

HABITUS AS A CRITIQUE OF THE SUBJECT-OBJECT DICHOTOMY: A
CASE OF ANKARA MUSICIANS

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CASE OF ANKARA MUSICIANS**

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ABSTRACT

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This thesis is a critique of the presupposition of the subject-object dichotomy that is prevalent in the methodologies of art theories. It conducts its critique by utilizing Pierre Bourdieu's notion of habitus in the analysis of its empirical data. The empirical data that this thesis presents consists of the interviews with Ankara musicians. Through the analysis of these interviews, the thesis demonstrates that art theories relying on the subject-object dichotomy fall short in explaining the empirical variety that this thesis presents. By utilizing the notion of habitus in the analysis of its empirical data, this thesis aims to provide a relational grasp of the situation of Ankara musicians.

Keywords: Subject-Object Dichotomy, Habitus, Presuppositionlessness, Relationality, Ankara Musicians.

ÖZ

ÖZNE-NESNE DİKOTOMİSİNİN HABITUS İLE ELEŞTİRİSİ: ANKARA MÜZİSYENLERİ ÜZERİNE BİR ÇALIŞMA

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Bu tez, sanat teorilerinin metodolojilerinde yaygın olarak görülen özne-nesne dikotomisi ön kabulünün bir eleştirisidir. Tez, bu eleştirisini, Pierre Bourdieu'nün habitus kavramından yararlanarak yürüttüğü ampirik verilerinin analizi aracılığıyla yapmaktadır. Bu tezin sunduğu ampirik veriler, Ankaralı müzisyenlerle yapılan görüşmelerden oluşmaktadır. Bu görüşmelerin analizi yoluyla tez, özne-nesne dikotomisine dayanan sanat teorilerinin, bu tezin sunduğu ampirik çeşitliliği açıklamada yetersiz kaldığını göstermektedir. Bu tez ampirik verilerinin analizinde habitustan yararlanarak Ankara müzisyenlerinin durumunu ilişkisel bir kavrayış ile çalışmayı amaçlamaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Özne-Nesne Dikotomisi, Habitus, Ön-kabulsüzlük, İlişkisellik, Ankara Müzisyenleri.

For whom it may concern.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Research Problem

This thesis aims to develop a critical analysis of the *presupposition of the subject-object dichotomy* that is prevalent in the methodologies of art theories through Pierre Bourdieu's notion *habitus*. The empirical data of the thesis consists of the interviews conducted with Ankara musicians. The analysis of these interviews demonstrates that art theories relying on the subject-object dichotomy fall short in explaining the empirical variety that this thesis presents and provides a relational grasp of the situation by utilizing habitus.

The notion of habitus provides a proper theoretical framework to develop my analysis because it is a direct criticism of the subject-object dichotomy, as Bourdieu states: "It [habitus] teaches us that we shall escape from the ritual either/or choice between subjectivism and objectivism in which the social sciences have so far allowed themselves to be trapped."¹ Elsewhere, Bourdieu stated that habitus "expresses above all a rejection of a whole series of alternatives into which social science (and, more generally, all anthropological theory) was locked, that of the conscious (or the subject) and the unconscious, that of finality and mechanism, etc."² While habitus directly

¹ Pierre Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice* (Cambridge University Press, 2013), 4.

² Pierre Bourdieu, *The Rules of Art: Genesis and Structure of the Literary Field* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996), 179.

targets that dichotomy, it also proposes a relational alternative to what it criticizes. Habitus does that by demonstrating “the intricate relation between objective structures and subjective constructions, which is located beyond the usual alternatives of objectivism and subjectivism, of structuralism and constructivism, and even materialism and idealism.”³ This is why Bourdieu describes his approach as

a science of the dialectical relations between the objective structures to which the objectivist mode of knowledge gives access and the structured dispositions within which those structures are actualized and which tend to reproduce them.⁴

The subject-object dichotomy appeared for me a research problem to be dwelled upon because it is a *presupposition that directly affects the research itself*. Hegel describes presupposing as the following:

to apply presupposed forms of definitions and the like without further ado, as known and accepted; and to make use of customary ways of argumentation in order to establish their general concepts and fundamental determinations.⁵

Because it is a presupposition, there cannot be found a justification concerning why such a dichotomous relation between the subject and the object has been constituted in the first place; instead, it is pre-accepted as a starting point. Presupposing the starting points means leaving them unjustified and rendering them implausible to question. In other words, it is tautologically assumed that the starting points do not need such justification simply because they are starting points. Therefore, the presupposed content is repeated instead of justified; and nothing new is said but only highlighted twice. Hegel described such a tautological characteristic of presupposing as the following:

³ Pierre Bourdieu, *Practical Reason: On the Theory of Action* (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1998), 12.

⁴ Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, 3.

⁵ Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *The Science of Logic*, trans. George Di Giovanni (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 23.

such knowing never gets anywhere, and it knows not why, subject, object, god, nature, understanding, sensibility, and so on, are uncritically taken for granted as familiar, established as valid, and made into fixed points for starting and stopping.⁶

Instead of assuming the validity of fixed starting points with no justification, Hegel claimed that thinking must be presuppositionless⁷ and explained it as “the demand that science ought to be preceded by *doubting everything*, i.e. by the complete *absence of any presupposition*.”⁸ For Hegel, this means that philosophy must not borrow its method other than itself; instead, what must be done is to begin thinking without presupposing anything, and “to display the realm of thought philosophically, that is, in its own immanent activity.”⁹ Although this thesis limits itself mainly on the presupposition of the subject-object dichotomy in art theories, it shares Hegel’s views on presupposing. This is because, presupposing the starting points themselves significantly affects the whatness of the result of a study and it generates problems especially for the studies that claim to produce objective scientific knowledge of what is researched, which means that what is considered as objective knowledge is under the influence of presuppositions that remain unquestioned.

Therefore, this thesis shares both Hegel’s and Bourdieu’s viewpoints on presupposing; however, it moves in a kind of reversed order. Instead of trying to begin presuppositionless, it analyzes the presupposed ground upon which art theories’

⁶ Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2013), 18.

⁷ Stephen Houlgate, *Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit: A Reader’s Guide* (London; New York, NY: Bloomsbury, 2012), 28. Hegel’s aim in presuppositionless philosophy has been acknowledged by the majority of thinkers, ranging from Schelling, Heidegger, Gadamer, Derrida. For instance, a more contemporary comment on that comes from Stephen Houlgate, who reads Hegel’s method as the “radical presuppositionless”.

⁸ Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Basic Outline. Part I: Science of Logic* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 125.

⁹ Hegel, *The Science of Logic*, 12.

arguments are based, i.e. the presupposition of the subject-object dichotomy, and criticizes it by utilizing the habitus in the analysis of its empirical data. Hence, this thesis aims to conduct “the objective analysis of practical apprehension of the familiar world”¹⁰ of Ankara musicians, which shows itself as “the project of objectifying the mental structures associated with the particularity of a social structure”¹¹ through utilizing the notion of habitus.

1.2 Methods

The thesis’ data consists of eleven in-depth interviews conducted with Ankara musicians and fieldwork containing the participation of musicians’ gigs. The fieldwork is conducted in the first six months of 2020, at the exact time period the COVID-19 Pandemic started. Although I have attended musicians’ gigs as an audience and was planning to participate in more of them and gather data, it was impossible to increase their numbers because of the pandemic, as the places musicians play remained closed even until I started to write the thesis. Therefore, the analysis had to rely primarily on the data that I have collected through interviews with Ankara musicians.

As the COVID-19 Pandemic has affected my possible participant observations, it also affected my interviews because I could not conduct them according to my plan. As there were several state-induced closures in different periods in Turkey, I had to cancel all of my face-to-face interviews and rearrange them as online ones. After conducting four of my interviews online, I felt that online interviews were doing more harm than good because they severely interrupted the flow of conversations and negatively affected the data I was gathering. Face-to-face interviews were going well, and I had already completed seven of them, but because of those negative effects, I decided to

¹⁰ Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, 4.

¹¹ Pierre Bourdieu, *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2000), xiv.

cease online interviews and postpone them until it would be possible to conduct them again in a face-to-face manner. Unfortunately, the pandemic has sped up, and state closures have increased, making the face-to-face interviews impossible to conduct. Therefore, I had to limit my interviews to eleven in total. Within these limits, the empirical data of the thesis does not include all the variety of different music types with different background of musicians. The statements of this thesis should be read within these limits, and should not be generalized to whole body of Ankara musicians.

My sample consists of nine male and two female musicians. The age range of musicians is the following: Three musicians are 20-30, five of them 30-40, and the other three are 40-50. All interviewees were university graduates. As most musicians oscillate concerning their economic statuses, it was not easy to attribute conventional socio-economic markers to them. Only one musician in my sample has an official insurance and regular income; every other musician works irregularly (in terms of conditions) and informally (as officially unregistered). Thus, according to the empirical data, it seemed more appropriate to categorize my sample into two as the following: (i) *mode of income* and (ii) *practices of music creation*. The first categorization, mode of income, simply indicates musicians' source of income, that whether they earn their living by music or not. Three significant distinctions have appeared regarding Ankara musicians' mode of income as the following: (α) Firstly, some musicians earn their living by music only (such as by creating, producing, teaching, performing, distributing, or promoting music). These musicians are utterly dependent upon the income they get from music for their survival, as they do not have a source of income other than music. (β) Secondly, some musicians can maintain their income from both music and other activities like regular or non-regular jobs. Musicians in this group are not wholly dependent upon the income that they get either from music or a regular job, and they could not assess either of the alternatives as their primary source of income, for it is possible that they sometimes get more money from music and sometimes not. In other words, neither music nor a conventional job is capable of standing as a secure mode of income; they rather oscillate between them. (γ) Lastly, some musicians have a regular source of income other than music. For these

musicians, the dependence on the income they would get from music is less significant (at least for their survival) than the previous two groups because they secured their income and earn their living from regular jobs other than music.

The second categorization is Ankara musicians' (II) *practices of music creation*, which points out that whether musicians create their own music or not. Three significant distinctions could be made as the following: (α) Firstly, some musicians create only their own music. These musicians release and perform their own material instead of making cover music. If a musician is completely dependent on the money that he gets from music while he makes his own music only, it means for him that he has to earn his living from whatever he creates. (β) Secondly, some musicians only perform cover music and do not write their own tunes. These musicians are generally members of several bands simultaneously, performing regularly at several places such as nightclubs, performance halls, weddings, etc. Interviews consist of musicians who both earn their living entirely from these performances and not, which is capable of affecting the meaning of these performances for a musician. (γ) Lastly, some musicians are in between the previous two groups, as musicians who both perform cover music and create their own tunes.

All of the interviewees perform music (whether their own or not), and the places they perform varied significantly. Although I could not include the musicians who play at *pavyons*, *türkü bars*, etc. (which I was planning to do, but because of the pandemic could not), the interviewed musicians in my sample were playing at several places ranging from *Kızılay*, *Tunalı*, *Ayrancı*, *Ümitköy*, *Gaziosmanpaşa*, *Çankaya* and, in some hotels. This was fortunate for me, because even though my sample size is relatively limited, the musicians I interviewed are encompassing a wide range of neighborhoods, in which the customer profile of these places ranged from students to foreign embassy members and employees.

The interviewees are recruited through the snowball sampling technique. I began to interview musicians whom I could reach, and then they recommended me to meet with some other musicians. I have especially chosen the snowball sampling because I am a

musician who has been in the Ankara scene for 15 years, so I wanted to exclude my biases and presuppositions from my study and recruit my interviewees without implementing any unconscious criteria as far as possible.

The close relationship that I have been in with the Ankara music scene, I think, makes my thesis relatively interesting because it was both an advantage and disadvantage at the same time. Throughout the years, I have been a part of several bands, projects with which I performed live music at various places and published music. I also have my own music project with which I have released one album, two EPs, and several singles so far. While being an insider has some advantages, such as being able to reach people easily and gather data extensively, it was also a disadvantage, especially for a thesis that aims to criticize presuppositions. However, that disadvantage turned out to be a productive one, as I have encountered so many presuppositions of mine throughout the process of my fieldwork and writing thesis, which I did not even know existed. I realized that I had established a sort of practical sensibility that affects how the context I have been a part of appears to me. There were so many instances in data that were appearing mundane to me while they were important for a sociological analysis, because all those years it is the way how things were operating for me, and it took me a while to realize that my past experiences influence the way how data appears to me.

1.3 The Structure of the Thesis

Chapter 2 discusses the presupposition of the subject-object dichotomy. Firstly, it discusses what that dichotomy is and why it is problematic for a sociological study. Then, I demonstrate how that dichotomy shows itself as a methodological presupposition in the research process and significantly affects the latter. Lastly, I discuss that that dichotomy can be identified in the art theories' methodologies. I have categorized the art theories into two as the subject-based art theories and object-based art theories, which I claim that both of them presuppose the subject-object dichotomy in their analyses.

In Chapter 3, Pierre Bourdieu's notion of habitus is discussed. It is discussed that what habitus is and how it presents a sociologically relevant alternative to the subject-object dichotomy that is prevalent in art theories. Habitus is discussed through three categorizations as the following: (α) Inseparability of the subject-object, (β) schemes of perception, and (γ) internalization of externality.

Chapter 4 is the analysis of the empirical data that the thesis has collected. This chapter aims to show that Ankara musicians can be considered neither as subjects nor objects. Through utilizing habitus in the analysis, it is demonstrated that Ankara musicians' case must be grasped as a dialectical relationship between the subject and the object, instead of conceiving it by pre-established dichotomous terms. The analysis consists of five sub-sections: *Seeking Originality*, *Self-Preservation in Encounters*, *Autonomy in Music Creation*, *Reciprocal Musician-Context Influence*, and *Future Anticipation*. In the Seeking Originality section, musicians' originality seeking attempts are analyzed. In the Self-Preservation in Encounters, musicians' 'resistance narratives' and acts of otherings are analyzed in terms of self-preservatory acts. Autonomy in Music Creation looks at how musicians want to be a final decider on whatever they create. In the Reciprocal Musician-Context Influence section, the interactions between musicians and the particular context that they are in are analyzed by highlighting that both parts continuously influence the other. The last section, Future Anticipation, analyzes how musicians anticipate their future, by underlining that these anticipatory patterns are conditioned by their particular relationship to the context that they are in. In all sub-sections, the aim is to demonstrate that the subject-object dichotomy that is presupposed in art theories tends to reduce the empirical variety into presupposed dichotomies.

CHAPTER 2

THE SUBJECT-OBJECT DICHOTOMY

2.1 What Is the Subject-Object Dichotomy?

Bourdieu identified the subject-object dichotomy as the most problematic one in the methodologies of social sciences, and he described it as the following: “Of all the oppositions that artificially divide social science, the most fundamental, and the most ruinous, is the one that is setup between subjectivism and objectivism.”¹² Bourdieu considers it as “the dilemma of objectivism and subjectivism”¹³ which is “the false choice in which social science generally allows itself to be trapped, that between social physics and social phenomenology.”¹⁴ This thesis agrees with Bourdieu on that problematic characteristic of the subject-object dichotomy. That dichotomy is problematic because it presupposes an ontological difference between the subject and the object.¹⁵ It means that both the subject and the object are assumed to be capable of

¹² Pierre Bourdieu, *The Logic of Practice* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990), 25.

¹³ Pierre Bourdieu, *Pascalian Meditations* (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 2000), 130.

¹⁴ Bourdieu, *The Logic of Practice*, 135.

¹⁵ Henry E. Bliss, “The Subject-Object Relation,” *The Philosophical Review* 26, no. 4 (1917): 395–408, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2178486>, 15; Tyler Burge, *Origins of Objectivity* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2010).

standing self-sufficiently, i.e. as immediate entities that do not need to mediate with each other to exist. It is presupposed that the parts' existences precede their constitutive relationality; therefore, in an analysis, the relation itself becomes secondary, and the focus is on these pre-given existences of the parts. Bourdieu identified this tendency as *the substantialist mode of thought* and strongly emphasized the methodological primacy of the relationality.¹⁶ He stated that substantialist thinking always relies on preconstructed oppositions showing themselves as fixed methodological starting points such as individual-society, agent-structure, freedom-determinism, mechanism-finalism, etc.¹⁷ Bourdieu argued that relational analysis is an exact opposite to substantialist mode of thought and suggested that sociology should accord primacy to relations.¹⁸ His opposition to substantialist thinking and emphasis on the methodological priority of relationality¹⁹ can be identified as the following:

it is first necessary to break with the propensity toward substantialist and naively realist thought which, instead of focusing on relations, limits itself to the phenomenal realities in which they are manifested.²⁰

¹⁶ Pierre Bourdieu and Loïc J. D. Wacquant, *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992). For instance, Loïc Wacquant described Bourdieu's approach as "methodological relationalism", through which one is able to criticize the presupposed dichotomous constitutions (15).

¹⁷ Bourdieu, *The Logic of Practice*, 46.

¹⁸ Pierre Bourdieu, *Practical Reason: On the Theory of Action* (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1998), vii-4.

¹⁹ Bourdieu and Wacquant, *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology*. Bourdieu's following remark shows the importance that he attributed to the relationality, although he presents here a wrong (yes, it is wrong) reading of Hegel (or a non-reading). Bourdieu stated that: "I could twist Hegel's famous formula and say that *the real is the relational*: what exist in the social world are relations—not interactions between agents or intersubjective ties between individuals, but objective relations which exist 'independently of individual consciousness and will,' as Marx said." (97). For what actually Hegel had said, see Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Philosophy of Right* (Oxford University Press, 1821), 14.

²⁰ Bourdieu, *Practical Reason*, 14.

What Bourdieu describes as the substantial mode of thought refers to the modern conceptualization of the ‘substance’. Descartes defined the substance as the following: “By ‘*substance*’, we can understand nothing other than a thing which exists in such a way that it needs no other thing in order to exist.”²¹ Needing nothing other than itself means that what exists as the substance does not have to be in relation to the other. In other words, the substance exists non-rationally. A similar conceptualization of substance can be identified in Spinoza too, where he defines it as the following: “By substance, I mean that which is in itself, and is conceived through itself: in other words, that of which a conception can be formed independently of any other conception.”²² As can be seen, both Descartes and Spinoza define the substance as something that can stand by itself independently, i.e. in a non-relational vacuum. That non-relational configuration and self-sufficiency of the substances are explained by Nathan Rotenstreich as the following: “Substance, *substantia*, is essence, that which subsists in itself, the status of the thing in its independence.”²³ When it comes to the presupposition of the subject-object dichotomy in particular, the substantial mode of thought assumes both the subject and the object as substantial entities in the previously mentioned sense. Hence, the subject and the object, solely by being themselves, can generate a relation of opposition to each other because they are defined as what the other is not. Similar to discussed above, the relation is not considered constitutive of such parts but instead grasped as a posterior phenomenon that occurred between those already existing substantial existences. However, there is no justification concerning why this is the case but only a presupposition.

²¹ René Descartes, *Principles of Philosophy* (Dordrecht; Boston: Kluwer, 1991), 23.

²² Benedictus de Spinoza, *Ethics* (Waiheke Island: Floating Press, 2009), 4.

²³ Nathan Rotenstreich, *From Substance to Subject* (Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 1974), 1.

Thus, the subject-object dichotomy is a presupposition that assumes the subject and the object as having their own substantial existences without needing the other. That dichotomy methodologically prioritizes the existences of these substances and conceives of their relation as something secondary that is established only after those existences. However, this kind of substantialist grasp of the situation generates methodological problems and affects the research process itself directly. Now, I want to briefly touch upon these problems by demonstrating how the presupposition of the subject-object dichotomy shows itself in a research process.

2.2 How the Subject-Object Dichotomy Shows Itself in A Research Process

When it comes to the research process in general, the subject-object dichotomy shows itself in the form of a methodological separation between the *researcher* and what is *researched*, in which the former appears as the subject for whom there are research objects that can be perceived, analyzed, and studied objectively. That separation makes it possible to assume the researcher as *the one who studies* while also assuming the research objects as studiable. Moreover, the act of studying itself is considered a sterile process that does not alter anything in the objects, the researcher rather appears as the *objective subject* who sees what the objects really are. Bourdieu criticized that given position of the researcher as the following, where the researcher is “imputing to its object what belongs in fact to the way of looking at it.”²⁴ The researcher does not think that his methodology or his way of looking at objects could alter something in them, because in the first place, these objects are assumed to exist independent of the researcher. Such independent, self-sufficient existences are grounded upon the presupposition of the subject-object dichotomy, which renders the researcher as an objective entity who observes the truth in the objects just by looking at them with her scientific-objective eyes. In other words, the researcher is not conceived of someone

²⁴ Bourdieu, *Pascalian Meditations*, 53.

who constructs research objects methodologically, but a prophet that sees what objects really are and demonstrates their true knowledge; the knowledge which is alleged to be scientific and objective.

Hence, the *objectivity of scientific knowledge* seems to be justified through hypostatizing this very cut between the researcher and what is researched, which is grounded on the presupposition of the subject-object dichotomy. This cut makes it possible to assume that what the researcher does is a sterile act that cannot penetrate the object itself. In other words, the research object is conceived of as ready-made instead of something that is methodologically constructed. Such a ready-made characteristic of what is researched was criticized by Hegel as this:

presupposed from the start is that the material of knowledge is present in and for itself as a ready-made world outside thinking; that thinking is by itself empty, that it comes to this material as a form from outside, fills itself with it, and only then gains a content, thereby becoming real knowledge.²⁵

In that quotation, Hegel criticizes the empiricism of his times, which argues that the thinking itself contaminates the objectivity of knowledge if it remains within its boundary. Empiricism can come up with such an idea because it presupposes that the knowledge is already there independent of the entity who observes it. A similar tendency can be identified in Karl Popper's *Objective Knowledge*, wherein he states:

Knowledge in this objective sense is totally independent of anybody's claim to know; it is also independent of anybody's belief, or disposition to assent; or to assert, or to act. Knowledge in the objective sense is *knowledge without a knower*: it is *knowledge without a knowing subject*.²⁶

Therefore, objective knowledge is a knowledge without a knower, it does not need a subject to exist; it is only brought into light scientifically by an objective subject. What the researcher does is just to exhibit that knowledge objectively, which renders

²⁵ Hegel, *The Science of Logic*, 24.

²⁶ Karl R. Popper, *Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach* (Oxford University Press, 1979), 109.

scientific knowledge of what is researched as a representational one. Bourdieu criticized that tendency as that “which one can feel entitled to perceive the world as a representation, a spectacle, to survey it from above and afar and organize it as a whole designed for knowledge alone.”²⁷ Consequently, the research process itself is not considered an act that can alter the objects themselves but rather a way of looking at objects objectively. Such an objective look clearly shows itself in Thomas Nagel’s work *The View from Nowhere*, where he describes the scientific objectivity as that which “allows us to transcend our particular viewpoint and develop an expanded consciousness that takes in the world more fully.”²⁸ Such objective look is non-subjective, trans-individual, scientific, and outside of thinking.

What causes such a thinking to appear, which asserts that the researcher can approach objects objectively, is, I claim, the presupposition of the subject-object dichotomy. Because, through that dichotomy, it is presupposed that as if the reality has such kind of dichotomy in itself, and consequently the one which is accounted for such a separation (between subject-object) is not the *methodology of the researcher*, the philosopher, the art theorist, or the sociologist but instead the *real itself*. In other words, it is assumed that the parts are ontologically separated by themselves without needing an external separator to separate them. However, as Bourdieu emphasized that this is just a presupposition wherein “the researcher presents the world as he thinks it (that is, as an object of contemplation, a representation, a spectacle)”²⁹ while he presupposes

²⁷ Bourdieu, *Pascalian Meditations*, 21.

²⁸ Thomas Nagel, *The View from Nowhere* (New York, NY: Oxford Univ. Press, 1989), 5. In general, the objective knowledge is explained by showing what it is not, i.e. its alleged difference from the subjective knowledge. In other words, tautologically, objective knowledge is the one that is not subjective; and ‘the view from nowhere’ means that we can transcend our particular viewpoints and get to know what objects really are.

²⁹ Bourdieu, *Pascalian Meditations*, 51.

that privileged position to himself in the name of objectivity. Elsewhere, Bourdieu criticized that separation and objective look whereas the researcher

constitutes the social world as a spectacle presented to an observer who takes up a 'point of views' on the action, who stands back so as to observe it and, transferring into the object the principles of his relation to the object.³⁰

Bourdieu describes that confusion as *scholastic epistemocentrism*, where the researcher ignores his influence over the research process because he thinks objects are there by themselves as themselves independent of him.³¹ In other words, the researcher deludes himself as capable of seeing the true relations belonging to the objects because he attributes self-sufficiency to the objects. Bourdieu described such kind of belief that the researcher has of herself towards what he researches as this: "Intellectualism is inscribed in the fact of introducing into the object the intellectual relation to the object, of substituting the observer's relation to practice for the practical relation to practice."³² Hence, as similar to what I have demonstrated through Popper and Nagel, the research object is alleged to stand as transcendental to the researcher, while the researcher is conceived of as the one who can examine what it is.

Paradoxically, what shows itself as the objectively produced knowledge is nothing other than the researcher's external reflection over what he takes as his research object; for the researcher not only considers himself as capable of seeing the true relations in the objects but also assumes his act of studying does not change anything in them. We often see such tendency in sociological studies wherein the empirical data is considered to be there by itself, transcendent to the researcher who observes it. This especially shows itself well in the methodology of grounded theory, wherein it claims

³⁰ Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, 96.

³¹ Bourdieu, *Pascalian Meditations*.

³² Bourdieu, *The Logic of Practice*, 74.

it collects data from the data itself.³³ The next-level tautology shows itself so well that I could not paraphrase it without losing the meaning, which is embodied in Charmaz's words as the following: "Stated simply, grounded theory methods consist of systematic, yet flexible guidelines for collecting and analyzing qualitative data to construct theories 'grounded' in the data themselves."³⁴ I think that such a claim can be made because the data itself is conceived of as a transcendental entity above the researcher.

As can be seen, the sociologist thinks that he just looks at the data itself shows us what the data really is. Sadly, this is so rigid in the sociological methodologies, and what guarantees the empirical data to show itself only in one true way or what gives such a privileged status to the researcher who has special eyes through which he sees the truth are not justified but rather methodologically presupposed. Tautologically, the researcher ignores his influence over the production of the knowledge of the research object while at the same time grounding his claim of objectivity on this ignoring. Consequently, he is able to claim that the act of studying does not modify anything in what is studied, and he can demonstrate the data in its all-nakedness. In other words, what the researcher does is to see what the real is, for he legitimately constituted himself in the name of objectivity as someone who objectively studies the state of affairs and produces the scientific knowledge of it. Contrary to such epistemocentrism, Bourdieu emphasized that the act of studying itself necessarily alters what is studied:

A much more fundamental alteration -and a much more pernicious one, because, being constitutive of the operation of knowing, it inevitably remains unnoticed- is performed on practice by the sheer fact of taking up a 'viewpoint' on it and so constituting it as an object (of observation and analysis) . . . where the social

³³ Kathy Charmaz, *Constructing Grounded Theory* (London; Thousand Oaks, Calif: Sage Publications, 2006).

³⁴ Charmaz, *Constructing Grounded Theory*, 2.

world presents itself as a spectacle seen from afar and from above, as a representation.³⁵

One last example considering what is described as scholastic epistemocentrism by Bourdieu, can be demonstrated through Hegel where he had criticized Leibnizian idealism. Hegel claims that Leibniz confuses his own presupposition regarding the plurality as if it belongs to the real itself.³⁶ For Hegel, Leibniz assumes the plurality of monads while ignoring that he was the one, in the first place, who had attributed that plurality to reality. In other words, Leibniz thinks that he is talking about the fabric of reality, which is the plurality of monads because he has the privilege of being someone who can perceive the real relations between monads themselves. Hegel criticizes Leibniz's epistemocentrism as the following:

in that indifferent independence [monad's beings as substances] of the monads plurality remains as a rigid *fundamental determination*, so that the reference connecting them falls only in the monad of monads [as Leibniz], or in the philosopher who contemplates them.³⁷

I find Hegel's above-mentioned criticism towards Leibniz valuable because it corresponds to the researcher-researched separation I discussed above. Hence, Leibniz's stance, as conveyed by Hegel, is similar to the sociologist (or the researcher) who thinks that he is capable of seeing the real relations of the social, while what he exactly does is to ignore his influence over the research process. This is problematic because it excludes the *construction process of research objects* from the discussion, and the scientific methods are conceived of as mere acts of *representing the objects* instead of constructing them.

³⁵ Bourdieu, *The Logic of Practice*, 27.

³⁶ Hegel, *The Science of Logic*, 135-37.

³⁷ Hegel, *The Science of Logic*, 137.

Therefore, the presupposition of the subject-object dichotomy generates a methodological separation between the researcher and what is researched, and the objectivity of scientific knowledge seems to be grounded upon that separation. While the researcher appears as an objective subject, what is researched shows itself as the research object that can be studied objectively by the researcher. I claim that that separation renders scientifically produced objective knowledge a representational one that bases itself upon a presupposition that is not justified but only pre-accepted, i.e. the subject-object dichotomy. Now, let us look at how the presupposition of the subject-object dichotomy appears in the methodologies of art theories.

2.3 The Subject-Object Dichotomy in Art Theories

The presupposition of the subject-object dichotomy can also be identified in art theories literature. The analyses in that literature generally rely on dualisms, such as individual vs. society, artistic intention vs. interpretation of the product, individual artist's freedom vs. socio-historical necessities, etc. which themselves seem to emerge from the presupposition of the subject-object dichotomy.

I have categorized art theories into two camps, (α) the *subject-based art theories* and (β) *object-based art theories*. Whereas subject-based art theories focus on the individual artist conceived through the notions of creativity, genuineness, artistic intention, freedom, object-based art theories exclude the individual from the picture and emphasize non-individual elements as substantial, such as the particular socio-historical constitution or the artwork itself. While they differ from each other as mentioned above, I claim that both camps operate within the subject-object dichotomy. It can be identified that although art theories consist of various views opposing each other in several ways, it seems that they commonly tend to grasp the situation in terms of a preference between either/or. The form of either/or stays as a constant, even though its content is filled changeably. Consequently, art theories try to assess one of the parts of pre-established dualisms as substantial. In other words, art theories oscillate between "mechanism" (as if the socio-historical context determines the

individual artist) and “finalism” (as if the individual artist is independent of the context that he is in), and therefore cannot escape from providing causal explanations supposed to operate one-way.³⁸ One example approaching the situation in that way would be Arnold Hauser’s *Sociology of Art*, wherein he claims that:

The question is whether we understand the creative process as an attitude which rest upon drive, talent, and inclination, and which cannot essentially be reduced to external inspiration, or as a process which is for the most part independent but conditioned by interpersonal relationships.³⁹

Hauser asks that whether we should attribute creativity to the internality of an artist or to the interpersonal relationships, but he seems to limit his interrogation upon that formal characteristic of either/or, which is described by Bourdieu as “the preconstructed opposition between the individual and society or the individual and the collective”.⁴⁰ However, the individual-society dualism is just one among others caused by the subject-object dichotomy, showing themselves in several ways such as artistic intention-interpretation of the product, freedom-necessity, etc. The way I categorized art theories relies on these distinctions, whereas subject-based theories focus on one part, object-based theories focus on the other. However, their disagreement on the part they prefer does not change the fact that their ground of disagreement is rendered possible by the presupposition of the subject-object dichotomy. In other words, both camps seem to agree upon the ground that makes their disagreement with each other possible in the first place. Thus, I have categorized art theories into two according to the characteristics mentioned above. Now, let us look briefly into the details of it.

³⁸ Bourdieu, *Pascalian Meditations*, 138.

³⁹ Arnold Hauser, *The Sociology of Art* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 18.

⁴⁰ Bourdieu, *Pascalian Meditations*, 156.

2.3.1 Subject-based Art Theories

Subject-based art theories tend to focus on the individual artist by relying on the conceptualization of inside-ness. The inside-ness of an individual can vary; for instance, it can mean the mind of an artist; his intentions, creativity, feelings, intellectual background etc. These notions are generally thought of as belonging to the subject as the individual artist because it is presupposed that the latter has such an inside.

For instance, when it comes to creativity, subject-based art theories conceive the individual artist as the subject who could create an object that would be considered an artwork. The created product is thought to emerge from the unique internality of the artist and “conceived as the product of intentional agency.”⁴¹ Paisley Livingston, in her *Art and Intention*, defines *intentional action* as:

the execution and realization of a plan, where the agent effectively follows and is guided by the plan in performing actions which, in manifesting sufficient levels of skill and control, bring about the intended outcome.⁴²

Hence, creativity is conceptualized as an artistic creation, which is an action that is executed by the agent according to her intentions and “ordered through the agency of an author in the interests of articulating an artistic content.”⁴³ In other words, whatever is created is thought of as “embodying the intentional activity of its creator.”⁴⁴

⁴¹ David Davies “*Categories of Art*” in *The Routledge Companion to Aesthetics*, eds. Berys Nigel Gaut and Dominic Lopes (London; New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2013), 227.

⁴² Paisley Livingston, *Art and Intention: A Philosophical Study* (Oxford: New York: Clarendon Press; Oxford University Press, 2005), 14.

⁴³ David Davies, “*Categories of Art*”, 227.

⁴⁴ David Davies “*Medium*” in *The Routledge Companion to Philosophy and Music*, eds. Theodore Gracyk and Andrew Kania (Abingdon, Oxon; New York: Routledge, 2011), 52.

Bourdieu criticized that intentional conceptualization of action and opposed it with notion of habitus as the following:

The theory of action that I propose (with the notion of habitus) amounts to saying that most human actions have as a basis something quite different from intention, that is, acquired dispositions which make it so that an action can and should be interpreted as oriented towards one objective or another without anyone being able to claim that objective was a conscious design.⁴⁵

The artistic intention seems to provide a space of freedom to an individual. That space of freedom means that the individual artist is considered capable of creating an object according to his own ideas and intentions, even though he encounters the constraints imposed by a particular socio-historical context that he is in.⁴⁶ The individual artist is thought to secure his position through that internally located capacity, and he can artistically create no matter what the specific conditions he is in.⁴⁷

Of course, subject-based theories do not exclude the conditions external to the individual artist, as if the latter has some superpowers that make her transcendent to socio-historical necessities. They do acknowledge the external necessities but conceive them unsubstantial, as they seek to protect the artist's given capacity to freely act within those necessities.⁴⁸ In other words, while acknowledging the existence of these necessities, they emphasize the individual artist's capacity to go beyond them. In that way, they seem to suggest the artist as an uncreated creator. Bourdieu describes

⁴⁵ Bourdieu, *Practical Reason*, 97-98.

⁴⁶ Stephen Davies, *Philosophical Perspectives on Art* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2007).

⁴⁷ Paula Thomson and S. Victoria Jaque, *Creativity and the Performing Artist: Behind the Mask* (London: Academic Press, an imprint of Elsevier, 2017).

⁴⁸ Stephen Davies, *Definitions of Art* (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1991); Nick Zangwill, *Aesthetic Creation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).

that tendency as “charismatic ideology” and sees it problematic because it “directs the gaze towards this apparent producer -painter, composer, writer- and prevents us asking who has created this ‘creator’ is endowed”.⁴⁹ Therefore, subject-based theories exclude non-individual elements from their analyses and conceive them as unsubstantial; even though they acknowledge those non-individual elements, they do not think that the individual artist is determined by them.

The self-sufficient individual artist (or the uncreated creator) proposed by subject-based art theories can also be seen in how they conceive the relation between the artwork and the audience. Subject-based theories tend to grasp that relationship in terms of how an artwork is created rather than how it is received. In other words, they ask, “what a poet (artist) is intending to do or convey with a poem (artwork)”⁵⁰ because the created product is already presumed to be a product of an artistic intention that the artist naturally has. For instance, Roger Scruton claims that the artwork “is the single vehicle of an original creative intention” while acknowledges the relation between the artwork and the audience, as he argues that: “From the philosophical point of view, the act of composition should be understood as the intentional creation of music for the attention of an audience.”⁵¹ Thus, it is thought that the individual artist knows that her product encounters the audience, nevertheless, that encounter cannot determine the whatness of a product because the product itself can only emerge from the artist’s intentions.

Therefore, subject-based art theories tend to dismiss the effectiveness of factors that are external to the individual artist. The ones that take such effectivity substantial

⁴⁹ Bourdieu, *The Rules of Art*, 167.

⁵⁰ Robert Stecker “*Interpretation*” in *The Routledge Companion to Aesthetics*, 360.

⁵¹ Roger Scruton “*Composition*” in *The Routledge Companion to Philosophy and Music*, 520.

(which I categorized as object-based art theories) and assume the individual artist unsubstantial is called as *sociological approaches*⁵² by Nick Zangwill. Subject-based theories claim that the focus must be on the individual artist instead of socio-historical conditions. For instance, Zangwill argues that: “Traditional aesthetics has firm foundations, whereas sociological approaches are flawed.”⁵³ Not having firm foundations is explained by him: “All they [sociological approaches] claim is that the deployment of the concept of beauty or the aesthetic is contingent on certain social circumstances”, and “these theorists say that there is no innate and culturally universal concept of beauty or the aesthetic. The concept has its source in a specific period of history or specific social arrangements.”⁵⁴

Another common aspect of subject-based art theories is their approach towards creativity, which is similar to how they conceive of artistic intention. The creativity of an individual artist is generally conceived of as *autonomy*⁵⁵ of the latter, wherein the artist is capable of legislating to herself her own laws. Here again, the inside-ness in contradistinction to the external necessities is at play, for it is thought that the individual artist can create autonomously instead of what is imposed on her by the necessities of the market, music industry, or anything. Kelly Comfort explains that situation as the following: “artistic autonomy is best characterized by the call for complete artistic freedom—freedom from morality, from didacticism, from

⁵² Nick Zangwill, *The Metaphysics of Beauty* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001).

⁵³ Zangwill, *The Metaphysics of Beauty*, 208.

⁵⁴ Zangwill, *The Metaphysics of Beauty*, 209-10.

⁵⁵ As it is known, ‘autonomous’ in Greek is αὐτόνομος, wherein ‘*auto-*’ (αὐτό) means ‘self’, and ‘*nomos-*’ (νομος) law. Hence, in that context, autonomous means the one who gives to itself its own laws.

convention.”⁵⁶ Such autonomy is also supported by the conceptualization of *genius*. For instance, Kant claims that: “*Genius* is the talent (natural endowment) that gives the rule to art.”⁵⁷ The law giving ability to oneself (autonomy) is considered as a talent that the individual artist has, through which the latter can also protect her space of freedom. As can be seen, subject-based theories emphasize such intra-individual characteristics, whereas, in object-based theories, the situation is reversed. For instance, Nick Zangwill also labels these theories as “the anti-genius discourse”⁵⁸, for they reject to conceive of individual artist’s that innate genius capacity. One of the strong proponents of the mentioned ‘anti-genius discourse’ seems to be Bourdieu, as he states:

it is belief in the ‘creative genius’ that they are tacitly admitting that they take for granted (and no doubt most of their readers along with them), thus dedicating themselves, in their own terms, to ‘one of the oldest and best established methods of literary study’, one that consists of searching for the explanatory principle of a work inside an author taken in isolation (uniqueness and singularity being central properties of a ‘creator’).⁵⁹

However, autonomy is only one part of the situation. There is also a valuation process of an artwork, which is something naturally external to the individual artist because the artwork, whether it emerges from the autonomous individual who is genius or not, has to encounter with some other than the artist himself. It means that there are other parties involved in the valuation process of an artwork. However, subject-based art theories conceive of that process as determined by the individual artist. They assume

⁵⁶ Kelly Comfort, ed., *Art and Life in Aestheticism: De-Humanizing and Re-Humanizing Art, the Artist, and the Artistic Receptor* (Basingstoke [England]; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 2.

⁵⁷ Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, trans. Werner S. Pluhar (Indianapolis, Ind: Hackett Pub. Co, 1987), 174.

⁵⁸ Zangwill, *Aesthetic Creation*, 56.

⁵⁹ Bourdieu, *The Rules of Art*, 186.

that the artwork emerges from the creative capacity of the individual artist, the capacity that artists have in their inside. The real value of an artwork must be determined in relation to that unique internality because the artwork itself is considered as an expression of the artist.⁶⁰ Expressing some uniqueness from the inside can be exemplified in Tolstoy's remarks, as he argues: "the man consciously by means of certain external signs, hands on to others feelings he has lived through, and that others are infected by these feelings and also experience them."⁶¹ Hence, because the real meaning of an artwork is the expression of the unique internality, subject-based art theories claim that the value of the artwork must be determined through it. In other words, the multiplicity of the interpretations concerning the same artwork is irrelevant, for it cannot represent the real meaning of it. Thus, as Bourdieu claims, they attempt "avoiding any enquiry beyond the artist and the artist's own activity into the conditions of this demiurgic capability."⁶²

2.3.2 Object-based Art Theories

The second view, object-based art theories, excludes the individual artist and its conceptualization as the subject from their art analyses. These theories emphasize either socio-historical conditions upon which such an artist is located or the artwork itself, which contains formal features that make it art. This means that the previously mentioned authority of the individual artist over his product and his pre-given creative capacity has been taken away from him in some degree and given to trans-individual

⁶⁰ Andy Hamilton, "The Aesthetics of Imperfection", 65, no. 253 (1990): 323-40. Accessed August 23, 2021. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3751429>.

⁶¹ Leo Tolstoy, *What Is Art?*, (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1995), 130, quoted in Gordon Graham, "Expressivism" in *The Routledge Companion to Aesthetics*, 106.

⁶² Bourdieu, *The Rules of Art*, 167.

forces and processes. Thus, object-based theories conceive of the individual artist unsubstantial and emphasize either the artwork itself or the context as substantial.

Firstly, object-based art theories excluded the individual from their art analyses by underlining the relationship between the artwork and the audience. That relationship is conceptualized wherein the audience is considered as the receiver of an artwork who can determine the value of the artwork. How a product is received became more important than how it is created, and consequently the artist who creates is not considered primary. Seán Burke exemplifies this situation wherein the artist becomes unsubstantial as the following: “Within modern aesthetics and New Criticism it became a virtual heresy to trace the novel to its author, the cantata to its composer, the sculpture to its sculptor.”⁶³ Tracing the artwork to its creator would be meaningless because the former has to encounter the audience, and that encounter itself determines the value of the artwork.

One strong argument emphasizing the socio-historical context as the substantial one in determining the value of an artwork can be identified in Aristotle. In *Poetics*, he stated that the poet’s activity is secondary in the valuation of the product because the artwork always has to encounter an audience which in turn determines its value. The party that is able to determine the value of the poem is not the poet himself but the particular relationship that the poem establishes with the context, as Pappas argues that: “Aristotle says that poets are not at liberty to change too many details of a traditional story. Again the poet’s activity becomes secondary in the presentation of a good story, and the story itself eclipses it.”⁶⁴ As Aristotle pointed, the poet simply cannot create something according to his own (as the subject-based art theories would

⁶³ Seán Burke, *The Ethics of Writing: Authorship and Legacy in Plato and Nietzsche* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh Univ. Press, 2008), 20.

⁶⁴ Nickolas Pappas, “Aristotle” in *The Routledge Companion to Aesthetics*, 18. Also see *Poetics* in Aristotle, *The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1995), 4979-81.

claim) because of the necessity that the story he creates must refer in some way to a traditional story. This means that the poem's value is always determined by the relation that it finds itself with the particular context. In other words, what determines the value of an artwork is not how the poet created it but how it is received. Hence, concerning the valuation process, the art-ness of an artwork has been reduced into a matter of interpretation by object-based theories, and consequently the particular context upon which an artwork makes its appearance stands as the sole factor in determining the product's value. This directly targets the way creativity is conceptualized by subject-based art theories, and it rendered the individual artist an irrelevant point of investigation, for what is created always has to be encountered with a particular context in which it is interpreted as an artwork or not. Such contextualist grasp of the situation is defined by Levinson as the following:

For contextualism, artworks are essentially historically embedded objects, ones that have neither art status, nor determinate identity, nor clear aesthetic properties, nor definite aesthetic meanings, outside or apart from the generative contexts in which they arise and in which they are put forward.⁶⁵

These contextualist approaches can be exemplified wherein Danto conceived art relative to an artworld⁶⁶, Becker underlined the complex webs of relationships showing themselves as artworlds⁶⁷, and Adorno claimed that “musical forms are internalizations of social forms.”⁶⁸ However, the exclusion of the individual out of the

⁶⁵ Jerrold Levinson, *Aesthetic Pursuits: Essays in Philosophy of Art* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2016), 20.

⁶⁶ Stephan Davies, “Definitions of Art” in *The Routledge Companion to Aesthetics*, 216-18; also see Arthur Coleman Danto, *The Transfiguration of the Commonplace: A Philosophy of Art*, Seventh printing (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1996).

⁶⁷ Howard Saul Becker, *Art Worlds*, (Berkeley, Calif.: Univ. of California Press, 2011).

⁶⁸ Theodore Gracyk, “Adorno” in *The Routledge Companion to Aesthetics*, 143; also see Theodor W. Adorno, *Aesthetic Theory* (London; New York: Continuum, 2002); Theodor W. Adorno, *Introduction to the Sociology of Music*, A Continuum Book (New York: Seabury Press, 1976).

picture has gone too far, and it turned into hypostatizing the external objective conditions as the transcendental one. For instance, Foucault emphasized that any artwork could have a multiplicity of interpretations, and it is impossible to come up with a singular interpretation of it.⁶⁹ Foucault emphasized the complex webs of relationships in which an artwork is located historically, in which the artist becomes irrelevant in determining the value of the product:

we must entirely reverse the traditional idea of the author. We are accustomed, as we have seen earlier, to saying that the author is the genial creator of a work in which he deposits, with infinite wealth and generosity, an inexhaustible world of significations.⁷⁰

Foucault recommends to focus on ‘inexhaustible world of significations’, because the author (or the artist), too, is a result of these historical processes, as he stated: “truth is quite the contrary: the author is not an indefinite source of significations which fill a work; the author does not precede the works.”⁷¹ Thus, he directly targets the pre-given status of the individual artist as proposed by subject-based art theories, as he states: “In short, it is a matter of depriving the subject (or its substitute) of its role as originator, and of analyzing the subject as a variable and complex function of discourse.”⁷² Roland Barthes has also put forward a similar view regarding the status of an individual artist.⁷³ He strongly criticized the tendency to seek an original author

⁶⁹ Michel Foucault, *This Is Not a Pipe* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983).

⁷⁰ Michel Foucault, “*What is an Author*”, in *The Foucault Reader*, ed. Paul Rabinow, 1st ed (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984).

⁷¹ Michel Foucault, “*What is an Author*”, 118-19.

⁷² Michel Foucault, “*What is an Author*”, 118.

⁷³ Roland Barthes, *Image, Music, Text*, ed. Stephen Heath (London: Fontana Press, 1987).

beneath the work as if the created product has a single meaning put into it by the author himself. For Barthes, the removal of the author out of the picture means:

refusing to assign a 'secret', an ultimate meaning, to the text (and to the world as text), liberates what may be called an anti-theological activity, an activity that is truly revolutionary since to refuse to fix meaning is, in the end, to refuse God and his hypostases – reason, science, law.⁷⁴

However, not all object-based art theories have conducted such removal of the author by highlighting the multiplicity of interpretations according to the particular socio-historical context. There is another clique, which might be labeled as the ones who want to return the objects themselves. Such a return is rendered necessary by the multiplicity of interpretations, as it is an issue that art theories have been discussed to this day. The multiplicity of interpretations posed a severe problem because while it highlights that there is more than just one beautiful, it also demands to answer the question of how the same object could produce these various affections in the people. That problem has been discussed and addressed a lot in art theories. For instance, Plato had conceived such variability as inferior and pointed out one single unchangeable form of beauty as opposed to it.⁷⁵ Erigena has identified this situation, and he questioned what makes it possible for one to have different attitudes towards the same object. He proposed a solution that one should have an attitude of disinterest toward the object because there will always be the existence of other interests than the art-related ones, which influence the observer's valuation of the object.⁷⁶ Similarly,

⁷⁴ Barthes, *Image, Music, Text*, 147.

⁷⁵ Plato, *Complete Works*, ed. John M. Cooper and D. S. Hutchinson (Indianapolis, Ind: Hackett Pub, 1997), 86-88.

⁷⁶ Johannes Scotus Erigena, *Periphyseon: The division of nature* (Montréal: Washington: Bellarmin; Dumbarton Oaks, 1987).

Augustine⁷⁷ had argued that instead of focusing on the variety of interpretations, he underlined “the need to distinguish between what is said and what is signified.”⁷⁸ The problem was also acknowledged by Hume, as he stated that “that a great variety of taste prevails in the world”⁷⁹, however, he stressed that there should be an individual-independent criterion, consisting of “true judges”⁸⁰ capable of determining the real value of the product.⁸¹ As can be seen, in all of these views opposing the multiplicity of interpretations, one common denominator appears repeatedly, which is the demand to focus on the object itself. Each thinker mentioned, has in some way pointed out the existence of a true interpretation of the objects themselves.

We can see other examples that subscribed to that demand to return to the objects themselves in Empiricism and Formalism. For instance, empiricism assumed that for the idea of beauty (or any valuation of an artwork) to appear in the human mind, there must firstly be the external objects affecting the mind.⁸² Levinson defines empiricism as the following:

Empiricism in art affirms that the essence of an artwork lies in its perceptual aspects or manifest face, and thus that understanding an artwork requires

⁷⁷ Augustine, *The Immortality of the Soul, The Magnitude of the Soul, On Music, The Advantage of Believing, On Faith in Things Unseen* (Washington, D.C: Catholic University of America Press, 2002).

⁷⁸ John Haldane, “*Medieval Aesthetics*” in *The Routledge Companion to Aesthetics*, 30.

⁷⁹ John Haldane, “*Medieval Aesthetics*”, 32.

⁸⁰ James Shelley, “*Empiricism*”, in *The Routledge Companion to Aesthetics*, 41.

⁸¹ Also see David Hume, *Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary*, ed. Eugene F. Miller, Rev. ed (Indianapolis: LibertyClassics, 1987).

⁸² Francis Hutcheson, *An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue: In Two Treatises* (Indianapolis, Ind: Liberty Fund, 2004); John Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (London: New York: Penguin Books, 1997).

nothing beyond perceiving it, without concern for its historical provenance or the problematic from which it emerged.⁸³

For instance, Hutcheson, who is considered as one of the founding figures of the Empiricist tradition and also the contributor of the modern usage of the term ‘aesthetics’, asked that “in virtue of what do objects cause the idea of beauty to arise in the human mind?”⁸⁴ He claimed that humans are capable of receiving the idea of beauty because they are internally sensible. Empiricist tradition suggested that the one that ‘causes’ such an idea to appear in the minds is nothing other than the objects themselves.

A more refined version of empiricism is formalism. Formalism is the movement that again seeks to focus on the object itself, rather than on the variety of interpretations when conducting an aesthetic judgment. Eduard Hanslick’s *The Beautiful in Music*⁸⁵ and Clive Bell’s *Art*⁸⁶ are two of the essential Formalist discussions in theories of art. For instance, Bell claimed that what makes painting art is “only its possession of significant form”⁸⁷, not its ability to represent nature or its interpretations according to its representative capability. Similarly, Hanslick, in *The Beautiful in Music* opposed the conviction that tends to evaluate music as beautiful because of its ability to express emotions. Hanslick describes his attempt as the “enquiry which is mainly and primarily directed against the widely-accepted doctrine that the office of music is ‘to represent

⁸³ Levinson, *Aesthetic Pursuits*, 21.

⁸⁴ James Shelley, “Empiricism” in *The Routledge Companion to Aesthetics*, 37.

⁸⁵ Eduard Hanslick, *On the Musically Beautiful: A Contribution towards the Revision of the Aesthetics of Music*, ed. Geoffrey Payzant (Indianapolis, Ind: Hackett Pub. Co, 1986).

⁸⁶ Clive Bell, *Art* (Charleston, SC: CreateSpace, 2012).

⁸⁷ Noël Carroll, “Formalism” in *The Routledge Companion to Aesthetics*, 88.

feelings.”⁸⁸ The attempt to focus on the object itself, can be clearly seen when Hanslick disregards the ‘extra-musical notions’ in the analysis as he claims that: “the beauty of a composition is *specifically musical -i.e.*, it inheres in the combinations of musical sounds and is independent of all alien, extra-musical notions.”⁸⁹ He directly states that “aesthetic investigations must, above all, consider the beautiful object, and not the perceiving subject.”⁹⁰ For him, the beautiful object that is to be perceived by the subject is already there by itself as he states that “although the beautiful exists *for* the gratification of an observer, it is *independent* of him.”⁹¹ However, focusing on the objects, as recommended by both empiricism and formalism, does not seem to be a satisfactory one, because people can have different interests towards that ‘same object’. Seeking an objective criterion to decide what makes an object art simply does not work because it reduces the socio-historical factors capable of influencing art-ness of a product. The tendency to remove the author altogether and open up the possibility for the multiplicity of interpretations appears the strongest argument, however, it paradoxically hypostatizes the socio-historical conditions as an ungrounded ground, i.e. a transcendental entity that can determine whatever it contains. To my eye, to come up with such an ungrounded ground is caused by presupposing the subject-object dichotomy, wherein the subject is considered as objectified entity by the Object. Thus, object-based art theories remove the effectivity of an individual artist either by emphasizing the context or the artwork itself. However, this second camp, as similar to the subject-based art theories, remains within the limitations of the presuppositions of the subject-object dichotomy.

⁸⁸ Hanslick, *On the Musically Beautiful*, 11.

⁸⁹ Hanslick, *On the Musically Beautiful*, 12.

⁹⁰ Hanslick, *On the Musically Beautiful*, 17.

⁹¹ Hanslick, *On the Musically Beautiful*, 19.

Even though art theories' argumentations differ from each other, I claim that they tend to presuppose the subject-object dichotomy and develop their further arguments upon that dichotomous ground. Hence, in my view, there is a need to reassess the situation in different terms, if one wants to avoid the subject-object dichotomy, which I think it as possible with Bourdieu's notion of habitus. Instead of relying on unjustified dichotomous relationalities and one-way pre-determined mechanisms, it is possible to demonstrate through habitus that neither the subject nor the object can precede their constitutive relation. Now let us look at the details of the notion of habitus and how I aim to utilize it in the analysis of the empirical data of the thesis.

CHAPTER 3

HABITUS

I have discussed in the previous chapters how the presupposition of the subject-object dichotomy shows itself in the methodologies of art theories and touched briefly upon the problems that it generates. From now on, I shall briefly open up the notion of habitus in terms of how it proposes a relational alternative to what it criticizes and discuss the reasons why it is the most plausible option for this thesis.

The notion of habitus will be examined under three sections: (α) *Inseparability of the subject-object* discusses how and why the subject and the object are inseparable and must be conceived of in their togetherness as the relation. (β) *Schemes of Perception*, discusses how individuals' cognitive structures are socio-historically constituted. Such socio-historical constitution means that the perception of the agents (musicians, in this case) does not consist of isolated subjective instances but has its social basis, which makes the perception itself as something to be analyzed sociologically. Lastly, in the section (γ) *Internalization of Externality*, discusses the fact that the socio-historical forces are entirely dependent upon the process of an internalization by the agent to be effective. That internalization process is the most crucial part of the theory of habitus because through that it is possible to grasp the situation as a relation, instead of conceiving it as a pre-established dichotomy.

3.1 Inseparability of the Subject and Object

As I have shown that,⁹² the presupposition of the subject-object dichotomy posits part's substantial existences and tends to conceive them in their non-relation. Habitus exactly criticizes such a non-relational constitution of parts and proposes their inseparability which, in turn, shows itself as the relationality. The emphasis on the inseparability can be seen in the following, where Bourdieu states:

In fact, the social world is an object of knowledge for those who belong to it and who, comprehended within it, comprehend it, and produce it, but from the point of view they occupy within it. One therefore cannot exclude the percipere and the percipi, the knowing and the-being-known, the recognizing and the being-recognized.⁹³

The parts reciprocally influence each other, and that very reciprocal influence itself is constitutive of them, i.e. it constitutes parts as parts; this is their inseparability. Hence, what renders parts as parts is not their prior existences to the relation each has to its other, but the very relationality itself. Therefore, Bourdieu stresses that the separations such as the subject-object, individual-society, agent-structure, researcher-what is researched, and knower-known, etc. must not be comprehended in their artificial separations, but in their togetherness. This togetherness can only be understood in the form of a *dialectical relationship* where the parts cannot be presumed to exist by themselves prior to their relation. Bourdieu describes such dialectical relation as “the intrinsically twofold reality”⁹⁴, in which “social subjects comprehend the social world which comprehends them.”⁹⁵ This means that neither part of the pre-constituted

⁹² See 2.1 above.

⁹³ Bourdieu, *Pascalian Meditations*, 189.

⁹⁴ Bourdieu, *The Logic of Practice*, 135.

⁹⁵ Bourdieu, *Distinction*, 482.

opposition can have their prior independent existence; they can only exist as the relation.⁹⁶

The non-justifiable status of prior separations has consequences for art theories tending to operate within the subject-object dichotomy. Since the parts' existences are a presupposition that cannot be justified, the further arguments relying on that ground also become unjustified. Hauser highlighted this situation as the following:

The question of primacy is undialectical, meaningless, and pointless as far as they are concerned, since it is in principle insoluble. It is an arché which is being sought, where there is no 'first' for dialectical thought and where there cannot be one, and the most important insight consists in the fact that such a first has no scientific meaning either as a perceptible object or as a subject capable of thought and consciousness which is presented to the perception.⁹⁷

Thinking together the subject and the object as inseparable is what habitus exactly does, as Bourdieu states:

This is precisely the function of the notion of habitus, which restores to the agent a generating, unifying, constructing, classifying power, while recalling that this capacity to construct social reality, itself socially constructed, is not that of a transcendental subject but of a socialized body, investing in its practice socially constructed organizing principles that are acquired in the course of a situated and dated social experience.⁹⁸

Therefore, the analysis of Ankara musicians is conducted through such theoretical framework provided by habitus, in which musicians are considered as always in a relation with their particular encounter, i.e. socio-historical configuration, without reducing the one part of the relation into the effect of the other and asking which part determines the other. The relational analysis provides irrelevance of such a question

⁹⁶ The self-sufficiency (*immediacy*) of parts had criticized by Hegel as this: "Since each of the two opposed sides contains its other within itself, it follows that neither of these determinations, taken alone, has truth, but only their unity does. This is the true dialectical consideration of them." see Hegel, *The Science of Logic*, 164.

⁹⁷ Hauser, *The Sociology of Art*, 188.

⁹⁸ Bourdieu, *Pascalian Meditations*, 136-37.

because the parts are not there before their constitutive relationality. Thus, this thesis claims that the only way to avoid implementing the subject-object dichotomy is to comprehend the parts (without pre-separating them) in their dialectical relationship.

3.2 Schemes of Perception

The subject-object dichotomy shows itself well in the way how perception is conceived of traditionally. The perception is traditionally understood as something subjective, belonging to the individual, consisting of several subjective instances such as feelings, senses, fantasies, dreams, aspirations, disappointments, etc., which do not have an objective basis.⁹⁹ Contrarily, what is objective is considered the externality of an individual, as the reality itself seems to be there by itself without asking the individual's permission to exist. Dichotomous thinking has an irresistible urge to separate objective and subjective domains from each other and conceive them independent from each other as much as possible. As such thinking seems to be incapable of comprehending the dialectical relationship, it comes up with methodological pre-rules that point out that as if an objective analysis must exclude subjective instances from itself, because subjective instances are simply mere opinions which do not have their objective bases. It is funny, however, because dichotomous thinking tends to forget that the very separation of subjective-objective domains from each other is generated by itself. Thanks to such separation, the subjective instances can be excluded from the objective analyses and considered mere opinions, whereas what is sociologically valuable are the objective data themselves. In other words, such a dichotomous grasp makes it possible to exclude subjective instances from objective analyses while it forgets that the separation is generated by itself in the first place.

⁹⁹ For a comprehensive study concerning how the notion of perception have been conceptualized throughout history of philosophy see Howard Robinson, *Perception*, Problems of Philosophy (London; New York: Routledge, 1994). For a discussion of how perception is discussed especially in psychology, see *Blackwell handbook of sensation and perception*, E. Bruce Goldstein et al., eds., (Oxford, UK; Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub, 2005)

Hence, the perception itself is thought of as a subjective instance which must be considered as non-objective information, and to be excluded from a scientific analysis because they are conceived of methodologically inferior that cannot be the source of scientific knowledge.

It is true that subjects, individuals, or agents (or whatever) always perceive the world through their own 'subjective' schemes of perception, the world can only appear in the way how it is perceived by them; but it is also true that the schemes through which the world comes to be do not belong only to the individuals themselves, but they are constituted socio-historically. In other words, habitus' schemes of perception have their socio-historical constitutions, so they cannot be considered tautologically as isolated subjective instances in contradistinction to what is objective; rather, they have their 'objective' bases. Bourdieu states that:

The 'subjective' dispositions which are at the source of value have, as products of a historical process of institution, the objectivity of something established in a collective order which transcends consciousness and individual wills.¹⁰⁰

This means that the perception, which is considered as an isolated subjective instance that a sociological research must excommunicate it from its religious circles, itself is something socio-historically constructed. Instead of being a true-follower of the subject-object separation (which sociology unfortunately tends to do), one has "to acknowledge that cognitive structures are not forms of consciousness but dispositions of the body"¹⁰¹, as Bourdieu suggests. Therefore, the schemes of perception of habitus *are* the 'objectively' (socio-historically) constituted 'subjective' structures, because, as Bourdieu claims, "the schemes of construction they [habitus] apply to the world have themselves been constructed by the world".¹⁰² For this reason, therefore,

¹⁰⁰ Bourdieu, *The Rules of Art*, 172.

¹⁰¹ Bourdieu, *Practical Reason*, 54.

¹⁰² Bourdieu, *Pascalian Meditations*, 149.

Bourdieu thinks that “it is possible to trace their [cognitive structures’] social genesis.”¹⁰³

Therefore, this thesis finds it possible *not* to conceive of perception as something subjective. By including into analysis how musicians perceive their particular situations, it is possible to grasp the ‘objective’ configuration of the socio-historical context that the musicians are in. To do this, however, one has to “break with the intellectualism of the Kantian tradition and see that cognitive structures are not forms of consciousness but dispositions of the body, practical schemes”¹⁰⁴, as Bourdieu argues. Hence, this thesis will provide an analysis of the schemes of perception of Ankara musicians without conceiving them within the limitations of the subject-object dichotomy; instead, it claims that the domain of subjectivity and objectivity should be conceived in their togetherness. In other words, this thesis aims “to establish the genealogy of the objective structures of the cognitive structures which are both the product and the condition of their functioning”¹⁰⁵, as Bourdieu states. This, I think, is the proper relational comprehension of the situation, the one that is meaningful sociologically.

3.3 Internalization of Externality

The above-mentioned socio-historical constitution of the schemes of perception must not be understood as if it is a one-way mechanism emerging from the external socio-historical forces and penetrating into the internality of musicians. This thesis does not assume musicians’ cognitive structures as an entity that is ready to be determined by

¹⁰³ Bourdieu, *Pascalian Meditations*, 172.

¹⁰⁴ Bourdieu, *Pascalian Meditations*, 176.

¹⁰⁵ Bourdieu, *Pascalian Meditations*, 115.

these external forces. To think in that way would be to go back into dichotomous thinking, wherein the internal and the external are separated from each other and exist substantially. Rather, the relationship of internal-external must be conceived of as a dialectical relationship, in which neither part can precede that relation. In other words, to put it roughly, neither the musician nor the particular context that the former is in can precede its other prior to their constitutive relation. Hence, what is at stake is a dialectical movement itself, rather than separated parts showing themselves in the form of preestablished internality and externality, which is the exact reason why Bourdieu defines habitus as “a system of internalized, embodied schemes which, having been constituted in the course of individual history and function in their practical state.”¹⁰⁶

Hence, the process of internalization of externality must be considered as a dialectical relationship, in which there is no distinction between the internal and the external prior to the relation; instead, as Bourdieu states, the “cognitive structures which social agents implement in their practical knowledge of the social world are internalized embodied social structures.”¹⁰⁷ This means that the process of internalization of externality is at the same time an externalization of internality, which is underlined by Bourdieu as: “the dialectic of internalization of externality and the externalization of internality.”¹⁰⁸

Here I must explain what is meant by internalization and externalization and how these processes are conceptualized. Because those who suffer from substantial thinking may prematurely conclude that the process of internalization of externality presupposes the internal and the external as separate entities; however, this is not the case. The internal and the external are not there by themselves prior to the relation that is constitutive of

¹⁰⁶ Bourdieu, *Distinction*, 467.

¹⁰⁷ Bourdieu, *Distinction*, 468.

¹⁰⁸ Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, 72.

them. To highlight, I think there needs a brief recall of how Hegel conceptualized the process of *aufhebung* (sublation) through which he criticizes the self-sufficiency (*immediacy*) of parts. It is important because substantialist thinking tends to separate the internal and the external from each other and conceives them as independent entities. Hegel had stated the impossibility of conceiving the parts as immediacies that can self-sufficiently exist and strongly argued that they can only exist in a relation to each other:

Since each of the two opposed sides contains its other within itself, it follows that neither of these determinations, taken alone, has truth, but only their unity does. This is the true dialectical consideration of them.¹⁰⁹

Hence, internal and external are entirely dependent to each other, they cannot exist by themselves, their self-sufficient existences cannot be presupposed, because each one consists of the other in itself. However, there appears a problem, especially for those who tend to think in a linear time-scale; which is a problem of *how the internal and the external can exist and not exist at the same time*. To clear up that point, it is necessary to touch upon briefly the process of *aufhebung* (sublation). As Hegel states:

The sublating of a *presupposition* is the disappearing shine¹¹⁰; only in the act of *sublating* the immediate does this immediate itself come to be, or is that shining; the beginning that begins from itself is first of all the positing of this itself from which the beginning is made.¹¹¹

In other words, there are no immediate entities preceding the process of *aufhebung*; the immediacy itself is retrospectively presupposed by the *aufhebung* process itself.

¹⁰⁹ Hegel, *The Science of Logic*, 164.

¹¹⁰ *Schein* in German. It is translated as ‘shine’ by Giovanni, whereas Miller translates it as ‘illusory being’. Miller’s translation: “The sublating of *something presupposed* is the vanishing illusory being; only in the act of *sublating* the immediate does this immediate itself become, or is this reflective movement; it is the beginning from itself which first is the positing of this self from which the beginning is made.” see Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Hegel’s Science of Logic*, trans. A. V. Miller (Amherst, N.Y: Humanity Books, 1998), 556.

¹¹¹ Hegel, *The Science of Logic*, 490-91.

As Žizek says, it is a process that “retroactively posits or creates its necessity”.¹¹² In other words, the immediacy itself is not presupposed *before* that process, but rather it has shown itself only *after*. It is true that through the process of *aufhebung*, some *x* (as the immediate) changes into *y* while preserving that some *x-ness* within itself into what it changed. Such an *x*, however, was not an *x* before the constitutive relation that makes it *x*, because it can only retrospectively presuppose itself after the relation. In other words, *x* does not go into the state of *y* through an alternation of itself, for *x* was not there as an *x* prior to the constitutive relation. This has crucial consequences for the discussion concerning the internal-external distinction. Substantialist thinking cannot comprehend such a dialectical relation wherein *x* exists and does not exist at the same time (or the internal and the external). It rather wants to begin with a secure substantial ground where the starting points do not have to be justified but as there by themselves as immediacies. When it comes to the internal-external separation, the dialectical relationship means that these parts do not have their existences before the relation, but they constitute themselves retrospectively as such after the relation. For that reason, the internal and the external are not substantial entities but rather moments, which can only be comprehended in their relation to each other. The above-mentioned dialectical characteristic of internal-external is described by Bourdieu as the following:

the internal dispositions -the internalization of externality- enable the external forces to exert themselves, but in accordance with the specific logic of the organisms in which they are incorporated, i.e. in a durable, systematic and non-mechanical way.¹¹³

Therefore, what Bourdieu stresses is that, for an externality to exert its external-ness, there must be an internality upon which such externality can exert its force. That exertion is not transcendental to the musician as if it determines the latter absolutely;

¹¹² Slavoj Žižek, *Less than Nothing: Hegel and the Shadow of Dialectical Materialism* (London; New York: Verso, 2012), 231.

¹¹³ Bourdieu, *The Logic of Practice*, 55.

instead, it depends upon its being internalized by the internality. Such a situation is highlighted by Bourdieu as: “In a general way, the efficacy of external necessities depends upon the efficacy of an internal necessity.”¹¹⁴ In other words, the external forces can only be external insofar as they are internalized because they are dependent upon the sublation of themselves into internality. For this reason, it is irrelevant to ask which part determines other; for the parts do not precede their constitutive relationality, and their possible effectivity on each other cannot be thought of prior to such relationality. This renders the internal and the external inseparable from each other. We can see this inseparability in Bourdieu as: “The world encompasses me, comprehends me as a thing among things, but I, as a thing for which there are things, comprehend this world”.¹¹⁵ This means that this thesis does not conceive external forces as transcendental to the musician as capable of determining the latter absolutely; instead, the effectivity of external forces is dependent upon their being appearing in the form of an internal necessity through the process of internalization. Thus, instead of relying on the preconstructed dichotomies, what needs to be done is to show the impossibility of thinking the substantial existences of the parts prior to the relationality. We should have to think that the objective-external structures are not there by themselves, they need to be incorporated into the form of internality, they must show themselves in the perception of the individual.

I claim that habitus with its three features mentioned-above, proposes an alternative to the presupposition of the subject-object dichotomy. It does that by highlighting the dialectical relationship that necessitates us to think the subject and the object as non-existent prior to their constitutive relationality, which in turn renders the parts inseparable from each other. To think the subject and the object in their togetherness as the relation has crucial implications for any art analysis, because it shows the

¹¹⁴ Bourdieu, *Pascalian Meditations*, 169.

¹¹⁵ Bourdieu, *Pascalian Meditations*, 130.

unjustified grounds of pre-established dualistic constitutions based on the subject-object dichotomy (such as the artist's freedom vs. socio-historical necessities etc.). Hence, in the following chapter, which is the analysis of the thesis' empirical data, I try to grasp the case of Ankara musicians by highlighting that relationality conceptualized by habitus, in which these musicians cannot be considered either as subjects or objects. In each case I demonstrate, it can be identified that the musician always interacts with his particular situation, and I claim that the subject-object dichotomy seems to grasp these interactions by reducing them into pre-established oppositions. Now let us look at how the case of Ankara musicians appears when the notion of habitus is utilized to analyze it.

CHAPTER 4

ANKARA MUSICIANS AS NEITHER SUBJECTS NOR OBJECTS

In this chapter, I aim to present an analysis of the interviews conducted with Ankara musicians and demonstrate the dialectical relationship pointed out by habitus between the subject and the object, in which neither the musician (or the subject), nor the context or the artwork (or the object) can precede its other. I have identified five themes which tended to recur in all the interviews, which are (α) musicians' *seeking originality*, (β) their tendency towards *self-preservation in their encounters* with their particular situation, (γ) their attempt of being *autonomous in music creation* processes, (δ) the *reciprocal influence* between *musicians* and *the audience*, and lastly (ϵ) musician's *future anticipation*. Hence, these five themes are analyzed in this chapter by utilizing habitus with the aim of providing a critique of the subject-object dichotomy.

4.1 Seeking Originality

Throughout the interviews, I have found that musicians are concerned about their originality. The concern for being original was a recurring theme in the interviews, but musicians expressed it in several ways, and the content given to it significantly varied among each musician. To my eye, musicians pursue such originality rather than having it as their natural property, as they are interested in acquiring such an original position for themselves. Hence, this section discusses *musicians' originality seeking attempts* without turning it into an investigation of whether they are really original or not.

The originality of the artist is also a pivotal point on which subject-based and object-based art theories are opposing each other. As discussed, while subject-based art theories consider originality as a gift that is naturally belonging to the individual artist, object-based theories were against such an isolated conceptualization, and they have emphasized the socio-historical factors upon which such an originality would be possible.¹¹⁶ Contrary to art theories' tendency to grasp the situation in terms of dichotomies, this section does not aim to investigate the real source and location of the originality but rather conceives it in terms of a pursuit on the part of musicians. Let us look at how that concern for being original appeared in the interviews.

The interviewee, Ilgın, is a musician in her late 40's who has been in the music business for almost 25 years. She is a well-known vocalist and can rightfully be considered a local rockstar in Ankara. Ilgın is a full-time musician whose income depends entirely on music. She regularly performs cover music with her bands at several places in Ankara and earns her living through that. Even though she is a cover musician currently, Ilgın is primarily known for her own music. She has released several records and got her relative fame through these.

Ilgın has to play cover music in order to survive because she simply cannot sustain her life if she remains in the business with her music only. Being a cover musician generates trouble especially for a musician who got famous with her music like Ilgın. The distinction between cover musicianship and creating one's own music is pretty clear for Ilgın, wherein she is in favor of the latter: "Cover musicianship or performing at bars for me is just a job, but what is essential for me is the other side. Because it will not go anywhere further, I just earn money from it." However, because of economic conditions, she does not have such liberty, and this situation seems to disturb her, which can be identified in her following remarks:

¹¹⁶ See 2.3 above for a detailed discussion regarding how I categorized art theories.

To tell the truth, I am a musician who *stuck in between two worlds*, as someone who does covers and bar musicianship, and also making own tunes at the same time. So I do both, actually.

The in-betweenness she feels, however, is not the only problem for İlgin. There is another issue, emerging from her belonging to the metal music culture in Ankara. İlgin describes herself as a metalhead¹¹⁷ who prefers to listen, play, and create metal music. The genre of her released material was also metal, and she also has a few metal bands with which she performs occasionally. These performances have to be occasional because they do not provide a sufficient income for a musician, so İlgin prioritizes performing with her other band by which she earns her living. With that band, they play pop music in an upper-class bar, and according to İlgin, the payment that they get is one of the highest in Ankara. She performs there regularly every Friday, and she with her band is pretty much identified with that place. They have been playing for almost eight years in that place on the same day, and the performances are well-appreciated by the audience. Therefore, these performances provide decent economic conditions for İlgin. However, there is a problem, which I mentioned before emerging from her being a metalhead. While İlgin can create metal music according to her preferences, she does not have liberty to play her favorite genre in her cover performances. Of course, she can play, and as I have stated, she has a few metal bands that she plays with occasionally; however, there is almost no income from being a metal musician. In the particularity of the live music environment in Ankara, only pop music and weddings produce high income for a musician; so it is a necessity rather than a preference for a full-time musician. In other words, if a musician wants to survive, she has to be part of either of the cases. İlgin suffers from that necessity too, i.e. she cannot play metal music simply because she cannot survive if she does just that.

In addition to above mentioned economic necessities, İlgin also expressed another issue that bothers her. She talked about a habit in metal music culture, which she did

¹¹⁷ People who listen to metal music (and also play) call themselves metalhead; ‘metalci’ in Turkish.

not come across in other genres before, that puts some sort of peer pressure on musicians pushing them to create their own music. As she stated, playing only covers and not creating their own tunes would be seen as inferior within the metal music context. She explained to me the specificity of the metal music culture in Ankara, that even if metal musicians started their music career with playing covers only, they gradually produce their own songs and substitute those covers with their own, because there is that sort of mechanism encouraging the musicians to create their own: “we [as metalheads] are more fanatic than most of the other genres . . . you have to make your own music, you have to produce your own tunes; in metal music, there is no such thing that you only do covers.” This creates a problem because Ilgin feels belonged to the culture that problematizes being only a cover musician. Hence, as a famous musician and a self-proclaimed metalhead, Ilgin simply cannot survive if she does her own music only, while also she cannot play her favorite genre in her performances.

In such a space of necessities that constantly troubles Ilgin, she seems to have found a way out by clinging to her original position that she claims she has. Although she thinks that what is essential for a musician is to make one’s own music and being a cover musician is unoriginal, she seeks some kind of originality in that ‘naturally unoriginal’ configuration. She described that she has a unique vocal style that makes her distinct from other vocalists, and in her cover performances she demonstrates it to the audience:

I have been singing all those years. I can integrate the vocal tricks I have developed throughout my experience in metal music when I sing pop music. I mean, I think I have a unique style, and maybe this is the most important thing; *I do sing any song as myself*. When I sing in this way, songs appear different to people; I do not know and cannot explain that situation.

As can be seen, what makes Ilgin’s vocal style original, according to her, is her ability to integrate her vocal style that she got from her metal music past. By doing that, she demonstrates something that she inheres from her past even though she is performing a whole different genre where she feels uncomfortable. I read that attempt as a way of protecting her self-proclaimed original position, which she has lost because of the economic necessities imposed on her. Ilgin seems to internalize the fact that she has to

perform cover music to survive, but with a touch of course; she sublimes the external necessities imposed on her by internalizing them in her own way. It is true that she has to sing pop music as a metalhead, but she sings it in her own way. I claim that Ilgin internalizes these external necessities, and while internalizing, she also externalizes them in her own way:

I always believed that some people glow on stage naturally, which cannot be given to someone afterward or taken from. I mean it is possible that a musician can learn to play better or become a virtuoso; he can learn everything, but how to appear in the stage, you cannot teach someone that. Some people are especially born for this, period. I see myself as such and believe that I have a second personality when on stage, although it is a little bit schizophrenic [smiles]. I mean, I am another person when I am on the stage, I do not confuse that person with me in my everyday life.

That process must be read, to repeat, as “the dialectic of internalization of externality and the externalization of internality”¹¹⁸, and I claim that this is the point where this thesis proposes something different from the art theories. Grasping the situation in terms of a dialectical relationship between the internal and the external makes it possible to not cling to the subject-object dichotomy. For instance, if one (a possibly objective-empiricist eye) excludes how Ilgin perceives herself in the particular situation that she is in, it might appear as if she surrendered to the conditions and started to play the game according to the rules by performing pop music covers. This would be a reduction because Ilgin herself is disturbed by the fact that she cannot be on the stage with her own music, and through that very disturbance she finds a way out; that she seeks some form of originality in her vocal style through which she can be referred to her particular metal music past. A subjectivist eye could also implement a reduction by grasping the situation as if Ilgin, in each situation, presents another form of originality, such as glowing on the stage, singing songs in a unique way etc. Such a reduction can easily be done, if one excludes from the discussion how these external necessities bother the musician and push her to cope with them in her own way. However, as can be identified in Ilgin’s case, the external necessities are significantly

¹¹⁸ Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, 72.

effective, and not including them into the analysis by focusing just on the subjectivity of the musician would be a reduction. Therefore, habitus, in that sense, provides an alternative to both objectivist and subjectivist stances by underlining the dialectical relationship between the internal and the external.

A similar concern for having an original position can be exemplified through another interviewee, Şenol, who is a jazz guitarist in his late 40's and has been in the music business for more than 25 years. Like Ilgın, Şenol is a full-time musician who plays cover music and creates his own. Şenol is also a famous musician in the particularity of Ankara music scene like Ilgın. The genres they feel they belonged to differ among them however, whereas Ilgın describes herself and is known for metal music, Şenol is a jazz musician. These musical differences are worth to be underlined because I think that they strongly affect how musicians perceive the originality. For instance, Şenol does not altogether discard cover music performances as ungenue as Ilgın did, which might be related to jazz music's tradition and structure. Jazz music essentially differs from the other genres like classical, pop, rock, or metal music in terms of the musicians' improvised solos that it contains within itself structurally. While these improvised solos constitute an essential part of jazz songs, they allow musicians to show themselves through their solos and 'be themselves'. Therefore, according to the particularity of jazz music structure and tradition, making one's own music is not the only parameter for appearing as a genuine musician.

Şenol's perception of originality seems to be influenced by the musical tradition that he feels belonged to. Being a jazz musician, Şenol criticizes what he calls as the inauthenticity of musicians, i.e. the musicians who play their instruments *not as themselves*. He stated that "there is so much pretentiousness¹¹⁹ in the scene" and continued his words with a bit of sarcasm in his tone: "I really think that they [some

¹¹⁹ He said "miş-gibilik" in Turkish, which I could not translate it to English without losing its depictive capability.

musicians] are so talented. I see it exactly as an *imitation talent* because they can imitate so well.” By describing pretentiousness as an imitation talent, Şenol highlighted that *a musician must be himself* when he plays and present something genuine: “I care about this a lot, especially for my own musicianship personality. Once Erkan Oğur¹²⁰ said to me that if you do not hear your own voice, you would better not play it.” As can be seen, Şenol presented another parameter for being original, which can be identified as playing the instrument as oneself. Although his remark shares some similarities with İlgin, as she claims to sing pop music in a way unique to herself, Şenol argues that one must be original when one plays his instrument, so he does not altogether discard performing the songs that one did not create, but rather seeks an originality when performing them.

Like what we came across in İlgin, Şenol is also concerned about creating his own music and has his own released material like İlgin. Unlike İlgin, however, Şenol continues to create his own music, and by the time we talked with him, he was about to release his new materials. However, he is in a similar position like İlgin in terms of his economic status, i.e. he could not survive by his music only. He has to be a part of several projects where he performs cover music because of his economic conditions. Although Şenol does not discard cover music performances altogether, the importance given to creating one’s own music and perceiving it in terms of originality is similar to what we saw in İlgin. For instance, Şenol describes why he creates as the following: “For me, music creation is a way existing. It is like writing a poem, you may have an ability to do it, and you do it.”¹²¹ Considering the above remarks concerning being original when a musician is playing his instrument, Şenol underlines the importance that he gives to being original in a more robust way when it comes to music creation.

¹²⁰ A musician who is well-respected among jazz guitarists in Turkey.

¹²¹ Sorry for bad translate; in Turkish: “Demek istediğim şey o, müzik üretmek bir varoluş. Yani mesela şiir yazmak gibi yani, senin elin güzel kalem tutuyordur, yazarsın.”

He claims that: “Whatever that is, there must be a story behind it. I am choosing my words carefully, but I think this is the case. I mean, there must be a story, it must emerge from a source.” What Şenol refers to as the “source” is the musician’s sense of belonging that he feels towards what he creates. Such belonging seems to appear natural for a musician himself; for one’s own music comes *originates* from the inside: “The thing is, I mean, it is your own music, it does come from inside you know, it is like groundwater¹²². What would I do if I do not do that?” The expression “groundwater”, through which Şenol defines his music, is an exact reference to that original source that the musician thinks he has of naturally. Hence, there is a similarity between İlgin and Şenol regarding how they approach their own creations. They both commonly establish an affinity between the music they created and their originality. Actually, they do not even establish such a connection, but only for an external observer such affinity exists, they most probably think that the *origin* of their music is themselves naturally. Even though these two musicians’ approach the issue of performing cover music differs slightly according to the particular past of the musical tradition that they feel belonged to, the data suggests that being just a cover musician does not effectuate in these two musicians a feeling of belonging which they would consider it original.

I have interviewed another musician, Boran, whom I think presented a whole different conception of originality, especially when it compared to both İlgin and Şenol. Boran is a full-time musician playing violin and has tenure in ‘State Opera and Ballet’ (*Devlet Opera ve Balesi*). Having a tenure makes Boran unique among the musicians I have interviewed as there is no full-time musician who succeeded in securing a regular income. Musicians rather work irregularly with no official insurances, which was also the case for the examples I have demonstrated so far (İlgin and Şenol).

Boran is a classical musician in his early 30’s, who trained in conservatoire from his early ages. He is accepted to conservatoire when he is eleven years old, and he started

¹²² “Yer altı suyu”, in Turkish.

to play violin. There are different departments in conservatoires that base themselves upon the curriculum according to the western classical music tradition. The departments can roughly be distinguished into two as the instrument division and the composition division. The former consists of the training of several instruments (varied according to the school) and the latter trains the composers who compose musical pieces. In western classical music, the difference between a musician who performs and who composes is arguably more distinguished than other music genres and traditions. That difference is generally highlighted in terms of a superiority of the composer over the one who is just a performer. The composer-performer distinction is explained by Roger Scruton as the following:

Composition, in the tradition of Western music, has generally been distinguished from performance, even when composer and performer are one and the same. The composer is creating a work of art, whose performances may vary, but which is the single vehicle of an original creative intention.¹²³

As Scruton emphasized, the one who composes conveys something unique to the audience in relation to its artistic intentions, whereas the performer is just performing what has been originally created. There are numerous examples in western classical music tradition that have touched upon the composer-performer distinction emphasizing the superiority of the latter; one of them is the following quotation by the medieval music theorist Guido d'Arezzo: "There is a great difference between musicians and singers: the latter vocalize, but the former knows what music consist of. For he who makes what he does not understand is defined as a beast."¹²⁴ Hence, there is a strong tradition in western classical music that seems to underline that difference and establish a hierarchical relationship between the composer and the performer, and Boran is on the performer-instrumentalist side of that distinction.

¹²³ Roger Scruton, "*Composition*" in *The Routledge Companion to Philosophy and Music*, 520.

¹²⁴ Erkki Huovinen, "*Understanding Music*" in *The Routledge Companion to Philosophy and Music*, 125.

Considering the above-mentioned distinction in classical music and the economic status that makes Boran unique among the other interviewees, I asked him if he creates his own music or aims to do so, he answered the following:

You mean writing something? I have not tried before. I mean, when I exercise or get bored, I play some improvisations, however, I never thought about it and tried writing something.

This is important because it means that *the most economically stable interviewee* in my sample did not even think about creating music. That answer would have been the opposite if it comes from İlgin or Şenol, as they strongly highlighted that they are obliged to perform cover music because of their economic status, and they would rather prefer to create their own music if it is possible. However, we can see that Boran's economic security does not lead him to create his own music. This difference seems to emerge from the different musical traditions that musicians belong to.

Even though Boran differs from İlgin and Şenol in terms of his attitude towards music creation, there seems to be a stable concern that can be identified in all three musicians, which is the concern for being original. This concern shows itself when Boran emphasizes that performing itself must not be considered as an unoriginal act but *is* an original act by itself:

Then, one shall not read a poem too. In the world, you know, no one is the same as the other. Also, everyone can interpret it [the piece] differently and produce different results. There are a few billion people in this world, and there might be a billion interpretations of it. If it does not matter, then one musician shall play, and we listen to that only. It cannot be enjoyed because there are tons of different people who have been experiencing different things in their lives and expressing them in different ways. Therefore, I think there are lots of interpretations.

As can be seen, Boran states that any performance of the same musical piece produces a different interpretation of it, and these differences are what make performances original. In other words, an interpretation of 'the same piece' or a performance of a composition that is created by some other, is essentially original for Boran because, in each instance, the musician produces something different than the written material. Contrary to absolute fidelity to written material, Boran stated that: "He [a violinist] must err. For me, the one who is a genuine violinist is the one that can make errors.

Because I find it to err is very beautiful and humane.” As can be seen, to err is conceived as originality by Boran instead of being absolute bound to the written material, which is thought of as an original product itself. As Boran suggests, by erring, one is able to play it in a unique way which makes that particular performance as belonged to him in a special way. Boran highlights these musicians who just play perfectly what is written as the following:

They work hard, and they are like a computer system, like an android. I am disturbed by such music because there is no sensuality in it, *there is nothing coming from inside* in that music. It seems to me that they just play like this by exercising 10-hours per day.

Thus, while Boran’s attitude towards music creation shows that the economic necessity is not the only determinant in a creative process, it also demonstrates that music creation is not perceived in the same way by every musician as something original. Unlike İlgin and Şenol, the music creation for Boran is not the ultimate original act that a musician can present. Boran is also concerned by being original, which we can identify that in the way how he discusses being a performer, and how an instrumentalist should play his instrument by simply putting something from himself into what he plays.

Another look, which seems to dwell on the opposition of the performer-creator, came from another interviewee, Mete, who is a guitarist in his late 30’s and a full-time musician. Mete does not create his own music; he performs covers and plays almost every night at several places with different bands. Mete was the one who has the most decent economic conditions as a full-time cover musician, but he, like all other musicians (except Boran), works informally without insurance.

Mete’s economic decency, however, comes with a trade-off as he is a very busy musician who does not have enough time to create his own music. He stated that he wants to create his own music because he is disturbed by the fact that he has to play some other’s songs:

I constantly want to do my own thing. Our attitude is now like that we should not play some other’s songs because they already had been made and played

well by some others; so we think that we shall create a new thing. If I succeed in doing so, I will be incredibly happy.

As I have mentioned before, in the particularity of the Ankara music scene, the highest income is provided by pop music performances. This necessity can also be identified in Mete's case, i.e. he gets the highest income from his bands that performs pop music with. However, he states that pop music is not his thing:

There is music I would create; I think every musician has such inclinations. Because you always listen to something, are affected by it, and want to play it. However, what affects me is not pop music, unfortunately. I play pop, and I think I play it well, however, there are better kinds of music than pop music for me.

What Mete calls the music he would create, I think, is the point where the musician draws the line between his originality and the necessary conditions which prevent him from acquiring such originality. As a full-time musician, he is in decent economic conditions, but he also does not have enough time to produce his own music. Even though the concern for being original does not explicitly show itself in Mete's words, the struggle he feels becomes apparent when he explains his disturbance by being obliged to be a cover musician only as the following:

We at least want to play our own tunes and go beyond being just a cover band. Because, I mean, we want to develop our own sound, publish it and say that *that is the product we created*.

The way Mete appeals to the distinction of 'music he plays vs. music he would create', I think, highlights the situation where he wants to present some originality that can be considered as his own. Mete does that again what can be roughly called as 'cover music-own music' distinction, by assessing the former as inferior compared to the latter. There are, however, slight differences when Mete's position is compared with İlgin and Şenol. Firstly, while both İlgin and Şenol are known for their own music, Mete has not created his own yet. Also, Mete has significantly decent conditions than both İlgin and Şenol, whereas these two musicians conveyed that they are performing cover music because of the economic necessities. However, the decent conditions do not push Mete to create his own, because, as he claims, his busy schedule does not let him to create. Mete also differs from Boran that in the way he approaches to the idea

of creating one's own. Whereas Boran did not even think about creating it (as I discussed it by relating to the musical tradition he belongs to), Mete strongly underlined that he wants to create his own.

Parallel to Mete's situation, the pursuit of originality through creating one's own music can be identified in another musician, Oktay. Oktay is a musician who earns his life both by music and other extra jobs. He is a bass guitarist in his late 30's, and his economic conditions are the poorest among the four interviewees mentioned before. As Oktay stated, he has to work in several part-time extra jobs other than his music performances, but these extras do not provide him sufficient conditions that he would be happy with.

Oktay started his career by creating their own music with his band. They had a band playing metal music and were creating their own tunes. As he stated, when they formed the band, they had some cover songs in their playlists, but they were highly focused on creating their own. Oktay said they were planning to get rid of the covers as soon as possible when they have enough songs to substitute covers. As can be remembered, Ilgin had stated that habit in metal music culture in Ankara, wherein musicians urge to create their own and exclude the cover songs from their playlist as soon as possible. Oktay, however, conveyed their attitude without any reference to being a metalhead. He said:

When we started, of course, we were playing covers. But we also had played one of our own songs even in our first gig. I remember that we somehow had a sensitivity concerning this situation, I mean, even if we could play one of our songs, we wanted to play it.

Like what we came across in Mete, Oktay also stated that they were disturbed by playing a song *created by some others*. He said that cover music does not satisfy them because what one does is only to re-play what has been already created, instead of presenting something new and original:

We wanted to play our own songs. Because we thought that, if we do not arrange from scratch the songs that we play, it is not meaningful to play covers because you play that song as it was. We had such logic: the song we would cover is already performed and recorded better than our performance.

As can be seen, playing a song that has been already created by some without changing anything in it was a problem for Oktay and his band. Mete also came up with a similar concern, even though he did not create his own music yet, that playing songs that are created by some others bothers him. However, as we see it in Boran, playing the songs created by others, is not considered unoriginal by everyone. While all of the five musicians are in some sense performers, each has a different attitude towards their performances. While the musical traditions that they belong to differ from each other, their way of approaching originality also varies among them. However, it is also interesting to see that they somehow pursue an original position (although the content given to it varies according to each musician). I think these varieties I have demonstrated through five interviews show us that it is rather difficult, or a vulgar reduction, to grasp Ankara musicians' situation in terms of a pre-established and not-justified-but-presupposed subject-object dichotomy. It seems that it is improbable to conceive such a variety in terms of generalized rules showing themselves in the forms of pre-established oppositions.

Thus, contrary to how art theories (both subjectivist and objectivist ones) have conceptualized the originality¹²⁵, it is possible through habitus to discuss the notion of originality without striving to locate it either in musicians or the particular socio-historical configurations that musicians are in. Instead, habitus makes it possible to grasp the case of Ankara musicians relationally in which musicians continuously encounter with their particular situations, and each encounter demonstrates variety of relations which must not be reduced into the subject-object dichotomy. I claim that such a variety can be identified through the examples demonstrated above concerning musicians' originality seeking attempts.

¹²⁵ See 2.3 above.

4.2 Self-Preservation in Encounters

I have come across another occurring theme in the interviews, which I label it as musicians' acts of self-preservation when they encounter with their particular situations. I have distinguished these self-preservatory acts into two, showing themselves in terms of (α) *resistance narratives* when musicians have to face with what they consider as the established rules in their careers, and *us vs. them* distinctions that musicians seem to conduct as an (β) *act of othering*, which shows itself more like as a belonging to the particular configuration while repelling the other. Let us firstly look at how *resistance narratives* appear.

Although their descriptions of the encounters with their particular situations and the perceptions of those rules vary among musicians, they seem to have a common disposition to protect their self-acclaimed position towards such established rules. I have observed that these resistance narratives function not just as protecting the initial stance of musicians but also in the very process of constituting it. In other words, by locating themselves as opposed to the rules (as they perceive them), musicians create for themselves an authentic position to be defended against those rules.

For instance, one of the interviewees, Çetin, is a drummer in his late 30's who has been in the music business for more than 15 years. Çetin is currently a full-time musician, but he had a regular job before 2012. While he works before 2012, he always continued to be a part of the music business, as he performed in that period with several bands at various places. However, it was also difficult for him to maintain both musicianship and a regular job at the same time, as Çetin explains it as the following: "When I was working, it was tough to play at nights and wake up early in the morning and go to your job; however, I have always continued to play." As it becomes more and more to sustain both music and regular job together, in 2012, Çetin decided to resign from his job and turn into a full-time musician. As Çetin stated, such a career-changing move appeared doable for him at that time economically, although he also knew that it was a risky move. Nevertheless, he was unhappy with his job, and Çetin's essential desire

was music only since childhood. Thus, he quitted his job and has been a full-time musician since 2012.

I asked Çetin if he has any regrets because being a full-time musician. He answered by highlighting the relatively relaxed conditions working as a musician in comparison to a regular job: “Sometimes I think about it and sometimes not. I mean, if I were to continue my job, I would have to wake up early in the morning and be unhappy again. I kind of like the comfort I have as a musician.” Even though musicianship provides flexible working conditions for one, it comes with a cost. As I have mentioned several times, earning sufficient income as a full-time musician means playing pop music or weddings. While that economic necessity makes it difficult for musicians to be in the business with their own music, it also generates problems for those who do not want to play pop music in their performances. Çetin seems to suffer both sides of the coin, as he is someone who creates his own music, while he has a strongly negative attitude towards pop music in general. Nevertheless, Çetin described himself as someone who wants to select what he does, as he has some preferences that he does not want to negotiate. He stated that:

In the live music sector, if you can do everything, like you play at weddings etc., and if genres do not matter for you, or if you do not care about where you play, there is no problem at all. However, if you have some preferences like you do not want to do be a part of these sorts of things, you are in a complete uncertainty.

As can be seen, although Çetin wants to preserve his principles, he also acknowledges the fact that it brings musicians uncertainty. However, he somehow embraces that uncertainty because his principles seem to weigh more than it. Çetin positions himself differently from what he conceives as the general tendency in the live music sector; for him, the musicians who put themselves in these situations compromise their desires, although they can increase their economic rewards. But preserving one’s principles comes with a cost, i.e. economic uncertainty, which is crucial especially for a musician like Çetin, whose income depends on music, simply because it threatens his survival. He stated that:

I have such a handicap; I have persisted in doing so unlike most of my friends. I have not done anything I did not want. I had already quit my job, which I was unhappy with, to be able to do what I want. I said to myself that if I do the things that I do not want, what was the reason for quitting that job. *I have this extra situation*, musicians, in general, do not problematize this, I mean, they play at weddings or play at commercial places etc., and they get away with it; they are not concerned about it.

I think that Çetin's *that extra situation* functions as a way of resisting the established state of affairs in the music sector. He wants to preserve his own principles, although the rules necessitate themselves upon the musician. I think this is one of the examples showing the musician's indefinite state, wherein it is difficult to consider him either as the subject or the object. It was evident that there is an attempt to protect one's self-proclaimed stance against the necessities imposed on him. As we see in Çetin, his self-preservatory act was successful but came with a cost, wherein the musician can remain according to his own principles insofar he embraces the threat to his survivability.

Çetin's case shows that, on the one hand, it is impossible to think of a musician as isolated from the particular situation that he is in. Çetin's acting as the subject depends upon a particular socio-historical configuration wherein there must be a set of established rules towards which Çetin is resisting. What makes such resistance possible is the context itself, wherein only pop music and weddings provide the highest income to a musician. In other words, the principles Çetin defends can only exist if there is a context toward which such defending would be meaningful. On the other hand, however, there has to be a perception of these established rules, the existence of these rules is dependent on how it is perceived by musicians; *the doxa accepted as something self-evident* as Bourdieu would say. The established rules towards which musicians resist can only be possible when they are perceived as such. This makes it necessary to think together both musician and the particular situation that he encounters in the form of habitus because the social world (or the established rules in

that case) can only appear by “the social construction of the structures or schemes which the agent implements in order to construct the world.”¹²⁶

Another self-preservatory showing itself in the form of a resistance narrative can be exemplified through Burçin. Burçin is a full-time musician who has been in the business for more than ten years. She is a lead vocalist in her late 30’s who performs four-five days a week at several clubs. Although she earns the most of her income by performing pop music, she is also in several other projects where she plays jazz and rock music, so she plays a wide range of spectrum in these performances. I have attended a few of her gigs and observed that her musicianship is highly appreciated by the audience.

As someone who has that level of versatility and an appreciation from the audience, Burçin mentioned the constant pressure from people around her that they try to convince her to apply to the popular show ‘O Ses Türkiye’. These pressures are also compliments however, because people think that Burçin would be successful in that show, even she could be the winner. She said that: “They constantly put pressure on me concerning that, however, I do not care.” She is disturbed by these insistent demands and mentioned that she is resisting them: “It is a huge pressure you know, they always say ‘come on, go, appeal’. No, I will not go. I have resisted to this so much.” As highly disturbed, she nevertheless succeeds in resisting such pressure because she thinks that she has a natural resisting character as her own trait, which she describes as the following: “I always resist, I am just like this, naturally resisting. I mean, I am not sure if I listen to what people say, I do not know.”

Burçin’s alleged resistance capabilities can be seen in the process of creating her own music, too. Although she is mainly a cover musician currently, she has released several of her songs and plans to release more in the future. As she stated, her plan is to be in the scene with her music and earn a sufficient income by doing that. She mentioned

¹²⁶ Bourdieu, *Pascalian Meditations*, 147.

one of the instances: Burçin was recording one of her songs, and she, with the musicians in her band, decided to put a guitar solo at the end of that song. Although everyone in the band reached a consensus on that matter, she said that some external comments recommended them doing the opposite. Burçin stated that more experienced people in the business whom she knows of told her not to put a guitar solo at the end of a song because radios would cut that solo and skip to the next song. As radios have a limited broadcasting time, they try to play the maximum number of songs. Consequently, radios would consider the ending of any song unimportant, and if a song has a guitar solo at the end, it is highly probable that they would cut the end of the song to create room for being able to play another song. Thus, Burçin found herself where she needed to decide artistically if she wants a guitar solo at the end or not. On the one hand, there is such a high probability that her song would be cut in radios and not played. On the other hand, if she decides not to put that solo, she would not create according to herself and be influenced by that necessity. So Burçin has told me that she had taken the risk of being cut and decided to release the song as it is, although she acknowledged that this situation produced second thoughts on her mind: “I got such feedbacks from the friends that have been in the business for more years than us. Of course, these are affecting you as a musician, you produce second thoughts concerning that situation and wonder that if I should do it in that way again.” However, as someone with her alleged rebellious capabilities, she continued: “However, I probably will not listen to them again, as I am a little bit of a fighter when it comes to these matters.” By referring to that situation where she decided to put a guitar solo at the end of her song, she stated that even though she wants to reach as many people as possible, she aims to do that with a minimum compromise in her artistic decisions. Therefore, according to Burçin, she resisted and pursued what she wants.

A similar story came from another musician, Mete, a guitarist that I mentioned him by highlighting his thoughts on the distinction between cover music-own music. Besides being a guitarist who performs live cover music, Mete also plays guitar for the records. Playing for the records operate in the following way: When musicians produce their albums, they hire instrumentalists to record several parts of their songs. For instance,

some artist named X can publish an album under his name, and he does not have to play all the instruments included in his song. X just hires the musicians needed to record his songs, and musicians record what is asked from them in studios. Mete is mainly a live performer, but he occasionally works as a recording musician too. On one of the occasions where he would record the electric guitars of the song, he was asked to play a guitar solo in that record. He willingly accepted to record a guitar solo, as he stated that: “I think musician always wants to put a solo in songs where he can show himself and have his private place.” He said that he played well and enjoyed recording that solo as well. However, as similar to what we came across in Burçin, Mete also encountered with similar external comments on the location of the guitar solo. However, as different from Burçin’s story, Mete here does not own the song, i.e. the one that has to decide artistically regarding where to put that guitar solo is not him. As the song was already released, the musician that Mete records guitars for, could not be able to change the location of that solo. However, Mete stated that if he is asked, he would defend for his solo. He said: “There were complaints from some people concerning why there is a solo in that song at all. Actually, I am happy with the decision, but people have different ideas.” Although there was not an actual situation where musicians had to decide whether to put that solo or not (because the song has already been released), I find it important that a similar tendency appeared for a musician in these two cases.

Ilgin also told a story from years ago. In late 90’s (possibly 1997-98), they formed a metal band to play one of the places. As she states, “there was an allergy towards metal music” in those years and “no one ever plays metal in bars”. She said they formed a band playing rock and started performing at *Gölge Bar*. However, she also said that they resisted the mainstream idea that (which she addressed as “an allergy towards metal music”), and they started to add their playlists metal songs: “We are metalheads you know, each week we added some metal songs to our playlist. As there were no metal bars, all the metalheads in Ankara started to come to our performances, and our performances became so popular.” Such a resistant act succeeded in the short-term and the day Ilgin’s band regularly performs were always full. However, “as metalheads

started doing pogo¹²⁷, etc.” *Gölge Bar* started to kick out those customers, and this created a problem. İlgin’s band protected their customers, and their relationship with the venue worsened. After a while, İlgin’s band is fired from *Gölge Bar*. But İlgin and her band go another place, *Sinema Bar*, and wanted to deal with it. İlgin states that, firstly, the venue-owner had some drawbacks regarding playing metal music in the venue. İlgin explains that situation as:

He said, ‘no, metal music will not work here’. And I said, ‘we do not want any money from you for two weeks.’ You know, it was a smart move, I think. ‘We do not want anything from you for two weeks, but you will see the venue is going to be full. But you will give two times more money in our third week’. And he accepted that deal.

Then, İlgin’s band has played at *Sinema Bar* for several years. İlgin also told a similar story that is more contemporary, related to the band İlgin performs with regularly every Friday. With that band, they have been playing for almost eight years in that place on the same day, and the performances are appreciated highly by the audience. According to İlgin, with his band, the payment that they get is one of the highest in Ankara, as she explained that situation as the following: “You have to be good at what you are doing. I am one of the best in the business in Ankara. I know that because I can get the most money and the best places.” However, things have not been in that way for İlgin. She stated that they simply could not perform well when they first started to play in that place. As someone from the metal music tradition, İlgin has formed a band with some other metal musicians. They had to play pop songs with the band because there is no such thing (still) in Ankara where you can regularly play metal music and earn significant money from that. As this is the case, they started as metal musicians to play pop music, which turned out to be bad. “It was a real mess, if I was the venue-owner, I would not let the band play more than two days”, said İlgin and continued: “Look, I see myself as an experienced musician and have two albums etc., however, I was like a fish out of water. Pop music is a whole different world that I knew nothing about it.” While the band was inexperienced in playing pop music, they were uncomfortable with

¹²⁷ A dance consists of aggressive moves, which has its roots to the Punk music culture.

that situation as metalheads. With the performances going not well, İlgin decided to transform the playlist into more pop-rock fashion, whereas they play several rock songs that they like. She said that: “We arranged our playlist and added songs that we could play. Not pop songs, but like pop-rock, I mean, the ones that fit well to us.” As they started to play the songs they are comfortable with, things started to go well and became more integrated. As I have attended several of these performances, I can confirm that currently, the best day in that place is the day İlgin’s band is playing. Therefore, after the learning process, things go well.

As a famous musician but found herself in such a vulnerable position where she could not perform well with his band, the moment of ‘restoring themselves into default settings’ seems to be a turning point in that story. Here there is a necessity for a musician that she has to play pop music in that bar. She firstly accepts the way things operate and attempt to play the game according to these rules. However, as time goes by and things do not go well, İlgin and the band resisted their situation and want to change it. That change was a return to themselves, which can be considered in terms of preserving their original position, the position of musicians who play loud and aggressive. “I transformed it somehow”, says İlgin. I read their act not as a conscious strategy but rather as an impulse to return into a secure ground. While she senses that things have changed in a way that they cannot push venues to play metal music in them anymore, as this was the case back in the days, she also tries to fight with that situation. And in that fight, or resistance attempt, she both changes something in herself and the configuration of the venue. As someone who is necessitated to play pop music, İlgin plays pop music as well, but she also adds rock music into the playlist. It is true that she cannot play metal and compromises; however, by doing that she also resists playing a playlist consisting of just pop songs. In other words, through compromising, or internalizing the necessities, she is able to change something in what she resists.

Secondly, there is also another kind of self-preservatory act through the distinction of *us vs. them*, that musicians seem to conduct an *act of othering*. While they are othering, musicians also constitute for themselves a position to defend, which shows itself more like a belonging to the particular configuration. As different from the previous

resistance narratives, in this distinction, musicians seem to generate an adversary relationship through some other, against which they underline a unique configuration to which they think they are belonging.

Another interviewee, Toygun, is a musician who is in his early 20's. He is a DJ, but he is also a part of more organizational aspects of music, such as organizing gigs, providing managership to musicians. Toygun is a student and does not earn significant money from being a DJ; however, his organizations provide him a relatively decent income, especially for a student.

In his DJ performances, Toygun is somewhat restrictive, as he states that he tends to play 'techno' only. He is also cautious when using that term because he thinks that there is a misunderstanding concerning it. He told me about an event in the past years, where there will be a "techno party" event in some place in Kızılay. However, for him, it was not the case because what they call techno is not techno but rather a 'by-product': "What they think as techno is not actually techno. In those days, people called it techno, but it is, at most, tech house, which is lame." The genre-based distinction that Toygun implements here refers to the difference between tech house and techno, whereas the former is more popular and commercial. Toygun claims that tech house is the one that is the "lame", whereas he considers the true one as techno and establishes an us vs. them distinction on the basis of it.

For instance, another 'us vs. them' distinction, through which one implements an act of othering can be identified in İlgin. As mentioned, İlgin is a self-proclaimed metal musician, and she feels belonged to the metal music genre fanatically. I observed that through the interview with her, in each case when she is about to explain something, she does that by comparing it with metal music tradition. For example, we were talking about the contemporary situation in Ankara, i.e. there are only a few places to perform at. As someone in the business almost for 30 years, İlgin stated that, back in the days, there were lots of places in Ankara wherein musicians can play. For her, this was creating an environment for musicians to push and develop themselves more because there were many opportunities. However, as years have passed, Ankara has become a

city whose night-life environment has worsened, and currently, there are not enough places for musicians to play. She explained me that situation by adding that metal musicians support each other in such an environment unlike other genres:

Metal has it, however, I do not see it in rock music. We are doing what we can, encouraging new bands to appear, and so on. And, while every other genre goes backwards, you never see it in metal music. I think I will support metal music till I die.

As can be seen, İlgin acknowledges the changing trend in Ankara as the first-hand experiencer of it and claims that metal music can stand against that trend. İlgin also firms that position in metal music by implementing the same othering act to other genres, such as pop music, as she claims she did not see that self-protecting attitude in pop music: “pop musicians too, they do not have such an attitude”. She summarizes her point by claiming that: “I mean I did not see anyone who is interested for the good of genre, I simply do not see. It seems that we are more enthusiast when it comes to protecting the genre, we do not let ourselves to die.” While othering the other, İlgin at the same time strengthens the position that she claims she defends.

The ‘us vs. them’ distinction in the metal music context conveyed by İlgin shows itself in another form in Oktay. As mentioned, Oktay had a metal band, and they were creating their own tunes; so he was a metalhead once. Unlike İlgin, however, Oktay did not continue to subscribe to the idea of being a metalhead. He states that in metal music culture, the tendency, a “habit” as he calls, to exclude others is prevalent, which he had suffered from it for some time: “I break that habit. I think that every metal musician has experienced this. Because being a metalhead means in some way to discard the other.” The othering process shows itself well by discrediting the genre, or the band one listens to:

You know, statements like this ‘oh, you listen to Duman’. We all have passed these roads; being a metalhead makes you say such things. I mean, ‘brother, are you listening to X, oh you are listening to Y’ kinds of statements. Yes, he listens to X, so what? Actually, it took me a while to realize that.

Oktay explained how he started to be aware of that tendency in metal music scene in Ankara. According to him, he also started to play with other bands, other than the band

he creates metal with. As time goes by, he became much more integrated with the market and began to play other genres such as pop and rock. As Oktay stated, his being part of the projects other than metal music, is implicitly condemned by the people in the metal music scene. He said, with a smile on his face, that he is accused of ‘quitting the cause’: “It does not look weird to me, but the people around me were seeing it weird. They say, ‘he gave up the cause’; no, there is no cause at all, there is just music, and we are trying to do just that.” Oktay strongly criticized that habit in metal music, wherein “people have such kind of logic that ‘we are metalheads, we do not do anything other than metal’. As they conceive you in that way, they accuse you of giving up the cause.”

For instance, Boran also criticizes the work environment and the musicians he works with in, which can be read as an act of othering too. Although he has tenure and decent economic conditions because of his job, he seems not satisfied with it because while such a job provides musicians decent conditions, it also gets them used to comfort. He states: “I describe them as playing-deads. They immediately get disturbed, they complain like ‘we work too hard, we get tired’ and so on”. Boran claims that the other musicians are too lazy, and because of such an environment, he is concerned about getting rust. To not get rust, he said that he seeks some other projects that he does not get any economic reward at all. He pursues the projects by which he can challenge himself and not get used to that comfortable environment because he thinks it makes him fall behind. These reasons influence the way Boran approaches his job, and even it provides him economic security, he does not feel he belonged to such a “mediocre” environment:

Unfortunately, the thing is sad but true. I never exercise any of the pieces properly because they are not matched to my capabilities. After seeing the notes, I can already play it in the second rehearsal, when they are still trying to learn it. The environment is intensely mediocre, like an old Renault 12 whose engine became old. You come to rehearsal and play it in two days, and you start to get bored because you do not have anything to do more.

Another musician Dumrul, who makes his own music and has been released an album and several singles so far, makes a similar us vs. them distinction which shows itself

as a disregard concerning pop music: “It is pop music; we can describe it as something throwaway products.” He explains the music he creates as something different from that, he claims that he does not pursue commercial interests with his music, which, according to him, pop music is exactly doing that.

A similar comment comes from Kongar, who is a musician who creates their own music with his band. Like Dumrul, Kongar’s band has an album, which they recently had published in 2020. I read how Kongar describes their music as an act of othering because he does that by explaining what their music actually is not. In other words, similar to the above discussions, firstly, it is created a target to be criticized, then, through the very criticism of what is considered as the enemy, there is an attempt to define what they themselves actually defend. We have seen this in Ilgin, where she accused rock musicians of not looking after their genre; in Oktay, where he is implicitly accused of leaving the cause; in Dumrul, he described pop music as a throwaway product. Kongar, too, seems to take a similar approach and states that, their music is different from *what is conventional*: “Our tunes are not like this, I mean, they do not have simple chord progressions or simple-conventional rhythmic structure such as 4/4.” The genre of Kongar’s band is progressive rock, therefore, not having a structure such as 4/4 becomes vital according to the particularity of the situation. I think that these instances can be considered in terms of acts of othering through which musicians are able to assess for themselves a unique position to be preserved. That position seems to be constituted by these very acts of othering, wherein musicians either label or accuse the other, and through that, they can establish their sense of differences from each other, i.e. by describing what they are not through the examples of musicians that they accuse.

Therefore, I claim that these two self-preservatory tendencies that I have demonstrated through musicians’ *resistance narratives* and *acts of otherings* (the first is musicians’ tendency to position themselves as against to what they perceive as established rules and the second is their *us vs. them* distinctions through which musicians constitute for themselves a position to defend) show us the fact that the case of Ankara musicians cannot simply be comprehended through the subject-object dichotomy. Instead of

conceiving these musicians either as subjects (who can act spontaneously) or the objects (as determined by the social), there has to be a relational grasp of the situation, which I claim habitus is able to provide. I think that habitus exactly shows the in-between state wherein it is improbable to assess either subjectness or objectness to musicians, and it emphasizes such in-betweenness as the relationality itself.

4.3 Autonomy in Music Creation

This section analyzes how musicians approach their music creation processes and discuss their attempts to be autonomous in their creativities. In parallel to how autonomy is discussed in Chapter 2, I conceive autonomy in the music creation process as musicians' capability to determine what they create. The autonomy in their creativities means to be free from the external factors that may significantly affect musicians' music creation processes, such as economic necessities, audience's expectations etc. In other words, autonomy highlights musicians' attempts to be the final decider on whatever they create. However, as similar to musicians' originality seeking attempts discussed above,¹²⁸ I do not aim to investigate whether musicians are really autonomous or not. The point here is instead the fact that *being autonomous* in the music creation process has appeared repeatedly *as a concern* in the interviews, which commonly brings various practices of musicians together under itself. Therefore, this section analyzes musicians' pursuit to become autonomous in each of their encounters with their particular situation.

One of the interviewed musicians, Evren, is a guitarist in his mid-40's who has been in the business for almost 20 years. He has played with various cover bands throughout his career and currently performs live with several of them at various places. Evren is a full-time musician, and a significant part of his income comes from these live

¹²⁸ See 4.1 above.

performances, even though he teaches guitar and earns a minimal amount of money from his teaching activities as well.

Evren told me a story about his process of leaving one of his bands. He was in a cover band like ten years ago, with which they were relatively famous and earning significant money from their performances. As he stated, they were all old friends in the band and playing together for several years. However, things started to go bad, and the band loses momentum after years have passed. They found themselves in a position where they could not get enough jobs to survive. In these times, band members were discussing about releasing an album and wanted to focus on creating their own music. However, there were some disagreements on that matter, and Evren defends that releasing an album is absurd because they simply cannot earn sufficient money to sustain their lives, let alone spend their time on album production. He recalls that situation as the following:

At that moment, we could not play at all, there were no jobs, and I was at a breaking point. However, we were also discussing about making an album. I mean, I get crazy because, you know, how can I think about an album when I am hungry.

At that time, Evren got an offer from another cover band which was called “central bank” among musicians because the band was earning remarkable money from their performances as it was playing in several cities, including İstanbul and Ankara, and sometimes even in Cyprus. While the disagreements between band members become apparent, Evren took that offer seriously and decided to leave his band. I do not have any information concerning the economic statuses of the other members of the band, however, Evren stated that he himself was not in decent conditions and prioritized his economic survival over music creation. After he joined the band, his economic conditions were improved significantly. I asked him if he created his own music in that period because I wanted to learn if that economic change affected Evren’s attitude towards music creation. He answered that he has “only a few pieces in the form of short drafts” that he has written and stated that he does not plan to work on these and release them, because he simply does not think them as “serious material”. Evren said

that he hesitates to create his own because he is concerned about how his product would be received by the audience:

I have not considered so much about releasing an album etc. That subject is a bit of a thing for me. Actually, people are encouraging me to produce something and always asking why I do not create. I think, I know and perceive pretty well the things that are good and I admire. I have always worried that mine would be funny or something.

Evren's hesitation in creating his own music does not go even though he is encouraged by the people around him (whom I do not know whether they are his friends or the audience he interacts with when he is on stage). However, I find it interesting that while the encouragement that he actually got from people does not make him produce something, the response that he did not get yet, i.e. the audience's response assessing his product funny, is directly effective. In other words, he is worried not because of the actual response by the audience to the product he created but by the mental representation of it in his mind. Evren anticipates the possible response to his product, and by doing that he assesses himself as capable of deciding whether he creates or not. I must strongly highlight here that what I am after is not the 'real reason' behind Evren's negative attitude towards his creativity but rather how that very attitude functions in establishing an autonomous space for the musician. It seemed to me that Evren protects his autonomy by assessing himself as the one who decides if the product is serious enough to encounter with an audience. He simply does not create anything or leaves what he created as short drafts by not working on them anymore. By doing so, he appears as the last decider in his creative process. Therefore, even if he does not create, he wanted to assess this as his own act. I think Evren's following remark exemplifies that situation wherein he attributes himself that deciding position:

I mean, you know, there is a difference between who plays well and not, you know it too, you are a musician too. The one who does not play well is eliminated, however, this is not the case anymore. People are not aware who plays well, I want people to be aware of that difference.

The way he positions himself as someone who can assess the quality of music functions in protecting his autonomy and enables him to appear as the last decider in his creative process. It seemed to me that Evren wanted to protect his autonomy by

assessing himself as the one who decides if the product is serious enough to encounter with an audience.

How musicians seek an autonomous position in their creativities can be exemplified through another musician. The interviewee, Kongar, is a guitarist in his early-30's who plays in a well-known band in the particularity of Ankara (and of Turkey relatively). The band makes its own music; they have been in the scene for almost ten years. They have published several of the records they created throughout the years and recently released their debut album in 2020. Before the release of their album, they were already doing some small and large scaled gigs throughout Turkey and had established their own fanbase which got bigger throughout years. As they have continued to play their own songs in these gigs, the audience got to know the band and their songs; so their popularity has continued to rise.

Despite being a well-known band, however, they do not earn significant money from their music yet. As I have stated before, this is the case among all the musicians that I have interviewed, that they cannot earn a significant income with their own music only; if a musician wants to earn money, he has to be a part of cover music projects. However, Kongar and the other members in the band have a regular income from their jobs, so they are not dependent upon the money that they get from music. This situation might have a positive effect on their creativities because they have an opportunity to make their own music without so much thinking about their survival. Kongar also highlighted the band's situation and stated that they know that it is most probable that they do not get money from their own music. However, he added that they also do not expect any economic rewards when they make music. He said that they produced an album because there was a pressure from the audience in doing so, therefore the motivation behind it was not economical. The pressure was increasing because as their fanbase becomes expanded, the people coming to their gigs wanted to listen to the band not just in these live performances but also via their recorded material. So there was an increasing demand coming from the audience for the band to produce an album:

When you present some stuff to people continuously through your live performances, they want them to be repeated, or they want to reach some part

of them other than your gigs. People keep telling us things like that ‘when will you make an album, we want to listen to it, we are coming to your gigs, but we also want to listen to you at home’. So, there was a demand for us to make an album.

As Kongar stated, the audience’s demand was effective in pushing them to release an album, however, he also added that it is not capable of affecting whatever they create. He said that when they create their music, they only write according to their own tastes, preferences, so they are not concerned about how the audience would appreciate and react to what the band creates:

We did not feel like ‘my audience likes such style of music, and if we do not conform to their expectations, they would not like us.’ We were very comfortable in creating music as we do not have such concerns.

Although Kongar has acknowledged the audience’s demand as a motivation for them to produce an album, he also described it as something that cannot penetrate into the content of what they create. As having economic liberty behind themselves, here we can see that Kongar’s band identifies themselves as the sole responsible for their creative processes. It is true that the audience has pushed them to create something, and they acknowledge that fact, however, the audience’s expectations remain non-effective to the band’s creativity. As Kongar underlines that situation: “There were no issues like if we do not do this, they [listeners] would not listen to us”. However, that claim to be autonomous can only be possible in a context where such a motive is meaningful, i.e. in a space of necessities wherein the musicians always interact and negotiate with the particular situations that they are in. It seems that the claim to be autonomous or an attempt of seeking such a position is only possible because there is an undeniable audience factor capable of affecting the creativities of musicians. In other words, the musicians tend to transform the audience factor into something non-effective, and by doing that they assess to themselves an autonomous position.

I think we see that exactly in Evren’s situation, whereas he discarded the encouragement he gets from the audience and assessed himself as the one who decides in creating something. The way he does that is rather complex, because while he protects his autonomy by being the last decider, he also expresses the audience’s

possible response as effective in his creation process. It seemed to me that Evren wanted to protect his autonomy by assessing himself as the one who decides if the product is serious enough to encounter with an audience. It also seemed to me that Evren's negative approach towards his creativity has some economic bases. As I mentioned, he once left his band when they decided to produce an album, because he simply cannot earn sufficient money to sustain his life. In other words, Evren had to perform cover music in order to survive. This economic necessity however seems to be internalized by him in a fuzzy way, wherein he transformed that necessity and took a negative approach towards his creativity.

I think Kongar's situation is similar to this although Evren's and Kongar's approaches towards their music creation processes differ among each other significantly. Kongar was more positive towards his creative process, however, he is not entirely independent either from his relation to the audience. Similar to Evren, Kongar had identified the band as the final point of decision on whatever they create, while he also admitted that the audience's demand urged them to produce something. In other words, the audience encouraged his band, but they are the ones who decide what to create. In both Evren's and Kongar's cases it is difficult to assess musicians either as uncreated creators or completely determined artists by the context that they are in. Rather, musicians continuously encounter with their surroundings, and each particular encounter can produce a variety of relationships that cannot be explained sufficiently if one sticks on to the subject-object dichotomy. While we see that, in Evren, the musician was more negative towards his creativity, which might have some connections his economic conditions; Kongar was a more economically secure musician than Evren and he seemed more positive towards his creativity. Although he acknowledged the audience's encouragement in their album creation, Kongar has taken it as non-effective in influencing whatever the band is creating. In Kongar's case, we see another internalization process, in which the audience's encouragement on producing an album is acknowledged by the musician while it is taken as non-effective in influencing whatever the band is creating. The push came from the audience is

internalized and sublated into a creative process wherein the musician assumed himself autonomous.

Although being autonomous shows itself as a substantial concern when musicians create, things can change when the necessities increase their pressure on the musician. This situation can be identified in Şenol as the following. Şenol is a jazz guitarist who has been in the business for almost 30 years. While he is a well-known guitarist in Ankara, he is also a well-respected musician. Şenol said that one of the motivations for creating his own music is to transmit the knowledge he gained so far in his music career into a concrete product. He states that: “The knowledge I have acquired for all those years would become meaningless if I do not transform it into music.” As I have mentioned it above when discussing the issue of originality, Şenol had described his desire to create his own music “as a way of existing”, which he feels himself as naturally bound to that. However, at some point, there was a period in which things were not going well for Şenol, and he had to take care of some family issues. He was working on his debut album at that period, but he also needed to earn money. As a full-time musician whose income entirely depends on music, Şenol said that he could not prioritize his own music creation. Instead, he concentrated more on performing in commercial jobs:

In that period, I was not in a romantic mindset of ‘oh, I cannot spend time to my own music’, because I had some crucial responsibilities. I think this is related to one’s own nature, some people do not care about their responsibilities and might say that ‘this is the thing I want, I will not do anything other than this’. However, I am not that guy.

Whatever life necessitated at that period for Şenol seems to have a determining character that is able to affect his possibility of making his music. As someone who is motivated in creating his own music and gives a strong emphasis in so doing, Şenol simply was not in a position where he could pursue that desire of him because of the conditions. I think Şenol’s case shows us that although the musician really wants to be autonomous in his creativity, there are other parties who can legislate the rules other than *one-self* and impose them on the latter.

Let us give another example of how a musician attempts to conceive himself as autonomous in the music creation process. The interviewee, Dumrul, is a musician in his early-30s, a vocalist, multi-instrumentalist, and producer. Dumrul is not a full-time musician as he has a regular income other than music. He had released an album under his own name in 2019, and he continues to produce and publish new things. He has a band of his own that he has been giving gigs with them for the past three years.

The musicians in Dumrul's band are session members who play with him on the gigs, so they are not part of the music creation process. Dumrul said that he wanted precisely this situation wherein he creates music by himself instead of playing in a band that creates their music collectively. There is a difference between a band that collectively writes its own tunes (which we saw an example of it in Kongar's band) and a musician who appears with his name and produces for himself. The latter only needs musicians to play with him or record the written material, but not depends on them in music creation process. Hence, Dumrul excludes other musicians from his creative process and wants to be the sole responsible in his creativity. As Dumrul conveyed, that was the case when he produced his album. He stated that he had written all the instruments in his album and recorded them by himself. The cost of producing and distributing the album was also afforded by him only, there were no sponsors or anything like that who supported him economically. These were the conditions when he was producing his debut album.

Dumrul also claims that, when he creates, he creates only according to himself. He explains: "There is an aim of course, but the aim is definitely not an audience-oriented one." He stated that he does not create his music in an audience-oriented way, and his creativity is not affected by the possible external comments on what he creates:

I do not think anything audience-related because I do not make such music. I do not make a piece of music, say, that can be played on a radio station. As this is the case, I do not have such concerns.

Hence, according to Dumrul, when he writes something, there is no other parameter that can influence his creativity other than himself. Instead of being audience-oriented,

Dumrul claims that what is crucial for him when he creates is only to satisfy his own aims:

So that rather than being audience-oriented, the only thing that I want is to be able to satisfy my expectations from my music. I mean, I just want to do better what I am doing already, to push my limits in this way.

Dumrul justifies his being-non-audience-oriented in a rather convincing way, as he states that if he would not be autonomous, there are other options for him to earn more money by not being autonomous:

The most important thing is my liking of it, otherwise, why would I do it? I do not have such sorts of expectations, if that were the case, I will go and play at weddings. If I do not produce something refined that I like, it would be meaningless for me.

The reasoning Dumrul presents is convincing because, as I mentioned, the weddings and pop music projects are the exact places where a musician is not autonomous but earns significant money (in the particularity of Ankara, of course). In that way, Dumrul shows some similarities with Kongar, as both musicians claim that they create according to their own tastes, and the audience is not influential in that process. Therefore, both musicians attempt to constitute themselves as self-referential in their creative processes, i.e. not influenced by the audience's expectations. That situation was slightly different in Evren's case as he approaches negatively towards his creativity and highlights that he is concerned about how his product would be appreciated. However, in Evren too, it can be identified that the musician wants to be in the position wherein he could decide if he creates or not. In that sense, Evren shares some similarities with the other two musicians, and I claim that in all three examples, it can be identified that musicians seek an autonomous position in their creativities. It is true that the content of the practices of these three musicians differs among each other and how they encounter with their particular situations too; nevertheless, there is an undeniable pursuit to be autonomous when it comes to their music creation processes. We have seen this situation similarly in both Evren and Kongar's cases, as an attempt to seek an autonomous position when they create something. Similarly, Dumrul describes his creativity as something self-referential, as if the only factor

capable of affecting it is solely himself and seems to be not worried about how his product would be recognized by an audience. In Dumrul' mind, the audience is instead as non-effective (as similar to what we see in Kongar's case). The audience and its possible influence over Dumrul' creativity are internalized as something non-effective. In other words, while he admits the existence of an audience, he at the same conceives it as ineffective.

Hence, the analysis in this section suggests that even though being autonomous in music creation process is commonly pursued by Ankara musicians, this autonomous position mostly remains as an idealization of musicians. I claim that such pursuit to be autonomous shows the ambiguous position that musicians are in, which should not be understood through the subject-object dichotomy. The examples demonstrated above show that these musicians cannot be considered as if they are the subjects acting spontaneously, or the objects determined by the particular socio-historical constitution. Instead, through habitus, it is possible to show that neither the individual artist nor the socio-historical context is the sole determiner in a creative process but only their continuous relation is. Therefore, the case of Ankara musicians concerning their creativities cannot simply be explained by grasping it through the subject-object dichotomy.

4.4 Reciprocal Musician-Context Relationship

Musicians are always in a continuous interaction with the particular socio-historical context that they are in. In this section, I analyze these musician-context interactions where in both parts of the relation reciprocally influence each other. These can take place in musicians' performances in which musicians interact with the audience, venue-owners and other musicians, appear in the form of musicians' being a part of commercial jobs such as playing at pop bars and weddings, or show itself as musicians' PR and marketing strategies. I conceive all of these instances in terms of a reciprocal musician-context influence. Let us look at the details of it.

For instance, Evren, who is a full-time cover musician, tells an anecdote that may exemplify the reciprocal musician-context relationship. With one of his bands, Evren plays in a place that can be considered an upper-segment one, whose customer profile also consists of relatively upper-class people compared to most of the places in Ankara. When one of the nights that they were on the stage, a woman had thrown a popcorn to Evren while he plays guitar. As he states he got shocked when it happened, and he recalls the situation as the following: “Firstly, I wanted to understand if I get this situation wrong because I could not believe it. I mean, how can such a situation happen, it is the stage, you know.” Evren got very angry about this situation, and he says that he could not calm down at all during his whole performance. Although the woman apologized for what she did, Evren’s performance turned into a complete mess for him. He said, “I got crazy; I was very angry”, and explained the situation:

You know, it is crucial, I mean, if you choose that way, you already have agreed several things. You decided to become a musician, you have to be happy on the stage. Anything that makes me unhappy on stage actually ruins me altogether, and I get very nervous and angry.

As can be seen, the musician on the stage is there with his whole historical background; as someone who have already sacrificed many things in his life; this can be identified when Evren describes himself as someone who has chosen that way and “agreed several things”. Here while Evren draws a picture of himself somewhat vulnerable, he also appears as someone who is on the stage that cannot be thrown a popcorn to, for he thinks that “it is the stage”. Even though the woman apologized and acknowledged her fault, Evren’s performance at that night has turned into a mess that he could not get any pleasure from it. Actually, it might be argued that for each party that (the one who throws popcorn and the one who is thrown at) that night was possibly displeasure.

Another example wherein the reciprocal musician-context influence can be identified is the following. As someone who is a full-time cover musician currently, Ilgin said that when she is on the stage, she is not just there to sing songs and get money from that, but also to establish some sort of connection with the audience. In that connection, she expects an appreciation from the audience, which is something more than wanting audience to have fun:

I want them to understand; I mean, this is not just the visual thing that they are jumping, they are having fun or something. Because you are making music; and you are doing this to be understood. You do this because you expect from the audience the same joy that you are feeling, you are not doing this just for playing.

Ilgin clearly states that the place she plays in and the people listening to her are important factors affecting her performances. For instance, she describes the place that they regularly play for years as “pretty decent, there are embassy members who regularly come there. I mean, the customer profile is unbelievably top-notch”. She describes the customers “more like herself” and feels well when she plays there:

I can talk with all of the customers and say ‘hello’, who are all university graduated people, I mean they are similar to us. I mean, I prefer to make music towards the people like me.

The customer profile and the general configuration of the place that Ilgin performs have a direct effect on what Ilgin does on the stage. She explained such effect as the following: “How I feel of course changes according to where I play; however, I choose where to play. Because I cannot sing at all if there are no people like me in that place.”

As can be remembered, Ilgin is a well-known musician who got famous with her own songs but is currently a cover musician only, and she is disturbed by the fact that she has to play cover music to survive. However, Ilgin’s above remarks regarding where she plays and how she interacts with the audience are related to her cover performances, not the performances of her own songs. In other words, she describes her current situation wherein she wants to establish some sort of connection with the audience in her. As someone who takes a negative approach towards cover musicianship and does not feel belonged there, Ilgin also wants to find something in it and be understood by the audience in her performances. I think, Ilgin’s that demand becomes meaningful when her past is considered, which is her negative approach towards cover musicianship as a musician who was making her own music but cannot do so right now. It seems that Ilgin wants to establish a connection with the audience where she does not appear as the one whom she strongly disregards, i.e. a cover musician, but rather as a musician who can present more than just a cover music performer.

I think both Evren's and Ilgin's cases show us that musicians' expectations from the audience vary according to the particularity of the encounter that they find themselves in. However, in each encounter, it seems that the musician comes with his/her own historical baggage which can affect the characteristic of that encounter. Thus, the expectations combined with a particular history of a musician generates an environment wherein the musician-context interaction cannot simply be understood as a subject-object dichotomy but must rather be grasped as a reciprocal influence of each part by other.

From now on, I will give examples more quickly concerning that reciprocal influence without so much commenting on them, to show the variety of interactions that musicians are in.

Another musician Burçin, who is both a cover musician and makes her own, told an incident that she experienced when she was on the stage. When they were playing, a woman came from the audience and said her to play some Turkish songs:

I experienced a bad thing once. A woman came and said to me 'play something Turkish'. I said to her that in that place Turkish music is not played. Especially that venue does not want Turkish music, I mean the venue owner himself does not want it. I simply said 'no, it is not done here', and she said 'this is Turkey, you shall play Turkish music' etc. That thing pretty much pulled my energy down.

As can be seen, that experience pulled Burçin's energy down and made her performance uncomfortable. This case shows us that the place that musicians playing in and the customer profile of that place can generate a variety of interactions that cannot be reduced into and grasped by dichotomies.

Another example can be given regarding this reciprocal musician-audience influence through Oktay, who is a cover musician both earning from music and other extra jobs. He mentioned about a joy aspect of musicianship when a musician is on the stage. This joy should not be considered as a subjective feeling on the part of a musician, but instead a social relation capable of affecting both parts of the musician-audience relationship. Here how Oktay states it:

When I enjoy [on the stage], I have been able to entertain the audience more. Because playing grumpy on stage is not a good thing. I say to myself that if people are enjoying, I must be enjoying too.

As can be seen, a facial expression like grumpiness might be considered a sign that musician is not having fun, and it directly affects the audience. Oktay explains that the audience simply wants to see the musician as enjoyed by what he does. Rather than a constraint that comes from audience to musician, Oktay acknowledges that demand from audience as legitimate. He sees it a legitimate demand because he, on his part, also wants to see the audience as enjoying:

People react very well to us when we are on stage, then they deserve at least a smiling face from me. Because it is similar as you do not want to see customers with grumpy faces when you are on stage, they do not want to see someone grumpy at the stage too. I mean, you don't want this, both you and I have watch lots of bands live. It is not a good thing to appear on stage like this. So if people are reacting positively, if it is crowded and people look to the stage with an interest, I do try to enjoy when I'm playing, this makes me happy.

In other words, both parts (the audience and the musician) expect a feeling of joy from each other, and when they do not see it, it directly affects the characteristic of that particular encounter. Oktay describes that situation by referring to his changing of mind towards being on the stage as a musician. He says that in the past years he was more thinking about himself, however, he came to realize that the stage is a place wherein the audience and the musicians continuously influence each other:

Before I was thinking about myself if I happy about what I play. After all those years however, it became more important for me that with whom I play, how the audience is responding us etc. I mean, if when I look around I am playing with the people whom I happy to play with and audience is responding well, this is a decent performance for me. I mean, back in the days I just care about myself, currently however I do not think myself as important at all.

Another example that is similar to Oktay's came from Mete. Mete, who is a full-time cover musician having decent economic conditions, talks about the importance of the image that musicians give to their audience when they are on the stage. He said that there are some unwritten rules that must be paid attention to by musicians; for instance, if a musician wants to entertain people, he must appear enjoyed on the stage. Mete stated this situation as the following:

When you play it without a joy on the stage, I think that you look weird. I see that there are musicians playing on the stage as if they are frozen like a piece of ice, which seems weird.

Such weirdness, -which can be considered as a symptom showing the reciprocal musician-context influence-, is felt actually by both audience and musicians, and this by itself is capable of highlighting continuous influence of the parts to each other in their encounters. Both the audience and the musician expect something from each other, and they interact according to the particularity of the context (in Mete's case as a relationship between the musician who does his job and the listener that is customer) through which they continuously influence each other.

There is also another aspect of musicianship, which again can be considered in terms of a reciprocal musician-context influence. As I have stated repeatedly the fact that in the particularity of the Ankara music scene, weddings and pop music performances provide the highest income for a musician. Now, I want to touch briefly upon, how being a part of those projects appear in musicians' experiences. According to these experiences, it can be identified that weddings and pop music (that is played in 'pop bars') appeared as the common enemies of musicians, however, as they are the ones that provide the highest income to musicians, they cannot be refused easily. These pop bars generally are located in *Çankaya*, which is one of the most economically developed neighborhoods in Ankara, so the customer profile consists of upper-class people (of course, if one wants to rely on conventional socio-economic parameters). However, as the interviews demonstrate, such socio-economical upper-classness does not mean that the customers appreciate what a musician does on the stage as a 19th century bourgeoisie would do. As will be seen, musicians describe their experiences in pop bars as the worst.

For instance, Mete stated that the venue you play and the customers in there directly influence the performances of a musician, and he expressed his disturbances regarding the venues wherein pop music is played:

I do not like pop bars, and I have not played in these places for a while. Actually I do not want to be dependent on that, you know, in pop bars, there is no difference between the musician playing there and the waiter who works there.

As Mete claims that there is no difference between waiters and musicians in pop bars; the customer profile and the behaviors of venue owners in these places also disturb him. He expresses the disturbance that he feels when he plays in *pop bars* as the following: “I mean the music in there, behaviors of the venue owners, behaviors of the customers, the customers themselves . . . To play in such a place is little disturbing unfortunately.” In other words, the whole configuration of the pop bars (together with the customers, venue-owners, conditions etc.) appears as a problem to Mete, which in turn is capable of affecting the performances of him and the pleasure he gets from them.

Mete thinks that he is not comfortable with playing to these people and he compares the customers of pop bars with other places that he is more comfortable with playing in. When Mete performs in Tunalı or Kızılay, he is more comfortable with the customers, and he explains it as the following:

People coming there are more like, you know, aware of themselves, younger and less dangerous people. Even if they start a fight like we see in pop bar customers, the security in that place could suppress it easily. However, the security cannot suppress such a thing in these other places because they themselves are scared of the customers.

As can be seen, pop bar customers are considered dangerous enough that security itself scared too. Mete accordingly told a story when he was playing on some of these pop bars, which was also a turning point for him in deciding not to play those places anymore. He said that when they are on stage, a fight begins “which is very common in pop bars” and suddenly there are guns involved. He said: “The event happened exactly in front of me, the man fired 4-5 shots to the ceiling. I mean if one shot bounced, you would be dead. Such fights are so usual in pop bars.” And that turning point, Mete decided to not play in those places anymore:

I do not prefer to play at those places anymore, because I have played enough. I was playing for 7-days a week in one place and 6-days in another at the same time. I have been through so many things, there were fights etc. I mean your life is at danger.

However, there is also the fact that playing at those places produce the highest income for a musician. Mete touches upon that issue as the following: “Yeah, the jobs you get

significant money are the pop music projects”. And he continues by conveying an analogy that he heard from one of his friends:

A friend of mine once said to me that, ‘I pretty much like to drive motorbike but I do not want to distribute pizzas with that.’ You know, the wedding jobs are like that. You do not want to do that but if you do that it is not the worst thing in the world because you get money.

Even though this is the case, Mete also acknowledges that necessity for a musician to be a part of these sorts of commercial jobs, because of they provide the highest income:

It may be the weariness I have accumulated throughout years, I do not know; however, I do not think that any musician aspires to play at weddings. I mean, not a single musician dreams about going to wedding and play there, however, the highest money comes from there, what would you do?

I think, these remarks show us the continuous reciprocal influence between musician and the context he is in, in which the musician can neither be considered as the subject or the object, simply because in each encounter there appears a unique situation that must not be reduced into pre-established dichotomies. Thus, there are numerous layers that must be included to the analysis, such as, the place they perform their music, the customer profile that there is, and how musicians are affected by them in general.

Another example showing that reciprocal musician-context relationship comes from Şenol, who is a full-time musician in his late 40’s and a well-known and respected musician. Şenol conveyed his experiences when he had to play at these pop bars, and he states his feeling of alienation when he plays there:

For instance, when we are on stage, I sometimes watch the customers. I was looking at their hair which are intensely ‘platin-ish yellow colored’ and ‘sticked to the one side’. I mean, I think this was the moment that you alienate yourself.

As can be seen, Şenol is disturbed by the customer profile, and he explains his disturbance through some cultural markers referring to one’s hair style. He seems that he does not feel belonged to that configuration, however, there are necessities. For instance, Şenol describes the necessity that a full-time musician is in, in relation to one’s economic status: “Okay, I play at weddings as extras, and I make it for money because at that time I need money. Because, you know, for some reason you need money. You do not refuse the offer, because you have debts, etc.”. He explains that he

had to play in these performances because of economical reasons, not for artistic reasons; and these are the exact instances that he feels alienated:

Regular earning is an intense luxury for a musician, because the musician always works and earns in a day-to-day manner; and the highest money comes from the weddings and these pop jobs, and yes, I played a lot in them.

While Şenol explains his disturbance by referring to the customer profile and the general configuration of those pop bars, he is also disturbed by the music that is played on these places; in other words, he simply does not like that job, but it brings one a decent amount of money:

There is a correlation between the quality of music and the money you get. The more music is poor the more you get from these jobs [smiles]. Well, if the music is decent, I do not know if the money you get decreases, but I know that you cannot find a job at all.

There is also another instance of the reciprocal musician-context influence showing itself through musicians' PR and marketing strategies. For instance, I have interviewed a musician, Toygun, who is a DJ, but mostly occupied with organizational aspects of music. While Toygun organizes some events such as gigs, parties etc., he also does managership to some musicians. As he started his career by playing guitar and then becoming a DJ, Toygun has turned more into the organizational aspect as time goes by. He describes himself: "My thoughts have developed more into stage design, sound engineering etc., I mean instead of producing music, I am more focused on how it is staged." He said that:

it necessitates for two different knowledges. While the musician focuses the production, the other person [the manager] must focus on how his product would be staged, so that it becomes genuinely a performing art.

Toygun thinks that how one appears on the social media directly affects the music he does, because he is able to increase his audience and simply summon more people to his gigs. He recalls one situation:

The day after we had an event at some place, there was another event. I did not know who will play, but when I looked his Instagram, I realized that he has so many followers. That event was more crowded than us.

As can be seen, Toygun correlates the success of an event with the musician's appearance on social media, as if the more followers you have, the more people would come to your gigs. I think this shows us that how a musician perceives himself, i.e. the self-image that he thinks he conveys to the audience, effectively influences the characteristic of musician-context relationship. Musicians think that the appearance of social media and their PR strategies directly affect their careers. I must add here that, I am not after whether those strategies are consciously conducted and they were successful or not. I am rather interested in such a concern of musicians about their self-image is a common theme, which seems to affect their perception of the encounters with their particular contexts.

A similar approach regarding the importance of social media came from Evren, who is not in decent economic conditions and sometimes regrets for being a musician. He says:

There needs something to be done . . . I mean, let's face it, you have to do your PR." He explains the importance he gives to social media as the following: "I think social media is very important. I have not done yet but I must have some Instagram sponsored videos. I mean I have to, I will do it.

Evren presents a self-criticism, that he is not active on social medias, which he thinks that it negatively affects his career. He says: "People upload lots of their photos on Instagram. Look what I have on my account, I just have 4 photos and two of them are my daughter's. I even do not have my own photos."

Another similar remark came from Şenol concerning that PR aspect of a musician, and he stated that he began to focus more on social media, and especially Instagram: "Nowadays, especially for this year, I am more active in Instagram. I mean in every month I discover a new guitarist, especially from İstanbul." Şenol also talked about his change of strategy that they, with his band, are nowadays much more focused on their PR strategies. This is because they think that through these PR strategies, they become more visible to the people and it affects directly their careers: "For instance, we have a Facebook page, YouTube account etc. If we record some video, I edit and upload it there. We also, once or twice, paid for that 'sponsored' thing."

Therefore, these were the findings that made me to think about the situation that Ankara musicians are in must be considered relationally. I claim that, neither the musician, nor the context are self-sufficient entities prior to their relation and can remain fixed as such afterwards also; because their relation consists of complex interactions in which each part influences the other, so they cannot remain as they are while interacting. In other words, on the one hand, the data suggests that musicians should not be considered as subjects who can act only according to themselves independent of what the particular context necessitates on them. On the other hand, the data also suggests that musicians should not be considered as the objects objectified by the particular contexts that they are in, because, as I have demonstrated, in each case, there appears a new way of dealing with it on the part of musicians; hence, there is not an absolute determination of the context to the musician but rather a continuous negotiation process which shows itself in the form of the reciprocal musician-context influence. While habitus suggests to reject conceiving the musician-context relationship in terms of the subject-object dichotomy, it also opens up the possibility to discuss the situation without reifying the positions (musician and context) and comprehending them axiomatically. It can be identified in each case I have demonstrated above that neither the musician nor the context can precede its other, rather they must be conceived of in their togetherness as the relationality, which I claim that through habitus it is possible to highlight such togetherness.

4.5 Future Anticipation

As discussed in Chapter 3, the cognitive structures of habitus through which musicians perceive the world they live in are constructed historically. Such conceptualization of the perception in general is crucial for this thesis, because it renders it possible to avoid grasping the situation either subjectivist or objectivist would do. Such socio-historical constitution of schemes of perception of habitus, transforms the question of future anticipation perceived by musicians into a question of a practical knowledge. As Bourdieu states it:

the incorporation of social structures in the form of dispositional structures, of objective chances in the form of expectations or anticipations that I acquire a practical knowledge and control of the encompassing space.¹²⁹

Thus, the focus of analysis here is not the musicians' perceptions of future as if it is an inquiry of their subjectivities, but is the ground, which is socio-historically constituted, enabling musicians to perceive their futures. This means that so-called subjective instances such as desires, aspirations, or the rules that musicians think they are bound of, have their socio-historically bases. Bourdieu sees such socio-historical conditioning of future anticipation through which musicians can assess *what to do or not* in relation to their particular situation as the following:

the sense of the probable future is constituted in the prolonged relationship with a world structured according to the categories of the possible (for us) and the impossible (for us).¹³⁰

This section analyzes these socio-historically constituted cognitive structures through which musicians perceive their futures. I especially look at how musicians oscillate between their perception of *the objective chances and subjective aspirations*, i.e. how some things appear to them as the things that can be done or cannot. Therefore, such an analysis must not be wrongly labeled as a subjectivist move, because musicians' perceptions are affected by the particular situation that they themselves are in. In other words, they act according to the probability they have assessed to their actions, as Bourdieu stresses: "in relation to objective potentialities, immediately inscribed in the present, *things to do or not to do, things to say or not to say, in relation to a probable upcoming future (un avenir)*."¹³¹

Let us firstly look at how musicians anticipate their future in terms of *security*. For instance, Şenol has a negative approach towards his future because of the music

¹²⁹ Bourdieu, *Pascalian Meditations*, 130.

¹³⁰ Bourdieu, *The Logic of Practice*, 64.

¹³¹ Bourdieu, *The Logic of Practice*, 53. Emphasis mine.

business itself. Şenol is in his late 40's and has been in the business for almost 30 years. As a full-time musician, Şenol feels an insecurity towards future, and it shows itself intensely uncertain to him:

You cannot see ahead because you do not have insurance or whatnot., which means that you also do not have a retirement if you do not have insurance. In musicianship, you just try to sustain your relationships; I mean all of my musician friends are like this, no one is doing something by thinking about their future.

Even though the uncertainty is real, Şenol also enjoys being a musician, as he says that what makes him to continue on in the music business is “the feeling of joy”. He states: “I think this is the definition of life. Why I am making music because it makes me happy. I mean, I love it”. However, the aspect of joy cannot remain as such when musicians have to face with the necessities that they have in their situations. It seems that when the necessities necessitate themselves upon musicians, that joy aspect can easily be lost, as he says: “Yeah, music was making me happy. But when you reach to some age, you know, there is that money factor”. Şenol told a story when he was fired from one of his bands that he was a member of at that time. With that band, he was earning significant income, but suddenly he got fired:

For instance, when my wife was pregnant, I was going both weddings and night pop music jobs. I mean, this was my job, and I was earning a considerable amount. However, in some way, the band fired me. They said that our bouzouki player could play baglama, oud, etc. They fired me and I suddenly became jobless.

Therefore, a musician can find himself in a situation where things suddenly turned bad. Such aspect of uncertainty of musicianship, which we saw another example of it in Çetin above,¹³² makes things a bit difficult especially when a musician had spent all those years of his life to that business. The uncertainty combined with the feeling of being not rewarded as deserved, generates an insecure configuration for a musician to carry on in a music business, and it directly affects how musicians anticipate their

¹³² See Gilbert above in 4.2 Self-Preservation.

futures. The feeling of uncertainty and the subsequent insecurity towards future can be identified in Şenol's following remarks:

You know it is music; today it is there, tomorrow not. You work in per diem, and even cannot get the money promised. That money is not guaranteed, there is not a contract or anything. For instance, there is no official connection between you and the venue-owner as your employer.

İlgin has also touched upon her feeling of insecurity towards the future, but she underlined it rather as a new phenomenon that she did not experience in the past: "I mean, you always think subconsciously about your security. However, I should say that I had never think about it until reaching my 30's, it did not even come to my mind." She thinks that being a musician was not that much uncertain at the past, she at least could imagine that one can sustain her life through musicianship: "But what happened? My job became something that cannot be pursued as an occupation and turned into an activity that you would do only as your hobby." İlgin here asks me a question by referring to my musicianship past and underlines the generation difference among us: "We were feeling that we could achieve anything. I mean, I can aspire to make a gig in Wembley, can you imagine for yourself the same thing?" As can be seen, İlgin once thought it possible to play in Wembley Stadium, she thinks that there were sufficient conditions to dream about such a thing. However, she says that, currently, and especially for my generation (I am 30 years old), it is not possible to think of such sorts of dreams anymore, according to her. In other words, the subjective aspirations, such as dreaming about playing in Wembley Stadium, are influenced by socio-historical conditions, which I think makes such 'subjective domain' an objectively constituted something. İlgin continues to emphasize the generation difference among us as the following:

There is such a difference between your generation and mine. If I was born at the same time as you, I possibly would do the same thing as you, or everyone else does; musicianship would not be my main job.

As can be seen, İlgin feels that being a musician has turned into something that cannot be pursued as a job because of the current economic conditions. This was not the case, as she repeatedly underlined that in the years when she was at my age that it was

possible to think more positively. However, like Şenol, under these conditions, İlgin continues to be a musician because she simply loves it: “Because I have to continue, you know, if do not, then the reason why I live is gone, what would I do then?”

A similar concern can be identified in Evren’s words, who is also a full-time musician like Şenol and İlgin. Evren claims that he sometimes regrets of being a musician and not having a regular job:

If I finish my school and got a job, I may have a regular income. But of course we would not know if it brings happiness. There are so many things also, I mean, there is marriage, the reality of the country, economy, etc. I do not think that a musician lives in Sweden ponders such things, it is related to the country you live in basically.

Besides having some regrets about being a musician, Evren also feels insecure about the future like we saw in Şenol and İlgin:

I mean musicianship is like, how could I say; your income is intensely dispersed. For instance, I list my monthly income, whereas in one month you earn 10k and the other 3k, I mean there is such an unbalance. And if you have a family life, children etc. such an uncertainty could bring you crises. But there is nothing to do about it, the musicianship is this, we are not salaried.

As can be seen, the uncertainty of musicianship strongly disturbs Evren, and it directly affects how he perceives the future.

There is also another comment coming from a musician having more decent conditions, he anticipates his future in rather positive terms. Mete wants to continue playing as much as he can, and he says: “I think I will play till I die.” As I have stated before, Mete is a cover musician, who has the decent economic conditions. He expresses that he intends to continue in the music business, and his positivity concerning the future can be seen in the following: “I mean, it is my intention [smiles]. I never thought about quitting, if I quit, I get depressed and now I die. I mean, if I quit, then it means that ‘yes, I died.’” But he also acknowledges that his position is rather rare among the musicians: “I am grateful, because I am very lucky, I mean, I can sustain my life by playing guitar in that country; there is not a big opportunity than this.”

There is another instance coming from Toygun, who is currently a student and does not earn his own money. He told me that he is rather hopeless regarding music. He thinks that music would not provide him decent conditions, although what he wants to do is music: “I absolutely want to earn my life with some music-related activity while I also absolutely know that I have no hope and security in so doing.” As a DJ, Toygun recently has started to organize some events like concerts, parties etc. He said that as he saw that the first events he organized gone well, he thought that he might sustain this job. However, that little spark of hope suddenly gone because the COVID-19 Pandemic happened:

When I saw that events were successful, then I thought that I would earn decent money from that. I mean, when I say decent, it is of course not the amount of money that one can sustain his life, but I can say that I get the return for my labors.

Thus, it can be identified that musicians are always affected by the particular situation that they are in when they anticipate their future. I think this constant affection points out the necessity to think Ankara musicians’ case as a relationality, instead of grasping it via pre-established subject-object dichotomy.

There is also another common aspect in musicians’ future anticipation, which is the anticipation of the *audience’s responses*. Such anticipation is not fortune telling however, instead, it is about how musicians *practically sense* the situation. For musicians, there appears ‘a space of what to do and nots’ that generally shows itself in the form of rules towards which musicians seem to find a proper strategy towards it. That point is a little bit different from what I have discussed in ‘self-preservation in encounters’ section, in which I looked *resistance narratives* and *us vs. them* distinctions of musicians. However, in this section, I am looking at how musicians are disposed to play the game according to these rules. Although musicians seem to have a disposition to play the game according to the rules, each musician came up with different description of concerning what these are. While they describe the rules differently, musicians’ strategies towards them also significantly varied among each other; as each musician has claimed that what they do is the true way. The emergence of that true way in the form of a strategy, I think, is related to the particular relationship

that the musician has to the context that he is in. In other words, there appears for musicians a list of what to do and not, according to the very relation that musician is in, which appears to affect the future anticipation of a musician.

For instance, Ilgin stated that she feels constrained by the possible reaction of an audience towards what she creates. She said that their possible expectations regarding how the audience would react directly affects what they do. She exemplified it by referring to their album creation process with her band H1, where they were having some concerns about what to create because of their anticipation of the audience's responses. In one of their sessions when they were writing their music, a different sort of song has appeared which they think that it would not be appropriate to be released under the name of H1. This is because, they thought that the song they created would be incompatible with how H1 is appreciated by the audience. She said that: "When our guitarist written that tune, he made something little different than the band's natural genre. We were concerned about how we integrate that song to our band, and we could not publish it in our album." Ilgin stated that the song was more popular compared to what they play with H1, it was more like a rock music rather than being a metal music. She said that with her band they are concerned to present them to an audience, because audience wants from them songs that are metal. After discussing that matter with her band, they decided that song not with the band H1, but with a different project that they have formed. Thus, Ilgin used that song with her other band. As can be seen, in that case, musicians' anticipation of what to do or not, has appeared in the form of audience's possible expectations, and it directly has affected their creation process.

A similar anticipatory pattern can also be identified in Şenol. As a musician who both performs cover music and produces his own, Şenol described the music he creates as something that will not provide him money. The genre of Şenol's released material is fusion, free-jazz, and according to him what he will create would be similar to these ones. That genre, however, is the least popular even among the genre jazz itself. On the one hand, there is so-to-say 'hard evidence' that the genre that Şenol plays (fusion, free-jazz) would not reach so many people, as one can look at, say, a statistical data retrieved from Spotify concerning worldwide numbers of how many people listens to

free jazz. These statistics would be pretty much convincing for a musician if he wants to reach to people. Therefore, a musician can entirely depend his strategies according to these hard evidence. On the other hand, however, there is another evidence, which this thesis is much more interested in. This evidence is what Bourdieu calls as the practical knowledge, by which musicians practically sense the situation that they are in rather than consciously calculating it and taking a tactical stance towards it. I find it more convincing that musician can anticipate the future because he practically senses what could be done and not. This practical sense is possible because of the socio-historically constituted relationship of musician with his surroundings. Therefore, when Şenol talks about his future and states that “not at all, the possibility of earning money is absolutely zero”, I tend to believe such statement more than a data from Spotify because I can conceptualize the ground of such a statement as one that is socio-historically produced. Such a practical sensing of the situation can be seen in the following words of Şenol: “I swear, I have zero expectations. Our music comes from our inner, we know that there will be no economical rewards and we do not aim at it.”

Another example regarding the anticipation of the audience’s reactions comes from Mete. To remember, Mete is a cover musician, however, he wants to create his own music when it is possible (it was not possible for him for the time being because of his busy schedule). He stated that the music he would create would not reach to so many people, because what he would create is a “music for musicians”:

I do not expect it to reach so many people, because it will be the music for musicians. I think, my musician friends listen to it, and if it can reach other people in the world through Spotify, I will be glad. This is my only expectation; I just want to do something and publish it.

Although he is confident about his anticipation where his music will be a music for musicians only, he does not seem to have that ability when it comes to read the audience’s possible reactions in his cover bands. When they are arranging a playlist for their cover bands, he says that he is the last person to be asked, because he simply cannot anticipate how the audience would react: “Well, I am the last person who can take such decisions in my cover bands, because I never listen to such sorts of songs in my personal life.” However, when it comes to his possible music creation, he claims

that he is knowing exactly well how his product would be received by the audience, i.e. as a music that would be appreciated well only by the musicians. I have to repeat this point once again to be not misunderstood. The point I am discussing is not the musicians' future prediction abilities. I am not interested with that in this thesis. However, I do discuss these predictions as something constructed through the encounters that musicians had in which they constantly negotiate with their particular situation (whether consciously or unconsciously).

Similar to Mete, another comment concerning how the audience would react musicians' own material came from Burçin, who is a both cover musician and creating her own songs. She stated that her music is not for one to get famous, as she does not expect this from her music: "I am not doing this to get famous. You can see that my first released song is not a song like this, it is not a song to get famous." Burçin continues: "How could I put it; the aim is not to get famous. My goal is this. I am already doing that job and want to continue in so doing." As she claims to anticipate how the audience would react to her material and she does not create music to get famous, she also stated that the audience's expectations have an influencing effects on her, as she states that:

I have been singing for all those years. I mean, I already have some reputation in Ankara locally. Because of this, I am concerned about harming my reputation when I am to make my songs. What are the expectations of people from me, or if I succeed in fulfilling those are the questions I always think about, which makes you get crazy.

As Burçin stated, while she anticipates in some way how the audience would react to her material, she also gets crazy when she thinks about it. In other words, if she thinks it carefully and, possibly, arranges her behavior according to these expectations, there would appear another kind of relationship that will disturb her. It seems to me that, what is at stake is rather, Burçin practically senses the situation instead of consciously calculating the audience's expectations.

Thus, I claim that musicians anticipate their futures in relation to the particular position they are currently in. These anticipatory patterns can be found in the cognitive structures of habitus. I have demonstrated that these patterns through highlighting

musicians' perceptions of their *securities* and anticipations of the *audience's expectations*. Through habitus, it is possible to conceptualize the perception of a musician as something socio-historically constituted, instead of conceiving such perception in subjectivist terms. While habitus rejects a subjectivist conceptualization of perception, it also proposes something different than the objectivist (mechanistic) one by emphasizing the effectivity of perceptory schemes in the social relations. I have demonstrated such effectivity through above examples in which musicians always act according to their anticipation of future. Therefore, habitus makes it possible to conceive these future anticipatory patterns as constituted socially while it acknowledges the effectivity of them, and in that way it provides a relational comprehension of the case of Ankara musicians than the subject-object dichotomy.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

The main aim of this thesis is to criticize the presupposition of the subject-object dichotomy that is prevalent in the methodologies of art theories by utilizing Pierre Bourdieu's notion of habitus in the analysis of its empirical data. As habitus directly criticizes the presupposition of the subject-object dichotomy and provides a sociologically relevant alternative to what it criticizes, it appears as a proper theoretical tool for the analysis of the empirical data that this thesis demonstrates. The empirical data consists of in-depth interviews conducted with Ankara musicians. Through habitus, this thesis claims that the situation must be understood relationally in which the Ankara musicians appear neither as the subjects nor the objects. Thus, contrary to what art theories propose by grounding themselves on the presupposition of the subject-object dichotomy, this thesis claims that it is possible through habitus to demonstrate the case of Ankara musicians relationally.

In the first chapter, I dwelled upon some introductory remarks on the presupposing itself, which I aim to focus on it more in my future studies. However, there needs to be briefly touched upon on one point in conclusion without postponing it for future discussions. This point is linked with the presupposing itself. Even though I have tried to demonstrate throughout this thesis the unjustified grounds of presupposing itself, I must admit that thinking itself seems to be bound to proceed with presuppositions. It seems that it is necessary that there has to be some sort of starting point upon which further arguments would be developed, and that starting point is always a presupposition. It is true that what makes one starting point a more proper one than the others can differ, and some presuppositions can appear more justified, however, in my view, it does not alter the problematic character of the presupposing in general that I

am trying to highlight. Hence, I want to note here that even though this thesis focuses on the presupposition of the subject-object dichotomy in particular, I strive for a more detailed discussion of the presupposing itself in my future studies. In other words, this thesis, in its limited area that makes it a master's thesis, acknowledges the necessity to start with something presupposed and focuses on the presupposition of the subject-object dichotomy in art theories for the time being.

It should be added, nevertheless, that although thinking seems to be bound with presuppositions, this does not null altogether the attempt to question the validity of those presuppositions themselves, i.e. what makes those starting points the starting points and how they legitimately appear in the first place as such. For instance, sociology in its part, has questioned such validity of the starting points by underlining the socio-historical grounds (or historical a priori, as Foucault would say)¹³³ that render them possible to appear as such. In this way, however, sociology seems to add another cut to the chain of causality by claiming to demonstrate 'the real cause' of these starting points, i.e. the starting points of the starting points. To clear up that point, some examples from natural sciences and physics can be given. For example, it is well known that the reality of the movement of celestial bodies has radically changed after Copernican Revolution, and the world is no more at the center of the universe. Or one can also think of the differences between Newtonian mechanics and quantum mechanics, as each one describes two different, irreconcilable realities. Sociology has approached to such sorts of radical historical changes and irreconcilable viewpoints concerning the fabric of reality by underlining the particular socio-historical configuration that renders these reality narratives possible to appear. In other words, sociological thinking finds irrelevant the internal content of these reality narratives, it is not interested in with the irreconcilable characteristic of the Newtonian and quantum mechanics or whether the earth is at the center of the universe; it rather focuses on the

¹³³ Michel Foucault, *The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences* (New York: Vintage Books, 1994).

conditions that make such a thinking possible to appear and asks what ‘causes’ such a variety of narratives, argumentations, theorizations, etc. to appear in the first place. However, in that way sociology created an uncaused cause (or god) for itself whose existence shall not be questioned but pre-accepted that might be termed as ‘the transcendent socio-historical configuration’. Here, I just wanted to note that I acknowledge that problematic and aim to dwell more upon that point in my future studies. In this thesis, nevertheless, instead of dwelling upon the presupposing itself in general, the main point that is problematized is the presupposition of the subject-object dichotomy in art theories; and the aim is to show that such dichotomy reduces the empirical variety that this thesis presents, and the thesis claims that it is possible to comprehend the case of Ankara musicians relationally through utilizing the notion of habitus.

In chapter 2, the presupposition of the subject-object dichotomy in general is discussed. Firstly, I have demonstrated that this dichotomy presupposes the subject and the object as substantial entities and assumes them as independent existences that do not need each other to exist, which is described by Bourdieu as the substantialist mode of thought. I have shown how that substantialist tendency grounds itself upon the modern conceptualization of the substance and how it prioritizes the existences of substances instead of the relations.

Then, I discussed how the presupposition of the subject-object dichotomy affects a research process in general. I mainly claimed that the subject-object dichotomy generates a methodological separation between the researcher and what is researched, and such separation itself crucially affects the whatness of a result of any study. As something that is generated by the subject-object dichotomy, the researcher-researched separation remains unjustified and pre-accepted as a methodological starting point of any research process. In my view, this has direct consequences on the production process of objectively scientific knowledge, for, what is claimed to be objectively produced knowledge substantially depends upon a presupposition that is not justified. I also discussed that situation by referring to Bourdieu’s concept of scholastic epistemocentrism, wherein the researcher confuses his own relation as if it belongs

to the research object itself. In other words, the researcher is sure that he can look into the eyes of the real and produce a scientific-objective knowledge of it. The researcher assumes himself as such because, as presupposing the subject-object dichotomy before any research, he thinks that the researcher-researched separation belongs to the real itself, not to the methodology of the research itself. Hence, it is ontologically assumed (or presupposed) that objects (as research objects) are there by themselves, existing independently, waiting to be researched objectively by the researcher.

After I have discussed such methodological complications in a research process generated by the presupposition of the subject-object dichotomy, I then discuss how that dichotomy shows itself in art theories. I have categorized art theories into two as the subject-based and object-based art theories, which both operate within the presupposition of the subject-object dichotomy. I claim that, even though there are a variety of art theories seeming to oppose to each other, these art theories remain within the dichotomous constitution of the state of affairs and their apparent opposition is rendered possible by it. In other words, these opposing art theories do share the ground upon which they oppose to each other, i.e. the presupposition of the subject-object dichotomy; hence, their opposition becomes null.

Chapter 3 consists of a detailed discussion of the notion of habitus and opens up how the latter proposes a sociologically relevant alternative to the presupposition of the subject-object dichotomy in art theories. I have examined the notion of habitus in relation to that dichotomy under three sub-sections. The first one is the *inseparability of subject-object*, which discusses how and why the subject and the object are inseparable from each other and shows the necessity to conceive them in their togetherness as the relation. The second, *schemes of perception*, discusses how individuals' cognitive structures, which are generally thought of as mere subjective instances, are socio-historically constituted. Such conception of cognitive structures is especially important for this thesis as the analysis that this thesis provides consists of the mental schemes of Ankara musicians. Through habitus it is possible to demonstrate that the perception of the musicians does not consist of isolated subjective instances but has its social basis, which makes the perception itself as something to be analyzed

sociologically. The last section in this chapter, *internalization of externality*, clarifies the deterministic atmosphere in the previous one, by discussing the fact that socio-historical forces are dependent upon the process of an internalization by musicians to be effective. That internalization process also simultaneously refers to an externalization process, i.e. externalization of internality, which makes it something not-one-sided. Hence, internalization and externalization processes are entirely dependent upon each other; i.e. neither the internal nor the external can precede its other, they can only come to be as a result of their relation, which is the result that retrospectively constitutes its own presuppositions. These three specifications of habitus are crucial for the analysis of the empirical data that this thesis provides because through that it is possible to grasp the case of Ankara musicians relationally, instead of reducing it into pre-established dichotomies.

Chapter 4 is the analysis part of the empirical data that this thesis has collected through the interviews with Ankara musicians. It contains five sections, *seeking originality*, *self-preservation in encounters*, *autonomy in music creation*, *reciprocal musician-context influence*, and *future anticipation*. The first section, *seeking originality*, discusses the musicians' originality seeking attempts without trying to assess whether they are really original or not. Being original constantly recurred as a common theme in the interviews, and the content attributed to that varied among each musician. What this section does, contrary to art theories, is to discuss the notion of originality without striving to locate it either in musicians or the particular socio-historical configurations that musicians are in; instead, through habitus, the thesis grasps the musicians' situation relationally without clinging to the presupposition of the subject-object dichotomy.

The second section, *self-preservation in encounters*, discusses the self-preservatory tendencies that musicians have when they encounter with their surroundings. It identifies two main self-preservatory acts of musicians showing themselves as the 'resistance narratives' and 'acts of otherings'. In that section, I claim that it is difficult to attribute musicians either subjectness or objectness in the way that art theories tend to do. It is difficult to assess them as objects determined by the particular socio-

historical condition because, as I have shown, musicians do resist to what they perceive as the established rules (or the particular-historical necessities). They also tend to create for themselves a space to which they seem to have a sense of belonging and protect it through the acts of otherings. I claim that these two self-preservatory acts of musicians show us that musicians are neither subjects nor objects. Musicians are not subjects that can act spontaneously because it is clear that they are under some form of constraint; we can see that from their tendency to resist. However, as I have shown, such constraint does not generate a complete determination of the musicians' acts, instead, musicians produce different strategies to cope with it. The existence of these strategies, which I have exemplified in that section, implies that musicians are not objects determined by the socio-historical necessities. Hence, if one clings on to just one moment, which is transient by itself, it is possible that an objectivist eye would see it musicians' unsucceeded endeavors to become subjects in their encounters. The subjectivist view can also focus on musicians' active acts where they effectively resist necessities and exclude other musicians while preserving for themselves a configuration to defend. Thus, if one abstracts a moment from the continuous relationality and hypostatizes it as the substantial, it is possible to assess the situation as if musicians are either subjects or objects. However, through habitus, the empirical variety appears in such a continuity wherein musicians are both subjects and objects, or in other words, they are neither subjects nor objects.

The third section, *autonomy in music creation*, dwells upon the notion of autonomy, which is an important topic in art theories (in both subjectivist and objectivist ones). Similar to the first section where musicians' originality seeking attempts are analyzed, this section does not investigate whether musicians are really autonomous or not. It rather looks at how musicians want to be a final decider on whatever they create and why they find it important to be autonomous in their music creation processes. While these autonomy seeking attempts of musicians in their creation processes show us that musicians want for themselves such a position, which might be called by subjectivist art theories a position wherein the individual artist appears as the subject; their endeavor to being autonomous also shows us that their incapability to become one. In

other words, they seek autonomy because they think they do not have it. As I have said repeatedly, this section is not interested in whether musicians have such autonomy; instead, they are concerned about having it, which shows us the ambiguity concerning the musicians' statuses as being either subjects or objects. Thus, this section investigates the music creation processes of musicians, which is a prominent point of discussion wherein the subjectivist and the objectivist art theories seem to oppose each other, and it shows that that process must be read relationally through habitus, which points out the musicians are neither subjects nor objects.

In the fourth section, *reciprocal musician-context influence*, the interactions between musicians and the particular context that they are in are analyzed. This section shows that both parts (musician and context) continuously influence the other, while they do not precede the reciprocal influence that each has towards the other. Through habitus, it is possible to grasp such reciprocal influence as the relationality without assuming either of the parts existing independently prior to it. In this section, I have demonstrated numerous cases that underline that influence, wherein musicians interact with other musicians, audiences, venue-owners etc. I claimed that these interactions should not be read axiomatically, as if, say, the musician and the audience are there by themselves as such prior to their particular encounter. In each instance, the parts interacting change something in the other, and their interactions are not isolated events as if two self-sufficient particles collide with each other in a vacuum; instead, as I have shown, these instances wherein the parts influence each other always happen in a particular socio-historical context. Hence, one should not cling to the one-sided determinations that tend to conceive musicians either as subjects or objects, but rather, there must be a relational grasp of the situation through habitus wherein being subjects or objects are just one moment of the continuous relationality.

The last section, *future anticipation*, analyzes the ways musicians anticipate their future. It underlines the socio-historical conditionings of these anticipatory patterns, wherein the musicians' future anticipations are always conditioned by their particular relationship to the context that they are in. While conditioned as such, musicians tend to act according to these anticipatory patterns, and in their turn affect the characteristic

of their encounters with their particular situations. Such a conception of musicians' cognitive structures (as constituted socio-historically) makes it possible to discuss *the perception* without necessarily attributing it to the subject as if the latter contains it in itself naturally. Instead, as I have shown that in that section, musicians' cognitive structures are always conditioned by the particular situations that they are in; in other words, their subjectivities are objectively constituted and in their turn these subjectivities are able to affect objectively the context that they are in. This is what Bourdieu has called the dialectical relationship that shows itself as the internalization of externality and the externalization of internality. Thus, this section shows that continuous relationality through habitus, wherein musicians are neither subjects nor objects.

In each section in chapter 4, there are lots of arguments without one solid 'finding' beneath them that this thesis has reached (or *found*) after all those pages that have been written; as if these arguments, instances, remarks, etc. themselves have pointed out to a singular result, and they somehow teleologically arrived at that point in conclusion. With habitus, what is aimed is not an urge to find something that the subject-object dichotomy cannot find; rather, it provides a possibility of a methodological discussion and shows that one's methodology directly affects the result of a research itself. Instead of relying on substantial existences as the starting point, which we see come across a lot in the dichotomous thought, habitus emphasizes a relationality by conceiving the relations as primary. What this thesis shows is just this, as I have repeated it so many times that, the methodological presuppositions affect directly the whatness of a result. On the one hand, for instance, if one stops short at one-sided determinations, it is possible to read this whole thesis as if the musicians interviewed are trying to become subjects but always fail. Each section in chapter 4 could be read as simply this, however, musicians' endeavors to become subjects is just one moment in a continuous relationality that I have demonstrated; there is numerous compelling evidence that sometimes musicians act like subjects too. Hence, one should read the minor details in this thesis that have been written, which would be odd to conclude each argument here again at this conclusion. On the other hand, a more objectivist (and

a conventional sociologist) eye, could read this thesis as an insufficient representation of the real because of the limited sampling size of the thesis. Such a representational thinking could even become uncomfortable by the title of the thesis for it contains within it 'general' terms such as *Ankara* and *musicians*. However, this thesis is not written through such a representational eye, and it is comfortable with using these words because they do not represent anything other than the fact that musicians interviewed are living in Ankara and they are musicians.

Therefore, all sections in the analysis part aim to demonstrate that the subject-object dichotomy that is presupposed in art theories tends to reduce the empirical variety into presupposed oppositions, and that empirical variety appears in a whole new different way if one utilizes habitus methodologically. In other words, one's methodology directly affects the whatness of a result because, in the first place, what is to be researched appears differently according to the methodological presuppositions. This practically means that there is not one empirical reality consisting of varieties in itself, but rather such empirical reality is rendered possible by how it is methodologically conceptualized. As I have shown, the subject-object dichotomy tends to operate within the domain of substantial existences, and consequently, it conceives musicians either as subjects (who can act spontaneously) or objects (as determined by the social). However, when the situation is conceptualized through habitus, Ankara musicians do not appear as either subjects or objects; they instead show themselves continuously in a relationship with their particular encounters that always generate a variety of interactions which cannot be reduced into the subject-object dichotomy. To conceptualize with and through habitus does not mean looking at the empirical data to find a finding and represent and write it in the conclusion because the convention imposes exactly doing that; but it means to *construct* how that empirical data appears. In each instance that has been mentioned in this thesis points out exactly that, i.e. the methodology is able to construct, it does not approximate us to the reality that is already there by itself. The methodology is not picking the best way to reach that reality scientifically (or sociologically), or to show the truth of it to the readers in the best possible way as if the sociologists are truth-seekers who are responsible for that

job. I think any proper investigative journalist can come up with more rigorous and objective findings than a mainstream sociologist can provide, so that this thesis believes in meritocracy and leaves that job to a journalist. What this thesis does rather is to problematize how empirical reality appears, to discuss the relation between such sense of reality and one's methodology, and to question the criteria of the scientific objectivity through its limited data that it has collected. It does that by showing the differences of how the situation of Ankara musicians appears if one clings on to the subject-object dichotomy or grasps it through habitus. Thus, I conceive this thesis as a methodological discussion rather than a sociological representation of the realities of Ankara musicians.

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APPENDICES

A. THE LIST OF INTERVIEWEES

Boran: A male musician in his early 30's; a violinist; has a tenure in State Opera and Ballet (Devlet Opera ve Balesi); full-time musician and has a regular income; does not create his own music, a western classical musician.

Burçin: A female musician in her late 30's; a vocalist; full-time musician who both performs cover music and makes her own music.

Çetin: A male musician in his late 30's, a drummer, a full-time musician since 2012, both cover musician and makes his own.

Dumrul: A male musician in his early 30's, primarily vocalist and multi-instrumentalist, earns both from music and other, makes his own only.

Evren: A male musician in his mid-40's, guitarist, full-time cover musician, does not make his own music.

Ilgin: A female musician in her late 40's, vocalist, metalhead, full-time musician, currently performs cover music but released her own material.

Kongar: A male musician in his early 30's, guitarist, earns both from music and other, makes his own music with his band.

Mete: A male musician in his late 30's, guitarist, full-time cover musician, does not make his own music. The most decent economic conditions among other cover musicians.

Oktay: A male musician in his late 30's, bass guitarist, currently cover musician but had a band makes their own music, income both from music and other part-time jobs.

Şenol: A male musician in his late 40's, jazz guitarist, full-time musician, both a cover musician and makes his own.

Toygun: male musician and organizer in his early 20's, DJ, student, does not make his own music.

B. TURKISH SUMMARY / TÜRKÇE ÖZET

Bu tez, sanat teorileri metodolojilerinde sıklıkla görülen özne-nesne ikiliği ön kabulünün bir eleştirisidir. Tez, bu eleştirisini, Pierre Bourdieu'nün habitus kavramından yararlanarak yürüttüğü ampirik verilerinin analizi aracılığıyla yapmaktadır. Habitus, Bourdieu'nün de belirttiği gibi, özne-nesne ikiliğini doğrudan eleştiren teorik bir kavramdır ve bu yüzden tez için uygun bir teorik araç olarak kendisini göstermektedir. Bu tez, Ankara müzisyenleri ile yapılan mülakatların habitus aracılığıyla analiziyle, özne-nesne dikotomisine dayanan sanat teorilerinin, bu tezin sunduğu ampirik çeşitliliği açıklamakta yetersiz kaldığını göstermekte ve habitus ile duruma dair ilişkisel bir kavrayış sağlanabileceğini iddia etmektedir.

Habitus nosyonu, bu tez için uygun bir teorik çerçeve sunmaktadır çünkü bu nosyon, özne-nesne dikotomisinin doğrudan bir eleştirisidir. Bourdieu bu durumu şöyle ifade eder: “[habitus] bize, sosyal bilimlerin sıkıştığı öznellik ve nesnellik arasındaki ya o/ya bu ritüel tercihten kaçmayı öğretir.”¹³⁴¹³⁵ Başka bir yerde Bourdieu şöyle der: “[habitus] sosyal bilimlerin (ve, genel olarak, tüm antropolojik teorinin) kilitlendiği bilinç (ya da özne) ve bilinçdışı, finalizm ve mekanizm, vb. gibi alternatiflerin tümünden bir eleştirisini ifade eder.”¹³⁶ Habitus bu eleştirisini doğrudan özne-nesne dikotomisine yönlendirirken, bu dikotomiye karşı da ilişkisel bir alternatif sunma iddiasındadır. Bourdieu, habitus'un gösterdiği şeyin “öznellik ve nesnellik, yapısalcılık ve kurgusalcılık, ve hatta materyalizm ve idealizm, gibi alternatiflerin ötesinde olan

¹³⁴ Tüm Türkçe çeviriler, referans kısmında belirttiğim İngilizce çevirileri temel alarak, benim tarafımdan yapılmıştır.

¹³⁵ Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, 4.

¹³⁶ Bourdieu, *The Rules of Art*, 179.

nesnel yapılar ile öznel kurgular arasındaki karmaşık ilişki”¹³⁷ olduğunu iddia etmektedir.

Bourdieu, özne-nesne dikotomisini sosyal bilimlerin metodolojilerindeki en sorunlu olan olarak belirtmiş ve bu dikotomoyu şu şekilde tanımlamıştır: “Sosyal bilimleri yapay bir şekilde bölen karşıtlıklardan en temel ve tahrip edici olanı öznellik ve nesnellik arasında kurulan olan karşıtlıktır.”¹³⁸ Bourdieu bu dikotomiyi “nesnelcilik ve öznelcilik ikilemi”¹³⁹ olarak değerlendirir; ve bunu “sosyal bilimlerin genellikle kendisini tuzağa düşürmesine izin verdiği, sosyal fizik ile sosyal fenomenoloji arasındaki yanlış bir seçim” olarak görür.¹⁴⁰ Habitus ise bu dikotominin direkt bir eleştirisidir: “O [habitus] bize, sosyal bilimlerin şimdiye kadar sürekli tuzağına düştüğü öznelcilik ve nesnelcilik arasındaki ya/veya seçim ritüelinden kaçacağımızı öğretmektedir.”¹⁴¹

Özne-nesne dikotomisi, özne ile nesne arasında ontolojik bir fark olduğunu varsayar ve bu yüzden sorunludur.¹⁴² Bu ontolojik fark, hem öznenin hem de nesnenin kendi kendine yeten bir şekilde, dolaysız varlıklar olarak varsayıldığı anlamına gelir. Bu durum, bir analizde ilişkinin kendisinin ikincil hale gelmesine sebep olur çünkü asıl odak, kendi kendine yeten varlıkların bu önceden verili varoluşları üzerindedir. Yani özne ve nesne birer parça olarak birbirlerinden ayrılmış durumdadır ve bu parçaların

¹³⁷ Bourdieu, *Practical Reason*, 12.

¹³⁸ Bourdieu, *The Logic of Practice*, 25.

¹³⁹ Bourdieu, *Pascalian Meditations*, 130.

¹⁴⁰ Bourdieu, *The Logic of Practice*, 135.

¹⁴¹ Bourdieu, *The Logic of Practice*, 25.

¹⁴² Bliss, “The Subject-Object Relation.”

varoluşları, onların kurucu ilişkiselliklerini incelemektedir. Bourdieu, bu eğilimi *tözcü düşünce* olarak tanımlamış ve ilişkiselliğin metodolojik önceliğini kuvvetle vurgulamıştır.¹⁴³ Bourdieu, tözcü düşüncenin kendisini her zaman *birey-toplum, aktör-yapı, özgürlük-determinizm, mekanizm-finalizm* vb. gibi sabit metodolojik başlangıç noktaları olarak gösteren önceden oluşturulmuş karşıtlıklara dayandığını belirtmiştir.¹⁴⁴ Bourdieu, ilişki analizin, tözcü düşünce tarzının tam tersi olduğunu savunmuş ve sosyolojinin metodolojik olarak ilişkiselliğe öncelik vermesi gerektiğini önermiştir.¹⁴⁵ Bourdieu'nün tözcü düşünceye muhalefeti ve ilişkiselliğin metodolojik önceliğine¹⁴⁶ yaptığı güçlü vurgu şu alıntıda kendisini net bir şekilde göstermektedir: “işkilere odaklanmak yerine, kendisini onların içinde tezahür ettiği fenomenal gerçekliklerle sınırlayan tözcü ve naif gerçekçi eğilimden kurtulmak bir zorunluluktur.”¹⁴⁷

Bourdieu'nün tözcü düşünce olarak tanımladığı şey, töz'ün modern kavramsallaştırmasıyla doğrudan ilişkilidir. Örneğin, Descartes tözü şu şekilde tanımlamıştır: “Töz dediğimiz şey, kendinden başka bir şeye ihtiyaç duymadan var olabilir.”¹⁴⁸ Yani, kendinden başka hiçbir şeye ihtiyaç duymamak, töz olanın, ötekiyle ilişki içinde olmadan var olabildiği anlamına gelir. Başka bir deyişle, töz, *ilişkiyel-olmayan* bir varoluşa sahiptir. Benzer bir töz kavramsallaştırması Spinoza'da

¹⁴³ Bourdieu and Wacquant, *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology*.

¹⁴⁴ Bourdieu, *The Logic of Practice*, 46.

¹⁴⁵ Bourdieu, *Practical Reason*, vii-4.

¹⁴⁶ Bourdieu and Wacquant, *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology*, 97.

¹⁴⁷ Bourdieu, *Practical Reason*, 14.

¹⁴⁸ René Descartes, *Principles of Philosophy* (Dordrecht; Boston: Kluwer, 1991), 23.

da görülmektedir. Spinoza tözü şöyle tanımlar: “Töz ile kendinde olan ve kendisi aracılığıyla kavranan şeyi kastediyorum: yani, kendinden başka bir kavranışa ihtiyaca duymadan kavranabilen şeyden.”¹⁴⁹ Görüldüğü gibi, hem Descartes hem de Spinoza, tözlerin ilişkisel-olmayan-bir-vakum’da, kendi başlarına bağımsız bir şekilde durabilen şeyler olduğunu iddia etmektedir. Tözlerin bu ilişkisel olmayan konfigürasyonu ve onların kendi kendine yeterliliği, Nathan Rotenstreich tarafından şu şekilde görülmüştür: “Töz, *substantia*, kendinde¹⁵⁰, ve kendi bağımsızlığında var olabilen bir özdür.”¹⁵¹

Tözcü düşünce, özne-nesne dikotomisi ön varsayımı söz konusu olduğunda ise, hem özneyi hem de nesneyi, yukarıda bahsedilen anlamda tözsel varlıklar olarak varsayar. Dolayısıyla özne ve nesnenin her biri, ‘ötekinin ne olmadığı’ olarak tanımlanır ve yalnızca kendileri olarak birbirlerine bir karşıtlık ilişkisi oluştururlar. İlişki, bu karşıtlıkların bir kurucusu olarak kabul edilmez; aksine ilişkinin kendisi, halihazırda var olan tözsel varoluşlar aracılığıyla oluşan ikincil bir fenomen olarak kavranır. Fakat, bu durumun neden böyle olduğu konusunda hiçbir gerekçe yoktur, yani bu durum sadece bir varsayımdır.

Özne-nesne dikotomisi, ayrıca, araştırma sürecinin kendisini de doğrudan etkilemektedir. Bu dikotomi bir araştırma sürecinde karşımıza *araştırmacı-araştırılan* ayrımı olarak çıkar. Bu metodolojik ayrım, araştırmacıyı *araştırmaya muktedir bir özne* olarak ileri sürerken, araştırma nesnesini de *kendisinin bir araştırmacı tarafından algılanmasını, çalışılmasını, analiz edilmesini bekleyen bir varlık* olarak kabul eder. Yani bu ayrım sayesinde araştırmacı *nesnel olarak araştırabilen kişi* ayrıcalığına sahipken, araştırma nesnesi de kendisini *nesnel olarak araştırılabilen şey* olarak

¹⁴⁹ Benedictus de Spinoza, *Ethics* (Waiheke Island: Floating Press, 2009), 4.

¹⁵⁰ İngilizcesi: “that which subsists in itself”.

¹⁵¹ Nathan Rotenstreich, *From Substance to Subject* (Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 1974), 1.

göstermektedir. Dahası, araştırma sürecinin kendisi, araştırma nesnelere neliğini etkileyebilen bir süreç olarak kavranmak yerine sadece bu nesnelere ne olduğunu gösteren steril bir süreç olarak kavranmaktadır. Yani araştırmacı, nesnelere gerçekte ne olduğunu görebilen ve bunları bilimsel olarak gösterebilen *nesnel bir özne* olarak araştırmasını yapmaktadır. Bourdieu, araştırmacının bu verili pozisyonunu, araştırmacının “aslında nesnesine bakış şekline ait olanı nesnenin kendisine atfetmesi”¹⁵² olarak eleştirmiştir. Araştırmacı, kendi metodolojisinin ya da araştırma nesnelere bakış şeklinin, bu nesnelere değiştirebilen bir şey olduğunu düşünmez, çünkü zaten bu nesnelere kendi başlarına, araştırmacıdan bağımsız bir şekilde var oldukları varsayılmıştır. Nesnelere bu kendinden menkul, bağımsız varoluşlarının iddiasının zemininde özne-nesne dikotomisi varsayımı vardır; bu varsayım, araştırmacının, nesneleredeki hakikati nesnel-bilimsel gözleri aracılığıyla gözlemleyebilen nesnel bir varlık olduğunu iddia etmektedir. Başka bir deyişle, araştırmacı, nesnelere metodolojik olarak kurabilen biri olarak görülmektedir, nesnelere gerçekte ne olduklarını ve onların bilimsel ve nesnel olduğu iddia edilen hakiki bilgisini gösterebilen bir kâhin olarak ortaya çıkmaktadır. Dolayısıyla, *bilimsel bilginin nesnelliği*, araştırmacı-araştırılan ayrımının kabulü ile gerekçelendiriliyor gibi gözükmektedir, ki bu ayrımın zemini de özne-nesne dikotomisi ön kabulüdür. Bu ayrım sayesinde, araştırmacının çabası, nesneye nüfuz etmeyen steril bir araştırma süreci olarak kavranmaktadır. Başka bir deyişle, araştırılan şey, metodolojik olarak kurulan bir nesne olmak yerine, halihazır bir varoluşa sahiptir. Hegel, araştırılan şeyin, bu halihazır karakterini şu şekilde eleştirmiştir:

Bilginin materyalinin kendisi ve kendi için mevcudiyetinin, düşüncenin dışında halihazır bir şekilde var olduğu baştan varsayılmıştır; düşünce kendi başına boştur, bu materyale bir form olarak dışarıdan gelir, kendisini onunla doldurur, ve ancak o zaman bir içerik kazanır, böylece gerçek bilgi haline gelir.¹⁵³

¹⁵² Bourdieu, *Pascalian Meditations*, 53.

¹⁵³ Hegel, *The Science of Logic*, 24.

Yukarıdaki alıntıda Hegel, kendi zamanının ampirizmini eleştirmektedir. Bu ampirizm, düşüncenin, eğer sadece kendi sınırlarında kalır ve nesnelere odaklanmazsa, bilginin nesnelliğini kirlettiğini savunmaktadır. Ampirizm böyle bir iddiada bulunabilmektedir, çünkü bilginin kendisinin onu gözlemleyenden bağımsız olarak var olduğu ön kabulüyle hareket etmektedir. Benzer bir yaklaşım, Karl Popper’da da görülmektedir:

Nesnel anlamdaki bilgi, herhangi birinin bilme iddiasından tümüyle bağımsızdır; ayrıca herhangi birinin inancından, ya da tasvip etme eğiliminden, ya da iddia edişinden, ya da eyleminden de bağımsızdır. Nesnel anlamdaki bilgi, *bilensiz bir bilgidir: o, bilen bir öznenin olmadığı bilgidir.*¹⁵⁴

Yani, nesnel bilgi bir bilenin olmadığı bir bilgidir, bu bilgi var olmak için bir özneye ihtiyaç duymaz; fakat kendisi ancak nesnel bir özne aracılığıyla bilimsel olarak ışığa çıkarılabilir. Araştırmacının yaptığı şey sadece bilgiyi göstermektir, bu da araştırılan şeyin bilimsel bilgisini temsilsel yapmaktadır, çünkü araştırmacının yaptığı şeyin sadece araştırma nesnesinin nesnel bilgisini sergilemek olduğu varsayılmaktadır. Bourdieu bu durumu, araştırmacının, “kendisinin, dünyayı bir temsil, bir gösteri olarak algılayabildiği ayrıcalığına sahip olduğunu, ve onu uzaktan ve yukarıdan inceleyip sadece bilgi için tasarlanmış bir bütün olarak organize ettiği”¹⁵⁵ bir eğilime sahip olduğunun altını çizerek eleştirmiştir. Dolayısıyla, araştırma süreci steril bir çabadır ve nesnenin kendisinde herhangi bir değişim oluşturduğu düşünülmez. Bu tarz bir nesnel bakış iddiası Thomas Nagel’de de görülmektedir. Nagel, bilimsel nesnelliği, “tikel bakış açımızı aşmamızı sağlayan ve dünyayı daha tümel olarak kavrayabileceğimiz genişlemiş bir bilinç geliştirmemize sebep olan”¹⁵⁶ bilgi olarak

¹⁵⁴ Popper, *Objective Knowledge*, 109.

¹⁵⁵ Bourdieu, *Pascalian Meditations*, 21.

¹⁵⁶ Nagel, *The View from Nowhere*, 5.

açıklamaktadır. Yani bir başka deyişle, bu tarz bir nesnel bakış, öznel-olmayan, birey-üstü, bilimsel, ve düşüncenin dışındadır.

Araştırmacının nesnelere nesnel bir şekilde yaklaşabileceğini iddia eden böyle bir düşüncenin ortaya çıkmasına sebep olan şey, bana göre, özne-nesne dikotomisi ön kabulüdür. Çünkü, bu dikotomi aracılığıyla, gerçekliğin kendisinin bu tarz bir ikiliğe sahip olduğu ve özne-nesne ayrımının, araştıranın, filozofun, sanat teorisyeninin ya da sosyoloğun metodolojisinde değil de gerçekliğin ta kendisinde olduğu iddia edilmektedir. Başka bir deyişle, parçalar kendiliklerinden ontolojik olarak ayrıdır ve kendilerini ayıracak dışsal bir ayırıcıya ihtiyaç duymazlar. Bourdieu bu eğilimi, “araştırmacı dünyayı kendisinin düşündüğü gibi sunar (yani, bir tefekkür nesnesi, bir temsil, bir gösteri)”¹⁵⁷ diyerek eleştirmiştir. Araştırmacı, kendisine bu ayrıcalıklı pozisyonu nesnellik adı altında uygun görür, ve “toplumsal dünyayı, gözlemcinin eyleme ilişkin bakış açıları aldığı, ve onu gözlemlemek için geriye çekildiği ve nesnesiyle olan kendi ilişkisini nesneye aktardığı bir piyes olarak kurar.”¹⁵⁸ Bourdieu bu tarz bir karmaşayı *skolastik epistemomerkizcilik*¹⁵⁹ olarak ifade eder. Bu, araştırmacının, kendisinin araştırma sürecine olan etkisini yok saymasıdır. Araştırmacı, nesnelere ait olduğunu iddia ettiği gerçek ilişkileri gördüğü yanılgısındadır, çünkü zaten başta nesnelere kendiliğinden ve bağımsız bir şekilde var oldukları ön kabulüyle hareket etmektedir. Yani, araştırma nesnesi, araştırmacıya aşkın bir şekilde var olurken, araştırmacı aynı zamanda bu nesnenin neliğini incelemeye muktedir bir varlık olarak ortaya çıkmaktadır.

Paradoksal olarak, kendisini nesnel olarak üretilmiş bilgi olarak gösteren şey, araştırmacının, araştırma nesnesi olarak aldığı şeye dışsal yansımasından başka bir şey

¹⁵⁷ Bourdieu, *Pascalian Meditations*, 51.

¹⁵⁸ Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, 96.

¹⁵⁹ Bourdieu, *Pascalian Meditations*.

değildir. Yani arařtırmacı, kendisini nesnelerdeki gerek iliřkileri grebilen olarak varsayarken onları arařtırırken onlarda bir Őeyler deęiřtirdięini dřünmez. Bu tarz bir yaklařım kendisini maalesef sosyolojik alıřmalarda da sıklıkla gstermektedir. Sosyolojik alıřmalar, ampirik veriyi, onu alıřan arařtırmacıdan baęımsız ve ařkın bir Őekilde kavramsallařtırma eęilimindedir. Bu durumun glü bir rneęini, temellendirilmiř teori (grounded theory) metodolojisinde aıka grebiliriz. Temellendirilmiř teori, veriyi, verilerin kendisinden topladıęını iddia eder. Bu tarz bir ileri-dzey totoloji, Charmaz'ın Őu szlerinde kendisini gstermektedir: “basite sylendięinde, temellendirilmiř teori yntemleri, verilerin kendilerinde temellendirilmiř teoriler inřa etmek iin, sistematik ve esnek bir Őekilde nitel veri toplama ve analiz etme ynergeleri ierir.”¹⁶⁰ Yani, verinin kendisi, onu arařtırana ařkındır. Grlebildięi zere, sosyolog, kendisini, sadece verilerin kendilerine bakarak, verilerin ne olduęu grebilen ve gsterebilen biri olarak kurmaktadır. Fakat ampirik verinin neden kendi bařına var olduęu ve arařtırmacıya bu ampirik verideki hakikati grme yetkisini ve ayrıcalıęını neyin verdięi gerekelendirilmemiřtir, sadece varsayılmıřtır.

Benzer bir skolastik epistemomerkzilik, Hegel'in eleřtirdięi Leibniz'ci idealizmde de grlmektedir. Hegel, Leibniz'in okluk hakkındaki kendi n kabullerini, gereęin kendisiyle karıřtırdıęını iddia eder.¹⁶¹ Hegel'e gre, Leibniz, monadların okluęunu ileri srerken, bunu en bařta iddia edenin yine kendisi olduęunu unutup bu okluęun, gereklięin kendisine ait olduęu sonucuna vardıęını iddia etmektedir. Bařka bir deyiřle, Leibniz gereklięin kendisi hakkında konuřtuęunu dřnrken, kendisine bu gereklięi (monadlar arasındaki gerek iliřkileri) grebilme ayrıcalıęını atfetmektedir. Hegel bu durumu Őyle ifade eder:

¹⁶⁰ Charmaz, *Constructing Grounded Theory*, 2.

¹⁶¹ Hegel, *The Science of Logic*, 135-37.

monadların bu kayıtsız bağımsızlıklarında [monadların töz olarak varlıkları], çokluk, katı bir *temel belirlenim* olarak kalır, bu sayede onları [monadları] birbirine bağlayan tek referans sadece monadların monadındadır [Leibniz], ya da onları düşünen filozoftadır.¹⁶²

Leibniz'in, Hegel tarafından aktarılan bu duruşu, toplumsaldaki gerçek ilişkileri gördüğünü iddia eden sosyolog (ya da araştırmacı) ile benzerlik göstermektedir. Bu problematiktir, çünkü bu eğilim, araştırma nesnelere metodolojik olarak inşa edilme süreçlerini yok saymaktadır.

Özne-nesne dikotomisi, kendisini sanat teorileri literatüründe de sıklıkla göstermektedir. Bu zeminde ilerleyen sanat teori argümanları, genellikle birey-toplum, sanatçının niyeti-sanat eserinin yorumu, sanatçının özgürlüğü-toplumsal zorunluluklar, gibi ikilikler aracılığıyla hareket etmektedirler. Bu sanat teorilerini, *özne-odaklı* ve *nesne-odaklı* sanat teorileri olarak iki temel kategoriye ayırabiliriz. Özne-odaklı teoriler genellikle sanatçı bireye odaklanır ve onda olduğu varsayılan yaratıcılık, özgünlük ve özgürlük gibi kavramlar üzerinden argümanlarını inşa ederken, nesne-odaklı teoriler bu sanatçı birey yerine, birey-dışı olduğunu iddia ettiği toplumsal-tarihsel faktörlerin belirleyiciliğinin altını çizerler. Fakat bu iki kamp, tamamen ayrı şeyleri iddia ediyor ve birbirlerine karşıtlar gibi gözükseler de, aynı ön kabul, özne-nesne dikotomisi ön kabulü, üzerinde hareket etmektedirler. Yani, bu iki kamp, hangi zemin üzerinde ayrışacakları konusunda bir mutabakata sahiplerdir.

Özne-odaklı sanat teorileri genellikle bir *içsellik* kavramlaştırması üzerinden hareket etmektedirler. Bu içsellik kendisini, sanatçının zihni, niyetleri, yaratıcılığı, hisleri ve entelektüel geçmişi gibi çeşitli nosyonlar aracılığıyla gösterebilir. Özne-odaklı teoriler, bahsedilen bu nosyonları, sanatçı bireye ait benzersiz özellikler olarak kavrama eğilimindedirler. Örneğin bu sanat teorileri, yaratıcılık kavramı söz konusu olduğunda, sanatçı bireyin özgün içselliği aracılığıyla, sanat eseri yaratmaya, üretmeye muktedir olduğu varsayılmaktadır. Bir başka deyişle, yaratılan ürünün (yani sanat eseri olduğu düşünülen nesnenin), sanatçının benzersiz ve kendine ait içselliğinden ortaya

¹⁶² Hegel, *The Science of Logic*, 137.

çıkan, “kasıtlı failliğin bir ürünü”¹⁶³ olduğu düşünülmektedir. Yani yaratıcılık kavramı, sanatçının sanatsal bir yaratımı olarak kavranmakta, sanat eseri ise “yaratıcısının kasıtlı eylemini kendisinde taşıyan” nesne olarak ortaya çıkmaktadır. Bourdieu ise tam da bu bahsedilen tarzda bir kavramsallaştırmaya karşı çıkmaktadır:

İleri sürdüğüm eylem teorisi (habitus nosyonu aracılığıyla) çoğu insan eyleminin kasıttan bambaşka bir temeli olduğunu söyler, yani, edinilmiş eğilimler, bir eylemin bir ya da bir başka amaca yöneltilmiş olduğunu, o amacın bilinçli bir şekilde tasarlanmadığını iddia edebilerek yorumlamamızı sağlar.

Özne-odaklı sanat teorilerinin, sanatçı bireyde bulunduğunu iddia ettiği bu sanatsal kasıt-niyet, sanatçı bireye özgürlük alanı sağlayan bir kavramsallaştırma gibi gözükmektedir. Bu özgürlük alanı sayesinde bireysel sanatçı, içinde bulunduğu belirli bir sosyo-tarihsel bağlamın, kendisine dayattığı kısıtlamalarla karşılaşsa bile kendi fikir ve niyetlerine göre bir nesne yaratmaya muktedir bir özne olarak ele alınmaktadır. Yani sanatçı, bu verili olan içsel kapasitesi sayesinde, içinde bulunduğu koşullar ne olursa olsun, sanatsal bir yaratım sürecini gerçekleştirebilir. Özne temelli sanat teorilerinin bir diğer ortak yönü de sanatsal niyeti özerklik kavramı üzerinden okuma eğilimleridir. Özerklik (otonomi), kendi kendine yasa koyabilen anlamına gelmektedir. Bu kavram aracılığıyla sanatçı bireyin bir sanat eseri yaratma sürecinde dışsal zorunluluklar yerine kendi içselliliğiyle hareket edebildiği iddia edilmektedir. Yani, müzik endüstrisinin, sanat çevresinin ya da sanatçıya dışsal olduğu düşünülen herhangi bir şeyin sanatçıya etkisi, yaratım sürecini asıl belirleyen şey olarak düşünülmez. Aksine, birey sanatçı bu tarz muhtemel baskı ve dayatmalara kendisinin verili özerkliği sayesinde karşı gelebilen bir varlık olarak görülmektedir. Özetle, özne-odaklı sanat teorileri, sanatçı bireye dışsal faktörlerin etkinliğini yok saymaktadır.

Nesne-odaklı sanat teorileri ise bireysel sanatçıyı ve onun özne olarak kavramsallaştırmasını sanat analizlerinin dışında bırakma eğilimindedirler. Bu teoriler, ya bir sanatçının içinde bulunduğu sosyo-tarihsel koşulları ya da bu sanatçının ürettiği sanat eserini ‘sanat’ yapan biçimsel (formel) özellikleri asıl belirleyici olarak

¹⁶³ David Davies, “*Categories of Art*”, 227.

tartışmaktadırlar. Buna bağlı olarak, bireysel sanatçının, ürünü üzerindeki otoritesinin ve verili yaratıcı kapasitesinin bir dereceye kadar elinden alınıp birey-ötesi güçlere ve süreçlere verildiği anlamına gelir. Bu nedenle, nesne temelli teoriler, bireysel sanatçıyı önemsiz bir odak noktası olarak algılar ve ya sanat eserinin kendisini ya da onun içinde bulunduğu tarihsel-toplumsal bağlamı vurgular. Bu iki kampın nasıl ayrıştığının, ve bu ayrışmaların hangi ortak zemin üzerinde hareket ettiğinin detaylı analizi ikinci bölümün son kısmında yapılmıştır. Sanat teorilerinin argümanları birbirinden farklı olsa da onların, argümanlarını, özne-nesne dikotomisi varsayımı zemini üzerinde geliştirdiği görülmektedir. Bourdieu'nün habitus kavramı ise tam da bu ikiliği kıran bir etkiye sahiptir. Habitus, sanat teorilerinde sıklıkla görülen gerekçelendirilmemiş ikili ilişkiselliklere ve tek yönlü önceden belirlenmiş mekanizmalara dayanmak yerine ne öznenin ne de nesnenin kurucu ilişkilerinden önce gelemeyeceğini gösteren kavramsal bir araçtır.

Üçüncü bölüm ise Bourdieu'nün habitus kavramına ayrılmıştır. Habitus, özne-nesne dikotomisi ön kabulünü doğrudan eleştirirken, eleştirdiği şeye de ilişkisel bir alternatif sunmaktadır; bu yüzden de kendisini bu tezin topladığı ampirik verilerin analizinde devreye sokulacak uygun bir teorik araç olarak göstermektedir.

Habitus, üç temel kategoride incelenebilir; bunlar, bu tezde (α) *özne-nesne ayrılamazlığı*, (β) *algı şemaları*, ve (γ) *dışsallığın içselleştirilmesi* olarak tespit edilmiştir. Özne-nesne ayrılamazlığı kısmı, öznenin ve nesnenin neden ve nasıl ayrılamayacağını ve neden bu ikisinin bir *ilişki* olarak beraberliğinde kavranması gerektiğini tartışmaktadır. Algı şemaları kısmı, müzisyenlerin genelde öznel ve izole olduğu düşünülen bilişsel yapılarının tarihsel-toplumsal olarak kurgulandığını tartışmaktadır, ve böyle bir kavrayışla, müzisyenlerin algı şemalarının toplumsal zeminin sosyolojik olarak inceleyebileceğini iddia etmektedir. Son kısım, dışsallığın içselleştirilmesi, bir önceki kısımdaki deterministik havayı dağıtmayı amaçlamaktadır. Bunu da, tarihsel-toplumsal kuvvetlerin etkili olabilmesi için bir içselleştirme sürecine tabi olduğunu ileri sürerek yapar. Yani tarihsel-toplumsal kuvvetler tek-yönlü ve mekanistik olarak çalışmazlar, aksine, etkili olabilmeleri için aktörde, bireyde, müzisyende (ya da tarihsel-toplumsal kuvvetlerin karşısına ne koyulacaksa onlarda)

gerçekleşen bir içselleştirme sürecine tabidirler. Fakat burada dikkat edilmesi gereken şey, bu içselleştirme sürecinin aynı zamanda bir dışsallaştırma süreci de olduğudur. Yani dışsallığın içselleştirilmesi aynı zamanda içselliğin de dışsallaştırılmasıdır. Ne içselleştirme ne de dışsallaştırma birbirinden bağımsız olarak düşünülebilir; hem içsel hem de dışsal, ancak onları bu şekilde kuran ilişkiselliğin bir sonucu olarak var olabilirler. Sonuç olarak, birbiriyle aslında iç içe olan bu üçlü kavramsallaştırma, habitusun bu tezde kullanılış şekline işaret etmektedir. Bu sayede, habitus aracılığıyla, bu tez özne-nesne dikotomisinden farklı bir bakış açısı sunduğunu iddia etmektedir.

Dördüncü bölüm ise toplanan ampirik verilerin analizine ayrılmıştır. Bu bölümde beş kısım vardır; bunlar sırayla, *Özgünlük Arayışı*, *Karşılaşmalarda Kendini Koruma*, *Müzik Üretmede Otonomi*, *Karşılıklı Müzisyen-Bağlam Etkileşimi*, ve *Gelecek Beklentisi* şeklindedir. İlk kısım, özgünlük arayışı, müzisyenlerin özgünlük arayışları çabalarını, gerçekten onların özgün olup olmadığını incelemeyi tartışmaktadır. Özgün olmak çabası, kendisine atfedilen içerik müzisyenler arasında değişiyor olmasına rağmen, kendisini her mülakatta ısrarla gösteren bir tema olmuştur. Sanat teorilerindeki genel eğilime karşı olarak, yani özgünlüğü sanatçı bireye ya da toplumsala atfetmeye çalışmadan, özgünlük, sanatçının sahip olmak için ulaşmaya çalıştığı bir nosyon olarak ele alınmıştır. İkinci kısım, karşılaşmalarda kendini koruma, müzisyenlerin kendi dışsallıklarıyla karşılaşmalarındaki kendilerini koruma eğilimlerini tartışmaktadır. Burada iki temel kendini koruma eylemi tespit edilmiştir. İlki kendisini ‘direniş anlatıları’ olarak gösterirken ikincisi ‘ötekileştirme eylemleri’ olarak ele alınmıştır. Müzisyenlerin analiz edilen bu eylemleri, onlara öznellik ya da nesnelik atfetmenin çıkmazını göstermektedir. Üçüncü kısım, müzik üretmede otonomi, hem özne-odaklı hem de nesne-odaklı sanat teorilerinin sıklıkla vurguladığı otonomi nosyonunun, Ankara müzisyenlerinin müzik üretme pratikleri özelinde nasıl ortaya çıktığını tartışmaktadır. Fakat bunu, özgünlük arayışı kısmındakine benzer bir şekilde, müzisyenlerin gerçekten otonom olup olmadıklarını soru haline getirmeden yapar. Yani bu kısımda sadece müzisyenlerin müzik üretme pratiklerinde otonom olma gibi bir derde sahip olduklarını, ve bu derdin kendisinin de özne-nesne dikotomisiyle kolayca açıklanamayacağını iddia etmektedir. Dördüncü kısım, karşılıklı müzisyen-

bağlam etkileşimi, müzisyenlerin ve onların içinde buldukları belirli bağlamın birbiriyle olan sürekli etkileşimini tartışmaktadır. Burada, habitus aracılığıyla, ne müzisyenin ne de ilgili tarihsel-toplumsal bağlamın bir diğerini öncelediği bir ilişkiselliğin analizi yapılmaktadır. Son kısım, gelecek beklentisi, ise müzisyenlerin geleceği sezme, tahmin etme kalıplarını tartışmaktadır. Burada, bu kalıpların, müzisyen öznelerin zihninde gerçekleşen izole bir süreç olmadığını ve bunların tarihsel-toplumsal zeminleri ve belirlenimleri olduğu iddia edilmiştir.

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