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PRODUCTION OF SPACE AND SOCIAL COHESION: ROMA, IRAQIS, AND
LOCALS IN THE ANKARA NEIGHBORHOOD OF DEMIRLIBAHÇE

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ABSTRACT

PRODUCTION OF SPACE AND SOCIAL COHESION: ROMA, IRAQIS, AND LOCALS IN THE ANKARA NEIGHBORHOOD OF DEMIRLIBAHÇE

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This research investigates the relationship between social cohesion and the production of space through the socio-spatial transformations that four specific streets of Ankara's Demirlibaħe neighborhood have been experiencing. The primary aim of focusing on these four streets, which have been appropriated by three communities (Roma, Turkmen migrants from Iraq/Telafer, and locals) is to scrutinize how the production of space in particular streets hampers possible social cohesion at the local level. In relation to the first, a second aim is to investigate to what extent immigrants' spatial practices become the basis of their sense of belonging, while in return creating differential spaces within the streets where preexisting social cohesion between the locals and Roma is reshaped. The study presents the ongoing socio-spatial transformations within the Demirlibaħe neighborhood, through tracing three groups' social cohesion processes in/to space and community.

Keywords: Production of space, Social cohesion, Neo-Ottomanism, Mimesis, Ankara, Demirlibaħe, Roma, Iraqi Turkmen

ÖZ

MEKÂNIN ÜRETİMİ VE SOSYAL UYUM: ANKARA DEMİRLİBAHÇE MAHALLESİ'NDEKİ ROMANLAR, IRAKLILAR VE YEREL HALK

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Bu araştırma Ankara Demirlibahçe Mahallesi'ndeki dört ana sokakta gerçekleşen sosyo-mekânsal dönüşümlere dayalı mekân üretim süreci ile sosyal uyum meselesini incelemektedir. Çalışma, Romanlar, Irak'ın Telafer şehrinden gelen Türkmen göçmenler ve yerel halktan oluşan üç grubun yoğunlukla bulunduğu bu dört farklı sokağa odaklanarak, ilk olarak bu sokaklarda gerçekleşen mekân üretimi pratiklerinin sosyal uyumu yerel ölçekte nasıl sekteye uğrattığını ortaya koymaktadır. 2014 yılında Iraklı göçmenlerin yoğun bir şekilde mahalleye gelmesine bağlı olarak bu sokaklar, günümüzde gerilimli bir şekilde gerçekleşen mekânsal pratiklere ev sahipliği yapmaktadır. Bu doğrultuda, ikinci olarak göçmenlerin mekânsal pratiklerinin aidiyet oluşumuna etkisi ve bu etkinin Romanlar ve yerel halk arasındaki hali hazırda mevcut olan sosyal uyuma katkısı tartışılacaktır. Nihai olarak bu araştırma, üç grubun topluma uyum süreçlerini mekân üzerinden değerlendirerek Demirlibahçe Mahallesi'nde gerçekleşmekte olan sosyo-mekânsal dönüşümleri ortaya koymayı amaçlamaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Mekânın üretimi, Sosyal uyum, Neo-Osmanlılık, Mimesis, Ankara, Demirlibahçe, Roman, Iraklı Türkmenler

For İsmet and Sevim Seyrantepe

*Ölüm Allah'ın emri,
Ayrılık olmasaydı*

Orhan Veli Kanık

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This thesis is the outcome of my relationship with my grandparents; İsmet and Sevim. After my grandfather İsmet died on 23 September 2016, I lost half of my life. My grandmother Sevim became the only light in my life. Their domestic labor has enabled me to love the things and people I love. I wanted this study to be the outcome of their domestic labor.

This study is personal because of them. To start off from Helga Hoca, she was the instructor of my sociology majoring mom Filiz here at METU in around late 1980s. As I have had the pleasure of being around Helga Hoca, now I understand why my mom was telling me she never skipped any of her classes. She has been *the* best teacher I have had. Yet, working more than 10 hours in a day, I am annoyed how Helga Hoca is overworking me.

The committee members Ali Cenap Yolođlu and Özlem Kocataş-Güney Hoca contributed not only this personal quest of mine, but also my other studies. Ali Cenap Hoca has always been there to critique my survey questionnaires and analysis, including my engagement with Bilkent University's Smoke Free Campus Policy. Özlem Hoca has been there to help practically about the people of Demirlibağçe. I am grateful for their guidance.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The refugee and Roma communities have been facing with series of stigmatization and racism across the world. While global efforts are made on the state level to secure their rights to education, employment, health, and housing, they still face with discrimination and othering on the national and most importantly on the local level.

In Turkey, several steps have been taken against such exclusionary practices. For Roma population, the EU accession process has become “the main driving force for the government to initiate talks with the Roma community” (Akkan B. , 2018, p. 11). The Roma were absent from the poverty and social exclusion debates in Turkey until the 2000s. However, with regulatory changes such as the 1983 Law of Associations, they have earned recognition at state level. Especially with the Roma Opening process in 2009, the difficulties faced by the Roma in everyday life have come to the fore, and now currently being addressed through the Council of Europe’s the Social Inclusion of Roma-SIROMA project. With the establishment of Directorate General of Migration Management (DGMM) in 2013, institutional efforts are being employed to facilitate the *cohesion process* (Turkish Ministry of Interior, 2020) along with various EU funded projects such as the Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN). Indeed, such institutional efforts have achieved a great progress in easing the integration process for migrants, in particular Syrians, through shared Islamic cultures (Rottmann & Kaya, 2020). Yet, their ‘acceptance’ has not improved much on local level as they are still the ‘other’ (Uştuk & Tunç Cox, 2019; Üstünbici, 2020).

As in the world, forced migrants and the Roma are portrayed with racist discourses under political economic fear of loss (Saraçoğlu & Belanger, 2019; Uzpeder, Danova-Roussinova, Özçelik, & Gökçen, 2008). While the Roma population are constructed as ‘dirty’ and ‘asocial thieves’ (The Council of Europe, 2015), the refugees are seen

as ‘opportunity seekers’ or ‘cowards’ (Nayari, 2019). Regardless of their socio-economic or legal status, the conceptions of Roma and refugee abstract the diverging origins of individuals, and render them upon an inferior position in social life. This inferior positioning reveals itself also in Demirlibahçe neighborhood towards the Iraqi and Roma population. Categorizing the whole Roma community as gypsy (Marsh, 2010) and the Iraqi population from Tal Afar as foreign refugee, the negative construction of ‘other’ is practiced in daily discourses.

The term social cohesion has been exhausted through policy and scholarly projects on migration phenomena. Yet, it is assigned a reductionist definition in policy planning, i.e. the absence of social tension between refugees and host communities in non-camp urban areas (WFP, 2020, p. 5; UNDP, 2020, p. 7). Centered on the concept of trust, its scholarly classical conceptualization refers to the willingness of the members to stay within the group (Festinger, 1950; Friedkin, 2004). Amid the increasing forced migratory events across the globe (Saggar, Somerville, & Ford, 2012), the term is extended for inter-group ‘harmony’ through which migrant population would keep its cultural identity within the host society (Hoffmann & Samuk, 2016; İçduygu & Şimşek, 2016). In this regard, the focus is centered on the local level analyses, particularly the neighborhood level (Hewstone, 2015).

However, even with this neighborhood turn, the role of space and its production (Lefebvre, 1991) is disregarded. Although migration studies facilitate urban concepts such as *right to the city* (Dikeç & Gilbert, 2002; Varsanyi, 2006), the literature seems to lack an investigation that reads social cohesion through the production of space. While the urban areas have been the hub for immigrants, the relationship between the two concepts bears a great importance to understand the effects of socio-cultural place-making practices (Schneekloth & Shibley, 1995).

Therein, this research investigates the production of space through socio-spatial transformations that specific streets of Ankara’s Demirlibahçe Neighborhood have been experiencing since 2014. Focusing mainly on four parallel streets appropriated by three communities – Roma, Iraqi migrants from Telafer, and *locals* – it is aimed to scrutinize how the production of space hampers possible social cohesion at the local level. Inhabited by three identity groups, these streets display ongoing and seemingly

contentious cultural mode of place-making practices since the massive influx of Iraqi *Türkmen* migrants in 2014. Besides, despite being gentrified in 2017-2019 for capacity building, Demirlibağçe Primary School, as socio-institutional gathering point, does not seem to be easing exclusionary spatial practices reshaping the streets. Instead, it becomes a focal node in which members of the three groups square off with each other.

Therefore, this ethnographically inspired study focuses on the extent immigrants' place-making practices concretizing their sense of belonging, while in return creating exclusionary spaces within the streets where preexisting social cohesion between the locals and Roma is reshaped. Conducting in-depth and group interviews with the locals, Roma musicians, and Iraqi immigrants based on convenience and purposive sampling, it is aimed to engage with social cohesion studies and projects. Eventually, the study lays out ongoing spatio-temporal transformations within Demirlibağçe neighborhood with regard to immigrant spaces.

1.1. Contextualizing Demirlibağçe Neighborhood and the Streets

Within the municipal borders of Ankara's Mamak district, Demirlibağçe neighborhood is one of the very few areas that had not been transformed by mass scale gentrification projects, until the late-2000s (figure 1). However, the neighborhood now goes through a series of socio-spatial transformations most importantly since 2014 when the Iraqi *Türkmen* from Telafer came to the neighborhood. These transformations are highly practiced in four streets that are appropriated mainly by the three identity groups – the *locals*, the Roma, and the Iraqi *Türkmen*.

Uzgörenler St. is the main artery serving as the commercial center of the neighborhood serving from technological devices to household appliances, from clothes to fruits and vegetables. Inhabitants often call it as Ankara's first modern street with its orderly built sidewalks and lightnings¹. The street's western side, near to *Cebeci*, is mainly populated by the locals due to the high prices for the fixed capital, except few *Türkmen* commercial places. Yet, *Türkmen* population mainly dwells towards the eastern part

¹ The first residents from the 1950s created a Facebook group called *Demirlibağçeliler biz bir aileyiz* (Residents of Demirlibağçe, we are family) in 2011 and *Ankara Demirlibağçem* (My beloved Demirlibağçe) in 2013

of the street and through the *Ağaçlı St.* While their central residential area is *Doğanbahçesi St.* – parallel to *Uzgörenler St.*, *Ağaçlı St.* serves as a commercial center for *Türkmen*. The Roma, on the other hand, live in *Demirkapı St.* – parallel to *Doğanbahçesi St.*

Being parallel to each other, the four streets are lived distinctively by spatial practices of their dwellers. Being phrased as ‘Gypsy street’ by the locals, *Demirkapı St.* is highly populated by the Roma who have recently established their own civil society organization called *Musicians Association* in December 2020. The entrance of the street starts from Mamak Municipality Culture Centre, former *Musiki Muallim Mektebi* ²and Mamak Municipality, and stretches towards Demirlibağçe subway station. Especially in spring and summer seasons, the inhabitants pour over to the streets and perform communal activities by sitting on the pavements.




Figure 1 Demirlibağçe Neighborhood and its distance to city centers of Ulus and Kızılay. Image from Google Maps. Accessed on 21 September 2021.

² Music Teaching School, later to be State Conservatory

Doğanhahçe St. was used to consist merely of residential buildings. It was a quiet street the only noise heard from the kids playing in Demirlibahçe primary school. Yet, when the school was gentrified in 2017-2019, its entrance point was moved from *Uzgörenler* St. to *Doğanhahçe*, increasing the density of car traffic. Also, with the arrival of the Iraqi migrants from Telafer³, the street has started to have small scale businesses such as a barber shops and a second-hand household furniture shop.

The transformation process of *Ağaçlı* St. is similar to *Doğanhahçesi* St., being once filled mostly with residential places. Cross-cutting *Uzgörenler* St. from the clock tower and reaching out to *Doğanhahçe* St., *Ağaçlı* St. was mainly consisting of pharmacies and the Family Health Center⁴. However, the number of commercial places has accelerated rapidly after 2018. The street now constitutes the main agglomeration point for the Iraqi inhabitants who own the newly opened shops ranging from restaurants to jeweler from bakery to butchery, leading to the emergence of an economic niche⁵.

Overall, since the arrival of Iraqi migrants in 2014, four observed forms of spatial transformation processes have determined the selection of these streets. Firstly, the three streets had previously experienced a contentious place-making process between the locals and the Roma, associated with the music sector. Residing in *Demirkapı* Street, the long-established cohesion between the locals and the Roma has been in the course of remaking with the arrival of Iraqi immigrants. Secondly, a significant proportion of local inhabitants has moved to the western part of Ankara by either selling their houses or renting them out to the Iraqi immigrants, while the Roma continues to dwell in *Demirkapı* St. This replacement of local inhabitants finds its reflection in spatial agglomeration points, as the immigrants concentrate in the north-eastern part of the streets where the rents are relatively affordable. Thirdly, Demirlibahçe Primary School was swiftly and ambiguously gentrified in 2017 and

³ Although the main pull factor is unknown, the *Türkmén* have chosen to live in Demirlibahçe Neighborhood due to their relatives who have been in the neighborhood before ISIS takeover of Telafer in 2014.

⁴ *Aile Sağlık Merkezi* in Turkish.

⁵ As there were no official materials/statistics regarding this transformation in land-use, I facilitate my own experiences in the neighborhood. I also consulted to the *Mukhtar* (neighborhood headperson).

reopened in 2019. Sitting at the center of the three streets, the school mainly hosts the children of the inhabitants. However, although this fait accompli establishment of the school was expected to be a habitus for the integration of the Iraqi, the Roma and local students, it seems to be a pot in which no cultural differences are melting down⁶. Lastly, Demirkapı St. was separated from the other parts of the neighborhood with the railway renovation process under the *Başkentray* project in 2017. Although the dwellers in Demirkapı organized a demonstration against the wall-like construction of subway rails (Giritoğlu, 2017), the spatial isolation of the Roma has not only been hampering social cohesion but also harming the political economy of the neighborhood⁷.

Therefore, considering the abovementioned events, the research aims to investigate the role of the production of space in relation to the concept and projects of social cohesion (Cheong, Edwards, Goulbourne, & Solomos, 2007, p. 29). Examining the tripartite relationship between the spatial practice (perceived), representations of spaces (conceived), and representational spaces (lived) producing Demirlibahçe's social space (Lefebvre, 1991), the study benefits also from auxiliary concepts such as placemaking (Jacobs, 1962; Schneekloth & Shibley, 1995; Friedmann, 2010; Adhya, 2012) and social integration (Rubin, Watt, & Ramelli, 2012, p. 499). These concepts are examined in detail in Section 2.3. where I elaborate on the theoretical framework of the study.

1.2. The main Research Question(s) of the Study

Tracing the historical transformations of Ankara's rooted, but 'fameless,' neighborhood with its four streets, the study aims to contribute to both urban and migration studies within the context of Ankara. Instead of providing a mere analysis

⁶ Based on the interviews conducted with the Demirlibahçe Primary School teachers, students prefer to group with those who are coming from similar cultural and ethnical background. Parent-teachers meetings are told to be not so progressive as well due to lack of institutional efforts.

⁷ Although no official source is present for measuring the damage on political economy, interviewees told me the reasons for this renovation process. I am discussing this matter in detail Chapter 3 – "Conceived Space of Demirlibahçe and its Political Economy"

concentrated either on social cohesion or on spatial transformations, the research stresses dialectical relationships between the social and spatial practices of the urban migrants. As the cities are the main agglomeration points for immigrants, the exploration of these relationships will serve to plan concrete policies.

Influenced by initial participant observations by simply *walking in the street* between the period of September-December 2019, two maps were created for descriptively illustrating the lived spaces in these streets (see figures 2 and 3⁸). Constituting the plot examination, the first map displays the spatial agglomerations of the three groups, while the second one reflects the perception of local inhabitants towards Iraqis. Based also on the daily chit chats with the owner of commercial places such as real estate agencies and restaurants, it was observed that locals become ‘friendlier’ when they inhabit spatially near to Iraqis.

As it is crucial for a study focusing on immigrant integration to secure external validity, this research pays particular attention to spatial transformation and place-(re)makings through which social cohesion is determined. In this regard, this study follows two main research questions i-) how the production of space in particular streets hampers possible social cohesion at the local level, and ii-) to what extent immigrants’ spatial practices concretize their sense of belonging, while in return creating exclusionary spaces within the streets where preexisting social cohesion between the locals and the Roma is reshaped. In answering the questions, the research discovers the production of space by particularly reading the language of the users of the space as codes of the particular location, instead of focusing only on one group’s socio-spatial practices. For codes are seen “as part of a practical relationship, as part of an interaction between 'subjects' and their space and surroundings” (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 18), the tripartite relationships between the spaces of perceived, conceived, and the lived allow the research to move beyond the mainstream migration studies that do not explore the particularities in which the general pattern of inclusion/exclusion are revealed.

⁸ The idea with the scatter map (figure 2) is to emphasize the agglomeration points of each group. These concentration points by no means represent enclave characteristics as the neighborhood streets are still heterogeneous.




Figure 2 Spatial dispersal of three identity groups. Design: Nagehan Vanlıoğlu-Yazıcı, 2019



Figure 3 Overall illustration of the streets and locals' perception towards Roma and Iraqis – Highlight is given to Demirlibahçe Primary School. Design: M. Gürkan Gürler, 2019

1.3. Introducing the Theoretical and Conceptual Framework

The thesis engages critically with the concept of social cohesion, as well as its operationalization in social projects of international (non-)governmental organizations (Coz, et al., 2021; UNICEF, 2021; UNDP, 2020) and academic researches. While the mainstream migration studies in national context abstract the spatial contextualities from the process of social cohesion, this study tackles the issue of exclusion through a spatial analysis by utilizing Lefebvre's (1991) spatial trialectics.

The concept of social cohesion often bears the following definition; “a state of affairs concerning both the vertical and the horizontal interactions among members of society as characterized by a set of attitudes and norms that includes trust, a sense of belonging and the willingness to participate and help, as well as their behavioral manifestations” (Chan, To, & Chan, 2006, p. 290).

Collaboratively, its measurement is done with regard to the concepts of social capital and social integration. While there are diverging definitions on these two concepts, the main emphasis is given to Putnam who bases ‘trust’ into its core (Putnam, 2007). However, Putnam's conceptualization of trust fails to be operative for differing groups and communities living in certain local spaces. Thus, Putnam states that diversity and heterogeneity, or immigration and ethnic diversity, in short to medium time “challenge social solidarity and inhibit social capital” (Putnam, 2007, p. 138). As people trust less to *others*, social capital and social integration turn into a competing factor for differing communities and groups that each aspire to increase their own capital.

Another definition for social capital is provided by Bourdieu (2008; 1986) relating it to *field* and *habitus*. However, this conceptualization is not operationalized in extent, leading the measurement of trust to be detached from its spatiality. Besides, for Bourdieu, social capital is seen as a negative aspect for social cohesion as it facilitates inequality among the classes. While immigrants' practices of place-making that are seen as a feeling of spatial and economic loss (Saraçoğlu & Belanger, 2019), social capital is not conceived as a unitary factor for all the members of a neighborhood community. Each identity group has its own (social) capital that its recognition and redistribution is spatial and political.

Due to these conceptual concerns for social capital, a reductionist approach has started to define social cohesion simply as the absence of social tension between refugees and host communities in non-camp urban areas (WFP, 2020, p. 5). Still, a more complex definition is proposed by the UNDP's 2020 report that "social cohesion is the extent of trust in government and within society and the willingness to participate collectively toward a shared vision of sustainable peace and common development goals" (p. 7). However, such conceptualizations are lagging behind to produce any effective policy outcome. Although main areas of concentration are thematized under 5 areas – Protection, Social Protection, Education, Livelihoods, and Healthcare – to mitigate the exclusion of disadvantageous groups, socio-cultural and spatio-political aspects persist, as in the case of Demirlibağçe neighborhood.

Therefore, this thesis explores the spaces of the Roma, Iraqi and local communities in the Demirlibağçe Neighborhood in Ankara. In this regard, their practices of place-making are investigated through three mutually-constitutive relationships between the fields of spaces; perceived, conceived, and lived that Henri Lefebvre talks about (1991). Therein, instead of merely describing ongoing discursive tensions within the neighborhood, the aspiration pursued here is to reveal what causes the seemingly exclusionary social practices observed among the three groups; the Iraqi, the Roma, and the locals.

Table 1 below illustrates the conceptual framework of the thesis. With the aim of mapping the social cohesion in relation to the production of neighborhood space, everyday life of the inhabitants' physical, economic, and cultural settings is explored. In doing so, a dialectic analysis is performed to relate each groups' perceptions towards each other's economic gain as well as cultural appearance in the physical settings of the streets. Further elaboration for the theoretical framework is presented in the section 2.3. under the literature review chapter.

Table 1 Map of conceptual framework

Social Cohesion	Production of Space
Physical Economic Cultural	Perception Political Economy Lived Space

1.4. Research Method

1.1.1. Friendly Neighborhood Researcher Faced with the Barriers Faced

Influenced by the Spider-Man comics, the story of my personal attachment to the neighborhood has necessitated me to reveal I am also a resident. This has allowed me to reach out to as many people as possible since *Mukhtar Hanım* introduced me as “Ozan is like a son to me. He is also from this neighborhood, conducting research in/for Middle East Technical University”. Thanks to her efforts inviting the inhabitants to participate in my study, I was able to pursue a smooth snow-ball sampling process, though this also has limitations.

Still, as my direct living involvement in neighborhood activities ended after 2007, when I started high school, I was seen with concerns by the locals who have a strong sense of belonging to the neighborhood. My initial attempts were to understand the socio-spatial dynamics between the three groups. Hence, I fell short to pursue an “action research”⁹ (Marsh, 2010; Uştuk & Tunç Cox, 2019) to promote the rights of the two underserved populations. Before starting interviews, I was constantly asked what good this research will do to the neighborhood and its residents’ problem (mainly economic and cultural). In order to ease their concern for their involvement in the research, I anonymously donated some material help (both in the form of money and

⁹ The first research project on Roma rights began in May 2006 by the Centre for Migration Research (CMR) at Istanbul Bilgi University (Marsh, 2010, p. 30).

furniture) through *Mukhtar Hanım*. Another challenge I faced was derived from my affiliation with the Middle East Technical University (METU/ODTÜ). As METU students, faculty members, and workers are famously known for their critical leftist and humanist orientation in politics¹⁰, I was challenged by conservative interviewees, who sort of interviewed me to see “what I am actually trying to do with this research”.

Another major challenge was the outbreak of COVID-19 pandemic that affected the process of taking Ethical Committee Approval from METU and Ministry of Education and reaching out to people. Further, as the schools went online since March 2020, I was unable to stretch my research to Demirlibahçe Primary School in detail. I was only able to conduct online interviews with five teachers, though I was already known by the principality and the teachers thanks to my mother who also teaches in there. While the abovementioned limitations have prevented me to measure the concept of *homeplace*¹¹ (Hook, 1984) using photo-interview technique (Schmauch & Nygren, 2014), I decided to ask the interviewees to mark the place they feel most belonging on the map of the neighborhood I had printed as a hard copy from Google Maps.¹²

1.1.2. Research Strategy

My grandparents have settled in Demirlibahçe in the 1950s. Yet, except for my grandfather, none of my family members have developed strong attachments to the neighborhood other than our Dügün St. I was also born and raised in Demirlibahçe and

¹⁰ See my friend Tuna’s research on how the *ODTÜlü* identity is constructed in campus setting (Uzunyol, 2019)

¹¹ The rationale was to ask participants to take a photograph of the locations that they feel attracted and belonging most. Being consisting of four phases – the opening phase, active photo shooting, decoding phase and analytical and scientific interpretation – this method would benefit the thesis to ‘objectively’ measure the concept of *homeplace* with spatio-temporal perspectives

¹² I found out that the Iraqi inhabitants are sensitive about photography. I learnt that, in September 2019, members of a clan/tribe involved in a knife fight over photo-taking during a wedding, without consent of the groom, in Uzgörenler’s side street. Three of the Iraqi interviewees (one is official, the other two are unofficial chit-chats) told me that it was about honor that the groom would not want his wife’s pictures in other men’s phones

spent my childhood in Dügün Street with friends who were the sons or grandsons of my grandmothers' neighbors.

My history with the neighborhood necessitates a debate on my positionality as a researcher. Although my parents and I have involved in neighboring activities – chatting, exchanging favors, and knowing information about one another (Guest & Wierzbicki, 1999, p. 93) – I was a total stranger to the majority of the neighborhood. Thus, though I facilitate my own personal experiences as a resident in exploring the everyday life during the pandemic, I locate myself as an outsider. Hence, I stood back from the social phenomenon being investigated (Blaikie, 1993, p. 11). While being a resident has facilitated the ways through which I reached out to people, I always inserted my identity as researcher when conducting the interviews. In this regard, my role has become a combination of the two extreme poles of being an expert and learner. In exploring how three identity groups construct the other, I was a learner whereas I was also an 'expert' in modeling the research project with concepts/theories. Therefore, the logic of research strategy has also become a mixture of retroductive and abductive as I aim to “locate the real underlying structure(s) or mechanism(s) that is (are) responsible for producing an observed regularity” (Blaikie, 1993, p. 9) by the using the “knowledge that social actors use in the production, reproduction and interpretation of the phenomenon under investigation” (p. 10).

1.1.3. Validity, Representability, and Reliability

In total 60 semi-structured interviews (34 locals, 10 Roma, and 16 Iraqi) are conducted, in addition to irregular chats and talks with the 'ordinary' residents belonging to each group. Also, during the plot examination and VEKAM¹³ submission, I reached out to *Uzgörenler* Street's taxi drivers, Police Commander (*karakol Amiri*) of Demirlibahçe Police Station, and former Demirlibahçe Primary and School teachers. During the data collection process after the plotting, I also tried to

¹³ Borrowing from the website “VEKAM is a research center of Koç University since 2014 that supports research of high-quality on Ankara, the capital of Turkey, and its environs” (VEKAM, 2021). Annually, the center receives research project manuscripts to be funded. This study is one of the accepted ones.

correspond with project specialists working in the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and International Organization for Migration (IOM), International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD), and Directorate General of Migration Management (DGMM). Yet, my inquiries were unanswered.

The logic of sampling for the official interviews followed snow-ball and convenience sampling. However, in order to achieve representability and reliability, I have given particular emphasis in reaching out to all age groups (ranging from 91 years to 16 years old), and lower and middle classes that earn above or below 4000 Turkish Lira based on the hunger threshold of 2865 Turkish Lira as of June 2021 calculation (TDS, 2021), in the course of September 5 2020 – April 29 2021.¹⁴

In order to achieve validity and secure ethical concerns, I initially adopted scales from previously conducted studies. However, the survey questionnaires were used to only challenge the quantification techniques in measuring social cohesion, which disregard the production of space. Hence, I also prepared another scale for semi-structured interviews to operationalize my theoretical and conceptual framework in seeing the dialectic relationship between the groups' spatial practices, cultural way of living, and networking of political economy.

Before adopting the survey questionnaires, I corresponded with authors who used them in similar contextualities. The paper by Oktay, Rüstemli and Marans (2009) discusses the “roles of social-spatial factors on the ‘satisfaction with neighborhood as a place to live’ were examined” (p. 17). Instead of taking satisfaction level as a dependent variable, they also emphasize the role of social processes shaping the belonging to the neighborhoods. With the same notion, I applied their Neighborhood Satisfaction Scale (or *Mahalle Memnuniyeti Ölçeği* in original Turkish).

Moreover, in order to further measure the feeling of belonging and attachment to the neighborhood, and its transformation, I corresponded also with Aylin Şentürk, as the first author of the paper (Şentürk & Gülersoy, 2019) on 20 August 2020. Using place

¹⁴ I received the official approval of the Ethical Committee on 5 November 2020 though I had submitted my application on 4 August 2020. Due to this delay amid the COVID-19 restriction, I requested an additional approval from my department on 5 September 2020 to officially start my field work.

attachment theory, they measure the relationships between time spent in the area and belonging, as well as the urban image of the location in the case of Kadıköy/İstanbul. I also took her consent and encouragement to use the scales for measuring belonging and urban identity.

As I intend to integrate how inhabitants of the neighborhood form cohesion among themselves, I decided to apply a Social Distance Scale. Hence, I reached out to Bahset Karşlı on 21 August 2020 and took his consent as well. He uses this scale to measure socio-psychological factors for the acceptance and exclusion of *Alevi* (Alawite) migrants (Karşlı, 2013). He asserts that the excluded minorities show more willingness to form cohesiveness.

With regard to the migration influx Turkey has been experiencing since 2014, this survey has also been used by the World Food Program (2017) and many other international/national organizations, think tanks, and etc. However, in order to explore the current contextual development amid the Syrian migrants, I reached out to Hülya Yiğit Özüdoğru on 17 August 2020. They developed an Attitude Scale to explore locals' attitudes towards Syrians (Özüdoğru, Kan, Uslu, & Yaman, 2018). Integrating the expressions of prejudice, threat and security, spatial and emotional closeness, contact and cultural values themes to the survey, their methodological inquiry created three sub-dimensions: threat, acceptance and rejection to measure locals' attitudes towards Syrians.

Lastly, I reached out to Gökhan Atik, to use his scales on Demirlibahçe Primary School (Atik, 2013). However, since the schools were closed due to COVID-19 restrictions, I was unable to use the scales – California Bully Victimization Scale and School Climate Survey (revised for elementary school) to the students and their parents. Yet, I was able to distribute surveys to the Demirlibahçe Primary School teachers that Taşkın and Erdemli (2018) use to measure the problems faced by teachers in Turkey with regard to the Syrian migrants. Figure 4 below illustrates the above described 'story-line' of this study.



Figure 4 Story-line of the study.

1.1.4. Data Extraction Techniques

Pursuing to analyze the production of space in the neighborhood in relation to social cohesion, this study is designed to be an ethnographic research with qualitative approaches. Although numerical data from Turkish Statistical Institute (TUIK) and DGMM are used in creating the socio-spatial demographic profile of the three groups, I was unable to reach to the Iraqi immigrants' demographics. Hence, the ultimate method for data extraction is done within interpretive approaches (Della Porta & Keating, 2008; Neuman, 2014) facilitated through mappings techniques.

In creating mappings, the project conducts initially participant observations (Bernard & Gravlee, 1998). As illustrated before (figure 2 and 3), these maps highlight spatial disintegrations and segregations of the three groups with regard to each other, but also the flows through each group's concentrated areas based on participant observations. Hence, acknowledging the selected landscape's own 'scope and mode of sheathing' (Casey, 2004, p. 266), layering technique¹⁵ (Corner, 1999, p. 235) is used to show such disintegrations and segregations for social cohesion. Additionally, this technique is enriched by putting an emphasis on non-used places in the streets via adopting non-

¹⁵ Corner (1999) explains this method of mapping as "the superimposition of various independent layers one upon the other to produce a heterogeneous and 'thickened' surface." ... "The resulting structure is a complex fabric, without center, hierarchy or single organizing principle. The composite field is instead one of multiple parts and elements, cohesive at one layer but disjunct in relation to others" (p. 235)

mapping (*haritalamama*) technique (Aral, 2019, p. 15). Also, to display agglomeration points, stain mapping technique¹⁶ is applied (Sargin, 2012, pp. 129-135).

In understanding the streets' historical socio-spatiality and current place-(re)makings, semi-structured interviews (Bray, 2008) are conducted. Two of the interviews are done via telephone interviews, and the rest are all face-to-face, with my N95 medical mask worn. Interviews began with "ground tour" (Saraçoğlu, 2008, p. 32) questions that interviewees were asked to compare today's Demirlibahçe with its past and indicate the major factors for its transformation. A similar set of questions directed to each group with small edits is provided in the appendix. I have conducted the interviews mostly in the places where interviewees work.

1.1.1.1. Local Participants' Distribution

There are 9 women and 25 men participants. They have a mean age of 47.94 years (SD = 14.307). The frequency table of the participants' dwelling period in Demirlibahçe is shown in the table 2 below. According to the distribution, 16 participants have been living in Demirlibahçe for more than 26 years. Further, only 5 participants are earning less than 4000 Turkish Lira per month. 10 of the participants are university graduates, 17 of them high school, and 6 of them are secondary school graduates. 16 interviewees are staying in *Uzgörenler St.*, while 3 in *Doğanbahçesi St.*, 6 in *Demirkapı St.*, and 6 in *Ağaçlı St.*, 3 of the respondents are not staying in Demirlibahçe as dwellers, but their shops and small businesses are in Demirlibahçe neighborhood, particularly in these four streets. 15 of the interviews were done in *Uzgörenler St.*, 2 were in *Doğanbahçesi St.*, 6 in *Demirkapı St.*, 5 in *Ağaçlı St.*, and 6 were in different places such as via phone calls and in restaurants.

In addition to these interviews, I investigated the Facebook Pages – *Ankara Demirlibahçe'm* (4 May 2013) and *Demirlibahçeliler biz bir aileyiz* (7 October 2011), by searching for the posts related to migrants and the Roma population since the first creation dates. Being called as *netnography*, the rationale was to treat the internet and

¹⁶ This technique is to demonstrate what locations are used most by each group in the neighborhood.

online environments as social worlds in their own right that how online and offline worlds interact and shape each other (Galip, 2017; Kozinets, 2011). Besides, my involvement into the group has allowed me to reach out to those initial residents that informed me about the history and the development of the neighborhood, particularly Uzgörenler St., after late-1960s onwards.

Table 2 Frequency distribution of the participants' years spent in Demirlibağçe as a dweller

How long you have been living in Demirlibağçe Neighborhood?		
Years	Frequency	Percent
0-5	1	2.9
6-15	7	20.6
16-25	10	29.4
26-49	12	35.3
50+	4	11.8
Total	34	100.0

1.1.1.2. Roma Participants' Distribution

In total, there are 8 individual participants. Although I conducted two group interviews with the founders of the *Musicians Association*, their distribution is not included here – but will be used for the data analysis section. There are 3 women and 5 men. Their mean age is 45.13 years ($SD = 11.969$) and the youngest is 26 and the eldest is 50 years old. 3 interviewees are living in Demirlibağçe for 6-15 years, 3 are 16-25, and 2 are 26-50. The economic struggle of the Roma population is also seen in the fact that 5 interviewees are earning less than 4000 TL. Having a stable income is especially harder for those who are not covered by insurance, working in private sector. While 2 of the women are working in domestic labor as housewives, one woman is selling

hand-crafted point laces¹⁷ she makes and sells in bazaars. Educational background of the interviewees is also poor, only 1 participant is a university graduate, while 1 is a high-school, and the rest are secondary and primary school graduates. All the participants are living in *Demirkapı* St., and I interviewed them either in the open-air garden of the *Mukhtarete* building or in coffeeshops that Roma men spend most of their day-time until their work begins at 5 p.m.

1.1.1.3. Iraqi Participants' Distribution

Excluding the irregular talks and official interviewees' relatives sitting near them, there are 16 (3 women) participants. The involvement of men relatives was common during the interviews with the women participants. I visited two Iraqi women participants in their houses with their daughters, sisters, and/or mothers.

I was at first told by the locals and Iraqi inhabitants that I should not interview women if they are not together with their husbands, brothers, or father. Yet, while trying to find a 'proper way' to reach out to Iraqi women, I was told that there is a Turkish woman called *Z. Hanım* who voluntarily arranges donations to orphan Iraqis. She was a civil servant working in İstanbul. Her return to Demirlibağçe after retirement coincided with the arrival of Iraqi immigrants, and since 2014 she has been trying to find resources for them by basically calling individuals who wish to donate. Thanks to her contribution to my study, I was able to visit these two women participants at their homes. As they have a strong *trust* and adherence to *Z Hanım*, their female relatives also wanted to involve in the interview process.

The women Iraqi inhabitants in Demirlibağçe have a mean age of 36.69 (SD = 16.560), and the oldest participant is 65 and the youngest is 16 years old. There are 5 participants who are under 18 years old. However, they have been working since they were 12 years old, and already claim themselves a man. I paid particular attention to ask questions in a proper way that does not cause any negative psychological effect.

¹⁷ A traditional crafting of sturdy paper pattern on lace. Yet, it is not attributable only to Roma communities.

Only 4 of the interviewees are earning more than 4000 Turkish Lira, and 2 of them are bachelor and master's degree graduates. Yet, only 5 participants are high-school graduates while 9 of them are not graduated from high-school. All the interviewees have been living in Demirlibahçe for more than 5 but less than 8 years.

I conducted most of the interviews in the shops that Iraqi participants own or rent. 7 of them were in *Uzgörenler St.*, but it was in the corners, or least desirable places, of the streets that the rents would be cheaper. Besides, despite staying in *Uzgörenler St.*, their houses are in further back parts of the street, away from the *Talatbaşa* Boulevard connecting the neighborhood to *Çankaya* District. Although the agglomeration center for residential areas is *Doğanbahçesi St.*, none of my interviews were held in there. Two of my interviews were done in the garden of the Mukhtarate. Yet, except these two and the other two home-visit interviews, I visited all the participants in their working places. Significantly though, during the initial site visits, it was observed that these commercial places are highly loaded with symbols such as calendars with Atatürk pictures, Ottoman signs, Islamic verses, and especially the Turkish flags. The usages of such symbols in the lived spaces are also be used as a textual analysis, as I systematically took note of these experiences in my fieldnotes (McKee, 2003).

1.1.5. Surveys

The surveys serve only to show how the mainstream migration studies work. The intention of using them is to demonstrate the role of space, which is lacking in the quantitative analyses, in addressing social cohesion. While their results are provided below, the surveys are there for this thesis to establish its own criticism for the methods in measuring social cohesion, and providing alternative ways by bringing up the production of space. As expected, locals who have lived for a long time in the neighborhood are dissatisfied about the socio-cultural and spatial transformations, whereas the Iraqi *Türkmen* are highly willing to share the environment they inhabit with the locals. Below I explain the used surveys and their analyses.

In order to measure the reliability of the Social Proximity scale distributed to the locals and the Roma, I applied Cronbach's Alpha Reliability Test through the IBM SPSS. The result shows the Cronbach's Alpha of the scale is 0.893, far above the average of 0.600, meaning the scale is highly reliable.

Validity of the scale is measured through Pearson's Correlation Coefficient. First, total scores of each question were calculated. Based on scores, the correlation between questions were analyzed. The analysis shows the majority of the questions have a Pearson correlation coefficient more than the critical values of 0.5 and 0.01. Therefore, it can be inferred that the scale is valid in general.

Total score of the scale is 70, meaning if an interviewee gives an answer of "5- I strongly disagree" to each question, they will have 70 points. The average point (mean) of 18 respondents is 58.722, with the standard deviation (sd) of 11.028. Since the sd is much smaller than the mean, it can be said the responses of the interviewees are spread on a narrower range and are located close to the mean. To conclude, it can be argued locals share the same positive attitude towards the social proximity in the neighborhood.

In order to measure the reliability of the Neighborhood Satisfaction scale, I applied Cronbach's Alpha Reliability Test through the IBM SPSS. The result shows the Cronbach's Alpha of the scale is 0.807, far above the average of 0.600, meaning the scale is highly reliable.

Validity of the scale is measured through Pearson's Correlation Coefficient. First, total scores of each question were calculated. Based on scores, the correlation between questions were analyzed. Analysis shows majority of the questions have a Pearson correlation coefficient more than the critical value of 0.5. Therefore, it can be inferred that the scale is valid in general.

Total score of the scale is 155, meaning if an interviewee gives an answer of "5- I strongly disagree" to each question, they will have 155 points. The average point (mean) of 18 respondents is 82.944, with the standard deviation (sd) of 16.188. Since the sd is much smaller than the mean, it can be said the responses of the interviewees are spread on a narrower range and are located close to the mean. To conclude, it can

be argued locals share the same negative perceptions towards the change and loss of identity in the neighborhood.

In order to measure the reliability of the Social Cohesion scale for Iraqi and locals (also Roma), I applied Cronbach's Alpha Reliability Test through the IBM SPSS. The result shows the Cronbach's Alpha of the scale is 0.815, far above the average of 0.600, meaning the scale is highly reliable.

Validity of the scale is measured through Pearson's Correlation Coefficient. First, total scores of each question were calculated. Based on scores, the correlation between questions were analyzed. The analysis shows that the majority of the questions has a Pearson correlation coefficient higher than the critical value of 0.5. Therefore, it can be inferred that the scale is valid in general.

Total score of the scale is 60, meaning if an interviewee gives an answer of "5- I strongly disagree" to each question, they will have 60 points. The average point (mean) of 18 respondents is 29.055, with the standard deviation (sd) of 8.425. Since the sd is much smaller than the mean, it can be said the responses of the interviewees are spread on a narrower range and are located close to the mean. This scale contains questions about locals' perception about living in the same environment with Iraqis and the higher point the interviewee chooses between 1 and 5, the more positive attitude they have towards the Iraqi people according to the scale. The results show locals' opinion about living in the same neighborhood with Iraqis and their vulnerability due to forced migration is quite negative.

For the Iraqi participants, I applied Cronbach's Alpha Reliability Test in order to measure the reliability of the Neighborhood Satisfaction scale. The result shows the Cronbach's Alpha of the scale is 0.781, above the average of 0.600, meaning the scale is highly reliable.

Validity of the scale is measured through Pearson's Correlation Coefficient. First, total scores of each question were calculated. Based on scores, the correlation between questions were analyzed. Analysis shows majority of the questions have a Pearson correlation coefficient more than the critical value of 0.5. Therefore, it can be inferred that the scale is valid in general.

Total score of the scale is 155, meaning if an interviewee gives an answer of “5- I strongly disagree” to each question, they will have 155 points. The average point (mean) of 7 respondents is 73.571, with the standard deviation (sd) of 10.721. Since the sd is much smaller than the mean, it can be said the responses of the interviewees are spread on a narrower range and are located close to the mean. To conclude, it can be argued Iraqis has a neutral attitude towards the change and loss of identity in the neighborhood.

In order to measure the reliability of the Social Proximity scale, I applied Cronbach’s Alpha Reliability Test through the IBM SPSS. The result shows the Cronbach’s Alpha of the scale is 0.895, far above the average of 0.600, meaning the scale is highly reliable.

Validity of the scale is measured through Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient. First, total scores of each question were calculated. Based on scores, the correlation between questions were analyzed. The analysis shows majority of the questions have a Pearson correlation coefficient more than the critical value of 0.5. Therefore, it can be inferred that the scale is valid in general.

Total score of the scale is 70, meaning if an interviewee gives an answer of “5- It would disturb me” to each question, they will have 70 points. The average point (mean) of 8 respondents is 20.375, with the standard deviation (sd) of 7.707. Since the sd is much smaller than the mean, it can be said the responses of the interviewees have almost the same answers to questions. To conclude, it can be argued Iraqis share the same negative attitude towards the social proximity in the neighborhood.

In order to measure the reliability of the Social Cohesion scale, I applied Cronbach’s Alpha Reliability Test through the IBM SPSS. The result shows the Cronbach’s Alpha of the scale is 0.815, far above the average of 0.600, meaning the scale is highly reliable.

Validity of the scale is measured through Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient. First, total scores of each question were calculated. Based on scores, the correlation between questions were analyzed. Analysis shows majority of the questions have a Pearson

correlation coefficient more than the critical value of 0.5. Therefore, it can be inferred that the scale is valid in general.

Total score of the scale is 50, meaning if an interviewee gives an answer of “5- I strongly agree” to each question, they will have 50 points. The average point (mean) of 8 respondents is 43, with the standard deviation (sd) of 3.251. Since the sd is much smaller than the mean and close to zero, it can be said almost each interviewee gave the same answers to questions. This scale contains questions about Iraqi people’s perception about living in the same environment with locals and the higher point the interviewee chooses between 1 and 5, the more positive attitude they have towards the locals according to the scale. The results show Iraqis’ opinion about living in the same neighborhood with locals is quite positive.

1.5. Research Method

The chapters follow in this order:

- (1) I start with the literature review about each group – *locals*, Roma, and *Türkmen*. I draw upon how their case in Demirlibahçe connotes to the other empirical studies around the world. In doing so, I also introduce the urbanization of Demirlibahçe. After providing an in-depth contextuality for the neighborhood space, I delve into theoretical framework in section 2.3. There, I establish the connection between the Production of Space and Social Cohesion. Lastly, in section 2.4., I draw upon similar studies from both national and international cases that focus on the refugee/immigrant population through facilitating concepts from urban literature. These are all compiled under the title of ‘Literature Review’ as I lay out how similar cases have been studied. The aim is to show there is a gap in the literature to engage with the concept of social cohesion as spatiality is disregarded.
- (2) After reviewing the literature, I operationalize Lefebvre’s spatial trialectics for measuring social cohesion. This section consists of 3 pillars, and in each pillar I refer to the original research question. Emphasizing the mutually constitutive characteristics of each pillar, I stress upon the different ‘layers’ for examining

the social cohesion. The term adopted in here refers to how Cassiers and Kesteloot (2012) define “The capacity to acknowledge the existence of different social and territorial groups present in the city, their diverse and sometimes contradictory interests as well as the capacity for these groups to organise themselves and for the city to create institutions in which these groups can confront each other and decide about the city’s future” (p. 1910). As they use this conceptualization for urban struggles, the case of Demirlibahçe shows there is ‘acknowledgement’ among the groups for their ‘others,’ but this acknowledgement is seen as something negative, concern for the future, and feeling of loss. Rather than deciding about the city’s future, these groups compete with each other over space due to the scarce resources provided to them. Besides, I find out that practices of social exclusion on the basis of group identity formation is transformed to political camping under neo-Ottomanist political agenda.

- (3) Lastly, I conclude by reviewing the discussions done in the section 3. Investigating the three layers for social cohesion (perception, conception/political economy, and lived space), I recommend having a *neighborhood council* as a policy suggestion. Drawing upon the case study in Roanoke Neighborhood, in the US, by Schneekloth and Shibley (1995), I highlight the importance of comprehensive partnership in making the neighborhood in all-inclusive matter with the assistance of professionals and local level politicians and administrative personnel. There was one workshop in 2019, conducted in Mamak Cultural Center, with the participation of municipality mayor, representatives of UNHCR, mukhtars, tribe leaders, and many other NGO presidents (Karadeniz, 2020). However, it did not produce a concrete, institutionalized, response for fostering social cohesion. Hence, having a *neighborhood council* would enable to develop “capacity to acknowledge the existence of different social and territorial groups” (Cassiers & Kesteloot, 2012, p. 1910) to discuss about the neighborhood’s future.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

The study finds its uniqueness by investigating the dialectical relationship between space and social within the context of immigrants' placemaking process at a local level. By looking at a local scale, it is intended to investigate the role of space in relation to social cohesion.

The English-speaking world asserts this dialectical relationship between space and social cohesion by emphasizing the role of public spaces and urban parks (Peters, Elands, & Buijs, 2010). Turkish scholarly work, on the other hand, seems to be focusing either on spatial gentrifications, and their social impacts, or on social transformations within the boundedness of institutionally-led renewal projects. In the context of Ankara, studies focusing on spatial transformations through gentrifications or renewals are wide-ranging. The cases of such urban transformations have been investigated within the contexts of Çukurambar (Akçaoğlu, 2018), Hamamönü (Altınışık, 2018), Ankara Castle (Artar, 2015), and Kızılırmak (Durmaz, 2014). The main motivation is to reveal how gentrification projects transform informal dwelling patterns such as squatter housing, or *gecekondu*, by idealizing the way of urban life in high-rise apartment buildings. However, these projects are far away from providing solutions to the community who are displaced as displacees' motivation to commit such a process was disregarded (Varlı-Görk & Rittersberger-Tılıç, 2016). Instead, the aim with these projects is to solve the problem of illegal settlers living in *gecekondu* (Dündar, 2001) and obtain "the unearned rent in the best possible way" (Güzey, 2009, p. 30).

In similar vein, Mamak district, where this case is a part of, has been undertaken by vast studies examining the abovementioned mass scale gentrifications. The impacts of the new Mamak project have drawn attention particularly from the disciplines of

political science, sociology, architecture, and city and regional planning (Poyraz, 2011; Yılmaz, 2011; Somali, 2013). While these studies base their foci on the spatial/material transformation with regard to the rent exploitation, Erman (2010) reflects upon the socio-political contextualities that affect the formation of neighborhood identity of *Alevi*s in Tuzluçayır neighborhood. She emphasizes neoliberal renewal strategies lead to erosion of the different neighborhood identity formations (the enclave of leftists against state capitalism in the 1970s and of secularists against the Islamists in the 1990s and 2000s) as being integrated into global and urban system is tempting.

Still, similar to Erman's problematization of collective identities in a local neighborhood, this study aims to focus on a different neighborhood in the same district. For the neighborhood has socially transformed its space since 2014, this research aims to shed a light on an area in which the literature on Ankara has not investigated, yet. While the Mamak district has been largely analyzed with its various neighborhoods (Aslan, 2017), this research also intends to fill the 'locational' gap by connecting studies on Mamak to the study of *Cebeci* (Cantek & Zırh, 2014) as the 'borderline' at *Çankaya* District, one of the middle- upper-middle class districts.

2.1. Locating the Locals in Demirlibağçe Neighborhood

The initial pattern of urbanization in Demirlibağçe starts with the establishment of *Musiki Muallim Mektebi* (the Music Teachers College) in 1924. After Ankara was declared to be the capital of the newly established Republic on October 13, 1923, the process of urban concentration has accelerated in *Ulus* district, near to the old citadel, with series of modernization processes (Günay, 2012). While the initial planning process was to establish a new compact center around the train station, the location of the Music Teachers College falls into the urban fringe where no residential or commercial areas existing (see figure 5).

Symbolizing the *civilization mission* of the Republic, the Music Teachers College (*Musiki Muallim Mektebi*), later to be Ankara State Conservatory in 1936 (Şahin & Duman, 2008, p. 264), had progressively become a center for young composer that

would base the foundation of. Later, the residential boundaries of the neighborhood expanded to the north-eastern side towards two cemeteries – *Cebeci Asri Mezarlığı* (Cebeci Modern Cemetery) in 1935 and *Cebeci Askerî Şehitliği* (Cebeci Military Martyrs' Cemetery) in 1936. While Ankara University Medical Faculty (1945) constituted the eastern side of the neighborhood area, the commercial and residential areas started to flourish with the establishment of Demirlibaççe Primary School in 1949.




Figure 5 Aerial photographs of Demirlibaççe Neighborhood from 1952 to 2021.
Source: General Directorate of Mapping. Edited by Gürkan Gürler

The urbanization of Demirlibağçe continued with increasing population concentrations near to the Music Teachers College (today's *Demirkapı* Street) and Demirlibağçe Primary School (today's *Uzğörenler* Street). While the origin of initial migration process is uncertain, it is likely that it was consisting of rural-to-urban migrants and those from urban higher social classes who came to attend to the education/work at state institutions such as the music school, medical faculty, and primary school. Further with the construction of Railway Lodgements and the Organization of Post and Telegraph (Posts, Telegraph and Telephone or *PTT*) during the late 1950s and early 1960s in Uzğörenler Street, the neighborhood area had started to become a self-sustaining urban scene by itself.

The initial city plans foresaw that the new capital Ankara's population would be around 250-300.000 in the early 1980s. However, the city had started to be overwhelmed with the massive migration rate throughout the 1950s and 1960s (Yavuz, 1981, p. 32; Kaya, 2002). This massive migration from the squatters in the peripheries to the capital's central locations has resulted in inner city concentration. During that time, a moderate portion of the initial residents of Demirlibağçe moved to Bahçelievler district.¹⁸

With migration outflow to newly established urban zones of Ankara's western axis, Demirlibağçe has come to be portrayed as a place of working-class railway workers. Indeed, in Cantek and Zırh's (2014) study on Cebeci neighborhood, one of their interviewees classifies Demirlibağçe and its surrounding as follows: "Demirlibağçe was a place for bread earning railway workers. It was consisting of people from lower class but also elite. No looter could come close to the crossroad (connecting Demirlibağçe to Cebeci). Şafaktepe neighborhood was a complete slum that we used to call it as 'bad neighborhood.' Yet, the quality of people would go up when you move towards the western axis, to Yenişehir¹⁹" (2014, p. 154).

¹⁸ Being the first permitted zoning area out of the urban fringe in 1935 (Mumcu-Uçar & Özsoy, 2006), Bahçelievler was a zone for those who aspired to live in a garden-city project as a way of representing higher class status at the time. A member of my grandfather's family was among those who moved from Demirlibağçe to Bahçelievler in 1960s

¹⁹ Yenişehir refers to the capital's new urban centers; Ulus and Kızılay, which are 2-3 km away from Demirlibağçe

Demirlibağçe has long been confused with its neighboring Cebeci. However, as indicated by the abovementioned quote, a differentiation can be made on the basis of class differences that Demirlibağçe is characterized by the working class. However, the presence of Music Teachers College complicates this working-class perception as many of the Turkish Classical Music artists used to dwell in Demirlibağçe such as Atilla Mayda, Muazzez Ersoy, Muazzez Türüng, Neşet and Leyla Ertaş, some of whom were also teaching at the primary school during the 1960s. With the establishment of *Atatürk Site Yurdu* (Atatürk State Dormitory) in the late-1970s, which was recently gentrified (BirGün, 2020), and three open-air theaters, the neighborhood area was attracting student and civil servant. Yet, during the 1980s a sort of demographic transformation emerged in Demirlibağçe; while the ‘lower class elites’ were further moving to the western outskirts, the Roma population whose origins stem from Marmara region of Turkey started to form the neighborhood’s recent fabric.

2.2. Locating the Roma in Demirlibağçe Neighborhood

Portrayed as being ‘noisy,’ ‘dirty’ and ‘untrustworthy,’ the Roma population across Europe and Anatolia has been perceived with caution. Although various world-wide institutional efforts are ongoing since the 1st Romani Congress in 1971, common features attributed to the Roma populations result in stigmatization and exclusion.

For instance, in her study on the education of the *lăutar* (Romani musician) families in Romania, Beissinger (2018) indicates that the “*lăutari* have monopolized music-making at weddings, baptisms, and other family celebrations” (p. 9). Yet, poor employability is an acute problem for Roma populations in Bulgaria as they indicate that music and other traditional skills and crafts cannot generate sustainable income (O’Higgins & Ivanov, 2006, pp. 16-17). While Roma youth has been vulnerable to unemployment and dependent on welfare payments, such common features in labor practices result in exclusion from the society (ibid: p. 18).

Chronic marginalization and discrimination are furthered with racial judgements. Certain names, accents, physical appearance, and illegal activities like stealing are ‘sticked to’ the Roma population through which territorial stigmatization is

strengthened for the production of Romaphobia (Ljujic, Vedder, Dekker, & van Geel, 2012). Consequently, attributed also to certain territories where Roma dwells result in the embeddedness in lack of education, employment and housing opportunities that mutually constitute their construction as being noisy, dirty and untrustworthy.

The Roma in Turkey face similar practices of exclusion, discrimination and marginalization. Indeed, Roma in Europe (or Rroma) are directly related to Roma in Turkey as they share much in culture, language and economic specialisms (Marsh, 2010; Uzpeder, Danova-Roussinova, Özçelik, & Gökçen, 2008). Their origin dates back to the 11th century Istanbul where “they worked as soothsayers, fortune-tellers, snake charmers, acrobats and entertainers” (Marsh, 2010, p. 28). Slightly diverging from the examples of criminalization in European context in the same period, they were initially “an important part of Ottoman society, known as Çingene (*Gypsy*) or Kipti” (p. 28) that does not reflect any sort of negative connotation.

Yet, their status was not equal to other Ottoman subjects since they were asked to pay *cizye* tax²⁰, despite being Muslim. Also, their testimony was not always accepted as valuable as other litigants or defendants in the courts of the judges (Uzpeder et al., 2008, pp. 14-15). Although they were not facing with persecution and violence, as Gypsies in Europe were experiencing, European ‘orientalist’ ideas began to influence the views of Ottoman officials negatively both about their Asian subjects and Gypsies after the 18th century (2008, p. 15). Registered as *people of malice*, Roma population has progressively been excluded from the Muslim population (Özateşler, 2014).

The same process of exclusion continued during the Republican era on legislative, political and socio-cultural levels. The Muslim gypsies were allowed to migrate to the Republic with the 1923 population exchange between Greece and Turkey in order to boost newly established Republic’s need for labor power (Uştuk & Tunç Cox, 2019). Yet, being called as “dark-skinned citizen,” or *esmer vatandaş*, in everyday language (Akkan, 2018), they were not given citizenship until 1934 after the Settlement Law of 1926 has changed. The law was targeting the gypsies, particularly the nomadic ones, for being foreign to *the* Turkish culture. For instance, the portrayal of Roma in

²⁰ A form of taxation collected from non-Muslims in the Ottoman Era.

Gümüşhane (a city in the Black Sea region) as “those who could only spend their time with music and dance” (Gürboğa, 2016, p. 125) by the city governor exemplifies the racist basis for their stigmatization.

This prohibition from equal entitlement to the rights on the basis of citizenship affected their political representation until the late 2000s. Particularly, the 1983 Law of Associations was forbidding to establish any sort of organization on the basis of race, religion, sect, culture or language. The Roma population has long struggled to have recognition (Akgül, 2010, p. 215) as Roma Assistance and Solidarity Association (*Romanlar Yardımlaşma ve Dayanışma Derneği*) was closed due to the Law of Associations in 1996. Although they were given an apology on behalf of the state by then Prime Minister Erdoğan during the Roma Opening Process in 2009-2010, the rapid emergence of Roma associations and organizations only targeted to overcome their negative portrayal in everyday life. While the main intent was to counter the term *Gypsy* (Dişli, 2016), they were still coming short to mitigate social and economic exclusion from the society.

Their marginalization in legislative and political spheres is rebounded on socio-cultural aspects of everyday life as well. This labeling further connotes to their religiosity and that they cannot be Muslim (Dişli, 2016, p. 101). Consequently, as they are marginalized from the legislative, social, cultural and political spheres, the Roma population has been embedded to live in spatially stigmatized neighborhoods (Akkan, Deniz, & Ertan, 2017). As the internalization of exclusionary discourses are stucked to their spaces of dwelling, the Roma population has been marginalized from the solidarity ties with social institutions. Thus, this process has started to illustrate hyperghetto characteristics where neighbors self-marginalize themselves (Akkan et al., 2017, p. 76; Uştuk, 2019; Wacquant, 2008). For the Roma had been repressed in the legislative and political spheres, their internalization of exclusion prevents them from establishing a collective organization. On the contrary, the established Roma organizations have collectively rejected to be regarded as a minority group, and they strictly pledge their commitment to the state (Uştuk, 2019; Akgül, 2010).

Currently, there are three main Roma groups in Turkey, named as Roma, Dom, and Lom (Akkan, 2018). Being defined by occupation such as “sepetçiler: basket makers;

kalayci: tin smiths; bokci: pedlars; hammanci: bath attendants; hamalci: porters and carriers; arabaci: horse-drawn carriage and wagon drivers, and so on” (Marsh, 2010, p. 28), these three groups live in specific regions of Turkey – Roma live in the western part, in the Marmara and Aegean regions; Lom live in the Black Sea Region; Dom live in Eastern and South-Eastern Anatolia (Akkan, 2018, p. 7). Among them, the musicians are regarded as the *elite* class amongst the Roma population (Marsh, 2010, p. 28).

The story of the Roma in Demirlibahçe resonates with the abovementioned literature. Since their arrival to Ankara in the 1950s, to work in the developing music sector, the Roma population in the neighborhood has been perceived as a source of conflict and trouble by earlier former residents. Moving from *Balıkesir* and *Bursa*, they initially resided near to *Ulus-Hamamönü* district where they could perform at musical restaurants, casinos, and night clubs, (*Pavyon*). *Pavyons* had been a place of entertainment involving music and dance for upper-classes till the 1950s, but they have progressively become a barrel house for rowdies (Sağlık, 2020, p. 54). Preserving its expensive service structure, *Pavyons* are simulation spaces (Aktaş, 2020) the rural rich would go to reproduce their masculine characteristics by interacting with *konsomatris*, whose *work* is to chat with the visitors (Sağlık, 2020, p. 56).

This transformation of *Pavyons* has been reflected on the structure of society and those, who are affiliated with those places are seen as bad person, a deviant. While the negative portrayal of *Pavyons* has been manifolded with the Turkish Cinema in the 1980s, the Roma musicians, affiliated with these places, have further been marginalized. As their artistry in playing instruments is downgraded by way of separating their art from those who perform Western style music (Yükselsin, 2009, p. 455), their socio-economic exclusion is justified by their idler occupation.

Residing initially in *Ulus* districts, Demirlibahçe’s Roma population was living in *gecekondu*²¹ areas. Diverging from apartment buildings, *gecekondu* neighborhoods had strongly been associated with criminal activities such as robbery and drug trafficking by the public up until the late 2000s. This is why former mayor of Ankara,

²¹ The direct translation of *gecekondu* means built-over-night; a squatter’s house.

Melih Gökçek, was so proud to announce his gentrification projects have ‘managed’ to demolish more than 20.000 *gecekondu* (Hürriyet Haber, 2017). Indeed, the perception of apartment buildings had usually been associated to the modernization process of Turkey (Gürel, 2016, p. 39; Bozdoğan, 2010, p. 405).

Yet, the perception of apartments as a modern way of life is problematized by Erman and Hatiboğlu. The authors question this understanding by stressing ‘increasing restrictions on interaction with neighbors, more separation of work from residence and private from public space’ (Erman & Hatiboğlu, 2018, p. 812). Highlighting the lack of neighborly relations that were common in *gecekondu mahalles* (streets), apartments were started to be seen as ‘modern jails’ (Erman, 1997, p. 98).

Still, comfortable apartments in ‘nice’ neighborhoods were looked upon as symbols of high-status and modernity. With this motivation, the Roma population had arrived to Demirlibahçe neighborhood that came to be defined as ‘the Paris of Mamak district.’ Illustrating their move from *gecekondu* to apartments in Demirlibahçe as an upward social mobility, the Roma population has come to concentrate in *Demirkapı* Street from the 1980s onwards. Keeping their familial ties tied and since their migration to Ankara, the *Demirkapı* Street had come to be called as *Musicians’ Street* by the locals.

Although the neighborhood population has not shown a hostile attitude towards the Roma population, existing stereotypes have caused reflexive exclusionary discourses (Rizzi, 2020). The general perception about the Roma in Demirlibahçe equates with their interests in playing instruments with idleness. Significantly some teachers at Demirlibahçe Primary School, the same stereotypes have caused to reduce the expectations from Roma pupils. Yet, the initial locals and the Roma community in Demirlibahçe had managed to establish a unique cohesion that no spatial segregation or a characteristic of a hyperghetto were present.

No, actually, there is not much of a problem between Roma and Turks. The Roma are in their own mood. So, it's not a group that makes you tired in classrooms. Sometimes someone forgets that we are in the lecture and starts tapping his hands to the tables as if he is playing drum in class. But the Roma and Turks are all friends with each other. Yet, if they have to take sides, Roma and Turks group against Iraqis. But we cannot talk about a grouping in general because it varies from person to person (*T2, Female, English Teacher (Retired)*)

When I first came to Demirlibahçe Primary School, I was lecturing a course for 8 grades [secondary school seniors]. In the first weeks, one of the students was not bringing any books. He [Roma] was sitting in the back row near the window. I said ‘why don't you have the book?’ He was only shaking his head. He was also disturbing his friends... I mean he was in his own mind-set. I talked to my friend who is also a teacher in here. She said ‘don't get too involved with him, his first carcass was her grandmother.’ I said ‘what happened?!’ ‘He pulled out the plug while his grandmother was in intensive care’ she said. He was asked why he unplugged and he said, ‘My father used to pull out the plugs so that the electricity bill wouldn't be too much, so I pulled it because of that.’ Yet, I had another Roma student. He loved me very much. (T3, Female, English Teacher)

2.3. Locating the Telafer's *Türkmen* in Demirlibahçe Neighborhood

According to the Law on Foreigners and International Protection (LFIP, 2013), there are two statuses for those seeking asylum in Turkey: International Protection and Temporary Protection. While International Protection goes parallel with Geneva Convention on Refugees regarding the criteria for providing *individuals* a *refugee* status, its difference is seen in the article 63. Due to Turkey's position in Geneva Convention for ‘geographical limitation,’ *refugee* status is only given to those coming from Europe. *Conditional refugee* status, on the other hand, is given to those coming from non-European countries. The word ‘conditional’ indicates that the individuals can stay in Turkey until they are transferred to a third country (LFIP, 2013). If an individual cannot be eligible either of the two statuses, s/he is given *secondary protection (ikincil koruma)* status when the person is unable, or unwilling, to have the protection rights in the country of stay and/or home country.

Temporary Protection, however, is given to those arriving at the borders of Turkey that flee from their country in groups and require immediate and urgent protection, as in the case of Syrians. The procedures for their departure from Turkey are regulated by the Presidential codes in coordination and cooperation with the international and national organizations. If any individual is found convicted, has a high potential for posing danger to the public, and has a record of guilt against the peace and prosperity by involving in terrorist action, is exempted from having *secondary protection*.

The *Türkmen* population from Iraq, however, has a special condition within the abovementioned legislative frameworks. According to the Ministry of Interior's circular letter on 12 February 2015 (Ministry of Interior: Directorate General of Migration Management - Office of Foreigners Department, 2015), new regulations are directed for an ethnicity-based approach. As specified in the circular letter, the word *Türkmen* is emphasized parenthetically next to the individuals of Iraqi nationality. Under the circular, *Türkmen* asylum seekers from Iraq can have i-) easy access for actions regarding voluntary return to Iraq, ii-) "humanitarian residence permit" based on law no: 6458, if individuals cannot return back to Iraq, and iii-) a right to apply for International Protection – *conditional refugee* status. Prior to the circular, Iraqi immigrants did not have access to health since they are not given Temporary Protection status. Their health payments were not covered by Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency (AFAD) and Social Security Institution (SGK).

With this circular, however, Iraqi *Türkmen* were given the options to choose from two ID cards – either International Protection Applicant ID (*Uluslararası Koruma Başvuru Sahibi Kimlik Kartı*), or a foreigner ID card starting with no "99". These steps allowed the *Türkmen* to benefit from health services for free, and eased the process to get a residency permit. However, these are all applicable if the migrant is determined to be *Türkmen* by the Ministry of Interior, and their enrollment to the system is done through selecting *Iraqi Türkmen* option within the section of *Turkish Descent* (see section 3.3. of the circular).

It has been observed that Iraqi *Türkmen* in Demirlibahçe are given International Protection when the participants willingly showed their *refugee* ID cards to me. However, negative discourses uttered by the locals and the Roma target their rights and entitlements such as right to education (only primary and secondary are covered by Turkey), right to have insurance (only for one year after the approval of individual's *refugee* status), right to work (6 months after the approval of the status), and being provided with pocketed money if seen necessary by the Ministry of Finance. The main reasons for the occurrence of the negative discourses can be ordered as i-) the number of immigrants in the neighborhood, ii-) demonization of Syrians, and iii-) country's economic degeneration.

Since summer 2014, Demirlibahçe neighborhood has become a hub for migrants from Telafar, a city in northwestern Iraq. This was mainly due to the guidance of former Iraqi residents, fled from the previous war in Iraq in 2003, who was working as real estate agents in the neighborhood. Leading to an increase in housing rents, the arrival of these new Iraqi immigrants has become a source of both economic satisfaction for real estate agents and social dissatisfaction for the former residents. Leading to the emigration towards the western axes of Ankara, their accelerated pattern of agglomeration has caused a demographic transformation in the neighborhood (figure 6). While out migrations have been evident in the neighborhood's population from 2007 to 2018, the major change is observed in 2019 when %10 of the population has moved from there.




Figure 6 Demirlibahçe's demography for the last 14 years. Source: TUIK, 2020

Although the neighborhood has long been told to be a center for exchange students from Asia and Europe, there has never been such an agglomeration pattern for one dominant group. The motivation of migration outflow from the neighborhood is in mutually constitutive relationship between the changing political economy and socio-cultural structure. While the initial residents controlling the *production in general* of particular branches of fixed and exchange capitals (Marx, 1993, p. 86) have started to

exploit migration inflow, their outflow movement is justified on the ground of social, cultural and racial discrimination.

Initially residing in the isolated parts of the neighborhood, away from the *Talatpaşa* Boulevard connecting the neighborhood to *Çankaya* district, the Iraqi residents have also started to open their own small businesses such as bakery, restaurant, grocery stores, electronics, butcher shop, male barber shops, and second-hand furniture sellers. Concentrated close by to the clock tower connecting *Uzgörenler*, *Ağaçlı* and *Gözdeğmez* streets, the emergence of commercial places run by Iraqis has shifted the perception of migrants as those who are in need (Üstüncü, 2020). “Contradicting both their image of the ‘needy refugee’ and of cultural and religious similarity” (p. 11), the locals started to complain about Iraqi migrants as being too crowded, not clean, and noisy. While the increasing concentration of commercial places has started to attract other Iraqi migrants living in different districts of Ankara, such as *Demetevler* and *Keçiören*, the negative attitudes towards them has accelerated.

In order to differentiate themselves from Syrians, the Iraqi migrants identify themselves as *Turkoman*, or *Türkmen*, which can be considered as a strategy of self-integration into the social and cultural aspects of a Turkish imaginary (Anderson, 1991; Batuman, 2010) from which they are institutionally excluded because of their citizenship status. Indeed, historical accounts indicate that constituting one of the largest minority groups of Iraq, the ethnic origins of Turkoman date back to the 16th century Ottoman Empire (Mercan-Sarı, 2018, p. 39) while others refer to the 10th century with the migration flows from Central Asia (Güngör, 2014). Often referred as Ottoman Turks, such seemingly nationalist scholarly works discuss about the term *Turkmen*. It is asserted the term was plastically created by the Iraqi government in 1950s in order to separate them from their *cognates* in Turkey (Mahmood, 2020, p. 67). The same term, on the other hand, is defined to differentiate Muslim Oghuz tribes from the non-Muslim Turks (Mercan-Sarı, 2018, p. 42).

The term *Türkmen* is used to encompass majority of different ethnic groups from Central Asia to Middle East and even central Europe, creating a confusion for Turkic nationhood. Still, many of the Iraqi residents in Demirlibahçe indicate that their distant relatives were from Turkey that they occasionally visited them in Turkey. Enabling

them to connect ties with the governmental organizations and political institutions such as *Ottoman Türkmén Association* providing livelihood assistance to them, their identity representation secures a place within the social and cultural structure of the Ottomanist nation-building projects.

Yet, this projection of being *Türkmen* does not provide the Iraqi residents with the means of socio-cultural inclusion in the neighborhood other than political representations at state-level. Despite having strong organizational structures in Turkey, livelihood assistances provided to Iraqi migrants in Demirlibağçe have turned to be a factor exacerbating already existing exclusionary discourses and spatial practices by the *locals*. As Iraqi refugees' fertility level, rivalry in the formal/informal economy, and assumed easy access to public services has been the source of discontent among the locals and the Roma (Narli & Özaşçılar, 2020), the COVID-19 outbreak has worsened these ties for social cohesion.

2.4. COVID-19 a factor complicating social cohesion

COVID-19 restrictions have severely deteriorated social and economic wellbeing of the vulnerable groups all around the world that being not exposed to the virus has turned out to be a secondary issue. As in the cases of Roma and refugees (indicated also by the interviewees), the closure of irregular working conditions has led them to extreme poverty leading to further social and cultural marginalization. Indeed, the Roma and refugee populations have always been considered responsible for their own situation in terms of social risks with the justification of lack of access to education, the formal labor market, and housing (Crețan & Light, 2020; Cengiz & Cengiz, 2020). Not only the economic impacts of the virus have caused a reduced income for the 73% of the Roma population living in Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Moldova, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia and Ukraine (Willis, 2020), but also increased stigmatization via quarantine practices enforced even with the use of armed forces, as in Slovakia (Holt, 2020). As for the refugees, the closure of state borders has *trapped* “many people around the world fleeing for their lives have no way to avail themselves of the legal protections of the Convention (1951) and the global refugee regime” (Perzyna, 2020, p. 6).

The Turkish Ministry of Health declared the first COVID-19 case on March 10, 2020, and afterwards the country imposed the lockdown policies on March 16th. According to the decision of Ankara Provincial Public Sanitation Board most of the businesses where the social distancing might be difficult to be maintained would be closed, except small-scale groceries. Later, on May 11th, barber, beauty salon/center, hairdresser and similar businesses were allowed to operate between 9:00 am to 9 pm with the strict regulation of following bodily practices. As the lockdown measures helped to contain the virus during these periods in a degree, the Provincial Public Sanitation Board, following the regulation of Ministry of Interior, declared that restaurants, cafes, patisseries, cafes, coffee houses, tea gardens, and clubs (except for dancing and gaming such as cards, rumors, backgammon and hookah, and *live music* activities that involve direct physical contacts) would start again to serve until 10 pm, starting on Monday, 1 June 2020. Soon after on 3 June 2020, it was declared that the music can be played only for the listening purpose that the dance and other entertainment related activities would be punished severely.

On July 21, the semi-strict lockdown measures on restaurants, cafes, patisseries, cafes, tea gardens, and clubs were lifted off. While the public recreation and other entertainment places like casinos, *pavyons*, discotheques, bars, pubs, taverns and nightclubs had been closed since the initial lockdown measures, the decision on September 16th has decelerated that if these businesses prefer to change their main field of activity, they can be used as cafes and restaurants by canceling their old license and re-licensing them, within the framework of the Regulation on Opening a Business and Working Licenses. With the last regulation on 1 December 2020, the country has gone back to the initial lockdown measures taken on 16th of March, with the same curfew restrictions (Ankara Valiliği İl Sağlık Müdürlüğü, 2020).

There is no direct stigmatization through quarantine practices observed in Turkey, either towards the Roma or refugees. Yet, the economic effects of the virus have led to job loss among the refugee groups that 71% of them are now unemployed, 27% of whom were working in regular jobs prior to the outbreak (ASAM-SGDD, 2020). In other words, 88.59% of the migrants under Temporary Protection are now unemployed, particularly Syrians. The only means for their livelihood is provided by private charities and local governments (Özkul, 2020). This problem is also felt in the

theme of education that around 30% of the refugees are unable to attend remote teaching.

However, as initial efforts have been to protect refugees against the virus, their accessibility to health services was eased by allowing refugees to receive healthcare in any city, no matter where they are registered. Regarding the Roma population in Turkey, the closure of music industry for about one and a half year has taken their livelihood away. Unfortunately, 102 musicians in general have committed suicides due to this loss (Senocaklı, 2021).

Coupled by the anxiety for the spread of the disease, economic constraints have become the fundamental reason for socio-cultural exclusionary practices in Demirlibağçe in the context of COVID-19. Constituting the main source of income for Roma and Iraqi groups, the closure of commercial places and all musical activities have led to a search for alternative job opportunities. Faced with a predicament between exposing themselves to the virus and living in extreme poverty, the Roma and Iraqi population in Demirlibağçe have found themselves in a such a desperate situation that the bodily practices of social distancing, face masks, and personal hygiene would turn to be impossible sets of responsibilities. Recently, a group of Roma from Demirlibağçe has participated in a protest in front of the main opposition part's, CHP, headquarter, about the deteriorated unemployment conditions and the neglect of public policies towards the musicians (Fox TV, 2021). Resulting to discomfort and unease among the locals, already existing exclusionary practices have been accelerated with the social and economic impacts caused by the lockdown measures.

All in all, to illustrate the whole contextualization process drawn by the literature, the story-line of Demirlibağçe Neighborhood starts in 1924 with the construction of Conservatory which would later be transformed into Mamak Municipality, and today's Cultural Center. The state-led urbanization patterns of Demirlibağçe and its near surroundings throughout the 1940s and 1960s have attracted people who would come to work or study. Although the neighborhood has given outward migration due to the zoning of *Bahçelievler* area for construction, the establishment of Bazaar, open-air theaters, and men-only *Site* dormitory have further led to the population increase. From 1990s onwards, the residents have started to move towards the sub-urban areas

of Ankara while the Roma population became concentrated in *Demirkapı* St. As this process continues, the neighborhood has turned into a cosmopolitan place with the arrival of Iraqi migrants from Telafer since 2014.




Figure 7 Story-line of Demirlibahçe Neighborhood. Created by the author (2021)

2.5. Production of Space for/against Social Cohesion

Following the massive migration influx to Turkey from Syria, the country has adopted institutional changes in order to mitigate the social, cultural, and economic impacts since 2011. The leading theme for these efforts has been *social cohesion* mentioned both in social projects and academic studies.

As a policy ‘project’, the term is borrowed from European contexts and applied to empower ‘connectedness,’ ‘social relations’, and ‘focus on common goods’ (Bertelsmann Stiftung; Eurofound, 2014, p. 6; Ataseven and Bakış, 2018). In the national context, five thematical areas are determined in order to mitigate the exclusion of disadvantaged groups – Protection, Social Protection, Education, Livelihoods, and Healthcare. The aim is to develop a community of shared values, shared challenges and equal opportunity based on a sense of trust, hope and reciprocity among the whole society (Jenson, 1998, p. 4). While the main foci are on economic balance within the society (Woolcock, 2006; Kantzara, 2016), the the term refers to the institutional level policy planning in order to overcome the drawbacks of neoliberal policies such as “mounting rates of income inequality and homelessness, street crime and other forms

of lawlessness, intractably high rates of youth unemployment, intergenerational dependency on social assistance, and climbing rates of child poverty” (p. 6).

However, policy-oriented debates are not sufficient to produce an effective policy outcome. Investigating the failures in the policy outcomes, scholarly conceptualizations investigate the structures for cohesive group formations (Fonseca, Lukosch, & Brazier, 2019). Hence, it is defined as “a set of attitudes and norms that includes trust, a sense of belonging and the willingness to participate and help, as well as their behavioral manifestations” (Chan, To, & Chan, 2006, p. 290). Differing from social integration,²² social cohesion emphasizes “the importance of social unity within the tension between individual freedom and social order” (Seyidov, 2021, p. 113).

Collaboratively, its measurement is done through facilitating survey questionnaires, mainly Bogardus’ Social Distance Scale (Bogardus, 1959), with regard to the concepts of social *capital* and social *integration*. Putnam’s (2007) elaboration on ‘trust’ and social capital determines the strength of social cohesion, though it does not apply directly for inter-group cohesiveness. Thus, Putnam states that diversity and heterogeneity, or immigration and ethnic diversity, in short to medium time “challenge social solidarity and inhibit social capital” (p. 138). As people trust less to *others*, social capital turns into a competing factor in and for space.

These accounts also relate to social *inclusion* when encountered with two different groups sharing the same environment (Narli & Özaşçılar, 2020, p. 304). In the case of migration, the concept is often used to identify inclusionary and exclusionary practices between the local and migration communities (Kavas, Avşar, Kadkoy, & Bilgiç, 2019). Conflicting with populist discourses that disregard diversities (Yenigun & Eraydın, 2019), the ongoing experiences with migrant groups have come to be defined as differential inclusion (Baban, Ilcan, & Rygiel, 2017), as they are not entitled to refugee and citizenship rights.

While no social inclusion research project has been conducted for the case of Demirlibahçe neighborhood, it would be difficult to operationalize the concept social

²² Social integration is defined as a regularized nature of face-to-face interactions and is based on the reproduction of institutions for social order (Seyidov, 2021, p. 113).

cohesion. As the arrival of Iraqi migrants has led to a major scale of population outflow and demographic change (figure 6), previously established social ties between the Roma and locals have been in the process of re-shaping. This results in what might possibly be defined as social cohesion crisis with the crumbling of social cement of a previous era (Forrest & Kearns, 2001). However, the political economy of the neighborhood shows signs of social inclusion as locals and Iraqi migrants are doing material exchanges, in addition to the Iraqi residents working in various crafts (such as barbers and civil society organizations – *Ottoman Türkmen Associations*). Additionally, everyday life of the three groups with signs and symbols, such as Sultan's signatures, bears commonalities under neo-Ottomanist imaginary.

Therein, the thesis explores the spaces of the Roma, Iraqi and local communities in the Demirlibağçe Neighborhood to see how the production of space in particular streets hampers possible social cohesion at the local level. In this regard, their practices of place-making should be investigated through three mutually-constitutive relationship between the fields of spaces; perceived, conceived, and lived that Henri Lefebvre talks about (1991).

Lefebvre famously emphasizes the tautology that social space is a social product (p. 26). The implication and consequences of this tautological proposition is that with the advent of capitalism space contains;

- (1) biological reproduction (the family)
- (2) the reproduction of labor power (the working class per se); and
- (3) the reproduction of the social relations of production - that is, of those relations which are constitutive of capitalism and which are increasingly (and increasingly effectively) sought and imposed as such

In this study, the role of space in this tripartite ordering of things is best captured by specific attentions to the streets each group appropriates. In other words, the observed illustration of the case of Demirlibağçe is explained in tripartite ordering of social relations of production and reproduction. Hence, the aim is to go beyond the abstract policies and their verbal outputs that focus on the economic and legal integration processes for the immigrants with a reductionist approach to their spaces. The thesis takes the social space of Demirlibağçe as a tool for the analysis of place-making

strategies of the three groups; the locals, the Roma, and the Iraqi by operationalizing Lefebvre's spatial triad – spatial practice, representations of space, and representational space.

Lefebvre defines *spatial practice* as “daily reality (daily routine) and urban reality (the routes and networks which link up the places set aside for work, 'private' life - and leisure)” within *perceived space*, under neocapitalism (1991, p. 38). In his exemplification, he refers to the daily life of a tenant in a government-subsidized high-rise housing project. In parallel with his example, spatial practice relates to the daily life of the i-) Iraqi immigrants under International Protection living in a state of partial legal inclusion/exclusion, ii-) the Roma population working in precarious conditions, and iii-) locals whose space is threatened by and benefiting from the others' practices. These spatial practices of the members of each group are examined through their negative and/or positive *perceptions* for each other.

Moreover, Lefebvre indicates that “spatial practice and architecture-as-practice were bound up with each other, and each expressed the other” (1991, p. 272). Thus, dual in character, the same concept of spatial practice completes with the intervention by the representation of space by way of construction, such as motorways and (air) transportation. This intervention in the case of Demirlibahçe is the urbanization pattern of the neighborhood in general, and in particular the destruction of the historical Demirlibahçe Primary School in 2017, and its renewal in 2019, together with the destruction of the bridge connecting the Iraqi's *Doğanbahçesi St.* with the Roma's *Demirkapı St.*

The renovation of the school and the bridge as planned and abstract space refers to the second concept – the *representations of spaces*. Interventions by such constructions in the abstract space “serve profit, assign special status to particular places by arranging them in the hierarchy, and stipulate exclusion (for some) and integration (for others)” (1991, p. 288). As the space of a (social) order is hidden in the order of space, those who are included and excluded are contained in their abstraction. Being a dominant space, the sole emphasis is on the exchange value of space, not its use value. The political economy for the ownership of commodities coincides with the political economy of space, of particular locations, in Demirlibahçe neighborhood. While the

relationships of the things in space are replaced by the representations (p. 311), the spaces, in parts and in whole, are defined in terms of the perception of an abstract subject (p. 313). Emphasizing the impossibility of conceiving abstract space in its abstraction, Lefebvre highlights the investigation of instrumentalization of political economy to avoid reductionism in reading the space (p. 306-313).

In this regard, he proposes two converging angles of approaches that examine the space in its parts and in its whole to see how representation of space abstracts the quality of the space. The parts of the space are abstracted through conception of its abstract subjects – the Roma represented as troublesome population, the Iraqis as invasive migrants, and locals as former elites – as well as the streets appropriated by the subjects. Relatedly, the neighborhood space, described as a whole, is also abstracted in this second approach; its exchange value is measured by the quality condition of housing and its distance to the city center for the spatial-analysis. Attaining these two ways of apprehending space, Demirlibağçe’s transformation can be grasped.

These two angles accentuate the theory of centrality in explaining “new capacity for *concentration*” (p. 334) in the streets of Demirlibağçe. Lefebvre defines centrality, whether mental or social, as “the gathering together and meeting of whatever coexists in a given space” (p. 331). As a form, centrality is also movable and centers of specific locations can shift. Further, as there can emerge new capacities for concentration, there can also be multiple centralities differing in scales and sizes. Diverging from the conventional understanding of urban being composed of *the* center and peripheries, Lefebvre asserts that “complete urbanization of society” (2003) leads to the massive dispersal of centralities with differing urban hierarchies on a planetary scale (Schmid, 2018, p. 604).

In Demirlibağçe, there are three centralities in the neighborhood appropriated by three groups, and exploited by capitalists. *Uzğörenler* St. constitutes the center for all, but is mainly appropriated by the locals. *Doğanhahçesi* St. and *Ağaçlı* St. have become the center for Iraqi immigrants in general, even for those who are not living in Demirlibağçe. Especially on weekends, Iraqi *Türkmens* from *Keçiören*, *Demetevler*, and *Abidin Paşa* neighborhoods come to *Ağaçlı* St. for shopping. *Doğanhahçesi* St. is only a center for the residential agglomeration. Lastly, *Demirkapı* St. has become a

center for the Roma residents since 1990s that they have residential agglomeration in there. While women meet in the street, men have their own *kahvehane* (café) that locals refer to as *Roman kahvesi*.

However, the emergence of new centralities has led to shattering of neighborhood spaces (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 334). As their arrival has created a massive demand for housing, the space was firstly “rendered artificially scarce” near to the centre *Uzgörenler St.* “so as to increase its ‘value’” (1991, p. 334). Resulting in the exploitation of Iraqi immigrants by the home owners and real-estate agents, in the two streets (*Doğanbahçesi* and *Ağaçlı*) the rental prices for housing were skyrocketed and uninhabitable places were sold out. Yet, following the emergence of centers for Iraqi residents after 2018, the neighborhood has started to lose its value in its representation as being considered as a *migrant neighborhood*. Indeed, Iraqi dwellers among themselves call *Doğanbahçesi St.* as *Baghdad Street*.

This process illustrates “the way in which space in practice becomes the medium of segregations, of the component elements of society as they are thrust out towards peripheral zones” (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 334). Yet, the use value does not disappear in the streets. The concentration of the Iraqi migrants in two streets for their use value causes a loss in the exchange value of the neighborhood’s housing prices due to its representativeness. For the “acquirer of space is still buying a use value,” the locals and the Roma residents are adapting themselves into this representativeness which makes it neither an enclave and a ghetto nor hyperghetto²³ that actually benefits from “exchange of signs” (p. 334).

With its differing centralities, the abstract space bears its own contradictions. In the third realm of social space, in the *representational space*, everyday life with the signs and cultures of the three groups contradict and slightly facilitates with one another, through the neo-ottomanist socio-political agenda. Although the everyday life with the signs and cultures are compiled under the neo-ottomanist way of life, (i.e. displaying the flags of former the Turkic States of Ottoman Empire and Uygur Khanate inside or in front of the commercial places, referring to the common heritage in discourses, and

²³ According to Wacquant (2008; 2014), core community in ghetto has a sense of belonging while in hyper-ghetto there is a shame to live in the specific location.

putting the Ottoman Sultans' tughras on the walls), it is also contradictory among the three groups of habitants, as it creates political exclusion.

The immigrants from Telafer, a city in northwestern Iraq, identify themselves as 'Ottoman Turks' as a strategy of self-integration into the social and cultural aspects of a Turkish imaginary (Anderson, 1991; Batuman, 2010) from which they are institutionally excluded because of their citizenship status. While Iraqi immigrants receive livelihood assistance from the *Ottoman Türkmén Association* (funded by the Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs and the Turkish Red Crescent), I observed (see section 3.4.) a mutually constitutive relationship between migrants' self-identification and constructed Ottoman identity (Chien Yang, 2017).

Particularly, Ankara has been the epitome for nation-building process through urbanization. Having been designated the capital to replace Istanbul, Ankara was reflected as "a declaration of the triumph of the new secular nationalist ideology advanced by Atatürk against Ottomanism" (Cınar, 2005, p. 100). However, the current ruling party's (AKP) orientation in defining the nation in accordance with the mimicry of the Ottoman Past has exacerbated the existing clash borne from the predicament of modernism (Bozdoğan, 1997). The acceleration of the ideological diversities between the secularist and the Islamist has led to the hegemony of Islamist urbanism through architecture in defining the nation (Batuman, 2017), within which Iraqi *Türkméns* are (self-)integrating themselves.

Therefore, this mimesis of Ottomanism has its role and function in this domination of space (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 376). Still, differences might endure and arise not only on the margins of the homogenized realm, but also in their own centralities in the four streets of Demirlibağçe. In this regard, the third concept of social space, *representational space*, is operationalized to illustrate the spatial struggles and commonalities among the habitants. Further, these struggles are revealed through the contradiction between use and exchange value of spaces (or streets).

Table 3 Theoretical Framework for linking the Production of Space and Social Cohesion.

	Determinants of Social Cohesion
Perceived Space	Negative & Positive Patterns of Discourses Constructing the other, self, and Demirlibağçe by Residents, Shop owners, and Real-estate agents
Conceived Space	Exchange value of Demirlibağçe Representations of the locals, migrants and Roma Representation of the streets Renewal projects of School and Railway
Lived Space	Ottomanism and Turkishness

2.6. Similar Studies on Migrants and Urban

This research with its best capacity is an attempt to overcome the problem of external validity on which the Turkish literature on immigration (mainly the Syrians) falls into. The migrants in Turkey are generalized over Syrians, and Syrians are generalized over the location they inhabit. The particularities of each case are swallowed by such generalizations, evident mostly in the reports by national/international organizations. A brief categorical literature review on migration studies within Turkish contexts seems to follow four approaches: (1) politico-institutional approaches, (2) judicial-institutional approach, (3) socio-cultural, and (4) socio-institutional approach.

- (1) Politico-institutional approaches mainly investigate Turkish state's institutional patterns for managing migration flows in relation to its foreign relations (Ergüven, 2013; İçduygu, 2015; Koca, 2016; Gökçek, 2017; İçduygu & Şimşek, 2017). Therein, their methodological approaches take Turkey as a black box, to use an IR terminology. The focus is mainly on the migration

governance at nation-state and international level, instead of the migrant subjects.

- (2) Judico-institutional approach examines immigrants' accessibility to judicial measures for their socio-economic protections (Cankurtaran & Albayrak, 2019). Being significantly analyzed within the focus on vulnerable groups, studies in this orientation contribute to the totality of integration studies for drawing attention on judico-institutional capacity building. Migrants are still abstracted over the term itself, and calculations for capacity-building are made on quantitative levels.
- (3) Socio-cultural approach analyzes the public opinion. The members of an identity community, such as 'Türks' and 'Syrians', are generalized, and taken as the same (Ekinci, 2015; Erdoğan, 2015; Efe, Pakso, & Pandır, 2015). These studies contribute to the totality of migration and social cohesion research by investigating the factors that shape the perceptions of the local and immigrant communities towards each other.
- (4) Socio-institutional approach focuses on the local complexities. The main emphasis is directed on the public schools, taken as *habitus* (Bourdieu, 2008). These studies contribute to the process of social cohesion by analyzing the role of public institutions at the local level (Dillioğlu, 2015; Sunata & Bircan, 2015; Sezgin & Yolcu, 2016; Ara & Yasun, 2016; Erçetin, 2018; Çelik & İçduygu, 2019; Gencer, 2019; Taşkın & Erdemli, 2018).

However, majority of the migration and social cohesion studies fails to provide concrete solution, as they reproduce the external validity problem. The migrants in Turkey are generalized over Syrians, and Syrians are generalized over the location they inhabit. Hence, instead of making large urban-scale generalizations, this research strictly focuses on the four streets (Türkyılmaz & Ayaokur, 2014).

Further, the study of immigrant integration in urban context is also analyzed by the national literature. Being emphasized, for instance, spatial mobility and practices of the Syrian migrants under Temporary Protection are being mapped (Alanyalı, 2017; Savran & Sat, 2019). However, in describing the immigrants' spatial practices (Eraydın, 2017), these studies are not too much concerned with the matter of social integration through which the space is actually reproduced. Indeed, such a dialectical

relation is recognized in the course of establishing new social cohesions (Uslu & Gökçe, 2010). Following this realization, the ‘street space’ is seen as social interaction, recognition of group identity and communicating with places and people (p. 2803).

In particular, international literature on migration contributes this research more with regard to its undertaking of Lefebvrian conceptualization of *right to the city*. While it has been argued about the possibility of urban citizenship to co-regulate immigrant citizenship from an inclusive perspective (Gebhardt, 2016), the conceptual integrity of *right to the city* has long been discussed (Dikeç & Gilbert, 2002; Varsanyi, 2006). While its operationalization refers to the “struggles over the conditions and inequities of globalization and urban life” (Dikeç & Gilbert, 2002, p. 64), a non-bounded but grounded citizenship is seen as a solution for refugee rights (Varsanyi 2006, p. 239). For noncitizen status can compromise claims to the city, the Lefebvrian conceptualization targets immigrants’ legal status and break free from the “territorial trap” (Agnew, 1994) that sees earth space as being consisting merely of territorial states (Karayigit, 2021). Although assigning a local citizenship status to immigrants at city level does not seem to be possible to the centralized governmental system in Turkey, a possibility of *de facto* involvement on a neighborhood level will be discussed at the conclusion.

Therefore, following this paradigm and the ethnographic undertakings in the field of immigrant integration (Saraçoğlu & Belanger, 2018; Erensü & Tellieli, 2019), I aimed to thematize socio-spatial rearrangements (Saraçoğlu & Belanger, 2019) by focusing on two main research questions i-) how the production of space in particular streets hampers possible social cohesion at the local level, and ii-) to what extent immigrants’ spatial practices concretize their sense of belonging, while in return creating exclusionary spaces within the streets where preexisting social cohesion between the locals and *Roma* is reshaped. Analyzing the production of social space, the research, thus, aspires to provide a way forward for depicting the possibility of new social cohesion in Demirlibahçe Neighborhood. (Saraçoğlu & Belanger, 2019).

CHAPTER 3

PRODUCTION OF DEMİRLİBAHÇE AND FORMS OF SOCIAL COHESION

Asserting the trialectic of perceiving, conceiving, and living, Lefebvre indicates that social life is a unity of physical, mental, and lived worlds (Fuchs, 2019). This unity is a combination of “mentally perceiving the physical and social world; mentally conceiving this world in particular cognitive ways as thoughts; and living the world in social relations in which humans communicatively produce themselves, use-values, collective decisions, rules, morals, norms, collective meanings” (Fuchs, 2019, p. 144). Therefore, the three pillars aspire to capture this unity by (1) firstly displaying the perceptions through negative and positive discourses of the residents, shop owners, and real-estate agents and others about the physical and social settings of Demirlibahçe Neighborhood after 2014²⁴. (2) Secondly, the reflections of these discourses for representing the space and their impacts on political economy are illustrated. (3) Thirdly, I will emphasize how the perceptions of the physical and social setting and representation of space and political economy produce the lived space through cultural signs of Ottomanism and Turkishness.

3.1. Perceptions of Space

The perception of space is analyzed through discourses and spatial transformations extracted through semi-structured interviews and participant observations. The analysis of these data is represented by comparing and contrasting related discourses made by participants for constructing the self, the other, and the neighborhood. The

²⁴ In order to preserve the confidentiality, the information about the interviewees is given codes (TR for locals, RM for the Roma, and IRQ for Iraqi *Türkmen*).

self refers to the dwellers of Demirlibağçe since 1960s, and how they see themselves. Although most of the initial dwellers have moved to other districts of Ankara, or outside of Ankara, the same discourses are mentioned by ‘late-comers’ to capture the neighborhood’s historical identity. ‘The other’ refers to the changing characteristics of the inhabitants that turn the neighborhood into a heterogeneous space. The aim, thus, is to represent the socio-spatial transformation of the neighborhood. Construction of the neighborhood refers to the represented characteristics that links the discussion to the second pillar of the *conceived space*.

3.1.1. Constructing the Self, the Other and the Neighborhood

The inhabitants of the neighborhood have perceptions in constructing themselves, the other, and the neighborhood they dwell in. Starting with the discourses regarding the history of the neighborhood, this section aims to provide the transformation of the neighborhood with regard to the spatial practices and discourses emerged with the arrival of the Iraqi migrants.

Locals’ construction of the self, the others and the neighborhood

Demirlibağçe’s local residents strongly assert the *elite* characteristics of the neighborhood with regard to its close physical distance to hospitals, universities, city centers, *Muallim Mektebi* (later Conservatory), and military institution (*Cebeci Askeri Dikimevi / Military Sewing Workshop*). Rooted residents of the neighborhood illustrate this characteristic as:

Can you imagine... thanks to the Conservatory, Müjdat Gezen, Mehmet Ali Erbil, Cihan Ünal, Selda Bağcan... These people passed through Demirlibağçe. They passed through the elite settlements of Ankara. And Demirlibağçe was already one of the elite places of Ankara. It was really a quality place... Neşet Ertaş... he also lived here. After that, Recep Kaymak²⁵... These are the people my big brothers told me about. (*TR5, Male, 1970, Real-estate Agent, Uzgörenler St.*)

²⁵ All the listed names in this text are famous film, theatre and music artists, and folk poets

I was born and raised in Demirlibahçe. It was an elite place until 1980. Until the period when the Conservatory was active. And the artists in the Conservatory were always in our neighborhood. Both instrumentalists and soloists used to live in the houses with gardens with plum, apple trees, apricot orchards, along the railroad tracks at that time. Especially on the weekends, *saz* was played, and folk songs were sung. It was beautiful. Also, our neighborhood had always been metropolitan. I used to have a Jewish friend, an Armenian friend, an Albanian. There was such diversity back then. They lived until the 70's. After that, there were quite a few Albanian immigrants. I had friends with whom I was very close, and there was no such negativity like today. There was a strong leftist opposition too. (*TR18, Male, 1954, Engineer and Lawyer, Uzgörenler St.*)

While all the local residents, regardless of their time spent in the neighborhood, unanimously construct Demirlibahçe as an *elite* neighborhood of Ankara, this construction depends on two factors – physical location and the people it has hosted. Reference is made to friendship, trust, and belongingness in the neighborhood. However, the street-scale particularities are not mentioned, except for playing football and natural beauties such as apple trees. These particularities (seen as negative transformation) are mentioned after the ‘others’ move in the neighborhood and agglomerate in particular streets.

Regarding the Roma, the locals had mainly negative perceptions from 1980s to late 2000s. Yet, with the arrival of Iraqi migrants, these have changed slightly, and reinforced the ongoing social cohesion between them after mid-2000s. Since most of the participants construct the Roma in relation with their negative perceptions of the Iraqi *Türkmens*, the Roma are now seen highly positive. Yet, previous perceptions of Roma still target their large numbers in the streets, their understanding of hygiene, and spatial practices such as noise.

It was very bad when they (*the Roma*) arrived. It started in the 1980s, but mostly in the 1990s. Roma still have a sense of alienation. Their racial exclusion is chronic. You have to see their way of life. Their speaking styles and accents are different. However, no one can say anything about their humanity and personality. I've been in many people's homes for my job. Their clothes may be in dirt, but their homes are immaculate. So, let me put it this way, the decoration of the walls, the ceilings are important. For example, how often do you get your house painted? About once every 10 years, right? They paint their house every two years (*TR15, Male, 1975, House Restoration and Decoration, Uzgörenler St.*)

Roma are minding their own businesses. The only thing is just they like to play music at night, by their very nature. Otherwise, there is no harm in them, they also contribute a lot to the economy here. They say they are Roma, but they are no different from us. (*TR20, Male, 1968, Real-estate Agent, Uzgörenler St.*)

Most of the rich, no longer sent their children to school when the Roma first came in this neighborhood. They were rude, and the rich wanted to keep their children away from them in the 1980s and 1990s. (*TR11, Male, 1938, Retired civil servant, Demirkapı St.*)

I have never had any Roma friends, but I know their life well. Roma do not harm anyone, they take great care about their clothing. However, they are not loyal to their debts, and they make noise. (*TR6, Male, 1990, Civil Servant (Night Watchment), Demirkapı St.*)

The Roma did not cause such trouble in this neighborhood. Absolutely. The locations of the Roma are already known, Demirkapı St... they are clustered there. They did not cause so much trouble. Let me tell you something. What do you call us, for example? Turk? A Roma is also a Turk. Further, rest assured, they are far superior to us in terms of decency, culture, and honor. Also, I have Roma clients. Be sure, for example, they borrow eggs, I give them without hesitation because they are loyal to everything. But there is also the gypsy part, these are the parts that are outside. Ours are not gypsies, ours are Roma. (*TR12, Female, 1962, Shopkeeper, Uzgörenler St.*)

I do not know the exact date of the arrival of the Roma. But I know that after 1997, they mostly agglomerated in our neighborhood. I know because I had children in school at that time. Firstly the lifestyles of the Roma did not suit the locals. They like to live at night and sleep during the day. This surely effected their children, in terms of absenteeism to school and performance. However, there was also a very good side, for example, that the Roma used to perform in school choirs. They were at the forefront of the 23 April and 19 May ceremonies. They knew music (already) without knowing how to speak. These are truly civilized people. Besides, they tried to adapt to the society by helping out to other school issues such as collecting money. The reason of their bad performance at school was that they already had a profession. They said that if they could not learn reading, they would go and play instruments. This was the logic. (*TR22, Female, 1967, Mukhtar, Ağaçlı St.*)

Although these initial perceptions towards the Roma persists in current discourses, the arrival of the Iraqi Türkmen has changed the way locals perceive the Roma. As the residents express this process of change in their perceptions, it is mentioned that the negative perspectives are being re-shaped for this particular Roma population of Demirlibağçe.

When the Iraqi Turkmen first came, the people started to love the Roma. The elite of the neighborhood used to complain about them. Now people see them as being quality. I also wish everyone was Roma. They are very clean people. If you go to a Roma house, you'll see the cleanest house in your life. The façade of the house might be shabby, but the interior is amazing. They wear the best, eat the best, and live the best. (*TR28, Male, 1965, Real-estate Agent, Uzgörenler St.*)

The Roma have completely adapted here. They are also Turks. And If this place was completely Roma instead of Iraqis, there would be nothing wrong, it would be perfect indeed. (*TR16, Male, 1990, Civil Servant, lives outside but works in the neighborhood*)

The difference is that we are now in touch with the people we call Roma. But, when I am asked to rent a building, there is a situation like this: The owner does not want me to give the house to a Roma and foreigners. But in general, we have established a dialogue with the Roma, but this is not possible with the *Türkmen*s. They are dirty. (*TR9, Male, 1960, owns a coffeehouse where Roma are the clients in Demirkapı St*)

I like the Roma. Their culture and Iraqi culture are not the same. For one thing, the Roma are not dirty. Yes, they have a different life. Those here are the Roma elites. In the past, they were excluded, but look at the situation now with the migrants. Now we're seeing worse. (*TR7, Female 1977, Real-estate Agent, Uzgörenler St.*)

The perception of the locals in the neighborhood towards the Roma has been reshaped upon the arrival of the Iraqi *Türkmen*. Being however mostly positive currently, the initial causes for the production of negative discourses for the Roma emerged from their:

- Performance at school
- Life-styles (not paying the debts, playing instruments at night, fancy clothing),
- Way of talk and accent,
- Numbers in population, and
- Being a closed community for themselves

However, each of these 'negative' perceptions now is acknowledged by the locals as being the result of the Roma's perished socio-economic conditions. For instance, the Roma children's performance at school is now understood to be the result of their fathers' working conditions. The same condition relates also to the noisy life-style. Their clothing and 'irrational' expenditures, such as paying extra care to house

decoration, are started to be seen as part of their ‘joyful’ culture. Their high number (crowdedness) and being a closed community are now perceived as source for a secure environment against any foreign threat to occur.

Similar categories of producing negative discourses apply also to the Iraqi *Türkmen*. The locals negatively perceive their performance at school, live-styles, way of talk, population size, and being a closed community as well. They firstly, think that the organic tissue of the neighborhood was destroyed because of their arrival. Secondly, their migrant status (not the legal terminology) is now turned to be seen negative as the locals think they should not have ‘comfortable’ life since they, as asylum seekers who fled from the war instead of arming up, do not deserve it. Lastly, the locals disregard the ethnic status of Iraqi migrants, as they are seen Arabs, not Turks.

I have observed an increasing tension during my initial site visits during September-October 2019 between the locals and the immigrants. While the main reason was based on the numbers of the immigrants *occupying* the streets, acceleration of negative discourses coincided with the discussions on Facebook. Since my involvement to the Facebook Groups in late 2019 (see methodology section), I have seen three major Facebook discussion posts that led to hate speeches against the migrants. While the first one was in September 2020, the second was in December 2020 amid the COVID-19 outbreak and the economic constraints brought by the lockdown policies, and the third one was in February 2021 mentioning about the loss of the neighborhood to the Iraqis. These discourses align with the face-to-face interviews.

The first major post (figure 8) came on 9 September 2020. The post calls on the local residents to act against the migrants in Demirlibahçe. Asking for a petition to get the migrants kicked out off the neighborhood, the reasons are stated as their dirtiness, staring with ‘bad’ eyes, and causing decrease in house prices. Indeed, some of the locals collected signatures for this and gave it to the *Mukhtar* on 21 October 2020 for handling the issue. The main issue was again not their culture in general, but their number and spatial practices that the locals perceived in the streets, as well as the economic concerns (discussed in section 3.3.).

The second post (figure 9) on 1 February 2021 shown below has a more ‘polite’ attitude inquiring about why the neighborhood has become a campus for Iraqi

migrants. The causes for this transformation are blamed on the real-estate agents in the discussion parts of the post. The outrage also targets their exceptionality in buying goods in shops for lower prices due to their migrant status. Besides, the opening of shops owned by Iraqis is seen as a high economic status (and thus they are not deserving aid) and it is questioned if they pay taxes like proper citizens do.

The organic tissue of the neighborhood is disrupted because the local residents are now unfamiliar with the faces they see in the streets. The increased numbers of one group concentrated in two streets of Demirlibaħçe (Doğanhahçesi St. and Ađaçlı St.) leads to increase in negative perception blaming the immigrants as the root cause for the neighborhood's transformation. Although unofficial records for the number of Iraqi residents in the neighborhood kept by the *Mukhtar* on her own initiative are 1173²⁶ (dispersed mostly over these four streets but particularly in Doğanhahçesi St.), their visibility in the eye of the locals leads to the production of negative discourses. Based on the Iraqi residents' numbers, the locals also comment on their hygiene, their behaviors and loudness, and laziness.

Right now, everywhere is dirty. Façades of the buildings are also corrupted. Personal hygiene is already below zero. But before, the façades would be well-kept and beautiful. Now it's broken. They are also disrespectful. They are constantly whisking things from upstairs (*TR10, Female, 1983, Shopkeeper, Ađaçlı St.*)

When *Türkmen* hang the laundry up to the window, it creates an ugly view. It creates a gypsy looking image, you know. There was no such thing before. Now, the buildings stink, they have a strange spice. (*TR24, Male, 1989, Women Hair Dresser, Ađaçlı St.*)

This corona virus does not affect the *Türkmen*, I guess. They always walk around without masks. Now, I do not allow them to enter my store without a mask. They say that they do not have the virus, but maybe I have? Maybe I am sick. No, they start with the permission of Allah. Always take refuge in Allah. We all take refuge in Allah, but first take your precautions. (*TR12, Female, 1962, Shopkeeper, Uzgörenler St.*)

²⁶ Demirlibaħçe Mukhtar S. Hanım has kept the number of Iraqi immigrants who received foreigner ID card starting with no "99" until January 2019.




Figure 8 Facebook post on “Demirlibahçeliler biz bir aileyiz” for kicking the migrants out from the neighborhood on 9 September 2020.



Figure 9 Facebook post on “Ankara Demirlibahçem” inquiring about the Iraqi residents in Demirlibahçe. 2 February 2021

At an extreme level, the Iraqi *Türkmen* are even seen as potential rapists and killers by the locals. As the country now hosts the most refugee population in the world (Christophersen, 2021), the negative meaning assigned to the migration politics leads the Turkish citizens to feel relational discomfort with the refugees, particularly the Syrians (Akyuz, Akbas, & Onat, 2021). In Demirlibahçe neighborhood, locals emphasize the increased level of fear from the migrants that might commit crime, especially against women.

My cousin was going to Ata Secondary School, she is very little, a young girl. A Syrian followed her for two or three days and vocally abused her. She was too scared to tell us at first. Later on, he cornered her near the school, and kissed her on the lips. There has always been harassment, but I have never seen anything like this. Our grandmother warned us not to go to the police and to keep quiet so our father wouldn't go out looking for that migrant (**TR3, Female, 2000, recent graduate, Doğanbahçesi St.**)

It is a disaster. For example, I could come to my house from outside at 11 p.m. from the cinema or else. Now, after 9 o'clock, there are Iraqi youths here and I cannot travel without tear gas. No street security at night (**TR33, Female, 1975, Veterinarian, Uzgörenler St.**)

We saw the danger from the moment they (*Türkmen*) first started to arrive. We resisted so much that we would not give houses to the *Türkmens*. As a real-estate agent, we resisted a lot. A *Türkmen* who came first told us that the fire will fall here too²⁷ (**TR7, Female 1977, Real-estate Agent, Uzgörenler St.**)

I have been in contact with the police station since the start of my field research. I was informed that there was no physical/sexual abuse recorded in the neighborhood. However, the locals mention that they have experienced such cases, but decided not to take the issue to legal arena by going to the police. They reflect that their aim was to keep their family (fathers and brothers) away from the trouble as they would seek for revenge from migrants. They elaborate their exhaustion with the judiciary steps against the migrants, thinking that they would not receive any punishment²⁸.

²⁷ “Fire will fall here too” is a direct translation of a Turkish phrase indicating what catastrophic events that happened in Iraq will spread to Turkey.

²⁸ The participant (TR7) indicated that police officers said to her they cannot take any action against the migrants if they are undocumented.

As the locals express their already existing anxiety towards the men immigrants in the neighborhood, their concerns are tripled with the number of children playing in the streets. The main problem is seen in their 'irrational' reproduction, along with the role of the women in the family. While the women are portrayed as a sort of animal for breeding, it is mentioned that *Türkmen* have too many children which they cannot support. As the children are led free, the locals perceive their play in the streets as threatening. Shifting the image of the migrants from vulnerable to threatening group, *wild* plays of the children in the streets facilitate negative discourses about the future of the neighborhood and the country.

The problem with the *Türkmen* is they are married too early. In our law code, for example, it is forbidden to marry before the age of 18. And this is where the real problems emerge from. You have children at a young age, they grow up without care. When you have 1-2 children, you care about them, but when you have 8-9, maybe you don't even know their names. There are also many consanguineous marriages, and it leads to disability. **(TR16, Male, 1990, Civil Servant, lives outside but works in the neighborhood)**

They give toy guns into children's hands, especially on holidays. I don't know why they give toys in their hands like that. So, I called the police station in Demirlibahçe, but they say call 155. They are not interested. The police came once. The migrants dispersed when the police arrived, but gathered again after an hour. **(TR2, Female, 1966, Retired Banker, Ağacli St.)**

They used to be a little shy at first, but now they are not at all. For example, I wear masks and they do not. Our people do not pay attention to the mask either, but they (migrants) are worse than us. And when you warn them, they do not mind what you say. They understand, but they pretend not to understand. If you could see the children going to school in the morning. Especially if you see it during the holidays. Guns in their hands. They get the children used to it. A man who sold his homeland does everything to us. **(TR17, Male, 1976, Barber, Demirkapi St.)**



Figure 10 A picture from Eid al-adha. Children playing with toy guns in Doğanbahçesi St. Photo by the author, 31 July 2020.



Figure 11 A picture from Eid al-adha. Children playing with toy guns in Doğanbahçesi St. Photo by the author, 31 July 2020

Lastly, locals doubt about Iraqi migrants' representation as *Türkmen*. Abovementioned spatial practices of the *Türkmen* clashes with the imagined *Turkishness* shaped after the Republican revolution²⁹. Concretized through maps hung on each high-school classrooms together with the lyrics of national oath and national anthem, a unique Turkish identity is established. For example, Turkish identity is determined territorially with regard to the migration history of the Turks, in the history textbooks taught throughout high school education in Turkey until the 2000s. As seen from the figure 12 below, distinct peoples living in various countries are represented as a united body” (Batuman, 2010, p. 226). As seen in the map with red lines, almost half of the Iraqi territory is represented as being consisting of the *Turks* who are not autonomous in the country.

However, the marking of *Turks* on the map does not mean all *Turks* share common memory and history. When faced with the spatial practices, locals' perception clashes with this imaginary, leading them to separate themselves from *Türkmen*. Further, while the image of the *Turk* is portrayed as brave warriors by birth who would die fighting to defend their homeland, the status of migrants equates with the cowards fleeing from war.

Let me tell you this... I can honestly say that these are not *Türkmen*. These are Arab-Kurds, directly Arab-Kurds. When you say *Türkmen*, there is the word *Türk*. No *Türk* leaves his homeland and runs away. You give your fight, but they didn't do anything, at the slightest difficulty they run away and left their land, and came here. (*TR1, Male, 1960, Retired Tradesman, Uzgörenler St.*)

Is it a Turk who sells out his homeland, and rains bullets on the state, stamps on the flag? He is *gavur* (unfaithful). In my eyes, he is worse than a Russian and the Greek. (*TR28, Male, 1965, Real-estate Agent, Uzgörenler St.*)

²⁹ Two pseudohistorical hypotheses (Turkish History Thesis and The Sun Language Theory) were posited during the 1930s to rewrite the history for a new Turkish identity; “emphasizing the ethnic, cultural, and civic components of Turkish nationalism, and leaving the Ottoman and Islamic identity behind” (Opçin-Kıdal, 2020, p. 60).

TÜRK DÜNYASI HARİTASI




Figure 12 Map of ‘Turkic World Map’. Source: (Türk Dili ve Edebiyatı, Edebiyat IV, 1993, cited in Batuman, 2010)

Eventually, what is seen is that production of negative discourses navigates through three themes; changing tissue of the neighborhood, migrant status, and Turkishness (table 4). These three negative aspects, on the other hand, allow the locals to construct their -self. Differentiating themselves from the Roma and the *Türkmen*, the locals position themselves on a higher status. With this self-construction, the locals also claim the neighborhood space that they perceive as being *occupied* by the two groups.

Further, they also compare the Roma with Iraqi *Türkmen* and appreciate Roma’s existence and values added to this neighborhood in a regretful way. However, *Türkmen* are compared to former migrants (*muhacirs*) from Bulgaria in 1990-1991 to further exclude them. Still, neither of the two groups are perceived in a positive way. Eventually, in the current situation, the self is further concretized through firstly constructing Demirlibağçe as once an elite place shared by the Roma as a joyful community, and secondly defining the *Türkmen* as inferior.

Supposedly, they are also Turkish, but they do not speak Turkish. It is not clear who the people are in Doğanbahçe are. I am very worried about the future. Both Iraqis and Roma could not adapt to the society. Especially the Roma. Do they not have a passion for anything other than music? Has anyone from the Roma ever managed to be in public services or faculty? And they give birth all the time. Each family has 4 children at least. What will these kids do? Will they live with the instrument? Besides, what will those who come from Iraq do? They are not like us. Ottoman Turks always made contribution to their life. But the Ottoman Empire could not have any contribution to them. *(TR11, Male, 1938, Retired civil servant, Demirkapı St.)*

Table 4 Themes of negative discourses by the locals.

Themes of negative discourses		
Changing tissue of the neighborhood	Migrant Status	Turkishness
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Numbers, - Dirtiness - Loudness - Harassments 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Vulnerable and people in-need 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Cowardness

Lastly, these negative perceptions are in dual relationship with the spatial practices of the Roma and the Iraqi *Türkmen* and are bound up with architecture-as-practice (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 272). As Lefebvre inserts, intervention by way of construction occurred in Demirlibağçe with two recent construction projects – renewal of the primary school and destruction of the bridge connecting Doğanbahçesi St. to the Demirkapı St. Resulting in the degeneration of the political economy in the upcoming years for the locals, these two spatial practices by construction are seen as the main sources that facilitated the abovementioned negative discourses.

There are other things, of course. Mamak Municipality was operating down the road. When it was moved, the economy collapsed. Also, there were around 10 thousand personnel in the military sewing institution across the street, now there are 3 thousand. They used to shop from here. Without considering these events, we cannot say, "oh, these Iraqis took our job." *(TR8, Male, 1975, Shopkeeper, Uzgörenler St.)*

People who were financially in good well-being moved from this neighborhood. Look, they destroyed the school. They even demolished the two schools at the same time, Demirlibahçe and Ata. Construction had not been over for about 2 years. They also destroyed the bridge. This is one of the most important reasons why people moved from here. When they destroyed the bridge, the shopkeepers' livelihood was taken away. In addition, families want their children to be educated in a place they live. Now they take their child to other schools by shuttles. What did the neighbors do? They moved. In those two following years, their space was filled with foreigners. *(TR5, Male, 1970, Real-estate Agent, Uzgörenler St.)*

The renewal project of the school is carried out in multiple locations of Mamak districts that each of the renovated school has similar architecture. The map below illustrates the location of these renovated schools with red squares (figure 13). Although the destruction and renewal of the historical primary and secondary schools were performed in 18 locations out of 70 in total, excluding those 19 in the peripheries of Mamak district, the case of Demirlibahçe Primary schools constitutes a controversial story. While the Strategy Plan of 2015 projects its 4 years aims to be actualized in 2019, the school was destroyed after completing its 2016-2017 curricular year (figure 14). The students and the teachers were moved to Nazım Berger Primary School for two years until the new building was completed on 27 March 2019, according to the official occupancy permit. However, the destruction of the school has not only affected the economy of the neighborhood, but also the belongingness of the locals who graduated from there.

I don't know much about Demirlibahçe Neighborhood, in terms of life and living there. However, I know this: Demirlibahçe Primary School provided stationary aid to the orphans in Korea, during the war. Think about it, in 1950... when we were lacking these materials and students could not find pencils in our schools. Yet, they sent aid packages to Ankara Primary School opened in Suwon *(TR 30, Male, 1930, Korean War Veteran, Cebeci)*

I posted photos in our Facebook group during the demolition of Demirlibahçe Primary School, and people were very emotional. Because their childhood was being destroyed. There were people who studied there in the 1960s and even 1955s. *(TR5, Male, 1970, Real-estate Agent, Uzgörenler St.)*




Figure 13 Map of the renovated schools in Mamak District (July, 2021), excluding those in periphery. Created by the author. Illustration: M. Gürkan Gürler




Figure 14 Destruction of the Demirlibağçe Primary School (built in 1949) as the students and passers-by watch. Source: Demirlibağçe Facebook Groups (2017)

Roma's construction of the self, the others and the neighborhood

The Roma residents of Demirlibaħçe have a reactive way of constructing the self and the others. In other words, they have perception on their own, but their construction of the self is done through reacting to and interacting with negative perceptions of the locals. While the Iraqi participants mainly tell that they are not interacting with the Roma population in extent due to their own personal preferences, the Roma residents refer to the locals as downgrading their culture and way of life through discourses and spatial practices.

Firstly, the Roma population perceives Demirlibaħçe in a similar way, though with less feeling of belonging attached to it. Their history of migration to the neighborhood is shaped solely by their work (i.e. being close to the night clubs and restaurants) and increased well-being (living in apartments instead of *geceköndü*). Migrating from Marmara region of Turkey to Ankara, the Roma residents of Demirlibaħçe previously dwelled in *Hamamönü*³⁰ due to its close distance to *Ulus* in 1950s.

I have been in Ankara for 45 years, whole of my life. We first came to Hamamönü, then we lived in Abidinpaşa for a while. Then we came to Demirlibaħçe, about 35 years ago. Ankara was becoming a center. For my father and brother were musicians, we came here because this place [Ankara] had a wider potential. I also learned the qanun here from my family. We already have a predisposition in the ear. We start doing this when we are born. We are born with music. (***RM3, Male, 1974, Musician, Demirkapı St.***)

While men of the Roma population mention about the economic aspects of Demirlibaħçe, the women refer to the neighborhood's bounding characteristics with neighbors. For most of the women are dependent on their husbands, as the breadwinners of the households, they previously had not developed any perception at first for the neighborhood. They were not using the public spaces in the city, though they had been engaging in neighboring activities in *Demirkapı St.* Now, they mention about the friendly relationships among each other. The same emphasis of being an *elite* place is also mentioned but not with a superior attitude.

³⁰ Hamamönü is a 'traditional' area that left idle while the new capital was expanding between old (north) and new (south). It is located in the historical city center of Ankara. It was gentrified in the 2000s. (Gültekin, Güzey-Kocataş, & Özcan, 2019).

I was born in Balıkesir, Sururluk. My father came to Ankara when I was 6 months old. I've been living here for 30 years. Demirlibahçe was a very decent place, close to everywhere. It was where elite people lived. How do you know when you say elite? Yes, there were people from the village, but there were manners and grace. Human relations were very good. We were able to visit our friends by knocking on their doors. I don't know who is in the apartment now. *(RM8, Female, 1967, Housewife, Demirkapı St.)*

However, the Roma population previously faced with exclusionary discourses and practices as well when they had first arrived. They were not *accepted* by the locals to the streets. Still today, some of the locals indicate that the landlords are not willing to give their houses to the Roma population although main perception of the Roma acknowledges how they keep their houses clean. Yet, the participants indicate that they have settled themselves in *Demirkapı St.* which consists mostly of their relatives from Marmara region.

When we first came here, we used to say Çamurlu Bahçe (or Muddy Garden in English) instead of Demirli-bahçe (Iron-garden). There was mud everywhere. At that time, there was one filthy man, not to mention his name. This man didn't give any of us, especially musicians, a home since we first arrived (late-1970s). He used to say, "these are Roma, I don't give them a home." However, as Atatürk said, "you can be anything, but you cannot be an artist." Because we make art, I do not understand why this discrimination exists. *(RM5, Male, 1967, Musician, Demirkapı St.)*

During the interviews, the Roma participants got emotional when talking about the exclusionary practices they faced when settling in the neighborhood. While remembering all these stigmatizing discourses about themselves, they later started to appropriate the street they live in. They now construct Demirlibahçe as their home, although some of the participants mention that the neighborhood is not the same due to the immigrants. Despite comparing their situation with the *Türkmen*, who receive financial, social, and psychological help, the Roma residents claim the neighborhood, at least *Demirkapı St.*, as their own.

Perhaps the best thing about living in Demirlibahçe is that we are still neighborly. Although I told you that I would like to live in the neighborhood of Çiğdem, I don't think I would make such close relationships there. Over there, you can't just leave the door open, or give your house's key to someone else. But here, I can still leave my door open or give the keys to a neighbor. *(RM1, Male, 1995, Musician, Demirkapı St.)*

Well, we are inseparable now, and none of us wants to live in another neighborhood. Everyone knows everybody now. We see Ayşe while walking, we see Fatma. We're chatting. Men go to work; women go to chat. We have a street culture. **(RM 6, Female, 1986, Housewife, Demirkapı St.)**

This claim of the *Demirkapı* St. is so strong that the locals now refer it as the Roma Street. Roma's claim over the street is acknowledged and justified by way of constructing the self firstly as *artists* and that the others should appreciate their work of art. The locals indicated that the Roma musicians are self-educated, and do not have a formal education in music. Some depredate the music performed by Roma as disturbing noises. As a reaction against such perceptions, the Roma participants indicate as a first problem the lack of opportunities provided to them by government institutions, and secondly the confirm that the actual quality of their music is not dependent on formal education. Although they learn music without having a formal education, they expect to be appreciated by the others. Referring to the founder of the Republic, Atatürk, the Roma eventually challenge the self-construction of the locals as *elites*.

I think the only reason for the exclusionary practices is the sound when we practice. Yet, we have to do this. I mean, we have Mamak Cultural Center near. To be honest, we did not receive any support for our practice. I think that people who do not know music purposefully create this perception. There was even a discussion about 'yours' and 'ours' with the locals here. I said, who do you mean by 'yours'? I took out my ID. I said, what does it say here? Turkish citizen. Finished. Senseless discussions. When I go out of this neighborhood and say that I am a musician, I receive respect. When they learn I play the qanun, they say they are surprised and envying and ask how I learnt, because it is a complex instrument. But when it comes here, things change. **(RM1, Male, 1995, Musician, Demirkapı St.)**

Secondly, the participants react to insulting discourses produced by the locals by constructing themselves as *honorable people*. Yet, this puts the Roma as *dishonorable*. While the locals talk about the Roma population as those who do not pay their debts to grocery stores or elsewhere, who are disloyal, who are dirty and smelly, and who have a tendency to steal, the Roma population strongly rejects such perceptions by mentioning defensively about their unique way of life.

Brother, we are Roma. We only deal with music. There are those who see Roma as thieves, apart from being a musician. Isn't there a thief or cheater in them (locals)? They have more dishonorable people than us. I'm in the music business, but a man says in front of me "don't be a gypsy". Why? Because of the music am I playing? You are worse than a gypsy. **(RM5, Male, 1967, Musician, Demirkapı St.)**

My sons are musicians too, have you heard anything about their honor? Never! If you have a request or help, they will run for your help with their souls. All are minding their work, and if you come to our house, we welcome you. Also, the work they do is very difficult, not everyone can do it. Music is a very important subject. Most of them work in TRT radio (*Turkish Radio and Television Institution*) and they are all humble people. My brother is retired from the Ministry of Culture, Folk Dance. My uncle Selahattin Altınbaş³¹ is a composer. I am proud of them. There is no such thing as banditry. There is no bullying at all. **(RM8, Female, 1967, Housewife, Demirkapı St.)**

We do not behave badly. Men gather here and chat with their friends. They talk about their daily lives and then they disperse. Then everyone goes home, washes, and goes to work. Hygiene is very important to us. It existed before the pandemic and now it continues. **(RM4, Female, 1965, casual work of point lace, Demirkapı St.)**

Thirdly and fourthly, the Roma population self-constructs themselves on the bases of their fun and united characteristics without reference to negative discourses produced by the locals. The Roma population expects the respect from those who exclude them because of their craft and honor.

Yet, in constructing the self, the Roma participants also acknowledge some of the negative discourses about them, such as being unsuccessful concerning education and making noise at night. It is in this regard that the participants differentiate themselves by way of constructing their own *others* (i.e. the gypsies and immigrants).

You must distinguish us from other Roma communities. What distinguishes us from others is that we produce music. There is contempt because of the name 'Roma'. People are afraid when we are mentioned. But, as I said, there are differences among the Roma. There are basket makers, broom makers, and blacksmiths. But we are musicians, we are different. We play for celebrities all over Turkey **(RM7, Group Interview with 4 male participants, Musicians Association)**

³¹ Famous compasor and oud player (1938-2003).

Let me tell you one of my anecdotes. One day, I was in primary school, a friend insulted me as a Gypsy. I raised my hand and said, teacher, can I ask you something? “Of course, my child,” he said. I said that my friend calls me a gypsy. I asked him if he could read the dictionary definition of gypsy, please. Then he read. He said something like people who do not settle down and roam freely. The Teacher said do you have these features? I said no, there is a certain place we live. Then the teacher got angry with my friend, and told him to apologize. *(RM7, Group Interview with 4 male participants, Musicians Association)*

There is a beautiful saying that I love; “Music would be left an orphan if there were no black and Roma in the world.” The most talented people in the world are Blacks and Roma. Jazz music is made by black people, and when you look at the flamingo music, it is Roma. The Roma perform in Turkey and in the Balkans. Today, for example, there is a similar situation against black people in America. They represent America in athletics, in boxing, and in music. But despite that, there's intense racism against them just because their color is black. Similar exclusion is being done to us. *(RM7, Group Interview with 4 male participants, Musicians Association)*

After differentiating themselves from other Roma communities (see section 2.2. *Locating the Roma*), the participants also isolate themselves from those locals that disrespect their craft. Indicating the international characteristics of the music, they criticize the locals who cannot read or play music. Again referring to the speeches of Atatürk on art, their response to the locals is shaped by being a good citizen that they contribute to the state while the so-called *elite* does nothing. However, with the arrival of the Iraqi migrants, the Roma's demand from the locals, or society in general, has increased. Parallel to their construction of self by explaining their characteristics and by differentiating the others, they express their disappointment for not receiving any value by the society or the state. Their feeling of isolation is further increasing.

Being a musician is an important value. It is very difficult to be an artist, but we were not given any value. I'm not just talking about our situation in Ankara. Immigrants are valued more than us, but we are the cultural assets of this country. I say negative things about the immigrants, because the government has not given a hand to us. *(RM3, Male, 1974)*

To summarize, the Roma population's perception of space is formed through constructions of the neighborhood, of the self, and of the other. Diverging from the locals' nostalgic remembrance, the Roma population recalls the exclusionary practices of not renting the houses and other discourses when they first moved in. Causing to the disapprobation of the neighborhood, the participants first perceive the physical

setting of the neighborhood as so dirty that they previously called the neighborhood muddy. Yet, with the further movements of relatives and other musicians, the Roma population appropriate their own space by way of agglomeration in Demirkapı St.

The construction of the self, thus, emerges from the initial exclusionary spatial practices and discourses by the locals. Contrary to the locals' self-construction through *othering* (Çelik, Bilali, & Iqbal, 2017), the Roma population initially mentions about two of their characteristics, which are music for men and honor for women, in responding negative discourses and practices. While this contributes to the formation of the self, they further illustrate their unique characteristics such as being fun and boundedness to each other. Acknowledging the *truth* of some of the negative aspects, such as having low grades at schools, they emphasize their profession and aim in life are unique but causing these problems in the society, as it is also 'different.'

Lastly, the Roma's perception of the social and physical setting is facilitated through comparing themselves with the others (the gypsies and the *Türkmen*). Re-emphasizing their unique capabilities of playing complex instruments, the participants put themselves on the highest status among the Roma communities in general. On the other hand, they emphasize their dissatisfaction about lack of respect and treatment compared to the migrants in Turkey. Exacerbated disastrously by the Covid-19 outbreak, lack of livelihood aids provided to them leads to the emergence of negative perception towards the *Iraqi Türkmen* running their own businesses in the neighborhood. Table below illustrates the argumentative scheme of the Roma perception and the causes of their spatial practices.

Table 5 Factors for the construction of the Roma Perception.

Construction of the Roma Perception		
Construction of the Neighborhood	Construction of the self	Construction of the other
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Denigrating the physical setting of the neighborhood due to the exclusion by the locals - Appropriation of the Demirkapı St. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Being artist - Being honorable - Being fun - Being united 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Locals as ignorant - Musicians, not gypsies - Immigrants as free beneficiaries

Iraqi Türkmen’s construction of the self, the others and the neighborhood

Iraqi *Türkmen* of Demirlibağçe have a pattern of constructing Demirlibağçe similar to the Roma. However, differing from them, the initial *Türkmen* arriving to the neighborhood has not faced exclusionary practices. On the contrary, their migrant (forced) and ‘Turkishness’ statuses created positive discourses among some of the locals. When their numbers increased, the discourses turned to be more negative, affecting their construction of the self and the other.

The *Türkmen* residents explain coming to Demirlibağçe neighborhood as a pure coincidence as their relatives have previously visited or stayed here before ISIS took over Telafer in 2014 (Chulov, 2014). Thus, the first motivation has been to come to a place that is already familiar. Further, the rental prices are affordable compared to other central districts of Ankara due to the over 30 years old housing stock³². Relatedly, the *Türkmen* stress the optimal location of Demirlibağçe as being close to center, hospitals, and schools.

³² Further debate is done in section 3 – Conceived Space of Demirlibağçe.

I have been living in Demirlibahçe since 2016. The main reason we settled here is because most of our relatives are here. For example, I can call my uncle and my brother so that we can help each other. Apart from that, the rents here are also affordable compared to other places. For example, this place is much more convenient than Çankaya. And here is a central place. **(IR4, Male, 1974, second-hand phone business, Uzgörenler St.)**

In constructing the neighborhood, *Türkmen* residents make references to their previous life in Telafer. The main emphases are given to the sizes of the houses, village life, and working conditions. The participants indicate that they had large size houses in Telafer that they could stay with the whole family; grandparents, parents, children, and grandchildren. Highlighting the freedom they had in such a huge place, they perceive the houses in Demirlibahçe as ‘modern jail.’ Expressing the rapid change in their life style in Demirlibahçe, nostalgia of living in the village life is mentioned.

The houses were so large. Oooo... You could get a tank inside. We are in a cage here, I swear. We used to sleep on the roofs there in the summer. Here, there are a lot of people, but we are not used to a crowd. Now most Turkish friends here complain about our Turkmens. Why is that? Because of the noise. We are not used to houses that are next to each other, like they are here, where the sound goes straight through. In our Iraq, the sound was not heard in houses with 6-7 rooms, 2 or 3 floors and in the houses with gardens. **(IR2, Male, 1976, Restaurant owner, Uzgörenler St.)**

In our village, there were chickens, cattle, and other small animals. It was nice to live in the village. You also have a village here, it is similar. We lived comfortably there, the house was ours, we did not need anyone or anything. You would work whenever you wanted there. For example, we had a shop, a grocery store in the village, I would go and open it whenever I wanted. I would not open it when I had another job. Not like here. Also, we had a well, water flowed 24 hours for free. **(IR9, Male, 2003, Osmanlı Türkmen Association, Ağaçlı St.)**

Saddam's time was going well. During the Saddam era, the government used to give us food in the beginning of every month. We had some kind of cards. With that, we could get financial aids and also sacks of sugar, rice, and all kinds of other things. We had a more friendly neighborhood environment than here, everybody knew everybody. Women never worked, we were housewives. Only men were going to work. **(IR15, Female, 1967, Housewife, Uzgörenler St.)**

Currently, the *Türkmen* of Demirlibahçe appropriate their own spaces in Doğanbahçesi and Ağaçlı St.. Similar to, but less than, the Roma population, they feel attachment to these particular streets. Since the neighborhood is inhabited by those who belong to the same tribe, they have their own labeling when talking about each-others. Turning the neighborhood into a center for themselves, Iraqi residents indicate that they claim Demirlibahçe as their own home. However, not all Iraqi *Türkmen* are missing their homes in Iraq. Especially those who prefer to forget the traumatizing memories of the past are very concerned about the way their relatives are claiming the streets.

Sir, I have many complains about that street (*Doğanbahçesi St.*). I wish, they (*politicians*) will intervene them, I swear. Even I get disturbed when I pass from this street. They stare so badly as if they have never seen a human being. They began to call there “Bagdat Street”. People living there started to say this. (*IR3, Male, 2004, tyro at women barber, Ağaçlı St.*)

There are children in the back street (*Doğanbahçesi St.*) that I am most angry about. They are very stubborn. I warned them ten times. For example, if I see someone coming from the opposite direction, I adjust myself from 15 meters away, no matter who they are, Turkish, Arab, human, I am checking myself. I said to those children, spruce yourself up a little bit, you're giving a bad image to us. (*IR2, Male, 1976, Restaurant owner, Uzgörenler St.*)

Not every Iraqi or *Türkmen* is the same. But this place (*Demirlibahçe*) is called Hasanköy. Hasanköy is a place in Telafer. They say it instead of Demirlibahçe. But I'm not saying this. *Turkmens* have good ones and bad ones. Our people there (*Doğanbahçe street*) are a little crazy. There is one garbage container in there, most of the people are gathering there (*emphasizing the bad image given to the people passing by*). (*IR5, Male, 2003, tyro at hardware store, Uzgörenler St.*)

Although the relatives were the pulling factor for the immigrants the migrate in Demirlibahçe, part of the *Türkmen* participants indicate their concerns about those who are claiming the streets. Highlighting the contrasts between their efforts for integrating themselves to the society and those who do not try, the construction of Demirlibahçe by the *Türkmen* is differentiated, but accepted as center for commerce and residence. The matter for them is to represent themselves in a proper way, so that the locals would not produce exclusionary discourses.

Thus, the *Türkmen* construct themselves as hard working, *original Turk*, and performers of their traditions. While their construction of the self is shaped by the notion of responding negative discourses in an indirect way, direct responses to such exclusionary acts target four areas; why they escaped war, why they are noisy, why they are smelly, and why their fertility rate is so high.

Indeed, except for one disabled person from 2003 Iraq war, one PhD student from *Baghdad*, and two women, all the participants are working in various sectors. I was told in an informal talk with a customer at an Iraqi restaurant in *Ağaçlı St.* that they start to go to work after the age of 12. While I was told that the situation in Iraq was different and that men used to start working after their 20s, now they stress their obligation to work for living. Indeed, even those who have chronic illnesses, such as one person who had glass bone disease, they start working in heavy duties at the age of 16, as was reported to me.

Referring their ancestry in the Ottoman past, the construction of the self as *original Türk* aspires to link two communities to each other. Indeed, the men participants mentioned that their choice for finding refuge in Turkey was because they see the country as their homeland, just as Iraq. They stressed also that even Europe opened the gate to asylum seekers, they would not intend to leave Turkey.

Turkey is also our homeland; our origin is Turkish. Our ancestry comes from the Ottomans. The first thing that comes to mind when talking about Tal Afar is Turkmen. You cannot find a single Arab, you cannot find a single Kurd all over Tal Afar. It is a Turkmen city in the middle of the Arabs. (**IR2, Male, 1976, Restaurant owner, Uzgörenler St.**)

I never thought of going to another country. Because we are already Turkmen, we came here. We always had a sense of belonging to Turkey. We also had Turkmen fronts in Iraq. After Saddam fell, fronts were established in 2004. (**IR1, Male, 1991, second-hand phone business, Uzgörenler St.**)

Perceiving themselves as the *original Türks*, the *Türkmen* of Demirlibahçe make further reference to their loyalties to the (Islamic) traditions. Responding indirectly to the negative discourses about their honor, *Türkmen* participants defended themselves on the ground of maintaining their traditions. The main emphasis is given to their hospitality. Moreover, this aspect is later used to criticize the locals for their detachment from traditions.

Currently, there is no hotel in our Talafar. Because it is a tradition inherited from our grandfathers. What is this? For example, let's say you will be my guest. I won't let you stay in a hotel because it would be a disgrace. (*IR2, Male, 1976, Restaurant owner, Uzgörenler St.*)

The direct engagement with the negative discourses aims to justify themselves for their escape, loudness, smell, and numbers. It is stated that there was no possibility to fight as the war was in their private places, at their homes. Trapped in the middle of a civil war, they stressed that they were unable to differentiate who is who, and with whom they should align. After trying to get a hold onto their territories, the drone missiles forced them to flee as they were not even able to see the bombs. After arriving to Demirlibahçe in order to be together with their relatives who settled down earlier, they acknowledge that they cause trouble in the neighborhood because of their noise, smelly foods, and fertility rates. Yet, they explain this situation as a swift change in life style induced by their migration from a village town to a capital city.

Firstly, the difference of the house types constrained them to change their way of talk as sounds can be heard by the apartment neighbors. Secondly, the participants explain that since they live in large groups for being able to pay the rents, there emerge unpleasant smells from their houses. Mostly living in places that do not see direct daylight, Iraqi residents staying in places that they cannot even open the windows in winter to not get cold. Thirdly, responding to their increased numbers in the neighborhood and fertility rate, some of the participants told it was in their culture to have as many children as possible. Yet, this situation applies mainly for those who are better off economically compared to other *Türkmen* participants. Those who lack economic stability indicate that they fled to Turkey with their children from Iraq, not gave birth to them in Turkey, to counter the negative perceptions about their fertility rate. Still, responding to the dissatisfaction, and even worry of the locals, about their numbers, one senior respondent affiliated with the establishment of the *Ottoman Türkmen Association* told that if any disturbance occurs by the Iraqi, he would kick them off Turkey.

There is a very bad smell in this house. I can't stand it, I'm looking for a new house, but it's very expensive. The houses start from 800 TL, how can I give it? We only earn 600 Turkish Lira for 5 people. (*IR15(2), Female, 1989, Housewife, Uzgörenler St.*)

I understand, of course, there are too many children. That's why it's so noisy. This is why there is unrest among the locals. I also think the neighborhood got crowded. Especially the ones that arrived last here are very dirty. They are from Antep and are very belligerent. They follow their relatives in Ankara. We didn't want that to happen either. The last time, a policeman came to our house for this reason. My father is my elder and he is respected by our Iraqis. The police pressured my father to send many people back. But my father said how he is supposed to send them back. **(IR8, Female, 1989, Grocery Store Clerk, Doğanbahçesi St.)**

When I migrated to here, I had 7 children. What should I do? Should I throw my children out on the street? If I had been married here, I would have had one or two kids like Turkish citizens. **(IR4, Male, 1974, second-hand phone business, Uzgörenler St.)**

They say *Türkmen* have many children, and they say they are not used to such noise in the street. Our minimum is 5-6 children. This is our culture. We would have more or less 12-13 children in our Iraq. But now, our people are adopting themselves. **(IR11, Male, 1980, Tyro at wholeseller, Doğanbahçesi St.)**

Lastly, the *Iraqi Türkmen* construct the *other* in order to concretize their identity by way of referring to immoral issues perceived from the locals and the Roma. The way of constructing the Roma and the locals is done through indicating their broken ties with the (Islamic) culture. As also acknowledged by one of local interviewee (*TR24, Male, 1989, Women Hair-Dresser, Ağaçlı St.*), the *Türkmen* told that the locals are disassociated from the traditions such as hospitality and celebrating the religious holidays. Even so that a young participant at the Association told me that he wants to return back to Iraq because here people are diverted from Islam.

No place is like your homeland. I mean, I'm tired of these people because they turned away from the book of Allah and the sunnah of the Prophet. All people, Turks and Iraqis alike. For example, let's say this is an Islamic country. How can you make halal what Allah has forbidden? For example, if Allah has forbidden something, you cannot make it halal. You become an infidel. **(IR9, Male, 2003, Osmanlı Türkmen Association, Ağaçlı St.)**

Further, while talking about the tradition and culture, the participants also emphasize the importance of their (women's) honor. This theme is repeatedly mentioned during the interviews. However, the reason is to defend themselves against the negative discourses by the locals, and differentiate themselves from what they perceive as the Roma.

Most of the locals in the neighborhood question the religiosity of the immigrants living in small houses with their fathers and brothers in law. Indeed, the discourse is that their *ablution* is not accepted because they are living, or *maybe*, sleeping in the same beds with brothers in law. During the interview at one of *Türkmen* women participant's house, Z. Hanım intervened and stated "Yes... I heard about these talks among the locals saying the migrants should take a shower, but their ablution will not be accepted. They doubt about immigrants' ablution. But let me tell you this; *Türkmen* have strong honor. Their women have strong honor. For example, when they are shopping for clothing, the girls do not try on the dresses in the cabin. They buy and wear at home. If they don't like it, they return it. They don't dress outside like our women." And one *Türkmen* participant told that this difference (see below quote) between the women emerges from the republican revolution *imposed* by Atatürk. Although he was shy to engage with such a politicized topic, he was indicating that if Atatürk had not attempted to secularize the *nation*, there would not be such a difference.

It is taught to us at a young age because it is the teaching of our Prophet that girls should cover their heads. But there is a sense of libertarian in Turkey. There are principles brought by Atatürk, although they are wrong principles in our opinion. For example, if you are fasting as a man, when a woman with a lewd dress passes in front of you, it also corrupts your worship. (*IR10, Male, 2004, Men barber tyro, Ağaçlı St*)

Also, indicating their perception of the Roma, the Iraqi participants firstly acknowledge their appropriated places as interviewees refer Demirkapı St. as the Roma neighborhood. Later, they express how unpleasant they found them because of their hostile stares and noises due to instrument rehearsals. While some of the participants running their own business say they have Roma customers but they do not know them very well, the persistent perception about the Roma is their boundedness to each other and sexuality. Yet, although the *Türkmen* diverge themselves on the basis of honor from the Roma, they indicate the similarities of exclusionary practices pointed towards them. The faced exclusionary discourses are perceived to come from *leftists* in the eye of Iraqi *Türkmen*, and from *elites* in the eye of the Roma.

Their lifestyles are different, we see. They seem a little open in terms of sexual things. I do not know but I have customers from them. But, where are their ancestors now? Does Roma mean to come from Rum. Are they Christian? Are they Muslims here? I see they drink alcohol in the pavilions. Still, most of the exclusions made to them are also made to us. Not all, but those with different opinions do the same. Particularly the leftists. **(IR4, Male, 1974, second-hand phone business, Uzgörenler St.)**

No dialogue between them and us ever happened. I guess they didn't even try to set it up with us. But Roma are walking around naked on their balconies. If you look at them, there will be a fight. But they are strange people, some of them come and want cigarettes, they get angry when you say you don't have it, they fight. By Allah, they have their own place down the road, and we have our own here (*Ağaçlı and Doğanbahçesi Streets*). **(IR13, Male, 1956, restaurant owner, Ağaçlı St.)**

To summarize, the *Türkmen* population's perception of space is formed through construction of the neighborhood as the place they claim as *Hasanköy* now, of the self who is *original* and *traditional Türks*, and of the other who are perceived as deviants. The initial migrants, settled in the neighborhood in 2014, have not developed a strong sense of attachment and belonging. However, they acknowledge that they appropriated two streets and name them in accordance with their home place in Iraq. While *Doğanbahçesi St.* is called as *Baghdad St.*, the neighborhood is named as *Hasanköy*.

However, the appropriation of these areas is not seen as a positive achievement by all *Türkmen* as well. For Iraqis in the *Baghdad St.* misrepresent the large group of *Türkmen* dwelling in Turkey now, the 'construction of the self' is disturbed. Already struggling with the exclusionary discourses on the basis of their behaviors in the streets that contradict with the vulnerable migrant image, they even produced self-disciplinary discourses. Indeed, one senior participant told that if any *Türkmen* causes any trouble here for the locals, he would have kicked them out from Turkey. Indicating their own policing capabilities, *Türkmen* interviewees signaled to ease the negative perception of locals' fear of crime.

Further, in response to the negative perception that their appropriation of the streets creates, they self-construct themselves as original *Türk* who are strongly tied to their tradition and values. Differentiating themselves from the locals and the Roma, they assert their unique construction of the self and spatial practices in Demirlibağçe. Table 6 below illustrates the construction of *Türkmen* perception in Demirlibağçe.

Table 6 Factors for the construction of the *Türkmen* Perception

Construction of the <i>Türkmen</i> Perception		
Construction of the Neighborhood	Construction of the self	Construction of the other
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Accepting the physical setting of the migrant status and relatives already living there - Appropriation of the Doğanbahçesi and Ağaçlı Sts. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Original <i>Türk</i> - Traditional - Being honorable - Being hard-working 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Locals as corrupted <i>Türks</i> - Roma as immoral - Other <i>Türkmen</i> as villagers

3.1.2. Conclusion

Based on the perceptions of the spatial practices each group has towards each other, it can be asserted that there is a low level of social cohesion. For the locals construct the self by way of differentiating the others, exclusion is seen as a necessary factor for their identity. While the exclusionary perception of the Roma are reproduced through judging their life-styles, later on these exclusionary perceptions are turned into positive discourses when faced with the newcomers, *Türkmen* since 2014. The Roma on the other hand do not have a particular disorientation in their perceptions about themselves and their other with regard to the arrival of the migrants. Except for the feeling of being de-valued compared to the migrants, they have their own cohesiveness in *Demirkapı* St. However, this feeling of being de-valued contributes to the reshaping of social cohesion between the locals and the Roma, as the two groups are united under Turkish citizenship status. The *Türkmen*, in this situation, perceives the neighborhood as their own by claiming its specific locations in their discourses. Therein, *Türkmen* self-integrate themselves into the local community by emphasizing their *Turkishness*. Table 7 below illustrates the discourses that each group directs towards each-other on the basis of their perceptions.

Lefebvre provides two ways of analyses for spatial practices; architecture by construction and practices in the space deriving from mental perception of the physical and social world in the neighborhood. Here, both of these two ways contribute to increasing cleavage towards social cohesion in the neighborhood.

Firstly, the initial locals were happy and satisfied about the neighborhood, being consisting of high bureaucrats and music artists. Yet, the arrival of the Roma during the 1980s and later the *Türkmen* after 2014 disturbed the neighborhood tissue. While Ankara's urbanization process towards its western axis was affecting the cohesiveness of the neighborhood since the 1960s, what they mentally perceive in the space was the changing social and physical setting that is worse than before. Producing nostalgic discourses about the past, the most visible changes through Roma and *Türkmen* arrival were seen as the cause.

Secondly, the Roma population perceived the spatial practices in two ways: physical setting of the neighborhood being close to the centers of the city, and thus to their workplace, as well as living in apartment buildings instead of *gecekondu*, and social setting as living with the musicians. While they were satisfied by living in such a neighborhood, their arrival has caused negative discourses among the locals that led to contesting relationship until the mid-2000s. Yet, the railroad project in 2017-2019 separated and isolated their street (Demirkapı St) by destroying the bridge, leading to the decrease in mobility and thus economic loss.

Coupled with the arrival of the *Türkmen* in 2014, thirdly, demographic transformation of the neighborhood has accelerated. Leading the locals, who *could* not (due to economic means) or *decided* (due to nostalgic belonging) to not leave the neighborhood, to curse the immigrants as the main factor that changing the neighborhood. Hence, the perception of space by the inhabitants of Demirlibağçe and their discursive constructions (Gür, 2002; Richardson & Jensen, 2003) negatively contributes to the social cohesion.

Table 7 An overview of the perceptions each group has towards each other. Irregular talks are also integrated.

Locals		Iraqi Migrants		The Roma	
Positive	Negative	Positive	Negative	Positive	Negative
They are our <i>Turkmen</i> brothers and sisters, we should help.	They are not Turks. No Turk flees from a war.	We are also Turks. We speak the same Turkish language in Iraq.	The most resilient Turk here cannot survive for one day in Iraq.	We do not differentiate human beings.	They (Iraqis) are the traitors. The sources of the country are spent on them. They even have their own businesses here.
We all share a common Ottoman past.	We are more civilized. They are culturally 50 years behind us.	We are from the Ottoman heritage.	Turks' loyalty to Allah is corrupted. They have forgotten about their culture and tradition.	We are all Ottoman and Turkish.	I cannot let my kid go out to the streets. Why would I? So that the Iraqis can rape them?
	They smell, they talk loudly, and block up the streets by gathering in large groups.	May Allah bless the Turks; they opened their doors to us.	Not all the Turks are the same (leftists vs rightists). Some of them do not even like their own people.	They are making their own fight to survive.	It bothers us a lot when we see the migrants are welcomed while we are neglected.
	They think their women are only for reproduction.		Our women pay attention to their honor, unlike the Turks.	I love my Iraqi neighbor's son. He is also my son.	They are extremely dirty and smelly.
The Roma are fun people and talented.	The Roma people make too much noise.	We have no problem with the Roma, some of them are our customers.	They act free sexually. Are they not Muslim?	We are all citizens of this country.	Those who consider themselves better than us, what contributions they have made to country? Do we not have value like the Iraqis?
Roma culture has value.	Their culture is different, and they do not contribute to the society. They are more idle.	We share a similar experience of being excluded.	They have a hostile attitude towards us.		Can the locals work under the conditions we work? They do not even know about music; how dare they ignore us!

3.2. Conceived Space of Demirlibağçe and its Political Economy

Construction of Demirlibağçe by the inhabitants has a mutually constitutive relationship with the exchange value of the neighborhood, and political economy within it. The political economy *of* the neighborhood refers to its exchange value with representations (its distance to central areas of Ankara and its subject ‘elites,’ ‘gypsies,’ and ‘migrants’). Affecting the political economy *in* the neighborhood, spatial practices of inclusion and exclusion are facilitated, and exacerbated, by the interventions (renewal of the school and destruction of the bridge) that manipulates the networks of exchange.

Therein, following Lefebvre’s proposition for examining the space with its parts and its whole (implication and explication), this section firstly examines the conception of Demirlibağçe as a whole. Investigating the socio-spatial transformations in the parts of the neighborhood, the aim is to relate the changing exchange value of the neighborhood as a whole with its parts (particularly the streets). Political economy *of* the neighborhood in this regard is read through the impact of these socio-spatial transformations on the exchange value of fixed capital and the exclusionary discourses. Resonating with the theory of centrality, concentration points of each group impact the representation of the neighborhood. For the Roma, Demirlibağçe is seen as musicians’ place, whereas it is *Hasanköy* for the *Türkmen*. Yet, it is not an *elite* place for the locals anymore.

Still, the changing conception of the neighborhood serves to the exploitation of the disadvantaged groups on the basis of real-estate prices. In other words, political economy *of* the neighborhood is instrumentalized to use space as the medium of segregations. However, the shattering of the neighborhood space is unified on the basis of commodity exchange that erases the differences. Hence, this section secondly examines the political economy *in* Demirlibağçe in parts, through networks of commodity exchange. Erasing the differences of space, the abstractions of the subjects as customers have a unitary effect. While exclusionary practices are reproduced by the owners of fixed capital in voicing their loss in exchange value, political economy *in* the neighborhood becomes the anchor for social cohesion. However, this sort of social cohesion persists when the hierarchical relationships are sustained while resulting to

greater social capitals for each groups. This is why once the differences are revealed in the lived space by way of place-making practices of the Iraqi shopowners, a feeling of economic and spatial loss is produced by the Roma and the locals. Lastly, the overall relationship between the political economy *of* and *in* the neighborhood is illustrated by the maps created.

3.2.1. Political Economy of Demirlibağçe

The conception of Demirlibağçe refers to neighborhood's exchange value through which its quality of representation is determined. The exchange value of the neighborhood is measured by the quantities it has such as its distance to public transportation, density of commercial places, and commodity quality of housing.

Demirlibağçe is one of the few places in Mamak district that has not been subjected to a gentrification project. However, two interventions – renewal of the school and the destruction of the bridge for a railway project – trigger the socio-spatial transformations of the neighborhood³³. Although these projects aim to increase the exchange value of the neighborhood (a bigger school to serve more students and parents, and *Başkentray* project (Uysal, 2016) to connect the neighborhood to banlieue hub), they reshape the physical cohesiveness of the neighborhood. Causing decrease in the real-estate prices in *Demirkapı* St. by detaching it from the rest of the parts, the planned space assigns “special status to particular places by arranging them in the hierarchy, and stipulate exclusion (for some) and integration (for others)” (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 288).

It was decided a railway project would be made. No single nail was hammered for about 4 years. This affected many people. Look, the disruption of order completely destroys the texture of the neighborhood. Tradesmen have become unable to sustain their businesses here. Dozens of years of pita bakers³⁴ have become incapable working. They are our Turks. But when the tradesmen are withdrawn, the movement disappears in the neighborhood. Immigrants are filling in instead. (*TR5, Male, 1970, Real-estate Agent, Uzgörenler St.*)

³³ Under the gentrification debates, this process might also be framed as *consecutive displacement* (Delgadillo, 2016, p. 1159; Shaw, 2008), as the process was generated by urban deterioration

³⁴ A special Turkish food (similar to Italian Pizza)

It was told that the school was demolished because it was old. They said they will finish it in 1 year, but it took longer, I don't know why. We had to go to a school in *Saimekadin*. I took my kids there by car every day. The new school is nice, but the Iraqi population is too much. (TR4, Male, 1977, *House Restoration and Decoration, Doğanbahçe St.*)

Indeed, it is initially the long-lasting construction processes that causes transformation in the demography of the neighborhood. As the demography of the neighborhood changes, the conception of Demirlibağçe also changes. As appropriated by three groups, the representation of the neighborhood in the conception of its abstract subjects is given different definitions.

For the locals, the exchange value of the neighborhood decreases due to the construction interventions that causes the out movement of the *elites*. When the neighborhood was in Çankaya Municipality, comprising the main centers of Ankara until 1983, its real estate value was higher. However, its integration to the Mamak district covering the eastern side of Ankara, has lowered its value, as Mamak ranks lower in terms of class-status in municipal representation of Ankara.

The process starting with Demirlibağçe's integration to Mamak transforms the neighborhood which used to have *high-quality* people. Thus, the conception of Demirlibağçe by the locals has changed before the *Türkmen* immigration in 2014, though accelerated with it. Indeed, the devaluation of Demirlibağçe allowed the migrants to settle in as the houses are old and wretched, aside from the removal of its assets such as *Muallim Mektebi* or conservatoire. One participant considers this process as losing the neighborhood culture.

Here, it was filled with two-storey houses with private gardens. I was able to see those times. In the past, artists used to live here. My father used to tell stories about it, when he bought the house in 1965. At that time, a few radio and theater actors were living in Uzgörenler Street. There was also the State Conservatory, of course. Also, there were successful students from medicine, law, political sciences, fine arts. But, they moved the Conservatory and the original architecture (building) here was used as Mamak Municipality. Mamak Municipality stayed here for many years but it became Culture Center when the new municipal building was built. Now, the texture and culture disappeared. (TR4, Male, 1977, *House Restoration and Decoration, Doğanbahçe St.*)

The crucial factor for this is the out-movement of the elites. They are right to move, because this neighborhood has not developed for years. There was an urban transformation project here in 2011, proposed by the district mayor of Mesut Akgül, but it was not actualized. If it had happened, there wouldn't be any foreigner (*referring to immigrants*) here. There would be a multi-storey parking lots with a shopping mall in the middle. If it had happened, this place would have been more famous than Kızılay. The rents would be no less than 5 thousand TL. Unfortunately, now there is no one but Iraqis. (**TR28, Male, 1965, Real-estate Agent, Uzgörenler St.**)

Arrival of the *Türkmen* is seen as the major factor for the decreasing value of the neighborhood that emerged after the interventions by constructions. Shaped by the negative perceptions the locals have towards the *Türkmen*, demographic transformation of the neighborhood is seen as the changing factor for political economy that is concretized by the place-making practices.

The hairdresser in front of us was crying because there was no customer anymore. *Türkmen* were sitting on the top floor, and their children were peeing all over the apartments. Well, you see... if I encounter such a view while entering a hairdresser, I would turn back and leave. (**TR7, Female 1977, Real-estate Agent, Uzgörenler St.**)

However, the demographic transformation of the neighborhood does not refer only to the Iraqi *Türkmen*. The movement of the Roma population is initially also a topic of concern for the political economy of the locals. As the Roma population around the world is characterized with racial judgements based on their accents and physical appearance, they are considered to have *tendencies* for illegal activities like stealing and pickpocketing. This Romaphobia is rebounded in the exchange value of Demirlibahçe neighborhood, as it creates a 'bad' representation (see section 2.1.).

Yes, they [Roma] were here before we came. As time passed, their numbers increased. Usually Roma is clustered in Demirkapı, 129. Street. 130. Streets. These streets are like *Cennet Mahallesi*³⁵. Criminal streets... In the eyes of the police, they already have a criminal record. There is a common saying among the police in the police department; "Is it Demirkapı street again?" (**TR6, Male, 1990, Civil Servant (Night Watchmen), Demirkapı St.**)

³⁵ A Turkish TV series (2004-2007) that depicts the life of Roma population in İstanbul in a caricaturized way

The locals' conception of Demirlibahçe is now different following to a 40 years-long process. Starting with detachment of the neighborhood from *Çankaya* District in 1983, and following with the closure of the state conservatoire (*Muallim Mektebi*) in 1989, the neighborhood now loses its elite representation. Leading to the out movement of its high-bureaucrat population, the social and cultural values of the neighborhood are now shifting. Coupled with the agglomeration of the Roma population in 1990s and Iraqi population in 2019, the exchange value of the neighborhood is now on a significant decrease. Currently, the only value attributed to the neighborhood is its close location to the hospitals and universities (Ankara University's faculties of law and political sciences, and Hacettepe University Medical Faculty).


It's over, Demirlibahçe is over. 5 years ago I could buy a place in central Ankara by selling my flat for 250 thousand and adding 150 thousand. But the prices in there have increased from 400 thousand TL to 800 thousand. Here, prices are not increasing, but they are decreasing. The Roma are down the road there and the Iraqis are above. We are thinking of ending our professional life here and leaving. **(TR26, 1976, Barber, Ağaçlı St.)**

The data extracted from the *Hürriyet Emlak* website (a real-estate portal) supports the changing conception of Demirlibahçe neighborhood. As seen in the demography graphic (figure 6), the decrease in sale prices for housing correlates with the decrease in the neighborhood population in the July 2018 – 2019. However, the rental prices increase in the same period, even more than Ankara's average. While its close neighbor, *Cebeci*, follows a stable price range that increased from around 9 TL per m² in July 2014 to around 12 TL per m² in July 2021, rental prices in Demirlibahçe skyrockets since 2014 – from around 7 TL to around 11 TL per m². Yet, selling prices show a contrary scenario for Demirlibahçe as they decrease significantly between July 2018 – 2019. The recent increase in selling prices, however, can be explained by the newly renovated houses and *Türkmen*'s place-making strategies, allowing them to buy, instead of rent. Still, *Cebeci* neighborhood does not see such a fluctuation, and it goes parallel with overall prices of *Çankaya*.

For sure, these periods of increases and decreases in rental and selling prices coincide with the construction process of the new school and bridge. However, the graphs below illustrate also that the arrival of the *Türkmen* has benefited most to the home-owners. Causing an increased demand for rentals, the *Türkmen* population is seen as a source

of income, in return of decreasing Demirlibağçe's exchange value in the selling market. Although locals conceive their space being threatened by the Roma and Iraqi immigrants, those who own fixed capital benefit, particularly the Iraqis, by way of exploiting the housing prices and using the space as a tool of power.

Rental Price / m²



Rental Price / m²




Figure 15 Rental prices for housing in Demirlibağçe and Cebeci neighborhoods.

Source: *Hürriyet Emlak* (July 2021).





Figure 16 Selling prices for housing in Demirlibahçe and Cebeci neighborhoods.

Source: Hürriyet Emlak (July 2021).

Yes, they were renting from us, but we are not responsible for this, the owners are. Because we do not have the right to have a say in someone else's home. If the owner says give somebody the house, then we do. The landlords have given up the houses, and now they regret it. (TR20, Male, 1968, Real-estate Agent, Uzgörenler St.)

Now people beg us for selling their houses to whomever wants to buy it, but the responsible for this situation becomes real estate agents? There is no such thing. We tried to give it to decent people as much as we could, but the owners pressure us for bringing money. (TR28, Male, 1965, Real-estate Agent, Uzgörenler St.)

The arrival of the Iraqis lowered the prices for sale, I don't know about the rents. I do not have a house to rent. But look, while rents are about 1200-1300 TL in *Cebeci*, similar buildings here are around 700 TL. In fact, *Demirlibahçe* is no different from *Cebeci*. The only difference is the Iraqi population. (**TR4, Male, 1977, House Restoration and Decoration, Doğanbahçe St.**)

The representation of mobility (Cresswell, 2010) for the Iraqi migrants is the main reason for their negative conceptions. Having been conceived as aid seekers in a pity way, their arrival differs from that of 'authentic' incomers (Zukin, 2008). Indeed, witnessing the ongoing situation, a humanitarian discourses are also produced by the local shop owners and residents. However, such discourses are at the expense of saving the decreasing value of the neighborhood.

The only reason the neighborhood has turned into a refugee district is that the houses are old and unusable, and the landlords rent out the houses to these people in order to get a little more rent. As a matter of fact, their victimization due to the war continues with exploitation here. (**TR8, Male, 1975, Shopkeeper, Uzgörenler St.**)

The causes for the decrease in *Demirlibahçe*'s exchange value, as well as use value, are blamed on the real-estate owners as well. Lefebvre (1991) defines use value as "inhabitable space commensurate with other such spaces, and semiologically stamped by a promotional discourse and by the signs of a certain degree of 'distinction'" (p. 399). Yet, this use value of the streets is perceived to be deformed due to the decreasing quality of the houses (old and neglected), as well as the hygiene, noise, and crowdedness of the users. Thus, this leads to further exclusionary discourses with regard to the political economy of the neighborhood.

While the locals' conception of the neighborhood refers to its decreasing exchange value, the Roma population conceives *Demirlibahçe* as a representation for their rising status; 'leveling up' from *gecekondu* life to apartment life. Indeed, the perception of apartment buildings had usually been associated with the modernization process of Turkey. "While squatter settlements multiplied as an undesirable consequence of rapid urbanization, the apartment was celebrated as a contemporary form of dwelling" (Gürel, 2016, p. 39; Bozdoğan, 2010, p. 405), along with physical proximity to *Çankaya* where the President used to reside (Erişen, 2003, pp. 107-109).

A lot has changed since we came here. I can say that people have improved their level. Their place of residence, their lives and lifestyles have improved. The reason for this is having money. Money, of course, is crucial. **(RM7, Group Interview with 4 male participants, Musicians Association)**

When we first came to Ankara in 1976, there were about 15 Roma families of musicians. And also, we always live together. Initially, we were living in *Hamamönü*. In Hamamönü, we were living in what is called Ankara houses (*geceköndü*). Then we moved to the apartments in *Abidinpaşa*. It can be thought of ranking up, not to belittle the *Hamamönü*. Then one or two musician fellows discovered Demirlibağçe. When they got there, we rented a house here. After that, every friend of ours who came to Ankara from the hometown came here to Demirlibağçe. Currently, there are about 500 families in Demirlibağçe. **(RM3, Male, 1974, Musician, Demirkapı St.)**

Indeed, the Roma population is not concerned about the political economy of the neighborhood in terms of its exchange value. As they already claim their own place, they are satisfied with the representation of Demirlibağçe as a musician neighborhood. Earning their livelihood by working in outside places, such as pavilions and restaurants, the musicians see Demirkapı St. as their own center, where they dwell.

Now there is such a perception in Ankara. Let's say you are working in a place or having a coffee somewhere. When they ask where you live and you say Demirlibağçe, they say "Oh, the musician neighborhood." People see it like that. When people think of Demirlibağçe, musicians come to mind. **(RM7, Group Interview with 4 male participants, Musicians Association)**

Acknowledging the socio-spatial transformation of the streets *above* (*Doğanbahçesi* and *Uzgörenler*), the Roma musicians mention repetitively about their indifference to the situation. Indicating their established bond with the owners of their rental places, changes in the value of fixed capitals in the neighborhood are not conceived negatively as their rent is kept unchanged. Although the increases in the rental prices and decreases in the sale prices are blamed on the Iraqi migrants, the only concern they have is about the use-value of *their* streets. While similar concerns apply also to the Iraqi migrants, their increased share in the political economy of the neighborhood is justified for their exploitation through real-estate.

Therefore, the political economy of the neighborhood is shaped by two external socio-spatial factors affecting the texture of Demirlibağçe, and thus its exchange value. On the spatial side, three factors are significant; separation from Çankaya District and

inclusion to the Mamak District, closure of *Muallim Mektebi* and movement of the municipality in 2005, and the renewal process of the primary, secondary schools and the bridge in 2017-2019. On the social side, mobility patterns of the three groups are important; out movement of the high level bureaucrats towards the suburban areas in 1980s-1990s, and inflow of the Roma (1990s) and the *Türkmen* (2014). In phase of these socio-spatial transformations, political economy of the neighborhood is instrumentalized to use space as the medium of segregations. While the owners of fixed capitals benefit from the situation through increased demand for rentals, abstract space is served to profit them and assign negative status to particular places. Arranging them in the hierarchy of the social order, Roma's *Demirkapı St.* and *Türkmen's Doğanbahçesi* and *Ağaçlı St.* are represented as causal factors for the decrease of the neighborhood's exchange value.

Hiding the exploitative strategies of the home-owners and real-estate agents to some degree, as well as the construction projects, the subjects of the neighborhood are blamed for the degeneration of social order. However, the changing conception of Demirlibağçe Neighborhood as *the Roma place* or *the immigrant area* paradoxically serves these two groups to build new capacities for their concentration. As the acquirers of these two streets, these two groups also buy the use-value of these spaces enabling them to establish their own social capital.

3.2.2. Political Economy in Demirlibağçe

The theory of centrality by Lefebvre is “a form, empty in itself but calling for contents - for objects, natural or artificial beings, things, products and works, signs and symbols, people, acts, situations, practical relationships” (1991, p. 331). Besides, it does not assert there is only one single center as there are multiple centralities in the local scale. Indeed, it is a matter of scale that its examination “gives us a final, crucial window on the uneven development of capital, because it is difficult to comprehend the real meaning of ‘dispersal,’ ‘decentralization,’ ‘spatial restructuring,’ and so forth, without a clear understanding of geographical scale” (Smith, 2008, p. 180). Hence, place-making practices of the Roma and *Türkmen* via use value create different concentrations in different scales of the neighborhood.

Leading to the concretization of social capitals for each group, the scale-making practices facilitate and exacerbate social inclusion and exclusion between the three groups. It exacerbates exclusion because growing capacity of a social capital for one group circulates the economy for itself. Yet, this circulation is not marked with boundaries that prevent commodity exchange with the others. Hence, it also contributes to the whole economy of the neighborhood.

In the struggle for the hegemony over the political economy of the neighborhood, the locals exploit the housing sector in collaboration with the real-estate agents. Although real-estate agents now vindicate themselves on the basis of not interfering the home-owners' preferences, all of real estate agents who participated in this research had one *Türkmen* work for them, except one (TR7, Female 1977, Real-estate Agent, Uzgörenler St.). These *Türkmen* workers who can speak Turkish and Arabic fluently helped the real-estate agents 'get' the Iraqi migrants. While the immigrants are already in search of place in Demirlibahçe in order to be close with their relatives, their unawareness about the housing market in the neighborhood are exploited. Approved by the home-owners who are satisfied by the *Türkmen* paying their rents without delay, the profit acquired from this exploitation is almost doubled.

Realtors were ultimately driven by the idea of making money. These people were coming here in droves, and there was lots of money to be made. In the end, the realtors would earn 2.5% from each rent, or even part of the rent. That's a good amount. How did realtors use it? They convinced the owners to rent the apartments by saying that the incomers are from a good family, there are not that many of them, and so on. Also, when 9 out of 10 incomers were Iraqi, they surely increased their money. Realtors saw they could go up to 800 TL, not 500 TL. When they came here, they also made serious profits. The only thing that is damaged here is the neighborhood culture. (TR 27, Male, 1986, Contractor, Ağaçlı St.)

You ask yourself now? Say you have 5 flats here. If Turkish customers were interested, they would pay 800 TL at most for the houses, while foreigners would pay 1100. Unfortunately, the houses are now commercialized. Now nobody thinks about the neighborhood, everybody thinks about their pocket. We, however, looked after one Iraqi who came to work for us. He was very poor. We took him under our arms. He was smuggled in here. (TR28, Male, 1966, Real-estate agent, Uzgörenler St.)

Later on, when the dilapidated places are sold out, the locals reflected upon the positive sides of having a cosmopolitan and diversified neighborhood. Covering the negative discourses based on their perception with humanitarianism, the benefits of having *Türkmen* for political economy *in* the neighborhood are emphasized.

Look, they (*Türkmen*) are very loyal about money. For example, they are very good at paying their rent. We've had no problems with 80-90% of tenants. Also, when I'm showing a house with Turkmens living in it, they always invite us in and offer us and the customer tea (**TR20, Male, 1968, Real-estate Agent, Uzgörenler St.**)

If you ask me, "do you prefer Turkish or Iraqi in terms of customers," I prefer Iraqi. That's because there is no lying, no credit card, no bargaining... they just give you whatever price you ask for. There is a lot of bargaining with our Turks. You agree on 300 TL, but they say they will not pay more than 150 TL and run away. (**TR24, Male, 1989, Women Hair Dresser, Ağaçlı St.**)

Let's say I don't give house to any foreigner, not just Iraqis. Who will pay me to take care of my family? People will come and say I love Demirlibağçe. But then, what is going to happen? I will close my place after 6 months. Then, will people support me? (**TR23, Male, 1970, Real-estate agent, Uzgörenler St.**)

Indicating the necessity of making money, the locals, and especially the owners, abstract the ethnicity-based perceptions. While the spatial practices of the *other* are perceived in a threatening posture, the political economy *in* the neighborhood erases the differences. In the capitalist system, the relationship between buyers and sellers connects them. However, this connection does not necessarily mean a step towards social cohesion. Although seen in the survey results that *Türkmen* participants are highly willing to be working or shopping with *Turks* (8 of the 8 participants agree or strongly agree for shopping and working with the locals in the survey questionnaires), this data does not represent the question of social and spatial.

In this regard, locals consult exclusionary practices since the *Türkmen* population is conceived to shop only from their market in *their* streets. While the process beginning with the exploitation of the fixed capital has led to the emergence of different centers in the neighborhood for two groups, the very same process is hidden on the basis of increasing social capital. Turning the specific locations of neighborhood into the centers of the Roma and the *Türkmen*, political economy *in* Demirlibağçe is shared by the two groups who once had no share.

Also, look. None of them [*Türkmen*] buy from Turkish shops. My friend, if we are enduring despite their dirtiness and tolerizing, they need to add value to our country. They open their own barbers, they go there. They open their own grocery store, they shop from there. They have their own bakery and restaurant, they eat and drink there. None of them adds value [to our society]! (**TR1, Male, 1960, Retired Tradesman, Uzgörenler St.**)

The involvement of the *Türkmen* into the share of political economy does not emerge with a deliberate intention for different center. Indeed, it was asserted, in the literature review section (section 2.3.), that these place and scale making practices do not refer to ghettoization. Yet, the emergence of the centers automatically hinders the share of the locals since those who belong to each group have more trust for themselves.

We wanted to do business with the Turks, but then a scammer appeared and stole my money. Whoever wanted to start a business with us tried to scam us. We've had a lot of this. His father for example (*points to the one Turkmen teenager working for the Association*). He gave 16 thousand TL for a husbandry business. The scammer buttered up his father and his father also gave him money. Then he took all of the money and disappeared. We are still looking for it. This has happened to a lot of our people. For this reason, we now open our own shops and wait to see whatever our destiny will be. (**IR13, Male, 1956, restaurant owner, Ağaçlı St.**)

Yes, now our people have many businesses in this neighborhood. I'm one of the first to come here. When I opened this shop, there was no one but me. Then, gradually, as the people fled, they came here. Then they started coming to me from all the districts of Ankara. Because there is trust in me. Sometimes they even send their phones from other cities so that I can fix and repair them. Demirlibahçe has become a place like a center now. Let me tell you this, when an Iraqi needs something, he comes straight here. He finds most of what he wants here and goes without any trouble. (**IR1, Male, 1991, second-hand phone business, Uzgörenler St.**)

While the Roma does not own a commercial place for themselves, the increasing share of the *Türkmen* in the political economy faces with strong pressures by the locals against their shops. Amid the sad day when 33 Turkish Army soldiers were killed in Syria's Idlib town on 28 February 2020, some of the locals went into the streets and shouted against the migrants' *comfort* in Turkey (NTV, 2020). Indeed, I was at the home when I heard "Our soldiers are being killed in f.. Syria while these m...f.... are enjoying themselves in here."

As a shop owner, I feel worse here as time goes on. The opinion of the citizens here is getting worse as we go further. There is a fight, I don't know what's going on, it becomes a sort of obligation to denigrate us. While we were coming here, there was a lot of help, now everyone is slowly hating us. I do not know why. (*IR4, Male, 1974, second-hand phone business, Uzgörenler St.*)

Last year, I remember Turkish soldiers were killed in Syria. That's why some Turks burned down foreigners' cars and shops in Demirlibahçe. I heard this from some other Turkmens. And I heard some Turks stopped foreigners in the street and said to them "What are you doing here? Go back to your country!" For this reason, my family and I always stayed home during that time as we were very afraid. I used to live in Bahçelerüstü. Such things never happened there, but they often happen in Demirlibahçe. If the economy improves in Turkey, such incidents won't happen anymore. (*IR14, Male, 1982, PhD Student & Civil Servant in Iraq, Demirkapı St.*)

The Roma population, on the other hand, is seen as an asset for the neighborhood, though not for cultural variety. As the Roma population is under precarious economic conditions exacerbated during the COVID-19 regulations, their centrality is not conceived as a source of 'threat' for the political economy *in* the neighborhood. For any sort of eruption in their livelihood would result to the loss of income for the homeowners, the locals prefer having the Roma in the equilibrium point for the political economy *in* the neighborhood. However, the lockdown measures imposed for countering the Covid-19 virus hits the music industry most among any other sectors in Turkey. Causing massive rates of suicides and protests among musicians in general (see section 2.2), the Roma population in Demirlibahçe is now unable to pay their rents and bills, as well as going for shopping for food.

Look at the musicians' street, the Demirkapı street. They sell olive oil in glasses there. People can't afford the whole bottle so they give it in glasses. They are in terrible conditions. If a musician comes in here with a knife and attempts to rob, I'll let him take whatever he wants, and put money in his pockets. They are in such perished condition. I would think the man came here to mob for food. (*TR31, Male, 1967, Grocery store owner, Doğanbahçesi St.*)

Having been isolated even further due to the pandemic measures, the Roma population often denies the impacts of the virus as they extremely feel isolated relatively to the migrant populations in Turkey³⁶. Complaining deeply about the care and assistance projects and discourses provided to the Syrians and other migrants, one musician indicated that the virus has made him and his family lose more than 150.000 Turkish Lira (around 16.147 US dollar as of 20 October 2021 currency rates) in 6 months.

I believe the virus is a made-up issue to protect the system of the elderly who governs us. They care only about themselves instead of people like us. I do not believe it is as dangerous as it is presented. Some rich people are having holidays and partying in luxurious hotels, but we are told not to work. It is nonsense. *(RM1, Male, 1995, Musician, Demirkapı St.)*

In the national news, another musician, who participated in this research, voices out their desperate situation causing them to sell their instruments to be able to live on January 15, 2021 (Fox TV, 2021). He states that “we, as the Roma musicians in Demirlibahçe neighborhood constitute approximately 50% of the music and entertainment sector for Ankara. Yet, we have never been given a value, not only during the pandemic but all the way long. Music is an art that not every person is capable of performing. I would love to remind you what Atatürk said, founder of our state, ‘a nation devoid of art and artists cannot have a full existence.’ What happens to us also affects our country.” Reflecting upon the elitist characteristics of the lockdown policies, the interviewees unanimously stress upon the *non*-health-related causes of the COVID-19 pandemic.³⁷

15 years ago, there was a big boom between 2005 and 2010. People preferred Ankara. Our musician friends from the rural (areas) were coming here because their jobs were bad there. At that time, there were 5 venues opening here a week in Ankara and there was a need for musicians. But now people are returning back to their homes due to the pandemic. 10% of people started to return to their hometowns, because the rents started to increase too much. *(RM3, Male, 1974, Musician, Demirkapı St.)*

³⁶ During my work in the United Nations, I participated in a presentation given by ILO. Unfortunately, my inquiries for music sector went unanswered, as ILO includes the music in ‘art’ theme. (Caro, 2020).

³⁷ Some of my results, derived from this project and thesis field work, investigating the impact of COVID-19 on social cohesion is under review for publication as a conference proceeding (Karayıgıt, 2021)

Still, the Roma population has now their own civil society organization – *Musicians Association*. It was during the time I was conducting the interviews. Indicating their long-awaited idea for this initiative, the aim is to secure themselves and their rights in the social and economic spheres. Intending to fight against their stigmatization and exclusion, the founding members (*RM7 and RM10*) hope to educate the new generation Roma, and provide them with opportunities other than music.

Therein, to answer the research question, immigrants' practices of place-making help them establish their own centralities that concretize their appropriation of the neighborhood. Yet, this in return, creates exclusionary practices by the Roma and locals. Struggling with the precarious working condition worsened by the Covid-19 measures, social cohesion between the locals and *Roma* is moving slightly towards a negative altitude. This time, it is not by the locals but by the Roma, who see locals as the responsible for the country's perishing economic condition. During my initial site visits around Demirlibağçe Primary school in October 2019, I was informed by one of the school teachers that one Roma parent (mother) started to shout against the Iraqi immigrants. While the parent was intimidating the Iraqi migrants, a school teacher tried to interrupt. However, the Roma parent told to the teacher "The blame for our perished well-being is on *your government*. Why did the Turkish state allow them in!"

Moreover, the Roma population expresses their gratitude to the Ankara Metropolitan Municipality as it was the only institution that tries to support those who are affected by the lockdown measures. They indicate that with the initiatives of the founding members of the association, the aid packages sent by the municipality are distributed to the residents in the neighborhood in front of the Demirlibağçe Primary School in *Doğanhahçesi* St. Yet, when I ask them about if they also called upon the immigrant residing in *Doğanhahçesi*, they reply they have given the aids, but not willingly.

No, we never thought of giving the aid we collected to Iraqis. We don't want them. Instead from the Iraqi store, I go and buy from GIMAT, so my Turkish wholesaler wins. After all, 10-15 years ago, there were no Syrians or Iraqis here. We were all getting along as brothers and sisters. But this is not like the sense of nationalism we have. If we wanted to be nationalist, we would have had the aids brought from our tradesmen in our *hometowns* (*Balıkesir and Bursa*). (*RM10, Group interview, Musicians Association*)

Therein, it is evinced that the place-making practices of migrants are conceived as a threat for the political economy *in* the neighborhood by the initial residents of Roma and locals. Emergence of different centralities asserts cleavages on social capital that political economy is concentrated on different streets. Although this separation seems to be homogenized by the networks of commodity exchanges that abstract the identity differences of the subjects, increased social capital of the *Türkmen* via *Ottoman Turkmen Association*, commercial places, additional donations, and services lead to the distortion of social cohesion between the locals and the Roma. However, the Roma population perceives itself as not different from ordinary citizens and does not have any intention to pursue an ethnic-based representation through the association. Hence, as a result of the reshaping of social cohesion between the locals, the Roma community expects to earn their respect for their crafts in music. Instead of being seen as a factor for segregating the Roma, their interests in and contribution to music are expected to be valued.

3.2.3. Conclusion

This section has demonstrated how the political economy *of* and *in* the neighborhood impacts the social cohesion between the three groups. In the first part, spatial transformation of the neighborhood is examined by focusing on the interventions by constructions. Designed on the planned space, these interventions are driven with the rationale of profit maximization at the expense of the social life in Demirlibağçe. Therein, renovations and transformation of institutional buildings and structures lead to a decrease in the exchange value of the neighborhood despite its physical proximities to Ankara's centers. As the political economy *of* Demirlibağçe gets devalued in its representation and conception, it triggers the out-movement of the *elites*. As Roma population agglomerates more to the emptied places from the out-movement of the *elites*, their conception as being dirty, noisy and dangerous by homeowners lead to exploitation via rents. As the Roma population gathers in groups in the streets, their spatial practices and perceptions correlates with the political economy. For example, even today, some are still resisting to rent their fixed capital to the Roma in order to *preserve the texture of the neighborhood as an elite place*. Leading to

increase in housing prices, decreasing political economy *of* the neighborhood is further exploited by the owners. The same practice is followed with the *Türkmen* newcomers.

However, concentration of these two groups in different scales of the neighborhood creates different centralities. Strengthening and concretizing the social capitals of each group, political economy *in* Demirlibağçe becomes a source of exclusion. As the network of commodity exchanges is steered towards these two centers, the locals' share in the economic market decreases. Leading to further exclusionary practices, *Türkmen's* practices of place-making are conceived negatively. Deviating from their initial conception of mobility as vulnerable migrants, their capacities for concentration are now conceived as main reason for the decreasing value of political economy *in* and *of* the neighborhood. As the sources in this political economy are thought to be scarce, the Roma and the locals align together to stigmatize the immigrants over economic concerns, leading to the reshaping of their social cohesion.

Although the network of exchange still facilitates social cohesion between the three groups, it is done through exploitation of labor. As the Iraqi migrants working in places owned by the locals do not have insurance due to their peculiar status, they are accepted, or tolerated, for their cheap labor. Yet, when this cheap labor is concentrated in the *Türkmen's* own work places, social cohesion is hindered. Currently, locals are hoping for a gentrification project in order, expecting to make profits which would also enable them to get rid of the *Türkmen* occupying their spaces (Göksu, 2020).

Demirlibağçe has only one salvation. It's getting worse and worse. While apartments are sold for 100 thousand TL in Demirlibağçe, in the heart of Ankara, similar houses are sold for 700-800 thousand TL in places at the corner of *Mamak* and *Sincan*. These places must be completely demolished and become part of urban transformation. Then I guarantee that the prices of one flat will be 700 thousand TL or even 1 million - 1.5 million. I do both real estate and construction business; I am the expert of this business. I know the market; this place is losing more and more value. I know people who sell a flat for 400 thousand TL, which would have normally cost 700 thousand TL, in the most luxurious locations of this place. The reason is immigrants. The locals now say that they do not want to raise their child here. Imagine, the subway has come here, the high-speed train has come, the service is excellent, but these things do not mean a thing, thanks to these foreigners! (TR23, Male, 1970, Real-estate agent, *Uzgörenler St.*)

In this regard, political economy *of* the neighborhood is now utilized for the exclusion of the *Türkmen's* share in the political economy *in* the neighborhood. Although inclusion is seemingly practiced through commodity exchanges and irregularly employing the *Türkmen*, practices of migrants' place-making lead to disruption of the preexisting social cohesion between the locals and *Roma* which is now being reshaped through exclusionary spaces within the streets. While the *Roma* conceive the migrants as a rival for their degeneration of economic well-being, they target institutional efforts on protecting the refugees, but not musicians. However, attaching themselves to the society in terms of culture, the *Roma* community in the neighborhood does not differentiate themselves. For their means of production depend on the locals' dominated sectors, their desperate situation embeds them to go along with the preexisting cohesion which is merely reshaped on the exclusionary practices towards the migrants as the common *enemy*. However, until the exchange value of the neighborhood is being consumed 'till its last bit,' the locals wish a total reset.

An effort of mapping is pursued for illustrating the current phases of centralizations for the three groups and the spatial transformations in the neighborhood with regard to the places appropriated by the immigrants, locals and the *Roma*. These maps represent that each group still aspires to clinch upon their own centralities which increases their own social capital at the expense of social cohesion. While the primary school as a social institution could have played a role for social cohesion, the COVID-19 outbreak and inefficiency of governmental efforts at schools are not benefitting the neighborhood for creating inclusionary spaces.



Figure 17 Mapping practice for illustrating the centralization of three groups in four streets. Map on the top illustrate the ownership of the fixed capital. Map on the bottom illustrates density of each group in the streets.

3.3. Conceived Space of Demirlibahçe and its Political Economy

The maps above give hints about how streets are *lived* by each group in Demirlibahçe Neighborhood. While the locals are not actually present in the streets anymore, the Roma and the *Türkmen* populations appropriate the streets. By way of exercising daily talks, the two groups make their own places. Thus, their visibility is caught by the eye, as they display their cultural way of lives through symbols.

Lefebvre asserts that although abstract space has homogenizing characteristics “towards the elimination of existing differences or peculiarities” (p. 52), it also carries the possibility of the creation of new spaces. This contradictory character of the abstract space has been illustrated through the examination of different representations of Demirlibahçe by and for each group in the two previous sections. These spatial contradictions express conflicts between socio-political interests and forces (p. 366). By establishing their own spaces, different from a *differential space*, the Turkmen inhabitants concretize their sense of belonging. These new capacities for centralization in Doğanbahçesi and Ağaçlı streets, however, “tends to annul rather than reinforce homogenization” in the neighborhood since their involvement encompasses only producing things in space (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 390).

With the “potential energies” (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 391) the *Türkmen* and the Roma populations are capable of diverting homogenized space to their own purposes. In their uses of public spaces, the Roma and *Türkmen* inhabitants usually deviate from homogenized space through their differences in culture, language, and ideologies. Yet, containing the induced differences, abstract space has a dominant role in the production of space. It facilitates the manipulation of representational space and spatial practices (1991, p. 59). This manipulation by the conceived space is observed through the mimesis of neo-Ottomanism.

Lived space seems to have their own unique characteristics within the appropriated streets. Such a view on the spaces of Roma and the *Turkmen* would demand the operationalization of the Lefebvre’s concept *differential space*, as their spaces would be intentionally produced against the capitalist accumulation and political domination. However, the differences are abstracted one more time as being “a coherent system that is partly artificial and partly real” (p. 376) in space through the mimesis of (neo-)

Ottomanism represented through the Ottoman flag and Sultan's signatures hung on the wall of the commercial places. Combined with Islamist practices as the bonding element of society and a 'liberal' quest, ethnic differences are transcended and united under a common Muslim identity (Erdem, 2017, p. 715). Aligned with neo-liberalism, the cultural life of the society is governed on the basis of market and neoconservative rationalities (p. 719). While this allows, and encourages, individuals to join the market, they are also required to comply with a set of moral-religious rules. Hence, it is not differential to see the symbols of Ottoman flag in front of commercial shops as inhabitants are well-informed about ruling party's political agenda in defining the nation.

Lefebvre indicates in this regard that differences "endure or arise on the margins of the homogenized realm, either in the form of resistances or in the form of externalities" (1991, p. 373). However, although those margins (Doğanbahçesi St., Ağaçalı St., Demirkapı St., and the rear parts of Uzgörenler St.) establish their own centralities that change the representation of Demirlibağçe, "the existing center and the forces of homogenization must seek to absorb all such differences" (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 373). The existing center and the forces of homogenization in this regard is the neo-Ottoman policies. Imposed ideologies of neo-Ottomanism further "fails to acknowledge the ethno-religious differences and the demands for cultural rights of its citizens" (Erdem, 2017, p. 715-716). Imposed by the ruling party's agenda on defining the nation (Batuman, 2017), the individuals with different ethnic and cultural background are represented as the same.

3.3.1. Symbolizing Neo-Ottomanism and Turkishness

As discussed in the construction of the self and the other in section 3.1., the inhabitants of Demirlibağçe Neighborhood perceive commonalities in the shared history of an imagined community – the Ottoman past. Yet, observed spatial practices of the three groups leads to the emergence of exclusionary discourses. While place-making strategies of the migrants exacerbate these exclusionary discourses vis-a-vis new centralities disturbing the political economy *of* and *in* the neighborhood, the *lived*

space of the neighborhood becomes an arena of symbols and images that overplay the physical spaces of the three groups.

By establishing their own spaces through spatial and social transformations, the lived space of the neighborhood becomes an arena of symbols and images that overplay the physical spaces of the three groups. These symbols and images are actually used by all the inhabitants as a strategy for (self-)integration, and thus to create unity with the abstract political nation-building propaganda within the spatial and social structure of the neighborhood. This is especially the case for Turkmen residents, who commonly display Ottoman flags and the Sultans' signatures in shops and commercial places. By thus symbolizing their rightful share in the production of space, the immigrants arrange their spaces through such representations.

These arrangements through symbols are made firstly through the naming of the shops; *Türkmen* butchery, Mosul Restaurant, Mosul Barber Shop etc (figure 18). Having the flags of Turkish state and Ottoman Empire inside their shops, the migrants secondly illustrate their *Turkishness* and Ottoman heritage. Indeed, when I asked the *Türkmen* shopkeepers the reasons why they put the flags inside or in front of their places, they emphasized the *fact* that they are Turkic despite having been lived in an Arabic state, Iraq.

We hung the flags because we are *racist*, because we are Turkish. Our blood is Turkish. Now I wish you could see my son. He's more of a racist than I am. Turanian. I mean, it's in our blood, there's no need to lie. But I wish the people would understand how we feel here, or realize the persecution we faced in Iraq because of our ethnicity. We saw a lot of discrimination during Saddam's time. Let me tell you something, we didn't have political power then. There were villages smaller than Telafer. They became provinces, but Telafer did not. Why not? Because Telafer is 80% Turk. (**IR4, Male, 1974, second-hand phone business, Uzgörenler St.**)

These self-integration premises by the *Türkmen* residents are also supported and represented by the *Ottoman Turkmen Association*. Established in Demirlibağçe on 10 October 2018, the association receives funding from the Mamak Municipality, individual donors, Turkish Red Crescent, and also the Directorate of Religious Affairs. While both the naming as "Ottoman Türkmen" and its funders illustrate the government-led neo-Ottomanist institutionalization, the association also contributes to

fill in the neo-Ottomanist mimesis, which actually attempts to overshadow ethnic and cultural differences. Hence, differences on the spatial practices/perceived space and political economy of the conceived space are covered by the neo-Ottomanist imaginary. This seems to be a contribution for social cohesion in the neighborhood.

These are our Turkmen brothers and sisters who have Turkish blood from our Ottoman past. Look at the name, it's "Turk-men." They know history as well as we do. They also say, "After the Ottoman Empire collapsed, we stayed there. The Iraqis there called us foreigners because they are of Arab origin, but we are Turkmen." Of course, we have citizens who exclude them here too, but after all, they are Turkish and have Turkish blood. And besides, we are all Muslims. We have many things in common. *(TR13, Male, 1971, President of Ottoman Türkmen Association, Ağaçlı St.)*



Figure 18 Façades of the Türkmen shops. Photo by the author. 9 October 2020.



Figure 19 Façade of the *Ottoman Türkmén Association*. Photo by the author. 9 October. 2020.



Figure 20 Three crescents in the façade of an Iraqi barber shop. Three crescents were used in Ottoman era. Now it is in the logo of Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) as a symbol of Turkish nationalism. Photo by the author. 9 October 2020.

Indeed, Islamist culture, Ottomanism, and Turkishness are used as a tool for the social cohesion of the three groups, despite their differing centralization. In order to counter the exclusionary practices, the Roma population also favors this tool to comprehend the *Türkmen* as well. For they are perceived as groups who are ethnically and culturally different, the same practice of self-inclusion also applies to them. Seeing themselves as a part of Ottoman heritage, the Roma population extends the Turkishness beyond the citizenship. In order to provide refuge for themselves in this mimesis of nationhood, the Roma sees the Iraqi *Türkmen* as having a similar trouble they have been facing.

Let me tell you something very interesting. I was at a wedding one day. A girl came and sat with me. That girl was studying at university at the time, she was older than me. We were drinking tea. She asked where I am from. I said that I am originally from Isparta, my mother is from Balıkesir. Thus, I said I am half Roma. “Oh, you speak Turkish,” she said. Believe me, I hear this question. She probably thinks the Roma are from Portugal or something, because some people are also called gypsies there. I remember getting up immediately and leaving, it was so hard for me. **(RM1, Male, 1995, Musician, Demirkapı St.)**

Iraqis are actually Turkmens. I wouldn't call them Iraqi. In fact, because they are misrepresented, problems arise. People think they are Syrians. Someone needs to come out and stress that these people are Turkmens, they are one of us. Of course, there were troubles before, but now there are none. The thing is all oppressed communities live in crowds because they are afraid. I see even the children banding together. In order to prevent this, it should be stated that these people are Turkish and, along with us, are part of the same mosaic. **(RM9, Male, 1986, Musician, Demirkapı St.)**

While this mimesis of neo-Ottomanism and Turkishness are symbolized voluntarily by the *Türkmen*, it is approved by the locals and the Roma. Leading to the connectivity between the spaces of centralization each group has, the symbols become the main unitary factor for covering the differences in the perceived space. However, although these mimesis of neo-Ottomanism and Turkishness are symbolized in order to homogenize the differences, *lived* space is actually not cohesive in Demirlibağçe Neighborhood. For these symbols are facilitated through dominant political agenda, the differences are not represented through them. Indeed, the demonstration of the flags and sultans' signature refers to the production of the reproducible. Aligning with the hegemonic political power of the ruling party (AKP), “the production of space is thus transformed into its opposite: the reproduction of things in space” (Lefebvre,

1991, p. 377). Turning these mimeses into a reproduceable imitations, the adoption of neo-Ottomanism leads to the renewal (or reproduction) of existing social relations (p. 377).

Therein, the spaces of the Roma and the *Türkmen* are not *differential* and do not constitute a struggle for space. Their efforts for political and economic representability are to be integrated in the existing hegemonic power that does not constitute a spark for *urban right movement*. For it is the differences between the cultures, the symbolization of Ottoman past or the Turkishness does not actually form a unity for the same cause in actual space. As the locals see the cultural practices of the Roma (celebrating the weddings in the streets, figure 21) and the *Türkmen* (relationship between men and women) inferior to them, there emerge the actual differences in the lived space.

Indeed, such differences between the Roma and Iraqi *Türkmen* are gone through series of physical contestations in Demirkapı St, as well as the primary school. As illustrated by the maps (figure 17), the two groups spend their time in the street which are visible to others. For both the Roma and *Türkmen* develop belongingness to the places they appropriate in the streets, the intersection of claiming a place leads to rapid collisions.

When Iraqis first came to Turkey, the place where they gathered was Demirlibağçe Demirkapı Sokak. I can't tell the exact date, but there is an incident that overflowed families as a result of an Iraqi child arguing with a child of our musician Roma citizens living here in the spring of 2017. And about 10 Iraqis and people from ours, whose number I can't count, got into each other. Later, three or four police cars were coming. They all came here, all the way to the police chief. I think the event was described as a diplomatic crisis. The reason was seen as the conflict between the two sides. In other words, the Roma are attacking the Iraqis and it was thought that there would be a big fight. Because a very serious police force came here. I'm not exaggerating, there were 40-50 policemen that day. *(RM9, Male, 1986, Musician, Demirkapı St.)*

There was a classroom of Roma and Iraqis. Some of the Romans were also uncomfortable with this situation. The parents started to send their children to other schools. There was even a conflict between Roma and Iraqis for this reason. I didn't see it, but I was told. There were too many Roma and Iraqis in two classes. Roma people shouted "we are in this state because of you" to immigrants. Other teachers were saying that. *(T4, Female, Form Teacher)*

It is in this regard that production of space is revealed through spatial contestations for and against the dominant symbols and images. Despite other symbols are used to mitigate contestations over the perceived and conceived spaces (figure 22), these symbols and cultural way of life lead to the feeling of threat especially by the women participants. Significantly, the role of the women in the Roma and *Türkmen* populations is seen as a factor of backwardness.



Figure 21 A Roman wedding in front of Mukhtarate building in Demirkapı St. Date unknown (presumably 2014-2015). Source: Mukhtar S. Hanım



Figure 22 Pictures of the leaders of different political party leaders. Atatürk in the middle. Photo by the author. 28 October 2020

3.3.2. Symbolizing Neo-Ottomanism and Turkishness

The early-age marriages and having too many kids are seen as cultural inferiority. These perceptions are experienced through the mobility patterns of the women. The mapping project, conducted Fall 2019-2020 semester, illustrates that *Türkmen* women do not float in the streets as much as the Roma and the local women. To represent this pattern of mobility differences between the three groups and genders, the direct lines show the women's mobility practices, and the wavy lines display men's mobility.




Figure 23 A mapping project for the course ARCH535 – Creative Mapping Techniques. Design: Nagehan Vanlioğlu-Yazıcı.

While the direct lines aim to indicate women do not circulate around the street with a free mind, the wavy line mean that men walk in the street without a necessary purpose. As indicated harassment show that women are forced to be fast in rhythm in order to avoid men's staring. Indeed, a *Türkmen* resident at the age of around 18 indicated in an irregular interview in October 2019 that he has right to stare at women who are not dressed *properly*. Labeling those who are not covering their limbs as searchers for a mate, he stated that the staring derives from the male instincts.

The map also illustrates that the rhythm of the women which accelerates around the primary school as they take their children to there and return to homes. While local and the Roma women have a greater freedom of mobility, the Iraqi women do not. Indicated in the perception section, this act is seen as honor and cultural backwardness by the locals at the same time. As men gather around in group at the side-walks, the women perceives this as a source of threat.

If you could see their eyes. Of course, I can't wear a dress here. My husband doesn't let me to wear nice dresses. At first, I was angry with my husband about what to wear. For example, we go to dinner in the evening. Right across from our house, my husband is waiting in the car. Of course, I wore my dress because I was going out to dinner. I am so inconvenienced till I get to the car. A crowd [of *Türkmen*] welcomes you, 10-15 people. They are hungry. It was like 8 o'clock, during the summer. The weather was bright. Think about it... I am not physically fit to dress openly because I am overweight. I have a normal strap dress, I'm 43 years old already. Believe me, I had a hard time walking, there are like 20 steps from the house to the car. I was so scared that something would be said to my husband. Or my husband would interfere with them because of their staring. I didn't know how I got on. I don't wear a dress since that day. (TR7, *Female 1977, Real-estate Agent, Uzgörenler St.*)

I mean, they're looking... They're staring as if they haven't seen any woman. Because they really didn't see it. They are irritating. But now their women are free too. They go out for shopping, for example. Do you see their clothes, for example? They are wearing hijab, but I swear, if they were naked, it would not be so inconspicuous. They wear closed but tight-fitting coats. Doesn't that interest people too? Excuse me, but their hips are on the market. But according to them, my head is bare, I wear trousers or a mini-skirt... They find it strange, they have not seen it. (TR12, *Female, 1962, Shopkeeper, Uzgörenler St.*)

Furthermore, similar discourses are produced also by the locals against the local women who *display* their bodies in the streets. "Their women do not look around while walking in the streets. You know ours (*women*); they look at you and then they get angry at you because you're also looking at them. Ours are derailed, you cannot avoid such things." (TR24, Male, 1989, Women Hair Dresser, Ağaçlı St.).

Despite all the commonalities, the Iraqi people are 20-30 years behind us. They are all different from us. My own personal opinion is this: When they get married, they live with their family. If you live in such a large family, adaptation to the society will be difficult. Your contact with the outside is limited. But if they live as a nuclear family, then they will be much closer to our culture. (TR16, *Male, 1990, Civil Servant, lives outside but works in the neighborhood*)

The main problem is that they are very crowded. For example, on Saturdays and Sundays, 30 men wait on the pavement on the road. When 30 men stand on the pavement, no one wants to bring their family here. Let's now consider the university graduates who used to rent houses here. Children are teenagers. They will have boyfriends or girlfriends. But when they look, and all I see group of men, they're bearded. And some of them are even wearing gowns. Man, this is the capital. You should wear decent clothes. You are sitting in the heart of Ankara. When I came here from Diyarbakır, I was so careful about my speech and cloth to fit into society. (*TR23, Male, 1970, Real-estate agent, Uzgörenler St.*)

The construction of honor being applicable to those being closed to outside world disturbs the local women when they realize their way of life is considered dishonest. While there are still some local women who think in the same Islamist way of constructing the honor, the others reject such labeling with the women body. In slightly different standpoint, the Roma women do not seem to be concerned any of these labeling. Except they feel they are being targeted for such stigmatization on their body, they do not feel any concern, as elaborated in the section 3.2. Hence, the main contestation seems to be between the locals and the *Türkmen* women. However, this reaction is not related to an ethnic or social way of life, but instead politicized cultural way of life, shaped by the neo-Ottomanist agenda of the current government of Turkey.

We went to the house of our *child* who used to work here. When we got their house, there is no mother. She was in the kitchen. I am sitting with the father of the child. I told the child, "son, call your mother." He says his mother won't come. His mother would not come near the man. I had my son with him. So I said to the boy, "I'm sitting across to your father, why isn't your mother sitting across to my son?" Is not it right? I got angry and I went to the kitchen, brought the woman out of the kitchen. I said am I exposing myself by sitting in front of your your father! Excuse me but, the man is sitting with his underwear, there is no respect, nothing. He is sitting in underwear. I said there is no such thing, did I come here to see your father?! I came here as a guest. They cooked their local dishes. They made preparations, they made their rice, meat, then from that special lavash bread. They were very welcoming, that's something else. But their thoughts are also different. They didn't show their wives. (*TR14, Female, 1973, Restaurant Owner, Uzgörenler St.*)

3.3.3. Conclusion

Lived space of Demirlibahçe is produced through neo-Ottomanist symbols that all three groups see a common ground. However, the usage of such symbols does not correspond to what Lefebvre proposes as a possible sign of resistance against the dominating power of the abstract space. Instead of representing their own space, neo-Ottomanist mimesis is experienced in order to take a place under the hegemony of the ruling party. While it is adopted for an identity creation, others who do not follow such ideological practices are portrayed as exclusionists despite it is them and their space that are excluded.

Subsuming a cultural way of life in accordance with the Islam, these symbols exclude women on the basis of their presence and physical appearance in the streets. In other words, an attempt towards a social cohesion is done over female body. Although approved by some of the women as well, the women are seen as something that should be kept away from the eyes.

The country belongs to the Republic of Turkey. We cannot say anything about it (women question). But whatever is secret, is more beautiful. After all, when you give a gift, you give it wrapped up. If it is covered, it looks beautiful, but if it is open, it is not beautiful. (*IR13, Male, 1956, restaurant owner, Ağaçlı St.*)

Therefore, although the neo-Ottomanist mimesis allows the three groups to have different representation gathered under one common form, it is actually assimilating. Observed as a set of practices against themselves, locals on the other hand resist to evade such cultural expression lived in the streets. Experiencing the different clashes of cultural practices in the streets, each group and its members inhabit the neighborhood as an arena of contestation. Thus, exclusion is re-produced in political basis; Islamist and secularist.

CHAPTER 4

CONCLUSION

This research explored the relationship between the space and social cohesion in three sections – perception of Demirlibahçe, conception of Demirlibahçe and political economy, and lived space of Demirlibahçe.

The first section displayed how the three groups construct Demirlibahçe, the self, and the other based on their perception of space and spatial practices. Combined with the intervention in the neighborhood by construction and renewal projects (Demirlibahçe Primary School and *Başkentray* Project), the commonalities and differences perceived in spatial practices are patterned, and put in order (see table 1).

The second section dwells on the conception of space. Following the Lefebvre's proposition to investigate how political economy is instrumentalized for the segregation of space, the research then focused on the exchange value of Demirlibahçe. Investigating the political economy in two perspectives – political economy *of* and *in* Demirlibahçe – it was explored that owners of the fixed capital include or exclude the Roma and the Iraqi on the basis of exploitation. Political economy *of* Demirlibahçe refers to the neighborhood value within Ankara. Now being represented as immigrant and the Roma area, the neighborhood is labelled with bad reputation in the market. Hence, this caused a decrease in the selling prices and causing a high level of exclusion by the locals. These increasing rental prices create a sort of inclusion, though on the basis of exploitation. Thus, political economy *in* Demirlibahçe revealed how the networks of commodity exchange become a way of social inclusion with exploitation. Turning the differing perceptions of the self and the other into the relationships of buyers and sellers, it is asserted the differences are subsumed under the homogenizing impact of the capitalist relationships. However, while these differences are homogenized under abstract space, there also emerge

different centralities in different streets that the Roma population calls Demirlibağçe *musicians' neighborhood*, whereas the Iraqi *Türkmen* call it *Hasanköy* with reference to a village in Telafer. These centralizations through political economy are illustrated via mapping practices (figure 17).

Lastly, the usage of symbols and signs are explored in order to reveal how inhabitants represent their own spaces, representational spaces. These symbols and signs are the usages of Ottoman flag and Sultans' signatures. The *Türkmen* residents use these symbols for self-integrating themselves into to neo-Ottomanist nation building process of AKP government. This nation-building agenda is defined through the combination of Islamist practices as the bonding element of society with 'liberal' quests (Erdem, 2017). Thus, ethnic differences are transcended and united under common Muslim identity. Aligned with neo-liberalism, cultural life of the society is governed on the basis of market and neoconservative rationalities (p. 719). While this allows, and encourages, the individuals to join the market, they are also required to comply with a set of moral-religious rules. However, since this is imposed by the hegemon political power, it is a mimesis. Lefebvre (1991) defines mimesis as a function in the domination of space (p. 376). Hence, it establishes an abstract 'spatiality' as a coherent system that is partly artificial and partly real (p. 376). Yet, this coherent system deviates from Lefebvre's concept of *differentiality* and right to difference. As the differences of the *Türkmen* and the Roma are voluntarily given up for the mimesis of neo-Ottomanism, the issue deviates from the social cohesion between the identity groups towards the political sphere. For this neo-Ottomanist agenda is imposed by the AKP government, those who are in the opposition are *differentiated*. Observed through the female body, the differences are practiced over the clothes and attitudes of women.

It is in this regard, the conclusion of this research asserts slight propositions. Although it is still incomplete, due to my unanswered efforts to reach out to Mamak Municipality for the establishment of public policies, this study suggests the establishment of *neighborhood council* within which the members of each group represent their rights and complaints. Instead of *merely* supporting each groups' civil association for the defense of their own rights (such as *Musicians Associations* for the Roma in Demirkapı St. and *Ottoman Türkmen Association* for the *Türkmen* in Ağaçalı St.), a unified body

of a policy institution would be beneficial for the determination of neighborhood's own development.

In their study Schneekloth and Shibley (1995) inserts the concept of placemaking for “doing neighborhood development” in Roanoke Neighborhood, in the US (p. 2). While the city faced with major outflow movement in the 1960s-1970s due to de-industrialization, there emerged a general feeling among many citizens that the city government was not spending the taxpayers' dollars efficiently. Being an aggregate of diverse neighborhoods of radically different socioeconomic, racial, and physical characteristics, Roanoke Neighborhood Partnership was established. With a utopian approach, the motivation was to declare “we, a partnership of neighborhood people, backed by the resources of the public sector, volunteer organizations, and businesses, can identify and resolve many of the problems affecting the quality of life in our city.” (p. 112). Through the partnership, the inhabitants have established a consensus to “create an open space for dialogue about place and placemaking through developing a relationship with place constituencies” (p. 6). Secondly, the partnership continued with confirmation and interrogation practices about certain places that they paid specific attention for development. Lastly, the professional placemakers are invited for facilitating the framing of action.

There has been one major event organized by Mamak Municipality on 23 August 2019 at the Mamak Cultural Center, with the participation of district mayor, mukhtars, various NGO presidents, UN representatives, academics, and *Türkmen* opinion leaders. I was unable to attend the meeting, but the workshop has a written output including all the transcriptions which I get to have thanks to the *Mukhtar S Hanım* (Karadeniz, 2020). Consisting of three sessions, the workshop discussed what has been done, is being done, and what should be done for the future for the social cohesion with regard to foreigners. Though not specifically for Demirlibahçe Neighborhood, the workshop provided larger framework for Ankara's foreign immigrant management strategies. Identifying the major problems (access to employment, profession, judiciary systems, health, education, socio-psychological support, and social services), the end result of the workshop called for an all-inclusive effort with the lead of *Türkmen* themselves to change the negative image of migrants by engaging in social works in localities (Karadeniz, 2020, p. 140).

It is evident that Mamak Municipality with its center of Consulting and Coordination for Asylum Seekers was in close contact with other state and international governmental organizations as well as the *Türkmen Migrants, Refugee, and Asylum Seekers Solidarity Association* and academics. The municipality also established City and Civilization Academy for discussing the urbanization process of Mamak district in late September (T. C. Mamak Belediyesi, 2020). Also, *Türkmen* have their own well-established organizational structures that provide solidarity and care for themselves. Yet, municipal efforts are now in idle (I did not receive any concrete response to my calls from the Municipality regarding the social cohesion issues in Demirlibahçe). Further, organizational structures of the *Türkmen* exacerbate further exclusionary practices, especially on the sphere of political economy. In this scenario, the ‘harmony’ between the three groups are destroyed, since each group aspires for its own social capital. Hence, this situation favoring the advantage of the advantaged ones causes further exclusion through exploitation, not based on the identity differences but on the social class and political differences. Therefore, while majority of the residents have mentioned about their dissatisfaction about the state level and municipal level negotiations, the establishment of a *neighborhood council* would enable the inhabitants to systematically gather and plan their own solutions via grassroots.

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APPENDICES

A. QUESTIONNAIRES (OPEN-ENDED AND SURVEY)

Yarı-Yapılandırılmış Görüşmeler için Soru Önergesi GENEL MAHALLE SAKINLERİ

1. Sosyal çevreniz kimlerden oluşmakta, ne tür aktiviteler yapmaktasınız?
2. Demirlibahçe Mahallesi'nde en çok vakit geçirdiğiniz yerler neresidir?
3. Kendinizi bu mahallede en çok huzur, mutluluk ve güven içinde hissettiğiniz alan neresidir?
- 3.1. Gündelik hayatınızda önemli bir yere sahip olan bu alanın fotoğrafını çekerek bizimle paylaşım yapabilir misiniz? Bu alanı/mekânı nasıl oluşturduğunuzu çektiğiniz görsel üzerinden bize anlatabilir misiniz?
4. Demirlibahçe Mahallesi'ne yönelik izlenimleriniz nelerdir? Buraya ilk geldiğiniz an ile bugün bulunduğunuz durum arasında bir farklılık oldu mu, olduysa ne gibi bir farklılıktan veya değişimden bahsedebilirsiniz?
- 4.1. Hissettiğiniz bu değişimlerden hangilerini olumsuz hangilerini olumsuz olarak değerlendirebilirsiniz? Bu değişimlerden sizi en çok sevindiren ya da en çok rahatsız eden faktör nedir?
- 4.2. Olumsuz olarak nitelendirdiğiniz durumlar için sizce ne gibi bir çözüm geliştirilebilir? Sizin bu çözüm adına katkınız ne olabilir?
5. Demirlibahçe İlkokulu sizce mahallenin huzurlu ve güvenli bir yer olması için bir role sahip midir? Okul öğrencileri ve velileri ne ölçüde birbirleri ile yakınlaştırmakta?
- 5.1. Çocukların sokaktaki tecrübeleri ile okuldaki tecrübeleri arasında sizce nasıl bir etkileşim olmaktadır?
6. Ankara genelinden düşününce Demirlibahçe Mahallesi'ni nasıl tanımlarsınız?
- 6.1. Demirlibahçe Mahallesi'nde yaşamak Ankara kenti ile olan bağınızı nasıl etkiliyor/biçimlendiriyor?

KİŞİSEL BİLGİ FORMU – YETİŞKİNLER

Değerli Demirlibahçe Mahallesi sakini,
Demirlibahçe Mahallesi çeşitli sosyal, kültürel, ekonomik ve siyasi görüşleri bünyesinde barındırmaktadır. Mevcut duruma yönelik olarak, her bir mahalle sakininin Demirlibahçe Mahallesi'ne yönelik algısının değişip değişmediğini ölçmek istiyoruz. Cevaplarınız tamamıyla gizli tutulacak ve sadece araştırmacılar tarafından bilimsel bilgi üretmede kullanılacaktır. Katılım sırasında sorulardan ya da herhangi bir başka nedenden ötürü kendinizi rahatsız hissederseniz cevaplamayı yarıda bırakabilirsiniz. Ölçeği tamamlamak yaklaşık **10 dakikanızı** alacaktır. Aşağıda Demirlibahçe Mahallesi ile ilgili birtakım sorular yer almaktadır. Lütfen cümleleri dikkatle okuyunuz ve çoktan seçmeli sorular için size en uygun olanını (x) işaretleyerek belirtiniz

1. Doğum yılı ve cinsiyetiniz:

.....

2. Memleketiniz (şehir):

.....

3. Oturduğunuz Sokak

.....

4. Mesleğiniz:

.....

5. Medeni durumunuz

(a) Evli (b) Bekar (c) Dul (d) Boşanmış

6. Çocuğunuz var mı?

Evet (_____ kız _____ oğlan çocuğum var) Hayır

7. Eğitim Düzeyiniz:

Sadece okuryazar (1) Ortaokul mezunu (3) Üniversite Mezunu (5)
 İlkokul mezunu (2) Lise mezunu (4) Y.Lisans/Doktora Mezunu (6)

8. Kendinizi hangi sosyo-ekonomik sınıfa ait görüyorsunuz?

- (a) Alt (b) Orta-alt (c) Orta (d) Orta-üst (e) Üst

9. Hanenize giren aylık gelir:

0 – 500 TL	1
501 – 1000 TL	2
1001 – 1500 TL	3
1501 – 2000 TL	4
2001 – 2500 TL	5

2501 – 3000 TL	6
3001 – 3500 TL	7
3501 – 4000 TL	8
4000 TL üstü	9
Cevap yok	10

KİŞİSEL BİLGİ FORMU – ÖĞRENCİLER

Merhaba! Türkiyeli arkadaşlarının okulundaki ve mahallendeki davranışlarıyla ilgili bir araştırma yapıyoruz. Aşağıda, okuldaki göçmen arkadaşların ilgili görüşlerini anlatacağın sorular bulunmaktadır.

1. Kaç yaşındasın (doğum yılın)?

2. Kaçınıcı sınıfa gidiyorsun?

1 2 3 4

3. Cinsiyetin nedir?

Erkek Kız

4. Anne ve babanın işleri/meslekleri nedir?

Anne Baba

.....

5. Sokakta oyun oynuyor musun?

Evet (Oynuyorsan ne sıklıkla)

Hayır

6. Őu anda aŐađıdaki derslerdeki baŐarı notun nedir? (her bir ders iŐin belirtiniz)

<input type="checkbox"/> 0-44 (1)	<input type="checkbox"/> 0-44 (1)	<input type="checkbox"/> 0-44 (1)	<input type="checkbox"/> 0-44 (1)
<input type="checkbox"/> 45-54 (2)	<input type="checkbox"/> 45-54 (2)	<input type="checkbox"/> 45-54 (2)	<input type="checkbox"/> 45-54 (2)
<input type="checkbox"/> 55-69 (3)	<input type="checkbox"/> 55-69 (3)	<input type="checkbox"/> 55-69 (3)	<input type="checkbox"/> 55-69 (3)
<input type="checkbox"/> 70-84 (4)	<input type="checkbox"/> 70-84 (4)	<input type="checkbox"/> 70-84 (4)	<input type="checkbox"/> 70-84 (4)
<input type="checkbox"/> 85-100 (5)	<input type="checkbox"/> 85-100 (5)	<input type="checkbox"/> 85-100 (5)	<input type="checkbox"/> 85-100 (5)

Matematik

Fen ve Teknoloji

TürkŐe

Sosyal Bilgiler

California Zorba Mağduriyeti Ölçeği

Tekrar merhaba! Şimdi ise senden okulda meydana gelebilecek aşağıdaki durumları düşünmen istenmekte. Lütfen ilk önce her bir durumun okulunda hangi sıklıkla başına geldiğini işaretle. Daha sonra da, bu durumun başka öğrencilerin başına ne sıklıkla geldiğine tanık olduğunu belirt.

1. OKULDA başka bir öğrenci tarafından kaba ya da kırıcı bir şekilde alay edilmesi ya da lakap/isim takılması.

Benim başıma geldi

- (1) Son bir ay içinde hiç olmadı
- (2) Son bir ay içinde 1 kez oldu
- (3) Bir ay içinde 2-3 kez oldu
- (4) Haftada 1 kez oldu
- (5) Haftada birkaç kez oldu

Başkasının başına geldiğini gördüm

- (1) Son bir ay içinde hiç olmadı
- (2) Son bir ay içinde 1 kez oldu
- (3) Bir ay içinde 2-3 kez oldu
- (4) Haftada 1 kez oldu
- (5) Haftada birkaç kez oldu

2. OKULDA kaba ya da kırıcı bir şekilde söylenti ve dedikodu yayılması

Benim başıma geldi

- (1) Son bir ay içinde hiç olmadı
- (2) Son bir ay içinde 1 kez oldu
- (3) Bir ay içinde 2-3 kez oldu
- (4) Haftada 1 kez oldu
- (5) Haftada birkaç kez oldu

Başkasının başına geldiğini gördüm

- (1) Son bir ay içinde hiç olmadı
- (2) Son bir ay içinde 1 kez oldu
- (3) Bir ay içinde 2-3 kez oldu
- (4) Haftada 1 kez oldu
- (5) Haftada birkaç kez oldu

3. OKULDA kaba ya da kırıcı bir şekilde bir gruptan dışlanma ya da kasıtlı olarak görmezden gelinme.

Benim başıma geldi

- (1) Son bir ay içinde hiç olmadı
- (2) Son bir ay içinde 1 kez oldu
- (3) Bir ay içinde 2-3 kez oldu
- (4) Haftada 1 kez oldu
- (5) Haftada birkaç kez oldu

Başkasının başına geldiğini gördüm

- (1) Son bir ay içinde hiç olmadı
- (2) Son bir ay içinde 1 kez oldu
- (3) Bir ay içinde 2-3 kez oldu
- (4) Haftada 1 kez oldu
- (5) Haftada birkaç kez oldu

4. OKULDA kaba ya da kırıcı bir şekilde vurulma itilme ya da fiziksel olarak yaralanma.

Benim başıma geldi

- (1) Son bir ay içinde hiç olmadı
- (2) Son bir ay içinde 1 kez oldu
- (3) Bir ay içinde 2-3 kez oldu
- (4) Haftada 1 kez oldu
- (5) Haftada birkaç kez oldu

Başkasının başına geldiğini gördüm

- (1) Son bir ay içinde hiç olmadı
- (2) Son bir ay içinde 1 kez oldu
- (3) Bir ay içinde 2-3 kez oldu
- (4) Haftada 1 kez oldu
- (5) Haftada birkaç kez oldu

5. OKULDA kaba ya da kırıcı bir şekilde tehdit edilme

Benim başıma geldi

- (1) Son bir ay içinde hiç olmadı
- (2) Son bir ay içinde 1 kez oldu
- (3) Bir ay içinde 2-3 kez oldu
- (4) Haftada 1 kez oldu
- (5) Haftada birkaç kez oldu

Başkasının başına geldiğini gördüm

- (1) Son bir ay içinde hiç olmadı
- (2) Son bir ay içinde 1 kez oldu
- (3) Bir ay içinde 2-3 kez oldu
- (4) Haftada 1 kez oldu
- (5) Haftada birkaç kez oldu

6. OKULDA kaba ya da kırıcı bir şekilde ayıp sözler söylenmesi, şakalar ya da el-kol hareketleri yapılması.

Benim başıma geldi

- (1) Son bir ay içinde hiç olmadı
- (2) Son bir ay içinde 1 kez oldu
- (3) Bir ay içinde 2-3 kez oldu
- (4) Haftada 1 kez oldu
- (5) Haftada birkaç kez oldu

Başkasının başına geldiğini gördüm

- (1) Son bir ay içinde hiç olmadı
- (2) Son bir ay içinde 1 kez oldu
- (3) Bir ay içinde 2-3 kez oldu
- (4) Haftada 1 kez oldu
- (5) Haftada birkaç kez oldu

7. OKULDA kaba ve kırıcı bir şekilde öğrenciler tarafından, diğer öğrencilerin eşyalarının çalınması ya da eşyalarına zarar verilmesi

Benim başıma geldi

- (1) Son bir ay içinde hiç olmadı
- (2) Son bir ay içinde 1 kez oldu
- (3) Bir ay içinde 2-3 kez oldu
- (4) Haftada 1 kez oldu
- (5) Haftada birkaç kez oldu

Başkasının başına geldiğini gördüm

- (1) Son bir ay içinde hiç olmadı
- (2) Son bir ay içinde 1 kez oldu
- (3) Bir ay içinde 2-3 kez oldu
- (4) Haftada 1 kez oldu
- (5) Haftada birkaç kez oldu

LÜTFEN SON BİR AY İÇİNDE SANA BUNLARI EN ÇOK YAPAN KİŞİYİ DÜŞÜN VE AŞAĞIDAKİ SORULARI BUNA GÖRE CEVAPLA.

8. Sana bunu yapan kişi kız mı yoksa erkek miydi? (Birisini daire içine alınız)

(1) Erkek

(2) Kız

(3) Bunlar benim başıma gelmedi

9. Hakkında düşündüğün bu kişi kendinle karşılaştığında nasıl biri?
(Birisini daire içine alınız)

a. Bu öğrenci benden ne kadar popüler	(1) Benden daha az	(2) Benim kadar	(3) Benden daha çok	(4) Bunlar benim başıma gelmedi
b. Bu öğrenci, okulda ne kadar başarılı?	(1) Benden daha az	(2) Benim kadar	(3) Benden daha çok	(4) Bunlar benim başıma gelmedi
c. Bu öğrenci fiziksel olarak ne kadar güçlü?	(1) Benden daha az	(2) Benim kadar	(3) Benden daha çok	(4) Bunlar benim başıma gelmedi

10. Bu olaylar okulda NEREDE başıma geldi? (Seçeneği daire içine alınız)

a. Sınıflarda	(1) Hayır	(2) Evet	(3) Hiç başıma gelmedi
b. Koridorlarda	(1) Hayır	(2) Evet	(3) Hiç başıma gelmedi
c. Yemekhane ya da kantinde	(1) Hayır	(2) Evet	(3) Hiç başıma gelmedi
d. Oyun ya da spor alanlarında	(1) Hayır	(2) Evet	(3) Hiç başıma gelmedi
e. Tuvaletlerde ya da soyunma odalarında	(1) Hayır	(2) Evet	(3) Hiç başıma gelmedi
f. Okul servislerinde ya da toplu taşıma aracında	(1) Hayır	(2) Evet	(3) Hiç başıma gelmedi
g. Okula gidiş ya da dönüş yolunda	(1) Hayır	(2) Evet	(3) Hiç başıma gelmedi
h. Başka bir yer (açıklayın)	(1) Hayır	(2) Evet	(3) Hiç başıma gelmedi

11. Bu olaylar NE ZAMAN başına geldi? (Seçeneği daire içine alınız)

a. Okuldan önce	(1) Hayır	(2) Evet	(3) Hiç başıma gelmedi
b. Derste	(1) Hayır	(2) Evet	(3) Hiç başıma gelmedi
c. Dersler arasında (sınıfları değiştirirken)	(1) Hayır	(2) Evet	(3) Hiç başıma gelmedi
d. Teneffüslerde (ders arası ya da öğle arası)	(1) Hayır	(2) Evet	(3) Hiç başıma gelmedi
e. Okuldan sonra	(1) Hayır	(2) Evet	(3) Hiç başıma gelmedi
h. Başka bir zaman (açıklayın)	(1) Hayır	(2) Evet	(3) Hiç başıma gelmedi

12. Bu başına gelenlerle ilgili kiminle konuştun? (Seçeneği daire içine alınız)

a. Bir arkadaşım ya da arkadaşlarımla	(1) Hayır	(2) Evet	(3) Hiç başıma gelmedi
b. Okuldaki bir yetişkinle (okuldaki bir büyükle)	(1) Hayır	(2) Evet	(3) Hiç başıma gelmedi
c. Evdeki bir yetişkinle	(1) Hayır	(2) Evet	(3) Hiç başıma gelmedi
d. Diğer aile üyeleri ile (erkek kardeş, kız kardeş, kuzen gibi)	(1) Hayır	(2) Evet	(3) Hiç başıma gelmedi
e. Bu olanlar hakkında kimse bir şey bilmiyor, kendimde sır olarak tutuyorum	(1) Hayır	(2) Evet	(3) Hiç başıma gelmedi
h. Başka birileri (açıklayın)	(1) Hayır	(2) Evet	(3) Hiç başıma gelmedi

Türk Öğrenciler

Merhaba! Okulunla ilgili düşüncelerin neler? Okulunla ilgili iyi ya da kötü yaşadığın durumları bize söylemeni istiyoruz. Aşağıdaki soruları okuduktan sonra 3 seçenekten 1 tanesini yuvarlak içine alarak cevaplayabilirsin.

	Hayır	Emin Değilim	Evet
1. Okulumdaki bazı çocuklar sıklıkla diğerlerine vuracaklarını ya da onları döveceklerini söylerler.	Hayır	Emin Değilim	Evet
2. Okulumdaki çocuklar iyi (terbiyeli) bir şekilde davranırlar.	Hayır	Emin Değilim	Evet
3. Okulumda çocukların anne-babalarının zengin ya da fakir olması bir şeyi değiştirmez, herkese aynı şekilde davranılır.	Hayır	Emin Değilim	Evet
4. Okulumda, anne-babalar yardım etmek için sıklıkla sınıflara gelirler.	Hayır	Emin Değilim	Evet
5. Okulumdaki çocuklar insanları önemserler.	Hayır	Emin Değilim	Evet
6. Okulumdaki çocuklara okuldaki başka öğrenciler tarafından sıklıkla zarar verilir.	Hayır	Emin Değilim	Evet
7. Okulumda herkese eşit davranılıyor.	Hayır	Emin Değilim	Evet
8. Annem-babam sıklıkla okuldaki veli toplantılarına katılır.	Hayır	Emin Değilim	Evet
9. Okulum genellikle çok gürültülü.	Hayır	Emin Değilim	Evet
10. Öğretmenlerim sınavlarda başarılı olmam için ellerinden geleni yapıyorlar.	Hayır	Emin Değilim	Evet
11. Okulumdaki öğretmenler sorunlarımızda biz çocuklara yardımcı olurlar.	Hayır	Emin Değilim	Evet
Bunu okuyorsan “Hayır” ı işaretle.	Hayır	Emin Değilim	Evet
12. Okulumda ne zaman eğlenceli oyunlar oynayacak olsak, hep aynı öğrencilere görev verilir.	Hayır	Emin Değilim	Evet
13. Okulumda, hep aynı öğrenci öğretmenime yardım eder.	Hayır	Emin Değilim	Evet

14. Okulumdaki çocuklar birbirlerini severler.	Hayır	Emin Değilim	Evet
15. Okulumdaki çocuklar birbirlerine güvenirlere.	Hayır	Emin Değilim	Evet
16. Bu okulda başarılı olabileceğimi hissediyorum.	Hayır	Emin Değilim	Evet
17. Okulum çoğu zaman temiz ve düzenlidir.	Hayır	Emin Değilim	Evet
18. Öğretmenlerim beni önemserler.	Hayır	Emin Değilim	Evet
19. Okulmda bazı çocuklar silah ya da bıçak taşıyor.	Hayır	Emin Değilim	Evet
20. Faaliyetlerimizde veya oyunlarımızda bilgisayar, top ya da piyano gibi şeyleri her zaman aynı çocuklar kullanır.	Hayır	Emin Değilim	Evet
21. Okulumdaki çocuklar birbirlerine yardım ederler.	Hayır	Emin Değilim	Evet
22. Okulmda, okuldan sonra yapılan etkinliklerde ya da kulüplerde (eğitsel kol) görev alması için hep aynı öğrenciler seçilir.	Hayır	Emin Değilim	Evet
23. Okulumdaki çocuklar çok fazla kavga ediyorlar.	Hayır	Emin Değilim	Evet
24. Okulumdaki çocuklar öğretmenlere saygı gösterirler.	Hayır	Emin Değilim	Evet
Bunu okuyorsan “Hayır” ı işaretle.	Hayır	Emin Değilim	Evet
25. Bu okulda öğrenmekten keyif alıyorum.	Hayır	Emin Değilim	Evet
26. Anne-babam okulumu sıklıkla ziyaret eder.	Hayır	Emin Değilim	Evet
27. Öğretmenlerim okulda başarılı olabileceğime inanırlar.	Hayır	Emin Değilim	Evet
28. Okuldaki özel projelere destek vermek için veliler sık sık okula gelirler.	Hayır	Emin Değilim	Evet
29. Okulumdaki öğretmenler bizlere okulla ilgili problemlerimizde yardımcı olurlar.	Hayır	Emin Değilim	Evet
30. Okulmda, kızlara ve erkeklere eşit davranılır.	Hayır	Emin Değilim	Evet
31. Okulmda öğretmenler bütün öğrencilere eşit davranıyorlar.	Hayır	Emin Değilim	Evet
32. Okulumdaki çocuklar birbirlerine kötü adlar takıyorlar.	Hayır	Emin Değilim	Evet
33. Okulumdaki çocuklar birbirlerine saygı gösterirler.	Hayır	Emin Değilim	Evet

34. Öğretmenlerimle sorunlarımı paylaşabiliyorum.	Hayır	Emin Değilim	Evet
35. Velilerim öğretmenlerimle görüşmek için sık sık okuluma gelirler.	Hayır	Emin Değilim	Evet
36. Öğretmenim kendim hakkında iyi hissetmemi sağlar.	Hayır	Emin Değilim	Evet

37. Sınıfında ne zamandan beri Iraklı arkadaşların var? Lütfen aşağıya yazarmısın?

38. Sınıfındaki Iraklı arkadaşlarıyla okul dışında veya mahallede görüşüyor musun?

39. Sınıfındaki ve mahallendeki Iraklı çocukların en iyi ve en kötü özellikleri nelerdir?

40. Uzaktan eğitim Iraklı arkadaşlarıyla ilişkini nasıl etkiledi?

41. Seninle ilgilenen kişi (annen-baban) okul toplantılarına gelir mi?

(a) Hiç gelmez (b) Arada bir gelir (c) Sıklıkla gelir

42. Okul dışında para kazanmak için bir yerde çalışıyor musun?

(a) Evet (b) Hayır

43. Teneffüslerde göçmen arkadaşlarıyla vakit geçiriyor musun?

(a) Evet (b) Hayır

44. Mahalle'nde göçmen arkadaşlarıyla vakit geçiriyor musun?

(a) Evet (b) Hayır

45. Oturduğun sokakta ya da mahallede kendini mutlu ve güvende hissettiğin özel bir yer var mıdır?

Varsa, o yeri bize söyler misin? _____

46. Mahalledeki hayatından ne kadar memnunsun?

(a) Memnun değilim (b) Ne memnunum ne (c) Memnunum
değilim

47. Çaldığın bir müzik aleti var mı? Varsa ne tür bir enstrüman çalyorsun?

Çeşitli etkinliklerde de çalıyor musun? _____

Şimdi ise, aşağıdaki ifadelerden hangileri göçmen arkadaşlarıyla ilgili seni rahatsız eder ya da etmez belirtmeni bekliyoruz. Cevaplarken 3 seçenekten 1 tanesini yuvarlak içine alabilirsin.

	Hayır	Emin Değilim	Evet
48. Mahallemde, Iraklı arkadaşlarım olmasını isterim.	Hayır	Emin Değilim	Evet
49. Mahallemdeki Iraklı çocuklara güvenirim.	Hayır	Emin Değilim	Evet
50. Mahallemdeki Iraklı çocuklarla birlikte oyunlar oynamak isterim.	Hayır	Emin Değilim	Evet
51. Mahallemdeki Iraklı çocukların tehlikeli oyunlar oynadığını düşünüyorum.	Hayır	Emin Değilim	Evet
52. Mahallemdeki Iraklı çocuklar olmasaydı sokaklarda daha çok oynayabilirdim.	Hayır	Emin Değilim	Evet
53. Mahallemdeki Iraklı çocuklar okula katılım sağlamaktadır.	Hayır	Emin Değilim	Evet
54. Mahallemdeki Iraklı çocuklar okul yaşamını olumlu etkiliyor.	Hayır	Emin Değilim	Evet
55. Iraklı çocuklar okula gelince mahalledekine göre daha uyumlu davranır.	Hayır	Emin Değilim	Evet
56. Iraklı çocuklar hem okulda hem de mahallede kavgacıdır.	Hayır	Emin Değilim	Evet
57. Okulumdaki Iraklı çocuklar derslere ve öğretmenlere saygı duyuyor.	Hayır	Emin Değilim	Evet
58. Okulumdaki Iraklı çocukların aileleriyle kendi ailemin arkadaş olmasını isterim.	Hayır	Emin Değilim	Evet
59. Okulumdaki Iraklı çocukların evlerinde misafirlğe gitmekten hoşlanırım.	Hayır	Emin Değilim	Evet
60. Okulumdaki Iraklı çocukların bize misafirlğe gelmesini isterim	Hayır	Emin Değilim	Evet
61. İleride, ortaokulda da yine Iraklı arkadaşlarımla beraber olmak isterim.	Hayır	Emin Değilim	Evet
62. Okulumdaki Iraklı çocukların aileleriyle kendi ailemin arkadaş olmasını isterim.	Hayır	Emin Değilim	Evet
63. Iraklı çocukların olmadığı bir yerde yaşamak isterim.	Hayır	Emin Değilim	Evet

Son olarak;

Sınıftaki ve mahallendeki Iraklı çocukların okulunda ve mahallende sergilediđi davranışlardan hangileri seni rahatsız, hangileri mutlu etmekte? Onlarla daha iyi anlaşabilmen için nasıl bir ortam olmasını isterdin?

IRAKLI/GÖÇMEN ÖĞRENCİLER

1. Sınıfındaki Türk/Roman arkadaşlarıyla okul dışında veya mahallede görüşüyor musun?

2. Sınıfındaki ve mahallendeki Türk/Roman çocukların en iyi ve en kötü özellikleri nelerdir?

3. Uzaktan eğitim Türk/Roman arkadaşlarıyla ilişkini nasıl etkiledi?

4. Seninle ilgilenen kişi (annen-baban) okul toplantılarına gelir mi?

- (a) Hiç gelmez (b) Arada bir gelir (c) Sıklıkla gelir

5. Okul dışında para kazanmak için bir yerde çalışıyor musun?

- (a) Evet (b) Hayır

6. Teneffüslerde Türk arkadaşlarıyla vakit geçiriyor musun?

- (a) Evet (b) Hayır

7. Mahalle'nde Türk arkadaşlarıyla vakit geçiriyor musun?

- (a) Evet (b) Hayır

8. Kaç senedir Türkiye'de yaşıyorsunuz? _____

9. Oturduğun sokakta ya da mahallede kendini mutlu ve güvende hissettiğin özel bir yer var mıdır?

Varsa, o yeri bize söyler misin? _____

10. Mahalledeki hayatından ne kadar memnunsun?

- (a) Memnun değilim (b) Ne memnunum ne
değilim (c) Memnunum

11. Çaldığın bir müzik aleti var mı? Varsa ne tür bir enstrüman çalıyorsun?

Çeşitli etkinliklerde de çalıyor musun? _____

Sosyal Mesafe Testi – Öğrenciler

Şimdi ise, aşağıdaki ifadelerden hangileri Türk arkadaşlarıyla ilgili seni rahatsız eder ya da etmez belirtmeni bekliyoruz. Cevaplarken 3 seçenekten 1 tanesini yuvarlak içine alabilirsin.

	Rahatsız etmez	Emin değilim	Rahatsız eder
1. Komşuluk etmek	Rahatsız etmez	Emin Değilim	Rahatsız Eder
2. Arkadaşlık etmek	Rahatsız etmez	Emin Değilim	Rahatsız Eder
3. Sırrınızı paylaşmak	Rahatsız etmez	Emin Değilim	Rahatsız Eder
4. Aynı ülkenin vatandaşı olmak	Rahatsız etmez	Emin Değilim	Rahatsız Eder
5. İhtiyaç duyduğunuzda yardım istemek	Rahatsız etmez	Emin Değilim	Rahatsız Eder
6. Cenaze törenlerine katılmak	Rahatsız etmez	Emin Değilim	Rahatsız Eder
7. Düğün törenlerine katılmak	Rahatsız etmez	Emin Değilim	Rahatsız Eder
8. Yemeğini yemek	Rahatsız etmez	Emin Değilim	Rahatsız Eder

SOSYAL UYUM ALGISI ÖLÇEĞİ (IRAKLI VELİLER)

Kıymetli veliler,

Demirlibahçe Mahallesi çeşitli sosyal, kültürel, ekonomik ve siyasi görüşleri bünyesinde barındırmaktadır. Mevcut duruma yönelik olarak, her bir mahalle sakininin çocuklarıyla birlikte sokaklarda huzur, mutlu ve karşılıklı güven içinde nasıl yaşayabileceğini araştırmak amacıyla siz mahalle sakinlerini bu çalışmaya katkıda bulunmaya davet etmekteyiz. Cevaplarınız tamamıyla gizli tutulacak ve sadece araştırmacılar tarafından bilimsel bilgi üretmede kullanılacaktır. Katılım sırasında sorulardan ya da herhangi bir başka nedenden ötürü kendinizi rahatsız hissederseniz cevaplamayı yarıda bırakabilirsiniz. Ölçeği tamamlamak yaklaşık **10 dakikanızı** alacaktır. Aşağıda Demirlibahçe Mahallesi ile ilgili birtakım sorular yer almaktadır. Lütfen cümleleri dikkatle okuyunuz ve çoktan seçmeli sorular için size en uygun olanını (x) işaretleyerek belirtiniz

1. Türkler ile bir arada çalışmaktan memnunuz /memnun olurdum.

(a) Kesinlikle Katılmıyorum (b) (c) (d) (e) Kesinlikle Katılıyorum

2. Türk ailelerle aynı binada oturmaktan memnunuz veya onlarla aynı binada oturmaktan rahatsız olmazdım.

(a) Kesinlikle Katılmıyorum (b) (c) (d) (e) Kesinlikle Katılıyorum

3. Çocuklarımın, Türk çocuklarla arkadaşlık etmesinden rahatsızlık duymam ya da çocuğum yok ama olsaydı Türk çocuklarla arkadaşlık etmesinden rahatsızlık duymazdım.

(a) Kesinlikle Katılmıyorum (b) (c) (d) (e) Kesinlikle Katılıyorum

4. Çocuklarımın, Türk biriyle evlenmesinden rahatsız olmam ya da çocuğum yok ama olsaydı Türk biriyle evlenmesinden rahatsızlık duymazdım.

(a) Kesinlikle Katılmıyorum (b) Katılmıyorum (c) Kararsızım (d) Katılıyorum (e) Kesinlikle Katılıyorum

5. Türklerin göçmenlere yardımcı olduğunu düşünüyorum.

(a) Kesinlikle Katılmıyorum (b) Katılmıyorum (c) Kararsızım (d) Katılıyorum (e) Kesinlikle Katılıyorum

6. Çoğu zaman mahallemde güvenli hissediyorum.

(a) Kesinlikle Katılmıyorum (b) Katılmıyorum (c) Kararsızım (d) Katılıyorum (e) Kesinlikle Katılıyorum

7. Türkçe konuşabiliyorum, ya da Türkçe öğreniyorum.

(a) Kesinlikle Katılmıyorum (b) Katılmıyorum (c) Kararsızım (d) Katılıyorum (e) Kesinlikle Katılıyorum

8. Mahallemdeki emlakçılar ve ev sahipleri göçmenlerle Türklere aynı kira fiyatını uyguluyor

(a) Göçmenlerden daha az para alıyor (b) Aynı miktarda para alıyor (c) Göçmenlerden daha fazla para alıyor (d) Bilmiyorum

9. Ülkemdeki savaş bitene kadar Türkiye’de oturabileceğime inanıyorum.

(a) Kesinlikle Katılmıyorum (b) Katılmıyorum (c) Kararsızım (d) Katılıyorum (e) Kesinlikle Katılıyorum

10. Çocuklarımın Türkiye’de parlak bir geleceęi sahip olacaęını düşünüyorum

- (a) Kesinlikle (b) (c) (d) (e) Kesinlikle
Katılmıyorum Katılmıyorum Kararsızım Katılıyorum Katılıyorum

11. Mahallenizde ve oturduğunuz sokakta yaşayan Türklerle ilgili paylaşmak istediğiniz başka bir düşünceniz var mı? (Oturduğunuz mahalleyi belirtmenizde yarar vardır.)

**12. Eğer taşınacak olsaydınız Ankara'nın hangi muhitine taşınmak isterdiniz?
Neden?**

SOSYAL UYUM ALGISI ÖLÇEĞİ – (TR-RMN)

Kıymetli veliler,

Türkiye Cumhuriyeti, komşu ülkelerde yaşanan iç savaş ve huzursuzluklar sebebiyle zorunlu göçe tabi olan birçok ulustan insana kapılarını açmıştır. Bu nedenle Demirlibahçe Mahallesi'ne yerleşen birçok göçmen 2014 yılından bu yana mahallede ikamet etmektedir. Geçen bu süreçte Demirlibahçe Mahallesi çeşitli sosyal, kültürel, ekonomik ve siyasi görüşleri bünyesinde barındırmaya başlamıştır. Mevcut duruma yönelik olarak, her bir mahalle sakininin çocuklarıyla birlikte sokaklarda huzur, mutlu ve karşılıklı güven içinde nasıl yaşayabileceğini araştırmak amacıyla siz mahalle sakinlerini bu çalışmaya katkıda bulunmaya davet etmekteyiz. Cevaplarınızı tamamıyla gizli tutulacak ve sadece araştırmacılar tarafından bilimsel bilgi üretmede kullanılacaktır. Katılım sırasında sorulardan ya da herhangi bir başka nedenden ötürü kendinizi rahatsız hissederseniz cevaplamayı yarıda bırakabilirsiniz. Ölçeği tamamlamak yaklaşık **10 dakikanızı** alacaktır. Aşağıda Demirlibahçe Mahallesi ile ilgili birtakım sorular yer almaktadır. Lütfen cümleleri dikkatle okuyunuz ve çoktan seçmeli sorular için size en uygun olanını (x) işaretleyerek belirtiniz.

1. Iraklılar (göçmenler) ile bir arada çalışmaktan memnunum /memnun olurdum.

(a) Kesinlikle Katılmıyorum (b) Katılmıyorum (c) Kararsızım (d) Katılıyorum (e) Kesinlikle Katılıyorum

2. Iraklı ailelerle aynı binada oturmaktan memnunum veya onlarla aynı binada oturmaktan rahatsız olmazdım.

(a) Kesinlikle Katılmıyorum (b) Katılmıyorum (c) Kararsızım (d) Katılıyorum (e) Kesinlikle Katılıyorum

3. Çocuklarımın, Iraklı çocuklarla arkadaşlık etmesinden rahatsızlık duymam ya da çocuğum yok ama olsaydı Iraklı çocuklarla arkadaşlık etmesinden rahatsızlık duymazdım.

(a) Kesinlikle Katılmıyorum (b) Katılmıyorum (c) Kararsızım (d) Katılıyorum (e) Kesinlikle Katılıyorum

4. Çocuklarımın, Iraklı biriyle evlenmesinden rahatsız olmam ya da çocuğum yok ama olsaydı Iraklı biriyle evlenmesinden rahatsızlık duymazdım.

(a) Kesinlikle Katılmıyorum (b) Katılmıyorum (c) Kararsızım (d) Katılıyorum (e) Kesinlikle Katılıyorum

5. Iraklıların, Türkiye'deki devlet okullarından ve hastanelerinden yararlanmasına izin verilmelidir.

(a) Kesinlikle Katılmıyorum (b) Katılmıyorum (c) Kararsızım (d) Katılıyorum (e) Kesinlikle Katılıyorum

6. Iraklıların, aynı iş için Türklere verilen maaşın aynısını almalıdırlar.

(a) Kesinlikle Katılmıyorum (b) Katılmıyorum (c) Kararsızım (d) Katılıyorum (e) Kesinlikle Katılıyorum

7. Iraklıların varlığı yaşadığım muhitteki hayat pahalılığını etkiledi

(a) Hayat pahalılığını azalttı (b) Değişiklik olmadı (c) Hayat pahalılığını arttırdı (d) Bilmiyorum

8. Iraklıların Türkiye'deki varlığı yaşadığım muhitteki suç oranını etkiledi.

(a) Suç oranları azaldı (b) Değişiklik olmadı (c) Suç oranları arttı (d) Bilmiyorum

9. Iraklıların sadece kamplarda yaşamaları gerekir.

(a) Kesinlikle Katılmıyorum (b) Katılmıyorum (c) Kararsızım (d) Katılıyorum (e) Kesinlikle Katılıyorum

10. Iraklı aileler, fakir Türk ailelere kıyasla daha zor durumdadır.

- (a) Kesinlikle Katılmıyorum (b) Katılmıyorum (c) Kararsızım (d) Katılıyorum (e) Kesinlikle Katılıyorum

11. Temel ihtiyaçlarını karşılayabilmeleri için sivil toplum kuruluşları, uluslararası kuruluşlar ve yabancı devletler Iraklı ailelere yardım etmelidir.

- (a) Kesinlikle Katılmıyorum (b) Katılmıyorum (c) Kararsızım (d) Katılıyorum (e) Kesinlikle Katılıyorum

12. Iraklıların temel ihtiyaçlarını karşılayabilmeleri için Türk Hükümeti'nin onlara yardım etmesi gerekir.

- (a) Kesinlikle Katılmıyorum (b) Katılmıyorum (c) Kararsızım (d) Katılıyorum (e) Kesinlikle Katılıyorum

13. Mahallenizde ve oturduğunuz sokakta yaşayan Iraklılarla ilgili paylaşmak istediğiniz başka bir düşünceniz var mı? (Oturduğunuz mahalleyi belirtmenizde yarar vardır.)

**14. Eđer taşınacak olsaydınız Ankara'nın hangi muhitine taşınmak isterdiniz?
Neden?**

SOSYAL MESAFE ÖLÇEĞİ (VELİLER)

Bu çalışmadaki soruların amacı sizinle ilgili daha çok bilgi almak ve ayrıca mahalledeki sosyal ilişkileriniz hakkında ne düşündüğünüzü öğrenmektir. Verdiğiniz tüm yanıtlar gizli tutulacaktır. Yani, verdiğiniz yanıtları kimse bilmeyecek ve görmeyecektir. Eğer soruları yanıtlamak istemezseniz, devam etmek zorunda değilsiniz. Eğer sorularla ilgili bir rahatsızlık hissederseniz, istediğiniz zaman yanıtlamayı bırakabilirsiniz. Lütfen soruların başındaki yönergeleri dikkatlice okuyunuz. Her bir soruyu okuyup, içtenlikle yanıt vermeye çalışınız. Yanıtların doğrusu ya da yanlışı yoktur. Verdiğiniz tüm yanıtlar gizli tutulacaktır. Aşağıda Demirlibağçe Mahallesi'nde bulunan göçmenler hakkında aşağıdaki ifadelerin sizi ne ölçüde rahatsız edeceğini veya etmeyeceğini, verilen ölçek üzerinde bir rakam işaretleyerek belirtiniz

Katılımınız için teşekkür ederim

	Rahatsız etmez	Pek rahatsız etmez	Emin değilim	Biraz rahatsız eder	Rahatsız eder
1. Evlenmek	1	2	3	4	5
2. Komşuluk etmek	1	2	3	4	5
3. Arkadaşlık etmek	1	2	3	4	5
4. Ticari ortaklık kurmak	1	2	3	4	5
5. Sırrınızı paylaşmak	1	2	3	4	5
6. Aynı ülkenin vatandaşı olmak	1	2	3	4	5
7. Aynı iş yerinde çalışmak	1	2	3	4	5
8. Alışveriş yapmak	1	2	3	4	5
9. İhtiyaç duyduğunuzda yardım istemek	1	2	3	4	5
10. Kızınızın evlenmesi	1	2	3	4	5
11. Oğlunuzun evlenmesi	1	2	3	4	5
12. Cenaze törenlerine katılmak	1	2	3	4	5
13. Düğün törenlerine katılmak	1	2	3	4	5
14. Yemeğini yemek	1	2	3	4	5

DEMİRLİBAĞÇE İLKOKUL ÖĞRETMENLERİ

Çok değerli öğretmenler,

Demirlibahçe Mahallesi çeşitli sosyal, kültürel, ekonomik ve siyasi görüşleri bünyesinde barındırmaktadır. Mevcut duruma yönelik olarak, her bir mahalle sakininin çocuklarıyla birlikte sokaklarda huzur, mutlu ve karşılıklı güven içinde nasıl yaşayabileceğini araştırmak amacıyla Demirlibahçe İlköğretim okulunun önemli bir role sahip olduğunu düşünmekteyiz. Bu hususta sizlerden okul ortamı ve öğrenciler arasındaki ilişkilere yönelik aşağıdaki soruları cevaplamanızı istemekteyiz. Cevaplarınız tamamıyla gizli tutulacak ve sadece araştırmacılar tarafından bilimsel bilgi üretmede kullanılacaktır. Katılım sırasında sorulardan ya da herhangi bir başka nedenden ötürü kendinizi rahatsız hissederseniz cevaplamaı yarıda bırakabilirsiniz. Ölçeği tamamlamak yaklaşık **10 dakikanızı** alacaktır. Aşağıda Demirlibahçe Mahallesi ile ilgili birtakım sorular yer almaktadır. Lütfen cümleleri dikkatle okuyunuz ve çoktan seçmeli sorular için size en uygun olanını (x) işaretleyerek belirtiniz.

Katılımınız için teşekkür ederiz.

Açık-uçlu Sorular

1. Ne kadar süredir öğretmenlik yapıyorsunuz?
2. Demirlibahçe İlkokulu'na sizi sürükleyen süreç nasıl gelişti?
3. Demirlibahçe İlkokulu'nda geçirdiğiniz süre zarfında burayı diğer okullardan farklı kılan özellikler nelerdir?
4. Demirlibahçe İlkokulu'nda geçirdiğiniz süre zarfında eğitim konusunda sizi en çok zorlayan faktörler neler oldu? Bunun yanı sıra kolaylaştırıcı faktörler neler oldu?
5. Demirlibahçe İlkokulu'nda geçirdiğiniz süre zarfında başka bir okula tayin istemeyi düşündünüz mü?
6. Demirlibahçe İlkokulu'nun yıkılıp yeniden yapılmasını nasıl değerlendirirsiniz? Artıları ve dezavantajları neler oldu?
7. Okula gelen yabancı uyruklu göçmenlerle ilgili eğitim alanında yaşadığınız olumlu ve olumsuz süreçler nelerdi? Bu süreçte yerel halk tarafından ne gibi yardım ya da tepkiler aldınız?
8. COVID-19 salgını ile beraber gelen uzaktan eğitim sürecinde derslere katılımı ne gibi zorluklar yaşandı? Bu konuda size Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı'ndan ne gibi bilgilendirmeler sağlandı?
9. Yabancı uyruklu öğrenciler ile sosyal uyumun sağlanması için alınan uygulamalarda sizin tecrübelerinize göre ne gibi eksiklikler ya da artılar bulunmakta? Demirlibahçe İlkokulu özelinde sizin yaptığınız uygulamalar oldu mu?
10. Demirlibahçe İlkokulu'nun Demirlibahçe Mahallesi'nde gündelik hayata etkisi var mıdır? Okuldaki arkadaşlıkların veliler ve öğretmenler vasıtasıyla mahalledeki birlikteliği güçlendirdiği oldu mu?
 - a. Sizce okuldaki arkadaşlıkların, veli ve öğretmen etkileşiminin mahalledeki birlik beraberliğe etkisi nedir?

Öncelikle sizden Demirlibahçe Mahallesi'nde yaşayan göçmenlere yönelik aşağıdaki soruları cevaplamanızı istiyoruz. Aşağıdaki soruları cevaplarken Iraklı mahalle sakinleri ile ilişkili değerlendirme yapmanızı ve bu değerlendirmenizin sizi ne derece rahatsız edip etmediğini belirtmenizi istiyoruz.

	Rahatsız etmez	Pek rahatsız etmez	Emin değilim	Biraz rahatsız eder	Rahatsız eder
1. Evlenmek	1	2	3	4	5
2. Komşuluk etmek	1	2	3	4	5
3. Arkadaşlık etmek	1	2	3	4	5
4. Ticari ortaklık kurmak	1	2	3	4	5
5. Sırrınızı paylaşmak	1	2	3	4	5
6. Aynı ülkenin vatandaşı olmak	1	2	3	4	5
7. Aynı iş yerinde çalışmak	1	2	3	4	5
8. Alışveriş yapmak	1	2	3	4	5
9. İhtiyaç duyduğunuzda yardım istemek	1	2	3	4	5
10. Kızınızın evlenmesi	1	2	3	4	5
11. Oğlunuzun evlenmesi	1	2	3	4	5
12. Cenaze törenlerine katılmak	1	2	3	4	5
13. Düğün törenlerine katılmak	1	2	3	4	5
14. Yemeğini yemek	1	2	3	4	5

Şimdi ise sizden 2017 yılında yıkılan ve 2019 yılında yenilenen Demirlibahçe İlköğretim okulunun mahallede ulaşılması hedeflenen toplumsal uyuma olan etkisiyle ilgili soruları cevaplamanızı istemekteyiz.

	Kesinlikle Katılıyorum	Katılıyorum	Tarafsızım	Katılmıyorum	Kesinlikle Katılmıyorum
15. Okulun eski hali tarihi bir dokuya sahipti	1	2	3	4	5
16. Okulun eski halinin kendine has bir dokusu olduğunu düşünüyorum	1	2	3	4	5
17. Okulun eski hali Demirlibahçe Mahallesi'ne kimlik veriyordu	1	2	3	4	5
18. Okulun eski hali kapasite olarak yetersizdi	1	2	3	4	5
19. Okulun eski halinin yenilenmesi gerekiyordu	1	2	3	4	5
20. Okulun eski halinde çalışmayı tercih ederdim	1	2	3	4	5
21. Okulun yenilenme süreci mesleğime olan bağımlı olumsuz etkiledi	1	2	3	4	5
22. Okulun yeni halinden memnunum	1	2	3	4	5
23. Okulun eski hali göçmen nüfusun eğitim ihtiyaçlarını karşılayamazdı	1	2	3	4	5
24. Göçmen çocuklar için ayrı okullar yapılması gerekli	1	2	3	4	5
25. Göçmen çocuklar okuldaki eğitimi aksatıyor	1	2	3	4	5
26. Göçmen çocuklar uzaktan eğitime katılmıyor	1	2	3	4	5
27. Göçmen çocukların sokakta geçirdiği vakit eğitim sürecini olumsuz etkiliyor	1	2	3	4	5
28. Çocuklarımı/torunlarımı şu anki Demirlibahçe İlköğretim okulunda okutmak isterim	1	2	3	4	5
29. Okul gibi mahallenin de kentsel dönüşüme girmesini isterim	1	2	3	4	5

Son olarak, sizden göçmen çocukların eğitimi ile ilgili açık uçlu sorular cevaplamanızı istemekteyiz.

30. Iraklı ve diğer göçmen öğrencilere yönelik yürüttüğünüz eğitim ve öğretim sürecinde size en çok zorlayan sorun(lar) neydi/nedir?

31. Iraklı ve diğer göçmen öğrencilerin arkadaşları, öğretmenleri ve müdüriyet ile olan ilişkisi sizce nasıl? Bu ilişkide olumlu ve olumsuz bulduğunuz yönler varsa lütfen belirtiniz.

32. Öğretmenlere ve öğrencilere göçmenlerin entegrasyonu amacıyla sağlanmış okul içi ve sınıflara yönelik bir destek veya herhangi bir yardım faaliyeti var mıdır?

MAHALLE AİDİYETİ ÖLÇEĞİ – (TR-RMN-IRK)

Değerli Demirlibahçe Mahallesi sakini,

Demirlibahçe Mahallesi'ne yönelik duygu ve düşüncelerinizi öğrenmek istiyoruz. Cevaplarınız tamamıyla gizli tutulacak ve sadece araştırmacılar tarafından bilimsel bilgi üretmede kullanılacaktır. Katılım sırasında sorulardan ya da herhangi bir başka nedenden ötürü kendinizi rahatsız hissederseniz cevaplamayı yarıda bırakabilirsiniz. Ölçeği tamamlamak yaklaşık **10 dakikanızı** alacaktır. Aşağıda Demirlibahçe Mahallesi ile ilgili birtakım sorular yer almaktadır. Lütfen cümleleri dikkatle okuyunuz ve çoktan seçmeli sorular için size en uygun olanını (x) işaretleyerek belirtiniz

1. Ne kadar süredir Demirlibahçe Mahallesi'nde yaşıyorsunuz?

- (a) 0-5 yıl (b) 6-15 yıl (c) 16-25 yıl (d) 25-50 yıl (e) 50+ yıl

2. Demirlibahçe'den önce başka bir semtte/mahallede yaşadınız mı?

3. Demirlibahçe'den taşınacak olsanız hangi semte/mahalleye taşınmak isterdiniz? _____

	Kesinlikle Katlıyorum	Katlıyorum	Tarafsızım	Katılmıyorum	Kesinlikle Katılmıyorum
4. Demirlibahçe'nin tarihi bir dokusu olduğunu düşünüyorum	1	2	3	4	5
5. Demirlibahçe'nin kendine has bir dokusu olduğunu düşünüyorum	1	2	3	4	5
6. Demirlibahçe'nin kendine has dokusunu bugün dahi taşıdığını düşünüyorum	1	2	3	4	5
7. Kendimi Demirlibahçe'ye ait hissediyorum	1	2	3	4	5
8. Kendimi Demirlibahçe'de güvende hissediyorum	1	2	3	4	5
9. Demirlibahçe'ye geldiğimde kendimi mutlu ve rahat hissediyorum	1	2	3	4	5
10. Uzun süre Demirlibahçe'den ayrı kalınca özlem duyuyorum	1	2	3	4	5
11. Çocuklarımın/torunlarımın da Demirlibahçe'de yaşamasını isterim	1	2	3	4	5
12. Demirlibahçe'deki sosyal hayatın bir parçasıyım	1	2	3	4	5
13. Demirlibahçe ile duygusal bir bağım var	1	2	3	4	5
14. Demirlibahçe'de komşuluk ilişkileri istediğim gibi	1	2	3	4	5
15. Demirlibahçe'de anahtarımı bırakabileceğim insanlar var (kapıcı hariç)	1	2	3	4	5
16. Demirlibahçe'li olduğum için kendimi özgün hissediyorum	1	2	3	4	5
17. Demirlibahçe'de eskiden aydın insanlar yaşardı	1	2	3	4	5
18. Demirlibahçe'de günümüzde de aydın insanlar yaşar	1	2	3	4	5

Şimdi, sizin Demirlibaħe Mahallesi'nin tarihsel serüvenini düşünmenizi istiyoruz. Sizin tanık olduğunuz kadarıyla, bu tarihsel gelişimi hangi açıdan (olumlu/olumsuz) değerlendirebilirsiniz? Aşağıda bu hususta kentsel koruma sorularını cevaplamayı istiyoruz.

	Kesinlikle Katılıyorum	Katılıyorum	Tarafsızım	Katılmıyorum	Kesinlikle Katılmıyorum
19. Demirlibaħe son yıllarda çok deėiştii	1	2	3	4	5
20. Demirlibaħe'nin eski halinde yaşamayı tercih ederdim	1	2	3	4	5
21. Demirlibaħe'nin mevcut dokusundan memnun deėilim	1	2	3	4	5
22. Demirlibaħe'deki kullanıcı profiline deėişmesinden memnun deėilim	1	2	3	4	5
23. Demirlibaħe'ye yeni gelen kullanıcı profili mevcut kullanıcılara benzemez	1	2	3	4	5
24. Mamak genelindeki kentsel dönüşüm projelerini olumlu buluyorum	1	2	3	4	5
25. Demirlibaħe'nin de kentsel dönüşüme girmesini isterim	1	2	3	4	5
26. Oturduğum apartmanın da dönüşüme girmesini isterim	1	2	3	4	5

Son olarak, mahalle sakinlerinin yaşadığı sokaktan duyduğu memnuniyeti öğrenmek istiyoruz. Şu anki haliyle Demirlibahçe Mahallesi'nde yaşamaktan ne ölçüde memnunsunuz.

	Çok Memnunum	Memnunum	Emin değilim	Memnuniyetsizim	Çok Memnuniyetsizim
27. Güvenlik açısından memnuniyet	1	2	3	4	5
28. Serbestçe yürüyebilme açısından memnuniyet	1	2	3	4	5
29. Dinlenme tesisleri (kahve, park vb.) açısından memnuniyet	1	2	3	4	5
30. Sokakların bakımı açısından memnuniyet	1	2	3	4	5
31. Yeşil ve ağaçlık alanlar açısından	1	2	3	4	5
32. Trafik yoğunluğu açısından memnuniyet	1	2	3	4	5
33. Gürültü seviyesi açısından memnuniyet	1	2	3	4	5
34. Nüfus yoğunluğu açısından memnuniyet	1	2	3	4	5

MUHTAR VE BELEDİYELER – AÇIK UÇLU SORULAR

Nüfus Yoğunluğu
1. Göçmenlerin (Iraklı) yoğun olarak yaşadıkları mahalleler nelerdir?
2. Belediye (veya mahalle) sınırlarınız içinde ne kadar Iraklı mülteci bulunuyor? Bunlardan kaçını çocuklar ve kadınlar oluşturuyor?
3. Iraklıların yoğun olarak yaşadıkları mahallelerde kayıt altına alınan Iraklıların oranı nedir?
4. Bu mahallelerde ne kadar Göçmen (Iraklı) ne kadar Türk nüfus barınmaktadır? Bu nüfus mahallenin yüzde kaçına karşılık gelmektedir?
5. Iraklıların yoğun olarak yaşadıkları mahallelerin 2010 yılı itibariyle eski ve yeni nüfus değişimi nasıldır?
6. Bu mahallelerde nüfusun cinsiyete göre dağılımı nedir?
7. Bu mahallelerde nüfusun yaş gruplarına göre dağılımı nedir?

Mekansal Ayrışma
1. Belediye sınırlarınız içinde Iraklıların yoğun olarak yaşadıkları mahallelerde kira fiyatları ortalama ne kadardır?
2. Belediye sınırlarınız içinde Iraklıların yoğun olarak yaşadıkları mahallelerde ne kadar mültecinin hangi sektörlerde çalıştığını tahmin ediyorsunuz? Bu konuda yerel halk tepki gösteriyor mu? Bu mahallelerde Iraklılar yoğunluklu olarak hangi iş kollarında çalışmaktadır?

Homojen İlişki
1. Aynı mahalle sınırları içerisinde yaşayan Göçmen ve Türk vatandaşlarının ilişkileri nasıldır? Birbirlerine bakış açıları nasıldır?
2. Iraklıların yoğun olarak yaşadıkları mahallelerde Iraklıların Türk vatandaşları ile ilişkileri ne düzeydedir?
3. Iraklıların yoğun olarak yaşadıkları mahallelerde Iraklıların birbirleri ile ilişkileri nasıldır? (alışveriş, komşuluk ilişkileri,

Sosyal Dışlanma
1. Belediye sınırlarınız içindeki Iraklılara ne tür hizmetler sunuyorsunuz?
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Yardımlar; i. Kışlık yardım ii. Gıda/erzak paketleri iii. Sıcak yemek iv. Giysi v. Ev eşyası vi. Kırtasiye vii. Kira yardımı viii. Nakdi yardım b. Tercüme hizmeti c. Ulaşım hizmeti (Hastane, okula vs. transferler) d. Psiko-sosyal destek, sağlık hizmetleri e. Gerekli kurumlara yönlendirmeler f. Dil kursları g. Meslek kursları h. Eğitim (Göçmen okulları, geçici eğitim merkezleri vs.) i. Diğer
2. Iraklıların yoğunluklu olarak yaşadığı mahallelerde belediye hizmetleri nasıl sunulmaktadır? Hangi belediye hizmetlerinde yoğunlaşmalar vardır?
3. Belediye hizmetleri Iraklı mültecilerin % kaçına ulaşmaktadır?
4. Aynı mahalle sınırları içerisinde yaşayan Iraklı ve Türk vatandaşlarının ilişkileri nasıldır? Birbirlerine bakış açıları nasıldır?
5. Belediyeniz tarafından özel gruplara (kadın, çocuk, engelli, yaşlı vs.) eğitim ya da sosyal destek veriliyor mu?
6. Belediyeniz mültecilerin eğitimine yönelik bir çalışma yürütüyor mu?
7. Belediyenizin kurduğu, yönettiği ya da işbirliği yaptığı mülteciler için Toplum Merkezi var mı? Varsa faaliyetleri hangi alanlardadır? Kaç kişiye hizmet vermektedir?
8. Belediyenizin mültecilerin yerleşme sürecine bir katkı ya da etkisi bulunuyor mu? (Ev bulma, kira ödeme vs.)
9. Iraklıların yoğun olarak yaşadıkları mahallelerde sosyal dışlanma hakim midir?
10. Iraklıların yoğun olarak yaşadıkları mahallelerde suç oranları ne düzeydedir? En çok suç hangi alanı kapsamaktadır?

Analiz Birimleri	
i. Demirlibahçe İlkokulu	a. Öğrenciler b. Öğretmen ve diğer personel c. Veliler
ii. Demirlibahçe Mahalle Muhtarı	a. Muhtar Seray Günyüz
iii. Emlakçılar	Uzgörenler Sokak 1. Genç emlak 2. Hafızoğlu emlak – Ali Bey 3. Doğan emlak 4. Semay emlak 5. Uğur emlak – Mesut Bey 6. Yılmaz emlak 7. Serkan emlak Doğanbahçe Sokak 8. Yılmaz emlak 9. Akın emlak 10. Ögüt emlak Demirkapı Sokak 11. Türkmen Emlak 12. Kerembey Emlak
iv. Kahvehaneler ve düğün salonları	a.
v. Demirlibahçe Mahalle sakinleri	a. Kartopu ve ulaşılabilir örnekleme
vi. Mamak Belediyesi ve Kaymakamlığı (opsiyonel)	a.

B. APPROVAL OF THE METU HUMAN SUBJECTS ETHICS COMMITTEE

UYGULAMALI ETİK ARAŞTIRMA MERKEZİ
APPLIED ETHICS RESEARCH CENTER



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Sayı: 28620816 /

02 KASIM 2020

Konu: Değerlendirme Sonucu

— Gönderen: ODTÜ İnsan Araştırmaları Etik Kurulu (İAEK)

İlgi: İnsan Araştırmaları Etik Kurulu Başvurusu

Sayın Prof. Dr. Helga Rittersberger TILIÇ

— *Danışmanlığımızı yaptığımız Hakkı Ozan KARAYİĞİT'in "Yerel Dönüşümler, yeni mekansal oluşumlar ve toplumsal uyum biçimleri için bir yol haritası: Demirlibağçe Mahallesi'nde Türkler, Romanlar ve Iraklılar "* başlıklı araştırmanız İnsan Araştırmaları Etik Kurulu tarafından uygun görülmüş ve 294-ODTU-2020 protokol numarası ile onaylanmıştır.

Saygılarımızla bilgilerinize sunarız.

Prof.Dr. Mine MISIRLISOY
İAEK Başkanı

C. APPROVAL OF THE MINISTRY OF EDUCATION



T.C.
ANKARA VALİLİĞİ
Milli Eğitim Müdürlüğü

Sayı : E-14588481-605.99-23249644
Konu : Araştırma İzni

29.03.2021

ORTA DOĞU TEKNİK ÜNİVERSİTESİNE
(Öğrenci İşleri Daire Başkanlığı)

İlgi: a) MEB Yenilik ve Eğitim Teknolojileri Genel Müdürlüğü'nün 2020/2 sayılı Genelgesi.
b) 11.13.2020 tarihli ve 212 sayılı yazımız.
c) 18.01.2020 tarihli ve 19299720 sayılı yazımız.

Üniversiteniz Kentsel Politika Planlaması ve Yerel Yönetimler Anabilim Dalı yüksek lisans programı öğrencisi Hakkı Ozan KARAYİĞİT'in "Yerel Dönüşümler, Yeni Mekansal Oluşumlar ve Toplumsal Uyumu Biçimleri İçin Bir Yol Haritası: Demirlibahçe Mahallesi'nde Türkler, Romanlar ve Iraklılar" konulu çalışması kapsamında İlimiz Mamak İlçesine bağlı Demirlibahçe İlkokulu'nda ilgi (c) iznimize ilave olarak ekli görüşme sorularını uygulama yapma talebi ilgi (a) Genelge çerçevesinde incelenmiştir.

Yapılan inceleme sonucunda, söz konusu araştırmanın Müdürlüğümüzde muhafaza edilen ölçme araçlarının: Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasası, Millî Eğitim Temel Kanunu ile Türk Millî Eğitiminin genel amaçlarına uygun olarak, ilgili yasal düzenlemelerde belirtilen ilke, esas ve amaçlara aykırılık teşkil etmeyecek, eğitim-öğretim faaliyetlerini aksatmayacak şekilde okul ve kurum yöneticilerinin sorumluluğunda, gönüllülük esasına göre uygulanması Müdürlüğümüzce uygun görülmüştür.

Bilgilerinizi ve gereğini rica ederim.

Turan AKPINAR
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D. TURKISH SUMMARY / TÜRKÇE ÖZET

Çankaya ilçesine bağlı Cebeci Mahallesi'ne komşu olan Demirlibahçe, Mamak ilçesi sınırlarında yer almaktadır (İngilizce metin, şekil 1). Her ne kadar mahalle genellikle Cebeci'nin bir uzantısı olarak karıştırılsa da Talatpaşa Bulvarı hem Mamak-Çankaya hem de Demirlibahçe-Cebeci sınırındır. Batıda Plevne Caddesi ve doğuda Şafaktepe parkının yer aldığı Demirlibahçe Mahallesi, aynı zamanda Mamak ilçesi genelinde henüz kentsel dönüşüme uğramamış sayılı mekânlardan biridir. Ancak, 2014 yılından itibaren mahallede büyük ölçekte Iraklı göçmenlerin gelişi ve mekân yaratma pratiklerine bağlı olarak sosyo-mekânsal dönüşümler yaşanmaktadır.

Birbirine paralel olan Uzgörenler, Doğanbahçe, Demirkapı ve Ağaçalı sokaklar sahip olduğu sosyal ve kurumsal toplanma noktaları nedeniyle dinamik bir özelliğe de sahiptir. Demirkapı Sokak'ta Demirlibahçe banliyö tren istasyonu, Muhtarlık binası ve iki adet kahvehane, Doğanbahçesi Sokak'ta bir düğün salonu ve yenilenen Demirlibahçe İlkokulu'nun girişi, hemen üstündeki Uzgörenler Sokak'ta kuyumcudan manava, restoranlardan otellere birçok küçük işletme, ve onun yanındaki Ağaçalı Sokak'ta ise Osmanlı Türkmenleri Yardımlaşma Derneği ile yine birçok küçük işletme yer almaktadır. Gruplar arası iletişime yol açabilecek bu tür yerlerin sıklığına rağmen ayrıştırıcı pratikler ve dışlayıcı söylemlerin önüne geçilememiştir.

Dışlayıcı söylemlerin kurumsallaşması kendisini mekânsal pratiklerle göstermektedir. Kimi mahalle sakini tarafından 'çingene sokağı' olarak adlandırılan Demirkapı Sokak, Roman müzisyenlerin yoğunlukla yaşadığı bölgedir. Sokakta sosyalleşme mekânı olarak işletmeciliğini yerel halktan kişilerin yaptığı iki adet (Roman) kahvehane ile 2020 yılı yazında açılan *Müzisyenler Derneği* bulunmaktadır. Doğanbahçesi Sokak'ta genellikle işletme harici konutlar bulunmaktadır. 2017 yılına kadar son derece sessiz bir yapıya sahip olan bu sokak Iraklı göçmenlerin ağırlıklı tercihi ve yenilenen ilkokul girişinin buraya alınması ile yoğunlaşma yaşamaktadır. Türkmen göçmenler bu sokağa

Bağdat Sokağı demektedir. Üstündeki Uzgörenler Sokak ise Demirlibahçe Mahallesi'nin yıllardır ana arteri olmuştur.

Telaferli göçmenlerin mahalleye gelmeye başladıkları 2014 yazından bu yana, mahalle genelinde ve bu sokaklar özelinde dört ana dönüşüm gözlemlenmiştir. Bu sebeple araştırmanın esas sorusu yaşanan bu dış göç ile birlikte yerel halk ile Romanlar arasında kurulmuş olan otuz-kırk yıllık toplumsal uyum ne derece bozulduğunu ve ne açıdan yeniden yapılanmakta olduğuna odaklanmaktadır. Göçmen nüfusun yoğun olduğu bölgede yaşamak istemeyen yerel halkın önemli bir bölümü evlerini satarak ya da kiradan çıkararak Ankara'nın batıdaki ilçelerine taşınmışlardır. Yaşanan bu nüfus 'transferine' bağlı olarak mahallenin kira fiyatlarının daha ucuz olduğu doğu cephesindeki sokakları Iraklı göçmenler tarafından kullanılmaya başlanmıştır. Demirlibahçe İlkokulu'nun şaibeli bir şekilde yıkılıp yeniden yapılması ise üçüncü ana dönüşümdür. Okul idaresi her ne kadar 2014-2019 yılları için beş yıllık bir plan hazırlamış olsa da alınan hızlı bir kararla 2017 yılında yıkılıp 2019 yılında daha fazla öğrenciye hizmet verebilmek adına yeniden açılmıştır. Ancak, açılan yeni okul farklı kökenden çocukların kaynaşmasına olanak sağlayabilecek bir *habitus* (Bourdieu, 2008) olmaktan ziyade bu farklılıkların karşı karşıya geldiği bir yüzleşme mekânına dönüşmüştür. Son ana dönüşüm ise yine fiziksel boyutta yaşanmıştır. Demirkapı Sokak eskiden Yemeni Sokak üzerindeki köprüyle mahallenin geri kalanına bağlanırken 2017 yılında yürütülen *Başkentray* projesi köprüyü yıkmış ve sokağı izole bir hale getirmiştir. Sokak sakinleri her ne kadar bu durumu protesto etmiş olsa da (Giritöglü, 2017) Romanların bulunduğu bu bölge mahallenin geri kalanından uzaklaştırılmıştır (Akkan, Deniz, & Ertan, 2017). TÜİK'ten elde edilen nüfus verileri ise mahallenin değişmekte olan yapısını göstermektedir (İngilizce metin, tablo 3). Her ne kadar ufak çaplı dalgalanmalar görülse de gözlemlenen başlıca değişim 2019 yılında mahalle nüfusunun %10'unun taşınması ile gerçekleşmiştir.

Bu mesele ile ilgilenmek adına belirli araştırma yöntemleri kullanmam gerekti, ancak ben de mahallenin bir sakini olduğum için hikayem kısa bir inceleme gerektirmektedir. Anneannem ve dedem, 1950'lerin sonlarında buraya yerleşti. Fakat dedem dışında ailemden hiç kimse, sokaktaki bazı komşular dışında mahalleyle güçlü bağlar geliştirmedir. Ben de Demirlibahçe'de doğup büyüdüm ve çocukluğumu Dügün

Sokak'ta anneannemin komşularının oğulları veya torunları olan arkadaşlarımla geçirdim. Liseye başladığım 2007 yılından sonra sokaktaki yaşamım sona erse de bugüne kadar orada (düzensiz aralıklarla da olsa) anneannem ve dedemle yaşamaya devam ettim.

Bu hikaye, bir araştırmacı olarak çalışmadaki konumum, *positionality*, hakkında küçük bir tartışmayı gerekli kılmaktadır. Ebeveynlerim ve ben komşularla sohbet etme, beraber küçük hediyeler verme ve birbirimiz hakkında bilgiler paylaşma gibi açıkça sosyalleşme olarak tanımlanan (Guest & Wierzbicki, 1999, s. 93) faaliyetlere katılmamıza rağmen bunlar yalnızca bir sokak ile sınırlı kalmıştır. Nitekim o dönemlerde Uzgörenler gibi diğer sokaklara doğru gittiğimde kaybolma korkusu yaşardım. Diğer bir deyişle, mahallenin çoğuna tamamen yabancıydım. Bu nedenle, bir mahalle sakini olarak kişisel deneyimlerimi salgın sırasında günlük yaşamı keşfetmek için kullanırken kendimi bir yabancı, *outsider*, olarak konumlandırmaktayım. İlâveten, kendimi araştırmakta olduğum sosyal olguların gerisinde tuttum (Blaikie, 1993, s. 11). Mahalle sakini olmak insanlara ulaşmamı kolaylaştırırsa da görüşmeleri yaparken her zaman araştırmacı kimliğimi ön plana sürdüm. Bu bakımdan rolüm, uzman ve öğrenen (*expert-learner*) olan üzere iki aşırı kutbun birleşimi haline geldi. Araştırması yapılan üç grubun ötekini nasıl inşa ettiğini keşfederken bir öğrenen; fakat başlangıçta tüm araştırma projesini kavramlar ve teorilerle modellerken uzman konumunda bulundum. Bu nedenle araştırma planının mantığı da *retroduction* ve *abduction* yöntemlerinin bir karışımı haline geldi, çünkü bu çalışmanın amacı "sosyal aktörlerin araştırılan olgunun üretiminde, yeniden üretiminde ve yorumlamasında kullandığı bilgiyi" (s. 10) kullanarak "gözlenen bir düzenliliğin üretilmesinden sorumlu olan gerçek temel yapı(lar)ı veya mekanizma(lar)ı tespit etmektir" (s. 9).

Her grubun sakinleri ile düzensiz sohbetlerin yanı sıra toplam 60 yarı yapılandırılmış mülakat yapılmıştır (34 yerel, 10 Roman, ve 16 Iraklı). Mülakatlar, mülakata katılanlara bugünkü Demirlibahçe'yi geçmiş ile kıyaslamaları ve dönüşümdeki en büyük faktörü belirlemelerinin istendiği "saha turu" (Saraçoğlu, 2008, s. 32) soruları yönlendirilerek başlamıştır. Benzer soru grubu, küçük düzenlemeler ile her gruba aynı tarzda yöneltilmiştir. İlâveten, çevrimiçi ve çevrimdışı dünyaların birbirlerini ne

ölçüde etkilediğini ve şekillendirdiğini İnternet kullanıcılarının kendi başlarına sosyal dünyalar olarak değerlendiren netnografik yöntemlerden de yararlanılmıştır (Galip, 2017; Kozinets, 2011). Bu amaçla, çoğu şu anda mahallede yaşamayan ilk sakinler tarafından oluşturulmuş iki Facebook sayfasında, *Ankara Demirlibahçem* ve *Demirlibahçeliler biz bir aileyiz*, yer alan gönderilerin incelemesi yapılmıştır.

Demirlibahçe Mahallesi İlk Sakinleri

Demirlibahçe bölgesindeki kentleşme örüntüleri *Musiki Muallim Mektebi*'nin 1924 yılındaki inşası ile başlamaktadır. Ankara başkent ilan edildikten sonra şehir Ulus ve civarında bir dizi modernleşme hareketleri geçirmiş ve bölgede hızlı bir kentsel yoğunlaşma yaşanmıştır (Günay, 2012). Dönemin öncelikli planlamaları tren yolu çevresinde bütüncül bir merkez yaratma hedefi taşıırken Muallim Mektebi'nin şehrin çeperinde kaldığı söylenebilir.

Cumhuriyet'in uygarlaşma misyonunun bir göstergesi olarak nitelendirilen Muallim Mektebi zaman içerisinde hızla genç besteci ve müzik yorumcuları için bir merkez haline gelmiştir (Şahin & Duman, 2008, s. 264). Aynı bina 1936 yılında Devlet Konservatuarı olarak hizmet vermeye başlamıştır. Bu dönemde şehrin ve aynı zamanda Demirlibahçe bölgesinin kuzey doğu aksında sınırı olarak kabul edilebilecek iki adet modern mezarlık inşa edilmiştir – Cebeci Asri Mezarlığı (1935) ve Cebeci Askeri Şehitliği (1936). Ankara Üniversitesi Tıp Fakültesi (1945) mahalle bölgesinin güney-doğusundaki sınırını tayin etmiştir. Bu kurumsal yapılaşmaları takiben 1949 yılında Demirlibahçe İlkokulu'nun kurulması ile ise mahalle içerisinde hızlı kentleşme pratikleri yaşanmıştır (İngilizce metin, şekil 5).

Demirlibahçe bölgesindeki kentleşme pratikleri Demirkapı Sokak'taki Muallim Mektebi ve Uzgörenler Sokak'taki Demirlibahçe İlkokulu çevresinden hızla devam etmiştir. Mahalleye bu dönemde yerleşen ilk sakinlerin nereden göç ettikleri tam olarak bilinmese de iki ana ayırım yapılabilir. İlk olarak, 1950'lere kadar Ankara'nın nispeten çeperinde kalan bu bölge kırdan kente göç edenlerin uğrak noktası olmuştur. Yeni başkente olan bu kırdan kente göç beraberinde gelişen kurumsal yapılaşmayla

müzik okuluna, tıp fakültesine ve ilkokula hizmet vermeye gelecek olan yüksek sosyal sınıf göçmenleri de bölgeye çekmiştir. 1950'ler sonu ile 1960'lar başı arasında Uzgörenler Sokak'a inşa edilen Demiryolu Lojmanları ve PTT binası ile devam eden süreçte mahalle neredeyse kendi kendisini idame ettirebilecek bir yapıya sahip olmaya başlamıştır.

Cumhuriyet Ankara'sının öncelikli planlamaları şehrin nüfusunun 1980'ler başında 250-300.000 arasında olacağını öngörmekteydi. Ancak 1950'li ve 1960'lı yıllar boyunca yaşanan yoğun göç ile birlikte bu sınır çoktan aşılmış (Yavuz, Başkent Ankara ve Jansen, 1981, s. 32; Kaya, 2002) ve şehrin içinde farklı yerlere doğru nüfus kaymaları yaşanmıştır. Bu dönemde şehrin giderek genişleyen sınırları içerisinde kalmaya başlayan ve yoğun nüfuslu bir yapıya ulaşan Demirlibağçe sakinlerinin bir kısmı ise imara açılan yeni bölgelere taşınmaya başlamıştır. 1935 yılında kent çeperi dışında imarına izin verilen ilk yer olan Bahçelievler bu dönemde Demirlibağçe sakinleri tarafından tercih edilmiştir.³⁸

Bahçe-şehir planlaması altında kendi yüksek sosyal statü tayinlerini yapmak isteyen ilk sakinlerinin şehrin batı aksına göçü ile Demirlibağçe Mahallesi, demiryolu işçilerinin çalıştığı "emekçiler bölgesi" olarak betimlenmeye başlamıştır. Nitekim Cantek ve Zırh'ın Cebeci üzerine yazdıkları monografide (2014) bir görüşmeci Demirlibağçe'yi ve çevresini şöyle tanımlamaktadır: "Demirlibağçe eli ekmek tutan demiryolcuların oturduğu bir yerdi. Alt sınıf ama daha elit. Cebeci Dört yol'dan aşağıya çapulcu girmezdi. Şafaktepe ise tam gecekonduydum, 'kötü mahalle' derdik oraya. Ama batıya doğru da kalite artardı. Yenişehir'e doğru" (s. 154).

Ancak belirtilmesi gerekir ki Cebeci Mahallesi ile yapılan bu ayrımın dayanak noktası pek de tutarlı değildir. Ankara Üniversitesi fakülteleri öğrencileri Demirlibağçe'de de ikamet ettiği gibi mahallede aynı zamanda pek çok önemli Sanat Müziği şarkıcısı da ikamet etmiştir. Muallim Mektebi'nin de mahalledeki varlığı ile de birlikte Atilla Mayda, Muazzez Ersoy, Muazzez Türüng, Leyla Ertaş gibi ünlü isimler ya bölge

³⁸ Dedemin iki kardeşi ve diğer arkadaşları 1960 yıllarda Demirlibağçe'den Bahçelievler'e taşınanlar arasındaydı.

sakinleri arasından yetişmiş ya da göçle burada ikamet etmişlerdir. Nitekim bu isimlerden bazıları ilkokulda öğretmenlik de yapmıştır.

1970’li yıllar boyunca Demirlibahçe genellikle kırdan kente göç edenlerin şekillendirdiği bir bölge olmuştur. 70’lerde inşa edilen ve günümüzde yıkılıp yeniden inşa edilen (BirGün, 2020) Atatürk Site Yurdu ve beraberinde gelen üç açık hava sineması ile mahalledeki yoğunluk daha da artmıştır. 1980’li yıllara gelindiğinde ise mahallede ilk nüfus dönüşümünün yaşandığı söylenebilir. Orta-yüksek gelir sınıfı gelişen Ankara’nın Çayyolu, Batıkent ve yine Bahçelievler’e doğru göç ederken köken olarak Marmara bölgesinden olan Romanlar Demirlibahçe mahallesine yerleşmeye başlamışlardır.

Yakın döneme kadar ‘huzurlu’ bir sosyal uyumun var olduğu belirtilen mahalledeki toplumsal yapı giderek artan yabancı göçler ile birlikte yeniden şekillenmeye başlamıştır. Bu doğrultuda mahallenin eski dönemine olan nostaljiyi yaratmak adına bölgenin 1950’li ve 1960’lı yıllardaki ilk sakinleri *Demirlibahçeliler biz bir aileyiz* (2011) ile *Ankara Demirlibahçem* (2013) ismiyle iki adet Facebook grubu kurmuştur. Ancak son zamanlarda bu gruplarda nostalji olduğu kadar bozulan sosyal uyuma yönelik yakınma ve hüznün de dile getirilmektedir.

Demirlibahçe’nin Roman Sakinleri

Gürültücü, pis ve güvenilmez olarak kalıba sokulan Roman toplumu Avrupa ve Anadolu coğrafyalarında kuşkuyla karşılanmıştır. Her ne kadar 1971 yılında gerçekleştirilen 1. Roman Kongresi ile küresel çapta kurumsal eforlar teşvik ediliyor olsa da Roman toplumlarının karşılaştığı sistematik damgalanma ve dışlanma aşılabilmiş değildir.

Örneğin, Beissinger (2018) *lautar* olarak adlandırılan Roman müzisyen ailelerin Romanya’daki toplumsal cinsiyet, etnik ve kimlik özelliklerini incelediği çalışmasında “*lautar*ilerin düğünlerde, vaftiz törenlerinde ve diğer aile kutlamalarında yer alan müzik sanatını monopolileştirdiği”ni söylemektedir (s. 9). Ancak, müzik ve diğer geleneksel zanaat türlerinin güvencesiz çalışma şartları altındaki Roman toplumları

için adeta kronikleştiği de bir gerçektir (O'Higgins and Ivanov, 2006, s. 16-17). Özellikle de Roman gençlerin karşı karşıya geldiği işsizlik ve sosyal güvencesizliğe bağlı hayat koşulları, aile yapısını ve emek gücü koşullarını da etkileyerek toplumdan genel anlamda bir dışlanmaya sebebiyet vermektedir (s. 18).

İlaveten, yoksulluk ve damgalamanın aile yapısı ve emek gücü vasıtası ile kısır döngü içerisinde yeniden üretildiği bu koşullar sadece Romanya için değil aynı zamanda Bulgaristan ve diğer pek çok Avrupa ülkesi için de geçerlidir. Creţan, Málovics, ve Berki (2020) yaptıkları araştırmada Roman toplumunun karşılaştığı sistematik dışlanmaya Macaristan üzerinden başka bir örnek sunmaktadır. Yazarlar, ırkçı damgalamaların yarattığı mekânsal etkileri vurgulayarak Romanların izole bölgelerde barındığını belirtmiş ve Roman düşmanlığının bu ayrıştırıcı söylemlerle kronikleştiğini vurgulamıştır. Bölgesel bazda yapılan damgalamalar toplumsal güç ilişkisini mekân üzerinden somutlaştırırken kentsel ölçekli damgalamalar “aşırı yoksulluk, yetersiz ve belirsiz konaklama koşulları, düşük eğitim imkanları ve güvencesiz çalışma standartları” gibi algıların oluşmasına sebebiyet vermiştir (s. 297). Nitekim üretilen toplumsal güç ilişkilerinin özellikle de göçmen çingenerler üzerinden gerçekleştiği, Birleşik Krallık'taki örneklerle tescillenmiştir (Kabachnik, 2012)

Kronikleşen ötekileştirme ve dışlama, ırkçı söylemler üzerinden adeta aklanmaktadır. Belirli isimler, şiveler ve fiziksel görünüm, illegal aktiviteler ile örtüştürülerek Roman toplumları üzerine yapııştırılmıştır. Romanların ikamet ettiği belirli mekânlar üzerinden daha da şiddetlenen bu damgalama pratiklerinin Romanofobinin üretimine sebebiyet verdiği görülmüştür (Ljujic, Vedder, Dekker, & van Geel, Romaphobia: A unique phenomenon?, 2012). Tüm bu döngülerin sonucunda ise oluşan durumda Romanların ikamet ettiği bölgeler düşük eğitim düzeyi, işsizlik ve kötü konaklama imkanları ile resmedilerek gürültü, pislik ve güvenilmezlik gibi tanımlamaların birbirini karşılıklı inşa sürecini oluşturmuştur.

Türkiye'deki Roman toplum da benzer dışlanma ve ötekileştirme pratikleri ile karşılaşmaktadır. Nitekim Türkiye'deki Romanların Avrupa'daki Roman toplumu ile kültür, emek gücü ve dil açısından doğrudan bağlantılı olduğu belirtilmektedir (Marsh, 2010; Uzpeder, Danova-Roussinova, Özçelik, & Gökçen, 2008). Genellikle falcılık,

yılan oynaticılığı ve akrobatlık işleri yapan Romanların Türkiye coğrafyasındaki kökenleri 11. Yüzyıl İstanbul'una dayanmaktadır (Marsh, 2010, s. 28). Avrupa'daki dışlanma ve suçlulaştırılma pratiklerinden farklı olarak Osmanlı döneminde Çingene, ya da *Kıpti*, toplumun önemli bir parçasıydı (s. 28).

Ancak yine de Romanlar statü bakımından Osmanlı halkının diğer mensupları ile aynı konumda da değillerdi. Müslüman olmalarına rağmen cizye vergisi ödemek zorunda bırakılan Romanlar, bunun yanı sıra kanun karşısında da toplumun geri kalanı ile eşit değillerdi. Öyle ki hakim karşısında gösterdikleri savunma diğer sanıklarınki ile eş değer değerde tutulmamaktaydı (Uzpeder ve diğerleri, 2008, s. 14-15). Olumlu olarak nitelendirilebilecek yegane şey Avrupa'daki Roman topluluklarının aksine Osmanlı'da Romanlara yönelik doğrudan suçlamaların yer almamasıydı. Ancak 18. yüzyılda imparatorlukta yer edinen Avrupa kaynaklı 'oryantalist' düşünce akımı, Osmanlı memurlarının Romanlara karşı olumsuz tavır geliştirmesine sebebiyet vermiştir (s. 15). Kayıtlara Ehl-i Fesad olarak kaydedilen Roman toplumu diğer Müslümanlardan ayrıştırılmaya başlanmıştır (Özateşler, 2014).

Benzer dışlama ve ayrıştırma geleneği Cumhuriyet döneminde kanuni, siyasi ve sosyo-kültürel alanlarda da devam etmiştir. 1923 Yunan-Türk mübadelesinde Müslüman çingenelerin de ülkeye göçüne onay verilerek yeni kurulan devletin ihtiyacı olan işçi gücünün sağlanması amaçlanmıştır (Uştuk & Tunç Cox, 2019). Ancak, ülkeye göç eden bu toplum, 1934 yılına kadar vatandaşlığa kabul edilmemiştir (Akkan, 2018). *Esmer vatandaş* olarak adlandırılan Roman toplumu, *Türk gelenek ve adetlerine* yabancı oldukları gerekçesiyle 1926 İskan Kanununda özellikle hedef alınmıştır. 1934'teki düzenleme ile vatandaşlık hakkına erişseler de yönetim boyutundaki ırkçı dışlamalar aşılamamıştır. Nitekim örnek olarak Gümüşhane valisinin 1925 yılında Dahiliye Vekaleti'ne gönderdiği yazıda Romanlar sadece dans ve müzikle vakit geçiren, 'aslen ve neslen ve ırkan ve ruhen kıbtî muhacirler' olarak tanımlanmakta ve bu kişilerin ancak ticari ve iktisadi faaliyetlerin yoğun olduğu el ve ayak hizmetlerinde çalışabilecekleri önerilmekteydi (Gürboğa, 2016, s. 125).

Roman toplumunun vatandaşlık hakları üzerinde ülkenin geri kalanı ile eşit konuma sahip olamayışı siyasal temsil konusunda da önemli etki yaratmıştır. Irka, dine, mezhebe, kültüre ve dile dayalı dernekleşmeyi yasaklayan 1983 Dernekler Kanunu Romanların 2000’li yıllara kadar siyasal boyuttaki temsilinin önüne geçmiştir. Şayet bu kanunda belirtilen gerekçelerle *Romanlar Yardımlaşma ve Dayanışma Derneği* açılmasını takiben 1996 yılında kapatılmıştır (Akgül, Türkiye Çingenerinin Politikleşmesi ve Örgütlenme Deneyimleri, 2010, s. 215). Sürecin devamında 2009-2010 arasında işlevselleştirilmeye çalışılan Roman Açılımı ile dönemin başbakanı Erdoğan yapılan bu sistematik dışlamalar için devlet adına Roman toplumundan özür dilemiştir. Ancak, bu açılım ile her ne kadar Roman dernekleri ve örgütleri ülke genelinde yaygınlaşmış olsa da Romanların öncelikli hedefleri kanuni ve siyasi arenadan dışlanmalarına çözüm bulmak yerine kendilerine *çingene* kavramı üzerinden etiketlenmiş olan olumsuz temsilleri kaldırmak olmuştur (Dişli, “Çingene” Mi, “Roman” Mi? Bir İnşa Süreci, 2016).

Kanuni ve siyasi alanda karşılaşılan bu dışlanma etkisini gündelik hayatın sosyo-kültürel düzleminde de göstermiştir. Şayet ten rengi, aksan ve konuşma tarzları üzerinden yapılan pislik ve tembellik tanımlamaları üzerinden bu koşullarla şekillenmiştir. Pislik ve tembellik üzerinden kurgulanan bu yapılandırma ile Romanların Müslüman olamayacakları dahi temellendirilmeye çalışılmıştır (Dişli, “Çingene” Mi, “Roman” Mi? Bir İnşa Süreci, 2016, s. 101). Sosyo-kültürel alanda da yaratılan bu etki neticesinde Roman toplumu, yaratılan bu dışlanmaları içselleştirerek gruplar halinde yaşamaya itilmiş ve mekânsal bazda belli başlı mahallelerde yaşamaya başlamıştır (Akkan et al., 2017). Mekânsal olarak da izole bir yaşama itilen Roman toplumunun dayanışma ve beraberlik yolunda sağlayabileceği bağlar tamamen kopartılmıştır. Yapılan araştırmalar, Roman toplumunun kanuni, siyasi ve sosyo-kültürel düzlemlerde karşılaştıkları baskılardan dolayı kolektif yapı geliştirememeye durumlarını Wacquant’ın hipergetto kavramı ile ele almıştır (Akkan et al., 2017, p. 76; Uştuk, 2019; Wacquant, 2008). Nitekim bu kavramı doğrular nitelikte kurulmuş olan Roman dernekleri de toplu bir şekilde azınlık olarak nitelendirilmeyi reddetmiş ve devlete olan bağlılıklarını sıklıkla yinelemişlerdir (Uştuk, 2019; Akgül, Türkiye Çingenerinin Politikleşmesi ve Örgütlenme Deneyimleri, 2010).

Günümüzde Türkiye’de üç grup Roman topluluğunun yaşadığı belirtilmektedir – Romanlar, Domlar ve Lomlar (Akkan, 2018). Emek gücüne katılımlarına göre yapılan bu tanımlamalarda (sepetçiler, kalaycılar, hamamcılar ve arabacılar) her grubun farklı bölgelerde yoğunlaştığı söylenmektedir (Marsh, 2010, s. 28). Romanlar genellikle Marmara, Ege ve Trakya; Lomlar Karadeniz; Domlar ise Doğu ve Güneydoğu Anadolu bölgesinde yaşamaktadır (Akkan, 2018, s. 7). Yapılan bu sınıflandırmada müzisyenlerin Roman gruplar arasında *elit* sınıf olduğu da belirtilmektedir (Marsh, 2010, s. 28)

Demirlibahçe’deki Romanların hikayesi de literatürde anlatılan örneklerle örtüşmektedir. 1970’lerden itibaren mahalleye gelmeye başlayan ancak 1990’lı yılların başında grupların halinde kümelenen Romanlar, mahallede benzer şekilde kaygı ve endişenin kaynağı olmuştur. Ağırlıklı olarak Balıkesir ve Bursa illerinden Ankara’ya 1950’li yıllarda göçerek Ulus-Hamamönü civarlarında ikamet etmeye başlayan Romanlar çeşitli gazino, müzikli restoran, meyhane ve pavyonlarda çalışarak geçimlerini sağlamaktaydı. Aynı dönemde pavyonlar genellikle orta-üst sınıfa hizmet eden eğlence mekânları olarak değerlendirilmekteydi. Ancak 1960’lı yıllardan itibaren dönüşüm geçirerek genellikle kabadayı ve mafyanın uğrak mekânları haline gelmiştir (Sağlık, Pavyon Kültürünün Aile Hayatına Etkisi, 2020, s. 54). Her ne kadar pahalı hizmet yapısını koruyor olsa da pavyonlar, simülasyon mekânları olarak hizmet verdikleri için taşradan eğlenmeye gelen toprak zenginlerinin sıklıkla ziyaret ettiği mekânlar olarak adlandırılmaya başlanmıştır (Aktaş, Ankara Night Clubs As A Simulation Space, 2020). Konsomatrislerle gelişen sohbetler neticesinde erkeklerin maskülen özelliklerini pekiştirdiği mekânlara dönüşen pavyonlar, zamanla kötü bir şöhrete sahip olmuştur (Sağlık, 2020, s. 56).

Geçimlerini pavyonlar üzerinden kazandıran Romanlar da nitekim bu eğlence mekânlarının yaşadığı dönüşüme kurban gitmiştir. Özellikle de Yeşilçam’da 1980’ler boyunca yer edinen ‘kötü-kadın’ ve ‘kabadayı-erkek’ öyküleştirmeleriyle pavyonlar toplum hafızasında yer edinmiş, pavyonlarla ilişkisi olan kişiler ise sapkın ve sakınılması gereken insanlar olarak görülmüştür. Geçim kaynaklarının da kötü şöhrete kavuşması ile toplumsal boyuttaki konumları daha da kötülenen Romanların çaldığı müzik türü de batı müziği icra eden sanatçılardan ayrıştırılarak aşağılanmaya

başlanmıştır (Yükselsin, Satılık Havalarda: Batı Türkiye Roman Topluluklarında Bir Müziksel Zanaatkarlık Biçimi Olarak "Çalgıcılık", 2009, s. 455).

Üzerlerine inşa edilen bu algı ile Ulus'tan Demirlibahçe'ye gelen Romanlar için bu durum çok da sıra dışı bir olay değildi. Nitekim gecekonduların hayatının zorluğundan sıyrılmanın başarısı ve yeni mahallede yeni apartmanlarda yaşamının sağladığı tatmin Roman grupları için esas olmuştur. Şayet Romanlara yönelik tüm kötü damgalamaların yanı sıra gecekonduların sakinleri üzerinde de ayrı bir dışlanmanın varlığı bilinmektedir. Apartmanlar 1960 yıllar boyunca modernlik sembolü olarak yansıtılmış ve artan göçe bağlı gelişen gecekondulardan farklı kılınarak güncel konutlaşma pratiğinin temeli olarak teşvik edilmiştir (Gürel, 2016, s. 39; Bozdoğan, 2010, s. 405).

İyi mahallelerde *güzel* apartmanlarda yaşamak bu dönem boyunca yüksek toplumsal statü ve modernlik temsili olarak değerlendirilmekteydi. Nitekim 'Mamak ilçesinin Paris'i' olarak da adlandırılan Demirlibahçe'ye yerleşmek bir nevi sınıfsal statü atlamak olarak görülebilir. Balıkesir ve Bursa'dan gelen aile bağlarını koruyarak Demirkapı Sokağına yoğunluklu bir şekilde yerleşen Romanlar, bu sokağın *Müziyenler Sokağı* olarak adlandırılmasına yol açmıştır.

Her ne kadar mahalle sakinleri Roman vatandaşlara düşmanca bir yaklaşım sergilememiş olsa da literatürde de bahsedilen sistematik damgalama ve dışlama pratikleri yerlilerin algısını etkilemiştir (Rizzi, 2020). Bu algı genellikle Romanların müziğe olan mesleki yatkınlıklarına yönelik gelişmiş ve *aylaklık* ile bağdaştırılmıştır. Bu algılar özellikle Demirlibahçe İlkokulu'na giden Roman çocukları etkileyerek mahallede ve okulda eğitime olan yatkınlıkları konusunda düşük beklentilere sebebiyet vermiştir. Yine de yaklaşık olarak geçen 30 yıllık süreçte Romanlar ve yerel halk arasında belirli derecede bir sosyal uyum gerçekleştiği söylenebilir; çünkü Demirkapı Sokak mekânsal ayrışma ve izolasyonun olduğu bir hipergetto özelliği taşımamaktadır.

Demirlibahçe'nin Irak/Telaferli sakinleri

2014 yazından itibaren Demirlibahçe mahallesi, Irak'ın kuzey batısında bulunan Telafer ilçesinden zorunlu göçle gelen göçmenlere ev sahipliği yapmaya başlamıştır. 2003 yılındaki savaştan kaçarak mahalleye yerleşen ve bir emlak şirketinde yardımcı olarak çalışan bir Iraklı bir kişinin yardımları ile göçmenler burada ucuz kiralara konaklama şansı elde etmiştir. Kısa sürede ev kiralarında hızlı bir artışa sebebiyet veren bu süreç, özellikle emlakçılar tarafından olumlu karşılanmış ancak yerel halkta büyük tepkilere sebep olmuştur. Demirlibahçe ile benzer kiralara başka semtlerde kalmayı tercih eden mahalle halkı, büyük oranda Keçiören ve Sincan gibi bölgelere taşınmıştır (tablo 1). TÜİK'ten elde edilen nüfus verilerinde her ne kadar ufak çaplı dalgalanmalar görülse de gözlemlenen başlıca değişim 2019 yılında mahalle nüfusunun %10'unun taşınması ile gerçekleşmiştir.

Demirlibahçe mahallesi 2000'li yıllardan itibaren Afrika, Asya ve Avrupa'dan gelen değişim öğrencilerine ev sahipliği yapmıştır. Ancak, ailevi ilişkilerin beraber tutulduğu bu derece yoğun bir göç hiçbir zaman yaşamamıştır. Bu durumla beraber gelişen mahalle halkının başka semtlere taşınma süreci bir diğer açıdan bölgede değişime uğrayan siyasal ekonomi ile karşılıklı ilişki halindedir. Yerel halk ilk başta mahalledeki *genel üretim* (Marx, 1993) araçlarının tamamı üzerinde kontrole sahipken Telaferli göçmenler üzerinden sömürü üretmiştir. Kiralanmaya elverişsiz dairelerin fahiş fiyatlara kiralanması üzerinden gelişen bu süreçte mahalle halkının bir kısmının göç etmesi bölgede yoğunluğu hızla artan göçmenlere karşı sosyal, kültürel ve ırk temelli ayrımcılığın üretimine sebebiyet vermiştir.

Öncelikli göç hareketini takiben, göçmenler ilk olarak Talatpaşa Bulvarı'ndan uzakta, mahallenin doğu tarafında kira fiyatlarının nispeten daha ucuz olduğu bölgelerde ikamet etmeye başlamıştır. 2018 yılından itibaren ise Telaferli göçmenler kasap, manav, elektronik, restoran, ekmek fırını, berber dükkanları, ve ikinci el eşya gibi bölgede kendi küçük işletmelerini açmaya başlamıştır. Özellikle Uzgörenler sokağın saat kulesi devamındaki Gözdeğmez Sokak ile Ağaçalı Sokak boyunca uzanan bölgede ticari işletmelerin kümelenmesi, mahalle halkında algı değişikliğine sebebiyet vermiştir. Başlangıçta mustarip durumda yardıma ihtiyacı olan *Türkmen* kardeşler

olarak görülen Telaferliler (Üstüncü, 2020) artık mahallenin kontrolünü ele geçirebilecek potansiyel rakipler olarak görülmeye başlanmıştır. Mülteciler üzerinden yaygın olarak resmedilen ‘ihtiyaç sahibi göçmen’ imajı ile çelişen bu durum, göçmenlerin mekânsal pratikleri üzerinden gerçekleştirdiği hareketlere referansla karşı tepki bulmuştur. Belirtilen sokaklar üzerinde bulunan ticari mekânların artışı Ankara’nın Demetevler ve Keçiören gibi diğer ilçelerinde ikamet eden diğer Telaferli göçmenleri de mahalleye çekerken, yerel halk tarafından kalabalık olma, kirlilik ve gürültücülük kavramları üzerinden dışlama pratiklerinin üretilmesine sebebiyet vermiştir.

Kendilerini Suriyeli mültecilerden ve onlara atfedilen dışlayıcı ve ırkçı söylemlerden ayırtmak adına *Türkmen* kimliklerini ön plana çıkartan Telaferli göçmenler, yasal ve kurumsal alanda dışlanmış olduğu topluma genel geçer *Türk* cemiyeti imajı (Anderson, 1991; Batuman, 2010) altında sosyal ve kültürel boyutta katılma çabası taşımaktadır. Tarih kaynaklardan bazısı *Türkmenleri* 16. yüzyıl Osmanlı’sına dayandırırken (Mercan-Sarı, 2018, s. 39) bazıları ise 10. yüzyılda Asya’dan göç eden Türk kavimlerine dayandırmaktadır (Güngör, 2014). Günümüzde ise genellikle Osmanlı Türkmenleri olarak adlandırılan bu topluluk için ise bir başka kaynak *Türkmen* kelimesinin 1950’li yıllarda Irak hükümeti tarafından suni bir şekilde bölgede yaşayan *Türkleri* Türkiye’deki soydaşlarından ayırmak üzere üretilen bir kavram olduğunu belirtmektedir (Mahmood, 2020, s. 67). İlâveten aynı *Türkmen* kelimesi, Müslüman Oğuzları gayrimüslim Türk kavimlerinden ayırmak adına kullanılan bir araç olarak da kullanılmıştır (Mercan-Sarı, 2018, s. 42).

Üretilen bu milliyetçi yazın ışığında Demirlibahçe’nin Iraklı sakinleri, yapılan görüşmelerde Türkiye’de birçok akrabalarının bulunduğunu ve onların Telafer’e sık sık ziyaretler yaptıklarını belirtmiştir. Mevcut hükümetin sürdürdüğü Osmanlıcılık ışığında yeni ulus-inşa projesinin bir parçası (Erdem, 2017) olarak değerlendirilebilecek bu süreçte *Türkmen* kimliği Telaferli göçmenlere ülke genelinde güvenli bir kapı aralamayı sağlamıştır.

Ancak, sıklıkla vurgulanan *Türkmen* kimliği devlet seviyesinde siyasi temsiller sağlasa da mahalle özelinde gerçek anlamda sosyal ve kültürel toplumsal kapsayıcılığa nail

olamamıştır. Aksine ülke genelinde kurumsal örgüt ve sosyal yardımlaşma ağlarına sahip olduğu düşünülen göçmenlerin birtakım sosyal ve sağlık hizmetlerine kolay erişim hakkı edindiği algısı yerel halk ve Romanlar tarafından dışlayıcı söylemlerin üretilmesine sebebiyet vermiştir. Bu söylemler genellikle doğurganlık oranları, kaçak ve resmi işçilikteki rekabet ve kamu hizmetlerine kolay erişim ayrımcılığı üzerinden gelişmekteyken (Narli & Özaşçılar, 2020), COVID-19 salgını beraberinde gelen bedensel pratikler de bu sürece dahil edilmiştir (İngilizce metin, tablo 8).

Dolayısıyla, bu bağlam bütünlüğü göz önünde bulundurulduğunda, mekân ve mekânda gerçekleşen gündelik hayat süreçlerini incelemek adına Lefebvre'nin *Mekânın Üretimi* (1991) kitabında bahsettiği kavramları işlevselleştirilmiştir (İngilizce metin, tablo 4).

Bulgular

Yapılan incelemeler ışığında üç ana analiz çerçevesi geliştirilmiştir; i) algılanan mekân ve mekânsal pratikler, ii) bilinen mekân ve siyasi ekonomi, iii) yaşanan/tecrübelenen mekân ve neo-Osmanlılık. Bu üç çerçeve geliştirilen iki araştırma sorusuna – mekânın üretimi belirli yerel ölçekte sokaklardaki sosyal uyuma ne derece etki etmektedir & göçmenlerin mekânsal pratiklerinin aidiyet oluşumuna ne ölçüde etkisi vardır ve şayet varsa bu etkilerin Romanlar ve yerel halk arasındaki mevcut olan sosyal uyuma katkısı tam olarak nedir – sosyal uyum açısından negatif cevaplar sağlamıştır.

İlk analiz çerçevesi üç grubun birbirine yönelik algılarını incelemiştir. Mahalle mekânında karşılaşılan durumlar üzerinden geliştirilen bu incelemede olumlu ve olumsuz söylemler değerlendirilmiştir. Her ne kadar üç grup birbirine karşı olumlu özellikleri belirtmiş olsa aslında hâkim olan algının olumsuz olduğu tespit edilmiştir. Bir diğer deyişle, olumlu geliştirilen algılar aslında bu algıyı geliştiren kişilerin diğer gruptan kişilerle gerçekleştirdiği ticari ilişkiler sonucunda ortaya çıktığını ileri sürmektedir. Şayet ticari ilişkiler üç grup üyelerine gelir sağlamaktaysa (meta, üretim fazlalığı, ve takas değeri), söylemlerin olumlu şekilde ifade edildiği gözlemlenmiştir.

Buna bağı olarak ikinci çerçeve mahallenin politik ekonomisini iki ayrı boyutta ele almıştır. İlk boyut mahallenin bütününe odaklanmış ve düşen takas değerine vurgu yapmıştır. Bu düşen takas nedeninin sebebi mahallenin ‘göçmen mahallesi’ veya ‘çingen mahallesi’ şeklinde ifade edilmesine bağlanmıştır. İlişkili olarak ise mekâna yapılan müdahalelerden de bahsedilmiştir. Okulun ve banliyö hattının yapılması ile Demirkapı Sokak – Doğanbahçesi Sokak arasındaki yaya-araç trafiğine açık köprünün yıkılması mahalle bütünündeki ekonomik zayıflığa sebebiyet vermiştir. Dolayısıyla mahallenin tasvirleri ve mekâna okul ve banliyö projeleri ile yapılan müdahaleler mahallelinin ticaret ilişkilerini yıpratmış ve negatif söylemlere sebebiyet vermiştir. İkinci boyutta ise mahalle içerisindeki ticari ilişkilere odaklanılmış ve üç grubun merkez edindiği bölgeler değerlendirilmiştir. Bu merkezleşmenin beraberinde gelen üç gruba ait artan beşerî sermaye ticaret dengesi açısından rekabetler doğurmuştur. Dolayısıyla sosyal uyumla ilgili geliştirilen algılar yerini dışlayıcı söylemlere bırakmıştır.

Son olarak, üçüncü çerçeve Demirlibahçe mahalle mekânındaki tecrübelenen ilişkilere semboller üzerinden odaklanmıştır. AKP hükümetinin ulus-inşa projesi olarak yeniden tasarlamış olduğu neo-Osmanlıcılığın etkileri incelenmiştir. Mahallelinin önemli bir kısmı ülkenin Osmanlı geçmişine saygı göstererek yeni Osmanlıcılığı benimsediği görülmüştür. Bu doğrultuda her üç grup da kendisini geçmişin Osmanlısı olarak gördüğünden bir bütünlük içerisinde oldukları görülmüştür. Özellikle dükkân vitrinlerine asılan Osmanlı bayrakları ve padişah tuğraları bunun yansıması olarak dikkat çekmiştir. Ancak, bu neo-Osmanlıcılık aslında bir *mimesis*, yani bir taklittir, geçmişin taklitlidir. Dolayısıyla farklılıkların kudretli Osmanlı tarihi kurgusu altında asimile edildiği bir projedir. Ancak, mahalleli yaratılan bu Osmanlıcılığın göçmenler ile birleşerek Cumhuriyet geleneğini ortadan kaldırmaya yol açan bir tehdit olduğu görüşüne de sahiptir. Seküler ve İslamcı ayırımına dayalı gelişen bu dışlama pratikleri, kendisini Demirlibahçe Mahallesi’nde kadın bedeni üzerinden göstermektedir. Kimlik temelinden ziyade (Iraklı, yerel, ya da Roman) siyasi tutum (seküler ve İslamcı) üzerinden gelişen bu ayrı dışlama pratikleri mahallede sosyal uyumunun farklı bir şekilde dışlayıcılığa itildiğini belirtmektedir.

Dolayısıyla, Demirlibahçe Mahallesi incelemesi sorulan araştırma sorularına şu cevabı vermektedir:

1. Mekânın üretimi yerel ölçekte sokaklardaki sosyal uyuma üç farklı boyutta (algılanan mekân, bilinen mekân, ve tecrübelenen mekân) olumsuz şekilde etki etmektedir.
2. Göçmenlerin mekânsal pratikleri mahalle aidiyeti gelişimine ufak da olsa etki etmektedir, ancak bu etki yerel halk ile Romanlar arasında bulunan uyumu değiştirerek yeniden inşa etmektedir. Ancak, yeniden inşa edilen bu ilişkiler olası bir sosyal uyuma değil mekânsal bir mücadele alanına ve hatta mekânsal dışlamalara ilerlemektedir.

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