

THIRD-COUNTRY PARTICIPATION TO THE EUROPEAN UNION'S CSDP:
TURKEY'S CSDP JOURNEY THROUGH OPERATIONS AND MISSIONS

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
OF
MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY

BY

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IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR
THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF SCIENCE
IN
THE DEPARTMENT OF EUROPEAN STUDIES

OCTOBER 2021

Approval of the thesis:

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ABSTRACT

THIRD-COUNTRY PARTICIPATION TO THE EUROPEAN UNION'S CSDP: TURKEY'S CSDP JOURNEY THROUGH OPERATIONS AND MISSIONS

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2021, 237 pages

The European Union has been moving towards strategic autonomy for years, and this effort has recently been more obvious. The EU's most visible actions in "global actorness" are arguably crisis management missions/operations. As an EU candidate for accession and a NATO Ally for over half a century, Turkey has been involved in the shaping of the European security and defense identity and policy. Turkey and the EU have had ups-and-downs in the accession process, and these have reflections on Turkey's interaction with the European Union's Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). This study attempts to develop an understanding on the evolution of Turkey's synergy with CSDP by analyzing her participation/non-participation in EU crisis management missions/operations. In doing so, and by the conviction that this evolution requires more than a "one-size-fits-all" approach to understand, the study calls upon Europeanization and de-Europeanization arguments, Turkey's role in peacekeeping to support these arguments and institutional soft-balancing concept to offer alternative motivations.

Keywords: CSDP; crisis management; Europeanization; soft-balancing; peacekeeping

ÖZ

AB’NİN OGSP’SİNE ÜÇÜNCÜ ÜLKELERİN KATILIMI: TÜRKİYE’NİN OPERASYON VE MİSYONLARLA OGSP YOLCULUĞU

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Tez Yöneticisi: Doç. Dr. Zerrin TORUN

2021, 237 sayfa

Avrupa Birliği yıllardır stratejik özerklik hedefi doğrultusunda hareket etmektedir ve bu yönelimi özellikle son dönemde daha belirgin hale gelmiştir. AB’nin “küresel aktörlüğüne” işaret eden en görünür faaliyetleri tartışmaya açık olmakla birlikte kriz yönetimi misyon ve hareketleridir. Bir AB üyeliğine aday ülke ve yarım asrı aşkıdır NATO Müttefikleri olarak Türkiye, Avrupa güvenlik ve savunma kimliğinin ve politikasının şekillenmesi süreçlerine dahil olmuştur. Türkiye ve AB üyelik sürecinde inişli ve yokuşlu bir süreçten geçmiş ve bu süreçler Türkiye’nin Avrupa Birliği’nin Ortak Güvenlik ve Savunma Politikası’yla (OGSP) etkileşimine de yansımıştır. Bu çalışma, Türkiye’nin AB kriz yönetimi misyon ve hareketlerine katılma veya katılmama durumunu incelemek suretiyle Türkiye’nin OGSP’yle sinerjisinin evrimine dair bir anlayış geliştirmeye teşebbüs etmektedir. Bu uğurda, bahse konu evrimin tek bir yaklaşımın ötesinde bir anlayış gerektirdiği düşüncesiyle, çalışmada Avrupalılaşıma ve Avrupa’dan uzaklaşma tartışması, bu tartışmayı destekleyecek şekilde Türkiye’nin barışı koruma çabalarındaki rolü ile alternatif açıklamak sunabilecek kurumsal yumuşak dengeleme kavramından faydalanılmaktadır.

Anahtar kelimeler: OGSP; kriz yönetimi; Avrupalılařma; yumuřak dengeleme; barıřı koruma

To my family, friends and loved ones

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This research has taken me 3 years to finish, and it would not have been possible to complete it without the critical contributions of my thesis supervisor Prof. Zerrin Torun. Her valuable feedback and encouragement made it possible for me to navigate such a complex subject matter.

I also would like to acknowledge Ambassador Özlem Ergün Ulueren's support to pursue my studies while posted in the Republic of Ghana.

I would like to thank the distinguished members of the thesis committee for their constructive contributions to this research.

Lastly, I would like to thank my friends and family, and loved ones for their outstanding support and patience during this stressful period. This work is dedicated to them.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AFISMA	African-led International Support Mission to Mali
AU	African Union
CAR	Central African Republic
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CJTF	Combined Joint Task Forces
CONOPS	Concept of Operations
CPCC	Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
D-SACEUR	Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Allied Forces Europe
EAPC	Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
EDA	European Defense Agency
EEAS	European External Action Service
EEC	European Economic Community
ERRF	European Rapid Reaction Force
ESDI	European Security and Defense Identity
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
EU	European Union
EUAM	European Union Advisory Mission
EUBAM	European Union Border Assistance Mission
EUCAP	European Union Capacity Building Mission
EUFOR	European Union Force
EULEX	European Union Rule of Law Mission

EUMAM	European Union Military Advisory Mission
EUMC	EU Military Committee
EUMM	European Union Monitoring Mission
EUNAVFOR	European Union Naval Force
EUPAT	European Union
EUPM	European Union Police Mission
EUPOL	European Union Police Mission
EUSEC	European Union Security Sector Reform Mission
EUSR	European Union Special Representative
EUTM	European Union Training Mission
FYROM	Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
GNA	Government of National Accord
HR	High Representative
ICU	Islamic Courts Union
IPTF	International Police Task Force
IPU	Integrated Police Unit
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
KFOR	Kosovo Force
KLA	Kosovo Liberation Army
LNA	Libyan National Army
MINUSCA	UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic
NAC	North Atlantic Council
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NMI	NATO Training Mission

OCHA	UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OPLAN	Operation Plan
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PSC	Peace and security Committee
RSM	Resolute Support Mission
SAA	Stabilization and Association Agreement
SAP	Stability and Association Process
SFOR	Stabilization Force
SHAPE	Supreme Allied Headquarters Europe
SSR	Security Sector Reform
TFG	Transitional Federal Government
TIPH	Temporary International Presence in the city of Hebron
UN	United Nations
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNAMID	AU-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur
UNIIMOG	UN Iran – Iraq Military Observer Group
UNIKOM	UN Iraq – Kuwait Observation Mission
UNITAF	Unified Task Force
UNMIK	United Nations Mission in Kosovo
UNMISS	United Nations Mission in South Sudan
UNOMIG	UN Observer Mission in Georgia
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSMIL	United Nations Mission in Libya
WEU	Western European Union

WFP World Food Programme

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH QUESTION

1.1. Introduction*

Over decades, the European Union has committed to shaping an autonomous Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and in affiliation with that, a Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP)¹. This effort is an ongoing one, but there has been a good deal of initiatives undertaken to put the EU on the map as a security actor, including a number of crisis management operations and missions. With almost all of EU member states being NATO Allies, some of these efforts have been in conjunction with NATO's own, while some have not. The most visible aspect of EU's CSDP is arguably crisis management operations/missions that have been deployed around the world.

As an accession country and a non-European NATO Ally, Turkey has been involved in the shaping of Europe's Common Security and Defense Policy since the very beginning of the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI)² within the Western European Union. Relations between Turkey and the EU, reflecting on Turkey's ongoing accession journey, contain elements that are essentially interlinked with cooperation in security and defense realms.

Currently, Turkey has become a significant actor in crisis management, with a wide range of initiatives ranging from conflict mediation and facilitation to participation in peacekeeping missions/operations covering a large area. While these initiatives have

* Views expressed here represent the author's own and cannot be affiliated with any official position.

¹ "Treaty on European Union" (Preamble, Art. B&J., Maastricht, 7 February 1992)

² NATO, "Final Communiqué of the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council," (Berlin:3 June 1996), accessed 5 September 2021, <https://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1996/p96-063e.htm>

regularly been in support of the CSDP, there are cases where Turkey and CSDP appear to be out of touch.

Since CFSP, and CSDP, is a chapter included in the accession negotiations, it represents a necessary aspect of policy and action alignment for Turkey as an accession country. European Union has been monitoring Turkey's alignment progress in the foreign and security policy domains since 1998 as reflected in Progress Reports³, which pay attention to her participation in crisis management efforts. Therefore, participation in crisis management initiatives serves as one of the measuring items for candidates' eligibility, if not for nudging the EU's judgement in a favorable direction.

Turkey is still officially a candidate country, from whom convergence on EU's foreign and security policy is expected. This merits a closer look at the Union's crisis management initiatives, which are handled under CSDP, and their collusion/collaboration impact on Turkey. As both the EU and Turkey have a large footprint in crisis management in the globe, this study attempts to make sense of the journey of Turkey's synergy with EU's CSDP over the years by analyzing the Union's crisis management initiatives and Turkey's involvement/non-involvement in them in the hopes of developing an understanding towards a possible pattern that is indicative of Turkey-EU relations in foreign and security policy, with a particular focus on the latter.

1.2. Research Question and Methodology

As briefly laid out in the introduction segment, the aim of this study is to take a closer look at the EU's crisis management missions/operations that have been conducted so far⁴, and attempt an analysis of prospects for Turkey's participation and non-participation in them. By doing that, the study aspires to sketch an overarching

³ "Turkey Reports Prepared by the European Commission," Directorate for EU Affairs (2021), accessed 5 September 2021, https://www.ab.gov.tr/regular-progress-reports_46224_en.html.

⁴ For the scope of relevance of this study, EU's supporting action to AMISOM in Darfur will be excluded.

interpretative account on the evolution of Turkey's involvement in CSDP, with a particular focus on crisis management missions and operations. The main question of this study is "*How has Turkey's involvement in the CSDP evolved between 2003-2021 through crisis management missions and operations?*"

In order to recount the evolution of Turkey's participation in CSDP, this study makes use of primary and secondary sources to deliver a logical timeline of events, which would have both descriptive and perceptive elements. While doing so, the study refers to primary sources including legal documents such as Treaties, Council Decisions, Joint Actions, Communiqués, Press Releases, official statements and speeches as well as other original documents issued by relevant institutions and entities. Secondary sources include policy papers and reports published by think tanks, books and journals by scholars in the field, newspaper articles and websites.

In the absence of comprehensive data on Turkey's involvement vis-à-vis CSDP missions/operations apart from the Turkish General Staff's official webpage, semi-structured interviews have been conducted with two Turkish Ambassadors, who are currently employed at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey and shall be referenced anonymously. Both interviewees previously served at NATO.

Since the research attempts to answer a "how" question, the study adopts an explanatory approach to recount events based on historical data. In attempting to answer this "how" question, the study employs three conceptual tools: Europeanization and de-Europeanization, peacekeeping, and soft-balancing. These concepts are applied to each case of crisis management initiative under CSDP from the perspective of Turkey as a contributor or non-contributor to figure out her potential motivations.

Chapter 2 seeks to provide an overview of the evolution of CSDP, third country participation and Turkey's relevance in the case.

The historical narrative method intended to be applied also requires a delineation of periods in Turkey-CSDP synergy, which will be detailed in Chapter 3. This Chapter also contains the literature review as well as the conceptual framework of the study.

In Chapter 4, the first set of CSDP operations are dissected in line with the analytical approach adopted in the study. The following Chapter 5 addresses the second batch of CSDP crisis management missions/operations vis-à-vis Turkey's participation. Findings and discussions are then reviewed in the conclusion, Chapter 6.

CHAPTER 2

INTRODUCTION TO THE EUROPEAN UNION'S COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY AND SYNERGY WITH TURKEY: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

2.1. A Brief Overview of CSDP's Evolution

The search for European security architecture could be traced back to the end of World War II where European states proved themselves to be still capable of destabilizing the continent by interstate conflicts even after World War I. The European rapprochement that began in the aftermath of World War II and the enlargement, integration and evolution of this into the European Union could also be read as the creation of a security community.⁵ Of course, building the European security architecture did not happen overnight. It took many years and efforts for it to culminate in the current form of CSDP, with 35 missions and operations under its belt.

For many, the European Union is seen as the socio-political pillar of the European project, whereas NATO assumes the military pillar. There has been another multilateral security and defense organization through the history of European security architecture: the Western European Union or WEU in short. However, WEU was not the only product within NATO of European integration in the field of security and defense following the end of World War II.

France's strong desire to push back against any possibility of rearming West Germany, which was not a NATO member at that point in time, gave birth to what was called the "Pleven Pan", which formed the basis of the Treaty Establishing European Defense Community. Similar to the Schuman Plan's spirit, Pleven Plan

⁵ Andrej Tuscicisny, "Security Communities and Their Values: Taking Masses Seriously," *International Political Science Review* 28, no. 4 (2007): 426-427.

also sought to achieve restraint on Western Germany by way of forming a supranational structure. The would-be European Defense Community was designed as part of NATO, with Article 5 applying to Community members. As would be imagined, pooling of national armies under the Community was a higher level of integration than that of coal and steel production. Military and national security was regarded as sensitive areas over which to partially give away sovereignty. The Treaty ended up being rejected by the French Parliament and Italy, and the project was altogether shelved with the accession of West Germany to NATO, at which point the WEU took precedence.⁶

Following the failure of the European Defense Community, a new diplomatic initiative was championed by the French President de Gaulle. Known as Fouchet Plans, this initiative marked a move from the supranational structure envisaged for the European Community, or EC, to an intergovernmental union of sovereign states. The Plan was on the table in 1961-1962 with the idea of creating a “union of European states” with the addition of foreign policy and defense dimensions. Nevertheless, its fate resembled that of European Defense Community. Due to disagreements among the inner six regarding their visions for European integration, especially for the Dutch and Belgians who tended to be more pro-Atlanticist than France, negotiations over the initiative were suspended and then never picked up again.⁷ Instead, the WEU took off within NATO, but had been dormant throughout the Cold War.

Originally named the Western Union, or WE, an alliance built in 1948 among the Benelux countries, France and the United Kingdom, the Western European Union

⁶ Josef L. Kunz, “Treaty Establishing the European Defense Community,” *American Journal of International Law* 47, no. 2 (1953): 275-281, Cambridge University Press.

⁷ Anthony Teasdale, “The Fouchet Plan: De Gaulle’s Intergovernmental Design for Europe,” *LSE ‘Europe in Question’ Discussion Paper Series*, London School of Economics and Political Science (2016): 1-3.

was formed with the renewal of the Brussels Treaty of 1948 in 1954.⁸ WEU was an essential part of the Western bloc within the transatlantic community, along with the United States, which in combination represented NATO. Western European Union membership was reserved for EU member states that were also NATO allies at the same time.⁹

WEU did not have collective standing armed forces, but relied on individual military capabilities of its member states. Following the Cold War and its destabilizing implications throughout the Southern and Eastern European neighborhood of the EU, the WEU decided to get involved in crisis management. With that conviction, the WEU took up the Petersberg Tasks, adopted with the Petersberg Declaration in 1992.¹⁰ These tasks then included humanitarian and rescue tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping, crisis management, including peacemaking. Moreover, under Petersberg tasks, the WEU forces were made available to both the EU and NATO.¹¹

The WEU was also tasked with the creation of a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI), which was intended to strengthen the “European” pillar within NATO, as opposed to a separate EU pillar. By creating and strengthening such an identity, NATO would be reassured that Europe could take care of the crises and disputes wherever NATO would not choose to get involved, which may be interpreted as a way to take some of the burden off the US in providing European

⁸ “Brussels Treaty,” Western European Union, (Paris: 23 October 1954).

⁹ Knud Erik Jørgensen, “The Western European Union and the Imbroglio of European Security,” *Cooperation and Conflict* 25, no. 3 (1990): 135-137.

¹⁰ Alyson JK Bailes and Graham Messervy-Whiting, “Death of an Institution: the end for Western European Union, a future for European defence?,” *Egmont Paper* 46 (2011): 25-26.

¹¹ “Glossary of Summaries,” EUR-Lex, accessed 4 September 2020, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/summary/glossary/petersberg_tasks.html.

security.¹² Additionally, at the 1996 Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) / North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), a communiqué was adopted that allowed the WEU to use NATO assets if necessary. This was known as the original Berlin arrangement.¹³

When the post-Cold War bliss was overshadowed by the crises that erupted at the doorstep of the EU, namely in Kosovo and Bosnia, the Union began to gradually assume a more assertive voice in the security and defense of the continent. The breakout of the Kosovo War in 1990s shook Europe and awakened it to its failure to act. It also showed Europe how incapable it was in preventing a crisis from evolving into a fully-blown conflict and resolving it.¹⁴

At this juncture, even the United Kingdom, the “awkward European partner”¹⁵ and a traditional opponent to a separate EU security and defense capability-building outside of NATO framework, warmed up to and then actually championed the idea of having available capacity with European partners to act in cases such as Kosovo.

In fact, it was the joint declaration by the United Kingdom and France at St. Malo that seeded the creation of an “autonomous European action”. This was in spite of the fact that traditionally and historically, France and UK had been at odds with each other over the issue of European security, especially in the post-war era. The St. Malo Summit came at the backdrop of yet another stalemate between the two at the Amsterdam Council of 1997 over whether to integrate the WEU to the EU, which

¹² Bailes and Messervy-Whiting, “Death of an Institution: the end for Western European Union, a future for European defence?,” 40-44.

¹³ NATO, “Final Communiqué of the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council,” (Berlin:3 June 1996), accessed 5 September 2021, <https://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1996/p96-063e.htm>

¹⁴ Jolyon Howorth, “Foreword,” in *Debating European Security and Defense Policy*, ed. Maxime H. A. Larivé (Oxford/New York: Routledge, 2016): xi-xii

¹⁵ Stuart Wilks, “Britain and Europe: An Awkward Partner or an Awkward State?,” *Politics* 16, no. 3 (1996): 159-161.

was supported by France and opposed by the UK, despite Prime Minister Blair's pro-EU tendencies.¹⁶

The following year at the informal summit in Pörschach, Blair called for a stronger European stance in foreign policy and security issues. Fast forward to St. Malo Summit in the same year, British Prime Minister Blair and French President Chirac adopted a joint declaration advocating autonomous action and military capabilities for the Union, which laid the basis for 1999 Helsinki Summit and the pledge to deploy military forces by 2003, also known as the Helsinki Headline Goal.¹⁷

The Summit triggered a series of discussions among member states over cooperation in security and defense policy. While it was the Treaty of Maastricht where the concept of European defense was first substantiated, such cooperation was conceived with the WEU in mind, not a separate entity or policy, but rather a bridge between the EU and NATO. As covered earlier, the first seed of European security and defense cooperation was sown at the NATO Foreign Ministers Meeting in Berlin, where it was agreed that ESDI would be created, and parts of NATO command structure would be "lent" to WEU for European operations in areas where NATO did not want to be involved.¹⁸

The impetus created by St. Malo declaration and subsequently its acknowledgement at the Vienna Council took shape at the Helsinki European Summit in 1999 of 2003 headline goals: having 60,000 military personnel deployable within 60 days by 2003. The Summit concluded that new political and military bodies and structures would be established with modalities developed in full consultation, cooperation and transparency between the EU and NATO. It also foresaw that arrangements would be

¹⁶ Andrew Shearer, "Britain, France and the Saint-Malo Declaration: Tactical Rapprochement or Strategic Entente?". *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 13, no. 2 (2000), 283-285.

¹⁷ Shearer, "Britain, France and the Saint-Malo Declaration: Tactical Rapprochement or Strategic Entente?" 283-285.

¹⁸ Peter Ricketts, "The EU and Defence," *RUSI Journal* 162, no. 3(2017): 31-32.

elaborated that would allow non-EU European NATO members and other interested entities to contribute to EU military crisis management undertakings.¹⁹

On the other hand, the key conclusion that sparked a diversion of interpretation between EU and non-EU NATO members was the emphasis on EU's autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to crises.²⁰ However, following much deliberation, the EU agreed to complement this stress on autonomous capacity, by adding that "this process would avoid unnecessary duplication and does not imply the creation of a European army".²¹ Besides, it aligned more with the three D's cautioned by Madeline Albright, former US Secretary of State, namely no decoupling, discrimination and duplication with NATO, which she laid out in an article following the St. Malo declaration.²²

With the coming into force of the Amsterdam Treaty in 1999, a separate European foreign and security policy and the post of "High Representative" to oversee it was announced.²³ The Treaty provided for closer relations with the WEU, which was a separate entity from the EU at that time, but paved the way for its eventual absorption "with a view to the possibility of the integration of the WEU into the Union, should the European Council so decide".²⁴ The scope of this closer

¹⁹ Peter Ricketts, "The EU and Defence," *RUSI Journal* 162, no. 3(2017): 31-32.

²⁰ Peter Ricketts, "The EU and Defence," *RUSI Journal* 162, no. 3(2017): 31-32.

²¹ "Helsinki European Council Conclusions", European Council, 1999, accessed 10 July 2021, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/hell_en.htm#b.

²² Madeline Albright, "The right balance will secure NATO's future," *Financial Times*, 7 December 1998.

²³ European Union, "Treaty of Amsterdam," Art. J8, 1 May 1999

²⁴ European Union, "Declarations Adopted by the Council," in *Treaty of Amsterdam*, 1 May 1999

cooperation between the EU and WEU was to be “humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking”.²⁵ These tasks were originally assigned to the WEU, but with the Treaty of Amsterdam, the EU interpreted Article J.7 as the transfer of Petersberg Tasks to itself.

The Council appointed Javier Solana to the post of the newly created High Representative for the European Security and Defense Policy as well as the Secretary-General of WEU.²⁶ His main task was to oversee the transfer of functions from the WEU to ESDP. The WEU Ministerial Meeting in Marseilles gave the greenlight to the transfer of the Organization’s capabilities and functions to the ESDP.²⁷

With the Treaty of Nice, signed in 2001, the relevant provisions of the preceding Amsterdam Treaty were amended to emphasize the “progressive framing of a common defense policy” and “cooperation among member states in the field of armaments”. The amended Article also referred to functions falling under Petersberg tasks: “humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking” within the progressive framing of EU’s common security and defense policy. This clearly indicated ceding WEU’s tasks to the Union.²⁸

The Treaty of Lisbon, ratified in 2009, abolished the pillar structure that was introduced in the Treaty of Maastricht, and created the Common Security and

²⁵ Treaty of Amsterdam, Article J.7 para. 2

²⁶ Council of the European Union, “Council Decision appointing the Secretary-General, High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, of the Council of the European Union,” 13 September 1999, Brussels, accessed 10 February 2021, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A31999D0629&qid=1635123744030>

²⁷ Western European Union, “Declaration by the WEU Council of Ministers” (Marseille: 13 November 2000).

²⁸ European Union, “Treaty of Nice,” Art. 1 (2), 1 February 2003.

Defense Policy (CSDP) with the High Representative as its chief and established the European External Action Service (EEAS) to be in charge of executing the CFSP and CSDP.²⁹

When the Treaty of Lisbon inherited the mutual defense clause of the WEU, the latter was eventually dissolved with a joint statement in 2010 by its full members (Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom) that envisaged the cessation of WEU activities “preferably” by June 2011.³⁰

From that point onwards, the EU has been on a journey of consolidating the CSDP and its strategic capabilities with the ever-increasing challenges in the global security environment.³¹ It has been a clear sight from the moment St. Malo Summit was convened that the EU pursued a policy to Europeanize security and defense, in the hopes of relying less on the NATO for European security and gain the ability to act autonomously in strategic matters.³²

EU’s efforts to galvanize CSDP have been gaining significant traction, with the addition of initiatives such as the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and the European Defense Agency (EDA), along with over 30 CSDP missions and operations under its belt. The former High Representative and the Vice President of the European Commission (HR/VP) Mogherini’s “Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy” set ambitious goals for the Union, aiming to

²⁹ European Union, “Treaty of Lisbon,” Art. 9B (2), 1 December 2009.

³⁰ “Statement of the Presidency of the Permanent Council of the WEU on behalf of the High Contracting Parties to the Modified Brussels Treaty – Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom,” Brussels, 31 March 2010.

³¹ Petros Violakis, “*Europeanisation of the EU Defence and Security Policy after the End of the Cold-War*,” (Routledge, 2016): 1-4.

³² Ömür Orhun, “European Security and Defence Identity - Common European Security and Defence Policy: A Turkish Perspective,” *Perceptions* (2012): 1-6.

empower Europeans to take more responsibility for their security and defense capabilities.³³ It is also worthy to note that boosting the CSDP was among the top priorities for former President of the Commission Juncker's election campaign.³⁴

The separation of European Security and Defense Policy from NATO and its evolution into CSDP is interpreted by many authors from different approaches. Benjamin Pohl argues that the French were the ones flying the EU flag on the way to establishing CSDP.³⁵ Pohl associates the traditional French foreign policy reflex towards balancing the US with the inception of CSDP. France was serious about creating an "autonomous" security and defense policy within the EU where it would be possible to take charge in Europe without the US' shadow. From this perspective, CSDP operations may be interpreted as France counter-balancing the US, especially where the stakes are high for French interests.³⁶

The conception of the CSDP is explained from various perspectives in the literature. According to Stephanie C. Hoffman, what led to the eventual creation of CSDP was the ideological congruence of the ruling parties in three major EU powers at the same time. The Labor government in the UK, RPR in France and SPD/Greens in Germany were all converged enough ideologically for the CSDP to kick-off.³⁷

³³ "A Global Strategy for the European Union," *European External Action Service* (2018), accessed 4 November 2020, https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/eu-global-strategy/49323/global-strategy-european-union_en

³⁴ "Towards a European Defence Union," *European Commission*, Brussels (2014): 1-4, accessed 12 July 2021, https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/towards-a-european-defence-union_en.pdf

³⁵ Benjamin Pohl, *EU Foreign Policy and Crisis Management Operations*, (Oxford: Routledge, 2014): 14-15.

³⁶ Benjamin Pohl, *EU Foreign Policy and Crisis Management Operations*, (Oxford: Routledge, 2014): 14-15.

³⁷ Stephanie C Hofmann, *European Security in NATO's Shadow: Party Ideologies and Institution Building*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015): 5-6.

Whereas some neo-functionalist authors link the birth of CSDP to the spill-over process triggered by the economic integration that laid the foundation of the Union in the first place.³⁸ Indeed, European states acted on their intention to converge their political will as opposed to cooperating solely in the economic sphere by establishing a European Political Cooperation (EPC) in the 1970s, though it was kept separate from the European Economic Community (EEC).³⁹ In time, it transformed into an integral part of the EU, whether in terms of *acquis* or institutions.⁴⁰

Another commentary in the literature about the conception of the CSDP is related to the EU's desire to elevate the institution to the level of a global security actor.⁴¹ Kaunert and Zwolski connect this idea to Duchene's conceptualization of Europe as a civilian power and how the EU aims to achieve this global power status through normative means, as suggested by Manners. This conceptualization puts more focus on the EU's soft power application, especially through its economy and values.⁴² Hedley Bull pointed out that Europe "should become more self-sufficient in security and defense" because the security-related interests of western European states and the United States were not aligned.⁴³ When the ESDP, and later CSDP, came into

³⁸ Julian Bergmann, "Neofunctionalism and EU External Policy Integration: the Case of Capacity Building in Support of Security and Development (CBSD)," *Journal Of European Public Policy* 26, no. 9 (2018) 1256-1260.

³⁹ Petros Violakis, "Europeanisation of the EU defence and security policy after the end of the Cold-War" (PhD diss., University of Exeter, 2016), 80; 194.

⁴⁰ Neil Fligstein, Alina Polyakova and Wayne Sandholtz, "European Integration, Nationalism and European Identity," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 50, no.1 (2012), 113

⁴¹ Christian Kaunert, and Kamil Zwolski, *The EU as a Global Security Actor: a Comprehensive Analysis beyond CFSP and JHA*, (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 5.

⁴² Kaunert and Zwolski, *The EU as a Global Security Actor: a Comprehensive Analysis beyond CFSP and JHA*, 6.

⁴³ Hedley Bull, "Civilian Power Europe: a Contradiction in Terms?," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 21, no. 2 (1982):155-156.

being, the concept of “civilian power Europe” had to be revisited and further elaborated in order to explain the actorness of Europe in world affairs.⁴⁴

While the European security architecture has been mainly supported by NATO, there is a renewed push to make the NATO-EU cooperation’s “separable but not separate”⁴⁵ balance leaning towards EU’s strategic autonomy.⁴⁶ This concept became a target in the Global Strategy⁴⁷, then was fervently promoted by the French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Angela Merkel⁴⁸, and finally became firmly embedded in the new “geopolitical Commission”- proposing a more assertive role for the EU in global foreign and security affairs as championed by the President Ursula von der Leyen and her deputy/High Representative Josep Borrell.⁴⁹

In light of the recent tidings surrounding the state of the transatlantic affair, assessing the overall sentiment of the US towards an increasingly autonomous Europe in defense and security is challenging. The former Trump administration scolded the attempts by France and Germany towards strengthening EU’s military capabilities,

⁴⁴ Kaunert and Zwolski, *The EU as a Global Security Actor: a Comprehensive Analysis beyond CFSP and JHA*, 9.

⁴⁵ “NATO Ministerial Communiqué M-NAC-1(96)63,” 1996, accessed 5 November 2020, <https://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1996/p96-063e.htm>.

⁴⁶ “European Council Conclusions– 19/20 December 2013,” 2013, accessed 5 November 2020, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/140245.pdf

⁴⁷ “European Council Conclusions on Implementing the EU Global Strategy in the Area of Security and Defence,” 2016, accessed 5 November 2020, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/11/14/conclusions-eu-global-strategy-security-defence/>.

⁴⁸ European Parliament, “The EU Strategic Autonomy Debate,” 2021, accessed 8 July 2021, [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2021/690532/EPRS_BRI\(2021\)690532_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2021/690532/EPRS_BRI(2021)690532_EN.pdf)

⁴⁹ “Speech by President-elect von der Leyen in the European Parliament Plenary on the Occasion of the Presentation of her College of Commissioners and their Programme,” *European Commission*, 2019, accessed 8 November 2020, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/es/speech_19_6408

but it could also be argued that the said administration gave the excuse for this drive in the first place by most notably demanding European allies to raise their defense budgets in contribution to NATO⁵⁰. Plus, there have been some sour reactions⁵¹ from the US towards CSDP initiatives which could be attributed to their exclusivity to member states only, casting out non-EU allies. However, there is a renewed hope for “saving” the transatlantic relationship during President Biden’s term, though it is still unclear how quickly the severed bond could be fixed and how far the EU’s drive for strategic autonomy could be favored by the White House.⁵²

In fact, the new “geopolitical Commission” seems to be setting another ambitious course on its CSDP agenda and the EU’s role in global affairs. Nevertheless, it is not only the US that has been left out by the EU’s efforts to isolate the European security architecture from non-EU countries that have helped build it in the first place. One such country in particular, namely Turkey, merits a closer study to provide a glimpse at the evolution of the CSDP through NATO’s and non-EU Allies efforts, which could also shed light on Turkey-EU relations in terms of security and defense.

2.2. A Critical Look at Third Country Participation in CSDP

In the literature, it is possible to find numerous works that consider the ineffectiveness of the EU in managing the crises in the Balkans in late 1990s and early 2000s that resulted in the creation of CSDP. The historical background has been covered in the earlier sections of this study, however; for the sake of unpacking third country participation, it is important to touch upon the transition from the WEU to EU.

⁵⁰ Maïa de la Baume, and David M. Herszenhorn, “Merkel joins Macron in calling for EU army to complement NATO,” *Politico*, 13 November 2018, <https://www.politico.eu/article/angela-merkel-emmanuel-macron-eu-army-to-complement-nato/>.

⁵¹ Guy Chazan, and Michael Peel, “US warns against European joint military project,” *Financial Times*, 2019, <https://www.ft.com/content/ad16ce08-763b-11e9-bbad-7c18c0ea0201>

⁵² Michael Shurkin, “Welcoming a Stronger European Defense,” *Rand Blog*, 22 January 2021, accessed 8 July 2021, <https://www.rand.org/blog/2021/01/welcoming-a-stronger-european-defense.html>

WEU was not exactly a robust security and defense organization, and it was mostly regarded as a side-dish to the main course of NATO in European security and defense.⁵³ Even the European Security and Defense Identity grew within NATO, with the WEU as the institution in charge. The membership of WEU was only reserved to the European Allies, and non-EU European allies such as Turkey had more swing as associate members.⁵⁴

Associate members of the WEU had the right to fully participate in the Planning Cell, unlike third states participating in CSDP operations today. Associate members were also entitled to take part in WEU operations and exercises with the same rights as full members, and to be informed about ongoing missions/operations. There were only two points that made them less involved in WEU than full members: Article V on collective defense which was only reserved to EU-NATO members, and the condition for participation in WEU missions/operations, which required simple majority from full members, as opposed to the possibility of veto from a member state in the Council today. Lastly, associate members contributed to the WEU budget.⁵⁵

Security and defense realm has long been considered as the "domaine réservé" of member states at the national level⁵⁶, and it has taken years for the CSDP to take off

⁵³ Knud Jørgensen, "The Western European Union and the Imbroglio of European Security," *Cooperation and Conflict* 25, no. 3 (1990): 150-151.

⁵⁴ Şeyda Hanbay. "Involvement of Non-EU European NATO Members in Common Security and Defense Policy: The Turkish Case," (MA diss., Ankara University, 2013), 130-137.

⁵⁵ Münevver Cebeci, "NATO, the EU and Turkey: The CSDP Stalemate," *Marmara Journal of European Studies* 20, no. 2 (2012): 97-98.

⁵⁶ Hylke Dijkstra, *Policy-making in EU Security and Defense* (Palgrave Macmillan: Basingstoke, 2013), 1-5.

from the ground by convergence of the member states' positions.⁵⁷ The effectiveness and necessity of the CSDP is still largely debated. Security interests and threat perceptions vary from one member state to another, and when most of them are already NATO members, the argument on the added value of a separate security and defense policy has received challenging reactions from inside and outside of the Union⁵⁸.

There are also varying approaches to the US response to a separate European security structure outside NATO. Some authors argue that the US had reached a point where it was no longer eager to send troops on the ground due to the Vietnam syndrome.⁵⁹ Instead, the US chose to provide air capabilities, for instance, in Kosovo, which determined the outcome of the conflict. On the other hand, it is no surprise that the US has not been the biggest supporter of the European pillar conceived within NATO turning into a separate entity that could potentially undermine NATO in some shape or form.⁶⁰

The US is not alone in the way it is being excluded from the CSDP, especially in terms of non-involvement in decision-making mechanisms, because Turkey, a NATO Ally and EU candidate, has been treated with the same kind of exclusion but

⁵⁷ Julian Bergmann, and Patrick Müller, "Failing Forward in the EU's Common Security and Defense Policy: the Integration of EU Crisis Management," *Journal of European Public Policy* 28, no. 10 (2021): 1670-1671.

⁵⁸ Hadewych Hazelzet, "The added value of CSDP operations," *European Union Institute for Security Studies Brief Issue* 31 (2013):1-5.

⁵⁹ Klaus Larres, "Une Europe démilitarisée? Un regard américain," *Politique étrangère* 1 (Spring, 2014): 4.

⁶⁰ Alexander Vershbow, "The American Perspective on ESDI/ESDP," *Perceptions* 5, no.3 (2000): 1-6.

still has given support and contribution to the conception and development of the CSDP.⁶¹

The visibility and legitimacy of the EU's bid to become a global actor is closely tied to its presence in different parts of the world as a security provider or a stabilization force. For the EU, CSDP operations and missions serve this purpose.⁶² However, there is also the visibility and legitimacy of the operations/missions to discuss. Thierry Tardy argues that participation from third states to CSDP mission/operations goes a long way to increasing their visibility/legitimacy, even though such contributions tend to be modest.⁶³

He also adds that for candidate countries such as Turkey and aspiring states such as Georgia and Ukraine participate in order to "raise their profiles and familiarize themselves with the security and defense aspect of EU".⁶⁴ Interestingly, he suggests that regional powers such as Russia and Turkey might seek an opportunity to shape or influence EU policies at the operational level by joining a CSDP mission/operation. Furthermore, other third states regularly participate in CSDP missions/operations with different motives, one of them being the security interest they associate with a mission/operation.⁶⁵

⁶¹ Esra Çayhan, "Towards a European Security and Defense Policy: With or Without Turkey?," *Turkish Studies* 4, no. 1 (2003): 45-46.

⁶² Pohl, *EU Foreign Policy and Crisis Management Operations*, 19-20.

⁶³ Thierry Tardy, "CSDP: Getting Third States on Board," *European Union Institute for Security Studies Brief Issue* 6 (2014): 1-4.

⁶⁴ Thierry Tardy, "Revisiting the EU's Security Partnerships," *European Union Institute for Security Studies Brief Issue* 1(2018): 1-4.

⁶⁵ Thierry Tardy, "Revisiting the EU's Security Partnerships".

Third state participation follows strict rules that favor the EU side, which indicates an asymmetrical relationship between the EU and non-EU participating states, which has proven to be a cause for tension⁶⁶.

From the Union's perspective, working with third states in CSDP missions and operations brings more capacity for a successful conduct, which is an advantage, considering that it sometimes struggles to staff its own missions with member states.⁶⁷ As a matter of fact, the EU utilizes third states to fill the gaps in its missions/operations, and these states do not get involved in the planning of the Concept of Operations (CONOPS) or the Operation Plan (OPLAN). This arrangement is often perceived by third states as having no choice but to say yes to everything the EU decides. The existence of a Committee of Contributors, tasked to provide input about the day-to-day functioning of the operation, does not give much to lift the level of third states from secondary to an equal footing with the EU.⁶⁸

As a third state participating in CSDP missions/operations, Turkey's case cannot be explained only by the description of an "aspiring accession candidate" since it is also a NATO Ally who has been involved in the crafting of the European security architecture from the very beginning.⁶⁹ And Turkey's dynamic with the CSDP is very much associated with NATO-EU relations in general, which have not been elevated to the level desired by both entities as yet.⁷⁰

⁶⁶ Thierry Tardy, "Revisiting the EU's Security Partnerships".

⁶⁷ Tardy, "CSDP: Getting Third States on Board," 1-4.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Mahmut Bali Aykan, "Turkey and European Security and Defence Identity/Policy (ESDI/P): A Turkish View," *Journal of Contemporary European Studies* 13, no. 3 (2005): 336-337.

⁷⁰ Sinan Ülgen, "The evolving EU, NATO and Turkey relationship: implications for Transatlantic security," *EDAM (Centre for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies) Discussion Paper Series*, no 2 (2008): 1-8.

Cebeci interprets the stalemate among NATO-EU-Turkey regarding CSDP as deepened by two major factors: one is the European segment born and raised within the NATO family but gradually and decisively carving out an “EU-only” creed within it, and the other is the EU’s asymmetrical approach towards Turkey that has developed during the country’s accession process.⁷¹

The Turkish-Cypriot conundrum⁷², as Akgül Açıkmeşe and Triantaphyllou put it, is considered as the main obstacle to strengthening NATO-EU cooperation by the majority of commentators. Indeed, if anything, since its accession in 2004, Cyprus has shown in multiple occasions that it tries to punch way above its weight against Turkey, a country who does not recognize it in the first place.

Dursun-Özkanca argues that the accession of Cyprus into EU marked a turning point in the ongoing inter-institutional deadlock⁷³, whereas Billion wrote that the disagreement “impeded NATO-EU cooperation.”⁷⁴ This so-called conundrum is important in analyzing Turkey’s place in the CSDP since it is relevant for Turkey’s participation in missions and operations and the overall health of NATO-EU cooperation.

⁷¹ Cebeci, "NATO, the EU and Turkey: The CSDP Stalemate," 95.

⁷² Sinem Akgül Açıkmeşe, and Dimitrios Triantaphyllou, "The NATO–EU–Turkey Trilogy: The Impact of the Cyprus Conundrum," *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies* 12, no. 4 (2012): 567-568.

⁷³ Oya Dursun-Özkanca, “Turkey–NATO relations at a crossroads ahead of NATO’s new Strategic Concept,” *Hurriyet Daily News*, 15 October 2010, <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=turkey-nato-relations-at-a-crossroads-ahead-of-nato8217s-new-strategic-concept-2010-10-14>

⁷⁴ Didier Billion, "La Turquie, L’OTAN et L’Union Europeenne - La Difficile Articulation Des Politiques De Cooperation Strategique," *Institut de relations internationales et stratégiques (IRIS)*, 2010, accessed 20 April 2021, https://www.iris-france.org/docs/kfm_docs/docs/observatoire-turquie/2010-11-10-cooperation.pdf.

2.3. Insert Turkey – A Non-EU Ally with Significant Contributions to European Security

Throughout the Union’s journey to flesh out CSDP, Turkey, an accession candidate and a NATO Ally since 1952, has contributed to the construction and maintenance of the European security identity and architecture.⁷⁵ Notwithstanding, EU’s tendency to narrow the CSDP circle by excluding non-member states, NATO Allies even, coupled with its reluctance to proceed with Turkey’s accession negotiations has put Turkey-EU as well as NATO-EU relations through some rough paths over the years.⁷⁶ The idea of Turkey as a security provider to Europe⁷⁷ will be highlighted in this study by looking at Turkey’s participation in the CSDP missions and operations as a non-EU third country, and a NATO Ally.

As the WEU was sidelined by the establishment of NATO in shaping the European security architecture, non-EU allies including Turkey became associate members.⁷⁸ The WEU’s role was closely tied to NATO since the former initially served as a tool to uphold the “European pillar” of the transatlantic community, charged with the construction of a European security and defense identity to aid NATO. It was not until the revamping process in 1984 that the WEU enjoyed visibility in significant

⁷⁵ Hüseyin Bağcı, and Ali Yıldız, “Turkey and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP): Confrontational to Cooperative Relationship,” *Foreign Policy Institute* 30, no. 3-4 (2004):111-113.

⁷⁶ Ülgen, “The evolving EU, NATO and Turkey relationship: implications for Transatlantic security,” 1-8.

⁷⁷ Tuba Ünlü Bilgiç, “Turkey as a Security Provider to the EU: Turkish Perceptions,” In *Turkey and the EU: the Process of Change and Neighbourhood*, ed. Atilla Eralp and Çiğdem Üstün, (Ankara: Middle East Technical University, 2010), 167.

⁷⁸ André Dumoulin, “The composition of WEU,” *Digital Research in European Studies - University of Luxembourg (CVCE)*, 2016, accessed 19 December 2020, https://www.cvce.eu/en/obj/the_composition_of_weu-en-2530303b-f81b-4783-8ec1-8dae3ba6a7dc.html.

security and defense matters. This visibility grew further with the introduction of Petersberg tasks in 1992.⁷⁹

As a candidate country, a NATO Ally, and a WEU associate member, Turkey has facilitated the construction of European security architecture since the beginning. This is not only due to Turkey's position of shielding the southernmost flank of the transatlantic territory but also as a member of the European family in negotiations for accession to the Union.⁸⁰ With such motivations, Turkey has taken part in numerous operations and missions within and without its capacity as a NATO Ally.

The first of such was the joint monitoring operation (Operation Sharp Vigilance, later Operation Sharp Guard) undertaken by WEU and NATO in 1992 for UN sanctions against Yugoslavia.⁸¹ As mentioned in the section above, the conflicts in the Balkans were the primary drivers for Europe to form a collective European military cooperation apart from NATO/WEU. The EU received Turkey's support and assistance in all the operations and missions undertaken in the Balkans, namely EUFOR Concordia, EUFOR ALTHEA, EUPOL Proxima, EUPM/BiH and EULEX Kosovo.⁸²

Another important step was the upgrade of the Berlin Agreement between NATO and the EU. This new deal was called the "Berlin Plus", adopted on 16 December

⁷⁹ Şuhnaz Yılmaz, "Turkey and the European Union: A Security Perspective," In *Turkey and European Security*, ed. Giovanni Gasparini, (Rome: Instituto Affari Internazionali Publications, 2007), 57-58.

⁸⁰ İhsan Kızıltan, "Improving the NATO-EU Partnership: the Turkish Perspective," *Turkish Policy Quarterly* 7, no. 3 (2008): 34-35.

⁸¹ "NATO/WEU Operation Sharp Guard," accessed 5 May 2020, <https://www.nato.int/ifor/general/shrp-grd.htm>.

⁸² Ünlü Bilgiç, "Turkey as a Security Provider to the EU: Turkish Perceptions," 179.

2002.⁸³ Under this arrangement, two major EU operations have been carried out using NATO assets and capabilities: EUFOR Concordia in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) and EUFOR Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the latter still being active.⁸⁴

It is worth highlighting that the use of NATO assets in EU operations under the Berlin Plus is, in practice, subject to NATO's "right of first refusal", meaning that in order for the EU to take on such operations and missions, NATO must decline to intervene in a given crisis.⁸⁵

From Turkey's point of view, certain aspects of the Berlin Plus arrangement must be dwelled upon. The Berlin Plus deal maintained the conditions for NATO-EU consultation arrangements for the crisis management operations/missions with recourse to NATO assets and capabilities. This channel already existed between WEU and NATO under the original Berlin arrangement.⁸⁶ In addition, for EU-led crisis management operations under the Berlin Plus arrangements, NATO allies must give unanimous support to sharing the Alliance's assets with the EU.⁸⁷ Turkey, for

⁸³ NATO, "Istanbul Summit Media Guide," (2004): 92-102, accessed 17 November 2020, <https://www.nato.int/docu/comm/2004/06-istanbul/press-kit/presskit-en.pdf>.

⁸⁴ Pohl, *EU Foreign Policy and Crisis Management Operations*, 40.

⁸⁵ Washington Summit Communique, para. 9.a: "We acknowledge the resolve of the European Union to have the capacity for autonomous action so that it can take decisions and approve military action where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged." NATO, 1999, accessed 22 December 2020, <https://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-064e.htm>

⁸⁶ Tim Waugh, "Berlin Plus Agreement," European Parliament, n.d., accessed December 2020, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/dv/berlinplus_/berlinplus_en.pdf

⁸⁷ Arnold Kammel, and Benjamin Zyla, "Looking for a 'Berlin-Plus in Reverse'? NATO in Search of a New Strategic Concept," *Orbis* 55, no. 4 (2011): 655.

instance, tabled reservations regarding the Berlin Plus arrangements that delayed the deployment of the operation Concordia for five months.⁸⁸

When the EU absorbed the WEU tasks in 1999 with ambitious military goals, Turkey began to think more sensitively about the future role of non-EU NATO members in security cooperation. As a WEU associate country, Turkey could participate in important WEU activities including bi-weekly ambassadors' meetings, deploy personnel in the planning cell, and was represented at the WEU Assembly. Even though Turkey was not fully involved in the decision-making process, when NATO assets were required through Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF), she could fully exercise her right as an Ally to participate in the WEU decision-making.⁸⁹

In addition, since the privileged access of the associate WEU countries had been considerably shrunk, the modalities of how NATO assets and capabilities were envisaged to be used in WEU-led operations within the framework of Petersberg tasks, especially their transfer, monitoring and return, had to be clarified.

The EU's decision at the December 2000 Nice Summit came as a blow to Turkey's, and other non-EU NATO Allies' contributions to the European security architecture because the Union completely excluded them from participating in WEU's decision-making structures.⁹⁰ One of the major reasons why the Nice Summit decisions were not welcomed by Turkey was that the new arrangement for non-EU NATO Allies did not fully compensate the position the country had as an associate member to WEU,

⁸⁸ Eva Gross, "Operation Concordia (FYROM)". In *European Security and Defence Policy: First 10 Years (1999-2009)*, ed. Giovanni Grevi, Damien Helly and Daniel Keohane (Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2010), 175.

⁸⁹ Şeyda Hanbay, "Involvement of non-EU European NATO Members in CSDP: the Turkish Case," *Baltic Journal of Law and Politics* 4, no. 1 (2011): 7.

⁹⁰ Yılmaz, "Turkey and the European Union: A Security Perspective," 59.

which could diminish the role Turkey could play – as she has done for years- within the European security architecture.⁹¹

Ankara's reaction was critical of the EU's expectation from non-EU NATO Allies to automatically comply with political decisions taken without their involvement.⁹² On the other hand, Turkey's crisis-prone neighborhood had ample potential for crisis management operations, so naturally she would have liked to get involved in or least be informed about them before they are officially launched in her proximity.⁹³

Another major problem for Turkey was that unlike the arrangements within the WEU, the CSDP missions and operations were subject to invitation by the Council. This meant that even one single country vetoing Turkey would be enough to ensure its exclusion from any mission or operation to be undertaken in her neighborhood or elsewhere.⁹⁴ On the NATO front, if an Ally were to veto the decision to undertake a crisis management action based on the Berlin Plus arrangements, then it could be taken up by the EU through the CSDP. This would mean another risk for Turkey to be excluded in crisis management, probably her NATO Ally and EU member state Greece.⁹⁵

Turkey's abovementioned concerns triggered a negotiation process on the Berlin Plus package, which was concluded in 2002, two years later than intended. During this period, EU could not undertake any CSDP missions or operations. The

⁹¹ Hanbay, "Involvement of non-EU European NATO Members in CSDP: the Turkish Case," 11.

⁹² Aykan, "Turkey and European Security and Defence Identity/Policy (ESDI/P): A Turkish View," 337-338.

⁹³ Cebeci, "NATO, the EU and Turkey: The CSDP Stalemate," 101.

⁹⁴ Hanbay, "Involvement of non-EU European NATO Members in CSDP: the Turkish Case," 8.

⁹⁵ Cebeci, "NATO, the EU and Turkey: The CSDP Stalemate," 102-103.

breakthrough came at the Copenhagen Summit in 2002,⁹⁶ which ensured that the CSDP would not be used against an Ally, and that Greek Cyprus and Malta would not take part in CSDP missions and operations within the Berlin Plus framework when they become EU member states. Following this progress, the Berlin Plus framework became effective in March 2003.⁹⁷

2.4. Turkey-Greek Cyprus vis-à-vis CSDP and the road to Berlin Plus

Turkey unlocked the EU full membership perspective with the Association Agreement in 1964. However, it was not until 1987 that Turkey made an official application to the EU for full membership. The reason it took time for Turkey to take this step is because the country had gone through two coups in that period.⁹⁸

The EU did not respond by announcing the start of negotiations upon application since it was experiencing what some describe as an “enlargement fatigue” after Spain, Portugal and Greece’s accession and also was occupied with the introduction of the single market.⁹⁹

A new hope blossomed in Turkey-EU relations when the Customs Union was enacted in 1995, but did not stay alive long enough because two years later at the

⁹⁶ Council of the European Union, “Declaration of the Council Meeting in Copenhagen on 12 December 2002,” *Annex II to Presidency Conclusions*, 2002, accessed 6 April 2021, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/20906/73842.pdf>

⁹⁷ Ricketts, “The EU and Defence,” 36.

⁹⁸ Meltem Müftüleri-Baç, and Lauren McLaren, “Enlargement Preferences and Policy-making in the European Union: Impacts on Turkey,” *Journal of European Integration* 25, no. 1 (2003): 21.

⁹⁹ Meltem Müftüleri-Baç, and Lauren McLaren, “Enlargement Preferences and Policy-making in the European Union: Impacts on Turkey,” 21.

Luxembourg Summit, the Union did not list Turkey among the countries to be included in the next enlargement wave, whereas Greek Cyprus was listed.¹⁰⁰

The Council Conclusion made reference to conditions for Turkey to strengthen her relations with the EU: establishing satisfactory and stable relations with Greece and supporting negotiations over the Cyprus issue under the aegis of UN Security Council Resolutions.¹⁰¹ To right the wrong it made at Luxembourg, the EU decided in its 1999 Helsinki Summit to grant Turkey candidate status.¹⁰² The Union's motivation behind this decision should be considered in relation to the possibility of Turkey's detachment from the newly established security concept of the EU in its periphery, the Balkans.

Meanwhile, Greek Cyprus was greenlit to start accession negotiations at the General Affairs Council in 1995.¹⁰³ Turkey reacted by convening the Parliament and calling for a decision to integrate the Northern Cyprus into Turkey's territory if the EU were to accept Greek Cyprus.¹⁰⁴ Greek Cyprus' accession was never tied to conditions whereas the restrictions put on Turkey's accession were unparalleled to any enlargement decision.

¹⁰⁰ "Statement on the EU's Luxembourg Decision," *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey*, 14 December 1997, accessed 17 May 2021, www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye-cumhuriyeti-disisleri-bakanliginin-ab-luksemburg-karari-ile-ilgili-aciklamasi-14-aralik-1997.tr.mfa.

¹⁰¹ "Presidency Conclusions," Luxembourg European Council, 12-13 December 1997, accessed 10 July 2021, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/lux1_en.htm#enlarge

¹⁰² "Presidency Conclusions," Helsinki European Council, 10-11 December 1999, accessed 10 July 2021, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/hell_en.htm

¹⁰³ European Commission, "General Affairs Council Meeting," 30-31 October 1995, accessed 27 October 2020, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/PRES_95_299

¹⁰⁴ Mehmet Uğur, "Testing Times in EU–Turkey Relations: the Road to Copenhagen and Beyond," *Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans* 5. No. 2 (2003): 170.

In a way, Turkey was expected to prove her worth by making progress in settling the Cyprus issue, but the EU did not make it clear whether Turkey was supposed to actually resolve the issue on her own or through supporting the UN efforts.¹⁰⁵ What Helsinki Summit put on Greek Cyprus' shoulder was merely limited to that "the political settlement of the issue will facilitate the accession of Cyprus".¹⁰⁶ This, according to Akgül Açıkmeşe and Triantaphyllou, implied that the EU did not take Turkey's messages on potential integration of Northern Cyprus into consideration.¹⁰⁷

The Helsinki Council also officially introduced the ESDP and highlighted the need for a clearly defined relation with NATO along with its modalities.¹⁰⁸ Turkey, similar to the US, was not hyped about NATO capabilities and assets being used for EU-led operations now that she had lost most of the privileges as an associate member when the WEU was absorbed into the EU through the Treaty of Maastricht. Last but not least, building on the joint declaration of St. Malo, Helsinki Summit also introduced a Headline Goal for military forces to be made available, called European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF), for the newly created ESDP.¹⁰⁹

An agreement on the modalities of NATO-EU cooperation was planned to be incorporated in the Washington Summit Communiqué but the negotiations were stuck due to Turkey's hesitations over the new framework the EU was pushing.

¹⁰⁵ Akgül Açıkmeşe and Triantaphyllou, "The NATO–EU–Turkey Trilog: The Impact of the Cyprus Conundrum," 560.

¹⁰⁶ "Presidency Conclusions," Helsinki European Council, 10-11 December 1999, accessed 10 July 2021, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/hel1_en.htm

¹⁰⁷ Akgül Açıkmeşe and Triantaphyllou, "The NATO–EU–Turkey Trilog: The Impact of the Cyprus Conundrum," 560.

¹⁰⁸ "Presidency Conclusions," Helsinki European Council, 10-11 December 1999, accessed 10 July 2021, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/hel1_en.htm

¹⁰⁹ "Presidency Conclusions," *Helsinki European Council*, 1999

Therefore, the Communiqué did not contain more than an acknowledgement of the EU's efforts and goals and a pledge to ensure the fullest possible involvement of non-European Allies in EU-led crisis management operations.¹¹⁰ Even in 1999, the WEU had to rely on NATO for the capabilities and assets needed to take on any operation because of its limited autonomous capacity.¹¹¹

The following Councils in Feira and Laeken laid down new details for the non-EU European Allies' participation in CSDP and modalities for NATO-EU cooperation. The unfolding scenario was still not ideal to Turkey for two main reasons: one is that Turkey, as any other non-EU country, had to be invited by the Council to participate in EU-led Petersberg tasks mission/operations, and two is that the framework the EU set up did not allow for any actual role in the decision-making and political steering of missions/operations, only in decision-shaping.¹¹²

What Turkey wished to gain from the negotiations over the Berlin Plus deal was a compensation for the considerable loss of entitlement as per WEU acquis. In specific terms, this involved eliminating the aspect of an invitation to participate in EU-led missions/operations, and instead be entitled to do so while also being involved in the planning phase of operations as opposed to a mere subject to operational and political decisions the Union might make¹¹³.

Even deeper motives of challenging Turkish position towards EU-NATO cooperation formulated within the Berlin Plus package as enshrined in Feira and Laeken Summits involved the threat of Greek Cyprus accession to the Union,

¹¹⁰ Antonio Missiroli, "EU-NATO Cooperation in Crisis Management: No Turkish Delight for ESDP," *Security Dialogue* 33, no. 1 (2002): 13; 16.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.* 14.

¹¹² *Ibid.* 16.

¹¹³ Missiroli, "EU-NATO Cooperation in Crisis Management: No Turkish Delight for ESDP," 16.

potential missions/operations to be deployed by Greece against Turkey's national interests, especially in the Cyprus theatre, all without any compelling incentives for Turkey to satisfy her national security needs.¹¹⁴

A breakthrough was achieved thanks to American and British mediation efforts when Ankara warmed up to the terms of the Nice Implementation Document (a slightly altered version of Ankara's document). The document acknowledged the special position of the non-EU NATO Allies by offering an ad hoc 15+6 (EU members + non-EU NATO Allies) meeting format on the political and bilateral levels, but participation in operations still required invitation.¹¹⁵

It also distinguished between 'EU-led operations using NATO assets and capabilities' and 'EU-led operations not requiring recourse to NATO assets and capabilities'.¹¹⁶ On the bright side, the deal allowed for non-EU European Allies to get involved in the planning phase of operations when recourse to NATO capabilities and assets was in question. Besides, the Committee of Contributors was first proposed in this document, a platform where day-to-day operational decisions would be discussed.¹¹⁷

This break was in vain as the North Atlantic Council Meeting in December 2000 did not bring a closure as everybody hoped due to Greek Cyprus' suggestion of

¹¹⁴ Ricketts, "The EU and Defence," 36.

¹¹⁵ Natalie Martin, "Security and Turkey-EU Accession Process: Norms, Reforms and the Cyprus Issue," (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015) 66-70.

¹¹⁶ Council of the European Union, "ESDP: Implementation of the Nice Provisions on the Involvement of the non-EU European Allies," *Annex II Brussels European Council Presidency Conclusions*, 24-25 October 2002, accessed 13 January 2021, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/20917/72968.pdf>

¹¹⁷ Council of the European Union, "Annex II Brussels European Council Presidency Conclusions," 2002.

deploying the premature ERF as a peacekeeping mission on the island and committing forces to it.¹¹⁸

In search of an understanding, the British drafted an informal paper which contained elements to reassure Turkey that no decision would be taken regarding a CSDP mission/operation at the EU-level against her without her involvement or in the country's geographical proximity.¹¹⁹

The UK Prime Minister Tony Blair sent the informal paper as a letter to the then Turkish Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit, who agreed to the understanding as framed in the text. It was then attached to the Laeken Summit Conclusion but the Greeks did not accept and asked for time for further discussion and reflection. This was because the letter was leaked to the public via a newspaper before the Council meeting.¹²⁰

The ensuing negotiation efforts by the British and Americans yielded a compromise where the Declaration of the Council Meeting of Copenhagen in 2002 concluded that 'the Berlin Plus arrangements and the implementation thereof will apply only to those EU member states which are also either NATO members or parties to the "Partnership for Peace", and which have consequently concluded bilateral security arrangements with NATO'.¹²¹

This clause clearly meant the exclusion of Greek Cyprus and Malta. Greek Cyprus was neither a NATO Ally, nor a party to the Partnership for Peace. Additionally, Greek Cyprus did not and could not sign a bilateral security agreement with NATO

¹¹⁸ Antonio Missiroli, "EU-NATO Cooperation in Crisis Management: No Turkish Delight for ESDP," *Security Dialogue* 33, no. 1 (2002): 17.

¹¹⁹ Ricketts, "The EU and Defence," 35.

¹²⁰ Missiroli, "EU-NATO Cooperation in Crisis Management: No Turkish Delight for ESDP," 21.

¹²¹ Council of the European Union, "Declaration of the Council Meeting in Copenhagen on 12 December 2002," *Annex II to Presidency Conclusions*, 12-13 December 2002, accessed 6 April 2021, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/20906/73842.pdf>

because of a possible veto from Turkey.¹²² This exclusion checked one of the boxes for Turkey to get on board with the Berlin Plus arrangements. However, the same Council meeting also concluded that Greek Cyprus, along with 10 other candidates, would become EU members in the next enlargement wave, and it acknowledged Turkey's alignment with the Copenhagen criteria, officially approving the start of accession negotiations with Turkey.¹²³

An interview with an EU official revealed that since Greek Cyprus would not agree with being left out of decision-making as an EU member in some aspects, the Union had to push through the deal before accession. There was also the urge from some major powers within the EU, most notably France that pushed for the CSDP to take control of the NATO's SFOR in Bosnia and showcase EU's strategic autonomy. Needless to say, there was a considerable amount of pressure to get the Berlin Plus deal signed.¹²⁴

While the Berlin Plus was negotiated within the EU and the North Atlantic Council at the same time, the resultant texts agreed internally were not identical. According to a Turkish diplomat, the Turkish side requested the inclusion of "and strategic cooperation" as opposed to merely military cooperation between EU and NATO.¹²⁵ This proposal did not find resonance from the EU at the behest of the Greek side. The ensuing incongruity has led to different interpretations pertaining to the coverage of Berlin Plus till this day.¹²⁶ Again, the French were very receptive to the biddings

¹²² Stephanie C. Hofmann, "Overlapping Institutions in the Realm of International Security: The Case of NATO and ESDP," *Perspectives on Politics* 7, no. 1 (2009): 45-52.

¹²³ Cebeci, "NATO, the EU and Turkey: The CSDP Stalemate," 104.

¹²⁴ Pohl, *EU Foreign Policy and Crisis Management Operations*, 52-54.

¹²⁵ Interview 1, *Interview with a high-ranking Turkish diplomat*, 13 May 2020, Ankara.

¹²⁶ Martin Reichard, *The EU-NATO Relationship: A Legal and Political Perspective* (Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing, 2006), 91.

of the Greek and Greek Cypriots in championing an interpretation of the deal limited to the military dimension of cooperation between two organizations, meaning that it would only apply to the cases where CSDP uses NATO assets and capabilities to run operations/missions.

NATO sided with Turkey¹²⁷ in arguing that strategic cooperation involves political decisions, therefore excluding Greek Cyprus from participating in operations/missions falling under the Berlin Plus framework.¹²⁸ This contested understanding of the scope of the Berlin Plus framework has rendered the EU-NATO cooperation unable to move further than Operation Althea. Yielding to the Greek and Greek Cypriot insistence, the EU does not allow for current joint meeting mechanism between the two organizations to go beyond discussing Operation Althea-related issues.¹²⁹

Pohl argues that although this constipation is often attributed to Turkish-Cypriot dispute, the larger stakes point towards the divergent motives the US and France had for the future of the European security architecture, and they often operated around such disputes to further their agenda. He elaborates this argument by pointing out that the tug-of-war to drive their visions was palpable at the time of the American invasion of Iraq. Despite this incongruity in the background, the Berlin Plus negotiations yielded result, thanks to the “Atlanticist” EU member states.¹³⁰

¹²⁷ Meltem Müftüler-Baç, "Turkey's Role in the EU's Security and Foreign Policies," *Security Dialogue* 31, no. 4 (2000): 494-495.

¹²⁸ Kızıltan, "Improving the NATO-EU Partnership: the Turkish Perspective," 40.

¹²⁹ Stephanie C. Hofmann and Christopher Reynolds, "EU-NATO Relations: Time to Thaw the 'Frozen Conflict'," *SWP Comments* 12 (2007): 3-4.

¹³⁰ Pohl, *EU Foreign Policy and Crisis Management Operations*, 53-54.

The framework was officially signed on 17 March 2003, very close to the US invasion of Iraq, and it was invoked for the first time in Macedonia, with the EU taking over from NATO's Operation Allied Harmony.¹³¹

In Turkey's 2005 Progress Report's CSDP section, it is stated that Turkey's participation in CSDP is riddled with difficulties due to divergent interpretations by the EU and Turkey of the Berlin Plus arrangements. The paragraph continues as follows:

*Turkey's participation in the ESDP continues to present certain difficulties. Indeed, Turkey and the EU have a different interpretation of the "Berlin Plus" agreements between EU and NATO. As a result, Turkey's insistence that Cyprus and Malta be excluded from the EU-NATO strategic co-operation in crisis management has so far hampered such co-operation.*¹³²

The last blow that ended up massively entangling Turkey-CSDP, and Turkey-EU relations at large, was the accession of Greek Cyprus, a non-recognized entity to Turkey, to the EU in 2004, with the biggest enlargement wave in the Union's history.¹³³ Even though Turkey negotiated resolutely to ensure the exclusion of Greek Cyprus from the Berlin Plus framework, the accession of the latter would prove to be a predominant challenge for not just Turkey-EU relations and Turkey's accession process, but also for closer NATO-EU cooperation.¹³⁴ At this point, it is worth mentioning that the Turkey-EU, and to a large extent for the purpose of this study, NATO-EU relations have been substantially tied to Turkey-Greece-Greek Cyprus relations, which will more comprehensively feature in the upcoming sections.

¹³¹ Pohl, *EU Foreign Policy and Crisis Management Operations*, 54.

¹³² "Turkey 2005 Progress Report", Commission of the European Communities (2005), 128.

¹³³ Akgül Açıkmeşe and Triantaphyllou, "The NATO–EU–Turkey Trilogy: The Impact of the Cyprus Conundrum," 564.

¹³⁴ Ricketts, "The EU and Defence," 36.

When the Brussels Summit in December 2004 confirmed that accession negotiations would start with Turkey in 2005, Turkey-EU relations took a more positive turn. However, since Greek Cyprus was now a full EU member, it had the capacity to block the process. And it did so by placing a unilateral veto over 8 chapters, including chapter 31: Foreign, Security and Defense Policy.¹³⁵

The EU started the institutionalization of third countries to CSDP missions and operations in 2004 with the introduction of Framework Partnership Agreements.¹³⁶ The FPA lays out the main operational and political modalities of a mission/operation. To date, 8 countries have signed an FPA with the EU, including all the candidates, whom have also taken part in CSDP missions/operations.¹³⁷ These FPAs, however, have not been able to create as robust a network as NATO through the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC).¹³⁸ Turkey signed an FPA with the Union in 2006, which came into force in 2007.¹³⁹

As briefly laid out above, Turkey has substantially contributed to the European security, and continues to do so as an EU candidate and a NATO Ally, which debatably remains the main pillar of the European security structure. This study will attempt to elaborate on Turkey's relationship with the EU's CSDP through a closer look at missions and operations undertaken by the Union. The following sections will focus on Turkey's journey in detail and try to make sense of Turkey-EU relationship

¹³⁵ "Current Situation," Directorate for EU Affairs, updated in 2021, accessed 14 July 2021, https://www.ab.gov.tr/current-situation_65_en.html.

¹³⁶ Missiroli, "EUISS Yearbook of European Security," 280-283.

¹³⁷ Tardy, "CSDP: Getting Third States on Board," 3.

¹³⁸ Tardy, "CSDP: Getting Third States on Board," 2.

¹³⁹ Council of the European Union, "Council Decision 2006/482/CFSP concerning the conclusion of the Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Turkey establishing a framework for the participation of the Republic of Turkey in the European Union crisis management operations," Brussels: 10 April 2006, accessed 29 November 2020, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32006D0482>

from a security-oriented perspective by zooming in on the decisions and reactions of Turkey with regards to CSDP missions and operations.

CHAPTER 3

A BRIEF ANALYSIS OF TURKEY'S PARTICIPATION IN CSDP OPERATIONS

3.1. A Periodical Categorization of CSDP Missions/Operations in Review

Before dissecting each CSDP mission/operation with regards to Turkey's involvement, it would serve the purpose of this study well to attempt an analysis on Turkey's CSDP journey. In this vein, setting some milestones along the road could support such analysis.

Leaving the associate membership to the WEU and the perks that came with it, the first dynamic that may function as a milestone for Turkey vis-à-vis CSDP could be the operationalization of the latter with the initiation of EUPM Bosnia. Since the crises that spawned the CSDP were concentrated in the Balkans, it is important to note the fact that Turkey, within and without the Berlin Plus arrangements, took part in all CSDP engagements in the region.

In total, there have been five CSDP missions/operations in the Balkans. The EU invited Turkey to participate in all five of them. Two of them were Berlin Plus operations: Concordia and EUFOR Althea.

This study will then categorize the second milestone of Turkey's CSDP journey as the beginning of her accession negotiations in 2005 whereby the dynamic of Europeanization in the sense of fulfilment of the EU's expectations from Turkey reaches its peak. Alternatively, the accession of Greek Cyprus to the Union could serve as the second milestone in terms of analyzing this journey. However, for the

sake of the conceptual approach adopted in this study to examine this period, the initiation of accession negotiations with Turkey is more appropriate.¹⁴⁰

Following the formal opening of negotiations on 3 October 2005, Turkey partook in a series of CSDP missions and operations, such as EULEX Kosovo, EUPOL COPPS, EUAM Ukraine and EUFOR RD Congo.

The period covering the second milestone could be argued to coincide with Turkey's selective Europeanization phase whereby she seems to prefer aligning with the EU's expectations on a case-by-case basis rather than on absolute conditionality. This selective nature manifests itself in the choices made by Turkey to participate or not participate in the CSDP initiatives undertaken during this period.

For this study, the third milestone is designated as the attempted coup in Turkey on 15 July 2016 and its aftermath vis-a-vis the relations with the EU. Turkey declared state of emergency¹⁴¹ and withdrew its staff from EUAM Ukraine and EULEX Kosovo.¹⁴² The state of emergency was lifted on 18 July 2018. Consequently, Turkey re-applied for posting staff at these missions but her applications have not been received favorably by the EU so far. Presently, the only CSDP initiative that Turkey participates in is EUFOR Althea, the exception to the withdrawal decision of staff following the state of emergency.

Ever since the CSDP-Turkey relations hit the third milestone, there has not been a new operation/mission to which Turkey contributed. On the other hand, the EU only launched four crisis management initiatives after this period, EUAM Iraq, EUAM RCA, Operation Iriini and EUTM Mozambique.

¹⁴⁰ On a related side-note, even though the Europeanization dynamic peaked with the start of accession negotiations, Turkey still maintains EU membership as a strategic goal, consistently enshrined as a tenet in her enterprising and humanitarian foreign policy as well as in the discourse of high-level political figures.

¹⁴¹ "Cabinet Decree on Declaration of State of Emergency," *Official Gazette*, Ankara: 2016, accessed 16 May 2020, <https://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2016/07/20160721-4.pdf>.

¹⁴² European Commission, *Turkey 2018 Report*, Strasbourg: 2018, 98.

Between the second and third milestones, Turkey was invited to a number of CSDP missions/operations to which she either agreed to contribute / issued approval to send support, or decided not to join. These missions will also be covered in the fourth chapter, along with the two CSDP initiatives undertaken after the third milestone, i.e. failed coup attempt in Turkey.

There have also been CSDP missions and operations to which Turkey was not explicitly invited but may have been interested in joining, such as those in her neighborhood, namely in Iraq, Georgia and Libya. Last but not least, within the range of CSDP missions/operations, there are also those that Turkey was not invited and did not express, as far as the public available sources tell, an interest to join. All such missions/operations will be analyzed in more detail in their respective chapters.

Throughout this journey along the abovementioned milestones, Turkey's synergy with EU's CSDP has taken different turns, and it would be difficult to analyze all missions/operations vis-à-vis Turkey's participation deploying a singular theoretical approach. Therefore, this study will attempt to make use of three conceptual approaches to examine the underlying dynamics of Turkey's participation and non-participation in CSDP missions/operations. For the purpose of seeking an overarching assessment, firstly, Europeanization and de-Europeanization tendencies as manifested in Turkey and EU's external policy alignment and misalignment synergies could provide an explanation.

Second, in probing the CSDP missions/operations where EU-NATO cooperation/competition dynamics loom, a compelling case could be made towards Turkey's soft-balancing attempts and opportunities against the EU or its individual members.

Last but not least, to offer a rationale for Turkey's participation in the missions/operations, a look at Turkey's role in peacekeeping operations and her motives in such efforts could prove useful. Accordingly, the study will dive into such CSDP missions/operations from the perspective of Turkey as a peacekeeper as the third concept for understanding Turkey's interest in CSDP.

3.2. A Conceptual Explanation of Turkey's Journey with CSDP

As mentioned in the above section, the literature on Europeanization could shed some light on the synergy between Turkey and the EU's CSDP while looking at operations and missions through Turkey's involvement and non-involvement.

According a prominent academic in Europeanization, Robert Ladrech, the concept refers to a process of adjusting policies to converge with those made by the European Union. In other words, it indicates the effects of European Union policies on national policies, i.e. a top-down process. The other aspect of the term involves the extent to which states influence EU-level decision-making, i.e. a bottom-up process.¹⁴³ However, since the latter process only applies to full member states, for a candidate country and for the sake of this study, the first process will be adopted in the analysis.

Another leading academic in the literature on Europeanization, Radaelli, broadly defines the term as the

*processes of (a) construction, (b) diffusion, and (c) institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, "ways of doing things," and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU public policy and politics and then incorporated in the logic of domestic discourses, identities, political structures, and public policies.*¹⁴⁴

For full member states, the process is guided through EU-level positions and decisions, which works through EU institutions and organizational structure. Especially with the emergence of the CFSP, the drive for convergence on a common foreign and security approach has been enhanced, whereas it used to be a *domaine réservé* for member states. As for candidate countries, even though CSFP was introduced as a chapter in the accession negotiations, this convergence process

¹⁴³ Robert Ladrech, "Europeanization and Political Parties," *Party Politics* 8, no. 4 (2002): 389-403.

¹⁴⁴ Claudio M. Radaelli, "Theorizing Europeanization," In *The Politics Of Europeanization*, ed. Kevin Featherstone and Claudio M. Radaelli (Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 30.

through EU-level decision-making and institutions does not operate for them in the same way as it does for member states. Given the nature of rules and institutions governing the EU-level decision-making, the bottom-up process of Europeanization is inapplicable to candidate countries.

As it has been established above that the top-down Europeanization is the only relevant process for candidates -provoking an asymmetrical power relation between the EU and candidates- the Union enjoys imposing conditionality over them for full membership. In other words, candidates are expected to align their foreign and security policies with CSFP norms and values, especially with the enactment of Lisbon Treaty¹⁴⁵ Therefore, as a candidate, Turkey is also conditioned to make necessary adaptations in her foreign and security policy to satisfy the norms, values and principles promoted by the EU in CFSP.

At the 1999 Helsinki Summit, the EU officially gave a green light to Turkey's candidacy status. From this step onwards, the EU conditionality exerted growing influence over Turkey's political realm as the country launched into an extensive reform campaign to fulfill the Copenhagen criteria¹⁴⁶ to formally start accession negotiations.

Among these norms upheld by the EU in CSFP is the use of civilian instruments in solving crises. Under the CSDP, the Union has launched a series of crisis management missions/operations in the Balkans, Middle East, Eastern Europe, Sahel, Central Africa, Mediterranean and Horn of Africa. As a member of the European security architecture through her membership to NATO and candidacy of EU, Turkey has taken part in numerous civilian and military crisis management

¹⁴⁵ Meltem Müftüleri-Baç and Yaprak Gürsoy, "Is there a Europeanization of Turkish Foreign Policy? An Addendum to the Literature on EU Candidates," *Turkish Studies* 11, no. 3 (2010): 405-411.

¹⁴⁶ Copenhagen, or accession criteria refer to the conditions and principles to which any country aspiring to become a full member of the EU must conform. These criteria were established by the Copenhagen European Council in 1993 and reinforced by the Madrid European Council in 1995; "Accession Criteria," *European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations*, 2021, accessed 21 May 2021, https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/enlargement-policy/glossary/accession-criteria_en.

missions/operations led by both organizations. This pattern of enhanced participation to crisis management initiatives ties in with the increasing role of European Union candidacy dynamics on Turkey's foreign policy.

The process of Europeanization is also evident in the increasing trend of Turkish participation to crisis management operations.¹⁴⁷ The country's pledge to contribute to the Headline Goal for 2010 with 6,000 troops, aircraft and ships further testify to her position as a team player with regards to the European security architecture. Indeed, even before the Helsinki Summit, then Defense Minister of Turkey Sabahattin Çakmakoglu declared "Turkey's readiness to contribute to ESDP with 5,000 troops, 36 F-16s, 2 transportation aircraft and warships and even more upon mutual agreement."¹⁴⁸

The Europeanization of Turkish foreign policy is also identifiable in the political elite's discourse after the Justice and Development Party came to power in 2002. The new government implemented an EU membership-oriented agenda in both domestic and foreign fronts. Former Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu described this agenda's goal as "*zero problem policy with neighboring regions*"¹⁴⁹, which triggered a rising trend of Turkey's involvement as a mediator and peacemaker in the Balkans, Caucasus and Middle East. Besides, the country pursued a growingly more active role within multilateral fora, which again falls in line with European foreign policy preferences.¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁷ Tarık Oğuzlu and Uğur Güngör, "Peace Operations and the Transformation of Turkey's Security Policy," *Contemporary Security Policy* 27, no. 3 (2006): 472.

¹⁴⁸ Bali Aykan, "Turkey and European Security and Defence Identity/Policy (ESDI/P): A Turkish View," 337.

¹⁴⁹ Ahmet Davutoğlu, "Turkey's Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007," *Insight Turkey* 10, no. 1 (2008): 80-83.

¹⁵⁰ Müftüleri-Baç and Gürsoy, "Is there a Europeanization of Turkish Foreign Policy? An Addendum to the Literature on EU Candidates," 408; 419.

In the security theatre, Turkey's support to the conception and evolution of CSDP and the numerous initiatives under it ties in with the Europeanization argument. Though a counter-argument could be lodged by those pointing out that the CSDP missions/operations Turkey contributed to in the first milestone of Europeanization period were indeed concentrated in the Balkans due to the country's strategic regional interests, the fact that she also supported EUPOL Kinshasa in Congo is a testament to the abovementioned trend in Turkish foreign and security policy.

The concept of Europeanization as adopted by this study could also throw some light on Turkey's participation in CSDP missions/operations in Africa. Thierry Tardy, for instance, points out that one of the main drivers of participation in CSDP initiatives for candidate countries is to "familiarize themselves with the various components of the EU and its procedures".¹⁵¹ This claim may be applied to Turkey since she contributed to CSDP missions in the DRC and approved to send support to missions in Mali, Central African Republic and Guinea-Bissau, even though the latter did not eventually happen.

On the other hand, it is important to note the limits of Europeanization and the bumps on the road of Turkey-CSDP synergy. As Müftüler-Baç points out, Europeanization is likely to occur when it benefits the perceived interests of the candidate state.¹⁵² In this case, the biggest obstacle hindering further Europeanization of Turkish foreign and security policy could arguably be the accession of Greek Cyprus to the EU and the double-vetoing dynamic it triggered and a ripple effect it created over the EU-NATO cooperation. This is most visible in the case of the launching process of EULEX Kosovo mission¹⁵³ as well as Turkey's relations with

¹⁵¹ Tardy, "CSDP: Getting Third States on Board," 3.

¹⁵² Müftüler-Baç and Gürsoy, "Is there a Europeanization of Turkish Foreign Policy? An Addendum to the Literature on EU Candidates," 422.

¹⁵³ In the preparation phase of EULEX Kosovo, EU initially intended to use NATO assets and capabilities and made arrangements that would allow Greek Cyprus to get involved in the mission. Therefore, Turkey objected to the use of NATO assets for EULEX Kosovo.

the European Defense Agency (EDA).¹⁵⁴ Most recently, the fallout between the EU and Turkey over the Eastern Mediterranean dispute leading to Operation Irini could be a notable case in point of this divergence induced by the accession of Greek Cyprus.

Aside from the Greek Cyprus hitch, the lack of consultations by the EU despite repeated calls from Turkey in the events of CSDP missions/operations launched in Turkey's neighborhood, as agreed within the Berlin Plus deal, has generated another cause for contention. The initiatives in Iraq and Georgia are particularly noteworthy to illustrate this affair.

Oğuzlu and Kibaroglu attribute this divergence to the incompatibilities of European and Turkish security cultures, an eroding dynamic whereby the EU began to consider Turkey as a security burden rather than an asset. Following their argument, the culmination of this reverse process led to the freezing of accession negotiations in 2006, lowering expectations for Turkey's Europeanization success.¹⁵⁵

The aforementioned *reverse* Europeanization trend is conceptualized as "de-Europeanization" by Aydın-Düzgit and Kaliber, who define it as "the loss or weakening of the EU/Europe as a normative/political context and as a reference point for Turkish society and politics".¹⁵⁶ They suggest that such a condition occurs when actions are taken without the need to align with those of the EU, broadly referring to a distancing of politics from the European system of norms, values and policy

¹⁵⁴ Greek Cyprus currently vetoes Turkey's associate membership application to the European Defence Agency.

¹⁵⁵ Tarık Oğuzlu and Mustafa Kibaroglu, "Incompatibilities in Turkish and European Security Cultures Diminish Turkey's Prospects for EU Membership," *Middle Eastern Studies* 44, no. 6 (2008): 947; 959.

¹⁵⁶ Senem, Aydın-Düzgit and Alper Kaliber, "Encounters with Europe in an Era of Domestic and International Turmoil: Is Turkey a De-Europeanising Candidate Country?," *South European Society and Politics* 21, no. 1 (2016): 6.

expectations.¹⁵⁷ Yılmaz studies the Europeanization process of Turkey from the Helsinki Summit in 1999 to 2014 and concludes that the period 1999-2004 witnessed progressing Europeanization, followed by 2005-2010 with selective Europeanization -whereby Turkey handpicked policy adaptations demanded by the EU- and then evolved into de-Europeanization when EU conditionality on and policy alignment by Turkey weakened.¹⁵⁸

The loosening of EU conditionality over Turkey, as Tocci explains, was triggered by the concerns of some EU member states such as Germany, France and Austria about the country's size and demographic growth, calling for a privileged partnership instead of full membership.¹⁵⁹ Eldem also attributes the incrementally degrading pace of Europeanization in Turkey to the lack of credibility and sincerity of the EU's commitment to Turkey's accession process, with growing anti-Turkish sentiment in European political parties and the questioning of a European future for Turkey.¹⁶⁰

Whereas the literature is teeming with studies looking at de-Europeanization dynamics at the domestic policy level, such as in the rule of law¹⁶¹ and freedom of media and expression¹⁶², this study will incorporate the conception of Europeanization as alignment with and de-Europeanization as the distancing of

¹⁵⁷ Aydın-Düzgüt and Kaliber, "Encounters with Europe in an Era of Domestic and International Turmoil: Is Turkey a De-Europeanising Candidate Country?," 6.

¹⁵⁸ Gözde Yılmaz, "From Europeanization to De-Europeanization: The Europeanization Process of Turkey in 1999–2014," *Journal of Contemporary European Studies* 24, no. 1 (2015): 86-87.

¹⁵⁹ Nathalie Tocci, "Europeanization in Turkey: Trigger or Anchor for Reforms?," *South European Society and Politics* 10, no. 1 (2005): 77.

¹⁶⁰ Tuba Eldem, "The End of Turkey's Europeanization?," *Turkish Policy Quarterly* 12 no. 1 (2013): 127.

¹⁶¹ Beken Saatçioğlu, "De-Europeanisation in Turkey: The Case of the Rule of Law," *South European Society and Politics* 21, no. 1 (2016): 133.

¹⁶² Gözde Yılmaz, "Europeanisation or De-Europeanisation? Media Freedom in Turkey (1999–2015)," *South European Society and Politics* 21 no. 1 (2016): 147.

politics in the foreign and security realm from the European system of norms, values and policy expectations by focusing on Turkey's participation or non-participation in CSDP missions/operations.

A significant marker that should be mentioned within the context of distancing with the EU's expectations is the coup attempt in Turkey on 15 July 2016 and the following state of emergency. The measures adopted by Turkey were repeatedly criticized by the European Union to the brink of ostracizing the candidate country. On top of these, the growing tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean with the Cyprus issue at the core - coupled with other antagonizing factors stemming from Libya and the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum¹⁶³- severely tested Turkey-CSDP synergy when EUNAVFOR MED Irini, also known as Operation Irini, was deployed. Indeed, on 22 November 2020, when a German ship operating in Irini stopped a Turkish-flagged vessel carrying humanitarian goods to Misrata for inspection without Turkey's consent, a NATO ally and an EU candidate, the country reacted strongly with a press statement highlighting the "biased" nature of Operation Irini.¹⁶⁴

A second, but supportive, approach to the argument on Europeanization of Turkey's external actions could be her increasing role in international and regional peacekeeping efforts.¹⁶⁵ The dataset project TUBAKOV created by Yalçınkaya, Hatipoğlu, Açar and Çelikpala reveal the extent to which Turkey has been involved in peacekeeping operations from the Balkans to Africa and Pacific. In fact, Turkey has also operation-leading experience with ISAF in Afghanistan. The dataset draws

¹⁶³ "Statement of the Spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Hami Aksoy, in Response to a Question Regarding the Meeting to Transform the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum into an International Organization," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, 2020, accessed 5 July 2021, https://www.mfa.gov.tr/sc_-3_-dogu-akdeniz-gaz-forumu-hk-sc.en.mfa.

¹⁶⁴ "Statement of the Spokesperson of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Hami Aksoy, in Response to a Question Regarding the inspection under Operation Irini of a Turkish-Flagged Commercial Vessel without Turkey's Consent," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, 2020, accessed 5 July 2021, https://www.mfa.gov.tr/sc_-115_-turk-bayrakli-bir-ticari-geminin-irini-harekati-kapsaminda-ulkemizin-rizasi-olmadan-denetime-tabi-tutulmasi-hk-sc.en.mfa.

¹⁶⁵ Gökhan Koçer, "Turkey's Contribution to Peacekeeping Operations," *Uluslararası İlişkiler (International Relations)* 3, no. 11 (2006): 48-49.

attention to the increasing trend of Turkey's participation in peacekeeping operations after 2001.¹⁶⁶

On the other hand, it should not be ignored that the roots of Turkish foreign policy since the foundation of the republic are deeply embedded in the principle of "peace at home, peace in the world" as laid down by the founder Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. From this perspective, it could be argued that Turkey has pursued peace in her foreign policy initiatives ever since, as it stands to be the core of her enterprising and humanitarian foreign policy.¹⁶⁷

Even though the Cold War dynamics of a bipolar world prevented the international community from launching as many crisis management actions as needed to put down the numerous fires that erupted during the period, Turkey contributed significantly to the UN military operation in Korea in 1950.¹⁶⁸ Nevertheless, due to the constraints on her options to maintain national security during the Cold War rivalry between two superpowers, leading the country to adopt Western military and political alliances, Turkey could not actively engage in UN peacekeeping efforts at that time.¹⁶⁹

In the aftermath of the Cold War, the nature and intensity of peacekeeping efforts launched by the international community has transformed. This page in international peacekeeping is also referred to as "Second-generation operations," "the New

¹⁶⁶ Haldun Yalçınkaya, Emre Hatipoğlu, Dilaver Arıkan Açar and Mitat Çelikpala, "Turkish Efforts in Peacekeeping and the Introduction of the TUBAKOV Dataset: An Exploratory Analysis," *International Peacekeeping* 25, no. 4 (2018): 487; 490.

¹⁶⁷ Burak Akçapar, "Turkey: An Enterprising and Humanitarian Foreign Policy," In *The Road Ahead: The 21st Century World Order in the Eyes of Policy Planners*, ed. Benoni Belli and Filipe Nasser (Brasil: Alexandre de Gusmão Foundation (FUNAG), Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Brazil, 2018): 50.

¹⁶⁸ Füsün Türkmen, "Turkey and the Korean War," *Turkish Studies* 3, no. 2 (2002): 161-180.

¹⁶⁹ Kemal Kirişçi, "The end of the Cold War and Changes in Turkish Foreign Policy Behaviour," *Foreign Policy* 18 no. 3-4 (1994): 5.

Peacekeeping,” “Wider Peacekeeping,” or “Expanded Peacekeeping”.¹⁷⁰ As the bipolar system of international system faded into unipolar one, the United Nations gained a more prominent role in addressing global security challenges. At the same time, new security threats emerged and the nature as well as the scale of conflicts also witnessed significant change. The United Nations Security Council became more capable of agreeing on taking decisions and actions when such challenges and conflicts arose.¹⁷¹

The turn in peacekeeping allowed more operations to be initiated as is evident in the increasing trend after Cold War years. With this turn, Turkey emerged as a significant member of the international peacekeeping community. The rising trend of Turkish involvement in peacekeeping efforts could be attributed to a number of domestic and international factors as well. The most significant domestic factor could arguably be the shift in foreign policy engagement when the ruling Justice and Development Party came to power in 2002. Whereas the evolution in the conduct of international peacekeeping in the aftermath of 9/11 attacks could be considered as an important international factor. As TUBAKOV dataset indicates, between 2001–2015 Turkey’s contributions to peacekeeping operations were markedly increased (35 out of 57 initiatives).¹⁷²

Oğuzlu and Güngör relates this trend of increasing Turkish involvement in international peacekeeping efforts with the ideational need to be counted among the members of the Western international community, in other words, an instrument of Westernization of Turkish security policy. Hence, peacekeeping operations assume for Turkey a constitutive power to bolster her European identity by transferring

¹⁷⁰ Steven R. Ratner, *The New UN Peacekeeping: Building Peace in Lands of Conflict after the Cold War* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995): 17.

¹⁷¹ Gareth Evans, *Cooperating for Peace: The Global Agenda for the 1990s and Beyond*, (Australia: Australian Print Group, 1993): 100.

¹⁷² Yalçınkaya, Hatipoğlu, Arıkan Açar and Çelikpala, "Turkish Efforts in Peacekeeping and the Introduction of the TUBAKOV Dataset: An Exploratory Analysis," 490.

European norms and values to Turkey.¹⁷³ From this perspective, the CSDP missions and operations Turkey has contributed to in those crisis theatres that may not be considered as strategically relevant (such as EUPOL Kinshasa and EUFOR RD Congo) could be appreciated in a different light.

From the standpoint of Turkey's role as a peacekeeper, the outstanding components that could be useful in explaining her involvement may be related to the changing nature of peacekeeping, the increasing trend of missions/operations, and the shift in Turkey's foreign policy as well as the ideational choices she makes to align with the Western norms and values.

Alternatively, the argument lodged by Dursun-Özkanca, who views Turkey-CSDP dynamic from a soft-balancing perspective also contains interesting insights for the purpose of this study. As per this argument, Turkey is in a pursuit to soft-balance the EU through CSDP in the Balkans. Drawing on Dursun-Özkanca's framing of "soft-balancing between friends", the stand-off between Turkey and Greco-Cyprus lobby within NATO and EU, respectively, over NATO-EU cooperation may be considered as inter-institutional balancing.¹⁷⁴

Subscribing to the realist theory of international relations, soft-balancing is a sub-concept of the balance of power theory. Robert Pape conceptualizes soft balancing as "*...actions that do not directly challenge ... but that use nonmilitary tools to delay, frustrate and undermine aggressive unilateral policies...*" by "*using international institutions, economic statecraft and diplomatic arrangements...*"¹⁷⁵

¹⁷³ Tarık Oğuzlu and Uğur Güngör, "Peace Operations and the Transformation of Turkey's Security Policy," *Contemporary Security Policy* 27, no. 3 (2006): 483-484.

¹⁷⁴ Oya Dursun-Özkanca, "Turkish Soft Balancing against the EU? An Analysis of the Prospects for Improved Transatlantic Security Relations," *Foreign Policy Analysis* 13, no. 4 (2017): 894-896.

¹⁷⁵ Robert A. Pape, "Soft Balancing against the United States," *International Security* 30, no. 1 (2005): 7-10.

Kelly contributes to the literature on soft-balancing with introducing strategic non-cooperation as a method whereby states “*deliberately reject possible cooperation ... to improve their influence*” in situations they try to avoid being perpetually sidelined in decision-making.¹⁷⁶ Alternatively, Oswald argues that soft balancing occurs between friends as in the case of the United States and the European Union, the latter conspicuously engaging in this behavior through economic integration efforts leading up to gaining an autonomous security role with CSDP.¹⁷⁷

On the other hand, He applies the concept to states’ behaviors in multilateral institutions, referring it as institutional balancing, and differentiates between inclusive and exclusive aspects of the term. Accordingly, inclusive balancing occurs when states engage in a norm building practice to influence other states’ behavior or agendas within multilateral institutions, whereas exclusive balancing refers to strengthening unity against external pressures.¹⁷⁸ In his more recent work in 2015, He also fleshes out inter-institutional balancing, which holds that states may use multilateral institutions to challenge the relevance of other institutions.¹⁷⁹

This notion could be utilized in the case of Turkey using NATO to soft-balance the EU, especially in scenarios involving Greek Cyprus and Greece.¹⁸⁰ Likewise, it could also be argued that the latter resort to exclusive balancing against Turkey by using

¹⁷⁶ Judith Kelley, "Strategic non-Cooperation as Soft Balancing: Why Iraq was not Just about Iraq," *International Politics* 42, no. 2 (2005): 154.

¹⁷⁷ Franz Oswald, "Soft Balancing between Friends: Transforming Transatlantic Relations," *Debatte: Journal of Contemporary Central and Eastern Europe* 14, no. 2 (2006): 158-159.

¹⁷⁸ Kai He, "Institutional Balancing and International Relations Theory: Economic Interdependence and Balance of Power Strategies in Southeast Asia," *European Journal of International Relations* 14, no. 3 (2008): 493.

¹⁷⁹ Kai He, "Contested regional orders and institutional balancing in the Asia Pacific," *International Politics* 52, no. 2 (2015): 217.

¹⁸⁰ Dursun-Özkanca, "Turkish Soft Balancing against the EU? An Analysis of the Prospects for Improved Transatlantic Security Relations," 108.

the EU. In short, institutional soft-balancing may be useful to include in the analysis toolbox.

Applying the abovementioned concepts to the analysis of Turkey's involvement vis-à-vis CSDP, the next two chapters will dissect each EU initiative by drawing on the arguments offered by the Europeanization and de-Europeanization trend in Turkish foreign policy, Turkey's role as peacekeeper and/or her engagement in institutional soft-balancing against the EU.

CHAPTER 4

FIRST MILESTONE: FROM CANDIDATE STATUS TO THE START OF ACCESSION NEGOTIATIONS

In the first milestone, covering the period from candidate status granted to Turkey at the Copenhagen Council in 1999 to the start of accession negotiations in 2005, there have been a number of elements that characterized the Turkey-CSDP synergy regarding involvement/non-involvement in crisis management operations.

One such element was the operationalization of EU'S CSDP with the first series of crisis management initiatives, mostly concentrated on the responses to crises taking places in Europe's doorstep, i.e. the Balkans. In this first milestone, EU initiated crisis management missions/operations towards the fallout from the breaking up of Former Yugoslavia, which induced instability in Bosnia and Herzegovina and North Macedonia (formerly FYROM).¹⁸¹

Besides the Balkans, CSDP was also deployed in the DRC twice, one in the form of a military intervention and the other in policing. Here, the CSDP's ambitious reach beyond the crises in the immediate neighborhood showed the willingness of the EU to take security-related matters into its own hands instead of relying on NATO.¹⁸² Indeed, NATO's area of operation did not extend to the West African region, and the

¹⁸¹ Michael E. Smith, "The First CSDP Actions: Taking over from the UN and NATO in the Balkans," In *Europe's Common Security and Defence Policy: Capacity-Building, Experiential Learning, and Institutional Change* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017): 81.

¹⁸² Barry R. Posen, "European Union Security and Defense Policy: Response to Unipolarity?," *Security Studies* 15, no. 2 (2006): 152.

Union utilized its means and capabilities to assert its role as a security actor beyond the European continent.¹⁸³

Nevertheless, it is safe to say that NATO maintained a strong relevance as the main pillar for European security even after the CSDP was operationalized, given that the first CSDP initiatives took the reins from previous NATO engagements. The EU also assumed responsibility in complementarity with UN efforts, especially in DRC.

The EU also tested its capabilities with two rule of law missions, one in Georgia and the other in Iraq. In many aspects, the first few years of CSDP crisis management initiatives shaped the reach and scope of the EU's willingness to carve out its role in global security maintenance, its capabilities, and expectations of Member States from it.

These aspirations were also closely related to the dynamics of EU-NATO cooperation. The conception of ESDI within WEU by NATO's enterprise, its transformation into CSFP/CSDP with Maastricht Treaty, declaration of Petersberg tasks on crisis management within WEU, the transfer of these tasks to the EU with Amsterdam Treaty and the creation of the cooperation mechanism between EU and NATO in crisis management under Berlin Plus agreement all informed the debate on EU chartering a more autonomous path, one alternative to NATO, in peace and security.¹⁸⁴

It was in this environment that Turkey, a formal candidate for accession, a non-European NATO Ally and a former WEU associate member, maintained keen interest to act with the European Union in crisis management. From the first assignment that EU took on with the police mission in Bosnia Herzegovina, Turkey

¹⁸³ Simon Duke, "Consensus Building in ESDP: the Lessons of Operation Artemis," *International Politics* 46, no. 4 (2009): 398-399.

¹⁸⁴ Petros Demetriou, "NATO & CSDP: Can the EU Afford to Go Solo?," *Cogent Social Sciences* 2, no. 1 (2016): 13-14.

has endeavored to be involved in EU's efforts to put out fires in the Balkans, their common neighborhood, all the way to DRC in the African continent.¹⁸⁵

The first category of CSDP missions also ties in with a regional perspective of the Balkans and Turkey's relations with the region. Being a Balkan country herself, Turkey's involvement in all CSDP missions carried out in the Balkans speaks to her inextricable significance for the region's security and her vested interests.¹⁸⁶

Turkey's foreign policy in this period was highly aligned with that of the EU's on matters ranging from the Balkans to Middle East. Particularly after the AKP government came to power, full EU membership campaign gained a big momentum with numerous reform packages on domestic policies, and a European style of foreign policy prevailed. These compelled the EU to cooperate closely in crisis management with a candidate country speedily enacting reforms to join the ranks of member states.¹⁸⁷

Turkey's foreign and security policy interests also matched the EU's expectations for outcome in the Balkans, where the bulk of first CSDP initiatives concentrated. Not to mention the retained involvement of NATO in these initiatives entailing close cooperation with Turkey. Furthermore, the requirements for force generation and crisis management capabilities outside NATO made the EU more welcoming to third state participation.

On the other hand, three CSDP undertakings in this period did not grant entry to third state participation, for reasons explained in their respective sections, signaling the exclusivity of EU's interests in certain crisis scenes: Georgia, RDC and Iraq. Nevertheless, despite the Trojan horse of Greek Cyprus becoming a member state

¹⁸⁵ Hüseyin Bağcı and Ugo Gaudino, "Involving Turkey in EU Common Foreign, Security and Defence Policies," *Eurasian Research Journal* 2, no. 1 (2020): 18-19.

¹⁸⁶ Interview 1, Interview with a high-ranking Turkish diplomat, 13 May 2020, Ankara.

¹⁸⁷ Tarık Oğuzlu, "Turkey and Europeanization of Foreign Policy?," *Political Science Quarterly* 125, no. 4 (2010): 665-666;669.

before Turkey in 2004 greatly impacting on Turkey's negotiation process, from the initiation of CSDP's first mission to the formal start of accession negotiations, Turkey-CSDP synergy was at its highest during this period.

The specific circumstances of the first batch of CSDP missions/operations undertaken during this period and implications on Turkey's involvement/non-involvement will be examined in the following section.

4.1. EUPM Bosnia

EUPM Bosnia was the first real test of operationalizing the CSDP. It was the initial mission undertaken by the EU. A civilian mission tasked with police reform, the EUPM was officially approved by the Council Joint Action 2002/210/CFSP, launched in January 2003 and lasted until 2012 with altered mandate.¹⁸⁸ Even though the genesis of CSDP was, for the most part, military in purpose, the influence of Nordic states also introduced civilian aspects.¹⁸⁹ All 27 member states, plus 6 third states¹⁹⁰ contributed to EUPM Bosnia. According to the Council Joint Action 2002/210/CFSP, all non-EU NATO members, accession candidates and non-EU OSCE members providing staff to the United Nations International Police Task Force (IPTF) were invited to join the mission¹⁹¹.

¹⁸⁸ European External Action Service, "Factsheet on EUPM Bosnia," updated in 2012, accessed 12 January 2021, https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/csdp/missions-and-operations/eupm-bih/pdf/25062012_factsheet_eupm-bih_en.pdf

¹⁸⁹ Michael Matthiessen, "The Institutional Genesis of EUPM Bosnia," In *Ten years after: lessons from the EUPM in Bosnia and Herzegovina 2002-2012*, ed. Tobias Flessenkemper and Damien Helly (Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2013), 13-14.

¹⁹⁰ Canada, Iceland, Norway, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine

¹⁹¹ Council of the European Union, "Council Joint Action on the European Union Police Mission (2002/210/CFSP)," Brussels: 11 March 2002, accessed 12 January 2021, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32002E0210>

The EUPM replaced the IPTF, which had some 2,000 staff, because the UN no longer felt available to continue this capacity in Bosnia and Herzegovina but still believed an international peace presence must remain in the scene.¹⁹² Having said that, EUPM did not inherit IPTF's entire mandate, which included executive powers, and was not involved in active police training, an activity already concluded under IPTF.¹⁹³ This lack of executive powers in the mission's mandate was criticized for weakening its success.

Following the conflict in 1992 and the Dayton Agreement signed in its aftermath that left the country ethnically and politically polarized and the central state weak, the highly divided police structure required reform. And since the High Representative, appointed for overseeing the implementation of Dayton, was also the EU Special Representative and received large executive powers in 1997, he/she could move the administration closer to aligning with EU requirements. As part of BiH's Europeanization journey, EU put in the condition to reform the police structure for signing a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) with the country.¹⁹⁴

Through its evolving mandates over the years, EUPM sought to adjust the policing standards in Bosnia to conform to those held by the EU. In doing so, the mission faced challenges, particularly with regards to the agenda on centralization of the police structure. It was then terminated in 2012.¹⁹⁵

¹⁹² Matthiessen, "The Institutional Genesis of EUPM Bosnia," 14.

¹⁹³ Srećko Latal, "Has Policing Changed? And if not, why not? – Local Community Perception," In *Ten years after: lessons from the EUPM in Bosnia and Herzegovina 2002-2012*, ed. Tobias Flessenkemper and Damien Helly (Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2013), 51-52.

¹⁹⁴ Michael Merlingen, "EUPM (Bosnia and Herzegovina)", In *European Security and Defence Policy: First 10 Years (1999-2009)*, ed. Giovanni Grevi, Damien Helly and Daniel Keohane (Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2010), 162-163.

¹⁹⁵ Zerrin Torun, "Strengths and Weaknesses of the European Union Police Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina," *Avrasya Edütleri* 50, no. 2 (2016): 22.

Turkey was among the participating states in IPTF.¹⁹⁶ Upon invitation by the EU, Turkey responded positively and concluded a Participation Agreement in 2003, enabling her to contribute.¹⁹⁷ The agreement stipulated the contribution to be 6 seconded police officers, but according to Turkish records, the contribution was actually 12 staff, 6 from the General Directorate of Security, and 6 from the General Command of Gendarmerie.¹⁹⁸

Considering the accelerated Europeanization trend in Turkey at the time EUPM Bosnia was launched, and the lack of NATO involvement which leaves the inter-institutional soft-balancing argument irrelevant in this case, it could be safely argued that Turkey's participation in EUPM Bosnia may be more related to her accession goal. Therefore, the policy expectation of the EU from Turkey was satisfied by her contribution to the mission. Still, it should not be ignored that for candidate countries, Europeanization process works best when the perceived interests of the candidate also allow for the expected action to be taken, which holds true for Turkey given her engagement with the Balkan country.

Indeed, in his address to the General Assembly in 2014, then Deputy Prime Minister Mr. Bülent Arınç cited Turkey's staunch support to the principle of the "indivisibility

¹⁹⁶ "Bosnia And Herzegovina: Beyond Restraint," *Human Rights Watch Report* 10, no. 5 (New York; London: Human Rights Watch, 1998), accessed 14 January 2021, <https://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports98/bosnia/>.

¹⁹⁷ Official Journal of the European Union, "Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Turkey on the participation of the Republic of Turkey in the European Union Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH)," 25 September 2003, accessed 14 January 2021, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A22003A0925%2812%29>

¹⁹⁸ Directorate for EU Affairs, "Brief Note on ESDP," last modified in January 2006, accessed 30 January 2021, https://www.ab.gov.tr/files/tarama/tarama_files/31/agsp.pdf.

of security” for the transatlantic alliance and accession candidacy to the EU as the main driver for participation in this mission.¹⁹⁹

Last but not least, since Turkey was already a participating state in the UN-led IPTF before the take-over by EUPM Bosnia, and her peace-brokering credentials in the Balkans, a case could also be made about her participation to be in line with Turkey’s peacekeeping role as outlined in the conceptual explanation chapter. On that premise, both Turkey’s Europeanization drive and peacemaking role may be considered as viable explanations for her participation in EUPM Bosnia.

4.2. Operation Concordia

The first military crisis management operation undertaken by the EU, Operation Concordia was launched 2003 by the request of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM)²⁰⁰ government to assist in the implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement of 2001. The deal, brokered by NATO, included a European future for FYROM tied to conditions. Since NATO already had assets in the region, and conducted three operations in FYROM before, it seemed to be the natural path to deploy a NATO mission to oversee the Ohrid Framework Agreement’s implementation.²⁰¹ Also considering the EU had no assets of its own, separate from what they already contributed to NATO, it was essential for the EU to access NATO’s assets and capabilities to carry out such a mission.²⁰² Regardless of the

¹⁹⁹ Turkish Grand National Assembly, *General Debate Minutes*, 24th Parliament, 5th Legislative Year, 17th Session, (Ankara: 2014), accessed 15 November 2020, https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/Tutanak_B_SD.birlesim_baslangic?P4=22278&P5=H&page1=34&page2=34

²⁰⁰ Currently the official name of the country is North Macedonia.

²⁰¹ Catriona Mace, "Operation Concordia: Developing a ‘European’ Approach to Crisis Management?," *International Peacekeeping* 11, vol. 3 (2004): 479-480.

²⁰² Petar Petrov, "Early Institutionalisation of the ESDP Governance Arrangements: Insights from Operations Concordia and Artemis," *European Integration Online Papers (EioP)* 14, no. 8 (2010): 6-7.

success of the mission, it was a symbolic achievement for the EU to take on CSDP's first military operation in a crisis region.²⁰³

In 2001, tension between the FYROM armed forces and the minority Albanian militia groups skyrocketed²⁰⁴. The Ohrid Framework Agreement was signed to bring stability and peace to the country, and the NATO and EU were coordination talks in line with the Agreement²⁰⁵. As part of efforts to implement it, NATO launched the operation Essential Harvest to disarm the Albanian militia groups. The NATO operation had 3,500 troops, including Turkey's company team dispatched on 27 August 2001. NATO's operation had achieved its target and was terminated on 27 September 2001, and the Turkey military company returned home on 6 October 2001²⁰⁶.

Two follow-up NATO missions were commissioned after Essential Harvest, namely Amber Fox and Allied Harmony. Turkey participated in the headquarters personnel of both NATO missions.²⁰⁷ These missions were tasked with the protection of international monitors in the country. Allied Harmony was also tasked with supporting the government to take over security functions in the country. When

²⁰³ Eva Gross, "Operation Concordia (FYROM)," In *European Security and Defence Policy: First 10 Years (1999-2009)*, ed. Giovanni Grevi, Damien Helly and Daniel Keohane (Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2010), 179-180.

²⁰⁴ "NATO Issues: NATO's Role in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia," *NATO*, 2020, accessed 19 June 2021, <https://www.nato.int/fyrom/home.htm>.

²⁰⁵ Mace, "Operation Concordia: Developing a 'European' Approach to Crisis Management?," 482.

²⁰⁶ "Contribution of the TAF to Peace Support Operations," Turkish Armed Forces - General Staff, accessed 4 October 2020, <https://www.tsk.tr/Sayfalar?viewName=ContributionToTafToPeace>

²⁰⁷ "Contribution of the TAF to Peace Support Operations," Turkish Armed Forces - General Staff.

Allied Harmony successfully came to the end of its mandate on 31 March 2003, the EU began preparations to take over the operation.²⁰⁸

Allied Harmony yielded successful results and the Albanian minority's disruptions were abated, leaving a favorable environment for the EU to launch Concordia with 350 military personnel from EU member states.²⁰⁹ In line with the Council Joint Action 2003/92/CFSP of 27 January 2003, Concordia began its mandate on 31 March and lasted until 10 December 2003.²¹⁰ Throughout the course of the operation, 13 EU member states as well as 14 non-EU states contributed to establishing a stable environment where the Ohrid Framework Agreement could be implemented.²¹¹

As the first operation conducted within the Berlin Plus framework, Concordia had access to NATO assets and capabilities, including the Supreme Allied Headquarters Europe (SHAPE) in Mons where it was ran. The force commander of the operation reported to the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Allied Forces Europe (D-SACEUR), who had a dual role also as the EU operational commander and thus reported to the EU Military Committee (EUMC). The chairman of the EUMC was answerable to PSC, which then informed the North Atlantic Council about the use of NATO assets. This quite cumbersome chain of reporting worked, albeit with some hiccups in intelligence sharing on the ground between the two organizations²¹².

²⁰⁸ Gross, "Operation Concordia (FYROM)," 179-180.

²⁰⁹ Annemarie Peen Rodt and Stefan Wolff, "European Union Conflict Management in the Western Balkans," *Civil Wars* 14, no. 3 (2012): 421.

²¹⁰ Council of the European Union, "Council Joint Action 2003/92/CFSP on the European Union military operation in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia," Brussels: 27 January 2003, accessed 23 March 2021, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32003E0092>

²¹¹ Gross, "Operation Concordia (FYROM)," 179-180.

²¹² International Crisis Group, "EU Crisis Response Capability Revisited," *Europe Report* no. 160 (2005): 48.

On the operation side, Concordia's tasks included patrolling, reconnaissance, surveillance, situational awareness, and reporting and liaison activities.²¹³ Even in the case of a transfer of functions to an EU operation, NATO kept a small presence in FYROM. Despite its comparably smaller size and short execution period, Concordia was deemed a success as the first military CSDP operation, more so in psychological and symbolic terms. It was seen as the EU's delivery of action rather than mere words in crisis management, and help anchor FYROM to the standards of the transatlantic community²¹⁴.

According to the ICG's assessment, coordination between NATO and EU was not pitch perfect, and reportedly NATO officials questioned EU's field performance. Their occasional disagreement included the meaning of "border management", with the EU seeing it as a civilian while NATO a military issue.²¹⁵ When Concordia's mandate successfully ran its course, a policing mission called EUPOL PROXIMA was launched in FYROM.

In unpacking Turkey's involvement in Concordia, it has to be pointed out first that Concordia's planned deployment was postponed from June 2002 to March 2003 due to the unfinished negotiations over the Berlin Plus arrangement. As explained in the first chapter, Turkey and Greece were engaged by Allies and EU members in a series of back-and-forth amendments over the content of the deal which was finally settled in Copenhagen Council Meeting in 2002. Still, the outstanding discrepancy between the interpretations of the Nice Provisions that lay down the implementation of Berlin Plus has remained a contentious debate between NATO and EU. In this case, it could be suggested that Turkey utilized her NATO membership as a tool to soft-balance the EU, i.e. inter-institutional soft-balancing.

²¹³ Gross, "Operation Concordia (FYROM)," 173-176.

²¹⁴ Fatih Demircioğlu, "Makedonya Cumhuriyeti'nde Barış ve Güvenlik Meseleleri," *Bilecik Şeyh Edebali Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi* 4, no. 1 (2018): 232.

²¹⁵ International Crisis Group, "EU Crisis Response Capability Revisited," *Europe Report* no. 160 (2005): 49.

4.3. Operation Artemis

The launching of Operation Artemis had a testy pre-story for the US and her European Allies. A group of French-led EU members initially sought to take over a large NATO mission in the Balkans. Meanwhile, the US was lukewarm to the idea of the EU deploying a large force in the region, and according to interviews by EU officials conducted by Pohl, the underlying calculation of US was to counter French motives to undermine NATO via CSDP.²¹⁶ In response, a group of French-led EU members, namely France, Germany, Luxembourg and Belgium, convened the Tervuren Summit in 2003 (ridiculed as Chocolate summit by Donald Rumsfeld) to prove their resolve for more autonomous European civilian and military capabilities “to prevent conflicts and manage crisis, including the most demanding missions”.²¹⁷ This meeting and its declared intentions created some tension within NATO as well as the EU.²¹⁸

Amidst the lurking tension behind, the French pressed ahead with “Operation Artemis” in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the EU’s first autonomous military operation without recourse to NATO assets and capabilities.²¹⁹ The move created controversy due to the lack of communication with NATO before the operation was launched, as would be expected within Berlin Plus.²²⁰ Artemis was

²¹⁶ Pohl, *EU Foreign Policy and Crisis Management Operations*, 54.

²¹⁷ “Meeting of the Heads of State and Government of Germany, France, Luxemburg and Belgium on European Defence”, Brussels: 2003, accessed 30 March 2020, https://ec.europa.eu/dorie/fileDownload.do;jsessionid=fNGXgBFL1ZyYHhZ-gSY10VuwxeuwsV_ZRqeZLj2N5p2ugtMs3xk!1583997504?docId=317247&cardId=317247

²¹⁸ Ambrose Evans-Pritchard and Toby Helm. "US requests crisis talks over 'Euro Army' threat to NATO role," *Telegraph*, 17 October 2003, <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/1444424/US-requests-crisis-talks-over-Euro-army-threat-to-Nato-role.html>

²¹⁹ Duke, "Consensus Building in ESDP: The Lessons of Operation Artemis," 399.

²²⁰ Pohl, *EU Foreign Policy and Crisis Management Operations*, 55.

widely viewed as a “French operation with an EU cover”²²¹ because “while it ultimately received EU clothing, its origin, command and control were French.”²²²

As specified in the Council Joint Action 2003/423/CFSP launching Operation Artemis, the EU stepped in to support the UN mission MONUC already deployed in DRC to manage the crisis resulting from the civil war.²²³ With 700 staff, MONUC troops were not enough to contain it, and the then-UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan asked for France’s help. At the initiative of France, the EU took on the operation to reinforce UN efforts, which lasted for 3 months.²²⁴ The first EU operation under the UN mandate, Artemis was approximately 2000-strong, receiving additional support from third countries (Brazil, Canada, and South Africa).²²⁵ The scale of participation was rather small, and while the operation is written off as a success story for the CSDP by the EU, it did not put an end to the instability in the DRC.²²⁶

Operation Artemis stirred the question of NATO’s “right of first refusal” in crisis management efforts. Bypassing the US and NATO, the EU somewhat displayed its

²²¹ Kees Homan, "Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo," In *Faster and More United?: The Debate about Europe's Crisis Response Capacities*, 2007, 151-155, accessed 12 July 2021, https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/20070531_cscp_chapter_homan.pdf

²²² International Crisis Group, "EU Crisis Response Capability Revisited," *Europe Report* no. 160 (2005), https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/28088/160_eu_crisis_response_capability_revisited_edit.pdf

²²³ Council of the European Union, “Council Joint Action 2003/423/CFSP on the European Union military operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo,” Brussels: of 5 June 2003, accessed 4 March 2020, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32003E0423>

²²⁴ Duke, "Consensus Building in ESDP: The Lessons of Operation Artemis," 402.

²²⁵ Damien Helly, "Operation Artemis (RD Congo)," In *European Security and Defence Policy: First 10 Years (1999-2009)*, ed. Giovanni Grevi, Damien Helly and Daniel Keohane (Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2010), 181.

²²⁶ Aymerillette Zafindranday, “*Avrupa Birliği'nin Büyük Göller Bölgesindeki İnsancıl Müdahalesi: 1990'dan Günümüze*,” (İstanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi, 2012), 91.

own interpretation of “where the Alliance as a whole is not involved” as an attempt to assert its strategic autonomy.²²⁷

There are no records available and information accessible through interviews conducted for this study that could throw light on the interactions between Turkey and EU regarding participation to Artemis. While the Council Joint Action adopted to launch the operation provides for third state participation upon invitation by the Council, and a number of third countries did contribute, whether an invitation was also extended to Turkey remains unknown within the bounds of this study. However, the fact that Greek Cyprus, not yet a member then, concluded a participation agreement with the EU to contribute to Artemis²²⁸ is a significant indicator for the prospects of Turkish involvement.

At the time of Operation Artemis, Turkey already was a contributor to NATO missions and Concordia, and had only deployed assistance to crisis management missions in Africa once in Somalia before 2003²²⁹. While there are no public or official statements about Turkey’s reaction to Operation Artemis, it is safe to assume that Turkey’s feelings about the EU’s direction towards self-autonomous capabilities rather aligned with those of the US, considering the recent “breakthrough” on the Berlin Plus arrangements.

An additional inference could be made as to Turkey’s non-involvement in Artemis by weighing in on the country’s foreign policy agenda at the time of the operation. In fact, Turkey’s focus was on the Balkans and the Middle East, especially considering

²²⁷ Cebeci, "NATO, the EU and Turkey: The CSDP Stalemate," 107.

²²⁸ Official Journal of the European Union, *Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Cyprus on the participation of the Republic of Cyprus in the European Union Forces (EUF) in the Democratic Republic of Congo*, Brussels (entered into force on 1 October 2003), <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A22003A1007%2801%29>

²²⁹ "Contribution of the TAF to Peace Support Operations," Turkish Armed Forces - General Staff, accessed 3 July 2021, <https://www.tsk.tr/Sayfalar?viewName=ContributionToTafToPeace>.

the US intervention in Iraq.²³⁰ Furthermore, Turkey's involvement in sub-Saharan Africa had remained negligible until then²³¹, and any trace of it was largely economy-driven.²³² While it might have skipped Operation Artemis, Turkey would take part in MONUC²³³ and the next CSDP mission in DRC Congo two years later.

4.4. EUPOL PROXIMA

Following the short-lived military operation Concordia in FYROM, upon invitation by the government, the EU decided to launch a civilian mission in the country to reform the police sector.²³⁴ More broadly, the mission was mandated with monitoring, mentoring and advising the law and order sector, practical implementation of reforming the Ministry of Interior, creation of a border police, and building confidence between the local police and the population.²³⁵ Following the efforts of NATO and EU in FYROM, the security situation was considered as improved to the extent that policeman became more relevant than soldiers.²³⁶ Formally launched with the Council Joint Action 2003/681/CFSP adopted on 29

²³⁰ Gürol Baba and Soner Karagül, "Türk Dış Politikasında Çok Taraflılığa Geçiş Çabaları: 1965 Çok Uluslu Güç Projesi ve 1 Mart 2003 Tezkeresi," *EUL Journal of Social Sciences* 1, no. 3 (2012): 20.

²³¹ Mehmet Özkan, "Turkey's Rising Role in Africa," *Turkey Policy Quarterly* 9, no. 4 (2010): 95.

²³² "Turkey-Africa Relations," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, accessed 22 December 2020, <https://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey-africa-relations.en.mfa>.

²³³ With one C-130 military transport aircraft and two military officers: <https://www.tsk.tr/Sayfalar?viewName=ContributionToTafToPeace>.

²³⁴ Isabelle Ioannides, "EUPOL Proxima / EUPAT (FYROM)," In *European Security and Defence Policy: First 10 Years (1999-2009)*, ed. Giovanni Grevi, Damien Helly and Daniel Keohane (Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2010), 189.

²³⁵ Ioannides, "EUPOL Proxima / EUPAT (FYROM)," 189.

²³⁶ Ibid. 190.

September 2003, PROXIMA lasted from December 2003 to December 2004,²³⁷ when it was renewed for another year (also referred to as PROXIMA II).

In accordance with the aforementioned joint action, third states were allowed to participate in the mission on the conditions laid out in Nice.²³⁸ The peak number of personnel the mission had was around 200, with participation from 22 member states and 4 third countries, namely Norway, Switzerland, Turkey and Ukraine. Upon the renewal of PROXIMA, 24 member states dedicated staff to the mission.²³⁹

On the operational front, the mission identified major issues to be reformed in the security sector, such as the issue of inequitable representation of minorities in the police, and coordinated and mentored efforts to improve internal security by developing a capable, depoliticized, decentralized, community-based, multi-ethnic police service in FYROM.²⁴⁰

The second policing mission undertaken by the CSDP, PROXIMA started from scratch, unlike the first policing mission EUBM in BiH that assumed the mandate from UN IPTF. As provided by the Ohrid Framework Agreement and the Stability and Association Process (SAP), PROXIMA sought to support the gradual stabilization of the country.²⁴¹ The title of the mission actually refers to it being more

²³⁷ Council of the European Union, "Council Joint Action 2003/681/CFSP on the European Union Police Mission in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (EUPOL "Proxima")," Brussels: 29 September 2003, accessed 9 October 2020, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32003E0681>

²³⁸ Ibid.

²³⁹ Ioannides, "EUPOL Proxima / EUPAT (FYROM)," 189.

²⁴⁰ Israel Biel Portero, "EU Operations within the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia: EUFOR Concordia, EUPOL Proxima and EUPAT," In *Mainstreaming Human Rights In EU CSDP Missions: A Transversal Analysis*, ed. Milena Costas Trascasas (Valencia: Low Cost Books, 2012), 74-75.

²⁴¹ Ioannides, "EUPOL Proxima / EUPAT (FYROM)," 190.

visible to FYROM citizens, unlike EUPM Bosnia which faced difficulty in establishing itself in the public's eye.²⁴²

Upon the invitation laid out within the Council Joint Action 2003/681/CFSP, Turkey responded affirmatively by contributing 4 gendarmerie staff and 1 military officer at NATO liaison office in Skopje.²⁴³ The Turkish gendarmerie staff was dispatched on 15 December 2003 and successfully completed their duty on 15 December 2005.²⁴⁴ The participation is also mentioned in the Commission's progress report on Turkey in 2004.²⁴⁵ As required, Turkey signed an agreement with the EU which enabled her to contribute to Proxima.²⁴⁶

Having been renewed for a second term, PROXIMA was considered a successfully executed mission that improved the policing system in the FYROM. Despite having a small force (~200 staff), the mission established effective patrols which would have provoked tension in the country in the past.²⁴⁷

²⁴²International Crisis Group, "EU Crisis Response Capability Revisited," *Europe Report* no. 160 (2005), accessed 12 October 2020, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/28088/160_eu_crisis_response_capability_revisited_edit.pdf

²⁴³ Tamer Yaman, "The legal basis of peace support operations and the benefits for Turkey joining in peace support operations" (MA diss., Süleyman Demirel University, 2007), 85.

²⁴⁴ "Contribution of the TAF to Peace Support Operations," Turkish Armed Forces - General Staff, accessed 16 November 2020, <https://www.tsk.tr/Sayfalar?viewName=ContributionToTafToPeace>.

²⁴⁵ Commission of the European Communities, *Regular Report on Turkey's progress towards accession*, Brussels: 2004, 152.

²⁴⁶ Official Journal of the European Union, "Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Turkey on the participation of the Republic of Turkey in the European Union Police Mission in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (EUPOL 'Proxima')," Brussels: 10 October 2004, accessed 18 July 2020, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2004:354:0090:0092:EN:PDF>

²⁴⁷ Portero, "EU Operations within the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia: EUFOR Concordia, EUPOL Proxima and EUPAT," 76.

Turkey's participation to Proxima could easily be placed within the conceptual context of Europeanization as a candidate country whereby she fulfilled the EU's expectations presented in the form of an invitation to join the EU's efforts in crisis management. Proxima was a policing mission and was not launched under Berlin Plus. Still, Turkey demonstrated her will to espouse with the CSDP's peacekeeping agenda within and without Berlin Plus in the case of Proxima.

The mission was terminated shortly upon the request of the Macedonian government due to the fear of having a crisis management mission in the country tarnishing the prospects of EU membership.²⁴⁸ Immediately after, the EU would launch another civilian mission, EUPAT, in FYROM.

4.5. EUJUST THEMIS

In July 2004, EU launched its first rule of law mission in Georgia, EUJUST THEMIS, which was also the first CSDP operation in the post-Soviet space.²⁴⁹ Ethnic conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia plus civil protests on the streets of Tbilisi, leading up to the Rose Revolution, fueled social unrest in Georgia.²⁵⁰ After the change of administration for the lack of democratization and reform, the new government represented the victory of the Georgian people and the prospect for opening up to the rest of the world, especially the West and sparked hopes for reforming institutions in the country, standing up to Russia and re-integrating the break-away regions.²⁵¹

²⁴⁸ Ioannides, "EUPOL Proxima / EUPAT (FYROM)," 195.

²⁴⁹ Xymena Kurowska, "EUJUST THEMIS (Georgia)," In *European Security and Defence Policy: First 10 Years (1999-2009)*, ed. Giovanni Grevi, Damien Helly and Daniel Keohane (Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2010), 202.

²⁵⁰ Nathalie Tocci, "Conflict and Reform in Eastern Europe," *The International Spectator* 41, no. 4 (2006): 70-71.

²⁵¹ Damien Helly, "EUJUST Themis in Georgia: An Ambitious Bet on Rule of Law" In *Civilian Crisis Management: The EU Way*, (Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2006).

Traditionally, the EU's approach to the disputes in South Caucasus was limited to supporting the efforts of the OSCE.²⁵² It was the Swedish presidency in 2001 that made the region a priority on EU's agenda, and the snow-balling support led to pleas for the appointment of an EU Special Representative (EUSR) for South Caucasus.²⁵³ The EUSR's stated objectives were mainly assisting the region's conflict resolution efforts, encouraging further cooperation among the South Caucasian states and enhancing the Union's visibility.²⁵⁴

In 2004, Lithuania proposed a civilian CSDP mission in Georgia, facing some challengers seeking to avoid Russian antagonism.²⁵⁵ On the other hand, the newly formed Georgian government expected the EU to step in after the OSCE Border Monitoring Mission ended to fill the gap.²⁵⁶ The Georgian request was met with nods from the UK and Baltic countries, but France and Germany were not so forthcoming. In the spirit of moving forward, a civilian CDP mission in Georgia specializing on the rule of law, first of its kind, was agreed.²⁵⁷

The Georgian government officially invited the EU to support the country's endeavors in reforming the judiciary. In response, the Council adopted a Joint Action

²⁵² Lili Di Pippo, "The Externalization of JHA Policies in Georgia: Partner or Hotbed of Threats?," *Journal of European Integration* 31, no. 1 (2009): 109.

²⁵³ Dov Lynch, "Why Georgia Matters," *Chaillot Paper*, (Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2006), 5; 13.

²⁵⁴ Council of the European Union, "Council Joint Action 2003/496/CFSP concerning the appointment of an EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus," Brussels: of 7 July 2003, accessed 22 August 2020, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A32003E0496>

²⁵⁵ Kurowska, "EUJUST THEMIS (Georgia)," 203.

²⁵⁶ Tocci, "Conflict and Reform in Eastern Europe," 76.

²⁵⁷ Helly, "EUJUST Themis in Georgia: An Ambitious Bet on Rule of Law".

on the deployment of Themis in June 2004.²⁵⁸ The mission was carried out by 10 EU advising staff²⁵⁹ and did not receive any third country participation, although the Council Joint Action made reference to allowing third country nationals to tender for contracts. With a short lifespan, the mission ended in July 2005, leaving behind a debate over its eventual success given the divide between Georgian expectations and the mission's deliverables.²⁶⁰

Digging into Turkey's non-participation, on the surface, Council Joint Action authorizing Themis did not specify third country participation in clear terms and the mission, as indicated above, had zero non-EU participation. That being said, an interview with a high ranking Turkish official revealed that had the EU extended an invitation, Turkey would have favorably considered participation.²⁶¹ Hanbay's interviews with Turkish diplomats who served at the Turkish Delegation to the EU in 2004 further expose that Turkey conveyed its interest to take part in Themis but had not received a response from the EU.²⁶²

Temporally speaking, Turkey was on a high Europeanization ride at the time of Themis' deployment. Furthermore, Turkey was an active participant to the UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) and OSCE Border Monitoring Mission.²⁶³

²⁵⁸ Council of the European Union, "Council Joint Action 2004/523/CFSP on the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Georgia, EUJUST THEMIS," Brussels: of 28 June 2004, accessed 5 July 2020, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32004E0523>

²⁵⁹ Kurowska, "EUJUST THEMIS (Georgia)," 201.

²⁶⁰ Di Puppò, "The Externalization of JHA Policies in Georgia: Partner or Hotbed of Threats?," 110-111.

²⁶¹ Interview 2, *Interview with a high-ranking Turkish Diplomat*. 23 July 2020, Ankara

²⁶² Hanbay. "Involvement of Non-EU European NATO Members in Common Security and Defense Policy: The Turkish Case," 83.

²⁶³ "Contribution of the TAF to Peace Support Operations," Turkish Armed Forces - General Staff, accessed 24 January 2021, <https://www.tsk.tr/Sayfalar?viewName=ContributionToTafToPeace>.

Not least of all, an ardent advocate of the territorial integrity of Georgia, categorically unrecognizing the secessionist South Ossetia and Abkhazia break-away regions, Turkey has been in perfectly good neighborly relations with Georgia. All these add up to the strong possibility of Turkey's potential affirmative response to participate had she been asked by the EU. In this case, non-participation by Turkey was not by choice, but by necessity due to mission's exclusivity to member states and rejection to accept third country participation.

4.6. EUFOR ALTHEA

The CSDP's most ambitious initiative to this day, EUFOR Althea was launched in 2004 as a post-conflict operation and is still ongoing.²⁶⁴ It is the second operation conducted under the Berlin Plus deal following Concordia in FYROM. The operation was transferred to the CSDP from NATO's Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina²⁶⁵ when most of the dust was settled thanks to SFOR in terms of overall security atmosphere.²⁶⁶

As a matter of fact, taking over SFOR and setting up an EU-led military operation in Bosnia has been occupying the minds of certain member states, particularly France, for a while before its eventual launch.²⁶⁷ During the 2002 Summit in Copenhagen, the EU declared interest in leading "a military operation in Bosnia following SFOR".²⁶⁸ Subsequently, this ambition was cleared at the EU Foreign Minister's

²⁶⁴ Jannik Knauer, *EUFOR Althea: Appraisal and Future Perspectives of the EU's Former Flagship Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina*, (Bruges: College of Europe, 2011), 3.

²⁶⁵ European External Action Service, "European Union Force in BiH - Mission Background," updated 14 January 2021, accessed 21 January 2021, <http://www.euforbih.org/index.php/about-eufor/background>.

²⁶⁶ Uğur Güngör, "Analysis of Turkey's Approach to Peacekeeping Operations," (PhD diss., Bilkent University: 2007), 91.

²⁶⁷ Pohl, *EU Foreign Policy and Crisis Management Operations*, 50-51.

²⁶⁸ Council of the European Union, *Presidency Conclusions*, Copenhagen: 2003, accessed 8 July 2021, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/20906/73842.pdf>

level and then confirmed at the NATO Istanbul Summit in 2004.²⁶⁹ Interestingly, prior to this nod at an EU-led mission taking over from SFOR, NATO's top military commander at the time, General James Jones, opined that it was "too early" for the EU to step in".²⁷⁰

NATO's presence in the country began with the deployment of 60,000 troops under the Implementation Force (IFOR) in 1995.²⁷¹ In 1995, NATO transformed this operation into SFOR with 32,000 troops.²⁷² As a separate entity, the EU first inserted itself in the BiH peace process through diplomacy, while NATO maintained a military presence through IFOR and then SFOR.²⁷³

The peace process in BiH spawned the position of High Representative with extensive powers. The European governments increasingly invested more in the peace process in Bosnia to make up for their earlier ineffectiveness.²⁷⁴ Althea was officially launched with the adoption of Council Joint Action in 2004, citing the endorsement of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1551 adopted in 2004 as

²⁶⁹ NATO, *Istanbul Summit Communiqué*, İstanbul: 2004, accessed 8 July 2021, <https://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2004/p04-096e.htm>

²⁷⁰ Stephen Castle, "Commander of NATO casts doubt on role for EU army," *Independent.Ie*, 5 August 2003, <https://www.independent.ie/world-news/europe/commander-of-nato-casts-doubt-on-role-for-eu-army-25933506.html>

²⁷¹ NATO, "NATO Marks 20 Year Anniversary Of IFOR Peacekeeping Mission," updated on 18 December 2015, accessed 21 January 2021, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_125737.htm

²⁷² NATO, "SFOR Stabilisation Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina," accessed 12 February 2021, <https://www.nato.int/sfor/docu/d981116a.htm>

²⁷³ Pohl, *EU Foreign Policy and Crisis Management Operations*, 52.

²⁷⁴ Bedrudin Brljavac, "Assessing the European Criteria in Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Litmus Test for the European Union," *Journal of Comparative Politics* 5, no. 1 (2012): 6-7.

the basis for the operation's legitimacy.²⁷⁵ Similar to the other operations and missions conducted under the EU command in the Western Balkans, Althea entailed a promise to BiH's accession to the EU.²⁷⁶

When the SFOR takeover finally happened, it was decided that NATO would still maintain some presence in Bosnia, along with a separate US presence on the ground.²⁷⁷ EUFOR Althea and NATO missions had partly overlapping mandates. This overlap necessitated a division of tasks and responsibilities between the two organizations.²⁷⁸ The EU kept the organizational structure and much of SFOR intact to ensure smooth continuity but was also self-conscious about proving its additional benefit. At the end of the day, the involvement of NATO via Berlin Plus as well as its concurrent presence on the ground put Atlanticist EU member states at ease.²⁷⁹

Almost all the force composition of SFOR was transitioned to Althea, with the significant exclusion of the US as contributor.²⁸⁰ Aside from American absence, SFOR contributors Turkey, Norway, Canada, Bulgaria and Romania transferred their

²⁷⁵ Council of the European Union, "Council Joint Action 2004/570/CFSP on the European Union military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina," Brussels:12 July 2004, accessed 5 May 2020, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32004E0570>

²⁷⁶ Ivana Boštjančič Pulko, Meliha Muherina and Nina Pejić, "Analysing the Effectiveness of EUFOR Althea Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina," *Journal on European Perspectives of the Western Balkans* 8, no. 2 (2016): 89.

²⁷⁷ NATO, "Press Briefing by Mr .Robert Serry, Deputy Assistant Secretary General, on the End of SFOR and the Future of NATO's Role in Bosnia-Herzegovina," 24 November 2004, accessed 5 February 2021, <https://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2004/s041124b.htm>

²⁷⁸ Daniel Keohane, "EUFOR ALTHEA (Bosnia and Herzegovina)," In *European Security and Defence Policy: First 10 Years (1999-2009)*, ed. Giovanni Grevi, Damien Helly and Daniel Keohane (Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2010), 212-215.

²⁷⁹ Trineke Palm, "The Changing Character of EUFOR Althea: Power Politics or Learning?," *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 30, no. 1(2017): 75; 77.

²⁸⁰ Julie Kim, "Bosnia and the European Union Military Force (EUFOR): Post-NATO Peacekeeping," *United States Congressional Research Service*, updated on 15 January 2008, accessed 6 November 2021, <https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RS/RS21774>.

SFOR staff to EUFOR. Althea's initial force generation was 7,000 troops, 80% of which were directly transferred SFOR personnel.²⁸¹

The wide-ranging participation to Althea from NATO and EU countries as well as other third states brandished the image of CSDP in terms of credibility, capability and visibility. Even though there is not enough reliable data to measure the troop movements and distributions over the years, contribution of troops by EU states and third countries is indicative of their expectations from Althea. While Berlin and Rome showed enthusiasm at the early stages of Althea, the same could not be said about all EU capitals.²⁸² Turkey, a non-EU NATO country, contributed more troops than most EU countries indeed.²⁸³

In reality, Althea was non-military operation with executive powers aiming to fight organized crime. It has evolved into a hybrid operation mainly handling capacity-building and training of Bosnian armed forces.²⁸⁴ Once the security situation in the country improved, plans for downsizing troops were brought up, which eventually led to the Council decision to reduce from 6,500 to 2,500 staff.²⁸⁵ This reduction left countries like Italy, Spain, Poland and Turkey with bigger roles within Althea.²⁸⁶

In 2008, France failed to get the EU to seal Althea and call it a success, but ended up withdrawing her deployment from the operation, followed by Finland. This pullout

²⁸¹ Frank Kupferschmidt, "Putting Strategic Partnership to the Test: Cooperation between NATO and the EU in Operation Althea," *SWP Research Paper* (Berlin: German Institute for International and Security Affairs, 2006), 9.

²⁸² Pohl, *EU Foreign Policy and Crisis Management Operations*, 58-59.

²⁸³ *Ibid.* 60.

²⁸⁴ Knauer, "EUFOR Althea: Appraisal and Future Perspectives of the EU's Former Flagship Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina," 3.

²⁸⁵ Palm, "The Changing Character of EUFOR Althea: Power Politics or Learning?," 78.

²⁸⁶ Pohl, *EU Foreign Policy and Crisis Management Operations*, 62.

left Turkey and Greece as the strongest supporters for continuing the operation.²⁸⁷ The complication was resolved by giving Althea non-executive tasks, which in turn fueled debates about the necessity of the Berlin Plus. Despite the background noise, Althea is still operational with near-universal participation, and remains to be within the Berlin Plus framework.²⁸⁸

Currently, Turkey is the second largest contributor to Althea with a maneuver company and five liaison monitoring teams, consisting 242 personnel deployed in Sarajevo.²⁸⁹ Since it is a Berlin Plus initiative taken over from SFOR, her participation did not necessitate a separate agreement to be concluded with the EU Council.

Althea represents the only operational bond between NATO and EU's declared strategic cooperation embodied in the spirit of Berlin Plus. As things stand, the EU seems reluctant to invoke Berlin Plus again without the ability of full participation by all member states, i.e. Greek Cyprus.²⁹⁰

Turkey's participation in Althea mainly falls under her Europeanization drive as the country was pursuing a strong reform process to start accession negotiations with the EU. It should not be neglected that Turkey participated as a NATO member to all previous NATO engagements in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which speaks to her long-standing role as a member of the European security structure. In many parts, Althea was a "legacy" mission from SFOR, and did not necessarily carry out stabilization tasks as the preceding NATO operations had already taken care of that goal.

²⁸⁷ Pohl, *EU Foreign Policy and Crisis Management Operations*, 63.

²⁸⁸ *Ibid.* 64.

²⁸⁹ "Contribution of the TAF to Peace Support Operations," Turkish Armed Forces - General Staff, accessed 24 January 2021, <https://www.tsk.tr/Sayfalar?viewName=ContributionToTafToPeace>.

²⁹⁰ Missiroli, "EUISS Yearbook of European Security," 281.

However, what sets Althea apart is the fact that the operation is still operational and Turkey has not pulled out troops from the operation, even at times when de-Europeanization dynamics are conceivably superseding. The operation, as mentioned earlier, is the only monument of the Berlin Plus, an arrangement that has exhausted EU and NATO negotiation powers for long and whose longevity is supported by Turkey as well as Atlanticist-leaning EU powers. As the only remaining Berlin Plus initiative, Althea gives Turkey more leverage via her NATO membership than an ordinary EU-led operation. This means that Turkey may exercise inter-institutional soft-balancing against the EU.

As a final point, since the country has long been engaged in all crisis management initiatives in the Bosnian scene, including the UN Mission in BiH, UN Protection Force, NATO Operations "Deny Flight", "Deliberate Forge", "Joint Guardian", IFOR and SFOR, and rounding up with Althea,²⁹¹ her participation could easily be categorized as Turkey's commitment to peacekeeping.

4.7. EUPAT FYROM

Following the conclusion of EUPOL PROXIMA, the Union planned to bridge the gains from the mission with a police advisory project upon the invitation from the FYROM government.²⁹² At the time, the fragility of the security situation in the rural areas and outside Skopje prompted the EU to take steps to safeguard the sustainability of the police reform undertaken with Proxima. With this commitment, the EU established a police advisory mission in FYROM in 2005, called EUPAT.²⁹³

²⁹¹ "Contribution of the TAF to Peace Support Operations," Turkish Armed Forces - General Staff, accessed 24 January 2021, <https://www.tsk.tr/Sayfalar?viewName=ContributionToTafToPeace>.

²⁹² Council of the European Union, "Council Joint Action 2005/826/CFSP on the establishment of an EU Police Advisory Team (EUPAT) in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM)," Brussels: 24 November 2005, accessed 17 May 2021, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/HR/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32005E0826>

²⁹³ Ioannides, "EUPOL Proxima / EUPAT (FYROM)," 192-193.

In terms of mandate, EUPAT shared the objectives of PROXIMA, prioritizing the aspects of advising and mentoring the Macedonian police forces at the local level.²⁹⁴ Since the FYROM government avoided welcoming an EU mission in the country again with a stability-oriented focus, it was a condition to not present it as a continuation of PROXIMA, but rather a reform-oriented transition step, thus a police advisory mission was agreed.²⁹⁵ Even though EUPAT was mission in nature, it was not formally referred to as one, but a police advisory team.²⁹⁶

The Council Joint Action 2005/826/CFSP did not make any references to third country participation and only EU member states contributed to EUPAT, which had 29 police advisors. Therefore, there was no prospect for Turkey as a candidate or any other third country participation in the mission. Though there are no official statements or documents explaining the decision of excluding third country participation, one might argue that given the bridging function associated with it, and the short duration and limited scope as well as being considered as an “exit mission”²⁹⁷ for the EU from FYROM, the EU opted to keep it in the house. In this context, non-participation by Turkey was not by choice or motive-ridden, but was by inevitability due to a lack of participation prospect.

4.8. EUPOL Kinshasa / EUPOL RD (Congo)

The first CSDP police mission in Africa, EUPOL Kinshasa was deployed on 12 April 2005 and lasted until 30 June 2007. It is one of three CSDP engagements in the

²⁹⁴ Ioannides, “EUPOL Proxima / EUPAT (FYROM),” 192-193.

²⁹⁵ Biel Portero, “EU Operations within the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia: EUFOR Concordia, EUPOL Proxima and EUPAT,” 81-82.

²⁹⁶ Ibid.

²⁹⁷ Ioannides, “EUPOL Proxima / EUPAT (FYROM),” 192-193.

Democratic Republic of Congo. EUPOL Kinshasa was legally established in December 2004 by the Joint Action 2004/847/CFSP.²⁹⁸

Locating the EU's interests in Africa's peace and stability, the Commission's Strategy for Africa published in 2005 cites support for peace operations, disarmament, conflict prevention initiatives and tackling the root causes of conflict among its goals.²⁹⁹ Furthermore, it is well known that due to colonial ties, some prominent EU member states have exclusive interests in managing crises in African countries. As it has been established in the section on Operation Artemis, the decision to deploy missions or operations may be subject to the lobbying efforts of certain member states, which is the case in CSDP undertakings in DRC.³⁰⁰

Suffering from years of turmoil brought by ethnic conflicts and numerous coups resulting in periods of political instability, the DRC finally had created an interim government in 2003 following a peace agreement signed in Pretoria, and then a final act concluded in Sun City.³⁰¹ However, violence in the Ituri region persisted, catalyzing the UN deployment of MONUC. The stability in DRC, according to the

²⁹⁸ Council of the European Union, "Council Joint Action 2004/847/CFSP on the European Union Police Mission in Kinshasa (DRC) regarding the Integrated Police Unit (EUPOL 'Kinshasa')," Brussels: 9 December 2004, accessed 8 August 2020, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32004E0847>

²⁹⁹ European Commission, "The EU and Africa: towards a strategic partnership," updated on 19 December 2005, accessed 17 February 2021, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/PRES_05_367.

³⁰⁰ Thierry Vircoulon, "EUPOL Kinshasa and EUPOL RD Congo," In *European Security and Defence Policy: First 10 Years (1999-2009)*, ed. Giovanni Grevi, Damien Helly and Daniel Keohane (Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2010), 222.

³⁰¹ Claudia Morsut, "Effective Multilateralism? EU–UN Cooperation in the DRC, 2003–2006," *International Peacekeeping* 16, no 2 (2009): 263.

Sun City agreement, required a robust Congolese police force in the capital, dubbed as integrated police unit (IPU).³⁰²

The UN was already engaged in supporting the nation-wide police force, and felt the need to rely on another entity to take care of the IPU in Kinshasa. To take up the charge, the interim Congolese government officially invited the EU.³⁰³ The EU responded positively with the deployment of EUPOL Kinshasa to support the IPU in carrying out its tasks.³⁰⁴

EUPOL Kinshasa was not a large mission and initially had only 29 staff, including from two invited third countries, i.e. Turkey and Canada. Although the mission was approved in 2004, due to the internal discord within EU on the shape of the mission, it could be effectively deployed in 2005.³⁰⁵

The main yardstick for EUPOL Kinshasa's original mandate was to help build the capacity of IPU to secure national elections in 2006, which were held in a quite atmosphere.³⁰⁶ Nevertheless, the security situation still remained volatile in the country, warranting the EU to extend EUPOL's mandate with some modification.³⁰⁷ Updated as EUPOL RD Congo, the mission's modified mandate focused on security

³⁰² Morsut, "Effective Multilateralism? EU–UN Cooperation in the DRC, 2003–2006," 263.

³⁰³ Marta Martinelli, "Implementing the ESDP in Africa: The case of the Democratic Republic of Congo," In *European Security and Defence Policy: An Implementation Perspective*, ed. Michael Merlingen and Rasa Ostrauskaite, (Abingdon: Routledge, 2008), 118-119.

³⁰⁴ Catriona Gourlay, "The Politics of EU Civilian Interventions and the Strategic Deficit of CSDP," *EU Crisis Management Papers Series*, (Brussels: DCAF Brussels - ISIS Europe, 2012): 10-11.

³⁰⁵ Hans Hoebeke, Stéphanie Carette and Koen Vlassenroot, "EU Support to the Democratic Republic of Congo," (Brussels: Centre d'analyse stratégique, 2007): 9-10.

³⁰⁶ Morsut, "Effective Multilateralism? EU–UN Cooperation in the DRC, 2003–2006," 266.

³⁰⁷ Vircoulon, "EUPOL Kinshasa and EUPOL RD Congo," 222.

sector reform and expanded the scope to the entire Congolese national police force, with a Council Joint Action adopted in 2007.³⁰⁸

Answering the call from the EU, Turkey participated in EUPOL Kinshasa by contributing staff from June 2006 to June 2007.³⁰⁹ In June 2006, Turkey signed a framework agreement with the EU for participation in crisis management operations.³¹⁰ Turkey's participation in EUPOL Kinshasa came after the start of accession negotiations, passing beyond the period for the first milestone, but time-wise, it was deployed before the halt in negotiations. Not just by that margin alone, her drive to support EUPOL Kinshasa could easily be considered within the Europeanization context as Turkey consistently showed willingness to join CSDP initiatives since Concordia.

At the same time, her participation in CSDP had thus far been contained in the Balkans setting, a very strategic region for Turkey. DRC was not exactly considered as a strategic theatre for civilian intervention by Turkey at the time. However, the country simultaneously contributed to MONUC, including with a C-130 carrier. This fact establishes the premise to argue for Turkey's involvement in EUPOL Kinshasa on peacekeeping motives beyond purely impressing the EU. In other words, Turkey's contribution to EUPOL Kinshasa seems to be attributable to her Europeanization efforts as well as credentials in international peacekeeping.

³⁰⁸ Council of the European Union, "Council Joint Action 2007/405/CFSP on the European Union police mission undertaken in the framework of reform of the security sector (SSR) and its interface with the system of justice in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (EUPOL RD Congo)," Brussels: of 12 June 2007, accessed 11 November 2020, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32007E0405>

³⁰⁹ "Contribution of the TAF to Peace Support Operations," Turkish Armed Forces - General Staff, accessed 3 March 2021, <https://www.tsk.tr/Sayfalar?viewName=ContributionToTafToPeace>

³¹⁰ Official Journal of the European Union, "Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Turkey establishing a framework for the participation of the Republic of Turkey in the European Union crisis management operations," Brussels: 17 July 2006.

4.9. EUJUST LEX-Iraq

The Iraqi war came at a critical point in the shaping of CSDP, and is considered as one of the cases where the US and the EU fell into disagreement over intervention. The UK was a staunch supporter of the US's Iraq campaign, but this support did not find its echo with the other power houses of the Union, namely Germany and France.³¹¹ That being said, although EU member states were divergent in their position towards intervention during the war, they pursued a united effort in reconstructing Iraq in its aftermath through civilian measures.³¹²

In the aftermath of the invasion of Iraq, the security situation and public order was in a fragile condition. The vulnerabilities in the Iraqi criminal justice system were multilayered, not least due to lack of training, resources, infrastructure and staff.³¹³ The United Kingdom took the lead in rallying the EU to launch a mission to support Iraqis in the post-war period.³¹⁴ In fact, some member states had earlier engagements in training Iraqi police before the proposal for a rule of law mission was even tabled.³¹⁵ And it had to be a civilian mission because of the strong opposition by

³¹¹ Jonathan Spyer, "Europe and Iraq: Test Case for the Common Foreign and Security Policy," *Middle East Review of International Affairs* 11, no. 2 (2007): 94.

³¹² Erkan Ertosun, "AB Ortak Dış Politikası: Irak'ın Yeniden İnşası Örnek Olayı" [EU Common Foreign Policy: Reconstruction of Iraq as a Case Study], *Uluslararası Hukuk ve Politika* 10, no. 39 (2014): 2-3.

³¹³ Alina Christova, "Seven Years of EUJUST LEX: The Challenge of Rule of Law in Iraq," *Journal of Contemporary European Research* 9, no. 3 (2013): 427-428.

³¹⁴ Guido Steinberg, "The European Union Integrated Rule of Law Mission for Iraq (EUJUST LEX): A Policy Surrogate with Potential," In *the EU as a Strategic Actor in the Realm of Security and Defence: A Systematic Assessment of ESDP Missions and Operations*, ed. Muriel Asseburg and Ronja Kempin, (Berlin: German Institute for International and Security Affairs 2009), 126.

³¹⁵ Ertosun, "AB Ortak Dış Politikası: Irak'ın Yeniden İnşası Örnek Olayı" [EU Common Foreign Policy: Reconstruction of Iraq as a Case Study], 16.

especially Germany and France to any military intervention in Iraq as well as the existence of a NATO training mission for Iraqi military.³¹⁶

To formulate a relevant response to Iraq's post-war needs, the Council tasked an expert mission to the country which would be responsible to come up with recommendations for a future CSDP mission based on the circumstances of the Iraqi criminal justice system.³¹⁷ Pursuant to the findings of the said mission, the EU officially launched EUJUST LEX in Iraq in 2005.³¹⁸

The EUJUST LEX- Iraq, as provided for in the Council Joint Action 2005/190/CFSP of 7 March 2005, sought to strengthen the rule of law and promote respect for human rights through training and providing professional development of the senior cadres in the Iraqi police, judiciary and penitentiary sectors, and by promoting cooperation between them.³¹⁹

The rule of law mission was deployed when Iraq was still in a fragile security condition and because of that, in the first few years, the activities in its mandate were carried out in European capitals. When the mission was extended in 2009 for the third time, some pilot activities were carried out in Iraq following a breakthrough consensus in the EU.³²⁰ Afterwards, in 2011, the mission fully relocated to its headquarters in Iraq and continued with a reinforced mandate, still within the

³¹⁶ Ertosun, "AB Ortak Dış Politikası: Irak'ın Yeniden İnşası Örnek Olayı" [EU Common Foreign Policy: Reconstruction of Iraq as a Case Study],” 16.

³¹⁷ Stephen White, "EUJUST LEX – The EU Integrated Rule of Law Mission for Iraq". *Obrana A Strategie (Defence and Strategy)* 8, no. 2 (2008): 98.

³¹⁸ Council of the European Union, "Council Joint Action 2005/190/CFSP on the European Union Integrated Rule of Law Mission for Iraq, EUJUST LEX," Brussels:7 March 2005, accessed 16 March 2021, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32005E0190>

³¹⁹ Ibid.

³²⁰ Christova, "Seven Years of EUJUST LEX: The Challenge of Rule of Law in Iraq," 433.

boundaries of integrated rule of law, until 2013, ultimately training over 7,000 mid- and senior level Iraqi officers in the justice criminal system.³²¹

EUJUST LEX is widely considered as a success in bringing the opposing member states over the war in Iraq together with a meaningful civilian mission while cooperating with the US on the ground.³²² On the other hand, its ambitious objective to contribute to the emergence of a secure and stable Iraq through reforming the rule of law sounds overly optimistic, considering that training officers in the Iraqi criminal justice system would bear fruit in the long term.³²³

In terms of third country participation, the original Council Joint Action establishing the mission does not make reference to third countries save for trainings that could potentially be hosted by them.³²⁴ It was the amended Council Decision in 2010 that inserted a section on participation by third states as per the established parameters.³²⁵

³²¹ European Union External Action Service, “Factsheet on the EU Integrated Rule of Mission for Iraq (EUJUST LEX-Iraq),” last updated in January 2014, accessed 8 January 2021, https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/csdp/missions-and-operations/eujust-lex-iraq/pdf/facsheet_eujust-lex_iraq_en.pdf

³²² Ertosun, “AB Ortak Dış Politikası: Irak'ın Yeniden İnşası Örnek Olayı” [EU Common Foreign Policy: Reconstruction of Iraq as a Case Study],” 20.

³²³ Steinberg, “The European Union Integrated Rule of Law Mission for Iraq (EUJUST LEX): A Policy Surrogate with Potential,” 130.

³²⁴ Council of the European Union, “Council Joint Action 2005/190/CFSP on the European Union Integrated Rule of Law Mission for Iraq, EUJUST LEX,” Brussels: 7 March 2005, accessed 16 March 2021, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32005E0190>

³²⁵ Council of the European Union, “Council Decision 2010/330/CFSP on the European Union Integrated Rule of Law Mission for Iraq, EUJUST LEX-IRAQ,” Brussels: 14 June 2010, accessed 16 March 2021, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32010D0330&qid=1634145470364>

So far, only Norway is known to have contributed as a third state, and as host for trainings, Jordan and Egypt have also been involved.³²⁶

Since this was a mission undertaken in her geographical proximity, a neighbor country, Turkey was supposed to be consulted as per the agreed Nice Implementation Document.³²⁷ Similarly, as was within her rights based on the same document, Turkey also expected an invitation to join the mission, but to avail.³²⁸ When the invitation did not come, Turkey expressed her desire to contribute to EUJUST LEX-Iraq³²⁹ with no affirmative bounce back. Turkish Ambassador Kızıltan states that “not even symbolic consultations were held with Turkey when “EUJUST LEX” was launched in Iraq or “EUJUST Themis” in Georgia, as would have been possible under the provision of the Nice document regarding EU operations conducted in geographic proximity of non-EU allies or that may affect their national security interests.”³³⁰

Turkey has been a loyal defender of Iraq’s territorial integrity and called for a political dialogue to stabilize the country. She also provides substantial assistance in

³²⁶ Daniel Korski, "EUJUST LEX-Iraq," In *European Security and Defence Policy: First 10 Years (1999-2009)*, ed. Giovanni Grevi, Damien Helly and Daniel Keohane (Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2010).

³²⁷ Council of the European Union, “ESDP: Implementation of the Nice Provisions on the Involvement of the non-EU European Allies,” *Annex II Brussels European Council Presidency Conclusions*, 24-25 October 2002, accessed 13 January 2021, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/20917/72968.pdf>

³²⁸ Interview 2, Interview with a high-ranking Turkish diplomat, 23 July 2020, Ankara

³²⁹ Commission of the European Communities, *Turkey 2005 Progress Report*, Brussels: 2005, 128; “It (Turkey) has similarly expressed its desire to contribute to the EUJUST LEX in Iraq concerning the development the rule of law”.

³³⁰ Hanbay. “Involvement of Non-EU European NATO Members in Common Security and Defense Policy: The Turkish Case,” 83.

the reconstruction and economic development of Iraq.³³¹ Besides, Turkey contributed to the NATO's training mission NMI, from 2004 to 2011, as well as UN Iran – Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG) and UN Iraq – Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM).³³² Also at that time, there was a positive progress in Turkey's accession to the EU and her potential to fulfill the Copenhagen criteria.

The issue of non-participation for Turkey in the case of EUJUST LEX-Iraq has similarities with the EUJUST Themis in Georgia, with the former accepting Norway's request to participate at a later stage while the latter excluding third countries altogether.

Buharali perfectly explains this dynamic in his argument suggesting that at the crux of the disagreement between EU and Turkey when it comes to the lack of involvement of and consultations with Turkey pertaining to civilian missions in Iraq and Georgia lies the contrasting interpretation by the EU and Turkey, and officially NATO, of the Nice Implementation Document. Accordingly, the EU makes the case that it only covers the responsibility to consult Turkey for military operations, while activities undertaken in Iraq and Georgia fall under civilian operations, absolving the Union from the liability of consulting to or inviting Turkey.³³³

4.10. EUSEC RD Congo

The peace accords signed in 2002 also prescribes the reformation of the Congolese army, in addition to the police, and the disarmament of militia forces.³³⁴ EUPOL

³³¹ "Relations between Turkey and Iraq," *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey*, accessed 22 August 2021, <https://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkey-and-iraq.en.mfa>.

³³² "Contribution of the TAF to Peace Support Operations," *Turkish Armed Forces - General Staff*, accessed 19 August 2021, <https://www.tsk.tr/Sayfalar?viewName=ContributionToTafToPeace>.

³³³ Can Buharalı, "Better NATO-EU Relations Require More Sincerity," *Discussion Paper Series* (Centre for Economic and Foreign Policy Studies, 2011), 7.

³³⁴ Martinelli, "Implementing the ESDP in Africa: The case of the Democratic Republic of Congo," 120-122.

Kinshasa was mandated to take responsibility for the police section.³³⁵ Answering the request by the DRC government, to complement the efforts of EUPOL, and with the initiative taken by Belgium and France, EU decided to launch a technical assistance and practical support mission for the Congolese military.³³⁶

EUSEC RD Congo was the EU's first civilian mission in a military setting, tasked with security sector reform activities. Launched in 2005, the original wording of its legal instrument did not provide for third country participation.³³⁷ Later, it was amended and a third country participation prospect was incorporated but only for the project on improving the chain of payments for the Congolese army.³³⁸

The mission had limited staff and focus, and only a number of member states contributed to it.³³⁹ With a mandate running until 2016, the scope of the mission has evolved more towards security sector reforms.³⁴⁰

³³⁵ Caty Clément, "EUSEC RD Congo," In *European Security and Defence Policy: First 10 Years (1999-2009)*, ed. Giovanni Grevi, Damien Helly and Daniel Keohane (Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2010), 243-245.

³³⁶ Hans Hoebeke, Stéphanie Carette and Koen Vlassenroot, "EU Support to the Democratic Republic of Congo," (Brussels: Centre d'analyse stratégique, 2007), 10-11.

³³⁷ Council of the European Union, "Council Joint Action 2005/355/CFSP on the European Union mission to provide advice and assistance for security sector reform in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)," Brussels: 2 May 2005, accessed 22 October 2021, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32005E0355&qid=1634213195317>

³³⁸ Council of the European Union, "Council Joint Action 2005/868/CFSP amending Joint Action 2005/355/CFSP on the European Union mission to provide advice and assistance for security sector reform in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) with regard to setting up a technical assistance project on improving the chain of payments of the Ministry of Defence in the DRC," Brussels: 1 December 2005, accessed 3 April 2020, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32005E0868&qid=1634213109662>

³³⁹ Clément, "EUSEC RD Congo," 243-245.

³⁴⁰ Martinelli, "Implementing the ESDP in Africa: The case of the Democratic Republic of Congo," 120-122.

Even though the mission allowed third country participation on a project basis, there is no evidence of an explicit desire by Turkey to support EUSEC RD Congo, and the mission has only been supported by a limited number of EU military experts.³⁴¹ At the same time, Turkey was contributing to EUPOL Kinshasa, EUFOR RD Congo and UN's MONUC in the DRC. In the case of EUSEC RD Congo, Turkey's non-participation does not fit in the conceptual merits of Europeanization, peacekeeping or soft-balancing arguments as adopted in this study, but may be categorized as a choice with no clear motives discernable from public records.

On the other hand, to offer an interpretative point, because she was already involved in multiple crisis management missions/operations in DRC, Turkey may have chosen to divert her resources elsewhere.

4.11. AMM Aceh

The conflict between the Indonesian government and the Acehese independence movement known as GAM had been raging for 26 years when a ceasefire was reached in 2002. The ceasefire only managed a fragile peace environment. Negotiations commenced in 2003 on how to implement it,³⁴² only to break down shortly, leading to the imposition of state of emergency.³⁴³ In the wake of the tsunami that hit Indonesia in 2004, the Aceh conflict found a new push for settlement. This time, the Helsinki-based Crisis Management Initiative, founded by the former Finnish President Ahtisaari, assumed the negotiator role and brokered

³⁴¹ European External Action Service, "Factsheet on EUSEC RD Congo," updated in July 2015, accessed 2 November 2021, https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/csdp/missions-and-operations/eusec-rd-congo/pdf/factsheet_eusec_rd_congo_en.pdf

³⁴² International Crisis Group, "Aceh: A Fragile Peace," *Asia Report No. 47* (Jakarta/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 27 February 2003), accessed 22 October 2021, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/indonesia/aceh-fragile-peace>

³⁴³ International Crisis Group, "Aceh: A New Chance for Peace," *Asia Briefing No. 40* (Jakarta/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 15 August 2005), accessed 22 October 2021, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/indonesia/aceh-new-chance-peace>

talks in 2005.³⁴⁴ Consequently, the Indonesian government signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the GAM on 15 August 2005.

The MoU stipulated that a monitoring mission would be set up to follow the implementation of the peace process. Ahtisaari appealed to the Council for the deployment of a civilian mission to fulfill the tasks of monitoring as per the MoU. ASEAN would have been a quicker choice had it possessed the capacity for carrying out crisis management initiatives. Pressure by Finland, Sweden, the Netherlands and France moved the request up in the EU's agenda, hinting at a political ambition to prove CSDP's global reach stretching all the way to Asia.³⁴⁵

Ultimately, the first and only CSDP mission in Asia was greenlit by the Council on 9 September 2005 upon the invitation from the Indonesian government.³⁴⁶ Five ASEAN countries were also invited and they provided monitoring support to the mission.³⁴⁷

AMM's mandate had executive powers granted by the MoU but was limited to intervention relating to the core tasks of demilitarization and disarmament.³⁴⁸ The mandate of AMM included demobilization of GAM, decommissioning and

³⁴⁴ International Crisis Group, "Aceh: A New Chance for Peace"

³⁴⁵ Felix Heiduk, "ESDP in Asia: The Aceh Monitoring Mission in Indonesia," In *the EU as a Strategic Actor in the Realm of Security and Defence: A Systematic Assessment of ESDP Missions and Operations*, ed. Muriel Asseburg and Ronja Kempin, (Berlin: German Institute for International and Security Affairs 2009), 101.

³⁴⁶ Council of the European Union, "Council Joint Action 2005/643/CFSP on the European Union Monitoring Mission in Aceh (Indonesia) (Aceh Monitoring Mission — AMM)," Brussels: 9 September 2005, accessed 22 October 2021, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.L_.2005.234.01.0013.01.ENG

³⁴⁷ Thailand, Malaysia, Brunei, Philippines and Singapore; European External Action Service, "Factsheet on AMM Aceh," updated in December 2006, accessed 2 November 2021, https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/csdp/missions-and-operations/aceh-amm/pdf/15122006_factsheet_aceh-amm_en.pdf

³⁴⁸ Heiduk, "ESDP in Asia: The Aceh Monitoring Mission in Indonesia," 103-104.

destruction of its weapons, ammunition and explosives, reintegration of active GAM members, human rights situation and ruling on disputed amnesty cases.³⁴⁹

The EU deployed 125 monitors in December 2005 and ASEAN provided 93 staff. The demilitarization, demobilization and disarmament part of the mandate was successfully completed, but the mission had to be extended twice to cover the monitoring of the political process involving the passage of the Law on the Governance of Aceh and local elections.³⁵⁰

Terminated in December 2006, AMM Aceh is considered as a gratifying show of EU's CSDP capabilities and its multilateral flexibility.³⁵¹ The mission's legal basis allowed for participation from acceding states and third states, with Switzerland and Norway contributing monitors, along with five ASEAN countries.³⁵² Turkey did not participate in AMM Aceh, with no explicitly declared motive.

Judging by the period of Turkey-EU relations, the mission was announced during Turkey's strong Europeanization phase. Therefore, an argument for de-Europeanization would not be merited to explain her absence. On the other hand, Turkey's historical relations with Aceh, hailing from the Sultanate of Aceh, may be worth a look. Turkey focused on delivering humanitarian aid following the tsunami that hit the region in 2004. This pre-occupation, coupled with her little strategic interaction with Southeast Asian countries at that time, could present a basic reasoning for her non-involvement.

³⁴⁹ Council of the European Union, "Council Joint Action 2005/643/CFSP".

³⁵⁰ Kirsten E. Schulze, "AMM Aceh, Indonesia," In *European Security and Defence Policy: First 10 Years (1999-2009)*, ed. Giovanni Grevi, Damien Helly and Daniel Keohane (Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2010), 271-271.

³⁵¹ Heiduk, "ESDP in Asia: The Aceh Monitoring Mission in Indonesia," 110.

³⁵² European External Action Service, "Factsheet on AMM Aceh".

However, in light of the absence of a tangible lead to argue within Europeanization or soft-balancing terms, AMM Aceh appears to be a case where Turkey's non-participation does not indicate a clear motivation.

CHAPTER 5

SECOND AND THIRD MILESTONES: FROM NEGOTIATIONS TO 16 JULY 2016 COUP ATTEMPT AND FORWARD

From the start of negotiations in 2005, Turkey has been exposed to two major blockages of negotiation chapters in 2006 and 2009, including Greek Cyprus' unilateral blockage on foreign, security and defence policy chapter.³⁵³ Despite this, foreign policy alignment did not suffer greatly until the third milestone, i.e. failed coup attempt in Turkey.

A significant feature of this period in terms of the characteristics of CSDP crisis management missions/operations was the primacy of civilian missions over military ones. This is frequently attributed to the effects of the economic crisis in 2008 in Europe and the lack of appetite from member states to spend money on expensive military operations, compromising on civilian missions that cost less.³⁵⁴

In response to the series of crisis and instabilities unfolding in the African continent, CSDP undertook numerous post-conflict stabilization-oriented military, training and capacity building missions/operations in DRC, Chad, Central African Republic, South Sudan, Niger, Mali, Guinea-Bissau, Somalia and Libya. Some of them were deployed as a bridging measure for larger UN missions or at the request of UN as additional support, while some were designed for complementarity within CSDP, in cases such as Somalia. The EU also launched CSDP missions/operations in its immediate neighborhood, such as Kosovo, Ukraine and extending to Georgia, as well as in its larger neighborhood, particularly in the Middle East.

³⁵³ "Current Situation," Directorate for EU Affairs, updated in 2021, accessed 14 July 2021, https://www.ab.gov.tr/current-situation_65_en.html.

³⁵⁴ Tim Haesebrouck and Melanie Meirvenne, "EUFOR RCA and CSDP crisis management operations: back on track?," *European Foreign Affairs Review* 20 (2015): 276-277.

Within this period, Turkey's neighborhood experienced an upward trend in terms of conflicts. Arab Spring spiraled into complicated civil wars in Libya and Syria, right at Turkey's doorstep. Russian aggression towards Georgia and Ukraine, as well as the Transnistria conflict in Moldova all influenced the foreign policy actions on both Turkish and EU side, whose positions converged to varying degrees on these conflicts.³⁵⁵

Surrounded by active and frozen conflicts from all sides, Turkey's foreign policy was compelled to assert a more active role.³⁵⁶ Turkey's operations in Syria were met with criticism from the EU although both actors cooperated in fighting against the Islamic State.³⁵⁷ Turkey also initiated a multidimensional engagement in Africa by leveraging her soft power.³⁵⁸

Despite differences on the conduct of foreign and security policy in Syria and Iraq, and the ever-present difficulties implicated by Greek Cyprus' EU membership, and in the face of growing threats around Turkey, EU membership still maintained its primacy as a foreign policy goal for Turkey.³⁵⁹

Unlike the case in the period between first and second milestones, CSDP missions/operations that were deployed from the second milestone and onwards

³⁵⁵ Tarık Oğuzlu, "Turkey and Europeanization of Foreign Policy?," *Political Science Quarterly* 125, no. 4 (2010): 665-666. For more information, see Turkey Reports published during this period at: https://www.ab.gov.tr/regular-progress-reports_46224_en.html, accessed 21 July 2021

³⁵⁶ Fuat Keyman and Şebnem Gümüüşü, "Turkey's Proactive Foreign Policy under the AKP," In *Democracy, Identity, and Foreign Policy in Turkey*, (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 70-83.

³⁵⁷ Çiğdem Nas, "AB'nin Suriye Krizine Bakışı: Türkiye Bir Ortak Mı? (The EU's Approach to the Syrian Crisis: Turkey as a Partner?)," *Uluslararası İlişkiler Dergisi* 16, no. 62 (2019): 55.

³⁵⁸ Kenan Toprak, "Turkey's return to Africa and its implications," *Observer Research Foundation*, 25 June 2021, accessed 3 September 2021, <https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/turkeys-return-to-africa-and-its-implications/>

³⁵⁹ Meltem Müftüler-Baç, "Assessing Turkey's Foreign Policy Choices towards the European Union," *Insight Turkey* 19, no. 1 (2017): 118-119.

allowed third country participation. Turkey was regularly invited to CSDP missions/operations within this time span, and participated in four of them, but the EU's tendency to ignore Turkey's calls to consult with her regarding missions/operations in her neighborhood remained unheeded by the EU.³⁶⁰

As a rising actor in peace-keeping, Turkey's involvement in NATO and UN missions at times coincided with CSDP missions/operations in the same crisis theatre. In cases where cooperation with NATO was encouraged by EU member states for more effective outcomes from CSDP engagements, there was a tendency of Turkish rejection due to counter-restrictions by Greek Cyprus, precipitating an inter-institutional soft-balancing tradition. Despite these ups and downs, Turkey-CSDP synergy was still viable.

Things took a different turn with the failed coup attempt in Turkey against the legitimate government by Fethullah terrorist organization and the ensuing state of emergency, a much critical event that led to the re-assessment of Turkey's foreign and security policy.³⁶¹ The state of emergency and the transition of government into a presidential system were heavily criticized by the EU.³⁶² Turkey-EU accession negotiations were exposed to calls for suspension and foreign and security policy alignment markedly deteriorated in the Commission's country reports.³⁶³ In the mainstream media and general debate, the 18 March Statement – mistakenly regarded by the EU as merely about migration – seemed to be the only remnant of decades of Turkey-EU cooperation.

³⁶⁰ Interview 2, Interview with a high ranking Turkish diplomat, 13 May 2020, Ankara

³⁶¹ Ayşe Sözen Usluer, "The July 15 Failed Coup Attempt and its Implications for Turkish Foreign Policy," *Bilig* (Journal of Social Sciences of the Turkic World) no. 79 (2016): 23.

³⁶² Kürşad Ertuğrul, and Öznur Akcalı Yılmaz, "The Otherness of Turkey in European Integration," *Turkish Studies* 19, no. 1 (2017): 63.

³⁶³ European Commission, *Turkey 2018; 2019; 2020 Reports*, accessed 3 November 2021, https://www.ab.gov.tr/regular-progress-reports_46224_en.html

The tensions over the equitable distribution of hydrocarbon sources in the Eastern Mediterranean, setting off a major fall-out between Greece-Turkey relations, and ensnaring the whole of the Union in a standoff against Turkey, occupied almost the entire Turkey-EU foreign and security policy agenda.

After the third and final milestone, CSDP only fielded four missions/operations: EUAM Iraq, EUAM RCA, EUTM Mozambique and Operation Iriini, the latter being a bone of contention between Turkey and EU. As far as the access of this study, Turkey was not invited to participate, nor did she show a particular interest. Despite all this turbulence, Turkey still maintains her contribution to EU's largest operation ever, Althea in BiH.

The following sections are dedicated to each of the missions/operations deployed by the EU in the period between the start of accession negotiations until present.

5.1. EUPOL COPPS / Palestinian Territories

Conceived out of a police formation project financed by the UK's Department for International Development,³⁶⁴ now within the FCO, the EU Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories – EU Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support, or EUPOL COPPS, was the first CSDP engagement in the Palestine, a territory engulfed in conflict for decades.³⁶⁵

Upon the request from the Palestinian Authority by a letter dated 25 October 2005, EU launched the Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories by adopting Council Joint Action 2005/797/CFSP, which built upon the existing EU Coordination Office

³⁶⁴ Malin Palm, "Accountability and Effectiveness of CSDP Missions: The Role of Civil Society - The Case of EULEX Kosovo and EUPOL COPPS," *European Peacebuilding Liaison Office*, 2010.

³⁶⁵ Ari Kerkkänen, Hannu Rantanen and Jari Sundqvist, "Building Capacity for the Palestinian Civil Police: EUPOL COPPS and Communications Project," *CMC Finland Civilian Crisis Management Studies* (Helsinki: Crisis Management Centre Finland, 2008), 2-3.

for Palestinian Police Support.³⁶⁶ While the green light to launch a mission to support the Palestinian security sector was the fruit of a successful consensus building among member states, COPPS mission was also expected to raise the visibility of EU in one of the most complicated conflicts in the world and test the resilience of CSDP.³⁶⁷

The main goals for EU's involvement in the Palestinian security sector were two-fold: the first was to re-build the institutions that were largely damaged during the First Intifada in 2000-2003. And the second was to reform and strengthen the fragmented and non-transparent security organs following Arafat's rule.³⁶⁸ Meanwhile, the main concern from the Union was ensuring that the Palestinian Authority remains committed to its obligations as per the 2003 Road Map agreed by the Quartet to restore order and fight against terrorism.³⁶⁹ Correspondingly, EUPOL COPPS would train, advice and equip the Palestinian police.

The mission was originally designed for three years, but its mandate has been extended until June 2022, now containing a rule of law dimension as well.³⁷⁰ When the mission was fully prepared to be deployed, Hamas won legislative elections and gained control of the Interior Ministry, a key partner for EUPOL COPPS, prompting the EU to postpone operationalization until a transitional government took over in

³⁶⁶ Council of the European Union, "Council Joint Action 2005/797/CFSP on the European Union Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories," Brussels: 14 November 2005, accessed 17 August 2021, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?toc=OJ%3AL%3A2005%3A300%3ATOC&uri=uriserv%3AOJ.L_.2005.300.01.0065.01.ENG

³⁶⁷ Gourlay, "The Politics of EU Civilian Interventions and the Strategic Deficit of CSDP," 10.

³⁶⁸ Muriel Asseburg, "The ESDP Missions in the Palestinian Territories (EUPOLL COPPS, EUBAM Rafah): Peace Through Security?," In *the EU as a Strategic Actor in the Realm of Security and Defence: A Systematic Assessment of ESDP Missions and Operations*, ed. Muriel Asseburg and Ronja Kempin, (Berlin: German Institute for International and Security Affairs 2009), 84-87.

³⁶⁹ Asseburg, "The ESDP Missions in the Palestinian Territories (EUPOLL COPPS, EUBAM Rafah): Peace Through Security?," 84-87.

³⁷⁰ European External Action Service, "The EU Mission for the Support of Palestinian Police and Rule of Law," accessed 16 August 2021, <https://eupolcopps.eu/page/mission/en>.

2007.³⁷¹ After being fully deployed, EUPOL COPPS also supported institution-building in Palestine, the mission helped establish the rule of law and order in Palestine by building the Palestinian police force's capacity of legal sanctions.³⁷²

The legal text authorizing EUPOL COPPS permits participation of third states. Initially, the mission accommodated around 30 international staff, but then grew to 41 in 2009 (contributions from 15 member states plus Canada and Norway), and 16 local staff.³⁷³ Commission's Progress Report on Turkey in 2006 recounts Turkey's expressed interest to support EUPOL COPPS and any other mission taking place in Palestine.³⁷⁴ However, it was not until 2013 that Turkey's participation became a reality: Turkey provided a police officer in advisory capacity from September 2013 until March 2014.³⁷⁵ Currently, Turkish participation is absent but calls for vacancies are being answered with applications by Turkish authorities.³⁷⁶

As a predominantly Muslim country, Turkey's foreign policy is devoted to mobilizing international support for the Palestinian statehood and the country is a globally vocal sponsor of the two-state solution to the conflict. Palestine-Israel conflict is one of the common grounds between Turkish and EU foreign policies. Even though the timing of Turkey's eventual contribution to the mission arguably coincides with her selective Europeanization phase, the intention has its origins in 2006, when the EU was a stronger anchor.

³⁷¹ Esra Bulut, "EUPOL COPPS," In *European Security and Defence Policy: First 10 Years (1999-2009)*, ed. Giovanni Grevi, Damien Helly and Daniel Keohane (Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2010), 289-291.

³⁷² Taylan Özgür Kaya, "Avrupa Birliği'nin Ortadoğu Barış Sürecindeki Rolünün Analizi," *Ortadoğu Etütleri* 2. no. 3 (2010): 92-93.

³⁷³ Asseburg, "The ESDP Missions in the Palestinian Territories (EUPOLL COPPS, EUBAM Rafah): Peace Through Security?," 86-87.

³⁷⁴ Commission of the European Communities, *Turkey Progress Report*, Brussels: 2006, 69-70.

³⁷⁵ Interview 2, Interview with a high-ranking Turkish diplomat, 23 July 2020, Ankara.

³⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

Nevertheless, a point could still be made that Turkey fulfilled EU's expectations by answering the EU's call to support its mission. And similar to the EU, Turkey has provided substantial humanitarian assistance to the Palestinian territories and rallied support for two-state solution by bringing it to the global agenda through multilateral diplomacy, both actions favored by the CFSP's principles, ideals and norms.

5.2. EUBAM Rafah

The Israeli and Palestinians signed an agreement in 2005 on movement and access to facilitate Palestinians crossing between Gaza and the West Bank, which formed a significant link of the peace process.³⁷⁷ It also opened the Gaza-Egypt border, known as the Rafah Crossing, and delegated it under the EU's supervision with a supplement to the agreement titled "Agreed Principles for Rafah Crossing".³⁷⁸

The mandate of EUPOL COPPS excluded the Gaza Strip, which was under Hamas influence, and the EU sought to support the territorial continuity between the West Bank and Gaza by contributing to the implementation of the agreement as a third party.³⁷⁹ Upon the invitation by the Palestinian Authority and the state of Israel, the EU planned to deploy a mission to manage the border crossings in Rafah, namely the European Union Border Assistance Mission for the Rafah Crossing Point (EU BAM Rafah).³⁸⁰

³⁷⁷ "Agreement on Movement and Access," PA-X: Peace Agreements Database, 15 November 2005, accessed 14 May 2021, <https://www.peaceagreements.org/view/139/Agreement%20on%20Movement%20and%20Access>.

³⁷⁸ For full details of the agreement and the supplement: "Agreed Documents on Movement and Access from and to Gaza," *Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs*, accessed 15 May 2021, <https://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/peace/mfadocuments/pages/agreed%20documents%20on%20movement%20and%20access%20from%20and%20to%20gaza%2015-nov-2005.aspx>.

³⁷⁹ Asseburg, "The ESDP Missions in the Palestinian Territories (EUPOLL COPPS, EUBAM Rafah): Peace Through Security?," 88-89.

³⁸⁰ Council of the European Union, "Council Joint Action 2005/889/CFSP on establishing a European Union Border Assistance Mission for the Rafah Crossing Point (EU BAM Rafah)," Brussels: 12 December 2005, accessed 15 May 2021, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32005E0889>.

Although the mission was fast operationalized, unlike the concomitant EU POL COPPS, it faced subsequent challenges in ensuring regular crossings. The first incident curtailing crossings was the kidnapping of an Israeli soldier. Later in 2007, Hamas gained control in the Gaza Strip, only humanitarian aid activities were allowed, suspending the functions of the mission.³⁸¹ Currently, the crossing remains closed due to clashes between Hamas and Israeli forces. EUBAM Rafah still remains operational but on a standby until the political and security conditions are favorable to redeploy to the crossing.³⁸²

As per the Council Joint Action that approved EUBAM Rafah, third countries may contribute within the established parameters. Turkey's desire to participate in CSDP missions in Occupied Palestinian Territories was mentioned in Commission's Progress Report in 2006.³⁸³ Yet, there is no official statement explaining non-participation in EUBAM Rafah.

One might argue that her long-standing contribution to the Temporary International Presence in the city of Hebron ("TIPH") would render an additional involvement in EUBAM Rafah redundant. TIPH was also an important instrument of the peace process with a mandate to "promote the well-being, security and stability of the Palestinians living in Hebron".³⁸⁴ Turkey, along with Norway, Italy, Denmark,

³⁸¹ Esra Bulut, "EUBAM Rafah," In *European Security and Defence Policy: First 10 Years (1999-2009)*, ed. Giovanni Grevi, Damien Helly and Daniel Keohane (Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2010), 302-303.

³⁸² European External Action Service, "European Union Border Assistance Mission for the Rafah Crossing Point (EUBAM Rafah)," accessed 27 June 2021, <https://www.eubam-rafah.eu/en/node/5048>.

³⁸³ European Commission, *Turkey 2006 Report*, Brussels: 2006, 69,70.

³⁸⁴ "Agreement on Temporary International Presence in the City of Hebron (II)," UN Peacemaker, accessed 12 September 2021, <https://peacemaker.un.org/israelopt-cityhebronII97>.

Sweden and Switzerland, was a monitoring state from 1997³⁸⁵ until TIPH's overhaul in 2019 by then Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu.³⁸⁶

In the absence of substantial elements to make a case in the context of Europeanization, EUBAM Rafah appears to be a mission where Turkey's non-participation did not present clear motives. Still, given her deep involvement in Palestine's fate as well as her support to TIPH and EUPOL COPPS, her peacekeeping credentials should not be ignored.

5.3. EUFOR RD Congo

After the ceasefire signaling an end to the conflict in the DRC, a transitional government was established, and it was envisaged that democratic elections would be held in 2006 to lead the country onto the path to stability. The international community mobilized under the UN roof with a stabilization mission, namely MONUC, to supervise the implementation of the ceasefire.³⁸⁷

The UN viewed elections as the exit strategy from DRC and focused on securing the elections, concerned with a potential revival of armed conflict in the aftermath. Unfortunately, seeing that MONUC's capacity was rather limited to cover the entire process, and despite repeated calls from then UN Secretary General Kofi Annan to reinforce the mission, MONUC was in need of a support system.³⁸⁸ This stimulated

³⁸⁵ "Contribution of the TAF to Peace Support Operations," Turkish Armed Forces - General Staff, accessed 12 September 2021, <https://www.tsk.tr/Sayfalar?viewName=ContributionToTafToPeace>

³⁸⁶ Noa Landau and Yotam Berger, "Israel to expel international monitoring force in Hebron after 20-year presence," *Haaretz*, updated 2 February 2019, <https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-israel-to-expel-international-monitoring-force-in-hebron-after-20-year-presence-1.6883412>.

³⁸⁷ "United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC)," UN Peacekeeping, accessed 28 September 2021, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/monuc/>

³⁸⁸ Denis M. Tull, "EUFOR RD Congo: A Success, but not a Model," *In the EU as a Strategic Actor in the Realm of Security and Defence: A Systematic Assessment of ESDP Missions and Operations*, ed. Muriel Asseburg and Ronja Kempin, (Berlin: German Institute for International and Security Affairs 2009), 46-47.

the UN to approach the EU, who accepted to deploy a CSDP military operation to DRC as per the mandate given by the UN Resolution 1671.³⁸⁹

The UK was already deeply engaged in Iraq and Afghanistan at the time, and made it abundantly clear that she was not going to steer this operation, while France felt that after commanding Artemis in the same country, it was another member state's turn to take the wheel. As a result, Germany was left with the task of commanding the operation.³⁹⁰

The Council issued a Joint Action in April 2006, authorizing the launch of EUFOR RD Congo, charging it to support MONUC and contribute to protecting civilians as well as the security at the airport as laid down in UNSC Resolution 1671.³⁹¹ On 30 July 2006, the EU deployed EUFOR RD Congo with 4,000 troops at service.³⁹² EUFOR's mandate was for 6 months, and in spite of requests by France and Belgium, and in favor of Germany's opposition, it was not extended further.³⁹³

The Council Joint Action authorizing the deployment of EUFOR RD Congo laid out the terms for third state participation, particularly specifying that all non-EU European NATO members and accession candidates shall be invited.³⁹⁴ Based on

³⁸⁹ "Resolution 1671," S/RES/1671, United Nations Security Council, Session 5421, 2006.

³⁹⁰ Martinelli, "Implementing the ESDP in Africa: The case of the Democratic Republic of Congo," 122.

³⁹¹ Council of the European Union, "Council Joint Action 2006/319/CFSP on the European Union military operation in support of the United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) during the election process," Brussels: 27 April 2006, accessed 2 September 2021, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32006E0319>.

³⁹² Claudia Major, "EUFOR RD Congo," In *European Security and Defence Policy: First 10 Years (1999-2009)*, ed. Giovanni Grevi, Damien Helly and Daniel Keohane (Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2010), 314.

³⁹³ Major, "EUFOR RD Congo," 315.

³⁹⁴ Council of the European Union, "Council Joint Action 2006/319/CFSP"

that statement, the EU invited Turkey to participate, who responded by assigning two military officers and a C-130 military transport aircraft.³⁹⁵

In approving to send staff for EUFOR RD Congo, Turkish Grand National Assembly attributed the motives for contribution to consolidation of Turkey's candidacy to the EU, her continued support to CSDP, and her resolve to take part in peacekeeping missions.³⁹⁶ In view of the official statement, it is safe to claim that Turkey's participation in EUFOR RD Congo was on the grounds of her Europeanization perspective as well as raising her peacekeeper profile.

5.4. EUPOL Afghanistan

Afghanistan has been a stage of active international engagement since the 11 September attacks, the fall of the Taliban regime, followed by the formation of an interim government within the framework of the Bonn agreement. Subsequently, the UN Security Council mandated International Security Assistance Force, or ISAF, and UN civilian assistance mission UNAMA.³⁹⁷ NATO later took over the operation of ISAF under UK command, and also launched the Resolute Support Mission or RSM for short, to "train, advice and assist Afghan security forces and institutions to fight terrorism and secure their country".³⁹⁸

Having faced decades of civil war, Afghanistan had barely time or capacity to develop its institutions and governance. The international community has been present in the country to help build capacity of the Afghan state in various areas,

³⁹⁵ Contribution of the TAF to Peace Support Operations," Turkish Armed Forces - General Staff, accessed 30 September 2021, <https://www.tsk.tr/Sayfalar?viewName=ContributionToTafToPeace>

³⁹⁶ "Resolution No 876 on authorizing Government Action pursuant to Articles 92 and 117 of the Constitution," Turkish Grand National Assembly, *Official Gazette*, Ankara: 2006, accessed 3 September 2021, <https://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2006/06/20060629-1.htm>.

³⁹⁷ Luis Peral, "EUPOL Afghanistan," In *European Security and Defence Policy: First 10 Years (1999-2009)*, ed. Giovanni Grevi, Damien Helly and Daniel Keohane (Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2010), 326.

³⁹⁸ NATO, "NATO and Afghanistan," updated 16 September 2021, accessed 22 September 2021, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_8189.htm.

from security sector to nation-building.³⁹⁹ However, the fragmented efforts from different actors hampered the pace of reformation that Afghanistan needed. Meanwhile, the US maintained its superior strategic presence in Afghanistan over other actors.⁴⁰⁰

Within the EU circle, it was Finland who brought up the proposal for a CSDP mission in Afghanistan, and Germans had expertise given their involvement in the Bonn process and training Afghan police.⁴⁰¹ The EU assembled a fact finding mission to Afghanistan to evaluate a potential role it could play in reconstructing the country. The EU was inspired by the findings to deploy a security sector reform mission aimed at training the Afghan police and supporting the rule of law.⁴⁰²

There were collateral reasons behind beefing up EU presence in Afghanistan, despite the lack of appetite from some member states.⁴⁰³ For starters, the EU was absent from the Afghan scene save for financial and humanitarian assistance. And equally important was the mounting pressure from the US to step up European engagement in Afghanistan.⁴⁰⁴

³⁹⁹ Maxime H.A. Larivé, "From Speeches to Actions: EU Involvement in the War in Afghanistan through the EUPOL Afghanistan Mission," *European Security* 21, no. 2 (2012): 194.

⁴⁰⁰ Eva Gross, "Security Sector Reform in Afghanistan: the EU's Contribution," *Occasional Paper Series*, (Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2009).

⁴⁰¹ Gourlay, "The Politics of EU Civilian Interventions and the Strategic Deficit of CSDP," 12.

⁴⁰² Larivé, "From Speeches to Actions: EU Involvement in the War in Afghanistan through the EUPOL Afghanistan Mission," 194.

⁴⁰³ Gourlay, "The Politics of EU Civilian Interventions and the Strategic Deficit of CSDP," 12.

⁴⁰⁴ Andrew Wilder, "Cops and Robbers? The Struggle to Reform the Afghan National Police," *Issues Paper Series*, (Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, 2007), 22. For a more current review: Scott N. Siegel, "Bearing their Share of the Burden: Europe in Afghanistan," *European Security* 18, no. 4 (2009): 461-482.

Following the Fact-Finding Mission to Afghanistan in 2006, and a letter of invitation from the Afghan Government in 2007, the EU adopted Council Joint Action 2007/369/CFSP in May 2007 to launch EUPOL Afghanistan.⁴⁰⁵ This was the first CSDP civilian mission deployed in an active conflict zone, which brought its challenges on the efficacy of the mission.⁴⁰⁶

EUPOL Afghanistan encouraged participation from third states, and received contributions from Canada, New Zealand and Norway.⁴⁰⁷ By the wording of the relevant Joint Action, candidate countries and third states were to be invited.⁴⁰⁸ In that connection, Turkey was also invited but opted out.⁴⁰⁹

Turkey has a strong involvement in Afghanistan and friendly bilateral relations.⁴¹⁰ She took an active role in the reconstruction and development of Afghanistan, including through her contribution to the UN Assistance Mission (UNAMA). Turkey heavily engaged to forge closer cooperation between Afghanistan and Pakistan in a trilateral format. Turkey also spearheaded a diplomatic initiative by launching a

⁴⁰⁵ Council of the European Union, "Council Joint Action 2007/369/CFSP on establishment of the European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan," Brussels: 30 May 2007, accessed 4 September 2021, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32007E0369>.

⁴⁰⁶ Thierry Tardy, "EUPOL Afghanistan 2007/16: Mission Impossible?," *Brief Issue 22*, (Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2017), 1.

⁴⁰⁷ Christopher S. Chivvis, "EU Civilian Crisis Management: The Record So Far," (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2010), 19.

⁴⁰⁸ Council of the European Union, "Council Joint Action 2007/369/CFSP on establishment of the European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan," Brussels: 30 May 2007, accessed 4 September 2021, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32007E0369>.

⁴⁰⁹ Interview 2, Interview with a high-ranking Turkish diplomat, 23 July 2020. Ankara.

⁴¹⁰ Turkey does not recognize the current Taliban regime in Afghanistan. For more details on Turkey-Afghan relations: "Turkey-Afghanistan Relations," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, accessed 5 September 2021, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey_afghanistan-bilateral-political-relations.en.mfa.

regional framework called “Heart of Asia-Istanbul Process” for enhanced cooperation, peace and stability.⁴¹¹

On the field, Turkey was one of the biggest contributors to ISAF since 2001 and has shouldered the leadership of the force multiple times.⁴¹² When the ISAF was terminated to launch a non-combatant mission RSM⁴¹³, Turkey continued her support, perhaps most notably by providing the security of Hamid Karzai Afghanistan International Airport.⁴¹⁴

At this point, it should be mentioned that with such scale of NATO presence in Afghanistan, EUPOL’s imperfect security arrangement was due in part to a lack of an agreement for exchanging classified information between NATO and EU.⁴¹⁵ Turkey’s veto over such an agreement to balance against Greece and particularly Greek Cyprus could be regarded within institutional soft-balancing. Although the veto was not specifically aimed at this mission, it impacted the overall success and the member states’ view of EUPOL Afghanistan.

Still, this is far from justifying Turkey’s non-participation to the mission since Turkey has participated in numerous CSDP activities despite the souring impact of her veto over exchange of classified information. Instead, it might have been her profound involvement in UN and NATO crisis management initiatives that have left Turkey with little desire to support another mission in an already crowded scene.

⁴¹¹ Nilüfer Karcasulu, “Reconstruction of Afghanistan and the Role of Turkey,” *Journal of Central Asia and Caucasia Studies* 5, no. 10 (2010):51-53.

⁴¹² George E Gruen, "Turkey's Role in Peacekeeping Missions," *American Foreign Policy Interests* 28, no 6 (2006): 440.

⁴¹³ After the Taliban takeover in Afghanistan, RSM was also terminated in September 2021.

⁴¹⁴ Contribution of the TAF to Peace Support Operations, "Turkish Armed Forces - General Staff, accessed 2 October 2021, <https://www.tsk.tr/Sayfalar?viewName=ContributionToTafToPeace>

⁴¹⁵ Chivvis, “EU Civilian Crisis Management: The Record So Far,” 27.

On the Europeanization front, Afghanistan case does not present any divergences between Turkey and the EU in the realms of foreign and security policy, as she has supported multilateral initiatives for ensuring peace and stability in the country as well as worked alongside EU countries on the field. The outstanding assessment remains for this study that there is no clear motive behind Turkey's non-participation to EUPOL Afghanistan.

5.5. EUFOR Tchad/RCA

The conflict in the Darfur region of Sudan uprooted thousands of people who sought refuge in the neighboring Chad and Central African Republic (CAR). The conflict environment intensified and permeated through the borders of Sudan into Chad and CAR. The situation was aggravated by the tension among local tribes who have long been competing for scarce sources of arable land, food and water in the Sahel, a region grappling with very high poverty.⁴¹⁶

Darfur also served as the base of operations for rebels opposing Chadian President Déby's rule, but the base shifted to eastern Chad while opposition grew larger, turning into proxy warfare between Chad and Sudan, both of which are known to be stoking violence against each other.⁴¹⁷

At the time, there was an existing international conflict management presence in the region because of the outbreak in Darfur. The AU-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) had civilian, police and military pillars, about which Chadian President Déby held unfavorable views, prompting France to consider taking the lead for a political CSDP action to support the UN military mission. However, later on, the EU took on a rather military/security role whereas the UN held the political and

⁴¹⁶ Gerald Hainzl and Walter Feichtinger, "EUFOR Tchad/RCA Revisited – A Synopsis," In *EUFOR Tchad / RCA: Revisited*, (Vienna: Austrian Armed Forces, 2011), 7-8.

⁴¹⁷ Alexander T.J. Mattelaer, "The Strategic Planning of EU Military Operations - the Case of EUFOR TCHAD/RCA," *Institute for European Studies Working Paper 5* (2008): 6-8.

humanitarian tasks. Subsequently, the UN also launched a mission in Chad and CAR, called MINURCAT, with police and military personnel.⁴¹⁸

Owing to France's historical ties with former colonies and the role she still plays in these countries' security, it goes without saying that France was instrumental in initiating an EU operation.⁴¹⁹ The Council took the decision to deploy a bridging military operation to support the UN's efforts in securing civilians and humanitarian aid deliveries.⁴²⁰ The legal endorsement of EUFOR was the same that authorized MINURCAT, namely UNSCR 1778. In 2009, the UN absorbed EUFOR, ending its mandate.⁴²¹

EUFOR Tchad/RCA allowed third state participation, and received contributions from Russia, Albania and Croatia.⁴²² Even though invited, Turkey did not participate in EUFOR Tchad/RCA, for which no official statement is available, making it a case of non-participation without a clear motive.

On the other hand, Turkey contributed a C-160 transport aircraft as part of NATO's support to the African Union's Darfur mission between 2005-2007, along with

⁴¹⁸ Mattelaer, "The Strategic Planning of EU Military Operations - the Case of EUFOR TCHAD/RCA," 6-8.

⁴¹⁹ Patrick Berg, "EUFOR Tchad/RCA: The EU Serving French Interests," In *the EU as a Strategic Actor in the Realm of Security and Defence: A Systematic Assessment of ESDP Missions and Operations*, ed. Muriel Asseburg and Ronja Kempin, (Berlin: German Institute for International and Security Affairs 2009), 57.

⁴²⁰ Council of the European Union, "Council Joint Action 2007/677/CFSP on the European Union military operation in the Republic of Chad and in the Central African Republic," Brussels: 15 October 2007, accessed 16 May 2021, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32007E0677>

⁴²¹ European External Action Service, "Factsheet on EUFOR Tchad/RCA," last modified in March 2009, accessed 19 May 2021, https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/csdp/missions-and-operations/eufor-tchad-rca/pdf/01032009_factsheet_eufor-tchad-rca_en.pdf

⁴²² Damien Helly, "EUFOR Tchad/RCA," In *European Security and Defence Policy: First 10 Years (1999-2009)*, ed. Giovanni Grevi, Damien Helly and Daniel Keohane (Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2010), 340.

personnel to UNAMID between 2006 and 2011.⁴²³ Based on this information, it could be reasoned that Turkey's existing support under NATO and UN might have impacted the decision to refrain from simultaneously supporting an EU mission.

5.6. EULEX Kosovo

The Dayton Accords signed in 1995 did not bring the change Kosovar Albanians longed for, nor did it contain any sign of amelioration of their status. Changing their tactics of resistance, Kosovar Albanians formed the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) in 1997, which provoked a response from the Milosevic regime in the form of brutal crackdowns and severe human rights abuses. These events prompted negotiations that were held in Rambouillet, but to no avail, even though Kosovar Albanians agreed to the deal that entailed disarming the KLA, autonomy for Kosovo and NATO force for security.⁴²⁴

When Milosevic rejected the deal, without an explicit UNSC mandate, NATO began an air campaign lasting for 78 days. Facing defeat, Milosevic agreed to observe UNSC Resolution 1244, with the promise of deciding on a form of autonomy for Kosovo in future negotiations, along with authorizing a UN mission in Kosovo, known as UNMIK, and international security presence under NATO, officially KFOR.⁴²⁵

By 2004, the delays and uncertainty surrounding the future status of Kosovo gradually grew into a major problem, leading to violent protests and attacks on Serbian enclaves in Kosovo.⁴²⁶ At this point, the UN looked for an exit from Kosovo,

⁴²³ Contribution of the TAF to Peace Support Operations, "Turkish Armed Forces - General Staff, accessed 23 May 2021, <https://www.tsk.tr/Sayfalar?viewName=ContributionToTafToPeace>

⁴²⁴ Tim Judah, *Kosovo: What Everyone Needs to Know* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 78-84.

⁴²⁵ Judah, *Kosovo: What Everyone Needs to Know*, 85-92.

⁴²⁶ James Ker-Lindsay, *Kosovo: the Path to Contested Statehood in the Balkans* (London: Tauris, 2012), 20-24.

and the Western capitals sought to delay the eventual status of Kosovo to the extent possible.⁴²⁷ In the face of the tightening tension, UNMIK and KFOR lost their aura of invulnerability and invincibility.⁴²⁸ It was the US that urged the actors to hold status talks, with the eventuality of giving Kosovo independence, which left little room for the EU states.⁴²⁹

Kai Eide, a senior Norwegian diplomat appointed by the UN Secretary General to assess the political situation for direct status talks, put forward in his report that it was time for the EU to take bigger responsibility in Kosovo, hinting at an EU takeover from UNMIK.⁴³⁰

Meanwhile, as per the Ahtisaari Plan, the International Steering Group for Kosovo was set up for status talks. The group was charged with the appointment and management of the International Civilian Representative for Kosovo.⁴³¹ Following deliberations, the EU Special Representative (EUSR) for Kosovo was also appointed as the International Civilian Representative, a position with wide executive powers.⁴³²

As the EU started preparing for a potential CSDP mission, dissonance soared as the member states harbored widely different positions towards the question of Kosovar

⁴²⁷ Mark Weller, "Negotiating the final status of Kosovo," *Chaillot Paper* 114 (Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2008), 17-22.

⁴²⁸ Ker-Lindsay, *Kosovo: the Path to Contested Statehood in the Balkans*, 21.

⁴²⁹ Pohl, *EU Foreign Policy and Crisis Management Operations*, 77.

⁴³⁰ NATO, "'Kosovo: the way forward' by Kai Eide, Ambassador of Norway to NATO," updated 4 November 2008, accessed 8 April 2021, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_21120.htm%3FselectedLocale%3Den.

⁴³¹ Weller, "Negotiating the final status of Kosovo," 52.

⁴³² United Nation Security Council, "Addendum to the Letter dated 26 March 2007 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council, Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement," 2007.

independence. The Quint member states all backed the Ahtisaari's end-solution, but due to their domestic political realities, Spain, Greek Cyprus, Greece, Romania and Slovakia was against Kosovo's independence.⁴³³ Therefore, the upcoming CSDP initiative for Kosovo would have to take into account the UN's status-neutral position as well as a framework that would not exploit executive powers to the dismay of anti-independence party within the EU.⁴³⁴

EULEX Kosovo was configured as the continuation of UNMIK, the executive and operational branch of the international presence in Kosovo, thus going far beyond merely advising or monitoring in and around rule of law. Since the UN Security Council did not decree a new resolution after Kosovo's declaration of independence in 2008 to replace 1244, as anticipated by the EU, full transfer from UNMIK has not been possible.⁴³⁵ Therefore, the EU had to cite the only UNSC Resolution in force – 1244 – in the Council Joint Action that officially launched EULEX Kosovo in 2008.⁴³⁶ This lack of a clear UN mandate has put the EULEX mission through testy roads.⁴³⁷

EULEX Kosovo is mandated with supporting the Kosovar authorities by monitoring, mentoring and advising rule of law components, consequentially reinforcing a multi-

⁴³³ Pohl, *EU Foreign Policy and Crisis Management Operations*, 84-85.

⁴³⁴ Solveig Richter, "Promoting Rule of Law without State-building: Can EULEX Square the Circle in Kosovo?," In *the EU as a Strategic Actor in the Realm of Security and Defence: A Systematic Assessment of ESDP Missions and Operations*, ed. Muriel Asseburg and Ronja Kempin, (Berlin: German Institute for International and Security Affairs 2009), 30-32.

⁴³⁵ Dimitris Papadimitriou and Petar Petrov, "Whose Rule, Whose Law? Contested Statehood, External Leverage and the European Union's Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo," *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 50, no. 5 (2012): 758.

⁴³⁶ Council of the European Union, "Council Joint Action 2008/124 / CFSP on the rule of law mission led by the European Union in Kosovo," Brussels: 4 February 2008, accessed 1 February 2021, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02008E0124-20080204>.

⁴³⁷ Martina Spornbauer, "EULEX Kosovo – Mandate, Structure and Implementation: Essential Clarifications for an Unprecedented EU Mission," *CLEER Working Papers* (The Hague: Centre for the Law of EU External Relations 2010), 13.

ethnic judicial and police system in Kosovo.⁴³⁸ EULEX Kosovo has also made positive contributions to prevention of conflict, albeit with some challenges and deficiencies.⁴³⁹ As the first CSDP civilian mission to hold executive powers, its mandate has been prolonged, with the current one covering 2018-2020 but extended for another year due to Covid-19 pandemic.⁴⁴⁰

The two main causes of friction challenging the success of implementation were probably the lack of UN endorsement, cited by Spain as her lack of contribution to the mission, and the union's lack of unity pertaining to the status issue.⁴⁴¹ Despite these two major challenges, EULEX Kosovo stands as one of signature CSDP missions ever deployed, with wide-range contributions from EU member states and third countries. In fact, EULEX Kosovo is the first CSDP mission receiving support from Washington, who sent approximately 80 personnel.⁴⁴² Taken altogether, EULEX Kosovo was unparalleled in terms of European and local staff size and also its executive mandate.⁴⁴³

⁴³⁸ "What is EULEX? - EULEX - European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo," European External Action Service, accessed 9 February 2021, <https://www.eulex-kosovo.eu/?page=2,16>.

⁴³⁹ Rok Zupančič, Nina Pejič, Blaž Grilj and Annemarie Peen Rodt, "The European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo: An Effective Conflict Prevention and Peace-building Mission?," *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies* 20, no. 6 (2017): 600.

⁴⁴⁰ "EULEX mandate in Kosovo extended for another year," *European Western Balkans*, 13 July 2020, <https://europeanwesternbalkans.com/2020/07/13/eulex-mandate-in-kosovo-extended-for-another-year/>

⁴⁴¹ Pohl, *EU Foreign Policy and Crisis Management Operations*, 84-91.

⁴⁴² Grevi Giovanni, "EULEX Kosovo," In *European Security and Defence Policy: First 10 Years (1999-2009)*, ed. Giovanni Grevi, Damien Helly and Daniel Keohane (Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2010), 360.

⁴⁴³ Spornbauer, "EULEX Kosovo – Mandate, Structure and Implementation: Essential Clarifications for an Unprecedented EU Mission," 3.

Turkey was among the contributors to EULEX Kosovo, posting 16 police staff since 16 February 2008,⁴⁴⁴ some of whom were transferred from Turkey's existing participation in UNMIK.⁴⁴⁵ A strong advocate of Kosovo's independence, Turkey has multi-dimensional friendly relations with the country.⁴⁴⁶ During NATO's air campaign in 1999, Turkey contributed 10 F-16s, and reinforced this support upon demand with 8 more F-16s and 3 tanker aircrafts. Moreover, as a NATO Ally, Turkey has made significant contributions to KFOR.⁴⁴⁷

When the KFOR's mandate was modified in 2008 to incorporate training tasks for the Kosovar security forces, Turkey blocked the establishment of a formal working relationship between KFOR and EULEX due to the long-standing contention about the Cyprus issue.⁴⁴⁸ The Commission listed Turkey's objection as one of the problems encountered by EU missions in Kosovo and Afghanistan.⁴⁴⁹

Turkey's contribution to EULEX Kosovo is regularly mentioned in Commission-issued Progress Reports from 2008 till 2016. In 2016, in the aftermath of the coup attempt, Turkey withdrew staff from EULEX Kosovo, also noted in her Progress

⁴⁴⁴ Interview 2, Interview with a high-ranking Turkish diplomat, 23 July 2020, Ankara

⁴⁴⁵ "AB, Kosova'da polis ve yargı misyonunu devraldı," *Deutsche Welle*, 9 December 2008, <https://www.dw.com/tr/ab-kosovada-polis-ve-yarg%C4%B1-misyonunu-devrald%C4%B1/a-3820151>

⁴⁴⁶ "Relations between Turkey and Kosovo," *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey*, accessed 17 February 2021, https://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkey-and-kosovo_.en.mfa

⁴⁴⁷ Gökhan Koçer, "Türkiye'nin Barışı Destekleme Harekâtlarına Katkısı (Turkey's Contributions to Peacekeeping Operations)," *Uluslararası İlişkiler* 3, no. 11 (2006): 54.

⁴⁴⁸ "NATO agrees to train Kosovo army as Turks block further deal," *Deutsche Welle*, 12 June 2009, <https://www.dw.com/en/nato-agrees-to-train-kosovo-army-as-turks-block-further-deal/a-3408562>

⁴⁴⁹ European Commission, *Turkey 2008 Report*, Strasbourg: 2008, 83-84.

Report from 2018 to 2020.⁴⁵⁰ Since the suspension of her participation, Turkey has applied to several vacancies in the mission with no favorable response.⁴⁵¹

When Turkey first joined the mission, Europeanization dynamics were still on positive grounds, and Turkey's alignment with EU's foreign and security policy positions was high. As the EU took over from the UN mission UNMIK, Turkey fulfilled what was expected from her by transferring personnel from the previous mission to support the EU's. On the other hand, her suspension after the coup attempt, which marked a backsliding in Turkey-CSDP synergy, still continues. This indicates a transition towards de-Europeanization.

On a separate but related note, her increasingly problematized objection to establishment of formal cooperation beyond Berlin Plus is evidently a bitter issue for EULEX Kosovo. By practicing her rights as a NATO Ally, Turkey conceivably attempted to soft-balance the EU in general, and Greek Cyprus in particular, the only EU member state to have never participated in EULEX.⁴⁵²

5.7. EU SSR Guinea-Bissau

When the former president Vieira of Guinea-Bissau returned from exile in Portugal to the country in 2005, the Portuguese obtained more stakes to control in the region. And during their term for EU presidency, Portugal convinced the EU to launch a CSDP mission to reform the security sector in Guinea-Bissau.⁴⁵³

⁴⁵⁰ European Commission, *Turkey 2018 Report*, Strasbourg: 98; *Turkey 2020 Report*, 109-110.

⁴⁵¹ Interview 2, Interview with a high-ranking Turkish diplomat, 23 July 2020, Ankara

⁴⁵² David Cadier, "EU Mission in Kosovo (EULEX): Constructing Ambiguity or Constructive Disunity?," *Johns Hopkins University Transatlantic Security Paper* No 3/11 (Maryland: 2011), accessed 13 September 2021, <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/133016/201108.pdf>

⁴⁵³ András István Túrke, "EUSSR Guinea-Bissau: Relative Success or Preordained Failure," *Centre Européen de Recherche pour la PESC (CERPESC)*, 2011, 1.

In February 2008, the EU decided to launch a security sector reform mission in Guinea-Bissau with Council Joint Action 2008/112/CFSP.⁴⁵⁴ The first mission planned entirely at the headquarters for EU civilian crisis management operations - the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC), EU SSR Guinea-Bissau's mandate was prolonged until 30 September 2010. Being a security sector reform mission, its mandate focused on contributing to drafting of National SSR Strategy Document to be implemented by Guinea-Bissau authorities.⁴⁵⁵

By virtue of Article 10 of Council Joint Action 2008/112/CFSP, third states could be invited to participate in the mission provided that they cover the costs of seconded personnel.⁴⁵⁶ Thus far, only a limited number of member states have contributed to the mission.⁴⁵⁷

Turkey did not contribute to EU SSR Guinea-Bissau. Her non-participation presents no clear motives, but given the minor scale of the mission and Turkey's limited engagements with Guinea-Bissau, there is also meager motivation for her involvement in the mission.

5.8. EUMM Georgia

Established in the aftermath of the Russo-Georgian conflict in August 2008, EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) in Georgia is an unarmed civilian monitoring mission,

⁴⁵⁴ Council of the European Union, "Council Joint Action 2008/112/CFSP on the European Union mission in support of security sector reform in the Republic of Guinea-Bissau," Brussels: 12 February 2008, accessed 13 September 2021, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32008E0112>

⁴⁵⁵ European External Action Service, "*Factsheet on EU mission in support of security sector reform in the Republic of Guinea-Bissau*," updated September 2010, accessed 22 July 2021, https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/csdp/missions-and-operations/eu-ssr-guinea-bissau/pdf/01102010_factsheet_eu-ssr-guinea-bissau_en.pdf

⁴⁵⁶ Council of the European Union, "Council Joint Action 2008/112/CFSP on the European Union mission in support of security sector reform in the Republic of Guinea-Bissau," 2008

⁴⁵⁷ Damien Helly, "EU SSR Guinea-Bissau," In *European Security and Defence Policy: First 10 Years (1999-2009)*, ed. Giovanni Grevi, Damien Helly and Daniel Keohane (Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2010), 369.

mandated with stabilization, normalization and confidence-building and reporting the situation on the ground pursuant to the EU-brokered “Six-Point Agreement” as well as the Agreement on Implementing Measures.⁴⁵⁸

The open conflict between Russia and Georgia, and the declaration of independence of the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, presented an opportunity for the EU to insert itself as a security actor, especially since neither the OSCE nor NATO showed willingness to take action despite the appeal by the Georgian government.⁴⁵⁹

With the involvement of the EU, OSCE, UN, US, Russia and Georgia, negotiations in Geneva were initiated on 14 October 2008. The mandates of OSCE and UN missions were not renewed, making the EU the only international presence in Georgia.⁴⁶⁰

Following the request by the Georgian government, the EUMM was launched on 15 September 2008 with over 200 civilian monitors. The Council Joint Action 2008/736/CFSP serves as the legal basis of its function. As per Article 11 of the Joint Action, third countries are encouraged to contribute.⁴⁶¹

EUMM was a special case for CSDP in that consensus-building was quick in the wake of a major conflict at Europe’s doorstep, its implications on EU-Russian

⁴⁵⁸ European External Action Service, “Factsheet on the European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia,” updated in February 2016, accessed 24 May 2021, http://www.eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/csdp/missions-and-operations/eumm_georgia/pdf/facsheet_eumm_georgia_en.pdf

⁴⁵⁹ Ronald Asmus, *A Little War that Shook the World: Georgia, Russia and the Future of the West* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2014), 200-213.

⁴⁶⁰ Teemu Sinkkonen, "A Security Dilemma on the Boundary Line: An EU Perspective to Georgian–Russian Confrontation after the 2008 War," *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies* 11, no. 3 (2011): 265-266.

⁴⁶¹ Council of the European Union, “Council Joint Action 2008/736/CFSP on the European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia, EUMM Georgia,” Brussels: 15 September 2008, accessed 29 September 2020, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32008E0736>

relations, making this mission the first time when the EU acted as the fundamental crisis manager with acceptance from Russia in the post-Soviet space, a feature that underpinned EU's role as a security actor.⁴⁶² Granting that the mission is largely considered as a success and fulfilled its original goal, EUMM has not been able to access the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia whereas the mandate covers the whole of Georgia.⁴⁶³

Turkey has a strategic partnership with Georgia, and does not endorse the declaration of independence by breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Turkey also supports Georgia's efforts for integration with Euro-Atlantic organizations.⁴⁶⁴ When extended an invitation to participate in EUMM Georgia to monitor the situation, Turkey expressed interest in accepting it but later on received word from the EU that her contribution was no longer needed.⁴⁶⁵

Although her participation never materialized, the intent to include Turkey and Turkish response in favor indicates positive synergy, particularly after the sour taste of total alienation in the case of EUJUST Themis. Also taking into account the alignment of Turkey's and EU's positions on the Russo-Georgian conflict, EUMM Georgia holds enough points to infer that, although participation did not happen, Turkey and the EU were on the same page.

5.9. EUNAVFOR Somalia/Operation Atalanta

Due to the instability in Somalia, rampant piracy activities off the Somali coast and in the Gulf of Aden were disturbingly growing, which was a cause of concern for

⁴⁶² Maria Raquel Freire and Lúcia Simão, "The EU's Security Actorness: the Case of EUMM in Georgia," *European Security* 22, no. 4 (2013): 470-472.

⁴⁶³ European External Action Service, "Factsheet on the European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia"

⁴⁶⁴ "Relations between Turkey and Georgia," *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey*, accessed 30 September 2021, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkey-and-georgia.en.mfa>

⁴⁶⁵ Interview 2, Interview with a high-ranking Turkish diplomat, 23 July 2020, Ankara

populations who depended on humanitarian aid carried by international vessels that were targeted by pirates.⁴⁶⁶ To curtail these attacks, some countries provided escorts to World Food Programme (WFP) ships delivering aid to Somalia.⁴⁶⁷

Additionally, Operation Enduring Freedom – Horn of Africa had been providing assistance since 2002 in combating piracy, as did NATO’s Combined Task Force 150.⁴⁶⁸ Despite these efforts, piracy continued to be a problem in the region, and the UK took the initiative to launch an EU-led naval operation to step in, with strong support from Germany.⁴⁶⁹

The EU’s first naval operation EU NAVFOR Somalia, or Operation Atalanta, was launched in 2008 with the objective to provide protection to WFP ships delivering aid to Somalia and combat piracy.⁴⁷⁰ At the core, EU NAVFOR was a military operation, but it was not designed to engage in the Somali conflict as much as for

⁴⁶⁶ Damien Helly, "EU NAVFOR Somalia," In *European Security and Defence Policy: First 10 Years (1999-2009)*, ed. Giovanni Grevi, Damien Helly and Daniel Keohane (Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2010), 391-393.

⁴⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁶⁸ Neil Melvin, "The Foreign Military Presence in the Horn of Africa Region," *SIPRI Background Paper*, (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2019), 24-25, accessed 8 August 2021, https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2019-05/sipribp1904_2.pdf

⁴⁶⁹ Annette Weber, "EU Naval Operation in the Gulf of Aden (EU NAVFOR Atalanta): Problem Unsolved, Piracy Increasing, Causes Remain," In *the EU as a Strategic Actor in the Realm of Security and Defence: A Systematic Assessment of ESDP Missions and Operations*, ed. Muriel Asseburg and Ronja Kempin, (Berlin: German Institute for International and Security Affairs 2009), 71-72.

⁴⁷⁰ Council of the European Union, "Council Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP on a European Union military operation to contribute to the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast," Brussels: 10 November 2008, accessed 16 August 2020, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32008E0851>

detering piracy from interfering with humanitarian aid efforts and European trade interests.⁴⁷¹

Scale-wise, the operation was smaller than Berlin Plus actions in Macedonia and BiH, and the strong sense of proving EU's ability by launching a maritime military operation under CSDP prompted the member states to take on the challenge without resorting to NATO means and capabilities.⁴⁷²

The Joint Action adopted by the Council of EU allows for third state participation,⁴⁷³ and countries such as New Zealand, Norway, Montenegro, Ukraine and Serbia supported Operation Atalanta.⁴⁷⁴ EUNAVFOR Somalia, an ongoing operation, put the EU on the map of a region intensely crowded with international presence including the US, China, Russia, Turkey, India, Iran, NATO, Combined Task Forces 150 and 151, among others.⁴⁷⁵

While the legal instrument enabling Operation Atalanta greenlights third country participation, Turkey did not join. There is no official statement explaining the reasoning behind this non-participation, but the fact that Turkey was already engaged before the launch of Atalanta in patrolling the regional waters and supporting Combined Task Forces 150 and 151 as well as NATO's Operation Ocean Shield⁴⁷⁶

⁴⁷¹ Weber, "EU Naval Operation in the Gulf of Aden (EU NAVFOR Atalanta): Problem Unsolved, Piracy Increasing, Causes Remain," 71-72.

⁴⁷² Marianne Riddervold, "Finally Flexing its Muscles? Atalanta – the European Union's Naval Military Operation against Piracy," *European Security* 20, no. 3 (2011): 394.

⁴⁷³ Council of the European Union, "Council Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP"

⁴⁷⁴ "EU Naval Force – Somalia," *European External Action Service*, accessed 21 December 2020, <https://eunavfor.eu/mission/>

⁴⁷⁵ Helly, "EU NAVFOR Somalia," 398-400.

⁴⁷⁶ "Contribution of the TAF to Peace Support Operations," Turkish Armed Forces - General Staff, accessed 3 December 2020, <https://www.tsk.tr/Sayfalar?viewName=ContributionToTafToPeace>

might have made involvement in Atalanta redundant. Besides, the presence of Greek Cyprus in EUNAVFOR⁴⁷⁷ could not have helped to change the Turkish interest.

On the Europeanization theme, a case for or against Turkey's non-participation would be unavailing since the EU seemingly did not alienate Turkey or other third states and Turkey did not seem to be interested in Atalanta. As for a discussion on divergence or convergence of interests, both entities engaged in combating piracy by individual and multilateral means without conflicting each other's pursuits. Therefore, in the absence of a conflicting interest between Turkey and EU in combating piracy off the Somali coast and the Gulf of Aden, and opposing approaches to alleviate the situation, non-participation by Turkey should not be taken as a disappointment for her Europeanization agenda.

That being said, as this operation falls under the period of selective Europeanization in Turkey's relations with the EU, Turkey's non-involvement could be alternatively attributed to the weaning effect of EU's conditionality on her foreign and security policy options and actions. Turkey is a multidimensional actor in Somalia and does not necessarily synergize with the EU's presence in the country. Therefore, Atalanta may be a case where de-Europeanization vis-à-vis Turkey's engagement with CSDP actions manifests.

Lastly, Operation Atalanta had to work in a separate geographical area from NATO's Operation Ocean Shield within the confines of an informally brokered deal to keep both operations intact. This was because Turkey would not agree to sharing tasks and information between NATO and EU.⁴⁷⁸ In that context, it could also be argued that Turkey's non-participation may be associated with her inter-institutional soft-balancing prospects.

⁴⁷⁷ "EU," *Ministry of Defence, Republic of "Cyprus"*, accessed 5 January 2021, <https://mod.gov.cy/en/e.e.html>

⁴⁷⁸ Stephanie C. Hofmann, "The Politics of Overlapping Organizations: Hostage-taking, Forum-shopping and Brokering," *Journal of European Public Policy* 26, no. 6 (2018): 899.

5.10. EUTM Somalia

After the Barre administration collapsed in 1991, fragility in Somalia worsened while successive attempts by the UN and US failed to achieve sustainable order in the country. With Somalia's fragmentation gaining speed, it looked like there was little to hold the country together. Upon the formation of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in 2004, Somalia was expected to take some steps towards stabilization but this too proved insufficient. Even though the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) brought some semblance of order, they were ousted by Ethiopian forces due to fear of extreme Islamism, after which the African Union commissioned AMISOM in 2007 for peacekeeping. The radical branch of ICU, Al Shabaab, which controls the majority of the southern part of the country, continued to fight against the transition government.⁴⁷⁹

To make matters worse, Somalia was also battling piracy and East African drought. These conditions impelled the EU to consider fielding a training mission in Somalia so that the national security forces could build capacity to combat terrorism and piracy as well as establish order.⁴⁸⁰ With this understanding, the EU Council adopted Decision 2010/96/CFSP on 15 February 2010, which underlines EU's contribution to strengthening Somali security sector by providing training to security forces.⁴⁸¹

Originally planned for 6 months, the mission has been extended so far and is still running. Due to the security climate in Somalia, Somali forces were taken to Bihanga

⁴⁷⁹ International Crisis Group, "Somalia: to Move beyond the Failed State," *Africa Report* no. 147 (2008), accessed 23 May 2021, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/somalia/somalia-move-beyond-failed-state>

⁴⁸⁰ Kseniya Oksamytna, "The European Union Training Mission in Somalia and the Limits of Liberal Peacebuilding: Can EUTM Contribute to Sustainable and Inclusive Peace?," *The International Spectator* 46, no. 4 (2011): 97.

⁴⁸¹ Council of the European Union, "Council Decision 2010/96/CFSP on a European Union military mission to contribute to the training of Somali security force," Brussels: 15 February 2010, accessed 23 May 2021, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32010D0096>

camp in Uganda for training, but later relocated to Mogadishu.⁴⁸² This is EU's first military training mission, which, according to Oksamytna, signifies the Union's aim to empower local and regional actors to cope with the challenges faced by Africa, rather than seeking to expand military presence.⁴⁸³

As per the Council Decision that launched the mission, third states are encouraged to participate within established rules and protocols. Currently, only Serbia is participating as a third country.⁴⁸⁴ The absence of Turkish participation could be liberally attributed to her existing efforts in military training in Mogadishu named TURKSOM.⁴⁸⁵

When the civil war broke out in Somalia, the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) was launched under the mandate given by the UNSC Resolution 794 to stop the hostilities.⁴⁸⁶ Between 1993 and 1994, Turkey contributed to this operation with a mechanized company to facilitate humanitarian aid and peace efforts. Later on, UNITAF transformed into UNOSOM II, which was commanded by a Turkish lieutenant for a period. The UN additionally deployed an assistance mission in

⁴⁸² European Union External Action, "Factsheet on the European Union Training Mission - Somalia," updated in August 2019, accessed 12 June 2021, https://www.eutm-somalia.eu/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/FACTSHEET-2019_G.B.-DE-SIO.pdf

⁴⁸³ Oksamytna, "The European Union Training Mission in Somalia and the Limits of Liberal Peacebuilding: Can EUTM Contribute to Sustainable and Inclusive Peace?," 99.

⁴⁸⁴ European Union External Action, "Factsheet on the European Union Training Mission - Somalia"

⁴⁸⁵ Melvin, "The Foreign Military Presence in the Horn of Africa Region," 14-15.

⁴⁸⁶ "United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II)," *UN Peacekeeping*, accessed 6 January 2021, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/past/unosom2backgr2.html>

Somalia known as UNSOM in 2013. Since 2015, Turkey has been contributing to this mission on a rotational basis as well.⁴⁸⁷

Given Turkey's established engagement in Somalia, within the UN mandate as well as on the basis of bilateral agreement with the Somali government, participating in EUTM may have seemed non-essential. However, Turkey's military training academy TURKSOM was opened in 2017, 7 years after EUTM was launched. Both training mission's objective is to support Somali security forces in their fight against Al-Shabaab.

As for Turkey's Europeanization status during the first couple of years since the launch of EUTM, there has been a high level of alignment on foreign and security policy. On the other hand, Turkey's integrated approach to Somalia, including with TURKSOM, has been put under criticism in terms of its aspects that are different from the "Western" model.⁴⁸⁸ Thus far, Turkey's soft power approach in Somalia has not been matched by EU efforts, but pulling the discussion back to security and defense aspect, both sides have shared interests. Against the background of the above, there is no clear motivation behind Turkey's non-participation in EUTM Somalia, which might be indirectly due to her existing peacekeeping engagement in the country. Her preference to UN and national structures over the EU for peacekeeping in Somalia may also suggest a soft-balancing in action.

On the other hand, a point could still be made towards a de-Europeanization tendency since Turkey has been present in Somalia independently from the EU's efforts, and given that EUTM Somalia's timeframe fits into Turkey's selective Europeanization period.

⁴⁸⁷ "Contribution of the TAF to Peace Support Operations," Turkish Armed Forces - General Staff, accessed 3 January 2021, <https://www.tsk.tr/Sayfalar?viewName=ContributionToTafToPeace>

⁴⁸⁸ Willem van den Berg and Jos Meester, "Turkey in the Horn of Africa: Between the Ankara Consensus and the Gulf Crisis," *CRU Policy Brief*, (The Hague: Clingendael Institute, 2019), 6.

5.11. EUCAP Somalia

Following the armed conflict in Somalia leading to the collapse of the state, pirate attacks in the Horn of Africa rose sharply. Upon the request of Somali Transitional Federal Government, the UN Security Council adopted 1816, allowing third states into Somalia's territorial waters and authorizing the use of all means to fight piracy. The EU deployed its first naval operation Atalanta in Somalia within the framework of this mandate.⁴⁸⁹

Nevertheless, the operation by itself was not enough to eradicate the root causes of piracy, compelling the EU to come up with a more comprehensive maritime security solution to the piracy problem in Somalia.⁴⁹⁰ Referring to the EU's Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa⁴⁹¹ and the warm reception by Djibouti, Kenya, the Seychelles, and the TFG of Somalia, the Council approved to launch a maritime capacity building mission, first of its kind for CSDP.⁴⁹²

The mission set out to assist creation of a self-sustainable capacity for their maritime security including counter-piracy and maritime governance. Over time, Somalia became the sole focus of the mission, providing strategic and operational advice, legislation and mentoring for Somali Coast Guard forces as well as capacity-building

⁴⁸⁹ Filip Ejdus, "'here is your mission, now own it!' The Rhetoric and Practice of Local Ownership in EU Interventions," *European Security* 26, no. 4 (2017): 471.

⁴⁹⁰ Ejdus, "'here is your mission, now own it!' The Rhetoric and Practice of Local Ownership in EU Interventions," 471.

⁴⁹¹ "Council Conclusions on the Horn of Africa," *Annex to the 3124th Foreign Affairs Council meeting*, Brussels: 14 November 2011.

⁴⁹² Council of the European Union, "Council Decision 2012/389/CFSP on the European Union Mission on Regional Maritime Capacity Building in the Horn of Africa (EUCAP NESTOR)," Brussels: 16 July 2012, accessed 4 March 2021, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:32012D0389>

for judiciary.⁴⁹³ Based in Mogadishu with field offices in Hargeisa (Somaliland), Garowe (Puntland), Mogadishu and a back-office in Nairobi, the mission's mandate has been extended until the end of 2022.⁴⁹⁴

EUCAP Somalia allows third countries to participate and Turkey was among the invited countries, yet she did not contribute.⁴⁹⁵ Turkey's non-contribution in EUCAP does not have an officially released explanation. Still, similar to the case in other EU initiatives in Somalia, it might be due to her presence through the United Nations Assistance Mission (UNSOM) within the capacity of Military Advisor since 2015 on a rotational basis.⁴⁹⁶ While her contribution to a mission with the same task, UNSOM, speaks to Turkey's role in peacekeeping, opting out of CSDP's engagement might be indicative of the weakening necessity to align with the EU's foreign and security policy courses. Considering that EUCAP Somalia also falls under the period of selective Europeanization for Turkey, coupled with her existing presence in Somalia separate from the EU's, it could be argued that her absence is indicative of a de-Europeanization case.

5.12. EUFOR Libya

Following the events that took place in Libya in 2011 during the Arab Spring, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1970 that stipulates imposing arms embargo and sanctions against the country.⁴⁹⁷ As the security situation deteriorated even

⁴⁹³ Hans-Christian Schmitz, Reinout Pienemann and Matthias Deneckere, "Information Management in a Civilian Mission: EUCAP Somalia Case Study," *International Conference on Military Communications and Information Systems (ICMCIS)* (Oulu/Finland: 2017): 2.

⁴⁹⁴ European External Action Service, "Factsheet - EUCAP Somalia," updated 21 March 2021, accessed 3 March 2021, <https://www.eucap-som.eu/fact-sheet/>.

⁴⁹⁵ Interview 2, Interview with a high-ranking Turkish diplomat, 23 July 2020, Ankara

⁴⁹⁶ "Contribution of the TAF to Peace Support Operations," Turkish Armed Forces - General Staff, accessed 26 January 2021, <https://www.tsk.tr/Sayfalar?viewName=ContributionToTafToPeace>

⁴⁹⁷ "Resolution 1970," S/RES/1970, United Nations Security Council, Session 6491, (2011)

further, turning into a civil war, the Security Council then adopted another resolution (1973) establishing a no-fly zone and approving all necessary measures to protect civilians.⁴⁹⁸ Based on these resolutions, a coalition of forces from France, the UK and the US started an air campaign, which was later combined under NATO's "Unified Protector" operation.⁴⁹⁹

While the UN and NATO were lauded for their quick reaction to the events in Libya, the EU was criticized for its ineffectiveness.⁵⁰⁰ This ineffectiveness has been generally attributed to the incoherence of the Union to adopt an approach to the crisis.⁵⁰¹ For instance, the European Council was aiming for regime change whilst the High Representative promoted a less interventionist approach.⁵⁰² There were also major differences between the member states on how to behave in Libya, reaching a point where it became nearly impossible to discuss a CSDP action.⁵⁰³

The exposed divisiveness of the EU over the course of inaction towards the Libyan crisis left little scope for a possible CSDP initiative, which attracted criticism about how an opportunity to fulfill its intended use in the EU's southern neighborhood was

⁴⁹⁸ "Resolution 1973," S/RES/1973, United Nations Security Council. Session 6498, (2011)

⁴⁹⁹ Ludovica Marchi, "The EU in Libya and the collapse of the CSDP," *US-China Law Review Journal* 14, no. 6 (2017): 1-2.

⁵⁰⁰ Nicole Koenig, "The EU and the Libyan Crisis – in Quest of Coherence?," *The International Spectator* 46, no. 4 (2011): 12; 29.

⁵⁰¹ Maja Kovačević, "European Union's Common Security and Defence Policy Operations in the Mediterranean: Missions Impossible," *Serbian Political Thought* 18, no. 2 (2018): 91.

⁵⁰² Sergio Fabbrini, "The European Union and the Libyan Crisis," *International Politics* 51, no. 2 (2014): 184.

⁵⁰³ Ronja Kempin and Nicolai Von Ondarza, "CSDP on the Brink: the Importance of Bringing France and the United Kingdom Back in", *SWP Comments*, (Berlin: German Institute for International and Security Affairs, 2011), accessed 6 March 2021, https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2011C13_kmp_orz_ks.pdf

missed,⁵⁰⁴ which would have been even better if Berlin Plus had been invoked.⁵⁰⁵ Much to the critics' dismay, the EU opted for a military operation with humanitarian priorities: support to humanitarian assistance in Libya and evacuation of civilians. The catch line for this mandate was that the EU would only deploy assistance if requested by the UN's Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).⁵⁰⁶

Then High Representative Catherine Ashton sought to expedite EUFOR's deployment, but when she received a letter from the UN's OCHA underlining the unnecessary of a military operation to secure humanitarian deliveries,⁵⁰⁷ the stillborn EUFOR Libya was repealed,⁵⁰⁸ leaving a legacy as an "April's fool"⁵⁰⁹ and the "Hour of Europe" long passed.⁵¹⁰

⁵⁰⁴ Erik Brattberg, "Opportunities lost, opportunities seized: the Libya crisis as Europe's perfect storm," *EPC Policy Brief*, (Brussels: European Policy Center, 2011): 4.

⁵⁰⁵ Marchi, "The EU in Libya and the collapse of the CSDP," 6-7.

⁵⁰⁶ Council of the European Union, "Council Decision 2011/210/CFSP on a European Union military operation in support of humanitarian assistance operations in response to the crisis situation in Libya (EUFOR Libya)," Brussels: 1 April 2011, accessed 19 March 2021, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32011D0210>

⁵⁰⁷ Toby Vogel, "Split over Military Mission to Deliver Aid," *Politico*, 13 April 2011, <https://www.politico.eu/article/split-over-military-mission-to-deliver-aid/>

⁵⁰⁸ Council of the European Union, "Council Decision 2011/764/CFSP repealing Decision 2011/210/CFSP on a European Union military operation in support of humanitarian assistance operations in response to the crisis situation in Libya (EUFOR Libya)," Brussels: 28 November 2011, accessed 20 March 2021, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32011D0764>

⁵⁰⁹ Ana Gomez, "Was EUFOR Libya an April Fool's Joke?," *EU Observer*, 13 July 2011, <https://euobserver.com/opinion/32624>

⁵¹⁰ Dieter Dettke, "Germany Says 'No' Again," *AICGS Advisor*, (Washington, D.C.: American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, 2011), accessed 3 August 2021, <https://www.aicgs.org/site/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/dettke0411.pdf>

As per Article 9 of the Council Decision 2011/210/CFSP, third countries, particularly member states of the Arab League, could be invited to participate in EUFOR Libya.⁵¹¹ Turkey expressed interest to contribute to the operation, and would have contributed had it been launched.⁵¹² She contributed four frigates, a submarine, a logistic support vessel, six F-16 fighters, two KC-135 tanker aircraft, Special Forces staff and helicopters deployed in vessels, Underwater Attack (SAT), Amphibious and Underwater Mission Teams to NATO's Unified Protector Operation in Libya.⁵¹³

A stillborn CSDP effort, EUFOR Libya never materialized, but given Turkey's strategic interests in her neighbor Libya and substantial contribution to NATO's Operation Unified Protector, and the permissive nature of the Council Decision for third state involvement, Turkey would have been willing to join the EU's effort.

After all, even though Turkey did not vie with the EU's sanctions against Libya, with regards to the political, security and humanitarian situation, both were on the same wavelength.⁵¹⁴

5.13. EU AVSEC South Sudan

Shortly after the independence of South Sudan from the Republic of Sudan in 2011, a civil war erupted in the newly founded country, and raged for two years. In the first few years of independence, South Sudan suffered from internal turmoil due to conflicts among local tribes.⁵¹⁵

⁵¹¹ Council of the European Union, "Council Decision 2011/210/CFSP"

⁵¹² Interview 2, Interview with a high-ranking Turkish diplomat, 23 July 2020, Ankara

⁵¹³ "Contribution of the TAF to Peace Support Operations," Turkish Armed Forces - General Staff, accessed 5 April 2021, <https://www.tsk.tr/Sayfalar?viewName=ContributionToTafToPeace>

⁵¹⁴ European Commission, *Turkey 2011 Report*, (Strasbourg: 2011), 105-106.

⁵¹⁵ Darina Dvornichenko and Vadym Barsky: "The EU and Responsibility to Protect: Case Studies on the EU's Response to Mass Atrocities in Libya, South Sudan and Myanmar," *Journal for the International and European Law, Economics and Market Integrations* 7, no. 1 (2020): 125-126.

In line with the newly-formed South Sudanese government's Development Plan for 2011-2013, the EU was crafting alternative engagements, including upgrading aviation security at Juba International Airport.⁵¹⁶ The South Sudanese government officially welcomed the EU to provide support in that vein, and the EU devised its first Aviation Security Mission.⁵¹⁷

Unfortunately, the conflict that broke out in 2013 as a result of ethnic tensions and major quarrel between the president and vice-president gave rise to another civil war. This acute escalation and the volatile security situation in the country eventually led to the evacuation of the EU AVSEC mission in 2013 before its mandate deadline in 2014.⁵¹⁸

The Council Decision that authorized AVSEC South Sudan permitted participation by third states. Accordingly, the EU invited Turkey, who did not contribute.⁵¹⁹ Turkey was among the first countries that recognized South Sudan's independence⁵²⁰ and provided 23 police officers to the UN mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) in 2014, maintaining her support with 20 staff today.⁵²¹ This existing support might

⁵¹⁶ Arnold H. Kammel, "The European Union and Security Sector Reform: South Sudan and the Challenge of Ownership," *South African Journal of International Affairs* 25, no. 4 (2018): 552.

⁵¹⁷ Council of the European Union, "Council Decision 2012/312/CFSP on the European Union Aviation Security CSDP Mission in South Sudan (EUAVSEC-South Sudan)," Brussels: 18 June 2012, accessed 5 January 2021, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32012D0312>

⁵¹⁸ Kammel, "The European Union and Security Sector Reform: South Sudan and the Challenge of Ownership," 554.

⁵¹⁹ Interview 2, Interview with a high-ranking Turkish diplomat, 23 July 2020, Ankara

⁵²⁰ "Relations between Turkey and South Sudan," *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey*, accessed 12 April 2021, <https://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkey-and-south-sudan.en.mfa>

⁵²¹ "Troop and Police Contributors; 2014," *UN Peacekeeping*, accessed 16 April 2021, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/troop-and-police-contributors>

have had an impact on the decision to forego EU AVSEC, a mission that could not be implemented as foreseen due to security conditions.

Based on the available data and given the conceptual approach, Turkey's non-participation does not seem to foreshadow any clear motive vis-à-vis Europeanization. Her sustained participation to UNMISS, on the other hand, attests to her role in global peacekeeping, and by diverting her resources to the UN instead of the EU's mission, a case may be made that Turkey chose to soft-balance the EU's relevance in South Sudan.

5.14. EUCAP Sahel Niger

The Malian Civil War that broke out in 2012, instability in Libya following Qaddafi's ousting, and the rampant Boko Haram threat in Nigeria all negatively impacted on the security condition and stability in Niger.⁵²² In fact, the country has been quite often cited as the embodiment of state fragility.⁵²³ To make matters worse, Niger struggled with illegal drugs, human and weapons trafficking, and when combined, all these factors culminated in a multiplicity of cross-border threats facing the country.⁵²⁴

Against the backdrop of various instances of instability in the region, the European Union adopted a strategy for security and development in the Sahel in March 2011.⁵²⁵ Upon the request of the Nigerien government to address the growing crisis,

⁵²² European Union External Action, "Factsheet on the EU CAP Sahel Niger," updated in April 2016, accessed 18 March 2021, http://www.eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/csdp/missions-and-operations/eucap-sahel-niger/pdf/factsheet_eucap_sahel_niger_en.pdf

⁵²³ Luca Raineri and Edoardo Baldaro, "Resilience to What? EU Capacity-building Missions in the Sahel," In *Projecting Resilience across the Mediterranean*, ed. Eugenio Cusumano and Stefan Hofmaier (Cham: Pelgrave Macmillan, 2020), 172-173.

⁵²⁴ Philippe M. Frowd, "Producing the 'Transit' Migration State: International Security Intervention in Niger," *Third World Quarterly* 41, no. 2 (2019): 350.

⁵²⁵ European External Action Service, "Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel," 2011, accessed 28 March 2021, https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/africa/docs/sahel_strategy_en.pdf

the Council officially approved the launching of EUCAP Sahel Niger, a civilian non-executive mission mandated to support the capacity-building of the Nigerien security sector.⁵²⁶

The mission was originally tasked with supporting the Nigerien security forces in upgrading their capacity to fight against terrorism and organized crime, but when its mandate was prolonged in 2016, the focus shifted to managing migration emanating from the transitory borders of Niger.⁵²⁷

The participating states to the EU CAP Sahel Niger have so far been limited to Member States notwithstanding the permissive clause in the Council Decision for third country participation. Turkey evidently did not participate in EUCAP Sahel Niger, for which there is no clear motivation that could be explained within the confines of the theoretical approach adopted for this study. Turkey does not have any crisis management history in the Sahel region, but is in friendly relations with the countries in the region, including Niger, and contributes financially to the G5 Force⁵²⁸ tasked with fighting against terrorism.

Whereas Turkey and EU do not have a security and defense related rivalry in Niger, and in fact share the same objectives of anti-terrorism, stability and development in the region, their rivalry, especially with France, manifests itself in trade⁵²⁹, which is outside the scope of this study. There is no declared motivation for not taking part in EUCAP Sahel Niger, but judging from the wider scope of Turkey-EU relations at the

⁵²⁶ Council of the European Union, "Council Decision 2012/392/CFSP on the European Union CSDP mission in Niger (EUCAP Sahel Niger)," Brussels: 16 July 2012, accessed 14 July 2020, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32012D0392&qid=1607211968339>

⁵²⁷ Morten Bøås, "EU Migration Management in the Sahel: Unintended Consequences on the Ground in Niger?," *Third World Quarterly* 42, no. 1 (2020): 61-62.

⁵²⁸ G5 Sahel Force covers Mauritania, Chad, Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger.

⁵²⁹ Hannah Armstrong, "Turkey in the Sahel," *International Crisis Group*, 27 July 2021, accessed 18 August 2021, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/turkey-sahel>

time featuring selective Europeanization, Turkey might have opted out potentially due to the lack of strategic interest she saw in joining EUCAP Sahel Niger.

5.15. EUBAM Libya

The EU reviewed its options for a CSDP initiative in Libya after the failure with EUFOR and the termination of military intervention, with Italy and France proposing a post-conflict civilian engagement.⁵³⁰ The UN's mission in Libya (UNSMIL) had already become operational with the target of disarming the combatants and broad post-conflict support.⁵³¹ Since the Libyan war generated a massive humanitarian crisis with a large number of refugees, the EU pondered the optics for an initiative to curb the irregular migration flow and trans-border crime, which became even more urgent with the uptick in militia activity in 2012.⁵³²

Upon the proposal by the Union, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of Libya formally accepted a CSDP mission to assist Libya's border management. Thereafter, the Council adopted Decision 2013/233/CFSP to establish EUBAM Libya to support the authorities to develop capacity for enhancing the security of the country's land, sea, and air borders.⁵³³

⁵³⁰ Wolfgang Mühlberger and Patrick Müller, "The EU's Comprehensive Approach to Security in the MENA Region: What Lessons for CSDP from Libya?," In *The EU, Strategy and Security Policy: Regional and Strategic Challenges*, ed. Laura Chappell, Jocelyn Mawdsley and Petar Petrov (Oxford; New York: Routledge, 2016), 61-62.

⁵³¹ "Mandate," *United Nations Support Mission in Libya*, accessed 21 June 2021, <https://unsmil.unmissions.org/mandate>

⁵³² Florence Gaub, "The EU and Libya and the Art of the Possible," *The International Spectator* 49, no. 3 (2014): 40-53.

⁵³³ Council of the European Union, "Council Decision 2013/233/CFSP on the European Union Integrated Border Management Assistance Mission in Libya (EUBAM Libya)," Brussels: 22 May 2013, accessed 9 April 2021, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32013D0233>

In the longer term, the mission aimed to assist Libyan authorities in developing an Integrated Border Management strategy.⁵³⁴ Nevertheless, even at the planning phase, the mission was at risk of serious shortcoming for its viability, but for the sake of saving face after EUFOR's doom, the EU chose to be engaged in a more soft-power capacity in Libya.⁵³⁵ One of the mistakes in the planning was the lack of consideration for Libyan counterparts, in a divided country drifting towards failed statehood, as interlocutors for the mission.⁵³⁶

When the violence in Libya soared in 2014 with fighting among different factions, the security conditions no longer qualified for the EUBAM staff to stay in the country, and the mission was relocated to Tunis with a significant reduction in size.⁵³⁷ Facing the challenges of an overly ambitious mandate in a deteriorating conflict environment, the mission was then put on hold until 2016.⁵³⁸

The mission then enhanced its presence in Tripoli, but following the surge in violence in 2019 when the hostilities between the self-declared warlord Haftar and the internationally recognized Government of National Accord (GNA) intensified, EUBAM headquarters were moved again to Tunis.⁵³⁹ Since the opening of the Mitiga

⁵³⁴ European External Action Service, "Factsheet on EUBAM Libya," updated in April 2018, accessed 4 July 2021, https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/version_anglaise.pdf

⁵³⁵ Mühlberger and Müller, "The EU's Comprehensive Approach to Security in the MENA Region: What Lessons for CSDP from Libya?," 62.

⁵³⁶ Maja Kovačević, "European Union's Common Security and Defence Policy Operations in the Mediterranean: Missions Impossible," *Serbian Political Thought* 18, no. 2 (2018): 97.

⁵³⁷ Mühlberger and Müller, "The EU's Comprehensive Approach to Security in the MENA Region: What Lessons for CSDP from Libya?," 62.

⁵³⁸ Chiara Loschi and Alessandra Russo, "Whose Enemy at the Gates? Border Management in the Context of EU Crisis Response in Libya and Ukraine," *Geopolitics* 26, no. 5 (2020): 8.

⁵³⁹ European External Action Service, "EUBAM Libya Strategic Review 2021," Brussels: 19 February 2021, 18.

Airport, international community, including EUBAM staff, have started to return.⁵⁴⁰ More recently, EUBAM Libya's mandate has been extended until 2023.⁵⁴¹

For all the permissive nature of Council Decision launching EUBAM Libya to third state participation, only member states are actively involved in the mission.⁵⁴² Turkey was also invited to contribute, and proposed to support EUBAM Libya.⁵⁴³ Yet, the EU rejected security clearance required posts that Turkey applied.⁵⁴⁴ Although there is no official evidence to back it up, it would be no surprise if the rejection was the result of lobbying from Greece and Greek Cyprus, or maybe straight from France herself, given that Turkey and France have been at loggerheads over the Libyan political leadership crisis.⁵⁴⁵

In terms of Europeanization argument, and keeping in mind the limited staff Member States have been willing to compromise, Turkey's application to EUBAM Libya vacancies is an indication of her willingness to uphold her European-oriented foreign and security policy choices. Considering that the mission has been mostly in a slump, and her rejection by the EU, Turkey might have distanced herself from the trouble of re-application to EUBAM Libya. This may be appraised as an effect caused by the EU's impertinence.

⁵⁴⁰ European External Action Service, "EUBAM Libya Strategic Review 2021," 9.

⁵⁴¹ Maria Lenzu, "EUBAM Libya: Council extends mandate for a further two years," *Council of the European Union*, accessed 20 June 2021, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2021/06/18/eubam-libya-council-extends-mandate-for-a-further-two-years/#>

⁵⁴² European External Action Service, "Factsheet on EUBAM Libya"

⁵⁴³ European Commission, *Turkey 2014; 2015 Report*, (Strasbourg: 2014; 2015), 72-74.

⁵⁴⁴ Interview 2, Interview with a high-ranking Turkish diplomat, 23 July 2020, Ankara

⁵⁴⁵ Michael Peel, Andrew England, Victor Mallet and Laura Pitel, "French spat with Turkey over Libya lays bare European divisions," *Financial Times*, 5 July 2020, <https://www.ft.com/content/3b85dd0e-1f2e-40b0-b44b-947b7f75a03e>

On the other hand, given the current foreign policy positions of EU and Turkey over Libya, arrested by a broader complication over the Eastern Mediterranean, it is very unlikely that the EU would consider any interest expressed by Turkey to join a CSDP initiative in Libya in good faith soon.

5.16. EUTM Mali

In January 2012, when a Tuareg rebellion in Mali broke out, the Malian armed forces were unable to deter their advance, leading to another coup and ousting of then President Amadou Toumani Touré. This failure of the state authority exposed the vulnerabilities of the Malian government, particularly its security forces.⁵⁴⁶ The US was not willing to engage in the Sahel's brewing conflicts, but France deployed "Operation Serval" on her own initiative.⁵⁴⁷

The United Nations, on the other hand, responded by citing the UNSC Resolution 2071, warranting the Malian army to be restricted and take the lead alongside African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA) in regaining control of the northern part of the country.⁵⁴⁸ The French were influential in moving a CSDP mission in Mali up in EU's agenda, and the EU started to draft plans for a military training mission for the Malian army.⁵⁴⁹

⁵⁴⁶ Béragère Rouppert, "EUTM Mali: A Rapid Response Operation Launched in an Open Conflict," In *Managing Crises, Making Peace: Towards a Strategic EU Vision for Security and Defense*, ed. Maria Grazia Galantino and Maria Raquel Freire (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 236-337.

⁵⁴⁷ Daniel Fiott, Hans Hoebeke, Esther Marijnen and Alexander Mattelaer, "The Sahel Crisis: Where do European and African Perspectives Meet?," *Institute for European Studies – Vrije Universiteit Brussel* (2013), 3.

⁵⁴⁸ Rouppert, "EUTM Mali: A Rapid Response Operation Launched in an Open Conflict," 237.

⁵⁴⁹ Ibid.

The training mission was deployed in February 2013 with the first mandate authorized by the Council Decision 2013/34/CFSP⁵⁵⁰ and is still ongoing with 3 non-EU states participating as well.⁵⁵¹

Turkey was invited to participate in EUTM Mali and responded favorably. Submitting the request to the Turkish Grand National Assembly, then Prime Minister Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu appealed by citing the UNSC Resolution 2085 that gives mandate to the EU to train the Malian army, Turkey's staunch commitment to the indivisibility of security in the Transatlantic realm as a NATO Ally and a candidate to the EU, and Turkey's active engagement in Africa compelling to contribute to the security and stability in the region.⁵⁵² The Assembly granted permission for participation of Turkish Armed Forces to EUTM Mali for a period of 1 year.⁵⁵³

Although Turkey's participation was approved by the Parliament, it was never commissioned due to the low levels of visibility and involvement in decision making for the vacant post allocated by the EU.⁵⁵⁴ EUTM represents a rare case in that Turkish Parliament approved participation to a CSDP mission in Sahel by invoking her candidacy and NATO Ally status, as well as contribution to security and stability

⁵⁵⁰ Council of the European Union, "Council Decision 2013/34/CFSP of 17 January 2013 on a European Union military mission to contribute to the training of the Malian Armed Forces (EUTM Mali)," Brussels: 17 January 2013, accessed 25 December 2020, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32013D0034>

⁵⁵¹ European External Action Service, "Factsheet on EU Training Mission in Mali," updated in July 2021, accessed 7 July 2021, https://eutmmali.eu/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/20210715_Fact-Sheet-EUTM-Mali-1.pdf

⁵⁵² Turkish Grand National Assembly, *General Debate Minutes*, 24th Parliament, 5th Legislative Year, 17th Session, (Ankara: 2014), accessed 15 November 2020, https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/Tutanak_B_SD.birlesim_baslangic?P4=22278&P5=H&page1=34&page2=34

⁵⁵³ Ergül Coşkun, "Orta Afrika ve Mali tezkeresi kabul edildi," *Anadolu Ajansı*, 21 November 2014, <https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/politika/orta-afrika-ve-mali-tezkeresi-kabul-edildi/99590>

⁵⁵⁴ Interview 2, Interview with a high-ranking Turkish diplomat, 23 July 2020, Ankara

in Africa, a combination that checks boxes for her Europeanization course, but this decision did not become real action.

At the end of the day, however, the decision to withhold contribution because of the low level of decision-making impact and visibility of the post speaks to the selective trend of Turkey's Europeanization journey. Although there is no official ground to support this argument, within the framework of the adopted conceptual approach, Turkey's non-participation to EUTM Mali could be debatably considered as a step in the de-Europeanization direction because she did not commit to the EU's expectations in this case. To put it briefly, Turkey's initial reaction to approve participation confirms her Europeanization at one level in the decision-making apparatus, whereas the eventual lack of contribution hinting at the opposite at another level of decision-making.

5.17. EUFOR RCA

The Central African Republic is one of the most fragile countries in the world, with a long history of coup d'états. In 2012, when President Bozizé was in power, armed conflict erupted between the government and Seleka, a coalition of rebel militia groups. The security crisis in the country worsened with thousands of internally displaced people and humanitarian disaster.⁵⁵⁵

Having closer political, cultural and historical ties with the country, France launched an operation on its own capacity, named Operation Sangaris. Concurrently, there was another operation led by African Union, MISCA.⁵⁵⁶ In 2014, the United Nations Security Council called for protection of civilian population in the Central African Republic and welcomed the readiness of the EU to launch a bridging operation to

⁵⁵⁵ International Crisis Group, "Central African Republic: Priorities of the Transition," *Africa Report* no. 203 (Brussels: 11 June 2013), 1-2, accessed 7 January 2021, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/central-african-republic/central-african-republic-priorities-transition>

⁵⁵⁶ Thierry Tardy, "EUFOR RCA Bangui: 'defence matters,'" *Alert Issue* no. 7 (Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2014): 1.

prepare the groundwork for a UN peacekeeping mission (MINUSCA) in the pipeline.⁵⁵⁷

Concerned about the risks of the conflict overflowing to neighboring countries, and accepting the proposal by the High Representative to play an active part in ensuring stability in the country, the Council passed a decision to deploy a military crisis management operation in the Central African Republic,⁵⁵⁸ first military operation launched under CSDP in five years. It was designed as a temporary fix until the UN peacekeeping force could take over from the EU.⁵⁵⁹

As is usual for most CSDP undertakings in Africa, France was the leading EU member state in getting the others on board, and since the French were already on the ground with Operation Sangaris, the EUFOR RCA would have preliminary experience.⁵⁶⁰ Despite that, force generation emerged as a serious problem, with only France and Georgia willing to commit troops and the reservations in the EU member states turning the situation into embarrassment.⁵⁶¹

In the end, around 800 out of envisaged 1,000 troops could be deployed, but at a much later time due to force generation problems and the violent security conditions

⁵⁵⁷ “Resolution 2134,” S/RES/2134, United Nations Security Council, 2014.

⁵⁵⁸ Council of the European Union, “Council Decision 2014/73/CFSP on a European Union military operation in the Central African Republic (EUFOR RCA),” Brussels: 10 February 2014, accessed 12 January 2021, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014D0073&from=HR>

⁵⁵⁹ Council of the European Union, “Council conclusions on the Central African Republic,” *Foreign Affairs Council Meeting* (Brussels: 17 March 2014).

⁵⁶⁰ Tardy, “EUFOR RCA Bangui: ‘defence matters’,” 2.

⁵⁶¹ Agnieszka Nimark, “EUFOR RCA: EU force or farce?,” *Opini3n Europa* no. 230 (Barcelona: Barcelona Centre for International Affairs, 2014): 1-2.

on the ground.⁵⁶² EUFOR RCA is considered as one of the most dangerous CSDP operations ever conducted and completed its mandate within the year by transferring to MINUSCA.⁵⁶³

As per Article 8 of Council Decision 2014/73/CFSP, third state participation was allowed.⁵⁶⁴ Turkey was invited by the High Representative. During the presentation of draft resolution to authorize participation of Turkish troops in EUFOR RCA in the Grand Assembly, citing third country participations by Georgia and Serbia, the planned support by Turkey is laid out as strategic air transport assistance to the headquarters in Bangui by 1 Turkish army staff.⁵⁶⁵

In spite of the fact that the Assembly passed the resolution to contribute to EUFOR RCA, Turkey could not actually send the support because the designated vacancies turned out to be no longer needed, and operation was terminated before the support could be delivered.⁵⁶⁶

Notwithstanding the eventual non-contribution, the political will manifested in the Parliamentary pass to send support signals a motivation in favor of Europeanization.

⁵⁶² Tim Haesebrouck and Melanie Meirvenne, “EUFOR RCA and CSDP crisis management operations: back on track?,” *European Foreign Affairs Review* 20 (2015): 279.

⁵⁶³ Thierry Tardy, “EUFOR RCA: tough start, smooth end,” *Alert Issue* no. 17 (Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2015): 1-2.

⁵⁶⁴ Council of the European Union, “Council Decision 2014/73/CFSP”

⁵⁶⁵ Turkish Grand National Assembly, *General Debate Minutes*, 24th Parliament, 5th Legislative Year, 17th Session, (Ankara: 2014), accessed 15 November 2020, https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/Tutanak_B_SD.birlesim_baslangic?P4=22278&P5=H&page1=34&page2=34

⁵⁶⁶ Interview 2, Interview with a high-ranking Turkish diplomat, 23 July 2020, Ankara

5.18. EUCAP Sahel Mali / EURACC Sahel

With the Sahel region in crisis, the EU stepped up its assistance within the framework of the Comprehensive Regional Approach and Action Plan for the Sahel region.⁵⁶⁷ With EUTM Mali training the Malian Armed Forces, the EU had already a presence in the ground. However, to help with the security sector reform in Mali beyond training the armed forces, and upon invitation from the Malian government, the EU launched a civilian mission to complement the EUTM in 2014.⁵⁶⁸

Dubbed as EUCAP Sahel Mali, this civilian capacity building mission was entrusted with assisting and advising the Malian security sector in implementing security sector reform.⁵⁶⁹ The mission has been extended several times with a wider mandate, engaging in border management against migration flows and supporting Malian security capacity in combatting terrorism and organized crime.⁵⁷⁰

Due to changing security situation on the ground and the needs of the Malian security forces in the wake of back-to-back coups in Mali this year (2021), the latest renewal of the mandate established new priorities such as supporting the return of the

⁵⁶⁷ Eric Pichon, "Understanding the EU Strategy for the Sahel," *EU Policies - Insight* (Brussels: EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service, September 2020), accessed 20 February 2021, [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2020/652050/EPRS_BRI\(2020\)652050_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2020/652050/EPRS_BRI(2020)652050_EN.pdf)

⁵⁶⁸ Shyamika Jayasundara-Smits, "Bracing the Wind and Riding the Norm Life Cycle: Inclusive Peacebuilding in the European Capacity Building Mission in Sahel–Mali (EUCAP Sahel–Mali)," *Peacebuilding* 6, no. 3 (2018): 238.

⁵⁶⁹ Council of the European Union, "Council Decision 2014/219/CFSP on the European Union CSDP mission in Mali (EUCAP Sahel Mali)," Brussels: 15 April 2014, accessed 2 February 2021, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32014D0219&qid=1607806834723>

⁵⁷⁰ Raineri and Baldaro, "Resilience to What? EU Capacity-building Missions in the Sahel," 173-174.

civil government and securing the environment for the upcoming elections in 2022.⁵⁷¹

The renewal of CSDP missions in the Sahel is attributed to the increasing interest of EU to managing conflicts in the region, which has turned into a field of experimentation for the Union of its new strategic concept and a redefinition of its approach to crisis management.⁵⁷²

To better support the Sahel countries in fighting against terrorism through the regional formation known as G5 Sahel Force, the EU decided to regionalize the capacity building mission in Mali to cover the G5 area. In that vein, a regional advisory and coordination cell was established within the mission in 2019, later known as EURACC Sahel, and the command and control of the mission was relocated from Bamako, Mali to Nouakchott, Mauritania.⁵⁷³

The legislative instrument allows EUCAP Sahel Mali to accept third country participation,⁵⁷⁴ and currently 3 non-EU states support the mission.⁵⁷⁵ Turkey was invited as well, but similar to the case in EUTM Mali, even though the Grand Assembly approved participation, the visibility level of vacancies was considered

⁵⁷¹ European External Action Service, "Factsheet on Civilian mission Mali EUCAP Sahel Mali," updated in July 2021, accessed 19 July 2021, https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/factsheet_english_2021.pdf

⁵⁷² Elisa Lopez Lucia, "Performing EU Agency by Experimenting the 'Comprehensive Approach': The European Union Sahel Strategy," *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 35, no. 4 (2017): 456; 458.

⁵⁷³ Council of the European Union, "Sahel: EU takes further steps to better support the security of the region," 18 February 2019, accessed 2 December 2021, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2019/02/18/sahel-eu-takes-further-steps-to-better-support-the-security-of-the-region/>

⁵⁷⁴ Council of the European Union, "Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/14 amending Decision 2014/219/CFSP on the European Union CSDP Mission in Mali (EUCAP Sahel Mali)," Brussels: 7 January 2021, accessed 2 February 2021, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32021D0014>

⁵⁷⁵ European External Action Service, "Factsheet on Civilian mission Mali EUCAP Sahel Mali"

low, as well as the level of influence in decision-making mechanisms, which led to discouragement from sending contributions in the end.⁵⁷⁶

In this context, EUCAP Sahel could be put in the same category for non-participation and reasoning with EUTM Mali in that the initial pass by Parliament indicates a political will for Europeanization whereas the consequential non-contribution suggests the contrary.

5.19. EUAM Ukraine

Following Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014, the Ukrainian then Foreign Minister sent a request to the EU for a monitoring mission to Ukraine and the EU dispatched a group of experts to Ukraine to draft a crisis management concept.⁵⁷⁷ Initially, a monitoring mission for the Eastern border of Ukraine was the main request, but due to the dissent from some member states, it ended up as a security sector reform mission.⁵⁷⁸ It is important to note that at that moment, EU already had a running border monitoring mission deployed at the Ukrainian-Moldovan border (EUBAM) whereas this time the crisis scene was Crimea and Ukraine's eastern oblasts.

EUAM Ukraine was officially launched in July 2014 with the objectives of mentoring and advising Ukrainian governmental bodies in generating a strategic framework for security by creating a conceptual framework for reforms in the rule of law and re-organizing the security structure to regain control and accountability over

⁵⁷⁶ Interview 2, *Interview with a high-ranking Turkish diplomat*, 23 July 2020, Ankara

⁵⁷⁷ Kateryna Zarembo, "Perceptions of CSDP Effectiveness in Ukraine: A Host State Perspective," *European Security* 26, no. 2 (2017): 198.

⁵⁷⁸ Zarembo, "Perceptions of CSDP Effectiveness in Ukraine: A Host State Perspective," 198.

security services.⁵⁷⁹ The underlying reason for this directive was to increase public confidence in Ukrainian security forces, which was tarnished in the eyes of the public due to violence against Euromaidan protestors.⁵⁸⁰

The contents of the mission created confusion among the Ukrainian counterparts because the concept of security sector reform was taken as assistance in security and defense trainings and equipment, whereas for the EU it refers to reinforcing the relevant institutions in the rule of law.⁵⁸¹ The fact that the EU did not consult the Ukrainian counterparts in the designing phase of EUAM and the complete exclusion of any concrete security and defense aspect of the mandate despite repeated wishes and requests of Ukraine did not satisfy the Ukrainians' expectations.⁵⁸² This was because the Ukrainians were looking for a solution to an ongoing crisis targeting their territorial integrity while the EU had to compromise internally, given the complexity of its member states' relations with Russia, on a merely civilian mission with a low-key task.⁵⁸³

An alternative opinion on EUAM Ukraine suggests that it was launched as a soft balancing endeavor by the EU against Russia's aggression driven by a larger

⁵⁷⁹ Council of the European Union, "Council Decision 2014/486/CFSP on the European Union Advisory Mission for Civilian Security Sector Reform Ukraine (EUAM Ukraine)," Brussels: 22 July 2014, accessed 3 December 2020, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32014D0486>

⁵⁸⁰ Niklas Nováky, "Why so soft? The European Union in Ukraine," *Contemporary Security Policy* 36, no. 2 (2015): 244.

⁵⁸¹ Chiara Loschi and Alessandra Russo, "Whose Enemy at the Gates? Border Management in the Context of EU Crisis Response in Libya and Ukraine," *Geopolitics* 26, no. 5 (2020): 15.

⁵⁸² Leonid Litra, Ivan Medynskyi and Kateryna Zarembo, "Assessing the EU's conflict prevention and peacebuilding interventions in Ukraine," *Whole-of-Society Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding* D3.4 (The Hague: Institute of World Policy, 23 March 2017), 34.

⁵⁸³ Shyamika Jayasundara-Smits, "From Revolution to Reform and Back: EU-Security Sector Reform in Ukraine," *European Security* 27, no. 4 (2018): 461.

geographical approach that seeks to build resilience of Ukrainian institutions to undermine Russia's ability to influence Ukraine.⁵⁸⁴

The mission's mandate was reviewed after a year to include solid projects and trainings,⁵⁸⁵ and runs until 2024.⁵⁸⁶ Third states may be invited to participate to EUAM Ukraine, with Canada currently being the only contributor.⁵⁸⁷

Previously, Turkey contributed to EUAM Ukraine upon invitation with a police officer between 23 November 2015 and 22 February 2016. After Turkey's contribution was suspended following the coup attempt on 15 July 2016, Turkey expressed desire to continue her participation.⁵⁸⁸ Ever since then, her applications to vacant posts in the mission have remained unanswered.⁵⁸⁹

With regards to Turkey's involvement in the case, she is neighboring Ukraine by the sea and regards Ukraine as a strategic partner with multifaceted relations that go as far as passport-free travel.⁵⁹⁰ In respect of Ukraine's territorial integrity, Turkey does

⁵⁸⁴ Nováky, "Why so soft? The European Union in Ukraine," 244; 247.

⁵⁸⁵ Zarembo, "Perceptions of CSDP Effectiveness in Ukraine: A Host State Perspective," 202-203.

⁵⁸⁶ Council of the European Union, "Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/813 amending Decision 2014/486/CFSP on the European Union Advisory Mission for Civilian Security Sector Reform Ukraine (EUAM Ukraine)," Brussels: 20 May 2021, accessed 15 February 2021, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32021D0813>

⁵⁸⁷ European External Action Service, "Factsheet on EUAM Ukraine," accessed 22 July 2021, <https://www.euam-ukraine.eu/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/Factsheet-EUAM-ENG.pdf>

⁵⁸⁸ European Commission, *Turkey Reports 2018; 2019; 2020* (Strasbourg: 2018; 2019; 2020).

⁵⁸⁹ Interview 2, Interview with a high-ranking Turkish diplomat, 23 July 2020, Ankara

⁵⁹⁰ "Turkey-Ukraine Relations," *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey*, accessed 18 July 2021, <https://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkey-and-ukraine.en.mfa>

not recognize Russia's illegitimate annexation of Crimea and the separatist claims over Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts.⁵⁹¹

In that vein, Turkey supports the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission with top diplomats. The post of OSCE Chief Monitor was carried out by former Turkish Ambassador Ertuğrul Apakan from 2014 to 2019, who relinquished the post to another Turkish Ambassador Halit Çevik.⁵⁹²

Turkey's participation in the past to EUAM Ukraine is undeniably related to her proximity to and strategic partnership with Ukraine. From the Europeanization argument's perspective, when the mission was deployed in 2014 and Turkey committed staff in 2015, foreign policy alignment with the EU was backsliding.⁵⁹³ However, on the issue of Russia's aggression against Ukrainian territorial integrity, Turkey and the EU were in tune. Besides, by contributing to EUAM, Turkey measured up to EU's call for support. While it may not be crystal clear that she did so out of her desire to satisfy the EU, this still qualifies as a step in that direction.

On the other hand, accounting for the time elapsed since the pullout of her contribution and the EU's lack of admission of her applications may point to a reserve dynamic, although there are no official and clear-cut indications to that end. In many aspects, Turkey's involvement in EUAM leads to the same conclusion as EULEX Kosovo, i.e. initially qualified as Europeanization and later transitioning to de-Europeanization, minus the soft-balancing angle.

5.20. EUMAM and EUTM RCA

Upon the letter sent by the CAR transitional Head of State inviting the European Union to deploy a consulting military mission in January 2015, the European Union Military Advisory Mission (EUMAM) in Central African Republic was launched

⁵⁹¹ "Turkey-Ukraine Relations," *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey*.

⁵⁹² Ibid.

⁵⁹³ European Commission, *Turkey 2014; 2015 Reports* (Strasbourg: 2014; 2015).

with the aim of advising the Central African authorities on security and laying the groundwork for the upcoming Security Sector Reform.⁵⁹⁴

In a sense, the mission was a prelude to broader reforms in the security sector to be reinforced by the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA).⁵⁹⁵ Despite being invited, Turkey did not participate in the mission.⁵⁹⁶

Five years after the end of EUFOR Tchad/RCA, the EU established a non-executive mission to the Central African Republic, EUTM RCA at the request of CAR authorities, to train the Central African Armed Forces in cooperation with MINUSCA.⁵⁹⁷

EUTM CAR admits third countries, and currently Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, North Macedonia and Serbia contribute staff.⁵⁹⁸ The mission's mandate has been extended until 2022 with a wider coverage beyond the capital and the town of

⁵⁹⁴ Council of the European Union, "Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/78 on a European Union CSDP Military Advisory Mission in the Central African Republic (EUMAM RCA)," Brussels: 19 January 2015, accessed 11 March 2021, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32015D0078>

⁵⁹⁵ European External Action Service, "Factsheet on the Central African Republic," updated in September 2019, accessed 25 July 2021, https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/20190919_mission_factsheet_eutm_rca.pdf

⁵⁹⁶ Interview 2, Interview with a high-ranking Turkish diplomat, 23 March 2020, Ankara

⁵⁹⁷ Council of the European Union, "Council Decision (CFSP) 2016/610 on a European Union CSDP Military Training Mission in the Central African Republic (EUTM RCA)," Brussels: 19 April 2016, accessed 11 March 2021, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32016D0610>

⁵⁹⁸ Annelies Hickendorff and Igor Acko, "The European Union Training Mission in the Central Africa Republic: An Assessment," *SIPRI Background Paper* (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2021), 1-2, accessed 12 March 2021, https://sipri.org/sites/default/files/2021-02/bp_2102_eutm_rca_final.pdf

Bouar.⁵⁹⁹ Turkey's non-participation is not subject to any official and public records or statements and is not attributable to a clear motive. She also does not contribute to the UN integrated mission MINUSCA.⁶⁰⁰

The lack of Turkish appetite in joining this mission may have multiple explanations, one of which could be found in the scarce strategic interest CAR holds for the country. Besides, as this mission was launched at a time when Turkey's Europeanization journey featured a more selective trend, opting out of EUTM RCA may be viewed from that perspective.

5.21. EUNAVFOR MED / Operation Sophia

In order to tackle the immigration flow from Libya, Italy has been calling on EU member states to take action and share the burden that she has been carrying alone with Operation Mare Nostrum. Italy's repeated pleas fell on deaf ears as the other member states were lukewarm to the idea of fielding a CSDP operation to fight illegal immigration.⁶⁰¹ This attitude changed when a refugee boat off the Libyan coast was tragically capsized in 2015, leaving 800 dead.⁶⁰²

Adopting Decision (CFSP) 2015/778 on 18 May 2015, with the intention to prevent human tragedies resulting from human trafficking in the Mediterranean, the EU set itself on a very arduous task by planning an operation that would be conducted in three phases: first phase would involve intelligence gathering on migration and smuggling routes; second phase targeted boarding, search and seizure of suspected

⁵⁹⁹ Hickendorff and Acko, "The European Union Training Mission in the Central Africa Republic: An Assessment," 1-2.

⁶⁰⁰ "MINUSCA," *UN Peacekeeping*, accessed 21 July 2021, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/minusca>

⁶⁰¹ Niklas Nováky, "The Road to Sophia: Explaining the EU's Naval Operation in the Mediterranean," *European View* 17, no. 2 (2018): 200-201.

⁶⁰² Anne Ingemann Johansen, "Assessing the European Union's Strategic Capacity: The Case of EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia," *European Security* 26, no. 4 (2017), 517.

vessels on high seas and territorial waters of the coastal state, and the third phase would concern taking any measures deemed necessary against the vessels.⁶⁰³

EUNAVFOR MED hit a wall in the second phase of the operation because while the EEAS fast tracked the planning, the legal basis of a military action against illegal migration was left fragile.⁶⁰⁴ The Council Decision refers to “any applicable UNSC Resolution” but there was none that could infringe upon the Libyan sovereignty on their territorial waters, which meant that the EU had to receive consent from the Libyan government, which has not been possible.⁶⁰⁵

Anxious to operationalize EUNAVFOR MED as foreseen, the EU lobbied within the UN Security Council for a resolution that would authorize phase two actions, and what came out of its hard work was Resolution 2240 (2015) which only granted authority of the said actions on high seas, and with the main objective of saving the lives of people aboard the vessels used for trafficking.⁶⁰⁶

To some, EUNAVFOR MED is the “trickiest” CSDP operation where the EU has been criticized for its overreaction instead of inaction unlike in previous crises. Even the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon expressed his contempt towards the risky nature of the operation involving refugees, to which then High Representative Mogherini defended the action by putting the smugglers into the target board of the

⁶⁰³ Council of the European Union, “Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/778 on a European Union military operation in the Southern Central Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR MED),” Brussels: 18 May 2015, accessed 8 December 2020, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32015D0778>

⁶⁰⁴ Nováky, “The Road to Sophia: Explaining the EU’s Naval Operation in the Mediterranean,” 204-205.

⁶⁰⁵ Giorgia Bevilacqua, “Exploring the Ambiguity of Operation Sophia between Military and Search and Rescue Activities,” In *the Future of the Law of the Sea: Bridging Gaps between National, Individual and Common Interests*, ed. Gemma Andreone (Rome: Springer, 2017), 176-177.

⁶⁰⁶ Mireia Estrada-Cañamares, “Operation Sophia before and after UN Security Council Resolution No 2240 (2015),” *European Papers* 1, no. 1 (2016): 187.

operation.⁶⁰⁷ Others also point out the non-transparent nature of EUNAVFOR MED and how it focused merely on the symptom, i.e. illegal migration, rather than the root causes of it⁶⁰⁸ while some drawing attention to its eventual fate as a salvage mission in the absence of permission by the coastal state.⁶⁰⁹

In absence of approval, EUNAVFOR MED's focus shifted to accommodate to the reality due to legal constraints.⁶¹⁰ In 2016, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2016/993, adding two tasks to the operation's mandate, namely capacity building and training of the Libyan Coast Guard and Navy, and contributing to information sharing and the implementation of the UN arms embargo on the high seas off the coast of Libya.⁶¹¹

The Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/778 provides for third state participation upon invitation by the PSC. Seeing that Libya falls within the category of CSDP crisis management sites that Turkey considers strategically relevant for national interests, Turkey would have considered favorably if the EU invited her to contribute.⁶¹²

⁶⁰⁷ Giovanni Faleg and Steven Blockmans, "EU Naval Force EUNAVFOR MED sets sail in troubled waters," *CEPS Commentary* (Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 2015), 1-5.

⁶⁰⁸ Marius Pricopi, "EU Military Operation Sophia: Analysing the Shortfalls," *Buletin Stiintific* 42, no. 2 (2016): 125.

⁶⁰⁹ Bevilacqua, "Exploring the Ambiguity of Operation Sophia between Military and Search and Rescue Activities," 178.

⁶¹⁰ Ingemann Johansen, "Assessing the European Union's Strategic Capacity: The Case of EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia," 521-522.

⁶¹¹ Council of the European Union, "Council Decision (CFSP) 2016/993 amending Decision (CFSP) 2015/778 on a European Union military operation in the Southern Central Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR MED operation SOPHIA)," Brussels: 20 June 2016, accessed 8 December 2020, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32016D2314>

⁶¹² Interview 2, Interview with a high-ranking Turkish diplomat, 23 July 2020, Ankara

However, despite the legal leeway, no third state was invited to participate in Operation Sophia, and only member states, including Greek Cyprus, was engaged.⁶¹³

EUNAVFOR MED's mandate discontinued in March 2020,⁶¹⁴ and was replaced by Operation Iriini. The mission rather fell short of its ambitious scope, which is evident from the force generation aspect as only 2 ships, 6 helicopters and 6 air assets were deployed before the close of the operation.⁶¹⁵

At the time, NATO was also conducting Operation Active Endeavor in the Mediterranean with a view to deterring maritime terrorist activity. Terminated in 2016 and succeeded by "Operation Sea Guard", NATO's Active Endeavor relied on naval asset contributions of Mediterranean Allies, including Turkey.⁶¹⁶

Turkey's situation vis-à-vis EUNAVFOR MED is comparable with the case in EUBAM Libya in that if invited, there is a high chance that Turkey may have responded favorably. And yet, much as the legal basis allowed third countries, and given the military nature of the operation warranting invitation to and consultations with Turkey due to her proximity to Libya pursuant to Nice provisions, the EU bypassed Turkey.

This is not attributable to Turkey's involvement in the Libyan scene but perhaps rather to the sensitivity of immigration in the EU politics and public opinion, making EUNAVFOR MED a close circle initiative. Besides, since the operation never turned

⁶¹³ Interview 2, Interview with a high-ranking Turkish diplomat, 23 July 2020, Ankara

⁶¹⁴ Council of the European Union, "Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/471 repealing Decision (CFSP) 2015/778 on a European Union military operation in the Southern Central Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR MED operation SOPHIA)," Brussels: 31 March 2020, accessed 21 August 2021, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32020D0471>

⁶¹⁵ European External Action Service, "Factsheet on the EUNAVFOR MED," updated in March 2019, accessed 13 July 2021, <https://www.operationsophia.eu/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Factsheet-about-Mission-EUNAVFOR-MED-Operation-SOPHIA-1.pdf>

⁶¹⁶ "Operation Active Endeavour (Archived)," NATO, accessed 6 July 2021, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_7932.htm

into what was expected of it, more ambitious force generation with the support of third states might not have become an objective. Lastly, EUNAVFOR MED rebuffing Turkey could be triggered by Greek Cyprus, one of the contributors, seeing that it was a military operation conducted in Eastern Mediterranean waters.

5.22. EUAM Iraq

In the wake of the trauma caused by the Islamic State's presence in Iraq, the Iraqi government invited the EU to assist in the implementation of National Security Strategy's civilian dimension.⁶¹⁷ The EU responded with an advisory mission in security sector reform, with a mandate that is broadly defined in civilian terms to support the Iraqi Ministry of Interior and the National Counter-Terrorism Committee with the generation of policy design, organized crime and security legislation.⁶¹⁸

In 2018, the Iraqi government also invited NATO to support the country in the defense aspect of their plan with a training and capacity-building mission for Iraqi forces.⁶¹⁹ The main objective of the NATO Mission in Iraq (NMI) is to train the trainers to build the capacity of the Iraqi forces so that they could fight terrorism and prevent the Islamic State from resurfacing.⁶²⁰ As both missions have mandates that complement each other, in 2019, EUAM and NMI signed a Memorandum of

⁶¹⁷ "EUAM Iraq," *European External Action Service*, accessed 13 August 2021, <https://www.euam-iraq.eu/About>

⁶¹⁸ Council of the European Union, "Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/1869 on the European Union Advisory Mission in support of Security Sector Reform in Iraq (EUAM Iraq)," Brussels: 16 October 2017, accessed 4 September 2021, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32017D1869>

⁶¹⁹ "NATO Mission Iraq," NATO, accessed 16 August 2021, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_166936.htm

⁶²⁰ Niels Schafranek, "NATO and EU training missions in Iraq – an opportunity to enhance cooperation," *NDC Policy Brief* no. 17 (Rome: NATO Defence College, 2019), 1-4.

Cooperation to reinforce their relationship on the ground.⁶²¹ Even though these ongoing missions cannot formally exchange classified information, they engage in informal practical communication to facilitate their tasks.⁶²²

In spite of the Council Decision on EUAM Iraq's provision for third country participation upon invitation by the Council, no such invitations have been extended to any third country including Turkey,⁶²³ keeping it an EU-tight mission with the exception the Iraqi national staff.

As a NATO Ally, and Iraq's strategic neighbor, Turkey has been involved in all NATO initiatives in Iraq, including NATO Training Mission (NTM) in 2004-2011, and currently contributes to NMI with 25 staff and a 61-strong force protection unit.⁶²⁴ The lack of consultations with Turkey before the deployment of EUAM in Turkey's neighbor Iraq, as is required under Nice Document, and the subsequent lack of invitation to Turkey for participation clearly do not send out optimistic signs.⁶²⁵ Here, once again, the arbitrary nature of EU's interpretation of Nice Document covering only military operations creates complications for an Ally country that shares a land border with Iraq.

Likewise, the lack of communication with Turkey in the run-up to EUAM's deployment to Iraq, and considering Turkey's sizeable support to NMI, a more

⁶²¹ "EUAM Iraq and the NATO Mission Iraq sign a Memorandum of Cooperation," EEAS - European Commission, accessed 16 August 2021, https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/mexico/69138/euam-iraq-and-nato-mission-iraq-sign-memorandum-cooperation_gl

⁶²² Bart M.J. Szewczyk, "Operational Cooperation," In *the EU and NATO: Essential Partners*, ed. Gustav Lindstrom and Thierry Tardy (Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2021), 21-27.

⁶²³ Interview 2, Interview with a high-ranking Turkish diplomat, 23 July 2020, Ankara

⁶²⁴ "Contribution of the TAF to Peace Support Operations," Turkish Armed Forces - General Staff, accessed 17 July 2021, <https://www.tsk.tr/Sayfalar?viewName=ContributionToTafToPeace>

⁶²⁵ Interview 2, Interview with a high-ranking Turkish diplomat, 27 May 2020, Ankara

ambitious initiative than EUAM, may presumably have discouraged Turkey from expressing any interest in supporting the Union's civilian mission. And the fact that Turkey recently experienced an attempted coup in 2016, leading to a state of emergency at the time when EUAM Iraq was launched brings up another discussion.

After the coup attempt in 2016, there appeared a discussion on Turkey's decoupling with the EU,⁶²⁶ and led to calls for halting accession negotiations.⁶²⁷ Foreign policy alignment in the aftermath of the coup attempt also suffered from the criticism from EU towards Turkey's state of emergency.⁶²⁸ Therefore, it could be argued that the fall-out of the attempted coup triggered a de-Europeanization trend in foreign and security policy realm, which might explain the lack of Turkish involvement in EUAM Iraq. Still, Turkey's continued support to Iraq's fight against terrorism through NMI and its predecessor signifies her credentials for crisis management efforts. All in all, both EU and NATO initiatives in Iraq presently co-exist in complementarity, but her presence with NATO in Iraq may be interpreted as a soft-balancing leverage.

5.23. EUAM RCA

Following the signing of the Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation between the Central African Republic and armed groups on 6 February 2019, the CAR government requested from the EU to assist the country in security sector reform and

⁶²⁶ Marc Pierini, "A Tale of a Dual Turkey," *Carnegie Europe*, 18 December 2017, accessed 15 October 2021, <https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategieurope/75048>

⁶²⁷ "Freezing the Negotiations on Turkey's Accession to the European Union," *European Parliament*, 24 November 2016, accessed 5 August 2021, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-8-2016-009001_EN.html

⁶²⁸ European Commission, *Turkey 2018 Report*, (Strasbourg: 2018), 96-98.

support its internal security forces. In response, the EU deployed an advisory mission to cover these tasks, named as EUAM RCA, launched on 9 December 2019.⁶²⁹

The mission allows third state participation, but official EU sources do not indicate whether any third state currently participates in EUAM CAR.⁶³⁰ It is also not clear if Turkey was invited or showed interest in contributing to the mission.

In 2014, the UN launched a multidimensional integrated mission to support the CAR through the political and humanitarian crisis, called MINUSCA.⁶³¹ Although Turkey is not listed among active contributors to this mission, the General Assembly has passed the bill to authorize deployment of Turkish staff to contribute to MINUSCA.⁶³²

Considering the uncertainty over Turkey's invitation to EUAM RCA, it may not be clearly justified to categorize her approval to contribute to a UN mission as a soft-balancing motivation vis-a-vis EUAM RCA. In that context, this could be a case where Turkey's absence does not indicate clear motives as per this study's scope.

5.24. EUNAVFOR MED / Operation Iriini

Libya's political and security fragility persisted even after the formation of the GNA, with the country's territory and leadership de facto split between the UN-recognized GNA, Khalifa Haftar's Libyan National Army (LNA) and the House of

⁶²⁹ Council of the European Union, "Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/2110 on the European Union CSDP Advisory Mission in the Central African Republic (EUAM RCA)," Brussels: 9 December 2019, accessed 1 December 2021, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/GA/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32019D2110>

⁶³⁰ European External Action Service, "Factsheet on the EU Advisory Mission in the Central African Republic (EUAM RCA)," n.d., accessed 1 December 2021, https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/factsheet_euam_rca_0.pdf

⁶³¹ "MINUSCA." UN Peacekeeping, accessed 1 December 2021, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/minusca>

⁶³² Ali Murat Alhas, "Turkish parliament ratifies extension of troops deployment in Africa," *Anadolu Agency*, 19 October 2021, <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/politics/turkish-parliament-ratifies-extension-of-troops-deployment-in-africa/2396900>

Representatives based in Tobruk⁶³³ Amid the unfaltering aggression, with Germany's initiative and hospitality, a consultation platform to resolve the Libyan crisis known as Berlin Conference was born.⁶³⁴ The conclusions of the Berlin Conference dedicated special attention to achieving a ceasefire, confidence building measures and respecting the arms embargo stipulated by UNSC Resolution in 2011.⁶³⁵

Grounded on the conclusions about the arms embargo in Libya, the EU decided to set up a military operation in the Mediterranean, off the coast of Libya, which would succeed Operation Sophia. Known as EUNAVFOR MED Irini, the operation was established by the Council in March 2020, and tasked with contributing to preventing arms trafficking in accordance with relevant UNSC Resolutions primarily, and capacity building of the Libyan Coast Guard as well as disrupting human trafficking secondarily.⁶³⁶

Narrating his visit to Irini's headquarters in Rome, High Representative Jorep Borrell reveals the rough consensus-building process to get the member states on board for Irini, alluding to the criticism inherited from Operation Sophia as a magnet for immigrants and claiming it to be unrealistic and inapplicable to Irini.⁶³⁷ Indeed, the successor of Sophia has come under fire for neglecting the immigration problem and

⁶³³ "Civil war in Libya | Global Conflict Tracker," *Global Conflict Tracker*, accessed 19 September 2021, <https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/civil-war-libya>

⁶³⁴ "Berlin International Conference on Libya," *UNSMIL*, 19 January 2020, accessed 22 September 2021, <https://unsmil.unmissions.org/berlin-international-conference-libya-19-january-2020>

⁶³⁵ "Conference Conclusions," *UNSMIL*, Berlin Conference on Libya, 19 January 2020, accessed 22 September 2021, https://unsmil.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/berlin_conference_communique.pdf

⁶³⁶ Council of the European Union, "Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/472 on a European Union military operation in the Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR MED IRINI)," Brussels: 31 March 2020, accessed 3 December 2020, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dec/2020/472/oj>

⁶³⁷ Josep Borrell, "Operation IRINI and the Search for Peace in Libya," *European External Action Service - European Commission*, 21 March 2021, accessed 9 October 2021, https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/95383/operation-irini-and-search-peace-libya_en

saving lives as it should while focusing only on monitoring ships, ports, landing strips and submitting classified reports to UN's Libya panel of experts.⁶³⁸ From this perspective, Irimi is regarded as a let-down for the expectations from EU to deal with immigration.⁶³⁹ In fact, Malta threatened to pull out of Irimi due to the EU's lack of appetite for managing immigration through Irimi.⁶⁴⁰

Aside from the lowered expectations in fighting illegal migration, human trafficking and saving lives from Operation Irimi, its very own design is under judgement. The escalation of tension in the Eastern Mediterranean in 2020 between Turkey and Greek Cyprus, pulling in EU member states, and the conflicting alliances formed by the EU trifecta – France, Greece, Greek Cyprus – backing a warlord Haftar and by Turkey backing the UN-recognized GNA lends a different approach to the real stimulus behind Irimi.⁶⁴¹

As Irimi's declared objective is to uphold the arms embargo on Libya, the naval operation risked weakening the UN-backed government who received supplies from the sea while completely ignoring warlord Haftar's supply chain running through land and air.⁶⁴² The trifecta –France, Greece and Greek Cyprus- weaponized Irimi to

⁶³⁸ Emma Wallis, "Irimi Mission: One Year, No Migrant Rescues," *Infomigrants*, 4 July 2021, <https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/31367/irini-mission-one-year-no-migrant-rescues>

⁶³⁹ Marius Pricopi, "The Military Operation EUNAVFOR MED Irimi – A Downscale of the EU's Involvement in the Migration Crisis," *Land Forces Academy Review* 25, no. 4 (2020): 302-306.

⁶⁴⁰ Barış Seçkin, "Malta, AB'nin İrimi Operasyonuna desteğini çekmeye hazırlanıyor (Malta set to withdraw support from EU's Operation Irimi)," *Anadolu Agency*, 8 May 2020, <https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/dunya/malta-abnin-irini-operasyonuna-destegini-cekmeye-hazirlaniyor/1834040>; Chris Scicluna and Robin Emmott, "Malta pulls out of new EU Libya sea patrols in migration row," *Reuters*, 8 May 2021, <https://www.reuters.com/article/europe-migrants-libya/malta-pulls-out-of-new-eu-libya-sea-patrols-in-migration-row-idUKKBN22K1VH>

⁶⁴¹ Ferhan Oral, "Is the Crisis in the Eastern Mediterranean about Energy or Sovereignty?," *Uluslararası Kriz ve Siyaset Araştırmaları Dergisi (Journal of International Crisis and Political Studies)* 5, no. 1 (2021), 219-247.

⁶⁴² Luigi Scazzieri, "The EU's new Libya operation is flawed," *Centre for European Reform*, 8 April 2020, accessed 19 October 2021, https://www.cer.eu/sites/default/files/insight_LS_8.4.20_fin.pdf

arrest the deal between Turkey and GNA on delimitation of maritime boundaries.⁶⁴³ EU's miscalculation with Irini was called out as a "biased operation" used as a tool against Turkey.⁶⁴⁴

What brought Turkey to this assessment was a blatant violation of Operation Irini when an affiliated German ship boarded and inspected a Turkish-flagged commercial vessel carrying paint and humanitarian aid to Misrata at gunpoint on November 2020.⁶⁴⁵ Protesting this violation, Turkish Foreign Ministry's official statement declared the inspection as an act against the international law, and highlighted the questionable neutrality of Irini and the lack of consultations with neighbors and NATO Allies before its launch.⁶⁴⁶

Despite the nod by the Council Decision to invite third states, participation has been limited to EU Member States.⁶⁴⁷ Turkey was not invited by the PSC to participate as

⁶⁴³ Tarek Megerisi, "Geostrategic Dimensions of Libya's Civil War," *Africa Security Brief* No: 37, (Washington, D.C.: Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 2020), accessed 5 August 2021, <https://africacenter.org/publication/geostrategic-dimensions-libya-civil-war/>

⁶⁴⁴ "Participation of Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu in the NATO Foreign Ministers Meeting Held via Videoconference, 1-2 December 2020," *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey*, accessed 19 September 2021, <https://www.mfa.gov.tr/sayin-bakanimizin-nato-db-toplantisina-katilimi-1-2-aralik-2020.en.mfa>

⁶⁴⁵ Tuğçenur Akgün, "Uluslararası hukuk İrini Harekâtı eyleminde neden Türkiye'den yana? (Why is the International law on Turkey's side regarding Operation Irini's actions?)," *Anadolu Agency*, 5 December 2020. <https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/analiz/uluslararasi-hukuk-irini-harek%C3%A2ti-eyleminde-neden-turkiyeden-yana/2066890>

⁶⁴⁶ "Statement of the Spokesperson of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Hami Aksoy, in Response to a Question Regarding the Inspection under Operation Irini of a Turkish-Flagged Commercial Vessel without Turkey's Consent," *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey*, accessed 19 September 2021, https://www.mfa.gov.tr/sc_-115_--turk-bayrakli-bir-ticari-geminin-irini-harekati-kapsaminda-ulkemizin-rizasi-olmadan-denetime-tabi-tutulmasi-hk-sc.en.mfa

⁶⁴⁷ European External Action Service, "Factsheet on EUNAVFOR MED IRINI," updated in May 2020, accessed 22 September 2021, https://www.operationirini.eu/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/factsheet_eunavfor_med_irini_070520.pdf

a third state, but “would not have responded favorably even if invited”.⁶⁴⁸ As per Nice Implementation Protocols, Turkey argues that the EU should have held consultations with her since Irini is a military operation being conducted in Turkey’s vicinity, in a territory holding strategic interests for Turkey. Turkey brought the issue of lack of observance to Nice Implementation provisions formally to the EU’s attention, which did not elicit the desired response from the EU.⁶⁴⁹

Turkey’s position vis-à-vis Operation Irini deteriorated when under the influence of France, Greece and Greek Cyprus, EU’s Foreign Affairs Council decided to include a Turkish maritime transportation company within the list of sanctions in connection with Libya.⁶⁵⁰

As things stand, with the latest country report from Commission⁶⁵¹ receiving a harsh backlash from Turkey, particularly with regards to the remarks about the Eastern Mediterranean, Aegean and Cyprus issues,⁶⁵² it is not surprising to see comments on Turkey-EU dynamic turning into a rivalry.⁶⁵³ Turkish government’s resolve for full EU membership remains, which is not the focus of the study. Based on the analytical

⁶⁴⁸ Interview 2, Interview with a high ranking Turkish diplomat, 23 July 2020, Ankara

⁶⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁵⁰ "Press Release Regarding the Inclusion of a Turkish Maritime Transportation Company within the List of Sanctions in Connection with Libya at the Meeting of the EU Foreign Affairs Council," *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey*, accessed 22 September 2021, https://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_-218_-ab-dis-iliskiler-konseynin-libya-baglaminda-turk-sirketinin-yaptirim-listesine-alinmasi-hk.en.mfa

⁶⁵¹ "Key Findings of the 2021 Report on Turkey," *European Commission*, accessed 19 October 2021, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/qanda_21_5282

⁶⁵² "Press Release Regarding the 2021 Country Report on Turkey by the European Commission," *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey*, accessed 20 October 2021, https://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_-251_-avrupa-komisyonu-2021-turkiye-raporu-hk.en.mfa

⁶⁵³ Luigi Scazzieri, “From partners to rivals? The future of EU-Turkey relations,” *Centre for European Reform*, June 2021, accessed 19 October 2021, https://www.cer.eu/sites/default/files/pbrief_turkey_LS_23.6.21.pdf

approach towards Turkey's Europeanization by involvement/non-involvement in CSDP operations/missions, Operation Iriini qualifies as an example of divergent expectations/actions between Turkey and EU in common foreign and security policy, i.e. de-Europeanization.

5.25. EUTM Mozambique

As the most recent CSDP initiative, EUTM Mozambique has been officially launched on 12 July 2021 to provide military training to the Mozambican army to deal with the volatile security situation in the country's northernmost province Cabo Delgado.⁶⁵⁴

As per the authorizing Council Decision, third states are allowed to contribute to the mission. Currently, only 10 member states take part in EUTM Mozambique.⁶⁵⁵ The mission still has not reached its full operation capacity, which is expected to occur mid-December 2021.⁶⁵⁶

Since the mission is still in development, it is not clear which third countries are invited and whether they include Turkey. Therefore, at this stage, it is too early to make a judgement on Turkey's involvement or lack thereof vis-à-vis EUTM Mozambique.

⁶⁵⁴ Council of the European Union, "Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/1143 on a European Union Military Training Mission in Mozambique (EUTM Mozambique)," Brussels: 12 July 2021, accessed 3 December 2021, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32021D1143>

⁶⁵⁵ European External Action Service, "Factsheet on the European Union Military Training Mission in Mozambique (EUTM Mozambique)," updated on 15 October 2021, accessed 3 December 2021, https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/trainingmozambique_15oct_0.pdf

⁶⁵⁶ "EU Military Training Mission in Mozambique set to start its operations," *Council of the European Union*, updated on 15 October 2021, accessed 3 December 2021, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2021/10/15/eu-military-training-mission-in-mozambique-set-to-start-its-operations/>

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

This study attempted to shed light on the dynamics of the relationship of Turkey with the European Union's Common Security and Defense Policy by focusing on cooperation in crisis management, particularly in EU-led CSDP missions/operations. As a long-time member of the European security structure and an EU candidate for full membership, Turkey's interaction over the years with the CSDP through crisis management missions/operations is only one aspect of the full range of the relationship dynamics, but the evolution of these dynamics since the inception of the first crisis management initiative until today provides a glimpse at the overall puzzle of Turkey-EU relations in foreign and security policy spheres.

Given the large number of CSDP crisis management missions/operations undertaken so far, the study adopted a periodization based on three milestones that have impacted on Turkey-EU relations over the years: the first milestone refers to the operationalization of CSDP (2003-2005), the second to the start of accession negotiations (2005-2016), and the third to the failed coup attempt against Turkish government on 15 July 2016. The CSDP missions/operations are then chronologically dissected in line with this periodization and with the help of three conceptual arguments offering possible explanations towards Turkey's involvement/non-involvement in each of them.

The first such concept is Europeanization and de-Europeanization trends in Turkish foreign and security policies since the initiation of CSDP crisis management operations/missions. Here, the study aimed to interpret the convergences and divergences between the EU's policy expectations from Turkey in foreign and security fields. The cases where Turkey's interests in the crises that CSDP took an action aligned with the EU's wishes and expectations from a candidate country are considered as signs of Turkey's motivation for Europeanization. Whereas the ones

where Turkey did not fulfill such wishes and expectations are taken as signs for a reverse trend in action: de-Europeanization.

A second approach supports the first concept in that peacekeeping is at the core of European Union's foreign and security ideals, and enshrined in CSDP's Petersberg tasks, making it an important element of Europeanization in foreign and security policies. This is relevant to the study because Turkey is a rising player in peacekeeping and overall crisis management. Therefore, Turkey's involvement in CSDP crisis management initiatives is a valuable yardstick for her fitness to be a part of "Europe". Turkey's policy choices in crisis management are also worthy of studying to understand the potentially underlying motivations for her involvement/non-involvement in certain CSDP initiatives.

The third theoretical explanation adopted in this study seeks out those cases where Turkey has been in a position to attempt or succeed in soft-balancing the EU by way of wielding her membership to another institution, which is referred to as institutional balancing. With this analytical tool, the study intended to offer an explanation on Turkey's relationship vis-à-vis CSDP crisis management operations/missions where her NATO membership holds sway.

Combining these analytical approaches and linking them with the available data on CSDP operations/missions and Turkey's participation/non-participation in them produces a wholesome picture as displayed in the following tables.

Table 1. Missions and Operations during the first milestone period

CSDP Operation/Mission	Participation/Non- participation	Motivation / Condition	Notes
EUPM Bosnia January 2003-June 2012	Participation	Europeanization / peacekeeping	
Operation Concordia March 2003-December 2003	Participation	Europeanization / soft- balancing	Berlin Plus operation
Operation Artemis June 2003-September 2003	Non-participation	No clear motivation	First autonomous EU-led operation
EUPOL PROXIMA December 2003-December 2004	Participation	Europeanization / peacekeeping	
EUJUST Themis June 2004-July 2005	Non-participation	By nature of exclusivity to member states	Lack of consultations with Turkey as required under Nice Implementation Document
EUFOR ALTHEA July 2004-present	Participation (active)	Europeanization / peacekeeping / soft- balancing	Berlin Plus operation / Ongoing contribution
EUPAT FYROM November 2005-June 2006	Non-participation	By nature of exclusivity to member states	
EUPOL Kinshasa / RD Congo April 2005-June 2007	Participation	Europeanization / peacekeeping	
EUJUST LEX Iraq July 2005-December 2013	Non-participation	By nature of exclusivity to member states	Lack of consultations with Turkey as required under Nice Implementation Document
EUSEC RD Congo May 2005-June 2016	Non-participation	By nature of exclusivity to member states	
AMM Aceh September 2005- December 2006	Non-participation	No clear motivation	

Table 2. Missions and Operations during the second milestone period

EUPOL COPPS November 2005-present	Participation (inactive)	Europeanization / peacekeeping	Currently non-participation
EUBAM Rafah December 2005-present	Non-participation	No clear motivation	Potential redundancy - contribution to TIPH
EUFOR RD Congo April 2006-November 2006	Participation	Europeanization / peacekeeping	
EUPOL Afghanistan May 2007-December 2016	Non-participation	Soft-balancing	Lack of consultations with Turkey as required under Nice Implementation Document
EUFOR Tchad/RCA October 2007-March 2009	Non-participation	Soft balancing	Potential redundancy – contribution to UNAMID
EULEX Kosovo February 2008-present	Participation (inactive)	Europeanization / peacekeeping / soft- balancing	Suspended post-coup attempt, re- applied, no response
EUSR Guinea-Bissau February 2008-September 2008	Non-participation	No clear motivation	
EUMM Georgia September 2008-present	Non-participation	Europeanization / peacekeeping (if participated)	Invited, interested, contribution revoked by EU
EUNAVFOR Somalia (Atalanta) November 2008-present	Non-participation	De-Europeanization / soft-balancing	Potential redundancy – contribution to NATO+CTF
EUTM Somalia February 2010-present	Non-participation	De-Europeanization / soft-balancing	Potential redundancy – TURKSOM (est. 2017)
EUCAP Somalia July 2012-present	Non-participation	De-Europeanization / soft-balancing	Potential redundancy - peacekeeping
EUFOR Libya (invalid) April 2011-November 2011	Non-participation	Europeanization (if deployed)	Operation demobilized

Table 2. Missions and Operations during the second milestone period (continued)

EU AVSEC South Sudan June 2012-January 2014	Non-participation	Soft-balancing	Potential redundancy – contribution to UNMISS
EUCAP Sahel Niger July 2012-present	Non-participation	No clear motivation	
EUBAM Libya May 2013-present	Non-participation	Europeanization / de-Europeanization	Invited, applied, rejected (security clearance requirement)
EUTM Mali January 2013-present	Non-participation	Europeanization / peacekeeping (if participated)	Parliament approval, consequential non-participation (low visibility + influence)
EUFOR RCA February 2014-March 2015	Non-participation	Europeanization / peacekeeping (if participated)	Parliament approval, consequential non-participation (redundant)
EUCAP Sahel Mali April 2014-present	Non-participation	Europeanization / peacekeeping (if participated)	Parliament approval, consequential non-participation (low visibility + influence)
EUAM Ukraine July 2014-present	Participation (inactive)	Europeanization / peacekeeping / de-Europeanization	Suspended post-coup attempt, re-applied, no response
EUMAM/EUTM RCA January 2015-present	Non-participation	No clear motivation	
EUNAVFOR MED (Sophia) May 2015-March 2020	Non-participation	Soft-balancing	Lack of consultations with Turkey as required under Nice Implementation Document

Table 3. Missions and Operations during the third milestone period (continued)

EUAM Iraq October 2017-present	Non-participation	Soft-balancing	Lack of consultations with Turkey as required under Nice Implementation Document
EUAM RCA December 2019-present	Non-participation	No clear motivation	
EUNAVFOR MED II (Irin) March 2020-present	Non-participation	De-Europeanization	Lack of consultations with Turkey as required under Nice Implementation Document
EUTM Mozambique July 2021-present	N/A	N/A	

In these tables, participation refers to the eventual outcome of Turkey's action in the form of contribution to a given mission or operation whereas non-participation means the lack of Turkish contribution in the form of staff or asset to a certain mission or operation.

This is by no means an ultimate explanation for Turkey's involvement/non-involvement in CSDP missions/operations, but a mere attempt to make sense of a complicated relationship. Keeping this table into consideration as well, the insights gained in search of answers for the research question are presented as follows.

European Union is clearly on a fast-moving path to consolidate its autonomy on security and defense policy, even though there are reservations shared by some member states over the possibility of CSDP undermining NATO or the latter losing primacy. While being outside the scope of this study, ambitious initiatives such as Permanent Structured Cooperation point towards a pivot for a more strategically autonomous EU.

Another take-away is that Turkey has been standing by the European security architecture and maintains NATO membership as her security and defense pillar. That said, she has strived to include herself in the separate strategic formation that appeared within NATO and transferred to the EU in the form of CSDP. She lobbied hard to make sure that her interests would not be sidelined by the EU and she would not be excluded from this structure as a non-EU Ally.

The fruit of all this lobbying was the Berlin Plus deal struck in 2003, but it has only been operationalized twice. There are also Atlanticist member states who believe that using NATO assets and capabilities in EU crisis management initiatives is valuable and effective. Unfortunately, the only remnant of Berlin Plus is EUFOR Althea BiH and there seems to be little chance that Berlin Plus would be invoked again.

This brings the discussion to the elephant in the room, the complication of NATO-EU cooperation: Greek Cyprus' accession to the EU sully prospects for both Turkey's membership and NATO-EU cooperation going further. One compromise

the EU had to make for Turkey to agree on Berlin Plus was the exclusion of Greek Cyprus from ever being a part of it. It did not take long for the mutual veto dynamic to kick in, with Turkey using NATO membership and Greek Cyprus the EU.

Looking at the tables, one could easily see that during the first milestone, Turkey had a strong Europeanization drive and participated in all the missions/operations she was invited. Even then, from the beginning of CSDP, EU's goal for strategic autonomy was shaping up, which is evident in the CSDP missions/operations which were reserved for member state participation: Artemis, Themis, EUPAT, EULEX Iraq and EUSEC RD Congo. Turkey could not participate in them simply because she was not invited and the EU did not design these for third country participation. Therefore, there is no base for an argument on Europeanization of Turkey in these cases.

Turkey's drive for Europeanization in the first period is reinforced by the increasing trend of her involvement in peacekeeping missions/operations at this time. These were not limited to EU missions/operations; they featured active engagement in NATO and UN initiatives as well. The main point is that this period clearly refers to the strongest will in Turkey for aligning her interests and actions in foreign and security policy areas with the EU given the boost in Turkey-EU relations following the announcement of the former's candidacy status in 1999, which manifests itself in the persistent involvement of Turkey in CSDP missions/operations.

This does not take away from the fact that there were challenges in Turkey-CSDP synergy, not least because the lack of consultations with Turkey as was agreed under the Nice provisions. EU's engagements in Iraq and Georgia should have sought to consult with Turkey as a neighboring Ally, and furthermore, invite her. This would have allayed Turkey's concerns for being excluded and reinforce her faith in the EU to honor the deal.

The second milestone heralds the start of a more selective tendency of Turkey in terms of Europeanization in general, which is reflected in her participation/non-participation in CSDP initiatives. Two blockages in negotiation chapters, one in 2006

and the other in 2009, the Lisbon Treaty, and the reluctance of certain member states and their leaders for admitting Turkey in the EU all played a destructive role by slowing down the Europeanization enthusiasm in Turkey.

In this period, there have been serious developments that made it difficult for different actors to respond collectively as well, including the Arab Spring, subsequent civil wars in Syria and Libya, Russian aggression leading to Russo-Georgia war, annexation of Crimea to list a few. As a country located in the middle of this ring of fire, Turkey's foreign and security policy transformed itself into a more proactive one.

The EU initiated a series of military and civilian initiatives in Africa and regularly invited Turkey to join. Of these, Turkey only participated in EUFOR RD Congo. Turkish Parliament passed the bill to send support to three more missions (EUTM Mali, EUFOR RCA and EUCAP Sahel Mali), the former two being deployed in 2012 and the latter in 2014, but the support was eventually withheld. This instance points at the impact of different moving parts in the decision-making machine on the overall question of participation, which remains as a gap in this study.

Within the period of selective Europeanization, Turkey participated in 4 CSDP initiatives, and expressed willingness to support 5 more. Meanwhile, the EU legally kept third-state participation as default for all CSDP initiatives under this period, but the Council did not open the doors with invitations to all interested parties. However, the Council's or Political and Security Committee's preferences are not under scrutiny for this study.

As Turkey's engagement increased, especially in the Middle East and Africa, her peacekeeping agenda was occupied with other institutions and initiatives than solely the EU. Turkey participated in several UN and NATO missions. In the cases of Kosovo, Somalia and Afghanistan, Turkey once again used her NATO membership to soft-balance the EU. Likewise, the EU sustained its policy of not consulting with Turkey when deploying missions/operations in her geographical proximity and/or affecting her national interests. Contestably, Turkey's preference to divert her

resources to NATO or UN missions while neglecting those of EU in the same crisis scenes may be interpreted as her attempt to soft-balance the latter.

Third milestone in Turkey-CSDP synergy could be drawn around alternative events for different policy areas or for the overall accession process whereas for this study's purpose, the failed coup attempt on 15 July 2016 serves as the starkest mark. Following the declaration of state of emergency, calls for suspending the negotiations altogether and the mounting divergences on foreign and security policies all had implications for Turkey's relationship with the EU in crisis management.

First of all, after the traumatizing coup attempt, Turkey had to re-assess her foreign and security policy. The transition from a parliamentary system to presidential system also brought new dynamics to foreign and security policy-making. On top of these, Turkey's neighborhood remained volatile, and the war in Syria took the heaviest toll on Turkey in terms of humanitarian aid, immigration and national security.

Secondly, the long-time fatigue of trying to satisfy the EU while it makes it ever so harder for Turkey to join its ranks for decades, accompanied by shifting positions and interests between Turkey and EU all culminated into a weaker Europeanization period, or as the literature points out, a de-Europeanization trend.

Indeed, during this timeframe, the EU only launched four initiatives, one in Iraq, one in the Central African Republic, on off the Libyan coast and most recently in Mozambique. As for Turkey's involvement, lack of consultations regarding operations/missions in two of her neighbors were not gestures of good faith by the EU. Moreover, the war in Libya complicated the EU-Turkey relationship to the brink of rivalry, and EUNAVFOR Iriini was used as a tool against Turkey, a candidate country and NATO Ally. Turkey's military training facility in Somalia, established in 2017, and her presence in the same capacity through NATO Iraq training mission (NMI) also provide premise to argue for Turkey soft-balancing the EU.

Even when the gap between mutual expectations and actions seem wide, Turkey's long-standing and sustained participation to EUFOR Althea, EU's largest operation, keeps the EU-NATO, and indirectly, EU-Turkey cooperation in crisis management alive. The fact that EUFOR Althea stands as the last monument of Berlin Plus could be taken as a testament to the existence of, even though to varying degrees, a will from both sides to hold onto this cooperation.

As would be expected from a study with a wide coverage, there are certain limitations of this research that ought to be declared. In terms of CSDP missions and operations, invitation by the PSC and/or the Council is a tricky trail of evidence to follow thoroughly. Therefore, the motivations on the EU side are crucial to fully account for Turkey's reactions in the context of a CSDP initiative. This study, however, only focuses on Turkey's involvement/non-involvement without little to no deliberation on the EU's perceptions/actions.

Another gap involves the various factors that may be influential in Turkey's preference of NATO or UN missions/operations over CSDP's. These factors could include the positions or vacancies expected to be filled by Turkish support and/or their level of visibility and participation in decision-making. Besides, the financial costs and their coverage in a mission/operation are important items to take into account when deciding on supporting a crisis management mission/operation.

Last but not least, converging or diverging approaches by different levels of decision-making to participating in a given CSDP mission/operation are not covered in this research. It could shed more light on the research question if insights could be gathered from different levels of the decision-making mechanism to piece together a fuller image.

While it is a fact that this study's data reach and theoretical approach may not explain the whole range of Turkey-CSDP synergy through crisis management initiatives, there is still some insight to be found in what has been covered. Although not crystal clear, it is possible to correlate the evolution of Turkey-EU relations with Turkey's participation in EU crisis management initiatives. At the same time, as this

relationship has been complicated with the accession of Greek Cyprus in 2004, Turkey has resorted to institutional soft-balancing efforts against the EU, and indirectly Greek Cyprus, by using her institutional arsenal in the sphere of crisis management.

The Berlin Plus was a hard-won deal made with a great amount of compromise and gave both sides ample opportunities for cooperation. In its current form, it packs the ultimate blueprint of cooperation between NATO and the EU. Due to the exclusion of Greek Cyprus, the EU is now in the pursuit of ignoring this deal altogether, and impose a kind of NATO-EU cooperation on its own terms. However, this is a pursuit that risks the positions and interests of non-EU NATO Allies.

Taking all the discussion points into account, it could still be inferred that Turkey's involvement in CSDP's crisis management missions/operations reflect the general state of affairs between the EU and Turkey and the evolution of Turkey-CSDP synergy is not independent from the overall Turkey-EU relations. To decouple this synergy from the complex politics of Turkey-EU relations, it may be useful to look at crisis management from a less political and more practical lens.

These dynamics have characterized the evolution of Turkey-CSDP synergy from 2003 until today. This journey is still on, but needs less political baggage to move forward. Turkey possesses assets and capabilities for effective crisis management which could bring comparative advantage to CSDP. Meanwhile, it is up to the EU to tone down the rhetoric and exclusory attitude towards Turkey, rekindle Berlin Plus, observe Nice implementation provisions fully, and approach crisis management from a more technical perspective.

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Interviews

Interview 1. *Interview with a high-ranking Turkish diplomat*. 13 May 2020, Ankara

Interview 2. *Interview with a high-ranking Turkish diplomat*. 23 July 2020, Ankara

APPENDICES

A. APPROVAL OF THE METU HUMAN SUBJECTS ETHICS COMMITTEE

B. INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

1. Which CSDP missions and operations has Turkey participated with military and civilian personnel?
2. Are there any CSDP missions and operations that Turkey has assisted the EU financially or in any way other than sending personnel?
3. What is the current situation with Turkey's participation in ongoing CSDP missions and operations?
4. What was the motivation behind Turkey's participation in CSDP's missions and operations in Africa?
5. Was Turkey's participation in the EU missions in D.R. Congo based on an EU invitation or her own initiation?
6. What was the motivation behind Turkey's involvement in CSDP missions and operations in the Balkans?
7. How did the participation process of Turkey in the EU's missions in the Balkans take place?
8. Are there any missions and operations that Turkey did not receive an invitation by the EU but would have wished or expressed interest to participate in?
9. Are there any missions and operations that Turkey was invited by the EU but did not accept to participate in? Why?
10. Can you detect periods of cooperation and non-cooperation between Turkey and the EU in CSDP? Why or why not?
11. What do you think about the current situation of the EU-NATO cooperation?
12. What are the obstacles for an effective EU-NATO cooperation? How can they be eliminated?

13. Does Turkey facilitate EU-NATO cooperation? Why or why not?
14. How do you think the evolution of deeper EU-NATO cooperation would play out for Turkey? Why?
15. What kind of EU-NATO cooperation would work best for Turkey and CSDP relations?
16. What role should NATO play in the CSDP? Why?

C. TURKISH SUMMARY / TÜRKÇE ÖZET

Avrupa Birliđi, özerk nitelikte bir Dış ve Güvenlik Politikası (ODGP) ve buna ilintili Ortak Güvenlik ve Savunma Politikası (OGSP) oluşturmak için yıllardır çaba sarf etmektedir. Halen devam eden bu çaba kapsamında AB'yi küresel çapta bir güvenlik aktörü olarak konumlandırmak amacıyla çeşitli girişimler başlatılmıştır. Bu kapsamda kriz yönetimi operasyonları ve misyonları en görünür girişimler arasında öne çıkmaktadır. Üye devletlerin ekseriyetinin NATO Müttefiki olmasının etkisiyle, bahse konu kriz yönetimi girişimlerinin bir kısmı NATO ile işbirliđi içinde, geri kalanları ise tamamen AB kabiliyetleriyle gerçekleştirilmiştir.

AB üyeliđine aday ve NATO Müttefiki olan Türkiye, Batı Avrupa Birliđi çatısı altında Avrupa Güvenlik ve Savunma Kimliđi'nin ortaya çıkışı itibarıyla OGSP'nin oluşumu ve gelişimi süreçlerine dâhil olmuştur. Türkiye-AB ilişkilerinin, katılım müzakerelerine de sirayet etmek suretiyle, güvenlik ve savunma alanlarında işbirliđiyle alakalı boyutları mevcuttur.

Türkiye, çatışmaların çözümü, arabuluculuk, barışı koruma operasyonları ve misyonlarına katılım dahil olmak üzere kriz yönetiminde aktif bir rol oynamaktadır. Bu unsurlar, AB'nin ortak dış ve güvenlik politikasının dayandığı temeller, ilkeler ve değerlerin merkezinde yer almakta olup, bir aday ülke olarak Türkiye'nin katılım sürecinde AB'yle politika ve davranış uyumunun beklenmesi bakımından önem arz etmektedir. Nitekim AB'nin her yıl hazırladığı Türkiye raporlarında dış, güvenlik ve savunma politikalarının örtüşmesi hususu da değerlendirilmektedir. Bu kapsamda, Türkiye'nin dahil olduđu veya katılmayı istediđi OGSP kriz yönetimi operasyon ve misyonlarına da yer verilmektedir.

Türkiye ve AB'nin güvenlik ve savunma ilişkilerine dair bir anlayış geliştirme maksadıyla OGSP kriz yönetimi operasyon ve misyonlarına Türkiye'nin katılma ve katılmama durumlarını ve bunların arkasındaki muhtemel gerekçeleri vaka olarak inceleyen bu çalışmada, ilk operasyonun başlatıldığı 2003 yılından bu yana Türkiye'nin OGSP ile sinerjisinin evrimini anlamlandırmaya teşebbüs edilmektedir.

Avrupa güvenlik mimarisinin tohumları, II. Dünya Savaşı sonrasında Avrupa devletlerinin ekonomi alanında başlayan kurumsal yakınlaşma ve entegrasyon sürecinin, hükümetlerin bağımsız yetki alanı içinde kabul edilen dış, güvenlik ve savunma politikalarına teşmil etmeye başlamasıyla atılmıştır. Öyle ki, AB'nin NATO'dan “ayrışabilen ama ayrı olmayan” bir güvenlik ve savunma politikası arayışının şekillendirdiği OGSP kapsamına bugüne kadar 30'u aşkın kriz yönetimi faaliyeti gerçekleştirilmiş, bunların konuşlandırılması dış, güvenlik ve savunma politikalarında yaşanan uyumun sonucu AB üye devletlerinin kararı doğrultusunda mümkün olmuştur. Bu operasyon ve misyonlara hem AB üye devletleri, hem de üçüncü devletler çeşitli vesilelerle katılım sağlamıştır.

AB'nin Pleven Planı, Fouchet Planları, Avrupa Savunma Topluluğu ve Batı Avrupa Birliği (BAB) gibi farklı güvenlik ve savunma işbirliği uğraşlarına rağmen NATO, Avrupa güvenlik mimarisinin temel çapası olmayı sürdürmüş, bununla birlikte, 1998 yılında Birleşik Krallık ve Fransa arasında varılan mutabakatla yayınlanan St. Malo bildirisiyle AB'nin savunma ve güvenlik alanında daha belirgin rol oynaması çağrısı ciddi bir atılım teşkil etmiştir.

Sadece NATO Müttefikleri AB ülkelerine tam üyelik hakkı tanıyan Batı Avrupa Birliği, güvenlik ve savunma alanında uzun süre atıl kalmış, ancak Soğuk Savaş sonrası Avrupa kıtasında ve etrafında çoğalan istikrarsızlıkla mücadelede daha etkin rol oynama kararı alarak, 1992 yılında kabul edilen Petersberg Görevleriyle kriz yönetimi alanına yönelmiştir. 1996 yılında ise NATO ile BAB arasında yapılan Berlin düzenlemesiyle BAB, gerektiği takdirde NATO varlık ve kabiliyetlerinden istifade etme imkânı kazanmıştır.

AB, Amsterdam Antlaşması'yla Dış ve Güvenlik Politikasını resmen oluşturmuş, Petersberg Görevleri'ni bünyesine geçirmiş ve BAB'ın da ileride AB yapısına dâhil edilebileceğinin sinyalini vermiştir. 2009 yılında yürürlüğe giren Lizbon Antlaşması'yla OGSP bugünkü yapısına evrilmiş, 2010 yılında da BAB tasfiye edilmiştir. Böylelikle, AB üyesi olmayan NATO Müttefiklerine ortak üyelik hakkı

tanıyan ve Türkiye'nin de ortak üyesi olduğu BAB varlığını yitirmiş, Petersberg Görevleri ise AB tarafından üstlenilmiştir.

Türkiye, BAB çatısı altında ve orijinal Berlin düzenlemesiyle birlikte Avrupa güvenlik ve savunma yapısı bağlamında sahip olduğu hak ve imtiyazları, AB'nin artarak özerkleştirdiği OGSP düzenlemeleriyle yitirmiştir. Nitekim, AB, kriz yönetimi çerçevesini belirleyen Petersberg Görevlerini harekete geçirmesinin NATO'nun müdahil olmamayı tercih etmesi şartını farklı yorumlamış, başlattığı kriz yönetimi operasyon ve misyonlarına AB dışı katılımı Konsey kararıyla davet edilme koşuluyla sınırlandırmıştır. Amsterdam Antlaşması'nın ardından BAB, AB ve NATO arasında kriz yönetimine ilişkin ayrıntıları AB bakımından belirleyen Nice Zirvesi'nde alınan kararlar, Türkiye ve AB dışı diğer ülkelerin Avrupa güvenlik ve savunma yapısıyla etkileşimini iyice daraltmıştır.

Bir NATO Müttefiki ve AB aday ülkesi olan Türkiye, bu gelişmeler karşısında Avrupa güvenlik ve savunma yapısı içindeki müstakbel yeri ve sirayet alanı hakkında daha hassas düşünmeye başlamıştır. Zira, AB güdümündeki kriz yönetimi operasyon ve misyonlarına katılımın Konsey kararına bağlı tutulması, Türkiye'nin dahil olmasını istemeyebilecek tek bir üye devletin vetosuyla dışlanması sonucunu doğurması anlamına geldiğinden, bilhassa Yunanistan ve üye olma yolunda ilerleyen Güney Kıbrıs Rum Yönetimi'nin (GKRY) tutumları hesaba katıldığında bu hassasiyeti doğrular niteliktedir.

Müteakiben, Aralık 2002 yılında, NATO ve AB işbirliğinin çerçevesini belirlemek üzere yapılan müzakereler sonucunda, hem Türkiye, hem Yunanistan, hem de NATO ve AB tarafından kabul edilen yeni bir Berlin düzenlemesine gidilmiş, AB güdümünde hayata geçirilecek kriz yönetimi faaliyetlerinde NATO varlık ve kabiliyetlerinden yararlanılması koşulları bu suretle belirlenmiştir. Türkiye, yoğun müzakereler sonucunda NATO üyeliğini kullanarak Barış için Ortaklık üyesi olmayan Malta ve GKRY'nin Berlin Artı operasyonlarına katılması olasılığının önüne geçmiş, ayrıca komşu bölgesindeki muhtemel OGSP operasyon/misyonları

öncesinde istişare mekanizmasının işletilmesi ve davet edilmesi hususlarında kazanımlar edinmiştir.

Berlin Artı mutabakatının uygulanmasına dair Nice uygulama hükümleri kabul edilmiş, bu hükümler Ankara'nın beklentilerini çoğunlukla yansıtmıştır. Bununla beraber, bahsekonu hükümler çeşitli kriz yönetimi operasyon/misyonları bağlamında AB tarafından yerine getirilmemiştir. Nice uygulama belgesinde genellikle AB tarafından yerine getirilmeyen hükümler, AB'nin Türkiye'nin başta komşuları olmak milli güvenlik çıkarlarını ilgilendiren bölgelerde kriz yönetimi operasyonu/misyonu konuşlandırmadan önce istişarelerde bulunmayıdır.

Bahsekonu sınamalara rağmen Türkiye, OGSP kriz yönetimi operasyon ve misyonlarına en başından beri kaydadeğer destek sağlamıştır. Bu tezde, Türkiye'nin hem bir NATO Müttefiki hem de AB üyeliğine aday bir ülke olarak AB'nin OGSP'siyle kriz yönetimi alanındaki sinerjisinin yıllar içindeki evrimi incelenmektedir. Türkiye'nin Soğuk Savaş sonrasında kriz yönetimine artan yönelimi ve katkısı, Türkiye'nin OGSP ile etkileşiminin değişen dinamiğinin geniş çerçevede Türkiye-AB ilişkileriyle nasıl örtüştüğünün kriz yönetimi alanındaki yansımalarını yorumlamak bakımından dikkate alınması gereken bir unsur olarak değerlendirilmektedir.

Kriz yönetimi veya barışı koruma çalışmaları, ayrıca OGSP'nin temel taşlarından biri olduğu için Türkiye'nin OGSP'yle dinamiğinin incelenmesi bakımından da anlamlıdır. Çalışmada Türkiye'nin OGSP'yle sinerjisi, kriz yönetimi operasyonları/misyonlarına katılım bakımından incelenirken Avrupalılaşıma kuramından faydalanılmıştır. Bu çerçevede, AB üyelik perspektifinin Türkiye üzerindeki etkilerinin OGSP kriz yönetim operasyon/misyonlarına katılımına yansımalarına bakılmış, Türkiye'nin AB'nin beklentilerini karşıladığı durumlarda Avrupalılaşıma dinamiğinin öne çıktığı, aksi durumlarda ise tersine işaret eden Avrupa'dan uzaklaşma olgusunun varlığı irdelenmiştir.

Türkiye'nin kriz yönetimi alanında yükselen rolü ve artan etkinliğini de dikkate alarak, barışı korumanın AB'nin dış ve güvenlik politikasının temel taşlarından biri

olduđu deęerlendirildięinde, Trkiye'nin Avrupalılařma servenini irdelerken barıřı koruma kavramından da istifade edilmiřtir.

Öte yandan, bu kavramların Trkiye-OGSP sinerjisinin evrimini kriz ynetim harektları/misyonlarına katılım baęlamında aıklamada yetersiz kaldıęı dřncesiyle, ayrıca yumuřak dengeleme kavramına da bařvurulmuřtur. Trkiye'nin NATO yelięi marifetiyle AB'nin OGSP operasyonları/misyonlarına ynelik tepkileri kurumsal yumuřak dengeleme kuramının tespitleri ıřıęında deęerlendirilmiřtir.

Dnemsel olarak bakıldıęında, Trkiye'nin OGSP kriz ynetimi faaliyetlerinin harekete geirilmesinden itibaren, 2005 yılında AB'ye katılım mzakerelerinin resmi olarak bařlatılmasına kadar geen srede OGSP ile sinerjisinin en kuvvetli olduęu grlmektedir. Bahsekonu dnem, alıřmada Avrupalılařmanın, dolayısıyla AB yelik perspektifinin Trkiye zerindeki etkisinin keza en yoęun olduęu zaman olarak ne ıkmaktadır.

Mteakiben, mzakere edilecek fasılların GKRY'nin yelięinin de etkisiyle ekseriyetinin bloke edilmesi nedeniyle Trkiye-AB yelik srecinde yařanan duraklama, Trkiye-OGSP sinerjisine de yansımıřtır. Ayrıca, ilerleyen yıllarda Trkiye'nin evresinde meydana gelen krizler ve ortaya ıkan istikrarsızlık ortamı, Trkiye'nin daha nalıcı bir dıř ve gvenlik politikası izlemesini gerektirmiř, bu doęrultuda AB ile dıř ve gvenlik politikasındaki rtřme ilk dneme kıyasla nispeten azalmıřtır. Sz konusu rtřmenin azalmasıyla, Trkiye'nin seici Avrupalılařma eęiliminin ne ıktıęı mřahede edilmekte ve bu durumun, Trkiye'nin AB gdml OGSP kriz ynetimi operasyon/misyonlarına katılımı incelendięinde, Trkiye-OGSP sinerjisine de yansıdaęı grlmektedir.

Trkiye-AB iliřkilerinin nemli bir dnm noktasını 15 Temmuz 2016 tarihindeki darbe teřebbs teřkil etmektedir. Zira, 15 Temmuz'un akabinde Trkiye, dıř ve gvenlik politikasını yeniden gzden geirmiř, keza kırılğanlıęın hakim olduęu komřu blgesinde istikrarsızlık durumunun devam etmesi, blgedeki krizler baęlamında AB'nin beklentileriyle ayrıřan bir tablo ortaya ıkarmıřtır. Bu dnemde

Türkiye ve AB dış ve güvenlik politikasında bilhassa Türkiye'nin çevresine ilişkin farklılıklar belirginleşmiş, keza bunlar da Türkiye'nin OGSP'yle kriz yönetimi bağlamındaki etkileşimini etkilemiştir.

Bu mülahazalarla incelediğinde, Türkiye'nin OGSP kriz yönetimi operasyonlarına/misyonlarına katılımının dönemsel evrimi münferit girişimler bağlamında aşağıdaki şekilde özetlenebilir.

AB'nin OGSP şemsiyesi altında ilk başlattığı kriz yönetimi faaliyeti olan “EUPM Bosnia”, 2002 yılında Bosna'da konuşlandırılmış bir sivil misyonudur. EUPM Bosna, Birleşmiş Milletler Uluslararası Polis Görev Gücü (IPTF) görevlerinin idari işlev haricindekileri devralmış, ancak aktif polis eğitimi de sağlamamıştır. Misyonun asıl görevi, Bosna polis gücünün yapılandırılmasının reform sürecine destek vermektir. Türkiye de BM Görev Gücü'ndeki varolan desteğini EUPM'e kaydırarak bu misyona katılım sağlamıştır. Bahsekonu katılım, Türkiye'nin Avrupalılaşıma gündemiyle ve barışı koruma rolüyle uyumaktadır.

Türkiye-Yunanistan arasında Berlin Artı düzenlemelerine ilişkin AB ve NATO tarafından yürütülen müzakerelerin sonucunda ilk OGSP operasyonu “Concordia”, Mart 2003'te Kuzey Makedonya'da konuşlandırılmıştır. Concordia'nın öncesinde NATO, Türkiye'nin de katılımıyla, Makedonya'da 3 operasyon düzenlemiştir. Concordia, devriye, keşif, izleme, durumsal farkındalık ve raporlama faaliyetlerini üstlenmiştir. Berlin Artı düzenlemesi kapsamında yürütüldüğünden Concordia, NATO varlık ve kabiliyetlerini kullanmakla birlikte, NATO Makedonya'da Concordia'dan bağımsız mevcudiyetini korumuştur. Türkiye'nin Concordia'ya katkısının hem Avrupalılaşıma ve barışı koruma hem de (Berlin Artı düzenlemelerini mümkün kılan müzakerelerde görüldüğü üzere) NATO üyeliği sayesinde kurumsal yumuşak dengeleme kavramlarıyla açıklanabileceği değerlendirilmektedir.

Ardından 2003 yılında başlatılan “Artemis” operasyonu, AB'nin NATO varlık ve kabiliyetlerinden bağımsız ilk askeri harekâtı olarak Demokratik Kongo Cumhuriyeti'ndeki iş savaşının akabinde BM barışı koruma operasyonu MONUC'a destek vermek üzere konuşlandırılmıştır. AB'nin NATO'dan bağımsız stratejik

özerkliğini savunan Fransa'nın inisiyatifıyla ve NATO'yla istişarelerde bulunmadan başlatılan Artemis, NATO içinde birtakım tartışmalara neden olmuştur. Türkiye, Artemis'e katılım sağlamamıştır. Bu kararın nedenine dair çalışmada kullanılan kavramlar bakımından belirli bir açıklama bulunamamaktadır. Öte yandan, o dönemde henüz AB üyesi olmayan GKRY Artemis'e katılım sağlamıştır. GKRY'nin katılımının Türkiye'nin kararında etkili olup olmadığı bilinmemektedir.

Makedonya'daki askeri operasyon Concordia'nın ardından AB bu defa polis teşkilatını reforme etmek üzere "EUPM Proxima" adlı sivil misyonu başlatmıştır. Nice Konseyi'nde alınan kararlar çerçevesinde üçüncü ülkelerin misyona katılımı mümkün kılınmış, Türkiye de bu doğrultuda AB'den gelen daveti kabul ederek katkıda bulunmuştur. Türkiye'nin desteği, dönemsel olarak AB'yle ilişkilerine de bakıldığında Avrupalılaşıma ve barışı koruma eğilimiyle örtüşmektedir.

AB'nin bir sonraki girişimi olan "EUJUST Themis", Sovyet dönemi sonrası bağımsızlığını kazanan bir ülkede Birliğin başlattığı ilk misyondur. Gürcistan'da 2004 yılında konuşlandırılan ve keza AB'nin ilk hukukun üstünlüğü misyonu olan Themis'e üçüncü ülkelerin katılımı öngörülmemiş, dolayısıyla yalnızca AB üye devletleri katılım sağlamıştır. Henüz üye devlet olmadığı için Türkiye de davet edilmemiş ve dolayısıyla katılımı sözkonusu olamamıştır. Bununla birlikte, komşu ülkesi Gürcistan'da konuşlandırılan Themis öncesinde Türkiye'yle istişarelerde bulunulmaması ve davet edilmemesi, Nice uygulama hükümleri bakımından AB'nin riayet etmediği vakalardan biri olarak değerlendirilmektedir.

AB, 2004 yılında Bosna-Hersek'te kriz sonrası askeri bir operasyon niteliğinde "EUFOR Althea"yı NATO'nun SFOR operasyonunu devralmak suretiyle başlatmıştır. Althea, AB'nin bugüne kadar yürüttüğü en büyük kriz yönetimi operasyonu olarak halen aktiftir ve Berlin Artı düzenlemeleri çerçevesinde faaliyetlerini sürdürmektedir. Türkiye, konuşlandırıldığı andan itibaren SFOR'daki katkısını Althea'ya kaydırmak suretiyle operasyona katkısını sürdürmekte olup, en fazla katkı sunan ikinci ülke konumundadır. Türkiye'nin Althea'ya katılımı hem Avrupalılaşıma eğilimi hem barışı korumadaki rolü hem de Berlin Artı kapsamında

olması nedeniyle NATO üyeliği bakımından yumuşak dengeleme potansiyeli zaviyesinden açıklanabilir niteliktedir.

Proxima'dan sonra Makedonya'da AB'nin son OGSP kriz yönetimi girişimi olarak başlatılan EUPAT, polis danışma projesi niteliğinde tasarlanmış ve üçüncü ülkelerin katılımı öngörülmemiştir. Bu nedenle, Türkiye'nin katılım sağlamaması, bir seçenek meselesinden ziyade misyonun üye devletlerle sınırlı tutulmasından kaynaklıdır.

Afrika'da konuşlandırılan ilk polis misyonu "EUPOL Kinshasa", AB'nin Kongo Demokratik Cumhuriyeti'ndeki kriz yönetimi girişimlerinin ikincisi olarak 2005 yılında başlatılmıştır. Üçüncü ülkelerin katılımına açık olan EUPOL Kinshasa'ya Türkiye AB'nin daveti üzerine katkıda bulunmuştur. Türkiye'nin bu katkısı hem Avrupalılaşıma eğiliminin öne çıkması hem Türkiye'nin barışı koruma rolünün yükselmesi bağlamında değerlendirilmektedir.

Irak'ta ceza yargı sistemini düzenlemek üzere OGSP kapsamında 2005 yılında başlatılan hukukun üstünlüğü misyonu "EUJUST LEX Iraq"a da üçüncü ülkeler dahil edilmemiş, 2010 yılında Konsey Kararı'nda yapılan tazminle üçüncü ülkelerin katılımına izin verilmiştir. Üçüncü ülkelerden katkıya yer verilmediği için Türkiye de misyona katılmamış, ayrıca AB, EUJUST LEX Iraq misyonunu konuşlandırmadan önce Nice uygulama hükümleri uyarınca komşu ülke Türkiye'yle gereken istişarelerde bulunmamıştır. Bu riayetsizliğin, AB'nin Nice hükümlerinin yalnızca askeri operasyonlar için geçerli olduğu yönünde ayrışan yorumunun tezahürü olduğu görülmektedir.

Kongo Demokratik Cumhuriyeti'nde kırılgan olan güvenlik ortamında silahlı kuvvetlerin kapasitesini geliştirmeye katkı sağlamak amacıyla AB bu defa güvenlik sektörünü reforme etme kategorisinde bir misyon konuşlandırmış, "EUSEC RD Congo" olarak adlandırılan bu misyona da üçüncü ülkelerin dahil öngörülmemiştir. Dolayısıyla, Türkiye'nin katılmaması misyonun tabiatıyla alakalıdır.

Bilahare yine 2005 yılında başlatılan "AMM Aceh" misyonu, OGSP'nin Asya'da gerçekleştirdiği ilk girişim olup, ASEAN ülkeleriyle işbirliği içinde yürütülmüştür.

Açe bölgesiyle tarihi bağları bulunmakla ve üçüncü ülkelerin katılımına müsaade edilmekle birlikte, Türkiye'nin bu misyona katılmayışının Avrupalılaşıma veya yumuşak dengeleme kavramlarıyla açıklanamayabileceği düşünülmektedir. Bu itibarla, Türkiye'nin AMM Aceh'e katılmayışının sarih bir nedeni en azından bu çalışma kapsamında bulunmamaktadır.

Türkiye'nin seçici Avrupalılaşıma dönemine geçildiğinde, irdelenen ilk misyon "EUPOL COPPS", Ekim 2005'te başlatılmış, Birinci İntifada'dan sonra Filistin güvenlik teşkilatının eğitimine odaklanmıştır. Türkiye bu misyona katkı sağlamış olup, bu katkısı Türkiye'nin Avrupalılaşıma gündemiyle uyumlu niteliktedir. Ayrıca, Filistin-İsrail ihtilafının çözüme kavuşturulması için çaba sarfeden Türkiye'nin bu katkısı, barışı koruma profili bakımından da anlamlıdır.

Bilahare AB'nin Rafah geçişlerini gözlemlemek üzere konuşlandığı "EUBAM Rafah" ise AB tarafından hala etkin tutulsa da esasen çok kısa süre fiilen faaliyet gösterebilmiştir. Türkiye, bu misyona katılım sağlamamıştır ve buna dair çalışma kapsamında açık bir nedene işaret edilememektedir. Öte yandan, işgal altındaki Batı Şeria'nın El-Halil kentindeki Uluslararası Geçici Mevcudiyet Gücü'ne İsrail tarafından kapatılana kadar katkıda bulunmuştur.

AB'nin Kongo Demokratik Cumhuriyeti'ndeki üçüncü girişimi olan "EUFOR RD Congo", 2006 yılında ülkedeki seçimlerin barış içinde gerçekleştirilmesini teminen BM'nin MONUC misyonuna destek amacıyla başlatılmış askeri bir operasyondur. Türkiye, bu operasyona katkıda bulunmuş olup, bu katkısının Avrupalılaşıma ve barışı koruma kavramlarıyla örtüştüğü değerlendirilmektedir.

Keza 2006 yılında AB, Afganistan'daki ilk ve tek misyonu olan "EUPOL Afghanistan"ı konuşlandırmış, bu misyon Afgan güvenlik teşkilatının modernize edilmesini hedeflemiştir. Üçüncü ülkelerin katılımını teşvik eden bu misyona Türkiye de davet edilmiş, lakin katılım sağlamamıştır. Bu karara dair açık bir beyan bulunmamakla beraber, Türkiye'nin NATO kapsamında halihazırda Afganistan'ın barışı ve güvenliğini teminen yürütülen tüm operasyonlarda etkin katkı sağlamakta olması, AB'nin misyonunu gölgede bırakmış olabileceği tahmin edilmektedir.

Ayrıca, birlikte aynı dönemde faaliyet gösteren AB ve NATO misyonları arasında bilgi paylaşımına Türkiye'nin itirazı, yumuşak dengelemeye işaret etmektedir.

AB'nin bir sonraki girişimi, Darfur krizinin yol açtığı istikrarsızlığın Çad ve Orta Afrika Cumhuriyeti'ne de yansmasıyla oluşan güvenlik krizini yönetmek için BM'nin konuşlandırmaya hazırlandığı MINURCAT misyonu için köprü vazifesi görecektir. "EUFOR Tchad/RCA" askeri operasyonudur. Türkiye davet edilmiş, ancak katılmamıştır. Bu karara dair keza açık bir neden bulunmamakla birlikte, Türkiye'nin Darfur krizi bağlamında NATO ve BM faaliyetlerine verdiği katkılar dikkate alındığında AB'nin köprü operasyonunun gölgede kalmış olabileceği ve dolayısıyla yumuşak dengelemenin etkili olabileceği akla gelmektedir.

AB'nin en büyük ve halen aktif sivil misyonu olan "EULEX Kosovo", BM misyonu UNMIK'in görevlerini devralacak şekilde tasarlanmıştır. Kosova'nın bağımsızlığına dair AB içindeki anlaşmazlıktan dolayı çeşitli sınımlarla karşılaşan EULEX Kosovo'ya Türkiye de misyonun başlatıldığı 2008 yılından itibaren katkıda bulunmuştur. Bu katkısı Avrupalılaşıma eğilimine ve barışı koruma rolüne işaret etmektedir. Öte yandan, Türkiye'nin 15 Temmuz darbe girişimi üzerine ilan edilen olağanüstü hal sırasında Kosova'daki personelini geri çekmesinin ardından münhal kadrolara yaptığı başvuruların AB tarafından yanıtızsız bırakılması, Türkiye-OGSP sinerjisinde zayıflamaya dalalet etmektedir. Ayrıca, NATO'nun KFOR operasyonu ile EULEX arasında bilgi paylaşımına yönelik resmi bir düzenlemeye itiraz etmesi Türkiye'nin yumuşak dengeleme hamlesinde bulunduğunu göstermektedir.

Ardından AB, Gine-Bissau'da güvenlik teşkilatını modernize etmek amacıyla bir misyon başlatmış, AB içinden bile sınırlı sayıda katılım sağlanan "EUGSSR Guinea-Bissau" misyonuna Türkiye davet edilmekle birlikte katılım sağlamamıştır. Sarih bir açıklaması olmasa da, Türkiye'nin Gine-Bissau'yla o dönemde kısıtlı etkileşiminin olması ve misyonun AB ülkelerinden de sınırlı ilgi görmesi dikkate alınabilecek hususlardır.

2008 yılında Rusya-Gürcistan savaşının ardından AB, güven ve istikrarı artırma görevlerini üstlenen bir gözlem misyonu ("EUMM Georgia") başlatmıştır. Türkiye

bu misyona davet edilmiş, katılım arzusunu belirtmiş, ancak AB'den başvuruda bulunduğu kadrolar bağlamında artık desteğe ihtiyaç bulunmadığı yanıtını almıştır. Türkiye'nin davete tepkisi, Avrupalılaşıma eğilimini ve barışı koruma iradesini göstermektedir.

Somali'deki istikrarsızlık nedeniyle Somali kıyılarında ve Aden Körfezi'nde artan korsancılık faaliyetlerinin insani yardım taşıyan gemileri hedef almasının sorunla mücadelede katkıda bulunmak amacıyla AB'nin 2008 yılında başlattığı "EUNAVFOR Somalia/Atalanta" operasyonu, AB'nin denizcilik alanındaki ilk askeri operasyonu olarak bilinmektedir. Üçüncü ülkelerin katılımına açık olan bu operasyona Türkiye katkı sağlamamış, bunun yerine aynı amaçlara hizmet eden NATO'nun operasyonu ile Birleşik Görev Gücü 150-151 operasyonlarına aktif katılımında bulunmuştur. Türkiye'nin seçici Avrupalılaşıma döneminin emarelerinin görülebileceği bu operasyonda, Türkiye'nin NATO ile AB operasyonları arasında görev ve bilgi paylaşımına itirazı ayrıca yumuşak dengeleme unsurları taşımaktadır.

AB'nin bir sonraki OGSP girişimi yine Somali'ye yönelik olmuş, 2010 yılında Somali ordusunu eğitmeyi öngören "EUTM Somalia" operasyonu konuşlandırılmıştır. Halen aktif olan bu operasyona Türkiye katılmamış, ancak BM'nin Somali'deki misyonlarına katılım sağlamıştır. Ayrıca Türkiye'nin 2017'de hayata geçirdiği TURKSOM'un EUTM faaliyetlerini yürütmesi, AB'nin operasyonuna katılımın Türkiye açısından artı değeri olmayabileceğini göstermektedir. Bu değerlendirmeler ışığında, Türkiye'nin EUTM bağlamındaki tutumunun Avrupa'dan uzaklaşma ve yumuşak dengeleme belirtileri taşıdığı söylenebilir.

Ardından OGSP şemsiyesi altında yine Somali'de deniz güvenliği ve adalet alanlarında kapasite geliştirmeyi hedefleyen "EUCAP Somalia" misyonu faaliyete geçirilmiş, Türkiye bu misyona da katılmamıştır. Bu karar, Türkiye'nin halihazırda Somali'de AB'den bağımsız mevcudiyeti dikkate alındığında, AB'nin Türkiye üzerindeki koşullu etkisinin zayıfladığına işaret etmekte, dolayısıyla Avrupa'dan uzaklaşma belirtisi olarak değerlendirilmektedir.

AB, Libya’da 2011 yılında yaşanan krizle bağlantılı olarak BM Güvenlik Kurulu tarafından Libya’ya yönelik silah ambargosunun uygulanmasını amaçlayan bir askeri operasyon tasarlamış, ancak EUFOR Libya olarak bilinen bu operasyon neticede konuşlandırılmamıştır. Türkiye, EUFOR Libya’ya katılım arzusunu bildirmiştir. Bahsekonu operasyon hayata geçirilmemiş olmakla birlikte, Türkiye’nin katkıya dönük olumlu yanıtı Avrupalılaşıma ve barışı koruma gündeminin varlığını göstermektedir.

Güney Sudan’ın bağımsızlığını kazanmasının ardından halen devam eden güvenlik krizini yatıştırmak için AB’nin Juba Uluslararası Havalimanı’nın güvenliğine katkıda bulunmaya yönelik 2012 yılında başlattığı “EUAVSEC South Sudan” misyonu, çatışmaların sürmesi nedeniyle AB tarafından erken tarihte tahliye edilmiştir. Türkiye, bu misyona katılmamış, ancak BM’nin UNMISS misyonuna katkıda bulunmuştur. Türkiye’nin katkısını AB yerine BM’ye yönlendirmesi, BM üzerinden AB’ye karşı yumuşak dengeleme teşebbüsü olarak yorumlanabilecektir.

Nijer’in güvenlik teşkilatının reformuna ilişkin AB kapasite geliştirme misyonu “EUCAP Sahel Nijer”e Türkiye keza katılmamış olup, bunun sarıh bir nedeni en azından bu çalışma kapsamında tespit edilememektedir. AB ardından Libya’da düzensiz göç ve sınırötesi suçla mücadeleye yönelik “EUBAM Libya” adlı sınır gözlem misyonu başlatmıştır. Misyon üçüncü ülkelere açık olmasına rağmen yalnızca AB üye devletleri katkı sağlamaktadır. Türkiye de katılım teklifinde bulunmuş ve katkı başvurusu yapmış; ancak başvuru kadrolara ihtiyaç duyulmadığı yanıtını almıştır. Türkiye’nin katkı vermek istemesi Avrupalılaşıma ve barışı koruma eğilimini desteklerken, günümüzde Libya bağlamında Türkiye ve belirli AB ülkelerinin ayrışan tutumları dikkate alındığında, mevcut durumun Avrupa’dan uzaklaşmaya evrildiği yorumlanmaktadır.

AB’nin müteakip OGSP kriz yönetimi girişimleri sırasıyla Mali’de güvenlik güçlerinin eğitimini hedefleyen “EUTM Mali”, Orta Afrika Cumhuriyeti’nde BM misyonu MINUSCA’ya köprü vazifesinde konuşlandırılan “EUFOR RCA” ve Mali’de “EUTM Mali”nin tamamlayıcısı olarak güvenlik teşkilatı reformu misyonu

“EUCAP Sahel Mali/EURACC Sahel” olmuştur. Türkiye’nin bu OGSP misyon/operasyonlarına katılım için gereken tezkere TBMM’den geçirilmiş, ancak neticede katkı gerçekleştirilememiştir. Katılım yerine gelmemişse de, Türkiye’nin buna ilişkin iradesi Avrupalılaşıma eğiliminin varlığına ışık tutmaktadır.

Türkiye, Kırım’ın ilhakının ardından AB’nin Ukrayna’ya konuşlandığı danışma misyonu “EUAM Ukraine”in görevleri güvenlik teşkilatının reformunu kapsamaktadır. Türkiye, davet üzerine bu misyona katılım sağlamış, lakin 15 Temmuz darbe girişimi sonrası ilan edilen OHAL tedbirleri çerçevesinde katkısını askıya almıştır. OHAL’in kalkmasıyla münhal kadrolara yeniden başvurularda bulunmuş, ancak bunlara yanıt alınmamıştır. Dolayısıyla, bu misyon bağlamında Avrupalılaşıma eğilimiyle başlayan yolculuk, günümüzde AB’nin yanıt vermemesiyle aksi yönde bir rotaya işaret etmektedir.

BM’nin Orta Afrika Cumhuriyeti’nde 2015 yılında faaliyete geçen askeri danışmanlık misyonu “EUMAM RCA”e Türkiye katılım sağlamamış olup, bu karara dair çalışma kapsamında sarıh bir neden bulunamamaktadır. Bununla birlikte, Türkiye’nin katılmamayı tercih etmesi misyonun seçici Avrupalılaşıma eğiliminin öne çıktığı bir dönemde gerçekleştirilmesiyle bağlantılandırılabilir.

AB’nin Libya sahnesindeki ikinci OGSP kriz yönetimi girişimi olan “EUNAVFOR MED/Sophia” operasyonu, Libya’daki istikrarsızlık ve güvenlik krizinin etkisiyle AB’ye yönelik artış gösteren düzensiz göç akınına durdurmayı hedeflemekte olup, AB bunu askeri yöntemlerle gerçekleştirmeyi seçmiştir. Operasyonun planlama safhasının aceleye getirilmesi ve bu safhada öngörülmeyen sorunların uygulamada aşılabilmesi nedeniyle Sophia, daha ziyade göçmen kurtarma faaliyetlerine ve ardından Libya sahil güvenlik güçlerini eğitmeye yönelmek durumunda kalmıştır.

Üçüncü ülkelerin katılımına hukuken müsaade edilmesine rağmen, Sophia’ya AB üye devletleri haricinde katılım sağlayan olmamıştır. Davet edilmiş olduğu takdirde Türkiye’nin katılıma ilgi duyabileceği bir operasyon olarak değerlendirilebilecek Sophia bağlamında keza AB yine Türkiye’yle Nice hükümleri çerçevesinde öngörülen istişareleri göz ardı etmiştir. Türkiye’nin katılmaması çalışma kapsamında

kullanılan Avrupalılařma kavramı çerçevesinde deęerlendirilemese de, Sophia'yla eřzamanlı NATO'nun bölgeye yönelik konuřlandırđı tüm operasyonlara katılması Türkiye'nin AB'nin bu giriřiminin geçerlilięine dair bir yumuřak dengeleme giriřimi nitelięinde görülebilir.

AB'nin Irak'taki ikinci ve halen devam eden OGSP mevcudiyeti olan "EUAM Iraq", güvenlik teřkilatının reformunu hedefleyen bir danıřma misyonudur. Üçüncü ülkelerin katılımı mümkün olmakla birlikte, bilinen kadarıyla misyona davet edilen ve katkı saęlayan üçüncü ülke bulunmamaktadır. Türkiye'yle keza misyon bařlatılmadan önce Nice hükümleri gereęi istifaareler AB tarafından göz ardı edilmiřtir. Türkiye'nin Irak güvenlik teřkilatının eęitimini amaçlayan NATO misyonuna süregelen katkısı, AB'ye karřı bir yumuřak dengeleme unsuru barındırma potansiyeline sahiptir. Ayrıca, 15 Temmuz darbe teřebbüsü sonrasında Türkiye ile AB arasında dıř ve güvenlik politikası bağlamında belirginleřen ayrılıkların da Türkiye'nin bu misyonda bulunmayıřıyla alakalı olabileceęi düşünölmektedir.

AB, 2019 yılında Orta Afrika Cumhuriyeti'nde hükümet ile silahlı gruplar arasında imzalanan barıř anlaşmasının akabinde ülkedeki güvenlik teřkilatının reformuna katkıda bulunmak üzere "EUAM RCA" misyonunu konuřlandırmıřtır. Bu misyona hangi üçüncü devletlerin davet edildięi bilinmemekte olup, Türkiye'nin katılım durumu çalıřma kapsamında kullanılan kavramlar çerçevesinde açıklanabilir nitelikte deęildir.

OGSP'nin en yeni operasyonlarından olan İrini, Libya'ya karřı silah ambargosunun uygulanması görevini AB'nin kendi kendine üstlendięi ve yine Türkiye'yle istifaarelerde bulunmaksızın Nice hükümlerine riayet etmedięi bir vakadır. İrini, Libya'nın BM tarafından tanınan Milli Mutabakat Hükümeti'yle de olumlu iliřkiler kuramamıř, hatta ambargoyu darbe hedefi güden Hafter'in meřru Libya hükümetine karřı saldırılarının devamına hanel getirmeksizin denizle sınırlı tutması nedeniyle yanlı bir operasyon olarak kabul edilmiřtir. Türkiye'nin insani yardım taşıyan gemisinin İrini operasyonunda görevli bir gemi tarafından durdurularak zorla aranması, AB'nin ekseriyetiyle NATO Müttefiklięi bulunan Türkiye tarafından

tabiatıyla tepkiyle karşılanmıştır. İrini operasyonu, birçok yönüyle, Türkiye ile AB arasındaki dış ve güvenlik politikaları ayrılığının en sarıh biçimde görüldüğü OGSP operasyonu olarak, bu çalışma kapsamında tanımlanan Avrupa'dan uzaklaşma eğiliminin de keza en güçlü olduğu kriz yönetimi girişimi olarak öne çıkmaktadır.

Son olarak, AB'nin Temmuz 2021'de başlattığı en yeni kriz yönetimi girişimi olan "EUTM Mozambique" bu ülkenin silahlı kuvvetlerinin eğitilmesini hedeflemektedir. Henüz tam operasyonel kapasiteye ulaşamamış olan operasyona Türkiye'nin davet ve katılım durumu belirli olmaması nedeniyle çalışmanın kavramsal çerçevesiyle açıklanması söz konusu değildir.

Yukarıdaki özet açıklamalardan görüldüğü üzere, Türkiye'nin OGSP kriz yönetimi operasyon/misyonlarına katılım durumunun sabit bir örüntüyü izlediğini söylemek güçtür. Daha ziyade, kriz sahalarında her iki tarafın çıkarları, bunların ne ölçüde örtüştüğü ve bu çıkarlara yönelik güdülen yöntemin de keza ne kadar uyumlu olduğu gibi unsurların çeşitli derecelerde etkili olduğunun da hatırdan tutulması önemlidir.

Türkiye-AB ilişkileri bakımından, Türkiye'nin Avrupalılaştırma skalasındaki performansının AB'nin Türkiye için üyelik meselesi de dahil olmak üzere güvenilir bir ortak olma iradesini ne kadar güçlü koruduğuyla bağlantılı olduğunun da aynı şekilde hatırdan tutulması gerekmektedir. Bu açıdan bakıldığında, bu çalışmada OGSP misyon/harekatlarına katılım AB'nin beklentilerinin bir aday ülke tarafından ne derecede karşılandığına işaret edecek şekilde dar bir Avrupalılaştırma kavramıyla ele alınsa da, bu anlayış, katılım sağlanmayan her bir OGSP misyon/harekatının Türkiye'nin AB'den uzaklaştığı varsayımı olarak kabul edilmemelidir.

Öte yandan, Türkiye'nin bilhassa Soğuk Savaş'tan sonra barışı koruma operasyonları ve kriz yönetimi girişimlerine artan yönelimi, çalışmadan da görüleceği üzere, AB haricinde NATO, BM ve AGİT tarafından yürütülen çabalara katılımında da barizdir. Türkiye'nin bu çabalara artan katılımı Avrupalılaştırma kavramını destekleyecek biçimde kullanılsa da, Türkiye'nin AB'den bağımsız biçimde yürüttüğü/katıldığı barış faaliyetleri sahip olduğu bu role hanel getirecek şekilde yorumlanmamalıdır.

Türkiye'nin OGSP misyon/operasyonlarına katılımını incelerken kullanılan bir diğer kavram olan yumuşak dengeleme teşebbüslerinin de keza sarıh bir şablona oturduğu söylenemese de, Türkiye'nin çıkarları doğrultusunda belirli kriz sahalarında AB'ye karşı yumuşak denge manivelalarını kullandığı görülebilmektedir. Netice itibarıyla, bu kavramlar birbirinden çeşitli yönlerde farklılıklar arzeden unsurlar barındıran 30'u aşkın OGSP misyon/operasyonlarına Türkiye'nin katılım durumunu tabiatıyla tek başlarında açıklamak için yeterli olmasa da, bu uğurda naçizane ve dar kapsamlı bir teşebbüs olarak kabul edilebilir.

Herhalükarda, bu çalışmanın araştırma sorusu ve incelenen vakalar değerlendirildiğinde, Türkiye'nin OGSP ile kriz yönetimi alanındaki işbirliğinin AB'yle ilişkisinden henüz bağımsız olmadığı, bu sinerjinin evriminde Türkiye-AB ilişkilerindeki gelişmelerin şekillendirici rol oynadığı görülebilmektedir.

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TEZİN ADI / TITLE OF THE THESIS (İngilizce / English): Third-Country Participation to the European Union's CSDP: Turkey's CSDP Journey through Operations and Missions

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