.1. Nature of the Ordinary Sensible Particulars

The differences between the predication theories of Plato and Aristotle suggest that they disagree on the nature of ordinary sensible particulars. It is taken for granted that the “participants” of the TF are ordinary objects of our daily lives. But Forms are supposed to be transcendental beings. The metaphysical difference between the Forms and their “participants” would be recognized better, according to Mann, by understanding the distinction between being and becoming that Plato refers in several of his dialogues.\(^{52}\)

Mann explains this distinction by the different senses of “is” in a propositional statement.\(^{53}\) A proposition in the form of “X is Y” can be true in more than one sense according to the TF:

\begin{itemize}
  \item[(1)] ‘X is Y’ is true, because being \(y\) is (part of) what being \(x\) is; or alternatively, because \(x\) is \(y\) in virtue of its own nature.
  \item[(2)] ‘X is Y’ is true, because \(x\) is \(y\), even though being \(y\) is not (part of) what being \(x\) is; or alternatively, because \(x\) is \(y\), but not in virtue of its own nature.\(^{54}\)
\end{itemize}

In the first case, \(x\) is \(y\), because \(x\) is \(y\) in its own right. This means that \(y\) is something that is essentially predicated of \(x\). \(y\) belongs to the essence of \(x\). This is the sense that we mean when we talk about Forms. To say that “The Form of

\(^{52}\) Mann, The Discovery of Things, 14 and 19. The dialogues that Mann refers to are Protagoras (339a-344c), Theaetetus (152d-159d), Timaeus (27d-28a; 30c-d; 37e-38b; 42e-43a; 48a), Republic (518c; 519b; 521d; 523c-524a; 525b; 526e) and Sophist (248a).

\(^{53}\) Ibid., 76-79, 87. The capital letters (X and Y) in the example are the linguistic representatives of the two entities, \(x\) and \(y\).

\(^{54}\) Ibid., 77.
Beauty is beautiful” is to mean that The Form is *essentially* beautiful. Beauty is simply (part of) this Form’s essence.

In the second case, $x$ is $y$, not because it is essentially $y$, but it is $y$ *derivatively*. $y$ is another thing, being in some relation to $x$ and it is due to this relation that $x$ can be said to be $y$. In other words, by virtue of this relation $y$ is predicated of $x$ non-essentially. For the TF, this relation is the participation of a sensible particular in a Form. The one which participates in the Form of Beautiful is called after Beautiful *derivatively*. That is, unlike The Form of Beautiful, “beauty” is not (part of) the essence of the participant.

Therefore, the copula “is” is used equivocally for the Forms and participants. When $x$ is a Form, $x$ *is* $y$ in the strict sense. But when it comes to a participant, $x$ merely *becomes* $y$. Thereby, Plato assumes two separate realms: the realm of *being* and the realm of *becoming*. Members of the realm of becoming, the ordinary sensible particulars, *are* not essentially what they are called, but they are only the ones that *become* what they are in a relation with the Form that they participate in. A participant $x$ is only called $Y$ after or from the Form of $Y$ without itself really *being* $y$.

Mann underlies the fact that the term *becoming*, contrary to the ordinary way of thinking and speaking, does not imply a process aiming to reach the *being* where it is understood as a determinate final stage. Rather, these terms correspond to two distinct realms located in different levels of a metaphysical hierarchy. These two realms so exclude each other that there is no smallest affinity between their members.

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56 Ibid., 82.

57 Ibid., 82-87.
If we distinguish the two worlds by their corresponding predication mechanisms, we can say that Forms are subject for *essential predication* as they truly have their predicates (essences). Therefore, they can be called as *genuine beings* which enjoy the properties of stability, order, etc. The members of the realm of *becoming*, on the other hand, are only subject for *accidental predication* which does not have anything to do with their essential nature. Accordingly, they are not fixed entities and are subject to change in every way due to their lack of any essence. Without any kind of nature, they should be accepted as merely “bundles of Form-Instances.”

Before presenting the predication theory of the *Categories* against the TF, Mann involves another account in his analysis: the account of “the late-learners of the *Sophist*”, whom Mann calls as “Plato’s curious alter ego.” In *Sophist* (251b-c), it is reported that the “late-learners” defend the view that we cannot say “man

58 *Ibid.*, 30, 82-87. Mann sees this sharp division between *being* and *becoming* as an extension of Pre-Socratic philosophy, which is developed against Eleatic challenge (that the being is stable and free from any change). For him, this tradition generally followed a dual approach to reality, one is permanently subject to change and not real, the other is stable and real. In that context, Mann regards Plato’s understanding of reality very close to that of Anaxagoras. Anaxagoras’ theory puts the elements on the one side as corresponding to the members of the realm of *being* that are eternal, immutable, infinitely divisible and real stuffs (they are natural stuffs and their features, like water, fire, stone, gold, the hot, the wet, etc.). On the other side, there are the mixtures composed of the bits of these elements in accordance with a ratio. Every mixture has a share in every element which makes them compound entities. Unlike the elements, they are subject to change, generation and corruption. They are called after the elements that they have share (although everything has a share of everything the dominant element in the mixture determines the name and the manifestation of the mixture). They are evidently the members of realm of *becoming*. The apparent link between Plato and Anaxagoras, for Mann, is overlooked because of the dominancy of the ontology of the *Categories* which shifted the direction of the distinction to the object and their accidental properties. This dominancy determined the ways of reading Plato (and also the accounts of Pre-Socratics) and prevented to realize that the participants of the TF are not the sensible particulars in the sense of the primary substances of the *Categories*. *Ibid.*, 29-31; 107-119.

59 This is the label of some thinkers according to the *Sophist* (251-252). Their views are widely attributed to Antisthenes about whom we learn little from Aristotle (*Met.*, Δ, 29, 1024b32). But there are also others who think that their views are coherent with Euthydemus and his brother Dionysodorus. See Francis Macdonald Cornford, *Plato’s Theory of Knowledge*, (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1935), 254.

60 Mann, *The Discovery of Things*, 28. Even though their views are not officially of Plato, I include them here, because they help to see the distance between the predication theories of the *Categories* and the TF with regard to the nature of sensible particulars.
is good”, but only “man is man” or “good is good.” They reject any possibility of saying more than one thing about something. Mann understands this predication theory as follows: We know that terms of natural kinds exclude each other. If something is a man, it is not a cat. If something is an animal, it is not a plant. What “late-learners” assume is that all predicates have this same consequence on its subject. They regard all predicates as if they are kind terms (terms corresponding to the species and genera) that exclude each other. A man cannot be good just in the same way that he cannot be a cat. Conversely, if something is good, it cannot be a man. We can only say about something what it is. We cannot say something that it is not. Therefore, a particular can only be subject for one predicate that corresponds to its single definition (logos).61

Thus, for “late-learners” being good and being man are ontologically on the same level. Indeed, they assume everything to have the status of a substance and, thereby, treat all non-substantial beings as if they are substances. It is this assumption that leads them reject any kind of predication except for essential one. For them, to say that “man is good” amounts to predicating a substance (good) of another substance (man).62

61 Ibid., 34, 173-174. Mann refers to some characteristics of Greek language that might make these thinkers reach to that conclusion: In English we use indefinite article in the case of sortals (This is a man, this is a cat), in the case of predicate adjectives we do not (This is good, this is white). Since Greek does not have indefinite article, both sentences comprising sortal expression or predicate adjectives are founded in the same way: “This is man” or “this is good.” Secondly, in English we can transform a sentence of “this is a man” into a form of “this man” in order to predicate more items to it (this man is good). Here, the pronoun “this” of both sentences correspond to the same object (man). However, we cannot do the same for the sentence of “this is good.” Even though terms of colors seem to be an exception (this white), “this” does not refer to the same item for two sentences. “This” in the sentence of “this is white” refers to the “thing that is white”, “this” in the sentence of “this white” refers to the individual instance of color white. In Greek, however, it is possible to reconstruct any sentence in form “this is X”, either the predicate is an adjective or a sortal term, as “this X is” where the pronoun “this” refers to the same item in both cases. Therefore, Greek language lacks instrument to distinguish a sortal term from a predicate adjective. Ibid., 174-175.

62 Ibid., 176.
A conclusion of this thought is that “late-learners” are said to attribute being or essential natures to ordinary things unlike Plato. The sensible particulars are what they are in their own right as they are subject for essential predication. But, as we have seen, they are subject for essential predication only. It is not possible for an ordinary sensible thing to have another kind of predicate, since every predicate necessarily designates another essential being (i.e., a substance). Consequently, since no substance can be accidentally predicated of another one, nothing could ever have any accidental property.

Accordingly, the account of the “late-learners” is the upside down version of the Platonic TF. Compared to the “late-learners”, in Plato sensible particulars can have several predications. But they have them at the expense of being deprived of their essences in the realm of becoming. They are, indeed, only subject for accidental predication. Therefore, they are particulars that are composed of accidental properties only. This is to say that, for Mann, sensible particulars of the TF are in a sense “many things”, since they are subject for many predicates; on the other hand, “they are not anything” since they do not have an essence or substance. We cannot legitimately make claims about their being.

In short, for Plato everything about the sensible particulars is accidental, whereas for “late-learners” everything is substantial. Mann reads the predication theory of the Categories as a resort to these two extreme accounts by virtue of allowing both essential and accidental predication at the same time. For him, the philosophical significance of Aristotle’s theory of predication in the Categories lies in its ability to account for things as having both essences and accidental properties at the same time and in a coherent way. Just as it is not true that

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65 Mann locates the account of the *Categories* in the last chain of a long tradition started by the pre-Socratics and followed by Plato with regard to the ontological status of sensible particulars (see n.58 above). Since the *Categories* does not mention any names of philosopher or thought and does not include clear expressions, it is not easy to recognize the connection of the past. *Ibid.*, 4-5, 196.
everything is accidental, it is not either true that everything is substantial. This is a mediate position between the accounts of Plato and the “late-learners.”

Mann sees the main contribution of the Categories in its distinction between essence and properties of a thing, instead of the distinction between being and becoming (as Plato uses them). It does that by its two different distinctions that are closely related with each other: (1) The three kinds of “–onymies” and (2) the two kinds of predication (being SAID OF and being IN).

Firstly; Mann ascribes “–onymies” a significant role in determining the nature of particulars. Far beyond providing a linguistic distinction, they point out the exact ontological differences. The dichotomy of synonymy and paronymy/homonymy reveals the features of Greek language that Plato did not notice according to Mann. Against the “undifferentiated eponymy” of Plato, they aim to explore differences in predication.

In that regard, Mann gives the special role to paronym. He says that in the Platonic dialogues (before the Theaetetus) Plato uses both abstract nouns (Justice) and their adjectival forms (The Just or The Just Itself) as the proper names of the Forms. This uniform use suggests, according to Mann, the idea that

66 Ibid., 35. Mann calls this as the “discovery of things” in the sense that they are now fundamental beings (primary substances) that are subject for everything (for both essential and accidental predicates). Ibid., 10-11.

67 Mann calls the notions of homonymy, synonymy and paronymy briefly as “–onymies.” Ibid., 26.

68 Mann thinks that real contrast is between synonymy and paronymy, since homonymy can be understood under the mechanism of paronym. Ibid., 193.

69 “Eponymy” in the Platonic terminology refers to that participants are called from or after the Form which they participate in. In the context of the one-over-many principle it can be said that many F things receive the proper name of the Form (F) as a common name. Different from the notion of homonymy, the participant and the Form does not merely share the same name in the case of eponymy, but the participant is specifically named after or from the Form according to Phaedo (100b-e, 102b2). Ibid., 47-48.

70 Ibid., 47, 196.
Plato did not realize an ontological distinction that these two forms of names might correspond to. On the contrary, they are treated by Plato as if they name the same kind of being. Whereas, according to Aristotle’s notion of paronymy, abstract nouns name the qualities, but the adjectives name the thing that is qualified. “Justice” is the name of the “quality justice”, whereas its adjective form, “just”, names Socrates who has this justice.\textsuperscript{71} This difference in the language serves as a valuable hint to distinguish a thing from its accidental properties. Being Socrates is something categorically different from being white.

Secondly; corresponding to these differences in language, the Categories posits two kinds of predication. Mann draws attention to the distinction between being SAID OF and being IN relations with regard to the transitive and nontransitive use of “is”:\textsuperscript{72} SAID OF predication has the feature of transitivity, that is, if x is SAID OF y, and z is SAID OF x, then, z is SAID OF y (1b10-15).

The transitive use of “is” (SAID OF) allows us to say what something essentially is by placing the subject in the species-genus family tree. Hence it corresponds to the “is” of Forms in Plato.\textsuperscript{73} By this transitivity function, being SAID OF relation creates “mutually irreducible hierarchies” for all kind of beings in their own categories, that is, for both substantial and non-substantial beings.\textsuperscript{74} We can think each of the ten categories constituting these hierarchies. We say that an individual instance of white (a quality) is white, white is a color, and color is a quality; so individual white is subject for all these beings located in higher levels. Likewise Socrates (a primary substance) is a man, man is an animal, animal is a substance; and Socrates is subject for all these predications. Every

\textsuperscript{71} \textit{Ibid.}, 26, 47. The notion of “synonymy”, likewise, points out another ontological distinction. We call Socrates and a universal kind synonymously man. But, the species “man” is something different from the individual “man.” \textit{Ibid.}, 27.

\textsuperscript{72} \textit{Ibid.}, 52.

\textsuperscript{73} See on page 24-25 above.

\textsuperscript{74} \textit{Ibid.}, 186-187.
being, located in its own category, is in somewhere located in this essential hierarchical structure.

On the other hand, the nontransitive use of “is” (being IN relation) allows us to say what something is like. It gives us information about the accidental properties of the object. Although there is nothing in the *Categories* about the nontransitive feature of the being IN predication, Mann thinks that this might be because it is so obvious. In a proposition “Socrates is white”, the species “color white” cannot be predicated of Socrates. Since individual whiteness IN Socrates and Socrates are placed in two different categories that do not have the same definition, the transitivity feature does not work here.

Mann defines substances (both primary and secondary) as the items in “the privileged hierarchy” and the non-substances (both particulars and their species/genus) as the items in “the dependent hierarchy.” Nine dependent hierarchies are connected to “the privileged hierarchy” by the being IN relation. That is to say, non-substances have to be IN at least one item in the category of substance.

When we compare the being IN relation of Aristotle with the “is” of participation in Plato, they seem to be the same in the first place. For Mann, they fit each other if the predication concerned is of non-substances: The statement “Socrates is white” is explained by Plato that Socrates participates in the Form of White and, thereby, he is derivatively white. The only essential white is the Form of White itself. For Aristotle, too, the whiteness of Socrates is not an essential predication either. Whiteness is IN Socrates and, so, he is accidentally white. Socrates and individual whiteness share the same name.

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77 See on pages 24-25 above.
“white” but Socrates does not get the definition of the white by virtue of this predication.\(^78\)

However, it is essential predication that reveals the basic disagreement between the two accounts regarding the nature of the sensible particulars. For Plato “Socrates is a man” since Socrates participates in the Form of Man. Participation makes Socrates to become man not be a man in the strict sense. The only essential man is the Form of Man. Socrates is man only derivatively. In other words, Socrates’ being a “man” would have the same structure as his being “white”: “man” would be IN Socrates (in the Aristotelian sense). For Aristotle, however, the predicate “man” is not among the items that can be IN Socrates. “Man” is an entity in the “privileged hierarchy”, that is, in the category of substance. Its being does not depend on another item like whiteness depends on a substance. Therefore, there is no “man of a man” unlike there is a “white of a white thing.” “Man” is SAID OF Socrates which means that both the name and the definition of “man” are predicated of Socrates. Hence, Socrates is essentially man which makes him and “species man” synonymous.\(^79\)

To put it in the terminology of Categories, Platonists assume everything to be IN the participants by their participation mechanism. For Mann, they did not realize that there are certain beings that are SAID OF the sensible particulars. Without such a predication Platonists assume that the essential natures are not of the sensible particulars but of Forms only. “Late-learners”, on the other hand, assume that everything is SAID OF sensible particulars. They did not allow some beings to be IN the particulars. Against these two extreme accounts, the Categories tells us that an ordinary thing is subject for both kind of predication.

\(^78\) Ibid., 190.

\(^79\) Ibid., 190-191.
There are essential and accidental aspects of being a thing. Thus, there are certain things that are SAID OF a thing and there are others that are IN it.\textsuperscript{80}

Therefore, sensible particulars of theCategories are essentially what they are but also “are qualified, quantified, located, affected, active, related to other objects, and so on, in various ways.”\textsuperscript{81} This makes them, for Mann, ontologically genuine beings (“bona fide things”) to be the underlying subject for everything else. Hence Plato’s participants are not the things in the sense of theCategories. They are simply aggregates of Forms-instances.\textsuperscript{82}

There are other authors in the literature who read theCategories as an objection to the TF regarding the nature of sensible particulars. Code,\textsuperscript{83} likewise, reads the difference between the two accounts by virtue of the notions of being and having.

For Code, these terms are significant in the sense that they reflect the relation between reality and language. In other words, how we call things are closely related with their nature. For him, both Plato and Aristotle provided accounts for the nature of things and their connection to language by observing a difference between “what a thing is” and “what it has”, which reflects the two ways of calling things. The former concerns a thing’s definition or essence (essential predication) whereas the latter points out the accidental features of the thing (accidental predication).\textsuperscript{84}

\textsuperscript{80} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{81} Ibid., 191.

\textsuperscript{82} Ibid., 200.

For Code, too, Forms and participants have completely different ontological status. Participants are devoid of their nature as against Forms. We can only talk about the being of the Forms, whereas sensible particulars are only associated with having by means of participation relation. This is why a Form is the unqualified answer to the Socratic question “What is X?” that aims to capture the definition of X. The Form is what it is in the strict sense and consequently it is a definable entity.\textsuperscript{85}

Code uses the example of “equal sticks” in the Phaedo (74) which is designed to show that even though particular things seem equal that does not mean that they are equal. The same sticks can appear equal to one, while they might appear unequal to another. The passage says that they are only deficiently equal but strive to be equal. This is the ontological split of the two realms according to Code. Participants, despite getting their names from or after Forms, are completely devoid of the essential natures of the Forms that they participate in. Furthermore, since definitions are the objects of knowledge, they are not definable or knowable objects either. While the only essential man is the Form of Man, it can be said that “Socrates merely Has, or participates in, man, without Being man.”\textsuperscript{86}

The same distinction is held among the genera and their species according to the TF. Code appeals to the Meno (72-74): Different species of bees are all called bee; roundness is called a certain shape; different virtues are all called virtue. These are so, because they all participate in their own “genus-Forms.”\textsuperscript{87} But none of them is identical with what it is called. None of the bee species is the

\textsuperscript{84} Ibid., 411-414.

\textsuperscript{85} Ibid., 417 and 426.

\textsuperscript{86} Ibid., 426-428.

\textsuperscript{87} The expression is of mine. In order to point out the hierarchy among the kind terms in an Aristotelian framework, I name the lower level as the “species-Form” and the kind itself as “genus-Form.”
bee; none of the species of shape (like the round shape) is shape itself. Each of
the particular kinds of virtue is a certain virtue, but none of them is virtue in the
strict sense. This suggests that the generic kind terms only apply thoroughly to
the genus-Form itself even though the species are called by the same kind term.
Only genus-Form is what it is, not the species-Form. So, only Form of Virtue is
strictly virtue, but not, say, the Form of Courage. It would only have the Form of
Virtue.\textsuperscript{88}

Code puts the predication theory of the \textit{Categories} as against this Platonic
picture. For him, Aristotle applies the same distinction in the \textit{Categories} but to
another structure, due to his disagreement with Plato regarding the nature of the
reality. The notions of \textit{being} and \textit{having} correspond to the SAID OF and being
IN relations, respectively. They are distinguished from each other according to
whether definition of the predicable is predicated or not. For the \textit{Categories},
unlike the Plato of the \textit{Phaedo}, sensible particulars are subject to both kinds of
predication that makes them be as well as have certain things.\textsuperscript{89}

Code emphasizes the priority relation between these predications. This priority
relation constitutes a fundamental contrast with Platonists regarding the nature of
the sensibles. For a particular in order to have something, it must be something
essentially in the first place for Aristotle. Without “being something” definable, a
particular cannot receive accidental properties.\textsuperscript{90} This suggests that the
particulars of the \textit{Categories} and the participants of the TF, which have
something without being anything definable, are not the same things.

Moreover, Code compares the species and genus relation between two accounts.
Unlike the account in the \textit{Meno}, the \textit{Categories} never allows species of a genus

\textsuperscript{88} Ibid., 428.

\textsuperscript{89} Ibid., 413, 417 and 430.

\textsuperscript{90} Ibid., 421.
to have that genus. On the contrary, the genus is always SAID OF the species.\textsuperscript{91} Otherwise, it would eventually preclude the sensible particular that fall under this genus from having its essence (since the transitivity of the SAID OF relation would not work). In other words, the genus must also be SAID OF the species as the genus and species are SAID OF primary substances, so as to endow the subject particular with its essence.

In short, for Code too, the sensible particulars of the \textit{Categories} have their essential natures by the SAID OF relation unlike the participants of the TF. But he also draws attention to the being IN relation in the same way: Since things get their essences by the SAID OF relation and accidental properties by being IN relation, we tend to think that, being IN relation does not include an essential aspect. However, it must be remembered that individual non-substances are also subject for essential predication (SAID OF) by their corresponding kind universals, which tells us that both primary substances and individual non-substances are endowed with their essential natures. The white of Socrates is something that Socrates has but this individual white \textit{is} also \textit{essentially} white. Therefore, contrary to Plato’s participants that are all accidental beings, both substances and non-substances of the \textit{Categories} are essential beings.\textsuperscript{92}

Cresswell, too, compares the accounts of the TF and the \textit{Categories} regarding the nature of sensible particulars and reaches the same conclusion aforementioned. But he also includes the notions of \textit{knowledge} and \textit{existence} in his analysis. One of his assumptions is that essence implies existence. If something has \textit{per se} properties that define its nature, we assume it exists. Secondly, to know a thing infallibly is to know its essence, that is, its \textit{per se}

\textsuperscript{91} \textit{Ibid.}, 428.

\textsuperscript{92} \textit{Ibid.}, 431. Code does not go further but I think this would make us say that the distinction between \textit{being} and \textit{having} does not mean exactly the same for the two theories. In the \textit{Categories} accidental predication include an essential part as we have seen, while the predication in Plato does not.
properties. Cresswell thinks that both Plato and Aristotle would not object these assumptions.93

For Cresswell, Plato’s doctrine does not allow sensible particulars to have essences, since they are not object of (infallible) knowledge and, therefore, they do not exist in the fuller sense. His first support is from the same passage in the Phaedo (74b-c). The example of equal sticks, that can seem equal to one and unequal to another, suggests that we do not have the knowledge of equality from equal sensible things. If to know something is to know its essence, then, the equality cannot be part of the essence of particulars. If only we had infallible knowledge of equality from a pair of sticks or stones, they would be essentially equal.94

The source of infallible knowledge of equality is, for Plato, the Form of Equality. This suggests that only Forms have essences and so can be known. Sensible particulars, on the contrary, are deprived of essence and are not object of knowledge. Furthermore if essence implies existence, then, we cannot claim that sensible particulars exist in the same degree with the Forms.95

Cresswell refers to the Republic V (476-480) for these different degrees and their connection between knowledge: Here Plato explains that the objects of knowledge are fully existent things (comparing to the objects of ignorance and belief). Since to know infallibly something is to know its essential properties, only the things that have essences are known. Then, they are the things that exist fully, as essence implies existence.96


94 Ibid., 101-102.

95 Ibid., 102.

96 Ibid., 102-103.
However, what we get from sensible particulars are never infallible. They give us inconsistent information: while one thing seems beautiful to one, it might seem ugly to another, etc. There will always be different circumstances, like light or personal differences, that would make the statement “x is F” false for a sensible. Being F, therefore, would not be a part of the essence of sensible x. As this is true for any property, there is no way that any property of a sensible particular can be part of its essences. Thereby, sensible particulars are not objects of knowledge but of belief and this makes them neither fully existent nor fully non-existent according to the Republic V.\footnote{Ibid., 103-104.}

Contrary to the sensible particulars, essential properties can only belong to the Forms. Accordingly, only Forms can be known. To say that “The Form of X is F”, as F holds \emph{per se} of X, amounts to saying “X is identical with F.” So the entity which exists in the fullest sense for Plato is the Form of X, not the sensible particular x.\footnote{Ibid., 102-104.}

Cresswell thinks that, for Plato, to show that a subject x does not have the property F consistently and stably is to show that the property F is not part of the essence of a subject x. Since Plato sees sensible world being in a flux, far away from stability, their members would not have their properties in the strict sense. Regarding participants as an imitation or a copy of the original models (\emph{Republic} X) would support this idea. According to Cresswell, it seems that in the absence of their own nature, sensible particulars would need Forms, as essential beings, for their explanation.\footnote{Ibid., 105-106.}

In contrast with Plato’s participants, sensible particulars of Aristotle do have essences for Cresswell. The \emph{Categories} distinguishes the predicates of a subject that are \emph{SAID OF} it and the things that are \emph{IN} it. Such a subject is the primary
substance which is a definite thing (a *this*) due to SAID OF relation with a secondary substance and distinct from the non-substance properties that cannot exist without being IN a substance. Apparently, for a thing to be a subject with an essence of its own, we initially must be able to say *what it is* essentially, which is different from saying *what it has*. The *Categories* does allow to say *what a thing is* and, thereby, it accounts for its nature. If individual things have essences, then, they exist in the strict sense.\(^{100}\) If “x is F” essentially, where x is a sensible particular, then, x is said to exist as being an F.\(^{101}\)

The main points that come out from what has been said so far can be summarized as follows:

- The participants of the TF are only subject for accidental predication. This makes them lack all essence and reduces them to mere aggregates of Form-instances.

- The sensible particulars of the *Categories* are subject for both essential and accidental predication. This makes them genuine beings together with their essential and accidental properties.

\(^{100}\) *Ibid.*, 108-111. For Cresswell, Aristotle holds the doctrine that “concrete particulars have essences, but only abstract entities have knowable individuating essences.” The account of the *Categories* is relevant only with the first part of this doctrine that “concrete particulars have essences.” For the rest, that is “abstract entities have knowable individuating essences”, Cresswell appeals further to the several passages in *Metaphysics* Z and H where Aristotle regards "universals" as substances in the primary sense unlike the *Categories*: Universals are what they are by their *per se* properties and, thereby, they are object of thought and exist in the fullest sense. But, they do not do the same work with Forms. Having their own essences make sensible particulars not need some separate entities that they strive to be like. This would only produce a carbon copy of the sensibles in the physical world. *Ibid.*, 106-111.

\(^{101}\) Cresswell makes the same comparison between the participants of the TF and the sensible particulars of the *Categories* in his paper “Aristotle’s Phaedo”. He reads the *Phaedo* (102b-103c) from the framework of the *Categories* and claims further that the example Plato gives there about the tallness and shortness relation between Socrates, Simmias and Phaedo, allows us to assert that non-substantial beings of *Phaedo* are subject for essential predication. Accordingly, the inference that participants of the TF does not have essential natures is not true for all the dialogues of Plato. But, still, Cresswell says that this does not seem a sharp theoretical attitude of Plato, since in the *Republic* Plato denies any essential predication of the particulars, and in *Timaeus* he depicts things as merely reflections or images of the Forms “in the receptacle of becoming.” Cresswell, “Aristotle’s Phaedo,” 131-152.
- Being IN relation of the *Categories* is not an essential predication but the individual non-substances which is IN a substance are always subject for essential predication: e.g., whiteness is SAID OF the particular whiteness which is IN Socrates. Thereby, being IN relation does not totally correspond to Plato’s participation relation. Both essential and accidental predications of the *Categories* have essential aspects. In other words, both substances and non-substances have their essences.

- The notion of essence is closely related with the notion of existence. If participants of the TF do not have essential natures, they are not fully existent things. If things have their *per se* properties by SAID OF relation as in the *Categories*, we, therefore, assume that they have existence in the full sense.

### 3.1.2. “How Can One Thing Have Many Names?”

Both Plato and Aristotle deal with the question “how can one thing have many names?” within the context of their predication theories. The question has a certain weight for both philosophers, since they hold a “realist theory of meaning”, according to which the words of a language correspond to the real items outside our minds. Words are the names of entities.\(^{102}\)

If so, to make a proposition in the form of “X *is* Y” amounts to proclaiming a relation between two entities. How is it possible, then, to predicate legitimately an *item* of another *item*? According to Hamlyn, it is natural to understand such a proposition as an identity statement.\(^{103}\) If the subject and predication, X and Y, denote real entities, then, the function of the copula “is” would be expressing an assertion about the identity of the subject: An item *is* that what it *is*. Man is man. Good is good. We cannot say that “man is good” truly, since “man” and “good” are two distinct things. Therefore, a thing cannot have many names, but only


\(^{103}\) *Ibid.*, 111. It must be emphasized that, here, it is assumed that each entity has only *one* proper name.
one, that is, its own proper name.\textsuperscript{104} The problem, then, is that how can one thing have many predicates? How can we say truly of something about a thing except for the identity?

For Hamlyn, Plato introduced the doctrine of communion of Forms in the \textit{Sophist} (251a-260a) as a solution to that problem.\textsuperscript{105} According to the TF, things are named after or from the Forms. The common names of the particulars, such as \textit{man, cat, white, just} are all proper names of the relevant Forms. Although each Form is the bearer of a single name, this doctrine enables that some Forms combine with each other and some do not. Thereby, a Form can be an instance of another Form. Stated otherwise, certain Forms themselves participate in some other Forms. This is the underlying mechanism of the statement, for instance, “motion exists.”\textsuperscript{106} Even though “motion” and “existence” are the proper names of two Forms, the Form of Motion and the Form of Existence, “existence” is predicated of “motion” by virtue of the communion relation with each other.

Those Forms whose combination would result in a contradiction or incompatibility would not combine with each other. The examples of “motion is rest” or “rest is motion” show that Forms of Motion and Rest cannot combine

\textsuperscript{104} David W. Hamlyn, “The Communion of Forms and the Development of Plato’s Logic,” \textit{The Philosophical Quarterly}, Vol. 5, No. 21 (October 1955): 290. Hamlyn, after referring to the “late-learners” of the \textit{Sophist}, attributes this idea to Antisthenes or Parmenides for different reasons. At the Antisthenes side, all the items in the sensible world are atomic independent beings (substances) that cannot be predicated of one another (the account Mann attributes to the “late-learners” of the \textit{Sophist}, on pages 26-28 above). It is this structure of being that prevents us from speaking about them, since any predication, except for the identity, would be to predicate a substance of another substance. Parmenides, on the other side, being a monist, acknowledges the existence of one being only and about it we cannot speak, since all predication would assume the existence of something else other than the one being. For Hamlyn, Plato’s aim was to reject these metaphysical views and to account for the statements other than identity. \textit{Ibid.}, 291.

\textsuperscript{105} The doctrine is regarded as a radical novelty within the TF, but for Hamlyn certain passages in some dialogues (\textit{Republic} 476a, \textit{Phaedo} 102b ff) already foreshadow this move before the \textit{Sophist}. Furthermore, the dialogues \textit{Parmenides, Theaetetus, Phaedrus} and \textit{Politics} have contents related with this doctrine, since they are significantly concerned with “the logic of propositions.” \textit{Ibid.}, 289.

\textsuperscript{106} \textit{Ibid.}, 290-291.
with each other. We cannot predicate “motion” of “rest” (and vice versa) without contradiction. They refuse such a relation.\textsuperscript{107}

Therefore, it is this feature of Forms that determines our ways of speaking about entities in the physical world. Combining Forms ground consistency but the ones that cannot combine brings about incompatibility. They together guarantee to make several and coherent predications for the same subject. Thereby, things are said to have many names in a consistent way.\textsuperscript{108} For instance, “man” can be called truly by “man”, “animal” or “white”, but we cannot predicate “plant” of “man.”

Hamlyn thinks that the account presented in the \textit{Sophist} only allows for the statements about kind terms (like “man is animal” or “man is white”). As for the relation of combining Forms and sensible particulars according to this doctrine of the communion of Forms, Hamlyn thinks that the following passage from the \textit{Philebus} is relevant:\textsuperscript{109}

> Whatever is said to be consists of one and many, having in its nature limit and unlimitedness. Since this is the structure of things, we have to assume that there is in each case always one form for every one of them, and we must search for it, as we will indeed find it there. And once we have grasped it, we must look for two, as the case would have it, or if not, for three or some other number. And we must treat every one of those further unities in the same way, until it is not only established of the original unit that it is one, many and unlimited, but also how many kinds it is. For we must not grant the form of the unlimited to the plurality before we know the exact number of every plurality that lies between the unlimited and the one. Only then is it permitted to release each kind of unity into the unlimited and let it go (16c-e).

Hamlyn understands this passage as follows: Forms are, for each substance, naturally structured as one genus at the top and \textit{infimae species} at the lowest level. In our inquiry for a definition of a certain thing, we must understand all the levels that are present in between. That means we can thoroughly analyze a thing

\textsuperscript{107} \textit{Ibid.}, 291-292.

\textsuperscript{108} \textit{Ibid.}, 292.

\textsuperscript{109} \textit{Ibid.}
in terms of its family tree. Thereby, we can account its essential nature. This implies the doctrine of communion of Forms, since this structure cannot be possible without a certain relation among certain Forms.\textsuperscript{110}

Only after having the knowledge of these kinds, we can pass into the infinite variety of sensible particulars, since this structure applies to them. If Forms apply to the sensible particulars and, accordingly, particulars receive their names from the Forms, then, every true proposition concerning a sensible thing must necessarily be related to the Forms. Without Forms structured in their natural order, there can be no truth. In other words, if a sensible thing is spoken, then, it is done by virtue of the Forms. In short, combining relation of Forms with each other and their application to the sensible things together enable particular things to have many names.\textsuperscript{111} We can say truly both “Socrates is man” and “Socrates is animal” following the account presented in the \textit{Philebus}.

However, for Hamlyn, this solution comes with a certain price: If things get all their names from Forms, as things are instances of Forms, then, there would be no proper name of a sensible particular. In other words, we cannot speak of names that peculiarly belong to the sensible things. Every name must be of a Form. Then, the name “Socrates” would only be the symbol of the proper names of the Forms that Socrates participates in: man, white, snub-nosed… What the name “Socrates” denotes is only this collection of names.\textsuperscript{112} Otherwise, we must postulate a Form for Socrates.\textsuperscript{113}

\textsuperscript{110} \textit{Ibid.}, 293.

\textsuperscript{111} \textit{Ibid.}, 293-294.

\textsuperscript{112} \textit{Ibid.}, 294-295. Hamlyn does not say so, but it can be further said that the initial question “how can one thing have many names” loses its significance at this point, since there is no “thing” anymore to have these several names. See “3.1.1. Nature of the Ordinary Sensible Particulars” on pages 24-40 above.

\textsuperscript{113} Hamlyn also, states that Plato might have looked for a solution only general statements (like “motion exists”) when he deals with the question “how one thing can have many names.” \textit{Ibid.}, 291. Since the Forms are the members of the realm of \textit{being}, the question, for Plato, might have
Despite these consequences, Hamlyn finds the doctrine of communion of Forms as an innovation in the TF. Plato finds a logical way to explain particular things’ having several predicates as names. But for him, the Categories does more by distinguishing different sorts of predication:\textsuperscript{114} It is \textit{homonymous predication} that brings an efficient solution for one part of the problem. It tells us that even though names correspond to the distinct items in a predication, not every item is in the same ontological status.\textsuperscript{115}

According to the mechanism of \textit{homonymous predication}, in the proposition “man is white”, “man” and the individual “whiteness” IN man are called homonymously white. White is predicated both of man and of the particular whiteness IN man. Both man and particular whiteness IN man have the name of white, but their definitions are different. Man is a “white thing”, whereas particular whiteness is a “color.” Individual whiteness is said to be IN man, because “man” and “white” are different kinds of being. Indeed, “white” (a non-substance) is an aspect of “man” (substance) and existence of “white” depends on the existence of “man.” They do not have equal ontological status, that is, they are not two substances that cannot be predicated of each other. Thereby, we truly say that the “man” has the name of “white” as well as his own name, man.\textsuperscript{116}

For Hamlyn, by introducing \textit{homonymous predication}, Aristotle solves one part of the problem. The \textit{synonymous predication}, on the other hand, in the Categories does not say much more than Plato in principle. For Hamlyn, addressed to the Forms. How the Forms engage in a relation with each other might be worth explaining than how they relate to the sensible things.

\textsuperscript{114} Ibid., 302.

\textsuperscript{115} Hamlyn, “Aristotle on Predication”, 116.

\textsuperscript{116} Ibid., 115-116. The solution suggested by \textit{homonymous predication} is also a challenge for the existence of Forms according to Hamlyn. If the existence of non-substantial beings depends on the existence of substances as subject, they would not need separate Forms to be meaning of their names. \textit{Ibid.}, 116.
synonymous predication works on the same logical ground with the doctrine of communion of Forms: The items denoted by “man” and “animal” are in an essential relation with each other. When we refer to man, we necessarily refer to animal as there is an “inclusion” or “partial identity” relation between two terms here. Hamlyn thinks that Aristotle might have assumed that this relation does not need a further explanation\textsuperscript{117} in the Categories, unlike homonymous predication.\textsuperscript{118}

Matthews and Cohen think, unlike Hamlyn, that synonymous predication in the Categories has much more to say than the doctrine of communion of Forms.\textsuperscript{119} That the understanding of predication in the Categories is entirely different from the TF makes synonymous predication provide a convincing explanation for the relation between an individual and its species and genus.

For Matthews and Cohen, Plato’s account of predication is grounded on the relation between two entities: one Form on the one side and the participants on the other. The predication mechanism always works in between these two sides.\textsuperscript{120} This relational account of predication, besides its several and serious difficulties,\textsuperscript{121} cannot provide a convincing reason for the relation of Forms both in themselves and with the participants, according to Matthews and Cohen.\textsuperscript{122}

\textsuperscript{117} Hamlyn refers to \textit{Metaphysics}, Z, 14, for the discussion of the problem that how species and genus, being distinct substances, can engage in a relation. \textit{Ibid.}, 116-117.

\textsuperscript{118} \textit{Ibid.}, 116.

\textsuperscript{119} Matthews and Cohen, “The One and the Many,” 648.

\textsuperscript{120} \textit{Ibid.}, 633-634.

\textsuperscript{121} Matthews and Cohen refer to the issue of making particulars essentially relational entities (like shadows or reflections), the notion of bare particularism and the dilemma of participation. \textit{Ibid.}, 633-634, 643-644. Each will be held below.

\textsuperscript{122} \textit{Ibid.}, 648-649.
Furthermore, the doctrine of communion of Forms is not compatible with the one-over-many principle of Platonists. Incoherency arises from the fact that the One over Many Argument posits only one Form for a property that the sensible particulars are said to have in common. Many F’s are called F by virtue of its relation with a single Form of F-ness. If x is called vanilla white, then, there is a Form of Vanilla White that x receives its name. The doctrine of communion of Forms, however, tells us that the Form “Vanilla White” is also in an inclusion relation with the Forms of White and Coloredness to assure that “x is vanilla white” entails “x is white” and “x is colored.” This means that, for Matthews and Cohen, x would also participate in the Forms of White and Colored respectively, after it participates in the Form “Vanilla White” in the first place.

The problem here is not to participate in multiple Forms. A sensible particular can be said to participate in the Forms of Man, White, Just, etc… But, here, a meaning relation is supposed among these Forms that are participated in. To call x vanilla white necessarily makes us to call x white. Likewise, to call it white is necessarily to call it colored. Therefore, x must receive the meaning of vanilla white not only from the Form “Vanilla White” but also from the other two Forms that the first Form is in a relation with, namely the Forms of White and Coloredness. But this is not the idea underlying the One over Many Argument. We no longer talk about a single name (F-ness) for the F-things. Instead, we consider this single name in its relation to other names (G-ness and others…). In other words, a name is given to a participant not by a single Form, contrary to the One over Many Argument, but by virtue of a Form’s relation to several other Forms.

Hence, this relational account of predication in the TF is both problematic and seems non-convincing to explain how one thing can have many names. Against that, Matthews and Cohen privilege the account of the Categories to explain how things necessarily get the names of their species and genus. According to their

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123 Ibid.

124 Ibid., 649.
reading, the idea behind the *Categories* is the classification of things according to their natural kinds: x’s being F is to classify x (substance) or something in x (non-substance) as F. When we say “Socrates is a human being” we classify Socrates as human being. When we say “Socrates is white”, the whiteness IN Socrates is classified as white, not Socrates.\textsuperscript{125}

In both ways of classification (essential predication of the particulars in different categories), the *Categories* does not regard subjects and predicates as two independent entities waiting for a reasonable account for their proper relation, as in the case of the TF. Even though they are not identical and there are still two entities at hand, they are essentially interdependent two beings, for Mathews and Cohen. To be Socrates is already to be a human being. There is no Socrates without being a human, there is no human without individual human beings. Likewise, there is no individual bit of white without the color “white” and there is no color “white” without its individual instances. Therefore, classification is more than grouping individuals according to their natural kinds, but *determining* their natural kinds by making every individual an “individual something” where “something” refers to the natural kind that the thing necessarily falls under.\textsuperscript{126}

It is this essentialist classification mechanism, for Matthews and Cohen, that explains why “Socrates is a man” entails “Socrates is animal” or “x is vanilla white” entails that “x is white.”\textsuperscript{127} To classify an individual as an “individual something” is already to locate it under a family tree. To be a human for Socrates is already to be pinned under the genus animal. When we say that “x is vanilla white”, we already locate this bit of color (individual whiteness of x) under the color white. Therefore, we can say that when a thing (both substance and non-substance) is some determinate being, it is subject for its secondary kind terms

\footnote{125 *Ibid.*, 632-633, 643.}

\footnote{126 *Ibid.*, 632-636.}

\footnote{127 *Ibid.*, 648.}
(species and genus). Thereby, Socrates is said to be essentially man and animal, or \( x \) is said to be essentially vanilla white and white.

In short, for Matthews and Cohen, the *Categories* presents by synonymous predication an essential inclusion relation between individuals and their species and genus, instead of an unconvincing relation among many separate entities (one participant and the several Forms). Thereby, it automatically explains how an individual is a subject for multiple predication through its species and genus.

The main points of this part can be summarized as follows:

- Plato introduced the doctrine of communion of Forms as a solution to the problem “how can one thing have many names?” Accordingly, certain Forms combining with each other enable for a subject to have several names. However, as every name must be of a Form, this makes a particular thing an aggregation of its several names received from the Forms. The proper name “Socrates” would only be the symbol of the proper names of the Forms that Socrates participates in: man, white, snub-nosed…

- Aristotle, in the *Categories*, defined two kinds of predication. By homonymous predication he showed that not every predicate is substance. Accidental properties are not substantial entities but the aspects of the thing that are predicated. Thus, one can be called by its non-substantial properties as well as its substantial ones.

- The relational account of predication in the TF does not provide a persuasive explanation for the relation between one participant and the several Forms. The predication account in the *Categories*, rather, presents a classification method (essential predication) of the different kinds of being. Both substantial and non-substantial individuals are essentially classified as “individual somethings.” Thereby, everything belongs to a certain kind. This account automatically entails things to be located under a family tree. Thus, things are called by the name of their species and genera.
3.1.3. “How Can Many Things Be Called by One Name?”

The question aims to understand why and how a plurality of things are subsumed under kinds and how they are named properly according to these kinds. Platonists answer that question by the One over Many Argument: There is one thing, F-ness, by virtue of which several things are called F. In other words, F-things get their names, by participating in the Form of F. If we call Socrates and Callias human beings, they are said to participate in the Form of Human. Plato says in the Republic (596a) that for the things having the same name, we tend to assume a Form.128

Accordingly, for Platonists, there is one name as a model for many others which is the proper name of a Form. Things are named derivatively after or from the Forms that they participate in. The predicates of a subject, then, are names in a sense which are not much different from the names of “Socrates” or “Callias.”129

As it is stated above, Matthews and Cohen think that this is a relational account of predication between two entities. It does not say much about the source of this relation between particulars and their kinds: If “human” is something besides Socrates and Callias, then, what is the reason that both Socrates and Callias participate in this separate Form? In other words, why a thing participates in F-ness rather than, say, G-ness? What makes us to call some certain things as F, instead of G? Why do things naturally fall into kinds? The One over Many Argument does not give us a reason against any arbitrary group of things.130 So,

128 Ibid., 630-631.

129 Ibid., 631.

130 Matthews and Cohen do not multiply the questions as I do here. They content themselves with referring to the question “why things naturally fall into kinds” (p. 630-631) as a perplexity the TF gives rise. Then, they mention the problem of arbitrary classification of things for which the One over Many Argument cannot present any solution (p. 645). Therefore, I assume that one of the contrasts they found between the One over Many Argument and the Categories is this contingent relation of Forms and particulars: The TF has difficulties to explain why things fall within their natural kinds. It only accounts for how common properties are explained by referring to a separate Form. But the separation of Forms from particulars does not explain why these
Matthews and Cohen read the *Categories* as a general answer of Aristotle to that account, and in particular to the One over Many Argument.\(^{131}\)

Aristotle’s alternative account in the *Categories* is a non-relational way of predication and it shows that predication is more sophisticated than Plato thought it to be. Names still denote things, but there is not a single way of calling several things by one name properly. For Matthews and Cohen, as it is stated above, the *Categories* classifies things in two ways according to their natural kinds (substantially and non-substantially).\(^{132}\)

In the first case, we classify substances. When we say “Socrates and Callias are men”, we classify them as man. Thereby, we place these men somewhere in a “classification chart” which classifies individuals according to their being man. But, the classification here does not mean to distribute some ready-made “individuals” among some ready-made locations. On the contrary, there is no *individual* in its own right and, likewise, there is no chart without individuals in it. There is no way of being an *individual* without being “*individual* something”. But also there is no “being *something*” without being an “*individual* *something*.” Particular and universal substances are totally interdependent entities.\(^{133}\)

Therefore, this essentialist classification mechanism denies that “man” is a single separate thing as against Socrates and Callias, like to separate ends of a relation. There is no “Socrates” or “Callias” without being man, there is no “man” without its individual instances. Socrates and Callias are *essentially* man.\(^{134}\)

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\(^{134}\) *Ibid.*, 632.
In the second case, the classification applies to the non-substances. Even though the structure is the same, the individuals are not the same kind of being. When we say that “Socrates and Callias are white” we do not classify Socrates and Callias anymore but their peculiar whiteness IN them as white. Whereas the first chart is of man, the second is of colors. Therefore, once again, Socrates and Callias are not called white because of participating in a separate Form of White.

Instead, *this bit of whiteness* IN Socrates makes him to be called white and *that bit of whiteness* IN Callias makes him to be called white. Given the same essential interdependence between individual and universal non-substances, there would be no individual whiteness without being essentially white and there is no color white without its individual instances IN particular substances.\(^{135}\)

Thus, for Matthews and Cohen, the *Categories* tells us that things (both substances and non-substances) are *essentially* subsumed under their natural kinds and are named by this single name accordingly. Instead of a relation between single F-ness and several other things, which is liable to the charge of contingency, particular things of the *Categories* are already what they are falling under their species and genus. This essentialist framework is the answer of the question why and how a plurality of things in the world can be classified under kinds and how they are named properly according to these kinds. Things of the *Categories*, unlike Plato’s participants, are the sort of things that cannot be otherwise.

Duerlinger also compares the TF and the *Categories* in their answers to the question “how can many things have one name?” In that regard, he draws attention to the function and importance of the notion of *paronymy* in the *Categories*. For him, one of the reasons Aristotle distinguishes SAID OF relation from being IN relation is his aim to avoid a certain weakness of the TF that come to light when Plato answers to that question. While Plato asserts that many things get their common names from the name of a single Form (*Parmenides*, 130e-)

131a, 133d; *Phaedo*, 102b, 103b-e, 104a), he did not explain the fact that a great number of particulars, in fact, do not have the same name with the Form in which they are said to participate. We can say that Socrates is called man, since he participates in the Form of Man. But it is not true that he is called “justice” since he participates in the Form of Justice. We say, rather, that “Socrates is just.”

It is Aristotle’s notion of *paronymy* that aims to capture this reality. For Duerlinger, the distinction between *synonymy* and *paronymy* is designed to explain this difference. It is only when a universal is SAID OF a particular, the particular necessarily has the name of the universal. If a universal is IN the particular, in the most cases, particular has a derivative version of the name of the universal. We call a man (a) man, since man is SAID OF him, but we call him grammarian, since grammar is IN him.

The main points emerging from this part can be summarized as follows:

- Plato’s relational account of predication (two sided relation between a Form and several participants) is weak to explain why things naturally fall into kinds. Things get their common names from the Form they participate in but this does not present a convincing account about the source of this relation between particulars and their kinds. The One over Many Argument cannot rule out arbitrariness in this relation. The non-relational account of the *Categories*, however, says that things are *essentially* subsumed under their kinds, since they are already what they are. An individual has to be “individual something.” This essentialist account suggests that things are instances of their natural kinds and hence are called by the name of their species and genus.

- The TF does not explain the fact that some things do not receive the exact name of a Form, but its derivative version. We call Socrates “just” even though he is

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137 Ibid., 180.
said to participate in the Form of “Justice.” The notion of paronymy in the *Categories* enables to explain this difference. When it is a non-substance universal that is to be predicated of a subject, the subject is mostly named by the derivative version of the name.

3.2. *Categories* Offering Solutions to the Problems of the Theory of Forms

This second half of the chapter aims to compare the two theories in terms of three difficulties that the TF itself gives rise. We find these difficulties in the contemporary philosophical debates (the problem of bare substratum), in Aristotle’s critiques (separation of Forms) or in Plato himself (dilemma of participation). The predication theory in the *Categories* is read as a solution to these by several authors.

3.2.1. The Theory of Forms and the Problem of Bare Substratum

The TF asserts a single and separate F-ness that several particulars participate in so as to be called F. The assumption underlying is that the participants and the F-ness are two distinct entities that are connected by the participation relation. This brings out this question: What are these participants, as being one side of this relation, apart from the Forms?138

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138 Matthews and Cohen, “The One and the Many,” 633. For them, Platonists might answer to that question by denying the assumption behind: F-ness and the participants are not two independent distinct entities. Rather, sensible things do not exist on their own. They are merely dependent beings on the existence of Forms. As they never exist by themselves, in other words as they are “essentially relational entities”, the question is not applicable. However, for Matthews and Cohen, such a denial undermines the One over Many Argument which aims to prove the existence of Forms. It makes the Argument circular by requiring to appeal Forms in the first place. *Ibid.*, 633-634. White also asks the question whether Plato is committed to the view that particulars are essentially relational entities (He calls this view as “Reflection Theory” that the particulars are only images or reflections of the Forms). Providing support for and against this view from the dialogues, he concludes that there is no univocal doctrine in the dialogues concerning the nature of participants, Forms and their relation. There are reasons for both regarding the participants as merely relational entities or embracing the notion of bare substratum. See F.C. White, “Plato’s Middle Dialogues and the Independence of Particulars,” *The Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. 27, No. 108 (July 1977): 193-213.
This question associates the TF with the “substratum theory”\(^{139}\) which is one of the ontological theories on the nature of sensible particulars. That theory basically assumes that a sensible particular as a sum total of its simpler elements. In that sense, an object is the gathering of its several attributes. But these attributes cannot come together on their own. They need something to hold them together. In other words, there must be something that itself is not an attribute but functions as the underlying subject or bearer of all these attributes.\(^{140}\)

Since the attributes and the underlying subject are two distinct things, this subject is to be ontologically apart from the attributes. Its being never appeals to the attributes it bears. But the particular object itself is composed of these attributes by nature. Therefore, it is impossible for the particular object itself to be the bearer of the attributes. On the contrary, the bearer must be a second element in addition to the attributes within the particular object. Consequently, in this theory, all particular sensible objects are composed of two basic elements: attributes and an underlying subject holding these attributes together.”\(^{141}\)

This second element, being independent from the attributes, is called “bare substratum (bare particular)”. That is, even though it is called the bearer of the attributes, its nature does not consist any. In itself, it is stripped of all kinds of attributes. It constitutes the particular object together with the attributes it holds together.\(^{142}\)

Loux ascribes a second role to the bare particulars: They guarantee the numerical identity of their objects. If ordinary objects are compound beings, they are distinguished from each other according to their simpler elements. We cannot

\(^{139}\) The term *substratum* (pl. *substrata*), corresponds to *hypoikeimenon* in Greek, meaning “underlying subject.”


\(^{141}\) *Ibid.*, 87-89.

\(^{142}\) *Ibid.*
rely on attributes for this identification, since they are repeatable beings in different entities and it is possible for two distinct objects to have the same attributes. But each particular object has its own bare substratum. They are unique beings as they individuate the object by gathering its attributes. The object x cannot have the bare substratum of the object y. It is non-recurrent and does not have any (repeatable) attribute in itself. Therefore, bare particular is the principle of numerical diversity of objects.

In short, this theory is grounded on the assumption that the attributes (universals) must be instantiated by something (particular). According to Loux, Platonists, too, would hold to that consideration. Although Forms enjoy ontological independence from particulars, if the attributes of a sensible particular are the instantiated version of the relevant Forms, then, there must be some holder underneath (a bare thing) that instantiate them. Matthews and Cohen, too, refers to the same notion for the TF as an inevitable result of a relational theory of predication.

Spade also regards the notion of the bare particular as a product of the “Platonic view of things.” For him, the dialogues prove that Plato already embraces this view. In Timaeus (48e-53c) Plato describes a third being in addition to the Forms and the participants: hypodoche. For Spade, hypodoche, translated as “receptacle” or “receptive”, is something like a sealing wax which is impressed

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143 Loux assumes that individual non-substances are recurrent entities (in agreement with Owen). The redness of the two distinct objects numerically is the same. There is only one redness.

144 Ibid., 102-103.

145 Ibid., 87.


by a signet ring and receives its design. By analogy, Forms can be said to leave their impressions on the hypodoche by virtue of participation and, thereby, the particulars emerge. Hypodoche does not have anything common with what it receives from Forms. It is completely independent from them. But, according to what it receives from Forms, it assumes several appearances. Indeed, in order to reflect these appearances neatly, it must be free from any attributes in itself. Any feature it has would only intrude the process and blur the attributes that it is meant to reflect. In short, it must be something totally bare.\textsuperscript{148}

As a result, according to these authors, the notion of the bare substratum is a natural implication of the TF. But the notion of bare substratum comes with its own problems.

\textbf{3.2.1.1. The Difficulties of the Notion of the Bare Substratum}

The notion of the bare particular comes with a serious dilemma. For one thing, it is a contradictory notion. Bare particulars are supposed to have no attributes, as the name suggests, but by definition they are underlying subjects for certain attributes. Then, the fundamental claim of the theory becomes “things that possess attributes possess no attributes.”\textsuperscript{149}

This claim can be objected by saying that it is bare in the sense that it has no attribute belonging to its essence. The properties it bears do not define the substratum itself, since bare particulars lack essence or nature. But this is also an incoherent claim, for Loux, because every being seems to have some essential properties. Every entity, for instance, is essentially something self-identical with itself. Further, the definition of something requires essential properties. We have defined a bare particular as something having no attributes in nature, being the underlying subject of the attributes and being the principle of numerical

\textsuperscript{148} At 50d, Plato makes the analogy between mother (the Receptacle), father (the Form) and offspring (the impression) for this tripartite ontology. And, later he identifies the hypodoche with space (52b).

\textsuperscript{149} Loux, Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction, 105.
diversity. These features cannot be something accidental to bare particulars, but they belong to their very essence by definition. Indeed, it does not seem possible to conceive or talk about bare particulars without ascribing these features to them. Then, we are compelled to reject the basic claim of the substratum theory: A bare substratum inevitably cannot be bare. It cannot be excluded from having essential (or necessary) properties.\textsuperscript{150}

So, what if underlying subject is not bare? In fact, this does not save us from falling into another problem. That the substratum has essential attributes in itself would abolish its fundamental role to be an underlying subject. The idea of a bare particular stands on the assumption that the attributes of a particular object must be held together by something that is apart from these attributes. The identity of the bare substratum must be distinct from what it bears. But now, if this something is the one having essential attributes in itself, this would make itself a compound being made up of its own simpler elements, not a basic constituent anymore. Then, by the same token, it would need a second substratum to bear its own essential attributes. It is clear that this would repeat ad infinitum.\textsuperscript{151}

Having attributes in nature would also abolish the other function of the bare substratum according to Loux: being the principle of numerical diversity. Loux claims that even though two things might have the same attributes, as the attributes are recurrent beings, their own bare particulars, being completely unpropertied and unique to their specific objects, assure their numerical identity. But if substratum is said to have an essence, then, every substratum would have the same essence as they all have the same ontological role. Then, they would become indiscernible from each other. Any attempt to employ a second substratum to provide a role for numerical identity makes nothing but infinite regress as long as the substratum is not bare. Since nothing is bare, for every case, we would need to look for another substratum. Consequently, the idea of

\textsuperscript{150} Ibid., 105-106.

\textsuperscript{151} Ibid., 106-107.
Positing an underlying subject for attributes other than the particular object itself is seriously flawed. We cannot reasonably assert a substratum, bare or not.\textsuperscript{152}

Even though this dilemma is already fatal to the theory of substratum, Loux indicates still another difficulty with the bare particular idea. If we keep the initial idea that the bare substratum is to be something devoid of all attributes in itself, we have no reason to think that these attributes come and attach themselves to this bare particular, rather than another one (or this set of attributes are attached rather than that set of attributes). Any attribute it bears eventually would be accidental to it in the sense that bare substratum is independent from what it bears. Thereby, we cannot see a necessary relation between the bare substrata and their attributes. As a result, the substratum theory cannot account for the nature of substance particulars by making every being contingent.\textsuperscript{153}

If the TF is accepted to assume a bare substratum in the participation, as the natural consequence of the view that Forms must be instantiated by \textit{something}, then, all these difficulties are also relevant for the TF itself. For one thing, as long as the notion of the bare substratum is contradictory and has unacceptable consequences in itself, appealing to this problematic notion would harm the TF too. The TF is expected to account for the predication of things and their numerical diversity without assuming a bare substratum.

Secondly, the notion of the bare substratum is subject for the charge of contingency. The TF, too, by positing Forms ontologically independent beings from the participants, does not give us any (essential) reason for a substratum to participate in the Form of F, rather than the Form of G. The relational account of predication in the TF, as we have seen so far, does not avoid the charge of contingency by not allowing essential predication.

\textsuperscript{152} \textit{Ibid.}, 102-103, 107.

\textsuperscript{153} \textit{Ibid.}, 97.
3.2.1.2. Aristotelian Substance Theory against the Substratum Theory

The authors above who associate the TF with the substratum theory presents the Aristotelian substance theory in the *Categories* as an alternative which is free from these problems. Basically, the essential predication (SAID OF relation) in the *Categories* precludes one from introducing a bare substratum for the attributes of a particular object.

Matthews and Cohen emphasize the non-relational account of predication in the *Categories*. Instead of putting particulars in a relation with their attributes, which takes us eventually to the notion of a bare particular, the *Categories* does not presume an individual without being individual something or another. As every particular *is* by being a member of its natural kind, the notion of bare particular is avoided.\(^\text{154}\)

For Loux, Aristotle does not conceive the particular things as compound beings made up of its simpler elements. Although this might seem to be natural, it is in fact a category mistake for Aristotle. The fact that the particulars have a structure does not mean that they are composed of simpler entities. On the contrary, particulars themselves are ontologically fundamental entities (primary substances). Therefore, we cannot understand the structure of a particular by dividing it into smaller units.\(^\text{155}\)

In this regard, Loux draws attention to how the *Categories* makes its distinction in terms of the attributes (universals) that a particular object is associated with: kind universals (secondary substances) and accidental properties (non-substances). As every existing particular necessarily belongs to a kind, according to the *Categories*, the kind universals cannot be reduced to the properties a particular has. They are not just some features contingently associated with a subject but they are the things that make the particular what it is. Humanness, for

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instance, is not some property in Socrates, but it is that which his essence. Therefore, these universals are related with the being of the particular and hence cannot be seen as parts or constituents of a particular object.\textsuperscript{156}

Other universals that a particular object is associated with are the accidental properties. Although the scope of properties that a primary substance can have is ultimately determined by virtue of the kind it belongs, these properties do not \textit{essentially} belong to a primary substance. The particular object can remain existing without them. They are the ones that characterize a member of a certain kind.\textsuperscript{157}

Now, the underlying subject which bears these two kinds of attributes (universals) is the particular object itself (primary substance) according to the \textit{Categories} (it holds the same assumption that universals are instantiated by a subject). As there are two kinds of universals, the way it bears them is also different. In the case of accidental properties, the underlying subject (primary substance) is said to have an independent identity from what it bears (as in the case of bare substratum). Socrates himself is the underlying subject for “white” but he can remain without it. He does not include in essence the attribute it bears, the individual white.\textsuperscript{158}

But it is not the same when it comes to kind universals. Socrates is also underlying subject for the humanness, but being a human is already his essence. He does not exist without being human (he \textit{is} by being an “individual human”). Human being is what Socrates is. Thus, in this case, the underlying subject is not independent from what it bears.\textsuperscript{159}

\textsuperscript{156} \textit{Ibid.}, 109-110.

\textsuperscript{157} \textit{Ibid.}, 110.

\textsuperscript{158} \textit{Ibid}, 111.

\textsuperscript{159} \textit{Ibid.}
In this picture, then, the underlying subject is neither bare nor a constituent anymore. As the particular objects are already essential beings, member of a certain kind, we do not have to assume a bare substratum (as a constituent) and worry about possible contradictory or inconsistent consequences. Moreover, the problem of making every predication contingent disappears, since particulars are essentially what they are.160

For Loux, this account also answers to the question about the numerical diversity of things. Essential predication in the Categories by itself guarantees the particularity of an object. As the particulars are instances of definite kinds, each instantiation by itself produces an individual. Stated otherwise, kinds reveal themselves by these individuals. Therefore, every instantiation is numerically distinct from another even though instances happen to have precisely the same accidental properties. This avoids us looking for something to be the principle of numerical diversity like a bare particular.161

Spade, too, reads the being SAID OF relation (essential predication) in the Categories as an answer to the question of numerical diversity of particulars. However, what Spade sees as a difficulty with the notion of the bare particular is different from that of Loux. He, in fact, argues in the opposite direction. For him, bare particulars cannot be the principles of numerical diversity. According to the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles, things are identical unless there is some feature to distinguish them. If a bare particular is devoid of any feature, then, how are we supposed to distinguish ontologically one bare particular from another? There should be, then, only one underlying subject as bare substratum. But this is also an unacceptable view. If there is one substratum, then, all the attributes must attach to it, which means one underlying subject would bear

160 Ibid., 110-111.
161 Ibid., 112.
contrary features at the same time. This is incompatible with the Law of Non-Contradiction.\textsuperscript{162}

The essential predication in the \textit{Categories}, for Spade, saves us from this dilemma. As the primary substances have their own essences, they are described and distinguished from one another by these internal features. Thereby, the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles does not constitute a problem for the essential beings of the \textit{Categories}.\textsuperscript{163}

In short, the secondary substances of the \textit{Categories} make primary substances determinate and distinguishable beings. It is only these essential particulars that are underlying subjects for the attributes (both substantial and non-substantial universals). They are not contingent beings but member of their universal kinds. By their essential features they can be distinguished from one another. In the absence of such an essential being, the relational account of Plato pushes us towards the problematic notion of the bare particular for any kind of attributes.\textsuperscript{164}

However, Mann does not agree with these authors; and he does not think that the TF’s participation theory assumes a bare substratum. For him, associating the TF with the substratum theory is the result of misunderstanding Plato due to the “post-Aristotelian way of looking at things.” The ontology of the \textit{Categories} has been so dominant over the years and it has become the part of our philosophical commonsense. According to Mann, this dominance of the Aristotelian

\textsuperscript{162} Spade, “The Warp and Woof of Metaphysics: How to Get Started on Some Big Themes,” 4-5.

\textsuperscript{163} Ibid., 17.

\textsuperscript{164} Sirkel suggests that the negative attitude of Aristotle against the notion of bare particular might be the result of his opposition to the Platonic theory of sensible particulars. Even though he is familiar with the notion of bare particular and apparently takes it into account in his inquiry of substance (\textit{Met., Z}), he does not give up his view that being is “being something.” A substance for Aristotle must be something determinate. Sirkel, “The Problem of \textit{Katholou} (Universals) in Aristotle,” 45-46.
perspective causes the dialogues of Plato to be read by the concepts of the *Categories*, instead of Plato’s himself.\textsuperscript{165}

Mann grounds his objection on the thesis that Plato did not recognize the sensible objects as essential beings. Nor was Plato interested in the distinction between object and its attributes. The fundamental distinction in his theory was between *being* and *becoming*.\textsuperscript{166} The participants, members of the realm of *becoming*, were not more than instances of several Forms coming together. He did not assume that these instances must be of some subject underlying, but he simply conceived them as mixtures.\textsuperscript{167}

Mann refers to the account of Anaxagoras in order to understand the concern of Plato better.\textsuperscript{168} Just like the mixture of Anaxagoras is simply a derivative item in the realm of *becoming* and nothing more than what is mixed in it (it does not involve any more constituent within), the participants of the TF have a similar ontological structure. For this reason, to assume an underlying subject for the attributes is not coherent with what Plato had in mind. Any attribute, for Plato, does not have to be of something. They are thoroughly aggregates or bundles of the Form-instances, rather than genuine objects in the sense of the *Categories*. Therefore, Plato should be exempted from the charge of the bare particularism.\textsuperscript{169}

\textsuperscript{165} Mann, *The Discovery of Things: Aristotle’s Categories and Their Context*, 5-6, 156.

\textsuperscript{166} See “3.1.1. Nature of the Ordinary Sensible Particulars” on pages 24-40 above.

\textsuperscript{167} Ibid., 156.

\textsuperscript{168} According to Mann, the participants of the TF must be understood by remaining inside the Pre-Socratic tradition that involves similar accounts by distinguishing two realms; *being* and *becoming*. See n.58 above.

\textsuperscript{169} Ibid., 30 and 156.
Consequently, according to Mann, the real contrast is between the Aristotelian substance theory and a Platonist “bundle theory”\(^{170}\) not the substratum theory. We can place the *Categories* against the TF by saying that the *Categories* does not define the sensible objects as a bundle of attributes. Instead, the *Categories* distinguishes essential and accidental attributes that a particular object exemplifies. Hence Aristotle recognizes sensible particulars as genuine beings.\(^{171}\)

The summary of that what has been said so far is as follows:

- As the TF presumes particulars on the one side, and the Forms on the other, as connected with each other by participation relation, it is argued that there must be an underlying subject that participates in these Forms in the first place. It is called a bare substratum that is itself devoid of any attributes, but the bearer of the attributes of its object. So, a bare substratum and the attributes are the basic ontological elements that together constitute the particular object. It is also thought that the bare particular guarantees the numerical identity of their objects as they uniquely individuate the attributes that they bear.

- But the notion of a bare particular gives rise to several contradictory and inconsistent consequences. It is contradictory that a substratum is both bare and the bearer of the attributes. It also does not seem possible for a thing to be devoid of any essential features in itself. But, on the other hand, that its having essential features is also equally problematic. This option precludes it from performing its two ascribed roles: being an underlying subject and also being the principle of numerical diversity. Lastly, there is the charge of making its object contingent as the theory does not present any essential connection between a bare substratum and the attributes it bears.

\(^{170}\) Bundle theory is the third alternative theory on the nature of the concrete particulars. Bundle theorists, briefly, defend that the reality of the particulars are explained by the universal properties clustered or bundled together without appealing to any subject underneath. Even though it rivals the substratum theory, both agree in explaining the reality by virtue of the dichotomy of that compound being and its *constituents*, contrary to the Aristotelian substance theory which regards the particulars as fundamental units. See, Loux, *Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction*, 84-120.

- The sensible particulars of the *Categories* are not composed of simpler entities, but themselves are ontologically fundamental entities that are subject for essential predication. As they are instances of their kind universals, “individual somethings,” there is no need to appeal to the notion of bare substratum. The only underlying subject is the particular substance itself for both substantial and non-substantial universals.

- The sensible particulars of the *Categories* are, thus, free from the charge of contingency as they are essentially what they are. Every particular belongs to a certain kind. Numerical diversity is also already guaranteed by being an individual instance of a kind.

- There is also another view that the notion of the bare particular is against the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles. As a bare particular is devoid of any feature, there is no possibility to distinguish one bare particular from another. If we assume one substratum to hold all the attributes, then, this is against the Law of Non-Contradiction, since this one substratum would bear contrary attributes at the same time. Against this dilemma, however, the account of the *Categories* makes the things to distinguish from each other by their essential attributes.

- Against the ones who associate the TF with the substratum theory, it is also associated with the bundle theory (although it is rival theory regarding the nature of sensible particulars) which conceives ordinary objects as being constituted of attributes without appealing to any underlying subject. According to that view, the participants of the TF are mere bundles of the Form-instances. Consequently, the substance theory of Aristotle in the *Categories* is to be placed as against this view. The genuine beings of the *Categories* are the ones that have both essential and accidental features.
3.2.2. The Ontological Dualism between Particulars and Universals

Separation of Forms from particulars is a well-known and major charge of Aristotle on Plato as a cause of several difficulties (Met., M, 9, 1086b6). Sirkel suggests to understand the term “separation” in three senses: Firstly, Platonic Forms enjoy an independent existence. Even though there is not a physical instance of it, a Form can exist. Secondly, Forms have ontological priority over particulars, given that the existence of particular things totally depends on the existence of the Forms. Lastly, Forms and particulars are external to each other in the sense that they do not share any essential feature (they are homonymous beings). They are “irreducibly distinct types of things” that they do not have the same ontological status.

In that regard, Sirkel refers to the two unacceptable consequences of separation of Forms according to Aristotle:

(1) *The TF is an incompatible account* (Met., M, 9, 1086a31-b11): Platonists embraced Socratic view that knowledge and definition are of universals. Without defining the universal, knowledge is impossible. They named these universals as Forms. But, on the other hand, Platonists thought that sensible particulars are not fixed entities as they are always subject to change. They held the Heracleitean view that there is no knowledge of these changing things. Since they assumed that any substance *besides* the sensibles must be separate, they separated Forms from sensibles by making them distinct substances.

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172 “Separation of Forms”, in fact, is not a difficulty on its own, but it causes several difficulties within the TF. Indeed, it is the underlying reason behind the claim that the TF cannot give convincing answers to the other five problems which are referred in this chapter. Bearing this in mind, I still include the issue of “separation of Forms” as a distinct heading here, since, firstly, it is one of the main areas in reading the *Categories* as a critique of the TF within the literature. Secondly, I think that the content of the discussion will give us insight to understand better the contrast between the accounts of the TF and the *Categories*, and, accordingly, their comparisons in the context of other five problems.


174 Ibid., 8-9.
What exactly Aristotle objects is not that Platonists posit separate substances, for Sirkel, but assumed that they behave like *universals* due to having particular instances. This is, however, the beginning of the difficulty, because it is assumed that separation implies a kind of particularity. If we consider a Form as a separate substance, then, it implies being an individual and numerically distinct entity. Then, Forms are said to be both universals and particulars. Form is said to have particular instances as well as itself being a particular. In short, Platonists, by treating universals as separate substances, turned them into particular substances.\(^{175}\)

(2) *Forms do not contribute to the being and knowledge of particular things* (*Met.*, A, 9, 991a12-14): Aristotle agrees with Platonists that knowledge is of universals. “[I]t is insofar as they are one and the same thing, and insofar as something universal belongs to them, that we know all things” (*Met.*, B, 6, 999a28-29). In the absence of universals there is no knowledge of particulars in themselves.\(^{176}\)

But, if universals are Platonic Forms, being separate substances, they do not provide us the knowledge of “this particular” since Form and the particular are two distinct types of beings. They are essentially different from each other and, thus, a Form cannot be responsible for the being of the particular thing. The Form of Human is essentially human, but the definition of human applies to Socrates only homonymously. He cannot be called a human being in the strict sense, but only derivatively, due to his certain relation with the Form of Human (the participation relation). It is this precise ontological split between two realms


\(^{176}\) *Ibid.*, 11-12.
which makes it impossible for Forms to contribute to the being and knowledge of the particulars.\textsuperscript{177}

Thus, the Platonists are said to hold a dualist view of particulars and universals. Universal (Form) is the one that have existential independence and ontological priority over the particulars. The existence of the sensible particulars, on the other hand, always depends on the existence of Forms. However, they do not have something common in essence. In other words, they are seen as ontologically two distinct types.\textsuperscript{178}

Sirkel thinks that Aristotle’s account in the \textit{Categories} does not reverse this picture unlike the traditional interpretation considers. According to the traditional view, the \textit{Categories} holds the same dualistic view of universals and particulars, but gives the ontological priority to the particulars by making them exist independently of universals, while the existence of the universals depends on the existence of particulars. For Sirkel, Aristotle does more than that in the \textit{Categories}. He does not separate universals from particulars in the Platonic manner but brings the two closer. Instead of attributing an independent existence or an ontological priority to one over the other, Aristotle regards universals and particulars as essentially interdependent beings.\textsuperscript{179} Thereby, he avoids the problems stemming from separation.\textsuperscript{180}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{177} Ibid., 7-8, 12. Sirkel also refers to Aristotle’s rejection that a Form itself is a genuine subject for knowledge, since it turned out to be a particular substance due to the separation (\textit{Met.}, Z, 15). In such a case, there seems nothing to claim that a Form, as long as being a particular substance, is more knowable than a sensible particular. In short, even though we need another being to appeal for knowledge, Aristotle does not think that these are separate Forms. \textit{Ibid.}, 12.
\item \textsuperscript{178} Ibid., 20.
\item \textsuperscript{179} Ibid., 20, 22-23, 27-28.
\item \textsuperscript{180} Sirkel’s main aim in her essentialist interpretation of the \textit{Categories} is to suggest a solution to “the problem of \textit{katholou}” in Aristotle. This problem corresponds to a tension in Aristotle’s ontology and epistemology. He assumes a correlation between knowledge and being: what is real and what is knowable coincide. But, whereas the object of knowledge is universal, the substance is particular. Stated otherwise, knowable things are universals, but substantial (real) beings are
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
Sirkel argues for the ontological interdependency between particulars and universals in the *Categories* in three steps. Firstly, she appeals to the passage that traditional view mostly relies on: “If the primary substances did not exist it would be impossible for any of the other things to exist” (2b5). Here Aristotle explicitly denies that universals have an independent capacity to exist. A universal, unless it is instantiated, does not exist. Sirkel thinks that this conclusion is carried further by the traditional view without enough textual evidence. They claimed that the passage implies that particulars can exist without universals. Accordingly, they gave the ontological priority to particulars. However, for Sirkel, this passage only suggests the dependence of universals on particulars. As it does not say anything about the ontological independence of particulars, it does not rule out the possibility of mutual dependency of universals and particulars.181

Secondly she presents positive evidence from the text. She reminds that the *Categories* calls species and genera “substances” because only they reveal the essence of the primary substances, by answering “what is x?” question (2b29-34). The answer of this question is the definition of the thing x. Therefore, only species and genus can define a primary subject, but not other predicates like “white” or “runs” (2b34-36). Accordingly, not accidents but secondary substances belong to the essence of the subject. While accidents are properties that are attached to a subject externally and, so, the subject can exist without them, secondary substances (species and genera) are what the subject essentially is. They reveal and determine the being of the primary substance. We cannot think Socrates without being a human being, as he is essentially human. Thus,

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181 Ibid., 34-36.
particulars could not be ontologically independent things in the *Categories* but, rather, they are beings whose essences are determined by their natural kinds.\textsuperscript{182}

Sirkel’s other support from the text is the ability of substances to receive contraries (4a10-21). The *Categories* says that a substance can be host for contrary accidental properties at different times. This amounts to saying that a substance remains what it is, while its accidents change. But, this is possible only if there is a substance underlying these changes. Otherwise, it would change too. Socrates must be essentially human being in the first place in order to be white and not-white at different times. By being human, he endures these changes. Therefore, it does not seem possible for a primary substance to exist independently of its natural kind. As long as it is a member of its kind, it remains to be what it is and is subject to accidental changes.\textsuperscript{183}

Hence, the *Categories* regards particulars and universals as being reciprocally depend on each other. There is no particular which is not fallen under a natural kind and there is no universal which is not instantiated by a particular. Every particular is “this something.”\textsuperscript{184} In such a picture, Aristotle seems to replace the Platonic understanding on universals and particulars (ontological duality) with a new one, instead of reversing it: Universals are not separate and, consequently, they are not particular substances over sensible particulars that would pose the problems abovementioned (“How is it possible for a particular substance to have particular instances?”). But as particulars and universals are also not identical with each other, Sirkel concludes that it is “a middle position between robust

\textsuperscript{182} Ibid., 37-40.

\textsuperscript{183} Ibid., 41.

\textsuperscript{184} Sirkel thinks that this view is also supported from Aristotle’s examples in the text: Different from the examples in his other treatises, in the *Categories* Aristotle does not mention personal names as the example of primary substances. Instead, he says that “any particular man” (*ho tis antropos*) or “any particular horse” (*ho tis hippos*). Thereby, Aristotle does not refer to a human or horse in particular but any particular as the instance of its natural kind, human or horse. *Ibid.*, 43-44.
dualism and strict identity."\textsuperscript{185} There are two beings but they are definitely not separated. We need to appeal the other in order to understand the one.\textsuperscript{186}

Sirkel calls this essentialist structure in the \textit{Categories} both epistemological and ontological. Both being and the knowledge of the primary substances are essentially determined by the secondary substances. The secondary substances qualify the individual as something real and existent. On the other hand, as it defines the primary substance, it gives us the knowledge of it.\textsuperscript{187} Thereby, the primary substances of the \textit{Categories} are also said to be immune to the other difficulties of the Platonic account that arise because of the idea of separation ("Forms do not contribute to the being and knowledge of particular things").

Duerlinger, too, points out the relation between particulars and universals in the \textit{Categories}. For him, Aristotle distinguishes two kinds of predication (SAID OF and IN relations) in order to attest that each kind of universals (substances and non-substances) depends on the particulars in their unique ways: In the first case, if there is no particular man, we say that there is no universal man. Since particular man is the individual instance of the universal man, man is SAID OF particular man. In the second case, we also say that if there is no particular man there is no universal knowledge, even though man is not the individual instance of the universal knowledge. Knowledge \textit{is} only by being IN the particular man. Knowledge is SAID OF individual knowledge that cannot exist apart from being IN particular man. Therefore, the existence of both substantial (man) and non-substantial universals (knowledge) depend on the existence of the particular substance (individual man) in their two peculiar ways.\textsuperscript{188}

\textsuperscript{185} \textit{Ibid.}, 55.

\textsuperscript{186} \textit{Ibid.}, 41-42, 49, 54-55.

\textsuperscript{187} \textit{Ibid.}, 47, 56.

\textsuperscript{188} Duerlinger, “Predication and Inherence in Aristotle’s Categories,” 181-182.
Thus, For Duerlinger, Aristotle’s statement in 2b3-7 “if the primary substances did not exist it would be impossible for any of the other things to exist” refers to this mechanism of predication. Here, Aristotle explicitly replies to the Platonic view of the capacity for independent existence of universals (Forms). Since his aim is to object this view, it would be wrong to infer that this statement implies the ontological priority of primary substances (i.e., that they can exist even if universals do not exist). In short, Aristotle in the *Categories* elaborates his rejection of separation and ontological priority of universals by virtue of his two kinds of predication.\(^\text{189}\)

The summary of this part is as follows:

- Platonic TF is criticized by Aristotle in respect of the separation of Forms. It gives rise to mainly two problems according to Aristotle: (1) Forms are considered as universals but separation turns them into particulars. Hence, the Forms, being themselves particulars, are expected to have particular instances. (2) Forms do not contribute to the being and knowledge of particular things, since Forms and particulars can only be in a homonymous relation with each other due to the separation.

- The *Categories* does not regard the particulars and universals as separate entities, but they are, rather, considered as ontologically interdependent entities (according to the essentialist interpretation). That sensible particulars are what they are by being members of their natural kinds suggests that particulars and universals reciprocally depend on each other in the *Categories*. As every particular is “this something”, there is an essentialist view in the *Categories*. Thereby, it is free from the problems of the Platonic account abovementioned.

- Two kinds of predication relations in the *Categories* show that the two kinds of universals (substances and non-substances) ontologically depend on the primary substances in their unique ways. Thereby, Aristotle elaborates his rejection of the

\(^{189}\text{Ibid., 182.}\)
Platonic view that universals (separate Forms) enjoy a kind of ontological independence.

3.2.3. The Dilemma of Participation

As the TF explains the fact that many things have the same name by participating in a single and separate Form, Plato asks in the Parmenides (130e-131e) and Philebus (15b-c) further about the structure of this participation relation: How can a Form, then, be in many things? In Parmenides, he argues that the question takes us to the Dilemma of Participation.

According to the argument, Forms can be in participants either as a whole or part. If a Form, as one and the same thing, is present in many distinct things as a whole at the same time, this would make it be separate from itself. If a Form, on the other hand, is present in many things by virtue of its parts, then, this would make it something divisible and things would participate in a part of a Form. A divisible feature is not said to be “one” feature anymore and, thus, this leads to these absurd consequences: Parts of the Form of Large would be smaller than the Form of Large, but a large thing is expected to be large by virtue of this smaller part. Or, the Form of Small would be larger than its parts (Parmenides, 130e-131e).

Allen, claims that the Categories aims to solve this dilemma by virtue of recognizing two kinds of being, their relevant predications and positing the exact distinction between universals and particulars. This intention of Aristotle is explicit in his deliberate word choice according to Allen: The term atomon literally corresponds to “indivisible.” But Aristotle uses it to mean “individual.” He clearly says that what is individual (atomon) and numerically one (hen arithmos) is, without exception, not SAID OF any subject, but some of them are IN a subject (1b6-7). So, he rules out, from the outset, that the notion of species and genus (the kinds of being that are only SAID OF their subjects) as things to
break into pieces. Universals are not individual and numerically one beings, unlike particulars.\textsuperscript{190}

Accordingly, in the category of substance, the problem is avoided: Secondary substances (the distinction of being) are not something present IN the primary substances, but they are SAID OF them (the distinction of predication). And secondary substances are not something individual or one in number (the distinction of “universal” from “particular”). In such a configuration, we do not need to worry about the riddle of that one particular “humanness” which is to be present both in Socrates and in Callias anymore. “Human” is a kind universal that determines their way of being. Therefore, secondary substances are not subject to the question whether they are predicated as a whole or in part.\textsuperscript{191}

On the other hand, universal non-substances (distinction of being) are IN the primary substances, but not directly. Firstly, essential relation, naturally, holds between individual non-substances and their kind universals (species and genus). Color white, not something individual or one in number, is SAID OF particular bit of white (distinction of “universal” from “particular”). Secondly, the particular bit of white, being individual and one in number, is IN Socrates (mediation aspect of being IN relation). For Allen, this individuality, which is grounded on the term “indivisibility”, underlines the fact that individual non-substances cannot be IN more than one substance. They are totally peculiar to their host primary substances and they are equally particular. This bit of white IN Socrates is numerically distinct from that bit of white in Callias, even if they are of the exact same shade.\textsuperscript{192}

Hence, in the category of non-substances, too, the dilemma is avoided. As long as non-substances are particularized by primary substances in virtue of these

\textsuperscript{190} Allen, “Individual Properties in Aristotle’s “Categories””, 38.

\textsuperscript{191} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{192} Ibid.
non-recurrent individual and numerically distinct beings, universal non-
substances are not subject to the question whether they are predicated as a whole
or part. Being IN relation saves us from falling into the problem, once again, of
the Dilemma of Participation. 193

Matthews and Cohen think that it is being IN relation of the Categories that
avoids the Dilemma of Participation. The question “how can a property be in
many things” is only applicable for the non-substances of the Categories, as they
are the entities that are IN substances. Since the predication theory in the
Categories classifies a subject as something (essential predication), a universal
non-substance is not ontologically apart from its individual instances. Both this
bit of grey and that bit of grey are said to be essentially classified as grey.
Greyness is not a separate single entity to be distributed among primary
substances. Therefore, the riddle of universals being present in the sensibles as a
whole or part is to be ruled out. 194

The summary of what has been said in this part is as follows:

- The predication theory in the Categories can be seen as a solution to the
Dilemma of Participation. Firstly, kind universals (species and genera) are not IN
their particular instances but SAID OF them. Also they are not individual beings
or one in number so as to be subject to the question how they are to be divided
among the particulars.

- Secondly, universal non-substances are IN primary substances by virtue of their
individual instances. As these instances are unique to their possessors, universal

193 Allen takes side with the traditional view on the debate regarding the nature of the individual
non-substances and, throughout his paper, refutes Owen’s arguments. This explanation of him
concerning the Dilemma of Participation is true only if the individual non-substances are taken as
tropes (see chapter 2 above, on pages 15-16). So, the connection of the Categories with the
Dilemma of Participation is another support for his own thesis. If individual non-substances are
recurrent and repeatable entities in many substances at the same time, as Owen asserts, then, the
account of the Categories will have to deal with the same dilemma in terms of the predication of
non-substances. Ibid.

non-substances are predicated of the primary substances not as a whole or part but by virtue of the mediation of these non-recurrent individuals.

- If the predication theory in the *Categories* is a matter of classification of things according to their essences, then, being IN relation is immune to the Dilemma of Participation. A universal non-substance (F-ness) is not something separate that is distributed among the particulars, but it is IN several particulars by classifying them as F.
CHAPTER 4

THE EXPLANATION AND ANALYSIS OF THE ARGUMENTS IN
ALEXANDER'S COMMENTARY (88,5-95,2)

This chapter is reserved to Alexander of Aphrodisias’ commentary on Metaphysics, A, 9, 990b22-991a8. This is a passage where Aristotle criticizes the TF mainly for its lack of internal consistency regarding different kinds of being. Even though it is in the Metaphysics, which is accepted to belong to Aristotle’s later ontology, its terminology and the way it addresses the problems give the impression that Aristotle’s critique is based on his metaphysical views in the Categories.

Alexander’s commentary supports this impression and carries it one step further by developing a detailed set of arguments that elucidate and enrich some implicit statements of Aristotle. Alexander’s arguments and the problems he points out about the TF also suggest that he assumes the account of the Categories. Thus, these arguments can be seen to include valuable hints concerning the critical relation between the Categories and the TF.

Accordingly, I present these arguments in detail here in order to give a textual support for the idea that the Categories can be read as a critique of the TF. Some principal aspects of this idea within the scholarly literature are presented in the previous chapter. In this chapter, I try not only to explain the arguments elaborated by Alexander in his reading of the relevant passage from Metaphysics, A, 9, but I also aim to understand the assumptions in the background. Exploring these assumptions will help both understand these arguments and reveal their connection with the Categories.

I divide the arguments of Alexander into four groups and name each one according to their contents, so as to explain them in an orderly way as much as
possible. Every group is presented with its corresponding lemma from the *Metaphysics*. First two group of arguments prove that the TF contradicts with itself as to the existence of Forms of things other than substances. On the one hand, the Platonic arguments imply that there are Forms of both substances and non-substances; on the other hand some other Platonic principles result in that there must only be Forms of substances. In the third group, Alexander adds some more arguments that do not correspond to anything explicitly stated in the *Metaphysics* passage in question. With these new arguments, he questions the nature of Forms and attests that Forms’ being substances are not coherent with some other Platonic assertions. Finally, in the fourth group of arguments, he proves that the relation between Forms and the participants can neither be synonymous nor homonymous. With these last two groups of arguments, he tells us that, according to the TF, there is no coherent way to say that there are Forms of even substances. As a whole the TF is false.\textsuperscript{195}

4.1. The First Group of Arguments

In this group of arguments, Alexander aims to prove that “The Theory of Forms contradicts with itself as to the existence of Forms of things other than substances”

**Lemma: 990b22-990b30:**\textsuperscript{196} Further, by the supposition according to which we say that there are Ideas, there will be Ideas not only of substances but also of many other things (for the intelligible object is a one not only where substances are concerned but also in the case of the other things, and there are sciences not only of substance but also of the other things, and countless other such difficulties arise). On the other hand, in accord with the necessities of the case and with the beliefs held about them, if the Forms are to be participated in, there must be Ideas of substances only, for they are not participated in coincidentally[.]

\textsuperscript{195} For the whole text of the commentary of Alexander at issue (88,5-95,3), see Appendix A on pages 128-135. The outline of the arguments is also introduced in the Appendix B on pages 136-140.

Alexander elaborates the two main premises of this text with several arguments. Firstly, by referring to some founding arguments of the TF, he explains how Platonists commit themselves to the existence of Forms of both substantial and non-substantial things. Consequently, according to the first premise of the argument that he develops against the Platonists in the text above, if the TF is true, then, there must be Forms of things other than substances. Secondly, he submits two other arguments (by appealing to the Platonic ideas and principles) to prove that the TF limits itself only to substantial beings. If there is a Form of a thing, this thing can be nothing but substance. From these two general premises it follows (by *modus tollens*) that the TF is false.

I begin by introducing the six arguments, which together constitute the first premise of this group. These arguments are the ones that are posited to prove the existence of Forms by Platonists. Alexander mentions them in order to show that if these arguments are valid and true, then, there must be Forms of both substances and non-substances. While Aristotle himself refers only to two of them in the lemma (The Object of Thought Argument\(^{197}\) and The Arguments from the Sciences\(^{198}\)), Alexander adds more. The arguments and their consequences at issue are as follows (88,5-89,7):

1. **Premise: According to the arguments of the Platonists, there must be Forms of both substances and non-substances**

### 4.1.1. The Object of Thought Argument:

Platonists assert that a Form is a common feature of several particulars that we can think of, even if the particulars

\(^{197}\) *Met.*, A., 9, 990b24-26.

\(^{198}\) *Met.*, A., 9, 990b26-27.

\(^{199}\) This is - together with the other two, “1.2. The Argument from the Sciences” and “1.4. The One over Many Argument” - one of the Platonic arguments that Aristotle lists in 990b11-17 and that Alexander reports formally in 79,1-85,3 as involved in Aristotle’s lost work *On Ideas*. According to Alexander, the Object of Thought Argument is as follows: “If, when we think of man or footed or animal, we are thinking of something that both is one of the things that are and is not any of the particular things (for in fact the same thought (*ennoia*) remains even after these things have perished), it is clear that there is something apart from sensible particulars, of which
cease to exist. They are something real but apart from any of the particulars. According to Alexander, if this proves that the Forms exist, it also proves that there are not Forms of substances only. The common feature we can think of could be the accidents of some particular things as well as their substances. Several man can be thought of with regard to their being man, but also to having the same color. Even if the particulars do not exist anymore, both their substances and non-substance properties can remain as an object of thought. Therefore, there must be Forms of both substances and non-substances according to this Argument.

4.1.2. The Arguments from the Sciences: Platonists introduce Forms as separate eternal models to be the object of science by these Arguments where they appeal to the scientific knowledge. The arguments tell that as each science deals with something common to several particulars but never with this or that particular, this common thing must be the Form. Similar to the first Argument, we can retain the knowledge of them even if their particular instances perish, since Forms are apart from the particulars. Alexander derives the same conclusion as in the Argument 1.1: The object of science naturally could be of substances and non-substances. Therefore, Forms are of both substances and non-substances.

4.1.3. The Virtues Argument: The existence of Forms is typically related with the existence of virtues for Plato, since most of his examples in the corpus are

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In Alexander’s commentary, this argument has three versions: “[i] If every science does its work by referring to some one and the same thing, and not to any particular thing, there must be, in the case of each science, something else apart from sensible things which is eternal, and a model of the things that come to be in each science. But the Idea is a thing of this sort. [ii] Again, the things of which there are sciences are, but the sciences deal with certain things apart from particular things, for these latter are unlimited and indefinite, whereas the objects of the sciences are determinate (horismenos). Therefore, there are certain things apart from particular things, and these are the Ideas. [iii] Again, if medicine is the science not of this particular health but simply of health, there will be a health-itself; and if geometry is not the science of this equal and this commensurable but simply of equal and simply of commensurable, there will be an equal-itself and a commensurable-itself; and these are the Ideas.” (79,1-79,15)
about virtues. Alexander, here, contents himself with saying that if there are Forms of virtues, which are not substances, then, Forms apparently should not be confined to substances. Because virtues are qualities, they are obvious examples for the existence of Forms of non-substances in the TF.\textsuperscript{201}

4.1.4. The One over Many Argument:\textsuperscript{202} This major Platonist Argument for the existence of Forms is grounded on the view that there is one distinct and eternal thing predicated of many particulars in the same way. The one, as a Form, remains the same while predicated of all the many particulars which constantly change and are different from each other. If so, this Argument of Platonists, too, introduces both Forms of substances and non-substances, since the many of which the one is predicated may be of a non-substance category, as well as a substance. Both substantial and non-substantial things are particular instances of their kinds. Then, individual whites would be the subject for the predication of color “white”, just like individual men are subject for predication of “man”.

4.1.5. The Fixed Model Argument: According to this Argument of Platonists, that things in this world are in an orderly way indicates that there is a fixed

\textsuperscript{201} Here Alexander does not refer to a “Platonic argument” for the Forms of virtues, unlike other five ones, but he merely mentions them as explicit examples of Forms. Thus this Argument itself is not of Platonists origin but it is of Alexander. Moreover, his implicit premise must be that “the virtues are dispositions” (hektis) as Aristotle describes them in Book 2 of the Nicomachean Ethics. Taking this as a starting point, Alexander’s statements might be seen as a distinct argument for the existence of Forms of non-substances. On the other hand, it is also possible to take the virtues in the Platonic or Socratic sense as “knowledge”: We can attain knowledge of the virtues, such as justice or courage, which shows us, again, that there are Forms of non-substances. But in that case, unlike being a disposition, Forms of virtues would be seen as an example of scientific knowledge. Thus, this second interpretation, would take the example from virtues as belonging to the previous Argument (1.2) instead of making it a separate argument on its own. This does not affect the whole point of Alexander: in either case, the Forms of virtues are used to prove that there must be Forms of non-substances according to the TF. For this second interpretation see Pieter d’Hoine, “Aristotle’s Criticism of Non-Substance Forms and its Interpretation by the Neoplatonic Commentators,” Phronesis, 56 (2011): 265.

\textsuperscript{202} According to Alexander, the argument is as follows: “If each of the many men is a man, and each of the many animals an animal, and so in all the other cases, and if in none of these cases is the same thing predicated of itself, but there is something predicated of all of them that is not the same as any of them, there must be something belonging to [all of] them, apart from the particular things, that is separated (kekhórismenos) and eternal; for it is always predicated in the same way of all the [particular] things that keep changing numerically. But that which is one over many, separated from them and eternal, is an Idea; therefore there are Ideas.” (80.9-80.15)
model for everything to be taken as reference. Forms are these perfect paradigms for their likes, namely the participants. For Alexander, this Argument too allows us to infer that the models – Forms – do not only apply to substances but non-substances as well: The man in the strict sense would always be the Form of Man. Likewise, the equal objects in the physical world are not equals genuinely but only defectively as they merely strive to be like The Equal as much as they can. Therefore, Forms must be of both substances and non-substances according to this Argument of Platonists.

4.1.6. The True Assertion Argument: This Argument of the Platonists is founded on the assumption that knowledge implies truth and existence. Making a veridical assertion about something implies the existence of this thing. However, the reason of our assertions regarding particulars cannot be the particulars themselves, since they are unlimited in number. In other words, as the object of knowledge is not of particulars, to assert something with truth brings in certain eternal things by reference to which we make these true assertions. Therefore, the real existing things must be the Forms. Alexander concludes that as we can make true assertions both about substances and non-substances (since our knowledge is not limited to substances), there must be Forms of both substances and non-substances.

Alexander ends his examples of the Platonic arguments by stating that there are also many other arguments of this sort giving the same result. Thus the TF seems to have existential implications for different sorts of being. In the second premise, however, Alexander claims that the logical necessities and the need for consistency within the Theory should be limiting the existence of Forms only to substantial beings. Alexander explains this necessity with two arguments:

2. Premise: According to the logical necessities and consistency about Forms, there must only be the Forms of substances

4.1.7. The Cause of Being Argument (89,7-89,20): Platonists claim that things owe their being to the separate Forms by virtue of the participation relation.
Forms are posited as the only cause of being for their participants. If so, they must naturally be the essential causes of their being, not an accidental one. A thing must be participating in a Form to receive its essence. Alexander gives the example of being “man,” holding to the idea of the *Categories* that “being is always being something.” If something is by being a man, he must be participating in the Form of man essentially, not accidentally, as the manness is his essence.

Thus, following Aristotle, Alexander distinguishes between *per se* (essential) and *per accidens* (accidental) participation. What he understands from *per accidens* participation is participating in some accidental attribute of a Form. An accidental attribute of the Form of Man could not account for the manhood of a particular man. The Form of Man can only confer being (being man) to the participant when it is participated *per se*, that is, with respect to being a man (essence of the Form). Alexander says that “what participates in man *qua* man [is man,]” Therefore, Forms are not supposed to be participated in with respect to their accidental attributes, but only with respect to their essences, if they are the causes of the being of the participating things, as Platonists claim. *per accidens* participation is, in fact, something incompatible with the principles of the TF. Participation would only be a proper relation between a Form and the thing only if it is held *per se*.

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203 Aristotle criticizes Platonists for neglecting to provide an explanation about the nature of the participation relation (*Met.*, A, 6, 987b12-13). In the lemma, his statement “they [Forms] are not participated in coincidentally” is elaborated by Alexander with an appeal to these two kinds of participation in accordance with the *Categories*.

204 Alexander does not tell us what an accidental attribute of a Form is. In the Argument of 4.2.1, however, repeating mostly Aristotle’s words, he says that “eternity is incidental to [Ideal Dyad]. Hence, if something that participates in the [ideal] dyad should be said to participate in eternity too… it participates *per se* in the [ideal] dyad, but *per accidens* in eternity[.]” Thus, by saying “accidental attribute of Forms”, he might have in mind the attributes that are true of any Idea in virtue of its status as a Form, like eternity or incorporeality. But, he might also be assuming the idea of combining Forms as Plato himself suggests: The Forms that are compatible can combine with each other (see on pages 41-43 above). In that regard, Form of White or Justice (and alike) might be accepted to be in an accidental relation with the Form of Man. In either case, Alexander seems to take all predicates accidental to a Form except for the particular one that defines it and differentiates from others. See n.208 below.
After determining that participation must only be *per se*, Alexander states that Forms are admitted as substances by Platonists, because they posit them as principles. To make a non-substance the principle of participants would amount to making a non-substance prior to everything (since Forms are prior to everything). If so, we must say that a non-substance in the Realm of Forms would have the ontological and causal priority over particular substances in the sensible world. Since the priority of non-substances over substances as their principles would be an absurdity, as Platonists would agree, Forms cannot be but substances.

These two consequences of the TF (i.e., only *per se* participation is possible and Forms are substances) necessarily imply that only substantial particulars could have Forms and that whatever has a Form can only be a substance. Forms could only be the cause of the being of the substances. Receiving its being (essence) from a substance (Form) by *per se* participation, the thing (the participant) must inevitably be a substance too. There is not a legitimate way of claiming that something participates *per se* in a substantial Form and be a non-substance. In short, for any x, if there is a Form in which x participates, then, x must be a substance.

In this Argument, Alexander also assumes another idea of the *Categories*: “being is said in many ways”. Hence, firstly, he thinks that different sorts of being (substances and non-substances) could not be explained by the same predication mechanism. Their predications must correspond to their peculiar kind of being. By this assumption, he distinguishes the two kinds of participation.

Secondly, as the other conclusion of this same idea of the *Categories*, Alexander assumes that different sorts of things (particular substances and non-substances) are essentially subject for their corresponding universal predicates. A particular man is subject for universal substance (man), and a particular white is subject for universal non-substance (color white) for their essences. A particular non-substance cannot be an instance of a universal substance, and a particular substance cannot be an instance of a universal non-substance. This would simply
be a category mistake. If there are substantial and accidental particulars, then, their universals must also be substantial and accidental. That is why, uniformly substantial Forms are only expected to confer substancehood. Thus, Alexander assumes that different sorts of things cannot be explained out by the same sort of being. Every particular is an individual instance of its corresponding universal in its own category (as the fourfold division of being suggests).

Alexander says that in this Argument, unless the Platonists commit themselves to these two assumptions, the TF limits Forms to be the causes of substantial beings only. In such a picture, when an individual non-substance participates in a substantial Form, this relation would make it behave like a substance. If a particular instance of white participates in the Form of White *per se* (if Forms are cause of being, then, the participation must only be *per se*), and since the Form of White is a substance, then, this participation would necessarily make this particular white a substance. In other words, there is no possibility for an individual white to participate in a substantial Form essentially and to be a non-substance.

### 4.1.8. The Argument on the Forms of Non-Substances (89,20-90,2):

Having proven, with the Argument above, that Forms are only of substances, Alexander assumes this time the existence of Forms of non-substances, although he excludes such a possibility in the first place by saying that “if there are Ideas too of things that are not substances, such as accidents, why, in the first place, are there not Ideas of all the accidents rather than of some but not of others?”

Alexander’s argument here has a disjunctive form and it is designed as a *reductio*. It aims to show unacceptable consequences of the assumption: If we admit that there is Form of a non-substance, this Form would itself be either (1) a non-substance or (2) a substance. In the first horn of the argument, where there are non-substantial Forms alongside with substance Forms, we would end up facing some non-substance beings as the principles of things. A non-substance Form would not be suitable for such an ontological status, as mentioned above in

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205 For an inquiry attempt into this cryptical statement, see the Appendix C on pages 141-144.
the Argument 4.1.7. It must solely be a substance if it is to confer being (essence) to its participants.

In addition to that conclusion, such a distinction between Forms (some are substances others are non-substances) is not compatible with the Platonic presumption that all Forms must be of the same nature. Indeed, Forms, being principles and, therefore, substances, are posited by Platonists as uniform causes of the all sorts of being. Thus the Theory itself excludes this option from the beginning.

In the second horn of the argument, where the Forms of non-substances are assumed to be substances, Alexander asks “how is it that some of the things participating per se in them come to be and are substances, but others are not substances?” He proved, in the previous Argument 4.1.7, that participation could only be per se, since only this conveys being (essence) to the participants as expected from the Forms. On the other hand, all the Forms are substances. In other words, the (essential) causes of being of things are located in only one category of being: substance. Therefore, per se participation in substantial Forms necessarily produce substances. The particulars in the category of substance are naturally substances.

Alexander assumes, once again, that different sorts of being (substantial and non-substantial) cannot be explained out as one kind of being. Since “being is said in many ways,” the particular instances of the different categories must be subject for their corresponding universal kinds (while “man” as a substantial universal is predicated of a particular man; “white” as a non-substantial universal is predicated of an individual white). Consequently, the TF cannot offer an explanation to the question how per se participation in substantial Forms can produce non-substances. It is not reasonable that some participants become substance but some others non-substance by this one-mode participation mechanism (per se) in one-mode Forms (substances). The TF, due to not distinguishing kinds of being, has to face this difficulty.
As a result, with this unacceptable consequence of the second horn, the Argument proves that there could not be Forms of non-substances, but only of substances.206

Consequently, the Arguments 4.1.7 and 4.1.8 both prove that “there must only be Forms of substances.” This premise, together with the result of the six Platonic arguments as explained above as the first premise, make up a whole argument which can be outlined as follows:

(1) If Platonism is true, then, there are Forms of things other than substances (Forms of non-substances).

(2) But for any x, if there is a Form in which it participates, then, x can be a substance only.

(3) Therefore, Platonism is false.

Thereby, Alexander shows how the TF contradicts with itself regarding the account of the being of non-substances, which requires another kind of explanation as the one elaborated in the Categories. The TF fails to provide such a coherent explanation.

206 Furthermore, in this second horn of the argument, Alexander adds that this unacceptable consequence is not limited to the case when the Forms are accepted to be substances but also if they are assumed to be the objects of thought, therefore, non-substances. By this addition, he seems to emphasize that as long as Forms are of the same nature, whether uniformly substances or non-substances, they cannot account for the categorical differences of being. Both options are unreasonable and the TF clearly neglects the reality of that there are in fact two sorts of being (substances and non-substances), not one. Alexander’s statement, depending on his assumption that particulars are individual instances of their universal kinds within their own categories, implies that, if Forms are substances they can be predicated essentially of the substantial beings. Likewise, if Forms are non-substances, then, they can only be predicated essentially of the non-substances. With the terminology of the Categories, the SAID OF relation is held in each category between particulars and universals. A particular, which is subject for SAID OF relation by its universal kind, is necessarily a member of this kind (it is a substance if it is in the category of substance; a non-substance if it is in the category of non-substance). The issue will be clearer in the 4.2.3. per se One over Many Argument below.
4.2. The Second Group of Arguments

These arguments, in the same vein as the arguments above (4.1.7 and 4.1.8), aim to prove that if Forms exist as Platonists assert, they are only of substances.

4.2.1. The Dyad Argument (90,5-91,5):

Lemma 990b30-b34: [B]ut rather a thing must participate in each in this way, namely, insofar as it is not said of an underlying subject (I mean, for example, if something participates in double-itself, it also participates in the eternal, but does so coincidentally, since it is coincidental to the double that it is eternal).[.] The Dyad Argument is meant to prove again that there must only be Forms of substances by appealing to the same premises (both of which are necessary consequences of the TF) of the Argument 4.1.7: (1) Only per se participation is possible, (2) Forms are substances. (3) These two premises necessarily imply that there are only Forms of substances.

The example of “dyad” in the Argument aims to prove that only per se participation could be possible (first premise) in a Platonic framework. The example is a hypothetical per accidens participation given by Aristotle quickly in a few words. Alexander develops it further. He distinguishes essential and accidental attributes of the Form of Dyad in order to explain Aristotle’s statement that “it is coincidental to the double that it is eternal.”

As it is the Realm of Forms, an accidental attribute of a Form must be the result of a certain relation with another Form. Even if each Form is a substantial being in itself, some Forms can be incidentally related to each other. For instance, as the essence of the Form of Dyad is being dyad, being eternal can only be an incident of being a dyad as such. In other words, what is a dyad would necessarily be eternal; but its being eternal would not be a part of its essence or

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207 Met., A, 9, 990b31-34. While Aristotle uses the term “double” (dplásios), Alexander changes it with “dyad” (duás). It should also be added that there is no agreement among scholars about this argument’s interpretation. See d’Hoine, “Aristotle’s Criticism of Non-Substance Forms and its Interpretation by the Neoplatonic Commentators,” 267 n.12.
definition as such. Consequently, the Form of Eternity can be said to be in an accidental relation to the Form of Dyad.\footnote{This is not a trouble-free assumption for sure. It could be fairly asked that what it exactly means to have an accidental relation for a (substantial) Form with another (substantial) Form. It is not easy to formulate such an assumption within the TF, as it is the major objection of Aristotle here to Plato that the TF simply neglects the being of non-substances and, thereby, their accidental relation with the substances. Yet, for the statement of Alexander, we might appeal to the doctrine of communion of Forms of Plato (see pages on 41-43 above). According to this idea, the Forms that are compatible with each other can be in a combining relation. Alexander’s (and Aristotle’s) assumption might be considered as being built upon this Platonic picture, but focusing on the distinction between essences and accidents. Through the Argument, Alexander emphasizes that the Form of Dyad is essentially dyad but accidentally eternal. He seems to stick to the Platonic basic idea that a Form is a one-featured simple being. There could not be any other essential predication of a Form. In other words, essential relation for a Form with another Form is impossible. All the other Forms that it necessarily has a relation must be accidental. Therefore, he would presumably take, for instance, the Form of Being or Rest or the Different, etc. (the Forms that all other Forms has a share according to the Sophist) all in an accidental relation with the Form of Dyad (Yet, the relation with the Form of Good would be seen somehow essential for a Form).}

Having identified the general assumptions, I will consider this Argument in two ways as far as the text allows. Although their conclusions are the same - i.e., that \textit{per accidens} participation (participating in an accidental attribute of a Form) is not possible, and, so, there are only Forms of substances - further consequences will not be exactly the same. The difference depends on what it is understood from the term “dyad” in the Argument. As Alexander does not explicitly name it but only refers to “dyad” or “something” like Aristotle does, here the “dyad” might be considered in two senses (mathematical and sensible), according to the division of numerical entities by Platonists.\footnote{Platonists divide the numerical entities in three. While (1) sensible numbers correspond to the unity of physical plurality of countable things, and (2) there are Forms of them, (3) mathematical numbers are the intermediates between Forms and the sensible numbers by being eternal and plural at the same time, according to Aristotle: “[They differ] from the perceptible ones in being eternal and immovable, and from the Forms in that there are many similar ones, whereas the Form itself in each case is one only.” (\textit{Met.}, A, 6, 987b14-18). Therefore, a mathematical dyad is the abstract eternal plurality of units that we appeal to in order to count two countable objects. A sensible dyad is the unity of the two sensible things, like group of two chairs.}

I will begin with the mathematical dyad version of it:

(1) Platonists claim that “mathematical dyad” is both dyad and eternal. Then, it must be \textit{essentially} dyad and \textit{accidentally} eternal. It becomes dyad insofar as it participates \textit{per se} in the Form of Dyad, since it is \textit{per se} participation providing
dyad-ness to the participant. But it is also expected to participate in the Form of Eternity, as the mathematical dyad is necessarily eternal. This second participation, however, would not be *per se*, because eternity is incidental to the Form of Dyad. If the Form of Eternity is accepted to be in an accidental relation with the Form of Dyad, it follows that the mathematical dyad could participate *per accidens* in the Form of Eternity.

While participation *per se* in the Form of Dyad would make the mathematical dyad essentially dyad, participation in the Form of Eternity would not make it eternal, since it does not participate in the Form of Eternity in the strict sense. As we know from the Argument 4.1.7, things are supposed to have their beings (essences) from Forms by only *per se* participation relation. Accordingly, becoming eternal is only possible by participating *per se* in the Form of Eternity. Therefore, if mathematical dyad is going to participate in the Form of Eternity too, this must necessarily be *per se*.

If so, mathematical dyad is said to participate *per se* in two distinct Forms which would result in having two essences. In other words, mathematical dyad would be *essentially* dyad and *essentially* eternal which is absurd. On the other hand, participation *per se* in Eternity will turn the participation in Dyad into a *per accidens* participation, simply because being eternal does not imply being dyad. Then, mathematical dyad would be *essentially* eternal and *accidentally* dyad which is also not acceptable. Consequently, the mathematical dyad would end up participating both in the Forms of Dyad and Eternity; and to each both *per accidens* and *per se* at the same time which is clearly a contradiction.

Therefore, the TF does not explain the accidental attributes of things. Any accident participating in its relevant Form must participate in it *per se*. The possibility of *per accidens* participation results in above absurdities. Only *per se* participation is possible according to the TF. And, as the Forms are uniformly substances, anything which participates in a Form *per se* can be nothing but substance. In conclusion, there are only Forms of substances.
When this result is read with the example of “mathematical dyad”, it implies that the predication theory of Platonists transform the non-substances into substances. Participating per se both in the Forms of Dyad and Eternity would make the particular dyad substantially dyad and eternal. In the Platonic picture, the mathematical fact that a dyad in reality is both eternal and a dyad at the same time can only be explained by attributing to it both features substantially. In other words, the mathematical dyad would plainly be an aggregate of different substances. Instead of distinguishing kinds of being and their peculiar predications, the TF makes all the existing things as the sum of different substances.

(2) In a second sense, the participant dyad can be taken as a “sensible dyad.” Indeed, in some manuscripts we have the term explicitly. A sensible dyad, according to the Platonists, is a unity of two physical countable things. It is claimed to be dyad, but not eternal.

Since the Form of Dyad is thought to be essentially dyad and accidentally eternal, all the sensibles participating in the Form of Dyad are also to participate in the accidental attributes of the Form of Dyad. Thus, when a sensible dyad participates per se in the Form of Dyad in order to have its essence (dyad-ness), it is supposed to participate per accidens in the accidental attributes of the Form of Dyad, such as its eternity.

However, a sensible dyad in reality is only dyad but not eternal. Sensible dyad and the Form of Dyad in which it participates per se are to be synonymously dyad, but this is evidently not the case with the Form of Eternity in which it supposedly participates per accidens. This implies that per accidens participation in the Form of Eternity would end up not conveying eternity to its participant. While per se participation provides essential similarity (synonymy) between the

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210 According to Dooley, the excerpt from Codex L and F is as the following: “The dyad-itself has its being not qua eternal … but qua dyad. If then its being belonged to it qua eternal, but the dyad [belonged to it] per accidens, and the sensible dyad were said to exist by participation in this [eternal] dyad, the sensible dyad would be per se eternal, but per accidens dyad” [emphasis added]. See W.E. Dooley, S. J. Alexander of Aphrodisias: On Aristotle’s Metaphysics 1, 128 n.280.
participant and the Form, *per accidens* does not result in such a similarity. Sensible dyad is not eternal but The Form of Eternity is. But this only proves that there is actually no participation relation at all between the Form of Eternity and the sensible dyad: the latter does not take any share in the former. If it did, it would be eternal; but we know that it is not.

It follows that it is not possible for things to *participate* in some accident of a Form. *per accidens* participation can only be a hypothetical option that does not have a real function in the economy of the TF. And, once again, as the Forms are substances, only *per se* participation in Forms necessarily produces substances. Therefore, there must only be the Forms of substances.

Consequently, the TF fails to explain how physical things have accidents in addition to their substances. It necessarily confines itself with saying that things can only have essential (hence substantial) relation with the Forms and this precludes accidental predication. But, this second interpretation of the example of dyad (sensible dyad), even though reaching the same conclusion with the first one (mathematical dyad) - *per accidens* participation is not possible and, so, there must be only Forms of substances- differentiates from it with regard to its further consequences. The example of sensible dyad suggests that the TF neglects the being of the non-substances in this world by excluding them from the participation relation with the Forms. Things can only get what their substances are by way of participation, but not their non-substances. When a sensible thing participates *per se* in a Form to receive its being (essence), it is not possible for it also to receive its non-substance(s), as the other relevant Forms are in an incidental relation with the first Form and *per accidens* participation is not a genuine participation. A human being, for instance, participates in the Form of Human to receive its (being) human-ness, but this participation makes it impossible to participate in the other (supposed) Forms of non-substances, such as whiteness or justice, just in the same way it precludes it from participating in other Forms of substances, such as Form of Cat or Tree, etc. Thus, “there must only be Forms of substances” here amounts to saying that, only primary
substances of the *Categories* have Forms. There could not be any Form of non-substances in the TF.

Alexander's concluding remarks of the passage also support this consequence: He says that “[T]he same terms signify substance here and in reference to eternal things, as man is substance in this world and in the ideal world, and heat a quality both here and there”. His reciprocal placement of Forms and things with regard to their kind of being (substance or non-substance) aims to reflect the same Aristotelian idea that different sorts of being cannot be explained out as one kind of being. He considers the particulars (participants) and universals (Forms) in terms of their own categories (as the fourfold distinction of the *Categories* suggests). Thus, he supposes that the realm of the particulars and the realm of the Forms must be, somehow, correlated. However, in so far as all Forms are uniformly substances, the TF does not allow such a correlation, but merely neglects the being of non-substances. He concludes that “if this argument is sound, the consequence will be that the Platonists must say that of the things around us, there are Ideas only of substances, if the Ideas are substances [emphasis added].” If so, it should not be unreasonable to consider the Forms of non-substantial sensibles otiose or not existing at all.

But, there can be two objections to this second interpretation of the Argument and to its consequence:

1. It is not legitimate to infer this result from the example of “eternity”, given that it is a necessary property of any Form and we already do not expect any sensible to participate in it. The conclusion about “eternity” in the Argument cannot be fairly extended to all non-substances.

I think this is quite a fair objection. Yet, for an answer attempt, we can appeal to the distinction regarding the predicates of a Form as discussed by Owen. According to him, the predicates of Forms are to be said of two types: *A*-predicates are the shared predicates of all Forms simply due to being Form, e.g., being intelligible, divine, eternal… *B*-predicates are certain predicates that are
true of a Form in virtue of the single feature it stands for. For instance, A-predicates of the Form of Man are “eternal”, “intelligible”, etc.; while the B-predicate of it is “man.”

Vlastos says that Aristotle must be considering that Platonists do not commit themselves to such a distinction between the predicates of Forms, as the Argument is built on Aristotle’s exploitation of this distinction. If the Platonists had the notion of such a distinction, they could easily “break [Aristotle’s] argument” by saying that “eternity” is an A-predicate and it does not imply any consequences for non-substance B-predicates. But this does not mean that Platonists were not aware of the issue. On the contrary, according to Vlastos, such a distinction between the predicates of a Form was familiar to the Platonists but it was unacceptable to them. This enables Aristotle to use it to attack them for the inconsistency of their Theory. Without such a distinction between the predicates of a Form, by the Platonists, the result of the Argument can legitimately be extended to all non-substances.

Julia Annas, on the other hand, draws attention to the meaning of “eternity.” She underlines that Aristotle criticizes Platonists for not understanding “eternity” in the strict sense, because they did not have any account of potentiality. Without


212 Gregory Vlastos, “The ‘Two-Level Paradoxes’ in Aristotle”, in Platonic Studies, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973), 323-334. Aristotelian formula of the distinction between predicates of Forms necessarily neglects the fact that Forms are introduced as one-featured simple beings by Platonists. A Form cannot be P in one respect and not-P in another. This distinction between the levels of predicates allows such contradictory propositions that a Platonist would not accept: Form of Man is mortal qua man (B-predicate), but immortal qua Form (A-predicate). Vlastos refers to the Sophist to show that how Plato himself rejected such a possibility, by denying that Form of Beauty is beautiful in one respect and ugly in another. For that reason this distinction, that Aristotle uses in the Double Argument, is against the Platonists from the beginning. Moreover, a Platonist would not accept the idea of “the Form of X qua X” (B-predicate). He would find this expression as misleading. When we say, for instance, “the Form of Animal qua Animal”, we consider all the properties we know from the sensible animals and attribute them to the Form of Animal. But for a Platonist, the properties that is acquired by the participation in a certain Form are distinct from what the Form truly is. As the Forms are out of time and space, we cannot legitimately attribute the temporal and spatial characters of the individuals to them. For these reasons, Aristotle was in a confidence, for Vlastos, that Platonists would not use this distinction as a self-defense against his Argument. Ibid. 329-332.
distinguishing potentiality from actuality, Forms are not exempt from the possibility of coming into or going out of existence. They just happen not to cease to exist and thus they are merely like some long-lasting beings (Met., N, 2, 1088b14-35; NE., 1096b3-5). Hence, “eternity” for Platonists can be accepted as an accident of the Forms. This would make Aristotle’s objection valid and extend its conclusion to the other non-substantial beings.213

Either suggestion can be considered for Alexander too. He might have in mind these considerations in his Dyad Argument. Furthermore, I think, he must be assuming that Forms can only be accidentally related to each other. Alexander conceives the Forms as one-featured simple substances: the Form “Man” can have no other feature than what it is to be a man; the Form Eternity can have no other feature than being eternal, etc. If a Form is such a one-featured simple substance, all other Forms can only be in an accidental relation to it, whether they are A-predicates or B-predicates. As far as it is not possible to participate in an accidental attribute of a Form, as the Argument suggests, this could be Form of any non-substance. Thereby, the conclusion of the Argument about “eternity” can be extended to other non-substances.

(2) According to a second objection, we should not derive consequences about primary substances (i.e., only primary substances of Aristotle have Forms and there could not be any Form of non-substances) from the example of “dyad”, which in fact belongs to a non-substance category, namely “quantity”. On the contrary, the second interpretation of the Argument, from another perspective, gives another example of turning an individual non-substance into a substance as in the case of the first interpretation of the Argument.

How does it do that? If we see a couple of chairs and say that “the chairs are dyad”, the TF claims that it is so, because the chairs (primary substances) participate in the Form of Dyad. But, in this Argument the participant is the individual dyad not the two chairs. To say it with the terminology of the

Categories, the individual instance of dyad IN the chairs participates per se in the Form of Dyad. Then, it becomes essentially dyad by this participation process, and not eternal (according to the Argument). But this is not sufficient to call the chairs dyad yet, as there is no mechanism to predicate this individual dyad of them (as in the case of being IN relation). We can only say that the “individual dyad IN the chairs is essentially dyad.” But, since the Forms are substances and the participation is per se, we could not take the individual dyad as a non-substance any more, rather, it would turn out to be a substance. Therefore, this example of per se participation in a substantial Form by an individual non-substance, once again, ends up turning a non-substance participant into a substance. It is a dyad only if it is a substance.

I also do not disagree with the alternative reading of the second objection. But, we can still derive consequences about primary substances from this Argument (i.e., only primary substances of Aristotle have Forms and there could not be any Form of non-substances). The Argument is, in fact, exclusively related with the issue of (not) participating in the Form of Eternity which is supposed to be in an incidental relation with the Form of Dyad. Alexander, by this example, aims to show that while a participant can have an essential relation with a Form, it is not a participation at all when it is held with regard to the Form’s accidental attribute(s).

Hence, I will follow Owen’s interpretation of the Argument. He uses “man” instead of “dyad” by stating that “the appropriate example turns out to be a substance-predicate.” According to his rewriting of the Argument, when a participant, say Socrates, participates in the Form of Man, he also participates in eternity, because Man is accidentally eternal. But, this participation would only be per accidens, not per se. Socrates is a man but is not eternal. Since eternity is only an accident of man (in fact only one man is eternal: The Form of Man), it is not possible for him to be eternal in consequence of this participation process which is something different from his being a man. Aristotle infers from this

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example, according to Owen, that it is not possible to participate in the Form of any non-substance. So, there can be no Forms of non-substances.  

Therefore, that dyad is an Aristotelian non-substance does not change the fact that the Argument aims to show the impossibility of the per accidens participation against the per se participation. Even if the participant in the example is a non-substance in Aristotelian sense, the Argument focuses on the fact that, in the TF, a participant fails to have an accidental relation with a Form. If we assume that per se participation produces substantial things, then, according to the Argument, a primary substance would not receive its accidental properties from Forms but only its essence (substance). Consequently, there is no reason to think that the Argument begs the question by choosing “dyad” or “double” (an example of Aristotelian non-substance) and so helps itself in proving that the participants could not be non-substances in general. Since it overall tells us that the TF can only account for substantial things, I think we can disregard the fact that dyad or double is an Aristotelian non-substance.

In conclusion, both interpretations of the Argument prove that there is no way in Platonism to account for the existence of non-substances. The TF necessarily either neglects their being by rejecting their Forms, or admits the existence of their Forms and accordingly turns their participants into substances.

4.2.2. The Definition Argument (91,6-91,13):

Lemma 990b34: [S]o that the Forms will be substance.

This Argument of Alexander proves, once again, that only substantial things can have Forms according to the TF and, consequently, the TF is bound to turn the non-substantial things into substances. Alexander depends on the same premises: (1) Things participate in Forms per se only, and (2) Forms are substances. The Argument supports these two premises.

Owen also finds this argument of Aristotle invalid. He says that participation per se in the Form of Double and per accidens in the Form of Eternity do not imply that they preclude the participant double from participating in the Form of Eternity. Aristotle only can claim that these together do not entail that the participant double participates in the Form of Eternity. Ibid.
Firstly, Alexander explains that how participation can be held. He reports that in some manuscripts of Aristotle, we read: “But things must participate in each Form in such a way that it is predicated of a subject.” Alexander thinks that, this statement of Aristotle points out that the TF allows things to participate in Forms only *per se*. That is, Forms are supposed to be (essentially) *predicated* of the things as subjects. Therefore, according to Alexander, this predication relation between Form and the participants is held through the *definition* (formula, *logos*) of the Form (like the SAID OF relation of the *Categories*). Only if the definition of a Form is truly predicated of a participant that their relation is to be called participation.

Alexander appeals to the same dyad example to explain his point: If the definition of the Form of Dyad applies to the thing, the thing is said to participate in the Form of Dyad and becomes dyad. If the definition applied is not that of dyad but of eternity, the thing is said to participate in the Form of Eternity. Thus, the *definition* of something is the *criterion* of the participation. We just need to find out the definition of a thing to identify its Form that it participates in. In the Aristotelian sense, there might be other predications of the subject – e.g., its accidents - but only the definition of the thing would show us the genuine participation. Participation must be a definitional relation and every definition must be grounded in a participation relation.

Secondly, Alexander refers to Aristotle’s claim that “Forms are substances.” Alexander thinks that when Aristotle asserts this, he must be assuming that participation can be held through the definition of the Forms. If the Form and the definition of the Form are distinct from each other, there would not be a problem to assert that a Form (one separate substance) is predicated of a participant (another substance) as subject. In other words, since Forms are said to be predicated of participants through their definitions, Forms’ being substances does not pose a problem in terms of predicating one substance of another. As a result, to call the Forms as substances is not incoherent for Aristotle’s arguments (hence for Alexander’s earlier arguments).
This Argument, as a whole, tells that (1) participation must be held, following what Platonists say, only if the definition of a Form is truly applied to a participant (this is per se predication), (2) Forms are substances, (since the definition of a substantial Form is predicated of a substance, not the Form itself, there is no problem to regard the Forms as substances); (3) therefore, the participant which is subject for a definition of a substantial Form must only be substance.

Consequently, the Argument supports what has been said so far. The predication theory of the Platonists cannot explain the being of the non-substances. Even they turn them into substances (as in the “mathematical dyad” version of the Argument 4.2.1): A man, for instance, is said to participate in the Form of Man as his definition is being a man. But, when it comes to the non-substantial properties of a man, according to the criterion of definition, the particular accidents are expected to participate in their relevant Forms. The participant of the Form of White would not be the particular man, but his individual instance of whiteness (because there is only per se participation and, so, if particular man participates in the Form of White, man becomes white per se). This participation would make the individual whiteness essentially white. But this is to say further that, the individual instance of whiteness, a particular non-substance in Aristotelian sense, becomes substance as getting the definition from a substantial Form. But the fact that we have a definition for the individual white should not mean that it is a substance for Aristotle. Although it has a definition for Aristotle (both substantial and non-substantial particulars have their essences according to the Categories), it is surely another kind of being, a non-substance. Platonism, by not introducing this distinction (between kinds of being and their peculiar predications), assumes that everything which have a definition is a substance.

4.2.3. per se One over Many Argument (91,13-91,31):

Lemma 990b34-991a2: But it is the same things that signify substance here as over there - or what will it mean to say that there is something beyond these things here, the one over many?
This Argument, once again, aims to prove that if Forms exist, they are only of the substantial sensibles. To do this, Alexander follows the same premises, that (1) only *per se* participation in Forms is possible and (2) Forms are substances. He again assumes that different sorts of things are subject for their corresponding kind universals and predication mechanisms. He refers to the One over Many Argument of Platonists to support his premise that only *per se* participation is the case in the TF.

For Alexander, the One over Many Argument of Platonists entails essential relation between Forms and participants. *Per accidens* participation between a Form and its participants would not provide the participant its being (essence), would not establish a similarity (synonymy) between Form and the participants, and hence would make the participation as a whole improper. Furthermore, without sharing the same essence, there is no necessity to participate in this Form rather than that Form. In other words, if there is no essential relation between one Form and its participants, all participation relations become contingent and, so, do not establish any necessary relation between a universal kind and its instances. In such a condition the One over Many Argument loses its merits.

For Alexander, there should be a reason to call several particular men as man, or several individual whiteness as white. The One over Many Argument does not preclude the arbitrary grouping of things, unless it entails an essential participation relation between one kind and its particular instances. Therefore, for Alexander, the ground to call any particular (substance or non-substance) by the name of a universal must be their sharing the same essence (nature). Consequently, things must participate in Forms only *per se*.

Hence, where Forms are uniformly substances, the things participating *per se* in a substantial Form must necessarily be substances. If Forms and participants are supposed to share the same nature, then, it is not reasonable to claim that some participants are substances and others non-substances by participating *per se* in substantial Forms. Thus, for any x if there is a Form on which x is modeled, then, x must be a substance.
Alexander repeatedly underlines in this Argument that “the same term signify substance in this world and in the ideal world.” This statement is the result of assuming categorical differences of being (particulars are individual instances of their universal kinds within their own categories). The assumption of essential relation between particulars and universals within each category causes this parallelism between “this world” and “the ideal world”. Hence, if one model is a substance (in the category of substance) in the Realm of Forms, its sensible instances must be substance as well. We cannot expect from a substantial kind (a substance Form) to be essentially predicated of non-substances. This would simply be a category mistake.

Thus, the TF ignores the fact that beings in the sensible world are of two types and not of one. Since Platonists introduce the Forms as uniformly substantial beings (only one category), their participants (particular instances) must necessarily be in the same category by virtue of the one-over-many principle (as long as the one-over-many principle could denote an essential relation). The TF could not account for different kinds of particular instances in the sensible world. In that picture, everything, regardless of their different kinds, seems to be subject for *per se* predication by the substantial Forms.

4.2.4. The Synonymy Argument (93,7-93,14):\footnote{This Argument is within a disjunctive argument where Alexander argues on the relation between Forms and things (within the 4th group of arguments) and assumes they are synonymous. But, in order to stick to the course of the subject, it is included under this heading.}

**Lemma 991a2-a3:** And if the Ideas and what participate in them are the same in form, there will be something common to these.

This Argument seems as a natural follow-up of the previous discussions. While Alexander repeats that *per accidens* participation is not possible between Forms and participants, he states that it is because of that things are supposed to have their being by participation relation (Argument 4.1.7) and, also, “they are particular things of this kind”. By stating this second reason, he explicitly mentions the idea of the *Categories* that he had assumed so far in the previous
arguments: Particulars are individual instances of their universal kinds (within their own categories).

The Argument assumes the Forms and participants being synonymous and concludes, again, that there must only be Forms of substances: (1) Participants and Forms must have the same definition as it is proved above (Forms are participants’ cause of being and individual instances must have the same essence with their universal kinds). (2) Forms are substances. (3) Then, this necessarily implies that all participants are substances. There must only be the Forms of substances.

4.3. The Third Group of Arguments

The arguments in this group do not have a corresponding lemma in the Metaphysics, but they are additional ones on the nature of the Forms. Alexander seems to articulate some further elaborations on Aristotle’s main criticism regarding the TF.217

In the first two groups of arguments, that are held above, Alexander showed the unacceptable consequences of the Platonic arguments and principles. He appealed to the Platonic idea that “Forms are substances” as one of his main premises. Now, in the following arguments, he questions this very idea together with the claim that Forms are simple and eternal beings. Thereby, he aims to show that Platonic claims on the nature of Forms are not coherent.

4.3.1. The Differentia Argument (91,31-92,18): The Argument targets the Platonic claim that Forms are simple beings by nature. Simplicity of Forms means that each Form has only one defining feature. That each Form is a one-featured substance and confers only this feature to the things preclude them from being compound beings. The Form of Dyad is only and solely dyad, nothing more.

217 By doing this, Alexander might have another source of Aristotle related to the Categories that does not survive today, just like On Ideas. The source might include these specific arguments against the TF in such an elaborate way.
For Alexander, as Forms must be participated by the sensible things in respect to substance, they do not only determine what the things are but also what they are not. It must be the Forms again that are responsible for the differences of the things, since things have their differences in virtue of their substances. To have a substance by participating in a certain Form makes the participant thing necessarily different from the other sensibles which participate in other Forms and, thereby, have other substances. Since there is no one single Form to cover all the substances and explain every feature of reality with all its differences between different kinds of substance, each member of the realm of the Forms is supposed to confer distinct substances.

Alexander approaches to that Platonic picture with Aristotelian tools once again: It is the differentia which makes all the differences between the substances and distinguish them from one another within the same genus. Animals, for instance, can be distinguished with respect to being rational and irrational. He assumes again a correlation between the realms of Forms and sensibles, and, so, says that the differentiae that we encounter in the sensibles must have a reflection their corresponding Forms. In other words, Forms are also responsible for the being of the differentiae. Form of Man, then, would confer the differentia of rationality together with its substance (manness). In the same vein, the Form of Animal should include in itself the differentiae rational and irrational at the same time. This amounts to saying that the Form “Animal”, although it is supposed to be only a one-featured substance, is the cause of two substantial features, i.e., “rationality” and “irrationality”. This damages the Platonic assertion of the simplicity of Forms.

The overall Argument states that the genera cannot be simple as they include their species which are substantially distinguished from each other by their differentiae. In a more general way, it can be said that higher classes in the natural kind family trees have inevitably compound structures. They cannot be simple. If we assume that they are simple Forms as Platonists do, then, the dilemma occurs: Either the Platonic Forms are simple beings and, therefore, they
cannot explain substantial differences among the things or they can account for such differences but, then, they cannot be simple beings. The first option includes an inconsistency: it is inconsistent to be the cause of their substance for particulars but not to be accountable for how they are different from each other. The second option, on the other hand, puts aside the basic claim of Platonists about Forms’ simplicity. In either case, the Platonic framework seems to be flawed about the nature of Forms. This is why Alexander suggests to doubt the adequacy of the Platonic thesis that Forms are substances in the sense of being the causes and principles of substantial differences among the sensibles.

4.3.2. The Argument on the Forms as Object of Thought (92,18-92,30): Alexander continues to question the nature of Forms by appealing to the Object of Thought Argument of Platonists: If we assume that, as Platonists suggest, Forms are what we find in our mind as a common feature of several particulars, this suggests that the Forms are said to be what they are as long as they are being thought of. In other words, they do not have existential independence, but they must be existentially dependent on our thinking. It is, then, impossible for them to exist at the same time, because thinking of contraries or opposites at the same time is not possible for us human beings. There are Forms, that are opposite of each other, that would necessarily be thought in turn. But thinking of the Forms in turn simply makes them exist in turn. Whenever I think of the Form of Even, it exists. But this precludes the Form of Odd from existing during that time, since both cannot be thought together. Only when I stop thinking of the Form “Even” I can think of the Form “Odd”, thereby, make it exist. In such a picture, Forms cannot be said to be eternal, but they must be temporal. The Argument of Platonists to found the Forms has this unacceptable consequence.

For Alexander, the second problem of picturing Forms as object of thought is that it prevents them from being substances. Not being a substance for a Form is unacceptable, as it is mentioned above (in Arguments 4.1.7 and 4.1.8). It is obviously not reasonable for the principles not to be substances. Also, the cause of a substantial thing in the sensible world cannot be explained with another
thing that is itself not a substance. This is as unreasonable as to claim that a non-substance sensible thing is what it is by participating in a substance Form (depending on the same assumption that particulars are individual instances of their universal kinds within their own categories). Thus, a non-substance Form cannot be (essentially) predicated of the substantial particulars.

As a result, to assume the Forms as objects of thought jeopardizes the main principles of the Platonists that Forms are eternal substances. Together with the Differentia Argument, the arguments in this group, show that the TF also lacks internal consistency regarding the nature of Forms. That their being simple beings or object of thought is not coherent with their being substances.

There is one consequence of this. Alexander, so far, said that the scope of the TF is necessarily limited to the substance sensibles due to the two Platonic premises (as they are the consequences of the TF itself): Forms are substances and participation relation is only held per se. If the TF cannot account for the Forms’ being substances in a coherent way, according to his arguments in the third group, this brings about another problem for the Platonic theory: If Forms are not substances, then, we even should not be able to say that Forms are only of the substantial beings in the world.

4.4. The Fourth Group of Arguments

Lemma: 991a2-a8: And if the Ideas and what participate in them are the same in form, there will be something common to these. For why should the two be one and the same in the case of the twos that pass away, and in those that are many but eternal, rather than in the case of [two-] itself and some particular [two]? But if they are not the same in form, they would be homonymous, just as if someone were to call Callias and a wooden statue a man, seeing nothing communal between them.

In this last part, Alexander shows that the nature of the relation between Forms and things is not free from trouble either. In fact, there is no way to find a convenient relation between the two realms, and this would imply the failure of the Theory to account for the being of the things altogether, not just for non-substances.
It is a disjunctive argument, again, which proves that Forms and the sensible things could be neither synonymous nor homonymous with each other. While the assumption of synonymy gives rise to the problem of “third man”, the assumption of homonymy leads to other unacceptable consequences for the Theory.

4.4.1. The Argument on the Relation between Forms and Participants (93,1-95,3): The first horn of the argument (93,1-93,7) assumes, as the TF, that Forms and things participating in them are synonymous, i.e., they have the same definition (logos). According to the TF, things participating in the same Form must already have the same definition with each other as they are admitted to be the instances of a kind. Participating in the Form of F, makes the participant things share the definition of F-ness. The same F-ness is predicated of all the participants. The Argument assumes that the Form of F itself has the same definition (F-ness) alongside these participants, that is, the same F-ness must be predicated of the Form of F, too. If so, this common F-ness, that is shared by the Form of F and its participants must be explained by another Form, apart from the Form of F (according to the basic idea of the TF, if there is a common attribute, it is by virtue of a separate Form). By the same token, there would be a third Form to be the cause of the same definition that sensible things and the two F-ness Forms share. This is an ad infinitum process. In short, the synonymy relation between Forms and the participants gives rise to well-known “the third man problem”.

The second horn of the argument (93,14-95,2) assumes the Forms and things participating in them to be homonymous, i.e., their definitions be different. This assumption brings about unacceptable consequences as follows: Firstly, if a single Form is the reason for a common definition that many participants have, the Form itself must have the same definition either. It would be absurd otherwise. Mathematical and sensible 2’s have the same definition (2-ness) regardless of the fact that former is eternal and the latter is not. If so, their
common Form (Form of 2), as the cause of this common definition, would naturally have the same definition.

Furthermore, the homonymous relation between Forms and things would make the Forms cease to be principles and, all participation become accidental and, so, contingent. Alexander, by reminding that the one-over-many principle of Platonists entails *per se* participation, states that having only the same name in common is not sufficient for a Form (a substantial principle) to be the cause of being of things. To explain why these things participate in *this* particular Form, there must be a resemblance between the Form and the participants. This resemblance must be with respect to substance, otherwise, participants and Forms would be irrelevant to each other. In such a picture, it is not reasonable to assert the one-over-many principle.

Thus, the synonymy relation between Forms and participants is inevitable. Indeed, there could not be any resemblance between Forms and participants other than substantial. The resemblance could not be with respect to the accidental attributes of the participants, such as shape or color, as the Forms lack these. It could not be with respect to the accidental attributes of the Forms that are true of any Form due to its status as a Form, such as eternity, incorporeality or immutability, since participants lack these. Moreover, even if things participated in the Forms with respect to these common attributes, this participation would not explain the substantial differences among things. Things have different substances in the world, some are human some are animal… The common attributes of Forms (eternity, incorporeality or immutability) are far away from explaining these differences in the world.

Therefore, the resemblance between Forms and their participants must be in respect to nothing but substance. Having the same substance (and, hence, the definition), they must be synonymous. This is a necessary consequence of the assumption that Forms are causes of the being of the things.

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218 See 4.2.3. *per se* One over Many Argument, on pages 99-101.
As we have seen, this necessity takes us to the previous unacceptable conclusion, i.e., “the third man problem”, as stated in the first horn of the Argument. Consequently, the Argument as a whole suggests that even if the interior structure of the Theory confines us to assume an essential relation between the Forms and things, this could only be a vacuous theoretical assumption. In effect, with this last Argument, it is proven that any relation between Forms and things turns out to be impossible. In conclusion, for Alexander, the TF cannot explain the being of the things. Hence, it is a false theory.
CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

The initial question of this thesis was whether the predication theory in the *Categories* of Aristotle can be read as a response to the TF. There are affirmative answers to that question within the contemporary literature. I tried to specify these answers, and analyzed Alexander of Aphrodisias’ commentary on *Metaphysics*, A, 9, 990b22-991a8 as a direct evidence for the relevance of the *Categories* as a critique of the TF.

After making an introduction to the subject in chapter 1, I outlined the predication theory in the *Categories* in chapter 2. Then, in chapter 3, I introduced the main arguments in the scholarly literature about the critique of the TF in the *Categories*. As we have seen from these examples, the *Categories* can be read as a criticism against the TF in two senses: (1) The *Categories* presents alternative answers to the philosophical problems that the TF claims to solve (“nature of the ordinary sensible particulars”; “how can one thing have many names?” and “how can many things be called by one name?”). These alternative answers show how the *Categories* disagrees with the TF about the metaphysical structure of reality. But more than that, they solve these problems without falling into several (further) difficulties that the TF falls into. (2) The *Categories* suggests solutions to the problems to which the TF itself causes (“problem of bare substratum”, “ontological dualism between particulars and universals” and “dilemma of participation”). These problems are, indeed, inevitable consequences of the Platonic arguments and principles. The predication theory of the *Categories* avoids all of them. In short, in chapter 3, I have found six different aspects of reading the predication theory of the *Categories* against the TF.
In chapter 4, I appealed to Alexander of Aphrodisias’ commentary on *Metaphysics*, A, 9, 990b22-991a8, so as to give a textual evidence to these readings. The passage Alexander comments consists of Aristotle’s exclusive critiques of the TF, mainly, for its lack of internal consistency regarding Forms of things other than substances. While doing this, Aristotle seems to appeal to the ideas he elaborated in the *Categories*, as one can tell from the terminology he uses and the way he addresses the problems. As we have seen, Alexander’s detailed and elaborated commentary on the arguments of Aristotle admittedly supports this impression.

In this chapter 4, I tried to explain and analyze the arguments of Alexander by dividing them into four groups. By *the first group* of arguments, Alexander proves that the TF is false, since it contradicts with itself as to the existence of Forms of things other than substances. On the one hand, the founding arguments of the TF imply that there must be Forms of both substances and non-substances; but, on the other hand, the very principles of the TF necessarily limits the existence of Forms to the substantial things only.

In *the second group* of arguments, in the same line with the previous group, Alexander proves that there must be the Forms of substances only. That the Forms are substances and the only *per se* participation that can be held in the TF necessarily implies that for any x, if there is a Form in which x participates, then, x must be a substance.

The two arguments of *the third group* aim to show that Platonic claims on the nature of Forms are not coherent. That Forms’ being simple beings or object of thought is not coherent with their being substances. This result makes the Platonic assumption dubious that the Forms are substances. In the light of the previous arguments, it follows that, when the Forms are not substances, even substantial things in the world would not be said to have Forms.

Lastly, the arguments in *the fourth group* prove that there is no way to find a relation in the strict sense between the Forms and things. Neither homonymous
nor synonymous relation between the two realms is possible. As a result, the TF cannot explain the being of things as a whole.

While Alexander argues against the TF, as we have seen, he appeals to the ideas and assumptions of the *Categories*. His commentary as a whole reflects the metaphysical views of the *Categories*, and, his criticism to the TF is fundamentally built on the predication theory as in the *Categories*. Now, I conclude this study by reviewing and evaluating Alexander’s position and, then, trying to associate it with the six problems discussed in the chapter 3. This will, hopefully, conclude my study in accordance with its initial purpose of providing textual support to the contemporary literature in reading the *Categories* as a critique of the TF.

**5.1. The *Categories* and the Commentary of Alexander**

Alexander strictly follows the Aristotelian idea that “being is said in many ways.” It is from this perspective that he questions the predication theory of the TF. All subsequent arguments and assumptions are shaped around this idea. He assumes that if there are different kinds (categories) of being, then, an ontological theory must account for all of them.

In that regard, he distinguishes what is essential from what is accidental in terms of particulars, Forms and the (participation) relation between them. Accordingly, there assumed to be substantial and non-substantial participants in the world; Forms are substantial beings but also have accidental attributes; participation relation can (theoretically) be both *per se* (essential) and *per accidens* (accidental).

His first assumption is, then, that if there are substantial and non-substantial beings in reality, their relevant predication mechanisms must be peculiar to them. A single predication mechanism is not coherent with the idea of the categories of being. According to the *Categories*, a particular man (a primary substance) is a man, since man (secondary substance) is SAID OF him. The particular man is white, because an individual instance of white (an individual non-substance), of
which the color white (universal non-substance) is SAID OF, is IN the particular man. Thus, two kinds of predication reveal different aspects of a thing: while SAID OF relation is about the essence, being IN relation is about the accidents of a thing. Alexander, accordingly, describes *per se* participation as a participation with respect to the essence (substance) of a Form; *per accidens* participation as a participation with respect to the (supposed) accidental attributes of a Form.

Alexander also embraces the principle that “being is always being something” where “something” denotes a natural kind. He argues that only *per se* participation is possible, since Forms are causes of being (Argument 4.1.7) in the sense that Forms confer “being” to their participants. What participates, for instance, in “man” *qua* “man” *is* man. This example explicitly suggests that Alexander thinks that being is only possible by being a member of a natural kind as the *Categories* suggests. Indeed, we find this idea lying under Alexander’s subsequent arguments.

His other assumption, that we have noticed almost in his all arguments, is that different sorts of being cannot be explained out by one and the same kind of universal. Particulars are individual instances of their universal kinds within their own categories. This is, in fact, a necessary conclusion of the two aforementioned ideas of the *Categories*: (1) Being is said in many ways, that is, the being of substances is different from the being of non-substances; (2) being is always being something, that is, every particular is a member of a natural kind; (3) therefore, every particular is an instance of its universal kind within its own category. The essences (what-ness) of the things are determined by their corresponding universal kinds.

In fact, substantial and non-substantial particulars are related with different kinds of predications (as it is mentioned above), but this idea works only if these particulars are essentially subject for their universal kinds. What is essentially predicated of a particular man is “man”, which is a *secondary substance*, but, what is predicated of a particular white is “color white” which is a *universal non-substance*. Thus, particulars in their own categories are individual instances of
their peculiar kinds. Accordingly, a substantial kind is never predicated of (SAID OF) a non-substantial particular, and a non-substantial kind is never predicated of (SAID OF) a substantial particular (although a non-substantial kind can be IN a substantial particular). That is what Alexander defends throughout his arguments against the TF.

All this shows that Alexander takes into account the fourfold division of being, as in the Categories, in his analyses of the TF. He distinguishes universals from particulars in their own categories. In other words, particular man and Form of Man must be in the same one category (category of substance), but a particular white, for instance, and the Form of White must be in another category (category of non-substance). Placing Forms within the category of secondary substances (in accordance with the Platonists’ claim) by analogy, he argues that all the participants of the substantial Forms must necessarily be the instances of this category (substances). Since, there is no distinction among universals (all Forms are substances), and no distinction with regard to predication (all participation must be per se, since Forms are cause of beings/essences, particulars must be essential instances of their natural kinds and the participation must be held with regard to the definition of a Form), the TF neglects the fact that things are in different ways (due to their belonging to different categories).

There is one last point to mention in Alexander’s commentary that refers it to the account of the Categories. In his Definition Argument (4.2.2), he distinguishes the Form from its definition (formula, logos). Thereby, the per se participation relation is said to be held through the definition of the Form. He says that when the definition of a Form is truly predicated of a participant we can call it a participation. He offers the definition of something as a criterion of participation. This explanation of participation reminds the synonymous (essential) predication of the Categories. Aristotle, too, appeals to the criterion of definition in order to distinguish two kinds of predication. Definition of a universal is predicated of a particular only in the SAID OF relation, but not in the being IN relation.
As a result, we have seen that the ideas and the assumptions of the *Categories* is largely and extensively used in Alexander’s commentary on a passage from *Metaphysics*, A, 9 which is exclusively devoted to a critique of the TF. This suggests textually that the predication theory in the *Categories* can work against the TF. I will now turn to the relation of Alexander’s commentary to the six problems delineated in the chapter 3 as the different aspects of reading the *Categories* against the TF.

5.2. The Commentary of Alexander and the Problems in the Chapter 3

We have seen under the heading of the “*nature of the ordinary sensible particulars*”\(^{219}\), according to the TF, that participant things do not possess essences. As the predication theory of the Platonists reserves essential predication to the Forms, and accidental predication to the participants, only Forms are essentially what they are. Sensible things are only derivatively (accidentally). The predication theory in the *Categories* is read against this structure. A primary substance is essentially what it is (SAID OF relation) and also subject for accidental properties (being IN relation). Moreover, both substantial and non-substantial particulars are essential beings due to being subject for essential predication by their universal kinds in their own categories.

Alexander does not say about what the ontological status of the Platonic participants are. But he says what the ontological status of these participants must be. In that regard, he repeatedly states that a Form and the participants must be in an essential relation (Forms are only participated *per se*). His reasons of this inference are as follows:

- Forms are cause of being of the things (Argument 4.1.7). As being (“being something”) can only be provided by an essential predication, no relation between a participant and a Form can be accidental: it can only be essential.

- Participation must be in respect of the definition of a Form, since Forms are supposed to be predicated of the particulars (Argument 4.2.2). Forms, not

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\(^{219}\) See on pages 24-40 above.
themselves, but through their definitions are truly applied to the participants. As the definition of something is related with essence, Forms and participants must be in an essential relation.

- The one-over-many principle of Platonists entails essential relation between Forms and the things (Argument 4.2.3; Argument 4.4.1). For a Form to be the model of the participants, the Form and the participants must share the same essence. Otherwise, the one-over-many principle would lead to the arbitrary grouping of things. In other words, in the absence of an essential relation between one model and its participant, all participation relations become contingent, and, so, do not establish any necessary relation between a universal kind and its instances. Thus, how Alexander understands the One over Many Argument of Platonists reflects his understanding of “being is always being something.” Therefore, individual instances of the same kind must have the same essence with the kind itself.

- Alexander also refers to the similarity (synonymy) criterion between things and the Forms (Argument 4.2.1; Argument 4.4.1). There must necessarily be a similarity between two realms, so that we can find an explanation for the being of the things in this world. This similarity must necessarily be in respect to essence, otherwise, Forms lose their roles as principles (as causes of beings) and all participation becomes, once again, contingent.

These suggest that Alexander considers the ordinary sensible things as the substantial beings (primary substances) of the *Categories* and expects the TF to explain their natures. According to his assumption, the things possess their beings and, hence, their essential attributes. Accordingly, if the Forms exist, they must be in a synonymous relation with the participants.

However, for Alexander, too, the TF fails to do that, and the participants of the TF lack their essences. Firstly, even Forms’ being substances are questionable, since it seems incoherent with other Platonic claims, that is, Forms are simple beings and they are objects of thoughts (Arguments 4.3.1 and 4.3.2). If a Form is
not substance, we cannot legitimately claim that they are essentially predicated of substantial things. Secondly, the TF cannot provide the synonymous relation between Forms and participants, as this gives rise to the “third man problem” (Argument 4.4.1). Beyond that, the same Argument tells us that it is not possible to found a reasonable connection between the two realms, being and becoming/having. In particular, the TF, by not allowing essential participation between Forms and participants, cannot account for the essential features of things and it makes everything accidental.

The second problem was that “how can one thing have many names?” This problem was the consequence of “the realist theory of meaning” that both Plato and Aristotle are accepted to embrace. Since the names we use refer to things as real items independent of our minds, to predicate something of another means to predicate one such item of another (a substance of another substance). This limits the predication to the identity statements only.

Plato’s solution to that problem was the doctrine of communion of Forms, which is found unconvincing from several aspects: It does not explain the proper names of things that peculiarly belong to them; it is not philosophically persuasive for the relation of Forms in themselves and with the participants; it is not compatible with the one-over-many principle. Aristotle’s solution to the same problem in the Categories also avoids these very difficulties that the TF falls in: The essential classification of things (“being something”) and distinguishing being of substances from non-substances (and their corresponding predication mechanisms) enable particular things to be called both by the names of their species/genus, and by the name of their accidental properties in a strict sense (e.g., “Socrates is white” designates Socrates as a white thing among other white things).

In Alexander’s commentary at issue, firstly, we do not see a reference to one part of this problem, that is, the problem of particulars’ getting multiple names (predications) from universal kinds (species and genus). But, as we have seen,

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220 See on pages 40-48 above.
he, throughout his arguments against the TF, embraces the assumptions behind the solution of the *Categories* to the problem: Things must be subject for the essential predication and they necessarily belong to a certain kind (“being is always being something”). Therefore, we can assume that he could see the same problem for the TF. He would legitimately ask this question: if there is no essential similarity (synonymy) between participants and the Forms (there should not be, as it leads to the third man problem, Argument 4.4.1), how the combining Forms (i.e., species and genera) would apply to the participants?

On the other hand, Alexander explicitly refers to the other part of the problem for the TF, that is, the problem of particulars’ getting multiple names (predications) from their accidents. We have seen that both the 4.2.1 The Dyad Argument (“the mathematical dyad” version) and 4.2.2 The Definition Argument imply that the predication theory of the Platonists gives rise to the very problem. According to these Arguments, the TF ends up turning non-substances into substances. Therefore, to predicate an accident of a substance means to predicate a substance of another substance, which is impossible. Then, there is no way to call a thing by its names of accidents, but only by the name of its substance.

As we have seen, this result follows from not making a distinction between essential and accidental universals (Forms) and their corresponding predication mechanisms. When the accidental property of the mathematical dyad, its eternity, participates *per se* (since only *per se* participation is possible) in the substantial Form of Eternity (all Forms are substances), it would necessarily become a substance (because every particular is an instance of its universal kind within its own category). A mathematical dyad would be both essentially (hence substantially) dyad and eternal. Likewise, if the participation is a definitional relation, then, when a non-substantial particular participates *per se* in a substantial Form, so as to receive its definition, it would become a substance. Hence, the TF makes all the existing things an agglomerate of different substances.
Alexander’s arguments clearly suggest that it must be the *Categories* which offers a genuine solution to this problem by providing necessary tools that the TF fails to do: essential predication of things (as a matter of classification) and distinguishing kinds of being together with their peculiar predication mechanisms. Thereby, things can get both their substances and non-substance properties, and one can be called by its accidental properties as well as its substantial ones.

The *Categories* was also read against the TF, in terms of their answers to the question “how can many things be called by one name?” This problem is about the relation between the particulars and their natural kinds. According to the One over Many Argument of the TF, there is one separate Form for each common property in virtue of which the things are called by the name of it. But, this relational account of predication between two sides does not say much about the source of this relation. In other words, the TF does not give a reason against arbitrary grouping of things and, hence, does not preclude contingency. The *Categories*, on the other hand, answers to that question with the non-relational account of the predication, namely, classification (essential predication). As every individual is “individual something,” things are subsumed under their kinds by essential predication. Thereby, individuals in each category are accepted to be the particular instances of their kind universals. In other words, things naturally fall into kinds and, so, are called by the name of their species and genus.

We have seen the same approach against the TF in Alexander throughout his arguments, with the assumption of “being is being something” behind. Alexander assumes that each particular is an instance of a natural kind. That is why he claims that the One over Many Argument of the TF must entail *per se* participation between Forms and participants (Argument 4.2.3). Likewise, he claims that only an essential (substantial) resemblance between Forms and participants can explain their relation (Argument 4.4.1). If the Forms are causes

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221 See on pages 49-53 above.
of the being of things, and participants are individual instances of them, then, they must have the same definition (Arguments 4.2.4 and 4.4.1). Without essential predication, everything becomes accidental, and the TF cannot answer to the question why these participants participate in this Form rather than another. Or, without sharing the same essence, things cannot be classified necessarily under a Form. But only arbitrarily.

We have also seen that Alexander holds to the same idea together with the categorical differences of being, in line with the Categories. When he argues that per se participation in a substantial Form necessarily implies that the participant would be a substance (1st and 2nd group of arguments), he clearly assumes the particulars as instances of their natural kinds in their own category (as the fourfold distinction of being suggests). As it is mentioned above, this is the conclusion of the two ideas of the Categories: If (1) being is said in many ways and (2) being is being something, then, every particular is an individual instance of its natural kind within its own category. Particulars fall under their natural kinds according to their kinds of being. Therefore, instances of substantial Forms must be substantial particulars.

Accordingly, when he claims that the Forms of non-substantial things cannot be substances (Argument 4.1.8) and that the Forms of substantial things cannot be non-substances (Argument 4.3.2), Alexander makes the same categorical distinction. The non-substantial particulars must also be subsumed essentially under their own natural kinds (universal non-substances). Hence, a substantial Form should not be predicated essentially of the non-substantial particulars.

Alexander thinks that the predication theory of the Platonists fails to correspond to this structure of being. The TF does not make a distinction among the kinds of being (all Forms are substances). On the other hand, although its principles confine it to per se participation only, the TF cannot allow it, because the need for synonymy between the Forms and their participants gives rise to the third man problem (Argument 4.4.1). Thus, the TF cannot give a reason against arbitrary grouping of things and does not respond to the contingency charge. In
such a picture, the One over Many Argument cannot account genuinely for both kinds of being, namely, substances and non-substances.

The *Categories* was also regarded to bring solutions to the problems of the TF itself. “The problem of bare substratum” was one of these.\(^\text{222}\) As we have seen, predication in the TF is associated with the notion of the bare substratum in the literature, as participation is a relation between two separate beings. Existence of a preliminary underlying subject is assumed and it is conceived as the subject of participation in a Form. Besides the problems of the notion of the bare substratum in itself, it also causes the problem of the contingency. As bare substratum and the attributes it bears are independent from each other, there is no essential relation between the two sides. Hence, the TF ends up being responsible for the same problem once again. It cannot provide a fundamental reason for a bare substratum to “choose” the Form X rather than Form Y to participate in.

Against this consequence, the predication theory of the *Categories* is offered: Essential predication of particulars by their universal kinds prevents us from appealing to a bare substratum. As primary substances are subject for everything (both substantial and non-substantial universals), the *Categories* identifies primary substance with underlying subject (substratum).

Alexander does not refer to the issue explicitly. But, as it is mentioned above, Alexander refers to the charge of contingency against the TF; and against this charge, he suggests essential predication (Arguments 4.2.3 and 4.4.1). As he assumes that particulars are members of their natural kinds (“being is being something”), he persistently claim that Forms and the participants must be in an essential relation (Arguments 4.1.7; 4.2.1; 4.2.2; 4.2.4). These suggest that he does not regard sensible particulars as composed of attributes and their underlying subject, but he considers them as unified essential beings that are instances of their universal kinds. In other words, once again, his sensible particulars are the primary substances of the *Categories*.

\(^{222}\) See on pages 53-65 above.
But, again, if the TF does not allow this essential participation between a particular and its kind, as it gives rise to the third man problem (Argument 4.4.1), the participants cannot be essential beings. Then, there is no reason not to assume two ontologically distinct entities in a participation relation (which somehow come together). On the one side, there are universal kinds (Forms), and on the other side, then, an underlying subject which exemplifies them. And, therefore, the TF has to face the problems that this notion causes.

"The ontological dualism between particulars and universals"\(^{223}\) was another area that the \textit{Categories} is read against the TF. According to Aristotle, separation of Forms by the Platonists causes two problems: (1) Forms are considered as universals, but separation turns them into particular substances. Then, the Forms, being themselves particulars, are expected to be predicated of many particular instances. (2) Forms do not contribute to the being and knowledge of particular things, since the TF does not allow Forms and particulars to have the same definition, due to the ontological separation of the two realms. The idea that “being is being something” in the \textit{Categories}, however, prevents particulars and universals from being two distinct types. Rather, they are ontologically interdependent beings. Hence, they are free from the problems of the Platonic account abovementioned.

In Alexander, it is possible to see one of the separation charges on the TF: “Forms do not contribute to the being of the particular things.” According to the Argument 4.4.1, participants and the Forms cannot be synonymous. If so, we cannot claim anymore that Forms are causes of the being of things (Arguments 4.1.7 and 4.4.1). In fact, the Argument 4.4.1 overall tells us that there is no way to found a convenient relation between Forms and particulars within the TF, since homonymy relation is also not acceptable. This, further, suggests that ontological dualism between things and their causes cannot be defended in a coherent way for the TF.

\(^{223}\) See on pages 66-73 above.
Against this problem, we know that Alexander assumes that particular things are essential beings by virtue of being the members of their natural kinds (“being something”) and, so, have the same essence with their universals. That is why he argues that the Forms and things must be inevitably synonymous (Argument 4.4.1). Consequently, we can assume that Alexander holds to the *Categories* view that particular things and their causes cannot be ontologically separate beings.

Lastly, the predication theory in the *Categories* was claimed to solve “the dilemma of participation”224 in the literature. The solution comes with its distinctions between (1) kinds of being, (2) kinds of predication and (3) particulars and universals. Firstly, universals are not something individual and numerically one to be divided into parts. Secondly, kind universals (species and genera) are not IN their particular instances but SAID OF them. They are not ontologically separate from their individual instances. And thirdly, universal non-substances are IN the primary substances by virtue of their individual instances. The individual non-substances, OF which the universal non-substances are SAID, are non-recurrent and numerically distinct beings. Therefore, universal non-substances are predicated of many primary substances not as a whole or part, but by virtue of the mediation of these non-recurrent individuals.

Alexander’s assumptions support this reading: Different sorts of things are explained by their corresponding universals and predication mechanisms. Without these distinctions, the substantial and particularized Forms of the Platonists would face the question whether Forms are predicated as a whole or in part. Hence, although he does not mention it, the Dilemma of Participation can be regarded as one of the conclusions of these inefficiencies of the TF that Alexander points out.

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224 See on pages 73-76 above.
I have tried to associate the passage of Alexander with the six problems which constitute the different aspects of reading the *Categories* against the TF in the literature. As we have seen, in Alexander’s statements, it is possible to see the same problems, directly or implicitly.

To sum up, then, what has been said so far; according to Alexander, the TF cannot explain the two features of reality: (1) Things are essential beings. (2) Things are not only substances, but there are also non-substantial things. Firstly, the predication theory of the TF fails to provide things with being (essence). Thus, it turns them into accidental beings. But also, it neglects that some things are as accidents and, accordingly, turns them into essential beings. Separation of Forms from particulars, not distinguishing what is essential from what is accidental in terms of both universal kinds and their predication mechanisms are seen as the reasons of these results. As a consequence, the TF fails to offer any convincing solution to the problems that are formulated under the six headings above.

Behind these two charges of Alexander against the TF, we have found the account of the *Categories*. Indeed, these charges are the consequences of the ontology in the *Categories*. Its predication theory explains these features of reality and, thus, offers solutions to the six problems as claimed in the literature. Then, Alexander’s commentary on *Metaphysics*, A, 9, 990b22-991a8 supports the reading in the contemporary literature just in the same way: We can find a response to the TF in the *Categories*, although Aristotle himself does not mention it explicitly.
REFERENCES


A. THE TEXT OF ALEXANDER’S COMMENTARY (88,5-95,2)

990b22 Again, according to the supposition by which we say that the Ideas exist, [there will be Forms not only of substances but of many other things as well]. [88,5-89,7] Aristotle says that as a consequence of the arguments that establish the Ideas, the Platonists must say that there are Ideas not only of substances but also of many other things, as has been proved by what has already been said. For the argument based on the fact that something common to several things can be thought of, and that it [continues] to be thought of even when the particular things no longer exist, brings in Ideas of perishable things and proves that there are Ideas not only of substances. Moreover, the arguments from the sciences similarly prove that there are Ideas not only of substances but also of many other things; for it is not only in the case of substances that thinking continues after the substances of which [something common] is predicated have perished, but also in the case of qualities and quantities and of each of the things that are in this way, nor are there sciences only of substances. Moreover, if there are Ideas of the virtues, there would not be Ideas only of substances, for the virtues are not substances. He says, ‘and a thousand other consequences follow’ [990b27], because there are certain other arguments aimed at proving the Ideas that result in saying that there are Forms not only of substances. For the argument from the fact that one thing is predicated in reference to many, a thing that, [being] the same, belongs to all of them although they differ from one another, and that is other than each of them, does not introduce Ideas only of substances; for that one thing is predicated with reference to many [is the case] not only with substance but with the accidents too. And the argument that says that the reason things come to be in an orderly way is that they come to be by reference to a fixed model, and that this is the Idea, does not apply only to substances. Moreover,
there is the argument that [begins] with the statement that whenever we make a true assertion [about something], that thing exists. But when we say there are five or three harmonies (sumphônia) and three concordances, we are making a true assertion; therefore, they are just this many. But surely the number of things in this world is unlimited; therefore, there exist certain other and eternal things by reference to which we make true assertions. Now this argument too does not [apply] only to substances; and there are many other arguments of this sort.

[89,7-89,20] But in conformity with what is necessary, and with what is consistent with the opinions about the Forms, according to which the Platonists say that they can be participated in, there will be, in their view, Ideas only of substances. For if, according to them, the Ideas are causes of the being of the things that are by reference to them, and if it is by participating in them that the things that are by reference to them have their being, clearly it would not be per accidens that they are participated in and are causes for the things that are by reference to, and through, them, but per se, inasmuch as they are Ideas. Things might be said to participate per accidens in certain [others] if they participate in them in some respect which is not that in virtue of which the things participated in have their being. But the Ideas, if they are participated in per accidens, would not confer being on the things that are by reference to them; for what participates in some accidental attribute of man is not a man, but [only] what participates in man qua man. But the Ideas are substances (for certainly the Platonists would not say that the principles are not substances, for thus what is not substance would be prior to substance); therefore, the things too for which the Ideas are causes of being by participation [of these things] in them must necessarily be substances as well. For the Platonists, then, there will be Ideas only of substances.

[89,20-90,2] For if there are Ideas too of things that are not substances, such as accidents, why, in the first place, are there not Ideas of all the accidents rather than of some but not of others? Again, either the Ideas of accidents will in their turn be substances, or they will not. If they are not substances, there will be Ideas
that, although principles, are not substances; but the Platonists say that the principles are substances. Again, it is absurd that all the Ideas should not be, to the highest degree, of the same nature. And if someone were to say that the Ideas are objects of thought (noêma) or substances, how is it that some of the things participating per se in them come to be and are substances, but others are not substances?

990b30 But things must participate in each Form in such a way that they are not predicated of a subject.

[90,5-91,5] That is, ‘But things that are by reference to the Forms must participate in each of them in such a way that they do not in any way have their being in a subject’, i.e. in such a way that they are not predicated per accidens and from some accident that belongs to the Forms – for here Aristotle uses [the expression] ‘of a subject’ instead of ‘of an accident’. Therefore, he says, since the things that come to be and are by reference to the Ideas, and exist because of them, participate in them per se, they would not [participate] in some accident belonging to the Forms. But thus the things that are by reference to the Ideas must be substances because they participate per se, and not per accidens, in the substances [of the Ideas]. He adds an example of participation per accidens. If the dyad that is dyad by participation in the [ideal] dyad participates in eternity, it does so per accidens, because the [ideal] dyad, by participation in which it is dyad, is eternal. But it does not participate per accidens in the [ideal] dyad, for [then] it would be dyad in the same way as it is eternal; but the [ideal] dyad is not dyad inasmuch as it is eternal, but eternity is incidental to it. Hence, if something that participates in the [ideal] dyad should be said to participate in eternity too, it would participate per accidens in the dyad. Since then it participates per se in the [ideal] dyad, but per accidens in eternity, it is dyad, and to that extent similar to that dyad, but it is not eternal; for things that participate in certain [others] per accidens are not similar to those in which they participate in this way. If then the things in this world are similar to the Ideas, they do not participate in them per accidens but per se; but what participates per se in substance is substance. Therefore, there will be Ideas only of substances, in
conformity with what is consistent with [the opinion of] the Platonists and a necessary [consequence] for them, if the Ideas are in fact substances, and the things participating *per se* in substances are substances. For the same terms signify substance here and in reference to eternal things, as man is substance in this world and in the ideal world, and heat a quality both here and there. And if this argument is sound, the consequence will be that the Platonists must say that of the things around us, there are Ideas only of substances, if the Ideas are substances.

[91,6-91,13] In certain manuscripts we find the reading: ‘But things must participate in each Form in such a way that it is predicated of a subject.’ And by this reading Aristotle would be saying that things participating in the Idea must participate in it *per se*, and that in this way the Idea will be predicated of them as subjects. As a result, if the formula of dyad applies to something that is said to participate in the [ideal] dyad, that thing participates in the dyad; but if the formula that applies to the thing participating is not that of dyad, but of eternity, it participates in eternity. But in saying, ‘so that the Forms will be substance’ [990b34], he means, ‘so that if the Forms exist, they will be substance’; or, ‘so that the Forms will be only substance’; for this point is assumed.

[91,13-91,31] ‘The same terms signify substance in this world and in the ideal world’ [990b34]. For if what is quality among us is substance among the Forms, it would certainly not be necessary to say that of the things in this world, there are Ideas only of substances; for if the Ideas are substances, it is surely not possible to say that some of the things that come to be by reference to them are substances, but others something else. ‘For the same terms signify substance in this world and in the ideal world, or what can it mean to say that there is something apart from these things, the one-over-many?’ [991a1]. If the things in this world do not participate *per se* in the Ideas, but [only] *per accidens*, what, Aristotle asks, does it signify for the Platonists to say that there is something apart from these things, i.e. the sensibles, something that, being one, is predicated of many and is the one model of the many things in this world? For
there will not be the one-over-many if this one is predicated *per accidens* of the things that come to be by reference to it (for in that case, all things could participate in all things); and what participates in something *per accidens* neither participates in it in the proper sense, nor has its being from that thing inasmuch as it is that thing, nor is made like it. Or else the question, ‘What can it mean to say that there is something apart from these things, the one-over-many?’ could be asked as a consequence of the statement that ‘The same terms signify substance in this world and in the ideal world’. For if this latter is not [true], what is the meaning of their assertion that there is something apart from sensible things, the one thing that is predicated of many? For this assertion is made on the ground that the same nature is manifested both by the one thing that is over many and by the many of which the one thing is predicated.

[91,31-92,18] Now that this point has been made, one might add to it the following. If it is in respect to substance that the things here participate in the Ideas, and if these things differ, either the same differences are also in the Ideas by reference to which these different things exist, or something analogous to these differences. For since the things in this world have their being from the Ideas, they will also have from these latter the fact that they differ, because they have their differences in virtue of the substance which they receive from the Ideas. For it is because of this that one Idea confers this form and another Idea confers that form, since otherwise nothing would prevent one Idea from being the source of all forms. As a result, each Idea either will be the same in substance and form as the things that come to be by reference to it, or will in any case at least possess some power whereby one Idea produces and confers this particular form and another that particular form, in virtue of which the things that have their being by reference to these Ideas also have their differences. But the [same] kind of difference that is in the things here that differ from one another will be in the Ideas too, or at least something analogous. But among the things in this world, one is rational animal, another irrational (*alogos*) animal, and it is an Idea that confers each of these proper differences; therefore, the rational and the irrational, or something analogous to these, in virtue of which one Idea confers
the rational and another the irrational, are in the Ideas too. And the things,
[rational and irrational animal,] that have their being by reference to, and from,
the Ideas have the same relationship (logos) to each other as do the things, [the
rational and the irrational,] by reference to which these [animals] came into
being, whether these [differentiae] are contraries, or one of them a possession,
the other a privation (sterēsis). Both the rational and the irrational, therefore, are
in the Ideas too. But if this is the case, how are the Ideas still simple?

[92,18-92,30] Again, if the Ideas are objects of thought, as some say, and their
reality (hupostasis) consists in their being thought of, how will the one who
thinks of them think of them at the same time? For it is impossible to think of
contraries or opposites at the same time, seeing that these are not simply a
plurality. But if the Ideas are thought of by turn, they are perishable, not eternal;
for when they are not being thought of they will not exist, if indeed their being
consists in their being thought of. Things that are impossible by their very nature
are impossible in all instances, just as, [once] it was impossible for the diagonal
to be commensurable with the side, this is similarly the case everywhere and for
everyone – indeed, even for the gods. Again, if the Ideas are objects of thought,
they are not substances, and the principles will not be substances. Again, how
will substance come to be by reference to something not substance? For as it is
absurd that what comes to be by reference to substance should not be substance,
so it is also absurd that what comes to be by reference to what is not substance
should be substance.

991a1 And if the Ideas and the things participating in them have the same
form, [there will be something common to these].

[93,1-95,3] The argument is from a disjunction, and from a disjunction divided
into contradictory [propositions]. For either the form and formula of the Ideas
and of the things participating in them is the same, or it is not the same. If it is in
fact the same, just as there is something common in (epi) the things that
participate, since they have the same form, so there will be something common
in, and predicated of, these things and the Ideas from which they are; for that
Idea has the same form as these things. But in that case, what is predicated in
common of them will be an Idea, and thus there would be an Idea of an Idea; and this process would continue \textit{ad infinitum}. What Aristotle says here is the second argument we gave in explaining the third man \cite{84,21ff}. Having shown previously that the things participating in the Ideas will not participate in them \textit{per accidens}, given that these things have both their being in general, and the fact that they are particular things of this kind, through participation in the Ideas, he introduces the present statement as being equivalent to [the following]: if therefore the Ideas and the things participating in them have the same form, as has been proved, there will be something common both in each Idea and in the things that are by reference to each Idea; but in this way the things here below, having as they do the same form as things in the ideal world, will also be substances because the Ideas by reference to which they are substances; and thus there would be Ideas only of substances. But if [the form of the Ideas and of the things participating in them] is not [the same], he will state the absurd consequence that follows in this case as well. ‘For why should 2 be one and the same in the perishable 2’s or in those that are many but eternal, and not the same in the 2-itself as in the particular 2?’ \cite{991a3}. This question serves to establish that there will be something common both to the Ideas and to the things that are by reference to them. For if, because the 2’s in sensible and perishable things have the same form as the imperishable 2’s by means of which we count sensible things (these would be the mathematical 2’s, for the Platonists said that mathematical objects are between sensible things and the Ideas \cite{52,10ff}, being eternal but multiple [and] similar to one another), we predicate 2 of these as one and the same predicate, disregarding the fact that one 2 is eternal and the other not, but, since they have the same form inasmuch as they are 2’s, predicating 2 in common of all of them similarly because each 2 has its being in virtue of its participation in 2-itself – if [we so predicate, then] it will be no less the case that 2 is predicated in common both of the Idea itself, the 2-itself, and of the particular 2’s that have their being from it: because, [that is, the ideal 2 and the particular 2’s] have the same form.
But if, [again,] the things that are by reference to the Ideas should not have been made like them either in substance or in form, they would be [only] homonymous with the Ideas. But in that case, why would a particular Idea be the cause of the being of things [only] homonymous with it any more than of some other things, if these things called by the same name \((\text{homonomos})\) as the Idea are not in fact made like it in substance and form? The case will be the same as if one were to call both Callias and a wooden image ‘man’, although the two are not at all alike with respect [to their being] men. And, in general, how could things be said to participate in the Ideas if they have no community \((\text{koinonia})\) whatever with them in respect to their substance? And this [objection] would be equivalent to the one stated shortly before: ‘What can it mean to say that there is something apart from these things, the one-over-many?’ \([991a1]\). For if we were to say that as likenesses [are called] by the same name as the things from which they are derived, so things here below too [are named after] the Ideas, in what respect will the Platonists claim that these things have been made like the Ideas if not in their substance? Are they likenesses by their shape or colour? but there is nothing of this sort in the Ideas. But have they been made like the Ideas in eternity or incorporeality or immutability? but that is impossible. If we examine the matter in this way, we shall discover [the similarity can be] in respect to nothing except substance. And indeed, even if it were the fact that things participating [in the Ideas] do so in virtue of some one of the other [properties] that belong to them, in virtue of which of these [properties] that the Ideas have in common with one another would things participate in them: their eternity, for instance, or incorporeality, or immutability? But if things did participate in virtue of some one of the common properties, why in the world is one of the things that participate man, another horse, another the number 2? [This is] not inasmuch as these [Forms are Forms of man and horse, etc.], or [inasmuch as] those [particular things are men and horses, etc.] by participating in the Forms – but on account of which of the common properties of the Forms, [then, are particular things differentiated]?
B. OUTLINE OF THE ARGUMENTS OF ALEXANDER

1. GROUP: “The Theory of Forms contradicts with itself as to the existence of Forms of things other than substances”

Lemma: 990b22-990b30

1. Premise: According to the following arguments of the Platonists, there must be Forms of both substances and non-substances. So, if the TF is true, there must be Forms of different sorts of being.

Platonic arguments (88,5-89,7):
- The Object of Thought Argument
- The Arguments from the Sciences
- The Virtues Argument
- The One over Many Argument
- The Fixed Model Argument
- The True Assertion Argument

2. Premise: According to the logical necessities and principles of the TF, there must only be the Forms of substances:

The Cause of Being Argument (89,7-89,20):
- Participation in Forms can only be held per se (Because Forms are posited as cause of being of the things. As being – “being something”- is related with essence, participation cannot be held per accidens).
- Forms are substances (Because they are posited as principles. Only substantial Form can have ontological and causal priority over sensible substances, not a non-substantial Form).
- Therefore, only substantial particulars could have Forms.
The Argument on the Forms of Non-Substances (89,20-90,2):

- Assumption: If there are Forms of non-substantial things, these certain Forms would themselves either be (1) non-substances or (2) substances (a *reductio* argument in disjunctive form).
  - 1st horn: It is not possible for Forms to be non-substances, because Forms are posited as principles. Also, the idea that some Forms are substances and some are non-substances is against the Platonic presumption that all Forms must have the same nature.
  - 2nd horn: Forms of non-substantial things cannot be substances, because only a non-substantial universal (Form) is (essentially) predicated of a non-substantial thing (particulars are individual instances of their universal kinds within their own categories).
- Therefore, the assumption is not true. There cannot be Forms of non-substantial things.

3. Conclusion: Therefore, the TF is false.

2. GROUP: “There must only be the Forms of substances”

The Dyad Argument (90,5-91,5):

Lemma: 990b30-b34

- Participation in Forms can only be held *per se* (1- Because *per accidens* participation leads to absurd and contradictory consequences; 2- There is no Forms of non-substances. Consequently, the TF either turns non-substances into substances or excludes them from participation relation).
  - Forms are substances.
  - Therefore, there must only be the Forms of substances.

The Definition Argument (91,6-91,13):

Lemma: 990b34
Participation in Forms can only be held *per se* (Because participation must be in such a way that Forms are predicated of the participants as subject. If so, the participation is held through the definition of the Form. That the definition of a Form truly applies to the participant is called participation).

- Forms are substances (As the Form and the definition of the Form are apart from each other, Forms’ being substances does not pose a problem in terms of predicking one substance, the Form, of another, the participant).
- Therefore, there must only be the Forms of substances.

*per se One over Many Argument (91,13-91,31):*

Lemma: 990b34-991a2

- Participation in Forms can only be held *per se* (Because the one-over-many principle of the Platonists requires an essential relation between one universal model and its particular instances. Otherwise, the one-over-many relation turns out to be a contingent relation; things cannot receive their beings; there would be no synonymy between Forms and things; and, therefore, there would not be proper participation).
- Forms are substances.
- Therefore, there must only be the Forms of substances.

The Synonymy Argument (93,7-93,14):*

Lemma: 991a2-a3

- Forms and participants have the same definition (they are *synonymous*) (Because Forms are participants’ cause of being, and individual instances must have the same essence with their universal kinds)
- Forms are substances.
- Therefore, there must only be the Forms of substances.
3. GROUP: “Platonic claims on the nature of Forms are not coherent”

The Differentia Argument (91,31-92,18):

- If Forms are the cause of the substances in the world, then, they must also be responsible for the substantial differences among things. As it is differentia which makes the differences between substances, then, Forms must also confer the differentia to the participants, together with their essences (substances).
- If so, the genus-Forms (e.g., animal) must consist of several substantial features (e.g., rational and irrational) in order to distinguish their species substantially.
- This result is not consistent with the simplicity claim of the Forms. According to the Platonists, each Form is a oneFeatured substance.
- This suggests that either the Platonic Forms are simple beings and, therefore, they cannot explain substantial differences among the things or they can account for such differences, but, then, they cannot be simple beings. Two options are unacceptable.
- This inconsistency damages the Platonic claim that Forms are substances in the sense of being the causes and principles of substantial differences among the sensibles.

The Argument on the Forms as Object of Thought (92,18-92,30):

- If the Object of Thought Argument of Platonists is true, then, Forms exist as long as they are thought of. They would not exist when they are not thought of. As the contrary Forms are necessarily being thought in turn, they exist in turn. This makes them temporal beings against the Platonic claim that Forms are eternal beings.
- If the Object of Thought Argument of Platonists is true, then, Forms are non-substances. Non-substantial Forms are not acceptable, since they are posited as principles. Also, a non-substance Form cannot explain the being of the substantial particulars, as particulars are the individual instances of their
universal kinds within their own category. A particular substance cannot be subject for (per se) predication by the non-substance universal (Form).

- As a result, Forms’ being object of thought is not coherent with the idea that they are eternal substances.

4. GROUP: “There is no way to find a convenient relation between the Forms and things”

Lemma: 991a2-a8

The Argument on the relation between Forms and participants (93,1-95,3):

- Assumption: Forms and participants are either synonymous (they have the same definition) or homonymous (they have different definitions) (a reductio argument in disjunctive form).

- 1st horn: If they are synonymous, this leads to the third man problem. As any common attribute among particulars is explained by a separate Form, we need to appeal to another Form for the common definition between particulars and their Form, which is an ad infinitum process. Therefore, synonymy assumption cannot work in the TF.

- 2nd horn: If they are homonymous, the Form and the participants do not have the same definition in common. But, this is an absurd assumption, since common definition between participants (which participated in the same Form) naturally requires that their single Form to have the same definition, either.

- Additionally, if they are homonymous, then, Forms cease to be principles, and all participation becomes contingent. The TF must found a substantial resemblance between things and the Forms. Only a substantial resemblance can explain why several things participate in a particular Form. Therefore, homonymy assumption leads to other unacceptable consequences.

- Consequently, either assumptions cannot be true. Forms and participants can be neither synonymous nor homonymous with each other. The TF cannot provide a genuine reason for the relation between two realms.
C. ON ALEXANDER’S STATEMENTS AT 89, 20 - 89, 21

If there are Ideas too of things that are not substances, such as accidents, why, in the first place, are there not Ideas of all the accidents rather than of some but not of others? (89, 20-21)

This short and confusing remark brings to mind that the members of the Academy might have discussed the question “what things could have Forms?” As a conclusion, they might have denied the Forms of some non-substantial beings. The statements of Alexander where he mentions the Forms of relatives seem to support such a possibility. We are told that, more than once, Platonists reject the existence of the Forms of relatives:

[Aristotle] says this because the Platonists did not say there are Ideas of all sensible things, for they did not posit that there are Ideas of those things among the relatives (ta pros ti) that exist by relation (skhesis). (50,24-51,2)225

Or again:

The Platonists denied that there are Ideas of relatives because Ideas, being for them substances of some kind, subsist independently, whereas relatives have their being in their relation to one another. (83,24-26)226

But, this testimony of Alexander seems quite perplexing, when we recall the several dialogues of Plato. We know that, from Phaedo (74a-75c), there are the Forms of Equal, Greater, Smaller and “all such things” that are perfectly what they are and distinct from their deficient participant objects. The participants in the sensible world only strive to be like them. Likewise, the Form of Double (Republic, 479b) or Forms “Sameness” and “Difference” (Sophist, 254e-256e) are the primary examples of Forms of relatives in Plato’s works. According to

225 Within his commentary on Metaphysics, A, 6, 987b9: “For the many things that have the same name as the Forms are [what they are] through participation in them.”

226 Within his commentary on Metaphysics, A, 9, 990b15: “Further, of the more exact of the arguments, some produce Ideas of relatives, of which we say there is not an intrinsic kind (genos), whereas others introduce the Third Man.”
Ross, there is no genuine evidence to assume that Plato later in his life abandoned the existence of Forms which he earlier admitted.\footnote{W. David Ross, \textit{Plato's Theory of Ideas} (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966), 171 and 175.}

In addition to these, there are examples of \textit{relational} Forms:\footnote{Gail Fine, \textit{On Ideas: Aristotle's Criticism of Plato's Theory of Forms} (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004 [1993]), 186.} The Form of Mastery, for instance, has its definition by virtue of its relation to the Form of Slavery \textit{(Parmenides, 133e)}. The Form of Three is also odd by participating in the Form of Odd \textit{(Phaedo, 104d)}. And the most fundamental characteristic of the Realm of the Forms is that any Form (not just of relatives) is what it is by its relation with the Form of Good \textit{(Republic, 505a-b, 506a, 508d-509b)}. The second excerpt is from the passage that Alexander explains in detail “the Argument from Relatives” of Platonists (one of the founding arguments of the TF) and the objections of Aristotle to this argument, by referring to the \textit{On Ideas} of Aristotle. For Fine, Aristotle, here, does not mean that Platonists do not want this sort of Forms or they explicitly reject them, but he himself criticizes the consequence of this Argument by showing the absurdity of the existence of Forms of relatives. For Aristotle, the TF entails to reject the existence of such Forms, since all Forms are substances as basic beings and exist in themselves, whereas relative beings are not admitted as substances. It is contradictory, for instance, for Form of Equal to be a substance, as it needs another being to be equal with. Thus, Platonists’ explicit admission of these Forms is incompatible with their initial theory.\footnote{Fine, \textit{On Ideas: Aristotle’s Criticism of Plato’s Theory of Forms}, 184-188. For Aristotle, the necessity for the rejection of the Forms of relatives eventuates from the fact that being a relative is always being in relation to something else. While all Forms are supposed to be substances, there cannot be a relative Form. No relative can enjoy being an autonomous substance, that is, being independent existentially and definitionally that all Forms are supposed to be. \textit{Ibid.}}

Ross, too, thinks the same way that what Aristotle says in 990b15 does not imply that Platonists explicitly rejected the existence of Forms of relatives as
Alexander suggests, but only they should have, due to the two conflicting claims of them. Aristotle, here, merely argues that they should have rejected their existence by recognizing that these Forms would not establish a “separately existing class” as the Forms are meant to be.\footnote{Ross, Plato’s Theory of Ideas, 170-171. Owen thinks in the same vein that Aristotle here points out the fact that the conclusion of the Argument from Relatives is in contradiction with the logical principles of the Academy. See G.E.L. Owen, “A Proof in the ΠΕΡΙΙΔΕΩΝ,” The Journal of Hellenic Studies, Vol. 77, Part 1 (1957): 107.} Moreover, if there had ever been some members of the Academy who rejected the existence of the Forms of non-substances, Ross thinks that Plato had never been one of them throughout his life. In addition to the Forms of relatives, the dialogues consist of Forms of non-substantial beings as the typical examples of the Theory (beauty, goodness, sameness, difference, rest, motion…). As a matter of fact, for Ross, Forms of substances had rather secondary role in the dialogues except the Timaeus.\footnote{Ross, Plato’s Theory of Ideas, 166-167.}

Yet, one way or another, the fact remains that Alexander says the opposite regarding the relatives: he thinks that the Platonists denied the existence of Forms for relatives. So, he might be pointing out this idea of denial when he asks, why Platonists did not posit the Forms of some accidental beings, in 89,20-89,21. Still, there might be two more possible explanation to his statements. For one thing, we can inquire the wording of the statement from another aspect. The sentence might be criticizing Platonists because of not explicitly admitting or rejecting the Forms of non-substances. In other words, may be, Platonists did neglect to discuss the question what things could have Forms with respect to the things’ being substances and non-substances. Since Forms are posited as substances, Forms of substantial sensible things do not pose a problem. But, Platonists must have also addressed the issue of the existence of Forms of non-substances thoroughly and explicitly, according to Alexander. In the absence of such a discussion or reflection, Alexander might be drawing attention to the fact that several examples of Forms of non-substances are only posited occasionally. He might be implicitly referring to this incoherency in Platonists’ position as
bearing in mind the existence of basic and well-known Forms of non-substances within the Theory; such as good, beauty or justice.

Secondly, the statement at issue might be analyzed from a more Aristotelian perspective as Alexander himself does throughout his commentary. Like that Plato’s doctrine of combining Forms explains the relation between a thing and its species/genus by claiming that participation in a Form (Form of Human Being) requires necessarily participating in the species and genus of this Form (Form of Animal), we can consider the same relation between certain substances and accidental beings. There could be two kinds of accidents, belonging to a substance, namely, necessarily and unnecessarily.

It can be assumed that participating in the Form of Human Being always brings along to participate in the Form of Colored. Because every human being has to have some color, it should not be possible for any x to participate in the Form of Human Being, but not to participate in the Form of Colored. On the other hand, in addition to being a colored thing in general, human beings also happen to be of a particular color: black, white, etc. But there is nothing to preclude a human being from being of a different color, hypothetically. This time, participating in the Form of Human Being does not entail participation in the Form “White” or “Black”. Thus, we do not need to suppose a Form of White (or other particular colors), but only Form of Colored. In saying that there are not Ideas of all the accidents, Alexander might be assuming such an Aristotelian look.


Bunun için, öncelikle, çalışmanın ikinci bölümünde, *Kategoriler*’de ortaya konmuş olan yüklememe kuramı, temel kavramları ve altta yatan varsayımlarıyla birlikte kısaca anlatılmıştır.

Aristoteles *Kategoriler*’de üç kavram ortaya atmaktadır: (1) “Eşadlı” (homonymy), ortak bir ada sahip olup, bu ada karşılık gelen varlık tanımlarının farklı olduğu şeyleri ifade eder. Örneğin, bir “insan” ve bir “resim” ortak


“Sokrates cesurdur” çünkü tümel olan “cesaret’in tikel bir örneği onun “çinde”dir. Sokrates “cesarete” sahiptir.

Yine, Aristoteles Kategoriler’de, varlığı töz ve dokuz adet ilinek (nicelik, nitelik, görevli ilişki, uzam, zaman, duruş, iyelik, etkinlik, edilginlik) olmak üzere on ayrı kategoriiye ayırrır. Başka bir deyişle, varlık tek bir cins olmak yerine, kendini bir biririnden ayrı en yüksek cinslerin birinde açığa çıkarmaktadır. Dolayısıyla, bu on kategori, bir taşırıcıya yüklenecek olan nihai ve en genel yüklemeleri temsil ederler.

Aristoteles varlığa çizdiği bu çerçeve aynı zamanda dörtlü bir ayrımı da tabi tutar. Böylece dört varlık kipi meydana gelir: Birincil ve ikincil tözlüler ile tikel ve tümel ilinekler. Burada bir yandan, töz kategorisi ilinek kategorisinden ayrılmakta, diğer yandan ise her bir kategori tümel ve tikel ayrımına tabi tutulmaktadır. Her bir kategoride bulunan tümel varlıklar (tür ve cinsler) aynı kategorideki tikeller (özne) için “söylenirken” (özel yüklemleme), ilinekler tözlernin “çinde”dir (ilineksel yüklemleme).


Kategoriler’deki ikinci fikir ise şudur: “Varlık, türlü türlü söylenir.” Varlık tek bir cins değildir, tözün var olmak-lishi ile ilineklerin var olmak-lishi birbirinden farklıdır. Diğer bir ifadeyle, varlık, töz ve ilinek kategorileri arasında kendini

*Kategoriler*’deki söz konusu yüklemleme kuramı kısaca açıklandıktan sonra, üçüncü bölümde, bu kuramı Platoncu FT eleştirisi olarak okuyan çağdaş literatürde ait başlıca argümanlara yer verilmiştir. Literatürde bu yönde farklı çekicilerde çeşitli örnekler yer aldığı için, bu örnekler problem alanlarına göre analiz edilip sınıflandırılarak anlatılmıştır.

Buna göre, ilk olarak, *Kategoriler*’deki yüklemleme kuramı, FT’nin de çözüm iddiasında bulunduğu ve fakat ikna edici bir cevap veremediği düşünülünlen bazı felsefi problemlere çözüm olarak sunulmaktadır. Başka bir deyişle, *Kategoriler*’in bu sorunlara getirdiği alternatif çözüm önerileri, FT’nin açıklamalarına nispetle felsefi olarak daha makbul sayılacak, böylece *Kategoriler*’in FT’ye bir eleştiri getirdiği düşünülmektedir. Bu yaklaşım içinde değerlendirilebilecek üç problem ortaya çıkmıştır:


aldığı tüm Formların özel isimlerinin toplama işaret eder: insan, beyaz, kalkık burun, vs…

Buna karşılık Kategoriler’de yapılan töz-ilinek ayırımı ve iki ayrı yüklemleme ilişkisi ile Aristoteles, bir özeye yüklenen tüm yüklemelerin töz olmadığını, dolayısıyla farklı bir ontolojik statüde olan ilineklerin de özeye (farklı sayılarda) yüklenebileceğini göstermiştir. İlineksel özellikler tözler gibi var olmazlar; toze yüklenirler ve o tuze farklı veçheler kazandırırlar. Böylece şeyler hem tözlerinin hem de ilineklerinin isimleriyle çağrılırlar.


3- “Şeyler nasıl tek bir isimle çağrılurlar? ”: Bu soru, şeylerin nasıl ve neden bir birlik altında (tür/cins) toplandığı ve buna göre isimlendirildiği ile ilgilenir. Platoncuların “Çokluktaki Birlik Argümanı”na göre, bunun sebebi bazı şeylerin


**4- FT ve Taşıyıcı Problemi:** FT bir varlığın diğerine yüklenmesini, birbirinden bağımsız iki ayrı alanda bulunan varlık türleri arasındaki (tikel nesneler ve bir Form) bir katılma ilişkisi olarak açıklıyorla, o halde şu soru aкла gelir: Bir Forma katılan şeyin kendisi nedir? Örneğin, İnsan Formuna ne katılmaktadır? Bu soru literatürde FT’yi “taşıyıcı kuramı” ile ilişkilendirir. Bu kurama göre şeyler, çeşitli özellikler (tümeller/yüklemler) ve bu özellikleri bir arada tutmaya yarayan alta yatan bir taşıyıcıdan meydana gelmektedir. Diğer bir ifadeyle, taşıyıcı ve tümeller bir nesninin temel ontolojik birimleridir.
Dolayısıyla, Platoncu FT’nin Formlara katılan ve böylece Formlardan aldığı özellikleri bir arada tutan bir taşıyıcı fikrini varsayıdığı düşünülmektedir. Bu taşıyıcı, nesneye ait özellikleri taşımamasına karşılık kendisi herhangi bir özelliğten yoksundur. Bir başka deyişle, taşıyıcının kendisine herhangi bir yüklem yüklenemez. İlaveten, her bir taşıyıcı kendi nesnesine özgü olduğu için, şeylerin sayisal özdeşliğinin de ilkesidir.

Ancak bu kuramın çelişkili ve tutarsız sonuçları vardır. Bir kere, taşıyıcının bir yandan bulunduğu nesnedeki özellikleri taşması, diğer yandan herhangi bir özelliğe sahip olmaması çelişkili görünmektedir. Diğer taraftan, iddia, taşıyıcı tarafından taşınan özelliklerin nesneye ait olduğu ve dolaysıyla taşıyıcının kendi özüne ait olmadığı ise, bu defa, bir özden yoksun olmak tam olarak ne demektir? Her şeyin mutlaka bir özsel özelliği olsa gerektir, kendisiyle özdeş olmak gibi. Yine, taşıyıcının, öz ilişkisinin bir özelliğe sahip olmadığını, nesnesine ait özelliklerini taşıyıcı olma özelliğini da sayısal özdeşliğin ilkesi olması gibi özellikler de ilineksel değil fakat taşıyıcının özüne ait özellikler olmalıdır.

Öte yandan, taşıyıcının özsel özelliklerinin olduğu fikri de eşit derecede sorunludur. Zira, bu fikir sonusuz gerilemeye (ad infinitum) yol açarak, taşıyıcının taşıyıcı olma ve sayisal özdeşliğin ilkesi olma rolünü ortadan kaldırır. Son olarak, taşıyıcının kendisi ve taşıdığı özellikler birbirinden ontolojik olarak bağımsız oldukları (özellikler nesneye aittir, taşıyıcıya değil) için, kuram bizi zorla yine olumsallık sorunuyla karşı karşıya bırakır. Bir taşıyıcı neden belli bir özellikler kümesini taşıdığı konusunda bu kuramın bir açıklama olmadığı için taşıyıcı, nesneleri de olumsal varlıklar haline getirir. Sonuç olarak, FT’nin yüklemleme anlayışı bir taşıyıcının bir taşıyıcıyı varsaydığı öğrencide, FT de bu zorluklarla yüzleşmek zorundadır.

Buna karşılık, Kategoriler nesneleri daha küçük ontolojik birimlere ayırınız. Nesnенin kendisi, temel ontolojik birimidir. Hem birincil tözler hem tikel ilinekler kendi türlerinin/cinslerinin üyesi olan özsel varlıklar oldukları için ayrı bir taşıyıcıya ihtiyaç duymazlar. Bütün tümelleri (yüklemeleri) taşıyan altta yatan
taşyııcı birincil tözün ta kendisidir. Birincil töz, hem ikincil tözlerin, hem de tümel ilineklerin taşıyıcısıdır.


Böylece, çağdaş literatürde *Kategoriler*’in bir FT eleştirisi olarak okunmasının temel örnekleri iki ayrı yaklaşım çerçevesinde toplam altı felsefi problem olarak ele alınmıştır. Ardından, dördüncü bölümde, literatürdeki bu felsefi okumaya doğrudan metin desteği sağladığı düşünülen, Aristoteles’in *Metafizik* A, 9, 990b22-991a8 pasajının Afrodisyaslı İskender’e ait şerhi (88,5-95,2) analiz edilmiştir.

Aristoteles’in FT’ye itiraz ettiği bu pasajda kullandığı terminoloji ve işaret ettiği problemler, burada *Kategoriler*’deki varlık anlayışının varsayıldığı izlenimini verir. İskender’in detaylı şerhi ise bu izlenimi aynı doğrultuda destekler. FT hakkındaki dile getirdiği çeşitli problemler ve bu problemleri ele alış biçiminin yanı sıra, dile getirmediği varsayımları da İskender’in, *Kategoriler*’de izah edilen yüklemleme kuramına başvurduğu düşündürmektedir.
İskender’in argümanları 4 ana gruba ayrılarak incelenmiştir:

**Birinci grup argümanlarda;** FT’nin, ilineklerin Formunun varlığına dair kendisiyle çeliştiği iddia edilir. Bir yandan, Platoncu FT argümanlarından, tözlerin olduğu kadar ilineklerin de Formunun olması sonucu çıkmaktadır. Ancak, yine, FT’nin kendi ilkeleri, yalnızca tözlerin Formu olmasını gerektirir. Burada İskender iki ayrı argümana başvurur:


2- İlineklerin Formları olduğunu varsayarsak, bu Formların kendileri ya töz ya da ilinek olmalıdır. İlkе olan bir varlığın ilinek olması kabul edilemez. Öte yandan, tikell bir ilineğe özel olarak yüklenen bir Formun, kategorik olarak tızk olması da mümkün değildir. Demek ki ilineklerin Formları olmaz.

Dolayısıyla, FT kendi kendisiyle çelişmekte; bir yandan ilineklerin de Formları olması gerektiğini söylemekte, ancak bu sonucu yine kendi ilkeleri karşısında çıkıktadır. Sonuç olarak FT yanlıştır.

**İkinci grup argümanlarda;** İskender, dört farklı argümana, yine, FT’ye göre yalnızca tızklerin Formlarının olabileceğini savunur. Bunun için iki ayrı iki öncüle başvurur: 1- Tikeller Formlara yalnızca özel olarak katılabılırler. 2- Formlar tözlerdir. O halde, yalnızca tızklerin Formları olmalıdır. İskender her bir argümanda, bu iki öncülden birini ya da her ikisini birden destekleyen argümanlara ve örneklere başvurur.

**Üçüncü grup argümanlarda** Formların ne olduğu konusunda FT’nin tutarsızlığı savunulur. İlk olarak, Formların töz olması, her bir Formun tek bir yüklemeye sahip olması iddiasıyla uyuşmaz. İkinci olarak ise, Platoncuların savunduğu gibi Formların düşüncede nesnesi olmaları fikri, Formların ebedi tözler olması fikri ile
uyuşmaz. Dolayısıyla, Formların töz olmaları iddiası da FT içinde doğru savunulamaz.

**Dördüncü grup argümanda** ise Formlar ve tikeller arasında ne eş anlamlı ne de eşadlı bir katılma ilişkisinin olabileceğini savunulur. Eğer iki taraf arasında eş anlamlı bir ilişki varsa (tikel ve Form hem aynı ada hem aynı varlık tanımına sahipse), bu bizi üçüncü adam problemine götürür. Bu ilişkinin eşadlı olma varsayımı ise (tikel ve Formun yalnızca adları ortak fakat bu ada karşılık gelen varlık tanımları farklı ise), ilk elden absürttur; zira Forma katılan şeylerin ortak bir tanımı varsa, bu şeylerin, katıldıkları Form ile de aynı tanımı paylaşmalarını beklenir. İlaveten, eşadlı bir katılma varsayımları Formların ilke olma özelliklerini sonda erdirir ve katılma ilişkisinin olumsal hale getirir. Oysa, FT’nin tikeller ve Form arasında özel bir ilişki kurabilmesi ve bu ilişkiyi açıklayabilmesi gerekir. Dolayısıyla FT iki ontolojik alan arasında makul bir ilişki kuramaz.


Bu iki fikrin doğal sonucu olarak İskender’in hemen tüm argümanlarında şu varsayımı görürüz: (1) Eğer töz ve ilinek iki ayrı kategorik varlık ise, (2) var olmak her zaman bir şey olmak ise, (3) o halde, her bir tikel nesne ancak kendi kategorisine ait bir tümelin aynı özden bir örnek olarak olacaktır. Farklı kategorideki tikel, tek bir kategorideki tümel ile açıklanamaz. Başka bir ifadeyle, özel yüklemleme yalnızca aynı kategoride mümkündür. İlkincil töz, tikel bir ilinege özel olarak yüklenemediği gibi, tümel bir ilinek de özel olarak birincil bir töze yüklenemeyiz. Aksi, tipki Platoncuların yaptığı gibi, bir kategori hatası olur: Töz kategorisinde bulunan bir Form, tikel bir ilinege yüklenemez, aynı şekilde, ilinek olduğu varsayılan bir Form da bir töze yüklenemez. İşte bu yüzden, FT şeylerin var olma biçimlerindeki bu kategorik farklılığı açıklayamaz.

İskender’in FT’ye bir diğer eleştirisi, şeylerin özel özelliklerini açıklayamaması olmuştur. İskender, ısrarla şeylerin ve Formların aynı özü paylaşması gerektiğini savunurken hep “varlık daima bir şey olarak varlık tır” fikrine dayanmaktadır. Ancak, FT’de şeyler ve Formlar arasında eş anlamlı katılma ilişkisi varsayıldığında, üçüncü adan sorunu doğmaktadır. Dolayısıyla, FT iki ayrı varlık alanı arasında özel bir ilişki kuramamaktadır.

O halde, İskender’e göre, Platoncu FT bir yandan, Kategoriler’e göre özel olması gereken varlıklar ile ilineksel hale getirmekte, öte yandan, ilineksel olması gerekenleri de özel varlıklar yapmaktadır. Formların tikellerden ontolojik olarak bağımsız olmaları (aralarında ontolojik bir ilişki kurulamıyor olması), töz-ilinek ayrımının yapılmaması ve buna bağlı olarak yüklemleme mekanizmasının (katılma) birbirinden ayrırmaması bu sorunun kaynağı olmaktadır.

Bu durum bize şu sonuç gösterir: Aristoteles’in Metafizik, A. 9, 990b22-991a8’de yapmış olduğu FT eleştirileri, Afrodisyaslı İskender’in şerhi ışığında okunduğunda, bu eleştirilerin Kategoriler’deki yüklemleme kuramının fikirleri ile yapıldığı anlaşılmaktadır. Öyleyse, Kategoriler’deki yüklemleme kuramı bir FT eleştirisi olarak çalışabilir. Gerçekten, literatürdeki bu yondeki Kategoriler okumalarına bakılgımızda (3. bölüm), altı ayrı başlıklı ele alınan argümanlardaki meselelerin doğrudan ya da dolaylı olarak İskender’in söz konusu iki temel
eleştirisine ait olduğunu görürüz. Başka bir deyişle, FT’nin bu altı probleme ikna edici çözümler sunamayışının sebebi, İskender’in de değdiği üzere, FT’nin Kategoriler’de sunulan bu temel iki fikirden yoksun oluşudur: FT duyu nesnelerini Formların kopyaları olarak anlayarak onları özel varlık olarak tanımaz (1. problem); şeylerin özel ve ilineksel özelliklerini açıktayamadığı için birden fazla isimle çağrılma problemine ikna edici bir açıklama getiremez (2. problem); özel yüklemlemeye izin vermediği için tikeller ve ait oldukları Türler arasındaki ilişki olumsal olmasına neden olur (3. problem); Forma katılan bir taşıyıcı varsayımına kapı aralar ve bu sorunlu fikrin yaratığı problemleri çözüm zorundadır (4. problem); tikelleri tümeller alanından tamamen yalıtarak ontolojik bir ikilik yaratır (5. problem); parça-bütün ikilemine maruz kalan tikellerin Formlara katılma ilişkisini açıklayamaz (6. problem).

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YAZARIN / AUTHOR

Soyadı / Surname : Duran
Adı / Name : Zeynep
Bölümü / Department : Felsefe / Philosophy

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PREDICATION IN ARISTOTLE’S CATEGORIES: A RESPONSE TO PLATO’S THEORY OF FORMS

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