

THE ROLE OF POLITICAL ACTIVISTS IN COUNTER-HEGEMONY
FORMATION: A CASE STUDY ON TUZLUÇAYIR/ANKARA

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ABSTRACT

THE ROLE OF POLITICAL ACTIVISTS IN COUNTER-HEGEMONY FORMATION: A CASE STUDY ON TUZLUÇAYIR/ANKARA

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This Ph.D. dissertation analyses the role of political activists in a local space in terms of creating counter-hegemonic practices based on field research carried in Tuzluçayır in Ankara/Turkey. In this sense, the role of the organic intellectuals in a specific neighborhood as driving forces of a potential counter-hegemony is questioned through operationalizing the Gramscian concepts hegemony, counter-hegemony and organic intellectuals. The main question is what is the role of the organic intellectuals in acting with the masses in terms of realizing their social reality and leading the masses to be the protagonists of social change? In this sense, this study argues that a neighborhood could be influential in terms of creating organic intellectuals and canalizing residents into political activism. Here, the political organizations in the neighborhood is important in terms of creating an “alternative” to the existing political system by resisting to the political and cultural hegemony. This study uses the Gramscian concepts of common sense, folklore and language which lead the way to understand the relation between ideology and hegemony. With reference to Gramsci, the relation between intellectuals and the people is questioned in terms of establishing a counter-

hegemonic project that necessitates not only economic but also an intellectual leadership. The study questions the relation of being an “organic intellectual” in Tuzluçayır linking the neighborhood to its space and history.

Keywords: hegemony, counter-hegemony, organic intellectuals, political opposition, local space, Tuzluçayır/Ankara

ÖZ

KARŞI-HEGEMONYA OLUŞUMUNDA SİYASİ AKTİVİSTLERİN ROLÜ: TUZLUÇAYIR/ANKARA'DA BİR ALAN ARAŞTIRMASI

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Bu tez, Ankara/Türkiye'de Tuzluçayır'da gerçekleştirilen saha araştırmasına dayalı olarak, siyasi aktivistlerin yerel bir alanda karşı-hegemonyacı oluşumlar yaratmadaki rolünü analiz etmektedir. Bu anlamda, hegemonya, karşı-hegemonya ve organik aydınlar gibi Gramscici kavramlar operasyonel hale getirilerek, belirli bir mahalledeki organik aydınların potansiyel bir karşı hegemonyanın itici güçleri olarak rolü sorgulanmaktadır. Esas soru, organik aydınların kitlelerle birlikte hareket etme, toplumsal gerçekliklerini gerçekleştirme ve kitleleri toplumsal değişimin kahramanları olmalarına yönlendirmedeki rolüdür. Bu anlamda, bu çalışma esas olarak bir mahallenin, organik aydın yaratma ve sakinlerini siyasi aktivizme kanalize etme açısından oldukça etkili olabileceğini savunuyor. Nitekim, mahalledeki siyasi örgütlenmelerin siyasi ve kültürel hegemonyaya tepki olarak mevcut siyasi sisteme “alternatif” yaratmada oldukça etkili olduğu görülmektedir. Bu çalışma ağırlıklı olarak ideoloji ve hegemonya ilişkisini anlamaya yardımcı olan Gramsci'nin sağduyu, folklor, dil kavramlarını ele almaktadır. Gramsci'ye referansla, aydınlar ve halk arasındaki ilişki, sadece ekonomik değil, aynı zamanda entelektüel bir liderliği de

gerektiren hegemonik bir karřıt proje kurma aısından sorgulanmaktadır. Bu alıřma esas olarak Tuzluayır'da “organik aydın” olmanın mahallenin mekânı ve tarihi ile iliřkisini sorgulamaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: hegemonya, karřı-hegemonya, organik aydınlar, siyasi muhalefet, Tuzluayır/Ankara

Can ođluma...

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

PLAGIARISM	iii
ABSTRACT.....	iv
ÖZ	vi
DEDICATION	viii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	ix
TABLE OF CONTENTS	xi
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS	xiv
CHAPTERS	
1. INTRODUCTION	1
2. UNDERSTANDING CONTEXT: WHY TUZLUÇAYIR?.....	7
2.1 Gramscian Concepts in Tuzluçayır.....	8
2.2 Following the Footprints of Hegemonic Moments in Tuzluçayır	11
3. UNDERSTANDING SOCIETY: GRAMSCI’S LEGACY	15
3.1 Culture in Gramsci.....	19
3.1.1 Language and Common Sense: Creating a Collective Identity	24
3.1.2 Praxis: Triggering Counter-Hegemony.....	29
3.1.3 Folklore: How does the subaltern survive?.....	32
3.1.4 Conclusion	36
3.2 Politics in Gramsci.....	37
3.2.1 Historical Bloc	38
3.2.2 Ideology	40
3.2.3 Hegemony	45

3.2.4 Conclusion.....	50
4. UNDERSTANDING THE “CAPITALIST STATE”	52
4.1 Poulantzas on Hegemony and State.....	55
4.1.1 Revisiting Hegemony	56
4.1.2 Conclusion.....	61
4.2 Gramsci and Poulantzas on Turkey	64
4.2.1 Before JDP: Turkish Modernization as a Failed Pursuit of Hegemony	65
4.2.2 Transformation of Neoliberal Hegemony and Populism of JDP	72
4.2.3 Conclusion.....	79
5. UNDERSTANDING URBAN SPACE	84
5.1 Possibility of Counter-Hegemonic Movements.....	86
5.1.1 Lefebvre on Urban Space.....	88
5.1.2 Conclusion.....	105
6. ENTERING THE FIELD: TUZLUÇAYIR AND THE POLITICAL ACTIVISTS... ..	108
6.1 Research Design and Respondents: Who are resisting?	108
6.2 Difficulties and Limitations of the Field Study.....	113
7. UNDERSTANDING TUZLUÇAYIR: BETWEEN TIME AND SPACE	116
7.1 The First Settlements: History of Solidarity	122
7.2 Tuzluçayır from 1980 to 2002: Military Intervention and Rise of Political Islam.....	137
7.3 Since 2002: Activists of the Political Organizations in Tuzluçayır.....	159
7.3.1 Neighborhood.....	160
7.3.2 Political Organizations	186
8. CONCLUSIONS.....	248
REFERENCES.....	256

APPENDICES

A. LIST OF THE INTERVIEWEES	271
B. APPROVAL OF THE METU HUMAN SUBJECTS ETHICS COMMITTEE	272
C. CURRICULUM VITAE	273
D. TURKISH SUMMARY / TÜRKÇE ÖZET.....	277
E. TEZ İZİN FORMU / THESIS PERMISSION FORM.....	296

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CUP	: Committee of Union and Progress
Diyanet (İşleri Başkanlığı)	: Presidency of Religious Affairs
RPP	: Republican People's Party
JDP	: Justice and Development Party
NMP	: Nationalist Movement Party
PDP	: Peoples' Democratic Party
CPT	: Communist Party of Turkey
VP	: Virtue Party
WP	: Welfare Party

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

“The Wind That Shakes Barley”

“Time never dies; circle is not round...”. In an impressive film written and directed by Milcho Manchevski, *Pred Dozhdot* (1996), in one scene, the audience saw a graffiti writing the statement above. Although, this sentence mostly commented as a reference to the nonlinear fiction of the film, since I watched it, I saw the reflections of this “motto” frequently in daily life afterwards. In my first visit to Tuzluçayır Neighborhood, I saw plenty of graffiti, murals on the walls of the houses; if one of these was “Time never dies, circle is not round”, it would not have been surprising. Tuzluçayır is a timeless neighborhood, somewhere between time and space with a few gecekondu left but still carrying the neighborhood life with people on the streets, seated in the local associations realizing the outsiders and knowing each other. It is like the revolutionary neighborhoods of the 1970s was transformed and formed a hybrid neighborhood which both looks like the neighborhoods of the “old” times but with a few modern updates. The news regarding the “resisting citizens” of Tuzluçayır, friend chats about the semi-legendary figures of the protests and the creative protest repertoire of the political organizations were quite influential to consider the neighborhood as a research field.

There is a tendency to consider time as linear; as if the same causes produce similar effects without considering the power of space and/or locality on the actions. Here, in the broadest sense this dissertation aims at showing the power of “space” on actions, the effects of locality on historical moments, on time and the results of their interaction. Tuzluçayır in this sense is one of the unique neighborhoods in Turkey with remarkable features both as a “neighborhood” and as a space of resistance that challenges the

existing hegemonic politics and culture. But why? Here, the author is looking for reasons that make Tuzluçayır a space of resistance and attempts to search for the potential of political organizations to form counter-hegemony. In this sense, it is essential to search for the counter-hegemonic political actors and the role of locality in the formation of counter-hegemony. Some basic questions enable us to question the possibility of counter-hegemony to spring up from a “single” neighborhood: How political organizations can build a counter-hegemonic project? Scaling up from a territorial struggle to a popular project of social transformation and then possibly to create a counter-hegemonic popular common-sense? What is the role of the organic intellectuals to act with the masses in terms of realizing their social reality and lead the masses to be the protagonists of social change? Can we speak of local organic intellectuals? Or can a neighborhood make the intellectuals “organic”?

In his landmark book “Rebel Cities”, David Harvey argued that domination of capitalist class can be observed on the whole population; their lifestyles, political and cultural values besides their labor-power. Here, through them, we can observe the capacity of the capitalist class to dominate the urban processes. Therefore, the urbanization of capital necessitates domination of the urban space. Another influential figure on space in general and urban space in particular. Henri Lefebvre in his innovative work “The Production of Space” claimed that through the acts of state and capitalist logic, organic space is reduced to an abstraction where space is infinitely fragmented, homogenized and has a hierarchical characteristic in order to meet the interests of dominant forces (state and capitalist class); as a result of this fragmentation, city space is defeated by the “urban” space. This defeat triggers the question of how could “use value” of the urban space be brought back into the discussion if one is interested in the democratic use of the city space. Here, the possibility of a coalition among different social groups guides us to focus on the ways for the organized power of political organizations.

In Turkey, we also observe the significance of urban space in terms of controlling/transforming both the objective and subjective conditions of “space”, the control and the regulation of human behavior, polycentrism, fragmentation and sub-urbanization, and differentiation of the usage of urban space among classes. These concerns are the results of some major changes in the economic and political realms

that can be related to the period after the 1980 military coup. During these times, the policies depending on import substitution were replaced with structural adjustment programmes. In addition, with the transfer of capital to the second circuit, land (built environment) became a commodity itself. With respect to this, it is possible to claim that starting with the 1980s; the urbanization process in Turkey was characterized by the urbanization of capital. Thus, while center(s) of the urban space was growing up in a dispersed manner, urban transformation projects under the name of “urban renewal” and/or gentrification (besides the high degrees of fragmentation nurtured by anti-democratic policies) became the most essential elements which defined Turkey’s cities. These outcomes reflected and at the same time supported the highest degree of urbanization of capital since the 1980s, coherent with JDP’s (Justice and Development Party) political ideology and strategy along with economic policies.

Therefore, through the commodification and politicization of urban space in line with conservative and neo-liberal policies, we can observe the importance of space as a political tool and its strategic importance for urban ideology as Lefebvre puts it. Here, one should keep in mind that, spatial forms include the social processes and the social processes in essence are spatial. Space has a primary value functioning as a political instrument for the state in order to ensure the proper functioning of its power. As the spatial design is a political instrument in the hands of the state, capital and the dominant class, spatial organization of metropolitan cities and their form represent power.¹ Here, the space is used both as a battlefield and as a tool for the practices of hegemony, which necessitates understanding the “power” of space as Lefebvre puts it. Following Lefebvre one can say that space is not solely the container of the social, social movements and/or resistance but also it (re)produces them in a dialectical way. In the *Production of Space*, he asks that:

Is it conceivable that the exercise of hegemony might leave space untouched? Could space be nothing more than the passive locus of social relations, the milieu in which their combination takes on body, or the

¹ Although it is not a discussion topic in this dissertation, it is essential to understand the perception of the politics as a “war” by JDP government(s); which could be labeled as addressing both the strategies of taking consent and using force in Gramscian terms. As it will be discussed, JDP is nourished by capital’s interests in appropriating the spaces of the “enemy” to take an advantageous position in the war on economic and ideological aspects of the urban space.

aggregate of the procedures employed in their removal? The answer must be no. (1991, p.11)

Here, hegemony could only function properly by using/dominating/manipulating the space, as it is critical to understand the spatio-temporality of social relations. As Kipfer stated, “Lefebvre’s main contribution² can be read as an attempt to urbanize the analysis of hegemony” (2002, p. 118). Therefore, hegemony in/on urban space is one of the cornerstones for understanding the inequalities, challenges, activities to the existing state-civil society relations. So, there are some essential questions to be asked to examine the power struggles on space and the role of the capitalist state in this process: How can we understand hegemony? What is counter-hegemony and who are the leaders of these counter-hegemonic “moments”? Can we define a “collective will” that leads these moments? Can we identify the leaders of these counter-hegemonic formations as “organic intellectuals?” Is it possible to define “local organic intellectuals?” In the following chapters, these questions will be discussed with a special focus on Gramscian concepts, as these are essential to understanding the possibility of projected social transformation.

It should be noted once more that “space” is not solely a passive subject on which the hegemony practices are reflected. Rather, it is a “position” in the practices of hegemony and/or counter-hegemony, which both shapes and is shaped by these struggles. In other words, obviously, the reflections of the struggles of hegemony could be observed on the urban space but beyond that, the “space” is an essential tool that constructs, reconstructs and deconstructs the hegemony in the hands of the power blocs. Therefore, Gramscian concepts should be elaborated to help us understand the importance of hegemony and the related potential of counter-hegemonic movements in terms of changing the power balance in the urban space. Gramsci’s set of concepts should be understood as a whole; his approach to culture is closely related to his political insights as his focus on language, common sense, praxis and folklore reflect the tools of struggles in counter-hegemonic alliances.

There are at least two parties in the discussion of hegemony in Turkey, which will be discussed in the third section. The “state” plays an essential role in the formation of

² To urban Marxism.

hegemony and the power bloc. Accordingly, Poulantzas analyzes the role of the political struggles in and between the “capitalist” state and its political formation with the concept of hegemony. Because of that, the third section will try to understand the formation of the relations within the power bloc and with the “other” social classes outside this bloc in line with Poulantzas’s theory of state and democracy. Poulantzas theoretically and politically challenges the concept of hegemony and attempts to adopt it to understand (the potential of) the political struggles between the state and the society. Here, he analysed the state in its conjunctural position and shows the possible cracks within the power bloc that will lead to political struggles with a potential of counter-hegemonic moments. However, it is essential to state that Poulantzas does not limit these struggles to state or power. To elaborate, his basic concern is to find a democratic way to socialism in which he necessitates the plurality of the political actors.

The focus of Poulantzas on the importance of the “plurality” of the actors in the way to democratic socialism makes us see the role of the leftist oppositions in the urban space which according to Poulantzas have to “ground themselves in popular struggles that always spill over and keep a distance from, the state.”³ In this sense, the fourth section will be spared to the struggle “on” the urban space with a special focus on Lefebvre who will lead us to understand the possibility of creating counter-hegemony. Here, as we labelled “urban space as a political battlefield” the leftist political organizations are agents to understand the relation between space and the social, in the framework of the state-society relations and the struggle for power. Therefore, urban conflicts together with the political and economic conflicts create a potential for the opposition, which have the potential for the formation of counter-hegemony. The “plural actors” Poulantzas emphasizes, should include the urban social movements as they are the key actors of urban politics.

In short, “time never dies and the circle is not round” in Tuzluçayır as there is no simple formula to understand the “causes” that resulted with the “effect” but there are

³ From the Interview with Poulantzas on 1979, retrieved from: <https://viewpointmag.com/2017/12/18/state-social-movements-party-interview-nicos-poulantzas-1979/> on 08.07.2020

complicated relations and oppositional reactions that are not simply explained with the political coercion of the government(s). This dissertation will try to understand the “uniqueness” of Tuzluçayır in terms of its historical heritage that makes the political organizations strong and activists “organized”. The ambiguity between time and space shows that regardless of yesterday and tomorrow there is a circle and it is essential to question the role of the political activists in forming this circle.

CHAPTER 2

UNDERSTANDING CONTEXT: WHY TUZLUÇAYIR?

In Turkish political history, certain neighborhoods are known for their oppositional characteristics as they nourish the political and/or social movements throughout their histories. Tuzluçayır is a neighborhood that is known for its ‘critical’ position as resistance movements in the times when social oppositions/unrests peaked, the opposition in the neighborhood also became visible. These spaces with an “oppositional character” have also another common point driving them to be marked as opposed to political power and/or state- which is also their motivation to resist: They all harbored the people who could be called as ‘excluded’ from the mainstream ‘citizen’ profile in Turkey, i.e. Turkish “and” Sunni. Here, the majority of the population in Tuzluçayır are Alevis. Although the residents of these neighborhoods are coming from a variety of economic, cultural and social backgrounds, they all are commonly excluded from government policies, from society, mostly from economic relations and from spatial relations (Erman, 2010). Therefore, mainly composed of lower/middle class households from ethnic and religious minorities, these neighborhoods accommodate the excluded/outcast of the society. This exclusion in Tuzluçayır is mainly in the political form; since the establishment of the neighborhood, it was an emancipated space, a safe zone for the opposition of the mainstream politics and that is why it is also known as “Little Moscow” (Bayrak, 2013). In a matter, the resistance movements in Tuzluçayır could be seen as a strategy to cope with this variety of exclusions.

Here, Gramsci provides us with a set of analytical tools to understand and analyze Tuzluçayır in terms of its potential for harbouring the political organizations in opposition. For these organizations, language is a social product that reflects the history of the neighborhood. There is a common language that is unique to the

residents and the historical moments and/or iconic social movements glorified in their daily practices. As will be mentioned later, the history of the neighborhood is reflected in a provocative language, that sharpens the borders with the “outside” and “outsiders”. Related to the use of the “same” language, one can say that common sense is an underrated concept that should be established by political organizations as a catalyzer.

2.1 Gramscian Concepts in Tuzluçayır

The Gramscian concept, common sense is a new philosophy and/or an ethos that should be created as an alternative to dominant ones. Along with language; common sense carries the potential of coalition among various political organizations in Tuzluçayır. Therefore, the way to the success of a counter-hegemonic formation, an alternative for the historical bloc that dominates the acts and thoughts of the masses is to unite the masses around a “modern prince”; a party in a broad sense. Language, common sense and folklore concepts that Gramsci focuses on are all the essential building blocks to form solidarity. This evaluation is quite visible in Tuzluçayır as it was observed through the interviews of the political activists, the neighborhood has “common values” that unite them. The political groups, movements, organizations in the neighborhood carry the potential of being organic intellectuals as the concept discussed above includes the people who are part of the social formation that organize, rationalize and affect the residents of the neighborhood.

One of the questions of this dissertation is if these political activists could be considered as the organic intellectuals of Tuzluçayır? Or in a broader version, does a neighborhood make the intellectuals “organic”; can we talk about “local organic intellectuals”? To understand the cultural and political concepts of Gramsci they should be operationalized. As Laclau and Mouffe (1985) put it, the concept of hegemony seems to make and maintain connections among movements. This leads us to another problem of this dissertation: Is it possible to up-scale a territorial struggle to a popular project of social transformation? Is it possible to create a counter-hegemonic popular common sense or a counter-hegemonic space?

In Tuzluçayır, common sense can be terrain from which counter-hegemonic challenge to dominant ideas can be mounted. Subaltern groups in the neighborhood are not passive recipients; they are the starting point for making their social reality critical. Alternative hegemony can be forged in there, which is the sphere of ideological and cultural reproduction. A counter-hegemonic force should take into account national-popular demand and organic intellectuals play an important role in that active participation in practical life. Here, one should ask whether the political activists in the neighborhood could be considered as constructors/ organizers/ permanent persuaders – not just simple orators? The role of activists in the neighborhood, just like the organic intellectuals, is essential in raising consciousness: They provide the tools for Tuzluçayır residents to understand their social reality, organize themselves and become protagonists of social change. The actions of the political activists not only remain at the level of protest; they promote practical alternatives. Here, these practical alternatives that inhold the nodes of counter-hegemony will be questioned in the analysis of the field study.

Related to this, the actions in question will be evaluated also as having the potential of being plural, differentiated, democratic and inclusive which are derived from Mark Purcell's characterization of counter-hegemonic movements (2013). Here, the presence of Gramsci in neighborhood is quite visible as political groups stand as bulwarks in the resistance to state officials and government: They challenge how politics are conducted in the neighborhood, city and country. Following this, another question of this dissertation has shown itself: Are there any counter-hegemonic articulations of differentiated but equivalent popular struggles? As it is essential for a counter-hegemonic articulation, each political organization should value the autonomy and particularity of other struggles which emphasize the importance of the local scale in the struggle for counter-hegemony. Therefore, the demands of the residents in the neighborhood should be covered at least in the agendas of the movements and also show the themes of the resistance. As Gramsci keynotes, the moral, intellectual and political leadership necessitates this unity around the popular demands derived from the popular masses.

To sum up, the dynamics of the counter-hegemonic potential in Tuzluçayır Neighborhood could be grasped through cultural and political insights of Gramsci as his focus on cultural concepts like language, common sense, folklore are necessary to show the relative success on the unity of the neighborhood standing against the existing hegemonic power relations. The neighborhood as will be seen in a detailed way has a “culture” in its broadest sense from their usage of the common language - that have references to the history of the neighborhood or the ethnic/cultural tendencies- to common sense that reflects a kind of reflex against the values, beliefs that are imposed by the hegemonic forces. Here, it should be questioned that in what senses the political organizations in the neighborhood carry the potential of leading the change that will represent the cultural and political leadership.

While we attempted to understand the potential of counter-hegemonic formation, it is essential to grasp the other side of the relation: the hegemonic forces. This dissertation confines itself to the post-2002 period, as the 2002 general elections were a landmark for Turkey in terms of indicating a new era for economic, political, social and cultural life.

the AKP has been quite successful in differentiating itself both from its past and the other political parties by defining itself as a “center-right party with a conservative-democrat identity.” It differentiated itself from the previous Islamic parties by suggesting that in its governance it locates itself in the center, more precisely in the center-right, and operates as a mass party initiating reformist, service-based, and proactive domestic and foreign policy. Defining itself as a center-right party whose reform-based proactive politics can carry out Turkey’s transformation process, rather than as an Islamic party, the AKP has widened and deepened its societal support and global legitimacy. (Keyman, 2010, p. 315)

Here, JDP won the majority of the seats in the Grand National Assembly in the 2002 elections and ended the era of coalitions since 1991. The era of AKP government(s) signifies a new historical bloc, a new hegemony formation according to several social scientists since 1980. (Yalman, 2004, 2014; Akça, 2011, 2014). In this sense, to grasp the hegemony that is positioned against the political movements in Tuzluçayır, “the state”, which is the executive of the dominant hegemonic project should be comprehended.

2.2 Following the Footprints of Hegemonic Moments in Tuzluçayır

It is important to note that the impact of Gramsci on our research field is going beyond providing a systematic analysis of classes, engaging with the elaboration of the notion of hegemony and ideology. Here, Gramsci provides a theory of politics/a political strategy that would enable the dominated classes to be engaged in a political struggle against the ruling classes trying to penetrate all aspects of the social and political life. As such, it seems that hegemony in the account of Gramsci may be regarded both as a strategy for the subaltern to establish its own hegemony and as a general theory of politics which shows the possibility and the path of transformation of the prevalent hegemonic system for any class, as it is fed both from theory and practice.

Following this line of thought, the basic question in the minds of the readers' of this dissertation is probably: Why Tuzluçayır? As mentioned above, there are various neighborhoods famous for harboring people of opposing views and being "safe" places for oppositional political movements. Also, "liberated neighborhood" is a term often used for these neighborhoods but as Erman states: "This is criticized for adopting a term used by fascists to label a neighborhood as unlawful." (2020, p.181). Whether safe or liberated, it is essential to clarify the position of being "opposite". Who and/or what are they opposed to? As will be mentioned below, Tuzluçayır Neighborhood, since the first settlements in the 1960s remains as a "disadvantaged section" of the city so far. Here, an inherent characteristic of Turkish urbanization (as in many other parts of the world) is the accumulation of wealth in some sections of the city and poverty in others. Because of the ever-increasing polarization of wealth and poverty, social inequality has deepened, and it has become quite a determinant in the structure and allocation of wealth and poverty within the city. In this sense, the city is not only quartered, but also layered, as there is a hierarchy between the classes and groups that differ according to their use of the city.

Here, Tuzluçayır neighborhood remained at the bottom of this hierarchy harboring the *gecekondus* built mostly by Alevi immigrants from central-Anatolian cities. In her book, based on a field study on Tuzluçayır Neighborhood, Yürekli states the

proportion of Alevi population as 90% by 2016, who mainly migrated from Çorum and Sivas (2016, p.130). A close estimation, %85 is also given by the *muhtar* of the neighborhood. In the preliminary interviews, most of the interviewees mentioned at least one relative, who was politically active and engaged in leftist organizations; was arrested, tortured and/or killed by the state officials. Here, even though the interviewees do not share similar political beliefs and/or affiliations, they were quite “proud” to live in the same neighborhood- although in different times- with political leaders of the student movements of the 1960s/1970s- when the rise of the revolutionary left found a strong base in *gecekondu* areas (Şengül, 2003). Starting from the 1960s with the migration from rural areas to Tuzluca, the migrants, the newcomers were also economically insecure similar to other neighborhoods. Here, Kıray explains this insecurity as follows:

When the peasants come to the city to be paid industrial workers, they neither bring their families with them nor sell the small piece of land they own. The only reason behind this famous phenomenon, which can be summarized as the fact that it is difficult to have truly urbanized skilled labor, is that economic development occurs at a slow pace and the new worker is not safe as a result of the lack of a social security system. (1999, p.61)

Köylüler ücretli sanayi işçisi olmak üzere kente geldiklerinde ne ailelerini yanlarında getirir ne de sahip oldukları küçük toprak parçasını satarlar. Gerçekten kentleşmiş nitelikli emeğe sahip olmanın zor olması şeklinde özetlenebilecek şu ünlü fenomenin ardındaki tek neden, ekonomik kalkınmanın yavaş bir hızda gerçekleşmesi ve bir sosyal güvenlik sisteminin bulunmaması sonucu yeni gelen işçinin güvende olmayışıdır. (1999, p.61)

Besides marginalization in their living areas, especially in *gecekondu* neighborhoods and inequality development based on reaching social and capital resources were pulling factors to mobilize.

Radical right-left clashes accelerated between 1970 and 1980 in which leftist militants emerged from the masses coming from urban segregated areas/neighborhoods comprised mostly Alevi, Kurd and poor migrants. Antagonistic dynamics emerging from these communities turned into one of the mobility channels. The *gecekondu* youth, particularly, Alevi youth articulated to the movement of left groups coming from outside the *gecekondu* areas (Massicard, 2005). In Tuzluca, there were armed

riots and clashes between the left-wing organizations located in the neighborhood and the state forces and/or right-wing groups. During this period, Tuzluçayır was declared to be an ‘emancipated zone’, detached from control and surveillance by the state. (Erman, 2010, p.184) The revolutionary groups in the neighborhood controlled the land and dwelling distribution and checked the entrances and exits of the neighborhoods.

Here, the history of “resistance as a reflex” and dominance of Alevi population are two of the main reasons for choosing Tuzluçayır- which are also related to each other- in terms of understanding the hegemony and potential/possibility of counter-hegemonic formations and/or instances. Therefore, the theoretical framework analyzed below is just a tool to understand the policies of central government(s) including the hegemonic projects to pacify the resistance potential in Tuzluçayır Neighborhood. Here, there are certain concrete examples that the hegemony of the central government(s) shows itself like the Cami-Cemevi Project in 2013 which was considered as an assimilation project of official political Islamic ideology by most of the residents in the neighborhood.⁴ Similarly, “the security” problems in the neighborhood especially after 2013 (following Gezi Park protests and Cami-Cemevi Project resistance) widely stated during the interviews. Therefore, most of the interviewees mention the drug dealers who suddenly appeared in the public parks of the neighborhood and were favored by the police officers. This also is considered to be an official strategy to *marginalize and/or criminalize* the neighborhood as it was claimed that the drug trade was tried to be imposed and normalized among the youth.

During the interviews, it was widely observed that the hegemony of political Islam/Sunni Islam is emphasized by the interviewees from language to common sense; folklore to daily life activities- a world view to be challenged. So, can we categorize the demonstrations, protests, petitions...etc. in the neighborhood organized by the local militants of the political organizations as counter-hegemonic formations? For instance, can a neighborhood watch to catch and “punish” the drug dealers in the public park by the local militants be considered as an attempt to create a counter-hegemonic

⁴ Retrieved from <https://www.ihd.org.tr/ankara-tuzlucayir-cami-cemevi-projesine-karsi-yapilan-gosteriler-ve-sonrasinda-gelisen-olaylara-iliskin-degerlendirme-raporu/> on 04.05.2020.

space? Constructing a counter-hegemonic space/struggle in Tuzluçayır is related to taking support of the masses which will also be questioned with the concrete examples of the support of the residents to political organizations. Who supports it and how? All these aspects bring us to the question: What are the popular demands of the people in the neighborhood? Do the political activists question the “content” of these demands? Are the political organizations responsive to these demands? These are all related to the resistance themes in the neighborhood and how these resistance practices relate themselves as plural, differentiated, democratic and/or inclusive. All these questions, in the end, will help us to understand the importance of a local scale in the struggle for counter-hegemony. The local scale is nontrivial for one of the basic concerns of this dissertation as mentioned above: Can we speak of “local organic intellectuals” or can a neighborhood make an intellectual “organic”? All in all, they will provide an integrative approach to an understanding of the potentiality of counter-hegemonic movements- carrying the potential to exceed the local scale of which leading figures are the leaders, members, intellectuals, activists of these movements.

CHAPTER 3

UNDERSTANDING SOCIETY: GRAMSCI'S LEGACY

In 1917, the October Revolution made against Tsarist Russia, brought a lot of open-ended questions within the Marxist tradition. Therefore, breeding from Marx, Lenin and Engels, from an orthodox Marxist position for a socialist revolution to be executed, advanced industrialization is necessitated which at that time indicated Western Europe in general and Britain in particular. However, quite the reverse of what Marx and Lenin anticipated, in the following years to come, the counter-revolutions by fascist movements came into the scene in many parts of Europe such as in Italy and Germany. On the other hand, in rural Russia under the autocracy of the Empire, a revolution “could” be organized from below. Marxism should provide a more dynamic and extended framework fit with the conditions of the changing Europe and Russia and understand the reasons for these “deviations” in social and political transformations. Here, the philosophical and political insights provided by Antonio Gramsci especially regarding the concept of hegemony- which is one of the key concepts to understand the political and social struggles in the 21st century- may be argued to be one of the cornerstones within that literature, since the Gramscian account of hegemony may be stated as the concept that provided the Marxist theory with dynamism.

The conjuncture of the historical period in which he lived, may be argued to be influential on the primary motivation that led Gramsci to write his basic texts “Political Writings”, “Prison Notebooks” and “Southern Question”, the backgrounds of which are marked with questioning and problematizing the passivity and easy submission of the proletariat in particular and all other constitutive elements of social formation in general, to domination; in its time: fascism. Besides, the problems inherited in Italy namely the disjointed relation between the intellectuals and masses which resulted in the absence of a “national-popular category” and as is mentioned above, the

unexpected path that the revolution made in Tsarist Russia in which developed capitalist relations would not be exercised could also be stated as the driving forces for the works of Gramsci.

Here, to grasp the significance of the arguments provided by Gramsci, especially with regard to his conceptualization of hegemony, it is essential to take into account that he is not a philosopher but a political activist trying to adopt the existing social and economic conditions to the Marxist Tradition. He was born in Sardinia which was the most underdeveloped area of the Mezzogiomo, exemplifying all the ills of regionalism characterized historically by the domination by foreign powers, a highly class-stratified feudal culture, dire poverty, exploitation of the peasant at the hands of landlords, repressive taxation, and political manipulation of the region by municipal and national governments which signified “Sardinian heritage” on his writings could be considered as a driving force (Landy, 1986, p. 50). Therefore, he realized that the social life in Southern Italy is not only organized by the strategies developed by the political power but also by the arrangements, tactics developed within/for the civil society. That brings him, in a sense, to explain the power in a broader sense than orthodox Marxism does: State appeared as a set of relations and institutions including the “instructor state” besides its coercive dimension (Bobbio, 1979, p. 34) which brings him to explain the power mostly related with the concept of hegemony.

Coming from and associating himself with the Marxist tradition, Gramsci regarded the submissiveness prevalent among the people to domination, as a result of the mechanistic and economist understanding and reading of historical materialism, which establishes a strict separation between the structure (the world of economy) and the superstructure (the world of ideas), identifying the former, that is to say, the material conditions, as the motor force of history. In this conceptualization, superstructure is said to be solely determined by the base and it is assumed to be a lack of the “power” to change the base and in this sense, foreclose the struggle against domination (Marx, 1977, p. 181):

In the social production of their existence, men inevitably enter into definite relations, which are independent of their will, namely relations of production appropriate to a given stage in the development of their material forces of

production. The totality of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which arises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the general process of social, political and intellectual life.

Here, this is a controversial “reading” of the relation between base and superstructure which jeopardize the revolutionary character of Marxist theory. In such a conceptualization, the superstructure is considered to be uni-dimensionally and absolutely determined by the structure, stripping the people of any means of waging a political struggle against domination, since the (socialist) revolution is possible only in the instance of maturation of material conditions, which would, in turn, generate the necessary consciousness for the political struggle. This, in fact, according to Gramsci is nothing but a wrong reading and results in questioning the revolutionary path that Marxism draw: turning it into only a philosophical theory capable of providing an account of the material and corresponding social conditions, but not of changing them via political struggle. To quote from him:

The claim (presented as an essential postulate of historical materialism) that every fluctuation of politics and ideology can be presented and expounded as an immediate expression of the structure, must be contested in theory as primitive infantilism (2000, p. 190)

And

...no society sets itself tasks for whose accomplishment the necessary and sufficient conditions do not either already exist or are not at least beginning to emerge and develop; no society breaks down and can be replaced until it has developed all the forms of life which are implicit in its internal relations” (ibid. 200)

It is on the basis of these criticisms that Gramsci proposes his reading of historical materialism that lies at the heart of all of his political concepts, as well as his account on the notion of hegemony. Here, as Mouffe indicates: “...any interpretation of historical materialism which reduces it to a simple methodology of sociological research and which separates it from praxis is considered by Gramsci to be a form of economism.” (Mouffe, 1979, p. 6). Therefore, he elevates the philosophy of praxis which indicates the coherent unity of theory and practice which will be elaborated in a detailed manner later.

Despite the fact that Gramsci lived between the two World Wars and under the severe conditions of fascist Italy, his *Prison Notebooks* provided a new framework for Marxist theory necessarily expanding the conceptualization of power and hegemony with the assistance of the concepts like language, common sense and folklore which will be elaborated in the following sections.

Although Gramsci readers commonly render Gramsci and his concepts in a way reflecting their philosophical and political standpoints in a sense “decoding” him; what is common for them is the fact that one of his basic contributions to the Marxist literature is the reconstruction of the base-superstructure model and his emphasis on the appearance of the capitalist state as exercising power which renders the coercion as becoming more ambiguous while glorifying the consent-based power relations combining with the coercive ones. In this sense, power is shaped with ideological processes towards the human minds rather than externally imposed institutional principles. He provides alternatives for the socialist revolution and reconstructs the roles and the formation of the classes towards the capitalist state. As Landy emphasized, *Prison Notebooks* aimed to explore basic questions concerning Europe in general and Italy in particular in the 21st Century:

What is the power of the state? Is modern culture basically coercive, allowing no space for resistance? Do all aspects of the modern social life reinforce the sense of the powerlessness of the masses? ...How do power relations change and how do subaltern groups gain power and become hegemonic? (1986, p. 51)

In this sense, one can say that he attempted to grasp the role of intellectuals in social change and possible directions for the political and cultural struggle which may avoid past problems. Gramsci, far more than providing a systematic conception of ideology, engaged himself with the elaboration of the notion of hegemony. Therefore, he was much more interested in providing a theory of politics or a political strategy that would enable the dominated classes to be engaged in a political struggle against the ruling classes. As such, it seems that hegemony -in the account of Gramsci- may be regarded both as a strategy for the proletariat (to establish their own hegemony) and as a general theory of politics which shows the possibility and the path of transformation of the prevalent hegemonic system for any class, as it is fed both from the theory and the practice:

In the theory of superstructures, civil society cannot be separated from political society in the narrow sense: the state in its “integral sense” is, says Gramsci, “dictatorship plus hegemony” or again, ‘...by “State” should be understood not only the apparatus of the government, but also the “private” apparatus of “hegemony” or civil society [emphasis original] (Texier, 1979, p. 49)

This is also the reason why Gramsci is considered as the theorist of the superstructures by Texier and many other Marxist theorists. Here, his construction of the reciprocity and dialectics between the base and the superstructure and especially the philosophy of praxis draw the framework for possible ways of socialist revolution. With his own words:

“Croce’s assertion that the philosophy of praxis ‘detaches’ the structure from the superstructures, thereby reviving theological dualism and positing a ‘structure as hidden god’, is not correct and it is not even a particularly profound invention. The accusation of theological dualism and of a breaking up of the process of reality is vacuous and superficial.” [emphasis original] (2000, p. 193)

3.1 Culture in Gramsci

Here, Gramsci as stated by Landy was aware that cultural practises “on the superstructure” should go hand in hand with a revolutionary theory and this way goes through the cultural practises of the subaltern classes. Because;

preparedness for revolutionary change entails a massive process which reaches deeply into private organizations and private lives, into everyday reality of the subaltern classes, certainly seems consonant with theoretical concerns... that stress the importance of mass culture. (Landy, 1986, p. 68)

Gramsci cares about the morality and daily practice of the people and he sees them worth analysing. In addition, he bases his analysis on the question of what kind of an emancipatory potential we can witness in the practices of ordinary people. Here, one can say that Gramsci deals with political, economical, historical and cultural issues at the same time. This also brings about a difficulty in studying him, due to the fact that one might not choose a starting point for him; because most of his conceptions are linked to each other, this aggravates their comprehension individually; to understand “one” concept, the reader should think and analyze the concepts with each other.

Accordingly, to understand his concept of hegemony and/or counter-hegemony, it is essential to elaborate his concept of folklore with the help of common sense and language; which is defined as the spontaneous philosophy of the masses from a broader perspective:

“...Gramsci argues that everyone is always already a philosopher (albeit unconsciously), to the extent that language, folklore, common sense, religion, and so forth provide everyone with conception of the world; thus, everyone is a philosopher because the *potential* for critical reflection is inherent. Yet, for Gramsci, the achievement of a coherent conception of the world involves the critical *transformation* of the prevailing common sense, folklore and so forth. [emphasis original] (Wainwright, 2013, p. 165)

Being the ideology of the subaltern classes, folklore cannot be restricted to the cultural sphere-actually this is relevant also for other topics of Gramsci- and so, although Gramsci did not write so much directly on folklore, it is almost a core concept to understand the place of Gramsci in cultural studies. It can be simply said that he underlines the political dimension-from the viewpoint of class struggle- within a Marxist perception of cultural studies.

Gramsci states “in Italy, there had been historically no national-popular culture, that is to say, no form of culture in which there was an organic relationship between Italian intellectuals and the broad national masses.” In addition, “the intellectuals’ failure to forge a national-popular alliance had contributed to the perpetuation of the gap in Italy between the elite in Italy between elite culture and popular culture...” (Gramsci, 2000, p. 363). As proof of this fact, it is argued that Italian people preferred to read foreign writers and admired their intellectual outlook.

Intellectuals were incapable of satisfying the intellectual needs of the people and so “a deep-seated bond of democratic solidarity between the governing intellectuals and the popular masses” (Boelhower, 1981, p. 584), that is national-popular consciousness for Gramsci, was not realized in Italy. The absence of this national-popular collective implies that the ‘people’ are excluded from the life of the ‘nation’ (Crehan, 2002, p. 159). Here, it should be noted that while in many languages, national and popular are

synonymous; their meaning is different in Italy, due to the fact that intellectuals are distant from the people. They formed a caste of their own and they appear as the representatives of the nation. Indeed, Boelhower argued that only the national is identified with culture. In contrast to the mentioned perception of culture, Gramsci prefers the definition of De Sanctis seeing culture as a coherent, integral and nationwide view of life and man. (Boelhower, 1981, p. 582) His basic assumption is that “everybody is already cultured but in a primordial and undisciplined way” (Forgacs, 2000, p. 54).

As an example for the former case as given by Brandist, art and language- that is seen as the expression of any type of culture- are the creative expression of the individual and the national popular masses and they cannot be subject to the abstract schemas of grammarians, which limit and restrict popular creativity (1996, p. 95). Gramsci’s main concern is to overcome this fact to serve his revolutionary aims, as a Marxist activist and to create a counter- hegemonic culture. This motivation determines the framework of his theory in general and his particular studies on language, common sense, folklore and popular culture.

One of his fundamental and original conceptualizations, that is the differentiation between traditional and organic intellectual, is also rooted in this motivation of his. In the first instance, it can be argued that representatives of the ‘nation’ are the traditional intellectuals and for the formation of a national-popular alliance/national-popular collective will, people should create their organic intellectuals. Gramsci challenges traditional conceptions of intellectualism and makes emphasis on the mission of organic intellectuals, making firm that “all men are intellectuals but not all men have the function of intellectuals in society” (Landy, 1986, p. 55).

Gramsci considers the relationship between intellectuals and the people critical as “the popular element feels but does not always understand or know; intellectual element knows but does not always understand, and, especially, does not always feel.” (Nun and Cartier, 1986, p. 207). The role of intellectuals seems to be especially important for Italy’s cultural circumstance that is experiencing a transition from tradition to modernity, implying that society is pregnant to changes, even the concealing

revolutionary potentials. Crehan makes emphasis on this dimension of the issue; she stated that:

In Gramsci's eyes, intellectuals are crucial to the process whereby a major new culture, one that represents the world-view of an emerging class, comes into being. It is intellectuals who transform the incoherent and fragmentary feelings of those who live a particular class position into a coherent and reasoned account of the world as it appears from that position. (2002, p. 130)

Before going on what kind of tasks and features Gramsci attributes intellectuals and also the people, looking at theoretical sources and Sardinian heritage of Gramsci would provide us with a better understanding of his concerns.

The character of his theoretical work is polemical and Georges Sorel and Henri De Man can be counted as his starting points in this way. That is to say, for instance, he says that De Man analyses the senses of the people but he does not adopt them to orient towards a new culture. (Gramsci, 1992, p. 430) In this sense, he underlines that the senses of the people should not be neglected by a genuine intellectual. As a matter of fact, this example of the polemical discourse of Gramsci is important to illustrate the heterodoxy of his, nourishing from various sources and utilizing some heterodox concepts like civilisation and culture. This feature of his is also perceived as bringing new declinations to Marxist theory. Benedetto Croce who contributed to the mentioned feature of Gramsci is also one of the most influential figures for him. Croce's historical thought represents a reaction against 'economism and fatalistic mechanicism and so it should be studied with great attention. Moreover:

Croce's thought has drawn attention to the importance of facts of culture and thought in the development of history, to the function of great intellectuals in the organic life of civil society and the state, to the moment of hegemony. (2000, p. 195)

At this point, it might be added that after giving Croce his due, Croce is still a traditional intellectual for Gramsci. It can be argued that Gramsci very appropriately adds the notions such as class struggle, cultural hegemony and organic intellectual to Croce in line with his main aims. Gramsci's emphasis on the need for organic intellectuals for the creation of a new cultural hegemony stems from his

awareness of the daily experiences of subaltern groups. As stated by Landy, “his experiences in the South had taught him that peasants and workers are not mindless automatons, that, in spite of the mythology of primitivism, the oppressed have an understanding, if only rudimentary, of their world.” (1986, p. 55) Following this line of thought, Gramsci seems to be attempting a cohesion of theory and practise- he calls this the moment of catharsis- that would allow the expression of the subordinated classes in a revolutionary manner.

As seen, he attempts to do more than “going to people” because he sees a luminous feature among the people and in their cultural practices. All men are philosophers as much as they act practically, says Gramsci and adds that ‘spontaneous philosophy’ is proper to everybody (2000, p. 325). Thereafter he counts the areas that this philosophy of the masses finds expressions in. The first one is language, which is a totality of determined notions and concepts and not just of words devoid of content. The second area is defined as the common-sense- meaning that a diffused perceptiveness of all societies’ exterior to science and philosophy- and good sense. Finally, it finds its expression in the popular religion and in the entire system of beliefs, superstitions, opinions, and ways of seeing things and of acting, which are bundled together under the name of ‘folklore’. (ibid. 324)

Here, to examine hegemony and/or counter-hegemony it is essential to understand the place of folklore in Gramsci’s theory. Beforehand, it is necessary to mention the places of language and common sense to be found and understand the theoretical basis of folklore. Indeed, all of these concepts and also other conceptualizations of Gramsci are very interlinked, so it is hard to understand one without knowing another. Here, the building blocks of this dissertation are built upon Gramscian concepts like language, common sense, folklore and intellectuals. Therefore, the main argument of this thesis is to understand the possibility of “local organic intellectual” that are the “natural” leaders of local movements who are/were nourished with the language, common sense and folklore of a neighborhood- Tuzluçayır in this case.

3.1.1 Language and Common Sense: Creating a Collective Identity

Initially, we can look at how Gramsci sets up the relation between philosophy and language and why he sees language worth studying. He explains this in the Prison Notebooks:

We have established that philosophy is a conception of the world and that philosophical activity is not to be conceived solely as the 'individual' elaboration of systematically coherent concepts, but also and above all as a cultural battle to transform the popular 'mentality' and to diffuse the philosophical innovations which will demonstrate themselves to be 'historically true' to the extent that they become concretely - i.e. historically and socially - universal. Given all this, the questions of languages in general and of languages in the technical sense must be put at the forefront of our enquiry. (2000, p. 347)

Another characteristic of language for Gramsci, as underlined by Landy, is that it is not an abstract issue but deeply rooted in social conditions of oppression. To put it more plainly, “the study of language was a study of everyday life”. Indeed, language can be perceived as a technique and a structure because “every cultural expression, every moral and intellectual activity, has its own historically specific language” (Boelhower, 1981, p. 596) and then becomes almost a structure. However, it should be added that Gramsci does not speak of language in a structuralist manner, talking solely about ‘structures’ alone but also about language usage which must be contextualized, differentiated across cultures and gender and class lines. The creations of individuals and groups in history are grounded in the uses of language (Landy, 1986, p. 56). That is to say, Gramsci clarifies the historical and social dimension of language both as a social structure and as a social product. Language is socially and historically determinate, which is underlined by Boelhower as follows:

The work of art, though, also contains other ‘historical’ elements besides its specific emotional and cultural world. These pertain to language meant not only as a purely verbal expression that can be grammatically photographed in a given time and place, but also a sum of total of images and modes of expressions that are not included in grammar. (1981, p. 596)

It was emphasized that there are also social and practical criteria for the use of words. By means of this, there was even emphasis made on the social and practical criteria

for the use of words. Neither can a verbal expression in particular nor a language as a totality be understood without an acquaintance with its practical use. Language can and should be studied with its relation to society. –Boelhower describes it as an isomorphic relation between language and society at the methodological level. - This is why Gramsci deals with language as “the mental habit of collectivity is that of world view”. (ibid. 595). As stated by Landy, language is a collective noun for Gramsci and the conception of language is not monolithic, it also means culture and philosophy and therefore, language as a fact is actually a multiplicity of more or less coherent and coordinated facts (1986, p. 56).

From another side, understanding the notion of language is also important to understand how Gramsci conceptualizes “folklore”. Folklore is related to the conception of the world and life; even it is the world or life itself. Language includes the components of a world view and a culture; culture at its various levels unites the individuals that have peculiar languages and exist as crowded strata. It is seen; at this moment that the cultural phase in the collective (practical) act is significant in and for the social practises of the people. Gramsci claims that:

A historical act can only be performed by 'collective man', and this presupposes the attainment of a 'cultural-social' unity through which a multiplicity of dispersed wills, with heterogeneous aims, are welded together with a single aim, on the basis of an equal and common conception of the world, both general and particular, operating in transitory bursts (in emotional ways) or permanently (where the intellectual base is so well rooted, assimilated and experienced that it becomes passion.) Since this is the way things happen, great importance is assumed by the general question of language, that is, the question of collectively attaining a single cultural 'climate'. (2000, p. 348)

It can be shortly argued that language is one of the means of effecting any change. Moreover, Gramsci’s interest in language as a political/cultural activity is not merely descriptive or theoretical but has practical implications for developing a popular culture. Developing a popular culture indicates to us the need for a struggle in the way of creating a counter-hegemony that would be achieved by a certain class. Here, the role of language for a certain group once again comes into sight because as mentioned above, a determinate social group has a conception of the world implicit in its social practice and which is manifested in the language it uses. (Brandist, 1996, p. 99). With

regard to this, language with its mentioned features is a very crucial component of “cultural struggle to transform the popular mind and diffuse philosophical innovations that will prove to be historically true to the extent that they become concretely and socially universal.” (Boelhower, 1981, p. 595). The protagonists of this mentioned cultural politics are the subaltern popular classes for Gramsci. Based on this fact, again departing from the case of Italy, Gramsci believes that the creation of a national collective language would be a means for the enhancement of the identities and interests of subaltern classes.

Here, in general for political opposition and in particular for a movement to claim its own hegemony, language plays an essential role. It is a necessity “to speak the same language” with the people if it is about rationalization and/or organization. For the subaltern classes, it is an effective weapon against the dominant ideology and hegemony to build their own hegemony. As will be discussed in the following sections, the role of language as a social practice, a political issue as for Gramsci “language as intricately connected to how we think about and make sense of the world” (Ives, 2004, p. 72). So, for an opposition to claim an alternative world, it is a must to create a “national-popular language” that reflects the social reality of subaltern classes.

Behind these narratives, there is embedded the idea that everyone is a philosopher because she/he interacts with the social world through language peculiar to him/herself as an individual or as a group. At this moment, the interrelatedness between language and philosophy might be highlighted. To illustrate this fact, their specialized philosophy and common sense can be best described as distinct regions of the same language (Nun and Cartier, 1986, p. 203). Here, for this dissertation, it is vital to understand the role of the language as it is an essential component that will have the potential to construct the identity of Tuzluçayır. Especially, we will see that the common history shared by the residents create their own language which is a tool for the leftist organizations to “touch” the people in the neighborhood.

Gramsci defines common sense as containing fragmentary ideas, a collage of opinions and beliefs, giving the illusion of a coherent world view and acting which is not at all coherent and certainly not critical (Landy, 1986, p. 57). It is not an opinion that

remains the same everywhere and every time. It is not rigid and motionless; it as a specific cultural domain is subject to changes:

Common sense is not a single unique conception, identical in time and space. It is the 'folklore' of philosophy, and, like folklore- I will talk about it later- it takes countless different forms. Its most fundamental characteristic is that it is a conception which, even in the brain of an individual, is fragmentary, incoherent and inconsequential, in conformity with the social and cultural position of those masses whose philosophy it is. (Gramsci, 1992, p. 419)

Nun and Cartier claimed that Gramsci attributed a kind of negativity to common sense by quoting from Gramsci that "just like religion, it cannot constitute an intellectual order because it cannot attain unity and coherence even within an individual consciousness, let alone collective consciousness." Furthermore, "vulgar common sense...is dogmatic, eager for fixed certainties" and also common sense is "narrowly traditional and conservative." (1986, p. 202). Actually, it would be much more correct if we say Gramsci neither looks down on nor sublimates "common sense"; because common sense includes both old and new and even the clues of the philosophy of the future. Therefore, for a perpetual struggle, the "starting point must always be common sense which is spontaneous philosophy of the multitude that must be made ideologically homogenous." (Gramsci, 1992, p. 421). That is to say, the nucleus of a change- a revolutionary change- and a new culture exists in common sense, but it requires an exterior force- which is formulated as a political party by Gramsci- and critique of common sense itself to be realized as a part of the counter-hegemonic struggle. In this regard, Gramsci says "when an individual from the masses succeeds in criticizing and going beyond common sense, he by this very fact accepts a new philosophy." (ibid.420).

Gramsci asks himself how theory can give way to a transition; and he finds an answer in the relation between spontaneous philosophy of the masses and consciousness leadership, his main concern is uniting them. As it is seen, the creation of a new culture is not an individualistic issue for Gramsci; it requires making critical forms of truth the basis for an element of coordination and intellectual and moral order. That is why Gramsci attempted to "make the common sense the liminal topic of the philosophy of praxis and giving special attention to the spontaneous sentiments of the masses and to

the problems which they present for a revolutionary strategy.” (Nun and Cartier, 1986, p. 199). Having this objective, Gramsci criticized common sense; his concern is exceeding it by revealing the emancipatory potential in it for the sake of the people, at the same time deriving his critiques from the already existing activities of people inherent in common sense. Incoherent and unsystematic features needed to be turned into a systematic, intellectual order. Actually, this task is attributed to a particular philosophy, which is formulated as something superior to common sense. Here, it is necessary to say a few words on the relationship between common sense and philosophy and also religion since we can perceive Gramsci’s above-described attempt also as an attempt of creating a popular philosophy superior to common sense:

Philosophy is an intellectual order, which neither religion nor common sense can be. It is to be observed that religion and common sense do not coincide either, but that religion is an element of fragmented common sense. Moreover, common sense is a collective noun, like religion: there is not just one common sense, for that too is a product of history and a part of the historical process. Philosophy is criticism and the superseding of religion and 'common sense'. In this sense, it coincides with 'good' as opposed to 'common' sense. (Gramsci, 1992, pp. 325-326)

Moreover, Gramsci puts the “will” into the basis of philosophy which, would form the basis for the notion of good sense, and defines this will as such:

Should this will be represented at the beginning by a single individual, its rationality will be documented by the fact that it comes to be accepted by the many, and accepted permanently: that is, by becoming a culture, a form of "good sense", a conception of the world with an ethic that conforms to its structure. (Gramsci, 1992, p.345-346)

The transition of this will into a good sense and development of a counter-hegemony, which is counter-culture in our context, is not a spontaneous process; at this moment Gramsci estimates a role for organic intellectuals and this is defined as such by Lusin Bağla;

The mission of the organic intellectual is to destroy the addiction of the people to the traditional culture, reconcile them with their own culture and to start the intellectual and moral reform that will lead them to the status of intellectual in a sense. According to Gramsci, the point of departure should be the common sense that should be homogenized and which is the philosophy-by-itself of the masses. Later, intellectuals should approach it

to the “philosophy of intellectuals” which is the final target of the common sense. (1977, p. 87)

For Gramsci, an intellectual and moral reform should be built over common sense and the power relations also operate through this concept. Here, the relation between language and common sense is quite interwoven as: “Gramsci uses the metaphor of language to analyse different possibilities for organizing ‘common sense’ and philosophies which are central to the notion of hegemony and why people consent to the power of the dominant social group”. (Ives, 2004, p. 77)

Just like his focus on language signifies, Gramsci’s concerns about the social and cultural role of the common sense on the subaltern classes are closely related to his conceptualisation of hegemony. Therefore, social transformation and/or solidarity between the subaltern classes is only possible through developing a common sense. As it will be questioned later, the social movements should have the role to create this “alternative” common sense to be able to create a counter-hegemonic culture. Common sense could have the potential to be the common ground for the subaltern classes and/or groups with different interests and the social movements have the potential to develop it.

The relation between the superior philosophy and good sense is assured by politics and politics to some extent is the process of philosophy of praxis. Here, it should be noted philosophy of praxis aims to change the existing social order and by means of this interrelates with political struggle; it can be read as politics. Philosophy of praxis can generate a potential counter-hegemony, since only it can make thought step forwards. For Gramsci, tactics for a new hegemony depend on the philosophy of praxis and it leads simple people to a higher conception of life, rather than leaving them simple in their primitive philosophy of common sense. (2000, p. 333)

3.1.2 Praxis: Triggering Counter-Hegemony

The philosophy of praxis for Gramsci is a phase of the modern culture and it is sought to be a criticism towards common-thinking and the philosophy of intellectuals:

The philosophy of praxis, on the other hand, does not tend towards the peaceful resolution of the contradictions existing within history. It is itself the theory of those contradictions. It is not an instrument of government of dominant groups in order to gain the consent of and exercise hegemony over subaltern classes; it is the expression of these subaltern classes who want to educate themselves in the art of government and who have an interest in knowing all truths, even unpleasant ones, and in avoiding deceptions (impossible) by the ruling class and even more by themselves. (Gramsci, 2000, p. 196)

This also indicates the historicism which he commonly uses: a philosophy could only change and develop if it interacts with the common people and thanks to this interaction a philosophy could gain historicism. Here, according to Kipfer, “Gramsci’s historicism was rooted in a method of investigation that begins with particular historical conjunctures” (2013, p. 85). That is to say, a philosophical stream is susceptible to development only if it is in contact with simple people. With this contact, philosophy becomes historical and purified from the elements that are peculiar to individualistic intellectuals. Namely, the philosophy of praxis is the only creative philosophy; one can say that to provide dynamism and creativity to the philosophy and it is only philosophy with a combination of history being capable of exploring and changing the existing social and economic conditions.

It is important to note the historicism advocated by Gramsci mainly amounts to the unity of philosophy and concrete, historical study, which would render it possible for the philosophy to become history or theory to become practice, different from Lukacsian historicism based on the expressive totality of consciousness and practice. On the basis of these, it is quite visible that the historicism of Gramsci, or to put it differently, a new conceptualization of historical materialism as “science of history and politics” is what enables him to celebrate the unity of theory and practice called “philosophy of praxis” and to rescue the Marxist theory from turning into a metaphysical theory establishing positivistic cause and effect relationships between the structure and the superstructure in the name of scientificity (ibid.333):

The philosophy of praxis does not tend to leave the 'simple' in their primitive philosophy of common sense, but rather to lead them to a higher conception of life. If it affirms the need for contact between intellectuals and simple it is not in order to restrict scientific activity and preserve unity

at the low level of the masses, but precisely in order to construct an intellectual-moral bloc which can make politically possible the intellectual progress of the mass and not only of small intellectual groups.

Here, it is possible to emphasize the philosophy of praxis as the critique of both the philosophy of intellectuals and the common sense as it originally arises as superseding the existing mode of thinking and existing concrete thought in a polemical and critical guise. This evaluation can be read as the expression of the historicity, which Gramsci frequently accentuates, of philosophy of praxis. Those people who are being evolved and evolve at the same time are reserved among the simple people and in their culture, which can be summarized as folklore. Here, the philosophy of praxis is a phase of modern culture and has two duties in this phase:

If it affirms a need for a contact between intellectuals and simple it is not in order to restrict the scientific activity and preserve unity at the low level of the masses, but precisely in order to construct an intellectual-moral bloc which can make politically possible the intellectual progress of the mass and not only a small of intellectual groups. (Gramsci, 2000, p. 333)

In this way, we can perceive the philosophy of praxis as the critique of both the philosophy of intellectuals and the common sense. To put it differently, the philosophy of praxis originally arises as superseding the existing mode of thinking and existing concrete thought in a polemical and critical guise. (ibid. 332). That is to say, a philosophical stream is susceptible for development only if it is in contact with simple people. With this contact, philosophy becomes historical and purified from the elements that are peculiar to individualistic intellectuals. Namely, the philosophy of praxis is the only creative philosophy; because:

In the most immediate and relevant sense, one cannot be a philosopher, by which I mean have a critical and coherent conception of the world, without having a consciousness of its historicity, of the phase of development which it represents and of the fact that it contradicts other conceptions or elements of other conceptions. (Gramsci, 1992, p. 324)

Here, the philosophy of praxis is a central role in terms of relating theory and practice to each other; it is in a sense a bridge between them. However, for Gramsci it is more than that; this philosophy is also utilized to connect the intellectuals with the masses; a common language that creates a ground. For a social movement to construct an

intellectual-moral bloc, it is essential to act with/in the common people as the unity between them is a prerequisite for a movement to claim counter-hegemony.

Those people who are being evolved and evolve at the same time are reserved among the simple people and in their culture, which can be summarized as folklore. If necessary to remind, “all men are philosophers” for Gramsci, because they participate in a given historical epoch’s conception of the world; and so, as it were reality is inherent in their philosophy, in their culture and their-particularly subaltern classes ideology, namely in folklore.

3.1.3 Folklore: How does the subaltern survive?

Until now, it is seen that through questioning the meanings attributed to language, common sense and philosophy of praxis, Gramsci believes that there is often hidden creativity and progressiveness, which is seen through the above-named concepts, in the culture of simple people and “in the folkloric sphere that arise spontaneously from the living conditions of the subaltern classes” (Boelhower, 1981, p. 598). Alan Dundes, focusing on the works of William Thoms’ works on folklore states that:

Although folklore is probably as old as mankind, the term “folklore” is of comparatively recent origin. In 1846 William Thoms, using the name Ambrose Merton, wrote a letter to *The Athenaeum* in which he proposed that a “good Saxon compound, Folklore,” be employed in place of such labels as *Popular Antiquities* and *Popular Literature*. Noteworthy is Thoms’ conception of folklore and his essentially enumerative definition: manners, customs, observances, superstitions, ballads, proverbs, and so forth. (1965, p.4)

In the works of Gramsci, folklore is presented as a political issue as it is a part of the struggle for a new cultural hegemony perpetuated by subaltern classes. In a sense, it is the ideology of the subaltern classes. Landy (1986, p. 57) labels the function of folklore as the way that subaltern groups learn to rationalize and survive under conditions of hardship. As seen it is not a mindless or negative act but at the same time, is not self-conscious and critical. Gramsci approaches folklore in a similar way to common sense acknowledging that it includes both negative and positive elements of the culture, being rather a particular conception of life:

Folklore should instead be studied as a 'conception of the world and life' implicit to a large extent in determinate (in time and space) strata of society and in opposition (also for the most part implicit, mechanical and objective) to 'official' conceptions of the world (or in a broader sense, the conceptions of the cultured parts of historically determinate societies) that have succeeded one another in the historical process. (Hence the strict relationship between folklore and 'common sense', which is philosophical folklore.) (2000, p. 360)

While he believes that there is revolutionary and emancipatory potential in folklore, he is aware that there can raise even fascism from the same folklore. Here, these contradictory dimensions of folklore can be clarified by two examples in an article on "Folklore and Western Marxism". It is mentioned there that- without necessarily referring to any particular time- folk and fairy tales were helpful for children to make them overcome in terms with their sexual conflict. Here, we witness much or less an emancipatory potential of folklore. Another example is rather on the negative sides of it. Just as Gramsci refers this dimension is tried to be illustrated by the case of fascism as is stated that:

German folklorists took a narrowly nationalist ideological direction as Germany developed into a nation-state and manipulated folklore to reach and control the people of different regions, to provide a false sense of identity that became manifested later in fascist symbols and emblems." (Zipes, 1984, p. 332)

As a matter of fact, the concern of Gramsci was to be scraped from the narrow and traditional perception of folklore-like the one employed by the mentioned German folklorists-and by means of this to strive for the formation of national-popular, in addition, collective will. Gramsci mentioned the multidimensionality of folklore and more under the title of "Observations on Folklore", he states that:

Folklore is many-sided- not only because it includes different and juxtaposed elements, but also because it is stratified, from more crude to the less crude-if, indeed, one should not speak of a confused agglomerate of fragments of all conceptions of the world and of life that has succeeded one another in history. In fact, it is only in folklore one finds surviving evidence, adulterated and mutilated, of the majority of these conceptions. (2000, p. 360)

It is pointed out by Gramsci that “the world view of the subaltern classes is implicit, asystematic, and unorganized, an undigested agglomerate of fragments that often includes elements of past or archaic world views” (Boelhower, 1981, p. 597) and so the folklore. Moreover, there is nothing more contradictory and fragmentary than folklore. However, it should be highlighted that these features and instability of the folklore give folklore a potentially progressive quality. What is needed is to awake this potential through systematization and organization of these elements in other words, “what is needed is recognition of positive aspects (of folklore)” (Crehan, 2002, pp. 109-110) to create an oppositional culture. In this sense folklore is crucial for the vitalization of Gramsci’s final objective- whether we put it as the creation of counter-hegemony or directly as a revolution-since only the folklore is in opposition to “official conceptions of the world.”

Gramsci insists on seeing and defining folklore as a conception of the world and life and he is totally against the traditional perceptions of folklore and he states that:

Folklore must not be considered an eccentricity, an oddity or a picturesque element, but as something which is very serious and is to be taken seriously. Only in this way will the teaching of folklore will be more efficient and really bring about the birth of a new culture among the broad popular masses, so that the separation between modern culture and popular culture of folklore will disappear. (2000, p. 362)

He sees that peasants are presented as picturesque, romantic and often as the font of comedy in Italian literature, which is defined as folkloristic in general (Landy, 1986, p. 61). He is opposed to such kinds of romanticisms by extracting the perception of folklore as a worldview rather than as a curiosity. Folklore can be understood only as a reflection of the conditions of the cultural life of the people; it is in a sense the reality itself. Within this framework, one can read the cultural life of the people as the cultural life of the proletariat, actually of the subaltern classes maybe a better usage because Gramsci is more preoccupied with the peasant question within the context of folklore. Because he believes that the praxis of proletariat “holds the premise of an emerging realm of freedom” (Nun and Cartier, 1986, p. 204) and he is an activist seeking the ways of the realization of freedom, be it directly or indirectly.

It can be added that Gramsci's conceptualization of folklore conceals some sort of anti-intellectualism that can be seen also in his emphasis on organic intellectuals. One of the reasons why folklore needs to be taken so seriously is that in its reactionary aspects it represents a conception of the world that progressive educators need to uproot. (Crehan, 2002, p. 109). A new culture that is immanent in the folklore requires those kinds of educators who are the organic intellectuals of subaltern classes; since "world views cannot but be elaborated by eminent minds, but the reality is expressed by the humble people, by simple souls". (Boelhower, 1981, p. 586). Here, it should be noted that this is the expression of what Gramsci means by 'anti-intellectualism'.

Gramsci sees that a genuine conception of life can flower from "below", and so he "was interested in drawing a map of popular taste in order to establish the terrain upon which cultural transformation might take place." (Forgacs, 2000, p. 364) He expects some sort of a movement that would create an impact similar to that of Reformation. He addresses the differentiation between Renaissance and Reform that is recognized by Croce. Renaissance remained in an elitist milieu as an aristocratic movement and was not applauded by the masses; on the other hand, Reform succeeded in penetrating people. In this regard, we can line up a similarity between folklore and Reform Movement. Furthermore, it is seen here that "Gramsci has a form of seepage theory of popular culture." (ibid. 364) which brings us to the deduction that popular culture and folklore is bounded with an umbilical cord.

Modern culture, especially idealist culture, which corresponds to a certain stage of the philosophy of praxis could not create a popular culture and as mentioned remained as a culture of narrow aristocratic intellectuals. For Gramsci, for a cultural product to become popular, "there must be a specific moral and intellectual content that is elaborated and finished expression of a given public, i.e., the nation-people in a certain phase of its historical development." (Boelhower, 1981, p. 588). That is to say, it should find repercussion within the masses and derive reflections from them; this depends on the collective action of intellectuals and the people. Gramsci stated that:

The process of development is tied to a dialectic between the intellectuals and the masses. The intellectual stratum develops both quantitatively and qualitatively, but every leap forward towards a new breadth and

complexity of the intellectual stratum is tied to an analogous movement on the part of the mass of the 'simple', who raise themselves to higher levels of culture and at the same time extend their circle of influence towards the stratum of specialized intellectuals, producing outstanding individuals and groups of greater or less importance. (2000, p. 335)

It can be argued that popular culture is in a sense realization of the abovementioned circumstances simultaneously for Gramsci. It is the critique of mass culture without breaking off it, just like the situation of folklore in Gramsci.

3.1.4 Conclusion

Up to now, the importance of cultural moment is illustrated in regards to its relation with the political moment, by implying that Gramsci's study of cultural forms addresses a revolutionary theory. Gramsci was aware that cultural practice should go hand in hand with a revolutionary theory and this way goes through the cultural practices of the subaltern classes. Because

preparedness for revolutionary change entails a massive process which reaches deeply into private organizations and private lives, into everyday reality – of the subaltern classes, certainly seems consonant with theoretical concerns...that stress the importance of mass culture. (Landy, 1986, p. 68)

Gramsci cares about the morality and daily practice of the people and he sees them worth analysing. In addition, he bases his analysis on the question of what kind of an emancipatory potential we can witness in the daily practices of ordinary people. This is why attention was paid to this matter to the extent that they address the formation of counter-hegemony. Since as argued by Bağla all of the narratives that Gramsci want to express are related to super-structure and transformation before the revolution (1977, p. 84). Yet, it should be added that the term super-structure in the context of Gramsci should be read as an attempt “to avoid the ultra-rationalist errors of structuralism” (Boelhower, 1981, p. 596) which does not disconnect with a dialectical criticism. That is to say, he does not put super-structural phenomenon at the core of his analysis for the sake of super-structure itself, but he derives his conclusions from the concrete reality. I think Buttigieg very appropriately makes emphasis on this

crucial issue: “Gramsci’s legacy is the worldliness of his intellectual work. He never withdrew from the confusing and contradictory world of social, economic, cultural, and political struggle.” (1986, p. 10)

Taking everything into account, if one has the aim of understanding the areas which Gramsci dealt with, she/he should be aware that Gramsci has never lost the guidance of class dimension and (all sorts of) struggle and then look at any issue under the light of this fact. In this sense, it is essential to understand his focus on language, common sense and folklore on the way to hegemony; with having in mind that Gramsci seeks a counter-culture (or counter-hegemony in general) and revolution which has its nucleus in the worldview, in the ideology or the culture of the subaltern classes or with another usage of the popular masses.

3.2 Politics in Gramsci

Up to now, one can see that Gramsci constantly asks himself how theory can make the *transition* into history; anybody who is a genuine militant, seeking to act in a revolutionary manner, necessarily comes up against this problem of how to effect a fusion of history and philosophy. Accompanied with cultural elements, political concepts empowering his insights, especially his assessment of class as a political category leads the reader to the concept of hegemony. Here, the most significant contribution of Gramsci may be argued to be the legacy that he left to the proceeding generations of Marxists theorists, as it is only by the employment of the political concepts that were provided by him or by the political insights that were implicit in his account on ideology and hegemony. There are some basic questions to be examined. How can we understand hegemony? Can we define it, if so, what are the landmarks of this/these definition(s)? Here, to comprehend the importance of hegemony, there are some concepts that will lead us to that concept one which is the “process” of historical bloc.

3.2.1 Historical Bloc

Historical bloc in Gramsci signifies a coalition among the subaltern classes which indicates an individual detachment of him from a deterministic understanding of base and superstructure relation. While the case is the determination of modes of production in Marx; Gramsci indicates that for Marx the modes of production set the conditions for (not determine directly) the political changes. Here, for Gramsci ideology and politics have their own existence and autonomy as they cannot be reduced to being moments of relations of production and they constitute a bloc through history which refers to history itself apart from being a formal concept. To put it in another way, historical bloc signifies the organic unity between the base and the superstructure formed in and by history:

Structures and superstructures form a 'historical bloc'. That is to say, the complex, contradictory and discordant ensemble of the superstructures is the reflection of the ensemble of the social relations of production. From this, one can conclude: that only a totalitarian system of ideologies gives a rational reflection of the contradiction of the structure and represents the existence of the objective conditions for the revolutionizing of praxis. (Gramsci, 2000, p. 192)

In other words, it could be understood as a unity constructed by politically and ideologically determined consciousness and unique to a specific historical moment. It means that the historical bloc is not a fixed political subject; it is a process. Jessop clarifies this as follows:

Gramsci integrated his analysis of base and superstructure with concrete political analyses. This was a key element in his concept of historical bloc and his systematic concern with the role of intellectuals in mediating these relations (see, for example, Portelli 1972). [emphasis original] (2014, p. 15)

It should be noted that the “scale” in terms of the political and social struggles is essential for Gramsci which is also quite determinant in his concept of the historical bloc. In this sense, it could be derived that there are so many ideological forms suitable to a specific social practice which also brings us to the conclusion that one cannot determine a “one to one” relation between the forms and the ideologies filling them.

Therefore, if we accept the ideologies as form, the historical bloc appeared to be the content of this form which implies the material effect of the ideologies. Here, as the constitution of the historical moment is not a historical necessity that signifies its uniqueness to a particular historical moment he concludes that any historical bloc could not be guaranteed to be permanent.

Here, Crehan pays attention to the popular tendency towards simplifying the concept by indicating it as a simple class alliance. However:

Radical shifts in the economic relations that “produce and reproduce real life,” such as the transition from feudalism to capitalism, occur when an emerging class is able to build a historical bloc, rooted in its specific conditions of existence, capable of bringing into existence a new hegemony. An essential element of such a historical bloc is a popular, commonsense “conception of the world” that while it portrays the world as seen from the vantage point of its dominant class, appears, like Adam Smith’s vision of “opulence for all,” universal. (2016, pp. 184-185)

In other words, as the formation of a historical bloc is not a structural necessity, it could be understood as a tendency of the dynamic and complex formation of structures which is shaped mainly by class struggles.

The base, the material forces according to Gramsci, only set the parameters for the developments taking place at the superstructure as mentioned above, within which the subjectivity is constituted and human actions are organized, bringing about in turn, the possibility of affecting the structural level. In Gramsci’s own words: “if men become conscious of their social position and their tasks on the terrain of the superstructures, this means that between structure and superstructure a necessary and vital connection exists” (2000, p. 197). One can say that the reciprocal and dialectical relationship between structure and superstructure is summarized by the concept of the historical bloc.

The introduction of this concept is a positive attempt by Gramsci for exceeding the criticism of being economistic directed towards the classical base-superstructure metaphor. However, Gramsci, himself, does not agree that there is a problem of economism in Marx’ writings as he took Marx’s assertion about the determination of

modes of production as setting the conditions for political change. In this sense, he denied the claim that for Marx, modes of production directly determine the political and social changes. Here, without form [ideology], the structure would collapse; similarly, without a content [existing material conditions], the form would collapse. Ideology and politics have their own autonomy throughout history and they constitute a bloc in history which is called by Gramsci historical bloc:

Appreciating the logic of the historical bloc in Gramsci's thought allows us to move away from the reification of hegemony in interpretations of his work to consider the complexity of relationships within an ensemble of social relations and the differential operation of power and ideology on different subject positions. (Short, 2013, p. 201)

As a process of articulation, historical bloc allows us to understand the logic of social change as paving the way for social processes and the spaces struggling against capitalism: "Gramsci's strategic-relational approach to hegemony focused on particular historic-geographical constellations of state and civil society (historical blocs), which fuse various class fractions and social groups in particular historical situations" (Kipfer, 2002, p. 126). As mentioned above, Gramsci's basic concern related to this theory of politics is drawing a pathline for a political strategy that would enable the dominated classes to be engaged in a political struggle against the ruling classes in the face of the penetration of capitalism into all aspects of the social and the political life. Followingly, ideology is an organic relational whole embodied in institutions and apparatuses which hold together a historical bloc around a number of basic articulatory principles. Therefore, to understand the concept of hegemony and its importance for social change, the role and importance of ideology "as a configuration of "ideas" that operate as material forces that shape social and political life" for Gramsci should be elaborated (Ekers, 2013, p. 232).

3.2.2 Ideology

For Gramsci, "the proletariat can become the leading and dominant class to the extent that it succeeds in creating a system of alliances which allows mobilizing the many of the working population against capitalism and bourgeois state" (2000, p. 173). The precondition of this leading role is that the working-class shouldn't remain confined

to the narrow defence of its corporative interests. An intellectual and moral leadership requires a higher synthesis: a “collective will” which through ideology becomes the organic cement unifying a historical bloc. For him, ideology is an organic relational whole embodied in institutions and apparatuses which hold together a historical bloc around a number of basic articulatory principles.

Here, Gramsci is able to break with the “negative” conception of ideology, since the strict separation between the base and the superstructure and the formation of a deterministic and uni-dimensional relationship flowing from the economy to ideology amounts to the conceptualization of ideology as an *epiphenomenon*, a shadow image of the economic structure. As such, the ideological terrain becomes the place where the dominant class conceals the relations of exploitation taking place in the structure since the ruling ideas are nothing but the ideas of the ruling classes that own the means and the forces of production. Then ideology, formulated as the ruling ideas of the ruling classes, by means of concealing the reality, serves to generate false consciousness on the part of the dominated classes. The error that is contained in such a conceptualization is represented by Gramsci in an analogy drawn on the basis of the human body:

In the human body it certainly cannot be said that the skin (and also the historically prevalent type of physical beauty) are mere illusions and that the skeleton and anatomy are the only reality. However, for a long time something similar to this was said. By highlighting the anatomy and the function of the skeleton nobody was trying to claim that man (still less woman) can live without the skin. Going on with the same metaphor one can say that it is not the skeleton (strictly speaking) which makes one fall in love with a woman, but that one nevertheless realizes how much the skeleton contributes to the grace of her movements etc.” (2000, p. 197)

Contrary to this, ideology in the formulation of Gramsci gets out from being a mere instrument at the hands of the dominant class and becomes the terrain, in which all the classes began to make sense of the world, and gain consciousness of their conditions of existence. Which should be noted that, is not important for Gramsci to be a false consciousness or not, since the truth of ideology according to him should be evaluated on the basis of its effectiveness in organizing and unifying the classes and the class fractions formed at the economic realm. It is in this respect that, ideology is conceived by Gramsci in positive terms, that is to say, as different from the formulation of it as

something that masks the reality. Here, Gramsci was aware of the negative conceptualizations of ideology and its dangers and he consciously denies this. According to Larrain, ideology in Gramsci is a worldview that stemmed from the material interests of the classes, which render it neutral or positive (Larrain, 1983, p. 46). Here, the usage of the word “material” is essential, as it is understood as a practice that not only functions at the superstructural level but also functions in the formation of the production process enabling harmony between the base and the superstructure. In this sense, he gave a material and autonomous existence to ideology and a “power” to change the structure. However, it is essential to differentiate the “organic” and the “arbitrary” ideologies:

One must therefore distinguish between historically organic ideologies, those, that is, which are necessary to a given structure, and ideologies that are arbitrary, rationalistic, 'willed'. To the extent that ideologies are historically necessary they have a validity which is 'psychological'; they 'organize' human masses, they form the terrain on which men move, acquire consciousness of their position, struggle, etc. To the extent that they are 'arbitrary' they only create individual 'movements', polemics and so on (though even these are not completely useless, since they function like an error which by contrasting with truth, demonstrates it). (2000, p. 199)

It is possible to figure out from the quotation above, that the historically organic ideologies are considered to have a psychological validity in the Gramscian account in their appealing to the masses and the construction of their subjective identities, but it is also the case that, thanks to the philosophy of praxis, they have a structural and epistemological character as well.

In addition, due to the embeddedness of the historically organic ideologies within both the social and the political realm, they acquire material appearance/shape, causing the popular beliefs and the practices to become material forces themselves, the fact of which is related to the second distinction drawn by Gramsci concerning the ideologies. The second distinction is between the systematic ways of thinking and the aggregated and internally contradictory forms of thinking. Since according to Gramsci, every practical activity, each and every encounter with the practices and the institutions of daily life generate a form of consciousness, he argues that everyone has a particular world view which, for sure, is influenced by the hegemonic system of the dominant

class. However, it is important to bear in mind that the terrain of ideology is not simply the terrain of the ideas of the dominant classes as it is an interface operating through culture, politics, philosophy and it is not a constant, fixed and dependent element. As Raymond Williams clearly put, it is a real field of operation. (1992, p. 71).

Here, organic ideology is a level that classes represent their interests and identify themselves with this ideology at the political level: we perceive the world in a particular manner and determine our behaviors according to this. In a capitalist society, ideology provides the domination in general, and hegemony in particular of the dominant classes and the social unity around this hegemony which signifies ideology as a prerequisite for the bourgeois domination. Here, it can be derived that ideology is a struggle executed by the subject (classes) to form or change the historical bloc. The civil society which is the elaboration sphere of the social practices like philosophy, literature and culture in essence is a sphere for the functioning of the ideology.

Therefore, Gramsci determines different domains for the definition of the political power relations namely; the social power relations domain related to the developmental level of the material production powers, the domain of organizational and political consciousness formation of different social classes and military power relations (Üşür, 1997, p. 30). Here, within these power relations, the political consciousness has three different moments to be hegemonic: *primitive economic*, *political economic* and *hegemony*. The hegemony moment signifies a class to go beyond being a mere class representing solely the economic interests and grasp the necessity of identifying a common interest for the long-term interests. Here, this moment is a point for the subaltern classes to integrate the economic, political and intellectual interests through the ideological struggle:

A third moment is that in which one becomes aware that one's own corporate interests, in their present and future development, transcend the corporate limits of the merely economic group, and can and must become the interests of other subordinate groups. This is the most purely political phase, and marks the decisive passage from the structure to the sphere of the complex superstructures; it is the phase in which previously germinated ideologies become 'party', come into confrontation and conflict, until only one of them, or at least a single combination of them, tends to prevail, to gain the upper hand, to propagate itself over the whole social area -

bringing about not only a unison of economic and political aims, but also intellectual and moral unity, posing all the questions around which the struggle rages not on a corporate but on a 'universal' plane, and thus creating the hegemony of a fundamental social group over a series of subordinate groups. (Gramsci, 2000, p. 205)

Mouffe draws attention to two basic points about the ideology in Gramsci (Mouffe, 1979, p. 194):

- Ideology assembled with the active struggle of the subjects and formed through over-determination.
- The collective ideological subjects formed through the ideological struggles do not directly represent a specific class interest.

This signifies that as well as ideologies having material existences within everyday life social and political practices and the institutions (implying that ideology is not solely composed of ideas), thanks to the ethico-political dimension of the philosophy of praxis; due to the existence of the historically organic ideologies with that of the arbitrary ideologies, side by side, the ideological terrain is also not homogenous, which explains the impossibility of an absolute determination by the ruling ideas. Also, ideology seems to alter when the social conditions alter which signifies “Gramsci’s dialectical view complicates ideas of revolutionary struggle by adding subjective factors” (Landy, 1986, p. 54).

So, ideology for Gramsci is not a trick, misrecognition or false consciousness which distinguishes him from Marx and Engels. Hegemony includes an ideological level but as mentioned above it is more than ideology as we cannot talk about the static structure of hegemony, hegemony is subject to struggles. Here, ideological domination is an aspect of the relations of class and between the class fractions. According to Crehan, hegemony in Gramsci:

...always involves ‘practical activity’, and the social relations that produce inequality, as well as the ideas by which that inequality is justified, explained, normalized, and so on. While sometimes Gramsci may have stressed consent, and sometimes the intertwining of force and consent, he never saw hegemony simply as ideology. (2002, p. 174)

Here, ideology for Gramsci is not a simple reflection of economic level; it bears contradictions and these contradictions inherit the roots for resistance and/or counter-hegemony. The truth of an ideology lies in its power to mobilize both politics and history towards praxis. Gramsci analyzes ideology in its lower meaning and agrees with Marx that dominant bourgeois ideology presents itself as being universal. The ruling block has the power to speak in the name of the people which is a precondition for the domination of the bourgeoisie.

To sum up, for Gramsci only through studying politics can one understand ideology as it is not a simple reflection of economic level. Ideology is not a static concept; on the contrary, it is lived relations so it bears contradictions in itself cradling the elements for resistance and/or counter-hegemony. Here, there is always a difference, a gap between ruling classes in the ruling block which brings us to the importance of the concept of hegemony including the ideological level but it is actually much more than it.

3.2.3 Hegemony

Let me say in the first place that although Plekhanov is the originator of the concept of hegemony, he rested it on the political area. However, for Gramsci the primary place of it is civil society as the hegemony of the ruling bloc cannot be observed only at a political level. Plekhanov employs the concept to indicate the alliance of the proletariat and bourgeoisie, later Lenin enhanced it to point out the proletariat- peasant alliance with the leadership of the former one (Brandist, 2015, p. 27). Here, hegemony for Gramsci may be regarded both as a strategy for the proletariat to establish its own hegemony and as a general theory of politics which shows the possibility and the path of transformation of the prevalent hegemonic system for any class, as it is fed both from theory and practice.

The supremacy of a social group according to Gramsci, may either be secured through domination or intellectual and moral leadership, as a result of which the concept of hegemony came to be defined by him, as the moral, intellectual and political leadership over the allied classes, combining both of the requirements of supremacy. This implies

that the notion of hegemony includes, but is broader than, the category of ideology and simple ideological domination. It is not the equivalent of ideological domination, since it rests principally and primarily on the dialectical relationship of the class forces, rather than on simple subordination, which reveals the importance of gaining the consent of the other classes and class fractions within the complexity of the social formation, mainly through overcoming the corporatist nature of the class, marked by a resistance to the granting of concessions to the other classes. He asserts that:

...one's own corporate interests, in their present and future development, transcend the corporate limits of the purely economic class, and can and must become the interests of their subordinate groups too. This is the most purely political phase, and marks the decisive passage from the structure to the sphere of complex superstructures...bringing about not only a unison of economic and political aims, but also intellectual and moral unity, posing all the questions around which the struggle rages not on a corporate but on a universal plane, and thus creating the hegemony of a fundamental social group (class) over a series of subordinate groups. (Gramsci, 2000, p. 181-182)

Hence, it becomes clear that the hegemonic moment corresponds to the form of consciousness that is competent with overcoming the sole economic interests of the particular class and taking into account the interests of the others.

The separation between state and civil society is an essential point to grasp the role of hegemony in the history of struggles. State and civil society appeared to be a dialectical relation in Gramsci rather than attributing a monolithic structure to the state. And at this point, the power in relation to the state is defined with the concept of hegemony rather than a mere "coercion". Therefore, hegemony refers to the moral, intellectual and political leadership over the allied classes, combining both of the requirements of supremacy which include consent plus coercion. Here, in the state, there are various structures such as family, the church and the media besides the economic relations. This implies that again the notion of hegemony includes, but is broader than the category of ideology and simple ideological domination. As Mouffe (1979) claimed, the concept of hegemony first appeared in Gramsci's work in 1926 in Southern Question and was introduced in the following way:

The Turin communists posed concretely the question of the "hegemony of the proletariat": i.e. of the social basis of the

proletarian dictatorship and of the workers' State. The proletariat can become the leading [*dirigente*] and the dominant class to the extent that it succeeds in creating a system of class alliances which allows it to mobilize the majority of the working population against capitalism and the bourgeois State. In Italy, in the real class relations which exist there, this means to the extent that it succeeds in gaining the consent of the broad peasant masses. (2000, p. 173)

In this sense, hegemony has a dynamic nature, contrary to the relatively static notion of ideology, since it has to be constantly reviewed and negotiated in the face of changing relations of forces. “Hegemony is ethico-political, it must also be economic...” (Mouffe, 1979, p. 80). At this point, the separation between organic and traditional intellectuals would be helpful to grasp the (re)construction of the hegemony.

According to Gramsci, all men/women are potentially intellectuals in the sense of having an intellect and using it, but not all are intellectuals by social function. In the first place there are the “traditional” professional intellectuals, literary, scientific and so on, whose position in the interstices of society has a certain inter-class aura about it, but derives ultimately from past and present class relations and conceals an attachment to various historical class formations. Secondly, there are the “organic” intellectuals the thinking and organizing element of a particular fundamental-social class (Hoare&Smith,1992, p. 3). Here, traditional intellectuals seem to be strictly bounded to the past and lack of changing the existing social and economic structure (which also be stated as being lack of forming counter-hegemony). However, organic intellectuals have a crucial role to play: they have to legitimize the power which signifies that subaltern groups have to develop their own intellectuals. The organic intellectuals that are allied with a particular class and incorporated within the political organization of that class are highly instrumental in initiating the political struggle, as well as in the establishment of hegemonic domination around “collective will”. According to Mouffe, hegemony could be set up through two basic ways: (Mouffe, 1979, pp. 182-184)

- Passive consensus: such as neutralization
- National-popular will: through moral and intellectual leadership to the masses.

Here, one can say that division among the intellectuals plays a crucial role in resistance movements as the organic intellectuals are supposed to be the carriers of the counter-hegemonic formations:

...organic intellectuals of the working class do not only resist hegemonic processes, but they attempt to displace the old hegemonic order by leading their class or popular front into more elaborated forms of understanding the capitalist system of exploitation. At the same time, organic intellectuals serve as role models that open the horizons of their class or popular front in order to secure a more equitable system of societal organization, which Gramsci believed must take the form of a socialist society. The role of the organic intellectual was to mediate between the good sense of subaltern groups and the formation of a counter-hegemonic consciousness that can read the contextually specific and historically conjunctural contradictions that suffuse the social formation. (McLaren et al., 1998, p. 28)

In a sense, Gramsci replaces Lenin's vanguard party with (organic) intellectual leadership. This "counter-hegemonic leadership should be democratic in both its aim and its actual practice" (Smith, 1998, p. 50).

Since, the existing hegemony bloc holds the instruments of the forces (such as the army, the police), it seems quite difficult for Gramsci to break this bloc and form a counter-hegemony. In this sense, he questions the Leninist strategy for the revolution: to break the state from down to up which signifies the attack to the "whole" (Anderson, 2004, p. 137). However, as the power in the West mainly gathered on the civil society, it is not an appropriate strategy for subaltern classes to seize the power. In other words, "War of Maneuver" appeared to be inappropriate for the West as the hegemony bloc holds the coercive force in its monopoly. Quite the reverse, the strategy to be followed should be: "War of position". This implies a long-term struggle as it could be understood as gun-shots to the specific positions:

A war of position is not, in reality, constituted simply by the actual trenches, but by the whole organizational and industrial system of the territory which lies to the rear of the army in the field. It is imposed notably by the rapid fire-power of cannons, machine-guns and rifles, by the armed strength which can be concentrated at a particular spot, as well as by the abundance of supplies which make possible the swift replacement of material lost after an enemy breakthrough or a retreat. (Gramsci, 2000, p. 226)

Here, Gramsci deduced the difference between two strategies by analyzing the strategies in the First World War: A war necessitates two pillars to result in a victory;

while the war continues on the positions, behind the fronts an organizational system is a must which will provide “the guns and supplies” to the positions. Based on the power balance; in other words, on the difference between the distribution of power in the hands of the state and civil society, these tactics vary:

In the context of a relatively underdeveloped civil society such as is found in the “East,” he argued, revolutionary strategy required a direct frontal assault – a war of maneuver – against the principal form of bourgeois political power: the state. In the “West,” however, with its more fully developed civil society, such a direct, lightning frontal assault against the state would likely fail. In this case, revolutionary strategy must be a slower, more protracted process of siege warfare, a war of position, in which subordinate classes wear away the existing civil society and, through their self-organization, create a new one. (Egan, 2015, p. 102)

Actually, this distinction is a methodological tool that helps to answer the question “To what extent does hegemony continue?” Here, in the societies under oppressive state rules running for a war of movement seems to be impossible as the power bloc uses coercion but it is more likely to take the power of culture which means focusing on the war of position is more feasible. Through this war, subaltern groups/classes may claim the power; but how?

Here, the concept of “modern prince” seems essential to understand the “alternative” culture and/or leadership against the hegemonic bloc. What inspires Gramsci while defining the modern prince is Machiavelli’s work- *Prince*, which was actually a search for a possibility of a collectivity to provide the unity of Italy. For Machiavelli, the Prince was supposed to be a leader which has certain characteristics that will lead him to unite Italy. Gramsci was inspired by Machiavelli’s search for the Prince as a political leader for the unification of Italy. However, Gramsci made an essential alteration: the new Prince is not the individual but the party. However, the concept of “party” could be confusing as it is not used by Gramsci in the traditional definition. It provides a culture and leadership as it denotes a new political collectivity:

The modern prince, the myth-prince, cannot be a real person, a concrete individual. It can only be an organism, a complex element of society in which a collective will, which has already been recognized and has to some extent asserted itself in action, begins to take concrete form. History has already provided this organism, and it is the political party - the first cell in which there come together germs of a collective will tending to become universal and total. (2000, p. 240)

The counter-hegemony could only be achieved through this collectivity which can utilize common-sense thinking over civil society. Here, the modern prince does not have a mechanical function, does not try to impose anything from above and open up to contradictions in the civil society. Just as Machiavelli suggests, the prince should take the consent of the masses rather than (besides) capturing them with coercion, the party should do the same. In other words, the party Gramsci mentioned is a new political collective providing leadership and an alternative culture to the subaltern classes which marks the conflicts within the existing social structure. It is said to provide a consensus within the subaltern classes and has to lead the counter-hegemony. In this sense, it is key to prevent an understanding of hegemony as a deception or brainwashing.

To sum up, hegemonic ideology could be understood as the articulation of the world views which means the ideological homogeneity between the dominant and the dominated classes. It could be said that ideology sets up the “subjects” who gave way to hegemony; in other words, the ideology paves the way for hegemony.

3.2.4 Conclusion

Overall, Gramsci presents a dialectical analysis as everything in daily life is related to each other. Here, his basic concern is the adherence of subaltern groups and the unity between political and cultural forms is the cornerstone of his analysis. As mentioned above, Gramsci tried to answer why fascism rose in Europe; why the subaltern groups gave massive support to fascist governments and probably more important than these, how can this hegemonic rule be reversed in the name of the public. Here, civil society is the sphere where hegemony functions, Gramsci says as hegemony takes its power from the consent of the civil society. Politics is an essential level of the superstructure as it is the key to the relations between the base and superstructure. The political level has its own rules different from economic laws and only through studying politics can we understand ideology.

Gramsci transformed ideology into a dynamic space analysis which signifies a domain of social struggle in which subjects try to represent themselves. In this sense, ideology

is a social practice that is constantly reshaped and brings us to the conclusion that none of the ideological formations is permanent. The main point with this discussion is whether Gramsci could overcome the problem of economism attributed to Marxist theory by constructing a relationship between the material practices and the organic ideologies.

As mentioned above, Gramsci modifies the classical model of base and superstructure: the determinacy of base (economy) over the superstructure and its non-autonomous conception. Although accepting the fact that economy is the determinant in the last instance, he granted power to the superstructure- which signifies the cultural elements' functions in the civil society- to change the social and political conditions of the historical moment. Although ideological categories were also acknowledged by Marx, Gramscian ideology has a "will" to form a terrain of consciousness and organize human acts. In this sense, he rescues ideology in the Marxist tradition from the uni-directional, passive and negative conception and attributes it a function to organizing, inspiring the subaltern classes which enable them to determine their behaviors according to their ideology-world views.

With the introduction of the "war of position", Gramsci enables a long-term struggle for Marxism to soften up the enemy- the capitalist system- which is in reality much more enduring to the economic wreckages than Marxists anticipated (Anderson, 2004, p. 137). Here, as mentioned above, in the struggle against the power bloc, an inter-class alliance between the subaltern groups is necessary for forming a counter-hegemonic project. Marx also defended the need for the alliance of the proletariat and the other classes to make the revolution but his basic concern was not to form a popular alliance but to construct a unified proletariat. On the other hand, Poulantzas carried a step further and claimed that the proletariat should form an alliance with the intermediary classes: The petit-bourgeoise should cooperate with the proletariat and the people should be unified against the power bloc⁵.

⁵ The truth of the matter is, it would be the dominant element which constitutes the heart of Euro Communism at the end of the seventies: the alliance of the people (Poulantzas, 2000:261).

CHAPTER 4

UNDERSTANDING THE “CAPITALIST STATE”

If we look at the theories of Marx and Engels, we come across their efforts to uncover the laws of the social, economic and political forces that led to capitalism including those problems that would eventually lead to its collapse and the advent of communist society. Here, as is mentioned above, the form of the state is conceptualized as a reflection of the economic base of society signifying the base-superstructure model for which they are labelled as economic reductionists. One can say that the state in their account is an instrument for class domination and their capitalist interests and class division characterizes society under capitalism. In this sense, the state in Marx and Engels is both the point of departure and the point of arrival in political analysis, since it can only be comprehended after a complex process of theoretical analysis and synthesis (Jessop, 1978, p. 58).

Therefore, the society in their theory is in a sutured relation with the state as they are parts of a unity: capitalism. The core of their instrumentalist approach is the idea that the state is employed by capital to promote its interests at the expense of other classes or social forces, be it individual capitalists, particular firms, specific fractions or sectors of capital, or the capitalist class as a whole. Exposition of class background and affiliation of the state elite (comprising career politicians and public employees) and those individuals and firms that take part in the formation and implementation of government policies empirically establish the rule of capital. Furthermore, it is established empirically by analyses of what immediate economic interests' different policies realize as they are implemented. But what is common to these sociological and political studies of classical Marxism is the view of the state as being a neutral tool, which is equally accessible in principle to the bourgeoisie and can also be used for any feasible governmental purpose and as a consequence the empirical analyses tend to be based on the limited scope of political resources alone.

To reduce the existence of the state and its separation from civil society to the existence of separate, particular interests in civil society, and to analyze the reproduction of the existence of the state in terms of the reproduction of the existence of particular interests in civil society is a quite different level of abstraction compared with an analysis of the 'concrete' forms and functions the state takes so to reproduce the 'concrete' particular interests in civil society. If we take into account that they do not try to make a coherent state analysis but to draw a revolutionary path for the proletariat, setting the conditions for the revolution, it is quite reasonable for them to focus on capitalist relations and the class struggles within capitalism.

So, one can say that there is not a substantial theory of state in classical Marxism, chiefly in Marx's and Engels' studies. In the *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, state is conceptualised as the direct outcome of the capitalist mode of production, for instance, they stated: "the executive of the modern State is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie." (1977, p. 37). This understanding is also seen in the *German Ideology*, *Anti-Dühring*, and *The Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*; it is assumed that state is a pure epiphenomenon of the economic base and that there is a perfect correspondence between base and superstructure. State is expected to maintain the exploitation of the working class by the bourgeoisie whose perception is taken and utilized by Lenin being his starting point. For Lenin, state is the executive board of bourgeoisie that was the official definition of state in the Soviet Union. Derived from this formulation, in *Anti-Dühring*, Marx and Engels put forth their famous thesis of the "withering away of the state". The logic behind this formulation is that state exists in a class-based and so antagonistic society, and with a socialist revolution society can be freed from classes, conflicts and the state. In this regard, Marx and Engels argue "political struggles within state are merely the illusory forms in which the real struggles of antagonistic classes fought out." (Jessop, 1978, p. 48)

However, as mentioned above the October Revolution challenged this classical conception of state-society relations and the instrumentalist approach of the state. Therefore, from Marx and Engels' position, for a socialist revolution to be executed, advanced industrialization is necessitated which at that time indicated the Western Europe. However, quite the reverse, in the following years, the counter-revolutions by

the fascist movements came into the scene in many parts of Europe which were led by Italy and Germany. Here, Marxism should provide a more dynamic and extended framework fit with the conditions of the changing Europe. However, Marxist theories, in general, tend to take the state as given although they have never said it is the case, in this sense they and besides them all state theories acted as if state is “a priori”. At that time, it could be useful to make a distinction within Western Marxism in the theorization of the state: state as an object and state as a subject (Bratsis, 2002, p. 249).

To elaborate, Gramsci took state as an object of inquiry and modify the classical usage of the base and superstructure model and claimed that; reading Marx in the sense that economy directly determined the political changes is a false reading; rather he insists that Marx’s model points out that economy set the conditions for political changes. Although accepting the fact that economy is the determinant in the last instance, he granted power to the superstructure-which signifies the cultural elements’ functions in the civil society- to change the social and political conditions of the historical moment. Therefore, he took the state in its “inclusive sense” signifying it as a collective of political and civil societies and he avoids identifying the capitalist state- modern state but instead focus on the modalities of the state power (Jessop, 2001, p. 35). He also made a distinction between the West and the East and put an emphasis on the ideological apparatuses’ function in the civil society for the West; while for the East he focuses on the coercive function of the state. It can be derived that Gramsci conceptualizes state in relation to civil society which is a true source of history. As it is obviously seen, the aim is to transform the “society” and it could be done through analyzing it in the sense of its relation to the state.

In this dissertation, to understand the hegemonic projects of the state, the latter will be analyzed with reference to Poulantzas as the author shares the view that state power is a condensation of class struggles which are themselves going to vary from time to time and place to place. Poulantzas underlined that the capitalist “state is actively involved in constituting and maintaining the capitalist division of labor and capitalist relations of production, as well as in organizing hegemonic unity within the power bloc and managing the material bases of consent” which still refer to the current role of capitalist state (Jessop, 2008, pp. 121-122). Here, these have secured up-to-date importance of Poulantzas.

4.1 Poulantzas on Hegemony and State

The arguments focusing on state as an object identify the state as a “set of institutions that constitute the site of political struggle and antagonism between various actors.” (Bratsis, 2002, p. 252). These theories are said to “reify the state” in the sense that approaching it as a logical necessity function according to the reproductive needs of capitalism. In Althusser, the role of the state is crucial for the relations between the base and the superstructure. While he is identifying ideological state apparatuses, he attributes them to the state, unlike Gramsci who ascribed to the civil society. In this sense, the relations between economy, politics and ideology are conceptualized with reference to the set of institutions as the state is a region of the given social formation and functions according to the needs of the social formation to “reproduce” the existing structure. Therefore, the strategy to enable it is the state’s ability to combine the repressive state apparatuses and ideological ones which do not exclude each other rather have a dialectical relation.

Following Althusser, Poulantzas focuses on the concept of relative autonomy of the state in terms of its power to reproduce the existing social relations. Therefore, he attributes meaning to society in terms of its relation to that state and similarly state is considered as its opposite or its modifier. Here, as Poulantzas claims: “we cannot imagine any social phenomena (any knowledge, power, language or writing) as posed in a state prior to the state.” (1978, p. 396) As is the case, society gains its meaning through its relation to the state and vice versa and as Holloway (1978) put it, the existence of the state as a thing separated from society is peculiar to capitalism.

Here, Gramsci has been quite influential on Poulantzas in terms of theorizing “the capitalist state” with his focus on the concept of hegemony and civil society inspired by the conflict between the state and political struggles. One of his early works, in *Preliminaries to the Study of Hegemony in the State* (1965) Poulantzas defines the importance of Gramscian use of hegemony as follows:

The concept of hegemony actually forms part of a whole distinctive problematic of dialectical materialism concerning the issues of the

base/superstructure relationship and the specificity of the political and state domain in a historically determinate social formation (2008, p. 74).

According to Jessop, Poulantzas develops on and proliferates the concept of “hegemony” borrowed from Gramsci in two ways: “the unification of dominant class fractions into a coherent, enduring power bloc and the struggle to win active consent from the ‘popular masses’ by presenting its own interests as those of the entire people-nation” (2019, p. 124). Just like Gramsci’s concept of hegemony; the definition of and importance attributed to the capitalist state by Poulantzas inherits hegemonic aspects that are conjunctural and historical. “The capitalist state” is constantly changing according to the distribution of power within/between the power bloc so as Jessop states: “as capitalism continues to change, the theory of the capitalist state must be revised to reflect those changes. Yet the revolutionary approach to the capitalist state that he developed in his later work still provides the best starting point for these revisions”. (Jessop, 2017, p. 188). Here, the hegemonic aspects attributed to the capitalist state by Poulantzas enable a dynamic theory as “relations of direct oppression develop into political relations of hegemony” (2008, p. 99).

4.1.1 Revisiting Hegemony

The most significant element in the methodology of Poulantzas was the clear separation between his early and late works. In his early works, we see more theoretical and abstract arguments whereas in his later works (especially in his last book *State, Power and Socialism*) we are faced with a Poulantzas who as a Marxist is concerned with developing a theory that is harmonious or complementary with the changing social conditions of Western Europe. What he did in his later works parallel to European Communism was an attempt to construct a solid ground, a strategy for the European left. Besides, his concept of “relative autonomy” differs in his early and late works. It is a shift from “emphasis on structures over the class struggle” to “emphasis on the class struggle over the structures”.

In his work *Political Power and Social Classes*, with reference to his structuralist base, he claims that state reproduces the class struggle, as it was the articulation of the economic class relations on the political sphere as the form and function of the state is determined by the class relations (1975, p. 191). In this sense, Poulantzas emphasized the relative autonomy of the political and economic sphere and draws a conclusion: To function as a class state, the capitalist state should be relatively autonomous from the class struggle in the production process. And this autonomy provides a separation of political class struggle from the economic class struggle (Jessop, 1982, pp. 163-165). He claimed that the process of capitalist production defines the formation of classes.

Poulantzas taking references from Gramsci stated that: “the concept of hegemony seems to indicate a historical situation in which class domination is not reduced to simple domination by force or violence, but comprises a function of *leadership* and a *particular ideological* function...” [emphasis original] but also provided new elements for the theory formulated by Gramsci (ibid.138):

- The basic provision for the formation of hegemony lies in the separation of state and civil society.
- Hegemony cannot be explained simply by the relations between the power bloc and the dominant classes, but also by the relations within the power bloc itself.

In this sense, he used the concept of hegemony to indicate -how in their relation to the capitalist state- the political interests of these classes are constituted, as representatives of the general interest of the dominant class. For Poulantzas, the capitalist state and the specific characteristics of the class struggle in a capitalist formation make it possible for a power bloc, composed of several politically dominant classes or fractions to function and “amongst these dominant classes and fractions one of them holds a particularly dominant role, which can be characterized as a hegemonic role” (ibid.141). As one can easily notice, unlike Gramsci, in his early works, Poulantzas accepted that the dominant class in the economic and political sphere should also be dominant ideologically.

Here, as we can easily see, the capitalist state has two main functions (Jessop, 1982, p. 164):

- The unification of the power bloc under the leadership of a particular class
- The presentation of the interests of the capitalist state as the general interests of the popular nation-state.

At this point, it would be meaningful to state the basic problem in the early works of Poulantzas: He formulated the state as relatively autonomous from the civil society because of the need for isolating the proletariat from the class-consciousness taking place in civil society (Cornoy, 1984, p. 106). In this respect, the political power of the dominant classes could not be restricted by the dominated classes which is a reflection of his structuralist framework.

Here, in his early formulation, Poulantzas formulated the state as a product and a shaper of the class struggles in civil society, not the place of the class struggle. The dominant classes could have little effect on the structure of the state. Although he accepted that the state would guarantee the economic interests of the dominant classes, he stated that these guarantees could not damage the political interest of the dominant classes. Gramsci stated that:

...this simplification of class relations at the level of political power is not a mere reproduction of the 'simple' economic contradiction between capital and labor. In fact, as regards the 'dominant' classes or fractions, it consists in their concentration at the political level, through the 'specific' interests of the 'hegemonic' class or fraction and by means of the state, into a 'power bloc'. Situated at the specifically political level, this power bloc actually constitutes a contradictory unity 'under the dominance' of the hegemonic class or fraction. (2008, p. 103)

To sum up, in his early works there is a limited set of concepts that can construct a strategy of the democratic way to socialism. In his later works, Poulantzas reformulate his theory to develop a strategy that enables dominated classes to the power and to grasp the growing state intervention. Here, his book “*State, Power and Socialism*” was a product of these attempts that also provide us with a more coherent framework to understand the “capitalist state”.

State, Power and Socialism start with stressing the necessity of questioning the relations between the state and the power which canalize Poulantzas to provide an analysis for the whole of Europe setting out from France. In general, the political theories of the 20th century were dealing with the relations between the state, power and the social classes, and Poulantzas also accepted the undeniable connection between political power and the dominant class. The political power is hidden in the institutional structure of the state. Just as we cannot reduce the functions of the state to political power, we cannot explain the formation of state with political power. Although, Poulantzas accepted the fact that, we should analyze the power and the state in the framework of relations of production and social division of labor; he uses the class not independent from the class struggle and the structures of power. In other words, the use of class is not simply economic-based.

In his article of his book *State, Power and Socialism*, Poulantzas tried to develop a strategy to prevent statism and to expand and deepen the existing democracy in the transition to socialism. This new strategy mainly suggests two radical transformations within Marxism:

- The denial of the dictatorship of the proletariat
- The priority of the political class struggle over the economic class struggle

These could be stated as a result of the existing situation in Europe when Poulantzas wrote his book *State, Power and Socialism*. Although he accepted the situation that Stalin was not the fault of Marx, he saw the negative consequences of Marxism and more specifically Leninism.

First of all, Poulantzas criticized the conception of state in the Third International and Lenin with a special focus on Lenin's lack of confidence in the popular masses. This criticism brings Poulantzas to the denial of the transition to socialism in an orthodox way. Here, even in his early works this denial of the transition- the dictatorship of the proletariat- was not clear; in this book, it became obvious which also signifies an alternative to the "Dual Power" strategy (Wood, 1985, p. 43). According to Poulantzas, the Leninist strategy cannot notice the fact that "socialism is democracy and a real socialism which is not democratic could not appear." (2000, p. 257). This criticism

shows us the denial of the transition to socialism put forward by Marx-the dictatorship of the proletariat. Unlike Poulantzas's argument which is based on the necessity of being democratic everywhere in transition to democracy, Marx claims that states having a strong democratic tradition could be faced with peaceful transitions, but adds, in other states, this transition could be received with violence (Thompson, 1997, p. 42).

Moreover, Poulantzas questioned a threat that occurred from Lenin's conception of direct rank-and-file democracy: a danger to give way to a centralistic and statist structure. At this point, with reference to the criticism of Rosa Luxemburg, Poulantzas tries to develop a strategy to prevent the statism through the combination of reformulated bourgeois democracy and direct rank-and-file democracy. According to Poulantzas, the institutions and the freedoms of the representative democracy are the results of the historical struggles so it would be a great mistake to destroy them just because they are being formal. Besides, "abolition of supposedly bourgeois parliamentary democracy inevitably leads to the suppression of direct democracy by the vanguard party due to the elimination of so-called formal liberties and a plural party system" (Jessop, 1982, p. 171).

The bourgeoisie state is a consequence and legitimate ground of the class struggle. Here, with the "bourgeois state" Poulantzas referred to a state of which the bourgeoisie dominant nature would be transformed and at the transition to socialism, its democracy would be deepened and expanded. At this point, what should be done is the protection of the existing institutions and freedoms of the representative democracy. Besides, the direct rank-and-file democracy should be spread and the self-management bodies should be settled down. As Poulantzas denies the instrumentalist conception of the state, he claims that the state is battle ground for the relations of production and the class struggles (Wood, 1985, p. 36). And this brings us to his strategy of transition to socialism, his alternative to Dual Power strategy: a democratic road to socialism.

According to Poulantzas, this road could be achieved through the transformation of the relations of production. And this could be possible only through the people nation as a whole. However, there is still a task for the proletariat: to unify the popular masses in the struggle against the power bloc (2000, p. 261). In this sense, there should be an

alliance with the intermediary classes: the petit-bourgeoisie should cooperate with the proletariat and the people should be unified against the power bloc. The truth of the matter is; it was the dominant element that constitutes the heart of Euro-Communism: the alliance of the people.

Just like Poulantzas, Wood signified the need for this alliance, as the majority of the population (petit-bourgeoisie and even some elements of the bourgeoisie besides the proletariat) could support socialism. In this sense, the general interests of the people should be taken into consideration not only the interest of the proletariat (Wood, 1985, p. 155). The emphasis was not only on the autonomy of the political and ideological instances but also on the dominance of them, which also signifies a clear separation from Marxist economism. In fact, Marx also defended the need for the alliance of the proletariat and the other classes to make the revolution. However, his basic concern was not to form a popular alliance but to construct a unified proletariat.

State, Power and Socialism attached innovations to the strategy of transition to socialism. Poulantzas rejected the need for a single revolutionary mass party. It was a consequence or evidence) of his commitment to the concept of “pluralism” in representative democracy. In this sense, there should be a plurality of the political actors -just like the political parties- and they should be actively participating in the new social movements which could not be reduced to the class antagonisms as it was the only way to provide a dynamic transition to socialism. In this sense, it can be concluded that Poulantzas has a practical standpoint as the contemporary leftist parties tried to include the social movements in their structure realizing the fact that they have a very strong social base and support.

4.1.2 Conclusion

In summary, in his early works, the influence of Gramsci and the concept of hegemony for Poulantzas’ theory of the state is quite prominent in terms of the distribution of power between state and classes and/or within the state. Keeping his distance from the instrumentalist approach, Poulantzas questions the relations within the power bloc. Here, his concept of power bloc is based on Gramscian hegemony as he mainly

questions the way for a class fraction of a dominant class becoming hegemonic in the power bloc:

... I am simply signalling that using the concept of hegemony makes it possible correctly to grasp both the framework of the liberal state and current developments in the state, situated within the basic coordinates of the capitalist type of state and the new forms assumed by hegemonic class exploitation. (2008, p. 91)

Therefore, in the early works like *Political Power and Social Classes* (1968), he stressed more abstract and theoretical arguments through which drawing a coherent policy towards democratic socialism is quite difficult. However, seeing the unavailability of concepts (in terms of both theory and practice) in orthodox Marxism just like “dictatorship of the proletariat”, he tried to develop a concrete strategy, a pathway to enable dominated classes to be dominant in Europe. Therefore, The Soviet Union had implemented the way Marx anticipated, but the result would be Stalinism which could be considered as a statist regime. So, the European Left should see these mistakes and draw a democratic way to socialism as socialism itself means “democracy” (2000, p. 257).

In this sense, in *Classes in Contemporary Capitalism* (1974), he attempted to implement his state theory to the strategic problems of the communist movement (Wood, 1985, p. 40). And this attempt was quite clarified with his last book *State, Power and Socialism* (1978). In this book, the break with the instrumentalist conception of the state is quite obvious. Therefore, the state has another nature that could not be simply related to the relations of production as the political power of the state, in essence, is hidden in the institutional structure of the state (2000, p. 12). It is impossible to form a “general theory of state” as it is not a steady object; and his emphasis on “the capitalist state” could be seen as an attempt to form a theory of state missing in Marxist theory (Karahanoğulları & Türk, 2018, p. 412). Here, it is clear that Poulantzas indicates a break within orthodox Marxism as his aim was not to deny the Marxism framework rather, to fit it into the existing conditions of Western Europe by adopting Eurocommunist strategy:

a left Eurocommunist strategy aimed at intensifying the contradictions internal to the state as well as mobilizing the popular masses outside the

state could prepare the ground for the eventual democratic transformation of the state system in its inclusive sense and its mobilization in support of even broader democratic socialist changes. (Jessop, 2017, p. 189)

Here, Poulantzas rejects all the theories that define state as an object (as is the case in Lenin) and their consequent model of 'dual powers'. As mentioned above, in his later works Poulantzas claimed that state apparatuses cannot have power of their own. Rather, they materialize and concentrate class relations. As Cornoy quoted from *The Crisis of Dictatorship*, according to Poulantzas: "the State is not an 'entity' with an intrinsic instrumental essence, but is itself a relation, more precisely the condensation of a class relation" (1984, p. 154). This conception of state in relation to social classes also emphasizes the fact that state apparatuses are inherently marked by class struggles. Poulantzas argued in his later works that, "...there is no 'structure' for the state; rather, the form and function of the State is shaped by class struggle in capitalism and the State's role in that struggle." (2000, p. 126). The most important repercussion of such an argument for Marxist theory is emphasizing political struggle for the working class rather than exclusive economic struggle. For Poulantzas, state apparatuses have a crucial role in "...the constitution and reproduction of social classes, class domination, and the social division of labor." (2000, p. 28)

On this issue, Poulantzas goes beyond Gramsci and Althusser: first, by blurring the separation between ideological and repressive state apparatuses; second, by adding a third kind of state apparatus to ideological and repressive state apparatuses, which are economic state apparatuses. Poulantzas claimed that the separation between ideological state apparatuses and repressive state apparatuses can only be descriptive and indicative since repressive state apparatuses are also ideologically bounded. (1984, p. 110). Furthermore, Poulantzas argued that: "according to the forms of the State and the phases of capitalist reproduction, certain apparatuses can move from one sphere to another, from the ideological apparatuses to the repressive and vice versa." (2000, p. 36).

The second issue is more crucial than the first one. Poulantzas criticises Althusser and Gramsci on the ground that in their theory of state, state can only act by repression and ideological inculcation; that is to say, it only acts negatively as a preventer, excluder, controller, etc. He claimed that such a presupposition envisages the economy as self-

reproducible. On the contrary, Poulantzas perceived state as engaging at the heart of capitalist reproduction process. As he puts it:

...the State also acts in a positive fashion, *creating, transforming and making* reality. It goes without saying that repression and ideological inculcation are present in the materiality of the State's current functions. But unless we are to play with words, it is hardly possible to grasp State's economic activities by referring exclusively to this dual-modality. [emphasis original] (2000, p. 30)

To sum up, according to Poulantzas there is an essential task for the subaltern classes: to unify the popular masses in the struggle against the power bloc. In this sense, there should be an alliance within the classes: the petit-bourgeoisie should cooperate with the proletariat and the people should be unified against the power bloc. In the next section, the importance of Poulantzas in reading the power relations in Turkey especially regarding the hegemony led by the state (apparatuses) will be questioned.

4.2 Gramsci and Poulantzas on Turkey

...Poulantzas extends Gramsci's concept of a State that is part of the (ideological) hegemony of the dominant class plus the repressive apparatus. Poulantzas's concept carries on both of these functions in the context of a class struggle (therefore the State is part of and the result of the class struggle) -and plays an economic role in reproducing the general conditions of the relations of production. And in the monopoly phase of capitalist development, the State enters directly into production itself *as part of its reproductive role*. [emphasis original] (Cornoy, 1984, p. 111)

Every periodization reflects a particular reading of history and it gives specific answers to the question of the underlying dynamics of change and continuity. "Turkish modernization carried by power bloc as a series of unsuccessful hegemonic attempts" could be understood through the scope of the Ottoman/Turkish transformation. The modernization period of the late Ottoman and the early Republic, according to Feroz Ahmad was very much interconnected with another continuity, that is, both the Empire's and the Republic's attempts to find a place in the world economy (2002, p. 11). In that respect, the period and aftermath of the French Revolution- which could be seen as the beginning of the "modern times"- and its reflections may be the most appropriate starting point for modern Turkey (Zürcher, 2004, p. 15). To understand

the modernization process of the Republic and its success the question of whether the Turkish Republic and specifically the Kemalist Regime or ideology imply a relation of continuity or rupture with its Ottoman past should be captured. It can be argued that the thesis of continuity and lack of a rupture in the Ottoman/Turkish trajectory constitutes the backbone of the narration of the hegemonic attempts of the constituent power of the Republic of Turkey.

It can be said that the ideological roots of the Kemalist regime are hidden in the Ottoman reform movement, especially on the eve of the second constitutional period. The Young Turks initiated a radical reform by transforming and manipulating the dynasty after 1908. Later, the regime led by Mustafa Kemal destroyed the old regime and established a secular republic by rejecting continuity (Ahmad, 2002, p. 25). In this respect, although the reforms of the Committee of Union and Progress also guided the republican reforms, the victory of the nationalists marks a new level in terms of modernization. According to Ahmad, while the ultimate goal of the Unionists was to save the empire by establishing a constitutional monarchy based on Islam, the Kemalists aimed to make radical reforms to establish a modern, secular and most importantly a new Turkey (ibid, 91).

4.2.1 Before JDP: Turkish Modernization as a Failed Pursuit of Hegemony

Mustafa Kemal's desire to create a new ideology representing a fresh mentality, as well as his desire to eliminate traditions, social beliefs and symbols, which are the most powerful tools in the establishment of political and social dominance, did not find a response in the society. The fact that such reactionary sentiments gave way in time to a conservative opposition did not lead to a questioning of means and ends in the revolutionary circles: "if they were unable to launch a frontal attack against tradition, that did not prevent them from sapping its foundations" (Ahmad, 2002, p. 87). Similarly, according to Ergun Özbudun the origins of Turkish political structure "...pitted a nationalist, laicist, cohesive state elite against a culturally heterogeneous complex, and even hostile periphery with religious and antistatist overtones." (2000, p. 81). He also argues that "the Ottoman-Turkish state has been characterized by a

strong state tradition... highly autonomous, and occupying a central and highly valued place in the political culture” (ibid. 126).

Metin Heper, another name trying to understand this transformation and can be evaluated within the center-periphery paradigm, has a similar point of view. Heper's “state tradition” thesis assumes the duality of the strong state autonomous from society versus a weak environment subject to the state (Heper, 1985). As can be seen, both Heper's and Özbudun's perspectives have a dual view of the social reality delimited between the state and society. Accordingly, in Özbudun's analysis, the so-called 'society' is divided into political elites, namely political parties. Society or classes (in general) lack the capacity to enter the picture because of the strong state tradition.

Here, production and distribution relations have a central role in understanding the Turkish modernization path. Since the problem is modernization and the carrier of the transformation process is the bourgeoisie, a special value should be attributed to the existence of the bourgeoisie. There were also the wealthy in Ottoman society who had similar functions to the bourgeois class, but they lacked the bourgeois political power and authority to shape society in their own interests. This is the background of the national bourgeoisie of the Kemalist era, created by the state. In this sense, the primitive bourgeoisie had to be transformed into a much stronger and more institutionalized bourgeoisie, and for this reason, Kemalist reformers tried to establish this type of class. Turkish modernization developed in a way that both continuities and ruptures are experienced within these dynamics. In this context, Ahmed argues that the state lacked a social basis in the 19th century and that the new bureaucrats tried to establish such a foundation, and that according to Ahmed, this fact will be the key to understanding modern Turkey (Ahmad, 2002, p. 41).

It is essential to distinguish between the political revolution and the social revolution, and also to perceive the founding of the Republic not only as a political revolution but as a more important social revolution. From 1908 onwards, the Unionists believed that the social order had to be completely changed in order for the collapsing structure to survive. They also supported the liberation of the peasants from the domination of the landlords for this purpose, but this aim was not achieved even in the early republican period. This will remain a fundamental handicap of the Kemalist regime.

Defining the period from 1908 to 1960 as the Young Turks Period, Zürcher argues that the Unionists established and realized the monopoly of power after sharing political power with others in a pluralistic and relatively free environment between 1908-13. The program of radical secularization and modernization between 1913 and 1918 (2009, pp. 145-201). According to Zürcher, the same pattern repeated itself after 1919, until the early years of the republic went through a pluralistic period and then turned into an authoritarian regime when the Kemalists implemented a reform program aimed at secularizing and modernizing society. Zürcher explains this tendency with the democratic approach of the Young Turks, in which democracy is viewed as a means rather than an end in itself, and the "end" is the strengthening and survival of the state. According to Zürcher, another similarity between the two periods is that both the Unionists and Kemalists did not go to a real socio-economic revolution or reform and did not attempt to change the property relations in the country. Zürcher (2009) states that the early Kemalist modernization reforms were extensions of the reforms in the Union and Progress period as well as in the Tanzimat period. For example, the authority of Shaykh al-Islam regarding religion was already limited to the field of civil law. What the Kemalists did go further, that is, they were trying to withdraw "popular Islam" by abolishing dervish lodges and zawiyas.

As seen above, Kemalists and Unionists have a common ideological community. The Committee of Union and Progress lacks a coherent ideological program; its programs are an eclectic one that blends different values of different ideologies (Zürcher 2009, pp. 199-200). Likewise, Kemalism has a loose meaning; hence it is defined by Zürcher not as an ideology but as a unity of certain attitudes and views (ibid. 269). Since the aim of both Kemalism and the Committee of Union and Progress is to protect and strengthen the state, it can be said that their ideologies are action-oriented. In this respect, some values that are glorified today, such as democracy, are not an end but a means for them.

Niyazi Berkes, on the other hand, thinks that the Republican revolutions can blend ideological dualities and differences in a harmonious structure and melt them in the same pot. At this point, a "national legal system" and a "national education system" were established, respectively, in contrast to the dual structures that emerged in the transition periods of Ottoman modernization by providing integrity on both the

superstructure and infrastructure basis (Berkes, 2010, pp. 527-533). Another revolutionary goal is the adoption and internalization of the principles of the revolution by the people. In pursuing this goal, the 'revolution in consciousness' was seen as a key element of enlightenment. The Republic project united these aims under the umbrella of modernizing reforms in the fields of language, history and culture, because it was determined that the lack of attention to these fields caused friction between different segments of society in the Ottoman experience (ibid. 541-547).

The newly established Republic not only changed the class relations or the positions of social classes but also transformed and modernized people's daily lives. However, at the same time, Kemalist reforms or revolutions could not form a strong power bloc, were not fully embraced by the people, and oppositions and reactions continued from place to place. The shortening of the distance between the CHP and the people will be possible if Bülent Ecevit introduces social democracy to the Turkish people and Turkish politics. Although there was a noticeable distance between the people and the RPP, they managed to mobilize the people. However, this mobilization was not within the framework of the bourgeois parliamentary regime on the basis of politics. Although the RPP economy aimed for a regime based on a market economy, neither a free market economy-based system nor a multi-party system could be implemented due to the worldwide crisis in 1929. While statism protects the country, saving the economy from the bad effects of the free market and those who criticize it will also pave the way for the formation of a bourgeoisie in the hands of the state. Fear of liberal democracy (Ahmad, 2002, p. 73) can be seen as a simple result of this fact. The bourgeoisie became a real and effective social agent/factor for Turkish modernization, especially after this period. While the Kemalists supported the bourgeoisie and capitalist development, they strongly opposed class stratification, class politics and Marxism as the basis of this model of society. The country's economy was mainly based on agriculture, industry was not developed and accordingly, there were very few industrial workers. For this reason, the peasant population was quite high, and it should be noted that the peasants made reform movements because they were not satisfied with their economic and social situation. İsmet İnönü II. His rule under the conditions of World War II worsened the standard of living of ordinary people. The perception of the post-World War II era as the victory of democracy created pressure for Turkey

to switch to a multi-party regime. The Democratic Party, which had great support from the peasants, rose in these bad conditions and was successful in manipulating the will of the people, especially the peasants. Under the DP administration, the state planning policy of the previous period was completely abandoned and liberalization propaganda was made in every field. After the Second World War, the USA emerged as the global power of the inaugural era. Adnan Menderes, the Prime Minister of the Democratic Party government of the 1950s, was decisive in taking sides with the United States in the New World Order. This meant that the traditional balanced policy of Turkish politics -between the Soviet Union and the USA- was eliminated for the sake of the liberal capitalist character of Turkish society. Since then, the United States has always been an important factor not only in foreign policy but also in domestic policy. NATO's role in these processes was also important; it is known that both NATO and the Turkish Army played a role in the country's democratization and modernization history.

The May 27 coup d'etat, or as Ahmed calls the May 27 Movement, can be seen as a revolution because it institutionalized its scope with the constitution to a large extent (2002, p. 153). Industrialization and change in consumption patterns, planning, trade unions, and realization of some social rights were among the elements of this "revolution". Besides workers, students and many other groups were also getting organized and acting collectively. The value should be attributed to these processes since in terms of democratization this was the popularization of politics. However, afterwards, especially after the 1971 military intervention, Turkish politics became much more fluctuant. Radical Islam also found a chance to be active in politics in this period. Turkish politics witnessed lots of inefficient and unsuccessful coalition governments. The before mentioned processes, if we refer again to the political economy based thesis of Ahmad, can be seen as parts of the painful transformation of Turkish modernization which is mainly guided by the pressure of being part of the capitalist world. The 1980s were also a real break for this history, it was a political and economic restructuring.

The real significance of the 1980 military intervention for Heper lies in its presumed efficacy to lead the way to the formation of new democratic institutions that would serve precisely the function of intermediary between the center and the periphery.

Heper argued that the military's objective between 1980 and 1983 was to transform the civilian bureaucracy into a “legal-rational institution (Heper, 2006, p. 235), and, further, that the military attempted to “inject a higher dose of rationality” into the Turkish political system (ibid.243). The former could undertake such a task, because it had maintained its character as an autonomous institution isolated from political and economic interests even through times of crisis, and because it had a long tradition of perceiving itself as the state institution, which gave it a unique place in society (ibid. 218-221). Here, Heper insisted that he does not entertain a conception that thinks of the Turkish Armed Forces as having a class-like character or organic links to the bourgeoisie, and conceives of the formation of OYAK⁶ as a further effort on the part of the military to remain autonomous in the midst of a society divided among primordial lines (ibid.221).

The previous era, at least, was being shaped under the impacts of different demands of different groups or social classes. Governments to a certain extent had to pay regard to a social and political balance in the domestic politics, but after the 1980s a neo-liberal hegemonic project was tried to be procreated. This project was part of a global project and economic and political restructuring at a global scale. For this reason, one may make the inference that the reason for military intervention was not (only) domestic; actually an exterior factor, that is the will to integrate with the new global capitalism, dominated the period. Turgut Özal was the most appropriate figure indicating the features of the new era. He and his government, his businessmen changed the form of “modernization”. The role of Islam in Turkish modernization made its presence felt again under the governance of Özal. As Ahmad indicates, Islam was the culture of the lower-middle class in Turkey and center right parties owe their success to the manipulation of this fact (2002, p. 257).

The motto was: less inflation, more economic growth, less bureaucracy. It was a mixed ideology, on the one hand defending liberalism in economy promoting individualism and free-market while in social and political life it was celebrating the conservative ideology with an emphasis on traditional values and authority. defending liberalism in

⁶ OYAK is a foundation established to support the members of the army financially as they defined their foundation as “complementary professional pension fund” (www.oyak.com.tr/corporate/about-us/oyak/)

the economy, whereas in social and political life conservatist elements were defended, i.e, individualism and free-market was aimed in the economy and traditional values and authority in politics. That is the reason why the new right is also called neo-liberalism or neo-conservatism. Some common elements helped to shape the new right. First of all, political life was considered a matter of individual freedom and initiative. The societal structure proposed was the free market society, and the state was the minimal state. Therefore, the welfare states were said to be “over-loaded governments” which was the proliferation of bureaucratic state agencies caused diminishing individual freedom. The state is said to be strong but limited. In this sense, the state should be strong within its limits to provide security to prosper the business, trade and family life and to be non-interventional.

Starting from Ottoman reform movements, the link between modernization, modern values and Islam was always the basic tension of Turkish politics. Ahmad (2002) adds the role of the military to this tension and also the motivation of being a part of the global capitalist world. To sum up, after creating the nation-state from the ruins of the Ottoman Empire, the cadres of the republic tried to create a modern society with a strong, progressive bourgeoisie to replace the conservative bureaucracy and peasantry. By the end of the 2nd World War, this class formation matured and led to a transition to the multi-party regime in 1950. The political and social tensions resulted in the military interventions of 1960, 1971 and 1980 as the bourgeoisie’s refashioning of society. This top-down imposed Turkish modernization which was perceived as a “mean” rather than an “end” could not be read as a success story, it is at best, an unfinished one.

Therefore, following the periodization of İsmet Akça, the period between 1980 (coup d’état on September 12) and 2002, indicates the attempt of hegemony and their failure story (2014, p. 22): The first period is the coup d’état in 1980 and the following military regime signifies the authoritarian statism which Poulantzas used to identify the post-1970s capitalist state with intensified state control and decline of political democracy (2000, p. 236). The second period is the government of the Motherland Party and the new right’s unsuccessful hegemony attempt which was followed by the 1990s, the third period, signifying the political crisis and the rise of political Islamism which is also closely related to the crisis of hegemony. The fourth and the last period

according to Akça is the hegemonic project of JDP which is constructed on neo-liberal authoritarian populism and became relatively successful.

4.2.2 Transformation of Neoliberal Hegemony and Populism of JDP

Following the Gramscian guide, this dissertation confines itself to the post-2002 period as the 2002 general elections were a landmark for Turkey in terms of indicating a new era for economic, political, social and cultural life.

the AKP has been quite successful in differentiating itself both from its past and from the other political parties by defining itself as a center-right party whose reform-based proactive politics can carry out Turkey's transformation process, rather than as an Islamic party, the AKP has widened and deepened its societal support and global legitimacy. (Keyman, 2010, p. 315)

It distinguished itself from the other political parties by defining itself as a “center-right party with a conservative-democrat identity” and also from the previous Islamic parties by suggesting that in its governance it locates itself in the center, more precisely in the center-right, and operates as a mass party initiating reformist, service-based, and proactive domestic and foreign policy. Here, winning the 2002 elections and coming to the power-holding majority of the seats in the Grand National Assembly ended the era of coalitions. The era of JDP government(s) signifies a new historical bloc, a new hegemony formation (Yalman, 2004, 2014; Akça, 2011, 2014).

While coming to power, JDP signalled that they combine the neoliberal economic policies with the authoritarian and conservative values of the social and cultural life, which also enabled them to present themselves as the heirs of the right-wing/conservative governments. Here, their promises for the electoral campaign stated in the election manifesto point to an eclectic collection that appeal to a popular mass.⁷

As Bozkurt draws attention:

During the electoral campaign of 2002, Recep Tayyip Erdogan raised popular expectations that his party would immediately tackle problems of growing poverty, distorted income distribution, and social inequality; yet

⁷ The detailed election manifesto could be obtained from: <https://www.akparti.org.tr/media/318780/3-kasim-2002-genel-secimleri-secim-beyannamesi-sayfalar.pdf>

the JDP remained within the neoliberal framework and conformed to the macroeconomic stabilization agenda of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) once in power. (2013, p. 272)

The electoral success of JDP was closely related to the existing social and economic conditions of Turkey as mentioned above, the economic crisis which resulted in high rates of unemployment, growing poverty and consequently general unrest and discontent among the society (Öniş, 2009; Boratav & Yeldan, 2006; Akça, 2011). The JDP government(s) points to a new historical bloc- related to this a new power bloc and hegemony formation. They used both the means for consent and coercion although the focus on each varies according to the degree of their support from the masses. Besides, JDP promoted both in Europe and the USA as promising for a stable economic environment in Turkey to attract international capital. As Yalman underlined, the liberal intellectuals of Turkey presented JDP in the international arena as representatives of democratic forces who fight against the authoritarian statist tradition (2014, p. 31). A similar approach is also seen in Tansel's analysis about the first years of the JDP government with an essential addition. Here, the second period of JDP rule – from 2011 onwards, the authoritarian characteristics of the power and party politics became dominant:

In the first portrayal (corresponding to the 2003–2007/10 period), AKP is positioned broadly as a democratic party with a clear intent on reviving the sclerotic Turkish economy through liberalisation and reinforcing the country's EU candidacy bid through civilianisation and democratic reforms. In the second period (from 2011, and particularly, 2013 onwards), AKP is clad in the mantle of a decaying hegemonic force that relies increasingly on 'coercion', rather than 'consent', to enforce its policies and shape an ever-increasing portion of the everyday lives of Turkey's citizens. We argue that these two images should be understood, not as diametrically opposed regimes with inherently contradicting modalities of rule, but as two interlinked nodes on the spectrum of a now-apparent authoritarian governance. In other words, we emphasise the importance of placing the two periods in a continuum whereby the 'authoritarian' practices of the later AKP rule can be retraced to – and properly understood in – the context of its earlier 'democratic' incarnation (2018, p. 198).

Although the dates of the periodization vary, it is obvious that to adjust its hegemonic project, JDP changed its policies by managing the balance between consent and coercion. In the first years of the government, they adopted policies to reach the consent of the popular masses which mainly identified as “moderate Islam” showing the harmony of Islamist politics with the capitalist system in the neo-liberal era

(Yalman, 2014, p. 31). Looking from the Gramscian perspective, the Sunni Islamic values were the cornerstone of the common sense. As mentioned above, hegemony provides the unity of the power bloc; in this case, while following a neo-liberal authoritarian and populist strategy a new power bloc arose. As Akça underlined, JDP presented itself as the leader to take power from Kemalist military-civil bureaucratic elites and passing it to the “nation’s bloc” which includes the peasants, workers, civil servants, artisans, merchants, industrialists, silent Muslim-conservative masses (Akça, 2011, p. 32). In this sense, it preached a new power bloc that is so-called inclusive and ignores the classes. For instance, the poor become dependent on the party as the policies targeting the poor and subaltern classes cannot simply be explained as giving charities and creating a dependent mass. As a matter of fact, JDP uses the social policy as politics of cultural representation that goes beyond a simple economic dependency on the Party and the government (Yılmaz, 2015, p. 61).

Here, although the “culture of charity” was used to collect consent, it was also used to mentally and socially pacify the masses. Yücesan-Özdemir also explains this strand as a social policy regime that combines neo-liberalism, conservatism and the essence of Islam that is led by the needs of the free market promoting the consumer individuals in “communities” instead of right-seeking “citizens” (2014, pp. 137-138). The JDP governments could not be evaluated as a whole as mentioned above, there are significant chronological crossroads from 2002 onwards. The first years of the JDP government “had witnessed an increasing struggle between different parts of the state and the government” attempting to solidify the hegemonic position (Lord, 2018, p. 73). They were battling for positions in the political, economic, social, cultural and military arenas which includes several policies that varied from pacifying the media and press through oppression. While JDP claims to “liberate” media to act objectively, they captured the media in the circle of media-commerce politics. Here, unlike the “ideal type” presented in the programme, JDP attempted to replace the old cartel in the media with a new cartel supporting through being a “partisan press”. The current media ownership structure became monopolistic which results in an antidemocratic media structure. The “radical” Islamist newspapers become mainstream and the organic intellectuals JDP desired were composed of the adherent, uncritical writers and artists who can articulate the interests of the conflicting classes. The rest were the enemies of

the democracy who supported the military coups- with a reference to the past experiences of military coups that Turkey has faced:

According to the JDP's organic intellectuals, the JDP was an actor of transformation and change in Turkish politics, while those who opposed it were spokespersons of the "status quo". The change started with the opposition of the "periphery" to the center, and the actors in the periphery, namely conservatives and Islamists, defined as the JDP's base, were in the position of forces defending democracy. (Yücel & Tanış-Zaferoğlu, 2016, p. 29)

Through the years of single-party government, JDP was prepared to the decrease of the popular support; promoting and nourishing the popularity of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan- the Prime Minister was an effective tactic to respond to this decrease. JDP's hegemonic project began to collapse after the 2007 General Election, as alongside the high unemployment rates and economic crisis, a high amount of businesses declared bankruptcy, the consensus within the capital dispersed, the policies regarding identity politics was delayed and the policies related to foreign politics failed (Akça, 2011, p. 35). However, JDP was ready for such a collapse as the 2007 Constitutional Referendum was a step towards securing the power of JDP as the positive growth rates of the first years of "single party" government and the reliable economic background for foreign capital has significantly changed. The amendments included: "tenure of the parliament; direct election of the president; meeting quorum of the parliament" (Yeğen, 2017, p. 80). The demand for "direct election of the president" was important as it was an attempt to empower the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan who was preparing for being President. Here, it was an attempt to end the independence of the judiciary and weaken the power of the legislature:

Even though the draft is incomparably more democratic and liberal than the present Turkish Constitution, it was met by strong criticism from those sectors of the public opinion who are deeply suspicious of the AKP's 'hidden intentions.' Thus, it was argued that the proposed draft undermined secularism and Atatürk's principles, intended to weaken judicial independence and to politicise the judiciary, thus creating an unchecked majority rule paving the way for gradually introducing an Islamic government. (Hale & Özbudun, 2010, pp. 66-67)

Here, the unity and cohesion among the power bloc were wounded- as Poulantzas underlined the political struggles were as effective as the economic struggles to provide the cooperation of the forces- the political conflicts among jurisdiction,

military, bourgeoisie and the government were effective in this collapse. Here, the bourgeoisie was also not content with the ideological and economic position as “not only had AKP’s predecessors the reputation of being committed to a hardline Islamism, but their economic programmes were distinctly interventionist, protectionist and nationalist. They had clear anti-Western and anti-EU orientations on international relations” (Boratav, 2015, p. 5).

On the other hand, although in the first years of their rule, JDP tried to reconcile with the military, with the hegemonic glory of the 2007 General Election, the necessity to pursue a war of position against them was abandoned and with the confidence of this ballot-box victory, JDP adopted war of manoeuvre (Akça, 2011, p. 34). Judiciary was also a threat that is unpredictable for JDP as the Constitutional Court attempted to close JDP in 2008 which will be punished with taking control over judiciary by Referendum on Constitutional Amendments in 2010: “the provisions of the referendum-related to the judiciary, changing the structure of the Anayasa Mahkemesi (constitutional court, AM) and the Hakim ve Savcılar Yüksek Kurulu (High Council of Judges and Prosecutors, HSYK) rendering them to the control of the JDP government.” (Bermek, 2019, p. 193)

Therefore, one of the trivets of JDP’s hegemonic project was neoliberalism which brings the policies that are serving the interests of several fractions of the capital. The policies regarding the economic regulation focused on privatisation, higher indirect taxation and reduction of the welfare state services. Here, the disadvantaged groups living “under zero” were excluded from the labor market; since they do not have a regular income or even no-income which means a failure to be involved in market relations; faced with the economic exclusion as they lose “the ability to financially support oneself or one’s family at the norm for society”; institutional exclusion as they do not have the access to the private institutions and social isolation as they cannot be involved in the social networks.

Here, while taking the consent of the masses and trying to be dominant in the power bloc, JDP highly polarized the society by creating “enemies”. After creating the nation-state from the ruins of the Ottoman Empire, the cadres of the republic tried to create a modern society with a strong, progressive bourgeoisie to replace the

conservative bureaucracy and peasantry. By the end of the 2nd World War, this class formation matured and led to a transition to the multi-party regime in 1950. The political and social tensions resulted in the military interventions of 1960, 1971 and 1980 as the bourgeoisie's refashioning of society. This top-down imposed Turkish modernization which was perceived as a "mean" rather than an "end" created masses with strong religious affiliations and completely ignored this project. Here, Islam was the culture of the lower-middle class in Turkey (Ahmad, 2002, p. 257) before the 1980s (since the New Right policies use religion as means to agitate the masses) and JDP owes a lot in its success to the manipulation of this fact. Here, in the first election manifesto in 2002, JDP challenged this modernization project as follows:

OUR PARTY believes that the intervention of the state in the institutions and values created by the society with its own experience will cause chaos and unrest. For this reason, the AK PARTY is the biggest guarantee against the attempts of adventurous politicians to destroy civil-democratic gains with ideological projects that are disconnected from the realities of society.

PARTİMİZ, toplumun kendi tecrübesiyle oluşturduğu kurum ve değerlere devletin müdahale etmesinin kargaşa ve huzursuzluk doğuracağına inanır. Bu nedenle, AK PARTİ, maceraperest siyasetçilerin, toplum gerçeklerinden kopuk ideolojik projelerle sivil-demokratik kazanımların tahrip edilmesine yönelik girişimlerine karşı en büyük teminattır.⁸

It was a challenge in terms of preaching the NGO's, cults, religious communities...etc that are excluded from the power bloc before. It was a promise for them to "get their pieces from the pie". As Duran underlines:

Islamists have been experiencing power, enrichment, upward class mobilization and they have pursued successful careers during the JDP governments. Opportunity spaces within the public sphere have opened up for Islamists so that they have now reached the higher echelons of bureaucracy and become owners of large companies and media groups. They are much more power and wealth oriented than ever before. (2010, p. 6)

Therefore, the silent conservative masses believe in both representations in the political arena and the possibility of upward mobilization. They were not the victims or the ones that should be hidden away anymore. In this sense, not only a transformation in politics but also focused on transforming the society through taking

⁸ Retrieved from <https://www.akparti.org.tr/media/318780/3-kasim-2002-genel-secimleri-secim-beyannamesi-sayfalar.pdf> on 06.05.2020.

the consent of the supporters and severely suppressing the opposition. Following these lines of policies, it was just a matter of time for the “enemy” to claim a position in this war having a doubt on the representative, motives and actors of a possible revolt. At the end of May 2013, the disorganized opposition of Turkey initiated a series of protests which was another crossroad for JDP rule. It was obvious that the source of the unrest was not the issue of “some trees” as it reflected all the accumulated anger towards the capital, high levels of social polarization in the cities, the increasing gap between the poor and the rich, policies “bio-politics” addressing the “body” of the individuals along with their “life styles”, “bureaucratic society of controlled consumption” etc:

While for the government it was seen as an international conspiracy to oust the Erdoğan administration from power, for the protestors the resistance was against the growing authoritarian tendencies of the government and its excessive interference into the private sphere of its citizens. This does not necessarily mean that environmental issues were deemed insignificant, but the heavyhanded approach of the government to suppress the peaceful protests had an impact on the public whose concerns were far beyond the well-being of the trees and the Park itself. The Gezi Park protests have been transformed into a symbol of resistance, a vivid example of government intolerance, a fresh hope for its critics and opposition and, ironically, a source of fear for the government and its supporters. It also set off a new terminology, as “resist” became a shortcut for any oppositional position during and after the demonstrations. (Uzgel, 2012, p. 198)

After Gezi Park Protests (GPP), the liberal role/identity based on pluralist and egalitarian values that JDP created for itself was shattered. “The year following the GPPs provided abundant evidence in support of this argument, where all the grievances that triggered the events were further exacerbated as Erdoğan’s government took an even more pronounced, reckless, and unapologetic authoritarian turn.” (Gürcan&Peker, 2015, p. 148) Here, this “authoritarian turn” was critical as the polarization became an essential politics to protect JDP rule. While consent-taking was a critical strategy to reach the so-called victims of a modernization project that are marginalized from the mainstream politics; the activists/sympathizers of the Gezi Park Protests announced to be “enemies inside” who are controlled by the “external enemies” even after years⁹. The war of manoeuvre was more severe than ever before

⁹Retrieved from <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/todays-headlines/praising-gezi-park-protests-is-supporting-terrorism/1317758> on 10.05.2020

as with gaining the control of both military and jurisdiction, the hegemonic project that JDP preached collapsed. They did not need the “support” of any allies anymore as they created their “safe” allies through these years by eliminating those who claim a share from the power bloc with conflicting interests.

4.2.3 Conclusion

While Poulantzas underlines the relative autonomy of the political and the economic to argue that in order to function effectively as a class state, the capitalist state has to be relatively autonomous from the class struggle in production. Such autonomy, in turn, gives rise to a distinctive separation of economic and political class struggles, which is also a feature of JDP rule. Here, JDP presents itself as representing the general interest; however, in fact, it represents the political interests of dominant classes. They provide class unity for dominant classes while individualizing and isolating subaltern classes. As a result, these permits, “...the development of the capitalist type of state as a state characterised by hegemonic class leadership.” (Jessop, 1982, p. 162). Due to the existence of the historically organic ideologies with that of the arbitrary ideologies, side by side, the ideological terrain provided by JDP is also not homogenous, which explains the impossibility of an absolute determination by their ruling ideas.

On the other hand, JDP attempted to create its own organic intellectuals who have a crucial role to play: they have to legitimize JDP rule being highly instrumental in initiating the political struggle, as well as in the establishment of hegemonic domination around “collective will”. Poulantzas identifies the strictly political function of the state with “the maintenance of political order in political class conflict.” Penetrating each political cell of the state institutions over the years, the JDP government(s) remove the relations of production and exploitation from their centric role in the state. Therefore, confronting forces are not classes struggling through their political organizations anymore; but political organizations taking place in the competition of party and politics. The current conflict between *Gülen Movement*¹⁰ and JDP also was a good illustration for that, starting with the ban

¹⁰ The *Gülen movement* which is named as “*Hizmet Movement*” by its participants led by Muhammed Fethullah *Gülen*, who is a preacher and a writer. He started to work in Edirne in 1959, later he was

of the *dershanes* (private teaching institutions) which are vital economic and human resources of the former. It was a challenge for JDP that it attempted to eliminate the Gulen Movement from the power bloc regarding a fight for power which will also be later supported with the judicial and legislative decisions legitimized with coup d'état attempt in 2016.

Poulantzas claimed that state is the condensation of class power; in Turkey's case, this condensation become more obvious ever before this attempt and the state was neither an object nor a subject. To recall, the state is not an entity with an intrinsic instrumental essence but is itself a relation as it becomes quite visible under the JDP rule. Here, for Poulantzas, the capitalist state provides the framework for struggles among fractions of dominant classes, individualizes the working class and later reintegrates them into a nation. So to speak, under JDP rule, the state provides the political space for class struggle, and so-just, as the capitalist state emerged from a struggle-state, becomes shaped by class struggle.

Here, the state functions as the institution where the fractions of the power bloc resolve their conflict. Furthermore, these conflicts do not arise only for state power, but they also take place among apparatuses of the state. As a result, the state turns to a strategic battlefield, rather than a monolithic bloc as we can see in the case of the JDP and Gulen Movement conflict. Secondly, as mentioned above Poulantzas underlined that with respect to the relation between state and dominated classes, state attempts to mediate the conflicts between power bloc and dominated classes by dividing and disorganizing the dominated masses. Since 2002, the laws and regulations that are implemented by JDP rule intervened social, political, cultural and even biological lives of the people which are closely related to economic policies; as in this hegemonic project a *persona grata* necessitated:

Treating the family as a locus of government intervention in pursuit of the 'ideal' citizen-subject is not new. Nükhet Sirman (2005) coined the term 'familial citizenship' to indicate that the Turkish republic-imagined as a community of equal men was predicated on the distribution of sovereignty

transferred to Izmir in where he was arrested for illegal religious propaganda. Since 2015 his "movement" is considered a terrorist organization which is called Fethullah Terrorist Organization (FETÖ) and Gülen was living in the USA since 1999. For detailed information about the history of the movement: Jenkins, G. (2008), Gunter, M.M. (2018).

to male heads of households. This established a gendered discourse in which the ideal citizen is inscribed as a sovereign husband and his dependent wife/mother rather than an individual, with the result that position within a familial discourse provides the person with status within the polity. Indeed, the idiom of family and kinship and the trope of masculine protection that permeates Turkish public life makes it possible (if not plausible) for the head of state to pose as the pater familias demanding obedience and respect. (Kandiyoti, 2016, p. 107)

Here, the meanings attributed to the “ideal citizen” was also closely related to the conservative approach that the citizen is to be “created” and dominated who have responsibilities more than rights. Here, I believe that the concept of “citizenship” was not arrogated by the majority in Turkey as the culture of *tebaa* (vassal) is inherited from the Ottoman Empire. Işın identifies citizenship as:

... a dynamic (political, legal, social and cultural but perhaps also sexual, aesthetic and ethical) institution of domination *and* empowerment that governs who citizens (insiders), subject (stranger, outsiders) and abjects (aliens) are and *how* these actors are to govern themselves and each other in a given body politic. Citizenship is not membership. It is a relation that governs the conduct of (subject) positions that constitute it...Being a citizen almost always means being more than an insider- it also means being one who has mastered modes and forms of conduct that are appropriate to being an insider. (2009, p. 372)

As this definition suggests, citizenship is a relational and dynamic concept that draws attention to the social interaction between the state and the citizen. In this sense, the state includes the contradictions that derived from these relations are a part of the “state” which is also a relation rather than a constant entity. Poulantzas argues that even though mass struggle can originate outside the state, the contradictions between dominant and dominated classes cannot stay outside the state, as far as they are political struggles. As in the case of the JDP rule, these contradictions are meant to be part of “state affairs”.

Poulantzas’s conceptualization of state as *the condensation of relations of forces and a battlefield of class struggle*- opposed to a conceptualization of state as a mere instrument to be captured by the working class in a frontal assault and an encirclement- provides a transition to socialism strategy which involves:

...the close articulation and coordination of class struggle *within* the official state apparatus aimed at intensifying its internal contradictions, polarizing significant sections of its personnel around a transition to socialism, and provoking ruptures among the various power centers,

branches, and apparatuses of the integral state; and class struggle *at a distance* from the official state apparatus aimed at changing the balance of forces within the state, building organs of direct rank-and-file democracy, and unifying the popular masses in opposition to power bloc.⁴⁹ [emphasis original] (1982, p. 179)

While Poulantzas draws a framework to understand “the” capitalist state, even relevant in the 21st century of Turkey, he also shows the way out of this type of state as mentioned above. However, it is quite controversial whether it was a utopic dream or a realistic solution. Or can we say that the way out of the capitalist state is also relevant for our time and geography? As mentioned above, for Poulantzas “socialism is democracy and there can be no true socialism that is not democratic” (2002, p. 168). Here, his alternative to frontal dual power strategy is a democratic road to socialism, which is the modification of relations of forces within the state through struggles of popular masses. Glorifying the struggles of popular masses against the power bloc within the scope of creating an alternative for “the” capitalist state is one of the cornerstones of this dissertation. To elaborate, the possibility and methods for unifying popular struggles under the hegemony of the working class against the power bloc should be discussed. As early as 1970, in *Fascism and Dictatorship*, Poulantzas advocated the necessity of priority of political class struggle over economic class struggle (ibid, p.178) which will be also emphasized in discussing these struggles. Therefore, in such a political struggle, there should be an alliance with intermediary classes as petit-bourgeoisie must be polarized around the working class and people must be unified under the leadership of the working class against the power bloc. As Jessop quoted from *Classes in Contemporary Capitalism*, according to Poulantzas, such a strategy requires

...a long-term strategy that recognizes the differences among the classes and fractions in the alliance, that attempts gradually to resolve the ‘contradictions among the people’ and to unify them, and that attempts to class positions (or demands) of potential allies so that they come to share the objectives of the working class in the transition to socialism (1982, p. 180).

In *State, Power, Socialism* Poulantzas adds new components to the strategy of transition to democratic socialism as he rejects the need for a single mass revolutionary party to act as the vanguard in the transition to socialism. This rejection is linked with his adherence to pluralism in representative democracy that mentioned above:

Poulantzas suggest that communist parties are in crisis because of their commitments to the primacy of the working class and to the primacy of struggles in the enterprise; this means that they have underestimated new social movements (such as feminism, regionalism, ecological movements, student unrest, etc.) that are ‘pluriclassiste’ and/or located outside the place of production. He concludes that parties must be actively present in the new social movements without becoming merely populist and that these movements must find a place in the parties without losing their own specificity, in turn this implies that a certain irreducible tension between working- class parties and social movements is a necessary condition of the dynamic of transition to socialism. (ibidem)

Such a focus on political opposition between power bloc organized by JDP rule and people in Tuzluçayır organized by popular alliance instead of direct class antagonism between capital and labor include various identities which are not stuck by force, but also accepted, resisted, chosen, specified, invented, redefined, refused and actively advocated by the people. As Poulantzas anticipated, through these struggles, masses- more than being static actors- become dynamic, actively participating in political life.

Here, Poulantzas’ anticipation to contain new social movements within the party as it provides a dynamic transition to socialism is one of the most signifiers of the currency of his strategy. He anticipated that a popular democratic “version” of socialism is possible with a special focus on representative democratic institutions and/or movements that are more dynamic than the “classical” political parties. Therefore, in this thesis, the possibility and ways of being active in these movements to reach a wider range of people will be discussed specific to political movements in Tuzluçayır Neighborhood. Political and/or social movements, on the other hand, become more and more inclusive in order to provide “popular alliance” which will be analyzed later. Therefore, Tuzluçayır is one of the most popular neighborhoods which is known for demonstrations, street actions, and clashes with the state and/or law enforcement agencies taking place with a relatively large number of participants. Not only the residents of Ankara but also the people with a political awareness from other cities could easily notice that since the first settlements, Tuzluçayır has been a center for social and political opposition. To elaborate, it is essential to understand the dynamics of the political struggles having the potential of threat against the existing socio-political system and the hegemony of the dominant classes.

CHAPTER 5

UNDERSTANDING URBAN SPACE

While “the capitalist state” has been deepening urban inequality and injustice, the opposition of exploited and oppressed groups increased as a response. Losers of this process are not only working-class but also women, ethnic groups, disabled and such groups who are not only economically exploited but also exposed to all the types of oppression and suppression. They have the opportunity to express their identity on and through urban space within the institutionalized or non- institutionalized channels of representation. As it is mentioned above, whether it is the unity of the social forces as Gramsci indicates, a national-popular alliance or political movements like Poulantzas brings forward, a mass unity is necessitated for the dominated classes to be able to form a counter-hegemonic movement. Here, it is essential to understand and analyze the potential of political movements in terms of being plural, differentiated, democratic and inclusive which can evolve them into counter-hegemonic movements.

It is a complex issue to analyze and frame political movements as the basic question is what is/not a political movement. A movement is a collectivity, a form of membership that is broader than a party or organization; more fluctuating. Here, studying political movements is closely related to studying collective behavior which is a cornerstone to studying society. The problem for collective behavior is its potential to create a change and/or be a result of social change. While before 1945 collective behavior was perceived as an “anomie”, after 1945 it became a part of the normal functioning of the social element for democratization and social change which was consolidated with the civil rights’ movements in the 1960’s- especially with the student movements.

Here, political movements in particular and social movements and/or urban social movements, in general, are formulated as consequences of the changes in social formation. In the 21st century, neo-liberal restructuring is the name of the change in

the capitalist-imperialist system starting from the 1980s all around the world. It was a hegemonic project having deep roots in the political, social and daily lives of the societies and the people. Besides, post-modernity was booming which indicates a new tendency breaking with the macro-approaches bringing a change of methodology. In the 1990s dramatic changes for the social movements theories arose such as globalization which is used since it is the most common and largely accepted word to define the current situation of not only economics but also other aspects of life. As a matter of fact, the word globalization itself is not neutral, it functions as ideological manipulation. However, it is still used for pragmatic reasons, especially for the new social movements and urban social movements literature it has a complementary function for their discourse and arguments. The forms, the ways and the political engagement of social movements need to be evaluated with reference to the mentioned transformation. The potential, the dynamics and the discourse of the social movements would be analyzed through such a perspective.

Here, the Gramscian paradigm continues to offer the best promise for understanding the social and political struggles that are signalled by contemporary social movements, while advancing a broadly defined socialist project. Although Gramsci did adhere to the Marxist premise of one hegemonic center (i.e., the social relations generated by the mode of production), his attention to culture and the relatively autonomous institutions of civil society amounted to a rejection of the monodeterministic base-superstructure argument of classical Marxism. Unlike Leninism, which ignored the democratic forms of culture needed to sustain autonomous movements, Gramsci's focus on a war of position; resonates with the efforts of social movements to create new political spaces within civil society and alter the content of hegemony. The Gramscian concept of history as its counterpart in the coalition-building notions prevalent in new social movements theory. The emphasis on the unification of class with popular-democratic struggles can be viewed, positively, as offering an analytic basis for exploring historical continuities between and social movements, a continuity otherwise obliterated by the atemporality of identity politics. In this dissertation, the relationship between social structure and political movements and the main factors of the participation of the political struggles in Tuzluçayır to the urban social movements

will be questioned as the rights and wrongs of their struggle strategies have the potential to show the ways to challenge the existing hegemonic structure.

5.1 Possibility of Counter-Hegemonic Movements

Until the 1960s, we can observe that orthodox Marxism neglected urban space in the analysis of capitalism as they failed to perceive the space as a social product in where F. Engels could be seen as an exception. In “*The Condition of the Working Class in England*” (1845) Engels glorifies the urban space with its potential and positive connotations, on the one hand, he criticized it for its creation of problems and misery, especially for the working class. Here, at first sight, it might seem like a conflict, a hole in Engel’s theory, however, this mainly resulted from a strong manoeuvre of his methodology- the dialectical materialism. There is a reciprocal and dialectical relationship between the progressive characteristics (the emergence of the industrial proletariat as a revolutionary force) and the obscurant characteristics (the emergence of the bourgeoisie as reactionary force) within the urban space.

However, this dialectical relationship creates the capital-labor conflict which also creates the necessary conditions for the revolution as the early phases of capitalism impose exploitation on the newly urbanized proletariat and used the industrial reserve army of labor to “tame” the laboring proletariat by compelling them to long working hours, low wages... etc. This, according to Marx and Engels creates the necessary condition for the revolution as they clearly expressed in the *Manifesto of the Communist Party*: “the advance of industry, whose involuntary promoter is the bourgeoisie, replaces the isolation of the laborers, due to competition, by the revolutionary combination, due to association.” (1977, p. 46).

Here, urban is perceived as the space in which the capital-labor conflict was intensified and consequently the conditions were set for the challenge of the capitalist mode of production by the proletariat. In this sense, for Marx and Engels, urban space has special prominence in terms of class consciousness formation. Therefore, the industrial proletariat works together in the workplaces and their living spaces as a result they live the process of exploitation, alienation and sub-alternation together. However, looking from the 21st century, especially Engels stands “naïve” while he was stating that the

capitalist mode of production deepens the class struggle and the spatial closeness of the proletariat will bring the end of capitalism is just “a matter of time”. Therefore, capitalism and the space it created appeared more resistant than Engels predicted.

In the 1960s Marxist theorists began to problematize the urban space as an object of inquiry rather than considering it as a “dependent” on economic relations. The “silence” of them is ended with Lefebvre’s “way back to the city” (Katznelson, 2004, p. 93) who is followed by Manuel Castells and David Harvey. Here, the strength of the Marxist urban theories came from their attempt to extend the understanding of the urban space from the relations of production to a broader set of economic, social and spatial relations. Therefore, as Katznelson stressed, one way or another they engage the dimensions of structure and agency to understand the urban space (ibid. p.138). They also used the capital-labor conflict to comprehend the usage of urban space itself as reproducing the existing inequalities. In this sense, their dialectical approach gave them a methodological manoeuvre space to show the inner conflicts and despite this fact, survival of capitalism that long. However, it should also bear in mind that they cannot show a coherent way to articulate the urban social movements to the class struggles. Accepting the fact that the urban space creates multiple consciousnesses, it is unclear how this consciousness organizes and transforms capitalism.

Capitalism has a tendency towards using potential weapons for its survival, which are originally designed for its own destruction. In this sense, what Marxism should do is to problematize the urban space as a problem of strategy and praxis beyond the labor-capital conflict. Today, there are multiple spaces of struggles like gender, race, ethnicity... etc., which cannot be reduced to the class struggle. The projects about the urban space take their power from the use/exchange value of the city, from the macro projects and in this sense the struggles, just like Lefebvre, Harvey and Castells suggest, should be for the spaces, the urban should be the space for resistance.

In his book *Rebel Cities* (2012), Harvey argues that domination of capitalist class can be observed on the whole population, their lifestyles, political and cultural values besides their labor-power through which we can observe the capacity of capitalist class to dominate the urban processes. Therefore, urbanization of capital necessitates domination of the urban space, which shows us the importance of urban space for

political struggles. Another influential figure on space in general, and urban space in particular, Lefebvre in his innovative work *The Production of Space* (1974) claims that through the acts of state and capitalist logic, organic space is reduced to an abstraction where space is infinitely fragmented, homogenized and has a hierarchical characteristic in order to meet the interests of dominant forces (state and capitalist class) as a result of this fragmentation city space is defeated by the “urban” space.

5.1.1 Lefebvre on Urban Space

As mentioned above, Lefebvre was the first among Marxist theorists who problematizes the urban space and questions its role/relation in/with the survival of capitalism. Integrating space to the Marxist discussion, Lefebvre attempted to analyze how capitalism has used urban space for its own sake: “Lefebvre’s argument was as path-breaking as it was prescient. He was one of the first to reveal the imperative role of urbanism in general, and production of urban space in particular, in the reproduction of capitalist relations” (Kuymulu, 2013, p. 925). Similar to Gramsci, Lefebvre’s focus on each aspect of the society from economy to culture everyday life, practices are an attempt to understand and eventually overcome the hegemony of the bourgeoisie:

Hegemony implies more than an influence, more even than the permanent use of repressive violence. It is exercised over society as a whole, culture and knowledge included, and generally via human mediation: policies, political leaders, parties, as also a good many intellectuals and experts. It is exercised, therefore, over both institutions and ideas (Lefebvre, 1991(b), p. 10)

After the promotion of capitalist ideology on the production sides of its evolution and regulation of the daily life of the society was completed, there was a new type of living experience created among this capitalist society. Lefebvre mainly deals with this process and its implementations to society from the perspective of “critical thinking”. He has tried to identify the structure of the capitalist system and the ways to find its survival during wars, the crisis of itself and its reproduction process. Kipfer calls attention to the semblances and differences in terms of meanings and roles attributed to the concept of hegemony between Gramsci and Lefebvre:

Gramsci and Lefebvre provided different but complementary approaches to hegemony. Gramsci's strategic-relational approach to hegemony

focused on particular historic-geographical constellations of state and civil society (historic blocs), which fuse various class fractions and social groups in particular historical situations. In contrast to Gramsci, Lefebvre neglected the relations, institutions, and strategies that mediate the extended state with everyday life. He approached the survival of capitalism dialectically, as a reformulation of the problematics of alienation and reification. (Kipfer, 2002, p. 126)

One of the important contributions of Lefebvre to “critical thinking” is his understanding of the reproduction of the capitalist system by focusing on the consumption side of the system rather than production, differing from orthodox Marxist theories. In fact, without disregarding the production side and in the last instance not rejecting Marx’s base and superstructure metaphor, he asked the question of whether the superstructure is just a determination of the former or has it a role in this determination process in a two-sided relationship. Therefore, as mentioned above the relative autonomy of the superstructure in Gramsci is also feasible for Lefebvre as similar to Gramsci’s focus on common sense on popular life, for Lefebvre; everyday life which is the area of the reproduction of relations of production constitutes the basis of social existence. In his words: “daily life can not be defined as a “sub-system” within a larger system. On the contrary; it is the “base” from which the mode of production endeavors to constitute itself as a system, by programming this base (Lefebvre,1991(a), p. 41)”.

It should be assumed that the state and economy is a result of this daily life experience. While the economy determines the shape of the social relations in society, and the state has a regulatory function of these relations, the power of the consumption side is critical too. When we look at the revolution done in the socialist states in the 20th century from this perspective, although they changed the structure of the state and even abolished private property one can say that they could not transform the origins of capitalism. According to Lefebvre, if the conformation of the social life does not change, the order of the older system will not be demolished. Therefore, daily life has a further meaning and significance than being a mere means of the superstructure. Lefebvre criticizes Soviet planners, architects in this respect;

Change life! Change Society! These ideas lose completely their meaning without producing an appropriate space. A lesson to be learned from soviet constructivists from the 1920s and 30s, and of their failure, is that new

social relations demand a new space, and vice-versa. (Lefebvre, 1991(b), p. 59)

Here, three dominant concerns are apparent in Lefebvre's works which can be listed as urban space and its production, everyday life in urban areas and the reproduction of capitalist social relations (Saunders, 1981, p. 158). According to Lefebvre, space should be considered as one of the elements of the forces and means of the production process. Besides being an essential part of production relations, it is also a product of these same relations and becomes an object of consumption (Gottdiener, 1988, p. 123). Since space is a product of capitalism, it is affected by the logic of capitalism that depends on the production of profit and exploitation of labor.

Lefebvre argues that this social production of urban space is fundamental to the reproduction of society, hence of capitalism itself. In relation to these, Lefebvre claimed that the basic contradiction in the production of urban space stems from the contradiction between the exploitation of it by capital in order to gain profit (exchange value) and the social requirements of those who consume it (use-value). In short, he claims that through the logic of capitalism, space was turned into a commodity (commodification of space) and a means for dictation of dominant ideology. In his words: "social space is a social product - the space produced in a certain manner serves as a tool of thought and action. It is not only a means of production but also a means of control, and hence of domination/power" (Lefebvre, 1991(b), p. 26).

Lefebvre identifies three dimensions in spatial practices, which are the material spatial practices, representations of space and spaces of representation. Each of these dimensions is dialectically related with each other and each of them corresponds to different meanings of space as the experienced space, the perceived space and the imagined space respectively. Material spatial practices are about physical and material flows, transfers and interactions that occur in and across space for production and social reproduction which is experienced by an ordinary person in his/her daily life. Representations of space refer to signs, codes and knowledge that allow material practices to be understood. It is the conceptualized space of scientists, planners, urbanists etc. and is the dominant space in every society while it was formed on the knowledge of ruling classes. Lastly, spaces of representation are social inventions such as symbolic spaces, particularly built environments, museums etc., helping to create

new meanings of possibilities for spatial practices. In other words, they are spaces directly lived and used by people (Harvey, 1989, p. 83).

One of the basic notions in Lefebvre's analysis of urban space is his introduction of abstract space and social space and the contradiction between them. According to him, through the acts of state and capitalist logic, organic space is reduced to an abstraction where space is infinitely fragmented, homogenized and has a hierarchical characteristic in order to meet the interests of dominant forces (state and capitalist class). Here, for Lefebvre "the degree to which the production of abstract space takes on hegemonic importance stands and falls with its capacity to incorporate everyday life (the immediate level of totality, or lived space, as Lefebvre calls it in his urban and spatial writings) (Kipfer, 2008, p. 196)."

As a result of this fragmentation, city space is defeated by the "urban" space. Lefebvre argues that abstract space creates illusions and, thus, false consciousness. On the other hand, social space is the integrated space of social communion which has an organic unity and has a very productive capacity in the way to transform the existing social and economic relations of capitalism (Gottdiener, 1988, p. 127). Social space is the space of everyday life in which biological reproduction, the reproduction of the workforce and the reproduction of the social relations of production operate in coexistence and cohesion (ibid:145). According to Lefebvre, social space which is the outcome of past actions is formed around encounter, assembly and simultaneity and he argues: "social space implies actual or potential assembly at a single point..." (Lefebvre,1991(b), p. 101). He names social space, which is the materialization of social being, also as the real space pointing out the lived experience (spaces of representation), rather than the concepts of specialists (representations of space) (Lefebvre, 1991(b)).

The contradiction between abstract space and social space is in fact the contradiction between the exchange value and use-value of space, which was mentioned above. Lefebvre states that in modern societies, social space is dominated by abstract space that leads to the process of "implosion-explosion," which is "introduced to illuminate the mutually recursive links between capitalist forms of agglomeration and broader transformations of territory, landscape and environment" (Brenner, 2014, p. 18). In

order to maintain the uniqueness of personalized and collectivized space, organic concepts of spatial segregation such as personal space, social space, residential space etc. arise and cities are separated into different ghettos. In short, the domination of abstract space over social space produces a fragmented urban space that is necessary for the reproduction of present economic, political and social relations (Gottdiener, 1988, p. 14).

From the oppositions and contradiction of abstract space, a new mode of spatial praxis emerged which is the differential space. It is, therefore, against the homogeneity of the abstract space which is eliminating the differences. In this sense, there is a dialectical relation between abstract and differential spaces as the latter is the resistance against the homogenization tendency of the former glorifying the use-value of the urban space over the exchange value. Following this, another essential argument put forth by Lefebvre is the claim that the reproduction of capitalist social relations occurs through the everyday use of space because of the subordination of space by the logic and power of capitalism. Through the everyday use of space, the form of capitalist relations such as individualism, commodification are imposed on the whole of everyday life. Then capitalism survives through its use of space, which reinforces the maintenance, and reproduction of social relations that are required for this survival. In other words, capitalist society reproduces itself through the medium of space (Kipfer et al., 2008, p. 6). Lefebvre emphasizes the importance of space as a political tool and its strategic importance for urban ideology. According to Lefebvre, space has primary importance as a political instrument for the state in order to ensure; “its control of places, its strict hierarchy, homogeneity of the whole and the segregation of the parts” (Gottdiener, 1988, pp. 125-126).

Closely related with the actions of state and the political power, Lefebvre defines dominated space as the space, which is transformed and mediated by technology and practice and views it as the closed, sterilized and emptied out space. Unlike the dominated space, a group produces appropriated space through the modification of natural space in order to serve the needs and possibilities of that group. As an example of dominated and appropriated space, Lefebvre suggests that outside spaces of a community are dominated spaces while indoor spaces where family life takes place are appropriated spaces (Lefebvre, 1991(b)).

To change the function, form, and structure of space, Lefebvre suggests that one must become conscious of how people produce physical, mental, and social space. By doing so, one becomes aware of the relationship between hegemony and the production of space. Therefore, his focus on the importance of space and/or everyday life of the “common people” provides a theoretical framework for understanding how the ruling class appropriates and dominates space to maintain social, political, and economic dominance.

Here, space for Lefebvre is a political instrument to control the society and even the means of production under “the capitalist state”. Urban space in specific has a primary importance functioning as a political instrument for the state in order to ensure controlling of spaces, its hierarchy, dictating the ways of life, segregation of the parts and extermination of the “enemy”. Here, in Turkey as “spatial design is a political instrument” in the hands of JDP rule, capital and dominant class; spatial organization of our metropolitan cities and their form represent power. JDP nourished by the capital’s interests appropriated the spaces of the “enemy” to take an advantageous position in the war on economic and ideological aspects of the urban space which brings us to the Lefebvre’s other – and probably the most controversial contribution to urban literature to overcome the hegemony of the dominant class on the urban space - *right to the city*. Right to the city is defined as a cry and a demand encouraging citizens to participate in the reproduction of the urban space opposing the hegemonic policies. Here, the calls for the right to the city have an important role to break the hegemony of dominant classes in urban space. Kipfer explains this as follows:

These calls for the right to the city challenged the hegemonic integrity of neo-capitalism because they linked a claim for a different, utopian urban order to assertions of the right to difference for those segregated and peripheralized: students, workers, immigrants, women and residents of peripheral regions. (2002, p. 142)

Here, these calls are the signs of being visible and carry the potential of finding cracks of hegemony on urban space. In this sense, right to the city “signifies the right of citizens and city dwellers, and of groups they (on the basis of social relations) constitute, to appear on all networks and circuits of communication, information and exchange” (Lefebvre, 2000, pp. 194-195).

As mentioned above, the urban space in the capitalist order has gained significance through exchange value rather than its use-value as dominant classes extracted value from the exchange of the spaces. Here, against these classes Lefebvre states that the masses in the urban space should fight for taking back the city, to be a part of the decision-making process. Lefebvre's vision about the urban space and/or city is not a nostalgic yearning to past relations/structure, rather it is a new urban strategy that assumes the city as a center:

the city creates a condition in which heterogeneous elements no longer exist in isolation. As a place of encounter, communication, and information, the city is also a place in which constraints and normality are dissolved, and are joined by the elements of the playful and unpredictable.”
(Schmid, 2011, p. 47)

In this sense, the city is the center both in terms of being at the center of the urban politics and urban “space”. Lefebvre successfully used Marxist conjuncture to extend its analysis on capitalism beyond the perception of urban as a space for production. The success of his theory comes mainly from his linking the success of capitalism to commodify, produce the space itself unlike Marx and Engels foresees (Lefebvre, 1996). Therefore, under capitalism, the space has exchange value besides its use-value and Lefebvre suggests political movements to use the class struggles in the urban space (Şengül, 2001, p. 16). In a sense, he suggests “the” socialist movement to “explore” the urban space just like capitalism did and identified the socialist space as a place for differences. However, he could not detail the integration process of the class struggles with the urban space and the unification of the differences to destroy the “power bloc”.

In that matter, he is differentiated from thinkers like F. Tönnies (1887), G. Simmel (1903), L. Wirth (1940) and many others who glorify locality and solidarity through “community lost” arguments. Here, as Bell & Newby (1971, p. 22) emphasized, the community lost arguments stand for the community life “before” urbanization and industrialization:

...in the nineteenth century ‘community’ occupied a position in the minds of intellectuals similar to the idea of ‘contract’ in the Age of Reason. The concept of community, however, was not a cold, analytic construct. On the contrary, the ties of community, real or imagined, came from these thinkers’ images of good the good life.

However, Lefebvre stands in a more concrete and structuralist position defending an urban praxis through which intervention to the decision-making process in/for the city is possible. “Right to the city” in this praxis appeared to be a process derived from the urban strategy including integrative struggles and tactical relations that should destroy the old ones and be reproduced consecutively. Here, “right to the city” is also an attempt to change the meaning attributed to the urban space by neoliberal hegemony; it points the urban space as a cradle for political struggles: “Reflective of his stress on the city as a space of politics, Lefebvre envisions a city where its inhabitants could properly participate in urban political life. This emphasis is most visible in the specific way he frames the right to the city” (Kuymulu, 2013, p. 925).

To sum up, Lefebvre broadened the concept of class and dealt with conflict and struggle he emphasized the role of the state in the exploitation of the urban space. Urban is the space for the struggle, revolution and/or change while urbanization is a new way for struggle and urbanism is the driving force. Similar to Gramsci, he attempted to understand the domination of the hegemonic forces in the nodes of the civil society, i.e, the daily lives of the “ordinary” people. However:

...Lefebvre was more doubtful than Gramsci about the self-sufficiency, or integrity, of marxism in a unified working-class culture. While both Gramsci and Lefebvre shared a normative commitment to totality - a post-revolutionary common sense (Gramsci) and the possibility of non-alienated human relationships (Lefebvre) - Lefebvre's sense of contradiction within the history of marxism made him more skeptical about the fusion of theory and practice, thought and being that Gramsci proposed with his theories of party and organic intellectuals. (Kipfer, 2002, p. 124)

Similar to Lefebvre’s focus on everyday life as a position for domination and in relation to the struggles on the urban space, Harvey, in his book *Rebel Cities* (2012) argues that domination of capitalist class can be observed on the whole population, their life styles, political and cultural values besides their labor-power through which we can observe the capacity of the capitalist class to dominate the urban processes. Therefore, the urbanization of capital necessitates domination of the urban space.

Mainly dealing with political economy, Harvey’s basic concern about urban studies is social justice and its implementation on urban space as the history of modern cities is the history of maximization of the profits of the capitalists. Here, Harvey states that there are many competing theories of social justice like positive law, social contract

and natural rights approach, utilitarian view, intuitionist and relative deprivation theories. He questions the most “just” theory among them arguing that competing discourses about justice cannot be thought independent from competing discourses about positionality in society. Here, there are two possible paths: How concepts of justice are embedded in language? (with reference to Wittgensteins’s language game) and to admit the relativism of discourses about justice, but to insist that discourses are expressions of social power. Harvey, in the end, argues that: “Taking capitalistic notions of social rationality or of justice, and treating them as universal values to be deployed under socialism, would merely mean the deeper instantiation of capitalist values by way of the socialist project” (1996, p. 596)

In Harvey’s analysis, the logic of the functioning of capitalism is centric for understanding urban processes. He focuses on the transitions between the three circuits of capital accumulation by referencing the urban space. Under the influence of Lefebvre’s diagnosis on the continuity of the capitalist system despite its crisis after the Great Depression that is asserting that capitalism survived because of its discovery of the urban space, Harvey tended to analyze the built environment and its relation with capital accumulation processes. He states that the over-accumulation pre-Keynesian period led to the transition from “supply-side” urbanization to a “demand-side” one (Harvey, 1985, p. 34). That implies the intensity of investments shifted from primary circuits to secondary circuits and the state plays a central role in these transitions between the circuits¹¹. For example, after Great Depression, the state made investments in built environments for production and consumption by creating suburbs. The state issued new urbanization policies by planning the areas outside the cities. In that process, many people were employed, and the construction of roads and buildings led to financing capital.

¹¹ Christophers summarizes the realms of circuits in Harvey as follows: “Following Lefebvre (1970), Harvey refers to these different realms as “circuits”: The “primary” circuit is the realm of production and of the creation of surplus value; the “secondary” circuit is the built environment; and the “tertiary” circuit, to which Harvey pays much less attention, includes “investment in science and technology” (the purpose of which is “to contribute to the processes that continuously revolutionize the productive forces in society”) and “social expenditures that relate primarily to the processes of reproduction of labor power” (1985b, pp. 7–8) (2011, p. 1361)

The role of the local state was placed on the consumption side that provides reproduction of labor power through social funds, investments in health, education... etc. Therefore, the state carries the burden of mediating between the circuits that are in line with the interest of capital. Moreover, in the early 1970s, because of the increase in the taxes used for the state expenditures, the profit proportion of the capital began to decrease. Thus, through the late 1970s, the end of Keynesian policies came into existence and the transition from the consumption side to the production side was realized with the mediation of the state. The economic problems that existed in the Welfare state and that originated from the crisis in the early 1970s caused a change in the structure of government on the urban level. The locals had to combat these problems without the financial support of the national state. In the case of investments, the role of the local level increased and the negotiation process between international finance capital and local powers started (Harvey, 1991, p. 5). Therefore, the cities' exchange value gained significance and they began to be transformed on the basis of attracting capital. One can say that the glorification of exchange value over the use-value of urban space which was emphasized by Lefebvre initially, manifest itself in the current policies of the governments on built-environment for which the concept of "creative destruction" could be explanatory.

For Harvey, when capitalism struggles with the periodic crisis of over-accumulation, it usually comes up with a solution of "spatial fix" which addresses the investment in fixed assets of infrastructure mainly. Here, urbanization itself is an effective tool to absorb the capital surplus and the built environment could function to displace the crisis with the fact that it has a limit and tends to "freeze" forces of production into a "spatial fix". However, capital, in its nature, cannot be satisfied with the degree of profitability, time and space compression reached extreme forms, especially through technological innovations. Although these innovations "devalue" -in its most softened way- the former investments and labor skills and in this sense "creative destruction" could be perceived as an organic part of the circulation of capital. Innovation brings instability/insecurity, which inevitably resulted in the periodic crisis of capital, and there are needed new product lines to create new wants and needs. But what about the left-over sectors? Here, the insecurity and instability were sharply deepened and the line of production that lost its profitability was abandoned by the capital and the labor.

There would be geographical movements of capital and labor to more advantageous places with a territorial and also international division of labor triggering the insecurity. Here, creative destruction is a strategy, a vicious circle so to speak developed not to solve but to move the contradictions and crisis geographically which most concretized in terms of globalization.

Moreover, we observed that especially after the 1980s, the disadvantaged groups living “under zero” were excluded from the labor market; since they do not have a regular income or even no-income which means a failure to be involved in market relations; faced with the economic exclusion as they lose “the ability to financially support oneself or one's family at the norm for society”; institutional exclusion as they do not have the access to the private institutions; social isolation as they cannot be involved in the social networks and finally they are experienced spatial exclusion nourished by creative destruction and by the strategy of “accumulation by dispossession” concretized in the “gentrification” and/or urban retransformation. Through this line of policies, it is a necessity for the ones who are excluded from the decision-making process in the urban space to claim a position in the war having a doubt on the representative, motives and actors of a possible revolt. Here, Harvey carefully recalled the “right to city” by envisaging the concept as a mean rather than an end admitting that Lefebvre has a revolutionary initial point:

The whole capitalist system of perpetual accumulation, along with its associated structures of exploitative class and state power, has to be overthrown and replaced. Claiming the right to the city is a way-station on the road to that goal. It can never be an end in itself, even if it increasingly looks to be one of the most propitious paths to take. (2012, p. xviii)

Harvey’s formulation is directly related to the problem of relations of the population in the urban space with the urban resources, decision-making process and in general with social life. In this sense, “right to the city” does not simply mean the right to access the resources in the urban space; rather it is a right to reproduce the social relations, transforming the urban space with a collective consciousness. One of his early works, *Social Justice and the City* (1973) demonstrates the possibility of bringing social processes and spatial forms to trigger the action in which he attempted to give a spatial dimension to Marx’s theory on capitalist accumulation.

It is essential to state that, the existence of capitalism as the dominant mode of production necessitates the analysis of the city to start with the analysis of “that” mode of production. So, just like Lefebvre, for Harvey the studies on urban space in general, and on right to the city, in particular, should be more than a simple “right seeking”; it should be a totalistic war against capitalism which essentially resulted in a revolution not only on the urban space but also in the mode of living. For Lefebvre, the class struggle should focus on the production of space, territorial structure of exploitation and controlled reproduction of the system as a whole. In advanced capitalism, the struggle will be in the form of an *urban revolution* for the *right to the city* and control over *everyday life*. In this approach, the spatial problem becomes central in the class struggle.

Any social revolution will require a spatial revolution. In this formulation, the right to the city should be against the system as urbanization is a capitalist process as the dominant classes embrace urban space as a surplus product. In other words, “right to the city” which was based on self-management, autogestion and urban change is a unifying element, a political strategy that could be used as a trigger to masses for anti-capitalist struggle and/or movements that are outside the decision-making process. It is the right not to be excluded from the centrality; a right to social space to another society. Mouffe draws attention to the “passive” formation of citizenship as a simple recipient who only enjoys the “protection of the law” under liberalism. (2002, p. 235). Similar to that, in Turkey, especially starting from the 2000s while the urban space was commodified, the citizen was reduced to a simple “consumer” without any kind of power in the decision-making process (Uzunçarşılı Baysal, 2011, p. 31).

In Turkey, the movements demanding (and crying for the) right to the city is in the first place a challenge to this “passive” conception of citizenship. With the changing definition of citizenship to an everyday activity/ a struggle which constantly redefines the rights and duties resulting with the shift in the scale, Purcell signifies: “citizenship is being reterritorialized” (2003, p. 567). Here in Turkey, probably more than anywhere, through this reterritorialization, the bonds between citizenship and the nation-state were weakened as in the 21st century, being a member of a political community does not necessarily mean being a member of a nation-state. As Mouffe suggest, the state does not necessarily include the politics, or to put it in another way,

the political and/or the politics does not directly relate with the state apparatus. Here, Purcell suggests three major changes in the definition and operation of citizenship (2003, p. 566):

- Citizenship is being *rescaled*, such that the former hegemony of the national-scale political community is being weakened by the creation of communities at other scales;
- Citizenship is being *reterritorialized*, such that the tight link between the nation state's territorial sovereignty and political loyalty is increasingly thrown open to question;
- Citizenship is being *reoriented*, away from the nation as the predominant political community.

Here, Purcell puts political struggle to the center as a determinant of the shifts in the context of citizenship stating that those changes are based on negotiation and conflict. While admitting that the scale of “nation” was basically dominant in the Fordist era, the changing context of the economy, state and sovereignty resulted in the “denationalization” of citizenship (2003, p. 568). In the post-national era, basically, globalization and migration resulted in partial glocalization of citizenship with the growing role of the supra-national scale. This rescaling manifests itself beyond “international citizenship” with the emergence of cosmopolitan, post-national and transnational citizenship. This rescaling both affects and is affected by *reterritorialization* of citizenship with the shifting target of loyalty from the nation-state to “a political community” as “the notion of sovereignty at the national scale is destabilized, the opportunity that the notion of sovereignty may be losing its position of dominance” (Sassen, 1996) (cited in Purcell, 2003, p. 574). With the destabilization of sovereignty in the nation-states, the loyalty formerly dedicated to the national level now shifted to the various political communities regarding ethnic, class, gender... etc. identities. Today, it is possible and common to be a member of or feel the sense of belonging to multiple citizenship statuses at non-national scales.

This shift in the scale is also relevant for this dissertation as one of the concerns regarding the potential of movements in Tuzluçayır Neighborhood is the sense of belonging “to” the neighborhood which assumed a “loyalty” that Sassen and Purcell anticipate. Therefore, as will be mentioned below, being “Tuzluçayırılı” as a label and as a new kind of citizenship in the subnational level will be questioned in terms of the

effectiveness and influence of the political activists over the residents. There, the processes mentioned above lead to *multi-layered citizenship* as having multiple identities means belonging to one more than a single political community. Moreover, the political communities in Tuzluçayır Neighborhood themselves are not uniform as they inherit several identity groups defined by their gender, ethnicity, class... etc. Here in Turkey in general, and Tuzluçayır in particular, together with rescaling and reterritorialization, reorientation of the citizenship challenges the classical/national model of citizenship as a result of the changing nature of the political economy, globalization and/or glocalization and political and/social movements. Here, with Holston's words citizenship, today is a "membership in a political association or community that articulates relation, not a dichotomy, between structures and social lives" (2010, p. 2) and the possibility of this kind of citizenship will also be questioned in Tuzluçayır Neighborhood.

Through this line of thought, Purcell's reformulation eventually leads us to the arguments of the changing context of urban spaces as he put right to city as a new form of citizenship. To understand the effect of political economy on citizenship on the urban level, it is essential to revise the arguments on the urban space focusing on "space as a social product" under capitalism. In Turkey, probably more than anywhere in the world, the concept/process of right to the city refer to the people/mass in the city who are one of the parties in this war seeking radical change not only in the city, but also in their lives. It is clear that the right to the city is a powerful strategy to be followed by the masses, but it is also essential to identify these masses. Here, the popular concept "insurgent citizenship", which is put across, by John Friedmann and James Holston in the 1990s is one of the effective tools to understand the subjects of the recent uprisings in the 21st century who have the potential to claim to the right to the city. To understand the distinguishing qualifications of Insurgent Citizenship, it is essential to identify insurgency with its relation to the concept of citizenship. Here, Holston identified the insurgent as:

...emphasize the opposition of these spaces of citizenship to the modernist spaces that physically dominate so many cities today. I also use it to emphasize an opposition to the modernist, political project that absorbs citizenship into a plan of state building and that, in the process, generates a certain concept and practice of planning itself. (2013, p. 424)

Here, as mentioned above in Turkey, land became a commodity itself especially in the 2000s. With respect to this, it is possible to claim that starting with the 1980s the urbanization process in Turkey is characterized by the urbanization of capital. Thus, while center(s) of the urban space was growing up in a dispersed manner, urban transformation projects under the name of “urban renewal” and/or gentrification became the most essential elements which defined Turkey’s cities reflecting the highest degree of urbanization of capital since the 1980s breeding with JDP’s political ideology and strategy along with economic policies. It is essential to mark the relations of contemporary urban policy, patterns of investment, eviction, “controlled consumption”, dispossession by accumulation strengthen through the political strategy of the government as symptoms of urban crisis. Therefore, through the commodification and politicization of the urban space through conservatist policies we can observe the importance of space as a political tool and its strategic importance for urban ideology as Lefebvre put it. So, “right to the city” has a primary importance functioning as a political instrument for the subordinated, dominated, and excluded from the decision-making process in order to challenge the existing urban policies.

As Şükrü Aslan put it, in Turkey the *gecekondulaşma* process includes a challenge in which the public land was occupied and gecekondu were built with the solidarity of the relatives/ “local citizenship” relations followed by the search for the “further rights” (2004, p. 64). It is in a sense, the first step to revolt against the design of the urban space. Uzunçarşılı Baysal asks that “whether the right to shelter have a potential to evolve into a struggle for the right to the city?” (2011, p. 45) We will ask a similar question while analyzing the movements in Tuzluca: Do the movements in Tuzluca have the potential to rescale themselves in terms of including the demands of “right to the city” as it includes the possibility of nationalizing these movements?

The strength of the Marxist urban theories mentioned above came from their attempt to extend the understanding of the urban space from the relations of production to a broader set of economic, social and spatial relations. Following Marx, both Lefebvre and Harvey examined to change the existing hegemonic relations in/on urban space and re-construct the latter in favor of the dominated classes. Therefore, as Katznelson stressed, one way or another they engage the dimensions of structure and agency to understand the urban space (1993, p. 138). They also used the capital-labor conflict to

comprehend the usage of urban space itself as reproducing the existing inequalities. In this sense, their dialectical approach gave them a methodological manoeuvre space to show the inner conflicts and despite these conflicts the reasons behind the survival of capitalism that long. However, it should also be borne in mind that neither Lefebvre nor Harvey can show a coherent way to articulate the urban social movements to the class struggles. Accepting the fact that the urban space creates multiple consciousnesses, it is unclear how this consciousness organize and transform capitalism.

When it is argued that the urban should be the cradle for the potential social and/or urban social movements, the right to the city arguments should also be comprehended as an alternative to entrenched notions of citizenship. According to Harvey, the failure of Marxism was to accept the capitalist base as all structure and no agency. However, Harvey asks who are the agents that understand the functionalism of the city and make it work but hardly gives an answer. As mentioned above, Harvey in several examples demonstrates that in various contexts, the agency of ordinary people has shaped the development of cities. He continues that, Marx in his time, couldn't explain class formation and how a class in itself becomes a class for itself. But the late 1960s was the right time to see and theorize the concept of social movement as an agent for social transformation of which consolidative block should be "right to the city":

One step towards unification of these struggles is to focus on the right to city as both working slogan and a political ideal, precisely because it focuses on who it is that commands the inner connection that has prevailed from time immemorial between urbanization and surplus production and use. The democratization of the right to the city and the construction of broad social movement to enforce its will is imperative, if the disposed are to take back control of the city from which they have for so long been excluded from and if new nodes of controlling capital surpluses as they work through urbanization processes are to be instituted. (Harvey, 2016, p. 278)

Here, the reframing of "right to the city" as a potential strategy of social movements by Purcell is a significant reconstruction of the concept focusing on the shifting orientation of power relations:

(Lefebvre's) right to the city is not a suggestion for reform, nor does it envision a fragmented, tactical, or piecemeal resistance. His idea is instead a call for a radical restructuring of social, political, and economic relations, both in the city and beyond. Key to this radical nature is that the right to the

city reframes the arena of decision making in cities: it reorients decision-making away from the state and toward the production of urban space. (2002, p. 101)

Just like Harvey, Purcell signified the decision-making process to be captured by the masses and towards the use-value of the urban space, not the exchange value. As a matter of fact, it is defined as a process that would radically change the composition of the cities towards the common good which necessitates restructuring the social, economic and political relations. In this sense, right to the city should be a revolutionary process to demolish the existing system on urban space that is based on the usage of surplus-value and instead of building a democratic city including masses as decision-makers. Here, while global capitalism has been deepening, urban inequality and injustice, the opposition of exploited and oppressed groups should be increased as a response. Losers of the globalization process are not only working-class as particularly women, ethnic groups, disabled and other disadvantaged classes and/or groups are not only economically exploited, but also exposed to all the types of oppression and suppression. They have the opportunity to express their identity on and through urban space within the institutionalized or non- institutionalized channels of representation.

As Katznelson comments on Harvey:

capitalist development convenes the spatial relationships that make this new consciousness possible, and Harvey tries to demonstrate, in a strained affirmation of orthodoxy, that the non-class relationships it express are fundamentally fictitious, because the only irreducible social relations in a capitalist mode of production are those of capital and labor. (ibid,122)

Mayer sees today's urban social movements as much more heterogeneous and fragmented in comparison to the urban movements of the 1970s and 1980's. She indicated aggregation of "the movements in defense of threatened communities" and "the movements of newly marginalized, poor people's movements" (1999, p. 215). On this basis, she suggests coalitions among these different sectors of urban movements for a democratic, ecologically sustainable and just city (ibid, 231). Followingly, Marcuse (2009) invites city dwellers to a unified struggle, to a coalition, an alliance, a movement or other formulation to fight for the use-value of the city. The discussion on right to city or radical urbanism can be seen as a new phase in the urban social

movements' theory and through this discussion Lefebvre, Harvey, Castells and many others drew attention to coalition among different social groups and paid attention to the organized power of the urban social movements.

5.1.2 Conclusion

In "New Imperialism" Harvey expressed the coercive character of accumulation by dispossession as capital's "possession" of assets including labor power and deriving them to profitable use. The resources of the assets, lands, production units...etc of the public institutions are possessed by a "bargain price" and extracted high profits from them. Here, the "Boulevard of Milli İrade" constructed illegally on the land of METU was legitimized by the preceding mayor of Ankara Metropolitan Municipality- İ. Melih Gökçek as serving for the "common good" and claims "paying for their prices" to the METU administration¹². As a matter of fact, admitting the fact that following Harvey, the mayor acted with an expectation of high profit, we can address not only the economic but also political profits he seeks for. Therefore, just before the local elections he "wishes to" be nominated by JDP and to achieve this, he attempted to use this "plunder" as an asset to compete with his rivals.

Another example that reflects the "capture of high-value land from low-income population" is Sulukule¹³ with its (former) characteristics of dominancy of the informal economy or economic activities departing from the mainstream economic activities on the neighborhood and residents living in the district conventionally working in the amusement sector. Sulukule was excluded in lots of dimensions as they are economically, ethnically-culturally and socially marginalized which made them both an "enemy" to be destructed and easy targets to be "dispossessed". The state

¹² Retrieved from <https://www.evrensel.net/haber/331932/odtu-agaclari-bir-gecede-yok-edildi-gokcek-ovundu> on 12.05.2020

¹³ Sulukule is the informal name of Hatice and Neslişah Sultan Neighborhood. The district is known as the oldest Romani settlement not only in Turkey but also in Europe. European Roman Rights Center states that Sulukule is inhabited by around 5,000 people who are predominantly Romani and is famous for its musical entertainment culture and is a UNESCO World Heritage Sight. This district, which is 1000 years old settlement, is in a very centric location within the boundaries of Fatih Municipality and this is the most important reason for the urban renovation project being executed with the cooperation of TOKİ and Fatih Municipality.

created a neighborhood that is profitable for the capital and desirable for the buyers as the ideological dimension- the “danger” of Romani people should also be recalled. Here, it is profitable on both sides: capturing the land from the low-income population, extracting high value from it and excluding and more than that “concealing” the poor, marginalized to the outskirts of the city. In both cases, one can easily observe that JDP nourished by the capital’s interests appropriated the spaces of the “enemy” to take an advantageous position in the war on economic and ideological aspects of the urban space.

It was in a sense both “a cry and a demand” struggle for the right to city, radical urbanism indicating the ways for urban demands including cultural or economic dimensions at the same time. Here, deepening economic inequalities and social injustice melding of this injustice with gender and ethnic discrimination, high degree of “abstraction of space” was reflected on the space based on a coalition around cross-class demands. Here, Lefebvre was seeing the potential for transformation of this bureaucratic society with the desire of the human being to the freedom, since he thinks that the basic goal of the human being is to reach an adequate level of the consciousness for “desire” and “pleasure”. Castells in *City and the Grassroots* (1983) states that class is no more at the center of the urban struggle; it is in a sense reduced to identity among the others such as black, woman, ecologist, lesbian...etc. In fact, the class and the city are used as categories as externally related, in this formulation. Then, urban social movements are perceived as a category of new social movements with their non-class basis, operation outside the realm of production and participatory ethos.

In Turkey, the revolts/conflicts in Turkey regarding the right to the city and in general “right to have rights” took their power mainly from this non-class basis; but ironically the weakness of their survival was probably derived from this non-class basis. The conflicts around social transformation should demand destroying hierarchical structures and aim to establish a society on the basis of participatory democracy, the autonomy of the localities and local cultures and on the basis of the use-value of the urban space. It should also be “a war against finance capital” and government in which the fashionable demand of “right to the city” should be questioned carefully as not only it addresses mainly to the middle class- in that sense, excluding the “soldiers” of

the other classes; but it could fall into the hands of private or quasi-private interests as Harvey exemplified in the case of the mayor of New York- M. Bloomberg:

is reshaping the city along lines favourable to developers, Wall Street and transnational capitalist-class elements, and promoting the city as an optimal location for high-value businesses and a fantastic destination for tourists. He is, in effect, turning Manhattan into one vast gated community for the rich...The right to the city, as it is now constituted, is too narrowly confined, restricted in most cases to a small political and economic elite who are in a position to shape cities more and more after their own desires (2008, p. 38).

Up to now, it is questioned that a radical change in the society starting from Gramsci to Poulantzas, and in the urban space from Lefebvre to Harvey, Castells and many others draw attention should address coalition among different social groups and pay attention to the organized power of the urban social movements.

Following them, one should invite urban dwellers to a unified struggle, to a coalition, an alliance, a movement or other formulation to fight for the use-value of the city. However, there is an essential question to be answered for the possibility of a unified struggle: who will be the inviter? From now on, I will try to find answers to some questions:

- How grassroots movements and/or political organizations can build a counter-hegemonic project?
- Scaling up from a territorial struggle to a popular project of social transformation, is it possible to create a counter-hegemonic popular common sense?
- What is the role of the organic intellectuals to act with the masses in terms of realizing their social reality and lead them to be the protagonists of social change?
- Can we speak of local organic intellectuals? Or can a neighborhood make the intellectuals “organic”?

CHAPTER 6

ENTERING THE FIELD: TUZLUÇAYIR AND THE POLITICAL ACTIVISTS

In this chapter, I attempted to clarify the methodological path that will guide my theoretical leadings-which are floating like dust particles. Studying a group of people in a demarcated space has brought certain difficulties which also necessitates a certain level of clarification. First of all, I will present the importance of the concept “hegemony” in the field and related to this, the possibilities of “counter-hegemonic movements” under the rule of the capitalist state (and its hegemonic projects) will be questioned while considering the empirical data derived from the field research in Tuzluçayır. Later, the methods of data collection that was used for this dissertation will be clarified which will be followed by a brief analysis of the sampling process. Finally, the difficulties and limitations of conducting such research will be elaborated.

6.1 Research Design and Respondents: Who are resisting?

Here, one of the limitations of this dissertation is the categorization and number of respondents of the field research. After the military intervention on September 12th 1980, the troops were deployed in emancipated *gecekondu* neighborhoods, one of which was Tuzluçayır. The military regime developed as a response to the needs of and pressures from an urbanizing poor and brought an end to the radicalizing agenda of cities (Şengül, 2003). However, Tuzluçayır remained as a neighborhood that is “safe” for leftist militants/activists resulting from the political and ethnic background of the residents. The 1990s witnessed striking poverty, socio-spatial exclusion and inequalities, polarization and fragmentation of the cities in Turkey. In this period, the radicalization of many leftists increased along with armed radical groups and urban protests in ‘emancipated’ regions where the actors out of the system became the legitimacy which kept Tuzluçayır active in terms of resistance. While the youth in the

neighborhood articulated with radical revolutionary groups, the older ones engaged with RPP. This alliance also continues nowadays as in June 2015 General Elections, RPP received the 76.5 % of the votes in the neighborhood, while for PDP the ratio was 10%¹⁴. The leading party in the elections- JDP only took 7.58 % of the votes while the ratio in November 2015 General Elections were 76.2 % for RPP, 9.77% for PDP and 9.62 % for JDP¹⁵. Similarly in 2019 Local Elections, while RPP took 7.380 votes, 829 people voted for JDP's candidate for Mamak Municipality, 7.487 people voted for RPP while it was 774 for JDP's candidate for Metropolitan Municipality¹⁶

The field research was conducted between 2013-2018, a long period as the political mobility in the neighborhood necessitates long term observation and participation. In this research, I mostly dealt with the qualitative approach as the political activists were accessed as the “objects” of the study rather than being “subjects”. It was essential to learn the feelings, ideas, and opinions of these social actors about the social experiences they lived through. Here, the perception of hegemony and/or hegemonic projects and the potential of counter-hegemony is limited to the “active players” of these political organizations. The identity of the neighborhood is meant to be evaluated according to the interaction of these political movements with supporters, sympathizers and the “neutral” residents. However, in this dissertation, the focus will be on the political activists' perception of the resistance movements and their evaluation of neighborhood participation in these movements. In this sense, this study is closely related to leadership as the aim is to understand the world of the activists and the solidarity among them that have the potential to pave the way for counter-hegemonic projects; grand or not. Therefore, this research is about the activists who take the lead.

It should be noted that this was considered to be analysed through qualitative techniques such as in-depth interviews and their interpretation. I have never thought about using the high-sounding quantitative data to determine the “level” of their

¹⁴ Retrieved from <https://secimatlasi.com/secim-sonuclari/2015/ankara/mamak/abidinpasa/tuzlucayir-mahallesi/> on 04.05.2020

¹⁵ Retrieved from <https://secimatlasi.com/secim-sonuclari/20152/ankara/mamak/abidinpasa/tuzlucayir-mahallesi/> on 04.05.2020

¹⁶ Retrieved from <https://sonuc.ysk.gov.tr/sorgu/> on 04.06.2021

potential but tried to present unique individual experiences of these social actors. To give a wider space to express themselves, the interviews were designed to be semi-structured, while even some of them are unstructured, mostly we started with my question, one thing led to another and as a result, almost all interviews lasted about 2 hours and were recorded between 2017-2018. It should be noted that, before initiating the interviews, approval was received from METU Ethical Committee on Human Research¹⁷. There were one-to-one and group interviews and these group interviews include both activists from the same political organization and different ones. Here, the interactions between the activists from different political organizations were valuable to observe, actually showing the essentiality of their cooperation and points of divergence.

The sample group was officially composed of 32 interviewees; 19 men and 13 women from ages 18-69 who were politically active and affiliated with an oppositional political organization. Many more off-the-record interviews were conducted to provide a better understanding of the internal structuring of the political organizations. For interpretivism, the social world is the world perceived and experienced by its members from the *inside*, the people living in Tuzluçayır have the most competent information about their potential. Hence, the task of the social scientist is to discover and describe this insider view, not to impose an outsider view. In this sense, during the interviews, I tried to be as impartial as possible but also encouraged them to express themselves freely. There were basic socio-demographic questions including, age, sex, marital status and educational background, but the rest of the questions were open-ended. With the consent of the interviewees, the audio-tape recording was used during the interviews and these were transcribed later on.

As a researcher, I actively spent time in the neighborhood to be able to understand the “practice” of the theoretical answers. Before conducting the interviews, I also had conversations with the local people, who are not affiliated with any political group, from owners of the local shops to workers and/or the ordinary people just sitting in a park. Being raised in a small neighborhood similar to that, it was relatively easy for me to start a conversation with the people. Moreover, participant observation was used

¹⁷ The protocol number of the Committee decision is 2017-SOS-153.

as an essential tool to understand where they stand in terms of the hegemonic formations; and their counter-hegemonic practices. Throughout these years, I was invited and/or participated in several protests, press statements, several meetings and social activities in which I could also observe the internal dynamics of these political organizations and intra/interrelations. In these actions, being witness to the communication among these activists were quite illuminating as the interaction provided a stimulating background for the concepts fostered by Gramsci. These were the most valuable times of this research. During these participations, I also talked with many other activists, supporters and sympathizers which were also quite valuable in terms of seeing the other actors behind the story.

To state the political organizations that the interviewees were affiliated with as; AKA-DER, Kaldıraç, Halkevleri, PDP, CPT, United June Movement¹⁸; among which AKA-DER and Halkevleri were the two most active ones in terms of the number of participants, organizing and leading the resistance actions. In the first place, I used my connections to find the interviewees, by a close friend who lived in the neighborhood and has an open political affiliation, who introduced me to a few of his friends and we tried to explain the aim of the study. After that a snowball strategy was applied to diversify the sample group in the later visits, almost each of the interviewees introduced me to another activist, who was quite willing to contribute to this research.

I carried a small diary notebook with me while visiting the neighborhood in which I took notes about the details of both practices and my opinions on these practices. It

¹⁸ AKA-DER is a socialist organization which is an abbreviation of Anatolian Culture and Research Organization which is established in Tuzluca in 2003. They defined their purpose as follows: “to reveal the history and culture of the Anatolian peoples, to create channels where people can express themselves, to raise awareness in large sections of the society against social problems, economic-political-ideological attacks against workers-labourers-people, and to improve social organization.” (obtained from their Facebook account Aka-Der Genel Merkez as they do not have a “more official” website.) Kaldıraç is a socialist journal based on the idea of “Anatolian Revolution” published since 1996 which has a symbiotic relation with AKA-DER. The journal became a center for a political movement in nation-wide. Originally, Halkevleri is the name of civil rights project which was founded in 1932 and abolished in 1951. Halkevleri in this dissertation, on the other hand, refers to the socialist organization that is reestablished in 1987 which has a legal association nowadays. Peoples’ Democratic Party (PDP) and Communist Party of Turkey (CPT) are political parties that define themselves in the left. United June Movement is the newest one of these formations as it is a political coalition which is formed in 2013- the name refers to the protests of Gezi Park on the June, 2013.

helped me to be more careful about the details while considering and rethinking the transcriptions. Also, I scanned online the news on the newspapers about the neighborhood constantly to understand the “outsiders” views. Therefore, the interviewees shared a similar orientation about the hegemonic formations “outside” the neighborhood as they mentioned the power of the mainstream media on the negative public opinion of Tuzluçayır. I took photos of the neighborhood which are shared below beside the photos/and videos recorded during the protests; obviously, these will not be shared in this dissertation but will be kept as good memories of this research.

6.2 Difficulties and Limitations of the Field Study

Viewing through the lens of an outsider, Tuzluçayır seems to be ‘excluded’ from the mainstream ‘citizen’ profile in Turkey, i.e. Turkish and Sunni. Although the residents come from a variety of economic, ethnic, cultural and social identities, as mentioned above, the majority of the neighborhood are Alevi and defined themselves with this identity, stating that they “feel” excluded from government policies, from society, mostly from economic relations and from the spatial relations. This exclusion is mainly in the political form; since the establishment of the neighborhood; it cradled the opposition of the mainstream politics and that’s why it is also known as “little Moscow” (Bayrak, 2013).



¹⁹ “Welcome to Little Moscow”

¹⁹ Retrieved from:
<https://www.facebook.com/ozgurtuzlucayir/photos/a.638245742936561/1224676370960159>, on
06.04.2021

The research question of this dissertation was derived from an assumption; an assumption that is nurtured from personal history and close relations with political organizations and/or movements. Standing outside, but in close relations with the activists with political ties made me question some essential issues: Why are there so many oppositional organizations/movements with similar interests? Why cannot they be united? If they can, how? Here, Tuzluçayır inhabits the answers to these questions, as organizations/movements with similar interests seem to be organized in unity when it is about to organize a protest, action, petition... etc.

Tuzluçayır is known for crowded demonstrations, street actions, and clashes with the state and/or law enforcement agencies. In this sense, the popular support, which is the ultimate goal of these political movements, seems to be provided and the residents who are not politically active in these organizations but support in various ways become important. Therefore, as mentioned above, one of the difficulties of this research is about designing the sample as I confined myself to the activists who led these movements. However, the division into activists and the “others” is not as clear cut as in some cases. I observed that some protests, some actions were “triggered” by a “normal” resident but embraced and executed by activists. So, in these cases, the “leading” position was confined with “taking the action” and “leading the masses” in terms of providing the path to follow.

Another difficulty was about providing the anonymity of the interviewees as the history of the families in the neighborhood carries so many indicative stories. Indisputably, the content of the interviews is often quite sensitive as it includes the actions, protests that are organized by activists which include some sort of “illegal acts”. For a reader who knows the personal histories of the residents in the neighborhood, it could be easy to understand the identity of the interviewees. To protect the confidential and privileged information of the interviewees, I used initial letters of their first names and tried to prevent using their political affiliations in the in-text references. In the parentheses at the end of the quotes, the single letters symbolizing the names of the interviewees are followed by their ages and their genders. Because there are unique pieces of evidence/cases that they lived and when combined with their political affiliation, it would be quite easy to identify the

interviewee. So, as an ethical obligation, the personal details of the interviewees were not exposed to prevent possible connections with the in-text quotations.

CHAPTER 7

UNDERSTANDING TUZLUÇAYIR: BETWEEN TIME AND SPACE


This is Tuzluçayır, so everyone here smiles, everyone hides something, but no one exposes what the others hide, everyone buries it inside. There are prostitutes here, as well as marijuana sellers; many types of people pass here: procurers, thieves, murderers... Everyone knows but no one tells anything, and when the police ask, they claim they don't know. This is Tuzluçayır, so there are few 'snitchers' here. You can count with your fingers, not that much.

(M., 50, male)

Burası Tuzluçayır, yani burada herkesin yüzü güler, herkes birşeyler içinde saklar ama hiç kimse kimsenin açığını piyasaya vermez, herkes içine gömer onu. Burada fahişesi de var, esrar satıcısı da geçiyor, kadın satanı da geçiyor hırsız da geçiyor, katili de geçiyor hepsi geçiyor buradan ama herkes bilir de kimse söylemez, polis sorduğu zaman bilmiyoruz derler, burası Tuzluçayır yani, gammad çok azdır burada, parmakla ya sayılır ya sayılmaz.

(M., 50, male)

Tuzluçayır is a neighborhood within the borders of Mamak District in Ankara and relatively close to two of the historical, social, economic and cultural centers of Ankara, Kızılay and Ulus; approximately a distance of 6 kilometers to each. It is surrounded by neighborhoods recently going through major urban transformation projects such as Ege Neighborhood, Derbent Neighborhood, Mamak Dumping Site... etc. As mentioned above Harvey (2003) expressed domination of accumulation by dispossession including labor power and deriving them to profitable use. The capital extracts high profits from the assets, lands... etc. possessed by bargains prices. Around Tuzluçayır Neighborhood, one can easily observe the capture of high-value land from low-income population and the creation of neighborhoods which is profitable for the capital and desirable for the buyers.



Retrieved from <https://www.google.com/maps> on 02.01.2020

As will be mentioned later, Tuzluçayır was composed of apartments which were largely built in the 2000s with the consent of the residents following the debates on urban transformation projects put forth by the Municipality (Erman, 2010, pp.186-188). However, the transformation process is still going on as there remained a few *gecekondu*s in the inner streets of the neighborhood. (Photos 1 and 2).



Photo 1 (taken by Duygu Tanış-Zaferoğlu, 25.11.2014)



Photo 2 (taken by Duygu Tanış-Zaferoğlu, 25.11.2014)

By 2020, the population of Tuzluçayır was 12.704; 6.109 of them were men while 6.595 were women. 17 % of the population were old aged, 29% were young while the

majority-54% were middle-aged.²⁰ The first settlements in the neighborhood were started in the 1950s with the migration from the villages of central-Anatolian cities which will be elaborated below. The physical conditions of the neighborhood were not advanced and as the settlement was not planned and/or organized it is much more disordered. There are branches of gross markets and banks, a few pet shops, several hairdressers and beauty centers, a big hospital, primary school and high school and plenty of hometown associations. Interestingly, these hometown associations are spaces of socialization for elder people who interact with their countrymen/women. (Photos 3,4,5, 20.10.2015, taken by: Duygu Tanış-Zaferoğlu)



²⁰ Retrieved from <https://www.endeksa.com/tr/analiz/ankara/mamak/tuzlucayir/demografi> on 05.06.2020.

Neighborhoods close distance to the cultural and social centers of Ankara enable younger residents to socialize in these centers as the neighborhood does not have so many attractive spaces to spend time.

There are five public gardens within the borders of the neighborhood, one of which was named after Menekşe Erbay, a key figure for the neighborhood, a symbol of the resistance in the neighborhood during the 1980s military regime. Her story will be told below. Besides, there is a library formed by Halkevleri which is named after Ethem Sarısülük²¹ murdered by the police force during Gezi Park Protests in 2013 who also has symbolic importance. (Photo 6)



“Ethem’s Library”, 27.11.2014 (taken by: Duygu Tamış-Zaferoğlu)

There are so many murals, graffiti, stencil art and slogans on the walls of the buildings mainly painted by the members of the political organizations. They are, as they defined, spirited forms of protests expressing the political and social messages powerfully. Formed mainly as part of demonstrations, they are said to be “tradition” since the first protests were organized in the neighborhood in the 1970s.

²¹ Ethem Sarısülük was an activist who was killed on 14.06. 2013 by the police in Kızılay Square during the demonstrations at the age of 27 in Ankara. He was one of the very first victims of the Gezi Park Protests causing people to question the “dose” of the police brutality. He was born and raised in Tuzluçayır, of whom family later moved on Batkent district but the people of Tuzluçayır considered him as the “child of Tuzluçayır”.



Photo 7,8,9: "Slogans on the Walls" 27.11.2014 (taken by: Duygu Tanış-Zaferoğlu)

7.1 The First Settlements: History of Solidarity

In the 1950s, the Marshall Aids resulted in mechanization in agriculture giving rise to a surplus of population in the rural areas caning ground to the rapid migration to the urban space. Therefore, the peasants, newly immigrants coming from the rural areas formed “the large labor pools in the cities” and this development became dominant in the period between the 1950s and 1970s (Şenyapılı, 1978, p.39). As a result of rapid migration and urbanization, the peasants brought crucial changes in the spatial, social, economic and political structure of the big cities. Most migrants arrived in the big cities with sufficient capital to start a new life and they started to segregate in ‘gecekondu’ neighborhoods.

Tuzlucaýır Neighborhood (Figure 1), located in Ankara is one of these neighborhoods that the first immigrants arrived in the 1960s mostly from Central-Anatolian villages with high Alevi populations. Here, the new immigrants were canalized by the first comers to settle down in Tuzlucaýır as at that time it belonged to the disadvantaged outskirts of the city:

This is a place far outside the borders of Ankara at that time. Life is cheap and comfortable homes can be built here. This is the middle of Tuzlucaýır, where no one comes or goes, even the bus does not work, the place where the park was built was the garbage dump of the former American army, NATO. They built them right next to the dump it's called Kartaltepe. Actually, my dad used to tell me when I was a kid that it was the first time they had seen a coke can. They were collecting it. They built a house next to the dump. And no one asks why. So, they prefer this place because this is the most convenient one. (B.,41, man)

Ya o zaman ki Ankara sınırlarının çok dışında bir yer burası. Hem ucuz, hem de rahat ev yapılabilir. Kimsenin gelip gitmediği hatta otobüsün işlemediği burası Tuzlucaýır'ın göbeğinin olduğu şu an park yapılan yer eski Amerikan ordusunun, NATO'nun çöplüğü. Çöplüğün hemen yanına yapıyorlar aslında o Kartaltepe denen yer. Hatta babamlar anlatıyor çocukken anlatıyorlar. Kola kutusu falan ilk kez orada görüyorlarmış. Topluyorlarmış öyle. Çöplüğün yanına ev yapıyorlar. Kimse de niye yapıyorsunuz falan demiyor. En uygun yer burası olduğu için burayı tercih ediyorlar yani. (B.,41, man)

Also, Tuzlucaýır has a rail station that lies on the line to central Anatolia. S. (63, man) stated that the choice of his ancestors is simply to be explained, being the first station when arriving with trains from their hometowns in 1966:

I was, like, 13 when I got here. That's how the process started. The only reason people from Sivas are here is that, as we said, they couldn't travel by bus, so they used the train, and the first station is Mamak. The ones that got off the train in Mamak, settled there around Tuzlucaýır. That's one of the reasons why I think why

there are so many people from Sivas here. Their fellow-townsmen took care of each other. Because the place we call Sivas is a rural city. People who could not fill their stomachs fled and came here. Then they settled here. They stood together. They built a gecekondu and lived in it because I did the same thing.

13 yaşında falandım buraya geldiğimde. Süreç böyle başladı. Sivashlıların burada olmasının yegâne sebebi işte söylediğimiz gibi ulaşım araçlarının otobüsle yapılamadığı olduğundan tren ile yapılabildiği için ilk istasyon Mamak'tır. Mamak'ta inen Mamak çevresine yerleşmiş. Tuzluçayır dolayına yerleşmiştir. Onun için buranın Sivashlıların yoğun olmasının yegane sebeplerinden bir tanesi bence böyle başlamıştır yani. Hemşerileri gelmiş herkes bir birlerini kollamışlar. Çünkü bizim Sivas dediğimiz yer kırsal bir memleket. Karnını doyuramayan insanlar kaçmışlar buralara gelmişler. Sonra buralarda barınmışlar. Birlikte dayanışmışlar. Gecekondu yapmışlar ve içinde oturmuşlar. Bende aynısını yaptım çünkü.

Here, Tuzluçayır was built with the help of co-villagers who migrated and dwelled there earlier. Schuler (1999) and Çelik (2003) explained the segregation on the basis of *hemşehrilik* (linkage of people originating from the same city or town or region), typical for those years. Keser (2008) identified this spatial segregation as the concentration of an ethnic group in a specified region of a city. This case has various causes. One of the reasons might be spontaneous –*wittingly or unwittingly, willy-nilly*– resulted in the social process. This is because the community endeavors to survive. The other reason can be because of legal discrimination policies such as

The Diyanet does not recognize Alevism as a complex of traditions whose identity is—like all religious traditions—fundamentally indeterminate and contested. Rather, it categorizes and stabilizes Alevism as an "interpretation of Islam" that is linked to the "common share of Islam" (Hurd, 2014, p.425).

Concentration in a specific area of the city can be evaluated as a collective attempt and as an instrument for the economic, social and cultural 'solidarity' of ethnic communities. In Turkey, segregation is a common practice in *gecekondu* areas where relations are mainly based on trust. Here, the first settlements in Tuzluçayır were mostly shaped by trust relations triggering chain migration which could be defined as "that movement in which prospective migrants learn of opportunities, are provided with transportation, and have initial accommodation and employment arranged by means of primary social relationships with previous migrants" (Mac Donald & Mac Donald, 1964, p.82). One of the first comers explains this as:

The year 1966. I came here at that time. If a neighbour came from there, a second neighbour also followed, and they settled down. For example, he arranged his work, then, of course, he is better in this respect. First, there was a little

homesickness. They came here to stand in solidarity with each other. It was a gecekondu or something. I was, like, 10 when I got here. (S., 63, man).

Sene 1966. Benim geldiğim dönem... Şimdi oradan bir komşun geldiyse ikinci bir komşu ona bakarak buraya gelmiş, yerleşmişler. İşte işini mesela ayarlamış, o zaman tabii o açıdan daha iyi. Önce biraz gurbetlik var. Birbirleri ile dayanışmak üzere buraya gelmişler. Gecekondu yapılanma falandı. Buraya geldiğimde 10 yaşında falandım. (S.,63, man)

Another interviewee also shared a similar background:

My parents came after my uncles in ' 65. There was nothing left in the village, there were two little kids, and they thought we'd send them to school. Also, they thought there would be a lot of job opportunities in the city. When my uncle found a job at Siteler, he called my family to arrange jobs for them too. And they built the house and all that together in the evenings after work. Ours indeed was built at night. (B.41, man)

65'te gelmiş bizimkiler, amcamların peşine. Birşey kalmamış ki köyde, e iki tane küçük çocuk da var, okuturuz diye de tabii düşünmüşler. Bir de iş çok diye düşünülüyor tabii şehirde. Benim amca Siteler'de iş bulunca, sana da ayarlarız diye çağırılmış bizimkileri. Evi falan da hep beraber akşamları iş çıkışı yaptılar yani. Bizimkisi hakikaten gece kondu. (B., 41, man)

In the first place, since the life of the newcomers was based on the experience and accumulation shaped according to rural, closed and small communitarian structures; it was hard for them to adapt to urban life. Therefore, they moved to Ankara along with their social capital, with their families, networks of relatives and co-villagers; they, therefore, continued their isolated community lives in the Tuzlucaşayır. As mentioned before, *hemşehrilik* relationship is both keeping together and opening social interaction channels for them in Tuzlucaşayır. Networks based on kinship and neighborhood made their lives easier by allocating necessary resources such as jobs and accommodation and prevented social and psychological isolation (Ayata, 1987):

Our family came here when my father was 5 years old, and there were also 2-3 more families from our village at that time. It was 1966. He says it felt like they were in the village, Ahmet, Mehmet, the guy in the neighborhood. Work is again Ahmet, Mehmet. Solidarity started since then, they supported each other, encouraged each other, opened their homes, shared their dinners. (Y., 51, man)

Babam 5 yaşındayken gelmiş bizim aile, o dönem de bizim köyden 2-3 aile daha var. Sene 1966 dediğine göre. Ama diyor kendimizi böyle köyde hissediyorduk, Ahmet, Mehmet mahalledeki adam. E iş desen yine Ahmet, Mehmet. Dayanışma o zamandan başlamış bak, birbirlerine destek olmuşlar, birbirlerini teşvik etmişler, evlerini, sofralarını açmışlar. (Y., 51, man)

These migrants that moved into Tuzluçayır along with their insufficient economic capital in the 1960s were not bourgeois or petit-bourgeois as most of them started to take part in wage labor and public institutions. The first generation gave priority to education which provided self-employment such as doctors, lawyers, engineers etc. Therefore, many of them experienced gradually and relatively better conditions in socio-economic conditions soon after. They experienced upward social mobility.

Here, in the early 1950s, with the transition to a multi-party regime, religion became a political trump in Turkey. With the agricultural development promise, many of the Alevis had supported the DP in the 1950 elections. However, following the alliances between the DP and Sunni Muslim groups, Alevis turned back to RPP starting with the 1957 elections (Schüler, 1999). Alevis got an opportunity of competing to reach various resources which they had been excluded until then. Therefore, a rivalry began between Alevis and Sunnis and also it brought about the process of politicizing disparities (Massicard, 2005).

After the 1960 military coup, the number of left and right-conservative organizations increased significantly. Despite the 1960 coup, pioneering of civilian rights and organizations, in parallel to the world conjuncture, led to standing out of the left in Turkey. It also caused the emergence of various movements, such as political Islam (Firat, 2004). As stated before, the post-1960 period experienced the establishment of various associations and parties which emerged with the increase in opportunities of organizations, opening and acting more freely in these areas. Here, the articulation of Alevis to the left *or* of the Turkish left to the Alevis in the 1960s developed a dual socio-spatial differentiation in the cities. As a result of the devastating economic crisis experienced in the 1970s, the political polarization deepened, too. (Zurcher, 2009; Ahmad, 2002).

At that period, as a result of modernization, urbanization developed leftist movements in Turkey which affected Alevis and they started to participate in the left-wing movement. As Jenkins stated:

During the 1970s, the focus of religious violence in Turkey shifted away from non-Muslims towards the Alevis; mainly as the result of the tendency of Alevis to identify with leftist parties and organizations at the same time as Turkish nationalists increasingly adopted the concept of the Turkish-

Islamic Synthesis. Initially, Alevi had tended to support leftist political parties because they regarded them as being more secular. However, as they became increasingly politicized, many Alevi began to see parallels between Alevism and socialism (2008, p.39).

In other words, Alevi had an important interaction with left-wing groups who saw Alevi as a natural alliance. That means there was a 'reciprocal' relationship between Alevi and left-wing groups (Bruinessen, 2000; Massicard, 2005; Aydın, 2007; Tol 2009). Meeting of Alevi with the left was the form of regeneration and reproduction of Alevi themselves. Due to the effects of the philosophy of enlightenment leftist Alevi began to consider their Alevi identity as secondary and they reinterpreted Alevism according to a Marxist view based on its historical materialist improvement (Aydın, 2007). As also Tol (2009) states "Enlightened Aleviness", with the interaction through left since the 1960s, believes that Alevism naturally is progressive. For political Alevism, the nature of Alevism has direct links with leftist ideas. Besides, left-wing groups became aware of the rise of the cultural and social revival of the Alevi. The rediscovery of the Alevi dynamic as a political factor led the left-wing groups to consider organizing Alevi easily (Irat, 2006). One of the interviewees explains the motivation for the organization of the left-wing groups in the neighborhood as follows:

I mean, in the 70s, I was very influenced by Devrimci-Yol (Revolutionary Path) in my youth and childhood. At that time, there were pirate rallies. Such were the organized structures at that time. You couldn't just take a brush in your hand and hang a banner or make graffiti in the daylight. You had to do it at night. You would have to stand guard while someone did the writing. It was easy for us here, of course, because everyone looks out for each other. Everyone here was already inclined to organize at that period, young people were eager. For example, I was very impressed with Dev-Yol. At Hacettepe University, we had a young friend named K... He was older than me. Let's call him our brother, I was very impressed by him. For example, his speeches impressed many people. (A.,55, woman)

Yani şimdi şöyle o 70'li yıllarda ben gençlik ve çocukluk döneminde Devrimci-Yol dan çok etkilenmişim. Öyle o zamanlar korsan mitingler falan yapılırdı. Öyle o dönem örgütlü yapılar böyleydi. Eline fırça alıp gündüz gözüyle o afişleme yap veya duvar yazılama yok öyle bir şey. İlla ki gece yapacaksın. İlla ki nöbet tutacaksın birileri o yazılmayı yaparken sen de nöbet tutacaksın. Bizim burada kolay olurdu tabii, herkes birbirini kolladığı için. Burada herkes meyilli zaten o dönem örgütlenmeye, gençler hevesli. Ben mesela Dev-Yol' dan çok etkilenmişim. Hacettepe Üniversitesinde K.. diye bir genç arkadaşımız vardı. O benden büyüktü. Abimiz diyelim ona, ondan çok etkilenirdim. Konuşmaları, anlattıkları çok insanı öyle etkiledi mesela. (A.,55, woman)

The articulation of the residents of Tuzluçayır to the left should be analyzed with the tendency of commenting Alevism as a revolutionist doctrine and a collectivist form.

As Subaşı (2005) also claimed, rather than a religious one, Alevism is a political organization in terms of its development path. Alevism is referenced as a philosophy, a way of life that fed on different cultures, shaped in its adventures in Anatolia, which has humanist, left-wing, secular, anti-power characteristics. Alevism is an antagonism to the capitalist state, exploitation and oppression. Throughout the history, Alevis were always repressed by hegemonic powers (Küçükaydın, 2009). The fact that ‘being repressed’ and in ‘opposition to power’ facilitated the interaction with the left. This link attached to the political movement is about Alevism itself; the social one and its historical background:

This is a region where there is a rebellion against the policies of the system. The first spark came out of Okmeydanı and Ümraniye in Istanbul, Tuzluçayır, Batıkent and partly Dikmen in Ankara. In the country, Alevis' demands for equal citizenship are not met, they pay taxes to an institution such as the Directorate of Religious Affairs, and barriers are set to live their own self-organization. An Alevi general manager in a government office is very rare. An Alevi in the military can't make it to the command post. But Alevis also pay taxes in this country. The last June resistance was very intense, in numbers of 20 thousand and 30 thousand. In the last mosque-cemevi²² project, especially the idea of creating its own Alevis, such as reconciling Alevis and Sunnis on a common ground, was reflected here and there were intense clashes. If there are just 10 people, to tell the truth or only 1 person, we will continue. This is our culture. Alevis, Kurds; they are the rebels. (Y., 51, man)

Burası sistemin politikalarına başkaldırının yaşandığı bir bölgedir. Kuvvencinin ilk çıktığı; İstanbul'da Okmeydanı, Ümraniye, Ankara'da Tuzluçayır, Dikmen kısmı olarak Batıkent. Ülkede Alevilerin eşit yurttaşlık taleplerinin karşılanmadığı, Diyanet gibi bir kuruma vergi ödemeleri, kendi öz-örgütlenmelerini yaşamada engellerin koyulduğu. Devlet dairesinde Alevi bir genel müdür çok nadir gözüktür. Askeriyede bir alevi komutanlık aşamasına gelemez. Ama Aleviler de bu ülkede vergi veriyor. En son Haziran direnişi çok yoğun yaşandı, 20 bin 30 binleri bulan sayılarda. En son cami-cemevi projesinde özellikle Alevilerle sünnileri barıştırma, ortak bir zeminde buluşturma gibi sistem kendi alevisini yaratma düşüncesi buraya yansitti ve yoğun çatışmalar yaşandı. Doğruları söylemeye 10 kişi de kalsak, 1 kişi de kalsak devam edeceğiz, bizim kültürümüz bu. Aleviler, Kürtler; başkaldıran bunlar. (Y., 51, man)

Here, Y. complained about the “outcast” position of the Alevis as the neighborhoods Y. mentioned are known as the Alevi Neighborhoods which are at the same time considered to be reflexive in terms of the political protests and political activism. Therefore, they are the safe nests for the leftist activists and Y. emphasized that this mainly results from the fact that Alevis are excluded from the state institutions, military, mainstream politics...etc.

²² Cemevi is a sanctuary place used for cultural and religious gatherings, “a meeting place in which to practice their religious rituals” (Rittersberger-Tılıç, 2005, p.90)

Similar to Y., another interviewee explains the tendency of Alevis towards resistance with their long-lasting oppression of the state forces, stating that they were always the ones who were marginalized by the system:

First of all, as an Alevi, you are already a danger to the system. Because you don't have an obedient religious understanding in the first place. Alevism is a culture that thinks, questions, investigates. That's why the Alevis have always defied the system. A system is a status quo. We are oppressed, excluded, but strengthened by this. (M.,50, man)

Bir kere sen Alevi olarak zaten sisteme tehlikesin. Çünkü en başta itaatkar bir dini anlayışın yok. Düşünen, sorgulayan, araştıran bir kültürdür Alevilik. O yüzden her zaman sisteme baş kaldırmıştır Aleviler. Sistem dediğin bir statüko. Biz ezilen, dışlanan ama bu sayede güçlenen insanlarız. (M.,50, man)

As mentioned above, by the end of the 1970s the economic crisis in Turkey did not emanate just from an internal crisis of the state. It was accompanied by a challenge from youth in urban centers. The rise of the revolutionary left found a strong base in *gecekondu* areas which derived them to include the policies regarding urbanization and housing problems (Aslan, 2016, p.81). In this period with the migration from rural areas to urban spaces, Alevis were also economically getting worse. Besides marginalization in their living areas, especially in *gecekondu* neighborhoods, increasing inequality based on reaching social and capital resources were pulling factors to mobilize. Therefore, Alevis hoped that unequal “chance” on their access to social and economic resources which they experienced would end with the victory of the working-class movement based on the equitable ideology:

Every time you knock on the door here, someone in the family has either been detained or jailed. Before 1980, our brothers would tell us to bring the guns at that time, we would bring them and the posters, but it was good at that time. People who lived in that environment can't leave here anyway. There is no one who has written the story of this place yet. For example, one of my uncle's was sentenced to 24 years at that time, in 1993, because of the DHKP-C, and my uncle, in 1980, was taken because of coal²³(S., 56, man).

Burada hangi kapıyı çalsan ailede biri bir dönem ya gözaltına alınmıştır ya içeri düşmüştür. 1980 öncesi, abilerimiz bize o zaman silahları getirin derlerdi, götürürdük, işte afişleri falan, ama güzeldi o dönem, hala o ortamları yaşamış

²³ The interviewee refers to an incident he defined as expropriating the coal in which a group of activists captured the coals of General Directorate of Coal Enterprises and distributed them to the residents of the neighbourhood at the end of the 1979.

insan buradan ayrılamıyor zaten. Buranın hikayesini daha yazmış insanlar yok. Mesela dayımın bir tanesi o zaman 24 sene yedi, 93'te, DHKP-C'den, daha önce 80'deki dayım da kömürden dolayı alındı. (S., 56, man)

Here, one of the oldest interviewees stressed an essential point while he was talking about the political organizations before 1980s:

Starting with the shanties, we solved our own housing problem. Then we started to find jobs, of course, after the shanties were formed, the contradictions of the region with the government are revealed. On the one hand, the housing problem was solved, and on the other, the government was trying to prevent them. People couldn't find a job, there was poverty, there was no school, no health center, no hospital, and there was a struggle in the region. At that time, the people were beginning to solve the problem of housing, the right to housing, the right to education, the right to health, by holding meetings, by trying to figure out how to solve the problem. It was a struggling line that started like this. (H., 69, man)

Gecekonduyla başlayarak kendi konut sorunumuzu çözdük, ondan sonra iş bulmaya başlamışız, tabii gecekondu oluşmaya başladıktan sonra iktidarla bölgenin çelişkileri açığa çıkıyor. Bir taraftan konut sorunu çözülürken, diğer taraftan engellemeye çalışıyor. İnsanlar iş bulamıyor yoksulluk var, okul yok sağlık ocağı yok, hastane yok, bunun mücadelesi veriliyor bölgede. Halk o dönemde konut sorunu, barınma hakkı, eğitim sağlık hakkını kendi içinde çözmeye başlıyor, toplantılar yapılarak, sorunumuz ne, sorunumuzu nasıl çözebiliriz. Böyle başlayan bir mücadele çizgisi. (H., 69, man)

As mentioned above, the migrants faced difficulties reaching political, social and economic resources which were resulted in political mobilization. Here, in Tuzluca, as H. mentioned, the residents are organized around their basic needs; need to shelter, need to education, health rights...etc. which resulted in the creation of their own solutions. Another interviewee also supported this argument:

People here say at that time their water did not flow. Immediately a revolutionary would organize people, and 100-150 people would march to the municipality from the square with canisters in their hands, and with slogans. Especially women, housewives, young girls, children would go first, because it is one of the most basic problems. Why does the other neighborhood have water and you don't? People were asking about it, seeking their rights. It would happen with the direction of the revolutionaries, but in the end, of course, there was organization. They would say, 'You can lead yourself, and you know better than those in power.' (S., 65, woman.)

Buradaki insanlar o dönemde diyorlar ki, bizim sularımız akıyor. Hemen bir devrimci örgütlerdi insanları, 100-150 kişi belediyeye yürüdü meydandan. Elllerinde bidonlar, sloganlarla. En başta da kadınlar. Ev kadınları, genç kızlar, çocuklar. Çünkü en temel sorunlardan. Neden yan mahallenin suyu var da senin yok? İnsanlar bunu soruyorlardı, haklarını arıyorlardı. O da devrimcilerin yönlendirmesiyle oluyordu ama, sonuçta örgütlülük vardı tabii ki. Diyorlardı ki, siz kendinizi yönetebilirsiniz, siz o baştakilerden daha iyi biliyorsunuz. (S., 65, woman)

Here, the last sentence is quite impressive in the sense that, S. made a definition for the organic intellectual as Gramsci focuses on the role to create an own culture, a culture to demand their rights in this example. Recalling that, for Gramsci organic intellectuals are “those who tend to produce opinion within the masses, who have the ability to develop, expand and improve the languages of the peasants, the working class and other subaltern groups” (Ives, 2004, p. 104). As being members of Tuzluçayır community, the leaders of these organizations speak the same language but enhance, proliferate it and promote them to “lead” themselves.

This also brings us to another common point that is one way or another expressed in almost all interviews: the identity of the neighborhood. Here, the interviewees mentioned that with the construction of the first settlements in the neighborhood, the identity began to be formed. The first comers told their children the settlement stories with a special focus on this identity:

There really is such a thing as being from Tuzluçayır. And it's been so since the first shanties were built. Because there are unity and solidarity, and joint action. If someone was going to build a gecekondu, the whole neighborhood would gather and build it together. Then, that person in return would help build someone else's gecekondu. People knew solidarity, unity. They took care of the neighborhood, and that culture still exists here. (C., 42, woman)

Tuzluçayırlı olmak diye birşey var hakikaten. Hem de ilk gecekondu kurduğundan beri var. Çünkü birlik ve beraberlik, ortak hareket etme var. Biri gecekondu mu yapacak, tüm mahalleli toplanır onun gecekonduğunu yaparmış. Ondan sonra o da başkasının gecekonduğunu yapmasına yardım edermiş. Dayanışmayı, birlik olmayı biliyorlarmış insanlar. Mahalleye sahip çıkıyorlarmış, ki o kültür hala var burada. (C., 42, woman)

Here, the identity in these expressions entails a distinction between ‘us’ and ‘others’. The identity of “being from Tuzluçayır community” implies a collection of identities united around political, social and spatial bonds. Moreover, “Alevism” as ethnic identity is also an essential brick to form this identity of the neighborhood. Here, ethnicity in Tuzluçayır as a form of identity is an embodied knowledge that derives from a practical sense of groupness and which is produced by and dialectically reproduces its ‘objective conditions of existence’. Therefore, the common ground which the new immigrants met in Tuzluçayır was Alevism which could be considered

as a collectivist form. The current opposing element of Alevism was easily adapted to socialism. The color of ‘Kızılbaş’²⁴ (redhead) turned into red of revolution:

I'm ethnically Alevi. I'm an Anatolian Kızılbaş ("Redhead") Alevi. I mean, there are issues like how can a communist be an Alevi etc. We can't ignore it. This is my origin. This is my past. It is as necessary as the air I breathe, as the water I drink. In Islam, of course, this is about how you define it, how Alevism historically emerged, its current situation... Yes, there is a belief system in them regarding how it came to this state. But it's about how you affirm it. An Alevi can be a communist. I believe so. I'm a Kızılbaş, an Alevi. This is not a belief in God. It's not like worshipping fire, worshipping nature. They have rituals. The most critical point for me is the justice system in that community. (Y., 28, man)

Etnik olarak Aleviyim. Anadolu Kızılbaş Ailevisiyim. Yani şöyle konular vardır: İşte bir komünist nasıl Alevi olur falan diye. Bunu yok sayamayız. Bu benim kökenim. Bu benim geçmişim. Aldığım, soluduğum hava, içtiğim su kadar uuu gerekli konulardan biridir. İslamiyet'te tabii bu Aleviliğin kendisini nasıl tanımladığınız ile ilgili tarihsel olarak nasıl geldiği bugünkü durumu... Nasıl bu duruma geldiği kısımlarıyla ilgili olarak evet içlerinde bir inanç sistemi vardır. Ama bunu nasıl olumladığınız ile ilgili. Bir komünist olabilir. Bence olabilir. Ben Kızılbaşım, Aleviyim. Bu bir Allah inancı falan değil. Ateşe, doğaya tapma, tapılma gibi bir şey değil. Ritüelleri var. Bende en kritik noktası o Cemdeki adalet sistemidir. (Y., 28, man)

Another interviewee also explained this as follows:

Alevi are marginalized and despised people. What does this necessarily cause? In support of one another, they tried to create a front together at the point of how to get rid of this marginalization. I look at it and think about it that way. In other words, when you look since Yavuz, wherever there is an Alevi village, it is definitely in a stream. So, they must be hidden in a corner. Over time, even I know that in the 70s, we used to come from the village to Ankara. My father always told us this: "Oh, my son, when you're asked about something, don't explain it. Fear! Don't say you're an Alevi. Just say, I am a Muslim" If there is an organization somewhere that has a chance to destroy this empire of fear, they must side with each other. If you're looking for methods, you're looking for them. This is what I think. (S, 56, man)

Alevi insanlar kıyıda köşede itelenmiş horlanmış insanlar. Bu da mecburen ne yapıyor? Bir birlerine destek içerisinde bu itelenmekten ötelenmekten nasıl kurtulunur noktasında birlikte bir cephe oluşturmaya çalışmışlardır. Ben böyle bakıyorum ve böyle de düşünüyorum. Yani Yavuz'dan bu yana baktığın zaman o Yavuz zamanından baktığında nerede bir Alevi köyü varsa mutlaka bir derenin içindedir. Mutlaka bir kuyunun içine gizlenmişlerdir yani. Zamanla ben bile şunu bilirim o dönemlerde 70'li yıllarda bizi Ankara'dan köyden Ankara'ya gelirdik. Babam bizi hep şöyle tembih ederdi. - Aman oğlum size bir şey sorulduğu zaman sakın açıklamayın. Korkun. Sakın Aleviyim demeyin. Müslümanım deyin geçiştirin. - Biz bu korku imparatorluğunu yıkabilmenin şansı bir yerde bir

²⁴ As Melikoff states *Kızılbaş* is the historical name for the Alevi: "It refers to the village groups and tribes who followed the first Safavids. Their name appears in the time of Sheykh Haydar (1460–1488), the father of Shah Isma'il. *Kızılbaş* means "red head". That name was given to them because of their headdress: a red bonnet with twelve facets. It was also called Tac-i Haydarî "the crown of Haydar". In the Ottoman documents, *Kızılbaş* has the meaning of "heretic" and "heretic rebel". (2005, p.7) Today, the term mainly used to insult Alevi.

örgütlülük varsa onlar yan yana gelmeli. Yöntemlerini arayış içinde ise onu arıyorsun. Ben öyle bakıyorum. (S.56, man)

Alevism in Tuzluçayır seems to create a “common sense” which could be identified as spontaneous philosophy of the multitude following Gramsci. The culture of “Alevism” cradled the nucleus of change, the potential for a revolutionary change and the exterior force that Gramsci assumes to lead people, in this case, the left-wing movements. However, we should bear in mind that common sense is

the ‘folklore’ of philosophy, and, like folklore, it takes countless different forms. Its most fundamental characteristic is that it is a conception which ... is fragmentary, incoherent and inconsequential, in conformity with the social and cultural position of those masses whose philosophy it is (Gramsci, 1971, p.419)

Radical right-left clashes accelerated between 1970 and 1980 and leftist militants in urban spaces were supported by masses from the segregated urban areas comprised mostly Alevi, Kurdish and poor migrants. Antagonistic dynamics emerged from these communities and turned into one of the mobility channels and the *gecekondu* youth, particularly Alevi youth articulated to the movement of left groups coming from outside the *gecekondu* areas (Massicard, 2005). In the large cities, there were armed riots and clashes between the left-wing movements located in *gecekondu* areas and the right-wing groups. The left-wing movements and the *gecekondu* youth were not satisfied with title deeds, provision of basic services and asking for more substantial changes. During this period, *gecekondu* neighborhoods were declared to be ‘emancipated zones’, detached from control and surveillance by the state. Indeed, neighborhoods communities and their areas were controlled by revolutionary groups (Aslan, 2016; Erman, 2004; Şengül, 2003). Tuzluçayır was one of these neighborhoods as the borders of the neighborhood were quite “sharp” and non-transparent:

From 1978 to 1980, Tuzluçayır was one of the areas where police rarely entered. Raids began after September 12. In the 70s, everyone was strong, the police couldn't enter our areas. At that time, the police would monitor from afar the posters made by the revolutionaries against imperialism, fascism, oligarchy in line with the disposal of them in work, war conditions, the distribution of the publications, and could not intervene. (A. 69, man)

78'ten 80'e kadar Tuzluçayır polisin çok nadir girdiği bölgelerdendi. 12 Eylül'den sonra başladı baskınlar. 70'lerde herkes güçlüydü, polis giremiyordu bizim bölgelere. O dönem devrimcilerin emperyalizme, faşizme, oligarşiye karşı iş savaş koşullarında bertaraf etmesi doğrultusunda yaptığı afişlemeleri, yayın organlarının dağıtımını polis uzaktan izliyor, müdahale edemiyordu. (A., 69, man)

They controlled the land and housing distribution and checked the entrances and exits of the neighborhood. Nonetheless, as mentioned above the movement of the revolutionary groups provided them with the opportunity of reaching basic resources. This case indicates that, as referring to Pickvance (1985) and Şengül (2009), additional to ‘deprivation’, ‘the availability of alliance’, ‘the existence of broader mobilization’, ‘states responses’, were the factors of integration of Alevis to left-wing movements:

Tuzlucaayır is a place where there is a very enlightened, democratic community, with intense immigration from outside. It is a place where the Alevi people receive intense immigration, the Alevi segment is rebellious, that is, they solve the problems themselves, it is easier for them to organize. For example, at that time, homeless people were allowed to build homes on the lands that were shown to them in order to solve the housing problem. For example, the dumpster problem, the coal problem, the prison problem were the main issues. To solve these problems, consumers' co-operatives were created. Citizens were buying directly from the manufacturer and shopping there without putting profit on the price. The revolutionaries were leading the way. In 1977-78 it mainly consisted of Dev-Yol. Dev-Yol's people's committees, resistance committees, street committees, food committees, etc. solving these problems, forming a committee, forming an assembly, entering into joint decision-making processes by discussing. Until September 12, Ankara was an enlightened, secular, democratic, beautiful city; a city that could share its problems; with a culture of solidarity. The state used the power of the NMP to clash over their disbandment. We've had periods of oppression of people in the resistance. There was a school called Açıkalan Primary School in 1979, there were no teachers, students could not get an education, they could not warm up. 200 of our women, including my wife, went to the Ministry of National Education in Kızılay and were arrested in a demonstration about ensuring the right to education, sending teachers here, and improving the physical structure of the school. These women were housewives, but they sent their children to school. 200 of our women were arrested. When I got home from work in the evening, there wasn't one woman left in our neighborhood, all of them had been detained. Poverty, unemployment, oppression were the days the people who really wanted to use their culture, their customs lived, until September 12. (Y., 58, man)

Tuzlucaayır çok aydın, demokrat bir topluluğun bulunduğu, yoğun olarak dışarıdan göç alarak. Yoğun olarak Alevi kesimin göç aldığı, Alevi kesim isyankar, yani yaşanana bu sorunlara kendilerinin çözdüğü, örgütlenmelerinin daha kolay olduğu bir yer. Mesela o dönem, evsiz insanlara arsa gösterilerek ev yapmaları sağlandı, konut sorununu çözmeye doğrultusunda. Mesela çöplük sorunu, kömür sorunu, cezaevi sorunu temel sorunlardı. Bu sorunları çözmek için tüketim kooperatifleri oluşturuldu. Direkt üreticiden alıp buradaki vatandaşlara kar koymadan vatandaşlar oralardan alışveriş yapıyorlardı. Devrimciler önyak oldu buna. Dev-yol ağırlıklıydı 77-78'de. Dev-Yol'un halk komiteleri direniş komiteleri, sokaka komiteleri, gıda komiteleri...vs bu sorunları çözen komiteleşme meclisleşme, tartışarak ortak karar alma süreçlerine girme. 12 Eylül'e kadar Ankara aydın, laik, demokrat, güzel bir kent; sorunlarını ortak paylaşabilen; bir dayanışma kültürünün olduğu bir kent. Devlet MHP gücünü kullanarak bunların dağıtılması konusunda çatışmaya geçti. Direnişteki insanlara baskıların yapıldığı dönemleri yaşadık. 79'da Açıkalan İlköğretim Okulu diye bir okul var, öğretmen yok, öğrenciler okuyamıyor, ısınamıyor. Benim eşim de dahil olmak üzere 200 tane kadınıız Kızılay'da Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı'nın önüne giderek eğitin hakkının sağlanması, buraya öğretmen gönderilmesi okulun fiziki yapısının düzeltilmesi konusunda yapmış oldukları bir gösteride içeri alındılar. Bu kadınlarımız ev

hanımıydı ama çocuklarını okula gönderiyorlardı. 200 kadını tutuklandı. Akşam işten eve geldiğimde mahallemizde bir tane kadın kalmamıştı, hepsini içeri almışlardı. Yoksulluğun, işsizliğin, baskının yaşandığı gerçekten kültürünü örfünü adetini kendisi kullanmak isteyen bir halkın yaşadığı günlerdi 12 eylül'e kadar. (Y., 58, man)

There were several protests that were shared by all interviewees and identified as a part of Tuzluçayır identity; the older interviewees witnessed themselves, while the younger ones learnt from their elders in the family. One of them was “Occupation of Tuzluçayır High School”²⁵ in April 1980 while nation-wide martial law had been proclaimed:

The anniversary of the execution of Deniz²⁶ and the others were coming, and there were going to be a boycott of classes and demonstration for the May 1 celebrations. There was Martial law. Panzer then broke down the door of Tuzluçayır High School. I was in middle school at the time, the panzer went up to the second floor from the stairs. Imagine how wide and strong the school stairs were. The Panzer climbed the stairs! The police fired so much, he fired so much on the same point, and then said: “How can these walls not be pierced, friend?”. The man shot 7-8 bullets with kalashnikov, but he couldn't pierce it. There were holes left on the wall for 13-14 years, and they left it as a lesson. (M., 50, man)

Deniz'lerin idam yıldönümü geliyor ve 1 Mayıs kutlamaları için ders boykotu ve gösteri olacaktı. Sıkıyönetim var o zaman da. Panzer o zaman Tuzluçayır Lisesi'nin kapısını kırdı, ben o zaman ortaokuldaydım, ikinci kata kadar çıktım, panzer merdivenlerden. Düşün ki okulun merdivenleri ne kadar geniş, ve ne kadar sağlam. Merdivenden panzer çıktı ya! Polis o kadar ateş etti o kadar ateş etti ki aynı noktaya, şu çıktı ağzından polis: “Ulan şu duvarlar nasıl delinmez arkadaş” dedi ya, adam 7 tane 8 tane mermi atıyor keleşle, delemedi. 13-14 sene delikler kaldı, ibret olsun diye bıraktılar. (M., 50, man)

Here, with the forthcoming of the anniversary of the execution of three revolutionaries: Deniz Gezmiş, Yusuf Aslan and Hüseyin İnan on May 6th of 1972 and May 1st protests along with the high tension that resulted from Maraş Massacre in December 1978²⁷, lessons in the school were boycotted which were ended with the harsh intervention of the security forces on 29th April of 1980. Almost every household has a member who witnessed these incidents:

²⁵ The interviewees identified the protests and boycott organized in Tuzluçayır High School leading to intervention of security forces as “occupation”.

²⁶ Interviewee is referring to the execution of Deniz Gezmiş, Yusuf Aslan and Hüseyin İnan in 1972.

²⁷ On 1978, December, there were attacks to Alevis (dwellings and workshops of Alevis) in the city of Kahramanmaraş which was followed by a Marshall Law. Just before Maraş massacre, it is well known that the killers marked the houses of Alevis to determine their targets. More than 100 Alevi Kurds were killed during these attacks.

During the Tuzluçayır High School incidents, my brothers were exercising in the garden, and the panzer pinned them down. When he came home my brother said that I wish my legs had been broken so they wouldn't have picked me up. Do you know, why they took the tall ones? It is because of Deniz Gezmiş. They thought they were Deniz Gezmiş wannabes. 2 buses at Tuzluçayır High School took all the tall ones including my brother, the short ones were all left. (Z., 52, woman)

Tuzluçayır Lisesi olaylarında abimler bahçede spor yapıyorlardı, panzer sıkıştırdı onları. Abim o zaman eve geldiğinde keşke bacaklarım şurdan kırılırdı da almasalardı beni demişti. O zaman uzun boyluları niye alıyorlardı biliyo musun, Deniz Gezmiş'ten dolayı. Bunlar Deniz Gezmiş özentisi diye düşünüyorlardı. Abimle birlikte Tuzluçayır Lisesi'nde 2 otobüs, ne kadar uzun boylu varsa hepsini götürdüler, sadece uzun boyluları, kısa boyluların hepsi kaldı. (Z., 52, woman)

Here, another impressive testimony from Veli Bayrak also identifies the intervention of the security forces just like describing a war:

On April 29, 1980, as a 1st-grade student of a secondary school, in the Resistance of Tuzluçayır High School, in which I was also present, Menekşe Erbay (Mother Menekşe) was screaming “we have children inside, they will kill our children” and she was killed by the gendarmerie. That day, Tuzluçayır High School was scanned for hours and the bullet holes formed on the surface of the school were not filled by 12 September fascism and its civilian practitioners for about 15 years. For 15 years, Tuzluçayır High School was not painted nor whitewashed.

29 Nisan 1980 tarihinde ortaokul 1'nci sınıf öğrencisi olarak aralarında benim de bulunduğum Tuzluçayır Lisesi direnişinde “İçerde çocuklarımız var, çocuklarımızı öldürecekler” diye haykıran Menekşe Erbay (Menekşe Ana) jandarma tarafından katledilmiştir. O gün Tuzluçayır Lisesi saatlerce taranmış ve okulun yüzeyinde oluşan mermi çukurları yaklaşık 15 sene 12 Eylül faşizmi ve onun sivil uygulayıcıları tarafından doldurulmamıştır. 15 yıl Tuzluçayır Lisesi boya badana yüzü görmemiştir.²⁸

Menekşe Erbay, mentioned above, is an important figure for Tuzluçayır people as she is recognised as a “martyr” of the neighborhood. It was told that, during the attack of the security forces, she was shot by a policeman while trying to “protect the children of the neighborhood” as H. tells. Since then, she is an essential part of the “folklore” of the neighborhood and serves as a reference point in the interaction with the state. One of the women interviewees (Z., 52) who was 15 years old, a young sympathizer of Dev-Yol while Menekşe Erbay was killed, mentioned the importance of her bravery and devotion to the children as follows:

Mother Menekşe is an idol to us, she took cover for the children of the neighborhood and was eventually killed, but she risked being killed. The government blatantly killed Menekşe Erbay. For them, it did not matter if she was dead or alive. She is alive for us, but look, her children live here. We gave her

²⁸ Retrieved from <https://sendika.org/2013/10/tuzlucayir-kucuk-moskova-veli-bayrak-demokrat-haber-146487/> on 10.06.2017

name to the park so that she would always be with us. Her courage is incredible, be it her boldness or motherhood.

Menekşe Ana bizim için bir idoldür, mahallenin çocukları için kendini siper etmiş ve en nihayetinde öldürülmüş ama öldürülmeyi göze almış. Devlet resmen göz göre göre katletti Menekşe Erbay'ı. Onlar için çünkü hiçbir önemi yok, ölmüş, kalmış. Bizim için yaşıyor ama bak çocukları yaşıyor işte burada. Adını parka verdik hep bizimle olsun diye. Cesareti inanılmaz, gözü karalığı olsun, analığı olsun.

In all interviews, her name is mentioned in the answers related to the history of the neighborhood and political mobility. For the political activists, being a milestone for constructing the cultural identity and even for the residents outside the political organizations, as they stated that, she is “beyond” a political figure:

Now, everyone here respects Menekşe Erbay, young or old, the ones who know her or the ones that don't. Because she did not go to the incident at the school as a representative of a certain ideology. She went to defend the children of the neighborhood. Now, who can question whether she was right-wing or left-wing? She went for the safety of your child's life. So, she's a different figure. For example, I listened to it from my aunt who supports RPP, who maybe has never been involved in an incident in her life, but talks about Menekşe Erbay respectfully. As I said, everyone respects her. Martyr and the mother of the neighborhood. May she rest in peace. (D., 35, woman)

Şimdi burada büyüğü küçüğü, bileni bilmeyeni Menekşe Erbay'a saygı duyar. Çünkü o okuldaki olaylara belli bir ideolojinin temsilcisi olarak gitmedi. Mahallenin çocuklarını savunmaya gitti. Şimdi kim sorgulayabilir onun sağcı mı solcu mu olduğunu? Senin çocuğunun can güvenliği için gidiyor. O yüzden başka bir figür o. Ben mesela teyzemden dinledim onu; teyzem CHP'li kadın, hayatında belki hiç olaya karışmamış ama nasıl saygıyla anlatır Menekşe Erbay'ı. Herkes saygı duyar dediğim gibi. Mahallenin şehidi, anası. Işıklar içinde uyusun. (D.35, woman)

Here, while portraying the events of Tuzluca High School on April 29th of 1980, the metaphor of war was widely used which also caused the identification of Menekşe Erbay as a “martyr”. Therefore, all testimonies include identification of a battlefield-the high school and the enemy-security forces opposing Tuzluca people. It should be noted that the improvement of the political Sunni movement, Alevism was seen as a dangerous factor not only by Sunnis but also by the State. Alevis are called left-wing in public common and formal documents of the army and the government. On the one hand attacks on Alevis²⁹, and the other hand silence and the unconcerned attitude of

²⁹The nationalist movements in the middle and eastern Anatolia started to target Alevis and used violence. Between 1978 and 1980 a lot of clashes broke out in ethnically mixed towns (Jenkins, 2008, p.140). The 1978-1980 massacres took place in Malatya, Sivas, Çorum and Maraş. Massicard (2005) indicates two important dimensions for the causes of the massacres. The first one is the socio-economic dimension. These massacres had an important role to reach the economic resources as the economic activities mainly controlled by the Alevis who were prospered with the agricultural support policies. To

the government developed the political polarization of Tuzluçayır neighborhood. Soon after these events, there was a military coup on September 12th in 1980 which resulted in the detention of 11,500 people in the first six weeks; “by the end of 1980 the number had grown to 30,000 and after one year 122,600 arrests were made. By September 1982, two years after the coup, 80,000 were still in prison, 30,000 of them awaiting trial.” (Zürcher, 2004, p. 279) Here, the *coup d’etat* in 1980 was a turning point for the neighborhood as for Turkey.

7.2 Tuzluçayır from 1980 to 2002: Military Intervention and Rise of Political Islam

With the military intervention on September 12th of 1980 troops were deployed in emancipated *gecekondu* neighborhoods. The military regime developed a response to the needs of and pressures from the urbanizing poor and brought an end to the radicalizing agenda of cities (Şengül, 2003). Therefore, the first target of the intervention was radical left groups that were considered threats to the regime. Unsurprisingly, after 1980, the security forces harshly attacked the ‘emancipated’ and ‘resistant’ neighborhoods harboring and nourishing radical left groups and politicized inhabitants:

The raids began on September 12. In the '70s, everyone was strong, the police couldn't enter our districts. At that time, the police would monitor from afar the posters made by the revolutionaries against imperialism, fascism, oligarchy in line with their disposal of them in work, war conditions, the distribution of the publications, and could not intervene. However, after September 12, when the organizations were disbanded, when people became lonely, when many families were scattered, they entered the districts, houses were raided, people were rounded up. In Ankara, this happened mostly in Tuzluçayır. (H., 69, man)

12 Eylülle başladı baskınlar. 70'lerde herkes güçlüydü, polis giremiyordu bizim bölgelere. O dönem devrimcilerin emperyalizme, faşizme, oligarşiye karşı iş savaş koşullarında bertaraf etmesi doğrultusunda yaptığı afişlemeleri, yayın

be clearer, along with the social transformation and cultural revival after migrating to the city centres from the villages and towns (including in middle Anatolian towns), Alevis started to receive a share from the market capital and move upwards in the social hierarchy (craft, trade, self employment, public officer, etc.) which had been belonging to Sunnis before. On the other hand, as a result of the high inflation rates at that time, the savings in Sunnis lost their values dramatically. Here, Sunnis could not tolerate this upside-down in social hierarchy and the competition was clearly deepened. The second one is the political dimension. In that era, both in the archives of the State and army and in the eyes of left-wing, Alevism was equated with communism. Massicard (2005) claims that the left-wing parties possibly wanted provoke these massacres in order to create a chaotic condition, so as to upset the government and to make inevitable the 1980 military coup.

organlarının dağıtımını polis uzaktan izliyor, müdahale edemiyordu. Ama 12 Eylül sonrası örgütler dağıtılınca, insanlar yalnızlaşınca, çok aileler dağılınca, artık onlar da bölgelere girdiler, evler basıldı, insanlar toplatıldı. Ankara'da ağırlıkla Tuzluca'yır'da oldu. (H., 69, man.)

The results of the intervention were quite striking as around 650.000 people were arrested while 230.000 people were trialled, while 517 of them were sentenced to death³⁰. In Tuzluca'yır, almost all households have a personal history of aggrivement related to a political activist and/or to a sympathizer of the leftist groups after the intervention:

Until 1982-83, incidents were never lacking in Tuzluca'yır. They broke into every house in the neighborhood. It was mostly around here (pointing to a crossroad in the center of the neighborhood), they raided people's houses at night, getting in by breaking the doors, never knocking. They were making everyone get out of bed to outside, making them shake from the cold in their pyjamas. They did not care if there were kids, searching all the way into the diapers of the babies, and then collecting the women and stripping them. Then they burned all the books inside the houses, all the books, including social sciences, mathematics, as forbidden publications. (M., 50, man)

82-83'e kadar Tuzluca'yır'da olaylar hiç eksik olmadı. Her eve girdiler mahallede. Çoğunlukla buralarda oldu (dörtüyl), insanların evlerini bastılar geceleri, kapı kırılıyordu, çalmak falan yok kapıyı, içeri giriyorlardı. Yataktan kaldırıyorlardı herkesi kapıya çıkarıyorlardı, pijamalar üzerinde soğuktan titriyorsun, çoluk çocuk demiyorlardı, kundaktaki bebelerin bezlerinin içine kadar arıyorlardı, sonra akınları bir yerde toplayı soyuyorlardı. Sonra evlerin içindeki bütün kitaplar, bunun içinde sosyal bilgiler matematik de dahil olmak üzere bütün kitapları yasak yayın diye yakıyorlardı. (M., 50, man)

These policies aimed at applying pressure on the neighborhood in terms of destroying the political mobility and breaking the resistance of the leftist groups; which were resulted in the damage of the control of revolutionary groups on the neighborhood. Therefore, most of the activists in the neighborhood were tortured, arrested, captured and trialled for execution:

After September 12, pressure increased in our district. The number of people who were not arrested in Tuzluca'yır is very small, so everyone was taken to prison. Lawsuits were filed for 2000-3000 people, and some were sentenced to death. Most people were in prisons for 5 to 10 years, most people had to go abroad, many families were torn apart. They attacked here with anger because the goal was to break that resistance. They were also largely successful for a while. (S.,65, woman)

12 Eylül sonrası bölgemizde baskılar arttı. Tuzluca'yır içeriye girmeyen insan sayısı çok azdır, yani herkes cezaevlerine götürüldü. 2000-3000 kişilik davalar açıldı, idamla yargılananlar oldu. Çoğu insan 5 seneden 10 seneye kadar

³⁰ Retrieved from https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/sirasayi/donem24/yil01/ss376_Cilt1.pdf on 04.03.2020

cezaevlerinde kaldılar, çoğu insan yurtdışına gitmek zorunda kaldı, çok aileler parçalandı. Hinçla saldırdılar buraya, o direnci kırmaktı çünkü amaç. Büyük ölçüde başarılı da oldular bir süre. (S.65, woman)

It should be noted that before 1980, demands of the Leftist groups and or sympathizers were reflected in the left parties of the local governments, as through the 1970s most of the municipalities of large cities authorized by RPP and the period of “New Municipalism” continued till 1980. (Şengül, 2003, p 161). The municipalities developed projects with their own resources to implement the policies on the basis of collective consumption, one was Ankara Municipality with mayor Ali Dinçer. (<https://www.ankara.bel.tr/kurumsal/tarihce>). Also, the RPP ruled municipalities viewed the squatter areas of cities as the practical basis of their discourse on social justice and equality. As an example, the New Municipalism movement practiced by Ankara Municipality Mayor, Vedat Dalokay in 1974 can be given with his public housing project. Vedat Dalokay was from Tunceli and as an Alevi, took popular support from Alevi neighborhoods in Ankara (Öner, 1999). Later, Ali Dinçer also maintained the principles of this “New Municipalism” which was also supported and/or used by Tuzluçayır people as measures against the attacks of the central government ruled by a coalition, they largely sympathized with the municipality. This was another strike hit by the military intervention:

Now, of course, we thought of the municipality as an ally then. Or, let's not call it allies, but rather as if they were not obstacles. The government was changing so much at the time. There were Nationalist Front governments, and then Demirel came. Alevi massacres mostly happened during their period. Again, when you look at them, the fact that municipalities were in the hands of RPP gave a little confidence to people, as if it were a port of refuge. And they took it away from us with the coup. (A., 55, woman)

Şimdi tabii belediyeyi o zaman bir müttefik gibi düşünüyorduk biz. Ya da müttefik demeyelim de sanki engel olmayanlar gibi. O dönem o kadar çok değişiyordu ki hükümet. Milliyetçi Cephe hükümetleri vardı sonra işte Demirel geldi. Hep onların dönemde yaşandı Alevi katliamları. Yine onlara bakınca işte belediyelerin CHP'de olması bir nebze insanlara güven veriyordu sanki, sığınacak bir liman gibi. İşte onu da elimizden aldılar darbeyle. (A., 55, woman)

As mentioned above “...following the military coup of 1980, the power of the armed forces was used to suppress all existing political and trades union formations, and to introduce a new economic policy, aimed at export-led growth and a free internal market, cutting wages and subsidies.” (Zürcher, 2004, p.5). In this sense, the economic targets and drawbacks of the intervention on urban space should not be underestimated. In the 1980s the central policy shaping the economy changed from ISI

to export promoting strategy with the influence of IMF and World Bank (Öniş, 2010, p.50). The military thus provided a suitable environment for the development of neoliberalism; in other words, the hegemony of neoliberalism is constructed by the military. However, in the first years of the military government, this hegemonic project did not pursue as “taking consent” was not on the agenda; instead, focus was on “coercion” as mentioned above.

It was stated by the interviewees that the leftist organizations were “the first target of the military as they were “dangerous” enemies for the military with their organized structures based on class-based politics. They mentioned that the state was afraid of their “power” in a sense:

The army took orders from America. Now, of course, there was a wave of right-wing governments that was rising around the world at that time. Do you think that our soldier did this coup so that there would be no more bloodshed? They did it, of course, to plant the flag of neo-liberalism. After Özal came, selling KİTs (state-owned enterprises), privatizations and all that was calculated. Of course, they first attacked the organized structures because they knew that we would resist. (C., 57, man)

Ordu emiri Amerika'dan aldı. Şimdi o dönemde dünya çapında yükselen bir sağ hükümet dalgası var tabii ki. Siz zannediyor musunuz ki bizim askerimiz gerçekten daha fazla kan dökülmesin diye yaptı bu darbeyi. Tabii ki neo-liberalizmin bayrağını dikmek için yaptılar. Sonrasında Özal'ın gelmesi, KİT'lerin satılması, özelleştirmeler falan hepsi hesaplıydı. Bizim direneceğimizi bildikleri için de bunlara önce örgütlü yapılara saldırdılar tabii ki. (C., 57, man)

In this quotation, C. provocatively point to a period that used every type of measure (ideological or material) to promote the bourgeoisie and targeted the working class starting with the 1980 military coup which is defined as the “‘golden age’ of the bourgeoisie” by Boratav (2006, p.3). One of the reasons that the military regime attacked the militants/activists was to make cities to be “safe” and desirable for capital to invest. The neighborhoods like Okmeydanı, Gazı in İstanbul that is “safe” for the opposition were under attack. Through these attacks, the borders of Tuzluçayır Neighborhood are said to be violated and also the interviewees focus on the power of their “territories”, their community. The intervention of the State under the military severely damaged the control of the leftist organizations over the neighborhood and the security forces managed to enter the neighborhood:

They entered every house, and people were persecuted in front of their own homes. Do you know why? Because they knew that every house had a revolutionary, if not there was someone who was going to be a revolutionary in 10 years. Before 1980,

everyone knew their boundaries, no one would dare to enter the neighborhood. They could not. But after 1980, they took people into custody, arrested them, held them captive, and broke that resistance. Before, we (left-wing organizations) would ensure the security of our neighborhood, we would know who was in the neighborhood and who was out. We also lost it with the coup. (A., 69, man)

Her eve girdiler, burada insanlar kendi evlerinin önünde zulmettiler. Niye biliyor musun? Çünkü farkındalardı ki her evde bir devrimci var, ha devrimci olmasa da 10 yıl sonra devrimci olacak biri var. 80 öncesi sınırlarını bilirdi herkes, sıkıysa biri girsin mahalleye. Giremezlerdi. Ama 80'den sonra insanları gozaltına alıp, tutuklayıp, tutsak edip o direnci kırdılar. Önceden biz (sol örgütler) mahallemizin güvenliğini biz sağlardık, kimin girip çıktığını bilirdik. İşte onu da kaybettik darbeyle. (A., 69, man)

Yalman stated that one of the basic aims of the military intervention was to end class politics (2004, p.65), which was shared by most of the interviewees. The neighborhood is defined as being the safe place for the leftist organizations who are the defenders of the class politics and destroying the integrity of the neighborhood was in a sense a signifier of striking to class politics:

We were defending the interests of our class, the worker, the laborer. All we wanted was a fair, egalitarian life, and we still want it. Here's the September 12 mentality that didn't want it, does the sovereign ever want an equal world order? Does he want the oppressed to learn the word "class"? After all, the class struggle is for the salvation of all people, for their freedom. Do they want people to be free? (Ş., 65, woman)

Biz sınıfımızın çıkarlarını savunuyorduk, işçinin, emekçinin. Tek istediğimiz adil, eşitlikçi bir yaşamdı, hala istiyoruz tabii. İşte 12 Eylül zihniyeti bunu istemedi, egemen olan hiç eşit bir dünya düzeni ister mi? Ezilenin sınıf lafını öğrenmesini ister mi? Sonuçta sınıf mücadelesi tüm insanların kurtuluşu içindir, özgürlüğü için. Onlar insanlar özgür olsun ister mi? (Ş., 65, woman)

The leftist organizations in the neighborhood were extremely disorganized with the intervention and all the households were terrorized with the accusation of “aiding and abetting” the militants of these organizations. Therefore, they were the “natural born terrorists” because of their identities and classes:

Now you're an Alevi, that's one. Second, you're a leftist. I mean, you're both a leftist and an Alevi; what's worse for the state? If you're also Kurdish, it's over. Joke aside, when they attacked here after September 12, they never thought about which house they were going to raid. Because to them, all the houses were “terrorist nests.” You must at least have helped a terrorist. Because they know that the place you call Tuzlucağır is the birthplace of these organizations. (I., 43, man)

Şimdi bir kere Alevisin, bu bir. İkincisi, solcusun. Yani hem solcusun hem Alevisin; bundan daha kötüsü ne devlet için? Ha, Kürt de olursan bitti. Şaka bir yana, 12 Eylül sonrasında buraya saldırırken hiç hangi evi basarız diye düşünmediler biliyor musun. Çünkü onlara göre tüm evler “terörist yuvası”ydı. E en kötü bir teröriste yardım illa ki etmişindir. Tuzlucağır dediğin yerin bu örgütlerin doğum yeri olduğunu bilirler çünkü. (I., 43, man)

Tuzluçayır, the “whole neighborhood” was seen as a threat against the existing socio-political system and the hegemony of the military regime. Although I. does not remember these raids personally, he had ongoing memories about the attacks and “witch hunt” and so much spoken in the households, that’s why he spoke like he was a witness. This “witch hunt” they said is necessary as the leftist organizations in the neighborhood and their supporters had the target and the potential to challenge the existing hegemonic structure.

As mentioned above, after the 1980 military intervention, Turkey went through an intense economic transformation of which one of the pillars is the urban space; beginning with the decrease in investment in the industry which led the state and the private capital to invest in building the environment. Hence, the change on the investment pattern originated from seeking lower costs, also this change brought about the end of investment on collective consumption such as the abolishment of urban services and subsidies. Besides, the speculative investment gained significance in the respect that urban space itself became part of these finance capital led investments. That means big capital (national and international) began to invest in urban space which implies a rise in the exchange value of space rather than use-value. Here, the withdrawal from industrial investments in the primary sector by state and private capital created a desire and tendency to invest in the “built environment”, especially in large cities. The big national and international construction companies began to involve in major construction projects such as underground railways, shopping malls, five-stars hotels and business centers, big dwelling and infrastructure projects, etc. The entrance of powerful actors into the urban arena turned towards *gecekondu* neighborhoods soon after the squatter law was issued in 1985, and hence a process of transformation in *gecekondu* neighborhoods was initiated to build apartment blocks.

As a result of these processes, end of the 1980s a striking polarization and fragmentation of the cities developed. In terms of residential differentiation, the duality of *gecekondu*/apartment blocks was replaced by more diversified dwelling areas. The newly emerging middle and upper-middle-income groups started to move outside the cities to newly built gated communities, while the traditional middle classes and sub-classes remained in the existing city (Tekeli, 2014). Tuzluçayır was also affected by this new economic regime as also in the neighborhood, the *gecekondus* began to be

demolished and apartment blocks to be built. As Erman underlined, at the end of the 1980s, *gecekondu*s started to be replaced with low rise apartment blocks, although the transformation process is quite slow (2010, p.184). However, we should bear in mind that, the socio-economic structure of the neighborhood did not changed dramatically as the transformation of the *gecekondu*s into apartment blocks was managed by the will of the residents and through private contractors. Erman interpreted this tendency as follows:

The political position of the people of the neighborhood is mainly based on pragmatic concerns rather than ideological; their resistance has been first to build their homes and neighborhoods, then to protect their “lifestyle” in their neighborhoods against the ‘religious’, and recently to protect their material interests in the rent-oriented transformation of the neighborhood. Considering that the only opportunities the low-income people, who migrated from the village, have to fix their situation are the shanties, their efforts to dispose of the shanties most advantageously will not be strange. (ibid. 193)

Ağırlıklı olarak mahalle halkının siyasi duruşu ideolojik temelden çok pragmatik kaygılara dayanmaktadır; direnişleri önce evlerini ve mahallelerini kurabilmek için, sonra ‘dinciler’e karşı mahallelerinde ‘yaşam tarz’larını koruyabilmek için ve son zamanlarda da mahallenin rant-odaklı dönüşümünde kendi maddi çıkarlarını koruyabilmek için olmuştur. Köyden göç etmiş dar imkanlı insanların durumlarını düzeltebilmek için ellerindeki tek imkanlarının gecekonduları olduğu düşünülürse, gecekondu arsalarını en avantajlı bir şekilde elden çıkartma çabaları yadırganmaz. (ibid. 193)

The people who used to live in *gecekondu*s did not leave the neighborhood; but moved into these new apartments. Although close to the neighborhood, there were urban transformation projects like Ege Neighborhood or Mamak Dumping Site; Tuzluçayır was not included in these projects. In this sense, one cannot talk about the resistance movements in other neighborhoods targeting “forced” urban transformation projects. In other words, Tuzluçayır remained out of this circle in terms of resistance to urban transformation projects which eventually pacify the neighborhoods they targeted and break the solidarity ties that nourishes the resistance movements. Harvey (2008, p.10) defines the process as “accumulation by dispossession” and says that “it is the mirror image of capital absorption through urban redevelopment and is giving rise to all manner of conflict over the capture of high-value land from a low-income population that may have lived there for many years”. One of the interviewees criticized this choice of the residents as follows:

Here people were mistaken. Well, let's not call it a mistake, but enthusiasm, maybe. Instead of lighting a stove, dealing with dirt, we can live in nice clean apartments. For example, some of them got 1.5 apartments. But the people here didn't leave the neighborhood. They gave up their shanties and moved into the apartment. From that point of view, no one objected to the transformation, the people wanted it themselves. (L., 50, woman)

Burada insanlar şöyle bir yanlışlığa düştüler. Yanılgı da demeyelim de heves belki. Soba yakmakla, kirle, pislikle uğraşacağıma güzel temiz apartman dairelerinde oturabiliriz. E kimine 1.5 daire düştüğü de oldu mesela. Ama buradaki insanlar mahalleyi terketmediler. Gecekonduğunu verdi dairesine taşındı. O açıdan kimse itiraz etmedi dönüşüme, insanlar kendileri istediler. (L.50, woman)

However, not all activists share the view that this transformation was simply related to the “consent” of the residents as some of them state that the dominant ideology imposed people that the view that “decent” lifestyle can be found in apartment flats:

Although it may seem voluntary now, I don't think this transformation is so. Because the view imposed on people then is that apartment buildings are modern. It may be true to some extent, after all, shanties are not considered comfortable. But the matter is that why is it presented as if it is the only truth? I think it's not that simple, shanties have another place in terms of organizing, being in solidarity with the neighborhood. And it seems to me they want to break that. As if it's not just rent economics. (Y., 28, man)

Şimdi gönüllü gibi görünse de bu dönüşümün ben öyle olduğunu düşünmüyorum pek. Çünkü o zaman insanlara empoze edilen görüş, apartmanların modern olduğu. Bir ölçüde doğru olabilir, sonuçta gecekondu konforlu sayılmazlar pek. Ama önemli olan neden tek doğru buymuş gibi sunuluyor? Bence bu o kadar basit değil, gecekonduların örgütlenme, mahalleliyle dayanışma içerisinde olma açısından başka bir yeri var. O kırılmak isteniyor gibi de geliyor bana. Sadece ekonomik rant değil sanki. (Y., 28, man)

Here, while defining the difference between *gecekondu* and the apartments, they pointed to a “lifestyle”, a culture; in this sense, it is not just a spatial transformation for them. It is more like a transformation and sometimes a retrogression in the communal values of the neighborhood. Here, Y. is not the only person that mentioned how “solidarity culture” is nourished by the lifestyle in *gecekondu*. Relations in *gecekondu* were said to be intimate and people are considered closer to the “street”. Through this closeness, they are said to be part of the solidarity:

I remember the time when there were shanties, of course. I was 10 or 11 years old, so we can say it was the end of the 80s. At those times, if you wanted to make tomato paste, the women of the entire neighborhood would gather in someone's garden to make it together, and then they would share the whole tomato paste. Or, for example, if you wanted to make gözleme (pancakes), you would make it enough for the entire neighborhood. In other words, imece usulü (collective work) is more common in shanties, it is very difficult to do it in the apartment. Then you'd put a chair and sit in front of the house, and you'd know who would come and go, who needed help, who had a patient. (S., 39, woman)

Gecekonduların olduğu dönemi ben hatırlıyorum tabii, o zaman 10-11 yaşlarındaydım işte 80'lerin sonu diyebiliriz. O zaman şöyle bir dönem, salça mı yapılacak. Birinin bahçesinde toplanır tüm mahallenin kadınları topluca yapılır o salça pay edilir. Ya da mesela gözleme mi yapacaksın, o hamur tüm mahalleliye yetecek kadar açılır. Yani gecekondu yaşamında imece usul daha yaygın, apartmanda onu yapman çok zor. O zaman atarsın sandalye evin önüne oturursun gelen geçenden de haberin olurdu, kim yardıma muhtaç, kimin bir hastası var gibi. (S., 39, woman)

Another interviewee, M. (50, man) shared a similar view:

At that time, we would gather there (pointing the building of Halkevleri - the building that is now the Ethem Sarısülük Library), you would not say someone to bring this or that. A meal would be prepared there, and for example, if you were poor, couldn't cook or if you were sick, they would bring the food to you, they would help you out. They would fix your toilet tap. That solidarity was beautiful, and now I can't say that it still does not exist, but it's easier to find in the shanties. I feel like apartments make people lonely, but I can't quite explain it.

O zamanlar orada (Halkevi'nin binası- şimdi Ethem Sarısülük kütüphanesi olan binayı işaret ediyor) bir toplanırdık, o zaman şu şunu getirsin bu bunu getirsin yoktu. Bir yemek yapılırdı orda, mesela sen oturuyorsun ya burda durumun iyi değil, yemek yapamıyorsun, hastasın veya sana getiriyorlardı, yardım ediyorlardı. Tuvaletini musluğu tamir ediyorlardı. O dayanışma çok güzeldi, şimdi de var tabii yok diyemem ama sanki gecekonduarda daha kolay bu işler. Apartman yalnızlaştırıyor gibi geliyor bana, tam anlatamıyorum ama.

The demographic structure of the neighborhood did not change because of this transformation. This point is important, as the neighborhood remains a “safe place” for the leftist organizations although it was damaged with the military intervention. As Y. mentions, the military could not touch the “soul” of the neighborhood, moreover, their “extreme” interventions based on violence made people unite:

Of course, we got hit, after all, all the houses were raided, books were burned, people were tortured, but you know what happened? People got angry and resented. They took your children and tortured them, what do you say? ” Okay, I'm giving up, ” of course, no one said that. Their resentment increased. Even those who did not support us, revolutionaries, before understanding that the state was the enemy. I think that's why we've never lost our strength in Tuzluca'yır. (M., 64, woman)

Tabii ki darbe aldık, sonuçta tüm evler basıldı, kitaplar yakıldı, insanlar işkenceden geçirildi ama ne oldu biliyor musun? İnsanlar hınçlandı, öfkelerini bilediler. Senin çocuğunu almış işkenceden geçirmişler, ne diyeceksin? “Tamam ben vazgeçiyorum bu işten” demedi tabii ki kimse. Herkes öfkelerini biledi oturduğu yerden. Önceden biz devrimcilere destek vermeyenler bile devletin düşman olduğunu anladılar. Biz o yüzden bence hiçbir zaman gücümüzü kaybetmedik Tuzluca'yır'da. (M., 64, woman)

Although the solidarity culture is said to be “damaged” because of these physical changes, Tuzluca'yır has not lost its “emancipated” character. The focus on “rage” against these attacks is in a sense provide the soul of solidarity to stay alive in the

neighborhood despite the spatial restrictions. Therefore, all the households have similar experiences in terms of confronting the security forces in particular and the state in general.

Representation of the urban poor was claimed to be picked up in the 1990s mostly by pro-Islamic parties, a few *gecekondu* areas, called ‘emancipated’ and ‘resistance’ neighborhoods continued to be represented by pioneering radical left groups and mostly by already politicized inhabitants of these areas (Aslan, 2009). Here, Aslan mentions Küçükarmutlu, Sarıgazi, Okmeydanı, Gültepe-Gülsuyu neighborhoods in Istanbul as examples of these “resistance” neighborhoods in which Tuzluçayır could be a strong example in Ankara:

If people think of Gazi in Istanbul when there is a protest, in Ankara Tuzluçayır would come to mind because our neighborhood is known as Alevi and leftist. I think they are the two most important features of a neighborhood (laughs). We raised our voice against all injustice, the Alevi massacres of the 1990s, mining accidents, the ones that remained unsolved. Even in the darkness of that time, we did not give up solidarity for a moment. We may be divided among ourselves, but we also know that the enemy is one. Our struggle with that dark mentality has never stopped. That's why Tuzluçayır comes to mind when resistance is mentioned. (M., 50, man)

Bir eylem var denince insanların aklına İstanbul'da Gazi geliyorsa, Ankara'da da Tuzluçayır gelirdi. Alevi ve solcu diye biliniyor çünkü mahallemiz. Bir mahalle için bence en önemli iki özellik (güliyor). Biz tüm haksızlıklara sesimizi çıkardık, 1990'lardaki Alevi katliamlarına, maden kazalarına, faili meçhullere. O dönemin karanlığında bile dayanışmadan bir an olsun vaz geçmedik. Kendi içimizde ayrışabiliriz ama düşmanın bir olduğunu da biliriz. Bizim o karanlık zihniyetle mücadelelerimiz hiç durmadı. O yüzden direniş denince Tuzluçayır gelir akla. (M., 50, man)

Inhabitants of these “marginalized” neighborhoods struggled through the 1990s and resisted hegemonic policies of the governments regarding political, economic, social, cultural and religious spaces as well as their living spaces. From the outsiders’ views, Tuzluçayır neighborhood was ‘other’s space’, “outcast” ‘ghetto’, ‘varoş’, ‘suburban’, ‘non-city-dwelling’ etc. Relating to socio-spatial polarization, this disclosure generally stems from labelling the neighborhood as a horror and crime center of Ankara:

People think of crime, terror, violence (when Tuzluçayır is mentioned). So, if 10 percent of the views of outsiders are positive, 90 percent are negative. For example, I went to a job interview, I don't remember the date, it could be 1995. I hid the fact that I lived in Tuzluçayır, I gave another friend's address as my home address. You would be labelled as a slum, if nothing else. Total prejudice. (I., 43, man)

İnsanların aklına suç, terör, şiddet geliyor (Tuzluçayır denilince). Yani dışarıdan bakan insanların görüşlerinin yüzde 10'u olumluysa, yüzde 90'ı olumsuz. Mesela ben bir iş görüşmesine gitmişim, tarihi hatırlamıyorum, 95 olabilir. Saklamışım Tuzluçayır'da yaşadığımı, başka bir arkadaşın adresini vermişim ev adresi olarak. Bir kere hiçbir şey olmasa varoş diye yaftalanıyorsun. Tamamen önyargı. (I., 43, man)

The transformation process from *gecekondu*s to apartments did not change “others’ gaze”; as mentioned above, the neighborhood’s demographic structure did not dramatically change. They were still “outcasts” and the neighborhood is a dangerous place from outsiders’ views identified with crime and delinquency. As a result of the “frightening” appearance of their neighborhood outsiders were afraid to “cross the border”:

In the 90s, shanties were largely demolished, apartments were built. Well, people thought that now we're like the people who live in the apartments, we mobilized upwards. No, brother/sister, you're still a slum for the people out there. Do you think you became a member of the middle class once you live in an apartment? People outside the neighborhood had a terrible prejudice against our neighborhood, and they still have. They think it's a terrorist's nest. So, stay in the apartment as long as you want, they won't even bother to come here and see it. (S., 56, man)

90'larda gecekondu lar büyük ölçüde yıkıldı, apartmanlar dikildi. E güzel, insanlar zannetti ki biz de artık işte dışarıdaki insanlar, apartmanda yaşayanlar gibiyiz, sınıf atladık. Hayır kardeşim, sen dışarıdaki insanlar için hala gecekondu lusun. Sanıyor musun ki orta sınıf oldun apartmana oturunca. Bir kere mahallenin dışındaki insanların korkunç bir önyargısı vardı mahallemize, hala var. Terör, terrorist yuvası diye düşünüyor, istediğin kadar apartmanda otur. Adam buraya gelip görmeye bile tenezzül etmiyor ki. (S., 56, man)

The introduction of neoliberal capital accumulation processes and the impact of globalization not only changed the economic life but also necessitated and resulted in the spatial transformation of the urban space. Post-Fordism together with the neoliberal restructuring signified an essential transformation, particularly of the economic and social structures, as well as the structure of the labor market. As a result of increasing competition between capitalists, the new labor-capital relate to the powerful stigmatization, production techniques, and new organizational forms created over-monitoring of labor and flexible production (Boyer, 1994). Flexible production is one of the most essential features of post-Fordism which requires high technology and a qualified workforce results in a decrease in the quantity of the products. In the post-Fordist regime, flexibility and high technology bring about high inequality in wages and part-time, temporary and home work; in addition to the temporary and permanently unemployed which significantly change the meaning and the formation

of the cities and the relations between them. The activists in Tuzluçayır were also largely affected by this socio-economic regime:

After the coup, there was also terrible unemployment in the 1990s, which I think was very affecting the structure of the neighborhood. If you ask why, you know, maybe the left wing lost blood, but the people who lost their job also began to question the current situation. Young people looking for work, for example, have become politicized in our neighborhood because they saw that employers were looking for ways to make people work without insurance, on low wages. Women were getting piecework at home, again without insurance. If you were lucky, you had a job, but you worked for a pittance. But on the other hand, the boss got rich with what he cut from you. Now we reached out to such people, of course, we chatted and tried to tell them. (H., 69, man)

Darbe sonrasında, 1990'larda korkunç bir işsizlik de yaşandı ki bence mahallenin yapısını çok etkileyen bir durumdu bu. Neden dersen, hani belki sol örgütler kan kaybetti ama işini kaybeden insan da sorgulamaya başladı mevcut durumu. İş arayan gençler mesela ister istemez politikleşti mahallemizde, çünkü baktılar patronlar sigortasız, düşük maaşlarla çalıştırmanın derdindeler. E kadınlara parça başı işler düştü evde, yine sigortasız. Şanslıysan çalışıyorsun eline geçen üç kuruş. Ama öbür tarafta patron senden kıstığıyla zengin oluyor. Şimdi böyle insanlara biz ulaştık tabii, sohbet ettik anlatmaya çalıştık. (H., 69, man)

Similarly,

I was in many jobs, and quit. I have never had a permanent job to say I am safe. However, for me, it was an advantage, because I feel like if I worked in a 9am to 6pm job, I wouldn't have time for revolutionism. Actually, there are people who find the time, for example, brother Y. was a trade unionist for many years, he was organized in the workplace. However, in order to organize in the neighborhood, the truth is, you have to spend your time in the neighborhood. You should be able to make home visits, I don't know, you should be able to go to a tea house and talk to people. (M., 44, man)

Ben çok işe girdim, çıktım. Hiçbir zaman öyle kalıcı aman güvendeyim diyeceğim bir işim olmadı. Ama benim için bu avantajdı; çünkü 9-6 bir işte çalışsaydım devrimciliğe zaman bulamazdım gibi geliyor. Bulanlar var aslında, mesela Y. abi sendikacılık yaptı uzun yıllar, işyerinde örgütlendi o. ama mahallede örgütlenebilmek için işin aslı vaktinin çocuğunu mahallede geçirmelisin aslında. Ev ziyaretleri yapabilmelisin, ne bileyim kahveye gidip insanlarla konuşabilmelisin. (M., 44, man)

Flexibilization became a key characteristic of the social regulatory processes associated with post-Fordism. For Harvey,

flexible accumulation has had a serious impact upon all urban economies. The increasing entrepreneurialism of many urban governments (particularly those that have emphasised "public-private partnership") has tended to reinforce it and the neoconservatism and post-modernist cultural trends that went with it. The use of increasingly scarce resources to capture development has meant that the social consumption of the poor was neglected in order to provide benefits keep the rich and powerful in town (1990, p.266)

Here, for some of the activists, this “flexibility” was identified as being “anti-proletariat”, but an opportunity for their organization as they had more time to contact with the people:

For me, working from home was actually an advantage, although it was a labor-hostile practice. Because I wanted to spend most of my time talking to people, making home visits, I don't know, arranging organizations. Otherwise, how would I find time to organize and do the housework at the same time? At that time, there were many women who took jobs from home in the neighborhood. In fact, this was also beneficial for the workshop manager. (A., 55, woman)

Benim için evde iş yapmak bir avantajdı aslında, her ne kadar işçi düşmanı bir uygulama olsa da. Çünkü ben vaktimin çoğunu insanlarla konuşarak, ev ziyaretleri yaparak, ne bileyim organizasyonlar düzenleyerek geçirmek istiyordum. Bir yandan ev işi, bir yandan çalışma hayatı, e örgütlenmeye nasıl vakit bulurdum öbür türlü? O dönem mahallede eve iş alan kadın çok oldu. Atölyecinin de işine geliyordu işin aslı. (A., 55, woman.)

As Boyer (1994) indicated the spatial reflection of post-Fordism appears to have two conflicting tendencies which are localization and globalization that caused a change in the structure of policies at the urban level. Local governments had to combat economic transformation/problems without the financial support of the state. In the case of investment, the role of the local level became more important, and the negotiation process between international financial capital and local powers began. Therefore, the cities' exchange value gained significance, and they began their transformation on the basis of attracting capital. The cities also began to compete with each other to attract capital. Investment appeared with an urban image “to save the day” rather than to create long-term projects (Harvey, 1989, p.5). These post-Fordist policies together with globalization created more inequality between and within the sections of the cities. Here, the activists of the neighborhood who witnessed this transformation from the 1980s shared a similar story:

Urban transformation was decided for 13 neighborhoods in Ankara. For example, they did not do it to solve the housing problem of citizens in these neighborhoods, but rather to extract rent for themselves. The rich neighborhoods got richer, the poor ones became poorer. (Y., 58, man)

13 mahallede mesela kentsel dönüşüm kararı alınmıştı Ankara'da. Mesela o mahallelerde vatandaşların konut sorununu çözme değil, bunu biraz rantasal olarak çözme, kendilerine rant çıkarma doğrultusunda yaptılar. Zengin mahallesi daha da zenginleşti, yoksul mahallesi daha da yoksullaştı. (Y., 58, man)

The state should be understood as a strategic/relational/spatial concept in which “glocalization”³¹ strategies is intended to provide a theoretical basis on which to grasp the increased strategic importance of urban and regional economic policies within this rescaled configuration of state spatiality.” (Brenner, 2003, p.214). As a matter of fact, urban space under post-Fordism is increasingly divided, separated or quartered, and promotes social dislocation of the population in the city:

At that time (the 1980s), Ankara was thoroughly separated. I don't know, new neighborhoods were being formed, luxury sites were being built outside, such as Çayyolu. Of course, in the center such as in Gaziosmanpaşa there were people that still lived as the middle class, but in general, they were running away from the city. The neighborhoods were so different in terms of development. For example, the roads of the next neighborhood were paved, apartment buildings were renovated, and they made parks and such there. However, when you walked 50 meters and came to your neighborhood, it was covered in mud. I mean, I'm not saying it's for just Tuzluçayır, most of the neighborhoods in Mamak have experienced it. They kept our physical conditions so bad that we were almost forgotten. The state openly ignored it. (Y., 51, man)

O dönemde (1980ler) Ankara iyice ayrıışmıştı artık. Ne bileyim yeni mahalleler oluşuyordu dışarıda işte Çayyolu gibi, lüks siteler yapılıyordu. Tabii merkezde GOP'ta falan vardı hala orta sınıf yaşayan ama genel olarak kaçıyorlardı şehirden bir nevi. Mahalleler o kadar farklıydı ki gelişme açısından. Mesela yan mahallenin yolları asfaltlanıyor, apartmanlar yenileniyor, park yapıyorlar falan. E 50 metre öteye geçiyorsun senin mahallen çamur içinde. Yani sadece Tuzluçayır için de demiyorum bunu, Mamak'ta çoğu mahalle yaşadı herhalde bunu. Fiziksel koşullarını insanların o kadar kötü tuttular ki, adeta unutulduk mahalle içinde. Devlet resmen görmezden geldi. (Y., 51, man)

As Y. mentioned, the unjust distribution of wealth and poverty in the city brought about deeper poverty for the poor areas, which were usually composed of disadvantaged groups of ethnic minorities or immigrants and brings greater wealth to the wealthy sections. The power elites chose sections of the city where they want to live and the remaining population is pushed to the sections with low-profit and low-quality infrastructure:

After 1980, the municipality here did not build roads, infrastructure work, or provide you with services. For one thing, they deliberately punished us; and secondly, there was no profit in this business. I mean, they spend capital on you in order to get more for themselves, right? You are already a “dangerous” neighborhood in their eyes, so they will do their best to intimidate you. They will cut off the water, won't build roads; we've been there. (M., 64, woman)

³¹ The concept of glocalization firstly introduced by Swyngedouw in 1992 which is identified as “the combined process of globalization and local-territorial reconfiguration” as cited in Brenner (1999, p. 486)

1980'den sonra burada belediye ne yolu yaptı, ne altyapı çalışması yaptı, ne sana bir hizmet getirdi. Bilerek cezalandırdılar bu bir; ikincisi herhangi bir kari yoktu bu işte. Yani, sana sermaye harcayacak ki kendine daha çok getirisi olacak değil mi? E sen bir kere "tehlikeli" bir mahallesin gözünde, bilakis seni sindirmek için elinden geleni yapacak. Suyunu kesecek, yolunu yapmayacak; yaşadık hep bunları. (M., 64, woman)

S. mentioned the newcomers to the neighborhood defending a similar perspective:

And when we look at those who moved in that period, we see that they were people from a very close socio-economic class. Rents were cheap, of course, some of the people from the shanties that turned into apartments rented them out. But the ones that came here knew how this place was, that it was Alevi and leftist. For example, Tuzluçayır, the place that was repulsive to a Sunni officer, was attractive to an Alevi worker. In that respect, the structure of the neighborhood did not change much at that time. If there was a place nearby, for example, where there was a transformation, people would naturally look near the place they were used to. There were also those who moved to the neighborhood at that time. At that time, there were people who moved to the neighborhood like that. (S., 65, woman)

O dönem taşınanlara bakınca da sosyo-ekonomik olarak oldukça yakın bir sınıftan insanlar olduğunu görüyoruz. Kiralar ucuzdu tabii ki, apartmana yeni dönüşen gecekondulardan kiminin dairesi vardı kiraya verdi. Ama buraya gelen buranın nasıl olduğunu, Alevi ve solcu olduğunu bilerek geliyordu. Mesela Sünni bir memura itici gelen Tuzluçayır Alevi bir işçiye çekici geliyordu. O bakımdan mesela çok da yapısı değişmedi o zamanlar mahallenin. Yakınlarda örneğin dönüşüm olan bir yer varsa, insanlar tabii alıştığı yerin yakınına bakıyordu. O dönem öyle taşınanlar da oldu mahalleye. (S., 65, woman)

The point that S. draws attention to is that being an "attraction center" for a leftist opponent has also been stressed by A. (41, man) who settled in the neighborhood with his wife and son. Being a member of a Kurdish political organization, they stated that the first reason for their choice of Tuzluçayır as a place of residence was it being leftist:

For one thing, Tuzluçayır was easy for us. It was a place where the whole left and the socialists were. We realized that we would be more comfortable in Tuzluçayır, because we felt ourselves close to them. We came to Tuzluçayır.

Tuzluçayır bir kere biraz bize kolay geldi. Bütün sol, sosyalistlerin bulunduğu bir yerdi. Bizim de kendimizi onun içinde hissettiğimiz için Tuzluçayır'da daha rahat edeceğimizin farkına vardık. Tuzluçayır'a geldik.

His wife R. (37, woman) states that:

Why Tuzluçayır? Because Tuzluçayır reminds me of democracy; because it is leftist, socialist which I feel close to. Because I'm a Kurd. I'm a Kurdish woman. I'm a democratic woman. I defend women rights. Because of that, I feel closer to it. I chose this place because the socialists were also here.

Niye Tuzluçayır... Tuzluçayır bana biraz demokrasiyi çağrıştırdığı için; sol, sosyalist kesim olduğu için, bana yakın olduğu için. Çünkü ben bir Kürt'üm. Kürt kadınıyım. Demokrat bir kadınıyım. Kadın haklarını savunuyorum. Bundan kaynaklı bana daha yakın geldiği için. Sosyalistler de bulunduğu için burayı tercih ettim.

In the 1990s the state improved the strategies of urban expenditures regarding the interests of capital groups. As a result of this, the spheres emptied of distribution-based struggles were filled by identity-based conflicts as the demands were not class-based anymore and started to be identity-based. As Olsson, Özdalga and Raudvere pointed out:

The leftist emphasis from the 1970s is turning more and more into a new pride and consciousness of cultural and religious tradition and the former biased notion of the Alevi as Anatolian peasants has changed. A distinct Alevi social and intellectual élite has emerged during the 1980s and 1990s and a host of books and journals debating very different Alevi positions have been published. (1998, Preface)

As mentioned above, the attacks of Sunnis towards Alevis and the government's improvidence in terms of preventing these attacks had nourished the identity of Alevism and affected Tuzluçayır:

We realized that we were terrorists in the eyes of the state. I was 16 at the time (1993 - Sivas Massacre), so I remember clearly that we watched those intellectuals burn alive. The state also watched with us. Such a moment of desperation. I remember how my father shed tears, how angry we were. When we look back at why those intellectuals were burned, we see that it was because they were Alevi and leftists, but mainly Alevi. Because for the bigots, the killing of the Alevi was obligatory. So, we clung to our Alevi identity, even if we didn't want to. (B., 41, man)

Devletin gözünde terörist olduğumuzu anladık bir kere. Ben o zaman (1993- Sivas Katliamı'nda) 16 yaşındaydım, yani gayet iyi hatırlıyorum o aydınların canlı canlı yakulmasını izlediğimizi. Devlet de izledi bizimle beraber, böyle bir çaresizlik hali. Babamın nasıl ince ince gözyaşı döktüğünü hatırlıyorum, nasıl sessizce öfkelenmişimizi. Neden yaktılar diye dönüp bakıyorsun, Alevi ve solcu olmalarından ötürü ama önce Alevi. Çünkü yobazlar için Alevilerin katli vacipti. Yani istemesek de Alevi kimliğimize sarıldık. (B., 41, man)

As B. states, the activists in Tuzluçayır began to value their identity more than before. One can say that Alevi, who participated in left-wing movements and thus were politicized, improving their organizational capacities, asserted to be pioneers of this form of identity politics (Massicard, 2005; Aydın, 2007; Tol, 2009):

We have never given up on class politics. However, incidents such as the Sivas massacre and before that the Maraş massacre actually proved that the state considered us as an enemy because of our identity. So, it's not just a class enemy, it's an identity enemy. Now, of course, it is inevitable to unite in the face of such exclusion. As an organization, we did not look narrowly at politics, we also defended the Alevi identity, that is, like the female identity or other identities. I personally didn't think of it as too separate from class politics at the time. In fact, those were the times when we had to cling to our identities after the coup. I, of course, do not limit Alevism as a religious identity, it is at the same time a cultural unity, an upper identity. (C., 57, man)

Sınıf siyasetinden biz hiçbir zaman vaz geçmedik. Ancak, Sivas katliamı onun öncesinde Maraş Katliamı gibi olaylar aslında devletin bizi de kimliğimizden dolayı bir düşman olarak gördüğünü kanıtladı. Yani sadece sınıf düşmanı değil aynı zamanda kimlik düşmanı da. Şimdi tabii ki böyle bir dışlanma karşısında birleşmek kaçınılmaz. Biz örgüt olarak dar kafayla bakmadık siyasete, Alevi kimliğini de savunduk, yani kadın kimliği gibi ya da işte diğer kimlikler. Ben şahsen sınıf siyasetinden çok ayrı düşünmedim o dönemde. En çok sahip çıkmamız gereken zamanlardı aslında kimliğimize darbe sonrası. Ben tabii dini bir kimlik olarak da sınırlamıyorum Aleviliği, kültürel bir birliktelik aynı zamanda, bir üst kimlik aslında. (C., 57, man)

In order to exercise the neo-liberal hegemonic project, the state firstly had to struggle to clean communist elements in the society. It had to create and feed a dominated culture to both fill the emptied spheres of the working class and continue to oppress other identities (Massicard, 2005). The hegemonic project chose the Sunni-Islam element and provided it to emerge and start to struggle over it. So, the most dominant identity was political Islam since 1980 and developed its supporters in the 1990s. The residual culture which was in the sediment became a dominant culture in Turkey (Şengül, 2004). Tol (2009) argued that the depreciation of the national homogeneity through weakening the nation-state and encouragement of the variety of ethnic, religious or cultural groups against the homogenous state was effective in the rise of identity politics. Therefore, the leftist organizations in the neighborhood include the “cries” and the “demands” in conjunction with Alevi identity:

We were obliged to be the voice of those people. So you're aiming for a socialist order, and you're going to tell people about an order where they're not excluded because they're Alevis, of course. Because, the person's oppression, the exclusion didn't just come from being a worker. Being an Alevi was also a reason, and surely, we did not ignore that. In other words, in the 90s, political Islam was gaining strength. We were dealing with the neo-liberal policies, but we could not ignore this religious hegemony, too. Especially in a neighborhood where Alevi like us live. Of course, our actions, our meetings, our contact with people have been shaped in this direction. (Z, 50, woman.)

Biz o insanların sesi olmakla mükelleftik. Yani bir sosyalist düzen hedefliyorsun ve insanlara Alevi olmalarından ötürü dışlanmadıkları bir düzeni anlatacaksın tabii ki. O insanın ezilmişliği, dışlanmışlığı sadece işçi olmasından gelmiyordu çünkü. Alevi diye de dışlanıyordu, şimdi biz tabii ki görmezden gelmedik bu durumu. Yani 90'larda siyasal islam güç kazanıyordu, neo-liberal politikalar tamam ama bu dini hegemonyayı da göz ardı edemedik. Hele bizimki gibi Alevilerin yoğun yaşadığı bir mahallede. Eylemlerimiz, toplantılarımız, insanlarla temasımız bu yönde bir şekillenme de oldu tabii ki. (Z.,50, woman)

Similar to Z., Y. also mentioned that Alevi identity formed solidarity mechanisms in the neighborhood. As Aslan (2016) stressed, the ethnic, cultural and political organizations functioned as the instruments both of solidarity mechanism and those of resistance:

No matter how many times we were hit after the coup, tortured and then arrested the solidarity kept us alive. We knew that when we got back to the neighborhood, the neighbours would open their arms and hug us. I mean, maybe you can't organize a protest, but even going to a picnic with a neighbour is a movement, an organization. We never lost that. (Y., 58, man)

Biz darbe sonrası ne kadar darbe alsak, işkenceden geçirilmiş sonra işte tutuklanmış perişan edilmiş olsak da dayanışma bizi diri tuttu. Biliyorduk ki mahalleye döndüğümüzde mahalleli bizi sarmalar, kucaklar. Yani yeri gelir belki eylem organize edemezsin ama mahalleliyle mesela bir pikniğe gitmek bile bir harekettir, örgütlenmedir. Biz bunu hiç kaybetmedik işte. (Y.58, man)

To sum up, economic depression and neo-liberal structuring of the economy were overwhelming factors compared with social unrest or violence that led to the turndown of pre-coup government at the end of the 80s. In addition, the rise of Islam can be taken as another example of how the sentiment of discontentment triggered by poverty was a critical factor that made Sunni Islamic discourse appealing to the people in the aftermath of the 1980 coup and during the 1990s (Tol, 2009, pp.416-417).

In Tuzluca, the political resistance nourished from the communal ties and the “leftist organizations” in the neighborhood were uniting due to their common class positions and interest and Alevism was an expression of this. Hence, Alevism was a common value that functioned as a building block in terms of nourishing resistance. Although 1980 military intervention damaged both the unity of the neighborhood and the structures of the leftist organizations, the neighborhood kept its characteristics as comprising different classes, statuses and ideologies. Their unity seems to be the outcome of being specifically oppressed and excluded, such as massacres and continuing exclusion in social and economic life.

The neo-liberal hegemonic project of the 1980s; initiated by the Motherland Party government and supported by the military intervention could be seen as an “unsuccessful project” (Akça, 2011; Yalman, 2004). However, it was after the 1980 military coup that the transformation of Turkey’s social, political, economic atmosphere started, beginning with January 24th economic regulations, and continuing with the Motherland Party government. Starting from 1980, deep political changes in the economy and politics came to the stage. The leftist organizations in the neighborhood were also affected by this new line of politics that attempted to harmonize neo-liberalism, authoritarianism and conservatism. As mentioned above, the conservative policies that address the “Sunni Islamic” values of

the people nourished the rise of political Islam in the 1990s. The effect of these changes on the neighborhood and the political activists should be examined carefully.

Relating to socio-spatial polarization, one can talk about the “disclosure” which generally stems from labelling Tuzluçayır as a horror and crime center of the city. It is claimed that when the process of hegemony in suburban areas is organized and based upon ethnic and sect community completed, explosions in these areas will turn into big catastrophes wrapping all around the state. Therefore, a disposal process should be immediately necessary for emancipating these areas which have never been integrated and fit into the postmodern cities. Once the transformation process was started with the favor of capital incoming from built areas, wiping out these nests of illegal organized, horror, crime and dirtiness (some areas) from the cities is considered to succeed at the end (Aslan, 2009).

Here, such a “disposal process” could not be achieved in Tuzluçayır as mentioned above; the ‘apartmentization’ could not make demographic changes because the residents did not leave the neighborhood in the transformation process. In this sense, the characteristics of the neighborhood in terms of providing a “nest” for the leftist organizations did not dramatically change during the 1990s.

Here, Akça (2014) dated the 1990s as the crisis of the political hegemony and its main reason was stated as the damage on class-based politics created by neo-liberal capitalism:

The causes of this crisis were twofold: neoliberal economic and social policies, and the militarisation and securitisation of questions of identity politics, such as the Kurdish question and the rise of political Islam. The resulting political vacuum, which was itself partially produced by the military through its securitisation of politics, was in turn filled by the military. (2014, p.34)

It is important to understand the effects of the rise of political Islam and its emphasis on identity politics on political organizations in the neighborhood. Besides, Kurdish question was started to be argued among the left- which has also consequences on the policies of these organizations. Therefore, as mentioned above the massacres³²

³² Refereeing Ümraniye (1 Mayıs District) massacre in 1997 and Sivas massacre in 1993, Gazi massacre in 1995 and Nurtepe neighborhood (mainly comprised with Alevi migrants) clashes and other clashes made Alevi youths to participate to the armed radical groups such as DHKP-C, TKP(ML), MLKP etc.

targeting the Alevi population in various cities became a point of legitimation and gained popular support in the neighborhood. One of the interviewees, I. reminds that period as follows:

We watched the intellectuals burn alive in front of us in a hotel; I mean all the Alevis, intellectuals, neighborhood, children, leftists, conscientious. The human beings, I mean, all of us burned on the inside with them. Didn't these people see that the state didn't try to do anything? Now I've told this of course. I told people: "the state sees you as an enemy, thinks you should be destroyed." In the least, it wants you to shut up and sit down. It does not care about your worship, your values, even your life. The state supposedly doesn't have a religion. Oh, come on, it certainly has. I wonder if the Sunnis have lost a place to the Alevis since then? (Ş., 65, woman)

Biz aydınların bir otelde gözümüzün önünde canlı canlı yanmasını izledik; biz derken tüm Aleviler, aydınlar, mahalleli, çocuk, çocuk, solcusu vicdanlısı. İnsan olanlar yani, içimiz yandı onlarla birlikte. Devletin kılını kıpırdatmadığını görmedi mi bu insanlar? Şimdi ben bu insane tabii ki bunu anlattım. İnsanlara şunu dedim: "Devlet seni düşman olarak görüyor, yok edilmen gerektiğini düşünüyor" En kötü sesini kes otur istiyor. Senin ibadetin, değerlerin, hadi onu geçti.m yaşamın bile umurunda değil. Devletin dini yok güya, hadi oradan. Var işte, Sünniler o günden beri bir yeri kaptırmış mı acaba Alevilere? (Ş., 65, woman)

In 1996, the resistance movements³³ organized by the political prisoners in prisons were supported by the militants from these resistance neighborhoods. Hence the local/urban anti-hegemonic project got the opportunity to spread all around the national scale. On the other hand, the state did not respond to these radical movements. Rising of the Kurdish movement, too, the state tried to beat down these movements with bloody measures. In Anatolian regions too Alevis were declared as 'terrorists' and had to leave their towns. For example, in 1995, the population of Sivas İmranlı decreased dramatically from 14.000s to 6.000s (Massicard, 2005).

The third migration wave developed in that period which was also the time that in the unity of the "power bloc" problems arose. Therefore, there was a high fragmentation in the center left and center right and as a result there were unsuccessful and unstable coalition governments. Remembering Poulantzas stating that, the state functions as an

Rather, these groups succeeded in cleaning criminals (such as theft, mafia and drug selling etc.) from these emancipated regions and controlled the real estate markets and dwelling there. Moreover, they sparked resistance and joined with neighborhood inhabitants protesting urban transformations.

³³ Retrieved from <https://m.bianet.org/bianet/insan-haklari/137704-1996-da-hapishanede-olumler> on 04.02.2020

Retrieved from https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler/2012/11/121109_turkey_hunger_strikes on 04.02.2020

institution where the fractions of power bloc resolve their conflict, the instability of coalition governments damaged this negotiation. Here, Aydın denotes that:

In the midst of this crisis of political hegemony, the Welfare Party (RP) imposed itself as a political actor by becoming the leading party, first in the 1994 municipality elections, and a year later, in the general elections, following which it became part of the government as a coalition partner in 1996. Thanks to its discourse of the ‘just order’, with its anti-neoliberal resonances, an emphasised religious identity, and its anti-Western and anti EU rhetoric the RP managed to unite social segments with different class interests under an Islamic identity. (2014, p.179)

The popular support that nourishes the rise of WP was stopped with the military intervention of 28 February 1997 which was followed by its closure in 1998. Not surprisingly, its successor VP will be banned on 22 June 2001 by claiming that it violated the secular articles of the Constitution and acted against the principles of secularism³⁴. These were the cornerstones in the success of JDP’s neoliberal authoritarian populist strategy which will also be a critical point for the period most intensively covered in this dissertation. Özbudun summarizes this success built on populism as follows:

AKP appears to have successfully rebuilt the Özal ANAP coalition, bringing together former center-right voters, moderate Islamists, moderate nationalists, and even a certain segment of the former center-left. Indeed, ANAP maintained this coalition for two legislative terms (1983–91), when it formed a single-party government and played a vital role in developing a free market economy open to international competition and in normalizing politics following a period (1980–83) of stern military rule. (2006, p.546)

Following Gramsci, the hegemony project of JDP is based on Islamic values and following Poulantzas the power bloc that addresses the authoritarian statism with the support of the “silent victim Muslim population” were critical to understanding the leftist activism in Turkey in general and Tuzluca Neighborhood in specific. As mentioned above, while referring to Gramsci, Poulantzas claims that hegemony has to be considered with the relations “in” the power bloc besides the relations between the power bloc and the dominant classes. Therefore, in the power bloc, not only the political parties but also the bourgeoisie, institutions of the state, bureaucracy and the capital included. Here, the relative autonomy of political parties necessitates the

³⁴ Retrieved from <https://www.milliyet.com.tr/siyaset/refah-partisi-de-ayni-gerekcilerle-kapatildi-505586> on 04.02.2020

“consent” of the masses as they have the “power” to legitimize the capital accumulation process. A popular alliance is necessitated against this power bloc, an alternative that could only be formed through not only political but also cultural and social alternatives. Therefore, for a movement, an organization to be inclusive in a popular sense provided the consent-taking and legitimacy of the struggle; so political organizations in Tuzluçayır should be considered in this framework.

Urban space after the 1980s increasingly divided, separated or quartered, and promoted social displacement of the population in the city which could enlighten the contemporary urban space. The unjust distribution of wealth and poverty in Ankara, just like in other big cities, brought about deeper poverty for the poor sections which are usually composed of disadvantaged groups of ethnic minorities or immigrants and brought greater wealth to the wealthy sections of the city. Here, Tuzluçayır was one of these poor sections composed of the Alevi community with lower-middle-class residents as mentioned above.

Identifying the modern city, Şükrü Arslan uses the term “unclaimed spaces” emphasizing the absence of a group that owns, protects and embraces the city as a whole (Arslan, 2016, p.11). On the other hand, his identification as “unclaimed” refers to the plurality of the groups in the city that are in constant debate with each other in terms of (re)producing the urban space. Obviously, the state is one of the strongest parties in this conflict about who are the decision-makers, which social groups or social classes take part in the decision-making mechanisms and who influences the governments or who are part of the state structure? While questioning the conflicting interests in and/or on the urban space, these are among the fundamental questions.

In a very broad sense, the question is who is/are at the steering wheel of history or what or who are the power engines of the society. At a different scale, urban politics are also concerned with the same questions: Who sets the rules in the urban space? Territorial contours of state regulation should be considered to comprehend the uneven geographical development of capitalism deepening after the 1980s. The state should be understood as a strategic/relational/spatial concept in which “glocalization strategies are intended to provide a theoretical basis on which to grasp the increased strategic importance of urban and regional economic policies within this rescaled

configuration of state spatiality.” (Brenner, 2003, p. 214). While questioning the relation of the leftist organizations in Tuzluçayır with the state, this should be the leading clue.

7.3 Since 2002: Activists of the Political Organizations in Tuzluçayır

“In the theory of superstructures, civil society cannot be separated from political society in the narrow sense: the state in its “integral sense” is, says Gramsci, “dictatorship plus hegemony” or again, ‘...by “State” should be understood not only the apparatus of the government but also the “private” apparatus of “hegemony” or civil society’” [emphasis original] (Texier, 1979, p.49)

As mentioned above, locality emphasized a strong reference for the formation of identity in Tuzluçayır. Up to now, we observed that the identity of Tuzluçayır, shaped strongly by the history of the neighborhood was one of the driving forces that affected the political activists. A very impressive and meaningful concept used by Castells to emphasize the role of locality is the “collective memory of locality” which in the case of Tuzluçayır trigger activists to a unified struggle, to a coalition, an alliance, a movement...etc.

Resistance in Tuzluçayır seems to make and maintain connections among movements which enable us to question the reflections of the hegemonic formations in the neighborhood and the resistance against them. As Laclau and Mouffe put it, it is the concept of hegemony that enable us to scale up from a territorial struggle to a popular project of social transformation. In this sense, to question the possibility of creating a counter-hegemonic popular common sense, first of all, it is essential to scrutinize the role of locality and territorialization in the making of political activities. Here, the reading of “space” through Lefebvre will also pave the way to understand the role of the political activists in the neighborhood. Therefore, as mentioned above Lefebvre emphasizes space functioning as a political tool and a strategic ally for the dominant ideology. Here, we should understand space as a political instrument for the existing hegemonic formation to control the “others” which makes spatial organization important in terms of representing power. So the possibility of the “other” side of the

story; a potential of an emancipated space, a space where the hegemonic moments was challenged should be questioned carefully.

One step further, the political activists have strategic tools nourishing political insights for a potential counter-hegemonic formation of which critical components are common-sense and language. Common sense and language can be terrains on which counter-hegemonic moments could be built. Here, the counter-hegemonic force coming from the political organizations in the neighborhood cares about fulfilling popular demands. Collective action in Tuzluçayır is a plural, differentiated, democratic and inclusive and political group in the neighborhood as bulwarks in the resistance to state officials and government: They challenged how politics are conducted in the neighborhood, city and country. To achieve this, they necessitated counter-hegemonic articulations of differentiated but equivalent popular struggles and almost every political movement values the autonomy and particularity of the other struggles.

7.3.1 Neighborhood

As mentioned above, Tuzluçayır gecekondus was transformed into apartments by the 1990s and now there are only a few gecekondus left. This transformation has several effects on the “fall of the community” characteristics of Tuzluçayır. At this point, it is useful to look at R. Sennett’s evaluations on the transformation of neighborhoods in modern society. In the book “The Fall of Public Man”, it can be said that Sennett makes a critique of modern society and associates it with the domination of intimacy and presents how it is reproduced through the organization of work and daily life and the organization of space, or the city. Similarly, in “Flesh and Stone”, he mentioned the “disconnected spaces” in the urban context and the exemplary individualism it creates (1994, p.358):

In the course of the development of modern, urban individualism, the individual fell silent in the city. The street, the café, the department store, the railroad, the bus, and the underground became places of the gaze rather than scenes of discourse. When verbal connections between strangers in the modern city are difficult to sustain, the impulses of sympathy that individuals may feel in the city looking at the scene around them become in turn momentary – a second of response looking at snapshots of life.

Here, the modern city and modern life turned out to be a meeting of single and silent individuals which gave way to the self-direction of the latter and the rise of individualism. The rise of individualism could be comprehended through the deformed/intimate society which was built on two basic principles: Narcissism and the destructive *gemeinschaft* (community)⁴.

The proliferation of the destructive *gemeinschaft* points to an exclusionary process shaped by purification. For destructive *gemeinschaft* to arise, people must believe that when they reveal their feelings to each other, they do so in order to form an emotional bond. This bond consists of a collective personality which they build up through mutual revelation. (Sennett, 1977, p. 262). In the community/*gemeinschaft*, the “aliens” were purified from the community, the relations with the outsiders was disconnected and accordingly, the “community becomes uncivilized” (ibid. 294, 313).

Here, the source of individualism is embodied in the modern city in two domains: one is the public space and the other is the neighborhood and quartier (ibid. 135). The interviewees signified the boundaries of Tuzluçayır often making the division between “us” and “them” clearly. They constantly use the words “we” and “us” while talking about the neighborhood signifying their identity as being “Tuzluçayırlı”. While asking about their thoughts on the existence of the “identity of the neighborhood”, they gave similar answers:

There is a reality called being from Tuzluçayır. Look, for example, a person who lives in Birlik Street does not say that I am from Birlik Street, but there is another meaning in being from Tuzluçayır here. In the past, people were more similar, since the 90s, the structure of those who live here has changed a little more, but there is still an identity of being from Tuzluçayır. (Z., 50, woman)

Tuzluçayırlı olmak diye bir gerçeklik var. Bak mesela atıyorum Birlik Mahallesiinde yaşayan insan Birlikliyim demez, ama burada Tuzluçayırlı olmanın başka bir anlamı var. Eskiden tabii daha benzer insanlardı, 90'lardan sonra biraz daha değişti oturanların yapısı ama yine de Tuzluçayırlılık var. (Z., 50, woman)

Similarly,

We're different from other neighborhoods. Resistance exists in our soul, in our history, in our past. Do you feel like you belong in your neighborhood? We do. Upon turning this corner, I say "I am home". There is such comfort in it. Look, here our women are free, they walk around in whatever hours they want, in whatever clothes they want, and no one can leer at them. I mean, there is such an atmosphere of freedom. After all, although there were those who moved here from

outside, let's say if there are 10 flats in an apartment, in 5 of them relatives and fellow townsman live. (A., 46, man)

Biz diğer mahallelerden farklıyız bir kere. Direniş ruhumuzda var, tarihimizde var, geçmişimizde. Sen oturduğun mahalleye ait hissediyor musun kendini? Biz hissediyoruz, şurada ben ışıkları döndükten sonra eve geldim diyorum. Öyle bir rahatlık var tabii. Bak burada kadınlarımız bizim özgürdür, istedikleri saatte, istedikleri giysiyle dolaşırlar. Bir kişi de yan gözle bakamaz onlara. Öyle bir özgürlük ortamı da var yani. Sonuçta dışarıdan buraya taşınanlar olduysa da yine bir apartmanda atıyorum 10 daire varsa 5i akraba, hemşeri. (A., 46, man)

Tuzlucaıyır carries a specific cultural identity, having a highly institutional autonomy and sacrificed by the state, homogenous and, of which exclusion mainly depends on ethnicity and political activism. Also, the uniqueness of the ethnic and political segregation in their history should be borne in mind while identifying “them”. While talking about the neoliberal populism of JDP, Akça mentioned that the latter claimed a passive subject as political activity is limited to voting behavior (2011, p.34). Starting from the very first settlements, the residents of Tuzlucaıyır were labelled as *persona non-gratae* claiming their rights and demands from the political administrators:

Here we're unwanted people. The state loves a citizen who is silent, who do what they say, who don't question, who don't think, who don't raise a voice. If I, as a citizen, do my duties, I naturally will demand rights. Isn't that indispensable to democracy? We are ostracized because we share our opinion, seek our rights, and want to be part of our own destiny. Because of that, they label us as terrorists. (D., 35, woman)

Şimdi biz bir kere istenmeyen insanlarız burada. Devlet susan vatandaşı sever, devlet kendi dediğini yapan, sorgulamayan, düşünmeyen, sesini çıkarmayan insan ister. Ben bir vatandaş olarak ödevlerimi yerine getiriyorsam hak da talep ederim tabii ki, bu demokrasinin vazgeçilmezi değil midir? Biz görüşümüzü söylediğimiz, hakkımızı aradığımız, aslında kendi kaderimizin bir parçası olmak istediğimiz için dışlanıyoruz. Terörist oluyoruz. (D., 35, woman)

Here, the last definition to use for Tuzlucaıyır people is “silent” as D. call attention. Here, the interviewees constantly emphasized their source of exclusion and the “siege” of their neighborhood as not being accepted as they are not “grateful” to the state. The ethnic and political segregation is embedded in the institutional, cultural, social, political and economic practices of the Tuzlucaıyır culture, in their “way of life”, which necessitates the identification of the neighborhood beyond the spatial exclusion.

Community implies a surveillance function that restricts the freedom of its members and becomes an exercise of “fratricide”. As Sennett mentioned: “Modern urban development makes community contact itself seem an answer to the social death of the city” (1977, p.298). The formation of modern community usually starts in the name

of fraternity in a hostile world but becomes an experience of fratricide and the dead public space and perverted community life is an anomaly. Here, this community life in Tuzluçayır encroaches on the human experience and the informative/pragmatic role of the “other”.

Today there is a tendency towards demonstrating exclusion and deprivation (of which degradation overrated is connected to the increasing rates of migration) without considering the territorial dimension. However, in this dissertation, it is essential to show the deficiencies of these “conceptual deductions” and draw a methodological tool to determine the uniqueness of the economic, historical, social and institutional stigmatization of Tuzluçayır. Therefore, while talking about the neighborhoods that are stigmatized, Wacquant stated that “the powerful stigma attached to the residence in the bounded and segregated spaces, the neighborhood of the exile” (2007, p. 237). Here, this brings us to the question that is essential for our concern: Could a neighborhood be a political battlefield? The answer to the question will be largely related to the conceptualization of this neighborhood and/or war and the local and national policies of the state/government. Politics needs space, as well as space, needs politics which brings us to question the potentiality of territorialization as a defence of the community.

7.3.1.1 Territorialization: Locality as a Defense of the Community

Wacquant et al. state that territorial stigma

...is closely tied to, but has become partially autonomized from, the stain of poverty, subaltern ethnicity (encompassing national and regional ‘minorities’, recognized or not, and lower-class foreign migrants), degraded housing, imputed immorality, and street crime.(Wacquant, Slater and Periera, 2014, p.1274).

While identifying Tuzluçayır, the activists made a differentiation between how they define Tuzluçayır and how they think that they are identified by the “outsiders”. As mentioned above this division is mainly derived from the presentation of the neighborhood as a zone of “crime and insecurity”. It is in a sense a demonization by which the neighborhood differentiates from the ‘deserving poor’ neighborhoods:

For example, if we ask someone who lives in Sincan, an Alevi or a leftist, whose heart belongs there, which neighborhood would you want to live in? His answer

will be Tuzluçayır. Or if you ask someone who voted for the JDP or the NMP name of the most marginal neighborhood, he will also say Tuzluçayır. Of course, they say that from their own perspective. One says it with love, one says it with anger, but this actually means something. If this is the first neighborhood that comes to mind on the revolutionary movement when you say Ankara, then it is a privilege to be from Tuzluçayır. As a matter of fact, it put you in another place, makes you feel special. (Y., 28, man)

Mesela Sincan'da yaşayan bir Alevi vatandaş ya da bir solcu, soldan beslenen, gönlü oradan yana atan birine sorsak hangi mahallede yaşamak istersin? Tuzluçayır der. Mesela işte AKP'ye oy veren ya da MHP'ye oy veren birine en marjinal mahalle neresi desen? O da der Tuzluçayır. Baktığı yerlerden bunu söylemler tabi. Biri severek, biri kızarak söyler ama bu aslında bir şey ifade eder. Ankara deyince devrimci hareket üzerine akla gelen ilk mahalle buraysa haliyle Tuzluçayırlı olmak da ayrıcalıktır. Haliyle ayrı bir noktaya oturtur. Bir özel hissettirir. (Y., 28, man)

Here, the activists identify this “confinement” as an obstacle in the outside world as they identified with violence and deprivation. In other words, the neighborhood becomes an obstacle in their relations with the “outsiders” just as they stated that it is perceived as a negative reference by the employers, the police, street-level bureaucracy... etc.:

For example, when you talk to a non-leftist person you just met and say that you live in Tuzluçayır, they stop for a moment. People's perception is very different because it's about us. Now in the media, in the news, they reflect so much that our neighborhood has such a violent environment or that when there is a protest, we immediately resort to violence. Because such a perception is created, people look at you in fear when you tell them where you live. (L., 50, woman)

Yeni tanıştığın mesela solcu olmayan bir insanla sohbet ederken Tuzluçayır'da yaşadığını söyleyince bir duruyor. İnsanların algısı çok farklı çünkü bize dair. Şimdi medyada, haberlerde öyle bir yansıtıyorlar ki elmizde silahlar böyle bir mafyatik ortam var. Ya da bir eylem olduğunda hemen şiddete başvururlar. Öyle bir algı oluşturulduğu için insanlar korkarak bakıyorlar yaşadığın yeri söyleyince. (L., 50, woman)

Interviewees add that Tuzluçayır is a “dangerous” place from outsiders’ views as it is identified with crime and delinquency. As a result of this label and somewhat frightening appearance of their neighborhoods, outsiders are afraid to “cross the border”, which reproduces their isolation but at the same time this label makes them claim as a “community”:

There was a friend I met in the University, not organized politically, not very political, he was very surprised when he heard that I live in Tuzluçayır. It's like I'm living in Harlem, surrounded by drug dealers, mass shootings. So, I guess such a neighborhood came to his mind. However, what they don't understand is that we are not like other neighborhoods, we have an identity. There are experiences that bring us together. (D., 35, woman)

Üniversitede tanıştığım bir arkadaş vardı, örgütlü değil tabii pek politik değildi, çok şaşırmıştı Tuzluçayır'da yaşıyorum diyince. Sanki böyle Harlem'de yaşıyorum, etrafımda torbacılar, çatışmalar falan var gibi. Yani sanırım gözünde öyle bir mahalle canlanmıştı. Ama tabii anlamadıkları bir durum olarak, biz diğer mahalleler gibi değiliz, bir kimliğimiz var. Bizi bir araya getiren yaşanmışlıklar var. (D.35, woman)

It is essential to detail this “frightening appearance” as D. stated, sometimes the “political” symbols on the walls, the graffiti and even the insufficient structure of the neighborhood seems to be dangerous for the outsiders. Besides, the “negative propaganda” about the neighborhood on the press and/or media are largely reflecting and nourishing this negative perception.

Locality is an appropriate scale for the initial formation of identity. This is at the same time a production process of “meaning and identity: my neighborhood, my community, my city, my school, my tree, my river, my beach, my chapel, my peace, my environment” (Castells, 1997, 61) and my music, my culture and my history. This is the most important dimension of the territorialization and identity formation taking place in Tuzluçayır Neighborhood. Formation of the identity and meaning is itself a success for Castells and he explained his argument with a specific emphasis on locality:

Yet, in many instances, regardless of the explicit achievements of the movement, its very existence produced meaning, not only for the movement’s participants, but for the community at large. And not only during the lifespan of the movement (usually brief), but in the collective memory of the locality. Indeed, I argued, and I argue, that this production of meaning is an essential component of cities, throughout history, as the built environment, and its meaning, is constructed through a conflictive process between the interests and values of opposing social actors. (Castells, 1997, p.61)

The locality and identity of Tuzluçayır acts as a connecting point both for the political mobilization in the neighborhood and the motivation for acting jointly:

Since 2005, we have claims to tell in what happens in this neighborhood and also throughout the country. But not only with words. We always have taken action. For example, against the missile shield to be made in Malatya Kürecik³⁵, the base stations, the base stations in Tuzluçayır, we both make our claims and act against them... We're famous around here, we're known. (S., 39, woman)

³⁵ In 2012 there was a military installation built for NATO use in the town of Kürecik in the city Malatya which is stated as an “early-warning radar against ballistic missile attacks”. (<https://www2.tbmm.gov.tr/d24/7/7-0373sgc.pdf>)

2005'ten bu yana bu mahallede hem ülke genelinde ne geliştirse hem bu yerelde ne geliştirse mutlaka bir sözümüz var ama tek başına değil. Mutlaka bir eylemimiz gerçekleşmiştir. Mesela füze kalkanı, Malatya Kürecik'e yapılacak olan füze kalkanına ilişkinde aynı dönemi yanlış hatırlamıyorsam baz istasyonlarına, Tuzluçayır'a yapılan baz istasyonlarına dönük hem sözümüz hem de eylemimiz var. Buralarda tanırız, biliniriz. (S., 29, woman)

Although the policies and ideological formation of these leftist political organizations vary, the common points that unite them are mainly the issues related to the locality. In Tuzluçayır, local identity is not a label that is stuck by force, but also it is accepted, resisted, chosen, specified, invented, redefined, refused and actively advocated identities by people. During the formation process of this locality, individuals become not only static actors but also dynamic, active participants in the formation of the identity of the neighborhood:

I feel so comfortable as a woman in this neighborhood. So here (showing the center of Tuzluçayır) I breathe a sigh of relief when I get off the dolmuş³⁶, I am safe now because I have come home. Do you know, for example, the ingenuity of my grandfather, my grandfather's fellow-townsmen, my great-uncle? Because here the neighborhood has not lost that established spirit. People didn't sell their houses and run away. They stayed here, continued to live the spirit of the neighborhood. Of course, solidarity is not as it used to be, but in the end, I think the spirit of being from Tuzluçayır lives on. (D., 35, woman)

Ben kendimi bir kadın olarak o kadar rahat hissediyorum ki bu mahallede. Yani şurada (Tuzluçayır göbeği gösteriyor) dolmuştan inince rahat bir nefes alıyorum güvendedim artık, eve geldim diye. Bu işte örneğin benim dedemin, dedemin köylüsünün, büyük amcamına marifeti aslında biliyor musun? Çünkü burada mahalle o kurulan ruhu kaybetmemiş. Millet evini satıp kaçmamış. Kalmış burada, o mahalle ruhunu yaşatmaya devam etmiş. Tabii eskisi kadar dayanışma tam şey değil ama sonuçta Tuzluçayırlılık devam ediyor bence. (D., 35, woman)

Similar to that, M. (40, man) mentioned the identity of Tuzluçayır as a reference point in the outside world:

My father used to say that we moved our village here with us when we came. Indeed, for example, 20 of the 100 households came here, part of it goes to the General Zeki Doğan, Ege or someplace like that; they are not too far away. Everyone knows each other, they own the neighborhood as if they own their village. You know, when someone asks you where you are from, you say the name of your village, for instance, when I went to Antep to get an education and met our organized friends, they asked me where I was from, I said Tuzluçayır. Because being from Tuzluçayır actually says a lot more. When I say that I also mean this: I am a leftist and an Alevi, no harm will come from me.

Benim babamın bir lafı vardı: Derdi ki gelirken bizim köyü buraya taşıdık biz. Biraz öyle hakikaten, şimdi o dönemden mesela atıyorum 100 hanenin 20'si buraya geliyor, işte bir kısmı da General Zeki Doğan'a, Ege'ye falan; çok uzak değil onlar da yani. Herkes birbirini tanıyor, aynı köye sahip çıkar gibi

³⁶ Dolmuş is a vehicle used as shared taksi.

sahipleniyorlar aslında mahalleyi. Hani nerelisin derler de millet köyünün adını söyler ya, işte öyle mesela ben okumaya Antep'e gittiğimde işte bizim örgütlü arkadaşlarla tanıştığım da nerelisin dediklerinde Tuzluca'yı diyordum. Çünkü Tuzluca'yı çok daha fazlasını anlatıyor aslında. Ben onu dediğimde şöyle demiş olmuyor muyum sence de: Ben solcu ve Aleviyim, benden zarar gelmez.

Here, the interviewees, coming from similar backgrounds, defined a local identity that is shaped through the years since the very first settlements which are cited as one of the reasons for long-term residence in the neighborhood. Because as M. drew attention, is being from Tuzluca refer to a multi-layered identity which is the shape and shaped by the spatial territories.

Lefebvre asks the question “why and how capitalism survived from the competitive industrial capitalism of Marx’s time to the advanced monopoly capitalism of today.” and he states that it survived by occupying space, by producing a space (1980, p. 215) There, the space has a critical role in terms of understanding the territorial structure of the neighborhood identity:

Did you know that during the Gezi protests, the police came in here and threw gas through the open windows of the houses? The aim was to send a message. You know, they say that we entered their lair when they humiliated the Kurdish struggle. He sees us as such an enemy, says I'll go into your neighborhood and throw gas at your house. Of course, let him think as much as he wants. He can't hurt us; on the contrary, he makes us stronger. (Z, 52, woman.)

Gezi zamanında polis buraya girip özellikle açık evlerin camlarından gaz attı biliyor musun? Mesaj vermek için aslında. Hani diyorlar ya kürt mücadelesini aşağılarken inlerine girdik diye. Öyle işte, bizi böyle bir düşman olarak görüyor, mahallenize de girerim evinize de gaz atarım diyor. Tabii istediği kadar öyle sansın, yani bir zarar veremez aksine biler bizi. (Z., 52, woman)

One can say that the establishment and survival of hegemony depended on distinctive occupation and production of space through bureaucratically controlled consumption, differentiation of centers and peripheries and the penetration of the state into everyday life. This is why the class struggle should focus on the production of space, territorial structure of exploitation and controlled reproduction of the system as a whole. Here, locality for activists in Tuzluca is an essential stronghold to fight with this hegemony:

Look, for example, in Ankara, Çiçin³⁷ is a very good example of how the dominant classes are fighting revolutionaries over a neighborhood. They attacked

³⁷ Çiçin was a stigmatized neighborhood in Altındağ district of Ankara city which was known as a “slum”, a center for crime, drug trade and illegal acts of which formal name is Gültepe. An urban transformation project targeted towards the neighborhood as “In three successive stages in 2006 (stage

Çinçin over the years for drugs, crime, prostitution. Why? Because they couldn't contain it, they immediately began to defame it. It's just a figure of speech, they've been doing it since the '70s. When they couldn't possess it, they tried to destroy it. They brought here their men from their homes, so now it has become just like any other neighborhood. That's why we look after our neighborhood. This is our sanctuary, and I think that's how we should protect it. (M., 50, man)

Bak mesela Ankara'da Çinçin hakim sınıfların bir mahalle üzerinden devrimcilerle nasıl savaştığına çok güzel bir örnektir. Çinçin'e yıllarda uyuşturucu, suç, fuhuş falan diye saldırdılar. Niye? Çünkü baktı ki orayı zaptedemiyorlar, hemen karalamaya geçtiler. Hemen lafın gelişi yani 70'lerden beri yapıyorlar tabii bunu. Ele geçiremeyince yıkmaya giriştiler. Oradaki insanlara evlerinden, getirdiler kendi adamlarını, şimdi herhangi bir mahalle oldular. İşte biz mahallemize bundan dolayı da sahip çıkıyoruz. Burası bizim sığınağımız, bu şekilde korumamız gerektiğini düşünüyorum ben. (M., 50, man)

They made an essential differentiation with the other neighborhoods in terms of local identity as it focuses on a social structure addressing a common culture, history and lifestyle. However, as a result of their various positions in the labor market which caused economic and educational differences, contact with the Left, working abroad, public experiences, marriages with “outsiders”, and thus it became impossible to sustain the closed-community way of life. A similar view shared by Erman related to the gecekondu neighborhood as she states that throughout the years, these neighborhoods were stratified and proliferated in terms of their economic situations (2010, p.192). In this sense, although it is not possible to talk about a “closed community”, they still prefer to live together and socialize with each other in their neighborhood.

As mentioned before, *hemşehrilik* relationship is one of the most essential factors that keep together and open social interaction channels for them in the neighborhood. As Ayata stated, networks based on kinship and neighborhood made Alevis easier by allocating necessary resources such as jobs and accommodation and preventing social and psychological isolation (Ayata, 1987). Here, hometown associations and foundations could be seen as the institutional forms of *hemşehrilik*. Hometown associations and foundations serving Alevi groups functioned as places of inter-community socialization and solidarity (Çelik, 2003; Fırat 2004). In Tuzluçayır there are dozens of these home-town associations that keep the “social interaction” alive,

1), 2011 (stage 2), and 2014 (stage 4) the Gültepe (Çinçin) UTP demolished 1491 squatter houses, and completed the construction of blocks with 13 stories, totaling 2342 apartments. (Mercan & Şen, 2021, p.608)

which is also emphasized by the interviewees as a signifier of loyalty to the neighborhood:

Look, for example, our people here (indicating the fellow countrymen association) cannot leave it. Can you find him in Birlik, in Yıldız? I mean, I think that's what makes a neighborhood a neighborhood. You know, you can have conversations, maybe remember the past, and you can find people from your own village. Where else could you find this in Ankara? Well, I can't say anything if you think it's like bringing the village life back, but it sure creates a feeling of belonging (D., 26, woman)

Bak bizim bu yandaki mesela (hemşehri derneğini işaret ediyor) Adam bunu bırakıp gidemez, sen bulabilir misin onu Birlik'te, Yıldız'da. Yani bence mahalleyi mahalle yapanlar böyle şeylerdir işte. Hani iki sohbet edebileceğin, belki geçmişini yad edebileceğin, işte adam kendi köylüsünü bulabiliyor. Nerede bulursun Ankara'da başka? Ha belki insanı geri götüren böyle sanki köy hayatına gibi düşünürsen ona bir şey diyemem ama bir aidiyet yarattığı kesin (D., 26, woman)

Here, the existence of hometown associations is a significant indicator of the Tuzluca identity as if the neighborhood is an umbrella under which there are plenty of identities but with an upper identity. It keeps the neighborhood compact and a community that residents are socially active and communicate with each other. In this sense, D.'s quotation shows us the "sense of belonging" is indispensable to keep the neighborhood together and make solidarity possible. It probably reminds the reader of the Simmelian approach to urban life as he states that the transition from an agricultural society to urban life marked an end to communities and presented a brand new individualistic, chaotic, competitive nature belonging to the urban life. The lifestyle in the community was dissolved and transformed into urban life, which resulted in the loss of a sense of locality (1950, p.395). Here, Tuzluca resisted to this disintegration.

On the other hand, with their contact in the public places outside the neighborhood, most of the time the interviewees chose the strategy of hiding their identities in order to deal with various forms of discrimination they faced. Moreover, although they continued to interact with non-Alevis, they still prefer to live together and socialize with each other in their neighborhood.

I mean, we're really like a family here, we know each other, we're comfortable. So think of the neighborhood as a village. Believe me, if I want to spend time with a friend from the neighborhood, I don't feel like going to Kızılay or anything like that. There is a place we always go here, I don't know, we have parks, here's our association. For example, look how you are sitting here chatting with us. We plant things in the garden in the summers and sometimes have a barbecue. You know what I mean? Of course, going out and socializing are needs, but most of the time we're enough for each other here. (C, 42, woman.)

Yani biz burada gerçekten bir aile gibiyiz, birbirimizi tanıyoruz, rahatız. Mahalleyi köy gibi düşün yani. Inan bak mahalleden bir arkadaşımınla vakit geçirmek istersem Kızılay'a falan gitmek pek gelmez içimden. Burada hep gittiğimiz bir yer var yukarıda, ne bileyim parklarımız var, işte bizim dernek var mesela ne güzel bak sen gel burada oturuyorsun bizimle sohbet ediyorsun. Bahçesini ekiyoruz yazın örneğin, mangal da yapıyoruz bazen. Anlatabiliyor muyum? Tabii ki dışarı çıkıp sosyalleşmek bir ihtiyaç ama çoğu zaman burada birbirimize yetiyoruz biz. (C., 42, woman)

Locality that is enhanced with networks based on kinship and neighborhood and allocating necessary resources such as jobs and accommodation prevented social and psychological isolation. Here, the identity of Tuzluçayır is quite strong in terms of being a part of “activating” the interviewees, as they stated. As mentioned above, since the very first settlements the residents had an organic relationship with the leftist organizations which shaped the current structure and “identity” of Tuzluçayır:

It stuck with us as an identity. For example, Abidinpaşa Neighborhood does not have an identity. Later, for example, an identity of being from Ankara (Angaralılık) was created with the help of a few tv series, but the identity of being from Tuzluçayır had already been existing, and we always think of it as something nice. For example, when I get off the bus, when I come to the neighborhood, I feel like I'm breathing. I am in the neighborhood. Its structure is changing a little, maybe a lot of things are happening, but Tuzluçayır means a lot to me. You go to Feyzullah Çınar Park, see a man with a bağlama in his hand, from the old revolutionary bards. This is especially important and flattering for us. So we have a Tuzluçayır identity. I love being from Tuzluçayır, and I love people who are also from here. (Y., 51, man)

Bir kimlik olarak bize yapışmış oldu. Mesela Abidinpaşalılık diye bir kimlik yok. Sonradan mesela Angaralılık yaratıldı mesela sonradan bir kaç dizinin yardımıyla ama Tuzluçayırlılık zaten vardı. Bizde de hep Tuzluçayırlılık güzel bir şey. Mesela ben mahalleye geldiğimde nefes aldığımı hissediyorum. Otobüsten inince diyorum. Mahalledeyim. Biraz yapısı değişiyor belki yani birçok şey oluyor belki ama Tuzluçayır bana çok özellikle Feyzullah Çınar parkına gidiyorsunuz. Elinde bağlamayla ayağa kalkmış bir adam yani. Orada ki eski devrimci ozanlardan. Bu mesela önemli bir şey, gurur verici bizim için. Tuzluçayırlı kimliğimiz var yani. Ben seviyorum Tuzluçayırlı olmayı ve Tuzluçayırlı olanları da seviyorum. (Y., 51, man)

The residents of the neighborhood constructed their own space with claiming the rights regarding their daily lives, which in other neighborhoods is achieved *de facto*. For instance, while in many neighborhoods infrastructure like the sewage system, the roads, electric system were provided by the municipalities without ‘claiming’ them, as many interviewees pointed to, in Tuzluçayır these “rights” were achieved through protests, marches...etc. That’s why they claimed that the neighborhood is “valuable” for them.

*We did everything here on our own, look, until recently, there were so few buses coming here. We protested as H*****, occupied the buses, and there was a lot of news about it in the newspapers at that time³⁸. We got what we were entitled to, and you don't have to fight for it in your neighborhood, do you? In the same way, like the women, we went to the door of the municipality when the water cuts were very intense. (M., 64, woman.)*

*Biz burada herşeyi tırnaklarımızla kazıdık, bak buraya yakın bir zamana kadar o kadar az otobüs geliyordu ki. Biz H***** olarak eylemimizi koyduk, otobüsleri işgal ettik o dönem gazetelerde baya haber oldu mesela. Hakkımız olanı aldık, senin mesela mahallende sen bunun için mücadele etmek zorunda değilsin di mi? Aynı şekilde su kesintilerinin çok yoğun yaşandığı dönemde de gittik belediyenin kapısına dayandık kadınlar olarak. (M., 64, woman)*

Or

Now you don't have an agenda of fighting for sewage, I don't know, water, a health care center or anything like that in your neighborhood, right? Because they already exist, the state provides you with services. We on the other hand had to fight for them and still do. It is what makes Tuzluca'yır Tuzluca'yır. In fact, for me, when you struggle so much, it becomes valuable, feels more like home. You connect, you understand its soul. You can see why those in the past fought for it. It is a home for Alevi and leftists. (C., 57, woman)

Senin şimdi mahallende kanalizasyon, ne bileyim su, ya da işte sağlık ocağı falan için mücadele vermek gibi bir gündemin yok di mi? Çünkü var zaten onlar, devlet sana hizmet getiriyor. Biz mesela onlar için de mücadele etmek zorunda kaldık, hala da ediyoruz. İşte Tuzluca'yır'ı Tuzluca'yır yapan bunlar aslında bana göre, böyle mücadeleyle alınca değerli oluyor o zaman evin oluyor aslında. Bağ kuruyorsun, ruhunu anlıyorsun. Mücadele verenler zamanında niye mücadele vermiş bunu anlıyorsun. Aleviler, solcular olarak bir yurt senin anlayacağın, yuva. (C., 57, woman)

As C. draws attention, they all defined Tuzluca'yır as a “home” as they formed, shaped and fight for it to keep “safe” way; these struggles make it valuable and indispensable for the interviewees.

At the beginning of July 2016, with the support of some deputies from RPP, some protests were organized: the members of *Halkevleri* squatted the buses in their stops in Kızılay without buying any tickets. The bus driver refused to drive and the police forces came and took the people in the bus to the police headquarters resulting in many

³⁸ In 2014, Ankara Metropolitan Municipality ruled by JDP administration changed the routes of Tuzluca'yır municipality buses without giving any ‘compelling’ justification. With the changing regulation, the municipality buses numbered 340-341 (which are also the only municipality buses that got through the neighborhood) changed their directions and bypassed the neighborhood. As a result of this regulation, with the leadership of one of the most powerful legal organizations in particular in Tuzluca'yır, and in general in Ankara- Halkevleri organized a march in the neighborhood with the residents and the buses were stopped in Tuzluca'yır square. (<http://www.diken.com.tr/tuzluca-yir-halki-otobusunu-isyan-devrim-otobus-sloganlariyla-geri-aldi/>).

custody. As a result of protests and public reactions, Ankara Metropolitan Municipality diverted the routes of buses numbered 340-341 to their primary schedule³⁹.

Especially, during and after the subway constructions in Ankara, there were significant changes in the routes and/or numbers of municipality buses all over the city. Most of the buses in the routes of subways were removed which resulted in extremely crowded subway services⁴⁰. From these changes, neighborhoods like Çayyolu, Hacettepe, Ümitköy, Sincan, Törekent... etc. were negatively affected as a result of insufficient subway services. However, these changes did not result in any significant and/or massive protests in those or other neighborhoods of Ankara other than in Tuzluçayır. Against the government policies targeting the obstruction of freedom of movement, the organizations and residents in the neighborhood are taking action as the emergence and possibility of the resistance against the spatial exclusion of Tuzluçayır should be examined carefully.

Following Lefebvre one can say that space is not solely the container of the social, social movements and/or resistance but it also (re)produce them in a dialectical way. The residents of Tuzluçayır, in this context, both utilize their neighborhood as a cradle for their political actions and they created an identity built upon the space they lived in. In its broadest definition, political exclusion addresses the deprivation of the basic legal and political rights which are an essential part of modern citizenship. It can be observed as a distance from political decision-making processes which resulted in creating protests and/or resistance to become visible/perceptible.

Tuzluçayır with claiming its identity indigenizing resistance as a political strategy creates a threat for the government(s) and is in constant tension with the system. It is in a sense creating a political space conflicting with the legal political field legitimized by the state. Here, it is essential to recall Lefebvre: “Space has a primary importance functioning as a political instrument for neoliberal hegemony in order to ensure

³⁹ Retrieved from <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/tuzlucayir-otobusleri-33-gun-sonra-eve-donuyor-26780994> on 05.06.2020

⁴⁰ Retrieved from <http://www.ankara.bel.tr/haberler/ego-otobusleri-rayli-sisteme-entegre-oluyor/#.WAN9hJOLTeQ> on 05.06.2020

controlling of spaces, its hierarchy, dictating the ways of life, segregation of the parts and extermination of the “enemy”. (1988, pp.125-126).

To sum up, in Tuzluçayır *locality is an appropriate scale for the initial formation of identity*. Two prominent aspects of territorialization in Tuzluçayır are the recognition of their identity and solution to the problems of everyday life including exclusion, poverty, the insufficient infrastructure of the neighborhood...etc. deepened by neo-liberal policies and/or hegemonic formation. However, these bring an essential question as to whether this embracement of the neighborhood identity brings an alternative social model or is it just a defence? Or in other words, is this defensive community reactionary?

7.3.1.2 Searching for An Emancipated Space: An Alternative?

Up to now, the testimonies of the political activists related to the meaning attributed to the neighborhood in terms of the role of the neighborhood in their lives in general and in their activism, in particular, are presented. Here, it should be mentioned that the defence of the territory or the “strong” identity of the neighborhood does not bring revolutionary acts *per se*. Here, we observe the significance of the “neighborhood” in terms of controlling/transforming both the objective and subjective conditions of “space”, the control and regulation of the behaviors, differentiation of the usage of the space among residents. Here, as mentioned above for the 2000s, the commodification and politicization of the urban space through conservatist policies we can observe the importance of space as a political tool and its strategic importance for urban ideology as Lefebvre put it. The activists of the leftist organizations in Tuzluçayır were important actors in this political struggle in terms of opposing the existing hegemony with their protests, actions, activities...etc. But what about alternatives that they presented to the residents of the neighborhood?

In Ankara, Tuzluçayır is perceived as a neighborhood/ district of rebellion by the system. Because it is rebelling against the policies implemented, its general structure is caused by its past organization. It is a region inhabited by a dense Alevi community, so struggles continue. I'm fighting for the right to housing. (Y., 58, man)

Ankara'da Tuzluçayır sistem tarafından bir başkaldırı ilçesi, mahallesi olarak gözüküyor. Çünkü uygulanan politikalara isyan ediyor, genel yapısından geçmiş örgütlenmesinden kaynaklı. Bir de yoğun bir Alevi toplumunun yaşadığı bir bölge, mücadeleler devam ediyor. Ben barınma hakkı mücadelesindeyim. (Y., 58, man)

They defined the neoliberal hegemony of the JDP government to be observed in all areas of their lives. One of the most iconic ones was the *Cami-Cemevi Project* in 2013. The government together with the Cem Foundation⁴¹ in September 2013 attempted to build a cem evi in the center of Tuzluçayır. The project was announced by İzzettin Doğan (Honorary President of Cem Foundation) claiming that they ‘compromised’ with Muhammed Fethullah Gülen- who bought lands to build Mosques and Cemmevi in Ankara and İstanbul⁴². The sud-cutting ceremony was made by Ömer Faruk Çelik (Minister of Labor and Social Security of 61st Turkish Government), Cemil Çiçek (Turkish Parliamentary Speaker) and İzzettin Doğan on September, 8th, 2013 which is also the date that marked the beginning of the resistance against the project. From that date, the protests, marches and resistance in the neighborhood were triggered by the organizations/political parties in the neighborhood. These actions were supported by the disorganized people who faced the disproportionate violence of the police forces⁴³:

The Cami-Cemevi project, especially the idea of creating their own Alevis, such as reconciling Alevis and Sunnis on a common ground, was reflected here last, and there were intense clashes. Everyone from seven to seventy in the neighborhood participated in the protests, including the most apolitical ones. Because now it was a real attack on the neighborhood. The Cemaat (pointing to Gülen Cemaat) tried to infiltrate the Alevis. (A., 69, man)

En son cami-cemevi projesinde özellikle Alevilerle Sünnileri barıştırma, ortak bir zeminde buluşturma gibi sistem kendi alevisini yaratma düşüncesi buraya yansıtı ve yoğun çatışmalar yaşandı. Mahalleden yediden yetmişe herkes katıldı eylemlere, en apolitik olanları da dahil. Çünkü artık resmen mahalleye fiili saldırıydı bu. Cemaat içeri sızmaya Alevileri saçma sapan bir hale getirmeye çalıştı. (A., 69, man)

S. tells the same events as follows:

At that time, the clashes were intense, because tent resistance and large-scale support provoked more police in the neighborhood. The state had probably already given an open check, you know, do what you do. After all, the neighborhood was already perceived as a terrorist from outside, so they thought

⁴¹ Cem Foundation is established by İzzettin Doğan 1995, which is defined as an educational and cultural foundation (<https://www.cemvakfi.org/pages/kurumsal/3/tarihcemiz> date of access). Unlike the other Alevi-dominated foundations, they have close relations with the JDP government(s).

⁴² Retrieved from <http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/gulen-cemaati-cami-cemevi-asevi-kompleksi-yapiyor-1138826/> on 16.03.2020)

⁴³ Retrieved from <http://sendika11.org/2013/09/cami-cemevi-projesine-karsi-mamak-halki-tuzlucayirayuruyor-dakika-dakika/> on 16.03.2020

of it as a fight against terrorism. You know, when they say three or five looters, it wasn't like that because they literally attacked the whole neighborhood. (S., 39, woman)

Şimdi o dönem çatışmalar yoğun yaşandı, çünkü çadır direnişi ve yani nasıl diyeyim geniş çaplı destek olması mahallelinin polisi daha çok kızdırttı. Devlet zaten açık çek vermişti muhtemelen, hani ne yaparsanız yapın. Sonuçta dışarıda da mahalle zaten terörist gibi ya, teröristle mücadele gibi düşünürdük dışarıdaki insanlara. Hani üç beş çaplıcı diyorlar ya öyle değil diye, tüm mahalleye top yekun saldırdılar resmen. (S., 39, woman)

After the intensity of the protests decreased, HRA (Human Rights Association) prepared a report to address the police violence and made interviews with organizations and protesters in the neighborhood. The common argument in the interviews showed that the protesters believed that the project was addressing assimilation of the Alevi population which was said to be organized by the government. The basic motivation of the protests was that the policy that is said to be 'integrating' Alevi and Sunni communities was imposed without offering for consideration of the people who are supposed to use the Cami-Cemevi complex. Therefore, in an interview with Yıldız Bahçeci who is the co-chair of Mamak District of BDP (Peace and Democracy Party), she states that on the day that the construction began, the neighborhood was occupied with TOMAs (Water Cannon Vehicles) and police vehicles as the government already knew the reaction of the residents⁴⁴. Similar to that Y. (51, man) describes the events as follows:

We decided as A ..., and started by setting up 2 tents there and stayed in them for around 69 days. A Cami-Cemevi was being built there. That's where one day we went to make a statement to the press. Friday, some went. Saturday we were all supposed to be going together. All the people gathered, children and all. There, police greeted people with riots, scorpions and water cannons. They destroyed our tents that day. They destroyed our tents that day. Because they sprayed us with water, we were forced to leave the center. They threw gas into the tents, into our tea house. After the press release, we were going to go and have tea there. They destroyed the tea house, scattered everything, they made it a disgrace. The next day, they came in a big truck from Mamak Municipality, accompanied by a riot squad, and they destroyed the tents. We built a library there, we had books and stuff. I heard the news, but could not reach anyone, M. was staying with us. I said M. get up, we're leaving. We went together. The riot squad put their shields in front of them. Together with M. we walked through them. We tried to do something as much as we could.

Biz artık A... olarak karar aldık oraya 2 tane çadır kurarak başladık ve orada 69 gün civarında orada çadırlardaydık. Oraya Cami-Cem Evi yapılmaya başlanmıştı. İşte oraya bir gün basın açıklaması yapılmaya gidildi. Cuma günüydü

⁴⁴ Retrieved from <http://www.ihd.org.tr/ankara-tuzlucayir-cami-cemevi-projesine-karsi-yapilan-gosteriler-ve-sonrasinda-gelisen-olaylara-iliskin-degerlendirme-raporu/> on 22.04.2020

bir gidildi. Cumartesi kitlesel olarak gidilecekti. Toplandı bütün insanlar çoluğu ydu çocuğu ydu yani ufak çocuklar da vardı. Orada polisler insanları çevikler, akrepler ve TOMA'lar ile karşıladı. Saldırı bir şeyler bize karşı ve çadırlarımızı o gün yıktılar. O gün o Göbekte bize su püskürttükleri için Göbek bir anda boş kaldığında çadırların içine gaz sıkmalar çay ocağına gaz sıkmalar... Basın açıklamasından sonra gidip orada çay içecektik. O çay ocağını dağıtmışlar her tarafı dağıtmışlardı rezalet hale getirmişlerdi. Ertesi günde zaten çevik eşliğinde Mamak Belediyesinin büyük kamyonu ile gelip çadırları falan yıktular hep. Kütüphane kurmuştuk orada biz kitaplarımız falan vardı. Bana haber geldi dediler böyle böyle. Kimseye ulaşamıyorum M. bizde kalıyordu. Dedim M. kalk gidiyoruz. M. ile birlikte geldik. Çevikler koymuşlar kalkanlarını onların arkasında kendileri. Artık onların arasından girdik biz M. ile beraber. Toparlayabildiğimiz ölçü de bir şeyler toparlamaya çalıştık.

The project was political, in a sense, a show of force that is reflecting the hegemonic power of the state. As mentioned above, JDP was utilizing consent and coercion at the same time but as Tansel accurately pointed out, it was a “decaying hegemonic force that relies increasingly on ‘coercion’, rather than ‘consent’” (2018, p.198). Here, all the activists interviewed stated that the religious sanctuaries ‘should’ have been constructed following the religious needs of the local people:

Now, if you come to a place where 90% of the population is Alevi and try to build a mosque, of course, they will question your intentions. Didn't they do the same to the Alevi villages? They built mosques and appointed imams to assimilate, to kill their culture, their faith. It means I don't recognize your religion, I can do what I want. Now, doesn't it mean that the state has committed violence? (S., 39, woman)

Şimdi sen nüfusunun %90'ı Alevi olan bir yere gelip Cami yapmaya kalkarsan niyetini tabii sorgularlar. Aynısını Alevi köylerine yapmadılar mı? Cami yapıp imam atadılar, asimile etmek için, kültürünü, inancını öldürmek için. Ya resmen devletin güdümüne almaktır bu ben senin dinini tanımıyorum, bildiğimi okurum demek. Şimdi devlet şiddet uygulamış olmuyor mu yani bu durumda? (S, 39, woman)

Or

Were there any requests for a mosque? No. Was there a need? No. Brother, we did not even need a Cemevi, we already had one. They also took a man called İzzettin Doğan with them, as if we requested for him. Of course, they tell the newspapers that their intentions are purely humanistic. And they talked about a meal center or something to make it believable. (C., 42, woman)

Senden cami talebi olan var mı? Yok. İhtiyaç var mı? E yok. Güzel kardeşim cemevine bile ihtiyaç yok, var zaten bizim Cemevimiz. O İzzettin Doğan denilen adamı da aldılar yanlarına böyle sanki bizim bir isteğimiz olmuş gibi. Tabii gazetelere falan böyle boy boy anlatıyorlar çok insani olarak biz bu işe giriştik gibi. Bir de aşevi mi ne diyorlardı yanına o da herhalde inandırıcı olsun diye. (C., 42, woman)

So, the meanings attributed to the project were criticized by the interviewees as they stated that the project has a symbolic meaning for the government and the *Cemaat* which is in a sense a *trojan horse* attacked to the integrity of the neighborhood. While

they are defining the mosques and *Cemevis* as sanctuaries, admitted that the project as a whole means “a lot” than being religious spaces including political and cultural purposes.

Here, as it is also mentioned in the report of HRA, there were both mosques and *Cemevis* in the neighborhood, which were quite close to the project area. The motivation for the protests was the imposition of the project without including the local people who are supposed to use the complex. In this sense, this project was identified as an “occupation” which was an attack on the “carefully chosen” neighborhood:

Why was this project planned in Tuzluçayır? In other words, if the goal is to fraternize Sunnis and Alevi, go and do it in Keçiören if you can. In my opinion, there are two dimensions to this project. The state has carefully chosen this place to break the resistance, the organization here. Maybe they said that there is a density of Alevi, and the integrity here must be disrupted. Two, they are Alevi, understanding people. If we talk about things like friendship and fraternity, they would buy it. However, they hit a stone wall. (D., 35, woman)

Neden Tuzluçayır'da yapıldı peki bu proje? Yani amaç Sünni ve Alevilerin kaynaşmasıysa git Keçiören'de yap sıkıyorsa. Benim düşünceme göre iki boyutu var bu işin. Bir devlet buradaki direnci, örgütlülüğü kırmak için dikkatlice burayı seçti. Şimdi dedi ki belki de bunların yoğunluğu var Aleviler olarak ben buradaki bu bütünlüğü bozarım. İki, bunlar Alevi anlayışlı olurlar, işte dostluk kardeşlik yuttururum zannetti. Sert kayaya çarptı tabii. (D., 35, woman)

The protests against the project were largely supported by the residents and a massive unity was provided according to the testimonies of the interviewees. They defined their strategy as “defensive” but at the same time as an attempt to construct an alternative for the neighborhood. The alternative was related to setting a small sample for a possible communal life including taking decisions collectively and “right to self-determination”:

Look, we showed a way there. For example, you're old, you can't come and stand in a tent, can you? That uncle brought us tea from home, the brother carried food every day. I mean, everyone did what they could. For instance, we provided security., it's like for a while we've been back to the communal life in that old shanties. (I., 43, man)

Biz orada bir yol gösterdik bak. Mesela sen yaşlısın, gelip çadırda duramıyorsun di mi? O amca bize mesela evde çay demleyip getirdi, H... baci mesela hergün yemek taşıdı. Yani kimin elinden ne iş geliyorsa onu yaptı. Bir nevi mesela bizde güvenliği sağladık. O eskideki gecekondudaki o ortak yaşam var ya böyle bir süreliğine ona döndük gibi oldu aslında. (I., 43, man)

Or,

In the next days, I saw that there was a daily activity, with about 300-400 people and when "famous" people came, the number increased even more. People really liked attending. Did you need anything? Someone would have brought it without asking. Things like cigarettes etc. So, the most unnecessary things, if you ask me. Someone would bring food. Someone would put money in the piggy bank. Someone would bring watermelons. People would be offering cold water to each other. Someone would say 'I will be back tonight, but you must be thirsty, here is some cold water', and would offer it. (Y., 28, man)

Sonra ki günlerde gördüm ki günlük etkinlik oluyor ve şöyle yani 300-400 kişi çok hani insan tırnak içerisinde tanınmış insanların geldiğinde sayı daha da artıyor falan. İnsanlar baya katılıyor falan. O kadar şeydi ki. Biri geliyor bir ihtiyacınız var mı? Biri hiç bir şey sormadan bir şey getirmiş. Sigara getirip, kartonla bırakanda vardı. Yani en gereksiz ihtiyaç bana sorarsan. Yemek getiren vardı. Kumbaraya para atan vardı. Karpuz getiren vardı. Bilumum soğuk su oradan geçerken soğuk su ikram ediyorduk. Akşam geleceğim ama yanmışsınızdır size bir soğuk su ikram edeyim falan diyordu. (Y., 28, man.)

Both I. and Y. portrayed a small community in which people are working and consuming together, an ideal way to distribute goods and services and control over the exchange. We can go a little further and claim that this attempt was just like a prototype for a communal way of life for the interviewees.

Although the protests were embraced by the majority in the neighborhood, the decision about the type of protests, the actions to take against this construction was taken by the political organizations. In this sense, although they mention the inconvenience of the residents about the project from the beginning they admit that especially K... decided the method of the resistance as mentioned above. The focus of the protest was preventing the construction of the project and in the end, the *Cami-Cemevi project* was turned into a public hospital project:

Of course, we held meetings at those times to see if this building would stay idle? Thousands of signatures were collected, given to the prefect, and then meeting were held with the mayor, with some bureaucrats and such. As a result, we were told that it would be used as a hospital. The people here demanded it, look, we resisted, as the local community. We wanted it, and we won. It happens when you raise your voice when you resist, when you are united. Because no one wanted it, neither Sunnis, nor Alevis. (D., 35, woman)

Biz o dönem toplantılar düzenledik tabii, hani bu bina atıl mı duracak diye? Binlerce imza toplandı kaymakamlığa verildi sonrasında belediye başkanı, kaymakam yani bazı bürokratlar falan toplantı yapıldı. Sonucunda da işte hastane olacağı söylendi. Bunu buradaki insanlar talep etti bak, direndik yani bölge halkı olarak. İstedik, kazandık. Sesini çıkarınca, direnince birlik olunca oluyor. Çünkü istemiyordu kimse yani sünni de istemiyor alevisi de istemiyor. (D., 35, woman)

Here, these testimonies identify a resistance over a space which brings to mind Lefebvre's popular definition of social space as "a social product - the space produced in a certain manner serves as a tool of thought and action. It is not only a means of production but also a means of control, and hence of domination/power (Lefebvre, 1991(b), p.26)". In the case of the project, the control, domination and/or power of the government (or state as they defined) was overwhelmed.

Another turning point that signifies the importance of the space for the neighborhood was obviously the Gezi Park Protests which was initiated with a

...spark that drew Istanbul into a fire of protest and uprising was initially set off by a modest 'occupy style' peaceful resistance, staged against the destruction of a historically public park, an urban commons, in order to make way for yet another shopping mall in Istanbul (Kuymulu, 2013, p.274)

Here, with the Gezi Park Protests the "passive" receivers of Turkey become active players in the "field" of urban transformation claiming their "gifts". It was obvious that the source of the unrest was not the issue of "some trees" as it reflected all the accumulated anger towards the capital, high levels of social polarization in the cities, the increasing gap between the poor and the rich, policies "bio-politics" addressing the "body" of the individuals along with their "lifestyles", "bureaucratic society of controlled consumption"...etc. an "enemy" to claim a position in the war doubting the representative, motives and actors of a possible revolt:

For the AKP, therefore, redeveloping the Taksim area is representative of more than "accumulation by construction," as there are also high cultural stakes embedded in the region for Islamists. The demolition of the AKM, Emek Theater, and Gezi Park as well as imposing severe conservative restrictions on the city's modern loci indicates the AKP's wholesale assault on the secular-republican urban fabric, lifestyles, and memory. Instead, building a mosque, neo-Ottoman military barracks, and a shopping mall in Taksim through the micromanagement of the PM himself is greatly symbolic in physically embodying 74 Challenging Neoliberalism at Turkey's Gezi Park Islamic-neoliberal authoritarianism, which has been intensifying in Turkey during the last decade. (Gürcan and Peker, 2015, pp.73-74)

Gezi Park protests were in a sense both "cry and demand" struggle for the right to city, radical urbanism indicating the ways for urban demands including cultural or economic dimensions at the same time. Here, deepening economic inequalities and social injustice melding of this injustice with gender and ethnic discrimination, high

degree of “abstraction of space” was reflected on the space based on a coalition around cross-class demands. Here, Lefebvre was seeing the potential for transformation of this bureaucratic society with the desire of the human being to freedom, since he thinks that the basic goal of the human being is to reach an adequate level of consciousness for “desire” and “pleasure”. Castells in *City and the Grassroots* states that class is no more at the center of the urban struggle; it is in a sense reduced to identity among others such as black, woman, ecologist, lesbian...etc. In fact, the class and the city are used as categories externally related in this formulation. Then, urban social movements are perceived as a category of new social movements with their non-class basis, operation outside the realm of production and participatory ethos. The revolts of/in Gezi Park took their power mainly from this non-class basis, but ironically the weakness of their survival can also be probably derived from this non-class basis.

During Gezi Park Protests at the end of 2013, protestors from all around Turkey organized protests, from left-wing but also there was support or at least sympathy from the right-wing opposition. The protests were concentrated in cities all around Turkey, the protests largely organized in the city centers- keeping in mind that cities were fragmented including several city center(s). However, among thousands of neighborhoods quite a few of them attempted to organize protests in their neighborhoods like Küçükarmutlu, Sarıgazi, Okmeydanı, Gültepe-Gülsuyu neighborhoods in Istanbul.

In Ankara Tuzluçayır was one of these neighborhoods among Dikmen, Çayyolu, Batıkent...etc. who organized the protests in their “neighborhoods”. However, quite a few of them attempted to reach the city center where the clashes were quite intensive between the protestors and the police forces. Those neighborhoods above organized spontaneous protests which rarely overflowed the borders of their spaces. However, the organizations and residents of Tuzluçayır made their calls mostly for Kızılay Square (a central square in Ankara). The protests that started in the neighborhood resulted in marches blocking the highways to Kızılay⁴⁵. There were two sides of the reflections of Gezi Park Protests on Tuzluçayır as the interviewees mention: The

⁴⁵ Retrieved from <http://www.baskahaber.org/2013/06/ankarada-direnis-devam-ediyor-500.html/> on 10.06.2020

protests that “defend” the neighborhood and the protests that targeted “occupying the city center”:

We were already there when the Gezi resistance first started. The one who started it, the one who said go out on the street at 3 a.m. and clap, so the first ones who started it. Then we stayed in the center for 3-4 days... The incident was mainly at the center, and when I went there a group of people on motorcycles gathered. They were skidding or something. You know the type... I said, brother Z... brother, let's entrust this place to them, we are at the center. Let them handle here a little, and then we'll see. We joined the neighborhood 3 days later. But in those 3 days, about 10,000 people gathered in the neighborhood. Then it gradually rose. After that, we realized we couldn't control it. How can we control it? I mean, friends, a sound system was installed here to control the mass. After we got the microphone, we became a little abler to control and direct the audience. In the meantime, the number increased to 20,000 or something. For example, we would delegate a person to use the microphone from us, and the next day, the state would arrest that person. Then we would choose another to give a speech, and the next day, his house would be raided, and he would be arrested. And the next, 3 people were arrested like that. B..., H..., Y... I mean, we realized after the second case, the state would arrest whoever had the microphone. (B., 41, man)

Gezi Direnişi ilk başladığında Türkiye geneli biz vardık zaten. İşi başlatan, alkışlarla sokağa çıkın falan diyen hani gece 3'te gerçekten iyiydi yani ilk başlatan. Daha sonra biz hep merkezde kaldık 3-4 gün... Merkezde olay orada yürüyordu ama burada ben ilk merkeze giderken motosikletli bir grup toplandı. Patinajlar falan yapıyorlardı. Böyle bildiğiniz çakal çocuklar... Dedim Z... abi artık burayı onlara emanet edelim biz merkezdeyiz. Biraz onlar çevirsin sonrada bakarız duruma falan yani. Biz 3 gün sonra mahalleye dâhil olduk. Ama o 3 günde ama o esnada 10000 kişiyi falan bulmuştur mahallede. Daha sonra da giderek yükseldi. Ondan sonra kontrol edemediğimizi fark ettik. Nasıl kontrol edebiliriz? Yani arkadaşlar burada ses düzeneği falan kurulduktan sonra ses düzeni kuruldu. Ondan sonra mikrofonu alınca biz şey yaptık. Biraz daha kitleyi kontrol edip yönlendirebilir hale geldik. Bu esnada 20.000 kişiyi falan bulmuştu ama yani biz mesela mikrofona bizden örneğin işte A kişisini temsilci veriyoruz. Ertesi gün devlet o A kişisini tutukluyor. Sonra B kişisini veriyoruz diyoruz ki o konuşma yapsın. Ertesi gün evi basılıyor o tutuklanıyor. Sonra C kişisi. 3 kişi tutuklandı öyle. 3 kişi B..., H..., Y... Devlet özellikle yani 2.den sonra uyandık zaten kimi verirsek şey tutuklanıyor bu adam yani. (B., 41, man)

Similarly, D. have a like experience:

We were at Kızılay for the first three days, but there were friends in the neighborhood. I mean, the neighborhood was already there, but here came the ones who heard that there was a protest. By clashing with the police at the center. It became too crowded over time, and there was such enthusiasm that we could show off in our neighborhood, saying that we went to Kızılay, K... and we were always at the center of the conflict, everyone knew us because we knew what is conflict, what is resistance. (D., 35, woman)

Biz ilk üç gün Kızılay'daydık ama mahallede vardı arkadaşlar. Yani şimdi mahalleli zaten vardı ama işte burada eylem olduğunu duyan da geldi dışarıdan da geldi. Şu göbekte işte geçirmemek şeklinde polisle çatışarak. Çok kalabalıklaştı zamanla arttı anlayacağın öyle bir coşku vardı ki hem yani mekanımızda gösteriyoruz kendimizi biz Kızılay'a gitmişiz orada bak en önde çatışanlarda hep K... vardı kime sorsan bizi gösterir çünkü biz biliyoruz çatışma nedir, direniş nedir. (D., 35, woman)

The protests of Gezi Park in Tuzluçayır had “national” demands like destroying hierarchical structures and aimed to establish a city on the basis of participatory democracy, the autonomy of the localities and local cultures and on the basis of the use-value of the urban space. Besides, as Y. (51, man) mentions these provided the “spirit of the neighborhood”, the unity that they forgot after 1980:

We remember the spirit of the neighborhood, of being from Tuzluçayır. I mean, I'm not saying it for us, of course, but in the neighborhood, people used the protests to reflect what they weren't happy about. To raise their voices, to be an activist just like the people in the 80. Everyone from young to old supported it, and because the police knew it, they randomly threw gas bombs at all the houses with the windows open.

Bir kere bize unuttuğumuz bişeyi hatırlattı, bak birlik olursak yaparız. Mahallenin ruhunu hatırladık ya. Tuzluçayırılı olmak ne demek; yani bizim için demiyorum tabii ama mahalle özelinde insanlar memnun olmadıkları şeyleri nasıl diyeyim yansıtmak için kullandı eylemleri. Ses çıkarmayı, yani herkesin eylemci olmasını tıpkı 80 öncesi gibi. Büyükten küçüğe herkes destek verdi işte polis de bunu bildiği için camı açık işte tüm evlere rasgele salladı gaz bombalarını.

Besides, most of the interviewees stated that there was quite a large participation in the protests from the “outsiders”. While some of them explained the reason behind this participation as “curiosity”, most of them stated the reason safety of the neighborhood “as a zone of resistance”: The inexperienced ones in protesting trusted and followed the people who were “senior” in resistance, they said. Admitting that there are multiple spaces of struggles like gender, race, ethnicity...etc. which cannot be reduced to class struggle as Lefebvre suggests, the resistance should be for the spaces, but also the urban should be the space for resistance. Here, Tuzluçayır becomes a space for resistance even for the outsiders:

Some of my friends living in other places came here, you know, some of them really wondered what Tuzluçayır was doing, but most of them came because of this: This neighborhood has been resisting since the 70s, that is, it protests, take action, collects signatures, walks to the municipality... Well, now, until the June Resistance⁴⁶, apolitical people also joined these actions, but they did not know what to do, right? For them, how can I say, it was a space of resistance, Tuzluçayır, the center. (S., 39, woman)

Benim başka yerlerde yaşayan arkadaşlarımdan gelenler oldu buraya, hani bazıları gerçekten Tuzluçayır acaba yapıyor diye ama çoğu aslında şundan geldi: Bu mahalle atıyorum 70'den beri direniyor, yani protestosunu yapar, eylem koyar, imza toplamaysa imza toplama belediyeye yürüme. E şimdi insanlar Haziran

⁴⁶ It should be noted that almost all of the interviewees used the term “June Resistance” while referring to Gezi Park Protests. This will be discussed below while evaluating the formation of “language” in the neighbourhood in a detailed way.

Direnişine kadar apolitik olanlar da katıldı mesela bu eylemlere ama ne yapacaklarını bilemediler di mi, nereye gidecek mesela evet eylem yapmak istiyor da. İşte onlar için de bir nasıl diyeyim direniş mekanıydı aslında Tuzluçayır, göbek. (S., 29, woman)

Tuzluçayır as “a space of resistance” is also emphasized by A. (46, man):

We were also in Tuzluçayır Square as B.... . I wish it had gone on for another week. We would have reached our desired goal. Finished early. Finished a week early. If it had taken one more week, we would really have made that revolution. It was terminated early. Thousands of people gathered, of course, there were more people in Kızılay, but there were so many people even in the neighborhood. They came here for support because the revolutionaries were resisting there. Because the neighborhood was in wholesale resistance. Because they knew that no harm would come to them here. The whole neighborhood, in different ways, supported this resistance. Here was a total space of resistance.

Biz de Tuzluçayır Meydanındaydık B.... olarak. Keşke bir bir hafta daha da devam etseydi. İstedığımız hedefe ulaşırdık. Erken bitti. Bir hafta erken bitti. Bir hafta daha sürseydi gerçekten biz o devrimi yapardık. Erken sonlandırıldı. Binlerce insan toplandı çünkü, yani burada bile tabii Kızılay'da daha çok ama mahallede bile o kadar insandı ki. Buraya desteğe geldiler devrimciler orada direniyorlar, mahalle toptan direnişte diye. Çünkü biliyorlardı burada kimse birşey yapamaz onlara, tüm mahalle öyle ya da böyle yani tabii farklı şekillerde ama destek verdi bu direnişe. Yani burası bir direniş alanıydı topyekun.

In this sense, the “territories” of the neighborhood are also admitted by the outsiders in terms of identifying it as a “resistance zone”. In general, the neighborhood has a negative public image- as most of the interviewees mentioned- it is stigmatized which is based on the assumption that it is closely related to delinquency, immigration and insecurity. However, it should be noted that from the political standpoint of the outsider, this identity varies a lot; for the pro-government Islamists/rightists, it is the zone of crime while for the leftist/oppositions and/or Alevis, the neighborhood is safe and “emancipated”. So, the borders of the neighborhood were easy to pass for the activists/protestors who participated in Gezi Park Protests.

Lefebvre should be recalled, to understand the spatial importance of the neighborhood as one should remember that following the logic of neoliberalism, space was turned into a commodity and a means for dictation of dominant ideology. Through the commodification and politicization of the urban space via conservatist policies we can observe the importance of space as a political tool and its strategic importance for urban ideology as Lefebvre puts it. The earlier mentioned project of *Cami-Cemevi* shows this ideological role which was mainly identified as *a trojan horse* that aimed at damaging the integrity of the neighborhood. Moreover, it is evaluated as a “message” to the rest of Turkey in terms of breaking the resistance. However, the

strong local identity and the demographic composition of the neighborhood along with the plurality of the political organizations who could canalize the grassroots resistance challenged the control of the neighborhood by the dominant ideology.

Here, Gramscian account of ideology and the related concept of hegemony may be stated as the concepts that provided us with the dynamism to understand the motivation behind the organized resistance in the neighborhood, lack of which will be inefficient to understand the authoritarian populism of JDP governments. Like Gramsci, the author of this dissertation- far more providing a systematic conception of ideology- engaged itself with the elaboration of the notion of hegemony, which may be caused by the fact that we are much more interested in providing a theory of politics or a political strategy that would enable the dominated classes to be engaged in a political struggle against the ruling classes in the face of the penetration of political Islam into all aspects of the social and the political life, rather than providing a philosophical and theoretical account of the notion of ideology.

Hegemony in the framework may be regarded both as a strategy for the people in the neighborhood to establish its own hegemony and as a general theory of politics which shows the possibility and the path of transformation of the prevalent hegemonic system for any class, as it is fed both from the theory and the practice. Here, as mentioned above space play a primary role in this struggle, so the spatial organization of the neighborhood and their form represent power. Tuzluçayır has made it difficult. Harvey stated that:

Places constructed in the imagery of homogeneity of beliefs, values, ideals, and persuasions coupled with a strong sense of collective memory and spatially exclusionary rights can be extra-ordinarily powerful players upon the world stage. The effect is to convert the dialectic of community solidarity and repression into a quagmire of violence and oppression. And if, as is so often argued, a place divided against itself will fall, then the maintenance of that permanence that grounds politics becomes an end in itself, however self-destructive the ultimate outcome might be. (1996, p.323)

The opposition to the existing conditions is first experienced at the local level and so do their attempts of political organizations in the neighborhood to make their voice to be heard. Urban space is also an aspect of their collective action or the social movements they join. For Castells (1997, p. 59) people “engage in urban movements, through which common interests are discovered and defended, life is shared somehow

and new meaning may be produced.” It should also be added that urban space and/or local organizations may provide the necessary ground for the overlapping of different social problems. Here, Castells points to the importance of locality as follows: “Urban movements are for the search of cultural identity, for the maintenance or creation of autonomous local cultures” (1983, p.319).

From a broader perspective, it is essential to understand the perception of politics as a “war” by the JDP government; which could be labelled as addressing both the strategies of taking consent and using force in Gramscian terms as mentioned above. Once, Nietzsche stated that perceiving the other as “different” rather than “enemy to be destroyed”, is key for a human being to have healthy morality, we could easily observe that JDP denies having “healthy morality” and in the battlefield of urban space attacking the enemy who is, in essence, a majority “different” than JDP’s norms. To achieve this, even the democratic processes were suspended and Tuzluçayır with its potential of danger for the government including the cores of the resistance became the target of “creative destruction”. To resist against the “destruction”, the residents should be invited to a unified struggle, to a coalition, an alliance, a movement or other formulation to fight for the use-value of the neighborhood. However, there is an essential question to be answered for a possibility of a unified struggle: who will make the invitation?

Here, these all lead us to our research questions to understand the political activists in the neighborhood: Is it possible for political organizations to build a counter-hegemony? Can they create a popular common sense which should be considered to scale up a territorial struggle to a popular project of social transformation? Here, among these “possibilities” to what extent, these political activists could be considered as “organic intellectuals” in terms of acting together with/leading the neighborhood in terms of leading the social change? However, among all of them, the most crucial question is probably the possibility of the organic intellectuals being “local”. To put it in a more coherent way, can a neighborhood make the intellectuals “organic”?

7.3.2 Political Organizations

If the urban revolution began in the ghetto streets and through the People's Park, then we have only ourselves to blame for not carrying the struggle, both utopian and strategic, inside the middle-class privacy of our own neighborhood. (Gottdiener, 2010, p. 291)

As mentioned above who are the decision-makers, which political organizations/groups or social classes take part in the decision-making mechanisms in the neighborhood and who influence the residents in terms of policy-making are among the fundamental questions to understand the dynamics of the political organizations in Tuzluçayır. In a very broad sense, the question is who is/are at the steering wheel of the protests/resistance or what/who are the power engines of the neighborhood. As mentioned above social movements point to the existence of the “movements” as social actors having an impact on the decision-making processes. We should question if movements that are acts of people or the masses have an impact on political decision-making mechanisms. As often emphasized in the interviews, “they can make their voice to be heard” is the summary of the initiation of their motivation behind collective action. As Oberschall (1995, p.17) pointed out:

Collective action may have been stimulated by new hopes and a more positive sense of opportunity for taking successful steps against an undesirable condition; it may have been stimulated because a condition long endured was increasingly experienced as unjust and inequitable; it may have been stimulated by a group's increasing capacity to act collectively; or indeed, by all of these factors.

It was stated that old social movements' point of departure was “class” while the new social movements are organized around plural identities. In the neighborhood, there exists a wide variety of organizations, associations and movements adopting class politics and/or identity politics. However, one can say that a sharp distinction cannot be made between the policies they adopted regarding class and/or identity:

I've been taking action with my comrades since 2005. Since 2005, we have a say in what has taken place in this neighborhood and also throughout the country, but not alone. We surely have taken action. In the same period, if I remember correctly, we both raised our voices and took action against base stations, base stations in Tuzluçayır. (Y., 51, man)

2005'ten bu yana bizimkiler ile hareket ediyorum. 2005'ten bu yana bu mahallede hem ülke genelinde ne geliştirse hem bu yerelde ne geliştirse mutlaka bir sözümüz var ama tek başına değil. Mutlaka bir eylemimiz gerçekleşmiştir. Bu yani füze kalkanı Malatya Kürecik'e yapılacak olan füze kalkanına ilişkin de, aynı dönemde yanlış hatırlamıyorsam baz istasyonlarına, Tuzluçayır'a yapılan baz istasyonlarına dönük hem sözümüz hem de eylemimiz var. (Y., 51, man)

Here, M., (44, man) identified their organization as “revolutionary” which aims at destroying the capitalist system and its institutions while constructing an egalitarian society without any classes. However, he added that although their goal was revolutionary, they are also dealing with reforms- especially about the demands coming from the neighborhood:

Sure, we take our power from class politics, that's different. But that doesn't mean, I am not doing anything about the sewer problem in the neighborhood you mentioned earlier. No, of course, we own the issues that concern my people here, the issues that they requested solutions from me. For example, the most effective actions for us are usually calendar protests⁴⁷. For example, the massacre in Sivas, memories of the events of Maraş. Because Alevism is the lifeblood of the people here, and the inhumane incidents that took place there still evoke anger in people like the first time.

Şimdi biz tabii ki sınıf siyasetinden gücümüzü alıyoruz, orası başka. Ama bu demek değil ki mesela daha önce bahsettiğin kanalizasyon problemi mahalledeki, onun için eylem koymuyorum. Hayır tabii ki, burada insanımı ilgilendiren konulardan, ondan sonra benden talepte bulunulan konuları biz sahipleniriz. Örneğin bizde etkili eylemler genelde takvim eylemleridir. Mesela Sivas Katliamı, Maraş olaylarının anmaları. Çünkü buradaki insanların can damarı Alevilik, orada olan o insanlık dışı olayları hala o ilk zamanki öfke duruyor insanlarda.

In this sense, one can say that M. and his organization are quite responsive to the demands of the community as he occasionally expresses their tendency towards class politics but the community's concentration on Alevi identity and/or local problems in the neighborhood. Similar to that, D. (35, woman) also mentions a political organization should be “broadly inclusive” as the enemy is so strong, so the alliance should target the majority of the population who are excluded/suppressed by the system. She uses the concept “united front against fascism” which is also used by other interviewees as they mostly defined the current period as a “fascist era”:

I think that we need to create a united front against fascism. Now the PDP has largely succeeded, hasn't it? I mean, they got so many votes, made an impact, because they included everyone who was outside the system. We can do it in the neighborhood. Organizations such as us, H..., K..., E.... come together, and hold

⁴⁷ The concept “takvim eylemleri” could be translated as “protests following an agenda” which implies the protests/actions repeated every year that are related to a past event/incident.

meetings. For example, if a resistance needs to be organized, we don't necessarily say that we will organize. A friend from H ... comes and suggests, for example, and we would discuss and claim it. Because let's face it, the enemy is strong. In other words, it attacks from everywhere, it attacks not only physically but also ideologically, it takes over the media, it takes over the next neighborhood. Even in education, the children started learning the Koran in kindergarten. For example, you have to offer people something against it. I mean, if they give this kind of education, you should be able to say: Let your children not get this education, here we offer a more egalitarian education that does not make propaganda of any faith. But it is a vicious circle, and you will need to be strong to do it. Both with manpower and ideologically. For instance, as an Alevi, I am literally subjected to such an education. Now, as organization X, how do you intend to carry out a revolution? The people will do it, I think you, like the X, Y. organization, have to listen to that demand.

Ben şöyle düşünüyorum, faşizme karşı birleşik cepheyi oluşturmamız gerekiyor. Şimdi bunu büyük ölçüde örneğin HDP başardı di mi? Yani sistemin dışında kalan herkesi kattıkları için içlerine bu kadar oy aldılar, ses getirdiler. Bak biz mahallede bunu yapabiliyoruz mesela. Biz, H..., K..., E.... gibi örgütler bir araya geliyoruz toplantı alıyoruz gibi. Örneğin bir direniş örgütlenecek illa biz örgütleyelim demiyoruz. H...den bir arkadaş gelir önerir örneğin tartışırız, biz sahipleniriz. Çünkü şunu kabul edelim düşman güçlü. Yani her yerden saldırıyor, sadece fiziksel değil ideolojik de saldırıyor, medyayı ele geçiriyor, e yan mahalleyi ele geçiriyor. Ya eğitimde bile baksana çocuklar kreşte Kur'an öğrenmeye başladılar. Mesela buna karşı sen bir şey sunmalısın insanlara. Yani o onun eğitimni veriyorsa atıyorum sen şöyle diyebilmelisin: Bak o eğitimi almasın, ben burada eşitlikçi, işte hiçbir inancın propogandasını yapmayan bir eğitim veriyorum. Ama işte bir kısır döngü, bunu yapabilmek için de güçlü olacaksın. Hem insan gücü, hem ideolojik olarak. Mesela ben Alevi olarak böyle bir eğitime yani resmen maruz kalıyorum. Şimdi sen tabii ki atıyorum X örgütü olarak nasıl devrim yapmayı düşünüyorsun. Halk yapacak, sen sadece X, Y. örgütü olarak o talebi dinlemek zorundasın bence.

An emphasis in this interview was so valuable as besides making a sharp distinction between “us” and “them”, she also defined most of the Gramscian concepts like “hegemony”, “counter-hegemony”, “modern prince” without using these terms. It seems that hegemony in the account of D. may be regarded both as a strategy for the subaltern classes to establish their own hegemony and also a possibility and the path of transformation of the prevalent hegemonic system for any class. Yet, it should be stressed once more that, only organic ideologies that are linked with a chain of necessity to the structure and only the ones that are capable of uniting the theory and the practice are apt of being the initiators of such a hegemonic transformation since only they are able to diffuse within the social and cultural practices of the people, as well as the political ones. The supremacy of a social group according to Gramsci, may either be secured through domination or intellectual and moral leadership, as a result of which the concept of hegemony came to be defined by him, as the moral, intellectual and political leadership over the allied classes, combining both of the requirements of

supremacy. M. (50, man) defines the necessity of multi-faced leadership over the allied classes as follows:

Some associations lost their purpose, for example, Pir Sultan was here before, and they turned it into someplace where only Alevi would come, play saz and whirl. The guys were so backward that the young people had to take over, but they told the young people that they can't do politics here. They say that the association of a man like Pir Sultan cannot have politics in it. What are these guys going to do, just Alevism? That perspective is crippling. On the contrary, it should aim to unite, multiply, that is, to make politics. As much as demonizing politics, it's a big problem to stay closed in on itself. You have power, brother, so you can organize the Alevi, right? Then, use it.

Bazı dernekler amacını yitirdi, örneğin Pir Sultan önceden buradaydı, içerik olarak sadece Alevilerin gelip, saz çalıp, semah döndükleri bir hale soktular yapıyı. Adamlar öyle geri kafalılar ki, yönetimi gençler almıştı, gençlere dediler ki siz burada siyaset yapamazsınız. Pir Sultan gibi bir adamın derneğine siyaset olmaz diyor. Ne yapacağı sadece Alevilik mi yapacak bu adamlar. Bu bakış açısı çok sakat. Oysa birleştirmeyi, çoğalmayı yani bilakis siyaset yapmayı amaçlamalı. Siyaseti şeytanlaştırmak kadar böyle kendi içinde kapalı kalmak da büyük sıkıntı. Elinde bir güç var senin kardeşim, yani işte Alevileri mesela örgütleyebilirsin di mi, kullansana onu.

M. points to essential detail that Pir Sultan Abdal Cultural Association carries a “potential” for hegemonic formation as the dominant ideology frequently attacks these institutions like associations, sanctuaries, trade unions...etc. Here, what he offers is actually a Gramscian move: using the association as a part of forming a counter-hegemonic culture, making politics; producing politics with the alternative scenarios. In this sense, M. denied demonizing the term “politics” and its connotations as he stated the field of politics does not belong to the “politicians” and/or the rulers per se.

This also implies that the notion of hegemony includes, but is broader than the category of ideology and simple ideological domination. It is not the equivalent of the ideological domination, since it rests principally and primarily on the dialectical relationship of the class forces, rather than on simple subordination, which reveals the importance of gaining the consent of the other classes and the class fractions within the complexity of the social formation, mainly by means of overcoming the corporatist nature of the class, marked by a resistance to the granting of concessions to the other classes. Hence, it becomes clear that the hegemonic moment corresponds to the form of consciousness that is competent with overcoming the sole economic interests of the particular class and taking into account the interests of the others:

What was the success of the JDP? The men promised everyone something. In other words, they promised jobs, food, help, they gave tenders to the employers, I don't

know increased job opportunities for the middle class. The economy improved in the first years, you know, induced by one-party stability. They took advantage of that, too. Then, gradually took advantage of both the economy and the social life. They openly penetrated society with the contribution of the Jamaat, of course. I mean, it's not like brainwashing, because they've actually done some good things, you know, for a party of order. In the early periods, they even supported the LGBTQ community, claimed to care about them because they needed votes. However, what happened is that when he came to power, that is, when he got almost 50 percent of the votes in the 2007 election, they said, okay, from now on, it will be as we say. (S., 39, woman)

AKP'nin başarısı neydi örneğin? Adamlar herkese birşeyler vaat ettiler. Yani garibana iş, aş, yardım dediler, patrona ihale verdiler, işte orta sınıfa ne bileyim iş olanaklarını kolaylaştırdı tabii ilk yıllarda ekonomi de düzelmişti hani tek parti istikrarından kaynaklı. Ondan da faydalandılar. Sonra işte yavaş yavaş, hem ekonomiden hem sosyal hayattan yavaş yavaş, Cemmatin de tabii katkısıyla topluma resmen nüfuz ettiler. Yani tabii böyle beyin yıkama gibi değil çünkü hakikaten bazı iyi şeylerde de yaptılar hani bir düzen partisine göre. Mesela ilk dönemler tabii oya ihtiyacı olduğu için LGBTQ'lara bile oynadılar, işte biz onları da önemsiyoruz gibi. Ama ne oldu, sonra gücü eline geçirince yani 2007 seçimlerinde neredeyse yüzde 50 oy alınca dediler artık tamam, bundan sonra bizim dediğimiz olacak. (S., 39, woman)

S.'s periodization is critical in terms of making a distinction between the “consent-based politics era of JDP” and the “coercion-based”, similar to Akça's (2011) (and many others') periodization about the hegemonic formation of JDP. Her focus on trying to take the popular support of the “majority” also shows that the power bloc inherits contradictions as Poulantzas assumed. Therefore, following the theoretical heritage of political Islamist parties, it was quite unexpected for JDP to embrace the “misfits” which was a tactical move, a “war of position”.

Here, S. is not the one who talks about the “first years of JDP government” who needs popular alliance and the later period when they quit following policies addressing the mass support. Most of the interviewees made a distinction between pre-2007 period and post-2007 period stating that the JDP government “do not need popular support anymore as they conquer the power bloc”:

When it was founded in 2002, no one expected the JDP to be in power alone. However, the formula was very simple, as if they were addressing everyone, like oppressed Muslims who were "persecuted" by the Kemalists. Of course, it goes all the way to Mustafa Kemal, and this is a long story. I'm just saying, they claimed to be there for everyone, to serve the people. How impressive is that? There was such populist rhetoric like 'we are at the service of our nation'. Because he needed the votes to get hold of all the institutions of the state, every cell of society. Well, then what happened? After 2007, there was no more need. He had already taken over, and then they kicked out the Jamaat because it was of no more service to them. How courageous! Erdogan gambled there, but he won. Now he can say whatever he wants, so to speak, like 'the state is mine, and I don't need any of you'.

Also, capital, too. Did he not create his own capital, enrich the religious people that capitalism has so far despised? So, like a virus, actually. (L., 50, woman)

2002'de kurulduğunda kimse ihtimal vermedi di mi AKP yani bir de tek başına iktidar olsun. Oysa formül çok basitti bak, sanki herkese hitap ediyorlardı, işte mazlum müslümanlar vardı böyle Kemalistlerin yani turnak içinde söylüyorum zulmünü gören, bastırılmış. Tabii Mustafa Kemal'e kadar gidiyor bu böyle de o uzun konu. Şunu diyorum aslında biz herkes için varız, hizmet etmeye geldik mesela, ne kadar etkileyici di mi? işte milletimizin hizmetindeyiz gibi böyle populist söylemleri vardı. Çünkü oya ihtiyacı vardı, işte devletin tüm kurumlarına, toplumun yani böyle her hücreğine işlemek için. Ha sonra nooldu, 2007'den sonra tamam artık gerek kalmadı. Zaten ele geçirdi geçireceğini, sonra zaten cemaati de şutladılar afedersin, size artık gerek kalmadı diye. Cesarete bak, tabii kumar oynadı orada Erdoğan ama hani kazandı da. Artık herkese hani tabiri caizse atar yapabiliyor, devlet benim hiçbirinize gerek yok diyor. Sermaye de mesela öyle, kendi sermayesini yaratmadı mı, bugüne kadar kapitalizmin küçük gördüğü dincileri zengin etmedi mi? Yani bir virüs gibi aslında. (L., 50, woman)

Gramsci argues that: "...the leading group should make sacrifices of an economic-corporate kind. But, there is also no doubt that such sacrifices and such a compromise cannot touch the essential; for though hegemony is ethico-political, it must also be economic..." (2000, p.211). Therefore, as L. implies, hegemony has a dynamic nature, contrary to the relatively static notion of ideology, since it has to be constantly reviewed and negotiated in the face of changing relations of forces. The struggle for the establishment of hegemonic power by a particular class, takes place at the level of civil society, defined by Gramsci, as the terrain that stands "between the economic structure and the State" (Hall, 1978, p.47), that includes both structural and superstructural elements, hinting at, the existence of traces of hegemony in all aspects of life like ideology itself:

I think the most important reason they're getting stronger is that they're targeting every area. Let me put it this way: they took over education, and he said 'I will raise a vindictive religious generation'. With privatizations in the economy, the state lost everything in its hand, which was probably the highest point of the neoliberal mentality. The lack of quality in the cultural sphere, watching characters like Recep İvedik⁴⁸ etc, is also a calculated move, I think. It's about transforming society, you know, social engineering. Sunni Islamism, that's what it is. (A., 46, man)

Bence güçlenmelerinin en önemli nedeni şöyle her alanı hedeflemeleri. Şöyle açayım: Eğitime el attılar, dedi ki kindar dindar nesil yetiştirecem. Ekonomide özelleştirmelerle, devletin elinde avucunda bırakmadı, bu da neoliberal zihniyetin yani en üst noktasydı herhalde. Kültürel alanda da seviyesizlik mesela ne bileyim

⁴⁸ Recep İvedik is a fictional character created by the film director and screen-writer Şahan Gökbakar. There are a series of films featuring Recep İvedik based on the absurd adventures of the character. Here, he symbolizes a degenerated male who is rude, sexist, idle and ignorant. In this annotation, the interviewee criticizes the "funny" presentation of this character.

Recep İvedik gibi karakterlerin izlenmesini falan bunların hep hesaplı olduğunu düşünüyorum. Top yekün toplumu dönüştürme bu, hani diyor ya toplum mühendisliği. Sünni islamcılık, yaptığı bu. (A., 46, man)

Here, to understand how the interviewees define and fight against the hegemony that they defined in relation to JDP governments, it is essential to understand its reflection and/or constituent elements in daily life. To elaborate, their quotes related to common sense, language and folklore will be questioned.

7.3.2.1 Understanding Common Sense, Language and Folklore from the Activists' Eyes

The focus on “Sunni Islamic” elements that are inherent in the organs of the state and its penetration into the society as a dominant aspect are often emphasized by the interviewees. They define “common sense” in terms of focusing on the negativity of the term which is identified as “spontaneous philosophy of the multitude” by Gramsci (2000, p.345). According to Gramsci, class interests, world views and values of the dominant classes were adopted by the masses; by the people as the “common sense”:

Erdoğan rose to power by claiming to be one of us. He waved a ring in his hand, said that if I ever have more than this ring, I must have been stealing. After that, he said that he was put in jail for reading a poem. I mean, I don't really want to use this word, but he played the victim. I think, people empathised with him too much. It became ordinary to provide extract rent through religion, and they even corrupted the society in this way. (S., 56, man)

Ben de sizden biriyim diye diye yükseldi Erdoğan. Elinde bir yüzük salladı, bu yüzükten daha fazlasına sahip olursam bilin ki çalıyorum dedi. Ondan sonra, işte ben bir şiir okudum diye hapse atıldım dedi. Yani çok kullanmak istemiyorum bu şeyi ama mağdur edebiyatı yaptı. Bu sefer halk yani fazla empati kurdu gibi geliyor bana. Din üzerinden rant sağlamak olağanlaştı hatta toplumu bu yolla yozlaştırdılar. (S., 56, man)

Or

I'll tell you how the JDP government succeeded: it made promises to an ignorant person, they humiliated the Republicans and the Kemalists claiming that because they are elite, they look at you from above. Society has been oppressed for years, and they claimed to be the voice of those oppressed. Of course, the Cemaat, US imperialism have played a role as well by insidiously integrating into the society. They despised important values, or even cultural activities such as reading, going to the theatre, etc., All of them became worthless. I mean, it's not just the economy, you know, even in everyday events like this, you see the change clearly. Even in the behavior of the person on the bus, this change is very obvious. (L., 50, woman)

AKP iktidarı ben söyleyeyim nasıl başarılı oldu: Cahil insana vaatlerde bulundu, bunlar elit, üstten bakıyorlar size diye cumhuriyetçileri, kemalistleri aşağıladı.

Toplum yıllardır eziliyordu, biz o ezilenlerin sesi olduk gibi. Tabii cemaat, ABD emperyalizmi bunlar hep etkili oldu böyle toplumu ince ince sinsice iliklerine işlediler. Önemli değerleri küçümsediler, ya kitap okumayı, tiyatroyu falan mesela böyle kültürel etkinlikleri bile değersizleştiler. Yani sadece ekonomi değil bak, hani böyle günlük olaylarda bile o kadar net görüyorsun ki değişimi. Otobüsteki insanın halinden bile o değişim yani çok bariz gerçekten. (L., 50, woman)

These two annotations are critical to show the populism of JDP from the eyes of the interviewees that what they told showed that they believed in JDP governments' "neo-liberal authoritarian populist strategy". As L. expressed they created "enemies" to present themselves as the victims of the previous governments who are "elitist". To achieve, the social, cultural and intellectual life of the society were targeted or "despised" as L. told.

Here, it should be reemphasized that Gramsci is critical about common sense but admits its potential for emancipation. It is an attempt to eliminate the alternative values and views that endanger the hegemony. Here, the common sense served the formation of a structure in which the governors are the sovereign at the same time:

In fact, it is necessary to criticize the order in the first place. Isn't the government there to serve you? We vote for them to work for us. But we have a general understanding that they have come to power, so we should do as they say. We have rights and responsibilities as citizens; however, we only look at responsibilities. No one is after his rights. Of course, the fact that they took over every area of society and spread themselves effectively. They plug every hole; the economy, politics, culture, that can spark such opposition, so to speak. (D., 26, woman)

Aslında düzenin eleştirisini yapmak gerekiyor en başta. Hükümet sana hizmet etmek için orada değil mi? Biz onlara bize çalışınlar diye oy veriyoruz. Ama bizde şöyle bir algı var, başa geldiler bizim onların sözünden çıkmamamız lazım. İşte hani bir vatandaş olarak hak ve sorumlulukların var ya, biz sadece sorumluluklarına bakıyoruz. Kimse haklarının peşinde değil. Tabii toplumun her alanını ele geçirmeleri de sirayet etmeleri diyelim etkili bunda, yani ekonomi, politika, kültür, böyle karşı kıvılcım çıkabilecek her deliği tikiyorlar tabir-i caizse. (D., 26, woman)

Here, D. criticized the view that the individuals in the society are "unaware" of their citizenship rights as they are still carrying the "spirit of a vassal". This is for D., actually a way to keep the society under control; building a common sense that enabled individuals to obey the rulers, hegemonic forces; just like Gramsci emphasized. Similarly, A. (41, man) states that:

In the past, 3-4 parties came together to form the government in Turkey. The ministries were yours. The military was yours. The police were yours. Now, what did he do? He said the police is his. The military is also his. The ministries and everything are his.

Eskiden Türkiye'nin yönetim şekli 3-4 tane parti bir araya gelmiş. Bakanlıklar senin diyordu. Askeriye senin diyordu. Polis senin diyordu. Şurası benim diyordu. Birleştiriyordu 3-5 parçaya bölüyordu. Şimdi ne yaptı poliste benim dedi. Askeriyede benim dedi. Bakanlıklarda benim, her şey benim dedi.

According to Gramsci, the common sense has an emancipatory potential and it should be canalized into an intellectual order but one should keep in mind that “Religion and common sense cannot constitute an intellectual order, because they cannot be reduced to unity and coherence even within an individual consciousness, let alone collective consciousness.” (2000, p.327). Here, it is possible to state that the systematic forms of thinking are those that are organically linked with a particular class, such as philosophy and ideology, whereas the aggregated forms of thinking are associated with belonging to the ones that are not affiliated with a certain class, like common sense and folklore. It is essential to understand the “commonality” of common sense as it refers to “Sunni Islamist values” often emphasized by the interviewees:

There's a “holy night” (kandil) fashion. It's very interesting. It's very recent actually. It's not a problem, but it's presented as normal in the society. Religion is one of the largest budget public institutions in Turkey with my tax, but if you look at it, it only works for Sunnis. There are mosques, but Cemevis are still not places of worship, are they? The Sunni lifestyle has no respect for anyone but itself. I, as a woman, am very uncomfortable with this situation because I think Sunnis do not consider a woman a person. (Z., 50, woman)

Bir kandil modası var bak çok ilginç. Eskiden yoktu bu biliyor musun ben mesela hatırlamam yani çok yakın tarihli aslında bu. Olması da problem değil ama bu toplumun normal gibi sunuluyor. Ya diyanet benim vergimle Türkiye'deki en büyük bütçeli kamu kurumlarından ama bakacak olursan sadece Sünnilere çalışıyor, işte camiler, mesela cemevleri hala ibadethane değil di mi? Sünni yaşam tarzı kendinden başkasına saygı duymaz. Ben bir kadın olarak bu durumdan çok rahatsız oluyorum çünkü bence Sünniler kadını insandan da saymıyor, ben öyle görüyorum yani düşüncelerini yaptıklarını. (Z., 50, woman)

Here, Z. states that the government presented the Sunni Islam and Sunnic Islamic values as the “normal” of the society, an ideal type may be. She defined a Sunni lifestyle that is promoted and mostly imposed which is not necessarily based on coercion but transforming the common sense to reach the people.

At this point, it is essential to elaborate on how the interviewees identify Alevism as opposition to Sunnism and the Sunni way of life, as they often emphasized. The fact that ‘being repressed’ and ‘opposition to power’ has facilitated the interaction with the left, and resulted in Alevi being ‘naturally’ in alliance with the left-wing opposition as mentioned above:

I was in the second or third grade (talks about his childhood in a Sunni neighborhood). They attacked me for being an Alevi. Since then, you've been involved in what it takes to be an Alevi, as well as being oppressed at that young age. Even that incident was maybe instrumental in my involvement in the organized struggle. (Y., 28, man)

Bu arada 2. sınıfa falan gidiyorum 3 ya da (Sünnilerin yoğunlukta olduğu bir mahallede geçen çocukluğunu anlatıyor). Alevi misin sen diyip böyle biraz çullanmışlardı üstüme. O zamandan beri bir Alevi olmanın getirdiği şeyle haliyle o küçük yaşta ezilmeyi kendisine dâhil oluyorsun. Örgütlü mücadeleye geçmemde o olay bile etkili olmuştur belki. (Y., 28, man)

Some of the interviewees stated that the political Sunni movement labels Alevism as a dangerous formation. This is mentioned not only by Sunnis but also by the State. Alevis are called left-wing in public and the formal documents of the army and the government, they said. On the one hand attacks of Sunnis towards Alevis, and the silent support of the government developed a political polarization and resulted in the emergence of movements built upon the Alevi identity.

Here, it should be noted once more that, the definition of Alevism or discussion related to what is “not” Alevism and who are they become a quarrel issue. Here, one cannot talk about unity “within” Alevis in the argument of what is Alevism. For some, it is a belief, while for the other, it is a philosophy, for some a religion, for others, it has no relation with Islam, or for some, it is a different comment and practice of Islam. Here, even among 32 interviewees, there were numerous definitions of Alevism. It can be said that the different definitions have a direct relationship between the interests and positions of different classes among them (Küçükaydın, 2009). Moreover, Alevism does not refer to a homogeneous religious group as it is an umbrella term that refers to a large number of different heterodox communities (Fırat, 2004). In Turkey, this heterogeneous group includes Nusayris (speaking Arabic language), Kurdish Alevis (speaking both the Kurmanci and Zazaki vernaculars of Kurdish language) and Turkish Alevis, as well as Bektahsis, Abdals, Tahtacis and Yörük.

Moreover, Alevism and Alevi identity do not have single definitions that are isolated from the “outside” world. Therefore, as Melikoff states:

We must also keep in mind that the Turks have often settled in territories which had been centers of heresies, so that there has often been a superposition of heretic creeds. For instance, the region of Erzincan-Divriği-Sivas was the center of the Paulician heresy (a strongly dualistic

sect) before becoming the center of the Kızılbaş-Alevi. Anatolia—especially Eastern Anatolia—was throughout the centuries a melting-pot where people and creeds have been subjected to a permanent procedure of catalysis. It is therefore difficult to isolate elements which have been fused in this way. (2005, p.7)

Since there is no unity in terming Alevism and Alevi are not referred to as a homogenous and/or an intact group, it is hard to make generalizations. However, there are some common points that the interviewees focus on related to their perception of Alevi identity. Here, despite being complicated and heterogenous forms, they mostly defined Alevism as a social structure that is considered an ethnic identity in terms of briefly belonging to a common culture, history and lively manner. Here, they stated that Alevism includes a potential of “change”, a “new order” that is far more progressive than Sunni Islam:

I see Alevism, how to say, as an umbrella that contains many theories, practices, cultures, and politics. For example, Alevism is against the uniform lifestyle which is unequal and unfair imposed by Sunnism. (Y., 51, man)

Alevilik içinde pek çok teoriyi, pratiği, kültürü, siyaset barındıran nasıl denir bir şemsiye gibi adeta görüyorum ben. Sünniliğin dayattığı o tek tip yaşam tarzı, eşitsiz, işte adaletsiz falan o tarzın tamamen karşısında mesela. (Y., 51, man)

Similarly,

Alevi are progressive, that's how clear it is. Look at us or our neighborhood, for example, equality between men and women, tolerance, understanding. In recent years, women in hijab began to move here. A friend said that the state is doing it specifically to transform this place, but I don't think so. I mean, if I were in hijab, I would like to live in an Alevi neighborhood because we approach everyone here with the same solidarity, sincerity. She can't see it in her neighborhood, and as a woman, she can't be as comfortable as she would be here. (Z., 52, woman)

Alevi dediğin ilerici olur bak bu kadar net. Bizimkilere bir bak mesela kadın-erkek eşitliği, tahammül, anlayış, ondan sonra tolerans. Ya bizim mahalleye mesela son yıllarda kapalılar taşınmaya başladı az önce Y. arkadaş dedi ya devlet işte bilerek hani burayı dönüştürmek için özellikle yapıyor. Ben pek öyle düşünmüyorum, yani ben kapalı olsam ben de Alevi mahallesinde yaşamak isterim çünkü biz burada herkese aynı dayanışmayla, samimiyetle anlayışla yaklaşıyoruz. Kendi mahallesinde bunu göremez mesela, bir kadın olarak yani buradaki kadar rahat da edemez. (Z., 52, woman)

Here, the “progressive” nature of Alevism was constantly emphasized by the interviewees as they stated that the conservative elements in Sunnism did not exist in Alevism. It is more than a religion, they continued, more like a way of life, a culture—in a somewhat pretentious way, carrying the potential of a new “common sense.”

It should be reemphasized that, in order to exercise the neo-liberal hegemonic project, the state firstly had to struggle to clean “communist” elements in society. It had to create and feed a dominated culture to both fill the emptied spheres of the working-class and continue to oppress the other identities (Massicard, 2005). The hegemonic project chose the Sunni-Islam element which had been dominant already in the society and provided it to the emergence and started to struggle over it. So, the most dominant identity was political Islam since 1980 and developed its supporters in the 1990s. The residual culture which was in the sediment became now a dominant culture in Turkey (Şengül, 2004). Tol (2009) argued the depreciation of the national homogeneity through weakening the nation-state and encouragement of the variety of ethnic, religious or cultural groups against the homogenous state was effective in the rise of identity politics.

The interviewees constantly emphasize that they canalize their policies, views and actions in line with these demands coming from the neighborhood related to “identity” politics. Here, a small note should be added: All the political organizations the interviewees participated in have autonomous structures in terms of deciding and performing protests. They stated that this is a “power” for them, as this autonomy enables them to be in close relation with the residents and act quickly:

In the place we call Menekşe Erbay Park, Mamak Municipality agreed with Avea a few years ago. They decided to build a base station in 50 parks in Mamak. They came here and began digging. My father-in-law saw it and asked what they were doing. The workers said that a base station was going to be built here. Father-in-law left immediately and picked up his shovel to fight those guys. In the meantime, our A... came too, and all of a sudden about 100 people gathered right there. A movement began against the base station, and we were the ones that led it. We believe that it has to be like this. (B., 41, man)

Şu aşağıda Menekşe Erbay Parkı dediğimiz parkta aslında Mamak Belediyesi bundan bir kaç sene önce Avea ile bir yer ile anlaşiyor. 50 tane Mamak'ta ki parka baz istasyonu yapma kararı alıyor. Buraya geliyorlar. Kazmayı çakıyorlar. Benim kayınpeder görüyor. Diyor ne yapıyorsunuz? Diyor işçiler baz istasyonu yapacağız buraya. Kayınpeder hemen gidiyor küreğini hemen alıyor. Adamlarla kavga etmeye gidiyor. O esnada bizim A...lilerde geliyor vs. bir anda 10 kişi, 5 kişi, 20 kişi derken 100 kişi hemen orada birikti. Baz istasyonuna karşı şey bir hareket başladı ve biz bu işin öncülüğünü yaptık. Böyle olması gerekiyor diye düşünüyoruz. (B., 41, man)

At this point, it is essential to elaborate on “identity” politics and the demands related to “identities” in the neighborhood. As stated above Laclau and Mouffe (1985) emphasize that subject positions act/would act in any kind of struggle as social and

political struggles shifted from working-class struggle to the areas of ecology, sexuality, religion, minority groups and peace...etc. Here, in Tuzluçayır, although the political organizations that are based on class politics and working-class struggle are dominant, they also take into account the demands of the residents:

For example, we need to create projects to have a more liveable neighborhood. Right now it's about asphaltting the roads, planting something in the park or something like that... I chatted with N... the other day. Our Tuzluçayır has a square. Between the Tuzluçayır Square and Ç.- market, there is a 300-500 meters' area. The area is so beautiful that we close it to traffic at events and such. It can be closed to traffic at certain hours like Sakarya Square, regularly. We can achieve that. By completely closing the 2 areas to traffic, different living spaces can be created. Cafes, areas where manual labor products are sold like in Yüksel Street, Sakarya Square, can be made. We now need to be able to redesign the neighborhood by thinking outside the problems like the broken lamp in the street. We need to think about a green neighborhood with walking paths, bike paths, bigger parks. I also talked with brother S..., who is in the management of the association. What we actually call the problems of the neighborhood are turning in this direction a little bit actually. We have very serious political problems, such as state interventions, ganging up through drugs and stuff, and we have to fight them, too. (S., 39, woman)

Mesela bizim mahalleye ilişkin daha yaşanabilir mahalle yaratabilmek için proje üretmemiz gerekiyor. Şu an asfalt yaptırmak işte, parka bir şey dikmek falan sorun... Şimdi mesela geçen N... ile sohbet ettik. Bizim Tuzluçayırın Meydanı var. Tuzluçayır meydan ile Çağdaş market arası belki 500 metrelik bir alan ya da 300 metrelik. 300 metrelik alan o kadar güzel ki yani biz etkinliklerde falan kapatıyoruz orayı. Orayı devamlı olarak ya da belli saatlerde dubalarla 20'den önce aynen Sakarya Meydanı gibi belli saatlerde trafiğe kapatılabilir. Mahallenin ana alteri ama biz bunu sağlayabiliriz. Mesela bu 2 alan tamamen şey trafiğe kapatılarak burada bambaşka bir yaşam alanı işte. Ne yapılabilir. Kafeler, el emeği ürünlerinin satıldığı alanlar böyle Yüksel Caddesi gibi, Sakarya Meydanı gibi bizim artık biraz daha hani direğimizde lamba yanmıyor falan fiandan çıkıp mahalleyi yeniden dizayn edebilmemiz lazım. Ağaçlandırılmış yeşil bir mahalle daha fazla bir parkın büyütüldüğü bir mahalle, yürüyüş alanlarının olduğu bir mahalle, bisiklet yollarının olduğu bir mahalle, şu an biraz daha mahalleye ilişkin bence yapabileceğimiz ki önümüze de aslında koymaya çalıştığımız. Şimdi dernek yönetiminde ki arkadaşları işte geçen S... abiyle de sohbet ettik. Biraz hani bu yönde aslında mahallenin sorunları dediğimiz şey dönüşüyor. Teknik sorunlar o yönde onun dışında yani çok ciddi siyasal sorunları var. Nedir? Devletin müdahaleleri, uyuşturucu bilmem ne yoluyla çeteleştirerek. Buralara karşı da bambaşka bir mücadele vermemiz gerekiyor. (S., 39, woman)

Therefore, social and political concepts should be perceived through the categories of space and identity and difference as they cannot be based on state and/or class. This shows us the necessity of organization of the political organization around the “other” kind of identities than the class. Remembering new social movements, in our world, people began to be identified with plural identities rather than simple attachments to their positions in the production process such as a Kurdish feminist factory worker: She/he could have different spheres of struggle, plenty of antagonisms within the

system which brings us his/her impossibility to be identified as simply worker framed with the new social movements:

Of course, we are doing class politics as X... but that doesn't mean that it is unlikely to reject identities today. For example, I am a woman, I am a Kurdish woman, thus I am a feminist, of course, so revolution yes. However, this does not mean a revolution made by proletarian men, you know, it includes everyone, environmentalists like in Gezi, homosexuals. Because the enemy attacks everywhere, like in the Gezi Park, or, for example, think of anti-abortion rhetoric. They all should be part of this struggle. So, all the oppressed must be able to act together against the enemy. (R., 37, woman)

Biz tabii ki X... olarak sınıf siyaseti yapıyoruz ama bu demek değil ki işte kimlikleri reddetmek günümüzde pek mümkün değil. Örneğin ben bir kadınum, bir Kürt kadınıym, ondan feministim tabii ki, yani devrim evet, ama bu demek değil ki işte erkeklerin sadece proleter erkeklerin yaptığı bir devrim değil düşünülen hani her alanda. Mesela eşcinseli de dahil ya da Gezi olaylarındaki örneğin çevreci arkadaşlar. Çünkü düşman da her yerden vuruyor, işte Gezi Parkındaki gibi, ya da mesela kürtaj karşıtı konuşmaları düşün. Hepsi bu mücadelenin parçası olmalı. Yani düşmana karşı tüm ezilenler hep birlikte bir hareket edebilmeliyiz. (R., 37, woman)

Here, R. emphasized the “inclusiveness” of her organization and make an essential evaluation of the spread of the Gezi Park Protests across the whole country: the inclusion of all the identities, embracing the worries, and being a “unity”. This is also, as she said, the ultimate aim of her organization: to unite people in a single movement that will change the system, the regime altogether.

Similarly, S. also emphasized the “inclusiveness”:

It's important to understand the difference. I am a proletarian man, a soldier of the class struggle. I'm also an environmentalist, so I'll fight against hydroelectric power stations. Do you think they should exclude each other? In fact, the opposite. The political Islamists who take capitalism behind them are attacking from everywhere. From this point of view, we think that we should expand the struggle in this way. Now, of course, women's murders are political. Can you think of a revolutionary organization that does not accept this? (S., 44, man)

Şunun ayrımına varmak önemli. Ben proleter bir insanım, sınıf mücadelesinin neferiyim. Ha aynı zamanda bir çevreciyim, yani HES'lere karşı mücadelemi de veririm. Bunlar sence dışlamalı mı birbirini? Aslında tam tersi, yani kapitalizmi arkasına alan siyasal islamcılar bak görüyorsun her yerden saldırıyorlar. Bu açıdan mücadeleyi öyle genişletmemiz gerektiğini düşünüyoruz biz. Şimdi tabii ki kadın cinayetleri politiktir. Artık bunu Kabul etmeyen bir devrimci örgüt sen düşünebilir misin? (S., 44, man)

Here, struggles are not only a matter of structural positions as there are any form, any type of struggle. Melucci (1995, p.113) criticized early social movement theories in terms of ignoring the cultural and symbolic parts which signify the preoccupation of early approaches only with struggles overproduction and material things. He

highlighted conflict over meaning or symbols as components of new social movements which are characterized by the emphasis on the cultural sphere, on identity, on non-material motivations of collective action, on symbols and meanings. When discursive exterior intervenes in structural position, it appears as a subject position which becomes effective through interpellation and identification. Here, the interviewees frequently emphasized the importance of these non-material motivations as mentioned above. Epstein (1996, p. 129) similarly states that for these movements, cultural change and transformation of values and everyday life here are more influential than political power and economic restructuring. Although these political organizations do not influence “more” from the cultural elements, they see the importance of these instances as much as the political and economic structures.

It is important for the interviewees to create “we” as a collective identity because of the nature of the power and existence of the “political”. In this respect, this kind of collectivity is crucial to be identified and understood: “for there to be a ‘democratic equivalence’ something else is necessary: the construction of a new common sense which changes the identity of different groups, in such a way that demands of each group are articulated equivalently with those of others” (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985, p.183):

In the interviews, a necessity for mass criticism of common sense as Gramsci necessitates this for a perpetual struggle, resulting in a new cultural formation was emphasized by the interviewees:

It's something I often think about now; about how important critical thinking is. That's what we always say on family visits. I mean, to be sceptical that every idea you're given as if it's normal. Look, for example, we say that idea we are given; even it says a lot. Why would you listen to an idea that someone gives? As X... that's why we have book clubs. Let people see, question, let them think. (A., 55, woman)

Ben şimdi sıklıkla düşündüğüm birşeydir bu yani eleştirel düşünce mesela ne kadar kritik. Aile ziyaretlerinde de hep söylediğimiz. Yani size verilen her fikre işte sanki böyle normalmiş gibi sunulmasına şüpheyle yaklaşmak aslında. Bak mesela verilen fikir diyoruz ya o bile çok şey anlatıyor. Sen kuracaksın aslında kimsenin verdiğini dinlemek nedir? Biz mesela X... olarak kitap atölyeleri bu yüzden yapıyorduk. İşte insanlar görsünler, sorgulasınlar efendim düşünsünler ya. (A, 55, woman.)

Or

I think the social field is very effective in destroying a total mentality, creating a new world. I always say: pop music came out, courage is broken; it used to be a gun, now pop music. How important are our idioms, our folk songs, how do they give social messages, right? Doesn't pop music kill it, too, by creating such an apolitical society, whose only concern is to dress up, to find boyfriends/girlfriends? They're hyping it as good music. (M., 50, man)

Top yekün bir zihniyeti yıkmak, yeni bir dünya yaratmak işte bunların yolu sosyal alan çok etkili bence. Ben hep derim mesela Pop müzik çıktı, mertlik bozuldu, eskiden silahtı şimdi pop müzik. Değişlerimiz, türkülerimiz ne kadar önemli nasıl toplumsal mesajlar veriyorlar di mi? Onu da öldürmüyor mü bu pop müzik böyle bir apolitik, tek derdi giyinmek, kuşanmak sevgili bulmak olan böyle yaratmak istedikleri toplumun yansıması. Güzel müzik diye yutturuyorlar. (M., 50, man)

Related to a question about the thoughts on the existence of other political organizations in the neighborhood, most of the interviewees stated that they are willing to create this “new common sense” together with the others:

We always try to interfere with the content of the action. Although it is only the action and protests by us. In our protests and activities with left-wing and friendly institutions, we do not prefer to participate in meetings like this: "We can't come this week, but we will accept whatever you decide". No, we're an organization that attends the meeting every week and tries to intervene in the content in a revolutionary quality. In that sense, such an intervention shows the participation in the protests and automatically shows its quality. Activities and protests are carried out together. Although they are interrupted from time to time, they are also done. After all, each organization has a plan, a program related to the neighborhood or other areas, or a plan about a province or the general agenda. There are actions to take according to those plans. Most of the time we meet in common discourse. (Y.,28, man)

Nitelik olarak her zaman eylemin içeriğine müdahale etmeye çalışırız. Sadece bizim yaptığımız eylem ve etkinlik olsa da. Sol kurumlarla, dost kurumlarla yaptığımız eylem ve etkinliklerde, hani toplantılara şöyle katılmayı tercih etmiyoruz. Biz bu hafta gelemiyoruz ama siz ne dersiniz kabulüz değil, her hafta toplantıya katılan, içeriğe devrimci bir nitelikte müdahale etmeye çalışan bir örgütüz. O anlamda da haliyle böyle bir müdahale eylemin katılımını, otomatikman niteliğini göstermiş oluyor...Beraber eylem, etkinlikler yapılıyor. Ara ara kesintiye uğruyor ama yapılıyor da. Sonuçta burada her örgütün planı, programı var mahalleye ilişkin ya da diğer mahallere ilişkin yada işte ilin yada o genel gündeme dair plan, programı söyleme çalışmaları var. Ona göre koyduğu eylem etkinlikler var. Çoğu zaman ortak bir söylemde buluşuyoruz. (Y., 28, man)

Here, the new common sense includes certain values that are embraced by the political organizations which should be stated. As mentioned above, although these organizations are emphasized as following class politics, they also emphasize that cultural change and transformation of values and everyday life are as influential as political power and economic restructuring. Here, the identities in those organizations resist the different kinds of power: feminists against patriarchal relationships,

environmentalists against the ones whose acts lead to pollution, peace activists against who causes war. The alternative that is presented by the interviewees can be read as a new collectivity to articulate these different collective identities that imply a transition from antagonism to agonism as mentioned above:

As X, we define ourselves as a roof organization. A friend who defends LGBTQ+ rights also finds himself in us, or an anti-imperialist one who already defends. We all have common values... I think we are political leaders in protests. Because when there's a protest, everyone looks at what X says, but of course, not in a competitive way. Of course, we have our differences, but in the end, if we are all aiming for a revolution, we must act in accordance with each other. (S., 44, man)

Biz X olarak kendimizi bir çatı örgütü olarak tanımlıyoruz. Bizde LGBTQ+ haklarını savunan arkadaş da kendini bulur ya da işte anti-emperyalist bir yoldaşımız da zaten hepimizin ortak değerleri vardır savunduğu...Diğer gruplar özelinde biz eylemlerde önderlik yapan bir siyasetçi diye düşünüyorum. Çünkü bir eylem olduğunda herkes X. ne diyor diye bir bakar önce ama tabii ki bu böyle bir rekabet şeklinde değil. Ayrıldığımız noktalar tabii ki var ama sonuçta hepimiz bir devrim hedefliyorsak birbirimizle ortak hareket etmeliyiz. (S., 44, man)

Or

Our enemy, our movement, are also common. In other words, we are all those who are pushed out of the system, those who are excluded, of course, next to the exploited working class. You know, there used to be this kind of reductionist approach, as a worker in a labor struggle is a factory worker. However, today, we make a very inclusive definition because the state is in the hands of Sunni Islamist ideology. Alevi, women, gays, workers, laborers, all of us are enemies in his eyes. Of course, we also have differences between ourselves, we can also differ with friends in other politics, but not in the sense of conflict. I think we listen to them, they listen to us, we say our word, and we should know how to put our actions together when necessary. (A., 41, man)

Düşmanımız ortak hareketimiz de ortak. Yani biz tüm system dışına itilenler, dışlananlar tabii sömürülen işçi sınıfının yanında. Hani eskiden böyle biraz indirgemeci bir yaklaşım vardı işçi mücadelesinde işçiyi fabrika işçisinden ibaret gibi. Oysa bugün geldiğimiz noktada biz oldukça kapsayıcı bir tanım yapıyoruz çünkü devlet Sünni İslamcı ideolojinin elinde Alevi, kadın, eşcinsel, işçi, emekçi gibi yani hepimizi düşman bildiği için. Tabii ki kendi aramızda farklılıklarımız da var, işte diğer siyasetlerdeki arkadaşlarla da farklılaşabiliyoruz ama bu çatışma anlamında değil. Biz onları dinleriz, onlar bizi dinler, sözümüzü söyler gerektiğinde eylemimizi ortak koymayı da bilmeliyiz diye düşünüyorum. (A., 41, man)

Providing this collectivity is another question at focus. The language as they often mention is an essential tool which is “the mental habit of collectivity is that of world view” for Gramsci which also should be evaluated in relation to common sense (1981, p.595). In the interviews, the activists often emphasized two essential points related to language. The first one is their thoughts on the dominant language/ language that

reflects the hegemonic formation, namely Sunni Islamic, while the second one is the language they use in the neighborhood- which is “common for us, alien to outsiders”:

Look, for example, when I said calendar protest, you asked me what it was, and it seemed very strange to me. Because when we say calendar protest, everyone understands what it means. For example, you're just like us, you know the jargon, but that means we're still more “us”. (laughter) (S., 39, woman)

Bak demin mesela takvim eylemi dediğimde sen sordun ya nedir diye bana çok acayip geldi. Çünkü bizde takvim eylemi dediğinde herkes anlar ne dediğini. Hani mesela sen de işte bizim gibisin aslında yani jargon bildiğin halde ama demek ki biz yine de nasıl diyeyim daha “biz”iz. (gülüşmeler)(S., 39, woman)

Similarly, C. (57, man) also mentions the role of language both as transforming and transformed by the hegemonic moments:

Sometimes I go to Kızılay because of some business with craftsmen, and when I open the door, I enter by saying Salamunaleykum. Even that's sad because it doesn't happen in the neighborhood where you can say hello in your own language. Also, we started to say “hayırlı işler” which is another way for people to evaluate each other.

Bazen Kızılay'a gittiğimde işte esnafla da işim oluyor, kapıyı açınca Selamünaleyküm diye giriyorum içeri. Bu bile çok üzücü, çünkü mahallede bir yerde olmaz yani bu, rahatça girer kendi dilinden selamını lafına girersin. Yok hayırlı işler türedi bir de mesela, oradan birbirini tartıyor insanlar.

Here, the quotations could be proliferated in line with the importance of the language, not only affected by the dominant ideology but also helping in the establishment of the latter. The choice of religious words, for instance, was emphasized especially by the older interviewees in contrast with the pre-JDP period:

Look, you can even see it in the choice of words they use, like an oil lamp. Here he says “Cehape” to insult the party or says Mr. Kemal to humiliate him with “Westernism”. So many religious things have come into our lives in the last 10 years. Of course, I think it has reflections in the language, but beyond that, I can see the effort to create such a re-creation through the language, to turn people into desirable citizens. I think it's double-sided, so it's not just that it's reflected in the language, it's transforming people at the same time. (D., 26, woman)

Bak bu kandil meselesi gibi kullandıkları sözcük seçimlerinde bile görüyorsun. İşte Cehape diyor ya aşağılamak için ya da Bay Kemal diyor mesela, niye böyle bir “Batıcı”lıkla aşağılayacak aklınca. O kadar çok dini şeyler girdi ki hayatımıza son 10 yılda. Ilmekilmek farketmeden insanların hayatına soktular...Tabii ki dilde yansımaları olduğunu da düşünüyorum ama onun da ötesinde dil üzerinden böyle bir yeniden yaratma, makbul vatandaşa dönüştürme çabasını da görebiliyorum. Çift taraflı bence yani basitçe işte dilde yansımaları oluyor şeklinde değil insanları dönüştürüyor aynı zamanda. (D., 26, woman)

The activists' quotations show that the language is not an abstract issue but was deeply rooted in social conditions of social life. To put it more clearly “the study of language

was a study of everyday life” as mentioned above. Indeed, language can be perceived as a technique and a structure because “every cultural expression, every moral and intellectual activity, has its own historically specific language” (Boelhower, 1981, p.596) and then becomes almost a structure. However, it should be added that it is not fair to understand language in a structuralist manner, talking solely about ‘structures’ alone but also about language usage which must be contextualized, differentiated across cultures and gender and class lines. The creations of individuals and groups in history are grounded in the uses of language. It is important to the historical and social dimension of the language both as a social structure and as a social product as it is socially and historically produced:

I think every era creates its own language like this. For example, Erdoğan has fashioned such a rowdy-like, rude, masculine language. I mean, the concepts he uses, the words, it's not a coincidence. He is like in a family man mood; blessing the family. His disregard for gays or his contempt for environmentalists... Then, he talks about the wage increase like it is some kind of a blessing for the workers, as if they are not citizens, but poor people in their charity work. As if the country is like a big troubled house and he is the father of that house... I mean, I don't know about that period, of course, but Ecevit, for example, my mother, would connect his influence over the masses to the fact that he spoke the language that the people spoke. However, when I say the language spoken by the people I'm not talking about Erdoğan's rudeness, I am talking about an egalitarian language, with an attitude like the ordinary people. Sure, he made a lot of mistakes as a party of order, but I think it was a strong feature of him. (D., 35, woman)

Ben böyle her dönemin kendi dilini yarattığını düşünüyorum. Mesela Erdoğan böyle kabadayı gibi konuşmayı, kabalığı, işte eril dili böyle üstten konuşmayı falan moda etti. Yani kullandığı kavramlar, kelimeler falan hiç tesadüf değil. Böyle bir aile babası havasında; aileyi de kutsuyor. İşte eşcinselleri yok sayması konuşurken ya da çevrecileri mesela küçümsemesi. Ondan sonra işçiye de sanki böyle vatandaş değil de hayır yaptığı işte garibanlar gibi zam haberlerini falan öyle lütuf gibi veriyorlar ya. Memleket sanki kocaman sorunlu bir ev de bu da o evin babası...yani ben o dönemi tabii bilmiyorum yaş olarak ama Ecevit'in de mesela annem işte kitleleri etkilemesini öyle halkın konuştuğu dilden konuşmasına bağlardı. Ama halkın konuştuğu dil darken öyle Erdoğanınki gibi kabalıktan bahsetmiyorum, eşitlikçi yani o da sannki sıradan halktan bir tavırla tabii çokça yanlışları da olmuştur düzen partisi olarak ama o da sanırım güçlü bir özelliği idi. (D., 35, woman)

Through this, they even made emphasis on the social and practical criteria for the use of words. Neither can a verbal expression in particular nor a language as a totality be understood without an acquaintance with its practical use. The quotations show that language can and should be studied with its relation to society as it is a collective noun that means culture and philosophy. Language is the language as a fact is actually a multiplicity of more or less coherent and coordinated facts which includes the components of a world view and a culture, and culture at its various levels unites the

individuals that have peculiar languages and exist as crowded strata. We have to recall Gramsci at this point: Everyone is a philosopher, interacting with the social world through language:

In my family, there are many revolutionaries, but usually the old revolutionaries (laughter). In such a family, the words you use unintentionally, your emphasis, that is, in a nutshell, left jargon settles into the language. For example, in our house, the word "captive" was used for my uncle in Dev-Yol who was in prison. you know, in a non-leftist family you can say prisoner, but for us, he was a political captive... There are other examples, too. There's a collective mind in the neighborhood, I think that's a reflection of the mind. Struggle, revolution, the meanings that we load into those words are very deep. Actually, these are things that reflect our freedom. (A., 43, man)

Bizim ailede devrimci çok ama eski devrimci genelde (gülüşmeler) Öyle bir ailede ister istemez kullandığınız kelimeler, vurgularınız ondan sonra yani özetele sol jargon ister istemez dile yerleşiyor. Mesela bizim evde cezaevindeki dev-yolcu dayım için tutsak sözü kullanılırdı, hani solcu olmayan bir ailede cezaevinde yatıyor denebilir ama bizim için o siyasi tutsaktı... Başka örnekler de var tabii. Kolektif bir akıl var mahallede, bu aklın yansıması oluyor sanırım. Burada mücadele, devrim işte bu gibi kelimelere yüklediğimiz anlamlar çok derin. Bizim içerideki özgürlüğümüzü yansıtan şeyler aslında bunlar. (A., 43, man)

Emphasis on "common language" is essential as while talking about the language, all the interviewees mentioned the domination of Sunni-Islamic influence on language at some point. As mentioned above, from the choice of the words to the content of the language, they defined a language that is "not" adopted by the neighborhood, instead, to have a language that reflects their ideology focusing on democratic and equitable values:

Do you know why the struggle for mother tongue-based education was so important for us? My personal opinion is that education begins with language. I mean, the words you use, the context you use them, the words the others use like the words they choose to humiliate you, they're all part of the whole. This is the political Islam project: the one who swore allegiance, excluding the one who did not, reactionary, bigot, imprisoning the women in the house, sacralization of begging. So, they're trying to dominate such a culture. Look, I didn't get an education after high school, I started working, but I improved myself; I read, I asked. For example, I learned about the feminist struggle, and then I realized the language I used was masculine. Curses, for example, or even words that you use every day reflect how you are a prisoner of such ideology. (F., 42, woman)

Bizim için niye anadilde eğitim mücadelesi çok önemliydi biliyor musun? Benim şahsi fikrim tabii bu, eğitim dilde başlar. Yani senin kullandığın kelimeler, onları kullandığın bağlam, karşı tarafın kullandığı mesela seni aşağılamak için seçtiği sözcükler falan bunlar hep bir bütünün parçası. Bu da işte siyasal islam projesi. Biat eden, biat etmeyenin dışlandığı, gerici, yobaz, kadını eve hapseden, el açmayı kutsallaştıran falan. Yani böyle bir kültürü egemen kılmaya çalışıyorlar. Bak ben liseden sonra okumadım, çalışmaya başladım ama kendimi geliştirdim, okudum, sordum. Böyle mesela feminist mücadeleyi öğrendim sonra bir baktım kullandığım dile, eril. Küfürler mesela, ya gündelik kullandığın kelimeler bile yansıtıyor nasıl bir ideolojinin esiri olduğunu. (F., 42, woman)

For instance, while talking about Gezi Park Protests, almost all of the interviewees used “June Resistance” to identify the same event(s). This choice was interesting as one of the interviewees states that it means more than simple events/actions that are organized to prevent building a mosque in a public garden. Admitting that it sparked, it turned out to be a resistance movement, “a united front against fascism.” Interestingly, this expression- among others- is an effective way to determine the difference between “us” and “them”. Here, I asked one of them why they “choose” to use “June Resistance” instead of Gezi Park Protests, she states:

Because this has turned into total resistance. Yeah, maybe the Gezi Park lit the spark, but it wasn't just a matter of a few trees, as they always say. People have fought against JDP mentality, political Islamist attack, capitalism and the enemies of women and children around Turkey. It was so encouraging, after all, I see this resistance as a united front against fascism. It's very valuable because people have learned to resist, people who have never faced the police in their entire lives came and fought shoulder to shoulder with us. Resistance means such a beautiful thing to me. (D., 35, woman)

Bu top yekun bir direnişe dönüştü çünkü. Evet kıvılcımı Gezi Parkı çaktı belki ama olay işte hep dendiği gibi öyle birkaç ağaç meselesi değildi ki. İnsanlar Türkiye'nin dört bir yanında AKP zihniyetine, siyasal islamcı saldırıya, kapitalizme, çevre kadın çocuk düşmanlarına karşı savaştı. Öyle umut vericiydi, sonuçta ben faşizme karşı birleşik cephe olarak görüyorum bu direnişi. Çok kıymetli çünkü direnmeyi öğrendi insanlar, hayatı boyunca hiç polisle karşı karşıya gelmemiş insanlar geldi bizim yanımızda omuz omuza savaştılar. Direniş işte böyle güzel birşeyi anlatıyor benim için. (D., 35, woman)

Although the characteristics of “that” language was expressed according to the political standpoint of the interviewees, there is a common agreement that the language which is dominant in the society is part of the Sunni Islamic hegemonic project of JDP. Obviously, they did not mention a “sharp” transformation in the language and related to that in the common sense with the JDP government, but it is stated that the conservative values, the passive position of the citizens and the discourse that “curse” political activism became popular in years:

Do you know what kind of person they need? A type that doesn't question, think or demand. I mean, a citizen, but who doesn't have rights, who will say that 'I only have one vote, and I would give it to the JDP'. They've been infiltrating society like this for years. As if this is normal as if there is no life other than what they offer. However, the motto that I love very much is “another world is possible”, it is possible especially starting with our own lives... I see it as a cultural invasion, and that's how they take over life. (I., 43, man)

Şimdi bunların ihtiyacı olan nasıl bir insan biliyor musun? Sorgulamayan, düşünmeyen, talep etmeyen. Yani işte vatandaş ama hakları olmayan, işte bir oyum var onu da AKP'ye veririm diyecek olan. Böyle toplumun içine işlediler yıllar boyunca. Sanki normal buymuş gibi, kendi sanduklarından lütfettiklerinden

başka bir hayatın mümkünü yokmuş gibi, oysa benim çok sevdiğim bir slogan "Başka bir dünya mümkün", mümkün, kendi hayatlarımızdan başlayarak da özellikle mümkün tabii ki... Kültürel anlamda bir işgal gibi görüyorum ben bunu aslında, hayatı böyle ele geçiriyorlar işte. (I., 43, man)

C. (42, man) also emphasized the factional language nourished with Sunni Islamic values:

Everyone is a terrorist in this country, that is, a critic, a thinker, the ones who raise their voices. That's how they work, you know, there's a language of terror that they use, like terrorist, looter, atheist, drinker, blah, blah, blah. It is no stranger to us because as Alevi, we revolutionaries have already been used to the labels of these bigoted Sunnis for years. Because we have always been a threat to the system, we have revolutionary potential, we have words, we have ideas because we already exist with our alternative, of course, scares the parties of order.

Herkes terörist memlekette, yani eleştiren, düşünen, sesini çıkaran. Öyle işliyorlar biliyor musun, bir terör dili var kullandıkları işte terörist, yok çapulcu, ateist, içkici falan filan. Bize hiç yabancı değil çünkü Aleviler olarak bir de biz devrimciler zaten yıllardır bu yobaz Sünnilerin etiketlerine alışkınız aslında çünkü hep biz tehdit olduk sisteme, devrimci potansiyel taşıyan, sözü olan, düşüncesi olan yani biz çünkü alternatifimizle varız zaten, bu tabii ki düzen partilerini korkutuyor.

Here, the interviewees mentioned an alternative that is similar to Gramscian folklore defined as the ideology of the subaltern classes, the spontaneous philosophy of the masses from a broader perspective. Gramsci believes that there is often hidden creativity and progressiveness, which is seen through language and/or common sense, in the culture of simple people. Therefore, it is a "political issue", because it is a part of the struggle for a new cultural hegemony perpetuated by subaltern classes.

Every practical activity, every encounter with the practices and the institutions in daily life generates a form of consciousness, everyone has a particular worldview, which, for sure, is influenced by the hegemonic system of the dominant class. Here, for the interviewees who are not organically linked with a specific fundamental class absorbing the ideas of that class, it is the case that, their world views involve both the elements of the ruling class ideas as well as their own, that stem from their practices within the civil society, which are chaotic, disjointed and inherently contradictory. In line with this, it is possible to state that the systematic forms of thinking are those that are organically linked with a particular class, such as philosophy and ideology, whereas the aggregated forms of thinking are associated with belonging to the ones that are not affiliated with a certain class, like common sense and folklore. Since according to Gramsci, everyone is an intellectual due to engagement in daily practical

activity, the above-mentioned distinction between the forms of thinking may be argued to be referring to the forms of thinking of the organic intellectuals and traditional intellectuals respectively.

7.3.2.2 Local Organic Intellectuals

The working class, like the bourgeoisie before it, is capable of developing from within its ranks its own organic intellectuals, and the function of the political party, whether mass or vanguard, is that of channelling the activity of these organic intellectuals and providing a link between the class and certain sections of the traditional intelligentsia. The organic intellectuals of the working class are defined on the one hand by their role in the production and in the organization of work and on the other by their "directive" political role, focused on the Party.

(Hoare & Smith, 1992, p.4)

Up to now, in the quotations, it can easily be observed that the activists define a hegemonic formation in which language and common sense play an essential role that they are “out of it.” Here, they defined a Sunni Islamic ideology that is dominantly consolidating with the creation of a cultural hegemony which is started before JDP rule but intensified with their governments:

Not the young friends but I, surely, remember that period (means before the JDP government) the rise of the Welfare Party, but in fact, it started with Özal this Sunnization project. It sounds contradictory because Özal was very liberal with his family relations, gambling, drinking. But it's not really a contradiction, because it was part of the project, he doesn't need to believe in it so much. Conservatism, thus developing a culture of allegiance... The JDP government now became its peak, as they say, because they have become stronger and stronger, and they have spread to society. Now you feel that Sunnization in every particle. (L., 50, woman)

Gençler değildir de ben tabii o dönemi hatırlıyorum (AKP iktidarı öncesini kastediyor) Refah Partisi'nin yükselişi ama aslında Özal'la başladı bu Sünnileştirme projesi. Kulağa çelişkili geliyor çünkü Özal mesela çok liberaldi, ondan sonra işte aile ilişkileri kumar, içki. Ama aslında çelişki değil, çünkü projenin bir parçasıydı, öyle çok inanmasına gerek yok aslında. Muhafazakarlaştırma, böylece bir biat kültürü geliştirme...Tabii AKP iktidarı artık nasıl derler zirve noktası oldu çünkü gittikçe güçlendiler e güçlendikçe iyice topluma sirayet ettiler aslında ya. Şimdi her zerrede o Sünnileşmeyi hissediyorsun. (L., 50, woman)

They focus on the reflections of Sunni Islamic elements on daily life which brings us to recall Lefebvre (1991b), for whom the reproduction of capitalist social relations occurs through everyday life because of the subordination of the latter by the logic and power of dominant classes. Culture and/or daily life has primary importance functioning as political instruments for the state in order to ensure controlling of the masses, its hierarchy, dictating the ways of life, segregation of the parts and extermination of the “enemy”. As this cultural domination is a political instrument in the hands of the state, capital and dominant class; Sunni Islamic common sense and its forms represent power:

In our organizational form before 12 September, Sunnis also participated very heavily in the struggle of that time. At the moment, Alevis, Kurds, are the ones who are rebelling. At that time, the people, the revolutionaries were strong, and everyone held the revolutionary struggle against dependence and imperialism. Of course, after September 12, the revolutionary organizations were disbanded. When everyone came home and was on their own, things happened that changed their minds. Most importantly, how should I describe it, the Sunni culture, that is, Sunnism actually prevailed when that mentality came to power. But it was not simply the JDP government, it has infiltrated this society since 2003. This time, they became stronger, and when I say them, I'm talking about a whole set of values, which are actually the product of a mindset. So, a very useful tool for the capable. (H., 69, man)

12 Eylül öncesindeki örgütlenme tarzımızda Sünniler de o zamanın mücadelesine çok yoğun bir şekilde katılmıştı. Şu anda Aleviler, Kürtler; başkaldıran bunlar. O dönem halk, devrimciler güçlüydü. Ve herkes devrimcilerin bağımsızlık, emperyalizme karşı mücadelesini tutmuştu. Tabii, 12 Eylül sonra devrimcilerin örgütlenmeleri dağıtıldı. Herkes evine döndüğünde kendi başına kaldığında kısmı kararlarını değiştiren, şeyler oldu. En önemlisi tabii Sünni zihniyetin, kültürün nasıl tarif edeyim yani sünnileşmenin aslında hakim olmasıydı, o zihniyetin iktidara gelmesi. Ama bu basitçe işte AKP hükümeti değildi, 2003'ten beri ince ince işledi bu toplumun damarlarına. Bu sefer güçlenen onlar oldu, onlar derken bir değerler bütününden bahsediyorum aslında bir zihniyetin ürünü yani. Çok kullanışlı bir araç maktadır için. (H., 69, man)

Similarly, Y. (51, man) tells Islamic reflections on daily life as follows:

I don't think anyone can question the peace and comfort of an Alevi neighborhood. There is a fact that the Alevis are modern people, they care about education, science, democracy, and the persecution and oppression that they have experienced over the years. For example, in our neighborhood, a woman can dress as she wants, can go out when she wants. They are important values for us, I mean, can you do this in Keçiören? I see that bigotry has become popular outside, for example, during Ramadan, people beat people who do not fast. In the workplace, people eat secretly so that the others won't know they do not fast. Look, it's been getting worse and worse for the last 15 years: we're going backwards instead of forward. Because it's like taking over the mind of society, it's like equipping society with immoral, self-interested, bigoted things.

Bir Alevi mahallesinin huzurunu, rahatlığını kimse sorgulayamaz bence. Şöyle bir gerçek var, Aleviler çağdaş insanlardır, eğitime, bilime, demokrasiye önem

verirler işte bazı yaşanmışlıkların da tabii etkisiyle yıllardır gelen zulüm, baskı. Örneğin bizim mahallemizde bir kadın istediği gibi giyinir, istediği vakitte dışarı çıkar. Bizim için önemli değerlerdir bunlar, bunu yani Keçiören'de yapabilir misin mesela? Dışarıda yobazlık popüler olmuş bakıyorum da mesela, Ramazan'da insan dövüyorlar ya oruç tutmuyor diye, işyerlerinde insanlar gizli gizli yiyorlar oruç tutmadığı anlaşılmasın diye. Bak bu mesela son 15 senedir gittikçe gittikçe kötü oldu böyle, gittikçe geriye gidiyoruz ileriye gideceğimiz yerde. Çünkü böyle toplumun nasıl denir zihnini ele geçirme gibi işte toplumu ahlaksız, çıkarıcı, yobaz şeylerle donatıp bitirme durumu.

Across Turkey, contrasting to rising Sunni impacts, the rising of Alevi demands based on identity was popular since 2002. Some traumatic events such as the 1993 Sivas massacre, Gazi and Ümraniye neighborhoods events, are ingrained in the Alevi memories. These events were both accelerated as being reactionary against Sunni radicalism and the state's discriminatory politics. Many Alevi associations were established just after these events occurred (Tol, 2009).

Here, in Tuzluçayır Alevism is not only a label that is stuck by force but also it is accepted, resisted, chosen, specified and actively advocated identities by residents as mentioned above. During forming process of this "identity", individuals become not only static actors but also dynamic, active participants in the neighborhood. One can say that they define an alternative home/ living space with a special focus on Alevism and its cultural reflections against Sunni Islamic system. Although they define the neighborhood as an Alevi neighborhood, their definition goes beyond this simple identification as they often put emphasis on communal values and solidarity as mentioned below:

There are also changes in the definition of Alevism, but I don't think it's just that. It seems to me that the past practices of the left tradition and communal life are also effective here. For example, there were cooperatives before the '80s, as if it still carries that culture here. Solidarity, that collective culture of the shanties, that is, we can actually think of it as the division of labor of households. I think it's distressing to define it with only Alevism, but as I said, If you think of Alevism only with such a religious reference. Sunnism on the other hand, how can I say, is related directly to religion. Alevism points to a broader cultural situation, of course. (S., 33, man)

Aleviliği tanımlarken de hani değişiklikler var ama bence sadece o değil. Burada sol geleneğin, komünal hayatın geçmişteki pratikleri de etkili gibi geliyor bana. Mesela işte kooperatifçilik vardı 80 öncesi, hala aslında o kültürün şeylerini taşıyor gibi buradaki siyasetler. Dayanışma olsun, gecekondü kültüründen gelen o ortaklaşma, yani aslında hanelerin işbölümü gibi düşünebiliriz. Sadece Alevilikle tanımlamak bence sıkıntılı, ama dediğim gibi Aleviliği sadece böyle dini bir referansla düşünüyorsan sıkıntı, mesela Sünnilik evet direct dinle alakalı bir nasıl diyeyim kavram; yoksa (Alevilik) daha geniş bir kültürel duruma işaret ediyor tabii ki. (S., 33, man)

While referring to religion, Gramsci stressed that “religion and common sense cannot constitute an intellectual order, because they cannot be reduced to unity and coherence even within an individual consciousness, let alone collective consciousness.” (2000, p.327). In this sense, the definition(s) of Alevism that are voiced out by the interviewees put more emphasis on cultural elements rather than religious ones as seen above and below:

Now, I think the most important thing that distinguishes Alevism from Sunnism is that Alevism also reflects a lifestyle. I think more like a worldview, a way of thinking. You know, when you say a Sunni neighborhood, an image doesn't come to your mind, but when you say an Alevi neighborhood, you think about a neighborhood with basic values, right? For example, women are free, I don't know, people respect each other, no one interferes with others' faith. In recent years women in hijab started to live here, okay, some of them were the people that the government deliberately placed in the neighborhood to break the integrity of the neighborhood, but some people were really attracted to the comfort of this place. If I were a Sunni, I would prefer to live in an Alevi neighborhood because we don't badmouth anyone's faith or lifestyle here. (S., 39, woman)

Şimdi bence Aleviliği Sünnilikten ayıran en önemli şey Aleviliğin bir yaşam tarzını da yansıtır oluşu. Ben daha çok bir dünya görüşü, bir düşünce tarzı gibi düşünüyorum. Hani Sünni bir mahalle diyince gözünde birşey canlanmıyor ama Alevi mahallesi diyince işte temel değerleri olan bir mahalle geliyor di mi gözünün önüne. Kadınların mesela özgür olduğu ne bileyim, insanların birbirine saygı gösterdiği, kimsenin inancına karışılmayan. Bak mesela son yıllarda kapalı kiracılığımız var, tamam bir kısmı tabii hükümetin kasıtlı işte mahalleye nasıl derler böyle homojen olmasın bütünlüğünü kuralım diye belki yerleştirdiği insanlar ama bir kısmı da gerçekten buranın o rahatlığından etkilenip gelenler. Çünkü ben Sünni olsam ben de Alevi mahallesinde yaşamayı tercih edebilirdim. Biz çünkü burada kimsenin inancına, yaşam tarzına laf etmeyiz. (S., 39, woman)

Massicard (2005) stated that Alevism can never be taken into a category as the expression of “syncretism” is generally used which means new social structures, customs or schools of thought comprised as a result of the interaction of different cultures. Alevism, which was formed as a new view, belief, or practice into a religious system actually distort the original faith, mainly differentiated from Islam as a religion. Here,

...as a committed secularist, for him [Gramsci] all religions, even the most refined and sophisticated are “folklore” in relation to modern thought’, but with the difference – indicated by the quotation marks given to ‘folklore’ – that the great religions are ‘elaborated and set up’ by intellectuals and organized religious institutions. (Crehan, 2002, pp.108-109)

This quotation reminds us of the testimonies that Sunni Islam and its hegemonic formation was supported by the military, government(s) and state institutions since the 1990s. A similar emphasis was made by İsmet Akça; as mentioned above he also

qualifies the rise of the Welfare Party (WP) which stands out from the “state parties” as a project of political Islamist hegemonic project (2011, p.31). Here, the activists put themselves and the neighborhood in opposition to this project by stating that the politicization of the dominant religion serves for the good of the dominant forces instead of the common good. In contrast, their emphasis on the importance of a secular system is remarkable as they necessitate it for the subaltern classes and their interests:

I think religion is a very problematic issue, it may be because I'm not really religious. However, Marx's phrase “Religion is the opium of the nation” has an important place in my life. Look at the state; it is using religion to manipulate the people. For instance, the Alevi massacres were done in the name of religion, so you know, the wars around the world, conflicts within the states stem from the dominant religion. For example, the interpretation of Islam can also change a lot, depending on where you stand. So, secularism is very important, indispensable for democracy. (D., 35, woman)

Bence din çok sıkıntılı bir konu, yani ben belki çok dindar olmadığım için. Ama Marx'ın “Din milletin afyonudur” lafını hayatımda çok yer edindim açıkçası. Şimdi bakıyorsun, devlet dini kullanarak halkı mainpüle ediyor. Alevi katliamlarına bakıyorsun din adına yapıyorlar, yani hani dünyaya bak dünyada da savaşların, devletler arası belki daha çok devletlerin içindeki çekişmeler hep işte hakim dinden kaynaklanıyor. Mesela islamiyet yorumu da çok değişebiliyor, durduğun yere göre. O yüzden laiklik çok önemli bir nasıl diyeyim olmazsa olmaz demokrasi için. (D., 35, woman)

Here, S. (39, woman) also mentions the necessity of a secular system:

Unfortunately, the state has a religion, the Presidency of Religious Affairs, for example, serves Sunnis. Don't others live in this country as well? What about the Christians, Yezidis, Alevis, atheists? How can you only serve a certain segment with my tax? What kind of state policy is this? We, as A..., are fighting this mentality. Religious belief is individual. Everyone's religious beliefs and thoughts concern themselves. The institutions of the state cannot favour anyone.

Maalesef devletin bir dini var, Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı var mesela ne yapıyor, Sünnilere hizmet ediyor. E kardeşim bu memlekette yok mu başka bunlardan başka yaşayan? Hristiyanı, Ezidisi, Alevisi, Ateisti ne olacak? Sen benim vergimle nasıl sadece belli bir kesime hizmet edersin? Böyle bir devlet politikası olabilir mi. Biz işte A... olarak bu zihniyetle mücadele ediyoruz. Dini inanç bireyseldir. Nokta. Herkesin dini inancı ve düşüncesi kendisini ilgilendirir. Devletin kurumları herhangi birini kayıramaz.

The “religion of the state” is defined as Sunni Islam by the activists which is quite problematic for the subaltern classes, groups from different religious backgrounds as they were subject to this “imposition”. This is one of the fractures of the society, as they mention, for which resistance and insurgency arise:

The problem is, the more the state takes sides, the more unrest in society increases. this is how it is. If you perceive Sunni values as if they are sacred for the whole society, how can I say, if you force society into a lifestyle, people will surely rebel.

They'll take you down the first chance they get. That's what we want society to see. Let the masses ask us how to overthrow them. Will we see those days? (laughter) (M., 41, man)

Sıkıntı şu aslında, sen böyle yaptıkça, yani işte devlet taraf tuttukça diyelim, toplumdaki huzursuzluk artar. Bu böyle. Sen sünni değerleri sanki böyle tüm toplumun kutsalları gibi şey yaparsan, nasıl diyeyim, toplumu zorlarsan böyle yaşamak zorundasın diye, tabii ki insanlar isyan eder. Bulduğu ilk fırsatta seni alaşağı eder. İşte biz de topluma bu gücünü göstermek istiyoruz. Bize desinler ki yani ben öyle hayal ediyorum böyle halk kitleleri biz bunları devireceğiz nasıl yapalım. O günleri görür müyüz? (gülüşmeler) (M., 41, man)

Here, they defined Aleviness as a progressive identity in the 1990s first appearing in “The Declaration of Aleviness” published on May 6, 1990, in the daily *Cumhuriyet*. For Schüler (2001), this was the first programmatic expression of a new emerging intelligent group in Alevis in the late 1980s. The principal demands in this declaration were the acceptance of the difference of the Alevi faith and culture, and equal representation and opportunities in education, media and in receiving their own religious services (Erman and Göker, 2000). Additionally, in this declaration also a constitutional reform was demanded thus for regulating issues and the recognition of Alevis as a sect, religion or religious order (Schüler, 2001).

Recently, some common demands of Alevis regarding the problems they experienced based on their identity are expressed such as; The Alevi identity must be officially recognized, the Directorate of Religious Affairs must be demolished, compulsory religion courses in schools must be removed from the regulation; the state must give up the politics of building mosques in Alevi villages and towns; the *cem* houses must be granted the status of prayer house; the religion section in the identity cards must be revoked... etc. Here, the activists state that they are quite sensitive about these identity-based demands coming from the residents in the neighborhood whether their political standpoints are class-based or not:

As K ... we feed on a path to the dictatorship of the proletariat, led by the working class, but this does not mean that it is just a class struggle. Here we should look at the demands of the people, that we are actually targeting. In other words, the right to housing, the right to transportation, demands of LGBT people... We pay equal attention to all of them. In our neighborhood, what my neighbours demand from me, from our politics, are class-based for me. (S., 44, man)

K... olarak biz işçi sınıfının önderliğinde, proletarya diktatörlüğüne giden bir yoldan besleniyoruz. Ha ama bu şu demek değil; işte sadece sınıf mücadelesi değil burada aslında hedeflediğimiz örneğin halkın bizden taleplerine bakmalıyız. Yani barınma hakkı, ulaşım hakkı, işte örneğin LGBT bireylerin talepleri hepsine

aslında eşit önem veriyoruz. Mahallemizde örneğin komşumun benden, siyasetimizden istekleri bana göre sınıfsaldır. (S., 44, man)

They stated that the government's ultimate goal is to create a Sunni Islamic society that obeys the rules put by the dominant classes following a neoliberal authoritarian populist strategy. Some specified that this is a project of hegemony/ a hegemonic project, but the term "hegemony" is mainly used as a near-synonym for "mind control":

The JDP has taken over the minds of people, destroyed the culture, destroyed tolerance, by Sunnization, by suppressing people, in order to create such an ignorant, needy society. (S., 65, woman)

AKP insanların zihnini ele geçirdi, Sünnileştirmeye, işte insanları bastırmayla, kültürü yok etti, hoşgörüyü yok etti. Böyle cahil, muhtaç bir toplum yaratmak için diyebiliriz. (S., 65, woman)

F., (42, woman) used the term "hegemony" to define the existing system that penetrated the whole aspects of daily life and express the way to destroy it as follows:

For example, I think it's important to break down this hegemony, even though it's not easy. There is a saying that revolution begins in man himself. I interpret it like this: first, you need to revolutionize your own mind. For example, you need to destroy the patriarchal order in your head such as what a woman should and shouldn't do, such discriminatory language, and then sexist curses. These are the most basic things.

Ben mesela bu hegemonyayı yıkmanın yani kolay olmadığını bilsem de önemli olduğunu düşünüyorum. Kim demişti işte devrim insanın kendisinde başlar. Ben bunu şöyle yorumuyorum önce kendi zihninde devrim yapacaksın. Mesela ataerki düzeni bi yıkacaksın kafanda, kadın öyle yapmaz böyle yapar gibi böyle ayırıştırıcı dil, sonra cinsiyetçi küfürler. En basitinden tabii bu dediklerim.

H. (69, man) also focus on the importance of cultural hegemony:

I think if you're going to take over a society, you're going to need to end it culturally, that's clear. How can I explain? Think of the village Institutes, for example, it was a project to create such a modern, thinking, questioning citizens, wasn't it? Imagine the opposite: people like sheep, ignorant, repressed, who don't even know they have rights. It is such an order as if nothing else is possible because the system presents itself like that.

Bence bir toplumu ele geçireceksen onu kültürel olarak bitireceksin bak bu net. Nasıl açıklayayım? Köy enstitülerini düşün mesela, orada böyle yani modern, düşünen, sorgulayan bir vatandaş yaratmak için bir projeydi değil mi. Tam tersini düşün şimdi, koyun gibi, cahil, bastırılmış yani insanlar hani hakları olduğunun bile farkında değil. Böyle öyle bir düzen ki sanki başkası mümkün değilmiş gibi, öyle sunuyor çünkü sistem kendini.

Here, the interviewees mostly admitted that they are targeting this system which is "not" created by but empowered by JDP governments. Therefore, they often state that

the demands of the residents in the neighborhood were not limited only to social and economic demands but also cultural and ethnic. Distribution of income and security, social and economic rights demands are compatible to the cultural, ethnic or local demands; especially under the rule of JDP government present a set of the intersection of both of the mentioned demand categories. Here, they necessitated a popular alliance that is sensitive to popular demands:

People's freedom of thought, freedom of wearing whatever they want, is one of the most important things for us unless it is used as a tool of propaganda, that's the point. Of course, people think differently about these artificial agendas and the turban, secularism/anti-secularism issue, republican rallies. I think that if we take the policies implemented by the system through people's own problems and demands, we will be able to solve the problem, we will be able to unite, we will be more organized. However, if we become divided as Alevi, Sunni, Kurd, secular, anti-secular, the ones in hijab etc; imperialism and its collaborators will win because that's how they apply their policies. We are the people, our strength comes from our unity. (Y., 51, man)

İnsanların düşünce özgürlüğü, giyimleri kuşamları bizim için temel baş tacımızdır ama siyasi olarak bir bindirme yapılmadığı sürece, önemli noktası budur. Ama tabii bu suni gündemlerle türban meselesi, laik anti-laik işte cumhuriyet mitingleri mesela bunlar farklı farklı düşüncede olan insanlar var mesela. Bence de sistemin uyguladığı politikaların halkın kendi sorun ve taleplerinin üzerinden götürürsen sorunu çözebileceğiz, kitleleşebileceğiz, daha örgütlü olacağız. Ama ayrışırsak, Alevisi, Sünnisi, Kürdü, laiki anti-laiki, türbanlı, türbansız olarak ayrıştıığımızda tam bu emperyalizmin ve onun işbirlikçilerinin işine geliyor. Çünkü onlar böyle uyguluyorlar politikalarını. Oysa biz halkız, gücümüz birliğimizden gelmeli. (Y., 51, man)

At this point, it should be questioned, the role of the activists in following, leading, shaping and/or reformulating these popular demands that are coming from the grassroots. To what extent do they lead to the demands that are building blocks of a cultural reform?

For Gramsci, the mission of the organic intellectual is to initiate and carry out "intellectual and moral reform", which will destroy the traditional cultural dependence of the people, reconcile it with its own culture, and reach the whole audience with a kind of intellectual status. As mentioned above, the point of departure must be the common sense that masses have to be made to be homogeneous and spontaneously philosophical. The intellectuals should then bring him closer to the ultimate goal of common sense, the "philosophy of the intellectuals." The relationship between high philosophy and common sense is politics as it is a process that Gramsci calls "praxis philosophy". The aim of a specific change in terms of the social order can be read as a

praxis philosophy policy in the context of the political-power struggle-its relation to the struggle. Through this line of thought, it is worth questioning whether the activists in the political organizations, NGO's in the neighborhood can be seen as organic intellectuals or not:

Revolutionary leadership is another dimension, of course, but what we really care about here is the leadership of the class. In other words, it is of course the working class that will lead the revolution in its most basic form, in which it falls to us, the revolutionaries, to carry through what the people want... Of course, in the neighborhood, what is important is that people take action themselves, not how many of them join the protests. (S., 39, woman)

Devrimci liderlik tabii ki başka bir boyut ama bizim burada asıl önemsedığımız sınıfın önderliği. Yani en temel haliyle bir devrimde önderlik edecek olan tabii ki işçi sınıfıdır, bu durumda biz devrimcilere düşen halkın bizden istediğini gerçekleştirmek...tabii mahalle özelinde de mesela ne kadar çok insanın eyleme katıldığı değil bence asıl mesele insanların kendilerinin eylem koymasını. (S., 39, woman)

The emphasis on not “leading” but following the demands of the masses is critical as while Gramsci criticises the intellectuals in Italy he states that “the intellectuals’ failure to forge a national-popular alliance had contributed to the perpetuation of the gap in Italy between elite culture and popular culture” (2000, p. 363). In Tuzluçayır, as mentioned above the activists defined “a local-popular alliance” which took its power from “following” the masses and making policies in line with such a lead:

Here, it happens like this: For example, calendar protests, such as the Alevi massacres, the remembrance of Çorum, the remembrance of Maraş; are what the neighborhood cares most about; we organize our protests within this framework, and lots of people participate. In addition, there are protests about our class-based demands, such as collecting signatures or just distributing leaflets. What we're trying to do is show people that the system is actually a part of the whole. In other words, I do not see the Alevi massacre as something different from class-based problems, and you need to see the economic aspects of it, that is, it is the result of a general problem such as fascism and an Islamist mentality. (S., 63, man)

Burada zaten olay şöyle geliyor aslında: Örneğin takvim eylemleri mahallelinin en çok önem verdikleri eylemlerdir, Alevi katliamları mesela Çorum anması, Maraş anması; biz bu çerçevede eylemimizi organize ederiz çok da katılım olur. Bunun yanında sınıf temelli taleplerimizle ilgili de tabii ki işte protesto olur, imza toplamak ya da hani sadece bildiri dağıtmak gibi. Bizim yapmaya çalıştığımız insanlara sistemin böyle aslında bir bütünün parçaları gibi olduğunu göstermek. Yani Alevi katliamını ben sınıfsal bir sorundan çok ayrı göremiyorum, onun da ekonomik yönlerini işte görmek mi dersin, yani faşizm gibi genel bir sorunun, İslamcı zihniyetin birer sonucu bunlar. (S., 63, man)

Coming from different political fractions, one of the common values they shared is a road to a democratic society focusing on the modification of relations of forces within the state through struggles of popular masses. In such a struggle, there should be an

alliance with intermediary classes, they said, which is polarized around the working class and people must be unified under the leadership of the working class against the power bloc:

I think sometimes we misrepresent the revolutionary struggle. When you talk to the public, people think of it as just the worker's revolution. It is not like gathering 1 million workers to make a revolution. Of course, we are talking about the people, the proletarians, the oppressed, the majority. Look at the October Revolution; it was achieved by the people. However, that's where we think the working class has an important task: to lead. Leadership is a very important concept. In other words, the subject of the revolution is the people, but the one that leads it is the working class. Of course, in the last 20 years, the definition of the working class has also changed. (C., 57, man)

Devrimci mücadeleyi ben bazen yanlış anlattığımızı düşünüyorum. İnsanlar işte sanıyor ki mesela halkla konuştuğun zaman yani sadece işçinin devrimi değil ki bu. Atıyorum 1 milyon işçi birleşti devrim yaptı olabilir mi böyle bir şey. Tabii ki halktan bahsediyoruz biz, proleterler, ezilmişler, halk yani çoğunluk aslında. Ekim Devrimi'ne bakıyorsun, devrimi halk yapıyor. Ama işte orada işçi sınıfına önemli bir görev düştüğünü düşünüyoruz. Önderlik etmek. Çok önemli bir kavram önderlik. Yani devrimin öznesi halk ama nasıl diyeyim yönlendiren, işte yolu açan mesela işçi sınıfı. Tabii son 20 yılda mesela işçi sınıfı tanımı da değişti. (C., 57, man)

Similarly,

In fact, what we are trying to say as K... is that the revolution will destroy this system, lead people to freedom. Well, who will make the revolution? A funny thing, for example, was that our old revolutionary brothers were underestimating us like if there was going to be a revolution, they would be the ones to achieve it., so we shouldn't bother. Here we say something else. Contact with people from all parts of society is very important. I think there are two classes in society, the bourgeois and the working class. If you're not a capitalist, if you're not exploiting people, if you're not accumulating wealth, you're from the working class, that's clear. Of course, we can talk about the middle class socially. But the struggle will be all together, the revolution will be made by society, like its examples in the past. This has always been the case. (B., 41, man)

Bizim K... olarak anlatmaya çalıştığımız şöyle birşey aslında: Devrim bu sistemi yıkacak, insanları özgürlüğüne ulaştıracak olan. Peki devrimi kim yapacak? Komik birşey mesela eski devrimci abilerimizden böyle bize burun kıvrıran oluyordu yapacak olsak işte biz yapardık hani uğraşmayın gibisinden. Biz işte burada çok başka birşey söylüyoruz. Halkla temas, ama halkın her kesiminden insanla temas çok önemli. Toplumda iki sınıf var bence, burjuvalar ve işçi sınıfı. Sermayedar değilsen, işte insan sömürmüyorsan, servet biriktirmiyorsan işçi sınıfındansındır, bu kadar net. Tabii sosyal olarak orta sınıftan bahsedebiliriz. Ama mücadele hep birlikte olacak, devrimi toplum yapar, yani tarihteki örneklerde bu hep böyle olmuştur. (B., 41, man)

Here, they stated that it is essential to resolve the contradictions among the people and to unify them which points to a popular alliance. This role is defined as “following the demands of the people” and “leading them in where necessary” for which they believe in their own political organizations. As mentioned above, according to Gramsci, the

precondition of the leading role of the working class should not be limited to defending corporative interests. In the interviews, it can be said that the intellectual and moral leadership, they defined point to a synthesis, a “collective will” since they are the ones to be engaged with the organization and systematization of the otherwise disjointed and chaotic ideas of the traditional intellectuals, that is to say, with giving a form to the otherwise meaningless content, and with the dissemination of those ideas to the public at large, in order to attract much more people to gain a mass adhesion, which is the primary factor that confers validity upon the hegemonic power and position:

Today we are against such a system. We don't call the desirable system communism, but we want to have an honourable life in which we are treated as humans. The only way to have it is to organize. There are other details; like a strike at a factory, a boycott at a school, or becoming like the 80s. Of course, there's only one way to do that: organizing. When this idea started to settle in me even more, this business started to get deeper. For example, we have a friend here... One day he said, 'Are you trying to organize me?', and I said, of course, why not? After all, I am obliged to organize everyone I see, apart from the people that have contacts with the state like the police, soldiers, and the capitalists. It is because I have the same problem as everyone else. I don't know how the poor worker who votes for the JDP will get there, but a worker wants to live humanely and honourably. Maybe he doesn't have a method or he's got the wrong method. My common problem with him is that I am obliged to organize him because we have problems. We want to live humanely and honourably. For this reason, we do it locally. I've never seen a person that tried to organize me by scolding, shouting, fighting with me; but of course, there were friends, brothers, sisters, aunts that we argued, provided that you don't offend anyone. The way you go about it is important. It's about what you expect, what you aim for. (Y., 28, man)

Bugün böyle bir sisteme karşıyız. Bunun yerine komünizm demiyoruz ama insanca ve onurluca bir yaşam istiyoruz. Bunun gelmesi için, gelmesinin tek yolu örgütlenmek. Bunun başka detayları vardır. İşte atıyorum bir fabrikada grev, işte bir okulda boykot ya da daha ötesi 80 dönemi gibi. Tabi bunu yapabilmenin tek durumu var, örgütlenmek. Başka bir şeyi yok. Karşılığı yok. Bu fikir bende daha da oturmaya başlayınca bu iş daha da derinleşmeye başlayınca mesela var burada bir arkadaşımız... Ya beni örgütlemeye mi çalışıyorsun dedi bana birgün. Ben de tabi ki dedim. Neden örgütlemeyeyim ki? Sonuçta gözümün gördüğü, devletin temas ettiği polis, asker, miti, iti dışında ya da sermayenin ekiplerinin dışında gözümün gördüğü herkesi örgütlemek ile mükellefim. Çünkü herkese ortalama aynı derdim var. Bugün AKP'ye oy veren yoksul işçi yoksul niteliği oraya nasıl olur bilmiyorum ama bir işçi, insanca ve onurluca yaşamak istiyor. Iuuuuu belki bir yöntemi yok. Ya da yanlış bir yöntemi var. Onunla ortak derdimiz, ben onu örgütlemek ile mükellefim. Örgütlü bir insan olarak. Çünkü derdimiz var. İnsanca ve onurluca yaşamak istiyoruz. Onun içinde şey bunu yerelde yapıyoruz. Hiç böyle benle kavga edercesine ya beni ne örgütlemeye çalışıyorsun, azarlayan, bağırın, çağırın görmedim ama tabi ki tartıştığımız, küsmemek kaydıyla tartıştığımız, konuştuğumuz arkadaşlar, abiler, ablalar, teyzeler oldu. Bu nasıl gittiğin ile ilgili. Ne beklediğin, ne hedeflediğin ile ilgili. (Y., 28, man)

The activists in this framework are assumed to hold essential roles in terms of allying with a particular class and incorporated within the political organization of that class which are highly instrumental in initiating the political struggle, as well as in the

establishment of hegemonic domination around “collective will”. Remembering Mouffe, who defined two ways for a hegemony to be set up which are the passive consensus and the constructing national-popular will in the moral and intellectual leadership- the activists that are interviewed undertook a mission that targeted constructing “popular will”, canalizing the residents into a culture of solidarity, they said:

I think it's a little about keeping alive that spirit of the '80s. In other words, revolutionary solidarity, collectivism, maybe not a communal way of life through cooperatives, but a reflection of a close mentality, culture...You know, and no matter how individual and selfish something is imposed on you by the system. I mean an alternative to the individualistic and selfish lifestyle that is imposed on you by the system, in which people will collectively learn that they will win through solidarity, that they will truly notice their lives. (S., 39, woman)

Bu biraz 80'ler öncesindeki o ruhu yaşatmakla ilgili diye düşünüyorum. Yani devrimci dayanışma, ortaklaşma mesela işte kooperatifler yoluyla yapılan komünal yaşam tarzı değil belki ama işte ona yakın bir zihniyetin, kültürün yansıması belki de. Hani sana dayatılan ne kadar bireysel, bencil bir şeyse sistem tarafından, bizim işte öteki alternatifi, insanların dayanışmayla kazanacağı, yaşamının gerçekten farkına varacağını ortaklaşarak öğrenmek diyorum ben. (S., 39, woman)

A. (43, man) also defined this tendency of human being towards “solidarity” as follows:

If there is such a thing as human nature, which I think we should discuss, anyway, there must be a communal life in human nature. For example, hunting, gathering, you do it according to your labor, according to your ability You have nothing to gain, so you actually do it to provide the necessary conditions for your life. So everyone is “fed”, and can support each other.

İnsan doğası diye birşey varsa- ki onu da tartışmalıyız bence ya neyse, doğasında insanın komünal bir yaşam var olsa gerek. Avcılık toplayıcılık mesela di mi, emeğine göre, yeteneğine göre yapıyorsun, bir kazanç şeyin yok yani aslında yaşamın için gerekli koşulları sağlıyorsun. Bu sayede hem herkes doyuyor, hani doymak tınak içinde, hem de birbirine destek olabiliyorsun.

The other significant point that is common in the interviews is the emphasis that the neighborhood made them activists with its “revolutionary past” and dominant culture of the left. To the question “What are the factors that drive you to become politically active and organized?”, out of 32 interviewees 30 of them stated that being born/living in the neighborhood was an essential reason that drove and/or nurtured them to be politically active and organized at the same time. ⁴⁹:

⁴⁹ Not surprisingly, two of the interviewees who do not give that answer were a married couple who were living in the neighborhood for 6 years; who were politically organized for more than 15 years.

At this point, we see the oppression of Alevis. Historically, there have been such problems that they encountered in their neighborhood. There are current issues. Before 1980, they gathered around the left, around the revolutionary movement. After watching a tv show or a movie about that period or its events, they would say "This is what we used to do, we had revolutionary brothers and sisters in our time." Now, as it is, it creates something in you. I don't know what that thing is, but it creates a small base, should I say preliminary information. Of course, since you live in this family, the neighborhood also matters here...It doesn't completely take you and put you in an organization, but it creates something in you in advance. There you learn fraternity, equality, brotherhood etc. You take a piece of these general things from those sentences, from that lifestyle. (C., 42, woman)

Alevilerin ezilmişlikleri var bu noktada. Tarihsel olarak böyle kendilerinin de yaşadığı, mahallerinde yaşadığı sorunlar var. Güncel konular var. 80 öncesi bir biçimiyle solun etrafında, devrimci hareketin etrafında falan bulunmuşlar. Haliyle televizyonda bir dizi ya da film çıktığında ya da bir olay gerçekleştiğinde haliyle onu izledikten hemen sonra ya da o tartışma yaptıktan sonra muhabbetinin sonunda "biz de işte bir dönem böyle gittik, geldik, zamanında devrimci abilerimiz, ablalarımız vardı" Şimdi o haliyle sende bir ufak bir ne derler ön şey yaratıyor. O şey ne bilemiyorum ama o ön bir bilgi mi diyeyim bir ufak taban yaratıyor. Haliyle bu ailede yaşadığın için mahallenin de tabi ki burada önemi var...Tamamen seni alıp belki bir örgüte koymuyor ama önden sende bir şey yaratıyor sonuçta. Orada kardeşleşmeyi öğreniyorsun vs. eşitlik, kardeşlik. Bu genel şeylerden birer parça o cümlelerden o yaşam tarzından alıyorsun. (C., 42, woman)

In C.'s annotation, there is a critical point that should not be overlooked: She mentioned characteristics of her "family" that the members of it although are not politically organized "now", have a "story" related to the political organizations which are also similar for the other families in the neighborhood. Here, this "story" allows the members of the families to empathize with the politically active ones. C. states that this attitude creates a background for the "locality" of political activism. Similarly, B. (41, man) explained this locality as follows:

Actually, I was staying at a high school in Sivas when the events 1993 Sivas incident happened. In fact, they ripped my finger off there. As a result of a fight. So, I decided that summer to actually organize, but of course, it didn't happen right away. The events of July 2 occurred. In fact, from July 2 until September, we lived in Sivas, and we were there when it happened. From July to September, I studied the sources we had about the history of Alevism. I became an individual revolutionary in September. I struggled and got beat up pretty bad. Then we came to Tuzluca. After those events, my father decided to move out of Sivas because of the hardships. When we came to Tuzluca, the first newspaper I bought was

However, they stated that they chose to live in Tuzluca, because of this oppositional culture and they feel comfortable as political activists, which was mentioned above.

*Kızıl Bayrak*⁵⁰ because the bookstall I went to was selling *Kızıl Bayrak*. That is the difference in Tuzluçayır.

Aslında şöyle ben 93'te Sivas Olayları yaşandığında Sivas'ta bir lisede yatılı kalıyordum. Hatta şey orada parmağımı şuradan kopardılar yani. Kavga sonucu. Yani o yaz karar verdim aslında örgütlenmeye ama tabii öyle hemen olmadı. 2 Temmuz olayları oldu. Hatta 2 Temmuzdan Eylül'e kadar biz Sivas'ta yaşıyorduk. Olaylar olduğunda da biz Sivas'taydık. Temmuzdan Eylül'e kadar Alevilik tarihi üzerine o günkü elimizde ki kaynaklar vs. çalıştım. Eylül'de bireysel bir devrimci oldum. Mücadele ettim ve çok kötü dayak yedim. Sonra Tuzluçayır'a geldik. O olaylardan sonra babam taşınma kararı aldı Sivas'tan. Çünkü çok zor geçti. Tuzluçayır'a geldiğimizde ben şöyle ilk aldığım gazete Kızıl Bayrak çünkü büfeye gittim, bak düşün büfede Kızıl Bayrak vardı, işte Tuzluçayır farkı gibi düşün.

Here, B., mentioned the “identity” of the neighborhood even reflects itself on the choice of the newspaper/magazine stands as in Tuzluçayır, one can easily find the leftist publications so easily. D. (26, woman) defined this “leftist identity” as a driving force for her tendency to be politically organized:

I mean, actually, the reason we chose this place is because we wanted to move here, not only because of its Alevi identity but also because of its leftist identity. My parents are people we can call leftists. But after I got here, my desire to organize grew even more according to the circumstances. They were people I already knew. I also had an organization in mind. It was always there, but there was no driving force. Let's just say the conditions weren't right. Us moving to the neighborhood became the driving force.

Yani aslında burayı seçmemizin sebebi hani sadece alevi kimliğinden değil solcu kimliğinden dolayı da buraya taşınmak istedik. Benim ailem de yani solcu diyebileceğimiz insanlardır. Ama buraya geldikten sonra örgütlenme isteğim koşullara göre daha da arttı. Zaten tanıdığım insanlardı. Benim de örgütlülük aklımda vardı. Her zaman vardı ama bir itici güç yoktu. Koşullar uygun değildi diyeyim. Burada işte itici güç oldu mahalleye taşınmamız.

Most of the interviewees emphasized that the common history of the leftist organizations and the neighborhood, demographical structure, the density of the Alevi population was quite effective in “creating activists”. It is important to recall Castells (1997) at this point as following him one can say that Tuzluçayır is an appropriate scale for the initial formation of an activist identity. Two prominent aspects of the urban resistance movements in Tuzluçayır are the recognition of their identity and solution to daily life including exclusion, poverty, the insufficient infrastructure in the neighborhood...etc. deepened by neoliberal policies and “war politics”. Systematic exclusion and ignorance by the JDP government are the most significant and crucial

⁵⁰ *Kızıl Bayrak* is a monthly socialist newspaper which is closely related with Turkey Communist Workers Party.

problems of the neighborhood and actually, the resistance of the activists is a reaction to the fight against these problems. Their opposition to the existing conditions is first experienced at the local level and so do their attempts of political organizations in the neighborhood to make their voice to be heard:

As soon as you are born in a neighborhood like this, you are born into that exclusion, into the threat of destruction. So, actually, the first exclusion happens automatically because you're in an Alevi and leftist neighborhood. Of course, the first reaction is against that. Then you learn about the class struggle, the proletariat, the importance of the revolution. (A., 46, man)

Bir kere zaten böyle bir mahallede doğunca işte o dışlanmışlığın, yok etmeye çalışılmanın aslında yani içine doğmuş oluyorsun. Sanki bence ilk onunla başlıyorsun yani aslında önce ilk dışlanmışlık işte alevi ve solcu bir mahallede olduğun için otomatikman oluyor. E tabii öyle olunca ilk tepkiler de ona karşı oluyor. Sonra öğreniyorsun işte sınıf mücadelesini, proletaryayı, devrimin önemini gibi. (A., 46, man)

As A. noted, to be organized is kind of a “reflex” against the exclusion they both heard and lived which is also emphasized by Z. (52, woman):

When I decided to organize, I started by thinking about my experiences in the neighborhood. Even before that, you start with the gender inequality in the family. I think it's like such a circle, family, neighborhood, city, country; a ring of inequality that goes on to grow like this: a circle of inequality. Then you start to fight the inequalities in the neighborhood because they're so basic, you know, like not having access to water, I don't know, not being able to find a bus to go to Kızılay. Why? Because the government is punishing you.

Ben örgütlenmeye karar verdiğim zaman işte nasıl denir referans olarak mesela ilk başta işte mahallede yaşadıklarını işte gözünün önüne getirerek başlıyorsun. Hatta daha öncesine git ailedeki eşitsizlikle başlıyorsun örneğin işte ilk evdeki kadın-erkek eşitsizliği. Bunun böyle bir çember gibi düşünüyorum ben, aile, mahalle, şehir, ülke böyle büyüyerek giden bir eşitsizlik nasıl denir halkası, evet tam öyle eşitsizlik çemberi. E haliyle mahalledeki eşitsizliklerle mücadele etmeye başlıyorsun çünkü bunlar bak çok temel yani işte suya erişememek gibi, ne bileyim Kızılay'dan gelecek otobüs bulamamak. Niye? Çünkü devlet cezalandırıyor seni.

Here, the political activists interviewed, identified a spatial bond to the neighborhood and as an essential driving force for their political activities and organized under a political organization. They stated that they are in a direct and close relationship with the residents in the neighborhood that the latter demanded from them to organize protests/actions on issues they problematized. In this sense, the interviewees stated that they have the “obligation” to consider these demands and canalize their policies according to them as these is indispensable characteristics of the grassroots movements:

I'm looking at some organizations, I won't name them, but you can probably guess. They look down at people, meaning to say 'you don't know anything, but we will teach you'. First of all, this is very wrong; yes, you may have a political background, but you are not a teacher who will teach the public some lesson. You get to organize the people by telling them the truth. I mean, you're obliged to do only this, but young people make this mistake a lot, I call it saving the people despite the people.

Ben bazı örgütlere bakıyorum işte isim vermeyeyim ama sen de tahmin etmişsindir, böyle halka yukarıdan bakan, işte biz biliyoruz size öğreteceğiz gibi bir tavır. Bir kere bu çok yanlış, evet senin bir siyasi birikimin olabilir ancak sen nasıl diyeyim bir öğretmen değilsin böyle halka ders verecek. Sen o halka gerçeği, doğruyu anlatmakla, onları örgütlemek olsun. Bununla mükellefsin yani, gençler ama bu hatayı çok yapıyor işte halka rağmen halkı kurtarma şeyi gibi diyorum ben buna.

Here, S. (44, man) impressively criticized the hierarchical relation of some political organizations and emphasized that the people should make politics for themselves. But as I. (43, man) noted, the role of the activist is also to show the people the roots of the problems:

In any case, what a revolutionary needs to do is take into account the needs of the people, but also to show them the origin of these needs: the problems. What is the origin? Capitalism and fascism, together economically exploiting the people with a neoliberal order, right? When you look at the origin of what you call an infrastructure problem, such as the electricity being cut too often, the municipality doesn't give you a bus etc., you can be able to see it. You have to be able to tell the public the humanity, justice, equality of the socialist order, without getting tired. Of course, there are problems that we can fix, but the problem is very deep. As H..., we give much importance to being able to talk about it, to listen, and to cooperate.

Zaten bir devrimcinin yapması gereken halkın ihtiyaçlarını dikkate almak ama bir yandan da işte o ihtiyaçların yani sorunların aslında kökenini göstermek. Nedir kökeni? Kapitalizm ve faşizm işte elele, ekonomik olarak neoliberal düzenle halkın kanını sömürmek di mi? İşte senin aslında altyapı sorunu dediğin de ne bileyim elektrikler çok sık mı kesiliyor, sana otobüs vermiyor mu belediye. Bunların hepsinin derinine inince görüyorsun bunu. Bunu halka anlatabilmek lazım, bıkmadan usanmadan. Sosyalist düzenin insancılığını, adaletini, eşitliğini yani önemlisi bu diye düşünüyorum. Yoksa tabii ki düzeltebileceğimiz problemler falan vardır illa ki ama sorun çok derin. İşte bunu anlatabilmek, dinleyebilmek, ortaklaşabilmek biz H... olarak buna çok önem veriyoruz örneğin.

I.. assumed a truth beneath the problems on the surface and he stated that a revolutionist is obliged to dig it and show the below.

Before Gramsci, the traditional intellectuals were identified as a social group/and or class who are independent of inner class relations, scientists that are obliged to “make science” and enlighten the people. The most important contribution of Gramsci is to identify them as the vanguards of the dominant classes who guarantee the sovereignty

of the power bloc. In this framework for the formation of a national-popular alliance/national-popular collective will, people should create their organic intellectuals:

The working class, like the bourgeoisie before it, is capable of developing from within its ranks its own organic intellectuals, and the function of the political party, whether mass or vanguard, is that of channelling the activity of these organic intellectuals and providing a link between the class and certain sections of the traditional intelligentsia. The organic intellectuals of the working class are defined on the one hand by their role in the production and in the organization of work and on the other by their "directive" political role, focused on the Party. It is through this assumption of conscious responsibility, aided by absorption of ideas and personnel from the more advanced bourgeois intellectual strata, that the proletariat can escape from defensive corporatism and economism and advance towards hegemony. (Hoare & Smith, 1992, p.4)

In Tuzluçayır, the activists stated that they assumed this “directive political role” thanks to the strong oppositional identity of the neighborhood and their political organizations. Moreover,

...the leadership of revolutionary parties who will lead Gramsci’s war of position because they are responsible for organizing “all the activities and functions” in civil and political society (the state) that are necessary for the proletariat and other subaltern groups (i.e. oppressed nations) to become the new hegemonic class... (Harris, 2018, p.22)

as in Tuzluçayır, the role of the revolutionary parties was undertaken by the political organizations besides the oppositional political parties. It needs to be added that, the discrepancy and the contradictions between the ideas and the values of the ruling classes that are absorbed by the dominated people and the spontaneous ideas arrived by them through their daily encounters are instrumental in waging a political struggle. There arises the opportunity to change the relations of forces between the class fractions and the power bloc, and thus, to change the prevalent hegemonic system, but, if and only if, the fractions are politically organized:

Here's what we're trying to say repeatedly. Alone, you are nothing, my friend! This order, this system, it's eating you up. I mean, think about it, you're walking alone outside, you're facing 20 guys with knives, do you have a chance to win? There, think of this political Islamic fascism as the 2,000 men with knives. However, if you are united, you can fight their dark mentality, and that's how you make the revolution. You do it not by tweeting or anything like that, you know; by organizing because it's a mindset struggle at the same time. (S., 39, woman)

Biz şunu anlatmaya çalışıyoruz boğazımız patladıkça yani. Tek başına sen bir hiçsin arkadaşım! Bu düzen bu sistem seni yiyip bitiyor öğretiyor. Yani şöyle düşün

sen tek başına yürüyorsun yolda karşına 20 tane eli bıçaklı adam çıkıyor senin kazanma şansın var mı bunların karşısında? Hah işte bu siyasal islam faşizmi 2000 tane eli bıçaklı adam gibi düşün. Ancak birlik olursan bunların zihniyetiyle işte bu karanlık şeyiyle mücadele edebilirsin, devrimi böyle yaparsın. Öyle klavye başında twit falan atarak da değil yani bildiğin örgütlenerek. Bu bir zihniyet mücadelesi çünkü aynı zamanda. (S., 39, woman)

However, the existing power bloc holds the instruments of the forces (such as the army, the police) besides the domination on the cultural practices, it is quite difficult to break this bloc and form a counter-hegemony, which was also stressed by Gramsci. In this sense, interviewees questioned the Leninist strategy for the revolution: to break the state from bottom to up which signifies the attack to the “whole” (Anderson, 2004: p.137). However, as mentioned above, the power accumulated in civil society obscures the subaltern classes to seize the power. In other words, war of manoeuvre appeared to be inappropriate for them as the hegemony bloc holds the coercive force in its monopoly. Quite the reverse, the strategy to be followed should be a war of position; they said which implies a long-term struggle as it could be understood as gunshots to the specific positions:

A war of position is not, in reality, constituted simply by the actual trenches, but by the whole organizational and industrial system of the territory which lies to the rear of the army in the field. It is imposed notably by the rapid fire-power of cannons, machine-guns and rifles, by the armed strength which can be concentrated at a particular spot, as well as by the abundance of supplies which make possible the swift replacement of material lost after an enemy breakthrough or a retreat. (Gramsci, 1992, p.234)

R., who talked about the need for unity for the political organizations and the necessity for being organized to stand against the existing hegemonic system mentioned the need for capturing the “positions”:

Personally, I'm saying that, whether you call it tactics or politics is up to you, it is a mentality that takes over every speck of life from your working life to your relationship with your neighbour, from the water you drink to the bill you pay, and then from the book you read to the music you listen to. This hegemonic mentality is targeting all of this, isn't it? Now can you say, for example, that the revolution will be limited to factories? Of course not. You will be able to seize as much of your life as you can. Even the language you speak is affected. For example, these Islamic renters has come up with sayings like 'hayırlı işler', 'hayırlı geceler', 'hayırlı...'. These are conscious interventions in the language, not simple sayings. Now I call you comrade, for example, because I am walking the same path as you, or rather we should be walking the same path. This is how it is. (R., 37, woman)

Şahsen benim dediğim şu taktik mi dersin artık politika mı, orası sana kalmış. Hayatın her zerresini ele geçiren bir zihniyet bu karşındaki işte zerre diyorum nasıl denir yani çalışma hayatından komşunla ilişkine, içtiğin sudan ödediğin

faturaya sonra okuduğun kitaptan dinlediğin müziğe, işte bu hegemonik zihniyet bunların hepsini hedefliyor di mi? Şimdi sen diyebilir misin ki mesela devrim fabrikalarla sınırlı kalacak. Böyle birşey olamaz, sen ele geçirebildiğin kadar hayatına dair şeyi ele geçireceksin tabii ki, mesela konuştuğun dil bile böyle hayırlı işler diye birşey türedi mesela bu islami rantçılarda, hayırlı geceler, hayırlı bilmem neler. Bunlar hep bilinçli müdahaleler bak, basit düşünmemek lazım. Ben şimdi sana yoldaş diyorum mesela, çünkü biz seninle aynı yolda yürüyoruz, yürümeliyiz daha doğrusu. Bu böyledir. (R., 37, woman)

H. defined every sphere of life, our behaviors, choices, tastes and habits as “controlled” and/or manipulated. Although we are not, as being not “pure receivers”- determined simply by the structure in particular or by the system in general, the choices we expected to make are presented, he said. A. (41, man) has a similar approach:

I think we need to realize some vital things that are being imposed on us. I mean, it's not exactly an imposition, but rather infiltrating the veins of the society, affecting the lifestyle, increasing the need for consumption. You think you're making your own choices, but the guys are already offering you their choices. Do you know what I mean? Actually, you choose what they choose. I mean, Erdoğan is saying that it's ideological in order to disparage leftists, but I don't mean to say it is ideological. Why? They use the word “ideology” as if it has something to do with anarchism, but it is not like that at all, as you already know.

Bize dayatılan bazı hayati şeylerin farkına varmalıyız diye düşünüyorum. Yani dayatma da değil aslında bu, içine işliyor toplumun böyle damarlarına giriyor yani. Nedir işte bunlar yaşam tarzı olsun mesela tüketimi körüklemek böyle bir şey. Sen kendin seçim yaptığını sanıyorsun ama zaten adamlar sana seçeceklerini sunuyorlar. Anlatabiliyor muyum? Sen onların seçtiklerinden seçiyorsun aslında. Yani bu çok ideolojik de demek istemiyorum, ideolojik diyor ya Erdoğan da böyle kötülemek için işte solcuları mesela. Niye? Ben okudum ideoloji üstüne öyle sanki anarşist gibi kullanıyorlar, öyle birşey değil aslında işte sen daha iyi bilirsin sonuçta.

He took attention to the idea that ideology should not be defined entirely negative, it should have a positive extension since it exists in the concrete reality. It operates within social reality:

To the extent that ideologies are historically necessary they have a validity which is “psychological”; they “organize” human masses, and create the terrain on which men move, acquire consciousness of their position, struggle etc. To the extent that they are arbitrary they only create individual “movements”, polemics and so on.....the conception of the *historical bloc* in which precisely material forces are the content and the ideologies are the form, though this distinction between form and content has purely didactic value [in the final analysis, Gramsci is still a Marxist which means superstructural elements would be inconceivable without a base but vice versa has validity, too], since the material forces would be inconceivable historically without form and the ideologies would be individual without the material forces. (Hoare & Smith, 1992, p.377)

Ideology is an interface operating through culture, politics, philosophy and it is not a constant, fixed and dependent element. The ideas of each class are given the umbrella of universality to represent itself as the dominant ideology or build a hegemonic project in Gramscian terminology. Ideology is the terrain in that man gains consciousness through the confrontation of opposing hegemonic projects (Mouffe, 1978, p. 186). The concept of organic ideology is the concept that links the meta-theoretical assumptions elaborated above and the theory of ideology in Gramsci:

But if it is through organic ideologies that men acquire all their forms of consciousness necessarily political. This enables Gramsci to make the following equation: philosophy=ideology=politics... He posits consciousness not as originally given but as the effect of the system of ideological relations into which the individual is inserted. Thus it is ideology which creates subjects and makes them act.” (Mouffe, 2002, pp. 302-303)

Here, the interviewees constantly criticized and denied the negative meanings attributed to the ideology and/or philosophy that are closely related to politics:

Erdoğan says “don't speak nonsense, don't speak like a philosopher”. I mean, you are in charge of an entire country, how can you speak so ignorantly? Instead of saying "I wish our young people could philosophize more", he talks about it like it's such a bad thing. That is because we learned revolutionism by philosophizing. For example, he tells us not to approach anything ideologically. Everything is already ideological, everything! Your policies, my resistance... I wish I could stand in front of Erdoğan and say that to his face. It is nothing more than humiliating the people, humiliating cultural values, contempt, raising ignorance, not letting anyone be enlightened. He is anti-enlightenment, it's that simple. (M., 41, man)

Yok laga luga yapma yok felsefe yapma. Koca bir ülkenin başındasın sen ya, böyle cahil konuşabilir mi bir insan? Keşke gençlerimiz daha çok felsefe yapsa diyeceksin sen, sanki böyle kötü bir şey gibi. Çünkü bak biz felsefe yapı yapı öğrendik devrimciliği, ideolojik yaklaşmayın diyor mesela. Yahu herşey ideolojik zaten, herşey! Senin politikaların, benim direnişim yani keşke şöyle karşısına geçsem de suratına söylesem Erdoğan'ın bunları. Halkı böyle aşağılama, kültürel değerleri aşağılama hor görme, cehaleti yükseltme bu başka birşey değil, kimse aydınlanmasın, aydınlanma karşıtı ya. Bu kadar basit yani. (M., 41, man)

The statement “do not philosophise” is a common expression, which is in essence underestimate philosophy and set aside it from daily life. An essential point is emphasized by M.: Everything is ideological as the interviewees identify ideology as the core of their political activism. Similarly, D. (35, woman) defined ideology as an attitude, a “state of mind” or set of behaviors:

I've already written this in our journal. I'll send it to you, please have a look. Now when we say ideology, the definition of ideology changed a lot, hasn't it? It is perceived as a tool for brainwashing, and mind control that the bourgeois use. I

mean, Marx and Engels perceived it like that, too, but I don't see it that way, and now many revolutionary organizations and leftists are thinking about ideology more comprehensively. Ideology expresses the mentality of establishing a new social and cultural hegemony and new world order, the transformation of the people on the way to revolution. For example, I read Althusser- 'Ideology and Ideological State Apparatus', you know, and that's where he talked about how the state uses churches, schools and all that. I honestly think that revolutionaries should also use these devices. Society is made up of them, it's not something outside of society. As revolutionary organizations, we are responsible for showing this to people, that is, we should be able to show people that another world is possible.

Ben bunu daha önceden bizim dergide yazmıştım sana göndereyim bir bak lütfen. Şimdi ideoloji derken tabii ki ideolojinin tanımı çok değişti di mi? Böyle bir beyin yıkama, işte sanki zihin kontrolü burjuvanın elinde. Yani öyle gibi sunuyorlardı işte Marx da Engels de yaptı bunu ama ben böyle görmüyorum ki artık birçok devrimci örgüt, solcular da ideolojiyi daha kapsamlı düşünüyoruz açıkçası. Nedir dersen, ideoloji senin devrime giden yolda, yeni bir dünya düzeni kurarken, halkın dönüşümünü işte onların tüm hayatındaki sosyal, kültürel yeni bir hegemonya kurulmasındaki zihniyeti ifade ediyor. Ben mesela Althusser'i okumuştum, Devletin İdeolojik Aygıtları, bilirsin sen de, işte orada anlatıyordu devletin kiliseyi, okulları falan nasıl kullandığını. Ben açıkçası devrimcilerin de işte o aygıtları kullanması gerektiğini düşünüyorum. Toplum dediğin onlardan oluşuyor zaten böyle dışarıda birşey değil ki. Biz devrimci örgütler olarak bunu insanlara göstermekle sorumluyuz, yani insanlara başka bir dünya mümkün diye gösterebilmeliyiz.

Here, this quotation from D. who is politically active and organized for 6 years brings us to the role of the political parties in Gramsci. The role of the party- which appeared to be the new prince- has an essential feature that part ways with the traditional conceptions of the party. As Gramsci noted, the new prince in the modern era could not be an individual but the party which signifies a new political collectivity. This party should not try to impose anything on the masses rather it should in a sense open up the contradictions in the society. Just as Machiavelli suggests the prince should take the consent of the masses rather than (besides) capturing them with coercion, the party should do the same. In other words, the party Gramsci mentioned is a new political collective providing leadership and an alternative culture to the subaltern classes which marks the conflicts within the existing social structure. It is said to provide a consensus within the subaltern classes and led to the counter-hegemony. D. continued her thoughts on the role of their political organization as follows:

We, like K., perhaps give the most importance to it. It's called being constructive. So, yes, we talk about what we oppose, but in doing so, we offer an alternative. Look, for example, we started organizing a summer school for children here. H ... has already been doing it, and we started 2 years ago. We are trying to teach children collective life, collaboration, that is, communal life, that there can be education without competition, exams, strife. We are trying to save children from computers, tablets, phones, we are saying that these devices are making them numb. They want to create a generation of children who don't think, don't question.

When people say "well, what to do?", we can offer our summer school with peace of mind. Otherwise, you don't get anything by being against everything. You have to be able to tell people "it won't work, but look, we have an alternative". I think that's our greatest strength as K...

Biz K. olarak en çok belki de buna önem veriyoruz. Yapıcı olmak da diyebiliriz buna. Yani evet karşı çıktığımız şeyleri anlatıyoruz ama bunu yaparken alternatifini sunuyoruz. Bak mesela biz burada çocuklara yaz okulu düzenlemeye başladık, H... daha önce yapıyordu zaten biz de 2 senedir bunu yapmaya başladık. Çocuklara kolektif hayatı, ortaklaşmayı yani komünal hayatı öğretmeyi işte yarışma, sınav, çekişme olmadan da eğitim olabileceğini öğretmeye çalışıyoruz. Biz işte çocukları bilgisayar, tablet, telefon karşısından kurtarmaya çalışıyoruz, anlatıyoruz diyoruz zararlı beyninin uyuşturuyor çocukların düşünmeyen, sorgulamayan bir nesil yaratmak istiyorlar. İnsanlar diyince peki ne yapalım diyince yaz okulumuzu söyleyebiliyoruz gönül rahatlığıyla. Yoksa öyle herşeye karşı olmakla eline birşey geçmiyor. İnsanlara o olmaz ama bakın bu var diyebilmen lazım. Bizim K... olarak en büyük gücümüz bu bence.

These summer schools have various programs but mainly have activities that reflect the thoughts and values of the political organizations. As a part of their curriculum, they attach importance to the activities that promote children to be “self-sufficient” which in essence glorifies the labor. They have classes related to horticulture that teaches children the trees, plants, fruits; how to cultivate besides showing children how to stitch, dish washes and even cook simple dishes...etc. Here, they have a similar approach to the “project of village institutes” in the 1940s which is led by Hasan Ali Yücel, who was the Minister of Education at the time. Similar to the academic program of the village institutes, their programmes is aimed at creating responsible, self-sufficient, intelligent, modern individuals who will be equipped with the values to change the existing system.

For instance, two of the summer schools had courses of *bağlama* and *semah* which have symbolic meanings both for leftists and Alevis. Semah is a ritual dance symbolized as part of Alevi prayers as:

the song (deyis, lit. 'saying' or nefes, lit. 'breath') and dance (semah, sema, lit. 'audition') are of central significance in the cem rituals. At the same time, they are perceived as an expression of faith. The religious repertory is usually based on subjects which relate to the Prophet Muhammed, Imam Ali, Imam Hüseyin and others. (Erol, 2010, p.378)

Bağlama is a musical instrument that is also used in the song- deyiş in *cem rituals*. However, it is more than that; as bağlama is an essential instrument in the folkloric and protest types of music. Here, they are defined as “our culture” by the interviewees against the degenerated culture imposed by the hegemonic cultural formations. It is

essential that the “summer schools” are emphasized by most of the interviewees as they are proud of them as an “alternative” to the existing hegemonic culture. The hegemonic culture they defined is said to be creating a generation that is passive both in the cultural and political sense:

For example, that's how we discussed this children's summer school. We, the revolutionaries, the democrats, the leftists, the opponents say that we are against this education system, brother. We are against this 4+4+4⁵¹ system which is based on rote learning, not secular, and very reactionary. Okay, we have some common ground. What do you say? Politics can't be done by being against something. Nothing works out of the opposition. Where's your production? Theoretically, we have it. We advocate free, scientific education. Let's assume that we are one click ahead compared with the X organization or X people. So, do you have the substance of this? You know, you can't create it by opening a school affiliated with the Ministry of National Education. There's no such thing. But where's its core? Show me that. Here, it is present in the study of A ... the First Summer School. (Y., 28, man)

Şöyle mesela bu çocuk yaz okulunu öyle tartıştık zaten. Biz diyoruz ki devrimciler, demokratlar, solcular, muhalifler diyor ki biz bu eğitim sistemine karşıyız kardeşim. Ezberci, laik değil efendime söyleyeyim çok gerici 4+4+4'e karşıyız. Tamam, buraların kimilerinde ortaklaşıyoruz. Sen ne diyorsun? Bir şeye karşı olmak üzerinden politika yapılmaz ki ya da siyaset böyle yapılmaz ki. Karşıtlık üzerinden bir şey yürümez. Üretimin nerede? Teorik olarak bizde mevcut. Özgür, bilimsel eğitimi savunuyoruz. Tamam, bu da tamam. Varsayalım X örgütüne ya da X kişilerine oranda bir tık daha ilerdeyiz sayalım. Peki, bunun somutun var mı? Bunun hani şimdi Milli Eğitime bağlı bir tane okul açıp bunu yaratamazsın. Böyle bir şey yok. Ama nüvesi nerede? Bana onu göster. İşte bu A...1.Yaz Okulu çalışmasında mevcut. (Y., 28, man)

Here, the focus of “the need to create an alternative” is an essential politics that is emphasized by most of the interviewees. Therefore, they constantly stated that they are not simply “opposing” policies and/or the system but instead they present an alternative, a “counter-hegemonic” formation to show people “another way is possible” just like Y. stated. S. (63, man) also defined their “alternative” for the individuals that the government attempted to create:

Look, what they're trying to do is create people who don't think, don't produce, don't question. Because a person who thinks and questions realize that there is a mistake in the system. Here I am the 78 generation: we learned socialism and revolution from our brothers, from books. Once you start questioning, nothing stays the same as before.

⁵¹ 4+4+4 system refers to the new educational system of Turkey which is introduced with “Primary Education Law no 6287” adopted on 30 March 2012. The system is criticized a lot “because of schooling age, interrupted and compulsory education as 4 year primary, 4 year elementary and 4 year high school education, instead of 8-year compulsory primary education, elective courses, orientation towards selecting occupation at early ages and imam hatip elementary school dimensions” (Gün and Atanur-Baskan, 2014, p.230)

Bak yapmaya çalıştıkları düşünmeyen, üretmeyen, sorgulamayan insan yaratma projesi aslında. Çünkü düşünen, sorgulayan insan sistemde bir hata olduğunu fark ediyor, işte ben 78 kuşağıym biz abimizden, kitaplardan öğrendik sosyalizmi, devrimi. Ha ondan sonra zaten hiçbir şey eksisi gibi olmuyor bir kere sorgulamaya başlayınca.

M. (50, man) also criticized that the individuals become culturally degenerated:

For example, I am fixated on pop music too much. You know how they say "the rifle was invented, the courage is broken", I think when pop music came out, the courage got broken. Ridiculous music, ridiculous lyrics... I mean, it's not only the music, but it's also the culture that makes society numb. Can you compare our idioms, folk songs, folk dances to it? They're killing the culture, the essence of this land. They are doing this starting with kids, you know, little kids envying that blonde girl whose family, I am sorry, makes money on her

Ben mesela pop müziğe çok takığım, hani bir laf var ya tüfek icat oldu mertlik bozuldu işte bence pop müzik de öyle, pop müzik çıktı mertlik bozuldu vallahi. Saçma müzikler, şarkı sözleri yani tek müzik de değil o kültür öyle uyuşturan saçma sapan. Bizim deyişlerimiz, türkülerimiz, halk oyunlarımız falan hiç karşılaştırabilir misin? Bu toprakların kültürünü, özünü öldürüyorlar. Bunu yapmaya da çocuktan başlıyorlar, küçücük çocuklara var ya işte böyle sarışın bir kızcağz ailesi afedersin böyle üzerinden para kazanıyor ona falan özenmeye başlıyorlar.

In this sense, the interviewees seem to regard an “alternative” for the people in this authoritarian regime, trying to be inclusive as in the summer schools all children in the neighborhood, regardless of whether they have a relationship with the organization or not, can participate. This can be seen as an activity; a political activity that is an essential part of a constantly evolving struggle for hegemony:

Now, as a citizen, I should be able to send my child to this school freely, but in reality, the state blacklists us all. Who sent their child where, what did they organize, it knows them all by name. They're afraid because, you know, people's eyes will open, children will learn something other than the Qur'an, or they won't even teach the Qur'an, I don't know, have you ever been to a Qur'an course? I know summer school is 1 month old, but I find it very valuable because a child goes there, but the entire family is also affected by this process. I think it's very valuable, it shows what we can establish together, for example, that education can be free and can be of good quality. I'm very pleased, to be honest. (B., 41, man)

Şimdi ben bir vatandaş olarak çocuğumu özgürce bu okula gönderebilmeliyim, ama burada ne oluyor biliyor musun, hepimizi fişliyor devlet. Kim nereye gönderdi, ne düzenledi hepsini adı gibi biliyor. Korkuyorlar çünkü biliyor musun, insanların gözü açılacak, çocuklar Kur'an dışında birşeyler öğrenecek, ya Kur'an'ı bile öğretmezler aslında, bilmem sen hiç gittin mi kursa da? Ben yaz okulunu hani 1 aylık birşey ama çok kıymetli buluyorum, çünkü orada bir çocuk belki gidiyor ama tüm bir aile etkileniyor o süreçten. Bence çok kıymetli, ele ele neler kurabileceğimizi işte mesela eğitimin ücretsiz ama kaliteli olabileceğini de gösteriyor. Ben çok memnumum açıkçası. (B., 41, man)

As B. emphasized, these summer schools are designed to show the people “another way is possible” as they are an attempt to aim to raise miscellaneous children who

embrace their own cultural values. Here, he defined the official education provided by the state as a policy to raise people who do not think, do not question, and obey. The alternative they offer on the other hand is enabling people who are self-sufficient, questioning, proactive citizens.

This is also an effective example of the fact that they are quite sensitive to the demands of the neighborhood which is a necessity for challenging how politics are conducted in the neighborhood and Turkey. Here, they provided the tools for Tuzluçayır residents to understand their social reality, organize themselves and become protagonists of social change, which in Gramsci are the characteristics of “organic intellectuals” as mentioned above. The summer schools in this framework are a popular project for the social transformation which are organized by a few political organizations and they can be considered as a part of creating a counter-hegemonic popular common sense:

Our summer schools, and also the summer schools of A... showed the neighborhood how to make something possible. Here, children learn, for example, to engage in the land, to draw freely, and also, we have chess lessons. I think we aimed to learn from each other by sharing it, which we have largely succeeded. I think, those kids changed their families. Families who were distant from us also understood, for example, what kind of structure we were in. You know, when you say A..., there was a perception that it was extremist, but we have shown that it isn't. Looking at events like this, this is the world, the system we believe in. So you don't have to live the life imposed on you on TV, on the internet. "Another world is possible", what a beautiful slogan, right? Another world is indeed possible. That's how you build another world, starting with the simplest daily activities. (F., 42, woman)

Bizim yaz okullarımızda, ha keza A... 'nın yaz okulları da mahalleliye birşeylerin nasıl denir mümkünatı mı dersin göstermiş oldu. Burada çocuklar mesela toprakla uğraşmayı öğreniyorlar, özgürce çizim yapmak mı dersin mesela satranç derslerimiz de var. Bir arada paylaşarak birbirlerinden öğrenmeyi biz amaçladık ki büyük ölçüde yaptık diye düşünüyorum. Bence nasıl biliyor musun, o çocuklar ailelerini de değiştirdiler. Bize mesafeli olan aileler de anladılar mesela nasıl bir yapı olduğumuzu hani böyle A... diyince işte uçlarda gibi bir algı oluyordu oysa biz öyle birşey olmadığını da göstermiş olduk. Biz diyoruz ki aslında bu gibi etkinliklerle bakın bizim inandığımız dünya, sistem bu işte. Yani o televizyonda, internette size dayatılan hayatı yaşamak zorunda değiliz. Başka bir dünya mümkün yani nasıl güzel bir slogandır değil mi? Ama öyle işte başka bir dünya mümkün. En basit günlük şeylerden başlayarak kurarsın işte başka bir dünyayı bu şekilde. (F. 42, woman)

Here, F.'s focus on creating an alternative world from the daily activities is essential as it promoted Lefebvrian focus on everyday life as an area of the reproduction of relations of production constitutes the basis of social existence; it is the “base” indeed. In the summer schools, these everyday life activities and the skills that nourish daily life are focused on:

My two nephews went there, and last week it was over. B.'s daughter was here with them. Now, these kids would be sitting at home with a phone in their hands, but here we have a kitchen garden that they can plant. There is also music, and art. Think of it as village institutes, to train conscious, cultured, modern, egalitarian citizens. I mean, don't underestimate it, maybe it'll sound ambitious, but it's a start. I mean, it's like the first step to creating a different world. (M., 50, man)

Benim iki yeğenim de gitti mesela işte geçen hafta daha bitti. İşte B.'in kız da burdaydı onlarla birlikte. Şimdi bu çocuklar mesela evde boş boş ellerinde telefon oturacakken burada bak mesela bostan vardı işte şu bahçede. E onu ektiler, işte müzik, resim. Böyle Köy Enstitüleri gibi düşün bak, bir böyle bilinçli, kültürlü, modern, eşitlikçi işte öyle bir vatandaş yetiştirmek için. Yani hiç küçük görmemek gerekiyor, belki iddialı gelecek ama bir başlangıç. Yani farklı bir dünya yaratmanın işte ilk adımı gibi. (M., 50, man)

M. defined an ideal citizen who are conscious, cultured, modern and egalitarian which are the values that he emphasizes. The daily skills like producing your own food, playing an instrument, drawing paintings...etc also evoked a “soviet type of education” which signifies an ideal type for M.

Y. who is one of the youngest interviewees is one of the activists who organized one of these summer schools, draws attention that it is also a signifier that shows the “trust” of the residents in the neighborhood as they “commit their children to the revolutionaries”:

There are a lot of operations aimed at revolutionaries. They are trying to invoke fear and succeeding in it. However, we can never say that fear is completely dominant because there are possibilities. In such a situation, people entrust their most valuable asset, their child, to the revolutionaries. 4 days ago, people were detained in the Nuriye-Semih protest. They've been in custody since then. There are risks of being arrested, and there are many examples like this, especially since Gezi. People who live in this neighborhood see and know how the revolutionaries are in constant danger. They know everything about oppression, exploitation, cruelty because they always face it, but despite this, they entrust their most valuable assets to the revolutionaries. So, the possibilities still exist. Despite all this cockiness, contamination, attacks, and fear-mongering, there are still plenty of possibilities because they can entrust their children here. They also recommend this place to each other. They give the solution to each other. (Y., 28, man)

Çekilen bir sürü operasyonlar var devrimcilere yönelik. Korku örgütlenmeye çalışılıyor ki epeyce bir korku yayılmış durumda. Tamamen hakim asla diyemeyiz. Çünkü olanaklar var dedik. Böylesi bir durumda insanlar en değerli varlığı olan çocuğunu devrimcilere emanet ediyor. Daha bir hafta olmadı işte 4 gün önce Nuriye-Semih eyleminde insanlar gözaltına alındı. 5 gündür gözaltındalar. Tutuklanma riskleri var ki bunun gibi bir sürü örnekleri var. Şu özellikle Gezi'den bu yana ki süreçte ama mahallede, bu mahallede yaşıyor insanlar, bunun devrimcilerinde ne kadar tehlikede olduğunu, kelle koltukta olduğunu görüyor, biliyor. Baskıyı, sömürüyü, zulmü her şeyi biliyor. Çünkü yaşıyor. Ama buna rağmen en değerli varlığını getiriyor devrimcilere emanet ediyor. Olanakları demek ki halen var. Tüm bu ukalalığa ya da kirlenmişliğe, saldırılara, korku egemenliği yaratmaya devam etmesine rağmen halen olanaklar fazlasıyla mevcut.

Çünkü çocuğunu buraya emanet edebiliyor. Yetmiyor. Okulda çocuğunun arkadaşı olan veliye de öneriyor burayı. Ona da çare getiriyor. (Y., 28, man)

Another indicator of that trust and consideration of the demands by the activists coming from the neighborhood is the “watches on the public gardens”. In the neighborhood, the interviewees mentioned the problem of drug selling/drug use, especially in the public parks for the last 5 years which is increasing gradually. On the other hand, was said to become widespread among the youth related to the increasing unemployment rates and the “organized plan of the security forces”. In all interviewees, this problem was said to be one of the most essential “attacks” of the government to damage the harmony of the neighborhood and stigmatize and marginalize the residents:

The biggest gang is now the state, the biggest organization that markets drugs is the state. Normally there is a quota for that. These are things made by mixing chemicals, these are an organization in itself.. If it comes from abroad, how can it pass through the border of such a powerful country? So, the state has its share. This cannot be solved by blaming a revolutionary organization. In the east of the country the crime belongs to them, so when the crime develops in the west of the country, is it someone else's fault? So, the state is to blame. Now, when it comes to this, if the history of class societies and the history of class wars are correct in this general definition, if it is real, then of course the state is to blame. For example, in Kurdish neighborhoods and Alevi neighborhoods, these things are developing especially at the points where revolutionary movements are strong, gaining strength and having that potential. (S., 33, man)

En büyük çete şu an bu devlet, uyuşturucuyu pazarlayan en büyük organizasyon yapan ekip devlettir. Normalde bunun bir kotası var. Bunlar kimyasal karıştırılarak yapılan şeyler, bunlar başlı başına bir organizasyon... Yurt dışından geliyorsa nasıl olur da bu kadar güçlü bir ülkenin sınırından geçer. Demek ki payı var. Bir devrimci örgüte suç atmakla çözülmüyor. Memleketin doğusunda bu iş geliyorsa suç onun da batısında gelişince suç başkasının mı? Demek ki devletin. Şimdi konu böyle olunca sınıflı toplumların tarihi, sınıf savaşlarının tarihi ise bu genel tanımda doğruysa, gerçekse haliyle devlet tabii özellikle ezilmişlerin. Mesela Kürt mahallelerine, Alevi Mahallelerine devrimci hareketlerin güçlü olduğu, güçlendiği, o potansiyeli taşıdığı noktalarda özellikle bu işler geliyiyor. (S., 33, man)

“Promoting” drug dealing in the neighborhood for S., is an intentional policy that aims at diverting their attention from politics by corrupting the morals of the youth. This is for S., is a win-win game for the government as they both damage the reputation of the neighborhood- announcing it as a drug den and thwarting the potential of youth to engage in political opposition. Similarly, M. (50, man) mentioned drug selling as one of the critical problems in the neighborhood which is also driven into the neighborhood deliberately by the government as he told:

There is pressure on our region from all government agencies. For that reason, they see Tuzluçayır as the place where terrorist organizations nest. Whereas it's a place where there are people who are looking for the most basic desires, basic rights. They're bringing here drugs, today's biggest problem. Indeed, most families' children, young children use drugs, they have addictions. We started a campaign last year, the anti-drugs campaign. For example, you can discourage 20-25 children from using drugs, encourage them to receive treatment, and they do not start again after the treatment. In order to break the organization of a region, they have to bring in drugs, I mean, they do.

Bölgemize tüm devlet kurumlarından baskı var. Onun için de sanki Tuzluçayır'ı şöyle görüyorlar: terör örgütlerinin yuvalandığı yer. Oysa ki çok temel isteklerini, haklarını arayan insanların olduğu bir yer. Bir de içeriye şey sokuyorlar, bugün en büyük sorun uyuşturucu sorunu. Gerçekten, çoğu ailelerin çocukları, genç çocuklar uyuşturucu kullanıyor, bağımlılıkları var. Kısmi oranda biz geçen H... bir kampanya başlatmıştık, uyuşturucuya hayır kampanyası. Mesela 20-25 çocuğu, tanıdığın bildiğin çocukları vazgeçirebiliyorsun, tedavi görüyor, başlayanlar olsa da, tedaviden sonra başlamıyor. Bir bölgenin örgütlülüğünü kırmak için onu da sokmaları gerekiyor, onu sokuyorlar yani.

Here, what they defined in the neighborhood is actually “territorial stigmatization” as Wacquant and others stated that “Territorial stigmatization is not a static condition, a neutral process, or an innocuous cultural game, but a consequential and injurious form of action through collective representation fastened on a place.” (2014, p.1278). It denotes that, the rules of the game that leads to stigmatizing of a “targeted” space was constituted and/or reconstituted constantly. Here, in the case of Tuzluçayır, interviewees mentioned that their neighborhood is targeted by the government with a purpose. However, as they said, they became actively involved in this “war” as the residents asked them to “solve” this problem:

My neighbour, aunt H... came and told me clearly. She said, my son, they bring a man to the park over there, they drop him off at night. Now, what do you understand of this? It's a civilian car, but you can guess who's in it. I mean, in particular, to keep young people here away from revolutionaries, to disrupt the integrity of two neighborhoods, to make it look like a nest of crime... She said, “do something, otherwise, we will lose the children”. That's how we, the revolutionaries, started to stand guard in the park. Instead of preventing crime, they are trying to create a crime-nest here (C.42, man)

Benim komşum oluyor, H... teyze geldi bana açık açık dedi. Dedi ki yavrum şuradaki parka getiriyorlar gece adamı bırakıyorlar. Şimdi sen ne anlarsın bundan? Getiren de sivil araç ama tabii içinde kim var tahmin edersin. Yani özellikle, bir buradaki gençleri devrimcilerden uzak tutmak, iki mahallenin bütünlüğünü bozmak suç şeysi gibi göstermek yani dışarı. Şimdi kadıncağız dedi ki birşeyler yapın çocuklar elden gidecek. İşte öyle park nöbetleri başladı burada biz devrimciler olarak. Suçu önlemesi gerekirken yani. Üstüne suç yaratmaya çalışıyor. (C., 42, man)

In a sense, the neighborhood created its own security forces against this drug trade. In this case, most of the political organizations acted together to defend their space

besides fighting against the “culture of drugs”. In contrast to the “mainstream” opinion, Tuzluçayır is quite safe as the dominant type of delinquency are petty crimes like car and motorcycle thefts, petty robberies...etc., which hardly included death. The drug trade is one of the most essential problems nurtured by the state, as they said, related to the neighborhood:

*For example, for about 10 years, there have been teenagers in parks selling drugs. As***** , we kept watch with ***** , reduced it a lot in this way for a while. For example, those who live close to them, those who live in places close to the parks, say that they see them being brought and here in a civilian vehicle. It's a cop's job. They want to ruin this place, look, they sell drugs there, they want to show us outside as an unsafe place. We also struggle with this perception. (B., 41, man)*

*Bak mesela yaklaşık 10 senedir, parklarda gençler türedi uyuşturucu satan. Biz *****olarak ***** ile nöbet tuttuk bir dönem o şekilde bayağı azalttık. Ama mesela oralara yakın oturanlar, işte parkları gören yerlerde oturanlar dediler ki biz bunların sivil araçla getirilip bırakıldığını görüyoruz. Polisin işi yani. Burayı bozmak istiyorlar, işte bakın orada uyuşturucu satılıyor, güvenli değil diye sunmak istiyorlar bizi. Biz bu algıyla da mücadele ediyoruz. (B., 41, man)*

On the other hand, H. (69, man) mentioned the economic dimension of the problem as he stated that the high unemployment rates became an essential factor for drug use as the youth are negatively affected. He also defines an “alternative” to keep the youth apart from drugs which are “politicizing” them and canalising them into the social movements:

I think the economic crisis had an impact on this drug business. Unemployment rates have risen a lot in recent years. I mean, of course, it affected young people a lot. Our young people here have fallen into a void, and of course, I think the depoliticization of the new generation is also important. For example, when we channel young people into social issues, we prevent them from acquiring these harmful habits. As their brothers, sisters, comrades, we try to explain as much as possible.

Ekonomik kriz bence bu uyuşturucu işinde etkili oldu. İşsizlik oranları çok arttı son yıllarda. Yani tabii bu gençleri çok etkiledi. Buradaki gençlerimiz çok boşluğa düştüler, bir de tabii yeni neslin apolitikleştirilmesi de önemli bence. Biz mesela gençleri toplumsal meselelere kanalize ettiğimiz zaman, onların bu zararlı alışkanlıkları edinmelerini engellemiş oluyoruz. Abileri, ablalaları, yoldaşları olarak mümkün olduğunca anlatmaya çalışıyoruz.

A similar policy, an attack- that is defined by some of the interviewees is the resettlement of the people from various countries by the JDP government to the neighborhood. A. (41, man) stated that this is another political move by the government to damage the harmony:

Right now, Tuzluçayır is at what we call the key point. All of them are replicating their own power with families brought from different foreign countries, Syrian, Kyrgyz, in line with the mindset they developed. They are also armed. We're aware of this. No matter which of the revolutionary institutions you tell here, they don't even know it. Well, we tell it. There are Syrians, Kyrgyzstanis, slant-eyed people walking around here. We don't distinguish between any people. We're not excluding any people, but these people are being trained by the JDP. They receive salaries from the JDP. They are sent to imam-hatips by the JDP.

Şu an Tuzluçayır kilit noktası dediğimiz noktada, hepsi bir zihniyetin, kendisinin geliştirdiği yol doğrultusunda Tuzluçayır'dan Suriyeli, Kırgızistanlı efendime söyleyeyim değişik dış ülkelerden getirdiği aileler ile kendi güçlerini çoğaltıyor. Hem de silahlı. Biz bunun bilincindeyiz. Burada devrimci kurumların hangisine söylersen söyle farkında bile değiller. Bunu söylemiyor musunuz desen? Valla söylüyoruz. Şurada Suriyeliler geçiyor. Şurada efendime söyleyeyim Kırgızistanlı geçiyor. Çekik gözlüler buralarda geziyorlar. Ha biz hiç bir insanı ayırt etmiyoruz. Hiç bir insanı dışlamıyoruz. Ama bu insanlar AKP doğrultusunda eğitiliyor. AKP doğrultusunda maaşlar alıyor. AKP doğrultusunda imam hatiplere sevk ediliyor.

Here, A. points to a common identity, a common ground for the residents in the neighborhood “except for” the ones who are recently settled down and casts doubts on in terms of their possible identities as counter-revolutionaries placed by JDP. In this sense, they are seen as *a trojan horse* just like the Cami-Cemevi Project mentioned above as they assumed a neighborhood identity that should be “protected”. Here, this attack they defined actually shows that they are in a war of position with the JDP government and the neighborhood is the most essential “position” in this war. Another interviewee, S. (39, woman) also stated that this is a new front in the war; which aimed at destroying the “counter-hegemonic articulation of differentiated but equivalent popular struggles” (Purcell, 2009, p.292):

There is a spirit, a belonging that we create here with friends from other politics. Now if you were an enemy, what would you attack first? The unity, right? It's like a seed of discord. Then you will dissolve organizations in the public eye. It's like disintegration, you know, spreading a bad reputation. In war, there is a moral of the law of war, but in the JDP, there is no such thing, I mean, one would want a good enemy.

Bizim burada diğer siyasetten arkadaşlarla oluşturduğumuz bir ruh, bir aidiyet var yarattığımız. Şimdi sen düşmansın, hani diyelim yani tabii ki öyle değil de, ilk neye saldırır düşman? Birlikteliğe değil mi? Birbirine düşürme olsun işte nifak tohumu gibi. İki, halkın gözünde çözeceksin örgütleri. Çözme dediğim, parçalanma gibi, hani kötü bir ün yayma da diyebilirsin. Savaşta da işte bir savaş hukuku ahlaki vardır ama AKP'de bu yok bak, afedersin belaltı vurmak, yani insan düşmanın da iyisini isteyesi geliyor.

Here, the other tactic that is defined by S. is to harm the unity of the political organizations by killing the spirit of the neighborhood. The homogeneity of the residents is an essential necessity for the organizations to reach people and organize

them, here through damaging this homogeneity, the enemy entered the “safe front”. Similar to S., another young woman interviewee D. (35) painted a similar picture:

If we are united, we will become stronger, and the state knows it, too. These fascist oligarchs, of course, do not want the people to be strengthened, to unite, and have a common struggle. In recent years, a wide variety of people have suddenly started to prefer this place. They're renting houses, but isolating themselves from the neighborhood. This is like an attack on that unity, on the power that will arise from that unity.

Birlik olursak güçlenirizin biz farkındayız da devlet değil mi? Bu faşist oligarklar pek tabii halkın güçlenmesini, birleşmesini, ortak mücadelesini istemiyorlar. Son yıllarda işte buraya çok çeşitli insanlar ne hikmetse birden tercih etmeye başladılar. Ev tutuyorlar, bir ilişki kurmaya çalışıyorlar! Yani bunlar hep o birlikteliğe, o birliktelikten doğacak güce bir saldırı gibi.

Here, it is important to note that, the interviewees stated that they are not prejudiced about these settlements to the neighborhood until they realized that when they tried to communicate, these people do not respond to the interviewees. For a neighborhood like Tuzluçayır, it was quite weird as they still have neighborhood relations related to their commitment to the community. As D. pointed to, this “unresponsiveness” is quite sceptical which creates an impression that they are not voluntarily settled in but forced to for “some reason”.

Another essential characteristic of these political organizations is their autonomy which enabled them to act fast and effectively. Therefore, the local branches of these political organizations in the neighborhood are largely autonomous in terms of decision-making about their actions. Most of the interviewees stated that this is an advantage which shows the uniqueness of Tuzluçayır as it means accepting its identity:

Of course, we act in coordination with the center when we are going to take an action, but it is never like getting permission because partners know that we are the ones who know the dynamics of this place. There has to be confidence in that. When we protest, it brings a voice, and the revolutionary friends here agree. (A., 43, man)

Tabii ki biz bir eylem koyacağımız zaman merkezle koordine hareket ederiz ama bu izin almak gibi değil asla. Çünkü bir yandan buranın dinamiklerini bilen biz olduğumuz da ortaklar iyi bilirler örneğin. O konuda güven olmak zorunda. Biz bir eylem yaptığımız zaman ses getirir buradaki devrimci arkadaşlar da kabul eder bak kimse sorsan. (A., 43, man)

Here, the decision-making process of these political organizations is said to be autonomous “enough” to act in line with the neighborhood’s agenda which enables them to be “inclusive” for the demands of the residents. This autonomy they talked

about is mostly unique to Tuzluçayır as they said, it is in a sense accepting the “identity of the neighborhood”.

Another critical characteristic focused on by the interviewees related to the political organization was their “reaction” to the international, national, and/or local agenda. Remembering Castells, having no alternative social organization, an alternative space, nor an alternative city means the absence of a channel for citizens to represent their feeling about their conditions, means there is no place for discourse in city, only there is one-way information flow and centralized of the state. These all lead to protests which could be identified as reactive rather than proactive:

The system is such a system that now we have to move forward with what we are against most of the time. For example, we talk about summer schools, but there are attacks from the government. In other words, there are so many attacks that most of the time we can't focus on anything on the agenda other than fighting these attacks on the agenda. I think that's the "success" of political Islamists. (M., 50, man)

Sistem de öyle bir sistem ki şimdi mecburen işte karşı olduğumuz şeyler üzerinden ilerlemek durumunda kalıyoruz çoğu zaman. Mesela işte yaz okullarından bahsettik ya, bir saldırı oluyor hükümetten. Yani aslında o kadar saldırı oluyor ki gündem bu saldırılarla mücadele etmekten başka bir konuya çoğu zaman yönelemiyoruz. Siyasal İslamcıların bence yani tırnak içinde diyorum başarısı bu diye düşünüyorum. (M., 50, man)

Here, M. focus attention on the fact that the political agenda at the national level is quite busy that they have to “react” to these policies which are quite diverting for their organizations. Therefore, he specifically stated that they are aware of the fact that they should set their own agenda to become effective but considered it difficult as a result of the systematic attacks of the government to the leftist opposition. A similar point is emphasized by L. (50, woman):

It's like we're moving with a reaction like this. By reaction, I mean, for example, they stopped sending buses here, so you need to organize a protest immediately, like in many other things. Thanks to him, the country is under such attack. So, whether you have an agenda or not doesn't matter.

İster istemez böyle bir tepkiyle sanki hareket ediyormuşuz gibi oluyor. Tepki derken, adam mesela otobüsleri kaldırdı işte konuştuk ya az önce, e sen ne yapıyorsun buna hemen bir eylem organize etmek lazım. Sanki bir çok konuda böyle oluyor mecburen. Sağolsun memleket öyle bir saldırı altında ki. Senin gündemin varmış yokmuş olmuyor yani.

L. also stressed that they wanted to make proactive, productive politics but the government attacks too much that they tried to respond to these attacks. Here, at the

local level changing the bus lines is defined as an attack that should be responded to or at the national level transforming the secular educational system into a more religious-based one should be reacted. In this framework, fighting against drug trade/ drug use can be considered reactive rather than proactive among many other topics, which are closely related to the defense of the neighborhood. As mentioned above, social movements are unable to fully accomplish their project since they lose their identity, in the end; they have to bargain for social reform within the political system. This is one of the reasons, why people insist on aiming at local targets, like in the case of Tuzluçayır.

Here, the collective action in Tuzluçayır seems to be plural, differentiated, democratic and inclusive as the political organizations are in close relation with each other and sensitive to each other's agenda, as the interviewees mentioned. Although each of the interviewees "believes" that their political organizations are the pioneer of the oppositional movements in the neighborhood, they did not deny the critical role of the others. They stated that the demands of the neighborhood and the agenda of the political organizations should be balanced which brings popular support:

I think until 2011-2012, for about 3-4 years it was very ordinate here, of course, some teams separated from the local organizations. There were H..., Ö..., E..., T...etc. These teams were always doing business together. Also, there were teams that stayed out of it like P..., A..., İ..., we, H... . Especially during the March-May period, March calendar, Gezi Resistance, Newroz, Mahir Çayan commemoration etc was being arranged regularly. Together with Gezi, there were regular meetings again until the end of the Cami-Cemevi protest. There was a separation again. There are regular meetings, especially before the 16 April Referendum⁵², that is, this year with Newroz. Protests, events are held together. We had a joint event here about the April 16 Referendum. So we hold events like this even though they are interrupted sometimes. After all, each organization has a plan, a program related to the neighborhood, other areas, provinces and the agenda. There are protests and activities according to that plan and program. (F., 42, woman)

Galiba 2011-2012 yılına kadar ben kendi olduğum dönem ile ilgili burada 3-4 sene boyunca falan çok düzenli, bu yerelde ki örgütler ile tabi ayrışan ekipler de vardı. İşte H..., Ö..., E..., T... vardı. Bunlar hep bir arada iş yapıyordu bu ekipler. Birde onun dışında kalan ekipler vardı. İşte P..., A..., İ..., biz, H... bunlar beraber. Bunlar özellikle o Mart-Mayıs sürecinde, Mart ayı takvimi, Gazi Direnişi, Newroz, Mahir Çayan anması gibi şeyleri eylemi, etkinliği düzenli yapıyordu. Gezi ile birlikte tekrar aslında Cami-Cemevi eyleminin sonuna kadar düzenli toplantılar

⁵² F., refers to the Constitutional Referendum in 2017, through which 18 amendments in the Turkish constitution was approved and the most dramatic one was the abolishment of the office of Prime Minister. It was a turning point for the democratic institutions and the opposition parties and organizations as a new executive regime, the presidential system is introduced which was followed by protests.

oluyordu. Yine böyle bir ayrılık oldu. Sonrasında özellikle 16 Nisan referandumdan önce, yani bu sene Nevroz ile birlikte düzenli toplantılar yapılıyor. Beraber eylem, etkinlikler yapılıyor. Burada 16 Nisan ilgilide, referandum ile ilgilide ortaklaşa bir etkinlik falan yapmıştık. Yapılıyor yani. Ara ara kesintiye uğruyor ama yapılıyor da. Sonuçta burada her örgütün planı, programı var mahalleye ilişkin ya da diğer mahallere ilişkin ya da işte ilin yada o genel gündeme dair plan, programı söyleme çalışmaları var. Ona göre koyduğu eylem etkinlikler var. (F., 42, woman)

Here, F. focused on the collectivity of the political organizations although it is not permanent and/or regular. However, as a result of the similar political grounds and policy-making approaches, their agendas and protest repertoire enables them to act together. Besides, they stated that the ultimate aim is not to take side against other organizations but it is to make people “politically organized”:

There are 9-10 politics in the neighborhood. Let the number increase. Let's contact more people. Right now, we don't have the power to have one-on-one contact with all the people in the neighborhood. Here's how we contact them all: we distribute leaflets in the square, at the bus stop in the mornings, and in the evenings after work. We also distribute newspapers or we make posters. We have contact with the whole neighborhood, even with the people in the other neighborhoods, but not one-on-one. The more organizations there are, the more one-to-one contact can be achieved. Also, the organizational capacity of the neighborhood will increase. So, they won't be able to come and sell drugs in the neighborhood. Let's think about this. If the state is going to make an organization, it will first think about the neighborhood. I'm not saying it can't do it, but it will think about it first and will make the preparations accordingly. In total, if what we say is true, if what we do finds a place in life, if the masses see this if they say it is true, we organize and we march. Competition divides, action unites. (Y., 28, man)

9-10 tane siyaset var mahallede. Sayısı artsın. Daha fazla insana temas edebilelim. Bizim şu an gücümüz yetip, tüm mahalle halkına bire bir temas edemiyoruz. Hani şöyle hepsine temas ediyoruz. Mesela meydanda bildiri dağıtıyoruz. Duraklarda sabah bildiri dağıtıyoruz. Akşam iş çıkışlarında bildiri dağıtıyoruz. Ya da gazete dağıtımı yapıyoruz ya da afiş yapıyoruz. Mahallenin bütününe hatta çevrede ki mahallede ki insanların mübalağasız bütününe temasımız var. Ama bire bir değil. Ne kadar fazla örgüt olursak bire bir temas o kadar artmış, örgütlenme o politikleşmenin ötesinde örgütlenmede artmış olacak. Haliyle bu bize yazar. Devrimcilere yazar. Bu mahallede eli kolunu sallayarak geri uyuşturucu satmaya giremez. Bir düşün bakayım. Devlet bir organizasyon yapacaksa mahalleye ilişkin önce bir düşünür. Yapamaz demiyorum. Ama bir düşünür. Hazırlığını ona göre yapar gelir. Bu bize yazar. Devrimcilere yazar. Toplamda da bizim söylediğimiz dediğimiz gibi doğruysa yaptıklarımız yaşamda yer buluyorsa, kitleler bunu görüyorsa, doğru olduğunu söylüyorsa bizde örgütlenir biz de yürürüz. Ama rekabet böler, eylem birleştirir. (Y., 28, man)

However, it should be added that these meetings organized among the political organizations are far from constructing an alliance, it should be questioned carefully whether it is “a collective and coordinated program”. Therefore, the main point they stated is that their organizations are the ones that lead the change having “the most popular” support of the neighborhood. This is an essential deficiency for them to act

together as Purcell signifies: “collective struggle can construct a political program that is different from and wider than the program of each local movement, but one that does not subsume or subordinate them (2009, p. 294)”:

When I stage a demonstration with H..., the police comes with 10 water cannons, a scorpion. Helicopters fly above. However, when 7-8 organizations make protests in which we don't participate, the police don't even come to stop it. So what is the reason?. It is because of the presence of the PDP. When we make a press release here, we say that 1-2 people will be enough. However, when we do it, if there is 5 of us present, then there will be 100 police waiting to interfere. (A., 41, man)

Burada polis tankı ile topuyla gelirken ben burada eylem yaptığım zaman H... yaptığı zaman 10 tane toma geliyor. Akrebi geliyor. Helikopter üstten uçuyor. Sen burada 7-8 tane örgütle benim içinde olmadığım bir eylem yaptığın zaman polis bile gelmiyor. Yani bu neyden kaynaklanıyor? Bu diyor ki HDP olunca işin rengi değişiyor. İşin rengi değişiyor. Biz burada bir basın açıklaması yapacağız. Basın açıklaması yöneticilerden doğru diyoruz ki sağdan soldan 1-2 kişi katılırsa yine yeter diyoruz. Hiç kimse çağrı mağrıda yapmıyor. Bir basın açıklaması yapacağımız zaman inancın olsun ki biz 5 kişiysek 100 kişi de polistir. (A., 41, man)

Y. (28, man) from another political organization stated that:

I remember the Gezi period. During the Cami-Cemevi protests, we were the first to access the knowledge that something like this was going to happen. Further, we were the first team to call for action on this. I'm not saying that tens of thousands have come here on our call, but in the gathering of these tens of thousands, yes, we were one of the first teams that made the call to both left institutions and others. We always try to interfere with the content of the protest, even though it is only the ones we arrange. In our protests and activities with left-wing institutions and friendly institutions, we do not prefer to participate in meetings like this: "We can't come this week, but we accept whatever you say". No, we're an organization that attends the meeting every week and tries to intervene in the content with a revolutionary quality. In that sense, such an intervention shows participation in the protest and automatically shows its quality.

Gezi dönemini hatırlıyorum. Cami-Cem Evi eylemlerinde durumun ilk böyle bir şey yapılacağına bilgisine ilk erişenlerdeniz. Daha ötesinde bunun ile ilgili eylem yapmada ilk çağrıda bulunan ekibiz. Bizim çağrımız ile buraya on binler dökülmüştür demiyorum. Ama bu on binlerin dökülmesinde hem sol kurumlara çağrıyı yapan hem de genelde de bir çağrı yapan evet ekip, en başında biz geliriz yani. Nitelik olarak her zaman eylemin içeriğine müdahale etmeye çalışırız. Sadece bizim yaptığımız eylem ve etkinlik olsa da. Sol kurumlarla, dost kurumlarla yaptığımız eylem ve etkinliklerde, hani toplantılara şöyle katılmayı tercih etmiyoruz. Biz bu hafta gelemiyoruz ama siz ne dersiniz kabulüz değil, her hafta toplantıya katılan, içeriğe devrimci bir nitelikte müdahale etmeye çalışan bir örgütüz. O anlamda da haliyle böyle bir müdahale eylemin katılımını, otomatikman niteliğini göstermiş oluyor.

Here, they all assumed to be the protagonists of the protests, demonstrations, press statements...etc and stated that they all have the position to “lead” the other political organizations. This assumption for each is reasonable because they defined themselves as “full-time revolutionists” which make this belonging valuable and indispensable not

only for themselves but also for other organizations. Although they have put forward their political organizations to the “leading” positions, they are quite careful about implying a hierarchy, an uneven relationship with the other organizations. They can be said to search for the connections with each other and question how to maintain these connections which reminds the ways that Purcell stated while identifying the counter-hegemonic articulations of these movements: “A hegemonic class leads the classes which are its allies, and dominates those which are its enemies” (ibid. 298). In this sense, the ultimate goal of the political organizations in Tuzluçayır Neighborhood for activists is to lead the other political organizations:

In my view, whether it's a country-wide activity or a local activity, whatever it is, when we meet the local with what we want to do, A... does a lot of right things. For instance, on May 1. Menekşe Erbay is the Sun of May 1 of our neighborhood. Menekşe Erbay was killed on April 29 in Tuzluçayır high school as a result of a shooting that occurred in the May 1 protests. She was trying to protect the children, including her own child. She is significant for us. Menekşe Erbay protected the Dev-Yol tradition. She is a martyr of our neighborhood, a martyr of all of us, and we found a photo of Menekşe Erbay for the first time in the neighborhood many years later. Menekşe Erbay's family is close to H... For example, they developed a much closer relationship with us. Major protests took place here. We gave food in the name of Menekşe Erbay. Here we named the big park "Menekşe Erbay". Also, we are having a very effective May 1 period in the neighborhood. All this happened under our leadership, so I can say it proudly. (B., 41, man)

Benim nazarımda ister ülke geneli bir faaliyet olsun, ister yerel bir faaliyet olsun, ne olursa olsun biz yapmak istediğimiz şeyle yereli buluşturduğumuzda A... çok doğru şeyler yapıyor. Mesela örnek 1 Mayıs. 1 Mayıs şurada bir tarihten sonra şöyle çalışmasını yaptık. Menekşe Erbay bizim mahallemizin 1 Mayıs güneşidir. Menekşe Erbay 29 Nisan'da Tuzluçayır Lisesinde 1 Mayıs eylemi yapan çocukları kendi çocuğu da dâhil olmak üzere korumak isterken açılan ateş sonucu öldürüldü. Bizim için değerlidir. Menekşe Erbay A... ilk çalışma yapana kadar mesela Dev-Yol geleneğine sahip çıkar Menekşe Erbay. Bizim mahallemizin şehididir, hepimizin şehididir ve Menekşe Erbay'ın ilk kez fotoğrafını bulduk mahallede uzun yıllar sonra. Sonra Menekşe Erbay'ın ailesi H... yakın bir aile. Mesela bizle çok daha yakın ilişkiler geliştirdi. Burada büyük eylemler yapıldı. Menekşe Erbay için yemekler verdik. İşte büyük parka Menekşe Erbay ismini verdik. Halen de az çok bilen de Menekşe Erbay parkı diye tarif ederler ve mesela mahallede çok etkili bir 1 Mayıs dönemi yaşıyoruz. Bizim önderliğimizde oldu bunlar yani gururla söyleyebilirim. (B., 41, man)

Here, there emerged two basic goals in the agenda of the activists; organising the “disorganized” people of Tuzluçayır under their own organizations and leading the other political organizations; i.e., becoming constructors, organizers and/or permanent persuaders like the organic intellectuals in Gramscian sense beyond being simple orators. They attempted to provide tools for both Tuzluçayır people and other activists to understand the social reality from their point of view, organize themselves and

become protagonists of social change. While defining authoritarian populism which harmonizes neoliberal, authoritarian and conservative elements in the government, Akça (2011, p.32) states that it necessitates “passive subjects” whose roles are limited with voting in the elections. Here, the interviewees defined an alternative type of citizen who is actively participated in the decision-making process, and in creating new, ethical, democratic and political institutions. In this framework, collective actions defined are not limited to the protests, actions and/or demonstrations organized by these political organizations:

I mean, we also did this: We brought 10 women together and organized "burghul salad days". This is a very important activity for us. We went to each other's homes and threw rice pudding parties. I mean, these are the things that we care about very much, so we never take them as simple. When we say action, if we just understand it as a press release, it's would be wrong. The police attacked the press release. That's what it takes to get into a house in the neighborhood. I mean, distributing our newspaper, getting money, getting donations, being listened we go out and talk, taking care of each other when something happens, it's all part of our lives. We don't calculate how many people come to our protests. People are afraid. We are aware of it, but we don't judge anyone for being afraid. However, it is the brave ones who will make history. (C., 42, woman)

Yani şunu da mesela yaptık. 10 tane kadını bir araya getirip kısır günleri düzenledik. Bu da bizim için çok önemli bir eylem. İşte evlere gidip sütlaç partileri yapıp düzenledik. Yani bunlar bizim çok önemseydiğimiz işler yani, bunları hiç basite almıyoruz. Belki eylem deyince sadece basın açıklaması gibi anlarsak o doğru olmuyor. Yani basın açıklamasında polis saldırdı. Mahalle içerisine bir eve girebilmek için de bu gerekiyor. Yani gazetemizi vermek, para almak, bağış almak, çıkıp konuştuğumuzda dinlenmek, birimize bir şey olduğu zaman sahip çıkılmak yani buralar bizim için, hepsi yaşamın. Kendi adımıza eylemimize kaç kişi geldiği gibi öyle basit kafa sayarak hesaplamıyoruz. Ama insanlar korkuyor onun da farkındayız. Korkuyor, kimseyi de korktuğu için yargılamıyoruz. Ama tarihi de cesurlar yazacak yani. (C., 42, woman)

Here, what C. talks about, these ‘day-parties’ they organized to show that her organization decides the type of the collective actions according to the demands and/or needs of the neighborhood. They did not patronize the daily activities of the “ordinary” people like womens’ gathering together at the houses for socializing while eating snacks which reminds us of Lefebvre’s definition of daily life as a “base” once more:

Daily life can not be defined as a “sub-system” within a larger system. On the contrary; it is the “base” from which the mode of production endeavors to constitute itself as system, by programming this base. (Lefebvre, 1991: p.41)

Similarly, visiting homes related to the demands, concerns and sometimes just worries of the residents and bringing journals of the organizations is also a glorified way to organize people. It is also an impressive way to “include” people in the decision-making process and enable them to be active:

For example, when we meet a member of our association or family of a member, we go and visit these families, both to ask after them and make assessments of the current political situation of the day. Exchanging ideas sometimes creates concrete suggestions about our work, the distribution of our regular publishing. They are probably political if our ideas are discussed there if they are living in this neighborhood if they are in some way in contact with us... They can also give very concrete suggestions about the heat and intensity of the agenda, like, "What if you actually did a movie screening in the park?", or "Nuriye and Semih is one of the most current issues today, if you make a panel in the park about it, don't you think people will come?". These are very concrete proposals. We may be already discussing this or we might know it, but the right suggestions coming from there also open our minds because there are other things laying in their subtext. What they design in their heads is different from what we designed. It is good from that standpoint. We visit them for those reasons, and it has positive returns. You know, for once, the human aspect is developing. You are starting to speak the same language. (Y., 28, man)

Bizim derneğimize üye ya da çocuğu üye bir biçimiyle tanışmışız daha önceden bir temas kurmuşuz bu aileleri gidip ziyaret ediyoruz mesela. Bir tarafı insani olarak hal, hatır sormaksa diğer bir tarafı da o günkü güncel politik durumu değerlendirmesi, fikrin tartışılması. Fikir alışverişi bazen somut böyle öneriler çıkıyor. Çalışmamız içinde. Bu sebepler ile yapılan. İşte düzenli çıkan yayınınımızın götürülmesi. Bizim fikrimizin orada tartışılması ve orada varsa sonuçta bu mahallede yaşıyorsa bizim ile bir biçimde temas kurduysa muhtemelen politiktir... Gündemin sıcaklığıyla, yoğunluğuyla ilgili çok somut öneri de verebiliyor. "Ya aslında parkta film gösterimi yapsanız şu konu ile ilgili" gibi. Bu dönem aslında şöyle bir saldırı oldu. Atıyorum Nuriye ve Semih bugün en güncel konulardan biri, bunun ile ilgili parkta aslında panel yapsanız aslında insanlar gelmez mi? Çok somut bir öneri. Bunu biz tartışıyor olabiliriz. Bunu zaten turnak içinde söylüyorum. Biz biliyor olabiliriz. Ama oradan doğru önerinin gelmesi ayrıca bir akıl açıyor. Çünkü onun alt metni de daha başka şeyler yatıyor. İuuu ya da onun kafasında tasarladığı bizim tasarladığımızdan daha farklı. O açıdan iyi olmuş oluyor. Bu sebeplerden ötürü ziyaret ediyoruz ve gerçekten olumlu geri dönüşleri var. Hani nasıl dersiniz bir defa gerçekten insani yönü geliyor. Aynı dili konuşuyorsun. (Y.28, man)

Here, one can say that they did not remain at the level of protest but promoted practical alternatives that are coming from the “ordinary” people of Tuzlucaıyır. In the last quotation, the focus on speaking the “same language” and Y.’s political strategy to speak this “same language” is essential as language is “the mental habit of collectivity is that of world view” which include culture and philosophy. Through the actions and policies of the activists with Tuzlucaıyır people, we can see that they tried to create this common language “as intricately connected to how we think about and make sense of the world” (Ives, 2004, p. 72)

It should be added that ideology is an organic relational whole embodied in institutions and apparatuses which are held together in a historical bloc around several basic articulatory principles. Political subjects are not classes but complex collective wills. So ideological elements in Tuzluçayır articulated by the activists of the political organizations do not have a necessary class belonging. Nevertheless, for Gramsci, even though diverse social elements have a merely relational identity achieved through articulatory practices, there must always be a single unifying principle in every hegemonic formation, this can only be a fundamental class. These are not contingent on hegemonic formation but are the structural framework within which every struggle occurs. Here, the activists in the neighborhood according to their political stands do not have a common view about the role of this “fundamental class”. While some are focusing on the proletariat “in the last instance” as a unifying element:

So the October Revolution is one of the most concrete issues on this subject. I mean, I can't say that there were 100 factions, but there were revolutionary socialists, Bolsheviks, Mensheviks, Narodniks. The theory, approach, and practice of the Bolsheviks found their place in life. They got organized. Under the leadership of the masses, the working class, they increased the struggle and a revolution took place. (D., 26, woman)

Ekim devrimi bu işin en somut konularından biridir yani. Yani 100 tane fraksiyon vardı diyemem belki ama şimdi burada devrimci sosyalistler, Bolşevikler, Menşevikler, Narodnikler vardı yani. Bolşeviklerin teorisi, yaklaşımı, pratiği, yaşamda yerini buldu. Örgütlendiler. Önüne geçen altında kaldığı kitlelerin, işçi sınıfının önderliğinde, mücadeleyi büyüttü ve bir devrim gerçekleşti. (D., 26, woman)

While for another activist, who is defending identity politics, the class is no longer determinant:

The politics I'm in, the party is calling for it. Come and unite. Since it's a joint party, it says "Let's be one, regardless of colour, identity, gender". Let's be together. It is because he gave us the call to come and be one with all the colours of the parliament in which we are now in, and with all the colours and identities and of those who are united by H... I see myself at that point and I am in line with that point. (A., 46, man)

Gelin canlar bir olalım. İçinde bulunduğum siyaset, parti tam onu çağırıyor. Gelin canlar bir olalım. Çatı partisi olduğundan, rengine, kimliğine, cinsine bakmadan gelin canlar bir olalım diyor. Beraber olalım. Bunu gerek şu anda içinde bulunduğumuz meclisin içerisinde tüm renkleriyle, gerek H...'nin birleşenlerinin kimliklerinin, renklerinin tüm renkleriyle tam bize gelin canlar bir olalım çağrısını verdiği için. Ben kendimi o noktada görüyorum ve o nokta doğrultusunda. (A., 46, man)

Here, A. identified a line of thought that aims to create “we” as a collective identity because of the nature of power and politics. A similar approach is put forward by Laclau and Mouffe: “for there to be a ‘democratic equivalence’ something else is necessary: the construction of a new common sense which changes the identity of different groups, in such a way that demands of each group are articulated equivalently with those of others” (1985, p.183).

In short, the supremacy of a social group according to Gramsci, may either be secured through domination or intellectual and moral leadership, as a result of which the concept of hegemony came to be defined by him, as the moral, intellectual and political leadership over the allied classes, combining both of the requirements of supremacy. The struggle for the establishment of hegemonic power by a particular class, takes place at the level of civil society, defined by Gramsci, as the terrain that stands “between the economic structure and the State” (Hall, 1978, p.47), that includes both structural and superstructural elements, hinting at, the existence of traces of hegemony in all aspects of life like ideology itself.

CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSIONS

Tuzluçayır is bigger than Ankara. We know like that. Even when you ask the world; you will get the answer: Tuzluçayır is bigger than Ankara. (A., 46, male)

Tuzluçayır Ankara'dan büyüktür. Biz öyle tanıdık, öyle biliyoruz. Dünyaya da sorsan Tuzluçayır Ankara'dan büyüktür. (A., 46, male.)

Here, this study focuses on the results of a long field research conducted with 32 political activists in Tuzluçayır Neighborhood, primarily to seek the possibilities and ways of counter-hegemony formation and/or counter-hegemonic practices, and to trace the "local organic intellectuals" who have the potential to realize these counter-hegemonic practices. Quotation "Tuzluçayır is bigger than Ankara" signifies two essential points for this study: The first one is related with the question "Why Tuzluçayır?" as the identity of Tuzluçayır is one of the building blocks of this study. The answers given to this question pointed to reading through the eyes of the political activists, since the subjects of the research are them. In this sense, this study must not be seen as a neighborhood reading or as a neighborhood history. The other point is about the "identity of Tuzluçayır" which is also a building block for political activists in their attempt to form counter-hegemonic moments and/or space.

The identity of Tuzluçayır neighborhood takes us to concepts such as language, common sense and folklore that play an important role in the construction of this identity. These concepts, which I instrumentalized while discussing hegemony, are among the most important indicators that the identity of the neighborhood can create a sense of belonging beyond a city or even a nation. This belonging actually leads us to the concept of counter-hegemony, which is an alternative to the hegemonic formations imposed by the official ideology. As I argued throughout the study, the Tuzluçayır identity was established long before the JDP rule in the historical process

and will probably continue to exist after the JDP rule.

The pressure exerted on the neighborhood over the years is making Tuzluçayır a community. In this respect, we see identity and a sense of belonging in the neighborhood, almost created by the state which is nourished by the political organizations and accordingly by political activists. Here, I attempted to consider to what extent the oppositional political organizations can react to state/governments' hegemonic policies in the Tuzluçayır Neighborhood and what policies they adopted to take the popular support of Tuzluçayır people. In this sense, Gramsci's ideas are of critical importance in terms of following the traces of ideological moments and hegemonic formation in the neighborhood. Gramsci intensely dealt with morality and daily practices of people, including the social acts that are related to their daily lives, and he sees them worth to be analyzed. In addition, he bases his analysis on the question of what kind of an emancipatory potential can be witnessed in the practices of "ordinary people". This is why this study tried to pay attention to this matter to the extent that the activists contribute to the formation of counter-hegemony.

In Tuzluçayır, there was an immense world hidden in the everyday life of the "ordinary people" whether they are political activists or sympathizers, or the ones without any political affiliation. Here, the concepts of common sense, folklore, language which lead the way to understand the relation between ideology and hegemony were utilized. One of the basic meta-theoretical assumptions of Gramsci in respect to the term ideology was the unity between theory and praxis as mentioned above. For him, the gap between intellectuals and the people should be decreased in order to establish a hegemonic project which should include not only economic-corporate but also an intellectual leadership:

Every social group, coming into existence on the original terrain of an essential function in the world of economic production, creates together with itself, organically, one or more strata of intellectuals which give it homogeneity and an awareness of its own function not only in the economic but also in the social and political fields. (Gramsci, 1992, p.5)

Here, one can say that the remarks of this intellectual leadership could be traced in Tuzluçayır as they are able to organize the neighborhood as a whole. Throughout the study, it was discussed whether political activists could be defined as local organic intellectuals. This discussion actually included two separate sets of questions. The

potentials of activists to become intellectuals and the locality of intellectuals. The relationship they established with the local people, how the local people see them, how they see the local people in the face of their activism and how they assign a role to these people who are not organized in their politics brought me to an important conclusion. Their sensitivity to the demands of the people, their observance of the dynamics of the people while taking action, and most importantly, their efforts to defend and explain their right to self-determination, rather than directing the people, showed that they were organic intellectuals. In addition, as they often emphasize, the fact that the neighborhood has an important role in being an activist and/or maintaining this activism was frequently mentioned by the interviewees throughout the study.

The idea of a gap between intellectuals and the people should be understood in terms of the assumption of Gramsci that philosophy should rest on common sense, culture, language and folklore of people (2003, pp.13-15). Philosophy should not be separated from cultural history according to Gramsci, this inseparability from cultural aspects that belong to the people, the relationship between theory and praxis, the necessity of a viable overlap and compatibility between theory and praxis is plausible when the relationship between philosophy and culture in Gramsci is read. Here, the prudence in the public thinking of activists in Tuzluçayır, or “common sense” as a Gramscian term itself is not separable from philosophy. Their dominant philosophy seems to be succeeding in keeping in contact with the ideas of Tuzluçayır people and this is actually the basis of intellectual leadership. This reasoning of success of intellectuals is also expressed by Gramsci himself as follows: “...and this was not the least of reasons for its success, since such a conception correspond to latent aspirations and conformed to the development of the real forms of life.” (2000, p.10).

On the other hand, with the introduction of the “war of position”, Gramsci enables a long-term struggle for Marxism to soften up the enemy- capitalist system- which is in reality much more enduring to the economic wreckages than the Marxists anticipated (Anderson, 2004, p.137). This is also quite meaningful and noteworthy for Turkey as JDP governments since 2003; politics was perceived as a “war”, addressing both the strategies of taking consent and using force in Gramscian terms. Here, Tuzluçayır is obviously quite far away from the Sunni Islamic norms of JDP rule as the majority of the neighborhood is composed of the Alevi people.

As mentioned, one cannot talk about a single definition of Alevism and Alevis and also the meaning and values attributed to these definitions are as much as the number of the interviewees. The antique/ancient Alevism; Alevism as a politic and social movement and/or Modern Alevism describing itself as a belief is referred by the interviewees. Besides, there is quite an obvious transformation in the definition and content of Alevism since while some relate it with religious references, some refer to cultural norms and habits. However, there is a common point that Alevism comprises different classes, statuses and ideologies, but they come together in terms of being oppressed due to their relief. It is clearly seen that this commonality is the output of the being specifically oppressed and excluded, such as massacres and continually exclusion in social life. The Sivas massacres in 1993 affected them deeply and they accelerated organization-based identity.

Modern Alevism owed a lot to the specific and gradually increased oppression on Alevis who moved with left-wing before the 1980s as they could not experience the same freedom and/or privileges granted to Sunnis by the state. The religion-based demands of Alevis are nurtured from the mosques in Alevis towns and the *imams* in there, fed from the existence of the Directorate of Religious Affairs, from state's fostering to politic Islam and taking measures to prevent Alevis from the exclusion of Sunnis, as Küçükaydın said (2009).

The fact that 'being repressed' and 'opposition to power' facilitated Alevis being 'naturally' in alliance with the left-wing opposition which was also the case in Tuzluca. It is an essential building block for resistance movements of political organizations against the Sunni Islamist hegemonic manifestations in the neighborhood. At this stage, I need to clarify one point: Alevism is seen as a venue first and foremost for the activists in Tuzluca. Here, in the interviews the focus on Alevi identity and its power to "unite" people were emphasized constantly. No matter how they define it, the point in common is that Alevism acts as a mortar that holds the people of Tuzluca together. Regardless of how the public defines it, activists emphasize the political rather than the religious aspect of Alevism. In this sense, Alevism matters in terms of forming a "community of Tuzluca" which brings a reader to question whether the counter-hegemonic bloc in Tuzluca is supposed to

include the Turkish Sunnis as well. This is an important question that could be questioned in future research.

Throughout the study, to understand the counter-hegemonic practices and the possibility of creating a counter-hegemonic space, the official ideology and the power bloc that forms the hegemony is questioned. As mentioned above, in the struggle against the power bloc, an inter-class alliance between the subaltern groups is necessary for forming a counter-hegemonic project. Marx also defended the need for the alliance of the proletariat and other classes to make the revolution. However, his basic concern was not to form a popular alliance but to construct a unified proletariat. On the other hand, Poulantzas under the effect of Gramsci claimed that the proletariat should form an alliance with the intermediary classes: The petit-bourgeoisie should cooperate with the proletariat and the people should be unified against the power bloc.

In Tuzluçayır, the political activists attempted to form this alliance of the people by focusing on the “demands” of the people. This alliance was inter-class as although in the last instance they assumed the leadership of the proletariat for the revolution to become, this fired “war” necessitates a “united front against fascism”. In this war, they accepted that it is quite difficult to knock down the enemy in a total war which necessitates their strategic move to continue the war “on the positions” as the enemy has all the necessary tools both for consent and coercion.

Here, Purcell leads us to a definition while identifying the political organizations and activists in Tuzluçayır in the war against the official ideology and hegemony: a “counter-hegemonic articulation of differentiated but equivalent popular struggles” (2009, p.292). While mentioning their organizations and the actions they take, activists focused on their “ability” to act together with other political organizations not only because the enemy is strong but also the people are organized around several identities, demands and responsibilities. Here, they took the support of Tuzluçayır people from this articulation of diversity.

Another point that is questioned is the possibility to create a counter-hegemonic space. Here, King stated that creating a counter-hegemonic space is an essential manoeuvre of oppositional political organizations of the people regarding their daily experiences against the hegemonic politics of state/government.:

...preparedness for revolutionary change entails a massive process which reaches deeply into private organizations and private lives, into everyday reality of the subaltern classes, certainly seems consonant with theoretical concerns...that stress the importance of mass culture... (2002, p.186)

The struggle of Tuzluçayır activists against the Cami-Cemevi Project and Gezi Park Protests in 2013 were critical attempts to defend their space. Following Lefebvre, one can say that space is not solely the container of the social, political movements and/or resistance but also it (re)produce them in a dialectical way. The activists of Tuzluçayır, in this context, both utilize their neighborhood as a cradle for their political actions and they create an identity following the space they lived in. Here, Purcell suggests that the agenda of the inhabitants in the urban space

must be negotiated through a complex politics of scale, identity, and difference, among other struggles. The right to participation means that inhabitants will play a central role in the decisions that produce urban space...They may pursue the production of urban space to meet the needs of inhabitants, but what those needs are will be determined through negotiation and political struggle.

The political activists in Tuzluçayır in this sense attempt to provide the necessary conditions for the people to be “active” in terms of determining the use of their neighborhood. For Holston citizenship today is a “membership in a political association or community that articulates relation, not a dichotomy, between structures and social lives” (2010, p. 2) which is the kind of citizenship that the political activists attempt to construct in Tuzluçayır, as they said.

Here, one of the main arguments of this study is that hegemony could only function properly by using/dominating/manipulating the space as it is critical to understand the spatio-temporality of social relations. The proposal and theoretical framework of this study start from the proposition that hegemony needs space to dominate, which in dialectical form necessitates a counter-hegemonic formation to create its own space. Here, following the rise of neoliberal restructuring in the last three decades, the possibility to resist and break this restructuring process are questioned carefully. Following this line of thought, this study could be seen as an attempt to contribute to the literature that is discussing the possibility of counter hegemonic space through questioning the dynamics of conflict and resistance in a unique neighborhood. It is essential to understand why and what the residents of the neighborhood are resisting,

in other words, what is the coping strategy with the systematic exclusion they claimed to be faced with and the target of their resistance was tried to be examined.

Tuzluçayır is a neighborhood, a space that is both produced by and/or produce daily life as the struggle areas of hegemonic culture as well as other cultures. The interviewees, the political activists whether in the same political organization or not, could form a collectivity, a form of membership that is broader than a party or organization; more fluctuating. Here, these people have an impact on the decision-making procedures which inherit the potential for counter-hegemonic “moments”. I attempted to question if political organizations and political activists have an impact on political decision-making mechanisms. In general, it is an effective starting point to question the motivation of the activists to understand “why” they are politically organized. These political organizations and their members can be considered a threat against the existing socio-political system and the hegemony. In other words, political organizations protesting the institutional administrative system and existing power relations have the potential to challenge the existing hegemonic structure.

Valuing the demands of the neighborhood, the political organizations from the eyes of the activists are “plural, differentiate, democratic and/or inclusive”. Gramsci sees hegemony as a practice-performance to dominate- of the dominant class and the concept of counter-hegemony is important in Gramsci’s theory especially while talking about a new social/ political project. In a way, Gramsci replaces Lenin’s vanguard party with organic intellectual leadership which should be democratic in practice. Here, the interviews show that there is the core of counter-hegemonic leadership in the neighborhood which is democratic and responsive to the demands of the residents. These organic intellectuals attempt to create a counter-hegemonic space, an essential manoeuvre of oppositional political organizations of the people regarding their daily experiences against the hegemonic politics of state/government and they utilize their neighborhood as a cradle for their political actions and they created an identity following the space they lived in. However, it should be noted that the uniqueness and closure mentioned above is a limitation of this research. Relations with people outside and the perspective of people coming to the neighborhood from outside are not examined in detail in this study. In addition, the effects of macro-scale government policies on neighborhood and Alevi identity were not included in this

study. To open a parenthesis, the definitions of Alevism and the theological discussions related to Alevism are not examined in detail but rather were considered as a class identity. Because one of the important points in the study was to emphasize the possibility of establishing a counter-hegemony by considering Alevism as a class belonging, against the hegemony projects that the state puts forward. Here, this study aims to contribute to the political sociology discipline in terms of searching for the possibilities and/ways to build counter-hegemonic formations.

There is no simple formula, and/or a chronological order that simply shows us the causes and effects- the hegemonic moments and the reactions which create the “local” organic intellectuals in Tuzluçayır. One cannot talk about a direct connection between these causes and effects nor a time plot. This field research shows that being an “organic intellectual” in Tuzluçayır is highly related to the space and history of the neighborhood. They are all nodal points in a circle.

“Time never dies, circle is not round.”

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APPENDICES

A. LIST OF THE INTERVIEWEES

	Initials of the Names	Age	Sex
1	D.	26	Woman
2	S.	63	Man
3	A.	55	Woman
4	B.	41	Man
5	Y.	28	Man
6	S.	33	Man
7	R.	37	Woman
8	A.	41	Man
9	M.	40	Man
10	M.	41	Man
11	Y.	58	Man
12	M.	50	Man
13	H.	69	Man
14	S.	65	Woman
15	A.	43	Man
16	Z.	52	Woman
17	S.	44	Man
18	A.	69	Man
19	D.	35	Woman
20	C.	42	Woman
21	S.	56	Man
22	A.	46	Man
23	I.	43	Man
24	L.	50	Woman
25	Y.	51	Man
26	M.	44	Man
27	C.	57	Man
28	S.	39	Woman
29	F.	42	Woman
30	Z.	50	Woman
31	M.	64	Woman
32	Ş.	65	Woman

B. APPROVAL OF THE METU HUMAN SUBJECTS ETHICS COMMITTEE

UYGULAMALI ETİK ARAŞTIRMA MERKEZİ
APPLIED ETHICS RESEARCH CENTER



ORTA DOĞU TEKNİK ÜNİVERSİTESİ
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10 EKİM 2017

Konu: Değerlendirme Sonucu

Gönderen: ODTÜ İnsan Araştırmaları Etik Kurulu (İAEK)

İlgi: İnsan Araştırmaları Etik Kurulu Başvurusu

Sayın Prof.Dr. Helga RITTERSBERGER TILIÇ ;

Danışmanlığını yaptığınız doktora öğrencisi Duygu TANIŞ ZAFEROĞLU'nun "Dynamics of Conflict and Resistance from the Perspective of Political Activists in a Neighborhood: The Case of Tuzluçayır Neighborhood" başlıklı araştırmanız İnsan Araştırmaları Etik Kurulu tarafından uygun görülerek gerekli onay 2017-SOS-153 protokol numarası ile 18.10.2017 – 30.06.2018 tarihleri arasında geçerli olmak üzere verilmiştir.


Bilgilerinize saygılarımla sunarım.


Prof. Dr. Ş. Halil TURAN
Başkan V


Prof. Dr. Ayhan SOL
Üye


Prof. Dr. Ayhan Gürbüz DEMİR
Üye

BUI UNAMADI
Doç. Dr. Yaşar KONDAKÇI
Üye


Doç. Dr. Zana ÇITAK
Üye


Yrd. Doç. Dr. Binar KAYGAN
Üye


Yrd. Doç. Dr. Emre SELÇUK
Üye

C. CURRICULUM VITAE

DUYGU TANIŞ ZAFEROĞLU

Personal Information

Date of Birth: 10/23/1983
Place of Birth: Mersin/TURKEY
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Education

2011-... PhD:
Middle East Technical University/Ankara-TURKEY
Sociology
GPA: 4.00/4.00

2006- 2009 M.S Major:
Middle East Technical University/Ankara-TURKEY
Political Science
GPA: 3.64/4.00

2001-2006 B.S. Major:
Middle East Technical University/ Ankara- TURKEY
Political Science and Public Administration
GPA: 2.97/4.00

1994-2001 High School
Yusuf Kalkavan Anatolian High School / Mersin-
TURKEY
GPA: 4.75/5.00

Work Experience

10.2010- ...

Ankara University
Position: Instructor

10.2007 - 10.2010

TMMOB Chamber of Cadastre and Survey Engineers-
Ankara
Position: Press Consultant

Languages

Turkish (Native)
English (Fluent)
French (Beginner)

Research Interests

Social Movements and Civic Action
Social Change and Social Stratification
Urban Politics
Urban Poverty and Social Exclusion

Field Experience

- Field Research for PhD Thesis: "The Possibility of a Unified Struggle: Politics of Urban Mobilization in Tuzluçayır Neighborhood"

Date : March 2013- September 2018

Duration : 5 years, 3 hours/day

- Ethnographic Field Research for Master's Thesis: "The Decline of Community-based Solidarity among the Urban Poor: The Case of Bostancık Neighborhood in Ankara/Turkey"

Date : September 2008- February 2008

Duration : 6 months, 10 hours/day

- Field Research for 5. European Social Forum presentation "Displacement of Romani Population in Sulukule/İstanbul"

Date : May 2008- July 2008

Duration : 3 months, 6 hours/day

International Conferences

Sociology and Critical Perspectives Conference (DAKAM) (2015)

İstanbul/TURKEY

Title of Presentation: A Short Assessment on the Interconnections of Urban Policy, Patterns of Investment, Eviction and Conflicts Resulting from Gentrification/Redevelopment Projects in Metropolitan Cities of Turkey

European Sociological Association, 12th Conference (2015)

Prague/ CZECH REPUBLIC

Title of Presentation: "Urban Image and Its Cinematic Representation: The case of Ankara" with Zeynep Baykal

V. European Social Form (2008)

Malmö/SWEDEN

Title of the Presentation: "The Urban Transformation Projects and the Human Rights- The Case of Romani People in Sulukule/İstanbul"

National Conferences

VIII. National Sociology Congress (2016)

Ankara/TURKEY

Title of Presentation: Creative Destruction of Citizenship: Analysis of Political Opposition in Tuzluçayır Neighborhood through the Concept of Insurgent Citizenship

XII. Turkish Social Science Association National Congress (2011)

Ankara/TURKEY

Title of Presentation: “The Excluded Urban Poor: A Case Study on Ankara Bostancık Neighborhood”

II. Bogazici University, The Ataturk Institute for Modern Turkish History Conference for Graduate Students (2009)

İstanbul/TURKEY

Title of the Presentation:“The Representation of the SubAltern Classes in Cinema: The Arabesque Films”

X. Turkish Social Science Association National Congress (2007)

Ankara/ TURKEY

Title of Presentation: “The Relationship of Kemalism with the Left”

Publications

Article in a refereed journal “**Türksolu Dergisi: Beyaz Türk’ün Karanlık Oyunu**” (in Turkish) in The Journal of Mülkiye, Volume 258

Available from: <http://www.mulkiyederigi.org/>

Articles in Periodicals

“**Hegemonik Bir Siyasetin İnşasına Doğru: AKP’nin Darbe Söylemi**” with Yunus Yücel (in Turkish) in Ayrıntı Dergi, Volume 17 (October -November 2016)

“**Kent için Savaşmak: Yurttaşların Başkaldırısı**” (in Turkish) in Ayrıntı Dergi, Volume 13 (December 2015-January 2016)

“**Hollywood’un Müstesna Düşmanları: Naziler**” (in Turkish) in Ayrıntı Dergi, Volume 21 (May-June 2017)

“**Daha: “Zaman asla ölmez, çember yuvarlak değildir**” (in Turkish) in Ayrıntı Dergi, Volume 22 (August-September 2017)

Book Chapter **“Pandora’nın Kutusu: Ne Gelir Elimizden İnsan Olmaktan Başka?”** in *Kadın Sineması: Kadınların Kaleminden*, edited by Sevcin Sönmez, Hale Satıcı, Doruk Yayıncılık, 2019.

Book Chapter (translation) **"Sosyal Hareketler ve Sosyal Değişim"** (Social Movements and Social Change) in *Siyaset Sosyolojisi: Devletler, Sivil Toplumlar ve Küreselleşme (The Handbook of Political Sociology: States, Civil Societies and Globalization)*, edited by Thomas Janoski, Robert Alford, Alexander Hicks, Mildred A Schwartz: Phoenix, 2010.

Memberships Member of Editorial Board – Ayrıntı Dergi
(<http://ayrintidergi.com.tr/>)

Member of Disciplinary Board - Education and Science Workers' Union (Eğitim-Sen)

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(Spring)

Interests Playing guitar
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Package/LibreOffice
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References

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D. TURKISH SUMMARY / TÜRKÇE ÖZET

Türkiye siyasi tarihine baktığımızda, siyasi ve/veya toplumsal muhalefet hareketlerini destekledikleri/besledikleri için muhalif özellikleriyle tanınan mahalleler olduğunu görürüz. Ankara’da bulunan Tuzluçayır Mahallesi de, toplumsal muhalefetin yükseldiği, iktidarların siyasi, ekonomik ve kültürel tahakkümünün görünür kılındığı zamanlarda muhalefetin, direniş hareketlerinin de görünür hale geldiği, 'eleştirel' konumuyla tanınan bir mekan olarak karşımıza çıkıyor. “Muhalif karakterli” mekânların, onları siyasi iktidara ve/veya devlete muhalif olarak damgalanmaya iten bir ortak noktası aynı zamanda onların direnme motivasyonu olarak karşımıza çıkmaktadır: Hepsi de Türkiye'deki ana akım 'vatandaş' profili olan “Türk ve Sünni” kategorisinin dışında kalan insanları içinde barındırmıştır. Bu mahallelerin sakinleri çeşitli ekonomik, kültürel ve sosyal geçmişlerden gelse de, hepsi genellikle hükümet politikalarından, toplumdaki, çoğunlukla ekonomik ilişkilerden ve mekansal ilişkilerden dışlanmaktadır. Bu nedenle, ağırlıklı olarak etnik ve dini azınlıklardan oluşan alt/orta sınıf hanelerden oluşan bu mahalleler, toplumun dışlanmış/dışlanmışlarını barındırmaktadır. Tuzluçayır'daki bu dışlama esas olarak siyasi biçimdedir; mahalle kurulduğundan beri ana akım siyasetin muhalefeti için özgürleştirilmiş bir alan, güvenli bir bölge olmuş ve bu nedenle “küçük Moskova” olarak da anılmıştır. Bir bakıma Tuzluçayır'daki direniş hareketleri bu tür dışlamalarla başa çıkma stratejisi olarak görülebilir.

Bu tez, bünyesinde barındırdığı muhalif hareketlerin, diğer mekanların aksine mahalleye karşı bir aidiyet hissettikleri, siyasi aktivistlerin mahallenin kimliğinden beslendikleri ve hatta mahallenin kimliğinin kendi aktivizmlerini başlattığı; başlatmadığı durumlarda da beslediği ve yönlendirdiği bir mahalle olarak Tuzluçayır'daki bu dinamikleri anlamayı amaçlamakta. Bu çalışma temel olarak iki temel soru etrafında şekilleniyor: Siyasal aktörlerin hegemonya karşıtı hareketlerin ve/veya hegemonya karşıtı alanların oluşumundaki rolü nedir? Bu aktörleri “yerel organik aydın” olarak tanımlamak mümkün müdür?

Kısa bir girişten sonra yazdığım ikinci bölümde bu çalışmanın neden Tuzluçayır'da yapıldığını bu sorulara odaklanarak özetlemeye çalıştım. Okurun tezin ismini görünce ilk aklına gelen Neden Tuzluçayır? sorusuna alana inmeden elde edilebilen veriler ve mahalleye dair ilk gözlemler, araştırmalar, okumalar ve haberler üzerinden cevap vermeye çalıştım. Bu açıdan Tuzluçayır Mahallesi'ni diğer mahallelerden ayıran özellikleri ve mahallenin muhalif kimliğinin nelerden kaynaklanabileceğine dair ilk izlenimleri bu kısımda anlattım. Karşı-hegemonya oluşturma potansiyellerinin ve aktivistlerin karşı-hegemonik pratiklerin oluşmasındaki “özümlü” rollerinin sorgulandığı bu ilk bölüm, bir nevi alan araştırmasına da giriş niteliği taşımakta.

Gramsci bize Tuzluçayır'ı siyasi aktivistlerin ve muhalif oluşumların mahalledeki değişim ve dönüşümü tetikleme/yaratma/yönlendirme/organize etme potansiyeli açısından anlamak ve analiz etmek için bir dizi analitik araç sunmaktadır. İkinci bölümde Gramsci'nin sunduğu bu analitik araçları tezin sorularını akılda tutarak incelemeye çalıştım. Bu açıdan organizasyon kolaylığını düşünerek Gramsci'nin kavram setlerini, kültürel ve politik olanlar şeklinde iki ana kategoriye ayırdım. Bu sayede mahallede yer alan muhalif organizasyonlar ve siyasi aktivistlerin siyasi ve kültürel olarak karşı-hegemonik alanlara yaratmadaki başarılarının her iki alana da vurgu yapılarak değerlendirilmesi gerektiğini düşünüyorum.

Bu açıdan ilk olarak, Gramsci'nin kültürel alanın belirleyici özelliğini vurgularken tartıştığı kavramlar olan dil, ortak duyu, praxis felsefesi ve folklor tartışıldı. Bu fikirleri özetlemek, kültürel hegemonik potansiyelini anlamak açısından açıklayıcı olacaktır. Landy'nin belirttiği gibi Gramsci, “üstü yapı üzerindeki” kültürel pratiklerin devrimci bir teori ile el ele gitmesi gerektiğinin ve bu yolun madun sınıfların kültürel pratiklerinden geçtiğinin farkındaydı. Çünkü “devrimci değişime hazırlık, özel örgütlere ve özel yaşamlara, madun sınıfların günlük gerçekliğine derinlemesine ulaşan kitlesel bir süreci gerektirir, kitle kültürünün önemini vurgulayan teorik kaygılarla kesinlikle uyumlu görünmektedir”. (Landy, 1986, s. 68). Bu açıdan Gramsci, insanların ahlakını ve günlük pratiklerini önemser ve onları analiz etmeye değer görür. Gramsci analizini sıradan insanların pratiklerinde nasıl bir özgürleşme potansiyeline tanık olabileceğimiz sorusuna dayandırır. Burada Gramsci'nin siyasi, ekonomik, tarihi ve kültürel meseleleri aynı anda ele aldığı söylenebilir. Bu aynı zamanda, onun için bir başlangıç noktası seçemeyebileceğinden, onu incelemekte bir

zorluk yaratır; kavramlarının çoğu birbiriyle bağlantılı olduğundan, bu onların kavrayışlarını bireysel olarak ağırlaştırır; “herhangi bir” kavramı anlamak için okuyucunun kavramları birbirleriyle düşünmesi ve analiz etmesi gerekir.

Buna göre Gramsci'nin hegemonya ve/veya karşı hegemonya kavramını anlamak için folklor kavramını sağduyu ve dil yardımıyla detaylandırmak gerekir:

...Gramsci, dilin, folklorun, sağduyunun, dinin ve benzerlerinin herkese dünya anlayışı sağladığı ölçüde, herkesin (bilinçsiz de olsa) zaten bir filozof olduğunu ileri sürer; bu nedenle, herkes bir filozoftur çünkü eleştirel düşünme potansiyeli doğasında vardır. Yine de Gramsci'ye göre, tutarlı bir dünya kavrayışının başarısı, hakim olan sağduyunun, folklorun ve benzerlerinin eleştirel dönüşümünü içerir. (Wainwright, 2013, s. 165)

Madun sınıfların ideolojisi olan folklor, kültürel alanla sınırlandırılmaz -aslında bu Gramsci'nin diğer konuları için de geçerlidir- ve bu nedenle Gramsci doğrudan folklor üzerine çok fazla yazmamış olsa da, kültürel alandaki hegemonya pratiklerini anlamak için temel bir kavramdır. Bu çalışma da, Tuzluçayır'da siyasi aktivistlerin önderliğinde yeni “bir folklor” oluşturma çabalarının varlığını göstermeyi amaçlamıştır. Gramsci, “İtalya'da tarihsel olarak ulusal-popüler kültür, yani İtalyan aydınları ile geniş ulusal kitleler arasında organik bir ilişkinin olduğu hiçbir kültür biçimi yoktu” der. Ayrıca, “aydınların bir ulusal-popüler ittifakı oluşturmadaki başarısızlığı, İtalya'da seçkinler ile İtalya arasındaki seçkin kültür ve popüler kültür arasındaki uçurumun sürmesine katkıda bulunmuştur...” (Gramsci, 2000, s. 363) der. Gramsci'ye göre aydınlar, halkın entelektüel ihtiyaçlarını karşılamaktan acizdir ve dolayısıyla “yönetici aydınlar ile halk kitleleri arasında derinlere kök salmış bir demokratik dayanışma bağının yokluğu”ndan bahseder (Boelhower, 1981, s. 584). İşte Tuzluçayır'da siyasi aktivistlerin “halktan kopuk” aydınların aksine bu bağı kurabildiğine tanık oluruz.

Tüm bunları tartışırken bir noktaya sürekli geri döndüm: Gramsci'nin temel kaygısı, Marksist bir aktivist olarak kullandığı kültürel kavramların karşı hegemonik bir kültür yaratmak için mevcut potansiyellerini sorgulamak ve hatta bu potansiyeli arttırmanın/sağlamlaştırmanın politikasını üretebilmek. Bu motivasyon, genel olarak teorisinin ve özel olarak dil, sağduyu, folklor ve popüler kültür konusundaki çalışmalarının çerçevesini de belirleyen bir tema çizer bize. Temel ve özgün kavramsallaştırmalarından biri olan geleneksel ve organik aydın arasındaki ayrım da onun bu motivasyonunda yatmaktadır. Gramsci, geleneksel entelektüellik

anlayışlarına meydan okur ve organik aydınların misyonuna vurgu yapar, “bütün insanlar aydındır, ancak tüm insanlar toplumda aydınların işlevine sahip değildir” (Landy, 1986, s. 55) der.

Gramsci, aydınlar ve halk arasındaki ilişkiyi eleştirel olarak değerlendirir: “popüler unsur hisseder ama her zaman anlamaz veya bilmez; aydın unsur bilir ama her zaman anlamaz ve özellikle her zaman hissetmez.” (Nun ve Cartier, 1986, s. 207). Gramsci hakiki bir aydının, halkın duyularını ihmal etmemesi gerektiğinin altını çizer. Yeni bir kültürel hegemonya yaratmak için organik aydınlara duyulan ihtiyaç üzerindeki vurgusu, madun grupların günlük deneyimlerine ilişkin farkındalığından kaynaklanmaktadır. Landy'nin belirttiği gibi, "Güney'deki deneyimleri ona köylülerin ve işçilerin akılsız otomatlar olmadığını, ikelliğin mitolojisine rağmen, ezilenlerin kendi dünyalarını yalnızca ilkel de olsa bir anlayışa sahip olduklarını öğretmişti." (1986, s. 55). Görüldüğü gibi halk arasında ve onların kültürel pratiklerinde dikkate değer bir özellik gördüğü için “insanlara gitmekten” fazlasını yapmaya çalışır. Bütün insanlar pratikte hareket ettikleri kadar filozoflardır, der Gramsci ve "kendiliğinden felsefe"nin herkese uygun olduğunu ekler (2000, s. 325). Daha sonra kitlelerin bu felsefesinin ifade bulduğu alanları sayar, bunlar dil, ortak duyu ve folklordür.

Tüm bu kültürel kavramlar birbiriyle derinden bağlantılıdır, öyle ki birini bilmeden diğerini anlamak zordur. Burada, bu çalışmada Tuzluçayır Mahallesi'ndeki siyasi aktivistlerin karşı-hegemonya oluşturmadaki rolünü anlamada dil, ortak duyu, folklor ve organik aydın kavramları kullanılmış, daha da ötesinde alan araştırması bu kavramların üzerine inşa edilmiştir. Ancak, nasıl ki Gramsci kültürel ve siyasi alanı birbirinden keskin sınırlarla ayırmayıp bu iki alt alandaki kavramları birbirlerini ve sistemi anlamak için kullandıysa, ikinci alt bölümde bende Gramsci'nin özelde siyasi oluşumları genelde ise toplumu ve toplumsal muhalefeti anlama konusunda bize yol gösteren tarihsel blok, ideoloji ve hegemonya kavramlarının bu çalışma için önemini anlatmaya çalıştım.

Gramsci, gündelik hayattaki her şeyin birbiriyle ilişkili olduğundan hareketle diyalektik bir analiz sunar. Burada temel kaygısı, madun sınıfların birbiriyle eklenmesini ve siyasi ve kültürel biçimler arasındaki birliği anlamaktır. Bu çalışma için de kritik olan önemli nokta Gramsci'nin faşizmin Avrupa'da neden yükseldiğini

yanıtlamaya çalışırken sorguladıklarının altında yatıyor aslında. Gramsci temel olarak madunların faşist hükümetlere neden kitlesel destek verdiği ve muhtemelen bunlardan daha da önemlisi, halk adına bu hegemonik hakimiyetin nasıl tersine çevrilebileceğinin diğer bir deyişle karşı-hegemonya yaratmanın mümkün olup olmadığının yanıtlarını aradı. Burada Gramsci'nin tariflediği şekliyle sivil toplum, hegemonyanın işlediği alandır, hegemonya gücünü sivil toplumun rızasından alır. Siyaset, alt yapı ile üst yapı arasındaki ilişkilerde anahtar olduğu için üstyapının vazgeçilmez bir düzeyidir. Siyasetin ekonomik yasalardan farklı olarak kendi kuralları vardır ve kültürel düzeyde Gramsci'yi praksise taşıyan kavramlar siyasetle de karşılıklı bir ilişki içerisinde karşımıza çıkar.

Gramsci, ideolojiyi, öznelere kendilerini temsil etmeye çalıştıkları bir toplumsal mücadele alanı anlamına gelen dinamik bir mekan analizine dönüştürür. Bu anlamda ideoloji, sürekli olarak yeniden şekillendirilen bir toplumsal pratiktir ve ideolojik oluşumların hiçbirinin kalıcı değildir. Yukarıda bahsettiğim gibi, Gramsci, altyapı ve üstyapının klasik modelini değiştirir: altyapının (ekonominin) üst yapı üzerindeki belirleyiciliği mutlak tahakkümünü reddetmekle birlikte son kertede ekonominin belirleyici olduğu gerçeğini kabul eder. Bu anlamda kültürel unsurların sivil toplumdaki işlevlerini ifade eden üstyapı için tarihsel anın toplumsal ve siyasal koşullarını değiştirme gücüne dikkat çeker. İdeolojik kategoriler Marx tarafından da kabul edilmiş olsa da, Gramsci'de ideolojinin bilinçli bir alan oluşturma ve insan eylemlerini organize etme "iradesi" vardır. Bu anlamda, ideolojiye madun sınıfları örgütlenme ve etkileme gücü atfeder.

İşte bu çalışma için temel bir yapıtaşısı ideolojinin madun sınıfları örgütlenme ve etkileme gücüne işaret eden bu "irade"sidir. Tuzluçayır Mahallesi özelinde sıklıkla vurguladığım gibi, ideoloji örgütlü olmayan mahalleliyi politize etme ve "kendi kaderlerini tayin" etme konusunda cesaretlendirme potansiyeline sahip en güçlü araçlardan biri olarak karşımıza çıkar.

Gramsci'ye göre iktidar bloğuna karşı mücadelede, hegemonik bir karşı proje oluşturmak için madun sınıflar arasında sınıflar arası bir ittifak gerektirir. Marx devrim yapmak için proletarya ve diğer sınıfların ittifakının gerekliliğini savundu, ancak temel kaygısı halkın ittifakını oluşturmak değil, birleşik bir proletaryayı inşa etmektir. Ünlü

teorisyen Poulantzas ise bir adım ileri giderek, proletaryanın/madunların orta sınıfla ittifak kurması gerektiğini iddia etti: Küçük-burjuva proletarya ile işbirliği yapmalı ve halk iktidar bloğuna karşı birleşmeliydi.

Çalışmanın üçüncü bölümünde toplumu Gramsci'nin kavramları üzerinden tartışırken, dördüncü bölümde hegemonya inşasının başat aktörü olan “devlet”in okumasını Poulantzas üzerinden yaptım. Bu açıdan ilk alt kısımda Poulantzas'ın hegemonya kavramını nasıl okuduğunu ve hegemonya kavramına getirdiği katkıları/yenilikleri anlatmaya çalıştım. Poulantzas'ın devlet teorisi için Gramsci'nin etkisi ve hegemonya kavramı, iktidarın devlet ve sınıflar arasında ve/veya devlet içinde dağılımını şekillendirmesi noktasında oldukça belirgindir. Araçsalcı yaklaşıma mesafeli duran Poulantzas, iktidar bloğu içindeki ilişkileri yapısalcı bir noktadan sorgular. Poulantzas'la özdeşleşen “iktidar bloğu” kavramı Gramscici hegemonyaya dayanmaktadır, çünkü esas olarak egemen bir sınıfın bir sınıf fraksiyonunun iktidar bloğunda hegemonik hale gelmesinin yolunu sorgulayan bir kavram olarak karşımıza çıkar. Siyasi İktidar ve Sosyal Sınıflar (1968) gibi ilk çalışmalarında Poulantzas demokratik bir sosyalizme doğru tutarlı bir politika çizmenin oldukça zor olduğu daha soyut ve teorik argümanları vurgulamaktaydı Ancak, tıpkı “proletarya diktatörlüğü” gibi kavramların (hem teori hem de pratik açısından) uygulanabilir ve demokratik olmadığını öngörerek, Avrupa'da tahakküm altına alınan sınıfların egemen olmasını sağlayacak bir yol, somut bir strateji geliştirmeye çalıştı. Sovyetler Birliği, Marx'ın öngördüğü şekilde bir geçiş aşaması olarak proletarya diktatörlüğünü uygulamıştı, ancak sonuç, devletçi bir rejim olarak kabul edilebilecek Stalinizm olmuştu. Dolayısıyla Poulantzas'a göre Avrupa Solu bu hataları görmeli ve sosyalizmin kendisi “demokrasi” anlamına geldiği için sosyalizme demokratik bir yol çizmeliydi. (2000, s. 257).

Bu anlamda Günümüz Kapitalizminde Sınıflar (1974) adlı çalışmasında Poulantzas devlet teorisini komünist hareketin stratejik sorunlarına uygulamaya çalışır (Wood, 1985, s. 40). Ve bu girişim, son kitabı Devlet, İktidar ve Sosyalizm (1978) ile oldukça açıklığa kavuşur. Poulantzas'a göre devletin siyasal iktidarı özünde devletin kurumsal yapısında saklı olduğu için basitçe üretim ilişkileriyle ilişkilendirilemeyecek başka bir doğası vardır (2000, s. 12). “Devlet” sabit bir nesne olmadığı için; aksine ilişkilerle sürekli reten ve yeniden üretilen canlı bir ilişkiler bütünü olduğu için “genel bir devlet

teorisi” oluşturmak imkansızdır. Bu açıdan “kapitalist devlet” vurgusu, Marksist teoride eksik olan bir devlet teorisi oluşturma girişimi olarak görülebilir (Karahanoğulları ve Türk, 2018, s. 412). Poulantzas bu teorisiyle devletin içindeki çelişkileri yoğunlaştırmanın yanı sıra devlet dışındaki halk kitlelerini harekete geçirmeyi amaçlayan bir strateji yaratmaktadır. Devleti bir nesne olarak tanımlayan tüm teorileri reddederek devlet aygıtlarının kendi güçlerine sahip olamayacağını iddia eder; devlet sınıf ilişkilerini somutlaştırır ve yoğunlaştırır.

Cornoy'un “Diktatörlüğün Krizi” kitabından alıntılacağı gibi, Poulantzas'a göre: “Devlet, içsel araçsal özü olan bir 'varlık' değil, kendisi bir ilişkidir, daha doğrusu bir sınıf ilişkisinin yoğunlaşmasıdır” (1984, s. 154). Sosyal sınıflarla ilgili bu devlet anlayışı, devlet aygıtlarının doğası gereği sınıf mücadeleleri tarafından işaretlendiği gerçeğini de vurgular. Poulantzas daha sonraki çalışmalarında, “...devlet için bir 'yapı' yoktur; daha ziyade, devletin biçimi ve işlevi, kapitalizmdeki sınıf mücadelesi ve devletin bu mücadeledeki rolü tarafından şekillendirilir.” (2000, s. 126). Böyle bir argümanın Marksist teori için en önemli yansıması, dışlayıcı ekonomik mücadeleden ziyade işçi sınıfı için siyasi mücadeleyi vurgulamasıdır. Poulantzas'a göre, devlet aygıtları “...toplumsal sınıfların oluşumu ve yeniden üretimi, sınıf egemenliği ve toplumsal işbölümünde” çok önemli bir role sahiptir. (2000, s. 28)

Bu konuda Poulantzas, Gramsci ve Althusser'in ötesine geçer: ilk olarak, ideolojik ve baskıcı devlet aygıtları arasındaki ayrımı bulanıklaştırarak; ikincisi, ekonomik devlet aygıtları olan ideolojik ve baskıcı devlet aygıtlarına üçüncü bir tür devlet aygıtı ekleyerek. Poulantzas, ideolojik devlet aygıtları ile baskıcı devlet aygıtları arasındaki ayrımın, baskıcı devlet aygıtları da ideolojik olarak sınırlandırıldığından, yalnızca tanımlayıcı ve gösterge niteliğinde olabileceğini iddia eder. (1984, s. 110) Ayrıca, Poulantzas şunu ileri sürer: “Devletin biçimlerine ve kapitalist yeniden üretimin aşamalarına göre, belirli aygıtlar bir alandan diğerine, ideolojik aygıtlardan baskıcıya ve tam tersi hareket edebilir.” (2000, s. 36)

İkinci mesele, birincisinden daha önemlidir. Poulantzas, Althusser ve Gramsci'yi kendi devlet teorilerinde devletin ancak baskı ve ideolojik telkin yoluyla hareket edebileceği temelinde eleştirir; yani, onlara göre devlet sadece bir engelleyici, dışlayıcı, denetleyici vb. olarak olumsuz bir şekilde hareket eder. Böyle bir ön

varsayımın ekonomiyi kendi kendini yeniden üretebilir olarak tasavvur ettiğini iddia eder. Aksine Poulantzas, devleti kapitalist yeniden üretim sürecinin kalbiyle meşgul olarak algılar. Onun dediği gibi:

...Devlet de olumlu bir şekilde hareket eder, yaratır, dönüştürür ve gerçeğe dönüştürür. Devletin mevcut işlevlerinin maddiliğinde baskı ve ideolojik telkinlerin mevcut olduğunu söylemeye gerek yok. Ancak kelimelerle oynamadıkça, Devletin ekonomik faaliyetlerini yalnızca bu ikili modaliteye atıfta bulunarak kavramak pek mümkün değildir. (2000, s. 30)

Özetlemek gerekirse, Poulantzas'a göre madun sınıfların temel bir görevi vardır: halk kitlelerini iktidar bloğuna karşı mücadelede birleştirmek. Bu anlamda sınıflar arasında bir ittifak olmalıdır: Küçük-burjuvazi proletarya ile işbirliği yapmalı ve halk iktidar bloğuna karşı birlik olmalıdır. Tüm bu kavramlar Poulantzas'ın bu çalışma için önemini ortaya koydu aslında. Poulantzas'ın iktidar bloğuna karşı mücadelesi ve sınıflar arası kitlesel bir ittifakın imkanı, alan araştırmasında Tuzluçayır'da yaşayan siyasi aktivistlerin eylemleri ve politikaları üzerinden tartışıldı. Bu çalışma için bir diğer önemli nokta da, Türkiye'de özellikle 12 Eylül 1980 askeri darbesinden sonra yaşanan sürecin eleştirel bir okuması yapılırken Poulantzas'ın gözünden bir okuma yapmanın gerekliliğini gözden kaçırmamaktı.

Poulantzas, bir sınıf devleti olarak etkin bir şekilde işlev görebilmek için kapitalist devletin üretimde sınıf mücadelesinden nispeten özerk olması gerektiğini öne sürerken, siyasal ve ekonomik olanın görece özerkliğinin altını çizer. Böyle bir özerklik, aynı zamanda AKP iktidarının da bir özelliği olan ekonomik ve siyasal sınıf mücadelelerinin belirgin bir ayrımına neden olur. AKP iktidar(lar)ı kendisini genel çıkarı temsil ediyormuş gibi sunar, ancak aslında egemen sınıfların siyasal çıkarlarını temsil eder. Alt ve orta/alt sınıfları bireyselleştirip izole ederken, egemen sınıflar için sınıf birliğini sağlarlar. Sonuç olarak, tüm bunlar "...hegemonik sınıf liderliği ile karakterize edilen bir devlet olarak kapitalist bir devletin gelişmesine" sağlar. (Jessop, 1982, s. 162).

Öte yandan iktidara geldiği 2002'den bu yana AKP, Gramsci'nin kavramlarını tartışırken gördüğümüz gibi iktidarı perçinleme noktasında çok önemli bir role sahip olması beklenen kendi organik aydınlarını yaratmaya çalıştı. Siyasal mücadeleyi başlatmanın yanı sıra "kollektif irade" etrafında hegemonik bir tahakkümün kurulmasında son derece etkili olan AKP iktidarını meşrulaştırmaları beklendi.

Hatırlayalım, Poulantzas devletin kesin olarak siyasi işlevini “siyasi sınıf çatışmasında siyasi düzenin korunması” ile tanımlar. AKP hükümeti(leri) yıllar içinde devlet kurumlarının her bir siyasi hücreğine nüfuz ederek üretim ve sömürü ilişkilerini devletteki merkezî rollerinden uzaklaştırdı.

Poulantzas'a göre kapitalist devlet, egemen sınıfların fraksiyonları arasındaki mücadeleler için bir çerçeve sağlar ve işçi sınıfını bireyselleştirir ve daha sonra onları bir ulusa yeniden entegre eder. Tabiri caizse, AKP iktidar(lar)ı altında devlet, sınıf mücadelesi için siyasi bir alan sağlar ve böylece -tıpkı kapitalist devletin bir mücadeleden ortaya çıkması gibi- devlet, sınıf mücadelesi tarafından şekillendirilir. Burada devlet, iktidar blokunun fraksiyonlarının çatışmalarını çözdüğü kurum olarak işlev görür. Üstelik bu çatışmalar sadece devlet iktidarı için ortaya çıkmamakta, devletin aygıtları arasında da gerçekleşmektedir. İkinci olarak, Poulantzas, yukarıda değinildiği gibi, devlet ve tahakküm altındaki sınıflar arasındaki ilişkide, devletin, tahakküm altındaki kitleleri bölerek ve örgütsüzleştirerek, iktidar bloğu ile tahakküm altına alınan sınıflar arasındaki çatışmalara aracılık etmeye çalıştığının altını çizmiştir. 2002 yılından itibaren AKP iktidar(ları)nın uyguladığı kanun ve yönetmelikler, ekonomik politikalarla bağlantılı olarak, insanların sosyal, siyasi, kültürel ve hatta biyolojik hayatlarına müdahale etti. Bu hegemonik projede tabii ki bir *persona non grata* da gerekiyordu, iktidar bloğunun kendi içinde yaşadığı çatışmalarda dönemin ruhunu ve gerekliliklerini yansıtan istenmeyen kişiler sıklıkla işaret edildi. Bu açıdan iktidarın kendi yarattığı ideallere uymayan insan ve ailelerin hedefe konması kaçınılmaz oldu.

Aileyi, "ideal" yurttaş-özne arayışında hükümet müdahalesinin bir yeri olarak görmek yeni değil. Nükhet Sirman (2005) 'ailesel vatandaşlık' terimini, eşit erkeklerden oluşan bir topluluk olarak tasavvur edilen Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin egemenliğin erkek hane reislerine dağıtılmasına dayandırıldığını belirtmek için ortaya attı. Bu, ideal vatandaşın bir bireyden ziyade egemen bir koca ve onun bağımlı karısı/annesi olarak kaydedildiği cinsiyetçi bir söylem kurdu ve sonuç olarak ailesel bir söylem içindeki konumun kişiye devlet içinde statü kazandırdığı sonucuna varıldı. Gerçekten de Türkiye’de kamu yaşamına nüfuz eden aile ve akrabalık deyimi ve erkek koruma kinayesi, devlet başkanının itaat ve saygı talep eden babalar gibi davranmasını (makul değilse de) mümkün kılmaktadır (Kandiyoti, 2016, s.107).

Burada “ideal yurttaş”a yüklenen anlamlar, haklardan çok sorumlulukları olan yurttaşın “yaratılması” ve tahakküm altına alınması şeklindeki muhafazakar yaklaşımla da yakından ilgilidir. Tebaa (vasal) kültürü Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'ndan miras kaldığı için “vatandaşlık” kavramının Türkiye'de çoğunluk tarafından sahiplenilmediğine inanıyorum. Işın, vatandaşlığı yurttaşların (içeridekilerin), öznelere (yabancıların, dışarıdakilerin) ve atılmışların (muhaliflerin) kim olduğunu ve bu aktörlerin nasıl yönetileceğini belirleyen dinamik (siyasi, yasal, sosyal ve kültürel ama aynı zamanda cinsel, estetik ve etik) bir tahakküm kurumu olarak tanımlar. Vatandaşlık üyelik değil, onu oluşturan (özne) konumların davranışını yöneten bir ilişkidir. Yurttaş olmak neredeyse her zaman içeriden biri olmaktan daha fazlası olmak anlamına gelir - aynı zamanda içeriden biri olmaya uygun davranış biçimlerine ve biçimlerine hakim olmak demektir (2009, s. 372). Bu tanımdan yola çıkarak vatandaşlık, devlet ile vatandaş arasındaki sosyal etkileşime dikkat çeken ilişki ve dinamik bir kavramdır. Bu anlamda devlet, bu ilişkilerden türeyen çelişkileri de içerir ve sabit bir varlıktan ziyade bir ilişki olan “devlet”in bir parçasıdır. Poulantzas, kitle mücadelesinin devletin dışından kaynaklanabilmesine rağmen, egemen ve tahakküm altındaki sınıflar arasındaki çelişkilerin, politik mücadeleler oldukları sürece devletin dışında kalamayacağını savunmaktaydı. İşte AKP iktidarında bu çelişkiler “devlet işleri”nin bir parçası olarak görülmektedir.

Poulantzas, Türkiye'nin 21. yüzyılına yerleşen “kapitalist devlet”i anlamak için bir çerçeve çizerken, yukarıda da bahsettiğimiz gibi buradan çıkış yolunu da gösterir. Tabii ki bunun ütöpik bir rüya mı yoksa gerçekçi bir çözüm mü olduğu oldukça tartışmalıdır. Veya kapitalist devletten çıkış yolunun zamanımız ve coğrafyamızla da alakalı olduğunu söyleyebilir miyiz? Yukarıda bahsedildiği gibi, Poulantzas için “sosyalizm demokrasidir ve demokratik olmayan gerçek bir sosyalizm olamaz” (2002, s. 168). Burada, Poulantzas'ın önerdiği yöntem, halk kitlelerinin mücadeleleri sonucunda devlet içindeki güç ilişkilerinin değiştirilmesi yoluyla sosyalizme giden demokratik bir yoldur. Halk kitlelerinin “kapitalist” devlete alternatif yaratma kapsamında iktidar blokuna karşı verdiği mücadelenin yüceltilmesi bu çalışmanın temel yapıtaşlarından biridir. İşte bu çalışmada, halk mücadelelerini iktidar bloğuna karşı işçi sınıfının hegemonyası altında birleştirmenin imkanı ve yöntemleri tartışılmaya çalışılmıştır. Böyle bir siyasi mücadelede, küçük burjuvazinin işçi sınıfı

etrafında kutuplaştırılması ve halkların iktidar bloğuna karşı işçi sınıfı öncülüğünde birleşmesi gerektiği için orta sınıflarla ittifak yapılmalıdır. Jessop'un Poulantzas'dan alıntılacağı gibi, bu “... ittifak içindeki sınıflar ve fraksiyonlar arasındaki farklılıkları tanıyan, 'halk arasındaki çelişkileri' aşamalı olarak çözmeye ve onları birleştirmeye çalışan ve potansiyel sınıf konumlarını (veya taleplerini) sağlamaya çalışan uzun vadeli bir stratejidir.” (1982, s. 180). En nihayetinde Poulantzas siyasi partilerin yeni toplumsal hareketlerde, siyasi hareketlerde aktif olarak yer almaları gerektiği ve bu hareketlerin kendi özgünlüklerini kaybetmeden partilerde yer bulması gerektiği sonucuna varır.

Burada Poulantzas'ın sosyalizme dinamik bir geçiş sağladığı için yeni toplumsal hareketleri parti içinde içermeye beklentisi, stratejisinin geçerliliğinin en önemli göstergelerinden biridir. Sosyalizmin popüler bir demokratik “versiyonunun”, “klasik” siyasi partilerden daha dinamik olan temsili demokratik kurumlara ve/veya hareketlere özel olarak odaklanmasıyla mümkün olduğunu öngördü. Dolayısıyla bu çalışmada da Poulantzas'ın Gramsci'den referansla geliştirdiği “ittifak” vurgusu çerçevesinde Tuzluca Mahallesi'ndeki siyasi hareketlerin ve bu hareketlerde aktif rol alan siyasi aktivistlerin geniş halk kitlelerine ulaşma imkânı ve yolları tartışıldı. Günümüzde siyasi ve/veya toplumsal hareketler “halk ittifakı”nı sağlamak için giderek daha kapsayıcı hale gelmektedir. Bu nedenle Tuzluca, gösteriler, sokak eylemleri, devlet ve/veya kolluk kuvvetleriyle yaşanan çatışmalar ve nispeten daha fazla katılımıyla gerçekleştirilen toplumsal muhalefetin kendini besleyebildiği ve güçlenebildiği en popüler mahallelerden biridir. Tuzluca'nın ilk yerleşimlerden bu yana toplumsal ve siyasi muhalefetin merkezi olduğunu sadece Ankaralılar değil, diğer şehirlerdeki siyasi bilince sahip insanlar da rahatlıkla fark etmişlerdir. Bu açıdan alan araştırmasında mevcut sosyo-politik sisteme ve egemen sınıfların hegemonyasına karşı tehdit potansiyeline sahip Tuzluca'da siyasi mücadelelerin dinamiklerini anlamak temel hedeflerden biriydi.

Çalışmanın beşinci bölümünde, hegemonyanın üzerinde hayat bulduğu, hem hegemonya ilişkilerini şekillendiren hem de onlar tarafından şekillenen mekânı Lefebvre üzerinden okumaya çalıştım. Zira, karşı-hegemonya mücadelelerinin imkanını anlamak da mekânı anlamadan mümkün görünmüyordu. 1960'larda Marksist teorisyenler, kentsel mekânı ekonomik ilişkilere “bağımlı” olarak düşünmekten ziyade

“kendisi için” bir araştırma nesnesi olarak sorunsallaştırmaya başladılar; sessizlikleri Lefebvre'nin “şehre dönüş yolu” (Katznelson, 2004, s. 93) ile sona erdi. Burada, Marksist kent teorilerinin gücü, kentsel mekan anlayışını üretim ilişkilerinden daha geniş bir ekonomik, sosyal ve mekansal ilişkiler dizisine genişletme girişimlerinden geldi. Aynı zamanda, sermaye-emek çatışmasını, kentsel mekanın kullanımını, mevcut eşitsizlikleri yeniden üreten bir ilişkiler ağı olarak kavramak için de kullandılar. Bu anlamda diyalektik yaklaşımları, içsel çelişkilerine rağmen kapitalizmin nasıl bu kadar uzun süre hayatta kaldığını anlamak için de metodolojik bir manevra alanı verdi. Ancak, kentsel toplumsal hareketleri sınıf mücadelelerine eklemek için tutarlı bir yol gösteremediklerini de akılda tutmak gerektiğini düşünüyorum. Kentsel mekanın çoklu bilinç yarattığı gerçeği kabul edildiğinde, bu bilincin kapitalizmi nasıl örgütlediği ve dönüştürdüğü açık olarak ortaya konulmamaktadır.

Kapitalizm hükümlerini sürdüğü süre boyunca, kendi yıkımı için tasarlanmış potansiyel silahları kendi lehine kullanma konusunda ne kadar başarılı olduğunu gösterdi. Bu anlamda kapitalizmi karşısına alan hareketlerin yapması gereken, kentsel mekânı emek-sermaye çatışmasının ötesinde bir strateji ve praksis sorunu olarak sorunsallaştırmak diyebiliriz. Bugün cinsiyet, ırk, etnisite vb. gibi sınıf mücadelesine indirgenemeyecek çok sayıda mücadele alanı var. Kentsel mekânla ilgili projeler, gücünü kentin kullanım/değişim değerinden, makro projelerden alır ve bu anlamda mücadeleler, Lefebvre, Harvey ve Castells'in önerdiği gibi mekânlar için, kentler için olmalıdır. Bu anlamıyla, Tuzluca'yı'daki siyasi aktivistlerin mekanları için mücadele vermeleri bir alan savunması olara karşımıza çıkmaktadır. Benzer şekilde Harvey, *Asi Şehirler* (2012) adlı kitabında, sermayenin kentleşmesinin, kentsel mekânın tahakkümünü zorunlu kıldığından bahseder ki bu da bize kentsel mekânın siyasi mücadeleler açısından önemini göstermektedir.

Lefebvre, sınıf kavramını genişleterek, çatışma ve mücadele ile ilgilenerken, kentsel mekânın sömürülmesinde devletin rolünü vurguladı. Kent, mücadelenin, devrimin ve/veya değişimin mekânıdır; kentleşme ise yeni bir mücadele biçimidir. Lefebvre de Gramsci'ye benzer şekilde, sivil toplumun düğüm noktalarındaki hegemonik güçlerin egemenliğini, yani “sıradan” insanların günlük yaşamlarını anlamaya çalıştı. Tam da bu noktada, Tuzluca'yı'daki siyasi aktivistlerin gündeliğe dair eylemleri ve sosyal hayatı değiştirmeye yönelik pratikleri önem kazandı. Zira kent sakinlerini, kentin

kullanım deęeri için savařmak üzere birleřik bir m¼cadeleye, bir koalisyona, bir ittifaka, bir harekete veya bařka bir form¼lasyona davet etmek, bir siyasi aktivistin bařat g¼revlerinden biri olarak karřımızza ıkar. Ancak birleřik bir m¼cadele imkanı için cevaplanması gereken önemli bir soru var: Davet eden kim olacak? Bu da beni alan arařtırması için aydınlatıcı olabilecek řu sorulara y¼nlendirdi:

- Muhalif hareketler ve/veya siyasi örg¼tler nasıl hegemonya karřıtı bir proje inřa edebilir?
- Bölgesel bir m¼cadeleden pop¼ler bir toplumsal d¼n¼ř¼m projesine doęru b¼y¼yerek, karřı-hegemonyacı bir pop¼ler saęduyu yaratmak m¼mk¼n m¼d¼r?
- Organik aydınların, kitlelerle birlikte kendi toplumsal gerekliklerini gerekleřtirme ve onları toplumsal deęiřimin önc¼leri olmaya y¼nlendirmedeki rol¼ nedir?
- Yerel organik aydınlardan bahsedebilir miyiz? Bir mahalle aydınları “organik” yapabilir mi?

Bu soruları takiben alıřmanın altıncı ve yedinci b¼l¼mlerini alan arařtırması ve alan arařtırmasından elde edilen verilerin teorik kısımda irdelemeye alıřtıęım kavramlarla tartıřmaya ayırdım. İlk alt kısımda arařtırma tasarımıyla ilgili bilgi vererek, daha sonra arařtırmanın kısıtlılıklarından ve zorluklarından bahsettim. 32 örg¼tl¼ siyasi aktivistle hem birebir hem de grup g¼r¼řmelerine dayanarak yaptıęım alan arařtırması nitel bir alıřmaydı. D¼rt yıla yayılan, mahallede yalnızca gezerek sohbet etmeyi, basın aıklamalarına, eylemlere katılmayı da ieren ruhen yorucu ama bir o kadar da umut verici uzun bir arařtırma olduęunu özellikle belirtmek isterim. Yedinci b¼l¼m¼n ilk alt kısımda Tuzluayır Mahallesi'nde yerleřimleri ve 2002 öncesi Tuzluayır'ın siyasi, ekonomik ve k¼lt¼rel atmosferini anlatmaya alıřtım. Bu aıdan 2002 öncesini iki önemli kısıma ayırdım: 12 Eylül 1980 askeri darbesi öncesi ve sonrası. ¼nk¼ g¼r¼řmelerde de sıklıkla karřımıza ıktıęı gibi t¼m T¼rkiye'yle beraber askeri darbe Tuzluayır'da da birok dinamięi geri d¼nd¼r¼lemez bir řekilde deęiřtiriyor.

Tuzluayır Mahallesi 1960'lı yıllarda oęunlukla Alevi n¼fusun yoęun olduęu Orta Anadolu k¼ylerinden gelenler tarafından kurulan bir mahalle. G¼çmenler sosyal sermayeleri, aileleri, akraba aęları ve k¼yl¼leyle birlikte tařındıkları için

Tuzluçayır'da köyde yaşadıkları hayat tarzını büyük ölçüde devam ettirebiliyorlar. Akrabalık ve komşuluk temelli ağlar, iş ve barınma gibi gerekli kaynakları ayırarak hayatlarını kolaylaştırıyor, sosyal ve psikolojik tecritin önüne geçiyor (Ayata, 1987). Görüşmelerde sıklıkla belirtildiği gibi Tuzluçayır sakinlerinin ilk yerleşimlerden itibaren muhalif hareketlere kucak açması ve hatta doğuşlarına öncelik etmesi Aleviliğin devrimci bir doktrin ve kolektivist bir biçim olarak yorumlama eğilimiyle analiz edilmelidir. Subaşı'nın (2005) da iddia ettiği gibi Alevilik, dini olmaktan çok, gelişim yolu açısından siyasi bir örgütlenmedir. Alevilik, hümanist, solcu, laik, iktidar karşıtı özelliklere sahip, Anadolu'daki maceralarında şekillenen, farklı kültürlerden beslenen bir felsefe, bir yaşam biçimi olarak referans alınmaktadır. Alevilik, kapitalist devlete, sömürüye ve baskıya karşı bir düşmanlıktır. Tarih boyunca hegemonik güçler tarafından bastırılan Alevilerin bu “bastırılmışlıkları” ve 'iktidar karşıtlığı' içinde olmaları muhalif hareketlerle etkileşimlerini kolaylaştırmıştır. Tuzluçayır'daki Alevilik kültürü Tuzluçayır'da Gramsci'ye referansla kitlelerin kendiliğinden felsefesi olarak tanımlanabilecek bir “ortak duyu” yaratıyor gibi görünmektedir. “Alevilik” kültürü, değişimin kalbini, devrimci bir değişim potansiyelini ve Gramsci'nin belirttiği gibi kitleleri yönlendirecek bir dış gücü ve en nihayetinde de Sol hareketleri beslemiştir.

1970-1980 yılları arasında yaşanan şiddetli çatışmaları ilk altı haftada 11.500 kişinin gözaltına alınmasıyla sonuçlanan 12 Eylül 1980 askeri darbesi takip etti. “1980'in sonunda bu sayı 30.000'e yükseldi ve bir yıl sonra 122.600 tutuklama yapıldı. Darbeden iki yıl sonra, Eylül 1982'ye kadar 80.000'i hâlâ hapisteydi, 30.000'i yargılanmayı bekliyordu.” (Zürcher, 2004: 279). 12 Eylül 1980 askeri müdahalesi ile solun kalesi olarak görülen gecekondu mahallelerine askerler konuşlandırıldı. Cunta, kentleşen yoksulların ihtiyaç ve baskılarına yanıt geliştirerek kentlerin radikalleşen gündemine son verdi (Şengül, 2003). Dolayısıyla müdahalenin ilk hedefi, rejime tehdit olarak görülen radikal sol gruplardı. Şaşırtıcı olmayan bir şekilde, 1980'den sonra güvenlik güçleri, radikal sol grupları ve siyasileşmiş sakinleri barındıran ve besleyen "özgürleşmiş" ve "direnci" mahallelere sert bir şekilde saldırdı. Tuzluçayır da bu saldırının hedefindeki mahallelerden biriydi. Çalışma boyunca darbeden sonra hemen hemen tüm hanelerde siyasi bir aktivist ve/veya sol grup sempatizanı olan bir akraba ve/veya tanıdık ile ilgili kişisel bir mağduriyet öyküsü karşıma çıktı. Siyasi

hareketliliği yok etmek ve sol grupların direnişini kırmak için mahalle üzerinde baskı kurmayı amaçlayan politikalar; devrimci grupların mahalle üzerindeki kontrolünün zarar görmesiyle sonuçlandı. Askeri yönetim neo-liberalizmin gelişmesi için uygun bir ortam sağladı; başka bir deyişle, neo-liberalizmin hegemonyası ordu tarafından inşa edildi. Ancak askeri yönetimin ilk yıllarında “rıza almak” öncelikli hedeflerden biri olmadığı için “zora” dayalı politikalar hayata geçti.

1980’ler ve 1990’larda kent mekanı da ciddi bir dönüşüm geçirdi, gecekondu mahallelerinde yoğun bir apartmanlaşma yaşandı. Tuzluçayır kentsel dönüşüm kapsamına girmese bile müteahhitler eliyle gecekondu apartmanlara dönüşmesini birçok mahalleli teşvik etti. Bu değişimler nedeniyle dayanışma kültürünün “zarar gördüğü” söylene de Tuzluçayır “özgürleşmiş” karakterini kaybetmedi. Kentli yoksulların temsili 1990’larda çoğunlukla İslamcı partiler tarafından ele geçirilmekle birlikte, 'özgürleşmiş' ve 'direniş' mahalleleri olarak adlandırılan birkaç gecekondu bölgesi, öncü radikal sol gruplar tarafından temsil edilmeye devam etti. Aslan (2009) Tuzluçayır’ın Ankara’da güçlü bir örnek olabileceği bu “direniş” mahallelerine örnek olarak İstanbul’daki Küçükarmutlu, Sarıgazi, Okmeydanı, Gültepe-Gülsuyu’ndan bahseder. Bu “marjinalleşmiş” mahallelerin sakinleri 1990’lar boyunca siyasi muhalif mücadelelerine devam etmiş ve hükümetlerin siyasi, ekonomik, sosyal, kültürel ve dini alanlara ve yaşam alanlarına yönelik hegemonik politikalarına direnmiştir. Resmi ideoloji tarafından da Tuzluçayır mahallesi 'ötekinin mekanı', 'dışlanmış' 'getto', 'varoş', 'banliyö' vb yaftalamalarla Ankara’da suçun ve “illegallite”nin merkezlerinden biri olarak hedef alındı.

RP (Refah Partisi)'nin yükselişini besleyen halk desteği, 28 Şubat 1997 askeri müdahalesi ve ardından 1998’de partinin Anayasa Mahkemesi tarafından kapatılmasıyla engellenmişti. Şaşırtıcı olmayan bir şekilde, halefi FP (Fazilet Partisi) de 22 Haziran 2001’de anayasanın laik maddelerine ve laiklik ilkelerine aykırı hareket ettiği savıyla yasaklandı. Bunlar, aynı zamanda bu tezde en yoğun olarak ele alınan dönem için kritik bir nokta olacak olan AKP'nin neoliberal otoriter popülist stratejisinin başarısının temel taşlarıydı.

Çalışmanın yedinci bölümünün ikinci alt kısmı AKP iktidarlarının başladığı yıl olan 2002 sonrası Tuzluçayır Mahallesi’ndeki siyasal islamcı hegemonyaya karşı gücünü

koruyan hareketler ve bu hareketlerin karşı-hegemonya oluşturmadaki rollere ayrıldı. Bu açıdan önce mekan olarak mahalle ve mahallenin siyasi aktivistler için önemi tartışıldı. Bu kısmı, muhalif örgütlerin “ortak duyu”, yeni bir “dil” ve folklor oluşturma potansiyellerinin eldeki verilerle değerlendirilmesi izledi. Son olarak da mahallede yer aldığını iddia ettiğim “yerel organik aydın”ların üzerinde mahallenin etkilerini tartışım. Tuzluca'yır'daki muhalif siyasi oluşumların hükümetin hegemonik politikalarına ne ölçüde tepki gösterebildikleri ve Tuzluca'yır halkının halk desteğini almak için hangi politikaları benimsedikleri alan araştırmasının ana odaklarından biriydi. Bu anlamda Gramsci'nin fikirleri, mahalledeki ideolojik anların ve hegemonik oluşumun izlerinin takip edilmesi açısından kritik öneme sahiptir. Daha önce bahsettiğim gibi Gramsci, insanların günlük yaşamlarıyla ilgili sosyal eylemlerini, ahlak ve günlük pratiklerini dikkatli bir şekilde ele alır ve herşeyden önce bu pratikleri analiz edilmeye değer görür. Ayrıca analizini “sıradan insanların” pratiklerinde nasıl bir özgürleştirici potansiyele tanık olunabileceği sorusuna dayandırır. Bu nedenle bu çalışmada aktivistlerin karşı hegemonya oluşumuna katkı sağladığı ölçüde bu konuya dikkat çekilmeye çalışıldı.

Tuzluca'yır'da siyasi aktivist, sempatican, hatta siyasi bağlantısı olmayan “sıradan insan”ın gündelik yaşamında saklı uçsuz bucaksız bir dünya olduğunu söyleyebiliriz. Bu dünyayı anlamak için ideoloji ve hegemonya ilişkisinin anlaşılmasını sağlayan sağduyu, folklore ve dil kavramlarından yararlandı. Gramsci'nin ideoloji terimiyle ilgili temel meta-teorik varsayımlarından biri, yukarıda bahsedildiği gibi teori ve praksis arasındaki birlikti. Ona göre, yalnızca ekonomik üstünlüğü değil entelektüel bir liderliği de içermesi gereken hegemonik bir proje kurmak için aydınlarla halk arasındaki uçurumun azaltılması gerekir. Burada, mahalleyi bir bütün olarak organize edebildikleri için bu entelektüel liderliğin izlerinin Tuzluca'yır'da gözlemlenebildiği söylenebilir. Aydınlar ile halk arasındaki kopukluk fikri, Gramsci'nin felsefenin insanların sağduyusuna, kültürüne, diline ve folkloruna dayanması gerektiği varsayımı üzerinden anlaşılmalıdır (2003, s.13-15). Gramsci'ye göre felsefe kültür tarihinden ayrılmamalıdır, halka ait kültürel yönlerden bu ayrılmazlık, teori ile praksis arasındaki ilişki, teori ile praksis arasında geçerli bir örtüşmenin ve uyumluluğun gerekliliği, felsefe ile praksis arasındaki ilişki makul olduğunda akla yatkındır. Burada Tuzluca'yır'daki eylemcilerin kamusal düşüncesindeki sağduyu ya da Gramscici bir

terim olarak “sağduyu” felsefeden ayrılamaz. Siyasi aktivistlerin tanıklıkları ve yaşanmışlıklarına göre muhalif örgütlerin felsefeleri, Tuzluçayır halkının fikirleriyle bağ kurmayı başarıyor gibi görünüyor ki bu da entelektüel liderliğin temelini oluşturur.

Öte yandan, Gramsci'nin teorisinde önemli bir yere sahip olan “mevzi savaşı”nın devreye girmesiyle, nihai hedef olarak kapitalist sistemin yenilgisini hedefleyen uzun vadeli bir mücadeleye olanak tanır. Bu Türkiye için de oldukça anlamlı ve dikkate değerdir, çünkü 2002 yılından bu yana AKP hükümetleri siyaset bir “savaş” olarak algılanmakta, hem rıza alma hem de güç kullanma stratejilerini Gramscici anlamda ele almaktadır. Tuzluçayır Mahallesi, çoğunluğu Alevilerden oluştuğu için, AKP yönetiminin Sünni İslami normlarından açıkça oldukça uzaktır ve çeşitli dönemlerdeki konjunktürlere uygun olarak kimi zaman sistemin dışındakilerinin rızasına oynayan ama çoğunlukla zora dayalı bir “mevzi” savaşına ev sahipliği yapmaktadır.

Teorik olarak tek bir Alevilik ve Alevi tanımından söz edilemez ve bu tanımlara atfedilen anlam ve değerler, çalışma için görüşülen kişi sayısı kadardır. Ayrıca Aleviliği kimi görüşmeciler dini referanslarla ilişkilendirirken kimisi de kültürel norm ve alışkanlıklara atıfta bulunduğundan Aleviliğin tanımında ve içeriğinde oldukça belirgin bir farklılık görülmektedir. Ancak Aleviliğin farklı sınıfları, statüleri ve ideolojileri içermesi, ezilen ve dışlanan bir kültür etrafında bir araya getirmesi konusunda ortak bir nokta olmaktadır. “Bastırılma” ve “iktidar karşıtlığı”nın sol ile etkileşimi kolaylaştırması, Alevilerin Tuzluçayır'da olduğu gibi sol muhalefetle “doğal olarak” ittifak içinde olmalarına neden olmuştur. Burada yapılan görüşmelerde Alevi kimliği ve onun insanları “birleştirici” gücü sürekli vurgulanmıştır. Mahalledeki farklı tanımlara ve değerlere sahip Alevilik kültürü, Sünni İslamcı hegemonik tezahürlere karşı siyasi örgütlerin direniş hareketleri için önemli bir harç görevi görmektedir. Bir bakıma politik olan ve olmayan arasındaki köprüyü kuran bir kavramdır.

Çalışmada sıklıkla belirtildiği gibi, iktidar bloğuna karşı mücadelede, hegemonik bir karşı proje oluşturmak için madun gruplar arasında sınıflar arası bir ittifak gereklidir. Poulantzas Gramsci'nin etkisi altında proletaryanın orta sınıflarla ittifak kurması gerektiğini iddia etti: Küçük-burjuva proletarya ile işbirliği yapmalı ve halk iktidar bloğuna karşı birleşmelidir. Tuzluçayır'da da siyasi aktivistler, halkın “taleplerine” odaklanarak bu halk ittifakını oluşturmaya çalışmaktalar. Bu ittifak açıkça sınıflar

arası, son kertede devrimin gerçekleşmesi için proletaryanın liderliği sıklıkla vurgulansa da, kendi tanımladıkları şekliyle siyasal islami hegemonyaya karşı açtıkları “savaş” “faşizme karşı birleşik bir cephe” gerektirmektedir. Bu savaşta, düşmanın hem rıza hem de zorlama için gerekli tüm araçlara sahip olması nedeniyle, savaşı “mevzilerde” sürdürmenin topyekûn bir savaştan daha sürdürebilir ve mümkün olduğunu sıklıkla vurgulamaktalar.

Çalışmada sorgulanan bir diğer önemli nokta da karşı-hegemonyacı bir alan yaratma olasılığıydı. King, karşı-hegemonyacı bir alan yaratmanın, halkın muhalif siyasi örgütlerinin, devletin/hükümetin hegemonik politikalarına karşı gündelik deneyimlerine ilişkin temel bir “manevra”sı olduğunu belirtmektedir (2002, s.186). Tuzluca'yır'da muhalif örgütlerin 2013'te Cami-Cemevi Projesi'ne ve Gezi Parkı Protestolarına karşı verdikleri mücadele, kendi alanlarını savunmak için kritik girişimlerdi. Lefebvre'den yola çıkarak, mekânın yalnızca toplumsal, politik hareketlerin ve/veya direnişin taşıyıcısı olmadığı, aynı zamanda onları diyalektik bir şekilde (yeniden) ürettiği söylenebilir. Tuzluca'yır'daki siyasi aktivistler bu bağlamda mahallelerini siyasi eylemleri için bir kök olarak kullanırlar hem de yaşadıkları mekândan yola çıkarak bir kimlik oluştururlar.

Bu çalışmanın ana argümanlarından biri, hegemonyanın ancak mekanı kullanarak mekana hakimiyet kurarak etkin bir şekilde işleyebileceğiydi. Bu çalışmanın başat önermelerinden birisi ve kuramsal çerçevesi, hegemonyanın egemen olmak için alana ihtiyacı olduğu, diyalektik biçimde ise kendi alanını yaratmak için karşı-hegemonik bir oluşumu zorunlu kıldığıydı. Bu açıdan, neo-liberal yeniden yapılanmanın son otuz yılda yükselişini takiben, bu yeniden yapılanma sürecine direnme ve kırılma olasılığı Tuzluca'yır Mahallesi özelinde sorgulandı. Bu düşünceden hareketle, bu çalışma, çatışma ve direniş dinamiklerini sorgulayarak karşı hegemonik alan olasılığını tartışan literatüre katkıda bulunma girişimi olarak görülebilir. Mahalle sakinlerinin neden ve neye direndiklerini anlamak esastır, başka bir deyişle, karşı karşıya kaldıklarını iddia ettikleri sistematik dışlanma ile baş etme stratejilerinin ne olduğu ve direnişlerinin hedefi incelenmeye çalışılmıştır. Bu direniş pratiklerini örgütleyen, yönlendiren ve eylemlere önderlik eden siyasi aktivistler ise Gramsci'nin idealleştirdiği düzeyde yerel organik aydınlar olarak karşımıza çıkmıştır.

Tuzluçayır, hegemonik kültürün ve diğer kültürlerin mücadele alanları olarak gündelik hayatın hem ürettiği hem de gündelik hayat tarafından üretilen bir mahalle, bir mekandır. Bu açıdan muhalif örgütlerin ve siyasi aktivistlerin karşı-hegemonyacı siyasi karar alma mekanizmaları oluşturma üzerindeki etkilerinin gücü sorgulanmıştır. Genel olarak, aktivistlerin politik olarak “neden” örgütlendiklerini anlama motivasyonlarını sorgulamak etkili bir başlangıç noktasıdır. Bu siyasi örgütler ve üyeleri, mevcut sosyo-politik sisteme ve hegemonyaya karşı bir tehdit olarak değerlendirilebilir. Diğer bir deyişle, kurumsal yönetim sistemini ve mevcut iktidar ilişkilerini protesto eden siyasi örgütler, mevcut hegemonik yapıya meydan okuma potansiyeline sahiptir.

Aktivistlerin gözünden mahallenin taleplerine değer veren siyasi örgütler “çoğul, farklı, demokratik ve/veya kapsayıcıdır”. Gramsci, hegemonyayı egemen sınıfın bir pratiği-egemenlik edimi olarak görür ve özellikle yeni bir toplumsal/politik projeden söz ediliyorsa, Gramsci'nin teorisinde karşı hegemonya kavramı önemlidir. Yukarıda bahsedildiği gibi, Gramsci, bir bakıma, Lenin'in öncü partisini pratikte demokratik olması gereken organik entelektüel liderlikle değiştirir. Burada yapılan görüşmeler, mahallede demokratik ve “sakinlerin taleplerine cevap veren” karşı-hegemonyacı liderliğin özü olduğunu göstermektedir. Bu çalışma, karşı-hegemonyacı pratikler ve alan yaratmanın önemi ve bu pratiklerdeki organik aydınların “yerelliğinin” önemine vurgu yapmaktadır. Bir mahalle kendi aydınlarını yaratabilir; bu aydınlar direnişçilerini yaratır ve bu direnişçiler önce bir mahalleyi, sonra bir şehri, ardından bir ülkeyi ve en nihayetinde de dünyayı değiştirebilirler.

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