AN ANALYSIS OF LABOR MARKET INTEGRATION POLICIES RELATED TO SYRIANS UNDER TEMPORARY PROTECTION IN TURKEY

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AN ANALYSIS OF LABOR MARKET INTEGRATION POLICIES RELATED TO SYRIANS UNDER TEMPORARY PROTECTION IN TURKEY

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This study aims to analyse labour market integration policies related to Syrians under temporary protection (SuTPs) in Turkey, to identify the problems of integration, and to evaluate the extent to which integration is achieved in line with Kuhlman’s model for the economic integration of refugees in developing countries. According to this well-accepted model, integration should be evaluated by the following criteria: 1) A participation level in the economy that enables an income level for refugees to have living standard that is acceptable for their culture 2) Having access to the services and goods that local citizens have. 3) Labour market effects of the refugees on the host community should be balanced and the situation in the local labour market should not be deteriorated for the host society. In this respect, the study investigates the integration policy instruments that are being implemented including the cooperation scheme built between European Union and Turkey, to what degree these policies are effective according to Kuhlman’s integration model, given the effects that the current setting in the Turkish labour market have on the integration policies and the impact of Syrian immigrant influx on Turkish labour market.

The study finds that there are significant constraints regarding the labour market integration of SuTPs in Turkey; due to the flexible labour market structure that exists because of neoliberal economy policies, high levels of informal employment and less
unionized labour in Turkish labour market, integration policy scheme and practices of limited burden sharing support by the international community.

**Key words:** Labour market integration policy, Kuhlman’s framework, Burden sharing, Syrians under temporary protection, Refugees
ÖZ

TÜRKİYE’DEKİ GEÇİCİ KORUMA ALTINDAKİ SURIYELİ SİĞİNMACILARLA İLGİLİ İŞGÜCÜ PIYASASI ENTEGRAYONU POLİTİKALARI ÜZERİNE BİR ANALİZ

Bayramoğlu, Nizamettin Kağan
Yüksek Lisans, Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi
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Bu çalışma, Türkiye’de geçici koruma sağlanan Suriyelilerle (GKAS) ilgili işgücü piyasanın entegrasyon politikalarını analiz etmeyi, entegrasyon sorunlarını belirlemeyi ve Kuhlman tarafından geliştirilen modele göre entegrasyonun ne ölçüde sağlandığını değerlendirmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Yaygın kabul gören bu modele göre entegrasyon şu kriterlerle değerlendirilmelidir; 1) Mülteciler için kendi kültürlerine uygun bir şekilde gelir elde etmelerine imkan sunan bir ekonomik katılım düzeyi olması 2) Yerel halkın erişim sağladığı mal ve hizmetlere erişimlerinin sağlanması, 3) Mültecilerin işgücü piyasası etkilerinin, ev sahibi toplum için dengeli olması ve yerel işgücü piyasası şartlarının kötüye gitmemesidir.

Bu bağlamda çalışma, Türkiye işgücü piyasasındaki mevcut ortamin entegrasyon politikaları üzerindeki etkileri ve Suriyeli göçmen akının Türkiye işgücü piyasası üzerindeki etkisi göz önüne alındığında, AB ile Türkiye arasında kurulan işbirliği şeması da dahil olmak üzere uygulanmakta olan entegrasyon politikası araçlarını ve bu politikaların ne derece etkili olduğunu Kuhlman modeline göre araştırmaktadır.
Bu tezin temel argümanı, Türkiye'de neoliberal ekonomi politikaları; yüksek düzeyde kayıt dışı istihdam ve daha az sendikal işgücü sonucunda var olan daha esnek işgücü piyasası yapısı; entegrasyon politikası şeması ve uluslararası toplum tarafından sınırlı yük paylaşımı desteği uygulamaları hususlarından kaynaklı olarak, GKAS işgücü piyasasına entegrasyonu için sınırlılıklar bulunduğudur.

Anahtar kelimeler; İşgücü piyasası entegrasyon politikası, Kuhlman modeli, Yük paylaşımı, Geçici Koruma altındaki Suriyeliler, Mülteciler
To my dear wife, without her, this thesis could not have been written...
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AFAD  Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency
ALMPs  Active Labour Market Programs
AMIF  Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund
BRICS  Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa
CBP  Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration Policy
CfW  Cash for Work
DGILF  Directorate General of International Labour Force
PoMM  Presidency of Migration Management
DİSK  Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions
ECHRC  European Court of Human Rights
ESSN  Emergency Social Safety Net
EU  European Union
FRiT  Facility for Refugees in Turkey
FRONTEX  Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union
GDP  Gross Domestic Product
ICMPD  International Centre for Migration Policy Development
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<tr>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organization</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>INGO</td>
<td>International Non-governmental organization</td>
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<td>PES</td>
<td>Turkish Employment Agency</td>
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<td>İGAM</td>
<td>Research Center on Asylum and Migration</td>
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<td>LFIP</td>
<td>Law on Foreigners and International Protection</td>
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<td>LFS</td>
<td>Labour Force Survey</td>
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<td>MoLSS</td>
<td>Ministry of Labour and Social Security</td>
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<td>NACE</td>
<td>Nomenclature statistique des activités économiques dans la Communauté européenne</td>
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<td>NBA</td>
<td>Needs Based Approach</td>
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<td>NES</td>
<td>National Employment Strategy</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organization</td>
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<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
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<td>OJTs</td>
<td>On the Job Trainings</td>
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<td>PES</td>
<td>Public Employment Services</td>
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<td>PEVTBs</td>
<td>Provincial Employment and Vocational Training Boards</td>
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<td>PLMPs</td>
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<td>PPP</td>
<td>Purchasing Power Parity</td>
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<td>PRS</td>
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<td>TRC</td>
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<td>TÜRK-İŞ</td>
<td>Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions</td>
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<td>UN 3RP</td>
<td>United Nations Regional Refugee Resilience Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund</td>
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<td>VTCs</td>
<td>Vocational training courses</td>
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<td>World Bank</td>
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Statement of the Problem and the Research Questions

Syrian immigration crisis is one of the most important developments in the last decade that affected both Middle East countries and European countries and Turkey is one of the most affected among them. Today, according to United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) “Global Trends” report (2021), 82.4 million people are the victims of the forced migration. Nearly three out of every four refugee has fled to a neighbouring country. Turkey is the leading country to host the most forcibly displaced people (refugees or refugee like situations): with 3.7 million people and 92 percent of them are from Syria (UNHCR, 2021).

Around the world, most of the refugees live inside the lower and upper middle-income countries and informal employment is an extensive problem for them. With the effect of neo-liberal trends, developing countries face increasing informal employment pressure. In these countries refugee influxes contribute to the neo-liberal agenda because of the lack of options caused by the malpractice of international law and thus overburdening of neighbouring country labour markets, refugees can only economically “integrate” through informal employment. To elaborate, if the country does not have the means to create jobs for the additional workforce brought by the refugee population, it could cause local xenophobia where the local population loses their jobs to refugees; or local population may concede and accept lower employment conditions because of the high labour force competition and become
informally employed, or it could also result in withdrawal from the labour force participation (Sak et al., 2017, pp. 2,4; Del Carpio and Wagner, 2015).

In this setting, labour market integration of Syrians under Temporary Protection (SuTPs) in Turkey is both vital for themselves and also for the host community. While there are several studies that evaluate the impacts of Syrian immigrant influx on Turkish labour market, the underlying reasons of these effects and the status of integration are not well understood in the literature. Accordingly, this study aims to analyse labour market integration policies related to Syrians under temporary protection in Turkey, to identify the problems of integration, and to evaluate the extent to which integration is achieved in line with the refugee integration framework proposed by Kuhlman (1991) for developing countries. According to this commonly accepted model, integration should be evaluated by the following criteria: 1) A participation level in the economy that enables an income level for refugees to have living standard that is acceptable for their culture 2) Having access to the services and goods that local citizens have. 3) Labour market effects of the refugees on the host community should be balanced and the situation in the local labour market should not be deteriorated for the host society. In this respect, the study investigates the integration policy instruments that are being implemented including the cooperation scheme built between EU and Turkey, to what degree these policies are effective according to Kuhlman’s model (1991), given the effects that the current setting in the Turkish labour market have on the integration policies and the impact of Syrian immigrant influx on Turkish labour market.

The main argument of this thesis is that there are significant constraints regarding the labour market integration of SuTPs in Turkey; due to the flexible labour market structure in Turkey that exists because of neoliberal economy policies, high levels of informal employment and less unionized labour in Turkish labour market, integration policy scheme and practices of limited burden sharing support by the international community.
The study finds that, according to the economic integration criterion of Kuhlman (1991), labour market integration of Syrians under temporary protection in Turkey is ineffective. Firstly, due to features of Turkish labour market, SuTPs in Turkey have lesser chance to acquire jobs that provide payment in accordance with their skill level; they can neither have access to jobs as locals because of work permit legislation nor same types of jobs as locals whereas various data sources (İŞKUR Database, 2020; Caro, 2020, p. 13; European Commission, 2020, 2020, pp. 27, 28) confirm they are mostly expected to be employed in several sectors. There are several features of Turkish labour market that cause these results and one of them is jobless growth problem that constitute an impediment to the creation of more and decent jobs for natives as well as SuTPs. Turkey’s inability to create more jobs even during the thriving times of the economy poses challenges for labour market integration of SuTPs by further limiting its labour supply absorption capacity in the face of such a huge influx. Results of neoliberal labour market policies have been the widespread informal employment in Turkish labour market along with less costly labour policies, de-unionization and work centred labour market services.

Secondly, the study also examines the integration policy instruments for SuTPs and to what degree they are effective. Harmonization approach of Law on Foreigners and International Protection (LFIP) which is quite similar to integration ideal that emphasizes the several extents of integration and more importantly, it has a very strong emphasis on becoming self-sufficient. On the other hand, the Law and related regulations do not seem to project active citizenship for all SuTPs as an end. There is also limited number of work permits given to SuTPs when compared with the number of SuTPs expected to participate in the labour market. Effective employment services that require development areas for immigrant services such as profiling systems especially compared to European versions were also a factor. Moreover, use of SuTPs’ informal job search channels also adds to the odds of informal employment because these channels mainly aim for informal employment. Additionally, SuTP available passive labour market policies were not referable for most of the SuTPs as they are mostly employed informally. As can be seen here,
according to Kuhlman’s (1991) second criterion SuTPs have access to same services as locals for employment, free of charge; however because of the explained features of the Turkish labour market and dynamics in place for such services to function, they cannot access to them as expected.

On burden sharing cooperation between EU and Turkey in terms of Syrian immigration crisis study discussed that EU-Turkey Statement mainly aims to regularize the Syrian immigration to Europe via immigrant population swap with Turkey and provides little financial relief for the country. This burden sharing approach does not seem fair as Facility for Refugees in Turkey (FRiT) funds only allocate 1/6 of its total amount to labour market integration related activities. Although Turkish labour market mostly in need of demand side improvements, facility provides little for this area of support. ESSN poses an obstacle to successful labour market integration of SuTPs because of low wages and cutting of the cord for ESSN payments in case of formal employment and this causes a narrower window for formal employment of SuTPs. Additionally, although PES services provided through facility are successful there is fund a need of at least at least 459 million Euros for such services to provide an effect on decreasing ESSN beneficiaries. Most importantly, burden sharing principal should be applied via resettlement of immigrants according to system that Jones and Teytelboym (2017) suggested as most of the times immigrants have ended up in neighbouring countries of country of origin. Other studies show the importance of resettlement, by pointing out financial relief can only be complementary to resettlement (IOM, 2000, pp. 5-7; Newland, 2011). Turkish Foreign Minister also emphasizes the importance of resettlement during an immigrant influx (Cavusoglu, 2016).

Lastly, in relation to Kuhlman’s (1991) successful labour market integration criteria that sets forth; conditions of locals in the labour market should not be deteriorating because of immigration. In order to examine this part of the criteria we have examined the demand side and supply side effect of SuTPs in Turkish labour market. On demand side it is found that although SuTPs contributed to Turkish economy greatly, there are problems such as informality and cultural adaptation. On supply
side, it is found that there are evidences for replacement of locals from labour market whether it be formal employment or informal employment and also it is seen that SuTP influx has caused lower wages, and had worse effects on the disadvantageous groups and less educated. Informal employment problem became bigger, and as a result of this, wages fell down in intensively SuTP populated provinces, child labour emerged as problem again. In this manner, replacement of natives from formal jobs also became a possibility. So, it is safe to say that, labour market conditions of locals have been adversely affected.

As a result of these factors, situation about labour market integration of SuTPs does not suit to one of Kuhlman’s (1991). These factors along with the magnitude of immigration influx caused lower wages for SuTPs for the same effort as locals, (UNHCR, 2013a) longer working hours, late payment of wages, lack of any social benefits, unsafe working conditions and employment services that needs more development for serving SuTPs etc. are seen as indicators of unsuccessful integration in the literature (Kuhlman, 1991; Tören, T., 2018, p. 3; Göksel, 2018a, p. 162; ILO, 2017; Honneth, 2014).

1.2 Study Design and Methodology

This study uses the methods of both qualitative and quantitative analysis. To evaluate the impact of Syrian immigration influx on Turkish labour market, it examines the Turkish Employment Agency (İŞKUR/PES) data on most demanded vacancies, percentage distribution of sectors that PES Active Labour Market Programs (ALMPs) are implemented on for SuTPs and also the percentage distribution of PES ALMP types that SuTPs benefited from since the beginning of Syrian influx. The study also conducts a literature review on SuTPs’ impact on Turkish labour market and compares their results to the data of the sole public employment service of Turkey, PES and deduces conclusions from it according to Kuhlman’s (1991) framework. In order to provide a better understanding, this study examines the documents of international law and national legislation, academic research articles, books, reports and conference proceedings on the subject as well.
In this setting, this study also looks into statistics, books and reports of Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), UNHCR, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), International Labour Organization (ILO), Turkstat, Ministry of Development, Ministry of Labour and Social Security (MoLSS), Directorate General of Migration Management (PoMM), PES, AFAD (Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency), Social Security Institution (SGK), Frit Office of Presidency of Republic of Turkey, Turkish Red Crescent (Kızılay), European Commission, Eurostat, World Bank, United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF) and several Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) and International NGOs (INGOs) in order to provide a perspective on economic and labour market developments.

Study also examines the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Law on Foreigners and International Protection, Regulation on Temporary Protection, The Regulation on Work Permits of Foreigners under Temporary Protection, verdicts of European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), Directives of Council of the European Union, EU-Turkey Statements, policy documents of Republic of Turkey and European Union to provide a comprehensive understanding about the body of rules that affect the labour market integration of SuTPs.

1.3 Significance and Contributions of the Study

The aim of this study is to provide a comprehensive perspective on labour market integration of SuTPs in Turkey and evaluate the determining factors in this manner. While doing this, study examines labour market features that affect SuTPs’ labour market integration with a critical perspective, such as jobless growth, informal employment, and weak unionization etc. meanwhile; examining the impact of SuTPs to Turkish labour market, Turkey’s integration policy scheme and EU’s burden sharing approach in the face of Syrian immigration crisis and contributing to the literature by evaluating SuTP data of PES and by also taking into consideration ideal of decent work for all.
The study contributes to the literature by showing that PES data on SuTPs supports the rhetoric that SuTPs fill the jobs that are not supplied by the local workforce, based on the ALMP data and the vacancies data of PES. In this setting, manufacturing sector which is among the top sectors where the informal employment is evident and also is the top sector that has most vacancies (İŞKUR Database, 2020; Kamalioğlu, 2014, pp. 196,197; Yıldız & Yıldız, 2017, p. 35; Kaya, 2016; Buyukgoze-Kavas and Autin, 2019, p. 66; Baban et al., 2017; İSKUR, 2020, pp. 47,48) was determined as the leading sector for SuTP labour market participation. This data can indicate that SuTPs are usually participating in the jobs and sectors that are more flexible whereas Kuhlman (1991) expects immigrants to be not limited to some types of jobs for labour market integration (UNHCR, 2013a).

The study is also significant in the sense that it examines the percentage distribution among PES ALMP types that SuTPs benefited from since the beginning of SuTP influx and describing how the results confirm the positioning of SuTPs in Turkish labour market and explaining the contributions of these services via laying out Public Employment Service provision for different kinds of protection statuses. The intensity of On the Job Trainings (OJTs) among other ALMP types also points out that SuTPs and natives mostly have similar skill levels because they are mostly in need of working experience provided by OJTs rather than learning new skills through Vocational Training Courses (VTCs). This situation also might indicate SuTPs are contributing the flexibility of labour market. The study also evaluates the possible improvement areas of Facility for Refugees in Turkey (FRIiT) activities in Turkey, especially from the perspective of fair burden sharing principal.

1.4 Outline of the Chapters

Chapter 2 presents the conceptual framework of the study. In Chapter 3, Turkey’s refugee integration policy framework is presented, along with the European Union policies on Syrian refugees and its relation to Turkey. It focuses on the attitude of EU towards the immigration crisis and alignment of the policies implemented by it, to the international protection law. The Fortress Europe policies, application of
international protection law with Needs Based Approach (NBA) by the EU, labour market services provided by EU countries for refugees, EU-Turkey Statement, its results on immigration flows are examined. The study compares the effects of refugees on EU labour markets and Turkey and also evaluates the possible improvement areas of FRiT activities in Turkey, especially from the perspective of fair burden sharing principal. The study also examines the Global Compact on Responsibility Sharing for Refugees and evaluates the supports provided through this policy tool to immigrant influx receiving countries.

Another issue examined in this chapter, is about the critics on work permits and employment quota for SuTP employment and how some studies suggest that these limitations should be removed, however from our perspective there is a necessity of these limitations that comes from the need for public authorities to be able to control possible social tensions and also because of the level of international cooperation on immigration considering the scale of the immigration movement. Moreover as explained in chapter 4 these limitations might not be the only cause of widespread informal employment of SuTPs. Additionally, the burden sharing approach by EU and other international parties in the face of such a huge scale immigration and how Syrians ended up in neighbouring countries as it is in other cases of immigration crises are also examined and resulting from this, sufficiency and validity of FRiT support by EU is evaluated.

In Chapter 4, the features of the Turkish Labour Market that have determinant impact on labour market integration of SuTPs are examined in detail and in what settings of a labour market that Syrians under temporary protection are expected to be integrated is discussed. In order to elaborate on this, structural features of Turkish labour market from various perspectives such as; jobless growth, flexibility issues related to informal employment, income equality, working hours, sufficiency of real wages, subcontracting, temporary work, level of unionization, contributions of the employment services have been explained with regard to causality of their functioning for SuTP labour market integration.
Chapter 5 of the study focuses on the impact of SuTPs to Turkish labour market considering the labour market features and employment integration service provision in Turkey in order to compare the situation with the Kuhlman’s (1991) criteria. The chapter also focuses on the demand side and supply side effects of SuTPs separately. On demand side new firm entries, their potential effects and policy provision of public authorities in face of such a situation is evaluated. On supply side, the existence of a situation of replacement of locals from labour market whether it be formal employment or informal employment by SuTPs is discussed. The widespread informal employment for SuTPs, underlying reasons why they accept to work in conditions they are in, are examined and also how this situation affected the labour market dynamics and also functioned for neo-liberal labour market policies are evaluated. Determinant factors for the effectiveness of work permit policy scheme is explained along with the discussion of general developments on labour market data since Syrian influx has begun. The chapter also explains some other results of SuTP informal employment such as less revenues for state to implement social state policies and its effect on social justice perception etc.

Chapter 5, also draws attention to barriers for SuTPs to access labour market and questions the existence of Protracted Refugee Situation (PRS) in relation to employment dimension of integration and Fortress Europe policies and compares the results with the Kuhlman’s (1991) integration criteria. In this chapter, study examines the PES data, in terms of what kinds of vacancies SuTP workforce fills, based on the ALMP data and the vacancies data of PES. In this setting, manufacturing sector which is one of the sectors that informal employment is high and also the sector that has most vacancies (İŞKUR Database, 2020; Kamalıoğlu, 2014, pp. 196,197; Yıldız & Yıldız, 2017, p. 35; Kaya, 2016; Buyukgoze-Kavas and Autin, 2019, p. 66; Baban et al., 2017; İSKUR, 2020, pp. 47,48) was determined as the leading sector for SuTP labour market participation. The study also examines the percentage distribution among PES ALMP types that SuTPs benefited from since the beginning of immigration crisis and describes what the results point out to on positioning of SuTPs in Turkish labour market and also the contributions of PES
services by also laying out Public Employment Service provision for different kinds of protection statuses. The characteristics about the results of such services provided to SuTPs both internationally and locally (Kaygısız, 2017, pp. 13, 14), show us that they are more open for working in precarious conditions (including child labour and gender differences) (Çeliker, 2018, pp. 109, 110; Dedeoğlu, 2014, pp. 108,109; Pitel, 2017; İçduygu and Diker, 2017, pp. 25, 26; UNICEF, 2014), have less chance to get a work permit and in need of learning how to speak Turkish (Durable Solutions Platform and İGAM Research Center on Asylum and Migration, 2019, p. 39). In this chapter, it is also pointed out that there is a need for stricter inspections on informal SuTP activities in the labour market and what are the potential development areas for services provided for their successful integration according to Kuhlman (1991) is emphasized.

In the last chapter, thoughts pointed out throughout the study are summarized, along with final evaluations about them. In this chapter making policy recommendations about what should be done to make successful labour market integration possible is also discussed.
CHAPTER 2

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

In this section, conceptual framework of the study will be presented in order to explain the related concepts and theories and provide a conceptual and historical background on the issue of labour market integration of Syrians under temporary protection.

2.1 The Term Refugee and Its Historical Background

The distinction between voluntary migration and forced migration originates from the adjustments of “1951 Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees” and “1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees” (Aydınlı, 2015, p. 18). In 1951 Convention, refugees are defined as, people who:

Owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it. (Plender, 2006, p. 153)

Although there are many, other types of protection in operation, the historical developments that brought international community to accept this definition of “Refugee” had been relatively rough. In order to examine these, we shortly need to explain the fundamental changes on the political, economic and philosophical approaches surrounding the issue.

According to Foucault (Foucault, 2010), with the changing understanding of governmental practice during the sixteenth century for states, population become a power supply that needs to be regulated and an entity that the continuity of the
existence of state depended on. The growth of the population had to be encouraged and the life of the state’s inhabitants had to be in order to provide productive contributions for increasing the wealth of state. For Mercantilist approach, emigration were forbidden and immigration were plausible. The greater the number of people in the country, the lower were the wages and thus making possible the cheaper products and more export levels which result in stronger state treasury. Strong treasury on the other hand provided opportunity for building powerful armies. So according to this approach, people migrating to any state perceived as a valuable thing that need to be preserved. This approach lasted until the mid-eighteenth century, with liberalism getting on to the stage by limiting interventionist understanding of state powers and changing the view on population by accepting it as a quasi-natural being that works based on its own needs and regulated by the “invisible hand” as it also provides productivity for the state. The role of the government is seen as securing the working of “invisible hand” mechanism of liberalism. Later on with the rise of nationalism, unemployment problem seen during the early years of the 19th century and government having more responsibility on managing the wellbeing of the population, the emigration started to be encouraged while immigration wanted to be kept under control and regulated. Changing policies like introduction of passport control system after World War 1, building of an international refugee regime that focuses on the perspective of seeing refugees as a problem rather than solving the problems of refugees brought the refugees’ problem to its present conditions (Saunders, 2018, pp. 63,68,69,83,84; Foucault, 2009, pp. 68,69,365; Foucault, 2010; Torpey, 2000, p. 21).

Today, according to UNHCR “Global Trends” 2020 report published on June 2021, 82.4 million people are the victims of the forced migration. Nearly three out of every four refugee has fled to a neighbouring country. Turkey is the leading country to host most forcibly displaced people (refugees or refugee like situations) with 3.7 million people and 92 percent of them are from Syria (UNHCR, 2021). More than 80 per
cent of all Syrian asylum seekers\(^1\) are located in the neighbouring countries. Moreover according to 2018 report, most resettlement submissions to UNHCR were also from Turkey by far with 16,042 submissions in 2018. Turkey also have most naturalized refugee population with 29,000 that are all Syrians in 2018. Turkey is the fifth country for asylum claims with 83,300 submissions in 2018 (UNHCR, 2021; UNHCR, 2020). According to PoMM (2021) only 55,074 of refugees in Turkey are living in the temporary accommodation centres. These statistics pretty much show the conditions of the today’s migration movements and Turkey’s place in it.

2.2 International Protection

International protection can be described as an international law protection shield that kicks in when a foreigner\(^2\) who lives outside of their own country and unable to return home because they would be at risk and their country is unable or unwilling to protect them. The risks that are mentioned here can be specified as: having the possibility of being persecuted, threats on life, freedom or physical integrity arising from an armed conflict or public disorder. Some other sources of risk can be famines, man-made disasters or being stateless (UNHCR, 2017a).

One of the strategic objectives defined by the office of UNHCR is to develop an international protection regime by promoting compatibility of United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, (from now on will be called as 1951 Convention). In order to achieve this, UNHCR supports signatory states to enable them to meet their obligations and apply the related international law on refugees. UNHCR promotes improvements on national asylum legislations and helps countries to increase their capacity to provide necessary protection (UNHCR, 2009, p. 19).

\(^1\) What is meant by the asylum-seeker is a person who is in a foreign country to seek protection as a result of a discriminatory treatment in her/his country and her/his evaluation process for demanding asylum has not been finished yet. (Kul, 2017, pp. 19,20)

\(^2\) In IOM’s International Migration Law Glossary on Migration a foreigner is defined as; “a person which is in a state who is not a citizen or national” and in this study this definition of the term is predicated on.
International protection law is widely accepted in the international arena but when it comes to putting it into practice, as Foucauldian power relations describes, results could vary. The people are free as long as they can act otherwise considering what is imposed upon them (Puggioni, 2016, pp. 135, 145, 146; Foucault, 1994, p. 342). Thus the implementation of the international protection regime is mostly dependent on the attitude of the states and regulations of the international law for protection are unable to exceed being advisory as they are in most of other areas of international law (Kul, 2017, pp. 24, 25).

To elaborate on the international protection regime, we have to have a review of the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees which are core elements of the international protection regime (UNHCR, 2017b, p. 15; UNHCR, 2011). Violations of basic human rights during the Second World War led first to Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 which accepts right to seek asylum as a human right, establishment of the UNHCR in 1950 and after that adoption of the Convention relating to the Status for Refugees in 1951. The 1951 Convention has taken effect in 1954 (Kul, 2017, p. 18; UN General Assembly, 1948; Eggli, 2002, p. 82; UN General Assembly, 1951). The 1951 Convention had a geographical and time limitation which it applies to events “occurring in Europe or elsewhere before 1 January 1951” which both of them were removed by the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. Turkey however, did not lift the limitations and kept the adoption of the 1951 Convention with its geographical limitation. Therefore, for Turkey only the people who flee Europe can be accepted as refugee according to international law (Plender, 2006, p. 153; UN General Assembly, 1951; Kul, 2017, p. 19; UN General Assembly, 1967, p. Article 1.2 / 1.3) and Syrian refugees are not de jure refugees for Turkey.

Refugees, people who lost the protection of their country of origin, can only rely on the international protection which is enabled by the contributions of the signatory nation states of 1951 Convention (Puggioni, 2016, pp. 8, 9). One of other main characteristics of the 1951 Convention is that it grants refugees right to benefit from the principle of non-refoulement and according to EU law, people who are seeking
international protection are defined as asylum seekers. (European Court of Human Rights, et al., 2014, p. 43) This Principle is important because an asylum seeker cannot be sent back until a decision is made by the relevant national authority whether she/he meets the criteria of being a refugee or not. Although this is the general approach that non-refoulement principle set forth, it has exceptions for people who poses a threat to the security of the hosting country based on reasonable causes and people who are convicted of serious crimes that can affect the hosting community (UNHCR, 2017b, pp. 17-20). In practice, countries also tend to abstain from proper application of the principle, Statement between Turkey and EU can be shown as an example of this. This Statement, which can be questioned about its conformity with the international law constructed through 1951 Convention for countries who accepted it without reservation, is not only way that nation states abstain from the proper implementation of the related principle. Countries also avert its implementation by acting widely reluctant to grant refugee status to asylum seekers and introduce other statuses like “temporary protection” that enables them to avoid responsibility of refugee protection framework even if their articulation with international law allows it (Kul, 2017, p. 22). The reason for this is that the 1951 Convention stipulates that recognized refugees, whether she/he is recognized by the UNHCR or related national authority; they are accepted as having right to “lawful stay” (UNHCR, 1988, p. 3) and as a result of this they are expected to have access to same treatment as nationals on social security, public relief, primary education etc. (UNHCR, 2006, pp. 17,18; UN General Assembly, 1951, p. Article 17).

1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol have established the refugee protection regime in a general manner worldwide but countries and supranational entities around the world have built complementing protection mechanisms (UNHCR, 2017b, p. 23). For example European Union has established the most comprehensive structure that has different legislative instruments that goes beyond the scope of the 1951 Convention.

Taken all together we can now examine the different types of international protection with their reflections on the Turkish law and regulations.
2.2.1 International Protection Applicants, Conditional Refugees and Subsidiary Protection

According to Turkish legislation on the topic, there are two other status types that are considered as the subtitles of international protection aside from the refugee status. First one of them is the conditional refugees which is defined in the Law on Foreigners and International Protection (LFIP) (LFIP, 2013) as:

A person who as a result of events occurring outside European countries and owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it. According to legislation, conditional refugees are to be allowed to stay in the country until they are resettled in a third country.

Subsidiary protection on the other hand is given to (LFIP, 2013):

A foreigner or a stateless person, who neither could be qualified as a refugee nor as a conditional refugee, shall nevertheless be granted subsidiary protection upon the status determination because if returned to the country of origin or country of [former] habitual residence would: a) be sentenced to death or face the execution of the death penalty; b) face torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; c) face serious threat to himself or herself by reason of indiscriminate violence in situations of international or nationwide armed conflict; and therefore is unable or for the reason of such threat is unwilling, to avail himself or herself of the protection of his country of origin or country of [former] habitual residence.

In addition to these, “international protection applicant” is also a status used by the Turkish legislation, which has determinant effects. International protection applicant simply means someone who has applied for international protection but any decision about her/his application has not been given yet by the related authorities. If we shortly compare the status types with each other, the difference between the refugee status and conditional refugee status is that conditional refugees should come from the regions other than Europe and apply for international protection. Subsidiary protection status, on the other hand is given to the foreigners who do not carry necessary conditions to be accepted as a refugee or conditional refugee and because of the three factors that are mentioned in the definition above cannot go back to

2.2.2 Refugees Right to Work

According to international law; on wage-earning activity, refugees, at minimum, must be treated in the most favourable way as foreign nationals in that country that are in the same circumstances are treated. To put it more explicitly, right to work applies to a) recognized refugees, b) asylum seekers whose process of refugee status determination is over-prolonged and c) refugees waiting for resettlement in another country. Additionally limitations on labour market access of foreigners should not be implemented on refugees who stayed in the hosting country for three years; and on refugees with a child who has the nationality of the hosting country. On the social security measures and labour protection legislations, refugees should have the same right as citizens, according to the 1951 Convention. Refugees are also exempt from the work and business start permits if they are not in a position to be expected of them to provide necessary conditions because of the forced displacement they have experienced. As we have mentioned earlier it is one thing to accept the rules and another to implement them. According to Global Refugee Work Rights Report (2014), 30% of the global refugee population have a legal barrier to access to labour market, and where there are no legal barriers, refugees often face de facto barriers like not having access to the life outside of camps or work permit fees. Not knowing the language of the hosting country and discriminative interpretation and the practice of the national laws are also other barriers that keep refugees from performing their right to work (University of Michigan Law School, 2010, p. 8; UN General Assembly, 1951, pp. art. 6, 17.2, 24).

2.3 Temporary Protection and Burden Sharing Principal

It is accustomed that some countries shape their international protection regimes regardless of the international protection mechanisms they have adopted or recognized and they steadily increase the limiting aspects of their asylum policies for
their own hand. With the end of Cold War, as accepting more refugees was no more
effective to bring prestige to western countries, these limitations has shown a rapid
increase and right of habitation and work rights also diminished as a result of
economic recessions and commencing of mainstreaming of globalization. Temporary
protection status was one of the many results of this restrictive approach (Mansouri,
2010, pp. 135,136; Chimni, 2000; Crisp, 2003, p. 7; Helton, 2002, p. 9; Gibney,
2004, s. 3).

UNHCR has defined the temporary protection as the response of the states to mass
migration movements that provides the principle of non-refoulement and meeting of
fundamental and urgent needs of the asylum-seekers (Kul, 2017, pp. 19,20; UN
General Assembly, 1951, p. art. 33). Even though, the practice of temporary
protection showed differentiation from state to state around the world, archetype of
the temporary protection practice can be accepted as the France and England to
provide asylum for the people that escape from the Spanish Civil War during the
1930s. Additionally, it was during the refugee crisis that countries like Indonesia,
Hong Kong, Philippines and Malaysia face, over the course of Vietnam War and
collaterally UNHCR advertised that in the cases of mass migration influx asylum-
seekers should be at least given the status of temporary protection and later on this
application became mainstream. Although TP provides asylum for a great number of
asylum-seekers, at the same time it ensures less rights than refugees have (Ciğer,
2016, pp. 65,70; UNHCR, 2014, p. 2; Perluss & Hartman, 1985, p. 551; Fitzpatrick,
2000, p. 279). For example, conflict in former Yugoslavia during the 1990s caused
mass migration influx and even though the people who are fleeing their home
country were most probably met the refugee criteria, central European countries
granted them the Temporary Protection (TP) status. Moreover, in 2001 EU enacted a
directive that enables the same approach for the mass influx cases and imminent
mass influx cases where the displaced people coming from a third country are not
able to return to their country of origin. Displaced people who are in this position
found suitable for the temporary protection status (Rygiel et al., 2016, p. 317;
A TP regime that complies with the international law should implement non-refoulement principal thoroughly (UN General Assembly, 1951, p. art. 33). Push-back interventions made by the receiving authorities like Italy on the Libyan refugee boats are prohibited by case law (Hirsi Jamaa and Others v Italy, Application No. 27765/09 ECHR, 23 February, paragraph 88). Limiting the time of temporary protection status with clear restrictions is another necessity of the international law because continuous application of TP regime for asylum-seekers means limited access to rights provided by the 1951 Convention for signatory states. The International Law Association and EU embrace that TP regime should be applied at most for three years (Hathaway & Neve, 1997, pp. 181,182). As the 1951 Convention and the related judicial opinions on the topic also commend that people who have temporary protection status naturally should have access to fundamental human rights as Ciger (2016) points out. The return of the TP status holders to where they come from, only should be enabled when it is safe and dignifying (access to food, water, shelter and urgent health services) for them (Ciger, 2016, pp. 78-85; UNHCR, 2003). Lastly, compliance of a country’s TP practice with the international protection regime is also closely related with the international conventions she is signatory of.

So, as mentioned above, TP regime enables countries to abstain from providing the actual international protection coverage and risks the successful implementation of the international protection regime (Fitzpatrick, 2000; Hathaway, 2003). In fact the changing approach to international protection in Europe can be observed through the findings of some of the field researches, as the study of Mansouri (2010, pp.136-145) suggests that in Denmark and Germany public discourse underwent a change that these refugee “friendly” countries are now unwilling to perform the international protection as it necessitates. Same study also points out that Europe has the lowest recognition rate for refugees. Lastly, TP regime limit the integration phase of asylum-seekers by limiting their access to health, education, language training and employment services.
Burden sharing principal of international protection law simply aims to promote international cooperation when a country is overburdened by a migration development. 1951 Convention uses this describes this term in its preamble as follows:

The grant of asylum may place unduly heavy burdens on certain countries, and that a satisfactory solution of a problem of which the United Nations has recognized the international scope and nature cannot therefore be achieved without international cooperation. (UNHCR, 2011)

Burden sharing principal foresees several aspects of cooperation however the main idea is that provided international cooperation should improve the capacity of asylum in the country that is subject to assistance. These aspects can be financial aids, commitments of financial aids and of course also the resettlement of immigrants to safe third countries. (IOM, 2000, p. 5) Studies also show the importance of resettlement, by pointing out financial relief can only be complementary to resettlement (IOM, 2000, pp. 5-7; Newland, 2011). In this manner, applying burden sharing principal via resettlement of immigrants according to system that Jones and Teytelboym (2017) could prevent the repetitive situation of immigrants having been ended up in neighbouring countries of country of origin and provide opportuntities for better implementation of burden sharing principal. According to this, in order to resettle refugees, a common information system among countries will be established and this information system will include data on; capacity of the country to host refugees, preferences of natives on which refugees they would like to host, efficiency and lastly and most importantly the preferences of refugees themselves.

So, in relation to burden sharing approach as a general rule of international cooperation which includes hosting refugees, when a country is overburdened with immigration influx (Kul, 2017, pp. 24,25,29), the related TP Directive of EU also foresees a burden sharing approach among the member states that could alleviate the economic and social impact of refugees in those countries; however, it is not expected to become effective in the near future because the member states, even the ones that are the least affected by the migration movements are not expected to approve it. Thus, no global or regional international law regulation can be said to
have constructed a TP regime that hold nation states responsible (Ciğer, 2016, pp. 71,72; Council of the European Union, 2001, p. art. 5; Ciğer, 2015, pp. 235,236). On the other hand,

After explaining the basic protection types, we will now explain the humanitarian assistance and the different approaches of it.

### 2.4 Rights Based and Needs Based Approaches to Humanitarian Assistance

Both for the international law and for our topic, the burden sharing principal for international protection brings humanitarian assistance to table for international community. Whether this assistance involves hosting refugees or just financially assisting to hosting countries, it all comes down to the point of view that is accepted by the relevant actors. As the study of Çeliker (2018) suggests, there are two competing approaches for the humanitarian assistance; the Needs Based Approach (NBA) and the Rights Based Approach (RBA). The NBA type assistance usually focuses on the fundamental needs of the refugees and aims to satisfy their needs rather than enabling them access and perform their rights which as RBA intends. Implementation of NBA puts limitations for assistance to refugees which are mainly resulting from political and international ambitions of responsible actors and cause them to be dependent on the aids like cash assistance or contributions in kind, instead of providing them a chance to perform their right to work etc. (Çeliker, 2018, pp. 5,44,45; Banik, 2008; Stevens, 2016; Wisken, 2012; Grabska and Mehta, 2008). RBA on the other hand forespeaks for self-sustained life for refugees and defends a perspective to keep the established authority responsible for realization of refugees as right holders (Türk, 2016, p. 55; UNHCR, 2014a).

The practice of international law during refugee crises often reflects the practice of NBA rather than RBA and consequently, if a country does not have the capacity to provide refugee assistance in scope of the rights based approach, burden sharing principal is put into practice by the international community only from the perspective of NBA. On the other hand, in some cases even UNHCR proves to be
ineffective, as the only thing it seems to be able to do is creating new mechanisms of intervention that do not work because of the internal power relations among countries who are actually providing funding for the functioning of it (Peshkopia, 2005, p. 219). Embracing of RBA by international community is important because interventions based on an approach that aims providing asylum seekers with the rights that international law entails and prioritises long lasting solutions, are far more rewarding for all the relevant parties of migration.

2.5 Integration

As Dionigi points out (2017pp. 113,114), scholars position the asylum seekers especially with their relation to the nation states. To exemplify, Haddad (2008) points out the structure of the international system as the cause of stranded people, the refugees (Arendt, 1973;). To cope with this situation a “solution” comes into action: that is called integration.

Defining integration is not an easy task as the literature on the topic is extensive and sometimes not clear ended. In order to reflect the common points made by other definitions in a most comprehensible manner it is favourable to accept the Kuhlman’s definition (1991) as a valid one. According to him:

> If refugees are able to participate in the host economy in ways commensurate with their skills and compatible with their cultural values; if they attain a Standard of living which satisfies culturally determined minimum requirements; if the socio-cultural change they undergo permits them to maintain an identity of their own and to adjust psychologically to their new situation; if standards of living and economic opportunities for members of the host society have not deteriorated due to the influx of refugees; if friction between host population and refugees is not worse than within the host population itself; and if the refugees do not encounter more discrimination than exists between groups previously settled within the host society: then refugees are truly integrated (Kuhlman, 1991).

In relation to the present topic, this definition powerfully emphasizes the economic and employment dimensions of the integration, however one of the most attention grabbing aspects of the integration, mentioned by the UNHCR (2013) is its entailment on the corresponding contributions of both the refugee and the host society (Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme, 2005). To elaborate from the system perspective, integration is the opposite of the segmentation
and the parts in an integration system are in interdependence. Thus in society integration, if the refugees are not integrated and are still trying to survive in that society; it is perceived as harmful for both the society as a whole and the refugees themselves which the end result of would be segmentation of the society. Esser (2001) embraces approach of 1951 Convention and uses the term “assimilation” for successful integration. The claim here is that this assimilation does not mean coercion but it only reflects refugees to successfully integrate into the social, educational, economic and cultural life of the society they live in and become a complemental part of it whilst also being able to uphold their individual differences. From this point of view, differences of the refugee groups can only be as much as other ethnic groups have in that society. Although interdependence is at the central of the integration, as Khulman’s definition also touches on, a society can reach to a point where it can no longer integrate the “alien” individuals and the living standards of the host society could worsen because of the refugee influx (Stadler, 2016, pp. 13,16,17; UNHCR, 2006, p. 24;). In order to eliminate such possibilities abovementioned, burden-sharing approach has a vital importance. Another necessity for integration is refugees to be willing to adapt to the host society and host community to be willing to accept the refugees no matter how much is the difference. That is being said, greater the cultural difference between host society and the country of origin, the harder it will be for refugees to integrate (UNHCR, 2013; UNHCR, 2005; UNHCR, 2002).

According to UNHCR integration evaluation tool; there are four major areas that determine whether the refugee integration was successful or not. These areas can also be understood as main necessary areas and first one of them is about the asylum reception conditions for refugees and its effect on the integration. Second area is the legal integration which projects refugees to have access to legal rights in the asylum country as much as the citizens living in that country and also on additional issues such as family unification. Third one is the socio-economic integration which entails refugees to have economical self-reliance by access to employment and entrepreneurship and basic needs like housing and access to health services. Last area
is the socio-cultural integration, which envisages the interdependence vision we have mentioned before but in a social way that enables refugees to live among host society members without discrimination and exploitation. For this area the openness and support of the host society has a key importance and it includes aspects like child education, language training and social orientation etc. (UNHCR, 2013, p. 39)

Among these areas and their ingredients, there are ones, which crosscut the functioning of the other ones. For example: housing is one of them, access to housing enables refugees’ chance to access health services and employment opportunities. Family unification reduces refugees to be isolated from the society. This crosscut relationship sometimes can work two ways as someone who is socially excluded may have hard time accessing health services on the other hand as the Swedish experiences point out bad health can also cause the social isolation. May be the most effective crosscutting notion is the language; it affects training, social relationships and of course the employment which has its own crosscutting effects for integration. At the end of it all, integration accepted as successful when refugees gained active citizenship by showing participation in civic and political decision making processes in the society they live. They will create a social position that they are going to feel included and because of it, they will have access to rights and services as other citizens do. After achieving this, they will have to fight for other areas of struggle whether it is related to being refugee descent or not (UNHCR, 2013, pp. 66, 70, 96, 97, 115; Ager, and Strang, 2004).

One other important point to touch upon is that as the development levels of the receiving countries show difference, intervention policies to enable integration should be designed in a tailor-made fashion. There are variety of reasons for it such as; cultural differences between the country of origin and the receiving country, economic situation of the receiving country etc (Sak, et al., 2017, p. 4).

Additionally, it is vital to make distinction between migrant integration and refugee integration because of migrant’s the ability to have free will on migrating as they can
have arrangements for their livelihood, social life etc. in the country they have migrated (Şimşek, 2018; Cheung and Phillimore, 2014; Danzer and Ulku, 2011).

We shall now explain the employment integration, the most important area of integration. We will focus on the employment dimension of the integration process for SuTPs in Turkey in chapter 3 and 4 of the study, in detail. In this chapter, we will try to explain labour market integration of refugees in general.

### 2.5.1 Labour Market Integration of Refugees and Kuhlman’s Framework

The title could have been the economic integration of refugees but as far as the real meaning of the economic integration for refugees goes, it all comes down to refugees’ ability of earning enough amount of money whether it stems from being an entrepreneur or being in paid employment. (Scottish Refugee Council, 2010, p. 14; Bommes & Kolb, 2006). Therefore, in this study economic integration of refugees will be accepted as their labour market integration.

As explained earlier, international law necessitates the access of refugees to labour market exactly as if they are the citizens of the hosting country whether this is about self-employment or paid employment. At the regional level European Union also emphasize the right to work for persons who acquired refugee status by saying; “*Member States shall authorise beneficiaries of refugee status to engage in employed or self-employed activities*” (UNHCR, 2006, p. 52; Council of European Union, 2004b, p. art. 26/1). Many experiences from the field (UNHCR, 2013, p. 76) show that economic issues especially the employment integration of the refugees are most vital part of successful integration. Additionally field research of UNHCR (2013) in the area show that when asked, what makes them feel integrated, answer of refugees gather around the notion of having a job. The integration process for the refugees who do not have a chance to be employed becomes harsher and takes longer period. One other finding is that earlier the employment the better the chance of refugees to integrate which as a cross-cutting factor with its positive psychological

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3 The terms “Employment Integration” and “Labour Market Integration” are used as synonyms in this study.
impact, facilitates the social and cultural interaction that can result in making language learning easier. (Scottish Refugee Council, 2010, p. 13; Şimşek, 2018, p. 382). Adversely the local language also contributes to the employability of the refugees even though it is also affected by some other aspects like social help mechanisms that could prevent employment. (Giesing et al., 2018, p. 5; Clausen et al., 2009; Rosholm and Rune, 2010).

There are many reasons why it is harder for refugees to be employed and number of factors that determine the employability of a refugee in country of asylum (Giesing et al., 2018). Firstly, refugees who fled their country of origin do not do it by choice; they are forced to. They do not come to country of asylum to get better jobs that are suitable for their qualifications but to guarantee they can perform their fundamental rights like; right to live. Sometimes they flee in such a way they do not have any document to show their educational attainment or they lost it because of the conditions in the country they fled. Skilled refugees could also have hard time getting employed because experiences show that even in the same type of professions same vocational terms can have different meanings in one country than the other and requirements of jobs can differ from country to country. Therefore, if the country of asylum does not have a sophisticated skills recognition mechanism they end up being underemployed more so in unemployment. The notion of underemployment on the other hand is not a rare case as it is seen to occur throughout years in different refugee experiences (Colic-Peisker & Tilbury, 2006). They often work in hard to fill positions where local labour force do not want to work and because of this experience employment services are found helpful by the refugees (UNHCR, 2013a, p. 16; Colic-Peisker & Tilbury, 2006, p. 211). Secondly, they do not have access to labour market like other type of migrants who get their work permit before arrival. According to international law, refugees do not have to have work permit in order to participate in the labour market but in some cases, the local implementation of the international law can differentiate. For example, in Germany most of the refugees are not allowed to work until after three months of their arrival. Third, refugees do not always have a chance to travel throughout the
asylum country as there are widespread cases limiting their mobility. Fourth, refugees usually suffer from many kinds of psychological problems and this puts them in even harder position to integrate into new society they have to live and adjust themselves for all sorts of new things (Giesing et al., 2018, p. 4). Fifth, as we have mentioned earlier, the more cultural similarities between the society and cultural traits of the refugees the better the chance of successful integration but this is not always the case for them. Refugees do not get to select the country they live in and whether it is because of the cultural differences with the host society or not, they can be the target of discriminatory actions. The private sector might not want to hire refugees or labour peace of the work place can be affected depending on the views of other workers. Lastly, the capacity of labour supply absorption in an economy is the main determinant among all of these (Sak et al., 2017, p. 2).

While defining the term integration, the approach explained by Kuhlman (1991) is used, which was centred on the economic integration of refugees and according to his views the economic integration of refugees should be measured by the following criteria (Kuhlman, 1991, p. 19):

a) A participation level in the economy that enables an income level for refugees to have living standard that is acceptable for their culture. For this criterion, having social benefits are too accepted as economic participation but obviously that is not enough to clarify. In order to clarify this criterion factors such as; participating in the labour market in exchange of earnings, being employed at the jobs that are commensurate with their skills and experiences, having access to same types of jobs as locals and not being confined to number of types of working areas and having a job retention period as much as locals etc. are also the ones that need to be checked for to determine whether they are employed in an integrated way (UNHCR, 2013a, pp. 8,9).

b) Independently from the income level, having access to the services and goods that local citizens have. For instance; in order to benefit from the employment services, SuTPs in Turkey do need to pay neither to the public employment offices nor to the private employment agencies as it is forbidden to take money
from job seekers to provide employment services independently of citizenship status.

c) Lastly, labour market effects of the refugees on the host community should be balanced and the situation in the local labour market should not be deteriorated for the host society. This criterion is important especially, because it largely affects the behaviour of host society on discrimination against refugees. This one, from our perspective is the most important criterion which determines whether it is going to be integration or segmentation for SuTPs.

For employment integration, learning the local language is vital but learning the vocational language also pays off. From applying to suitable job vacations to understanding the workplace occupational health and safety rules, a lot of employment related issues are affected by this factor. In order to encounter this issue, Finland and Norway pays particular attention to vocational language training with the applications like “language apprenticeship” and sparing some hours of each work day to vocational language learning. (UNHCR, 2013a, p. 31).

Recognition of skills is one of the most controversial topics on the labour market integration of refugees not just because it helps determine the qualifications of the refugees but on the other hand it also measures whether the skills in the country of origin overlaps with same skills in the country of asylum. However, skills recognition without documentation is a hard task to implement successfully, for instance; in Spain recognition of formal skills can take up to 2 or 4 years. EU even has a tool for skills recognition for third country nationals which does not function as intended because it is not accepted as valid indicator by the member states. (European Commission, 2019 ; Dhéret & Diez, 2019, pp. 7,8 ; Martin et al, 2016).

Entrepreneurship activities for refugees is a promising area of economic activity because it creates employment and not just for the refugee herself/himself but also some others. In Turkey, experiences show integration process for SuTPs have improved faster for the ones who started their own businesses (Şimşek, 2018, p. 382). Although micro-grants could seem like a proper way to create refugee
entrepreneurships whether they are provided in exchange for additional employment or not; it is also important to provide mentoring service for businesses.

2.5.2 Decent Work and Relation of Immigrant Influx, Flexibility and Informal Employment

After describing the employment integration of refugees we also need to explain what should be the conditions of employment in the country of asylum whether they be for locals or refugees. In order to refer to these conditions we will use the term “decent work” that has been conceptualized by ILO in 1999. ILO (1999) defines decent work as “productive work in which rights are protected, which generates an adequate income, with adequate social protection” (Buyukgoze-Kavas and Autin, 2019, p. 64). In order to measure the Decent Work level in the US Duffy et al. (2016) developed a Decent Work Scale and Işık and friends’ (2019) study compared and evaluated the applicability of that certain scale to Turkish society and found it to be applicable. According to this scale there are 5 indicators to determine if a work is “decent” enough and these are; “(a) interpersonally and physically safe working environments, (b) hours that allow for adequate rest and free time, (c) organizational values that are in congruence with family and social values, (d) adequate compensation, and (e) access to adequate health care”. As we will elaborate in the chapter 4, creating jobs that provide decent work conditions has been challenging for Turkey (Buyukgoze-Kavas and Autin, 2019, p. 64; ILO, 2008).

In light of ideal of decent work we have to also mention the terms of flexibility and in relation with it, informality and its effect in a labour market.

The term flexibility became more and more common since the 80s as neoliberal policies become more adopted by the countries through the guidance of Washington Consensus organizations like; OECD, World Bank and IMF. In short, flexibility of labour market can be defined as its capability to accommodate itself to changes that economic developments or policies bring. There are several subheadings of flexibility and one of them is about the protection of employment where the rules and
regulations determine the conditions of workers to lose their jobs or get a job by the decision of employers. Another subheading is about wage where union membership or government determined minimum wage levels are important factors. One other subheading is about the features of contract of employment where working time of the worker and expectations from them are determined. This subheading might include sub-contracting and temporary work applications. Lastly, the subheading about the flexibility from the worker’s side which can include working at different places at the same time or a working time design guided by the needs of employees etc. (Van Eyck, 2003). After explaining flexibility we have to mention informal employment to clarify the real meaning of the term especially for the developing countries. In these countries regulations such as minimum wage rather than “flexibility” of it for employers, provide no significant effect on employment creations and also supports fighting with poverty. A flexibility approach that focus on creating more jobs and a labour protection approach that targets providing decent work conditions can be reconciled via capable institutions that can create a balance for both of this applications; however in a labour market where informality is widespread the existence of such institutional capacity can be questioned (Rodgers, 2007).

Informality can be defined according to participation of one’s to labour market from either demand side or supply side. So, one also can be an informal employer or contributing family member but as the topic of our study relates more we will explain employee informality. Employees are accepted as informally employed if they or their employers do not pay pensions or do provide contributions to the social security system (OECD/ILO, 2019, p. 26). In countries, where informality is widespread and where there is need for more powerful inspection mechanisms flexibility and informal employment might overlap. So, for employers, all of the positive factors that can be brought by the flexible employment are provided through unchecked informal employment (Van Eyck, 2003). However there are also downsides of informal employment especially if a country with an informal employment problem receives an immigration influx. For instance; in Colombia
where informality is also a problem after the Venezuelan immigration locals experienced a wage decrease as mostly immigrants participated in informal jobs and also formal employment of natives decreased (Delgado-Prieto, 2022; Caruso et al., 2019).
CHAPTER 3

TURKEY’S REFUGEE INTEGRATION POLICY FRAMEWORK AND ITS RELATION TO THE EUROPEAN UNION POLICIES ON SYRIAN REFUGEES

In order to provide a perspective on EU’s international burden sharing approach for Syrian immigration crisis in Turkey, this chapter aims to present Turkey’s refugee integration policy framework, along with the European Union policies on Syrian refugees and its relation to Turkey. It argues that cooperation scheme established through EU-Turkey Statement does not represent a fair burden sharing approach and points out to possible improvement areas. It also discusses the comparative effects of refugees on EU labour markets and Turkey.

3.1 Refugee Integration Policy Framework in Turkey

Turkey is the signatory of the 1951 Convention but sustained the geographical limitation. Therefore, for Turkey only the people who flee from Europe can be accepted as refugees according to international law (Plender, 2006, p. 153; Kul, 2017, p. 19) and Syrian refugees are not de jure refugees for Turkey. Main Turkish legislations on the topic are Law No: 6458 Foreigners and International Protection and Regulation on Temporary Protection. The related Law defines Temporary Protection as follows: “protection provided for the foreigners who comes or passes the border in mass influx in order to find urgent and temporary protection because they are forced to flee from their country and they cannot return” (LFIP, 2013, art. 91). The first practical examples of the TP in Turkey can be accepted as asylum policy implemented for the asylum-seekers who fled to Turkey during the first Gulf War from Iraq (Ciğer, 2016, p. 66; Çiçekli, 2009, p. 118). As the below table shows, because of the Syrian civil war, since 2011 Syrian asylum seeker arrivals to Turkey
continued throughout the years, gradually increasing. (POMM, 2021) Lastly, regulation on Temporary Protection (2014) necessitates SuTPs to have a temporary protection identity card which enables them to have access to education, health and employment services (Şimşek, 2018, p. 377).

**Figure 1: Number of SuTPs in Turkey**

In the past, immigration law of the Turkish state administration was designed mainly for people who have Turkish ethnic descent. According to Settlement Law (1934) it was only projected for people who are from Turkish descent to migrate and gain a citizenship in the country. The reason for this approach was the view of nation building process for Turkish Republic that is applied by the government during that period. For seven decades, this model for immigration policies had been implemented for ongoing immigration movements. Although there have been some minor changes on the immigration approach of the country, it was not until a mass influx from Syria -which caused Turkey to become a net immigration country (Düvell, 2014) - that a paradigm shift occurred on the issue at hand, and the

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4 Source: (PoMM, 2021)
inducement by EU caused the abovementioned LFIP to be enacted in 2013 (İçduygu et al., 2014, p. 123; Göksel, 2018a, pp. 152,153; Biner & Soykan, 2016).

This law made the integration of immigrants from non-Turkish descent possible for the first time (İçduygu & Şimşek, 2016, p. 65; Açıklgooz & Ariner, 2014). This new approach avoids using the term “integration” but instead uses the term harmonization. In LFIP (2013), article 96 defines the purpose of Harmonization as follows; “to equip applicants, international protection beneficiaries and society, with the knowledge and skills to be independently active in all areas of social life without the assistance of third persons in Turkey or in the country to which they are resettled or in their own country.”

Comparing the approach of the LFIP with the one of integration ideal; it can clearly be seen here that the new law does not project any political agenda for the SuTPs as compared to term integration which includes usually, active citizenship for all, in the end. The law mainly deploys Presidency of Migration Management for the implementation of harmonization policies but on the other hand commands the cooperation and contribution of the other public institutions, local governmental bodies, Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs) and universities along with international organizations. As we mentioned earlier -as UNHCR adopts- LFIP harmonization approach, also embraces two way process for both the host society and the SuTPs to adjust themselves for each other. Finally, aside from the political dimension, harmonization approach also emphasize the education, health and employment extents and more importantly the defined purpose has a very strong emphasis on becoming self-sufficient which greatly corresponds to the labour market integration of SuTPs. As can be seen, harmonization approach does not have much of a difference from integration.

Moreover, looking into employment integration policies of the European Union according to abovementioned Action Plan (European Commission, 2016) on integration of third country nationals, employment is seen as the most important aspect of the integration and especially the self-sustainability for refugees gained via
employment is seen the most vital contribution for the future of Europe. Same problems such as underemployment of refugees and lower labour market participation of women among refugees are also valid for EU experiences. Vocational training that provide working experience and micro-credit schemes for supporting entrepreneurship activities of the refugees are encouraged. On the vocational training activities, in EU funded projects, and international best practices, know-how sharing is emphasized (European Commission, 2016, pp. 8-10).

Lastly, many studies show that refugee women needs special attention on labour market integration whether it is about finding employment, taking vocational and language training or participating in cultural orientation activities there is a visible gender gap which requires special coping interventions (UNHCR, 2013a; Codell et al., 2011; Bevelander et al., 2009).

3.2 European Union Policies about Syrian Refugees and Its Relation to Turkey

This section examines the attitude of EU towards the immigration crisis and alignment of the policies implemented by it to the international protection law.

Since the millennium, political meetings about integration policies conducted regularly by the related ministries of the member states, across the EU. These meetings focused on all abovementioned major areas of integration. In 2004 as a continuation of support provided to member states by EU, Common Basic Principles (CBP) for Immigrant Integration Policy is adopted, as the main agenda. In this document, for the first time it is accepted that integration is a two way process which requires both the refugees and the host community to adjust themselves to each other. A Union level systematic approach to direct and follow-up the nation states according to the developments has been established for the first time. As a result of this, member states developed their own national integration policies tailor-made to their situations with the help of EU. The CBP also gave special importance to encouragement of participation of the refugees in decision making mechanisms. The European Commission (2016, p. 2) has also emphasized the importance of the
employment integration of refugees. The qualification recognition and providing
access to labour market for refugees have been underlined (European Commission,
2011; Centre for Strategy and Evaluation Services, 2013; Council of European
Union, 2004a).

The first legal and formal shift for EU on the integration policy came with the Treaty
of Lisbon in 2010 which promoted expansion of integration policies. Thus new
policy instruments are created and immigration became an instrument to solve
problems brought by the aging population of Europe. In order to afford the expenses
of pensioners, the increase needed for worker contributions are supported by the
refugee labour force (Van Wolleghem, 2019, p. 219; European Commission, 2011a;
Lanzieri, 2010).

From early summer of 2015 number of Syrian refugees coming to EU showed an
increase. This situation caused border closures and even buildings of fences along the
borders between the some member states, which indicates a damage to the
foundations of European Union. The European Agenda for the Integration of
Third Country Nationals came into play at this stage which is created in 2011 in
order to contribute member states by helping them compose a response to the
integration problems in areas they need help (Çeliker, 2018, p. 72; European
Commission, 2011; Neumeier, 2017; Centre for Strategy and Evaluation Services,
2013, p. 11).

On 7th of June 2016, European Commission launched the Integration Action Plan of
Third Country Nationals for non-EU nationals that reside in the EU. The action plan
accepts that responsibility for implementing integration policies is belong to the
member states but it works as an instrument to help EU coordinate and develop
union wide policies. Plan reflects the European integration policy tradition and put
successful integration forward as a beneficial aspect for both the host community and
the immigrants. It does not only focus on refugees but it also takes on other types of
international protection statuses. Action Plan is actually a plan that sets out targets
with time frames in various areas such as education, employment active participation
etc. and calls out for contributions of private, public sectors and NGOs. It also envisages operational and financial help for the member states by also firmly emphasizing the importance of early employment opportunities for immigrants on successful integration. For us with its cultural integration dimension Action Plan virtually promotes Arendtian living in the world experience for immigrants (European Commission, 2016a). On the other hand, Action Plan is criticized mostly for being ineffective on national policy frameworks and being too loose on directing national integration policies (European Commission, 2016).

The funding support for integration policies in member states is given steadily increasing importance. Multiannual financial framework reflects this view as the funds that are envisaged for these frameworks have increased many times more throughout the years. Funds for 2007-2013 period were 825 million Euros and for 2014-2020 period (under the titles of Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund,) it has been increased to 3 billion Euros. In addition to this, target principle for these funding have also been widened and Union contribution for this funds have been steadily increased as much as 90 percent. With the increasing migration pressure to member states, Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF) had the most influential implementation process compared to past applications. All in all, for Van Wolleghem (2019, pp. 223, 233), the effect of European Union on integration policies of member states set to increase as it would become part of a macro migration policy and with rising procedural control on the multiannual financial frameworks.

There are a lot of criticisms towards the EU integration policies and some of them are discussed under the upcoming titles. Criticisms for EU usually publicly known for the policy implementations of “Fortress Europe” and its results have variety of effects.

The term “Fortress Europe” refers to the set of policies that are applied by the EU in order to keep “unwanted others” out of its borders by means of surveillance systems and providing financial support for its neighbours, fortifying the borders of member
states in order to create buffer zones that they can send them back to. For instance; Italy, Greece, Bulgaria, Spain applies expelling and push back methods that “puts the lives of the asylum seekers in grave danger” (Cullberg, 2016, p. 10) in addition to their deprivation from international protection rights as a result of such actions (UNHCR, 2015). The main argument put forward by some quarters of the EU is that it is overburdened by the awful lot of immigrants and limiting this even using the unlawful methods as such is not wrong. However, most of the refugees are living in the neighbouring countries of the country they fled from and as we will examine in the oncoming chapters this is also the case for the Syrian refugee crisis. All things considered, all of these policies can be accepted as aspects of Fortress Europe approach (Amnesty International, 2014, pp. 5,6; UNHCR, 2014b). Moreover, European countries are in need of less skilled labour in order to fill such vacancies and have increased social security expenditures as a result of gradually aging population which requires input of immigrant young population for the sustainability of social security system. So, it is argued that Europe is actually in need of immigration for economic sustainability, in the long term (Loshitzky, 2006, p. 630; Sassen, 2006).

These criticisms has been vocalized especially since 2010 and gained strength with the interferences of Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union (FRONTEX) with the international law. So the real implementers of the non-refoulement principal become the neighbouring countries of the EU, which are accepted as safe countries but whether they are safe is very much disputable (Çeliker, 2018, pp. 73,74; Bialasiewicz, 2011, p. 11). As a consequence of this approach, neighbouring safe countries face many challenges and EU attempts to solve this problem by financial support which is proven to be ineffective from our perspective. Accommodation conditions for refugees in EU are also problematic as Callais camp example shows (Taylor, 2021).

EU has been implementing Fortress Europe policies since the 90s by using intelligence networks, FRONTEX like devices against irregular migration movements and building border protections. The case of the Syrian immigration
flows made this phenomenon more visible than ever especially after 2015. In this period, EU intensified the use of buffer zones for limiting immigration, such as funding EU-Turkey statement. According to Kale (2017, p. 71) the main criticisms for this statement is about its conformity with the international law and more importantly its acceptance of Turkey as a safe third country for Syrian “refugees”\(^5\) in the light of EU standards for safe country (Sajjad, 2018, pp. 3-5; Eurofound, 2016, pp. 5, 6; Kale, 2017, p. 71).

The increase of immigration flow during this period -because of the political perceptions on refugees in the member states- threatened the very existence of the EU. At some point even the application of Schengen system put on hold in the countries refugees transited and targeted. Right wing parties in EU countries found support from society more than usual and caused questioning of the notion of European Union and its migration policies (Kale, 2017, pp. 67, 68). They were more concerned about the relative economic impact of migration than the rights of refugees and thus international protection were being applied NBA style rather than RBA style. At the same time, Turkey has been criticized for letting refugees go through its territory to reach Europe by the EU members. However in this situation Turkey has been a country which has received too many Syrian refugees compared to its absorption capacity and thus not been able to provide them with the decent conditions of integration as the studies in oncoming chapters indicated (Çeliker, 2018, pp. 59,60; Traub, 2016). In order to limit these irregular immigrant flow, EU made a deal with Turkey to provide better conditions for Syrians in there, so they would stop trying to seek asylum in EU countries.

We will focus on the EU-Turkey statement later on but in order to understand the difference of employment integration approach between these partners we will firstly refer to EU policies on this matter. EU treats refugees and the asylum seekers with different set of rules and as refugees have same rights to get access to labour market as EU nationals, asylum seekers who applied for international protection have to be

\(^5\) Syrians who are irregularly immigrating can be accepted as refugees by the EU however the same cannot be done by Turkey as we mentioned in the chapter 1
granted access to services, after twelve months of their application at the most and member states can set these time period to a lesser time period (European Commission, 2016b, p. 21). Nevertheless, in practice, for asylum seekers there can be sector, skills or work permit limitations in various Union countries and those who do not meet the criteria cannot work legally (OECD, 2018b, p. 137). Moreover profiling asylum seekers according to their skills is of great importance when it comes to successful labour market integration and many of the EU countries have a structure to apply this type of assessment along with the “Skills Profile Tool Kit for Third Country Nationals” developed for the member states (European Commission, 2017, pp. 2, 3; European Commission, 2017a). For instance; in countries like Belgium, Finland, Denmark and Norway there are systematic undocumented skills recognition procedures for refugees and in countries like Spain, Bulgaria and Greece establishment of such systems is at their initial stage (European Commission, 2017b, pp. 20, 21).

Another influential application is that EU countries mostly know and appreciate the early access of asylum seekers to integration services and do not refrain from early labour market integration implementations at least for the ones who are seen to have “qualities” to stay and live in EU thanks to profiling tools. (European Commission, 2017, p. 6; OECD, 2020, p. 73). Leading EU countries such as Belgium, Germany and Austria provide wide range of services for both refugees and asylum seekers which include; language courses, orientation courses, vocational counselling, incentives, vocational training and even public work programs etc. Among these countries, Sweden and Germany are the countries that provide the most variety of options and the also developed ones. In most of the European countries, no self-employment opportunities are provided for asylum seekers. Passive labour market policy instruments centred on the unemployment benefits is available to asylum seekers in most European countries but the precondition of official labour market participations poses an obstacle because of low levels of labour market participation. In Germany, one of main target countries of asylum seekers in Europe, they are restricted to travel to districts that they did not have a permit to go to during their
asylum process. The distribution among districts is made according to their tax income and number of inhabitants (Eurofound, 2016). During this process, PES is not the only actor either, in more than half of the member states, social partners are involved in such labour market integration applications also.

As we mentioned in the earlier sections, learning the local language is of great importance for refugees to integrate at any dimension of integration based on the experiences of EU countries. According to OECD (2017) research an efficient way of doing this by vocational language trainings which are provided during the employment or on the job trainings. This way, participants of the program can hasten their employment integration both ways and European countries emphasize the importance of early language training especially along with the vocational language training (Liebig & Huddleston, 2014). Additionally, supporting the capacity development of actors in refugee labour market integration is a point to emphasize along with the actions that decrease the tensions between the host community and refugees such as applying to the expertise of mediators and organizing activities that promote social cohesion. Moreover, supporting employers with financial incentives to hire refugee labour which, in return seeks refugee employment, is also emphasized. The EU experience for PES followed the trajectory of tailoring themselves according to the needs of refugees and capacity development activities especially the ones including orientation of staff on migration related service issues. Integration policy experiences at the EU also points out the importance of the raising the awareness of the public on results of unsuccessful integration and its cost to society in order to change the objecting mentalities (European Commission, 2017, pp. 9, 11-14). The integration policies of EU can be summarized in this manner, however as we mentioned earlier these policies also include creating buffer zones to control the migration influxes in places such as Turkey or Libya.
Table 1: Number of Asylum Applications for the EU-27 Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Asylum Application</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>282,875</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>307,130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>401,245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>594,770</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>1,283,075</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>1,221,480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>677,705</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>625,820</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>699,095</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>471,900</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (Eurostat, 2021)

Table above shows the yearly number of asylum applications data for EU-27 and effect of the Syrian civil war can be seen clearly. Moreover, EU-Turkey Statement which was enacted in 2016, also shows its effect, as in the year 2017, number of asylum applications fell to half of year 2016 (Eurostat, 2021).

Considering immigration related labour market data of the EU between the years of 2014-2020 working-age population is expected to decrease 2% even when with the effect of all types of immigration is accounted for and the impact of increase caused by the immigration is estimated to cause 0.36% increase of the working-age population in 2020. In countries such as Germany, Sweden and Austria low educated working-age population show up to 20% increase which is remarkable considering the other mild effects of the recent immigration influxes. The number of labour market participants among refugees who live in EU countries expected to have been risen as much as 590,000 in 2020 (OECD, 2018b, pp. 143, 145). Moreover, although additional refugee burden on unemployment rate in EU is assessed as 1% (OECD, 2018b, p. 149) increase between the years of 2013 and 2020 in 2019 immigrant unemployment rate has decreased 0.9 percent falling under 10% since 2007 for the first time (OECD, 2020, p. 74). For the same period, there is expected a 1.2 million rejected asylum applications which is also anticipated to cause informal employment
effect and relevantly by 2018 wages to decline as much as 0.2% (OECD, 2018b, p. 152).

After explaining the situation in Europe, we can now focus on the main intervention area of EU’s migration management which is outside of its borders and in relation to our topic EU-Turkey statement. Before explaining the details of the statement we should also mention that Turkey tried to establish a no-fly zone in Syria in order to enable the return of Syrian refugees both in Turkey and maybe in Europe but did not receive the necessary international support to implement it (Kale, 2017, p. 68; Ferris and Kirişçi, 2016, p. 49).

Since the 1990s, EU tried to establish a common response mechanisms to crisis situations including the refugee crises. The main purpose of these Union “burden sharing” mechanisms was to distribute burden fairly among the member states that is caused by the circumstances like refugee influxes by using funds created with the fair contributions of members and fair physical distribution of refugees. However in practice it did not work that way as countries did not commit fairly as their size to refugee crisis management efforts. As we mentioned earlier EU did not choose to implement RBA while applying these mechanisms but the NBA and this development led to outsourcing refugee protection to Syria’s neighbouring countries such as Turkey and EU-Turkey statement was the main determinant of this approach. (Kale, 2017, pp. 71-75; European Council, 2016).

3.2.1. EU - Turkey Statement

As we described earlier and as it can be seen from the table 9 high number of irregular immigrants has become a big problem for EU’s existence. The deal mainly circles around the agreement of a population swap, according to this part of the statement as of 20 March 2016, all irregular Syrian immigrants who reach to Greece through Turkey will be sent back to Turkey and for every one of them one registered Syrian in Turkey will be resettled to EU. In this way, Statement aims to regularize the Syrian immigration to Europe (İçduygu & Millet, 2016, p. 5; European Council,
In other aspects of it, Turkey pledges to provide access of labour market for Syrians under Temporary Protection and to conduct necessary security measures to limit irregular migration of SuTPs from Turkey to EU (Rygiel et al., 2016, p. 316; European Council, 2016). The Statement also have an inkling on a visa liberalisation for Turkish citizens to enter in Schengen area but it has not been materialized till this day and it also included the donation of three billion Euros to help Turkey tackle every cost of SuTPs in Turkey. Later on, this financial support called FRiT has been extended to 6 billion Euros. Lastly, Statement also covered reaccelerated accession process of Turkey to EU (Elitok, 2019, p. 3; European Council, 2016).

Table 2: Number of Arrivals from Turkey to EU

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Sea arrivals</th>
<th>Land arrivals</th>
<th>Dead and missing</th>
<th>Total number of arrivals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>9,714</td>
<td>5,982</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>15,696</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>59,726</td>
<td>14,887</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>74,613</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>32,494</td>
<td>18,014</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>50,508</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>29,718</td>
<td>6,592</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>36,318</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>173,45</td>
<td>3,784</td>
<td>441</td>
<td>177,234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>856,723</td>
<td>4,907</td>
<td>799</td>
<td>861,630</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>41,038</td>
<td>2,28</td>
<td>405</td>
<td>43,318</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (UNHCR, 2021a)

As can be seen from the table 9, number of arrivals from Turkey to Greece fell greatly after the declaration of the Statement, which the EU sees as its true success (UNHCR, 2021a). However examining the data clearly shows that after the announcement of the Statement, sea arrivals started to increase at a steady pace in the later years, aside from the year 2020 when the impact of COVID-19 pandemic has started take its toll. The land arrivals on the other hand has not seemed to be affected by the Statement as much as it has been affected by the COVID-19 pandemic and increased the border controls caused by it. So, EU-Turkey Statement bases itself on the notion that Turkey is a safe country according to international standards for SuTPs or asylum seekers which has been challenged by the validity of this
assumption. According to Kale (2017, p. 163), human rights organizations and academic circles criticized the Statement’s assumption of Turkey as a safe country, which received too many asylum seekers to handle compared to its absorption capacity.

Several aspects make the Statement quite questionable. Firstly, as we mentioned earlier Turkey put a reservation on who to accept as refugee and only the people fleeing Europe as refugees. So, they do not have the same international protection scheme applied to them in Turkey, like it is in Europe (Ghosh, 2018, pp. 44, 45; Kul, 2017, pp. 78, 79; Human Rights Watch, 2016). Besides, the study conducted by IOM in 2017, demonstrates us that even though Turkey is a neighbouring country for Syrians, only 40% of them sees Turkey as a destination country for migration. However UNHCR data shows us that for 6.6 million Syrian refugees worldwide, 5.6 million of them is being hosted by the regional or neighbouring countries and more than 65.7% of these immigrants are living in Turkey (UNHCR, 2021b; UNHCR, 2022). The financial aid provided with the EU-Turkey Statement is much needed but they are clearly not enough for burden sharing principal to be counted as addressed. Lastly, we understand here that, criticism of Turkey over the geographical limitation on 1951 Convention, has become null and void as the lack of international cooperation on burden sharing6 (Kul, 2017, s. 24) (Phuong, 2009, p. 8) of refugee protection puts Turkey in the right position to protect its social and economic cohesion intact. Nevertheless, this limitation too might not prevent the disturbances to arouse caused by SuTPs in Turkish society from time to time as the studies suggest (Yıldız & Uzgören, 2016, p. 6; Yıldız, 2012; Kale, 2017, p. 78).

According to EU to be called a safe country there is a criteria to be complied and these are;

i) the life and liberty of asylum claimants and refugees will not be threatened on account of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion; ii) there is no risk of serious harm as defined in Directive 2011/95/EU; iii) the principle of non-refoulement is respected; iv) the prohibition of removal, in violation of the right to freedom

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6 1951 Convention includes in its preamble to describe the similar conditions to Turkey’s position as a country accepting too many asylum seekers
from torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment is respected; and v) the possibility exists to request refugee status and, if found to be a refugee, to be accorded Refugee Convention Protection (Şimşek, 2017, p. 164).

Aside from article fifth of the criteria Turkey complies all of the other articles however this article is clearly not applied in Turkey for SuTPs. Additionally, Turkey is also not accepted by the EU as a country that applies EU asylum conditions (Elitok, 2019, p. 7).

As we can see even from EU’s perspective Turkey is not a safe third country for refugees, as it is perceived in the Statement. Looking at the issue from labour market integration, early access to employment is a vital step for successful integration; however the conditions in the Turkish labour market is not suitable for this kind of integration. As it will be discussed in the following chapters, as a result of overburdened absorption capacity; informal employment, requirement of work permit for SuTPs to work formally due to high number of SuTPs received and employment conditions that might be open to improvement are the structural labour market conditions that emerge as the obstacles (UNHCR, 2013a) to successful labour market integration for refugees according to Kuhlman (1991).

As a possible result of informal employment, not being able to sustain social state activities along with the child labour, which Şimşek (2017) points out that it is common among Syrian children in cities like Şanlıurfa and Hatay and comes as a forefront factor that prevents school participation. (Yalçın, 2016). For Şimşek (2017, pp. 172, 173, 177) in addition to all those other reasons mentioned before; such as lower level of wages, longer working hours could push SuTPs search for new home again especially in EU member states.

The need for more developed skills assessment tools or profiling tools, for refugees is also an important capacity difference on labour market integration of refugees and asylum seekers between Turkey and developed EU countries. According to Kızıl (2016, p. 169), this capacity development need is confirmed in Turkish institutions, as most of the SuTPs who have valuable skills for Turkish labour market left for
Europe or conceded to work in jobs they are overqualified for. The need for more effective labour market integration tools as PoMM’s Migration and Harmonization Strategy that puts together a map of integration for asylum seekers is an area that requires solutions for services Turkey provide, which lack of, can cause duplications of services from different institutions, inefficient resource allocations, misappropriations etc. For instance; a SuTP could earn social aid from several resources whether they are locally or internationally funded or participate in ALMPs from different actors at different time periods for the same aims. An effective tracking system and cooperation among local and international institutions could prevent misuse and also the situations of inadequate aid for all in need.

The interprovincial travel ban and the distribution of SuTPs among the provinces might not be determined according to the capacity of the local economies and because of it, some of the cities like İstanbul have too many SuTPs to “harmonize” but some others do not, considering their economic capacity. (PoMM, 2021)

Looking at the working-age population increase provided by the SuTPs, Turkstat data accepted as counting in the SuTP working-age population, it amounts to the 6.8% of working age-population (PoMM, 2021; Turkstat, 2021). As we mentioned earlier in EU, this rate is estimated to only amount 0.36% of increase across the Union even when not just the Syrians but all immigrants are taken into account. Therefore, considering the -working-age population, Turkey faces a much deeper impact. Bearing in mind the capacity differences between the two parties for labour market integration, impact on Turkey grows still bigger.

As we will examine in detail later on; about unemployment rate as several studies (Esen, & Binatli, 2017; Del Carpio & Wagner, 2015; Akgündüz et al., 2015; Balkan and Tümen, 2016; Ceritoglu et al., 2017; Kızıl, 2016, p. 169) support the opinion that SuTPs causing unemployment whether it be informally or formally. Additionally, even though we cannot single it out as sole cause of it, unemployment rate in Turkey follows an upward trend after the year 2012 when the Syrian immigration to country has begun. Additionally, similar to EU, SuTPs in Turkey caused lower wages in the
labour market especially in the informal jobs as the literature evidences (Del Carpio, Wagner, 2015; Ceritoglu, et al., 2017; Caro, 2020; Şimşek & Çorabatır, 2016; Kaya, 2016; Erdoğan & Ünver 2015; Esen & Binatli, 2017; Korkmaz, 2017; Loayza, et al., 2018; Tümen, 2016; Işıksal et al., 2020; Yıldız, & Yıldız, 2017; Altındağ, et al., 2020; Bağır, 2018), which also caused the replacement of locals in these jobs, similarly to most asylum seeker “friendly” countries in EU such as Germany, Sweden and Austria. Although this seems like an important similarity, native informally employed group in EU is a small one, however in Turkey it represents 30.6% of the labour in employment according to 2020 data (Social Security Institution, 2021; OECD, 2018b, p. 156).

International organizations like UNHCR, ILO etc. also function in the dimension of labour market integration for SuTPs. Their activities involve, employment counselling, entrepreneurship support, skills training activities capacity building of relevant public organizations however we will keep our area of investigation limited to the EU both because its close relation with the crisis at hand and greatness of its level of contribution compared to other international actors.

3.2.2. **Financial Assistance to Turkey by EU**

EU as an entity provides financial aid to Turkey for hosting Syrians, under a program called FRiT according to the Statement. At present, FRiT consists of two tranches that amount to 6 billion Euros which each have a budget of 3 billion Euros. These funds are being spent as funds of projects, which are being designed and implemented by the cooperation of Turkish public institutions. First Tranche mainly aimed to provide basic needs of the SuTPs. In time as the trajectory of the Syrian civil war become more and more murky, SuTPs in Turkey started to be seen more as permanent residents of the Turkish community. Thus, some of the FRiT funds channelled to implementation of projects that contain more sustainable “harmonization” activities such as employment (FRiT Office of Presidency of Turkey / Ministry of Family, Labour and Social Services, 2018, p. 4).
FRiT funds devolve into six categories and these are; a) Protection, b) Health c) Basic Needs d) Education e) Administrative Expenditure f) Socio-economic support and g) Municipal infrastructure. The one, which includes the funds that support projects that are related to the labour market integration of SuTPs, is named as Socio-economic support. In FRiT, Long-term outcome desired from socio-economic sector actions was set as improved socio-economic conditions for SuTPs. Intermediate outcomes on the other hand, was set a) basic needs of the most vulnerable SuTPs covered b) employment prospects of SuTPs and Turkish citizens has improved c) livelihood opportunities created through economic activity d) social cohesion between SuTPs and Turkish citizens increased. In order to reach these outcomes FRiT focuses on four outputs and these are:

1. Provision of labour market supply side services,
2. Provision of labour market demand side services,
3. Strengthening capacity of public institutions and NGOs that function in these areas,
4. Communication, outreach and support activities for provide sector to provide better social cohesion and outcome for SuTPs in the labour market (European Commission, 2020, p. 6).

Below table 10 shows the socio-economic sector projects that are at some level effective in providing contributions to labour market integration of SuTPs. As we can see from the table, FRiT currently allocates 925 million Euros of funds to this area. In first Tranche, only 215 million Euros of it have been allocated to the socio-economic sector and 193 million Euros of it have been transferred to Institutional Financing Institutions (IFIs) that are subcontractors of the projects that “design” and oversee the implementation of projects by the Turkish institutions. They are seen necessary by the EU delegation for implementing the project in accordance with the EU’s ambitions. IFIs are usually the international organizations like World Bank, Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW), Agence française de développement (AFD), International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD), UNDP, ILO etc. IFIs are paid at least 4 percentage of the budget of projects they oversee (European
Commission, 2019b). So, for instance; in FRiT 1, all of the projects in socio-economic support category (SESC) are being implemented by IFI supervision which means at least 8,6 million of it is already being spent to IFIs. In FRiT 2, which allocated 710 million Euros to the SESC projects, in that tranche, at least 28.4 million of it goes to IFIs (European Commission, 2021c).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3: List of Projects Implemented Under the FR Funds</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Funds</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FR 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FR 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FR 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: (European Commission, 2021c)*
Looking into the general structure of the SESC; projects can be separated as the ones that support to labour market from the supply side and the ones that support the labour market from demand side. On the other hand, this separation is not a strict one as a labour supply project includes side activities or indirect effects that support labour market from demand side such as funding of OJT's. There are 18 different projects at SESC and 10 of them include activities that support the labour market from just supply side and their total budget amounts to 373 million Euros which 192 million Euros of it has been spent. There are only 4 projects which include activities that support the labour market from just demand side and their total budget amounts to 229 million Euros, which 33 million Euros of it has been spent. There are three projects that support the labour market form both sides and their budget amounts to 76 million Euros, which 33 million Euros of it has been spent. Lastly, one project called “Improving the living standards of the most vulnerable refugees through basic needs support (C-ESSN)” has a budget of 245 million Euros and does not belong to the either side of the labour market supports. This project is rather about providing financial assistance to SuTPs who are not eligible for working and so far 4 million Euros of it has been spent. Below table 11 summarizes the general distribution of SESC projects in FRiT.

Table 4: Distribution of SESC Projects Under the FRiT Program

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title of the Project</th>
<th>Number of Projects</th>
<th>Amount Committed (in Euros)</th>
<th>Amount Contracted (with IFIs) (in Euros)</th>
<th>Disbursements in Projects (in Euros)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Labour Supply Projects</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>373,736,890</td>
<td>373,736,890</td>
<td>192,667,697</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour Demand Projects</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>229,782,249</td>
<td>229,782,249</td>
<td>33,173,861</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>76,827,751</td>
<td>76,827,751</td>
<td>28,607,983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>245,000,000</td>
<td>245,000,000</td>
<td>4,175,249</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (European Commission, 2021c)

FRiT table of European Commission shows the disbursements of this sector as 258 million Euros but this does not mean that entire fund has been spent. Actually, this amount shows us the funds that has been distributed to the IFIs, but it does not mean
that all of it has been contributed to the Turkish economy. As we mentioned earlier FRiT funds firstly, disbursed to the IFIs but IFIs only bring them to the use of Turkish institutions gradually as they are spent. According to Landell Mills (2021, p. 56) some of the projects from FRiT 1, which sees the end date of the projects in 2019, described as totally disbursed in the table but whether they are fully distributed even to Turkish institutions is questionable. Moreover COVID-19 pandemic related restrictions affected the SESC as the other sectors and it is expected that projects will last longer than designed thus causing longer time needed for full expenditure. (European Commission, 2020a, p. 2).

Looking into the activities of the labour supply projects, we can summarize the actions included in them as follows (Delegation of European Union to Turkey, 2021):

1. Vocational education and training activities for both SuTPs and Turkish citizens,
2. On the Job Training activities for both SuTPs and Turkish citizens,
3. Cash for Work programs for both SuTPs and Turkish citizens,
4. Skills profiling, certification and job and vocational counselling along with the livelihood counselling,
5. Communication and outreach activities to promote social cohesion in different sectors,
6. Language Training,
7. Apprenticeship programs,
8. Soft skills training,
9. Capacity development activities for the relevant public institutions,
10. Programs and trainings that aim SuTP women,
11. Impact evaluation activities for the project activities,
12. Awareness raising activities in order to prevent child labour,
Looking into the activities of the labour demand projects, we can summarize the actions included in them as follows (Delegation of European Union to Turkey, 2021);

1. Dissemination activities for employers on work permit processes of SuTPs,
2. Entrepreneurship training activities,
3. Providing grants to employers and entrepreneurs,
4. Incentives which includes the ones that are given for providing employment or workplace equipment and machines,
5. Social entrepreneurship actions that pivots around women initiatives such as providing grants and supporting incubation of firms,
6. Supporting the creation of a country policy of social entrepreneurship,
7. Socio-emotional and other relevant kinds of training activities for employers,
8. Credit extension activities for employers including the ones that aim formal employment in workplaces,
9. Sectoral needs analysis activities,
10. Wage subsidies,
11. Impact evaluation activities for the project activities,
12. Capacity development activities for the relevant public institutions,
13. Entrepreneur mentorship and firm start-up support activities.

After describing the scope of the activities in SESC from both the labour demand side and supply side we should also mention the developments about relevant project activities. According to Facility Monitoring Report of the European Commission dated December 2019, as shown in the table 12 number of ALMP beneficiaries - which a third of are Turkish citizens- and employment related service beneficiaries (skills profiling, vocational counselling, work permits etc.) showed a promising development when compared to facility targets. On the other hand Cash for Work (CfW) and language training progress are far behind the targets. Number of SuTPs registered with PES on the other hand, is the most one the nose hits -along with the
beneficiaries of employment related services- among the indicators shown in the report (European Commission, 2020, p. 27).

Table 5: Distribution of Beneficiaries on Employment Related Services

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Progress</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of SuTPs and Turkish citizens who participated in employability skills training programmes</td>
<td>39.061</td>
<td>45.820</td>
<td>82.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of SuTPs and Turkish citizens who benefited from employment related services</td>
<td>47.594</td>
<td>50.420</td>
<td>94.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of SuTPs and Turkish citizens who participated in CfW programmes</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11.480</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of SuTPs who completed a Turkish language course outside the formal education system</td>
<td>16.504</td>
<td>49.330</td>
<td>33.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of SuTPs registered with PES</td>
<td>11.471</td>
<td>13.800</td>
<td>83.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (European Commission, 2020)

On the other hand, the report points out that even though PES was very effective on placing SuTPs to OJTs the number of employed SuTPs through all of the activities of Facility remained relatively low. The apprenticeship programs implemented through the Vocational Education Centres provide more formal works however in the report it is explained that working conditions are much less desirable in terms of payment and duration. Similar to findings of the PES data in the previous chapter, courses on manufacturing jobs are widespread in FRiT funded activities too. Thus, our deduction of SuTPs to fill the vacancies that local workforce does not want to get employed also supported by the facility activities. Additionally, the facility report emphasize that commonality of manufacturing sector courses inside the facility funded courses causes less women to participate in these. The report also indicate that facility supported language trainings were not sufficient to provide necessary level of Turkish language required by the employers (European Commission, 2020, 2020, pp. 27, 28).

All in all, considering the time that past since the date of the data used in the report; indicator results in the labour supply side of the Facility support; probably already
reached their target especially for indicators about number of ALMPs and employment related services beneficiaries and number of PES registrants.

The important point here is that; in a situation where a 6,8% increase in the working-age population of Turkey have been experienced, the targets of the FRiT SESC seem small even if they were many times more considering the need for at least 459 million Euros of project funds for supporting employment activities, as explained below on ESSN exit projections. Firstly, Turkish economy needs enlarging the pie because even before Syrians, capacity of local labour demand to absorb labour supply was questionable considering the high level of unemployment rates throughout the years. Looking into the projects that provide support for the labour demand side; 539 of 1.110 target, for “Number of Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) that benefited from coaching activities” achieved by the end of 2019. Another indicator on labour demand activities is the “Number of SMEs that received Facility Financing (such as incentives and micro-grants)” where 152 of 440 target has been achieved which only amounts to 35% of the target value. These financing activities do not involve lending till the report date and start up activities usually amounts to € 5.000 per enterprise (European Commission, 2020, pp. 29, 30). Again we think that the level of completion on these targets should be higher considering the time passed since 2019. However the demand side interventions are limited to provide enough opportunity for job creations to absorb labour supply brought by the SuTP working-age population.

Correspondingly, with the importance of social cohesion for successful labour market integration, FRiT SESC activities included such activities to improve social cohesion between two communities. As the below table shows targets set for social cohesion activities have been met at least two times over (European Commission, 2020, p. 30).
Table 6: Number of Targeted Social Cohesion Activities under the FRiT Program

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Progress</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of supported operational community centres</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>166.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of SuTP and host community members who participated in social cohesion activities</td>
<td>455,906</td>
<td>136,430</td>
<td>334.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (European Commission, 2020)

In order to fully grasp the situation on whether it is feasible to implement labour market integration policies with so much SuTPs for labour market to absorb or not, along with the informal employment in the Turkish labour market we need to mention Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN) programme. ESSN is cash transfer programme created to support SuTPs who are living outside the camps by providing their basic needs via FRiT funds. People supported by the Programme through a debit card application called Kızılay card which provides every card holder 155 TRY monthly payments for the year of 2021. (Turkish Red Crescent et al., 2018, p. 23; Mülteciler Derneği, 2021). The Programme aims to increase the possibility of social cohesion by making them more self-reliant (Turkish Red Crescent, 2019, p. 3).

Considering the structure of ESSN it poses an obstacle to successful labour market integration of SuTPs to Turkish labour market because there are 1,486,219 people benefiting from the ESSN. Moreover, it is estimated that 437,666 ESSN beneficiaries that are at the age range of 18-55 who can also participate in the labour market. Turkish Red Crescent (Kızılay) – one of the main partners on field application of ESSN- predicts only 167,402 people who benefit from ESSN can graduate the Programme and participate in the labour market (FRiT Office of Presidency of Turkey / Ministry of Family, Labour and Social Services, 2018, p. 11). FRiT 2 project “Support to Transition to Labour Market” specifically aims to support increasing the ESSN graduation and labour market participation of SuTPs and project partners are Turkish Red Crescent and PES. However according to estimation of MoLSS for 167 thousand SuTP to leave the ESSN there would be a need of at least 360,000 ALMP course and programme implementation (FRiT Office of
In the view of the fact that, FRiT 1 project of “Employment Support for Syrians under Temporary Protection and Host Communities” provided 38.3 million Euros for 14,800 ALMP beneficiaries and considering exchange rate changes during the elapsed time for Lira, needed fund would be at least 459 million Euros. Nevertheless, “Support to Transition to Labour Market” project has a budget of only 80 million Euros and half of the ALMP beneficiaries are projected as Turkish citizens (The World Bank, 2017). So, considering the budget and structural limitations in the labour market it would be optimistic to expect lasting, substantial outcomes from FRiT actions alone (The World Bank, 2021).

Considering the level of informal employment in the Turkish labour market especially for SuTPs, lower levels of work permits given to SuTPs and the cutting of the cord for ESSN payments in case of formal employment, causes a narrower window for formal employment of SuTPs in Turkish Labour Market. In addition to these, this situation pushes ESSN beneficiary SuTPs to stay in the informal employment in order them to be able to keep receiving ESSN help. Moreover, being able to benefit from the health services without social security premium payments is another factor. Thus, SuTPs -aside from the long term premium payments that contributes to base time for their retirement- have no incentive to participate in the labour market formally considering their educational attainment level and level of knowledge about Turkish social security system. As we mentioned earlier, informal employment in Turkey is a structural problem and cannot expected to be solved in medium-term. Along with other indicators which we have mentioned in the previous chapter, this situation too, show us that there is too much SuTPs for Turkey to successfully absorb and integrate into labour market. Even the need for ESSN like help mechanisms to last already after 6 years of the peak of the immigration crisis, tells us about the amplitude of the issue at hand.
3.3 Evaluation of the EU Refugee Integration Policy Framework and the Related Programs in Turkey

Considering all of the FRiT SESC actions together, it may be argued that they cannot provide solutions to long term problems such as labour market integration of refugees, because they are temporary measures in their nature and as the policy measures that make successful labour market integration possible according to criterion of Kuhlman (1991) can only be achieved through medium and long-term because of their nature. Especially for the criterion of Kuhlman (1991) on balanced impact of immigrants to locals in the labour market and having access to same types of jobs as locals (UNHCR, 2013a); providing and enabling such conditions can only be achieved through long-term policy approaches particularly for countries like Turkey which had a similarly skilled immigration influx with natives, in a very short period of time. These problems require long-term projections and policy directions to cope with, which can only be established by a well thought state policy that sources and sustainability limitations are determined clearly. This conclusion brings us to the point that instrumentalized financial aids by EU or any other international party does not provide an opportunity to reassert international law on refugee protection and fair application of burden sharing principal because they can be medium term interventions at most, which limits and implementation period is not controlled only by the public policy makers but other entities which might prefer using buffer zones for immigrant influxes. When we consider the number of SuTPs in Turkey and all of the FRiT funds—which some part of went to use of IFIs- for every SuTP in Turkey there is only 1.634 Euros of funds available and this is a not sufficient level of funding considering the toll on Turkish economy and society. In order to provide a perspective; Turkey has spent $ 10.683 for each SuTP in the country even according to 2019 data and this shows us FRiT funds are far from being sufficient to meet their needs (Erdoğan, 2019).

Overall cooperation level on FRiT activities between Turkish government and EU also does not look promising. As Çeliker (2018, p.122) points out, EU’s expectation to provide cash aids to one and half million SuTPs (ESSN) do not suit (FRiT Office
of Presidency of Turkey / Ministry of Family, Labour and Social Services, 2018) to Turkish Government’s righteous demand for long-term, sustainable infrastructure investment and capacity development investments, as they are spent by SuTPs’ pocket money in an unsustainable manner.

In order to provide a fairer solution to this kind of problems, UN Secretary-General proposed a Global Compact on Responsibility Sharing for Refugees in 2016, and it was adopted by the General Assembly in 2018. The main target of the Compact was activating international community whether they are nation states or other partners to share burden and responsibility to provide suitable and concrete responses for refugee situations (United Nations, 2018). The structure of the compact envisages a mechanism for equalizing the burden of the countries that host largest number of refugees through a cooperation system. This cooperation system aims to lighten the burden of host countries through; implementing a pledge mechanism for international actors; increasing self-containment of refugees; creating opportunities for resettlement to third countries and assisting to establishment safer conditions in country of origin (Türk, 2016, pp. 48, 49). However similarly to most UN interventions, a structure of international cooperation is established but making it work is the major issue. From this point of view, one exceptional feature of the Compact is that it establishes a pledge system which might include financial, material, technical assistance and as well as resettlement places (United Nations, 2018, p. 8). According to 2020 Pledge report most pledges fulfilled came from Europe, however they were on financial and policy support dimensions (UNHCR, 2021c). The limited contributions from parties and lack of an enforcement mechanism for cooperation shows us that expecting a fundamental change for uncooperative nature of international protection of refugees would be too optimistic (Çeliker, 2018, p. 3; Alborzi, 2006). From our perspective in the face of such a big immigration influx the burden sharing principle can only be actualized through fair distribution of refugees among safe countries according to their economic capabilities. Only after that the financial assistance structures, information sharing on best practices can constructively be helpful, because only after that countries like
Turkey and Lebanon can have a capacity to cope with the immigration burden and create a sustainable integration (or harmonization) policy scheme on employment or other dimensions of integration.

In the end, all of these efforts by the EU whether they are FRiT funds or other funds provided by the European institutions like Danish Refugee Council, KfW etc. comes to the point of preventing SuTPs crossing to Europe. Their long-term effects to Turkish society should also be considered.

All in all, EU’s approach does not seem to serve to the purposes it seemed to serve which is providing better livelihood opportunities for SuTPs in Turkey. It is not only insufficient for to be counted as a complying with burden sharing principal (IOM, 2000, pp. 5-7; Newland, 2011; Cavusoglu, 2016) in the face of such a big immigration influx it also does not take labour market integration of SuTPs into account at least from a perspective of Kuhlman’s (1991) labour market integration criterion. For instance; it neither projects a resettlement of excess SuTP population in Turkey nor it seems to pay enough regard to how native population is affected by this immigrant influx. As we have seen from the arrivals to Europe data the after COVID-19 effect, based on the time periodical information, arrivals were on the rise again.
CHAPTER IV

4. TURKISH LABOUR MARKET AND THE IMPACT OF SUTPS

In this chapter, the features of the Turkish Labour Market that have determinant impact on labour market integration of SuTPs are examined in detail and in what settings of a labour market that Syrians under temporary protection are expected to be integrated is discussed. In order to provide a perspective about situation that Turkish labour market is in, in relation to Kuhlman’s (1991) first criterion about having access to employment protection and decent work conditions etc. is discussed from the perspective of natives. To widen the perspective on this structural features of Turkish labour market from various perspectives such as; jobless growth, flexibility issues related to informal employment, income equality, working hours, sufficiency of real wages, subcontracting, temporary work, level of unionization, contributions of the employment services have been explained with regard to causality of their functioning.

4.1 Growth and Unemployment Rate Relationship in Turkey

To discuss the status of Turkish labour market and examine its relation with the integration of the SuTPs, it is important to consider the “jobless growth” issue first. Jobless growth is an important issue in relation to our topic because it shows Turkey’s inability to create more jobs even during the thriving times of the economy and regarding the Syrian influx; job creation was required as economy needed enlarging the pie because even before Syrians, capacity of local labour demand to absorb labour supply was questionable considering the high level of unemployment rates throughout the years. (Turkstat, 2021) An evident jobless growth problem will limit the absorption capacity of the country for Syrian labour supply. For this
purpose, it would be useful to touch on the concept of Okun’s Law. This “Law” is proposed for testing the inverse relationship in the US economy between economic growth and unemployment rate in 1962 (Barışık et al., 2010, p. 90). According to this approach 2 percent of an economic growth caused 1 percent decrease in the unemployment rate in US economy in different time periods (Okun, 1962; Freeman, 2001). This view later on gained wide acceptance in the literature. However a research conducted for 16 OECD countries by Lee (2000) suggests that after 1970s because of the structural break in the country economies, findings did not always support the Okun’s Law. Additionally a research conducted by Cuaresma (2003) shows that response of unemployment rate to economic growth in recession times is bigger than when it is observed in the expansion times. Another research conducted in some Middle Eastern countries by the Moosa (2008) suggests that in the economies dominated by the state there is no relationship between the unemployment rate and the economic growth (Aksoy, 2013, p. 75).

When we look at the economic growth and employment relationship on a global scale there are also some inconsistencies. The statistics picture that economic growth does not create employment as much as it did before. Between the years of 1996 and 2006 World Economy grew by 4.1% and created 1.6% employment growth. (ILO, 2007) On the other hand in 2010 and 2011 World Economy was able to show great economic growth as 5.1% and 4% but employment growth was only 1.3% in 2010 and in 2011, number of unemployed people raised by 27 million when compared to the 2007 data (Aksoy, 2013, p. 74; ILO, 2012).

According to World Bank data during the periods of 2000-2005 and 1990-2000 different regions of the World showed great economic growth but the same cannot be said about the employment, in fact unemployment showed huge increases especially in the developing countries. This shows that economic growth can be achieved without employment increases and also with the declines as produced goods and services might be increased through excessive working hours and increased productivity (Tezcek, 2007, p. 2).
Looking at the validity of the Okun’s Law in Turkey, there are some research carried out in this area. Barışık et al. (2010) found that between the years of 1988 and 2008 the economic growth did not necessarily create employment. As we mentioned earlier they also suggest that unemployment rates response to economic growth could change based on whether the economy is at the expansion or contraction period. Demirgil (2010) in his research suggests that the Okun’ Law is not valid for Turkey between the years of 1989 and 2007. Another research carried out by Yılmaz (2005) found that between the years of 1978 and 2004 there were no causal relationship between employment and economic growth in Turkey (Aksoy, 2013, pp. 75, 76). Lastly Barışık et al. (2010, pp. 96, 97) in their research conclude that Turkey’s not being able to generate comparable employment growths with the very high economic growth in the post 2001 period shows that country has a jobless growth problem. Study of Genç and Aydın (2018) examines the relationship between the economic growth and the unemployment for the period of 1988-2016 and suggest that for this period Okun’s Law is not valid for Turkey. Lastly, Pehlivanoğlu and Tanga (2016, p. 42) investigates on the validity of Okun’s law for the period of 1990 and 2014 in BRICS countries and they conclude as it is not valid for Turkey, Brazil and South Africa (Genç & Aydın, 2018, p. 41). Below graphic provides us with the view on how the relationship between the unemployment rate and real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rate unfolded between years of 2005 and 2018 for Turkey.
According to Esen and Bayrak (2013, pp. 136,137), in the 2001-2008 period Turkey had a fast growth but not with a comparable unemployment decrease. However focusing on the post 2005 period, as can be seen from the figure, country succeeded to show economic growth except the years around the 2008 financial crisis. Strangely enough unemployment trends followed the real GDP movements again except from the years around the 2008 crisis. Especially right after the 2008 financial crisis Okun’s Law is sometimes valid and sometimes not. On the other hand, during the crisis time, economic contraction causes increase in unemployment.

Important detail of the graphic is that real growth rate does not provide the expected level of unemployment rate decrease even when it does provide some. Moreover, for the years of 2013, 2015, 2017 and 2019 unemployment rate continues to increase even though the real GDP growth rate shows increases. This period also overlaps with influx of SuTPs in Turkey started to put the country among one of most refugee hosting countries. Additionally, according to the study of Acaroğlu (2018, p. 158) among G-20 countries China, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia and Turkey are the ones that

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7 Source: own calculations based on Turkstat data.
do not necessarily satisfy the Okun’s Law and the main reason behind this situation for these countries could be the population growth. In order to function a sustainable economy for these countries it is suggested to implement population control. So from economics perspective having too much additional workforce of the refugee population could pose a problem both for economy and integration policies which we shall examine the effect of, in the oncoming chapters.

Additionally study of Aksoy (2013) that takes on Turkish Economy’s economic growth and employment relationship from an industrial perspective, has some interesting findings. According to study -which covers ten industrial sectors- employment response to growth varies across the industrial sectors. Interestingly economic growth in the tourism and commerce industry causes employment decreases in them. The manufacturing and energy production and distribution industry on the other hand creates employment with the economic growth. (Aksoy, 2013, pp. 84,85). So except from the “reverse” version of it during the contraction years, Okun’s Law is not as much effectively valid for Turkey as it should have been. Erceylan and Akpılıç’s study (2015, p. 13) which covers 2005-2014 period shows that at least 3.7 percent\(^8\) nominal GDP growth rate is needed for unemployment rate to be constant, so when the growth rate is less than 3.7, unemployment rate is expected to be increased. All in all, these findings and statistics of studies suggest that jobless growth in Turkish economy is evident.

There are several reasons for the jobless growth to take place in Turkish economy, as discussed below.

4.1.1 Productivity Increases Based on Working Hours

High productivity levels is also another reason for jobless growth in Turkey. Between the years of 2001 and 2011, industrial production in Turkey increased by 72.9% where employment rose only 24.6% at the same sector. On the other hand in the post 2001 period, economy witnessed approximately 4% growth rates with high

\(^8\) Same study shows that when calculated with growth elasticity of the employment the same rate found as 4.1 percent.
labour productivity where 5.2% increase in efficiency per working hours and 4.8% increase in efficiency per working person was reached (The World Bank, 2006). World Bank study (2006) suggests that increase in productivity for Turkey has been due to increased working hours per worker rather than increased factor productivity per worker and during this period, Turkey is accepted as a country which has the most working hours overall in manufacturing sector (Herr and Sonat, 2013, pp. 5,6; OECD, 2010). According to Esen and Bayrak (2013, pp. 139,140) Turkey’s structural transformation led her manufacturers into a global competition and in order to compete as the way Turkey articulate itself to neoliberal order, firms tried to improve the production levels through the additional working hours for workers rather than hiring new workers. Considering all of these factors together the contribution of the additional Syrian workforce who is expected to be more submissive to accept less decent working conditions when compared to the local workforce should also have an effect that serves for less costly labour factor in this manner.

4.1.2 Agricultural Transformation

After Turkey started to implement neoliberal structural adjustment policies, together with the transformation of the economic structure, labour markets also have gone through a big change. Conformably with the neoliberal policy implementations, the employment areas of population moved from agricultural sectors to non-agricultural sectors. Before the transformation in 1970s, 70% of the employed people was in the agricultural sector and it produced 32% of the total revenue but today it has 30% of the employment and only 9% of the revenue. The income differences between the agricultural sector and the other sectors and also the working conditions of the low/un-paid family workers in the agricultural sector are some of the factors that caused this migration stream. One of the reasons for increasing unemployment was the skill mismatch of the migrants for urban jobs. When people came to cities from the country side, the jobs available, almost always demanded skills that migrants do not have (Bencivenga, & Smith, B. 1997). This made finding jobs difficult for them. Additionally the industrial and services sectors were unable to create enough jobs to
absorb the migrating population (Tezcek, 2007; Esen and Bayrak, 2013, pp. 141, 142). An indicator for this can be shown; while between years of 2000 and 2007 number of people employed in the industrial sector was increasing from 3.8 million to 4.3 million and in the services sector from 10 million to 11.6 million, in the agricultural sector it was decreasing from 7.8 million to 4.9 million for the same years (Herr, and Sonat, 2013, p. 5; Republic of Turkey Ministry of Development, 2012). Another reason for agricultural transformation to have adverse effects on employment is about cultural aspects of the Turkish society. When women work in the family businesses of agricultural sector it might not be a problem. After the migration to cities especially, male family members sometimes did not allow women to work in the urban works. Such that, they even have hard time accepting their little girls to attend to school. This is a factor even today for limiting labour force participation for women (32% in second quarter of 2021 according to Turkstat data) and restricts the employment growth (Ok, 2008). The Syrian immigration could have an impact that escalate this issue because SuTP women also do not participate in the labour market as much as men because of the reasons like lower educational levels, cultural (for instance; for some Syrian women it is something derogatory to work) and language barriers. They also they usually work in the informal employment intensive jobs such as jobs in the agricultural sector or everyday cleaning activities which can be evaluated as non-participation or informality by estimations (Korkmaz, 2017, p. 66; Aktaş, 2016, p. 45; Aygül, 2018, p. 73; Lordoğlu and Aslan, 2016; FRiT Office of Presidency of Turkey / Ministry of Family, Labour and Social Services, 2018, p. 16).

4.1.3 Low Wages

According to Herr and Sonat (2013, pp. 15,16) Turkey is one of the countries that has the lowest monthly minimum wage when compared to the EU countries. Low wages has a negative circular effect on the economy, by limiting demand and causing lesser sales and production, in the end it also decreases the job creation opportunities. Low wages also affect the people’s will to participate in the labour market (International Labour Office ILO Research Department, 2015, p. 21). One of the
reasons for the low wages in Turkey can be mentioned as lack of strong labour unions. As we will examine in the oncoming sections the labour unions’ inability to affect the wage determination processes causes workers to have less bargaining power. As a result of this only wage bargaining factor that should be taken seriously becomes the minimum wages (Herr and Sonat, 2013, p. 23). Studies show that Syrians in Turkey have an impact that lowering the wages especially in informal employment (Şimşek & Çorabatr, 2016; Kaya, 2016; Bağır, 2018; Işıksal et al, 2020; Esen & Binatli, 2017). So, further deteriorating the effect of low wages for job creation.

After explaining the jobless growth phenomenon in Turkey, the next section examines the labour politics in Turkey in general and how development trajectory was after the start of neoliberal transformation policies.

4.2. Labour Policies of Turkey in the Neoliberal Era

According to Bakır (2018, p. 1467) one of the main features of the neoliberal era labour policies is the firm emphasis on the “flexible” employment which also resulted as subcontracted labour, precarious work, temporary work and less unionization of workers. Tören (2018) points out that these policies are also closely related to the less costly labour and non-farm informality in the labour market. To render the implementation of these policies possible, state administrations around the globe used authoritarian tactics to divert public opinion. According to Duman (2014, pp. 140,141) even though it was not possible to implement less costly labour policies at the beginning of the 80s because of the relatively powerful labour unions; the competition for drawing international capital with the effect of deregulation in the financial sector during late 80s made discouraging labour unions necessary (Ercan, 2006, p. 404). For Bozkurt-Güngen (2018, p. 4) the reason for this was the changing perception of the labour, as a production cost because of the export led accumulation approach and thus, targeting of getting better at international competition (Boratav, 2004; Çelik, 2015). Later on, Erol (2018, pp. 2,9,10) points out that, especially during the last two decades, clientalistic social assistance mechanisms have been
used to increase popularity among labour class and poor while on the other hand focus on accessing quality education that creates “equality in opportunities” has not been much higher than it was before (Özden, 2014; Özden et al., 2017, p. 195). Yalman (2002) and Bakır (2018) points out that during neoliberal era, capital class used every crises period as an excuse for extending “flexibility” in the labour market even though it was part of the problem that is causing the crisis in the first place.

In addition to this, in countries where informal employment is widespread regulations such as minimum wage rather than “flexibility” of it for employers, provide no negative effect on employment creations and also supports fighting with poverty. On the other hand, it is expected that a flexibility approach which focuses on creating more jobs and a labour protection approach that targets providing decent work conditions can be reconciled via capable institutions that can create a balance for both of this applications; however in a labour market where informality is widespread the existence of such institutional capacity can be questioned (Rodgers, 2007). Dysfunction of rule of law in the labour market is one of the main causes for informality in labour market. Lack of a strong inspection capacity and low level of unionization for labour market activities cannot be expected to provide prevailing of formal employment. Rule of law could make informal employment costlier than formal employment if a successful structure is established (Cesur, 2017, p. 50). According to study of Sarıca (2006) the level of inspection capacity in Turkey is far from being deterrent enough for informal employment activities in Turkish labour market. So, it is safe to say that Turkish labour market is already flexible enough because of the informal employment that occur due to abovementioned reasons and SuTPs can only have increasing impact of this “flexibility” in light of information about their impact. This interrelation limits the possibility to achieve Kuhlman’s (1991) labour market integration criterion for SuTPs in Turkey especially in terms of; being able to refer to legal services of labour market integration; not worsening conditions of natives’ labour market participation and also about participating in limited number of sectors for employment (UNHCR, 2013a), as the study explains in snatches.
To provide extension of the neoliberal implementations on local labour markets EU has adopted a perspective on European Employment Strategy named flexicurity. For this perspective flexicurity perspective targets enabling the flexible employment conditions employers want, while providing secure employment that employees or job seekers need with a reconciliation of both (European Commission, 2007). Turkey also, adopts this perspective and sets flexicurity as the one of the main objects of the National Employment Strategy (NES) (Çalışma ve Sosyal Güvenlik Bakanlığı, 2017). However, as studies of Bakır (2018, p. 1467) and Kılıç (2006, p. 56) suggest flexicurity for Turkey worked more in the way of “flexibility”. Bakır and Kılıç finds that after 80s, consecutive governments established an environment where targeting a more balanced income distribution was not leading the agenda and thus labour had to go through a tougher period when compared to capital class. In this setting, they point out that bourgeoisie gradually gained ground with the help of this ordering. According to them, lacking the necessary protection mechanisms due to less unionized labour, lack of inspection capacity and as a result of it, informal employment; labour class have not seen more increase of ground when compared to the ones of the capital class.

In Turkey unemployment has always been a big issue in the labour market and country has implemented unorthodox methods to cope with it for instance one of them was sending abroad many number of workers to Europe to ease astounding labour supply after 60s which the bilateral agreements of are still in effect but in practice not effective as much as it was before (İŞKUR, 2018). There are several features in the Turkish Labour Market which makes some if its problems lasting. First of all, the prevalent informal employment is one of the important ones, as the rate for 2020 recognized as 30.59 percent (Social Security Institution, 2021). Low labour market participation especially among women is another challenge faced in the Turkish Labour market. In 2021 Labour Market participation for the country realized as 50 percent and for women it was 32 percent (Turkstat, 2021).

Another issue to be touched upon is that less costly labour policies that are implemented throughout the neoliberal era in Turkey. Although it is beyond the
scope of this study to elaborate on the mechanics of the less costly labour policy briefly stating; to allure more foreign investment into the country, less costly labour has been used as a competitive factor. If we were to provide some periodical examples according to Cam (2002) during the time period between 80s and the end of 90s purchasing power parity of the workers in the manufacturing sector were 27% of Canadian workers at the beginning of the period but it has decreased to 18% of it and same data comparison when compared to Germans workers’ PPP was realized as a decline from 29% to 20%. Looking into the trends of the real wages, according to Çelik (2010, pp.73, 74) index of manufacturing sector workers; when 1997 accepted as 100, a downward trend occurs where it is realized 88 in 2002 and 86 in 2006. At the same time Akgündüz and friends’ (2018) study shows us that for all sectors the real wage showed a trend toward decrease especially with leaps and harder downs after 2014. The important point in here is that changes occurred during this period where a record economic growth achieved. According to Şenses (2012, p. 25) this shows us distribution of earnings were changed in disadvantage of the labour class since 1980. Labour productivity in manufacturing between the years of 1998 and 2010 has increased 5 times more when compared to the real wage increases (Boratav, 2011).

Labour participation rates during these years and especially after 90s followed a course of rate that is just above 50 percent showing lesser percentages during 2000s. Gini coefficient for Turkey is 0.39 for 2018 which puts it among the highest countries in OECD and this ordering is valid also for income distribution and poverty (OECD, 2018a). The wage range is relatively wider with a very small percentage of the population earn so much higher compared to the majority of the population (Keeley, 2015, p. 35).

Looking into general labour market developments in 2019, unemployment rate has increased for the first time in the last 12 years while the labour force participation rate were decreasing (Turkstat, 2020). This represents a different trajectory for the unemployment in the country and a continuation process for the upward trend for the unemployment rate as we have shown in the Figure.1. Another interesting indicator
is that employment rate has declined for the first time since global financial crisis in 2008, realizing as 45.7% (Turkstat, 2020). When compared to other countries in OECD, Turkey is among the least successful three countries on employment rate and labour force participation rate with the rates of 47.4% and 53.2% respectively (OECD, 2021). The gender gap on labour market participation rate and employment rate for women are among the most problematic issues for the Turkish Labour Market where labour force participation rate and employment rate for women has been the lowest among OECD countries since 2000 and it has been realized respectively as 34.2% and 29.4% in 2018 (OECD, 2021). According to Bakış (2015, pp. 79,80) reasons for lower employment rate for women can be summarized as; lack of skills that are demanded in the labour market, urban immigration and cultural background of the migrants and the unpaid housewife work. Same indicators for male labour force followed a better or similar trajectory to OECD average during the same period. Weekly working hours is also second most for Turkey among OECD countries, with an average of 47 hours in 2018 (OECD, 2021). Although this is so much over the legal limits it did show a downward tendency since 2006 where it was 52.6 hours a week (OECD, 2021). For the last six years, number of work accidents have shown dramatic increases where the number of work accidents for 2014 was 221,366 and for 2020 it was 422,463 of which 1.147 workers have died because of them (Social Security Institution, 2020). When compared it shows great difference from the period between 2007 and 2013 where the yearly average was 88.038 cases of work accidents (Social Security Institution, 2020; Uzgören, 2017, p. 2). Lastly, according to International Trade Union Confederation’s 2019 Global Rights report Turkey is among the top 10 worst countries for workers.

After shortly mentioning the main issues we will now try and give detail on the characteristics of the Turkish Labour Market in order to make the graveness of informal employment in the labour market more apparent. Doing this will help understand why it is so hard for Turkish labour market to integrate SuTPs in line with the Kuhlman’s (1991) criteria.
4.2.1. Informal Employment in the Turkish Labour Market

When we consider the informal employment data and the NES targets for a more flexible labour market (30.59% for 2020) (Social Security Institution, 2021) for Turkey, according to Lawson and Bierhanzl (2004) the labour market of the country can be regarded as highly “flexible”. According to Esen and Bayrak (2013, pp. 140,142) weakening of the labour unions also makes contributions for the labour market “flexibility”, as workers have hard time defending their rights. Early retirement implementations from the past experiences put high pressures on the public budget and more importantly, they caused the experienced and well-informed labour to be excluded from the economy (Akçoraoğlu, 2010; Telli, et al., 2006; Onaran, Ö., 2002). While the reality of the labour market in Turkey provides us with a hard challenge, these features of it, will have effects on the integration of SuTPs, as we will explain in the next chapters.

As we have mentioned earlier some academic circles (Yalman, 2002; Bakır, 2018) point out that capital classes uses the crisis periods to extend their neoliberal implementations. According to Duman (2014, pp. 143,144) and Akkaya (2005, p. 27) the same mechanism applied for the rights of labour. Labour law no 4857 adopted in 2003 which allowed subcontracting and provided capital to opportunity to layoff the workers individually or collectively easier than before. They also emphasize that, it also worsened the conditions of labour by allowing the transfer of their contracts to the third parties via subcontracting. Duman points out that the law was targeting the protection of work more than worker (Yücesan-Özdemir and Özdemir, 2008, pp. 97,98,117). According to some researchers, similarly to the NES the law followed the pro-neoliberal EU pattern by allowing different types of employment, flexible working hours, and tripartite decision making mechanisms (Aybars, and Tsarouhas, 2010, p. 755; Bugra, and Keyder, 2006).

One other important aspect of the 2003 Labour law is its vision to establish the temporary work employment relationship for Turkish labour market. The amendment made in 2016 for Labour Law made possible private employment agencies to create
contracts for temporary employment (İŞKUR, 2003; Bozkurt-Güngen, 2018, pp. 12,13). When compared between years of 2004 and 2018 job placement statistics for private employment agencies (PEA) is 308.438 during the same period PES have achieved 7.064.785 job placements. To make things clearer 14 year performance of the PEAs is nearly equivalent of the performance of the PES just in year 2011. Additionally PES is not even always the most frequent channel for finding work for Turkish Labour. Acquaintance, including relatives, showed greater performance for finding job than PES for some years (İŞKUR, 2018a).

On the other hand, according to Bakır (2017, pp. 23-29), the ability to create temporary employment contracts for PEAs could change the picture. For him, this result is expected, because of the experiences country went through after the subcontracting labour was enabled, which shows us that ability to create temporary employment by the PEAs could be implemented widespread and it could cause rights of labour to be not implemented the way it should be. In its essence temporary employment allows PEAs to rent its workers for another employer and this new employer becomes the one that can give work orders for workers. Even though it seems like easier way of managing worker contracts for employers, actually it has the potential to limit the rights of the workers. For Bakır, (2017) one of the reasons for this development could be the lack of capacity of control mechanisms for limiting misconduct of related laws and regulations in the labour market. The capacity of inspection on labour market activities and on subcontracting points out that it is not close to being deterring for such activities and it could have the same results for temporary employment given the current setting (Sarica, 2006). Moreover, the regulation could also make it more difficult for workers, to be eligible for earning severance pay and much harder to unionize as other international experiences showed. Economically, it is also expected to affect wage levels negatively as the PEAs become the first receiver of their contributions (ÇSGB, 2013, p. 35).

After shortly explaining the legal “flexible” structure in the Turkish Labour Market we can now focus on the informal employment in the Turkish Labour Market. For Kuhlman’s (1991) labour market integration criterion informality can have negative
effects for SuTPs to benefit from public services that are provided for their labour market integration. As we will explain in next chapter it could also enable conditions for SuTPs to have adverse impact on Turkish labour market.

Although it shows a downward trend for the most part of the years after 2004 which it was around 50%. Now the informal employment rate with a relatively successful decline is 34.5% for 2019 according to Turkstat⁹, showing a near one point increase after the year 2015 as can be seen from the figure below. Even though the gap seems to be closing, female informal employment rate is on average 15 percent higher than the male informal employment rate between the years of 2014 and 2019.¹⁰

![Figure 3 - Informal Employment Rates]  

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⁹ Turkstat changed the assessment method for informal Employment after 2014 so that the data before that cannot be compared.

¹⁰ After 2019 no comparable Turkstat yearly informal employment data is available.

¹¹ Source: Turkstat (2020)
As can be seen from the figure, although only around 20 percent of the labour force is formally employed in the agricultural sector for the years after 2014, excluding it causes more than 10 percent decrease in the informal employment rate (Turkstat, 2020). According to Kan (2012, pp.26-28), several other reasons can be mentioned for this level of informal employment in the Turkish Labour Market. One of them is that an overwhelming majority of Turkish firms to be SMEs that lack capacity from several perspectives. Widespread low-skilled labour in the Turkish labour market is also accepted among the factors that pave the way for high informal employment rates because it increases the possibility of acceptance for informal employment by the labour force. Lastly, as we mentioned earlier, lack of capacity for inspection over informal employment activities is also one of the reasons for informal employment.

This type of informal employment, increases the burden on the social security system and it indirectly affects the benefits of the formal employment. One estimation by Taymaz (2009) shows us that if the all informal firms in the Turkey’s manufacturing and service sector could be made formal, their output would increase 5% and 25% respectively (European Commission, 2019a, p. 13). So, “flexible” labour market of the NES is already achieved by using the informal employment even though it was not planned in that way. Thus for Bakır (2018, pp. 1471,1472) informal employment, made problems like long working hours, ill pay and precarious employment conditions harder to overcome (Mütevellioğlu and Işık, 2009) and all of these factors are closely related to SuTPs’ impact on Turkish labour market and also with their labour market integration according to Kuhlman’s (1991) criteria.

4.2.2. Unionization in the Turkish Labour Market

According to Kus and Ozel (2010, p. 3), the trend of neoliberal era worked in the same way as other aspects on labour and did not give enough importance on labour unions in order to succeed on international competitiveness via less costly labour. To provide a perspective from 1975 to 1985 number of labour unions has been decreased from 781 to 99. Etcı (2018, p. 126), points out that the international
transformation for neoliberal “flexible” labour markets also showed its effects on unionization and made them less powerful.

A cross country comparison for the union density among OECD countries, shows us that Turkey is among lowest 5 countries for the year 2018 and according to this data since 2003, Turkey has only been among the lowest 5. The fact that remains is that before 2003, Turkey performed better on union density rates but it was only as good as to make her only the 6th worst performing country. (OECD, 2021) When it comes to percentage of employees with the right to bargain Turkey is worst performing country among the OECD countries for the period of 1999 and 2016. (OECD, 2021)

MoLSS estimates the labour union density as 13.86% while OECD estimates it as 9.2% for the same year. The difference is said to be mainly caused by not taking informal employment into consideration for the MoLSS estimation. The main function of the labour unions is providing its members collective bargaining. So to reach the true union density rate Etcı (2018, pp. 126-128) in his study emphasizes that a more realistic calculation for union density should be based on collective bargaining numbers and estimation of it should use the method of taking average of two sequential years for number of workers who have access to collective bargaining. In order to provide a perspective in Europe Union member countries only the 25% of the working labour is the member of a labour union however 65% of the workers were being covered by a collective bargaining agreement in 2016 (Bakır, 2018, p. 1473; DİSK, 2016, pp. 2,3). Through this method, when 1986 is taken as a base year; in the year 2016 collective bargaining rate for Turkish workers showed a decrease of 25 percent (DİSK, 2019, p. 7).

Although the number of union members has increased since 2013, Turkey has experienced a great decrease on the percentage of workers that are union members since the 80s. There are several reasons for this that can be mentioned here. Firstly, flexible employment models such as part-time, on-call working and telecommuting made it harder for labour to organize union movements under these working schemes (Müftüoğlu, 2006, pp. 144,145). Şenkal (1999, p. 276) finds that, the rising white
collar employment and their lack of participation and will in union activities were also one of the causes. As we mentioned earlier high rates of informal employment in Turkish labour market is one other factor for low-level unionization because as workers cannot access to formal employment they cannot also be a member of labour union. Etcı (2018, pp. 132-141) points out to another reason that because of the lack of inspection capacity of the relevant authorities, employers can sometimes fire their workers giving their union membership as an excuse and also showing a different legal reason for the layoff. Etcı also points out to yellow union phenomenon that base their reasoning for less unionization; on employees to lost their trust on the unions. According to Özkaplan (1994) subcontracting activities and legalization of temporary employment are also seen as aspects that have the potential to cause less union density in Turkey. Lastly, these types of problems do not only occur at the Turkish Labour market for Labour unions, globally unions are losing ground, gradually, in local labour markets (Uzgören, 2017, p. 7).

Turkey also adopted the OECD advocated tripartite governance model and thus included the unions in these type of decision making mechanisms however sometimes their effect could not go further from being advisory. Participation of Turkish Labour unions needed improvement on the issues where their contributions are vital (Bozkurt-Güngen, 2018, p. 10). Dereli (2013) points out that in 2010, although some legal improvements were provided for labour unions such as civil servants’ being able to conduct collective bargaining, it did not provide a major improvement to the real life contributions of labour unions and labour unions did not become main determinant of issues related to labour (Bozkurt-Güngen, 2018, p. 14). Çelik (2012, p. 20) provides an example of this by mentioning that; at the design process of NES, opinion of Turkish Confederation of Employer Associations (TİSK) were more vocalized in the strategy while the opinions of labour unions such as Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions (TÜRK-İŞ) and Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions (DİSK) were not as much vocalized.

As we have touched upon in the first chapter; in this setting, Pereira (2019, p. 1) points out that emergence of the term decent work can be accepted as an institutional
effort to fight neo-liberalisation of the labour markets (Ferraro, et al., 2017). On the other hand, creating jobs that provide decent work conditions has been a big challenge for Turkey which the examinations mentioned in this chapter also prove (Buyukgoze-Kavas, and Autin, 2019, p. 64). First of all: Turkey has a way to go for providing interpersonally and physically safe working environments as the number of work accidents points out. Secondly, classification of Turkey’s weekly working hours among OECD countries shows us on the indicator of “hours that allow for adequate rest and free time” Turkey does not perform well enough and needs improvement in this area. Moreover, effect of informal employment on success of “adequate compensation” indicator and social protection have also been negative as it causes workers to earn below minimum wage and miss out on social protection schemes. Lack of union density in labour markets represented one of the main factors that paved the way for these developments. These developments as an end are factors that can limit SuTPs labour market integration as explained above. If there have been a more powerful unionization among local labour, Turkish labour market could have been providing more decent working conditions for natives as well as SuTPs and flexibility in the labour market would not be this much in disadvantage of labour. Since there is a less unionized labour in Turkey which have problems defending its rights, SuTPs too just like other social groups might not act as a unit to defend their labour rights with their native counterparts, in a class based perspective (Urhan, 2005; Şengül, 2002).

4.2.3. **Employment Services in the Turkish Labour Market**

Under this section, we will explain the employment services in Turkey, what kinds of contributions they bring to Turkish labour market as they are closely related to provide opportunities for labour market integration of SuTPs, which we will elaborate on in next chapter.

PES (İŞKUR) is the main public institution to provide employment services in Turkey. Interestingly enough, PES had played an important role on the topic of emigration in the past. During the 1960s and till 1975; 797.434 Turkish workers had
been sent to work, in Western European countries via PES (Yiğit, 2011, p. 46). Throughout the years, İŞKUR has adopted itself to the main changes of political and economic approaches and employment policies were not an exception, as the clear result of the fact that employment policies are related to the many other policy areas such as labour market policies, macro economy policies, fiscal policies etc.

As we mentioned earlier to attract more and more international capital, labour market policies are focused on providing a state level international competitiveness. Yeldan (2012, p. 8) points out that these policies do not aim employment as their first target but rather they are more about providing employment opportunities. Whether the individual will get a job or not is accepted as mostly dependent on the ability of getting employed of that specific individual. At this point, job security was not prioritized as much as keeping labour’s vocational knowledge up to date to enable them get other jobs if they lose their current ones, via various labour market policies.

Employment policies PES provides, consist of two main policy areas; active labour market policies (Nunn, 2018, p. 168) and passive labour market policies. OECD, defines the ALMPs as policies that correct the dysfunctions of the labour market by improving vocational skills and increasing the effectiveness of the labour market, while defining the Passive Labour Market Policies (PLMPs) as interventions that provide income support to unemployed (Aydınlı, 2013, pp. 122,123; Biçerli, 2004, p. 46).

ALMPs’ function of correcting the dysfunction of labour market, is also thought as a catalyser for enabling abovementioned flexible labour markets as it serves to increase competitiveness of the country by bringing the skills of the labour to the levels needed by the current expectations. First application of the ALMPs as it was understood today implemented through the re-formalization by World Bank for such activities of PES, in 1988 (Aydınlı, 2013, p. 126; Korkmaz, and Mahiroğulları, 2007, p. 121). After this experience, ALMPs in Turkey diversified and mainstreamed to Job and Vocational Counselling activities, Vocational Trainings, On the Job Trainings, and Public Work Programs etc. In its essence these types of policy tools
mostly serve people to stay employable according to expectations of labour market (Akpınar, 2018, pp. 794,795; Erol, & Özdemir, 2012, p. 85; Oğuz, 2008, pp. 8-11).

Counselling services of PES focuses on sophisticated intermediation of job seekers and employers with activities that comprise of skills assessment, systematic registration of education level, training and certification info and past job experiences for job seekers and mainly vacancy needs and stimulus packages for the employers. Study conducted by Şahin et al. (2019, pp. 161,169,171) which took the data between the years of 2009-2017 shows that PES’s job matching services were more effective for the men, people who have low level of education (higher education graduates have the least placement statistics) and people who are older than 35 years of age. Study also shows that job search via PES is not among the top three (applying directly to employer, acquaintance, newspapers and internet are the top three) channels. (Tutar, K., 2015) However throughout the years, job find ratio of PES has moved from one person for every ten applicant in 2009 to two persons for every ten applicant in 2017 and for employers it was the top in vacancy search channel with 59% in 2019 (İŞKUR, 2020, pp. 5,6).

OJTs are one of the most the commonly implemented ALMPs of PES and they mainly target providing job seekers with job experience, showing them the application of profession which they had theoretical education on beforehand by getting them accustomed to work place (Aydın, 2013, p. 127). From employers’ perspective OJTs provide them an opportunity to get to know the person and their capacity to contribute to the business, who they might employ before signing the employment contract with them (Yılmaz, 2016, p. 25). OJTs pay for the short-term insurance premiums and stipends which amounts to similar levels with minimum wage for the attendants (İŞKUR, 2013/1).

VTCs on the other hand, are the courses that are conducted on the vocations demanded in the labour market which targets improving the qualifications of persons who have a vocation but need improvement to increase their employability (Şahin et al., 2019, p. 164). VTCs also pay for the short-term insurance premiums and stipends
which amounts to similar levels with minimum wage for the attendants. There are also additional payments for women and women who are responsible for childcare (İŞKUR, 2018b).

Another ALMP type that is conducted by the PES is the Public Works Programs (PWPs) which are implemented during the high unemployment conditions caused by the privatization or economic crisis, in order to prevent people from becoming long-term unemployed or losing the discipline of work life. These programs are usually implemented on the lines of work that has public interest in the related public institutions and provide their attendants with monthly, minimum wage (Aydın, 2013, p. 128.129).

So, all of these ALMP types implemented by the PES also include financial support for their participants. PES also serves the NES’s policy centreline of “Increasing the employment of disadvantageous groups” by providing incentives to employers for the employment of disadvantageous people after they have benefited from the ALMPs (Çelik, 2012, p. 21; Çalışma ve Sosyal Güvenlik Bakanlığı, 2017). All of these ALMPs are funded by a portion of the Unemployment Insurance Fund.
Table 7 - Number of Active Labour Market Program Beneficiaries by Year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>OJTs</th>
<th>VTCs</th>
<th>PWPsl2</th>
<th>Total ALMP Beneficiaries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>1.285</td>
<td>160.426</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>213.852</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>4.671</td>
<td>156.584</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>211.627</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>16.393</td>
<td>145.393</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>250.016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>31.773</td>
<td>215.399</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>464.645</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>63.660</td>
<td>131.249</td>
<td>197.182</td>
<td>417.257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>59.456</td>
<td>109.666</td>
<td>191.000</td>
<td>391.770</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>159.076</td>
<td>169.402</td>
<td>234.941</td>
<td>605.326</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>238.205</td>
<td>119.172</td>
<td>172.995</td>
<td>593.633</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>297.255</td>
<td>117.580</td>
<td>266.924</td>
<td>775.775</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>300.512</td>
<td>117.239</td>
<td>355.482</td>
<td>854.416</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>402.393</td>
<td>124.920</td>
<td>329.545</td>
<td>897.965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>335.761</td>
<td>87.372</td>
<td>126.344</td>
<td>549.477</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totall3</td>
<td>1,910.440</td>
<td>1,654.402</td>
<td>1,874.413</td>
<td>6,225.759</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: İŞKUR annual activity reports

PES’s ALMPs showed increasing trend over the years as can be seen from the table in a decade the yearly number of beneficiaries form the ALMPS become 3,5 fold more of the one in 2009 (IŞKUR, 2020a). Although nearly one third of those beneficiaries have benefited from the PWPs Aşkın and Aşkın (2017) found its effect as limited, in their study on the program (Şahin, et al., 2019, p. 169). On the other hand OJTs are implemented nearly as much as PWPs and according to PES OJT catalogues their permanent employment success rate can be up to 80% (Acar, & Kazancı Yabanova, 2017, p. 107).

Since its start from the 60s ALMPS become more and more mainstream around the World for tackling problems related to the employment policies. Thus their burden on the public budget become more visible. As a result of this, the effectiveness of these programs became a widespread study area (Şahin, et al., 2019, p. 163). For example; a study conducted by the Ronsen and Skarohamar (2009) shows that

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12 For the years between 2009 and 2012 number of PWP beneficiaries could not be separated from the total beneficiaries based on the İŞKUR data.
13 Total number of ALMP beneficiaries amounts more than the total number of beneficiaries for OJTs, VTCs and PWPs because the table does not show relatively insignificant beneficiary data for Entrepreneurship Programs and Social Work Programs.
ALMPs conducted in the Norway had an average positive impacts but for migrants, single women and youth, it even had a negative effect (Şahin, et al., 2019, p.168).

Effectiveness of PES’s vocational trainings have also been examined by various studies. First one of them we can mention, is the one that is applied by the World Bank which is conducted by using the PES data of December 2010 and June 2011. By comparing the employment related status of the training participants and control group, study tries to derive conclusions about the impact of the VTCs. The study found courses ineffective on employment status but slightly effective on employment quality increasing their possibility to work formally by 3% (World Bank, 2013, pp. X, XI). On the other hand there are studies that shows otherwise Tamer’s research on administrative data on VTCs of PES shows that they are effective for providing employment to 50% of their participants whether they have condition of employment guarantee or not (Yılmaz, 2016, p. 73). Quasi experimental study of the İrdem (2016, pp. 101, 127, 145) on the other hand focuses on the impact of PES VTCs by determining the control and experiment groups after the trainings implemented - which by the way seems to be only ethical impact analysis method because of the “public service” feature of the PES’s activities-. Her study covers the period between January 2014 and June 2015 and a survey was applied to the sample group of VTC participants and to the control group of that period within the scope of study. The results show that participants of the courses are 1.4 times more likely to be employed than non-participants. Male participants are 1.7 times more likely to be employed when compared to female participants. The possibility to have a wage raise for course participants is 2.5 times more when compared to the control group who did not participate in the VTCs. Lastly and more significantly her study found that independently from their education level, VTCs increase the employability of their participants.

ALMPs of PES whether they are employment guaranteed or not are an effective way of getting job seekers accustomed to the conditions of labour market. On the other hand, they also serve to employers by disbursing wages via unemployment fund for them and shaping the skill levels of workers according to their expectations. These
applications also enable government to perform lower rates of unemployment (Aydın, 2013, p. 140).

PMLPs usually implemented in order to decrease the harms caused by the unemployment either on a personnel or social level (Yılmaz, 2016, p. 21; Biçerli, 2011, p. 492). PLMPs provided by the PES are unemployment insurance payments, job loss indemnity, short-term working payment and wage guarantee fund.

Unemployment insurance fund is funded by the 4% of the gross salary of the worker as 1% of it is worker’s share, 2% employer’s share and 1% is the state’s share (Aydın, 2013, p. 134; İşsizlik Sigortası Kanunu, 1999). This fund is managed by the PES and as it was in the case of ALMPs, PLMPs too are funded by this fund. Unemployment insurance benefit is the payment that is made to job seekers for the time period that they are unemployed if they meet the conditions such as involuntary job loss, being employed the last 120 days before the lay-off, having been paid 600 days of unemployment insurance premium in the last three years before the lay-off and applying to PES local offices, online or in person, in 30 days after the lay-off. Although this application is the most common one, short-term working payment - which is implemented during times of crisis where the crisis causes the stopping of the work at least 1/3 of the working time, at a workplace- is also among the common ones and COVID-19 pandemic confirmed it. Short-term working payment covers a gradual share of the worker wages at most for three months, however this time period can be extended by the government decision and have been extended according to the duration of the crisis in the past experiences.

All in all, the employment policies in Turkey as other global examples, are used as a measure to keep the labour employable according to expectations of the labour market. According to Nunn (2018, pp. 169, 170) in this setting, less costly labour factor and informal employment are usually the factors that usually work in favour of employers (Streeck, 2014; Peck, & Theodore, 2001).
Syrians under temporary protection comes into play in the midst of such a scene in the country and their effect on the labour market should also be perceived from this perspective. Their effect on Turkish labour market, Turkey’s employment services response to this situation and position that EU puts Turkey in such a crisis will be evaluated in the next sections in detail.
CHAPTER 5

EVALUATION OF LABOUR MARKET INTEGRATION OF SUTPS IN TURKEY

This chapter evaluates the integration of SUTPs to Turkish labour market, using the framework of Kuhlman (1991). Accordingly, it first discusses the impact of SUTPs on Turkish labour market, using the concepts of informality and flexibility. Next, it presents labour market integration policies for SUTPS in Turkey along with the problems in the implementation of these policies, while evaluating them according to the integration model proposed by Kuhlman (1991).

5.1 The Impact of SUTPs on Turkish Labour Market

Without a doubt Turkey has been affected by the SuTP influx in many ways; politically, economically or sociologically. Conformably with the subject of this study, we will focus on the labour market effects in detail.

The public funds spent on the Syrians has been announced as 40 billion dollars according to the 2019 data which amounts to 5% of the GDP of the country at the same year (Erdoğan, 2019; World Bank, 2021a). This puts pressure to Turkish finance system and it also affects its capacity for crisis management. For example; as it could be indicator for this, among international COVID-19 responses ranking, Turkey takes place as the 72nd among the first 100 countries (Lowy Institute, 2021).

On the other hand, there are studies that show informal employment of SuTPs with lower wages caused decrease of input prices and ergo the prices of consumer products in the hosting regions (Konuk & Tumen, 2016, p. 5; Tümen, 2016; Akgündüz et al., 2015a). However most of these studies are conducted during very early stages of the SuTP influx between 2012 and 2015 and probably is not valid.
anymore as we explain below. Furthermore, there are also studies that show consumer prices increase over the national average in Hatay, Gaziantep and Şanlıurfa at the same period and even if the first statement was valid the medium and long term effects of the informal employment is not sustainable (Aygül, 2018, p. 78; Del Carpio & Wagner, 2015, p. 22).

From labour market perspective, the demand side effects show that, even though total new firm entry does not change for much, (OECD, 2018b, p. 136; Akgündüz et al., 2018a). SuTPs contributed to the demand side of the labour market greatly, as the table below describes there are 9,030 Syrian partnered new firms between the years of 2013 and 2020 in the country. The Syrian nationals are at the top of the list throughout these years with one exception of year 2019.

**Table 8: Number of Syrian Partnered New Firms over the Years**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Firms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>489</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>1257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>1599</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>1764</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>1202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>1595</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>747</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>377</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: (TOBB, 2021)*

According to Akgündüz (2018a, p. 12) increased number of new entry of firms may be caused by the lesser labour cost provided by the flexibility of informal employment of the SuTPs. In addition to this high number of Syrian new firms that are registered, there are also many informally functioning ones. In relation to Kuhlman’s (1991) labour market criteria, as we will explain in next sections, this type of informality might hinder practicability of services such as Passive Labour Market Policies.
Local employers have some common topic of complaints about SuTP labour as the study of Pınar et al. (2016) explains. These topics can be summarized as not having ability to speak Turkish, problem on adapting to Turkish society in many ways including work culture and security reasons. Kaygısız (2017) and Pınar et al. (2016) points out that although some of these problems can be expected to go away in time such as ability to speak Turkish; adaptation to Turkish society and security reasons might cause some persistent problems for the Turkish society in the future. These problems could also affect the possibility of SuTPs to access same types of jobs as locals (UNHCR, 2013a) as Kuhlman (1991) expected.

After explaining the demand side effects of the SuTP influx we can focus on the supply side effects. Firstly, we need to mention that there are only few studies that focus on the topic and most of them are conducted at an earlier stage of the refugee influx and their capability to measure the impact were limited because of this. Their findings often points to the limited adverse effects on the local labour markets, moreover they also describe some positive results for the local economy. As we mentioned earlier truer score and the most prominent effect of the SuTPs at the labour market is on informal employment and its effects can be realized in medium and long term. In order to understand this at least to a point of mid-term effects; it would be better to take the most recent studies more seriously. To provide a perspective studies show that there are 911,116 SuTPs in Turkish labour market whereas there are only around 139,178 work permits (2019 data) given to citizens of Syrian Arabic Republic. So informality could be common for SuTP labour market participation (FRiT Office of Presidency of Turkey / Ministry of Family, Labour and Social Services, 2018, p. 8). Loayza (2018, p. 2) points out that the increase of informal employment caused by the SuTP labour supply might create supply shocks across the country as the less skilled native workers migrate because they cannot get employed in the provinces where SuTPs densely populated. These developments are contradicting points for Kuhlman’s (1991) labour market integration criteria firstly because so little part of them benefiting from the work permit services due to
widespread informality and secondly they are causing adverse impact on locals’ labour market participation.

Studies about the impact of SuTPs to Turkish labour market have some common findings. As it represents a decisive aspect of study, an overview of studies on the impact SuTPs to Turkish labour market as to show alignment of SuTP immigration in Turkey according to Kuhlman’s (1991) criteria can be stated as follows; most of the studies found that informal native employment is affected negatively, wages declined, disadvantageous groups and less educated is affected worse, child labour emerged as problem again but the formal employment of natives is positively affected due to need for more qualified labour force for additional service provision to SuTPs. (Del Carpio, Wagner, 2015; Ceritoglu, et al., 2017; Caro, 2020; Şimşek & Çorabatır, 2016; Kaya, 2016; Erdoğan & Ünver 2015; Esen & Binatli, 2017; Korkmaz, 2017; Loayza, et al., 2018; Tümén, 2016; İşiksal et al., 2020; Yıldız, & Yıldız, 2017; Altındağ, et al., 2020; Bağır, 2018) Study of Del Carpio and Wagner (2015) found that, for every 10 SuTP recruitment into the informal jobs, 6 natives were being dismissed from their informal jobs regardless of their gender, educational and skill level or age and also for every 10 SuTP informal jobs, 3 formal native jobs had been generated. In research of Şimşek and Çorabatır (2016) it is found that prevalent informal employment situation for SuTPs caused wages to fell down. In the study of Korkmaz, (2017) informal employment of SuTPs in textile sector and their effect on the local labour force is examined including the women and the impact of SuTP influx has been found as more profound on them. Moreover, study of Yıldız, and Yıldız (2017) emphasizes the increased child labour as a revived issue that has been decelerated before. Lastly, in the study of Esen & Binatlı (2017) the mid-term effects of the Syrian immigration influx examined and this study differentiating from earlier studies finds that along with informal employment displacements it will also have detrimental effects on formal employment too and absorption capacity of Turkish economy is not enough in the face of Syrian immigration influx.

The study by (Ceritoglu et al., 2017) similarly found that native men who lost their informal jobs to SuTPs caused unemployment. Informally employed native women
on the other hand have left the workforce. So, disadvantaged groups such as women and less educated are the ones that are most affected and the informal employment in Turkish labour market also enabled these conditions (Ceritoğlu et al., 2017, p. 5). To instantiate; according to Bağır (2018) in the business lines like construction, agriculture, textile and services; native workers were displaced because of the decreasing wages caused by the informal SuTP labour supply in the cities like Adana and Şanlıurfa where SuTPs are densely populated (Bağır, 2018). For Kaya (2016, p. 5) Syrians are accepted as the labour supply for the jobs that locals would not like to work. So, all of these conditions provided employers with less costly labour but at the same time they could also be interpreted as not contributing to the labour peace because of decreasing the possibility of creating decent works.

The studies conducted on the local labour force also supports the view that SuTPs deteriorated the conditions of locals where the study of Erdoğan and Ünver (2015a, p. 88) show that in the border provinces like Adana, Gaziantep, Şanlıurfa, Hatay and Mardin nearly 70% of the respondents agree with the statement “Syrians are stealing our jobs”. The ILO study show similar results as 90% of the natives state that Syrians have increased informal employment, caused Turkish citizens to lose their jobs and also decreased the earnings of the native workforce (Kaygısız, 2017, p. 9; Pınar et al., 2016).

The study of Esen & Binatli (2017) provides a depiction of the conditions the country is in as far as SuTP labour supply effects considered. The main finding of their study is that SuTPs have been increasing the unemployment and decreasing the informal and formal employment of natives especially in the cities where SuTPs densely populated. Same study also suggests that increase in the formal employment of natives vanished and in the mid-term and effect of theirs became negative because of SuTPs to mostly start living outside the camps. The most striking finding of the study is that for every 100 SuTPs 19 natives have become unemployed. (Esen, & Binatli, 2017) This could also be caused by the need for increased inspection capacity on informal employment and low level of unionization. The implications of these studies show us that even though Turkey used unorthodoxly “flexible” labour
absorption methods (Del Carpio et al., 2018, pp. 10, 11) (informal employment) as the less unionized labour market allowed, it still could not do it without native replacement from jobs and it has received too many SuTPs to be absorbed by the labour market. As pointed out in the literature contributions of the study; finding of participation of SuTPs in jobs that natives do not want to participate via PES data, is also supported by other studies (Caro, 2020).

For Yıldız and Yıldız (2017) Informal activities of the SuTPs along with the provided extra “flexibility” reduces the revenues of the public administration which in turn limits the intervention capacity of the state and its social state activities because of lack of resources and also because of misinterpretation of economic indicators. It could also affect the social justice perceptions of the society when authorities cannot make informal actions of a group of people formal ones while addressing their needs by applying taxes on the others (Yıldız, & Yıldız, 2017, pp. 36, 37; Korkmaz, 2003).

So, according to Kuhlman’s criteria (1991) that emphasizes the importance of labour market conditions for natives to not be deteriorating could not be provided in this setting. Along with studies of Işıklsal et al. (2020), Altındağ (2020) and Kaya (2016), abovementioned studies show us that SuTPs affected the labour market conditions of natives adversely. Moreover as the studies of Şimşek & Çorabatır, (2016), Işıklsal et al. (2020) and Caro (2020) points out SuTPs are expected to increase informal employment problem in the country thus causing the more “flexibility” of labour market in disadvantage of employees also thanks to problems of unionization in the labour market. In this manner, the study of Aygül (2018) emphasizes how Syrian immigration influx completes the less costly labour policies of neo-liberalisation in Turkey. Considered together with the lack of institutional capacity of Turkey (because of widespread informality due to low levels of unionization and lack of inspection capacity) (Cesur, 2017) to reconcile flexibility and labour protection approach that aims decent work conditions for all, end result should be expected as widened application of informality.
As we will explain in detail later on legislation on work permits should not be expected to provide any changes on the how things are functioning for the SuTPs in Turkish labour market, because an already unchecked informal employment could not be expected to lessen by an additional work permit fee or by lack of it for SuTP employment. According to Caro (2020) the similarities of skill levels between the local labour force in the informal employment and the SuTPs, further aggravated the situation about formal employment of SuTPs and widespread implementation of work permits. In fact the study of Caro (2020) claims that SuTPs deflected the trend of formal employment to become prevalent into the trend of prevalent informal employment thus providing further “flexibility” in Turkish labour market. Aside from the replacement effect, the role of “completing part” for the jobs that natives did not want to get employed at, (mostly manufacturing sector jobs as we mentioned at the previous section) SuTPs provide a good contribution, but the cost of it emerges as poor integration (Caro, 2020, p. 16) according to criteria of Kuhlman (1991). Aside from this, the study also finds that 91,6% of SuTPs are employed informally, which amounts nearly to 900.000 and we should not expect formal employment of more than 31% of them (Caro, 2020, pp. 13, 38). So, along with the restrictions designated by the laws and regulations which we have mentioned are necessary to provide right way of integration; labour market conditions reflect that labour supply as a result of SuTP influx has been and is being at a boiling point for Turkish labour market to healthily absorb.

Below table simply shows us the developments took place on the key labour market indicators since the beginning of the Syrian influx.
Table 9: Key Labour Market Indicators in Turkey

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Labour force participation rate (%)</th>
<th>Employment rate (%)</th>
<th>Unemployment rate (%)</th>
<th>Informal Employment Rate (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>46.5</td>
<td>41.3</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>43.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>47.4</td>
<td>43.1</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>42.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>47.6</td>
<td>43.6</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>39.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>48.3</td>
<td>43.9</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>36.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>50.5</td>
<td>45.5</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>34.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>51.3</td>
<td>46.0</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>33.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>52.0</td>
<td>46.3</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>33.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>52.8</td>
<td>47.1</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>33.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>53.2</td>
<td>47.4</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>33.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>53.0</td>
<td>45.7</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>34.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Turkstat and (Social Security Institution, 2021)

As it can be seen from the table, unemployment rate follows an upward trend especially since the year 2012 where the effect of the Syrian influx started to be felt and even though we cannot surely blame it on all the Syrian influx but considering the abovementioned indicators it does not seem to help much for labour market data to get better either.

![Unemployment rate (%)](attachment:image)

**Figure 4 - Rate of Unemployment in Turkey**

14 Source: Turkstat
Considering the approach of Kuhlman (1991) the adverse effects of SuTPs on Turkish labour market are at a stage where successful integration seems hard to achieve. Erdogan’s study (2014, p. 26) showed us that 70.8% of the respondents points out that Turkish economy has been harmed because of the SuTPs.

According to Tören, from SuTPs’ perspective widespread precarious working conditions (including child labour) can only be sustained to a certain point for them to feel belong into Turkish society where they might not have access to goods and services as natives do as Kuhlman (1991) pointed out. For Akpınar (2017), this setting is not hopeful for future generations either, where SuTP children are still having problems to reach education as they are seen as additional bread earners (because of the lower levels of pays to SuTP labour) of the families and are being steered to work by them.

5.2 Labour Market Integration Policies for SuTPs in Turkey

Under this section we will describe the general service provision for SuTPs’ labour market integration in Turkey in order to be able understand and compare its functioning results with the service provision expectations of Kuhlman’s (1991) integration criterion and also the its relation to flexible informal labour market of the country.

When it was for sure that the SuTPs were more than just “guests” in camps in 2013, Turkey took on a more decisive stance which had effects on various policy areas including employment. During this period SuTPs did not have access to work permit services and the public opinion for SuTPs were foreign friendly in a fragile way (Erdoğan & Ünver, 2015). However, with the increasing Syrian inflow and the widespread urbanization of the ones in the camps, the necessity to implement integration policies become clearer. Especially after 2015, the pressure on Turkish authorities by EU caused a relative policy change, and EU’s “cooperation” with Turkey to keep the Syrians out of the Fortress Europe has increased (Konuk & Tumen, 2016, p. 3; Çeliker, 2018, p. 99).
SuTPs in Turkey gained right to participate in labour market formally in 2016. The Regulation on Work Permits of Foreigners under Temporary Protection allowed SuTPs to have access to work permit after six months of their registration. According to the regulation, the number of SuTPs in a workplace cannot exceed the 10% of the number of Turkish citizens working in that workplace. If there are less than 10 workers the employer can only employ one SuTP worker. Exceptionally, the seasonal agricultural and animal husbandry activities (which are also jobs where informal employment is widespread) can be participated without having a work permit by SuTPs. However there are other exceptions to this. If an employer cannot fill the position she/he was looking for one month, with Turkish labour force through PES provincial directory and have documentation to show this development. The SuTPs who are subject to these developments can be hired with no need to comply with 10% quota. Lastly, we have to mention that, the work permits are only valid for the province SuTPs live in, as SuTPs are prohibited from traveling to another city without official permission (The Regulation on Work Permits of Foreigners under Temporary Protection, 2016/8375; Tören, 2018, p. 26). So, when compared from the perspective of Kuhlman’s (1991) labour market integration there are limits for SuTPs to access services as locals. For instance; they need to have work permit to get formally employed otherwise they cannot benefit from the long-term pension benefits of the formal employment.

According to the open data provided by the Directorate General of International Labour Force (DGILF) we cannot track the work permits given based on the international protection type but as the table below shows since 2016 there has been a dramatic increase for the work permits given to citizens of Syrian Republic which shows a neglectable positive difference from the work permits given to SuTPs (ÇSGB, 2021).
### Table 10: Number of Work Permits Issued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of work permits given to the citizens Syrian Republic</th>
<th>Total number work permits given</th>
<th>Percentage of total work permits given to citizens of Syrian Republic inside the total work permits given</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>2,541</td>
<td>52,304</td>
<td>4.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>4,019</td>
<td>64,547</td>
<td>6.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>13,290</td>
<td>73,560</td>
<td>18.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>20,966</td>
<td>87,182</td>
<td>24.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>34,573</td>
<td>115,837</td>
<td>29.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>63,789</td>
<td>145,232</td>
<td>43.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>139,178</td>
<td>538,662</td>
<td>21.16 (Average)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (ÇSGB, 2021)

While there was no special design about work permits for SuTPs, the number work permits given to the citizens of Syrian Republic only represented around five and six percent of the total work permits given during the years of 2014 and 2015. On the other hand after the regulation enacted, this rate went up as much as thirty percent in the year 2018. Additionally, given the millions of working age SuTPs in Turkey, these numbers are still so limited. The language barrier is also another important factor for the low level of work permits as it is for any other public service provided for the SuTPs they might not have information about benefiting from such public services.

In the study of Loayza et al (2018, p. 1) it is mentioned that late legislation of work permit regulations for SuTPs caused them to be more informally employed and as a result of it brought informal employment shocks in the local labour markets. There are a lot of reasons for the design of work permits scheme for SuTPs to be as it is. The study by Cengiz and Tekgüç (2021, p. 31) shows that if the SuTPs have been working formally from the beginning their effect on the local labour force would be much more adverse. Considering the average of 735,000 new labour force entry to
Turkish labour market between the years of 2014 and 2019 which amounts the 2.4% increase rate annually, limiting the unemployment rate—which trends above 10% for the same period—has been a challenge for the governments on an ongoing basis (Turkstat). The pressure from the EU who is easily the biggest international trade partner with Turkey in terms of exports was also another factor. On the other hand, as the studies of World Bank and OECD (2018b, p. 127) describe the adverse effect of SuTPs on the informal employment of local labour force because of the similarities between them qualifications wise, might have brought the limitations such as fulfilment of 6 months temporary protection period and 10% workplace quota for the work permit of SuTPs (Del Carpio et al., 2018, p. 10). These results are closely related to the informality in the Turkish labour market which through it is flexible and become more flexible with the SuTP influx and all of these factors also limits the chances of referral for labour market services for SuTPs as Kuhlman (1991) envisaged.

The PES services provided for each of the international protection type varies. Below table summarizes the registration and placement services according to international protection types. According to the relative legislation SuTPs can benefit from the PES services including registration, counselling and ALMPs aside from the public work programs.

They can also benefit from the PLMPs as long as they have the requisite qualifications to benefit from those policies just like Turkish citizens because the unemployment insurance payment and its related activities, such as short-term working payment functions like a universal insurance from this perspective.
### Table 11: Registration and Placement Services Based On International Protection Types

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status of the foreigner</th>
<th>TP STATUS</th>
<th>Refugee Status</th>
<th>Subsidiary Protection Status</th>
<th>Conditional refugee status</th>
<th>International Protection Applicants</th>
<th>Other Foreigners</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NTS</td>
<td>6 months</td>
<td>Not necessary</td>
<td>Not necessary</td>
<td>6 months</td>
<td>(Foreigners with TP status can apply to the DGILF for work permit after 6 months of their registration to TP status.)</td>
<td>Not necessary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stipulation of work permit during registration to PES</td>
<td>No (Regulation for Active Labour Market Services article 104)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>(Foreigners with conditional refugee or international protection applicant status can apply to the DGILF for work permit after 6 months of their application to international protection)</td>
<td>Yes (exception for foreigners who want to benefit from the PLMPs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stipulation of work permit before being recruited by an employer</td>
<td>Needed</td>
<td>Not needed</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Needed</td>
<td>Needed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** (ÇSGB, 2016; Yıldız, 2017; ÇSGB, 2016 / 29695; IŞKUR, 2013/1)
As we can see from the table, PES services generally do not require a work permit for SuTPs, however it is required when the end result of public employment service is met, that is employment. On the other hand, SuTPs should pass 6 months of their international protection status to benefit from PES services. Although this aspect seems restrictive, a vast majority of the SuTPs in Turkey does not have any problem having 6 months of TP status because nearly all of them have been living in Turkey for years now. The developing profiling system of related public institutions for immigrants when compared to more developed European versions and coming together with the better economic opportunity conditions in the EU may have caused Turkey to lose a chance to utilize better qualified Syrian workforce as study of Korkmaz (2017) suggests. As a result of this, Syrian population in Turkey showed similarities with the workforce in the south-eastern region of Turkey in terms of qualifications. Today only 1,4% of the SuTPs live in the camps remaining vast majority of them live in urban areas (PoMM, 2021). Local population and SuTPs both of them are less qualified in terms of education and past work experience when it comes to supplying the labour market demand. So they needed more ALMP services to be able to meet the vocational skill needs in the labour market and this situation created more demand for PES services in the region.

Çeliker (2018, p. 88) points out that as it is in the other policy areas, mass flow of SuTPs in the country overburdened Turkish state in employment area too. This pressure has been eased with a) donations and contributions in the field from the NGOs, INGOs or International organizations including EU b)labour market “flexibility” provided through informal employment caused by the Syrian workforce supply that is above the bend of local labour market capacity of most migration effected provinces. Del Carpio et al. (2018, p. 10,11) finds that these provinces are also the ones that has lower density of formal employment, lower educated population and higher unemployment rates when compared to the national average which increases the chances of SuTPs to get informally employed.
The neo-liberal policies along with the abovementioned effects put SuTPs in a tough spot in labour market. Whether it was because of the informal employment in the Turkish labour market or not with an additional disadvantage of being “guests”, SuTPs face worse conditions to provide livelihood for themselves and inexorably similar to any other immigrant labour market integration problems around the world they usually work in the less qualified jobs even if they have skills and qualifications that match for more qualified ones (underemployment) (Göksel, 2018a, pp. 165,166). This situation also represents a contradiction for Kulhman’s (1991) labour market integration criterion in terms of SuTPs to be confined to jobs that are not suitable for their skill level or experience. On top of all of these, Şimşek (2018, p. 380-381) points out that requirement of work permits which is seen essential to protect local work force from a supply hike shock, puts the Turkey in a questionable position as a suitable country for this many SuTPs.

Kaygısız (2017, p. 13-14) points out that Harmonization policies for Syrian mass immigration could have commenced earlier. On the other hand, setting a clear agenda for the labour market integration of SuTPs could makes things easier for them because making investment plans or establishing a sustainable social protection relationship with the market becomes easier for them (Durable Solutions Platform and İGAM Research Center on Asylum and Migration, 2019, p. 39).

Despite all of these factors Turkish government, shows good will to integrate SuTPs into the Turkish labour market and one clear indicator for this is the “Migration and Harmonization Strategy” published by the PoMM. This Strategy firstly, targets analysing the data on Syrian labour market activities in an up to date manner. Secondly, it emphasizes the importance of identifying individual past job experiences and skill and education levels and vocational skills of the SuTPs. Lastly and more importantly Strategy gives point to protecting the working rights of the SuTPs and informing them about the formal employment and tracking their developments in the area of labour market harmonization (PoMM, 2018).
SuTPs in Turkey, participates in the labour market in two different ways. First one of them is as an employer. From 2011 to 2017 Syrians in Turkey started 6,033 new businesses, making Syrian owned firms 39 percent of the foreign owned firms in 2016 (Göksel, 2018a, p. 165; Ucak, 2017, p. 9). The second and most common way of participation for SuTPs in the labour market, is by becoming an employee whether this is formally or informally (Korkmaz, 2017, pp. 64, 65; Yaman, 2016, p. 120). According to UNHCR, Syrians in Turkey categorized into 5 different categories based on their type of their participation in labour market. These are; entrepreneurs, micro-entrepreneurs, professionals, farmers and unemployed (İçduygu, and Diker, 2017, p. 24). On the other hand, İzmir Chamber of Commerce classifies the Syrian labour in the three categories based on their skill level. First group is the highly skilled professionals like doctors, engineers and lawyers etc. who most of have already left the Turkey for Europe. Second Group is the blue-collar, who are experienced in the industrial sector and can participate in the formal jobs. Last group composes of the less skilled and the ones that usually participate in the informal jobs (Yıldız, C., 2017, p. 40; Kaya, S., 2016, p. 4). There are overlapping details between the categorization of UNHCR and İzmir Chamber of Commerce as for each category of UNHCR there are different skill levels that corresponds to the one of İzmir Chamber of Commerce. It can be interpreted that for every category of UNHCR’s most of highest level skilled SuTPs have left the Turkey for Europe. This situation has ended up as Turkey to have a similar skilled SuTP labour supply with the unemployed natives in the country causing increased competition in the labour market and in some ways increasing the informal employment and flexibility of Turkish labour market in disadvantage of workers as explained under the impact of SuTPs section.

5.3. Problems in the Implementation of the SuTP Labour Market Integration Policies

The general body of rules for SuTP labour market integration policies are stated above but the functioning of it does not always go as it is planned. This situation is related to the informality in the Turkish labour market which through it was flexible
and become more flexible with the SuTP influx and all of these factors also limit the chances of referral for labour market integration services for SuTPs as Kuhlman (1991) envisaged. About the work permits employers might see having to be paying work permit fees for SuTP employment as an additional cost which is 378 Turkish Lira according to the DGIFL for the year of 2021 (DGILF, 2021). This notion effects the formal labour market integration of SuTPs, however one should not think that if it were not for the work permit fees employers would formally hire SuTPs. As we mentioned in the chapter 4, informal employment in Turkey is widespread and effect of work permits for informal employment of SuTPs can be accepted as peripheral, (Işıksal et al., 2020) considering the level of acceptance for SuTPs on working conditions.

Language barrier on the other hand effects the labour market integration of SuTPs gravely. Firstly, SuTPs who do not know Turkish are prone to precarious working conditions because they do not know their rights and cannot even question the faulty implementation by the employers, in case. In the study of Durable Solutions Platform and Research Center on Asylum and Migration (İGAM) (2019, p. 39), SuTPs state that knowing how to speak Turkish is even more important than having a work permit. Another study by Korkmaz (2017, p. 65) shows SuTP respondents see speaking Turkish more important than finding a job to be successful in the working life. Speaking the Turkish language shown to be increasing SuTPs’ employment quality and also increasing the possible employment areas for them. (Aygül, 2018, p. 74). The language courses provided for the SuTPs might not always be sufficient for them to learn vocational Turkish. Informal employment of SuTPs which requires most of them to work for longer hours also an important obstacle for them to attend to language courses provided as needed (Göksel, 2018a, p. 164; Karaca, 2017, p. 59). This also brings another unconformity with Kuhlman’s (1991) labour market integration ideal as SuTPs become mostly confined to the jobs (UNHCR, 2013a) that do not require high level of Turkish language speaking ability.

As we mentioned earlier in the previous chapter, Turkish Labour market has various challenges in its functioning for even the local working class. When it comes to
SuTPs who have limited knowledge about their rights, these challenges increase to a higher level. According to Çeliker (2018, p. 89) the PRS caused by the, ongoing crisis in the emigration country, national economic and hence legal structure in the immigration country and lack of necessary international cooperation, puts SuTPs in a vulnerable position (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2017). This vulnerability brings more informal employment in a labour market where informal employment is already high. To say it more clearly, as study of Caro (2020) points out in this setting informal employment become common than an exception for SuTPs.

According to data gathered from AFAD and World Health Organization more than half of the SuTPs who are at the working age are working informally (Del Carpio et al., 2018, p. 11). Moreover according to an ILO study, based on 2017 data, 91.6% of the SuTPs who are working are in informal jobs. (Caro, 2020, p. 13). Considering the situation they are in, they are willing to work for a lower salary than the Turkish labour especially in the sectors where informal employment concentrated such as textile. Child labour is also common especially in the agriculture and textile sectors according to studies (Çeliker, 2018, pp. 109, 110; Dedeoğlu, 2014, pp. 108,109; Pitel, L., 2017; İçduygu and Diker, 2017, pp. 25, 26; UNICEF, 2014). The lower cost of informal employment for employers and as Bakır (2017) points out the need for stricter inspections on labour market activities can be interpreted as factors of this order. Additionally, similar education and skill levels with the local labour force in the south-eastern provinces that show higher Syrian population density makes informality highly likely and yet still a preferable situation for SuTPs (İçduygu and Diker, 2017, pp. 23, 24; Konuk & Tumen, 2016, p. 9). As studies suggest these types of illegal employment activities cause lower wages for SuTPs for the same effort as locals, longer working hours, late payment of wages, lack of any social benefits and unsafe working conditions etc. As a result of these factors, in the long run, preventing the establishment of mutual trust and recognition between two communities, all of these unsuccessful integration indicators may prove to be costly for all of Turkish society in future. (Tören, T., 2018, p. 3; Göksel, 2018a, p. 162; ILO, 2017; Honneth, 2014). This level of uncomformity with the local laws and
regulations and first and foremost the cause of all this; widespread informality, shows us that SuTPs did not integrate to Turkish labour market as Kuhlman’s (1991) labour market integration criteria expected.

Whether this is knowingly supported by the EU or not is beyond the scope of this study however it is obvious that with a fair burden sharing approach in the international arena, SuTPs in Turkey would not be in such PRS. This issue is closely related to the labour supply absorption capacity of Turkey and implicitly insufficient burden sharing attitude of EU (Tören, 2018, p. 51).

The ESSN assistance on the other hand, has an effect to make people stay in informal employment, further limiting the labour market integration chances as Kuhlman (1991) pointed out, because if a person gets employed formally, the ESSN assistance stops. The cost of living and limited level of ESSN assistance, force SuTPs to search for jobs even though they get the ESSN assistance. Still, inadequate labour supply absorption capacity might necessitate the existence of such an assistance. (Durable Solutions Platform and İGAM Research Center on Asylum and Migration, 2019, p. 39).

Lastly, to clarify the consequences of the informal employment, they cannot benefit from the right to have legal minimum wage\textsuperscript{15}, severance pay, unemployment insurance and other types of passive labour market policy instruments (Korkmaz, 2017, p. 66; Karayel, 2016). All of these public policy instruments became vital during COVID-19 pandemic and because they are mostly employed informally SuTPs could not be able to reach to government benefits during this period and naturally, some of them also lost their informal jobs (Çeliker, 2018, p. 111).

\textsuperscript{15} As a result of widespread informal employment SuTPs are also left devoid of benefits of the formal employment, they usually work at a wage that is half of the minimum legal wage and have longer working hours. The field studies also show that timely payment of the wages is another big issue. Last point to touch upon is that SuTPs mention earning more with the SuTP employers than with the local employers which points to discriminative behaviour in the labour market (Korkmaz, 2017, p. 65; Taş, et. al., 2016, p. 270).
Through all of these mixed relations between the policy implementation and the policy designs, Bakır (2018, pp. 1469, 1470) points out that neoliberal order seems to achieve a more “flexible” labour market brought by the additional informal labour supply of the SuTPs.

According to Aygül (2018, p. 73), the sectors and business lines that Syrian population get employed mainly includes the areas of construction, agriculture, textile, manufacture (which changes depending on the province they live in) where informal employment is widespread or local labour force do not usually get employed.

**Table 12: Distributions of the Courses Attended By SuTPs, Based on Sectors**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NACE Rv. 2 Sectors</th>
<th>Percentage of courses in that sector which SuTPs participated in 2020</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>54,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative and support service activities</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional, scientific and technical activities</td>
<td>10,61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>9,37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles</td>
<td>2,76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accommodation and food service activities</td>
<td>1,92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>1,74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other services activities</td>
<td>1,66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transporting and storage</td>
<td>1,64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture, forestry and fishing</td>
<td>1,61</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** İŞKUR Database

On the other hand the rhetoric that SuTPs fill the jobs that are not supplied by the local workforce is somewhat true, based on the ALMP data and the vacancies data of PES. The table 4 shows the percentage of vocations that SuTPs benefited PES ALMPs on, in 2020, according to NACE sectors classification. This table shows
great similarities with the 2019 Labour Force Survey (LFS) of the PES on account of vacancy results. Top 10 vocation sectors of the vacancies are also among the top nine ALMP vocations sectors that SuTPs benefited from. The manufacturing sector, being number one in both rankings, constitutes also more than 54% of the ALMPs that SuTPs participated in 2020 and it is also the number one vacancy sector according to LFS of 2019 (İŞKUR, 2020, pp. 47,48; İŞKUR Database, 2020). Moreover, according to 2018 labour market survey of İŞKUR in cities like Gaziantep, Şanlıurfa and Hatay where SuTPs are densely populated, employers are having hard time filling their vacancies in the manufacturing sector. The employers who share this opinion are 66.9% of the respondents in Gaziantep, 45.24% in Şanlıurfa and 31.5% in Hatay. Lastly, according to study of Caro, which estimates 91.6% informal employment rate among SuTPs, also show that 48.2% of the SuTPs who are working are employed in manufacturing sector (Caro, 2020, p. 13). This data shows us that even though they are not exactly confined to them, SuTPs are limited to participate in various types of sectors and jobs as Kuhlman (1991) has seen as a contradiction with the successful labour market integration (UNHCR, 2013a).

According to Kamalioğlu (2014, pp. 196,197) manufacturing sector is among the top sectors for the informal employment activities are seen in Turkey (Yıldız & Yıldız, 2017, p. 35; Kaya, 2016; Buyukgoze-Kavas and Autin, 2019, p. 66; Baban et al., 2017). For instance; according to study, in sub-sector of manufacturing, in textile sector more than 99% SuTP workers are employed informally (Tören, 2018, p. 28; Erol et. al., 2017, p. 58). According to Toksöz (2008, pp. 7, 9, 15), lower expectations and need for stricter inspection for labour law practices (informal employment, longer working hours than legally determined etc.) along with the similarities between the host community and the irregular immigrants in terms of skill levels, could put SuTPs in a more economically demandable position for employers (The World Bank, 2006). Thus, this structure, benefits further from the Syrian labour in the manufacturing sector as PES data also confirms with the demand on manufacturing sector ALMPs. Considered together although it seems like SuTPs are filling the jobs that natives do not want to get employed by accepting poor
working conditions. This competition with the local labour force might create tensions which could harm process of labour market integration of SuTPs as it could also affect labour market conditions of locals adversely. Additionally, in line with this idea, Korkmaz (2017, p.72) points out that SuTPs usually work informally where they earn 2/3 of the minimum wage in 2017 which forces all of the family members to participate in the labour market informally or formally, regardless of their age.

As of 30th of September 2021, there are 2,142,786 working age population of SuTPs in Turkey and Turkish Presidency and MoLSS assesses that 911,116 of them will participate in the labour market (PoMM, 2021; FRiT Office of Presidency of Turkey / Ministry of Family, Labour and Social Services, 2018, p. 8). The total number of work permits given to them, which are usually valid for one year, only amounts to 139,178 cumulatively between the years of 2014 and 2019 (ÇSGB, 2021). This comparison shows us that formal employment integration of the SuTPs is still a long way to go. On the other hand, as we mentioned earlier vast majority of them are participating informally in the labour market. The ALMPs of PES are important intervention policies to get SuTPs used to working formally (European Commission, 2020). Additionally, sometimes even the channels SuTPs use in Turkey to search for a job are usually informal ones. This also adds to the odds of informal employment because these channels mainly aim for informal employment (Tören, 2018, p. 30; Development Workshop, 2016, pp. 153, 154). Nevertheless, one should not get ahead of herself/himself about the fact that main reason for this informality is the overburdening of absorption capacity of Turkish labour market. So even with the help of PES activities, this informality phenomenon for SuTPs should not be expected to be completely gone as long as SuTP workforce quantitatively has lessened to the levels that local labour demand can absorb formally. In this regards PES services are positives factors to help achieve labour market integration of SuTPs according to criteria of Kuhlman (1991) because they are positive factors to limit SuTP informality in the labour market and provide exceptional opportunities to develop labour market participation areas for them.
Since the beginning of Syrian crisis, as of November 2021, 68% of ALMPs that SuTPs benefited from consists of OJT-s and 31% of it consists of VTCs while less than one percent of it consists of entrepreneurship program attendants (İŞKUR Database, 2020). The direct “benefit” of OJT-s to employers is undisputed, on the other hand OJT-s provide its attendees with great opportunities such as working culture and job experience as it is seen as second most common feature needed while seeking even young workforce, by the employers (İŞKUR, 2020, p. 123). The intensity of OJT-s among other ALMP types may also points out that SuTPs and natives mostly have similar skill levels because they are mostly in need of working experience provided by OJT-s rather than learning new skills through VTCs. This data when considered together with the data of some other studies (Caro, 2020) also shows us that SuTPs might have increasing impact for the labour market flexibility because they have mostly similar level of skills with the local labour force they can also mostly participate in similar jobs as long as they do not have barriers accessing.

When all of the information we mentioned about formal labour market integration of SuTPs are put together, it seems that the cogwheels of the system are forcing them to the protracted situations. This functioning put SuTPs in a position where they are the most vulnerable. Thus, in terms of burden sharing principal it requires special attention in order to provide decent jobs for all and asking part of SuTPs in Turkey to be sent where there is safety, respect to human rights and more jobs in both quality and quantity in the World, becomes a necessity for sound implementation of international law on refugees.

According to Şimşek & Çorabatır (2016) and Aygül (2018), the capacity of the related institutions to conduct skills assessment for the SuTPs who do not have necessary documentation to show their skill level -or in some cases they could have it but those documentation belong to the institutions that do not have any certification of equivalency in Turkish corresponding- in the face of more developed foreign versions of these services along with the better economic conditions in elsewhere might have caused skilled SuTP labour to escape to Europe, Canada and USA. For Korkmaz (2017, p. 64), living standards, precarious working conditions and
discrimination by the locals forced some of them to flee Europe (Tümtaş ve Ergun, 2016, p. 1355). Following these developments, Turkish government enacted a *Turquoise Card* permit system which targets skilled immigrants to stay in the country by providing them with work permit without a time limitation after a 3 years of evaluation process (İçduygu & Şimşek, 2016, p. 64; International Labour Law, 2016, p. art. 11). Even though SuTPs are not eligible to apply for *Turquoise Card* there are evidences that government opens pathways for citizenships of high skilled SuTPs (İçduygu and Diker, 2017, pp. 19, 20).

Although Europe might have been the most demanded destination for Syrian refugees; in reality the changeless rhyme for refugees to mostly flee to the neighbouring countries rather than the sound application of the burden sharing principle have been monotonous for the Syrian refugee crisis also. While European countries accept so little of the Syrian refugees according to their economic capabilities; neighbouring countries of Syria flooded with the Syrian refugee influxes (Şimşek & Çorabatır, 2016, p. 70). In the grand scheme of things when one compares the number of refugees received by country, according to Norwegian Refugee Council data there is only one European country among the top 10 countries that do not have a humanitarian crisis close to their border and received most refugees as a percentage of their local population. Aside from Sweden the rhyme continues for not applying the principal of burden sharing (Christophersen, 2021). These attitudes from capable international actors are indicators of faulty application of burden sharing principal and also one of the main reasons that lead to the state of working conditions of the SuTPs and the possibility of a PRS for them in Turkey.

Moving onto the gender; 27% of the SuTP attendants for the PES ALMPs are women and unlike the total direction of the statistics women mostly prefer the VTCs with a percentage of 73. SuTP women do not participate in the labour market as much as men because of the reasons like lower educational levels, cultural (for instance; for some Syrian women it is something derogatory to work) and language barriers. Additionally, they usually work in the informal employment intensive jobs such as jobs in the agricultural sector or everyday cleaning activities which can be
evaluated as non-participation by estimations. SuTP women employment is a challenge at another level because the south eastern Turkey where SuTPs are densely populated, also have lowest levels of women employment even for the native work force (Korkmaz, 2017, p. 66; Aktaş, 2016, p. 45; Aygül, 2018, p. 73; Lordoğlu and Aslan, 2016; FRiT Office of Presidency of Turkey / Ministry of Family, Labour and Social Services, 2018, p. 16).

Experts see that a huge majority of SuTPs in Turkey wants to live in Turkey permanently especially because of the ongoing conflict in Syria (Yıldız, 2017, pp. 35, 36; Duran, 2015). On the other hand, it is much more important to enable the labour market integration of those who are permanent at the earliest stage possible; however, overburdening on labour demand with too much labour supply, could do more harm than good on economic, social and also cultural aspects of the Kuhlman’s (1991) successful integration approach and realizing this seems to be beyond the economic and social limits of Turkish society. For instance; when they feel like they are losing their jobs to SuTPs, as the study of Erdoğan & Ünver (2015) points out host community might not want to interact with them and as a result not wanting to hire SuTPs at least formally caused economic dimension of integration to hinder social dimension (Durable Solutions Platform and İGAM Research Center on Asylum and Migration, 2019, p. 39).

All in all, all of these problems prevent SuTPs from; refferring to the services as locals do, cause them to work in underemployment situations (UNHCR, 2013a), confine them to jobs that adverse working conditions are common. This situation also cause labour market conditions of Turkish citizens to deteriorate. These are all red flag indicators for successful labour market integration of SuTPS according to Kuhlman (1991). As we can see main causes of these situations to occur are; firstly, the increased “flexibility” -that could not be reconciled with the ideal of creating decent work conditions because of the lack of institutional interception capacity and neoliberalisation process in the country- and secondly the unfair burden sharing attitude of EU that does not apply resettlement of immigrants as a mean for burden sharing.
CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

Syrian immigration and as a result of it, policies about their integration is definitely an important topic and for successful integration it is most vital to enable employment integration. As it is with the most humanitarian crises, a huge amount of the burden have fallen upon the neighbouring countries to the neighbours of the Syria. From this point of view, question of providing the successful employment integration conditions for SuTPs in Turkey -which is the World’s leading refugee hosting country- becomes an interesting area of investigation.

For Syrian refugees, Turkey applies a TP regime and complying with its geographical limitation to articulation of 1951 Convention it does not have to provide de jure refugee status for Syrians in Turkey. From a right based perspective this application seem unfair however considering the position of Turkey, in the face of a huge mass migration movement it is not easy to reach such a conclusion. Providing the Syrian immigrants with the sense of living in the world as Arendt describes where they can participate in their new home as an ordinary resident, surely requires more than TP status however, for that kind of provision, absorption capacity of Turkey is questionable, as we have explained in detail.

The evidence for this PRS like situation for SuTPs is one of main activities designed and implemented in the FRiT, which is ESSN. As we have examined in chapter 5, the need for ESSN is still very much valid and it is also an important obstacle for successful labour market integration of SuTPs considering the level of informal employment in Turkish labour market. The graduation target from the ESSN and FRiT project for implementing it, is far from having enough money and time to be successful as the Presidential government reports indicate. The cost of living, force
SuTPs to search for jobs even though they get the ESSN assistance, thus leading them to informal employment (Durable Solutions Platform and İGAM Research Center on Asylum and Migration, 2019, p. 39).

In this setting, considering the criteria pointed out by the Kuhlman (1991) on economic integration as we described in chapter 2, labour market participation by SuTPs just like locals is not in place in Turkey, because they need to have work permit to participate in the labour market. SuTPs had to work in underemployment situations (UNHCR, 2013a) as a similar refugee labour market participation problem around the world and are confined to jobs that informal working conditions are common. The condition for SuTPs to have access to goods and services as locals do is met but the actual benefitting does not occur because of widespread informality in the labour market as they cannot meet the necessary conditions to benefit from some of them such as PLMPs. Moreover, the condition which foresees that labour market effects of the refugees on the host community should be balanced and the situation in the local labour market should not be deteriorated for the host society is not met also as explained in detail in the previous sections on labour market impact of SuTPs. Direct access to labour market by SuTPs through informal employment brought a supply shock for the local labour force and further increased the labour market “flexibility”, in disadvantage of workers, through informality. Additionally, since there is too many SuTPs living in the country even though there are social help mechanisms like ESSN etc. they were not enough to provide a subsistence level of living for them. As a result of this, instead of formal labour market, first supply shock have been felt by the informally employed local labour force, then it had spread to the formal jobs as we have examined in chapter 4.

The structural features of the Turkish labour market also represent important obstacles for successful labour market integration of SuTPs. Turkey’s inability to create more jobs even during the thriving times of the economy and regarding the Syrian influx; job creation was essential because economy needed enlarging the pie even before Syrians, capacity of local labour demand to absorb labour supply was questionable considering the high level of unemployment rates throughout the years.
An evident jobless growth problem will limit the absorption capacity of the country for Syrian labour supply. In this order, because of the lack of inspection capacity and low levels of unionization; using increased capacity usage (being the second most for the weekly working hours among OECD countries is an evidence of this), lower wages; seem like givens. Applying less costly labour policies to allure more foreign investment into the country may have caused depreciation of real wages throughout the years, as OECD data shows Turkey among the least successful countries on income equality. Median levels of employment and labour market participation rates along with the gender issues related to labour market participation put the country even into a harsher position with the similar effects of the SuTP labour supply.

On burden sharing principal; EU’s approach does not seem to serve to the purposes it seemed to serve which is providing better livelihood opportunities for SuTPs in Turkey. It is not only insufficient for to be counted as complying with burden sharing principal (IOM, 2000, pp. 5-7; Newland, 2011; Cavusoglu, 2016) in the face of such a big immigration influx it also does not take labour market integration of SuTPs into account at least from a perspective of Kuhlman’s (1991) labour market integration criterion. For instance; it neither projects a resettlement of excess SuTP population in Turkey nor it seems to pay enough regard to how native population is affected by this immigrant influx.

All in all, all of these problems prevent SuTPs form referring to the services as locals do, cause them to work in underemployment situations (UNHCR, 2013a), confine them to jobs that adverse working conditions are common. This situation also cause labour market conditions of Turkish citizens to deteriorate. These are all red flag indicators for successful labour market integration of SuTPS according to Kuhlman (1991). As we can see main causes of these situations to occur are; firstly, the increased “flexibility” -that could not be reconciled with the ideal of creating decent work conditions because of the lack of institutional interception capacity and low levels of unionization that occurred because of the neoliberalisation process in
the country- and secondly the unfair burden sharing attitude of EU that does not apply resettlement of immigrants as a mean for burden sharing.

After explaining the situation about labour market integration of SuTPs in Turkey we can focus on the solutions for achieving successful integration.

6.1 Recommendations

Integration policies require long-term planning which includes contribution and coordination of several policy areas. These policies should take into account both the wellbeing of host community, immigrants and other vulnerable sub-groups (women, children, handicapped etc.) that belong to society. Having their contributions during the policy making process should also be a priority (Şimşek & Çorabatır, 2016, p. VIII). As Turkey is a country already fighting with economic problems (unemployment, informal employment, inflation, and fairer distribution of income) an immigration influx that does not help solving these problems on the contrary aggravating them could not be expected to be ending up with successful integration (Gelekçi et al., 2018, p. 472). So, Turkey needs to find a way to apply a right based approach for SuTPs and should do it in a way that contributes both host community and Syrians in the country. As we explained, with too much SuTPs to absorb it poses a great challenge, even for both ways.

International community, especially the EU should implement a rights based approach and end the Fortress Europe policies along with its all components.

In order to eliminate discrimination possibilities it is important to place emphasis on public awareness activities about what will be the positive contributions of guests to hosting community, culturally and socially. In service training of civil servants and decision makers who are responsible for immigrant related services, with a rights based approach in accordance with international law, should be conducted at regular intervals (Council of European Union, 2004b, p. 32).
Setting the policy management level right is also important for successful integration policies as the SuTP population density varies across different cities as well as their economic capacities, thus, right interventions, necessitates locally tailor made policy design and implementation and also include distribution of SuTPs across cities according to their absorption capacity. Activating local tripartite governance mechanisms (for instance PEVTBs) which are also including SuTP representatives in its structure, with more authority, to reshape (Nunn, 2018, p. 177) and thus to question neo-liberal policies and to enable sound design and implementation of policy measures is essential (OECD, 2018, p. 24). In the same setting, implementing effective communication activities and information campaigns on SuTP rights are also important for realizing planned policy actions and reaching timely targets (Şimşek, 2018, p. 386).

Keeping away from the implementation of academically determined main factors for unsuccessful labour market integration is also important and unfortunately some of them had to be implemented by Turkey as an ongoing policy. These are; firstly, seeing asylum seekers as “temporary guests” (TP regime), secondly, restrictions to freedom of movement and lastly restrictions on employment (work permit). Turkey should lift these restrictions but as we mentioned earlier lifting these restrictions should not have diminishing results for economic welfare of host community. In order to achieve this, Turkey and International community in compliance with the burden sharing principal should resettle much of the SuTPs residing in the country to countries who have more labour market absorption capacity within the limits of international law (Jacobsen, 2003, p. 79). More importantly, international community should end the “endless rhyme” of most of the refugees ending up at neighbouring countries and a resettlement process based on international cooperation and standards should be applied. For this type of application, system suggested by Jones and Teytelboym (2017, pp. 668-670) could be implemented. According to this, in order to resettle refugees, a common information system among countries will be established and this information system will include data on; capacity of the country
to host refugees, preferences of natives on which refugees they would like to host, efficiency and lastly and most importantly the preferences of refugees themselves.

As Nunn (2018, p. 178) points out repetitive crises of neoliberal order should be turned into opportunities for gradual acquisitions for better and more decent working life both for the host community and SuTP labour.

For good measure to overcome jobless growth problem, a financial system related and serving to the real economy is necessary for Turkey. High earnings from the financial sector and speculative activities should be restricted and the most gainful area of economic activity should be made industrial production which as a result would cut off the features of economy that does not generate employment and supports the ones that does. Additionally tariffs and industrial polices needed to support the late comer economy of Turkey. In order to help achieve a more just income distribution, a direct-tax based tax system and a monitoring mechanism for rentier activities should be established (Herr and Sonat, 2013, pp. 24-26).

Employment services of PES could be made more job seeker friendly and should be individualised according to needs of SuTPs. Establishing an effective skills assessment mechanism for directing immigrants to right employment services but at the same time not classifying them as valuable or not valuable has a high level of importance. ALMPs conducted for SuTPs, by all the parties, should at least be certificated by Ministry of National Education as it is for variety of ALMPs of PES.

For successful labour market integration of SuTPs Turkish language training including vocational language training, (OECD, 2020, p. 98) should be provided in a manner of targeting successful participation (and in compliance with the working hours for those who are in employment) which would reach the results of either reward (stipends) or punishment (cutting off of social aid) for its participants and service provision should be conducted by exceptionally qualified entities preferably by public institutions.
The cause of most of the PRS like situations, inability to benefit from a variety of public services and lack of trust between host community and SuTPs in the labour market is the informal employment and fighting with it should be taken as a number one policy objective while determining the long-term labour market objectives. Conducting information campaigns on effects of informal employment and child labour with collaboration of local tripartite governance mechanisms, both for now and in the future along with the effective inspection mechanisms (deterrent administrative fines, banning from tender bidding and jail time etc.) (Kan, 2012, p. 33; Tunc, 2006) is necessary. Successful matching of SuTPs to sectors and courses that are most vacant by PES, points to a successful policy intervention however it seems that wide spread informality and precarious working conditions in those sectors is to be watched out. PES could improve effectiveness of their policy interventions by conducting impact analysis activities that pivots around spreading decent jobs for all. Reaching to gender equality targets in labour market could be provided through implementation of cultural orientation activities that have similar reward and punishment mechanism to the ones suggested for Turkish language trainings. Labour demand stimulation policies for positive gender discrimination for SuTPs could also be effective as they are already being implemented in various PES services.

The components that are causing ESSN to make informal employment desirable, should be revised and in the long-term ESSN should be removed as a necessity for livelihood of SuTPs by means of especially, as necessity of burden sharing principal the resettlement to the countries which have more absorption capacity (in terms of labour demand, housing, health system, education infrastructure etc.) and accountable labour market demand support activities that creates more and decent jobs for all. The PRS like situations should be ended through sustainable livelihood support policies for SuTPs. These policies should involve transformation of labour market policies toward providing decent jobs. Creating less costly labour factor policies should be set aside, labour unions should be empowered and more effective inspection mechanisms should be established to create a reconcilable labour market
habitat between flexibility and decent work. Fighting for income inequality should be made a political priority.

A system that aims to extend the application of decent work with the functioning of market and effective inspection mechanisms could be set up throughout the country both for natives and SuTPs. In order to do this; an incentive mechanism that rewards creation of decent jobs should be organized. After establishing an effective inspection mechanism, the products or services of firms could be classified according to conditions provided to labour by employers during the production of those products or services (Hiscox, & Smyth, 2008). These conditions may include; payment, working hours, days paid leave allowed for workers, details of paternity leave, occupational health and safety standards applied, etc. The classification of workplaces could be applied to direct the perception of consumer. For example; if a product is produced under decent work conditions a green label (or if it was the other way around it could be red label) should be showing this on product package. Workplaces that employ SuTPs could be provided with positive discrimination and have better grades for same conditions according to other workplaces that do not employ SuTP workforce. This should of course, be under the condition of application of fair burden sharing through resettlement of SuTPs in Turkey to other countries that have relevant capacities. The Public institutions should track and keep up to date classifications of workplaces. For example; while searching for a job at PES, job seekers should be able to selectively, only search for work places that have “it is great to work here” label (Great Place to Work, 2021). Thus such workplaces could meet their labour demand earlier and with better qualified representatives of labour, expand their company and also the decent jobs. Effective inspection mechanisms should also punish any illegality during the application of this system. So in a way both the market and legal responsible bodies would be contributing for extending the application of decent jobs.

Life of immigrants should not be subject to international relations and rights of immigrants should be realized as it is foreseen in the international protection law. A more accountable agreement in respect to international protection rights should be
“ratified” between the parties especially in relation to resettlement of SuTPs in Turkey.

Taking Global Compact on Responsibility Sharing for Refugees implementations into account, from our perspective the burden sharing principal can only be actualized through fair distribution of refugees among safe countries according to their economic capabilities as Jones and Teytelboym (2017) suggested. Only after that the financial assistance structures and information sharing on best practices can constructively be helpful, because only after that countries like Turkey and Lebanon can have a capacity to cope with the immigration burden and create a sustainable integration (or harmonization) policy scheme on employment or other dimensions of integration.

In FRiT SESC, broader labour market support activities are needed both for supporting the demand and supply side. Nevertheless as we have explained earlier, these types of project funds should not be expected to enable successful integration policies but they could just teach responsible bodies practical lessons.
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Dünya genelinde mültecilerin çoğu alt ve üst orta gelirli ülkelerde yaşamakta olup kayıt dışı istihdam onlar için büyük bir sorun teşkil etmektedir. Neo-liberal eğilimlerin etkisiyle gelişmekte olan ülkeler artan kayıt dışı istihdam baskılarıyla karşı karşıya kalmaktadır. Bu ülkelerde uluslararası hukukun yanlıs uygulanmasıyla yol açtığı seçeneklerin yetersizliği ve dolayısıyla komşu ülke iş gücü piyasalarının aşırı yüklenmesi nedeniyle mültecileri neo-liberal gündemdektikte bulunmakta olup, mülteciler ancak kayıt dışı istihdam yoluyla ekonomik olarak entegre olabilir halde görünmektedirler. Detaylandırım gerekirse, ülke, mülteciler nüfusun getirdiği ek iş gücü için iş yaratma imkanlarına sahip değilse, yerel nüfusun işlerini mültecilere kaptırmayı yerel yabancı düşmanlığına neden olabilir; ya da yerel nüfus, yüksek iş gücü rekabeti nedeniyle daha düşük istihdam koşullarını kabul edebilir ve kayıt dışı istihdam edilebilir ya da süreç iş gücüne katılmadan geri çekilme ile sonuçlanabilir (Sak ve diğerleri, 2017, s. 2, 4; Del Carpio ve Wagner, 2015).

Bu ortamda, Türkiye'de Geçici Koruma altındaki Suriyelilerin iş gücü piyasasına entegrasyonu hem kendileri hem de ev sahibi topluluk için hayati önem taşımaktadır.

Bu tezin temel argümanı, Türkiye'de neoliberal ekonomi politikaları; yüksek düzeyde kayıt dışı istihdam ve daha az sendikal işgücü sonucunda var olan daha esnek işgücü piyasası yapısı; entegrasyon politikası şeması ve uluslararası toplum tarafından sınırlı yük paylaşımı desteği uygulamaları hususlarından kaynaklı olarak; Geçici Koruma Altındaki Suriyelilerin işgücü piyasasına entegrasyonun ciddi sınırlılıklar bulunduğu bulunuyordur.

Çalışma, Kuhlman'ın (1991) başarılı ekonomik entegrasyon kriterine göre, Türkiye'de geçici koruma sağlanan Suriyelilerin işgücü piyasasına entegrasyonunun etkisiz olduğunu ortaya koymaktadır. Birinceisi, Türkiye işgücü piyasasının özellikleri nedeniyle, Türkiye'de Geçici Koruma altında Suriyelilerin beceri düzeylerine göre ödeme sağlayan işler bulma şansları daha azdır; çalışma izni mevzuatı nedeniyle ne yerel halkla aynı türden ve ne de aynı şekilde işlere erişimleri bulunmaktadır. Çeşitli

özellikleri ve bu hizmetlerin işlenmesi için mevcut dinamikler nedeniyle, beklediği gibi bunlara erişmemektedirler.

AB ve Türkiye arasındaki yük paylaşımı işbirliği konusunda Suriyeli göç krizi çalışması bağlamında AB-Türkiye Bildirisi'nin esas olarak Türkiye ile göçmen nüfus takası yoluyla Avrupa'ya Suriyeli göçünü düzenlemeyi amaçladığı ve ülkeye çok az mali yardım sağladığı tartışılmıştır. FRiT fonları toplam miktarının yalnızca 1/6'sını işgücü piyasası entegrasyonu ile ilgili faaliyetlere ayırığından, bu yük paylaşımı yaklaşımdı adil görünmemektedir. Türk işgücü piyasası çoğunlukla talep yönlü iyileştirmelere ihtiyaç duyduya da, FRiT bu destek alanı için çok az şey sağlamaktadır.


Son olarak, Kuhlman'ın (1991) işgücü piyasasındaki yerel halkın şartlarının göç yüzünden kötüleşmesini gerektiği hakkındaki başarılı işgücü piyasası entegrasyonu kriteri ile ilgili olarak; kriterin bu kısmının incelenmesi amacı ile Türk işgücü piyasasında GKAS’ın arz ve talep yönlü etkileri incelendiği, işgücü piyasasında yerel halkın kayıtlı istihdam ya da kayıp dışı istihdam fark etmesinin GKAS tarafından ikame edildiği konusunda kanıtlar bulunmuş ve dahası GKAS akının daha düşük maaşlara neden olduğu ve dezavantajlı gruplar üzerinde olumsuz etkilere sahip olduğu görülmüştür. Kayıp dışı istihdam problemi daha da büyüümüş ve bunun sonucu

Bu etkenlerin sonucu olarak, GKAS’in işgücü piyasası entegrasyonu Kuhlman’ın (1991) kriterlerine uymamaktadır. Bu etkenler göç akınının büyüklüğüyle birlikte, yerlerle aynı eforu sarf eden GKAS için daha düşük maaşlara (UNHCR, 2013a), uzun çalışma saatlerine, ücretlerin geç ödenmesine, sosyal yardımların eksikliğine, güvenli olmayan çalışma koşullarına ve GKAS özellikle geliştirilmesi gereken KİH’e sebep olmuş olup, bu hususlar literatürde başarısız entegrasyonun göstergeleri kabul edilmektedir. (Kuhlman, 1991; Tören, T., 2018, s. 3; Göksel, 2018a, s. 162; ILO, 2017; Honneth, 2014)

Çalışma bu bilgiler ışığında aşağıdaki hususlarda son değerlendirmelere varmaktadır. GKSS’lerin sürücemi Mülteci Durumlarına benzer durumlar da bulunduklarına ilişkin bulgünün başında ESSN olup, söz konusu uygulama FRiT kapsamında tasarlanan ve uygulanan başlıca faaliyetlerden biridir. Bölüm 5’te incelendiği üzere, Türkiye işgücü piyasasındaki kayıt dışı istihdam düzeyi göz önünde bulundurulduğunda, ESSN’e duyulan ihtiyaç halen fazlasıyla geçerlidir ve GKSS’lerin, işgücü piyasasına başarılı şekilde entegrasyonunun öncesinde önemli bir engel teşkil etmektedir. Cumhurbaşkanlığı raporları göstermektedir ki ESSN ve FRiT projelerinin tamamlanma hedefi, başarılı olmak için yeterli paraya ve zamana sahip olmaktan çok uzaktır. Hayat pahalılığı GKSS’leri, ESSN yardımları almalarına rağmen iş aramaya zorlamakta ve dolayısıyla kayıt dışı istihdamaya yönelik etkilendiği de belirtmektedir (Durable Solutions Platform ve İGAM Research Center on Asylum and Migration, 2019, s. 39).

Bu durumda, bölüm 2’de ifade edildiği gibi Kuhlman’ın (1991) ekonomik entegrasyon ile ilgili işaret ettiği kriter dikkate alındığında, Türkiye’de GKSS’nin vatandaşlar gibi işgücü piyasasına katılımı mevcut değildir, çünkü işgücü piyasasına katılımları için çalışma izni almaları gerekmektedir. Dünya genelinde göçmenlerin

Türk işçi piyasasının yapısal özelliklerini de GKAS’in başarılı işçi piyasası entegrasyonu açısından önemli engeller teşkil etmektedir. Türkiye’nin ekonominin büyüdüğü zamanlarda dahi daha çok iş yaratma kapasitesinden yüksek olması ve Suriyeli akınıyla ilgili olarak; Suriyeli akınından da önce postanan büyütülmesi gerektiği için iş yaratmanın da önemli olduğu ekonomide, işçi talebinin işçi arzını abzorbe etmesi durumlu yıllarda itibariyle görülen yüksek işsizlik oranlarından da anlaşılacağı üzere hâlihazırda sorunlu durumdadır (Turkstat, 2021). Bu durumda kanıtlanmış olan bir istihdamsız büyümeyi, ülkenin ihtiyaç duyduğu Suriyeli işçi arzını gerekli işçi abzorbe etme kapasitesini sınırlayacaktır. Bu çerçevede, yetersiz denetim kapasitesi, düşük düzeyli sendikalaşma; artırılmış kapasite kullanımı (OECD ülkeleri arasında haftalık çalışma saatı göstergesinde en yüksek ikinci ülke olmak bunun bir kanıtudur) karşısında düşük ücretler veri olarak kabul
edilebilir. OECD verileri Türkiye’yi gelir adaletsizliği konusunda en başarısız ülkeler arasında göstermektedir; ülkeye daha çok yabancı yatırım çekebilmek için daha düşük maliyetli işgücü politikaları uygulamak yıllar itibariyle reel ücretlerin değerinin düşmesine sebep olmuştur. Orta düzeydeki istihdam ve işgücüne katkı oranları ve toplumsal cinsiyete dayalı işgücüne katkı problemleri GKAS’ın da benzer etkileriyle ülkeyi zor bir pozisyona sokmuş olabilir.


Çalışma literatüre, GKAS’ın yerli işgücü tarafından talep edilmeyen işlerde çalıştığı retorikinin, KİH’in AİPP verisine ve açık iş verisine dayanarak desteklediğini

Çalışma aynı zamanda GKAS’ın en çok yararlandığı KİH AİPP türleri arasındaki yüzdesel dağılımı inceleyerek GKAS’ın işgücü piyasasındaki yerini doğrulamakla ve farklı koruma statülerine sahip olan KİH çerçevesini açıklamakla literatüre katkı sağlamaktadır. GKAS’ın yararlandığı AİPP türleri arasında diğer AİPP türlerine nazaran İş Başı Eğitim Programlarının (İEP) yoğun olması, yerel işgücü ve GKAS’ın genellikle benzer beceri düzeylerine sahip olduğunu göstermektedir. Çünkü, GKAS genellikle Mesleki Eğitim Kurslarıyla (MEK) sağlanan yeni becerileri öğrenmekten çok İEP’lerle sağlanan çalışma deneyimine ihtiyaç duymaktadır. Bu durum aynı zamanda GKAS’ın işgücü piyasası esnekliğine katkı sağladığı da gösterebilir. Çalışma aynı zamanda Türkiye’deki Mülteciler için Mali İmkan (FRiT) tarafından yürütülen faaliyetlerin olası gelişim alanlarını da yük paylaşımı prensibinden ele almaktadır.

Çalışmanın bölümsel dağılımına bakacak olursak; bölüm 2 çalışmanın kavramsal çerçevesini sunmaktadır. Bölüm 3’te Türkiye’nin mülteci entegrasyonu politika çerçevesini, Avrupa Birliği’nin (AB) Suriyeli mültecilere yönelik politikalarıyla birlikte sunulmaktadır. Bu bölüm, AB’nin göçmen krizi hakkındaki tavrına ve AB tarafından uygulanan politikaların uluslararası koruma hukukuna uygunluğuna odaklanmaktadır. Kale Avrupası politikaları, AB tarafından İhtiyaçlara Dayalı Yaklaşımla (NBA) uygulanmaka olan uluslararası koruma kanunu, AB tarafından mülteciler için uygulanmaka olan işgücü piyasası hizmetleri, AB-Türkiye Bildirisi ve bunların göç akını üzerindeki etkisi incelenmiştir. Çalışma bu bölümde
mültecilerin AB ve Türk işgücü piyasası üzerindeki etkilerini karşılaştırmakta ve aynı zamanda FRiT kapsamdaki faaliyetlerin olması gelişim alanlarını yük paylaşımı ilkesi açısından ele almaktadır. Çalışma burada aynı zamanda, Küresel Mülteciler için Sorumluluk Paylaşımı Sözleşmesini incelemekte ve bu araç sayesinde mülteci akını alan ülkelerde sağlanan destekleri değerlendirilmektedir.

Bu bölümde ele alınan bir başka konu ise, GKAS için Türkiye’de uygulanmakta olan çalışma izinleri ve istihdam kotasi düzenlemeleri olup; bu kısıtlamaların nasıl bazı çalışmalarca kaldırılması gerektiğini belirtmesine rağmen, aslında kamu otoritelerinin olası toplumsal gerilimlerin önüne geçmek gerekçesinden ve böyle büyük bir göç karşısında uluslararası işbirliğinin düzeyinden kaynaklı olarak uygulanmak zorunda olduğu ortaya koyulmuştur. Dahasi 4ncü bölümde açıkladığı üzere bu sınırlamaların aslında GKAS’ın kayıt dışı çalışmasının tek sebebi olmayabileceği ortaya koyulmuştur. Ek olarak, AB’nin FRiT desteğinin yeterliliği ve doğruluğu, Suriyeli göçmenlerin genellikle göç akınlarında görüldüğü üzere nasıl komşu ülkelerde kaldıği ve AB’nin böyle büyük bir göçmen akını karşısında izlediği yük paylaşımı ilkesi yaklaşımını bakımdan incelenmiştir.

4ncü bölümde, Türk işgücü piyasasının GKAS’ın entegrasyonu üzerinde belirleyici etkisi olan özellikleri, detaylı bir şekilde incelenerek Suriyelilerin nasıl bir işgücü piyasasına entegre olmasının beklenliği tartışılmıştır. Detaya girecek olursak; Türk işgücü piyasasının yapısal özellikleri farklı yönleriyle; istihdamsız büyüme, kayıt dışı istihdama bağlı esneklik meselesi, gelir adaleti, çalışma saatleri, reel ücretlerin yeterliliği, alt sözleşme, geçici iş ilişkisi, sendikalaşma seviyesi, istihdam hizmetlerinin katkıları gibi hususlar üzerinden GKAS’ın işgücü piyasası entegrasyonu açısından işlevsellikleriyle birlikte açıklanmıştır.

konuda kamu otoritelerinin politika yaklaşımı değerlendirilmiştir. Arz yönünde ise, kayıtlı ya da kayıt dışı istihdam açısından farklı etmeksizin yerel halkın işgücü piyasasından GKAS tarafından ikame edilmesi üzerinde durulmuştur. GKAS’ın yaygın kayıt dışı istihdamda çalışması, neden bu şartlarda çalışmayı kabul ettiğini dair altta yatan sebepler ve bu durumun işgücü piyasası dinamiklerini nasıl etkilediği ve ayrıca neo-liberal işgücü piyasası politikaları açısından bu durumun nasıl bir işlevde bulunduğu incelenmiştir. Çalışma izni politika çerçevesinin etkinliği için belirleyici faktörler, Suriyeli akının başladığı ve işgücü piyasası verilerinde görülen değişimlerle birlikte ele alınmıştır. Bu bölümde GKAS kayıt dışı istihdamının sosyal devlet politikalarının uygulanması için daha az gelir elde edilmesine sebep olması ve toplumsal adalet algısı açısından etkileri vb. ayrıca hususlar ele alınmıştır.

Bölüm 5 ayrıca, GKAS’ın işgücü piyasasına erişimi için bulunan engellere dikkate çekmekte, sürünçeli mülteciler durumunun varlığını entegrasyonun istihdam boyutu ve Kale Avrupası politikaları ile ilgili olarak Kuhlman’ın (1991) entegrasyon kriteri ile karşılaştırmaktadır. Bu bölümde çalışma, KIH verilerinden AİPP ve açık işler verilerinde dayanarak GKAS’ın ne tür açık işleri doldurduğuunu incelemektedir. Bu çerçevede, kayıt dışlığın yoğun olduğu ve en çok açık işin bulunduğu imalat sektörü (İŞKUR Veri tabanı, 2020; Kamaloğlu, 2014, s. 196,197; Yıldız & Yıldız, 2017, s. 35; Kaya, 2016; Buyukgoze-Kavas and Autin, 2019, s. 66; Baban ve diğerleri, 2017; İSKUR, 2020, s. 47,48) GKAS işgücü katılımı için lider sektör olarak belirlenmiştir. Çalışma aynı zamanda, Suriye krizinin çıktından bu yana GKAS’ın faydalanmış olduğu KIH AİPP türleri arasındaki yüzdesel dağılımı incelenmektede ve GKAS’ın Türk işgücü piyasasındaki konumu hakkında çıkarımlar yapmakta ve farklı koruma statüleri için sağlamaktaka olan Kamu İstihdam Hizmetleri çerçevesini açıklamaktadır. GKAS için bu kapsamlı gerek uluslararası gerek yerel düzeydeki hizmetler (Kaygısız, 2017, s. 13, 14), bize onların riskli çalışma koşullarında istihdam edilmeye (çocuk işçiliği ve toplumsal cinsiyet farklılıkları da içerecek şekilde) (Çeliker, 2018, s. 109, 110; Dedeoğlu, 2014, s. 108,109; Petel, 2017; İçduygulu ve Diker, 2017, s. 25, 26; UNICEF, 2014) açık olduğunu, çalışma izni almak için
şanslarının az olduğunu, Türkçe konuşmayı öğrenme ihtiyacı duyduklarını (Durable Solutions Platform ve İGAM Research Center on Asylum and Migration, 2019, s. 39) göstermektedir. Bu bölümde aynı zamanda, kayıt dışi GKAS işgücü faaliyetleri için daha sıkı denetimler gerektiğini ve Kuhlman’a (1991) göre onların başarılı işgücü piyasası entegrasyonlarının sağlanabilmesi için potansiyel gelişim alanlarının neler olduğunu vurgulanmıştır.

Son bölümde, çalışma boyunca öne sürülen düşünceler, onlar hakkındaki son değerlendirmelerle birlikte özetlenmiştir. Bu bölümde ayrıca, başarılı işgücü piyasası entegrasyonunu mümkün kılacak için neler yapılabileceğiine dair politika önerileri geliştirilmiştir.

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