TIME-SPACE AND POLITICS IN UNDERSTANDING OF JACQUES RANCIÈRE

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
OF
MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY

BY

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IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR
THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF SCIENCE
IN
THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

OCTOBER 2021
Approval of the thesis:

TIME-SPACE AND POLITICS IN UNDERSTANDING OF JACQUES RANCIERE

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ABSTRACT

TIME-SPACE AND POLITICS IN UNDERSTANDING OF JACQUES RANCIERE

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M.S., The Department of Political Science and Public Administration
Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Dr. Ömür BİRLER

October 2021, 123 pages

This study aims to analyze the relationship between politics and the configuration of time-space in Jacques Ranciere’s understanding. In Ranciere’s approach to politics, there is a different spatial and temporal perspective that has a direct impact on emancipation and equality. Time and space play an important role in political action. Therefore, political formulations are related to spatio-temporal constructions and theorizations. This dissertation is conducted to show that an emancipative political praxis is associated with subversion of meanings and structures of time and space in the form of “now and here”. By focusing on primary and secondary readings, I try to demonstrate that Rancierian politics provides new possibilities for temporality and spatiality.

Keywords: politics, space, time, Ranciere
ÖZ

TIME-SPACE AND POLITICS IN UNDERSTANDING OF JACQUES RANCIERE

ÇOKŞEN, Sibel
Yüksek Lisans, Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi Bölümü
Tez Yöneticisi: Assist. Prof. Dr. Ömür BİRLER

Ekim 2021, 123 sayfa


Anahtar Kelimeler: politika, zaman, mekan, Ranciere
to all women who struggle for emancipation
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to express my gratitude to my supervisor, Assist Prof. Dr. Ömür Birler, who guided me throughout this project. I also appreciate all the support I received from my family and friends.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

When a woman is harassed, raped or killed by a man in Turkey, the first question that comes to patriarchal mind is “What was she doing there at that time of the night?”. The question implies that women are placed in certain times and places, and that when they transcend these temporal and spatial boundaries, they will get what they deserve since they violate spatial and temporal configuration of the patriarchal normality. Against imposition of spatial and temporal patriarchy, women have these slogans in annual Feminist Night March: “We will not leave the streets and the nights to harassers”, “We do not leave the streets, squares, places and nights” etc. Seen from this perspective, mode of spatio-temporal configuration refers to insubordination as well as subordination. Therefore, there is a relationship between time-space and emancipation. In other words, time and space are related with way of being and of living and hence, equality is embedded in disruption of present order of time and space, and reconfiguration of them. Reflecting on the relationship between spatio-temporal configuration and emancipation brings me to Jacques Ranciere, who connects equality-based political action with the redistribution of time and space. In that regard, Ranciere’s political understanding provides a revolutionary framework which refers to rupture in spatio-temporal order and thus to emancipation of subjugated groups and individuals in the society.

This thesis intends to understand the role of the space and time in Ranciere’s conceptualization of politics. Ranciere’s political thought consists of two dynamics;
polis order and political action. Polis order refers to the ancient Greek city-states which provides a model for anti-political organization of the order, besides an object of analysis. Rather than being disciplining forces of state, the polis, here, means an order in which bodies, roles, identities, capabilities, tendencies, possibilities and impossibilities are distributed and regulated. It is distribution of the sensibility and, inequality and hierarchization reign that order of the polis. On the other hand, politics, for, Ranciere, is disruption of the polis order, redistribution of the sensibility, and violation of borders which are contingently constituted through determining roles, capacities and possibilities. Ranciere’s understanding of politics is related with spatio-temporal reconfiguration. Therefore, main aim of this study is to understand political rupture in polis order and spatio-temporal emancipation. This thesis appreciates a shift in the paradigm of theorizing emancipation, which expresses a break from utopianization of the space, from the postponement of the time, and from the reproduction of hierarchical relations in the name of leading emancipation. For this reason, the study aims to understand Ranciere who contributes to this paradigmatic change through his conceptualization of the political action. In that context, those questions form main concerns of this thesis: What is the relationship between space-time and politics in understanding of Ranciere? What is the relationship between spatio-temporal emancipation and disruptive act of politics? How space and time are distributed in the polis order? How spatial and temporal rupture intervenes in polis order through political action?

This study is structured in three basic stages, starting with the spatio-temporal literature, developing with the spatio-temporal configuration of inequality in the polis order, and maturing with the spatio-temporal rupture of political action. It is organized in this order to follow a path from unequal spatio-temporal distribution, which condemns lower classes to impossibilities, to spatio-temporal emancipation that allows for another way of being and life through providing possibilities. While the former concerns Ranciere’s critique on the inequality method, which refers to hierarchical relationship of pedagogical authority, the latter is based on Ranciere’s conceptualization of politics. On that account, in the first stage I intend to show that time and space have an important impact on regulation of structures and daily life
which dominate individuals, groups or lower classes. Then, I try to indicate that inequality is consolidated, maintained and legitimated through spatio-temporal constructions which locate lower classes to impossibilities either contingently or scientifically. And lastly, I seek to analyze Ranciere’s emancipative politics which refers to dissensual action in and through spatio-temporal reconfigurations.

In the first chapter, I will try to analyze general framework of time and space. In this reviewed literature, it is seen that regulation and theorization of time and space have influence on the relationship between individuals or groups and their actions. Then, I would like to provide a background consisting from spatial-temporal understanding of Marx, Benjamin and Lefebvre and puts Ranciere on this Marxist ground in order to understand his conceptualization of emancipation and equality. The aim of this section is to look at the Marxist concepts of time-space, which form the backbone of Ranciere’s spatio-temporal aspect of political understanding that we will discuss later. The purpose of this chapter is not to explain time in Marx or space in Lefebvre, but to look at time and space in Marx and Marx-inspired literature to understand where the foundations of Ranciere came from. However, since it is an extensive literature, I will limit the Marxist spatio-temporal framework to Benjamin's understanding of time and Lefebvre's understanding of space. Benjamin’s understanding of time rests on the critique of historical progressivism and determinism. His conceptualization of “Jetztzeit” goes beyond the deterministic burden of historical materialism and hence, provides an area for praxis free from temporal deferments leading to the continuation of hierarchical relations. With Marx, we see capitalist exploitation of workers’ time and with Benjamin we enter into a framework of rupture in temporal constructions and mentalities. Marx’s analysis of spatial organization of capitalist system is deepened by Lefebvre’s formulation of space as a mean of production and this leads us to a spatial rupture. In order to keep the entirety of time and space in themselves, I analyze Benjamin’s formulation of time after indicating Marx’s approach to time, and following Marx’s spatial figuration of the capitalist system, I continue with Lefebvre’s conceptualization of space. I deal with Marx, Benjamin, and Lefebvre in a way of description and explanation rather than critically to provide a framework for understanding Rancierian conceptualization of time and space.
In the second chapter, I intend to analyze Ranciere’s formulation of the *polis* and consensus which are distribution of the sensibility. In this chapter, I will deal with spatial and temporal configuration of the *polis* order through three modes of political philosophy which are archipolitics, parapolitics and metapolitics. In section of archipolitics, I will discuss Plato’s archipolitic philosophy with relations between time-space and *polis* order and connect Ranciere’s critique on Bourdieu with that philosophy. In section of parapolitics, I will try to analyze Aristotle’s thoughts on politics and connect his notion of lack of leisure time with Sartre’s concept of fatigue and Ranciere’s critique of Sartre. In section of metapolitics, I will deal with Marx and Althusser, their understanding of politics and their pedagogic attitude which leads to temporal postponement of the emancipation. Despite the fact that Marx, Bourdieu, Sartre, and Althusser are anti-capitalists, they nevertheless are far from a Rancierian understanding of equality. Although they aim for an equal world, they have an inequality method that reproduces hierarchical and unequal relations. In this context, I deal with Bourdieu, Sartre, and Althusser as modern reflections of unequal *polis* order criticized by Ranciere. In this chapter, I try to show that *polis* order refers to spatial and temporal configuration of inequality. From Ranciere’s perspective, these thinkers maintain unequal configuration of time and space through their consensual regime of sensibility and acceptance of fatalistic manifestations of the present spatio-temporal distribution. By visiting these thinkers in this chapter, I would like to show what equality and politics are not in understanding of Ranciere and how non-political and unequal theorization of spatio-temporality contributes to naturalization, legitimation and scientificization of hierarchical distribution of time and space.

There is a parallel relationship between these thinkers’ understanding of politics and their spatio-temporal formulation. Therefore, by dealing with them I try to show two points at the same time: first political perspectives are interrelated with spatio-temporal aspects and second, Ranciere’s political thought is more radical than their theories. Ranciere’s formulation of the politics can contribute to political theories. With this study, I intend to pay attention to Ranciere’s understanding of the political from the aspect of time and space. And for doing this I need to show how Ranciere’s politics is different from some left figures. Therefore, even though there are many thinkers which
I invite to this chapter, I think grasping their formulation of time-space and politics with Ranciere’s eye will provide us to better understand how Ranciere conceptualizes the political and hence, to deepen the spatio-temporal aspect of the politics.

In the third chapter, I will try to analyze political understanding of Ranciere with his emphasis on equality. Equality, dissensus and subjectification are main dynamics of the political action. Therefore, I focus on these dynamics in order to discuss that Rancierian politics is inherently dissensual, equality-based and, related to the subjectification process. In other words, Rancierian politics does not refer to agreement or consensus, hierarchical power relations and the subjugation of people or groups. Rather, it is an intervention in the present unequal order of polis by those parts who are located in the area of impossibilities and are thought to lack the necessary qualifications to be a political subject. Political action is dissensual in the sense of both break with the existing order and break by the ignored parts of society. From this standpoint, Ranciere’s formulation of politics is very related to intervention, rupture, break, dissensus, disagreement, violation of borders, disidentification etc. These expressions allude to praxis or action of uncounted parts rather than a system or mechanism of meta narratives or structures. Therefore, Ranciere’s praxis-based politics also implies reconfiguration of time and space, rather than waiting for the right time-space to implement emancipation. Rupture in the sensible regime of the polis order is related to the political action here and now, and to the transformation of the relationship between configurations of time-space and parts of society. This leads us to the next section in which I try to show spatio-temporal dimensions of political emancipation. Here, the primary tool of focus is Ranciere’s The Nights of Labor or, in other translations, Proletarian Nights in which he analyzes 19th-century workers in France who interest in intellectual studying during the night. Lastly, in conclusion, I will discuss political praxis and relationship between spatio-temporal redistribution and political action.
1.1. **General Framework of Time and Space**

The gods confound the man who first found out
How to distinguish hours—confound him, too,
Who in this place set up a sun-dial,
To cut and hack my days so wretchedly
Into small pieces! When I was a boy,
My belly was my sun-dial—one more sure,
Truer, and more exact than any of them.
This dial told when ’twas proper time
To go to dinner, when I ought to eat;
But now-a-days, why even when I have,
I can’t fall to unless the sun gives leave.
The town’s so full of these confounded dials¹

Temporal issue has been investigated mostly by anthropology in order to figure out and bring into the open cultural diversity of non-Western societies. These societies which are conceptualized through Western-based figuration, such as “traditional” and “primitive”, have natural temporal rhythms which are shaped by natural periods rather than by linear operation of time (Bryson, 2007, pp. 24-5). Since in such cultures future is seen as extension of present or grounded on old knowledge of the past, potential novelty and modification of the present situation is eliminated (Bryson, 2007) or at least, is unnoticeable. (Carvounas, 2002, p. 11). Ancient regime of temporality was based upon superiority of past over present and especially future. Privilege of the past stemmed from its feature of being primary source and initial origin and therefore

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excellence, coherence and optimal fulfillment of the temporal order were attributed to it. Hence there was a counter relationship between past, present and future; the more the past had worth, the less present and future became insignificant (Carvounas, 2002, p. 5). This hierarchical temporality gave shape to “ancient political philosophy”: Plato’s *polis* cleaned out the ideal order from possible novelty and from intervention of unusual changes of present and future (Carvounas, 2002, p. 5). The future was covered up by perpetuation of retrospective stability and uniformity, and thus political alteration was limited. However, with entrance of Christianity, alongside the regeneration of cyclical time, a linear understanding of time has spread: a linear temporality which have been coordinated from the beginning of the Creation to the Day of Judgement (Bryson, 2007, p. 191).

Eviatar Zerubavel depicts how linear understanding of time was settled down and normalized through strict disciplined rituals of Benedictine monasteries. “Table of hours”, or “horarium” was first sample of arrangement of everyday time, including planning of hours (Zerubavel, 1985, p. 31). Benedictines, for him, provided arrangement of Christian life of style and temporal rationalization. He quotes from Harold A. Innis who specifies that developing monastic rituals and setting of worship time through church bells\(^2\) consolidated organization of temporal ordering (Zerubavel, 1985, p. 35). Benedictine rule of temporal rigidity developed an ethical understanding that was based on consecration of punctuality, reprimand of tardiness, and glorification of ascetic submission to the temporal order (Zerubavel, 1985, pp. 35-6). Furthermore, need for the synchronization of religious rituals led to clock-based regulation and thus temporal closure. As a result of this situation, a socio-temporal order was constituted which brought about solidarity in monastic system (Zerubavel, 1985, pp. 64,65,66,70). Monastic organization of time, therefore, provided a distribution of time which determines each hour of monks and embodied this distribution through imperious bell. This regulatory clock-based time looks familiar; because it appears us in the secular form of modern temporality.

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\(^2\) There is a considerable etymological connection between the bell and the clock. The latter is originated in Latin word “ciocca” which refers to the bell (Zerubavel, 1985, p. 38).
Carvounas points out that through development of natural science which uncovers distant past findings and data of geology, it was discovered that there was another temporal narration outside of “biblical chronology”. Saving time from “biblical chronology” eliminated confinement and control of past over the present and so, it enabled probability of designing and planning a different future time which disagreed with retrospective heritage (Carvounas, 2002, p. 21). Conceptualization of time improved both “backward past” and “forward future” (Carvounas, 2002, p. 21). Thus, a conjectural environment for temporal narration was provided which enabled opportunity to design the future. In a nutshell, we can conclude that with some factors, such as organization of Christian life, development of scientific discoveries etc., present-time was rationalized and systematized. Start and end of activities or tasks were determined by clocks or bells. Taking control of present-time undermined fatalistic burden of retrospective heritage. In addition to this developing sense of controlling temporal rhythms and instruments of governing the time through schedules and clock-based regulations, a new understanding of history, which was based on “forward future” imaginations, emerged through discovering further side of biblical temporalization. As a result of imagining a different future from past, future-oriented political philosophies came into view.

With emergence of modernity, the past lost its role of guide to elucidate pathways of the future and modern understanding of politics appreciated value of the future (Carvounas, 2002, pp. 12-3). Thomas Hobbes, who lived during political and social turmoil and witnessed that past experiences could no longer be used as a reference to future, epitomized modern temporal understanding which emphasized transition of value from past to the future (Carvounas, 2002, p. 9). Another representative name of modern temporal regime was Immanuel Kant whose theorization of history grounded on “valorization of future” and “idea of progress” (Carvounas, 2002, pp. 23-4). He contributed to the Enlightenment age through providing hope of advancement. In this way, he underlined continuity between three modes of time: past, present, future in which past is replaced by the future (Carvounas, 2002, p. 24). This understanding emphasized historical process which we will meet in Marxist understanding of historical stages explained by historical materialism. Kant’s strategy to reach a better
future did not lean on the past heritage, but on the reasonable and future-based actions (Carvounas, 2002, p. xiii). He placed reasonable actors of history against nature’s irrational temporality: searching for an advanced future requires “deliberative future-oriented activity” of actors’ “free will” and these owners of free will take control of time in order to constitute a human system through dominating the nature (Carvounas, 2002, p. 30).

Instead of disregarding the past, Hegel made a connection between past, future and present as a bridge in his theory of “historical time” (Carvounas, 2002, p. 44). For him, the historical forward path of future on its own did not provide situation of excellence, for measurement to evaluate and judge the futuristic advancement was undetermined. He made a distinction between “quantitative” and “qualitative” development of history and in order to search a qualified development, a destination to be reached was settled (Carvounas, 2002, p. 46). Hegel’s “qualified development” positioned the state as destination point. He explained institutionalization of time through myth of Kronos and Zeus: Kronos ate up his children, in other words his actions and productions, and “produced no ethical works” and Zeus removed him from power, took time under control through embodying moral establishment of political institution in the form of the state (Carvounas, 2002, p. 50).

While Hegel treated the past as an idealist aspect which provided grasping the “historical development”, Marx consulted the past as a materialist explanation of the historical progress (Carvounas, 2002, p. 96). Like Kant, Marx sees the present time as a prologue of forward-looking deeds and he deals with the past as historical progression of different modes of production (Carvounas, 2002, p. 96). For him, the present is loaded with heritage of the previous production relations and with last subversive class fight cruel conditions of the current present will be eliminated (Carvounas, 2002, p. 96). Simply put, the present burdens the inheritance of the past and at the same time it has responsibility to bring a better future. Therefore, it is understandable why Marx indicates that the modern present includes both agony emanating from exploitative conditions of class domination and hope for a better life which is provided through industrial and scientific progressions (Marx, 1856, pp. 655-
With the emergence of modernity “everything seems pregnant with its contrary”; development in technological and scientific knowledge which provides opportunity to facilitate life conditions, is accompanied by growth of exploitation of the human which is no longer subordinate to hard requirements of the nature, but subjugated by other human beings (Marx, 1856, p. 655). In this context, aiming to reach a better future is not based on faith in growing development in itself, but rather on active and intended forward-looking deeds (Carvounas, 2002, p. 69). This is best indicated in a statement of the Marx: “History is the judge – its executioner, the proletarian” (Marx, 1856, p. 656).

Briefly, this temporal framework intends to clarify that with modernity old temporal understanding, which appreciated the past and excluded possible novelties, is replaced with a new paradigm of temporality that refers to rationalization of the present time and valorization of the future. The sense of controlling the time through rationalization and measurement of it, led to the development of temporal consciousness which offers a new understanding of the past, present and future. Accordingly, a new historical sense emerges which leads to formation of the future-oriented political philosophies. If this is the case for time, how does modernity conceptualize the space? Time and space together compose social realities and experiences just as they play a significant role in human being. They cannot be thought separate from each other. We can follow this trace of nonseparation in use of the language which invalidates division of time and space; for example, concept of “progress” implies moving on from one point to another in the space and thus shows spatial origin of the concept (Boyarin, 1994, p. 7).

Above, we mentioned organization of time through regulation of daily rites and modernization of temporal measurements which brings temporal disciplinary and thus a sense of controlling the time. Thus, new understandings of the history which are actively thought and projected, emerged. Temporal regulation and modernization were not alone, they were accompanied by spatial organizations and new understanding of temporality interrelated with spatial mentality. However, although space and time or disciplinary form of them, geography and history together provide a framework for understanding physical and social life, historical reflection has been more favored than spatial and geographical contemplation (Soja, 2010, p. 15). That tendency toward
history and time rather than the space and geography derives from extreme attention to avoid from being labelled “environmental determinism” of the geography (Soja, 2010, p. 4). Temporal tendency does not provide sufficient explanations to understand geographical politics and regulations and this impotent space is reduced to a container in which things happen; however, the space “is actively involved in generating and sustaining inequality, injustice, economic exploitation, racism, sexism and other forms of oppression and discrimination” (Soja, 2010, p. 4). Opposing to superiority of the history, “spatial turn” has arisen as a result of recognition of importance of the spatial-being as well as the temporal being (Soja, 2010, pp. 16-7).

First dominative act in history might be efforts and attempts to subjugate nature. Humans, whose existence cannot be thought without the nature, maintain their life through using, regulating, occupying, shaping and seizing it. Having relations with the nature, they build their houses, define borders, and construct life areas; in other words, they form and create their spaces. In that case, there is a close relationship between manners of approaching to nature and construction of space. For instance, Cartesian thought which is based on dichotomous classification such as subject-object and mind-body, takes the nature as an object of knowledge and thus handles the space and time as object of knowledge and measurement which leads to absolute space understanding. In other words, comprehension of the absolute space (as we will see in section of Lefebvre) is originated in philosophical tradition of the Enlightenment and Cartesian logic of the space which is rooted in binaries such as “res extensa-res cogitans” and treats the space as absolute space (Lefebvre, 1991, pp. 1-2). This understanding of absolute space that implies to Cartesian quantifiability can be seen in the form of sovereign state (Boyarin, 1994, p. 4). Cartesian logic, therefore, provides an explanation for the strictly determined authority of the state over dominated territories.

Another example of the Cartesian logic which shapes composition of the space can be seen in Descartes’ famous formulation: “Cogito, ergo sum”. Here, the mind is taken as a point of departure to signify human existence and in that sense a hierarchical relation is constituted between mind and body. Authority of mind over body, or body-space, is represented by formation of absolute space, as we will see later in section of
Lefebvre, which is quantitatively measured and organized by city-planners or governments. As a further example, Aristo’s conceptualization of zoe and bios can be also understood as superiority of mind over the body-space. Both zoe and bios mean “life” in Greek; yet while former refers to physiological life of humans and animals, the latter stands for humanistic lifestyle (Agamben, 2013, p. 134). Domain of the zoe is domestic space in which bestial life, reproduction and propagation reign; on the other hand, area of the bios implies public space of the polis which is grounded on pursuit of good life rather than simple life of the zoe (Montag, 2013, p. 198). Bestial life of the zoe is located outside of the polis and politics is separated from that location which is deprived of eligible life of the politics (Agamben, 2013, p. 135). From that perspective spatial division between natural life of the domestic zoe and political life of the public bios refers to differentiation of political mind from domestic body. This implies that the politics is revised to those who have intellectual capacity, or in old traditions, who have the wealth and nobility. Reflection of this logic can be seen in today’s spatial organizations or institutions. In the modern world, state and state officials or politicians have a role for being and acting as “mind” of its citizens who are mostly reduced to simple life and therefore, depoliticized. Just as the body is understood as a tool of the mind, in most of the states, the people are seen as an instrument of the state power.

Through these analyses, we can conclude that spatial logic has an important role to play in formulation of the political understanding and vice versa. In that context, it becomes clear that capitalist system involves nature to extract profit as much as possible and accordingly, constructs and regulates the space in favor of itself. Through exploitation of nature, capitalism carves out spaces which are profit-oriented. However, spatial aspect of capitalism is overshadowed by time and history-based analysis. This attitude can be seen in Marx who meticulously analyzed temporal exploitation of the workers and established historical materialism which explains different mode of production and social relations of production in the history. Nevertheless, there is limited emphasis on the space in Marx’s analytical framework, therefore we will examine his thought of spatiality as long as his works allow us to do so.
This chapter aims to look at temporal and spatial perspective of Marx and Marx-inspired theories that form the basis of Rancierian understanding of relation between time-space and politics. Since Marxist literature is comprehensive, this chapter is limited with Walter Benjamin and Henri Lefebvre. In order to understand Ranciere’s perspective, Marx’s argument is dissected through Benjamin’s conceptualization of time and Lefebvre’s approach of space. However, the main purpose of this chapter is not to focus on their critical reading and to discuss them in depth. Rather, it is intended to establish a general framework. This chapter intends to draws attention to Ranciere’s formulation of spatio-temporality and politics through anchoring his understanding to a Marxian framework. Therefore, Marx, Benjamin and Lefebvre will be analyzed on a descriptive level. These descriptive analyses will be presented as a theoretical framework only to the extent that they compose the corpus of Ranciere’s understanding of time and space and help us to understand how Ranciere forms his own theory.

1.2.1. Marx’s Temporal Understanding

“Socrates said that leisure is the sister of freedom.”

Marx handles the issue of time in terms of processes of production and consumption in capitalism. As indicated in the argument that “first historical act is the production of the means to satisfy basic human needs” (Ranciere, 1983, p. 70; Tomlinson, 2015, p. 26), his historical explanation is embedded in production. As George Tomlinson states, “labor historicalizes: it produces history”. Act of labor, by its very nature, is

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temporal and historical in understanding of Marx (Tomlinson, 2015, p. 12). Therefore, in order to figure out temporal and historical understanding of Marx, it is important to grasp how he explains temporal aspect of capitalist mode of production.

According to Marxian understanding, time is embedded in the action of production and the value of labor is made up of temporality of productive activity (Marx, 1955, pp. 16-7; Neary & Glenn Rikowski, 2000, p. 20). Result of a labor is stated according to time which is used during the process of production. Different products are compared according to their time-use in production: same time-use of diverse products means same value of them and in this manner, products refer to solidified situation of labor-time (Marx, 1887, p. 29). Before capitalism, since the practical usage of the product was more important than exchange value of it, time was not considered as measuring labor value (Booth, 1991, pp. 10-1). Precapitalist status of economy was structured on use-value of C-M-C: C refers to commodity, while M indicates money (Neary & Glenn Rikowski, 2000, p.19; Booth, 1991, p.10). Fundamental goal of this type of economy is to meet basic requirements of humans in order to ensure material life of human and of dominant classes; therefore, there is no place for surplus value (Booth, 1991, pp. 10, 33, 34). In the C-M-C pattern of precapitalist economy, a commodity was produced and sold in order to buy another commodity to satisfy another need. Since motive force of this type of economy was not the pursuit of gain from extra value, time was not exploited. Briefly, C-M-C economy composed of three pillars (Booth, 1991, pp. 11-12): I) There was no surplus time, working time was limited. II) Since in this economic pattern focus of production was not gaining extra profit, there was no interest of developing technological improvements. III) As a result of these characteristics of C-M-C economy, division of labor in the society was limited. In C-M-C economic pattern, time was considered in terms of free activities rather than of profit from surplus temporality. Time was extorted from dominated classes in ancient economy in order to provide extra time for development of sovereign groups (Booth, 1991, p. 10). Appreciation of time was for the sake of formation of leisure time to provide a space for development of gentry class and so, technological facilities of the ancient era were used in favor of leisure time (Booth, 1991, pp. 18-9). In C-M-C type of economy, time was lived rather than used as a measurement.
With development of capitalism, we see M-C-M type of economy which is based on the exchange value. A commodity, in M-C-M economy, is bought for selling with a higher price. The commodity is produced in order to gain more money from previous money (Neary & Glenn Rikowski, 2000, p. 19). In other words, pursuing surplus value and profit is centered in this economic pattern. Rather than meeting basic requirements of human needs, capitalist economy is organized to extract surplus value from production process (Booth, 1991, pp. 12-3). In this context, time in the capitalist world is reformulated and reorganized according to the desire of gaining profit. A statement which Marx quoted in *The Capital* epitomizes importance and role of time in capitalism: “Moments are the elements of profit.” (Marx, 1887, p. 167). “Small thefts of capital from the laborer’s meal and recreation time”, “petty pilfering of minutes”, “nibbling and cribbling at meal-times” (Marx, 1887, p. 167) are tactics of the capitalist to exploit and usurp time of the workers. Marx points out that necessary time of production measures the value of labor-power. However, as he indicates through some formulations, the time spent during the production process is more than the necessary time; it also includes surplus time which is excepted from value of labor-power (Marx, 1887, p. 162). Quantitative relation between two aspects of time – surplus time and necessary time- forms surplus value which is a fundamental principle of capitalism (Booth, 1991, p. 13). Accordingly, surplus value is increased or decreased by determining surplus time. Exploitation of workers’ surplus time enables exclusion of them from surplus value. There is no limit on working day except sleeping time for being ready for the next day’s job, and thus a few times for workers’ recreation cannot escape from the capitalist temporal regime (Marx, 1887, pp. 178-79). In desire of pursuing profit and surplus value, capitalism does not recognize neither moral nor physical limits of the working day; it appropriates workers’ time which is necessary for a healthy human being (Marx, 1887, pp. 178-79). Through buying labor-power of the worker, the capitalist obtains right of possession of the worker’s time and working-time reflects consumption of labor-power (Marx, 1887, p. 163). Marx clarifies that portrayal of workers as “full-timers” and “half-timers” on the one hand reduces individual workers to “personified labor-time” (Marx, 1887, p. 168) and, on the other hand, the capitalist is nothing other than “personified capital” whose spirit belongs to
the capital (Marx, 1887, p. 163). Therefore, within this constructed normality of personified labor-time and personified capital, when the worker reclaims his disposable time to use for himself/herself, he or she steals from the capitalist.

Capitalist organization of economy, in order to increase profit, tries to retrench and reduce costs through three important regulations. First of all, lengthening working time as much as physically possible is oldest method of extracting surplus value (Booth, 1991, p. 14). However, extending working time cannot exceed the physical barrier and this restriction directs the capitalists to develop second method to enhance surplus value: improvement of technological machines (Booth, 1991, p. 14). Through technological improvements necessary labor time is decreased (Booth, 1991, p. 15), but length of working day does not change. Reducing necessary labor time is accompanied by increasing surplus time (Marx, 1887, p.167; Booth, 1991, p.14; Harootunian, 2015, p.38). In other words, “capital frees time in order to appropriate it for itself” (Booth, 1991, p. 14). There is a paradoxical relation between technological development -aiming to facilitate difficulties of production process and to decrease necessary labor time- and deterioration of the worker’s situation (Booth, 1991, p. 18). Working time includes both necessary labor time and surplus labor time; hence a capitalist who buys labor-power, also buys time of the worker (Magun, 2010, p. 100).

Marx specifies that extending working time refers to “absolute surplus value” while “relative surplus value” emerges as a result of reducing necessary labor time and rising surplus labor time (Marx, 1887, p. 221). Thus, with technological improvements and investments time of the worker is more exposed to capitalist domination. The third factor is implementation of division of labor in the production process. The capitalist retrenches costs of production by regulating division of labor in time and space. As manufactures develop and increase, producers accumulate and collect around same place and they start to work simultaneously rather than successively (Marx, 1887, p. 237). Contrary to the old system in which artisans produce in a sequence, capitalist organization of production obtains more profit from division of labor among workers who produce a discrete part of a product at the same time (Marx, 1887, pp. 237-38).

In a footnote, Marx cites from Dugald Stewart who explains that division of labor uncovers a new “economy of time” which organizes simultaneous production in a
given time and thus by providing more products it also provides saving-time (Marx, 1887). Organization of collective labor requires aggregation of a great number of workers in the production place. Thus, gathering many workers in a given place leads to valorization of the tools of production; yet building an atelier according to division of labor among numerous workers countervails the cost (Tombazos, 2014, p. 104). Another factor of saving-costs due to division of labor is “spatial simultaneity” of the production process which serves to reduce necessary labor time (Tombazos, 2014, p. 105). In a system of division of labor, integrated labor is more profitable than supplementation of isolated individual labor (Tombazos, 2014, p. 105). Complexity of the work is alleviated through distribution of workers according to their proper task, hence necessary labor time is decreased (Marx, 1887, p. 229). Consequently, individuality of the workers becomes insignificant because of utilizing machines and division of labor for the sake of maximization of capital (Marx & Engels, 1970, p. 40). Allocation of workers according to specific jobs, thus, reduces the existence of the worker to an additional part of the machine (Marx & Engels, 1970, p. 40). Due to division of labor, while the job is specified and simplified, the number of specialized tasks in a given time increases. By ascribing workers to the simplified and recurrent actions of production, “rhythm of labor” is dominated by “the rhythm of the machine” (Tombazos, 2014, p. 110). Process of mechanization, homogenization and ordering of working time makes the workers alien to their own labor and intellectual capacity (Tombazos, 2014, p. 110). Due to specialization process of production in the system of division of labor worker becomes an organ of the machine; he or she fulfills and applies the function of machines (Marx, 1887, pp. 238-39). With mechanization of the worker’s body and simplification of the worker’s labor, the worker is dominated by the machine and the clock time becomes measurement of the worker’s productivity and for this reason a worker’s labor is equal to another worker’s when the time of creating a product of a worker is equal to another one’s (Marx, 1955, pp. 21-2). In other words, “time is everything, man is nothing” (Marx, 1955, pp. 21-2). Marx makes a long quotation from Wilhelm Schulz and cites that in order to reach level of the “spiritual freedom”, workers must go beyond physical requirements of their body and they must engage in creative actions in their leisure time. Yet, although mechanization
of the production process declined necessary labor time, time of the slavish working is raised (Marx, 1988, pp. 29-30).

In expression of achieving spiritual freedom through gaining leisure time free from bodily needs, there is an implicit notion which makes a separation between those who have leisure and therefore, spiritual freedom and those who do not. Here, the worker is confined to basic material needs of his/her body by exploitative system of the capitalism. In other words, as we will see later in Sartre, the worker is doomed to fatigue. Then, how could a worker decide that s/he should have the leisure time for freedom while s/he is already devoid of spiritual freedom due to capitalist exploitation? This is a Rancierian question, and it implies that this separation affirms and maintains inequality even though it is intended to abolish it. If the worker does not have the capacity to decide and determine his/her actions, then s/he needs an intellectual or authority who draws the path of the worker. In this respect, capitalist boss is replaced with intellectual boss. As we will see in detail, for Ranciere equality arises from equality, and inequality from inequality.

The working class has a long history of temporal struggle in which the workers organize to fight against capitalist temporal regulations. Marx quotes from an announcement of The General Congress of Labor at Baltimore in 1866:

The first and great necessity of the present, to free the labour of this country from capitalists slavery, is the passing of a law by which eight hours shall be the normal working day in all States of the American Union. We are resolved to put forth all our strength until this glorious result is attained. (Marx, 1887, p. 195)

Therefore, temporal regulation which determines time of working and leisure becomes an arena of class struggle in which the working classes aim to obtain disposable time in order to provide advancement of their conditions (Harootunian, 2015, p. 31). Class struggle does not only imply conflict between the proletarian and the bourgeois, but it also refers to the clash between overwork of the workers and leisure of the bourgeoisie (Magun, 2010, p. 99). In a footnote Marx cites from workers who declare their demand of decreasing the work-time:
We, the workers of Dunkirk, declare that the length of time of labour required under the present system is too great, and that, far from leaving the worker time for rest and education, it plunges him into a condition of servitude but little better than slavery. That is why we decide that 8 hours are enough for a working day, and ought to be legally recognized as enough; why we call to our help that powerful lever, the press… and why we shall consider all those that refuse us this help as enemies of the reform of labour and of the rights of the labourer. (Resolution of the Working Men of Dunkirk, New York State, 1866) (Marx, 1887, p. 212)

Marx analyzes time issue in terms of capitalist organization of production. Capitalism not only exploits labor power but also labor time through usurping surplus labor time of the worker. Through claiming right over the worker’s time, capitalism does not limit itself to extort surplus labor time, additionally it steals physically necessary reproduction time of the worker. In spite of improvement of technological machines, capitalist mode of production maintains its exploitative temporal regulations. Extending working day, shortening necessary labor time, thus prolonging surplus labor time, time-saving regulations of organization of division of labor, all these factors force the worker to stay in an economized temporal regime. Marx points out struggle of workers which aims shortening working time and thus obtaining labor time against capitalist seizing of time. Hence, they would be able to reach a level of developed humanity. It seems that workers’ gaining of leisure provides them to elevate their consciousness and overcome the alienation. It can be concluded that for Marx, temporal regime of capitalism imposes a temporal division which separates working time from the leisure time. When selling his/her labor, the proletariat also sells his/her time. Hence, the capitalist who buy proletarian time gains power over the regulation of proletarian time. The capitalist has both the proletarian time and leisure time which arises as a result of usurping surplus labor time. In this regard, time is distributed unproportionally between the worker and the capitalist. From this point of view, removing inequality between the worker and the capitalist requires the worker to have a share in this temporal distribution. Through temporal struggles, the workers aim to participate in leisure time, because the leisure provides human beings to develop intellectual capacities and to implement their freedom. This understanding presupposes that the capitalists who have the leisure time are more improved and
sophisticated than the worker. In order to be humanly and intellectually developed, the worker should keep up with the bourgeoisie through fighting for obtaining leisure. Thus, as Rancierian understanding designates, it presupposes the inequality as a starting point and indicates the equality as a destination point. From his perspective, drawing a road map which points out a path from inequality to equality is, in fact, affirmation of the inequality. As we will see later, the path from inequality to equality is full of suspension, delay, de-politicization and pedagogical authority of the intellectual who forms theoretically this path and has an authority to lead those who are in need of knowledge and guidance of him/her. On the other side, in Rancierian conceptual world, the equality cannot emanate from the inequality, but only from equality itself. Different from Marx’s equality path which refers to progressive process of the history, Ranciere denotes equality of moments which are based on the verification of equality itself.

The proletarian struggle for leisure is an important step toward the socialist revolution, because through having leisure time the workers become aware of class-consciousness and thus releases themselves from alienation. Thus, they become ready to play their historical role: replacing capitalism with socialism through a proletarian revolution. Their position is elevated from miserable victims of the greedy capitalist temporal regime to the point of heroic practitioners of revolutionary history. Now, we examine the historical understanding of Marx. Against understanding of “speculative philosophy of history”, Marx puts forward a materialist understanding of secular history which is based on the present issue instead of vague conceptualization of past and future (Harootunian, 2015, p. 44). Releasing history from philosophy makes conceptualization of temporality to focus on the present (Harootunian, 2015, p. 45). Marx argues that speculative understanding of history, through disconnecting the link between the mode of production and the dominant ideas, reduces the history to the history of ideas; and it is based on abstraction of history which suggests that conceptualized “essence of Man” is the source of factual relations between men (Marx & Engels, 1976, p. 61). For Marx, on the contrary, rather than the conceptualization of consciousness or ideas it is the material form of life and mode of production which construct social and historical world (Cohen, 2000, p. 22). Marx grounds his historical
understanding on production of material life and explains that contrary to idealist conceptualization of history, which deals with ideals as force of history and historical change, conceptualization of ideas are outcomes of both material production and relations of production (Marx & Engels, 1976, p. 54). Since all ideal formations including consciousness, religion, philosophy etc. are result of the material production of life and social relations, historical change becomes possible with breaking material relations of production down; in other words, it is the revolutionary practice -rather than the idealist conceptualizations- which compoes motive of the history (Marx & Engels, 1976, p. 54). By neglecting material foundation of the history, idealist understanding of history makes a separation between common or usual life of material conditions and historical conceptualizations as “extra-supeterrestrial” and hence historical events are reduced to unusual political or religious fights (Marx & Engels, 1976, p. 55).

Marx and Engels, places their historical understanding on three important pillars: Before making history, humans, first of all, must have conditions of survival which includes food, shelter, clothes, etc. and production of tools to fulfill these basic requirements. Providing facilities for sustaining very existence of humans, is “the first historical act” which is maintained even today (Marx & Engels, 1976, pp. 41-2; Tomlinson, 2015, p. 22; Ranciere, 1983, p.70). Secondly, after fulfillment of the basic human needs there exists emerging new requirements and actions to meet these needs (Marx & Engels, 1976, p. 42). In this second moment of history humans differentiate themselves from animals through production of material life (Tomlinson, 2015, p. 22). Shaping the external world and capability of providing material conditions for life ensure their separation from animal being (Avineri, 1968, p. 85). In Marx’s understanding, the very existence of human beings is separated from the animals because of the immanent characteristic of historical and temporal being of labor of the former. In other words, contrary to human beings, animals do not have the capacity of production and reproduction of material life (Tomlinson, 2015, pp. 24-25). Unlike animals, human beings are vulnerable to the challenging conditions of nature and cannot easily accommodate in untouched nature; therefore, the human uses his/her mental capacity to adjust the nature for constructing a livable world and hence, history
emerges as outcome of struggle against the nature (Cohen, 2000, p. 23). Thus, second moment of history pays our attention to developing human consciousness as a result of production of material life and formation of new material conditions. Third situation of the history is procreation of human species and thus human relations develop in the form of man-woman relations, familial relations and social relations (Marx & Engels, 1976, pp. 42-43). However, the third moment of history as procreation is not limited to bodily reproduction of human beings. A specific form of life is produced and since it exemplifies material production, consciousness of human is shaped by valid production type (Tomlinson, 2015, p. 22). History occurs as a result of fulfillment of basic human requirements, but history is not limited to only this side; it is also related to creation and specification of new needs (Avineri, 1968, p. 79). Individual consciousness does not automatically overlap to the material conditions, because the individual consciousness itself is determined and shaped by antecedent generations (Avineri, 1968, pp. 79-80).

Marx deals with history in terms of progressive processes and founds his historical understanding upon investigation of the present which signifies the potential of the future and clarifies the past (Hobsbawm, 1984, p. 107; Harootunian, 2015, p. 41). He accentuates the past political formations which shape temporal normality (Harootunian, 2015, p. 23). For him, history is composed of both inherited formations of the past and intended actions to alter the present conditions and to reach a future different from the past (Marx & Engels, 1976, p. 50). The past is not “historical in itself”, it becomes historical through association the present (Harootunian, 2015, p. 23). Harry Harootunian argues that for Marx there is no straight line between the past and the present since interpretation of the past is constituted through present consciousness and point of the present is flexible (Harootunian, 2015, p. 23). Marx focuses on the present as a mode of historical analysis, therefore he takes social order of bourgeoisie as the most advanced mode of production (Marx, 1993). Through examining the bourgeois order, disappeared social relations and residues of former modes of production could be comprehended: in order to understand anatomy of the ape, attention should be paid to the human anatomy (Marx, 1993). It is important to grasp advanced form of economy, namely capitalist economy, in order to uncover
primitive form of economic organization. In other words, self-criticism of the present structure is a key factor to understand the past formations. For example, after commitment of self-criticism, Christianity obtains objective comprehension of primitive myths and in the same way, bourgeois structure of economy grasps feudal and the primitive mode of production when it self-criticizes (Marx, 1993). For Marx, in a nutshell, understanding the present elucidates formations of the past. Precapitalist structure of social and economic organization is based on communal order and classification of the clans (Harootunian, 2015, p. 47). There was equality among humans in primordial classless society in which they worked for communal benefit (Cohen, 2000, p. 24). But, with the increase in production and offensive technology, harmony between nature and the human was disrupted and so, human beings became more demanding: animals were no longer just eaten, they were also domesticated, herbal foods were not only collected from the nature, but also they were harvested (Cohen, 2000, p. 24). Thus, the surplus was accumulated and as a result of this, an affluent class emerged and contradistinction between classes developed (Cohen, 2000, p. 24). Until emergence of class differentiation of primitive organization of accumulation, fundamental human action was to readjust the nature according to herself/himself conditions; but with accumulation of surplus and existence of the higher class, the human was dominated by other human beings which formed the source of the state (Marx & Engels, 1976, p. 50). Capitalist mode of production reaches such a point that productive forces are replaced with “destructive forces” and thus most poor member of the society is proletarized who are excluded from favorable conditions of surplus economy and therefore, who have awareness of an imperative revolution (Marx & Engels, 1976, p. 52). Like we mention before, Marx emphasized the present to understand the past and to design the future. Capitalism, in this sense is a key factor to contemplate future possibilities as well as to elucidate old mode of production of the past. From that perspective capitalism is a necessary step for development (Cohen, 2000, p. 198); because it ensures sovereignty of the human over the nature and deepens class conflicts toward a such point that emancipation of the proletariat appears as a need and purpose (Cohen, 2000, p. 25). With capitalist mode of production, surplus is so much produced that satisfaction of basic human needs is
no longer a necessary part of production. Therefore, it provides a condition of plenty which gives rise to emergence of class antagonism (Cohen, 2000, pp. 198-99). Furthermore, capitalist development provides a model for socialist revolution in the sense that the proletariat revolution and construction of classless society is inspired from bourgeois revolution which overthrows old feudal mode of production (Carvounas, 2002, p. 87). However, as Marx stated, while the former revolutions in the history did not alter the way of action and the “distribution of labor”, the communist revolution would bring a fundamental change in this distribution and relations between classes and thus provides a classless social world inasmuch as it is brought by a class of which existence is negated and of which mission is abolition of all classes (Marx & Engels, 1976, p. 53). This aforementioned class is the proletariat. The mission of the proletariat is to take action for playing his/her role and thus for making his/her own history (Fritsch, 2005, p. 17). Marxism is an attempt not only to make a history of subordinated class but also to conquer the history itself and as an outcome of this process exploited classes are united and obtains his/her consciousness and become significant subject of the history (Sartre, 1981, p. 90). Role of the proletariat as an important subject of the history is recruited from “history of victimization”: this means that the suffering of the past is linked with hope for an emancipated future (Fritsch, 2005, p. 21). In other words, “the future belongs to the laborer” (Carvounas, 2002, p. 87).

In summary, Marx understands the issue of time in relation to the act of production. For him not only social relations are formed by the mode of production, but also temporal relations and temporal understandings are shaped by it. There are two different ways of use of time which are formed according to the production style. In C-M-C type of production, since it was not transformed into money, time was lived. Even though there was slavery-based exploitation, time was experienced as use-value. Because in that type of economy, time itself was profit or had a value, rather than being a tool of profit or an instrument to extract extra value. With the advent of M-C-M way of production, importance of time was replaced by a passion for profit and pursuit of more money. In this capitalist system time becomes a commodity for which temporal struggles fight. In that regard, proletarian struggle for time is directed at gaining leisure
time and thereby obtaining the opportunity to be ready for his/her historical task. However, these temporal struggles for leisure time maintains distribution of time between work time and free time and between those who have leisure time and who do not. In other words, from Rancierian understanding it does not destroy this partaged and shared temporal order and thus preserves pre-acceptance of inequality. In addition, linear paradigm of history provides deterministic understanding of history which assumes capitalist mode of production as a step toward socialist revolution. This perspective consigns revolution and emancipation to the meta narrative belief of historical evolution. Through these historical meta narratives, historical linearity implies a separation between the intellectual who can understand relationship between historical context and current conditions and those who do not know the appropriate time for action. Also, determining destination of the history as a communist order refers to a teleological and Messianic sense of history which we will examine with Benjamin’s critique. Now, we are going to try to understand Benjamin’s understanding of history, his critique on historical materialism and his formulation of praxis as a rupture in the history which has some commonalities with Rancierian political action. Benjamin’s historical understanding can provide us a historical conceptualization which is not reduced to historical evolutionism and therefore, goes beyond meta narratives. In that sense, Benjamin’s formulation of history contributes to a non-deterministic historicity through valorization of moment, of actions in the moment rather than valuation of big revolutionary moments of the events of which right moment is to be determined by the intellectual.

1.2.2. Walter Benjamin’s Understanding of Time

Understanding of history in Benjaminian thought relies upon three references which are Marxism, messianism of Judaism and German Romanticism (Löwy, 2005, p. 4). In his first thesis on the history, Benjamin tells a story about setting up a chess-playing robot which is secretly directed by a pygmean person in order to respond any move of
a chess player. He establishes a correlation between this robotic mechanism and historical materialism: both of them are assumed to achieve a triumph, however, this assumption alludes to a theological understanding “which as everyone knows is small and ugly and must be kept out of sight” (Benjamin, 2005). Benjamin makes an interesting integration between historical materialism and theology (Löwy, 2005, p. 25). He engages in theological way of thought which supplies memory and salvation (Löwy, 2005, p. 27). There is a parallel understanding between constitution of memory and Marxian understanding of past relations of production and also between theological salvation promise and expectation of communist revolution. In other words, Marxist thought of history is messianic in the sense that it supposes universal socialist revolution of the dominated classes and with this revolution it is expected that another type of world is instituted in which the working class is emancipated (Magun, 2010, p. 95). He supports secularization of messianic understanding by Marx which keeps messianic disruptive character (Löwy, 2014, p. 28). Benjamin’s understanding of messianism underlines this disruptive manner not only in theoretical explanations of historical process but also in messianic and eschatological daily life (Magun, 2010, pp. 92-93). Thus, it becomes understandable that rather than future-oriented actions which intend to reach an emancipated point in the historical development, Benjamin pays attention to the present moment in which messianic subversion is located. With Benjamin history rips off teleological envelope and a transition “from a time of necessity to a time of possibilities” is underlined (Löwy, 2005, p. 102).

Benjamin distances himself from materialist explanation of class struggle (Lindroos, 1998, p. 55). His Marxist understanding rests on the critique of the historical development and he deals with nostalgic past as a mode for criticizing the present (Löwy, 2005, pp. 2-3) which is unlike Marx’s method of critique of the past through the present. Benjamin grounds his historical understanding on the present where the gaze is directed to the past. He points out Paul Klee’s drawing, Angelus Novus, and states that “the angel of history” takes place in a past-oriented position in which the angel’s “face is turned towards the past” (Benjamin, 2005). The past-looking angel of history, thus, sees agglomeration and accumulation of historical disasters and the angel is terrified. But it cannot withstand flow of time and is dragged into the future by
temporal hurricane and this hurricane, Benjamin indicates, is the progress (Benjamin, 2005). He refuses the enlightenment’s understanding of progressive history which ignores any regressive character and rejects alternative truths (Lindroos, 1998, p. 73). Progressive understanding treats history as accumulation and development of “homogenous and empty time”, therefore criticizing progressive history is founded on analyzing of this homogenous development (Benjamin, 2005). He rejects the conceptualization of the history as monolithic and blank which is supposed to be filled with gradual development of linear temporality (Lindroos, 1998, p. 31; Löwy, 2014, p. 26). He criticizes understanding of historical progress which composes sequential stages. In this context he explains in this eighth thesis that for anti-fascists, fascism has a chance to be accounted as a necessary stage to reach a developed point in the history (Benjamin, 2005). Benjamin objects future-oriented and progressive history of utopian Marxism which keeps present experiences out of future-oriented historical development (Lindroos, 1998, pp. 88-9). Against progression of materialist history, Benjamin argues that constitution of socialism is neither a certain result of some historical processes nor an unavoidable end of the developmental process, but rather it emerges as a consequence of disruptive intervention in historical progression (Löwy, 2014, p. 21; Löwy, 2005, p. 9). As we will see later, this perspective of Benjamin is similar to Ranciere’s conceptualization of the equality as subversion of temporal distribution.

Both Marx and Benjamin attach importance to the present consciousness, but there is a subtle difference between their understanding of the present temporality. In Marx, present temporality refers to instrumental handling of the present where intended-actions of the subject aim to reach emancipation in the future. Whereas in Benjamin’s formulation, present is not so much future-oriented, rather he pays attention to possibility of the redemption of the past through remembering it and present-time action. In this sense he marks a Copernican revolution in understanding of history. This indicates that, unlike classical historical approach which determines a fixed object of knowledge in the past and carries the present to this fixed point, the fixed point in the past is carried to the present and thus it is provided to become aware of the unrecognized knowledge of the past in the present-time (Benjamin, 2002). History is
an object of present-time fiction (Benjamin, 2002) and only those who reach salvation can completely own their past and so, every moments of their past become worth to be citable (Benjamin, 2005). Redemption of the past means having such a past that each component of it is cited by the present time. For instance, Robespierre cited from ancient Rome and considered the French Revolution as return of the Rome (Benjamin, 2002). In other words, Copernican revolution in history provides that the history which is buried in the past rests on the actuality in the present (Tiedemann, 2002). It is the action of the remembrance which determines Copernican turning point in the history (Benjamin, 2002). Thus, it can be inferred that the history, in this regard, is based on the dialectical relationship between the past and the present. As Benjamin delineates from Angelus Novus, history is a catastrophic mass of the past and the present. Face of the angel of history turns to the present and past in order to intervene the catastrophic mass and thus to reformulate the past through present-time. In brief, Benjamin’s understanding of present-oriented action is for the sake of the redemption of the past, while Marx deals with praxis of present-time for emancipation in future. Redemption of the past refers to its reinterpretation and exposition of “temporal contingency” of the historical composition (Lindroos, 1998, p. 60). In this respect subject of the history, in Benjaminian conceptual world, is released from the “causality of action” and thus he or she has more effective power of the act to break the temporal linearity (Lindroos, 1998, p. 60).

He objects utopian Marxist perception of future which is located in spatially distant point from the present and grasped as a destination place (Lindroos, 1998, p. 38). In order to express his composition of past-looking present temporality he borrows a Jewish taboo which prohibits prophecy and fortune telling. Jews, who are banned to get information from the future, have only the present and the past time. In other words, they have their worships and religious rituals which they pray in the present time and have remembrance of the past (Benjamin, 2005). That situation saves Jews from “a homogenous and empty time” and releases the future from determination of the past and present, because in Jewish understanding every second of the present moment provides a possibility for appearance of the Messiah (Benjamin, 2005). In that context, he forms a philosophy of history which clarifies that history is established by “the here-
and-now”, “Jetztzeit” (Benjamin, 2005). Intervention in temporal stability plays a significant role in splitting the temporal coherence in which catastrophic history emerges (Lindroos, 1998, p. 34). Awareness of “the here-and-now” provides opportunity to disrupt temporal continuity and thus renders time more heterogeneous and introduces different aspect of the temporality (Lindroos, 1998, p. 84). Characterization of rupture in time as subversive and redemptive and thus awareness of the present temporality not only underline expectation but also put emphasis on experience (Lindroos, 1998, p. 43). Through actions which are equipped with temporal consciousness, each moment of the present opens a space for a possible revolution and unanticipated probabilities (Löwy, 2005, p. 98). Messianic rupture in the time breaks straight line of temporal flow through now-consciousness and hence, builds disruptive moments which compose critical history (Lindroos, 1998, p. 40). Perpetrator of historical subversion, in other words the Messiah, from this perspective, is not someone who is sent by God because every human being has a potentiality to have messianic capacity (Löwy, 2005, p. 32) or, in other words, humans have “a weak messianic power” (Benjamin, 2005). Subject of the history is warring class who is subordinated by capitalism and thus who struggle for salvation for dominated classes (Benjamin, 2005). Consequently, it becomes clear that mode of historical formulation gives shape to human praxis and political acts (Lindroos, 1998, p. 31). In Benjamin’s thought there is an alternative reading of history, which includes the subjugated classes and written by them. Moreover, his historical understanding is grounded on temporal disruption which breaks continuity between the past, present and the future. In this sense temporal disruption requires a present-oriented consciousness, because temporal disruption conjures up the conscious intervention in flow of time and among three mode of time – past, present, future- it is the present which is only available to subject’s praxis. In a nutshell, Benjaminian mode of historical understanding gives way to formulations of the present-time consciousness and subjectivity which recalls political praxis. Benjamin’s understanding of historical materialism roots in his

4 Dennis Redmond, translator of “On the Concept of History” notes: “Jetztzeit was translated as “here-and-now,” in order to distinguish it from its polar opposite, the empty and homogenous time of positivism.”
conceptualization of subversive action as messianic politics (Tiedemann, 2002). It is the political action which overthrows temporal totality and which is placed in the present (Lindroos, 1998, pp. 89-90). Historical formation of the political praxis, therefore, should create an “emergency situation” in temporal totality (Benjamin, 2005). In this way, revolutionary praxis arises from intervention in temporal unity and hence, revolutionary possibilities have an opportunity to be realized (Lindroos, 1998, p. 90). Revolutionary praxis of rebellious class breaks linear flow of history when this class carries out political praxis in the present time. The French Revolution is a concrete example of reformulation of time and history. Following the French Revolution, the old calendar was replaced by a novel one and there were efforts of reorganization and redetermination of timetables, holidays and schedules (Benjamin, 2005). As this example shows us revolutionary politics, for Benjamin, refers to the rupture in sequential temporality of history and to the reinterpretation of that temporality. Political praxis is the action of discovering new aspects of the past and present through exposing temporal contingency of the history (Lindroos, 1998, p. 101).

Like Benjamin’s understanding of Copernican revolution in the history, Ranciere’s technique is based on the temporal non-continuity. Ranciere’s conceptualization of history jumps over centuries and he places different social formations, institutions and actions in juxtaposition (Ranciere, 2009, p. 287). Benjamin’s understanding of “tiger’s leap”, past-looking present and redemption of the past through the present time has a similar position in Rancierian world which is based on the disruption of temporal succession. Ranciere defends his anachronistic position in historical formations with explaining that chronicle-based statements of events or things restrict those things with

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5 Two important revolutions in the history, the French and the Bolshevik Revolutions tried to impose some alterations in the social rhythm. In order to control social rhythm, reformulation and reshaping of the calendar was handled seriously. The calendar itself has a capacity to become arena of political struggles, because it has power to control and organize social rhythm through regulation of periods such as holidays, festivals, rituals and religious rites. French Revolution witnessed several initiatives which aimed to replace Christian temporal organization based on the seven-day week with newly formed cycle, “the ten-day decade”, and Décadi which is created as rest day substituted the Sunday. Other attempt to regulate temporal formulation was enforced by Joseph Stalin who presented a six-day week. Also, with French Revolution time of New Year’s Day, 1 January was replaced with 22 September which is date of first French Republic (22 September 1792). Thus, it was aimed to make a separation between the old and new order which symbolized transition from Christian Era to Republican Era (Zerubavel, 1985, pp. 45, 46, 73, 85, 86).
certain time and space, thus put limit on creative thinking (Ranciere & Panagia, 2000, p. 122). In addition, Benjamin’s “Jetztzeit” (here and now) is parallel with Ranciere’s formulation of politics as redistribution of time and space in here and now (Robson, 2015, pp. 298-99). In both of them moments of the present have an important place and these moments are characterized as political praxis. However, Rancierian disruptive moment is conceptualized as verification of equality, while Benjaminian subversive present-time is a formulation of the redemption of the past.

1.2.3. Marx’s Spatial Understanding

Marxist thought takes a position against “fetishism of space” which implies that space and spatial relations are independent from social relations of production (Smith & O'Keefe, 1980, p. 37). This attitude results in an insufficient analysis of the space in comparison with the time and history. Although modification of the geography according to capitalist needs and urbanization issues are pointed out, there is a lack of sufficient and profound conceptualization of the space (Harvey, 2000, p. 24). Space is taken as “sporadic and “unsystematic” (Harvey, 2006, p. 374), since development of capitalism is seen as temporal-oriented which makes progress toward a specific destination (Harvey, 2000, p. 57). Nevertheless, there are some implications of the space in Marx (Swyngedouw, 2003, p. 42).

There are three aspects of the spatial perspective in Marx: 1) implication of space on the basis of the production; 2) spatial regulation of production, especially in factory, through division of labor which gives rise to alienation of the worker; 3) creation and discovering new spaces for capitalist expansion. First spatial issue in Marx is embedded in production. As we remark above, for him the first historical act is production. With production human beings not only make history but also create and modify the space through transforming the nature according to their needs. When human shapes and modifies his/her environment, he/she also alters and shapes his/her own existence (Marx, 1887, p. 127). Humans, most probably, make spaces before
making history. They took refuge in the caves and not only used the caves as a shelter, but also drew their rituals, faith, lifestyle on the walls. In doing so, they reflect their very existence on natural spaces. Then they built houses, squares, temples, pyramids, ziggurats, roads, bridges, villages, cities, states, markets and so on. They even projected after-life spaces through designing graves, decorating coffins, forming heaven and hell. Humans were both the creators of those spaces and were shaped by them. History of the humanity is full of wars, occupations, invasions over spaces. All humanistic actions are related to the space, either through creating or destroying it; being in it or being by it. In that sense, since the productive action is embodied in space which provides itself as a tool, object, goal or as a mission of the production, first historical act is also first spatial act. When humans engage in the act of production, they produce their spaces too (Swyngedouw, 2003, p. 44). Put simply, production is also spatialization. This spatial perspective is also related to the second Marxian implication of the space since it refers to a relationship between production and spatialization.

Second spatial implication in Marx’s thought is division of labor in factory which regulates the space of production and controls the worker in that space. In this regulated production space, workers are allocated to restricted and repetitive tasks for production. Early division of labor grew in manufacture where separation of the craft was implemented and thus skills of the artisan were particularized (Tombazos, 2014, p. 106). In pursuit of more production, large numbers of artisans were collected in one space where the process of production was transformed from successive act to simultaneous act of production (Marx, 1887, pp. 237-38). Each production stage was separated, and artisans were allocated to redistributed works, so that through recurrent action, this incidental redistribution was systematized in the form of the division of labor (Marx, 1887, pp. 237-38). Hence, regulation of the production spaces in this manner led to collection of the workers in factories and facilitated the development of capitalism. Enlargement of production spaces in the form of factories gave rise to creation of total spaces which compose of parts; parts of production of any piece of product, parts of consumption, of circulation etc. These spaces are formed in such a way that they are visible, controllable, manageable, profitable and exploitable.
However, there are some contradictions in these spaces: on the one hand, through spatial division of production, workers are assigned to specific tasks which simplify their labor qualities and, on the other hand, concentration of the workers in factories causes development of solidarity among them. They become conscious of their factual situations and develop common interests, and therefore they “build institutions, such as unions” in order to struggle for their aims (Harvey, 2000, p. 25). In that sense, spatial distribution of the worker has an important impact on both consolidation of the capitalism and opposition of the workers against it. Regulation of the production space in the form of the distribution of works and workers corresponds to the Rancierian *polis* where every individuals or groups are assigned to specific jobs and virtues. In a footnote (Marx, 1887, p. 258), Marx cited from Cesare Beccaria:

> Everyone knows from experience that if the hands and the intelligence are always applied to the same kind of work and the same products, these will be produced more easily, in greater abundance, and in higher quality, than if each individual makes for himself all the things he needs… In this way, men are divided up into various classes and conditions, to their own advantage and to that of the commodity.

Therefore, through division of labor an understanding of monotechnic, i.e., worker’s engagement in nothing but only one act of production, has been developed. In that way, due to performing only one stage of production, the worker’s body is transformed into an automaton and hence he/she produces more products (Marx, 1887, p. 33). Again, in another footnote, Marx explicates that according to Plato, the worker must be accorded to the work, rather than making the conditions of work suitable for the worker and he calls attention to the continuity of this Platonic view in capitalist type of production (Marx, 1887, p. 259). This Marxian analysis echoes in Ranciere when he expresses that in the Platonic *polis* order, the foremost virtue of the individuals is to remain in determined and deserved places, doing only specific jobs and having ideas which are suitable to those places (Ranciere, 1999, p. 106). Ranciere also explains that in that order the work must not wait the worker and he or she must be available to act in right moment and, so must have only one specific job (Ranciere, 2003, p. 5). Although he does not present a clear reference to this Marxian explanation of Platonic
order, it is apparent that Ranciere’s formulation of *polis* order is under the influence of this Marxian analysis. However, Ranciere also sees a continuation between the Platonic idea of distribution and Marx himself. He points out that for Marx there is only one task of the proletarian which is making revolution and yet the worker cannot make the revolution on his/her own because of his/her “pure loss of every attribute, the identity of being and nonbeing” (Ranciere, 2003, p. 80). Put simply, there is a close connection between Ranciere’s analysis of the Platonic order of spatiality and Marx’s explanation of spatial distribution of capitalist mode of production; but Ranciere disagrees with him in terms of distribution of proletarian roles and virtues.

Marx’s final spatial perspective pertains to spatial expansion of capitalism through exploration of new lands and their reconfiguration according to capitalist requirements. Geographical factor plays a significant role in capitalism’s survival which is inherently engaged in crises and contradictions. Overcoming these unavoidable crises is only possible through capturing new markets, while the exploitation of forces of production continues (Marx & Engels, 1970, p. 39). The bourgeoisie not only discovers new markets but also transforms other lands into a capitalist mode of space. In his words, the capitalist system civilized nations by destroying Chinese walls, by overthrowing xenophobic borders and finally creating “a world after its own image” (Marx & Engels, 1970, p. 37). With bourgeois revolution a spatial distribution was emerged which instituted domination of cities over rural places, of civilized lands over barbarian ones, of “nations of bourgeois” over “nations of peasants” (Marx & Engels, 1970, p. 37). In that sense, Marx puts the bourgeois spatial configuration into a progressive point in history which according to the law of historical materialism composes the previous stage of the socialist revolution. Marxian understanding of space is, therefore, bound up with his formulation of linear temporality. Here, space is reformulated and reconfigured with historical development. From that perspective, every space belongs to its own time and each historical praxis of development constructs its own space. Therefore, it is not only the time or history which is linear, but also the space is characterized according to the principle of linear development. In that regard, there is a perfect synchronization between time and space, history and geography. However, this approach may
overlook, for example, a disruptive form of spatiality that is incompatible with the actual historical framework. Ranciere arises at this point and introduces an anachronistic method\(^6\) which refers to disruption of consensus between time and space and thus to a non-restricted interpretation of individuals, groups, things, or events.

As we said before, Marx sees a connection between bourgeois revolution and its spatial reconfigurations. This understanding is a reflection of his conceptualization of linear time, and therefore he sees bourgeois revolution as a trend which destroyed old barbaric spatial organizations and introduced the civilization to those spaces. In that context, he regards free time as a “space for human development” (Booth, 1991, p. 9). This perception necessarily places the spatial configuration behind historical developments. In other words, firstly, a historical revolution occurs, then the space is reformulated and reconfigured according to this new framework. Or, to put in a different way, the requirement for free time precedes the necessity of space for human development. As we said in the previous section, struggle for free time, in his understanding, is important to gain class consciousness and thus to play role of historical task to make the socialist revolution. Thus, we come to the initial point where Marx gives more importance to the time and history than the space and geography.

Putting the historical and temporal action to the first stage causes an approach of deferment which reflects historical determinism and unclosed distance of pedagogic inequality.

To sum up, there are three aspects of spatial perspective in understanding of Marx. Firstly, space is inherent in the production. Productive action is also an act toward

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\(^6\) Ranciere deals with anachronism in terms of disrupting normal flow of time (Ranciere, 2011b, p. 5) His anachronistic method pays attention to such historical events which contradict with gradual progression. He gives two examples which explain anachronistic perspective. One of these examples which he mentions is Lucien Febvre’s rejection to define Rabelais as an atheist, “because atheism was not a concept available in Rabelais’s time”. This anachronistic character of Rabelais is ignored for the purpose of keeping normalization of the history. Another example is dissimilarity of Jean-Joseph Jacotot who was a pedagogue lived from the end of 16th century to beginning of the 17th century. He developed a method of education which is known as intellectual emancipation. He theorized and applied a diverse method of education and thus, cannot be placed in the Enlightenment paradigm and even in the current modernity (Ranciere & Panagia, 2000, p. 122). Therefore, Jacotot violates progressive history.
transformation of environment and change. Related to this aspect of production as a spatialization, second spatiality in Marx is about configuration of production spaces which determines and distributes the work and worker. In capitalism, production spaces are regulated in a monotechnic style. In that regard, capitalist space of production is similar to Platonic polis order. Thirdly, Marx points to the spatial expansion of capitalism and sees the bourgeois spatialization as progressive as well as exploitative. This temporal and spatial linearity result in both emphasizing history over geography and deferment attitude which maintains inequality. As can be seen, despite the lack of systematic analyzation of the space in Marx, he nevertheless provides a basis for a geographical perspective (Garnier, 1993, p. 98). On that basis Lefebvre develops the theory of historical-geographical materialism which, as we will see in the next section, refers to a connection between mode of production and mode of space, and production of space.

1.2.4. Henri Lefebvre’s Understanding of Space

For Hegel, historical time generates space in which there is state sovereignty and time is congealed into it (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 21). In Hegelian thought even if the history ends, the space maintains to exist. With the end of history, fixed and static space dominates the time which is limited to “repetition and circularity” (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 21). Ideal embodiment of this space is the state which refers to the goal of the history. Against this “fetishization of space”, Marx searches for “restoration of time” and relocates the historical time in the position of revolutionary time (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 21). Lefebvre criticizes both Hegelian philosophy of the space and critique of this philosophy in terms of spatial function (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 279). He locates the space at a point between fetishization of the space and ignoring it by historical materialism. Lefebvre integrates his study on space with Marxist historical development and formulates his understanding of production of space as an aspect of the mode of production (Butler, 2012, p. 45). All type of spaces such as dwellings, towns, countries,
natural environment take an important place in both experiential and perceptual world (Elden, 2004, p. ix). An ideology, religion or an institution is unimaginable without the space:

What would remain of a religious ideology – the Judaeo-Christian one, say - if it were not based on places and their names: church, confessional, altar, sanctuary, tabernacle? What would remain of the Church if there were no churches? The Christian ideology, carrier of a recognizable if disregarded Judaism (God the Father, etc.), has created the spaces which guarantee that it endures. More generally speaking, what we call ideology only achieves consistency by intervening in social space and in its production, and by thus taking on body therein. Ideology per se might well be said to consist primarily in a discourse upon social space. (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 44).

The space is thought as a necessary condition for the development of the capitalism and so, the history of space investigates modification of natural spaces through collective experiences. To explain this Lefebvre makes a separation between capitalist composition of “abstract space” and other spatial forms (Butler, 2012, pp. 45-6). His analysis of spatial history is based upon two skeletons: conceptual space which has three characteristics; “spatial practices, representations of space and representational spaces” and the other is historical formulation of space which refers to “abstract, absolute, relative and concrete space” (Elden, 2004, p. ix). In this section we will focus on abstract and absolute space because these spaces refer to both Marxist critique of expansion of capitalism through exploitation and regulation of the space and Ranciere’s formulation of the polis order.

The origins of the absolute space lie in the Cartesian logic which is rooted in binaries such as object-subject and “res extensa-res cogitans”. (Lefebvre, 1991, pp. 1-2; Butler, 2012, p. 38). Absolute space is closely connected to the nature and natural rhythms and figuration of that space is constricted to rural and agrarian functions which includes pre-capitalist economic and social organizations (Butler, 2012, pp. 46-7). Although humanity’s ritual actions are attached to natural movements which forms a “rational unity of Logos and Cosmos” (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 238), absolute space is not characterized as totally naturalistic. In time the religious aspect of the absolute space gains a more institutionalized authority (Butler, 2012, pp. 46-7). With transition from
feudal to capitalist mode of production and with increasing power of the bourgeoisie, there is a change in spatial organization and thus religious, feudal space is replaced with the secular, bourgeois space. This new secular understanding of spatial formation paves the way for “historical space” (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 253). Replacement of the absolute space by historical space also shows that newly emerging historical space is founded on physical violence and legal regulations whose subject is the state (Butler, 2012, p. 48). In this historical space where the Western state dominates the rural area, labor and space are abstractualized (Lefebvre, 1991, pp. 48-9). Lefebvre formulates the concept of abstract space in order to question unrecognized capitalist rationality of homogenization which sterilizes human life through excluding “creative dimensions of space’s use” (Lennon & Moore, 2018, s. 3). Abstract space is a regulation of spatial order and is based on “formal and quantitative” arrangements which exclude differences (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 50). As an object of analysis, Lefebvre gives importance to everyday life, where the organization of the abstract space is grounded on three functions: homogeneity, fragmentation and hierarchization.

Homogeneous regulation refers to a spatial order of monotony which is constituted through recurrent implementation of dominant laws and iterative actions of everyday life. Consequently, in this order of space, inequalities are concealed in the form of unity and homogeneity (Lefebvre, 2014, p. 757). Homogeneous dimension of the abstract space is used to exclude and suppress any obstacles in order to consolidate uniformity of the spatial construction. In this context, Lefebvre describes three forms of spatial homogeneity. The geometric formant relates to the Euclidean space which refers to the absolute space; the second is the visual formant that indicates superiority of the optical form of the homogenous space which dominates other sensual experiences (Lefebvre, 1991, pp. 285-86). The homogenous character of the abstract space is founded on the ‘visibility’ of everything: all things and individuals are distributed in a manner of being visible and yet, recurrent actions of homogeneity is concealed behind this visibility of everything (Lefebvre, 1991, pp. 75-6), and existing social relations are covered through efforts of homogeneity (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 83). Nevertheless, abstract space substantially is not homogeneous, it rather aims to reach homogeneity (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 287). Lastly, the phallic formant signifies patriarchal
power and ‘male fertility’ in the formulation of the abstract and homogenous space; phallic violence is not seen only in the construction of buildings and monuments in a way of phallic verticality but it is also in the form of bureaucratic regulations of the state (Lefebvre, 1991). In phallic formulation of the space, the oppressive regulation of the space is organized in such a way that everything and everyone are under the control of the authoritative observation (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 147).

Other principle of the abstract space is fragmentation which implies allocation of space and time. Division between “private and public, conceptual and experiential, nature and technique, foreigners and fellow citizens” commits partition of the social space (Lefebvre, 2014, p. 758). However, there is a contradictory point that needs to be emphasized. Rather than preventing homogeneity, fragmentation of the abstract space serves for the consolidation of homogeneity through determination of the fragments and locations of them (Lefebvre, 2014, pp. 790, 824). Third element of the abstract space is hierarchization which refers to hierarchy of placements and of things in the space (Lefebvre, 2014, pp. 758-59). Hierarchical regulations distribute “centre and peripheries” in favor of economic and political powers (Butler, 2012, pp. 50-51). Spatial distribution makes a separation between those who derive advantage from hierarchical regulation of the order and those who are debarred from favorable part of the spatial segregation (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 289). Rulers of the hierarchized space, which are “priests, warriors, scribes and princes” extort the space from the real producer of it (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 48).

Through its principles of homogenization-fragmentation-hierarchization, logic of abstract space provides constitution of an order which allocates individuals, groups or things to determined positions and status. Thus, everything and everyone become visible, controllable and manageable through this regulation of the spatial order. Lefebvrian formulation of the abstract space as allocation and dispersion through spatial homogenization, hierarchization and fragmentation, resembles to Rancierian understanding of the polis order which counts everything and every virtues to locate them to their appropriate positions. However, their understanding of politics is not similar. Lefebvre’s politics splits into two: institutional politics of the state and
revolutionary politics of rebellious actions. Ranciere locates politics as an opposite and subversive action of the *polis* order. Whereas in conceptual domain of Lefebvre, institutional politics itself is responsible from the regulation of the abstract space and the state is the primary perpetrator (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 287). He formulates the abstract space as both “political” and institutional arising as an outcome of violent actions of the state (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 285). Especially the modern state, for him, establishes an order of control and excludes social and cultural excesses and differences through temporal and spatial regulations (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 23). Lefebvre marks that the state has an important role to play in the formation of abstract space; it shapes and uses the space as a political tool to order the social (Butler, 2012, pp. 50-51) and thus dominates society through homogenization, fragmentation and hierarchization of the space. According to him, the space is inherent in the formation of state and disregarding its spatial basis results in the reductionist rationality of the Hegelian understanding of the state (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 281). The state structure cannot be understood in the absence of the “instrumental space” and on account of this indispensability, it becomes clear that each political institution and each state has its own mode of spatial distribution and regulation (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 281).

Productive powers and production relations have a significant role in the production of space (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 46). Therefore, the space is not independent of the mode of production. Transition from a specific mode of production to another one is accompanied by a new organization of the space (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 48). In that context there is a strong relationship between capitalist mode of production and composition of the abstract space. With formation of the abstract space an exploitable environment which enables for development of exchange value is established (Lennon & Moore, 2018, s. 3). Abstract space is designed according to economical requirements of capitalism and hence it promotes capitalist figuration of the space by providing suitable conditions for endurance of capitalist social relations (Butler, 2012, p. 49). This means that the space ensures incorporation of the capitalist economy and statist politics (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 321). Different from structuralism and orthodox Marxism which consider capitalist regulation of the urban space as a place of reproduction of the production relations, Lefebvre adds that capitalist system occupies
everyday life through some policies: these are exclusion of alternative spaces and actions which are different from the capitalist constructions, bureaucratic regulation of public and private consumption, and continuation of pursuit of profit in other areas “such as leisure, arts, information, architecture and urbanism” (Butler, 2012, p. 51). The space is a part of the “capitalist trinity” which consists of “land-capital-labour” (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 282). Based on exchange value, abstract space of the capitalist mode of production is constructed on “consensus more than any space before it” (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 57). This consensual space refers to rational regulations which are imposed through quantitative measurements such as planning, designs and statistics and with these regulations it aims to reach a quantitative spatiality resting on dissolution of the qualitative space (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 352). Yet this agreement-based abstract space is not immune to the conflicts arising from the oppositions between safe consensus and hazardous dissensus (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 57). Spatial conflicts are reflections of contradictions of relations of production and since these contradictions are actualized through shaping the space, conflicts in space turns into conflicts of the space (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 365). Abstract space is a scene of a process which witnesses to the transformation of the productive relations into the new relations; therefore, in spite of capitalism-oriented regulation of the space, it has “the seeds of a new kind of space” which is called differential space by Lefebvre (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 52). In that context Lefebvre conceptualizes the differential spaces as a mode of revolt against the consensual organization of the abstract space. Contrary to the tendency of the abstract space to assimilate differences in favor of the homogeneity, formation of the new space, in other words differential space leans on the differences (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 52). Differential space disrupts totality of the abstract space which is based on three functions; standardizing, partitioning and ranking. It breaks totality opposing to homogeneous principle of the old spatiality and also, at the same time it constructs an integrity against fragmentative function of the abstract space:

It will also restore unity to what abstract space breaks up – to the functions, elements and moments of social practice. It will put an end to those localizations which shatter the integrity of the individual body, the social body, the corpus of human needs, and the corpus of knowledge. (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 52).
Similar to Rancierian formulation of the *polis* which is based on the consensual distribution of the sensible and carries within itself the possibility of the political interruption, the abstract space has always the potential of disruption and intervention by realization of differential space. Because totality of the abstract space is imperfect and possibility of an unorthodox spatiality leaks from cracks of the abstract space (Butler, 2012, p. 54).

Ranciere deals with the space as both distributive function of the *polis* and subversive action of the political praxis. Similarly, Lefebvre takes the space into consideration in order to reveal it as a political tool of the state and as an element of the relations of production and yet he considers it also as an alternative use of the space by creative actions (Butler, 2012, p. 37). State and domination-based regulations and control of the space give rise to counteractions. “The violence of power is answered by the violence of subversion” (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 23). Ranciere and Lefebvre take the space as both regulative and disruptive form of action, yet the main difference is consideration of the politics. We can briefly formulate that Ranciere’s intervention in the *polis* order is affirmation of the politics, however in Lefebvre’s differential space which counteracts the *polis*-like abstract space, is a rejection of the institutional politics since, for him, it is realized by dominant powers. Like Marxist understanding of the metapolitics, Lefebvre’s conceptualization of the differential space goes beyond institutional politics. The praxis of the differential space uses political strategies in order to uncover realities of social and spatial relations which are hidden by political illusions. And in this sense metapolitical understanding of the differential space indicates that uncovering the reality by removing political mask is a politics which aims to dissolution of itself. This argument acquires its inspiration from those Lefebvre’s explanations:

Are we talking about a political project? Yes and no. It certainly embodies a politics of space, but at the same time goes beyond politics inasmuch as it presupposes a critical analysis of all spatial politics as of all politics in general (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 60).
Since Rancierian understanding of politics is not positioned in the state and bureaucratic regulations, but in the subversive actions of politicized subjects, Rancierian intervention in the spatial regulation has a more potential radical rupture in the spatial allocation.

As we mentioned earlier, in order to understand relationship between time-space and politics, this study is built upon two fundamental columns: distributive order of the time-space and disruptive action of the politics. In terms of the first framework, so far we discussed conceptualization, regulation and distribution of time and space and tried to understand Marx’s approach of space-time and condensation and deepening of his spatio-temporal understanding through Benjamin and Lefebvre. With Marx, Benjamin and Lefebvre we reach a comprehension to appreciate the importance of time and space in terms of both dominative order and subversive praxis. However, in their understanding politics is on the side of the dominative distribution of time-space rather than being subversive confrontation with this distribution. Now, we are going to figure out second column; disruptive action of the politics. I am going to take this spatio-temporal distribution and try to relate it with *polis* order and political action. For that reason, I am going to analyze Rancierian formulation of politics and *polis* and then, try to show reconfiguration of time and space through political intervention in the *polis*. 
First of all, it is important to clarify that what Ranciere means when he talks about *polis* differs from the modern understanding of the *polis* as a state body that has a duty to provide enforcement of the law. In other words, it does not refer to the “state apparatus”. Because conceptualization of the *polis* as state apparatus implies a separation between the state and society, and the former is considered to have harsh power in order to control the latter (Ranciere, 1999, p. 29). Ranciere puts the *polis* in a broader context and for him, what is actually known as politics in current understanding constitutes an important part of the *polis*. Political understanding which refers to the administration and regulation of the society and competition for a taking share in government of the state is called *polis* by Ranciere (Ranciere, 1999, p. 28). The *polis* is much more than the action of the state to manage and control the society. It is an order of normativity and normality which determines the criteria of being a part of society. The *polis* order is a system which defines existence of the parts of the society and attributes certain roles to those parts. The *polis*, in this sense, refers to tacit standards of a particular type of perception which provides to understand, to see, and to hear certain parts, groups, values, voices, and thoughts. It is “an order of bodies” which determines “ways of doing, ways of being, and ways of saying” and distributes those ways of existence to certain roles and duties (Ranciere, 1999, p. 29). In brief, the *polis* is distribution of the sensible.7

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7 *Polis* will be used in the sense of “distribution of the sensible” unless otherwise stated.
In French Ranciere defines the *polis* as “le partage du sensible” which is translated into English as distribution of the sensible. In this translation, depth of the meaning of “le partage du sensible” is missed and it is reduced to the allocation. With “le partage du sensible”, he points to two different meaning of the partage: on the one hand, it indicates division and thus implies exclusion and on the other, it designates sharing a commonality (Ranciere, 2010, p. 36). Partage of the sensible includes two different processes which are distribution and division, or partition and sharing (Tanke, 2011, p.2; Davis, 2010, p.91; Dikeç, 2013, p.82). Namely, the *polis* order makes a separation between parts and then, constructs a common world in these separated parts. With separation, division of labor, values, virtues, and roles are identified and, in this way, some parts are excluded from other parts. For example, the shoemaker is excluded from the virtue and capacity of the philosopher. Through portraying function of each part, the *polis* counts and includes those people who are assigned to the necessary parts. Partage of the sensible in the *polis* order indicates two principles: Separation of the parts is legitimizised through a Platonic lie, myth of the metals. And sharing of a common world in those separated parts are so perfected that there is no any void part, or any uncounted parts.

In *The Poverty of the Philosophy*, Marx quotes from Adam Smith and says that inherent differences between humans are the result of the division of labor rather than the cause of it (Marx, 1955, pp. 57-8). This fact must be distorted if it is aimed to achieve a distribution of natural characters and stratification of the society in the *polis* order. For this reason, the *polis* order relies on two Platonic lies: myth of leisure and myth of metals. Myth of leisure lies in the practical reality of lack of time of lower classes to participate in other segment and roles in the *polis* and myth of metals provides a logos for the inequality (Ranciere, 2009, pp. 275-76). In Socratic dialogues of *The Republic*, deviation from truth is seen a medicine for the people when it is used beneficially for them. However, lying becomes a serious crime when the ruled lies to the ruler, the patient to the doctor and the student to the teacher and for that reason, only those who run the state should have authority of deviation from the truth and can lie to citizens and enemies for the sake of the state (Plato, 2010, p. 79). In this regard, there is a Phoenician tale which tells that the God created the humans and their natures
with different metals. According to this myth of the metals, there is gold in the spirit of the leader, silver in the assistant, and iron in the souls of the farmers and workers (Plato, 2010, p. 111). Thus, the worth of each part in the *polis* order is hierarchized according to this tale. The logic of *polis* is based on the standards which provide distribution of roles and characters. This distribution of the sensible which is realized through tacit laws, principles, standards and allocation of bodies, is based on horizontal and vertical classification. For instance, there is horizontal division between shoemaker and carpenter and vertical separation between the artisan, the warrior and the philosopher. What makes the *polis* order stable is vertical distribution rather than the horizontal one. Plato explains this situation by saying that if the shoemaker interferes with the job of the carpenter or vice versa, the existence of the state is not threatened; but if the artisan steals the role of the warrior or a warrior participates in government, it is doubtless that the state would collapse (Plato, 2010, p. 133). Interchangeability between parts of the horizontal distributions, at worst, violates the principle of not doing two things at the same time, but it is harmless for the authority of the philosopher as long as vertical hierarchy is maintained. Because the philosopher takes care to preserve his value against the intervention of the lower parts, rather than caring about violating the horizontal division (Ranciere, 2003, p. 52). If, for example, a shoemaker becomes philosopher-king and leads the city-state, then the foundation of the *polis* order will collapse. Because the alleged natural difference between the philosopher and the artisan loses its validity. In other words, as Smith indicates, differences of capacity among humans are not cause of the division of labor, but result of it. Therefore, the position of the philosopher lies in the efforts to position himself on such a high level that the lower parts engage in works that the philosopher does not bother to do. For this reason, it is not the natural differences of the capacity, but the philosopher who constitutes, or at least, facilitates the division of labor or distribution of the sensible. This explains the contingent character of the *polis* order. It is contingent in the sense that hierarchical order of the *polis* lies in the philosopher’s choice instead of a reasonable truth (Davis, 2010, p. 75). Hence partage of the sensible in the *polis* system is contingent (Dikeç, 2012a, p. 270).
As we mentioned before, partage of the sensible is based on two principles; division of the sensible through myths and constitution of a common world through counting members of this sensible regime. Every part of the polis system is counted in order to construct a determined and consensus-based common sensibility within those parts. In this respect all parts of the polis “are already known –already named and counted” (Davis, 2010, pp. 78-9). By counting, the polis order puts the counted parts into the realm of intelligibility and being counted means being sensible (Chambers, 2010, p. 63). In that regard, there is no any void implying the existence of uncounted parts since all counted parts are intelligible and all intelligible parts are counted. Ranciere explains in the seventh thesis that main principle of the partage of the sensible is “the absence of void and of supplement”. Each part is attached to determined places, roles and characters, and each part is appointed to a presupposed way of existence; therefore “there is no place for any void” (Ranciere, 2010, pp. 36-7). In counted order of the polis, a common world is constituted in which it is the main principle of engaging in one job and doing nothing else. In this regard, the world of a shoemaker is limited to shoemaking and of a carpenter to carpentry. As we will see in next sections, this understanding still lives in some emancipatory theories which despairingly affirm that the proletarian does not know anything but proletarianity, therefore the proletarian needs the guidance. In monotype world of the counted sensibility, members of each part are anchored to the determined standards. Aristotle classified three counted parts and said that the aristoi is attached to ‘virtue’, the oligoi to ‘wealth’ and the demos to ‘freedom’ (Ranciere, 2010, p. 30). Only merit of the demos is an ‘empty freedom’ which refers to surrender to monotype world of the polis order. (Ranciere, 2010, p. 30).

Ranciere sees a parallel relation between polis of the antiquity and consensus of the modernity. Consensus is not an achieved agreement between two parts, groups or individuals. He puts the consensus in a broader context and points out that it is “a determined regime of the perceptible” (Ranciere, 1999, pp. 107-108). It is unanimity on what is sensible, visible, and sayable rather than an agreement on the conflictual issues. Its etymological root shows us that consensus refers to feel, perceive or know
In that regard, before agreeing on a conflictual issue, consensus means perceiving or seeing if such an issue exists. It is accepted that everything in consensual world is seen and counted and there are no any parts which are outside of the count. This denial of the void composes main principle of consensus. There is no void between individuals or groups and their identity, and between law and reality in consensual world (Ranciere, 1999, p. 115). With consensus, every individual and group are placed in common world of humanity and thus, it is admitted that there are no excess identities which are excluded from the consensual humanity (Ranciere, 1999, pp. 124-25). Yet, between constructed identities and humanity, there is distribution of the sensible which refers to principle of counting (Ranciere, 1999, pp. 124-25). Since it removes the interval between parts and humanity, the consensus claims a universality which is isolated from quarrelsome relations. This universal claim of consensus might be called equality, freedom, or justice and every part of the society is identified according to those principles. However, as the consensus is an agreement on what is sensible, visible, and sayable, when some parts are somehow removed or rejected from the sensible order, the consensual order becomes blind to see the excess parts. The consensual order, in this regard, has a contingent character. Actually, it is arbitrary to decide and determine which parts, identities or features are suitable for humanity and so, which parts are seen as human and inhuman. Thus, those parts removed from area of humanity, mostly are subjected to the heaviest inhuman policies. “Man ‘born free and everywhere in chains’ has become man born human and everywhere inhuman” (Ranciere, 1999, p. 125).

Consensus is regime of counting which parts, issue or identity exist. In liberal consensual order of 19th century there were “elites and unwashed masses”, “chiefs and Indians” and now it is accepted that there are different communities, majorities, minorities and interest groups and “there is no part of those who have no part” (Ranciere, 1999, p. 14). Yet, there is always part of those who have no part, who are not counted, who are not included in universal humanity, who are accepted as non-

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existent and who are not placed in sensible order. In that sense, although the consensual order is based on the denial of uncounted parts and voids which are outside of the determined sensible regime, it is impossible to reach a perfect consensus. When the proletarian is cleared away as a force of anti-consensus, the migrant emerges as uncounted parts (Ranciere, 2004, p. 8). Therefore, the consensual system like the *polis* order is threatened by the possible political disruption of those uncounted parts.

As it is an agreement on specific regime of the sensibility and denies excess parts which are outside of the determined order, the consensus expresses modernization of the *polis* order. In the *polis* and consensual order, it is more important to sense inequality rather than believing it and experience this partition of the sensible (Ranciere, 2016a, pp. 136-37). The consensus is kept through maintaining partition of the sensible and staying in determined places, identities and values. In that context opposing unequal order and at the same time, sticking to partition of sensible in this order is also included in the consensus. In other words, for example, admitting that the worker has not capacity to struggle against capitalism on his/her own because of devoid from sources such as leisure time and intellectual background, means being loyalty to the determined sensible regime of the consensus. This refers to consensual division between exclusion and inclusion and in that consensual partition even struggling for elimination of exclusion is affirmation of consensus from another angle (Ranciere, 1999, pp. 115-116). Because, as we said before, the consensus is denial of the excess and uncounted parts and participation in consensus through struggling against exclusion consolidates consensual regime of the sensible.

In modern world, consensus is identified with democracy. Consensual democratic understanding implies elimination of conflictual issues through representation of every individual and group in determined identities. Consensus refers to elimination of conflictual character of the society through reducing social problems to reallocation of wealth and power and through rational assessment of the reallocation and partition and thus provides negotiation between interlocutor of this partition (Ranciere, 2004, p. 7). As a homogenous order, consensus is “actually the modern form of reducing politics to the *polis*” (Ranciere, 2004, p. 7). Therefore, consensus is not simply having general
agreement on the common good in the society, but it is about common consent on the present partition of the sensible. Rather than being a peaceful negotiation, the consensual order is based on rejection of dissensual excess parts and making them invisible and in this sense, it is “the end of politics” (Ranciere, 2010, pp. 42-3). Like platonic *polis* order, modern understanding of consensus relies on determined partition in which every part of society is identified and represented in homogenous system. Hence, it rejects any void in where the uncounted parts locate. This denial of the void is the most ancient rejection:

From Athens in the fifth century B.C. up until our own governments, the party of the rich has only ever said one thing, which is most precisely the negation of politics: there is no parts of those who have no part (Ranciere, 1999, pp. 13-4).

In summary, any conflict in the society is so identified, classified, and included in the consensual order that there is no need for the political interruption by those who have no part and at most it is needed to bargain over group interests and negotiate rival policies. With consensual system conflictual interests are regulated and arbitrated by the modern state and modern partage of the sensible. The hierarchical and divided *polis* order was grounded on a lie, myth of three metals. Consensual system of the modernity refers to a denial of the denial, rejection of existence of void. In this sense, the consensus is modernization of the *polis* order and it is important to take into account that there is an ancient continuity between mode of partition of the sensible and negation of politics. As we will see in the next section, this mode of the partition of the sensible distributes groups and individuals into certain time and space so that nullifies political subjectivization. Nevertheless, the political action which comes from the void or from the rejected parts reconfigurates and redistributes the determined sensibility. In this way, it invalidates the present spatio-temporality through actualization of the principle of the equality by the political subjects.
2.1. Spatio-Temporal Order of Polis

So far, we have seen that the politics is not the polis order in Ranciere’s understanding. The polis order is based on the partition of the sensible which divides and determines every part of the order and assigns some capabilities and non-capabilities, possibilities and impossibilities to those parts according to the logic of arkhe. It also distributes time and space according to hierarchized roles of individuals and groups. Artisans are so located in specific time and spaces that this regime of distribution becomes their limitations. The consensus, which is the continuation of the polis order, maintains these contingent limitations. Both polis order and the consensus are grounded on the principle of invalidation of the politics. Ranciere holds that political philosophy is responsible for legitimation and rationalization of this invalidation of politics. He defines three forms of political philosophy: archipolitics, parapolitics and metapolitics which invalidate politics respectively through repression, nullification and dislocation of it (Ranciere & Panagia, 2000, p. 119).

2.1.1. Space and Time in Three States of Non-Political Politics

In this section, I am going to examine those philosophies of ‘non-political’ politics with respect to their relationship with time and space. This section does not intend to summarize or discuss history of political philosophy, but rather it aims to accompany Ranciere in his explanation regarding the relationship between distribution of the sensible and spatio-temporality. Therefore, this section consists of looking at where Ranciere points. For this reason, here, perspectives of Plato, Bourdieu, Aristotle, Sartre, Marx and Althusser are constricted with Ranciere's contact. Looking at them will provide us a panoramic view to see the deep relationship between politics and time-space.
These three modes of philosophy are founded on a three-dimensional frame: identification of poor⁹, depoliticization and spatio-temporal distribution. These three approaches eliminate and suppress the politics in their own way. Each of them locates poors in a weak position which deprive them of necessary conditions to understand the context they live in. And, lastly, these philosophies distribute spatio-temporality in such a way that the emancipation of the poor is either excluded from possibilities or postponed to an uncertain future. Basically, although they are categorized under different names in the sense of suppression of the politics in different ways, these approaches rest on a common Platonic kernel which refers to hierarchization between philosopher and non-philosopher, sociologist and non-sociologist, or intellectual and non-intellectual. In that sense, modern versions of these philosophies maintain this three-dimensional structure of domination.

2.1.1.1. Archipolitics From Plato to Bourdieu

Arche means an initiative essence which explains root or source of rule and thus justifies it (Perica, 2019, p. 20). It is the first law or first principle which explains reason of the present order and logic of the authority. In that context, archipolitics refers to Platonic polis order and provides a basis for hierarchical distribution and division of labor in the polis. Plato conceives the archipolitics as a perfect materialization of the arche in the society (Ranciere, 1999, p. 65). Plato’s political philosophy in the form of the archipolitics intends to establish a social and political order in which unsystematic and uncontrolled diversity of demos is removed from projected scheme (Bosteels, 2010, p. 83). Every part of the society is counted and put into the certain determined categories in which individuals or groups play their role according to their own nature. Chaotic multiplicity of those groups who are not suitable to the determined roles are banished from this well-organized order. Modes of existence of each individual and groups are determined and placed into the specific

⁹ Ranciere does not think the poor as against the rich or does not define it as a person who is devoid of wealth. In Rancierian framework poors refer to those who do not have part and who have “empty name of freedom” (Ranciere, 1999, pp. 13-4).
roles and characters “with nothing left over” (Ranciere, 1999, p. 68). Thus, a strict homogeneity is established within this order in which boundaries between inside and outside are set so that ‘democratic excess’ is removed from appearance (Munster, 2009, p. 271). Either inside or outside, a group or a person is counted and determined in any case. Therefore, there is nothing further reality beyond being inside or outside. With counting, each part of the society is located in described virtues and characteristics. Virtues of groups are categorized under homogenization of the characteristics and way of life. In that sense, parts of the society should play their role in a defined time and space. Thus, time and space of the society also are homogenized. The shoemaker should devote his/her time to do only shoes, the warrior to fight. Groups and individuals are condemned to stay in the places reserved for them. Thus, temporal homogenization and regulation is accompanied with “spatial fixation and closure” (Dikeç, 2012b, p. 671). Plato’s archipolitical philosophy attributes individuals to specific categories in which natures and roles of them are described by the philosopher and distributes their way of life into the temporal and spatial solidifications.

Main principle of the archipolitics is justice which is instituted against an-archie basis of the equality. According to Plato, justice is provided by the division of labor that provides each part with roles and functions appropriate to its natural characteristics, and justice is remaining loyal to these separated and partitioned roles and not interfering in other affairs (Shaw, 2017). In archipolitics justice is based on the arche which explains natural differences between different parts of the society and on the loyalty to the distributed time and spaces. As I mentioned before, this logic of arche provides a myth of three metals that describe the natural features of each part of society. It is fair and just that a shoemaker makes shoes and does not engage in other affairs, and a carpenter knows nothing other than the carpentry. Plato makes a correlation between justice and moderation. For him moderation is being loyal to the determined roles and characteristics. Apart from courage and wisdom, moderation is a virtue which exists in all parts of the society rather than being limited to some parts (Plato, 2010, p. 130). It is a horizontal virtue which touches to every part of the society. The moderation provides a harmonious order between different segments of society,
from the poor to the rich, the weak to the strong (Plato, 2010, p. 130). As can be seen, the only thing that is equal among all segments of society is equal loyalty to the archipolitic order through virtue of moderation. Archipolitical justice means organization of virtues and merits of each part of the society. It is fair that state is governed through wisdom, warrior is equipped with courage and artisans with “sophrosune” which refers to moderation and temperance (Ranciere, 2003, p. 25; Ranciere, 1991, p. 67). It is the basic principle of sophrosune that the artisan stays in the determined place and uses his/her time to do the determined works. It does not matter whether the artisan does his/her job badly or not, what is important is that the artisan should be loyal to the determined places (Ranciere, 2003, p. 25) and temporal partage. In archipolitical philosophy, the sophrosune refers to:

The fact of each person’s being in their place, going about their own business there, and having the opinion identical to the fact of being in that place and doing only what there is to do there (Ranciere, 1999, p. 106).

Submission to the principle of sophrosune requires engaging with a single job in the determined space. This loyalty to the principle of the sophrosune points out ‘monotechnic’ type of living and working. With monotechnic, the worker should have only one occupation and should not be engaged with other works; the worker should not do “anything else” than his/her job (Ranciere, 2003, p. 28). In this context, monotechnics does not refer to the artisan’s specialization and excellence in one job, but rather merely to engage in that job. Now we know that a true shoemaker is not someone who makes good shoes but someone who does not pass himself off as anything other than a shoemaker (Ranciere, 2003, p. 22).

Prohibition against doing more than one job is put forward to protect justice and order in the archipolitics through sophrosune. The virtue of the sophrosune is associated with the artisan’s “lack of time” (Ranciere, 1999, p. 67). The shoemaker should not produce anything different from shoes according to virtue of sophrosune due to the insufficient time. In this respect, what is needed to save the time is a division of labor. If individuals spend all their time meeting some daily needs on their own without
division of labor, then their action of production will be both inefficient and insufficient (Ranciere, 2003, pp. 4-5). However, in a non-capitalist economy, as Ranciere asks, “why is it necessary to produce so much?” (Ranciere, 2003, pp. 4-5). In that case, emphasis of producing so much is for the sake of division of time rather than division of labor. To repeat, artisans should dedicate all their time to a specific job in order to produce more products. However, what actually lies in this argument is that artisans should produce more and more products and should sacrifice all their time to a single job in order to be excluded from participation in wealth of time. Hence, rather than the division of labor, it is the division of time which designates those who have leisure time and who do not, and appoints those who have leisure time to the superior roles of the golden-natures. Distribution of the sensible is based on the distribution of the time which dictates that manual workers devoid of enough time to engage in philosophy (Robson, 2015, p. 308). Temporal distribution provides a basis for hierarchic order of the polis and for naturalization of inequality through myths of metals and leisure. Philosophy of the archipolitics confines those lower-natures to a limited time and thus, distributes the sensibility. Here is a long quote from Ranciere which implies main essence of the sophrosune-based of the distribution of the sensible is distribution of the time and determining the sensible depends on the temporal partage:

If he (the philosopher) pretends not to know whether nature leaves the farmer and the mason with sufficient leisure, and whether society does the same for their fellow workers, it is because he has decided that they should not have all the time that circumstances, sometimes too generously, have given them. … For a while we readily admit that nature gives individuals different aptitudes and tastes, and that it forms some bodies better suited to work in the open air and others to the workshop’s shade, how are we ever to differentiate a weaver-nature from a shoemaker-nature except through that absence of time which, combined with the urgency of the tasks at hand, never allows the one worker to be found in the other’s place? (Ranciere, 2003, p. 6)

Archipolitics, against chaotic principle of the equality, is grounded on the moderation basis which refers to measured and determined patterns. Everyone and everything are counted and measured and put into the specific patterns of roles and characteristics.
This calculated character of the archipolitics explains rationalization and legalization of contingent reality of the hierarchy. Ranciere expresses it as transition from ‘phusis’ to ‘nomos’\(^\text{10}\) which implies that controversial difference of the politics is displaced by domination of the law (Ranciere, 1999, p. 70). Through sovereignty of the nomos and principle of saturation which refers to negation of the void, political action of those parts who have no part is rendered impossible in archipolitics. (Vegsö, 2013, p. 70).

Archipolitic philosophy causes the nature to become law or, in other words, it renders natural differentiations lawful (Bosteels, 2010, pp. 83-4). In appearance, the justice principle of archipolitics relies on the direct relationship between the nature and law. Law rationalizes and legitimizes natures that allegedly already exist. And in that perspective, what already exists in nature is that all humans have inherently different characteristics. Like told in the myth of the metals, they are created with different tendencies which determine who has capacity to rule, to fight, and to work. Plato’s philosophy of the archipolitics enacts these natural tendencies and makes lawful for each individual to live according to their aptitudes. However, if everyone has his or her own natural tendencies, for example, if a shoemaker has not tendency and capacity to think philosophically, then why legitimization is necessary? If a carpenter knows nothing other than the carpentry and has a natural aptitude appropriate to his/her yeast, then why s/he would like to become someone else, or for instance, a king? If flying does not come to a fish’s mind, it is because the fish is not a flying bird. But, if a shoemaker desires doing and living different from a life of shoemaking, then his/her mind or passion is beyond being just a shoemaker. In this sense, in order to avoid chaotic disorganization which is caused by those parts of no part and parts existing inside of individuals’ mind and desire that escapes from being limited or determined, it is necessary to legalize the myth of the three metals. It is the philosopher who describes the nature of each part of the society, and determines suitable lifestyles.

\(^{10}\) Phusis or physis refers to the nature or state of nature, while nomos means an unnatural order provided by the conventions or deals between people. Opposition between phusis and nomos was main philosophical debate in fourth and fifth centuries of the ancient Greek. Main discussions were about whether states are constituted as a result of natural requirement of celestial comment or human laws, whether inequality between humans stems from natural hierarchy or from some artificial rules. Guthrie says that European social contract theories of the 17\(^{\text{th}}\) and 18\(^{\text{th}}\) centuries are originated in the advocates of the nomos and human contracts (Guthrie, 1971, pp. 22, 55, 57, 58).
according to different characteristics. The philosopher, in this regard, first naturalizes differences among parts of the society, then legalizes these differences for the purpose of taking desires of who attempts to go outside of the determined existence under the control of the law. In this way, what the philosopher does is to make the contingent fact the inevitable reality. The philosopher builds a tautological cycle between the naturalization and legitimization by fabricating and naturalizing a creation myth which is symbolized with metals and lastly by legitimizing this fabricated and naturalized myth. This tautological circle reproduces the philosopher’s status of being necessity. The philosopher in the archipolitics is necessary to tell the myth, to describe natures of each parts in the society and to regulate relationship between these different natures. In this sense, for instance, the warrior must be controlled and trained by the philosopher to not “bite his friend”. Different natural aptitudes of each part of the society affirms the necessity of the philosopher and his supremacy:

The warrior’s superiority lies not in his occupation but in his nature insofar as the formation of his nature is the specific task, the masterwork, of the philosopher-king. The virtue of warrior also makes the philosopher necessary (Ranciere, 2003, p. 14).

The philosopher, through his arbitrary naturalization of differences in the society and making his existence as a necessity for the order of the polis, constitutes a “world of appearances” in which those who have limited time are rendered invisible. World of appearances refers to the distribution of the sensible in such a way that the artisan is excluded from it whether or not s/he gets the truth which is under the philosopher’s monopoly (Ranciere, 2003, pp. 51-2). In this regime of the distribution of the sensible absence of time plays a significant role to make the poor invisible and inaudible. However, for Ranciere, both myth of metals and myth of leisure time are not convincing; they refer to “arbitrary prohibition” of temporal monotechnics (Davis, 2010, pp. 19-20) and arbitrary naturalization of division of labor in the society. Plato, who makes lack of time the artisan’s virtue, dooms the artisan to the cyclical action of production and reproduction by excluding the artisan from leisure time and empty space (Ranciere, 2003, pp. 225-26).
Platonic fixation of time, space and identities in the *polis* order has some reflections in Bourdieu’s sociology which is criticized by Ranciere. For that reason, I will try to analyze continuation of the Platonic principles in Bourdieu’s sociology from Ranciere’s perspective. For Ranciere, he confirms main Platonic principle which refers to the division between those who have knowledge of the truth and those who are limited to the appearances (Pelletier, 2009, p. 141). Ranciere makes a connection between Plato’s philosophy of archipolitics and Bourdieu’s sociology. However, what makes them equivalent to each other is not their aim. For, Platonic archipolitics relies on defending the inequality as a foundation to the arche-based *polis* order, while Bourdieu’s primary aim is the elimination of the inequality itself. Nevertheless, Bourdieu’s sociology, for Ranciere, maintains ancient Platonic principle under the name of the scientism.

In his autoanalysis, Bourdieu explains that he prefers sociology to philosophy and points out that this is a return to his original class (Timur, 2011, p. 195). During the 1950s in France, while philosophy represented intellectual aristocracy and ‘symbolic capital’; sociology was seen as representative of plebian and populist simplicity (Timur, 2011, p. 195). For him, philosophy was far from the real issues of the world, whereas, as he experienced in his studies on the Algeria, sociology was intertwined with the ordinary people and ordinary events of the real life (Timur, 2011, p. 195). Bourdieu associates sociology with the science of the truth, which can provide justice and equality. Through uncovering mechanisms of domination which are not visible in the society, sociology undermines the present social order (Bourdieu, 1993, p. 9; Swartz, 1997, p. 260). In that sense, for him, sociology is an act of politics which intervene in the order of domination by making power relations visible and understandable and thus, sociology is on the side of struggle of the dominated groups (Swartz, 1997, p. 260). Sociological knowledge has an important role in providing a transformation in the society (Bourdieu & Chartier, 2015, p. 33).

Although Bourdieu emphasizes the importance of the sociology in order to provide dissolution of the power relations through revealing mechanisms of dominations, he has a distrust of the people and society which form the object of the sociological studies. He bases his understanding of the sociology upon “a Socratic metaphor” which
means that Socrates asks some questions but, he, at the same time, suspects the truth of the answers (Bourdieu & Chartier, 2015, p. 25). Like this Socratic method, the sociologist is aware that statements of the people do not correspond to the truth (Bourdieu & Chartier, 2015, p. 25). Therefore, like Platonic philosopher, sociologist is the one who can see beyond what is visible and known. The sociologist has scientific research tools to help reveal the reality of domination, inequality, and power relations. This role of the sociologist makes him/her competent to guide the subordinated class. The sociologist has the capacity to understand hidden power relations and to explain causes and effects of these relations on the society. Ranciere sees a parallel relation between the Platonic philosopher-king and Bourdieu’s sociologist, and hence, he calls it “the sociologist-king”.

Bourdieu’s sociology is based on an idea that stays between structuralism and subjectivism, which appreciates both determined conditions and a little possibility of escaping from those conditions (Bourdieu & Chartier, 2015, p. 20). He points out that individuals and groups live in a field and habitus which form and shape their lives, actions, habits, thoughts and cultures. Field refers to relations between different positions which have important impacts on inhabitants in the form of domination or subordination through allocation of the power (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 97). In this regard, the field indicates a space in which positions and power are located and distributed. Being as a space, the field has boundaries which restrict its effects to spread outside the field (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 100). Therefore, the field refers to the “space of positions” (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 86), struggle for “position-takings” (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 105), and relations between these positions which are hierarchized through rank of the powers (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, pp. 113-14). In this framework, subjects of struggle or revolution are not groups and individual actors; but only spaces of positions. This implies that subordinated groups can overcome the domination and inequalities as long as spaces of positions in the field are restructured. Spaces of positions in the field are seen as structures. Hence, emancipation is possible through structural change. That perspective leads to an understanding which distrusts subversive actions and places the poor in a fixed space. This spatial emphasis in Bourdieu’s field, implies that groups or actors are distributed
in different fields and it is the field which determine positions of those actors and forms their way of life. The understanding of field as a space of positions resembles Plato’s formulation of *sophrosune* through which he places parts of the society into it. Like Plato’s order of *sophrosune*, his conceptualization of field expresses that everyone stays in the place allocated to them and acts, thinks and lives according to norms and system of that field.

Spaces of positions in the field form habitus through organization of practices, dispositions and representations (Masquelier, 2018, p. 9). Habitus connects objective structures with subjective actions of individuals and in this way, it explains that those individuals who are shaped and managed by the structure, also reproduce the habitus through their practices, thoughts and perceptions (Sonderegger, 2012, pp. 251-52). In that regard, habitus indicates habits, abilities, thoughts, opinions and perceptions which are constructed by the structure of field. Habitus and field form and shape each other; the field constructs the habitus and habitus provides a cognitive basis for the field (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 127). Thus, individuals are shaped and limited not only by objective structures of their positions in the field, but also by the subjective structures of their cognitive processes in the habitus. Two-layer reality exists in external conditions and internal perceptions and therefore, a person is like “a fish in water” who is not aware of the water and of taken-for granted things and habits (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 127). In view of this, individuals and social groups do not have awareness of world in which they live and they are oriented and conducted by their routines, habits, rituals and structure of the fields in which they take position. Bourdieu’s metaphor of “fish in water”, in that respect, has some similarities with Platonic cave allegory which says that those in the cave do not have knowledge of the truth. It is the sociologist-king who knows that there is another reality other than water and the mind of fish. The sociologist does not only have knowledge of the reality outside of the structural and habitual normality, but also is aware of the subconscious of individuals and social groups. Referring to the psychoanalyst’s method of treatment by revealing unconscious of the patient, he places the sociologist in a position in which “social unconscious” is uncovered with socioanalysis (Swartz, 1997, pp. 9-10). From this standpoint, the sociologist should avoid from cyclical repetition of daily life in
order to reach the understanding of social unconscious and to not become the fish in the water. This entails that the sociologist should have leisure time and be free from bindingness of practical life in order to study it (Swartz, 1997, pp. 273-74).

Dominated social groups are so surrounded with their positions and ritual cycles that their experience of time and space does not go beyond what spatio-temporal structure of the field and habitus impose on them. By being confined in the cycle of production and reproduction, they do not have enough time and cognitive capacity to understand what is going on. Acting “through time”, they require panoramic view of the sociologist (Swartz, 1997, p. 59). Within this framework, dominated groups and agents need the eye of the sociologist-king to see themselves, the mind of him to understand their situations and the knowledge of him to make sense of their world. The philosopher-king distributes people to natures formed through myth of metals, the sociologist-king does the same through sociological observations. For the sociologist, people are conditioned by their fields and habitus and hence they are not independent of these structures in order to emancipate on their own. In that way, the sociologist turns the arbitrary prohibition into the necessary condition:

The philosopher started from the arbitrary in order to reach necessity. The sociologist reaches necessity starting from the illusion of freedom. He (Bourdieu) proclaims that it is the illusion of their freedom that binds artisans to their places. The declared arbitrariness thus becomes a scientific necessity, and the redistribution of cards an absolute illusion. (Ranciere, 2003, p. 179).

As a consequence, the philosophy of the archipolitics is based on the realization of the arche which describes and determines natures, characters and roles of the individuals or groups. Archipolitic is a project to harmonize and homogenize chaotic feature of the heterogenous multiplicity through counting, describing, regulating, distributing and systematizing different natures and roles of the parts of the society. And in order to implement this project, Plato creates a world of appearances in where the poor is excluded. Main instrument of this exclusion is the distribution of time. Bourdieu, in an opposite way, locates the poor in realm of appearances which are conceptualized as habitus and field by him. His poor is confined by structures of the field and habitus. Therefore, the poor does not have capacity to see the real mechanisms of the
domination and to emancipate on her own. Most significant tools of this are the fixed spaces of the field and recurrent cycle of the habitus.

### 2.1.1.2. Parapolitics From Aristotle to Sartre

Ranciere associates the philosophy of parapolitics with Aristotle and his approach to the politics. Different from Plato, Aristotle takes a stand against total elimination of politics; rather he tries to integrate the politics with the *polis* (Ranciere, 1999, p. 70). He accepts that “nature of politics” is founded on the equality and thus the very character of the politics is “disruption” (Ranciere, 1999, p. 70). While Plato, negates equality in order to avoid from political disruption which has a chaotic principle, Aristotle does not reject the equality; therefore, through accepting the principle of equality he also admits the inevitability of the political intervention. It can be seen that Ranciere’s main idea relating the principle of equality to the political action is inspired by this Aristotelian formulation between equality and politics. Because of the “natural equality of the citizens” and the natural multiplicity, implementation of an absolute homogeneity in the city-state is unrealistic for Aristotle (Shaw, 2017). He himself prefers that most skillful persons should govern the city forever, but it is not possible (Ranciere, 1999, p.70; Shaw, 2017). Hence, the main issue for him is to regulate chaotic principle of the equality and to control political action through construction of a government system which is based on the submission of disobedient principle of the politics to the arranged order of the *polis*.

Parapolitic philosophy sees the politics as a combat for the sake of seizing the power and taking control of the *polis* order. Parapolitics overcomes antagonistic character of the politics through combining it to the issue of government. In this sense, the main point is taking the head of the government in order to appease and control subversive political actions that leads to the disruption of the order (Ranciere, 1999, p. 73). Through formulation of the politics as struggle for power, parapolitics approaches it as organization of different regimes of government. Different from Plato’s archipolitics which provides the order through locating every parts of the society to
the determined places, characteristics and roles, Aristotle’s parapolitics ensures the order by representing every part through participation in government and power of rule. In that regard, demos, who provides political action to break out in Rancierian understanding, is seen in parapolitics as a party of the struggle for political power in the form of government (Ranciere, 1999, p. 72).

Parapolitics is a philosophy which builds a relationship between politics, participation or ‘partaking’ in the politics (politics as power and mode of rule), and the subject who has capacity to do politics through partaking. With figuration of politics as an issue of partaking, Aristotle portrays the citizen as “he who partakes in the fact of ruling and fact of being ruled” (Ranciere, 2010, p. 27). Thus, the conflictual nature of the politics is disciplined and domesticated through regulation of partaking in the government.

What regulates regime of government and participation in it is existence or absence of leisure time. In parapolitics leisure time is the main factor which shapes the political life of artisans and farmers in the ancient Greek. In this sense, there are two contradictory approaches to the leisure and participation in rule of the city: On the one hand, Xenophon points out that artisans cannot engage in politics due to their “effeminate life” and absence of time; on the other hand, for Aristotle, artisans have “too much leisure” which allows them to participate more in political life, and thus they corrupt the democracy (Ranciere, 2003, pp. 6-7). According to both of them, farmers are more suitable for the politics because of “not the most leisure but the least absence of leisure” they have (Ranciere, 2003, pp. 6-7). Here, time is an important factor in determining principle of partaking and in defining best model of the citizen with the least leisure time.

With parapolitics, arbitrary character of the arkhe becomes struggle for partaking and for determining which ‘worth’ is suitable for political contestation and partaking. Each political group is based on a specific worth which defines specific criterions for ruling.

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11 Ideal order from the parapolitical perspective is about ensuring a balanced government. This balanced government refers to such a regime which on the one hand, protects the interest of the elites, on the other hand, does not provokes the subversive responses of the inferiors. A balanced government or a good regime for Aristotle is keeping a balance between ruling of the rich and unprovoked poor. However, all governments have a tendency to incite revolts of the ruled parts; therefore, a good government should be based on the self-restriction of the rulers (Ranciere, 1999, p. 73).
Thus, the worth of each group is defined and distributed according to the grade of their worth. The virtue of the *demos* is an empty freedom that cannot be used due to the lack of time. Accordingly, distribution of time has a close relation with distribution of virtues. This leads to construction of a regime which implies that those who have time, have also right to partake. As we mentioned earlier, Aristotle sees public and political life of the *bios* as more valuable than domestic and physical life of the *zoe*. In this sense, those who have nothing virtues other than providing their body are inherently doomed to be slave (Ranciere, 2003, p. 24). And the slave is also the one whose time is occupied by production and services for the master and whose space is restricted with domestic realm. In other words, spending time with production and reproduction in domestic life and with services for the master is an indicator of low value.

Engaging with politics requires having logos, but those who are occupied with slavery and chores of slavery are excluded from the politics because of having no logos. Aristotle conceptualizes the logos and voice and puts the former into area of political life of *bios* and the latter into the realm of the *zoe* which refers to physical life. Owning logos means comprehension of just and unjust, while the voice is useful only to explaining some basic feelings such as pain and pleasure that serve to separate the animal from political animal (Ranciere, 2010, p. 37). However, when those endowed with privileged virtues and logos command their own interlocutors who are devoid of logos, a paradoxical gap between owner of logos and of voice comes into the open. If those who can only have voice to express main bodily reactions, then how they can understand commands of their masters having logos? Aristotle tries to bridge this paradoxical gap by bestowing on owners of voice the capacity only to understand the commands without being included in the community of logos (Ranciere, 1999, p. 17). Namely, the slave has enough logos to understand orders and however, at the same time, is devoid of logos enough to be excluded from the privilege of having logos. Just as the farmer's participation in political life is approved due to the minimum lack of leisure time, the slave is the person who has the minimum capacity to understand the master's orders. Hence, logos and time are so distributed in the society that the power of elites and aristocrats is not threatened by them.
Modern reflection of the parapolitics is represented by Thomas Hobbes who formulates theories of “the social contract” and “sovereign power” and who develops modern philosophy of parapolitics through criticizing arbitrary character of the ancient parapolitics (Ranciere, 1999, pp. 75-6). Like Aristotle, Hobbes realizes equality principle of politics which leads to conflicts and wars. Hobbes’ well-known formulation of “war of all against all” implies that myth of inequality has no natural basis (Shaw, 2017). His understanding of equality is based on equality of interests justifying that everyone has equal right to pursue his or her interest (Shaw, 2017). In that regard, since equality of interests creates a chaotic and savage disorder, regulatory principle of the hierarchy is needed. This regulatory principle is embodied in sovereign power which has authority to represent equal wills and arbitrate conflicting interests in order to avoid from chaotic disorder of the equality principle. Aristotle’s parapolitics relies on the appeasement of the confrontative groups of the society; whereas Hobbes’ understanding of parapolitics is based on mollification of individual conflicts. Hobbes’ parapolitics refers to naturalization of “individuality” and fabrication of an individual nature (Ranciere, 1999, p. 78). This nature of the individuality refers to reconciliation between natural equality and self-centered beings of everyone which explains that each individual pursues her own interest and this leads to a conflict of interest and thus war of all against all. Hence, authority of a sovereign power becomes an indispensable necessity in order to provide a peaceful order.

Aristotle’s philosophy of parapolitics is based on the pacification of the antagonistic action of the politics through regulation of regime of the government. This canalizing political energy into the rival parties in the society reminds of the principle of the representation which becomes the most common reality of our day. Sartre’s approach to time and the worker has some connection with his understanding of the worker’s inability and necessity of the party. Sartre’s understanding of time and history is connected with a strong subjectivity and sense of the subjective freedom. However, the workers, because of their hard conditions of working and their “fatigue”, are devoid of the necessary time to develop their subjectivity and to obtain freedom. Here, the party and the philosopher appear as a “third gaze” or “third party” in order to save them from their ignorance and to represent them.
Sartre defines two types of being: Firstly, being-in-itself, which is also objective being, means an “opaque, objective and inert” being and “it is what it is” (Priest, 2001, pp. 107-108). In being-in-itself, there is no any act of becoming toward something, or transition from something to another thing. It is a passive being; because there is neither movement of transformation nor change in it. Therefore, being-in-itself does not have any temporal aspect (Priest, 2001, p. 107). Secondly, being-for-itself as a subjective being is related to the consciousness which means that being-for-itself has consciousness of being, being something or someone and it refers to active being of the individual (Priest, 2001, pp. 13, 107). It includes ‘intentionality’ (Priest, 2001, p. 107), and hence, refers to the temporality and history of act of creation by free individual. Thus, being-for-itself of an individual is inevitably temporal: an individual is her own past in sense that she is formed by her past actions and choices; she is her own future due to her present possibilities opening to the future and lastly, she is her own present in both sense of ‘the presence of being’ and the present time (Priest, 2001, p. 165). Being-for-itself has ontological connection with the time, because: The past is someone’s past. The present is someone’s present and the future is someone’s future. If there were no subjective conscious beings, there would be no past, present or future (Priest, 2001, p. 165)

Besides this explanation of temporal aspect of existence, Sartre also mentions existential aspect of temporality. In this regard, the past is related to the inert and fixed being-in-itself; the individual cannot intervene in the past and so, the relation with past is connected to the being-in-itself (Priest, 2001, pp. 165, 168). The present is attached to the being-for-itself because of conscious and intention-oriented actions in the present and lastly, the future is outside of both type of beings; since it does not exist yet, it is “pure possibility” (Priest, 2001, p. 165). Within these three modes of time, it is the present time which stands for the conscious and creative praxis of the free individual. Sartre points out that praxis is negation of the taken-for-granted and also at the same time, is affirmation of the intended goal (Sartre, 1981, pp. 92-3). In that sense, praxis is connected to the conscious of being-for-itself and capacity of it to act in the present. Praxis of being-for-itself entails a free subjectivity which belongs to those
who have capacity to become it. Sartre’s poor is devoid of being-for-itself and subjective use of time due to his/her fatigue-being.

Due to lack of leisure time, tiredness of the worker increases like a snowball that prevents the worker from development and makes him or her an unqualified worker (Ranciere, 2003, p. 137). Workers’ absence of time along with their tiredness and the factory in which they work do not give them enough time to be organized and revolt against the bourgeoisie and to make their own history (Ranciere, 2003, p. 154). From that perspective, this unqualified worker is placed into the category of the being-in-itself which is fixed, inert and passive. At the same time, temporal existence of the worker is located in the passive temporality of the past rather than the effective and free praxis of the present time. As indicated above, temporality is an important factor of the being-for-itself (Priest, 2001, p. 107). Then, the worker is deprived of being-for-itself because of her lack of time. In this light, the worker does not belong to the present time; she has inactive being-in-itself of the past or at best, her subjective action and being-for-itself is delayed to the future. In any case, the worker is excluded from ‘present’ in both sense of it; from subjective existing of being-for-itself and from existence in creative time. In other words, “agency in a spontaneous present” (Priest, 2001, p. 3) does not belong to the worker’s being-in-itself.

In Sartre, absence of leisure time and impossibility of doing two job at the same time, do not stem from an interdiction; but from conditions of the mass production (Ranciere, 2003, pp. 137-38). In that sense, capitalist circumstances deprive the worker of the conditions necessary for her to be a skilled person and thus prevent her from reaching level of being-for-itself. Since there is a close connection between being-for-itself and the present time, those who have capacity of being-for-itself, have also ability to act and create in the present time. However hard conditions of capitalism, in which fatigue of the worker does not let her to develop a free individuality, exclude the unskilled worker from a qualified existence and use of time. In that perspective, therefore, totalizing view of the philosopher and representation by a party are needed for the fatigue worker. Attributing inertness to the worker makes the representation an
indispensable requirement and entails knowledge of the experts and thus, recalls Platonic principle of the distribution (Tanke, 2011, p. 31).

Sartre mentions a metaphor of ‘third gaze’: He looks at working a roadmender and gardener from his window. They are separated by a wall and therefore unaware of each other’s existence; however, the philosopher on the window “can see them without being seen” (Sartre, 2004, p. 100). Like Plato who sees inner nature of individuals and groups, and like Aristotle who knows who owns the logos, Sartre’s philosopher at the window has a knowledge of the reality that the poor is full of the fatigue. Third gaze of the philosopher connects these workers who do not know each other and established relation between them (Ranciere, 2003, p. 144). Contrary to the poor’s being-in-itself, the philosopher’s being-for-itself has logos which gives him the capacity to see these ignorant and fatigue workers and unite them under representation of the third gaze. In this regard, Sartre’s conceptualization of the fatigue worker unwittingly reproduces Aristotelian distinction of between those who have logos and those who do not, between act of speech and rudimentary voices. Furthermore, because of their fatigue-being and lack of time, workers have not capacity to think; therefore, Sartre thinks that they are in need of representation by the Communist Party and thus revives the Platonic principle of specialization and sophrosune which refer to prohibition against doing two things in a determined time and space (Davis, 2010, pp. 20-21). Thus, the ancient division of labor between the thinker, or the philosopher and the ignorant masses are reproduced in Sartre. The philosopher who has being-for-itself and enough time to bring a free individuality into the open, sees emancipation of his poor in representation by the philosopher and the party.

To put it briefly, parapolitics does not reject antagonistic principle of the politics, but tries to domesticate it through regulation of a government system which is based on the representation parts. This regulation rests on the distribution of virtues which are shaped by different access of leisure time. In understanding of Sartre, the poor’s lack of leisure time results in his/her fatigue-being which means that the poor does not have neither time nor conscious existing of being-for-itself. Therefore, the poor needs third
gaze of the philosopher and third party which has capacity to organize and represent fatigue and ignorant workers.

2.1.1.3. Metapolitics From Marx to Althusser

Third mode of politics is called metapolitics and associated with Marx by Ranciere. As the prefix “meta-” shows us, metapolitics denotes a theory which examines ‘beyond’, or ‘behind’ the politics. Metapolitics, in that sense, points out an inconsistency between ideal formulation of politics as rights and equality-oriented and reality of politics that looks like Hobbes’ understanding of state of nature (Ranciere, 1999, p. 82). It refers to questioning of what the politics promises and what its reality is. Metapolitical philosophy treats politics as a mechanism of appearance that hides the reality of society and structures, and therefore suggests going beyond politics in order to understand the real mechanisms accurately (Ranciere, 2005, p. 18).

Different from Plato’s archipolitics and Aristotle’s parapolitics which aim to negate and passivate the politics for the sake of the hierarchical order, Marx’s metapolitics is based on the goal of achieving equality and establishing an equality-based system. From the metapolitical perspective the politics stands as an ideological illusion on the road of the equality. Thus, unlike archipolitics and parapolitics, politics is passed over for the sake of the equality. In metapolitical perspective, what is known as politics is a concealed ideology which covers the truth, the truth of exploitation, oppression and alienation. What remain behind the rights of citizens are actually the rights of the proprietors and political action hides exclusion of those non-property owners from realm of citizenship rights (Ranciere, 1999, p. 83). In that regard, what seems rights of citizens or equality among citizens are illusory appearances (Fisken, 2014, p. 154). In metapolitical philosophy, politics is the realm of superstructural appearances which reduce fundamental class conflicts to struggle for superficial liberal rights. Politics is seen as an ideological trap that superficializes radical transformation of the revolutionary actions, rather than providing real emancipation.
“The ultimate goal of ‘true’ politics is thus its self-cancellation’ (Zizek, 2004, p. 67). A genuine politics emerges with proletarian struggles (Munster, 2009, p. 271) which engage in political action in order to eliminate the politics itself. In other words, a real politics which is independent from superficial and illusory appearances, is a self-eliminated politics. In “a fully self-transparent rational order of collective Will” (Zizek, 2004, p. 67), revolutionary emancipation removes economic exploitation so that political illusions are abolished and political conflicts become unnecessary. Thus, different from archipolitics and parapolitics which negate and suppress the politics for consolidation of inequality-based order, philosophy of metapolitics aims to transcend the politics in order to achieve equality. When defining politics as “a lie about reality” (Ranciere, 1999, p. 83), metapolitics refers to condemnation of politics.

Metapolitics philosophy distrusts not only appearances and politics, but also workers who are thought to be incapable of going beyond the illusions of politics on their own. In this sense, Marx follows the Platonic formulation of the poor who are incapable of acting by his/her own initiation (Hewlett, 2007, p. 91). Ranciere pays attention to Marx and Engels’ approach that underestimate workers even though they are seen as actors of a new future (Davis, 2010, p. 16). In this light, Marx places the worker in a point between sanctification and victimization. Sanctification or idealization of the worker comes from her being exploited by the capitalist system, rather than from her own capacity of acting on her own and of understanding the context in which she lives. The worker has been so victimized that s/he has no choice but to make the socialist revolution. Since the workers “have nothing to lose but their chains” they are limited to their historical task of making revolution. This historical task does not stem from their power, but rather from their powerlessness and “pure loss of every attribute” (Ranciere, 2003, p. 80). They are “gravediggers, not even assassins” and their being is possible due to the bourgeoisie and mechanization in mass of production (Ranciere, 2003, p. 92). Like Plato’s monotechnic argument of sophrosune, the worker has only one thing to do: to make revolution. Instead of myth of metals, this time capitalist exploitation compels the worker to stay in determined places and times. This Marxist version of sophrosune inherits underestimation of the worker from ancient categorization and determination of the poor. The poor of metapolitics has not enough
power to counteract the capitalist system, but has enough reason to destroy it. Thus, the poor is in need of the guidance of the intellectual or philosopher who becomes eyes and mind of the worker and hence, sees the reality lying behind the appearances and understands the context of exploitation and revolution. In this way, for Ranciere, Marx combines sociological and pedagogical domination which have mission to train and lead ignorant masses (Fisken, 2014, p. 145). This pedagogical superiority gives the authority to the intellectual to know when it is the best time for action.

As I mentioned in Chapter 1, Marx focuses on the present time to grasp the past and to design the future. And what he sees in the present is that the workers are so exploited and alienated that their emancipation is projected in the future. The worker belongs to the future, not to the present. The present time is occupied and exploited by the capitalist mode of production. Temporal policies of the capitalism force the worker to stay in an economized temporal regime. Hence, Marx’s temporal approach focuses on the capitalist use of time, rather than on the proletarian perspective (Ross, 2009, pp. 23-4). Transferring the proletarian emancipation to the future implies postponement of the praxis of equality to an ambiguous future. Furthermore, this historical linearity refers to the division between the intellectual who has knowledge about the context of revolution and the proletarian who should wait the decision of the intellectual in order to act in right time.

Another important intellectual figure, which Ranciere holds responsible for pedagogical authority and thus reproduction of inequality, is Althusser. For Althusser, theoretical background of socialism is needed to strengthen. Scientific activity and theory are sacrificed to political actions and praxis; however political action is in need of a theoretical ground and a “good policy” requires a “good theory” (Althusser, 1969, pp. 27, 55). In this light, theory saves the praxis from spontaneity; it formulates scientific principles and laws which explain historical development and current conditions, and thereby manages the process of praxis and canalizes flow of subversive actions into a determined path which will arrive at emancipation as a destination point. Accordingly, this emphasis on the formation of the theory and theoretical background reveals the importance of the intellectual of whose task is to develop a scientific theory.
For him the intellectual is important in the sense of playing a significant role in history and tradition of resistance (Althusser, 1969, p. 23). With focusing on formulation of the theory, a distribution of task between the intellectual and non-intellectual, the proletarian, is formed. Task of the intellectual is to provide a theoretical basis for praxis, while the other’s job is to implement these theoretical principles. Althusser’s formulation of “technical division of labor” provides a distribution between “manual and intellectual labor” and thus maintains hierarchical order (Ranciere, 2011a, p. 11). Without a sophisticated and systematic theorization or a director role of the intellectual, the workers are given free rein to participate in utopian movements (Althusser, 1969, pp. 23-4-5). Namely, the intellectual is mind of a movement of which body consists of the workers. As I mentioned before, it is a Cartesian logic that prioritizes the mind over the body. The movement, capacity, hope, and resistance of the proletariat, and historical conditions are Cartesian objects which need to be analyzed, systematized and theorized by the intellectual subject.

During 1960s there was a debate about survival of the capitalism of which dissolution was thought unavoidable and therefore, Marxists focused on the reproduction of it (Swyngedouw, 2003, p. 49). One of those was Althusser who analyzed non-economic factors which provides endurance for capitalism and indicated that ideology and state apparatus help capitalism to overcome crises (Swyngedouw, 2003, p. 50). State apparatuses refers to formal and informal institutions, and governmental organizations which provide subordination of the working class. These state apparatuses are rendered invisible, acceptable and legitimate by ideological formations; hence the ideology becomes an influential instrument to maintain exploitative world of capitalism. Against ideology, which belongs to the bourgeoisie, the proletarian movement has a revolutionary science of Marxism which is regarded as savior of the workers and which shapes them through intellectual hierarchical relationship with the movement (Ranciere, 2011a, p. 41). On the road of socialism, there is a fog of ideology which allows capitalism to endure and live through structures. According to Althusserian thinking, what intellectuals have to do is to dissipate this fog of ideology through using science.
In May 1968, a political movement against de Gaulle government broke out which consists of student uprisings, occupations and of worker protests and strikes. Althusser thought that students, workers and those live under bourgeois order are shaped by the bourgeois ideology, therefore, he stigmatized student movements “as a petit-bourgeois movement” (Ranciere, 2011a, p. xiv). As we mentioned above, Althusser avoids from spontaneous actions that are not under the control of the authority of intellectual knowledge. Because, for him, without intellectual leadership uprising masses fall into the trap of bourgeois ideology. Althusser, thus, formulates a distribution of task between intellectual and non-intellectuals. This intellectual function is conceptualized as “pedagogic authority” by Ranciere. It refers to inequality-based operation of instructing those who have not enough knowledge (Ranciere, 2011a, p. 144). The pedagogic approach here implies that without intellectual knowledge, the workers or oppressed groups cannot have information about how they are exploited and blinded by ideological manipulations of the bourgeoisie. In other words, through ideological function of concealment, the masses are deprived of truth and this understanding leads to development of “the sociology of misrecognition” which suggests that “the dominated are dominated because they are ignorant of the laws of domination” (Ranciere, 2011a, p. xvi). Similar to Bourdieu’s metaphor of “the fish in the water”, this understanding reminds us of Plato’s allegory of the cave in the sense that those ignorant of their reality live with an ideological distortion and thus are prisoner of the capitalist structure of the cave and also in the sense that the intellectual who corresponds to Plato’s philosopher, reaches the light of the scientific truth and thus, is independent from that structure. Hierarchy between the bourgeoisie and the workers is doubled by the hierarchy between intellectuals and non-intellectuals and therefore, this approach passivates the workers instead of providing emancipation for them (Munster, 2009, p. 267).

Pedagogic authority is also related to the aforementioned Cartesian principle in Althusser which refers to intellectual-mind and proletarian-body. This means that the transfer of information from the intellectual to the worker refers to an instructive attitude which implies that it is the intellectual who gives meaning to the present conditions and finds a way out of the exploitative order. Ranciere opposes this
approach and says that it is a “theory of education” and therefore, it sustains
dominative order even though it aims to eliminate it (Davis, 2010, pp. 7-8). For
Ranciere, pedagogical relation, in this regard, is grounded on the inequality and
therefore, an equality-based emancipation cannot be achieved with pedagogic
hierarchy. In the pedagogical function of the scientific theorist, there is an unclosed
distance between the giver and receiver of knowledge. In pedagogical relationship, the
master knows what the student does not know and even when the student does not
know what to know, the master knows it and also the master knows how to dispel the
student’s ignorance (Fisken, 2014, p. 148). Althusser’s method is based on the
inability of the non-intellectuals, and therefore, for him, it is necessary to develop “a
theoretical avant-garde” while Ranciere’s technique is rooted in radical equality and
there is no need an instruction to clarify how the capitalist order is exploitative for the
workers (Tanke, 2011, pp. 15, 20). With this distrust of the worker, Althusser puts
forward the necessity of the party organization to achieve emancipation. The
intellectual enlightens the party by formulation of a scientific theory which explains
and shows how to reach socialism. Then, the party organizes and prepares the masses
who are lack of capability to understand their situation and to fight against the
bourgeoisie on their own. “Out of the Party, no salvation for the masses, out of the
philosophy no salvation for the Party” (Ranciere, 2011a, p. 11). Althusserian
understanding of the party organization reflects the principle of pedagogical authority.
Like the intellectual, the party defines the present conditions, indicates right moment
of intervention and thus, determines the orbit of the workers’ movement. In other
words, it points out the “structural weak points that allow for intervention” (May, 2010,
p. 6). From this perspective, the intellectual and the party should watch the right
moment of the action which emerges as a result of structural powerlessness and then
order the worker to start to move. We can draw two conclusions from that perspective:
Firstly, waiting appropriate moment of the action refers to the strategic delay which
postpones realization of the equality to the future. Thus, the worker's authority of
having his/her present time and the possible disruptive actions that may occur in the
present time are transferred to the intellectual and the party. As mentioned earlier, there
is a close relationship between use of time and historical understanding, which means
that people see themselves as subjects of their own history if they have control over their own time. However, in Althusserian understanding we see that the workers live in a distorted reality due to the ideological manipulation of the bourgeoisie and so, they do not have real knowledge of their present time conditions and possibilities. In that sense, emancipation is delayed by the intellectual who has capacity to see not only the truth of the bourgeois ideology in the present time, but also the constitution of the revolution in the future time. Then, it is not the worker who has his/her present time consciousness, but the intellectual. Thus, we come to the second conclusion: Together with pedagogy of delay, watching for the weakening of the structure is to make the history subjectless. According to Althusser the history is subjectless and aimless process and the human has no decisive role in this process; s/he engages in historical process only when the structure permits and provides some conditions to do so. (Timur, 2005, pp. 134-35). Driving force of the history is not the subject, but the class conflict and hence, the proletarian class and masses must be enlightened by the intellectual and guided by the party (Ranciere, 2011, pp. 120-21; Timur, 2005, pp. 135-36). This formulation of the history as subjectless process provides a representative system which silences those whom the intellectual speaks on behalf of (Ranciere, 2011a, pp. 120-21).

In Althusserian structuralism the masses make their history as long as they are instructed and organized by the intellectual and party. (Ranciere, 2011a, p. 11). In this case, since the masses are reduced to practice the scientific law of theory, actually, it is the intellectual, not the masses, who write history. Ranciere calls it “theoretical heroism” and briefly explains in that way: “the masses can make history because the heroes make its theory” (Ranciere, 2011a, p. 32). Aforementioned Cartesian logic in Althusserianism which refers to the priority of the intellectual-mind over the worker-body appears once again in his formulation of the history. What masses have knowledge about is the nature, rather than the history, because they engage in nature during their action of production and so, they are withdrawn from historical arena by bourgeois ideology (Ranciere, 2011a, p. 9). From this perspective, intellectual-mind engages in contemplation, while the worker is busy with act of production. Like in Cartesian principle, this leads to a hierarchical separation between the intellectual and
worker. As a simple being, the worker is immanent in primitiveness of the nature, while the sophisticated intellectual deals with historical complications (Ranciere, 2011a, p. 10). Separation between intellectual and manual labor confines the worker to some patterns of roles and ideas determined by the inequality principle of the pedagogic authority. In this way, the worker is deprived of the ability to engage in politics, just as s/he lacks the capacity to write history. In understanding of the separation between the intellectual-mind and the worker-body, “politics is ‘more difficult’ than production” and therefore, the worker should stay in his/her natural place and leave the politics to those who have enough time and capacity to clear ideological fog of the bourgeoisie (Ranciere, 2011a, p. 11). Accordingly, we see also the Platonic idea in Althusser’s thought which defines roles and identities of the workers, masses, the party and the intellectual and determines their capacity and location according to division of intellectual and manual labor.

For both Marx and Althusser, politics is a mechanism of appearance hiding the reality and the poor is unable to overcome ideological illusions of this mechanism. Marx deals with temporality as a tool of capitalist exploitation which is usurped by capitalism. Similarly, for Althusser, since workers live in a distorted reality, they do not have knowledge of the right moment of the praxis. Therefore, in both of them, emancipation of the workers is delayed into the future.
Ranciere’s definition of the *polis* strips politics from its classical understanding. What is known as politics is placed in the characterization of the *polis* by him. In that sense, politics does not mean government of the state, management of people or regulation of power relations. “Politics is not the exercise of power”, says the first of his ten theses on politics (Ranciere, 2010, p. 27). In contrast to the *polis*, it does not refer to an order of distribution, but implies disruption of that order. Besides this, politics does not rely on a certain way of being, which marks the differentiation between political and non-political beings. Associating it with a particular being eliminates the disputative character of politics (Ranciere, 2010, p. 40). Thus, what appears to affirm politics actually creates another distribution between political and non-political sensibilities. Announcements of philosophical “return of politics”\(^\text{12}\) and sociological “end of politics” are important factors in the elimination of politics (Ranciere, 2010, p. 42). Call of return to politics is based on the differentiation between the social and the political, which maintains ancient political philosophy’s principle of specialization of the politics. Thus, the return of politics implies that politics has a particular field, which is the state itself (Ranciere, 2010, p. 43; Ranciere, 2011b, p. 3). In this way, politics is reduced to the state and its functions. Implications of saving the politics from social interventions contribute to the purification of the politics which is inherited from ancient political philosophy. Understanding of pure politics includes a “vicious circle”\(^\text{12}\).

\(^{12}\) In the French intellectual atmosphere of the 1980s, there was a trend of desubjugation of political from social interests. Levi Strauss and Hannah Arendt epitomized this trend of specialization and purification of politics. So, primary targets of Ranciere’s critiques here are Strauss and Arendt (Ranciere, 2011b, pp. 2-3).
which means that association of politics with a specific lifestyle assigns politics to those who have already the tendency and capacity to become political (Ranciere, 2011b, p. 3). The differentiation between a political and non-political way of life maintains the ancient formulation of political arkhe which had ontological implications of having the capacity and qualifications to engage in politics. For this reason, Ranciere’s understanding of politics disrupts “the logic of arkhe” which regulates and allocates political and non-political tendencies (Ranciere, 2010, p. 30).

Politics does not rely on ontological implications, “metaphysical destination”, and “temporal teleology” (Ranciere, 2011b, p. 12). Rather, it refers to a “twist” which explains the existence of equality within contingent inequality (Ranciere, 2011b, p. 12). As mentioned before, the principle of inequality stems from equality itself. A basis of equality is implicitly established between interlocutors as soon as one part of those interlocutors is expected to understand and follow the orders of another. The slave has enough logos to understand that there is an inevitable inequality between her and her master. She is equal to her master enough to understand this inequality, but no more than that. Thus, inequality is contingently formed through the twisting principle of equality. This twisting of equality is an operation of a “wrong” which is based on the contingency of inequality (Tanke, 2011, pp. 51-52). Here, wrong refers to the distribution of the sensible rested on the inequality and uncounted parts. The wrong becomes the name of uncounted or miscounted parts or parts of those who have no part. Miscounting is connected with the process of the wrong in which perfect distribution of the sensibility is distorted by the uncounted incommensurable. In this sense, miscounted parts’ proclamation of this wrong is a disclosure of the contingent inequality. Politics is intervention in the allocation of the sensibility through the exposure of the wrong (Ranciere, 1999, p. 35). Intervention by uncounted parts makes the wrong visible and hence brings out the political. In other words, politics derives from those uncounted or miscounted parts.

Uncounted parts refer to those who do not have any parts and who are so distributed in the polis system that they become invisible, inaudible, and unintelligible. Namely, those parts are demos or people who compose “the class of the wrong” (Ranciere,
These parts of those who do not have parts that form the class of the wrong imply *demos*, poor, or people. *Demos* implies neither a collective form of people nor anti-elite masses; but refers to supplementary parts of the community (Ranciere, 2004, p. 6). These are surplus groups who do not have any divine, natural, or scholar entitlements that give them the right to speak, rule, and be visible. Nevertheless, these wrong and uncounted parts reveal the contingency of unequal order when they act, speak, and become visible, even though they are miscounted in the order of distribution of the sensible. In other words, those surplus groups who form the void or gap in the distribution violate the logic of arkhe. Thus, they, or their existence in the form of the void, disagree with the logic of the arkhe and the distribution order. On that ground, “dissensus” becomes the very expression of their existence.

“Mésentente” is translated as disagreement or dissensus, yet this translation misses the nuances of what the original term implies. Indeed, it refers to an unshared sensibility rather than a disagreement between previously established parts (Ranciere, 2016a, pp. 83-4). Dissensus amounts to “difference between sense and sense: a difference within the same, a sameness of the opposite” (Ranciere, 2011b, p. 1). In this regard, dissensus is violation of all categorizations, classifications, and definitions. It breaks the border which is created as a result of identifications and classifications. Dissensual action passes beyond bounds of antinomies and uniformities through seeking diversity within uniformity and sameness within antinomy. In other words, dissensus uncovers the unsensible, unheard, or unspoken ones which are beyond the sensible order. With exposing contingency of borders and classifications, dissensus provides confrontational encounters between different sensibilities and worlds. Rather than being conflict between different opinions or interests (Ranciere, 2010, pp. 38-9), dissensual action reconfigures, redefines, and redistributes the sensible order itself. It, thus, reveals the political praxis which means that the politics is inherently dissensual. In this way, uncounted or surplus parts display the gap or void in the distribution of the sensible through their destructive action of political dissensus. With disruptive action of political dissensus, *demos* as a surplus subject becomes visible, audible, and apprehensible and hence reforms the sensible order. Ranciere illustrates dissensual
action of the politics with Aventine plebs and points out that there can be political interaction between different parts when there is disagreement over whether there is a common stage or not and whether there is reasonable interlocutor or not (Ranciere & Panagia, 2000, p. 116; Ranciere, 1999, p. 26). The politics comes into the open when objects and subjects of the political action are not predetermined. Since politics is disruption of the present sensible order, it requires involvement of an uncounted interlocutor who is not visible and audible. In condition of the Aventine plebien secession, in the beginning patricians did not accept to engage in a political discussion with plebeians. Because for them, there was neither a party nor a common platform for discussion. “Your misfortune is not to be”, said the patrician to the plebeian (Ranciere, 1999, p. 26). Although plebeians’ sensible being was not recognized by them, at the end, patricians accepted to negotiate with them. In this way, plebeians revealed the political praxis for Ranciere. From that perspective, politics is to go beyond what is or what is constituted and to make what is not; to make visible what is invisible, audible what is inaudible etc. In that sense, politics forms the very subject itself. This means that, subject, like the political action, is inherently dissensual.

By engaging in political action, demos emerges as political subject of dissensual action rather than being predetermined subject (Ranciere, 2010, p. 27). In parallel with conceptualization of politics as de-ontologicalization, denaturalization, and nonpurification, the political subject does not have an original root or a specific wealth which enables him or her to become political. Like political action, the political subject is positioned outside of the principle of the arkhe. Therefore, uncounted parts of the polis order appear as political subjects after taking part in the dissensual action of the politics. Political subjects reveal uncounted and wrong parts who are banished from the present sensible regime. In that sense, subjectification brings a platform into the open in which those unsensible, invisible and inaudible parts become sensible, visible and audible. The existing regime of the sensible, hence, refers to an operation of

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13 It is told that Secessio Plebis at the Aventine Hill in 494 BC is the first general strike in the history. In Rome, plebeians withdraw from their job in the city because of the oppressions by the patricians. They protest against patrician suppressions and locate at the Aventine Hill. After that Menenius Agrippa is sent to bargain with plebeians (Zipory, 2015).
modification. That is why Ranciere calls the political subject as “a process of alteration” (Ranciere, 2016a, p. 119). Subjectification emerging as a result of political disruption of the sensible order refers to intervention in the present configuration of the \textit{polis}. Dissensual subjectification of the political action changes the way of living, thinking and of being. It, therefore, reconfigures the sensible order and breaks the ties between established identities and determined roles for those identitarian categories.

There are three basic principles of subjectification composing of “argumentative demonstration”, “theatrical dramatization”, and “heterologic disidentification” (Davis, 2010, p. 84). Argumentative demonstration concerns the proclamation of a wrong or void which violates the supposed universality. It refers to the inconsistency between universal principles and practical distortions and thus demands that these distortions be corrected and fixed according to the alleged universal values. For example, when tailors in Paris went on strike in 1833, they called for the implementation of the basic principle of the Charter of 1830 that “all the French are equal before the law” (Davis, 2010, pp. 84-5). Second basis of the subjectification is theatrical dramatization which implies that political subjects act in a “theatrical” or “spectacular way”. \textit{Polis} order is anti-spectacular and its characters is well summarized in the stereotyped expression of police$^{14}$ forces: “Move along now, there is nothing to see” (Davis, 2010, pp. 85-6). However, political subjectification arises when it shows that there are some things and gaps to see which undermine the contingency of the present order. Third principle of subjectification, heterologic disidentification refers to violation of borders which are drawn between different identities and classifications. Disidentification is resistance against identitarian formations in the \textit{polis} order and it is epitomized in a slogan of 1968 movement: “We are all German Jews” (Davis, 2010, pp. 87-8). In this context, political subjectivation emerges as a process of disidentification, which expresses getting rid of all categorizations, roles and naturalness attributed to it.

Since it refers to disidentification, the political subject is free from any predeterminations even if these are thought advantageous for the subject itself. The

$^{14}$ Here, by “police” I mean official force of the state.
subject arises with political praxis, therefore, it does not fit in any consensual formations. When the subject is equipped with affirmative characteristics to reveal political action, it is limited and reduced to some predetermined identities and cannot be different from what it is supposed to be. On the other side, when political action is revealed not through preconstituted subjects, but through dissensual actions of those who are not seem as subject or even who are not counted, then the political subject comes into the open. Therefore, subjectivation also implies independence from affirmative characterizations and identifications. This means that, for example, although the workers are expected to be loyal to their authentic culture and to be proud of their misery, these do not contribute to their emancipation and do not make them subjects. When Ranciere searches working class and its culture, he finds that workers are more than as they are supposed to be and sees that they are interested in the bourgeois world that is made impossible for them. For him, much attention is paid to the worker culture in isolation rather than its confrontation with other cultures (Parker, 2003, p. xi). Hence, encounters with different worlds and imitation of the bourgeois world by workers are overlooked. Through imitation, uncounted parts undertake roles which are excluded from them and thus, disrupt the normality of the distribution of the sensible. This understanding of Ranciere is different from the Marxist thought which values the truth beyond appearances or forms. According to Ranciere, as parallel with his non-ontological and non-archael thought, it is not the object or substance that creates politics, but the form in which equality is verified (Ranciere, 1999, p. 32). The political action is the confrontation of two worlds: worlds of possible and of impossible. World of those parts where they are counted and have capacity as much as the bourgeoisie and world of those parts where they are determined and distributed to certain roles, identities and characteristics. Actually, these worlds are not completely separate worlds. Just as the inequality is based on the very principle of equality, so the world of the impossible embodies the world of possibilities. The form of the politics in which equality is verified and the political praxis is revealed, therefore, displays heterogenous character of homogeneously constituted sensible order. In other words, the political action is “contradiction of two worlds in a single world” (Ranciere, 1999, p. 27).
What reveals the world of the possible, which is twisted in the world of the impossible, is the principle of mimesis. Political praxis is the process of reconfiguration of the distribution of the sensible through which those who do not have right to speak, to act and place outside determined roles. In this process, political subject is driven by a presupposition which signifies that s/he has the equal capability to those who are sensible, visible, and audible. This presupposition of equality refers to the mimetic principle of political action. Mimetic principle implies that the subject plays the role which is banned from itself. Hence, by being two things at the same time, the existence of subject goes outside of determined classifications. Hallward points out that “theater” provides an explanation for Rancierian formulation of equality and politics. As he makes clear, verification of equality requires construction of a stage which violates borders of determinations and categorizations (Hallward, 2009, p. 141). Performativity in the political action indicates that politics is about construction of a stage and playing there. In theater a person can become anything and play any role. This factor violates the basis of the polis order and its monotechnic way of living. Because of that factor, mimetic principle of the political praxis refers to “theatrocracy” as called by Hallward. Theatocratic politics which is based on the mimesis reconfigures the sensibility of the order and thus makes uncounted parts visible subjects.

In brief, Ranciere places the politics on the contrary of the logic of arkhe which implies that politics is an action of purity. Politics exposes the initial twist, twist of equality principle. Therefore, political action discloses the contingent inequality which is based on this twist. With political praxis the gap, the wrong or the void and the uncounted parts become visible and sensible. This process is performed through dissensual character of politics by which uncounted parts and demos become political subjects. What makes the ordinary individuals or groups political subject is their assertion of equality. And it is the assumption or claim of equality that makes an action political. When world of the impossible is challenged by the world of the possible, mimetic principle of theatocratic politics attracts attention to performing equality. Furthermore, the principle of equality is inherently dissensual as it reveals the contingent character of inequality and inequality-based polis order. Here, the equality principle takes part in junction of political action, dissensus and subjectification. On
account of this, equality constitutes the main point of Rancierian political understanding.

Ranciere’s approach to the equality is mostly affected by Joseph Jacotot’s formulation of the equality. Jacotot was a teacher who had to teach French to students who did not speak any language other than Flemish. And he did not know to speak Flemish, too. According to Ranciere, he succeeded in teaching French by leaving the students with their own intelligence. With this achievement, Jacotot realized that even if the master had no knowledge of a subject, s/he could teach his students the subject by allowing them to use their own intelligence. Thus, he criticized the pedagogical inequality and instead of it, he developed a theory of radical equality of intelligences. In 1820s there was a widespread idea of equality in France aimed at eliminating inequality through the education of ordinary people; however, Jacotot said that the pedagogical distance between the educator and the educated reproduces inequality rather than eliminating it (Ranciere, 2016a, pp. 137-38). Due to the fact that the master knows what the student knows and what does not know, and on the other side, the student does not have any knowledge about what to know and what s/he does not know yet; the master is always one step ahead of the student (Ranciere, 2016a, p. 138). Ranciere adopts Jacotot’s paradigm of equality and develops his understanding of politics on the basis of this. Equality cannot stem from inequality and the presupposition of inequality does not have any power to bring the equality in course of time. Instead, equality can be implemented through recognition of equality in the first step. This forms Rancierian equality paradigm which is called the axiom of equality.

Axiom of equality is based on two principles: first is the equality of initial logos. As I mentioned before, inequality is established on the basis of the equality principle itself. The slave has to have an equal intelligence with his master in order to understand the master’s orders and the necessity of obeying these orders. Therefore, unequal relationships between hierarchical classifications refer to the principle of initial equality. Moreover, Jacotot’s formulation of pedagogic emancipation based on the equality of intelligences supports the principle of initial equality. Second point of axiom of equality is the presupposition of equality. A path from the inequality to
equality represents a never-ending distance between the targeted equality and determined things to do. Thus, “there is either a path from equality to equality or a path from inequality to inequality” (Ranciere, 2016a, p. 136). Transforming from an unequal position to an equal one implies a “state of becoming” which is designed for the future. This state of becoming equal is actually the call of the future which is sanctified by progressive modernists. Yet, postponing equality to the future is like a failed attempt to catch the one’s own shadow. Similar to the shadow which flees as it is chased, the expected future is delayed to an endless distance of “not now, not here”, as long as the equality is reduced to the state of becoming. Thus, the path from inequality to equality also refers to the assumption of the spatial and temporal impossibility of "now-here" equality, and hence, unintentionally makes equality "nowhere". However, Rancierian axiom of equality rests on “the state of being” equal which implies “now-here” equality. The state of being equal disrupts and reconfigures any determined arrangements and categorizations including spatial and temporal constructions. Equality, in this sense, is not something to be achieved or grabbed, but rather something to be verified. When equality refers to set of strategies and principles in order to be reached, it is abstracted from the present time and space. Through this abstraction from “now-here”, equality is rendered impossible for those who are thought they cannot be equal unless they are educated or have consciousness. In this way, equality is placed on the side of those who are already equal. Thus, those who are already equal and want the others to “become equal”, undertake a pedagogical and intellectual role: to provide consciousness of equality for those who are deprived of it. However, when equality is verified right now and right here, the distance between the impossibility of the present and possibility of the future is closed, and hence, this pedagogical role becomes unnecessary. Therefore, verification of equality is inherently disruption and redistribution of the present configurations including time and space. In other words, the affirmation of equality necessarily implies an intervention in time and space.
3.1. Spatio-Temporal Rupture of Politics

Politics is an aesthetic experience. Here, aesthetics is not related to art or artistic formulations. Aesthetics, in Ranciere's conceptual world, corresponds to Kant's thought of "a priori forms of sensibility" (Ranciere, 2005, p. 13). The aesthetic aspect of politics refers to the reconfiguration of sensibility, including time and space. What is aesthetic is making visible those invisible, making audible those inaudible parts, and making apparent existence of those uncounted parts. In other words, reconfiguration and redistribution of the polis order are an aesthetic act of politics. The pattern of the present sensible world is changed through political action; ways of living, being, seeing, and perceiving all change. This is why the contradiction of two worlds in a world refers to the aesthetic act of politics. The aesthetic experience of political action has an important impact on the pattern of time and space. It regards time and space as a gateway to another world, a world of possibilities, and as a reconfiguration of the sensibility. Time and space are formed as elements of the distribution in the polis order. As I mentioned before, time and space are constituted in a way of configuration and regulation of all parts of society in distributive order of the polis. Uncounted parts are distributed in such a way that they lack temporal possibilities and are placed in spaces where they are subjected to a monotechnical way of life. At the same time, however, time and space provide emancipation for these parts through the spatio-temporal aspect of the political action. Ranciere calls it “aesthetic revolution” which means rupture in the pattern of the sensible order and in the allocation of bodies in time and space (Ranciere, 2005, p. 14; Ranciere, 2016, p. 146).

Ranciere deals with the aesthetic revolution of the workers' movement in his book The Nights of Labor. After researching the archives of the workers' movement in France, he finds that the very beginning of the movement is related to intellectual equality. These workers established organizations and journals and explained their opinions in artistic texts and poems. Therefore, they tried to put forth their reasonable beings and to take part in the partage of the sensibility. In that sense, rather than sanctifying values of being a worker, they challenged to being identified and categorized, and hence, through their “transgressive will”, the workers undermined the present pattern of the
sensible order (Ranciere, 2003, p. 219). *The Nights of Labor*, is about those laborers who think, ponder, and write at night while they are supposed to rest for the next day of work. Here, the leading part is Gabriel Gauny, who was a 19th-century joiner and wrote many artistic and analysis texts. Gauny was both worker of the day and intellectual of the night. Ranciere quotes a passage by Gauny, who wrote about a floor-layer with a self-reflection style:

> Believing himself at home, he loves the arrangement of a room so long as he has not finished laying the floor. If the window opens out on a garden or commands a view of a picturesque horizon, he stops his arms a moment and glides in imagination toward the spacious view to enjoy it better than the possessors of the neighboring residences (Ranciere, 1989, p. 81).

In this depiction, violation of the separation between “the work of the hands and the pleasure of the eyes” (Ranciere, 2009, p. 279) indicates that the floor-layer transgresses the boundaries of identifications and roles. Not only the floor-layer in this fiction text but also Gauny, who is both worker and writer, disrupts the borders of identifications. Here, there is a two-layer subversive and aesthetic act of politics: firstly, Gauny violates the Platonic logic of the *sophrosune* which locates everybody to attributed spaces and times. Platon condemns the act of writing; because it refers to a chaotic situation in which neither the writer nor collocutor has a specific place and attribution. Anyone can write anything to anyone else and hence disrupt the *sophrosune* order (Ranciere & Panagia, 2000, p. 115). Secondly, Gauny challenges Aristotle’s notion of political animals, which claims that those with logos have the act of speaking and the capacity to know what justice and injustice are. Aristotle’s political animal is separated from other beings who are constricted with bestial voices of pain and pleasure. Ranciere interprets Aristotle’s political animal as a “literary animal” that appropriates the words and sounds of those who have logos. Literary animals appropriate what they do not have and thus, exchange their pains and sufferings for others that do not reflect their situation (Ranciere, 2016a, p. 145). In that context, Gauny effectuates the political action which reconfigures aesthetic formations of the sensibility. This leads to the emergence of a new spatio-temporal formation of the world of possibilities.
Ranciere points out that what young workers in the 1830s did not accept actually were not pauperism, poor income, lack of food and of shelter; rather, it was the temporal deprivation that compelled them to devote all their time to the cyclical needs of working life (Ranciere, 2012, p. vii). The key thing in the *sophrosune* order of the *polis* is not only the distribution of the sensibility in and through time and space but also the distribution of time and space in and through identifications. As mentioned in the second chapter, what the *sophrosune* order imposes is that the artisans should be allocated according to the principle of division of labor and thus, should produce more and more products and devote all time they have to a specific work. To remember, the principle of division of labor, strongly defended by Plato, leads to a question Ranciere asks: "Why is it necessary to produce so much in a non-capitalist economy?". Here, the division of time rather than division of labor draws attention to drive the artisans out of the wealth of time. In other words, configurations of time and space constitute an order of sensibility in which uncounted parts are forced to subjugate this order. With mythical fabrications, groups and individuals are attributed to the specific characterizations and identifications to play their own role. Then, these identified and classified parts are supposed to stay in determined places and to act in particular times. Through this order, time and space become jail of these parts. Constituted time and space form the structural reality of parts in the society and hence, are seen as natural habitus of them. As I denoted before, in classical Marxism and left movements, workers or *demos* cannot emancipate on their own, because they are deprived of the required qualities to become the subject of their movements and they need to import some enlightened opinions from intellectuals and leaders. However, this unequal pedagogical approach maintains spatio-temporal jail in which the workers do not have suitable conditions to actualize their ideas. Without a rupture in the spatio-temporal configuration by those uncounted parts themselves, neither the imported ideas of the intellectual nor the endowed equality by the pedagogical approach contribute to political emancipation. Therefore, for example, instead of increasing wages, reconfiguration of time and space which releases the worker from monotechnic style and vicious circle of everyday life provides a ground for verification of equality.
The foundation of the \textit{polis} order rests on the prohibition of doing two things, engaging two different worlds, performing different characteristics, playing other roles, and hence, making the partage of the sensibility invalid. This prohibition is implemented by imposing the notion of “lack of time” on the workers or artisans. So much so that the lack of time becomes a constitutive part of the worker’s identity. “The worker is he who has no time to do anything but his own work” (Ranciere, 2005, p. 14). In this context, the worker paves the way for emancipation when s/he is engaged in the aesthetic act of politics by disrupting the \textit{polis} order. Rupture in temporal configuration leads to two fractures that disturb the distribution of the sensibility of the \textit{polis} order. One is a disruption in the division of time that determines who has time and who does not, and assigns them to contingently constituted natures. Another is to break identifications and roles which are intertwiningly formed with the distribution of time. Those who interfere with the temporal order of sensibility, at the same time invalidate their determined identities, and therefore, become political subjects of their own emancipation process. It is for this reason that those workers of the 19th century, who are analyzed by Ranciere, make an emancipative rupture in the division of time when they transgress the boundaries of regulated day and night.

The time of workers is organized according to the working principle of the capitalist system, which usurps not only surplus labor time but also recreation time. As analyzed by Marx, time of recreation also belongs to the capitalist; because the worker sleeps and rests during the night for the sake of the next working day. It is considered that the night pertains to those who have the capability to regulate the working day and who have the privilege of being awake and producing thoughts during the night (Ranciere, 2012, p. 57). Those proletarians who engage in literary production -writing texts and poems- during the night, instead of being prepared for the following working day, steal the time from capitalists and hence, change the relationship between day and night and between them and their time. They spend their night for themselves. Through reappropriation of the night, they create a split in the temporal organization based on adapting the circulation of their body to the working conditions. In that way, the meaning of the night for proletarians starts to change. Contrary to the capitalist temporal regulation in which importance of the night derives from the working day,
proletarians spend the working day for the sake of the night time, which provides them to verify their equality. Workers of the day become philosophers or poets of the night. Therefore, the meaning of the nights for them refers to the realization of equality. In addition to this reconfiguration of night-time, those proletarians who seize the right to speak for themselves alter their relationships with the temporal organization. They no longer have to wait for the right moment of action or postpone their emancipation to an uncertain historical conjuncture. As it is seen in Gauny’s floor-layer, he takes an aesthetic break and enjoys the view. The floor-layer mixes the time of working with the time of relaxation. Moreover, he violates the principle of the Platonic order by performing manual labor of the worker and aesthetic consumption of the intellectual in a single body at the same time. Here, the rupture in the temporal configuration also refers to the process of disidentification. During this temporal disruption, he creates a breach in his working time and experiences a possible world in the hub of the impossible world. Now, he is in time and flows with time rather than staying behind it. Insofar as the floor-layer intervenes in the configuration of time here and now, he reveals himself as a political subject, a subject of disidentification and the aesthetic act of politics.

Another example expressing that the political subject is revealed through temporal reconfiguration and disidentification is the “Take Back the Night” movement in UK. The Leeds Revolutionary Feminist group has held night marches since 1977 to protest the sexist temporalization that puts women at risk of being killed or raped at night. The gender structure of temporal construction normalizes those fearful nights that put women's lives at risk, and thinks that the real danger for women is to cross the temporal boundary that forces them to stay away from the night and leave it to men. In a situation when a woman is killed or harassed at night, as Reclaim The Night movement states, the police (official force of the state) response is “to tell women not to go out at night, effectively putting them under curfew” 15. Here, “curfew”16 indicates temporal

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16 Etymological root of curfew shows its relationship with temporal organization. In Old French, it was used to mean "the evening signal, the ringing of the bell at a certain hour", which meant to put out the fire at a certain time. https://www.etymonline.com/word/curfew
configuration of the *polis* order which regulates time to be outside, especially at night. Therefore, when a woman is murdered or raped at night, she is blamed for being outside at night and violating the curfew. In that context, movement of Reclaim the Night challenges this temporal normalization of the patriarchal order:

The Reclaim The Night march gives women a voice and a chance to reclaim the streets at night on a safe and empowering event. We aim to put the issue of our safety on the agenda for this night and every day. ¹⁷

Women, as part of those who do not have part at the night, disrupt distribution of time and space by reclaiming the night and street. They challenge the division of time which makes their existence illegitimate at night. Thus, by reclaiming the night and the freedom to be fearless at any part of time, they make women’s existence at night sensible, make their unhearable voice hearable, their invisible right visible. Expression of aiming “to put the issue of our safety on the agenda” implies that they make an intervention in the distribution of the sensibility and disrupt the sensible regime through the temporal rupture in the present normality of the time. In that regard, reclaiming the night is also reclaiming the equality which challenges temporal construction of the present sensible regime.

The temporal configuration of the *polis* order is intertwined with the spatial distribution that determines who is where and who is worth being seen. As Ranciere remarks:

The ‘spatial’ closure of Plato’s Republic which wants that anybody be at its own place is its temporal partition as well: the artisans are initially figured as they who have no time to be elsewhere than in their place (Ranciere, 2011b, p. 7).

The *sophrosune* order of the *polis* refers to the placement of each individual in a specific space in which existence of those individuals or groups is figured according to being in there. An artisan’s way of life is restricted with her or his workshop, a

¹⁷ Reclaim The Night, [http://www.reclaiemthenight.co.uk/why.html](http://www.reclaiemthenight.co.uk/why.html)
farmer with the farm etc. Being identified with a particular role in the society implies being located, which determines who is visible and who is audible. The notion of “lack of time” indicates “lack of space” which means that temporal prohibition in the polis order refers to the spatial impossibility of being something different from what is identified. Imposition of engaging with only one job which is proper for identified and determined capacities of parts contributes to regulating time and space in the polis order. “A capacity is more than a skill: it is a destination. And time is not a duration. It is a location” (Ranciere, 2016b). The temporal partition of possibility and impossibility also determines the spatial distribution of the sensibility. Postponing emancipation into the future means the spatial impossibility of emancipation in the present. Therefore, the attitude of “not now, not here” leads to the formation of “nowhere” fact, which alludes to no place for emancipation, equality, and politics. At this point, Gauny’s floor-layer challenges this attitude and makes a breach in the space as well as time. The floor-layer transforms the place of work into the site of aesthetic enjoyment. “Believing himself at home”, he changes his relationship with his place of work. His workplace is no longer belongs to his employer, and it is not only a place of job. Because he derives the space of emancipation or verification of equality from the space where he is exploited and made invisible. He reveals the world of possibility from the world of impossibility. This is an important point which Gauny shows us that emancipation is “a reconfiguration in the here and now of the distribution of space and time, work and leisure” (Robson, 2015, pp. 298-99).

The eighth thesis from Ranciere’s "Ten Theses on Politics" states that the basic function of the politics is dissensual confrontation of two worlds in a world and hence, the formation of its own space in which political subjects gain visibility (Ranciere, 2010, p. 37). ‘Confrontation of two worlds’ evokes an encounter between two different spatialities: spatial configuration of the polis order and spatial disruption of that order. However, it does not mean that the space of the polis and the politics are totally separated from each other. “Politics acts on the polis” (Ranciere, 1999, p. 33). Although some places such as parliament, streets, and squares can be used for political action and can be locations of the revelation of dissensus, politics does not have a specific place which implies that being in there or acting in there is inherently political.
Nothing is inherently political as long as it rests on predeterminations and identifications. As Dikeç cites from Ranciere, “Politics has no ‘proper’ place [lieu propre] otherwise it would not be politics proper” (Dikeç, 2005, p. 183). Therefore, space, like time, becomes political when taken away from the ground of the distribution of sensible. Just as politics comes out of the polis, spatial action of politics is embedded in the polis order. When political praxis intervenes in the sensible order of the polis, it at the same time, creates its own space. “Politics inaugurates space” (Dikeç, 2012b, p. 670).

It is important to take into account that space refers both to the distribution of the sensibility in and through itself and to the reconfiguration of the sensibility that emerges as a result of the aesthetic act of politics. Therefore, the space is not restricted to the closed world of impossibility, which makes emancipation impracticable “here” because of external conditions. Space as a place of verification of equality provides a way out for the revelation of the world of possibility. When implementation of emancipation is transferred to a sterile space, a space that is cleaned from factors such as exploitation, domination, and oppression, the spatial performing of equality is delayed to a designed place, just like its temporal realization. The extreme side of this spatial deferment is called “utopia” which originally means “nowhere”. In light of this, the spatial reconfiguration of political action does not leave emancipation “there” where refers to the sterile formation of the space. “There” refers to the place which is not “here”, or which is away from “here”. Spatial deferment of emancipation implies that “here” is not suitable for performing equality and for this reason, a designed “there” is created and theorized for ensuring emancipation. Hence, it provides spatial closure of the world of the impossibility. At this point, Ranciere’s statement, which says that there is no specific place for politics, denotes the importance of “here”, rather than “there”. “Here” is the place of desubjugation as well as subjugation. This is why he puts forward that space of politics arises from the polis. “Here” is the place of both sensible regime of the polis order and aesthetic act of the politics. The figure of floor-layer in Gauny’s text shows us that spatio-temporal reconfiguration in the form of “now and here” saves the verification of equality from the spatio-temporal postponement in the form of “then and there”. The floor-layer appreciates the view
from where he works; he makes his workplace the home that provides him the independence to develop an aesthetic attitude. Of course, his workshop is the place where he is exploited. However, when he changes his relationship with the place he is working, he makes a rupture in the sense of spatial configuration and disrupts the identifications of himself as a victim of an exploitative system. He steals the aesthetic eye of the bourgeoisie. Therefore, “here”, in the workplace, he starts the process of disidentification. He collects the place of emancipation from the place of exploitation.

Space is related to the distribution of the sensible; because places are partitioned, borders define conditions of being inside and outside and hence determine what is worth being visible (Ranciere, 2011b, p. 6). Therefore, intervention in spatial configuration and alteration of spatial relations point to the disruption of the sensible regime of the polis order. With the political reconfiguration of the space, those who were once invisible, inaudible, and miscounted becoming visible and counted subjects. Spatial reconfiguration of the political action plays a significant role in the manifestation of the political subject. In that sense, there is a close relationship between the political subject and the redistributive intervention in the configuration of the space. Disruption of the sensible regime of the polis order refers to the process of emancipation by which “polemical place” is revealed (Ranciere, 2009, p. 276). In that process of emancipation embarked by the political subject, a polemical confrontation happens between fixed figuration of the space and dynamic reorganization of it. This points to what is political which means conflictual meeting between the polis order and the politics. Political inauguration of space, in that regard, refers to the polemical place in which not only dissensual character of the political action is reflected, but also the wrong is displayed. The polemical place created by political disruption of the sensible order turns into the political space, not because of conflictual interests of power relationships in it, but because of demonstration of the equality (Dikeç, 2005, p. 172). For instance, Ranciere mentions about the occupation of factories by French workers in 1936, and he pays attention that occupying the factory is more than taking control of the workplace and appropriating the means of production. With occupying the factory, the main function of the space as a place of work turns into a place of
living in which the workers organize their daily life together (Ranciere, 2016b). Thus, the workplace becomes a polemical place in which they realize their equal beings.

In terms of the spatial reconfiguration, there is another important instance in north Syria in which a village for women is built. This village is named “Jinwar” which means place of women in Kurdish language. *Jinwar* was founded on November 25, 2017, by women, for women whose family was killed in civil war and who escape from male dominance and from chaos of warfare in which they were kidnapped, sold and raped. *Jinwar* is an autonomous organization of a village in which women produce, rule, and serve for their own needs. Such an organization of a place for women in the Middle East, where gender structures and sexist-bias are still thick and widespread, points out a significant rupture in the sensible regime:

By building *Jinwar* as part of autonomous self-government, we have used our knowledge and experience, our strength and creativity to build a place where we can liberate ourselves from relationships in which we are seen only as objects (Jinwar, 2020).

In this expression, an assertion of subjectivity intertwined with the creation of a place in which they obtain emancipation draws attention. This means that those women try to change the way of being seen, of being sensible by forming a place for themselves. They make a break from identifications such as “object” and start the process of disidentification through engaging in reformulation of the space. With using their own knowledge, experience, strength, and creativity, they do not wait for a structural suitability; they build their places here and now in the middle of the warfare atmosphere.

Women are solving economical problems here by themselves…. They look and see for the first time: Economy is not the property of men. Economy can be built on the base of the knowledge and effort of women.18

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18 Jinwar: A Women’s Village Project, stable URL: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6GejkdzmnV8&list=PLc0i6EWSyLnSMHmqjiGSI9J8whSoo1ar
Hence, with reconfiguration of the space in the form of Jinwar, their relationship with economy and production starts to change. In this women's place, they are no longer slave or exploited labor of the economic system but are the subjects who have capability to make decisions on the economy. With engaging in spatial reformulation, women reveal the process of political praxis through which they become subjects. In other words, political action in the space turns to the politics of the space meaning that spatial dissensus, which is reconfiguration of a space that makes a rupture in the distribution of the sensibility, itself refers to the political praxis.

I do all kinds of work. Even work I have never done before, I want to do, I want to participate. For that our communal life can flourish I need to know all these things. I did not do agricultural work before, in Jinwar I did.¹⁹

These are expressions of a woman shown in a documentary about Jinwar. In that context, spatial emancipation transforms monotechnical way of life which is the main basis of the sophrosune of the polis order. When those parts who do not have a part in the polis reveal the political action, determined identities, and identifications change as well as spatial and temporal configurations. From another angle, relationship between spatio-temporal configurations and politics also refers to the subjectification process.

¹⁹ Ibid.
There is a close connection between the mode of spatio-temporal configuration and the way of political thought. The conceptualization of time and space has an important impact on political philosophy. The way of dealing with past, present, future, and with spatial regulations shapes the attitude of the political action and vice versa. As anthropological studies show us, in non-Western and pre-capitalist societies, past is located in the center, and future and present time are honored through inheriting the heritage of the past. The past has a supremacy character because it is seen as the first origin which provides a source for optimal realization of the order. The logic of arkhe of which etymological root refers to “ancient”, “beginning” and “the first”\(^{20}\), lies in this privilege of the past. Therefore, potential changes are excluded from Plato’s *polis* order, which is based upon that logic of arkhe. Furthermore, with the organization of the Christian way of life in a day by disciplined rituals of Benedictine monasteries, a present-time consciousness is developed. By determining the time of start and end of religious tasks through clocks and church bells, the present time is rationalized. The advancement of rationalized present-time consciousness subverts the fatalistic burden of retrospective heritage. Besides that, through scientific developments, facts from the distant past are founded and hence, the scope of the temporal horizon is extended beyond the biblical chronology. Therefore, a new understanding of history that is based upon forward-future comes into the open. This leads to the formulation of future-
oriented political philosophies. In terms of the relationship between spatial conceptualization and political formulation, the influence of Cartesian can be seen in the hierarchization and distribution of the space through binary of domestic and public space.

Marx, Benjamin, and Lefebvre provide a framework for understanding relations between time-space and emancipation. Marx develops an important theory which connects the configuration of time and space with the mode of production. In a capitalist organization of the economy, not only the worker’s labor is exploited, but also time and space are used as instruments for profit-making. This contributes to the oppression of workers and prevents them from developing their own consciousness to build a socialist world. Victimhood of the unconscious worker, hence, leads to the theorization of history which is based on determinism of historical laws. It is historical law which develops from one mode of production to another and creates actors of the history. That determinist figuration of history underestimates the subjectivity of the workers and makes them gravediggers, not even killers of the capitalist system. In this way, emancipation of workers is transferred to prescriptions of meta-narratives which draw their path to socialism. Benjamin challenges linear understanding of history and objects determinist formulation of the historical materialism. Both Marx and Benjamin pay attention to the present time as a mode of analysis. However, Marx sees the present as a stage for reaching another historical stage in the future, while Benjamin deals with the present time as a probable rupture in historical linearity, implying that the meaning of the past is reconfigured through remembrance of it in the present. This rupture in historical progressiveness is called Copernican Revolution by Benjamin. Method of Copernican Revolution does not theorize past as passive and dead. But it is reinterpreted and hence, its relationship with the present is reconstituted through bringing the temporal contingency into the open, which implies that neither the past is a necessary cause of the present, nor the present is a necessary result of the past time. Thus, the subject of the history is relieved from “causality of action” imposed by the understanding of historical linearity and determinism. In that respect, Benjamin develops “Jetztzeit” theory, which refers to the realization of the history “here and now”. Understanding of Jetztzeit provides disruption of temporal linearity and brings
the different dimensions of the time. The messianic principle of temporal rupture uncovers a disruptive temporal framework in which each moment of the present time has a space for possible revolution. Therefore, Benjamin’s messianic rupture of temporal linearity is a call for praxis here and now. Within this framework, a connection between Benjamin’s ‘Jetztzeit,’ which means the here and the now, and Ranciere’s political action as redistribution spatial and temporal sensibility now and here, can be established. When we come to the spatial framework of Marxism, we meet with Lefebvre, who makes a connection between the mode of production and the mode of spatialization. The transition from a specific mode of production to another one is accompanied by a new organization of the space. In this sense, abstract space belongs to the capitalist mode of production and is shaped according to the profit-oriented capitalist economy. Similar to the Platonic polis order, abstract space distributes individuals and groups to determined positions through its principle of homogenization, fragmentation, and hierarchization. Against the abstract space of capitalism, Lefebvre provides differential space which disrupts the totality of the abstract space and uncovers differences suppressed by the capitalist organization of space. Lefebvre’s conceptualization of differential space resembles Ranciere’s aesthetic act of politics, which reconfigures space as well as time. However, Ranciere puts the politics at the center of spatial emancipation, while Lefebvre’s spatial struggle against capitalism implies the negation of politics.

This study is actually based upon two pillars, which are spatio-temporal distribution as polis order and spatio-temporal dissensus as political action. The polis order which constitutes a distribution of spatial and temporal sensibility is not restricted to the ancient Platonic system. The primary function of the polis order is the distribution of the sensibility, regulation of parts of the society, and allocation of them to certain determined identifications and roles. This function is maintained under the name of consensus, which refers to the modernization of polis and rejection of politics. In Rancierian thought, the consensus is unanimity on the present sensible regime rather than agreement on conflictual issues. In that regard, there is a consensual aspect in theories of Bourdieu, Sartre, Marx, and Althusser when they restrict the poor to a determined role and area which keeps the poor from being emancipate on its own.
Their inequality method, which accepts inequality as a starting point and aims to reach equality through leading and enlightening the poor, reproduces and maintains spatio-temporal configuration of the consensual order. They are included in three forms of philosophy of “non-political” politics; archipolitics, parapolitics, and metapolitics which negate the politics respectively through repression, invalidation, and dislocation of it. Identification of poor, depoliticization, and spatio-temporal distribution form common points in these three modes of philosophy.

Archipolitics indicates an order in which each part of the society is identified, distributed, regulated, and hierarchized according to the myth of metals. Each part of the society is counted and located in determined identifications where they fulfill their roles in accordance with their fabricated natures. The basic feature of this archipolitical order is the principle of sophrosune which means loyalty to stay in the allocated locations and identifications and to have a way of living suitable for these allocations. Platonic polis order’s basis of sophrosune, thus, shows spatial and temporal fixity which binds each part to the determined roles. Archipolitical order rests on the division of time which dictates that artisans should spend his/her time doing certain jobs and which allocates leisure time to those worthy of it with their superior golden natures. In this sense, what makes sophrosune order realizable is the division of time rather than the division of labor. Temporal partage in the archipolitical order refers to the exclusion of artisans from leisure time and hence, from space. This spatio-temporal fixity provides justification for naturalization of inequality through the myth of metals and the myth of leisure and therefore contributes to the hierarchical polis order. Bourdieu’s sociologist king transforms the contingent distribution of the sophrosune order into the necessary requirements by which the poor is restricted to the conditions of the field and habitus. The field and habitus determine actors’ positions, their way of life, and their place. Since those who are placed in certain fields and habitus have thoughts and norms proper to their field and habitus, they do not have knowledge of their exploitation; hence, they are in need of the wisdom of the sociologist king. Subordinated groups are restricted with their habits, ritual cycles and the horizon of their fields. Accordingly, their spatial and temporal experiences are limited to the structure of field and habitus. However, the sociologist king’s privilege of spatial and
temporal independence provides him with the tools for leading the emancipation of the poor.

In parapolitical philosophy of Aristotle, parallel with his division between domestic and public life in the form of zoe and bios, and with his separation between the speech of those who have logos and voice of those who do not, lies distribution of virtues which determine participation in the political life. What falls to *demos’* share is empty freedom which makes it slavish due to the lack of time and trivialization of its place. Philosophy of parapoltics deals with politics through domesticating its disruptive aspect with the parliamentary representation of conflictual parts. One of the main principles of partaking in political life is having leisure time, which makes it possible to participate in the management of the city-state. Similar to Aristotle’s argument of lack of leisure time that provides partaking, Sartre’s notion of fatigue refers to the tired worker who has neither time nor power to become an independent subject on its own. Fatigue implies a mode of existence, which is the being-in-itself, a passive being. Contrary to the being-for-itself, it does not have subjectivity, which provides creative actions in the present time. The poor, in Sartrean context, does not have enough time to engage in praxis and to organize the struggle against capitalism and thus, to make its own history. For this reason, the party and the philosopher’s third gaze are needed to represent the poor, to unite workers, and open their eyes. Sartre’s conception of fatigue maintains Aristotle’s hierarchical separation between those who have leisure time, which provides them logos and who do not.

Marx deals with time in terms of production relations. Time, in the capitalist mode of production, is seen as a significant instrument for gaining profit. For this reason, workers’ time is exploited as much as possible. Temporal exploitation contributes to their alienation, and workers struggle for gaining leisure time in order to have opportunities to develop their consciousness and to realize their historical task, bringing socialism. Since leisure time provides them overcoming alienation and hence bringing a qualified being with itself, workers engage in temporal struggles. This presupposes that those who have leisure time own independent and equal being which is far from the proletarian way of living. In that sense, metapolitical philosophy does
not trust the workers who are alienated, unconscious, and devoid of the necessary time and space to reach emancipation on their own. Since politics comprises the ideological illusion of the capitalist system, in that perspective, the poor or the worker needs the leadership of the intellectual and of the party which have knowledge about the path of the history and the right time for action. Workers are placed in the economized temporal regime of the capitalist system. They are so exploited and alienated and the present time is so occupied with the capitalist mode of production that their emancipation is postponed to the future through linearly constituted history. As mentioned before, the proletarian belongs to the future, not to the present. This understanding dooms the workers to the world of the impossibility, which holds them in a solidified structure of time and space. Like Marx, Althusser sees politics as an appearance that conceals the truth behind ideological illusions and the poor does not have enough sources to overcome these illusions on its own. Althusser makes division between the worker and the intellectual, paralleling with separation of nature and history. The intellectual contemplates, theorizes, and hence engages in historical complications while the worker is busy with production, action, and with the primitiveness of nature. In Althusserian thought, politics is a complicated issue which should be left to those who have the required capacities. Workers belong to the production and nature, which are easier actions than the contemplation or theorization and history. Division of labor between the intellectual of the history and the worker of the nature indicates that the former has the dynamism of the time while the latter is restricted to the fixity of the space. This implies that just as the space is a passive configuration waiting for its own right time, the worker waits for the decision of the intellectual who has a dynamic to determine when is appropriate for historical action. The worker has neither the consciousness nor knowledge of the present time. Workers are surrounded by illusions and manipulations, and they need to be guided by the intellectual and the party to determine the right moment of praxis. In the philosophy of metapolitics, thus, the inequality method of the pedagogic approach delays emancipation into the future.

The second pillar on which this study is based is the spatial and temporal dissensus of the political action. Politics is intervention in the distribution of the sensibility and
reconfiguration of way of living, being, seeing, saying, and hearing. The wrong and the uncounted parts of the society becomes visible and sensible and hence, they transform into subjects with political disruption of the *polis* order. Therefore, the fundamental feature of politics is dissensus, which refers to the action of reconfiguration of the sensibility and disidentification process of the subject rather than conflicts between different interests and opinions. Dissensual action of the politics implies that it does not have any ontological basis which refers to the logic of arkhe. In understanding of Ranciere, neither the political praxis nor the political subject has an ontological root which makes them political in itself. What makes them political is not their pre-determination, but dissensual framework of redistribution and disidentification. In other words, the politics does not have a pure ground which is reserved for some certain issues, subjects and actions. Just as there are no specific claims and subjects which are political in itself, there are also no specific time and space for political action. That is to say, the logic of arkhe is exiled from the spatial and temporal dissensus of political action. In line with this anti-arkhe attitude, it is not a particular substance or aim which brings about the politics, but the form in which equality is verified. Contrary to Marxist thought which has a mission to reach the truth behind the appearances and forms and to uncover ideological illusions. Rancierian politics is interested in distribution of the sensibility that refers to the appearance of the sensible regime. Political action is realized in the arena of appearances through its mimetic principle. For this reason, Ranciere’s politics is an aesthetic experience which reconfigures forms or appearance of the present order of the sensibility including time and space. If there is no an arkhe or originality which is aimed to reach, then there is no need for imagination or theorization of another time and space providing emancipation. Hence, the inequality method of the pedagogical approach which brings hierarchization between the intellectual and the worker, and postponement attitude of future-oriented theories, become unnecessary. Because, with dissensual and aesthetic act of politics, equality is verified now and here. Just as the world of possibility stems from the world of the impossibility, namely, the politics emanates from the *polis* itself, time and space of emancipation are produced through fissures of time and space of the distribution of the sensibility. And it is political actions here and now that make these
fissures probable. Aesthetic act of the politics saves the emancipation from spatial and
temporal deferment; it verifies equality now and here, not then and there.
REFERENCES


Bu doğrultuda ilk aşamada zaman ve mekanın gündelik hayat üzerinde nasıl bir etkiye sahip olduğu, zaman-mekan anlayışlarının tarihsel olarak hangi değişimlerden geçtiği ve nasıl şekillendiği ile ilgili kısa bir değerlendirme olacaktır. Burada temel amaç, zaman-mekan düzenlemeleri ve kuramlarının bireyler, gruplar ve onların eylemleri üzerinde önemli bir etkiye sahip olduğunu göstermektir. Zaman bağlamında, modernite ile birlikte geçmişe daha çok değer veren ve olası yenilikleri dışlayan eski zamansal anlayışın, şimdiki zamanın rasyonelleştirilmesine ve geleceğin değerlendirilmesine atıfta bulunan yeni bir zamansallık paradigmasıyla değiştirildiğini görüyoruz. Zamani rasyonelleştirme ve ölçme yoluya kontrol etme duygu, geçmiş, şimdiki ve gelecek hakkında yeni bir anlayış sunan zamansal bilincin gelişmesine yol


yaklaşım, işçilerin fikirlerini hayata geçirecek uygun koşullara sahip olmadığı zaman- mekan hapishanesini devam ettirmektedir. Sayıştırmayan parçaların kendileri tarafından uzamsal-zamansal konfigürasyonda bir kopuş olmaksızın, ne entelektüelin irthal edilen fikirleri ne de pedagojik yaklaşımanın bahşettiği eşitlik, politik özgürleştmeye katkıda bulunur. Dolayısıyla, örneğin ücretlerin artırılması yerine, işçiayı monoklinik tarzdan ve gündelik hayatın kısır döngüsünden kurtaran zaman ve mekânın yeniden yapılandırılması, eşitliğin doğrulanması için bir zemin sağlar.


duyumsanabilir düzenin örtüntüsünden ve bedenlerin zaman ve mekanda dağıtılmadan kopma anlamına gelen “estetik devrim” adını verir.


belirlenmiş kimliklerini de geçersiz kılıyor ve dolayısıyla kendi özgürlümeye sürecinin politik öznesi oluyor. Bu nedenle, Ranciere tarafından analiz edilen 19. yüzyıl işçileri, düzenlenmiş gece ve gündüzün sınırlarını aşıklarında zamansal iş bölümünde özgürlüştürücü bir kırılma yaşarlar.


Polis’in sophrosune düzeni, her bireyin, o birey veya grupların varlığının orada bulunmaktadır göre şekillendiği belirli bir mekana yerleştirilmesini ifade eder. Esnafın

çelişkili karakterinin yansıtıldığı değil, aynı zamanda toplumdaki sayılmayan parçaların sergilendiği polemik bir alanı ifade eder.

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