

AN ANALYSIS OF THE INTERCONNECTIONS BETWEEN FORMS OF  
OPPRESSION FROM AN ECOFEMINIST AND DECOLONIAL PERSPECTIVE

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## ABSTRACT

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This thesis investigates the interconnections between forms of oppression and the role of oppression of nonhuman nature in these interconnections by implementing a conceptual and logical analysis of the oppressive subjectivity, which functions to create, maintain, and justify oppression. A close reading of the studies of ecofeminist philosophers Karen Warren and Val Plumwood will reveal that dualist thinking is the necessary condition for justifying the oppressor's superiority, which is essential to justify oppression, and providing certainty of the legitimacy of oppression. Straining through decolonial philosophers' discussions on the colonial self will shed light on the metaphysical and epistemological forces of the oppressor that explain and justify dualist thinking. Examining reason/nature and human/nature dualisms and dehumanization, a moral and logical strategy functioning in conceiving the other less than human or nonhuman, will clarify the role of oppression of nature between

forms of oppression. The genesis and formation of reason/nature and human/nature dualisms in the Western rationalist and humanist tradition will be examined through the philosophies of Plato, Aristotle, and Descartes. As can be seen, in this tradition, the status of human-others, namely women, slaves, blacks, change in parallel with the image, the moral and ontological status of nature. Finally, an examination of ideal and non-ideal contract theories will show that the social contracts exclude nonhuman nature from the realm of morality and thus produce oppressive subjectivity. This alternative reading of contract theories will clarify the socialization of oppressive subjectivity, institutionalization of oppression, and interconnections between institutionalized forms of oppression.

**Keywords:** oppression, human, nature, dualism, subjectivity

## ÖZ

### TAHAKKÜM BİÇİMLERİ ARASINDAKİ İLİŞKİSELLİĞİN EKOFEMİNİST VE DEKOLONYAL BİR PERSPEKTİFTEN ANALİZİ

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Bu tez tahakkümü kuran, sürdüren ve haklı gösteren tahakkümcü öznelliğin kavramsal ve mantıksal analizini yaparak farklı tahakküm biçimleri arasındaki ilişkiselliği ve doğanın tahakkümünün bu ilişkisellikteki rolünü incelemektedir. Ekofeminist filozof Karen Warren ve Val Plumwood'un çalışmalarının yakın bir okuması düalist düşüncenin tahakkümü meşrulaştırmak için hayati önemde olan ezenin üstünlüğünün kanıtlanmasının ve tahakkümün meşruiyetinin kesinliğinin sağlanmasının zorunlu koşulu olduğunu gösterecektir. Ezenin düalist düşünce biçimini açıklayan ve doğrulayan metafizik ve epistemolojik kuvvetlerin anlaşılması için dekolonyal filozofların sömürgeci benlik hakkındaki tartışmalarından faydalanılacaktır. Akıl/doğa ve insan/doğa düalizmleri ve ötekini insandan az ya da insandışı görmek şeklinde işleyen ahlaki ve mantıksal strateji olan insandışılaştırmanın analizi doğanın tahakküm ilişkileri arasındaki ilişkisellikteki



rolünü açıklayacaktır. Batı felsefesinin rasyonalist ve hümanist geleneğinde akıl/doğa ve insan/doğa düalizmlerinin doğuşu ve oluşumu Platon, Aristoteles ve Descartes'ın felsefeleri üzerinden incelenecektir. Görüleceği üzere, bu gelenekte insan ötekilerinin, yani kadınların, kölelerin ve siyahların, imgesi, ahlaki ve statüsü doğanın imgesinin, ahlaki ve ontolojik statüsüne paralel bir şekilde değişmektedir. Son olarak, ideal ve ideal olmayan sözleşme teorilerinin incelenmesi toplum sözleşmelerinin insandışı doğayı ahlakın alanından dışladığını ve bu sebeple ürettiği öznelliğin tahakkümcü olduğunu gösterecektir. Sözleşme teorilerini okumak için önerilecek bu alternatif okuma tahakkümcü öznelliğin toplumsallaşmasını, tahakkümün kurumsallaşmasını ve kurumsallaşmış tahakküm biçimleri arasındaki ilişkiselliği açığa kavuşturacaktır.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** tahakküm, insan, doğa, düalizm, sözleşme

*Dedicated to the memories of Berkin Elvan  
and our friends we lost in the Gezi Resistance*

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## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

It has been 34 years since James Hansen has broken out climate change onto the international stage: "The greenhouse effect has been detected, and it is changing our climate now."<sup>1</sup> Nevertheless, for 34 years, humanity's unwillingness to take necessary actions paved the path from climate *change* to the climate *crisis*. Without a radical shift in the human-nature relationship and ceasing to view nature as alien to us and having no moral communion, we will not be able to exceed offering temporary and mostly individual solutions for the ecological problems.

We can find social, political, or philosophical crises at the doors to new periods and the birth of all grand philosophies of the history of philosophy. We cannot read Plato's philosophy, which shaped and affected the Christian and medieval philosophy, independently from the moral crisis of the Greek society caused by Sophist's relativist philosophy. We cannot give a complete account of the philosophy of Kant, who is the leading figure of the Enlightenment, without considering the question asked by Hume (which is 'how can we be sure that the sun will rise tomorrow?') that shakes the reliability of scientific knowledge. Today, we come up against the climate crisis, which is one of the severest crises that humankind has ever witnessed. While overcoming previous crises, philosophers aimed to rescue the dominant philosophical paradigm. However, the climate crisis differs from the previous crises. Overcoming it is not possible with rescuing the dominant paradigm, which is the epitome of the cause of this crisis. This time, the crisis does not accept patching

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<sup>1</sup> Dyke, Watson, and Knorr, "Climate Scientists."

anymore, and as such it forces us to question our conceptualization of life, humanity, and nature, produce another subjectivity to form a harmonious and integrated relationship with nature.<sup>2</sup>

As I will show in this thesis, the continuity between different periods in the history of western philosophy is sustained with the master and repressive model of reason as the basis of human superiority over nature that justifies the oppression of nature by humans. Nevertheless, the scope of human identity is determined only by those in power, while women, slaves, nonwhites, and other human-others, whose humanity is questioned and denied, share the common fate with nature for centuries. In other words, this paradigm not only creates and justifies the oppression of nature but also the oppression of human-others. Therefore, this paradigm shift is necessary for both ecological and social problems.<sup>3</sup>

This thesis analyses the interconnection between different forms of oppression, the role of oppression of nature in this interconnection, and the inseparability of the liberation of different oppressed identities. The way I will appeal to maintain this analysis will be questioning the necessary conditions of creating, maintaining, and justifying any form of oppression. In other words, without appealing to a particular form of oppression, I will question how one can justify any mode of oppression.

Of course, there are essential differences between, let us say, oppression of women and oppression of animals, and one may ask rightfully whether this thesis falls into the trap of universalization and being reductive. I believe necessary conditions of justifying all forms of oppression are not universal, but there are universal conditions

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<sup>2</sup> During the thesis, I use the concept of *nature* referring to nonhuman animals, material and bodily sphere, plants, lands, rivers, and all other nonhuman nature.

<sup>3</sup> I make a distinction between ecological and social problems for the sake of the clarity of expression by noting that this thesis claims ecological problems' inseparability from social problems.



of justifying oppression that interconnect different forms of oppression. I believe examining these interconnections does not make this study necessarily reductive, but it is helpful to have a deeper and comprehensive understanding of oppression and to advocate strategies and recommend solutions against oppression. As we will see, as the oppression of human-others and oppression of nature are interconnected, the liberation of nature and liberation of human-others are inseparable. By showing these interconnections and inseparability of liberation of forms of oppression, my ultimate aim is calling for strengthening the solidarity of different liberation movements and developing their theoretical and practical sensitivity to each other. Since we are on the cusp of a new era in the history of philosophy and that this crisis heralds the most significant shift in the philosophical paradigm, our theoretical and practical solidarity and struggle have the most potentiality ever had before.

If we define ethics as self's way of relating to life, the world, and the other, what I primarily do is examining the ethics of oppression or oppressive ethics. I question how the oppressor relates himself to the other, the world, life, and himself, and where 'nature' stands in his ethics. I aim to show that the one who justifies any mode of oppression always has the metaphysical and epistemological forces to extend the scope of oppression. The role of oppression of nature should be understood in this context. Most of us call ourselves anti-racist or anti-sexist, but few of us can claim to be anti-speciesist. However, our ethics and humanist values that exclude nonhuman nature from the realm of morality and justify oppression of nonhuman animals provide a ground for justification of human-others by denying their humanity, identifying them with animals, and conceiving them less than human or nonhuman in mass violence or societies where oppression is institutionalized and normalized.

I am not the first to claim an interconnection between forms of oppression; it has been crucial to many ecological thoughts. My thesis aims to contribute a small share to this discussion by analyzing many aspects of this issue by focusing on oppressive subjectivity that creates, maintains, and justifies oppression. The second chapter will

introduce the debate on the relationship between social and ecological domination between three leading philosophical approaches; deep ecology, social ecology, and ecofeminism. My aim for discussing different ecological positions is to put a finer point on ecofeminism's insight, power, and premises.

Ecofeminism does not denote a single position; I primarily appeal to the positions of Karen Warren and Val Plumwood. Many ecofeminists demonstrated historical, empirical, discursive, cultural parallels between the oppression of women and the oppression of nature. Yet, Warren and Plumwood are few of those who successfully explained the conceptual and logical interconnections underlying these parallels. While introducing and discussing their ideas, I will show where Warren's and Plumwood's ideas intersect and how they complete each other. By doing that, I will clarify the method of this study and explain why I find conceptual analysis of oppressive subjectivity a reliable way of analyzing the issue of oppression.

I will begin the third chapter by formulating a concept: oppressive subjectivity. I explain how I will use Warren and Plumwood's central concepts and offer a way of reading their philosophies together. If the logic of domination, which assumes superiority justifies oppression, is the primary moral assumption of oppressive subjectivity, I claim that dualist thinking justifies the superiority of the oppressor by construing diversity hierarchically, asymmetrically, and exclusively.

Analyzing interconnections between forms of oppression through the logical and conceptual analysis of oppressive subjectivity provides a holistic analysis that covers ontological, political, ethical, epistemological, and aesthetical dimensions of oppression. We can find this opportunity even in the definition of subjectivity, a particular way of thinking, feeling, conceiving, and perceiving that reflects and shapes how one view oneself and others and their social, moral, or political values. Nevertheless, Warren and Plumwood missed out two points. First, they overlooked the role of desire in oppression. Second, they did not question the metaphysical and

epistemological power of the oppressor. To overcome the first problem, I offer to make a distinction between identity and image and explain the relationship between image and desire. By analyzing the formation of dualist thinking, which includes dualist image and desire production in three steps, I aim to give a clear explanation of the conditions that demand dualist thinking for explaining and justifying oppression. To overcome the second problem, I will appeal to decolonial philosophy's critique of the colonial self and explain the metaphysical and epistemological power of the oppressor that enables him to create, maintain, and justify oppressive subjectivity. Later, in the same chapter, I will discuss the relationship between images, identities, and concepts and the critical role of reason/nature dualism in western culture. This chapter will end with a discussion on dehumanization, where I summarize the interconnection between forms of oppression and the unique role of oppression of nature.

In the fourth chapter, I trace the genesis and development of reason/nature dualism in the history of western philosophy through Plato, Aristotle, and Descartes' philosophies. Since I define dualism as a way of construing diversity hierarchically, asymmetrically, and exclusively, I show that the first two steps in the formation of the dualist construction of reason and nature are taken by Plato and Aristotle, and Descartes takes the last step by eliminating all commonalities between reason and nature. I show the moral and ontological interconnections underlying the parallel between the movement of nature's image and moral status and human-others in these philosophies.

While most of us are familiar with the oppressive moral values of these philosophers' concerning animals, women, slaves, we usually take these ideas as insignificant details of their philosophies, as we take conquest, colonization, enslavement in western societies were accidental phenomena. To demonstrate the influence of these philosophers on the moral norms and values of European societies, I begin this chapter by presenting three arguments of Gines de Sepúlveda, an Aristotelian

scholar, articulated in the Valladolid Debate, which is the first debate on the moral and ontological status of Indigenous people. Plumwood's reading of Plato, Aristotle, and Descartes are largely in my discussion. Among these philosophers, only Descartes does not claim inequality among humans. At the end of the chapter, I interpret decolonial philosophers' critique of Cartesian philosophy and discuss the influence of the Cartesian image of nature on the development of the modern colonial self. Besides analyzing the continuity between these philosophers by following Plumwood's reading, I will show the radical changes in the Cartesian self's epistemological and metaphysical perspective caused by the formation of a strict dualism by making use of decolonial philosophers' discussion on Descartes.

The fifth chapter offers reading contractarianism through oppressive subjectivity. I claim that making the contract produces a particular subjectivity, and signing a contract corresponds to adopting a particular subjectivity. By reading the social contract theories of Hobbes and Locke, I show the moral status of animals in these theories. Later, in the same chapter, I introduce two non-ideal contract theories, the Sexual Contract and the Racial Contract, to explain the production and reproduction of oppressive structures of modern societies. I show that both ideal and non-ideal contracts produce oppressive subjectivity, which explains the interconnection between oppressive structures of societies. The chapter ends with initiating a discussion with Carole Pateman, who thinks that parallels between oppression of women and oppression of nature can be easily broken down and does not lean towards extending her theory, *The Sexual Contract*, to another contract that explains and justifies the oppression of nature.

## CHAPTER 2

### CURRENT DEBATES IN ENVIRONMENTAL PHILOSOPHY

The three main currents that adopt a stance radically different from liberal environmental movements by claiming an interconnection between social domination and the domination of nature and advocating a radical change in the relationship between nature and humanity are deep ecology, social ecology, and ecofeminism. While these positions agree that there is a relationship between different modes of domination, they differ in their methods for examining this relationality and the solutions they propose. Bookchin appeals to historical analysis as his method and claims that social domination is historically prior to the domination of nature; therefore, the liberation of humans is strategically prior to the liberation of nature. Plumwood, on the other hand, uses philosophical analysis to understand the nature of domination. She finds out that there is an interconnection between different modes of dominations and that the liberation of humans and nature cannot be separated from each other. By showing their differences, my aim is to clarify the power and premises of ecofeminism. I will contend with a summary of deep ecology. After examining the fundamental ideas of social ecology, I will explain Plumwood's criticisms for social ecology and why I agree with her.

After analyzing and introducing their discussion and criticism of each other, I will explain why I defend and use ecofeminism in the next chapter where I will analyze the logical and conceptual interconnection between forms of oppression and the unique role of oppression of (nonhuman) nature.

## 2.1. Deep Ecology

Deep ecology fundamentally differs from shallow ecology by proposing a radical change of the human-nature relationship rather than offering temporary and mostly individual solutions for ecological problems.<sup>4</sup> According to deep ecologists, environmental issues are caused by the conceptualization of nature as serving humans' interests, with lower ontological status and without intrinsic value. They reject Cartesian philosophy's dualist, and thereby anthropocentric conceptualization of the human and nonhuman on three counts: [1] the conceptualization of nonhumans as having a lower ontological status and no intrinsic value due to not having a mind, [2] the conceptualization of humans as ontologically different from nature by being free by dint of having a mind, [3] and the conceptualization of individuals as if they are distinct from each other, in other words, the radical distinction between subjects.<sup>5</sup> Engaging with Spinoza's monism, deep ecologists promote a perspective where all beings have the same intrinsic value and their opposition to anthropocentrism results in an ecocentric position. Even though deep ecology considers the capitalist production relations harmful effects on nature, by taking a mysticist position, deep ecology appears to be more of a religion and cannot develop an adequate political approach. Moreover, affirming wild nature and defending ecocentrism,<sup>6</sup> deep ecology's position is accused of being misanthropic and fascistic, as well sexist. Mark Stoll, on the dispute between Bookchin and Foreman, summarizes the proclamations by deep ecologists who have led to the aforementioned accusations as follows:

Foreman, the most prominent voice in *Earth First!*, opposed aid to famine-stricken Ethiopia so that nature could "seek its own balance." On the pages of the *Earth First!* journal, someone with the pseudonym "Miss Ann Thropy"

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<sup>4</sup> Naess, "The Shallow and the Deep, Long-range Ecology Movement. A Summary," 96.

<sup>5</sup> De Jonge, *Spinoza and Deep Ecology*, 122.

<sup>6</sup> Foreman, *Rewilding North America A Vision For Conservation In The 21st Century*.

praised AIDS as a means of population control. Abbey opposed Hispanic immigration with words that verged on the openly racist and carried implications of anti-Semitism.<sup>7</sup>

## 2.2. Social Ecology

Bookchin, who developed the theory of social ecology, makes the harshest criticisms of deep ecology. According to him, deep ecology fails to link environmental crises with authoritarianism and hierarchy. He defines deep ecology as "a vague, formless, often self-contradictory, and invertebrate thing" and accuses deep ecologists of being "barely disguised racists, survivalists."<sup>8</sup> The main argument of social ecology is that domination and exploitation of nature are related to social domination. However, Bookchin<sup>9</sup> tries to protect humanism and anthropocentrism. He posits that the critical point is changing the way we approach and affect nature and achieving evolution in humans' relations with nature; this is possible only with changing social relations. Engaging with communalism, Bookchin<sup>10</sup> opposes the capitalist system of production and consumption and defends a decentralized and united society where the social relationships and humans' relationship with nature are not based on domination.

Explaining Bookchin's definition and conception of humanity and nature is essential to understand why he uses historical research as a method to understand the relationship between social domination and the domination of nature. For Bookchin,<sup>11</sup> definitions of nature as a scenic view, a person, a caring mother, a mere process that

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<sup>7</sup> Stoll, "Green versus Green," 412.

<sup>8</sup> Bookchin, "Social Ecology versus Deep Ecology," 2.

<sup>9</sup> Bookchin, *Re-Enchanting Humanity*.

<sup>10</sup> Bookchin, *Social Ecology and Communalism*.

<sup>11</sup> Bookchin, *Remaking Society*.

involves repetitive cycles, are not able to see nature's history of natural development that involves the cumulative evolution of inorganic and organic realms of phenomena "toward ever more varied, differentiated, and complex forms and relationships."<sup>12</sup> Humans, who are more intelligent, self-aware, and complex animals, are products of natural evolution, and they are not aliens in the natural world.<sup>13</sup> Therefore, humans are not destined to dominate nature or view themselves as the lords of creation but as part of the natural world as the other animals view themselves.

Bookchin thinks humans differ from 'mere' animals with two unique capacities. First, humans have the capacity to reshape their natural environments consciously.<sup>14</sup> Secondly, humans form societies, as institutionalized communities have developed from the natural world to a social world.<sup>15</sup> Both worlds interact, but there is no relationship of domination between nonhuman animals in nature. Therefore, the notion of domination must have emerged in social history. For Bookchin, humans "did not think of dominating nature until they had already begun to dominate" each other.<sup>16</sup> Thus, social domination is conceptually prior to the domination of nature. Bookchin<sup>17</sup> implements a historical analysis, from early preliterate societies (which he calls 'organic societies') to the modern world, to understand how and why the notion and practice of domination emerged in the social world.

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<sup>12</sup> Bookchin, 36.

<sup>13</sup> Bookchin, 41.

<sup>14</sup> Bookchin, 42.

<sup>15</sup> Bookchin, *The Ecology of Freedom*, 22.

<sup>16</sup> Bookchin, *Remaking Society*, 44.

<sup>17</sup> Bookchin, *The Ecology of Freedom*.



There is no hierarchy or domination in organic societies. Bookchin thinks that this fact can be seen in their languages which do not include words such as equality or freedom "because they are not placed in juxtaposition to the concepts of "inequality" and "unfreedom," these notions lack definability."<sup>18</sup> These societies live in harmony and unity with nature. Nature is not merely a habitat, and they are not a part of nature only; nature is a participant of the community "that advises the community with its omens, secures it with its camouflage, leaves it telltale messages... whispers warnings... nourishes it with a largesse of plants and animals..."<sup>19</sup>

However, even the most egalitarian societies are not homogenous social groups. Nevertheless, the differences between individuals were seen as a unity of diversity, not as hierarchies.<sup>20</sup> Each community member is defined by certain everyday roles, tasks, and responsibilities based on sex and age. These roles have not been structured hierarchically, nor have they had any oppressive practice. The basic division of labor is defined based on sexual differences, "age confers the prestige of experience and wisdom."<sup>21</sup>

Because of human infant's protracted development and dependency, women's capacity to move freely was restricted, and the division of labor assigned hunting tasks to the male and domestic tasks to the female.<sup>22</sup> The division of labor between men and women is determined not because of the hierarchical definition of sexual

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<sup>18</sup> Bookchin, 44.

<sup>19</sup> Bookchin, 47.

<sup>20</sup> Bookchin, 5.

<sup>21</sup> Bookchin, 74.

<sup>22</sup> Bookchin, 77.

differences (nor is women conceived as physically or mentally inferior to men). Since those societies have no sharply-etched distinction between 'home' and 'world,' they have no notions of 'public sphere' and 'private sphere.' Therefore, women's role in those societies is not assigned to dominate them, and the role of men is not assigned to provide privileges to them. The division of labor between men and women complements each other, and it is for the interests of society.

Bookchin thinks that age groups have a crucial role in the emergence and establishment of social power, hierarchical roles, and domination. Elders have weak survival and physical powers, and they depend on the help and support of the community for their survival. They use their knowledge and wisdom and create institutional roles in the social realm to make themselves accepted among the community.<sup>23</sup> Moreover, they approach nature with fear, ambiguity, and hatred because of their difficulty adapting to natural vicissitudes. The superior, privileged and exploitative conception of reason and "the nascent ambiguities of the aged toward nature later give rise to Western "civilization's" mode of repressive reason."<sup>24</sup>

Hence, hierarchy founded on age is not an institutionalized hierarchy; rather, "it is hierarchy in its most nascent form: hierarchy embedded in the matrix of equality."<sup>25</sup> Every member of the community who does not die prematurely will benefit from these privileges and hierarchical positions. On the other hand, the shamans are a strategic figure for social hierarchy, professionalization of power, institutionalization of power, and sharing the privileges of the hierarchical roles and privileges

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<sup>23</sup> Bookchin, 81.

<sup>24</sup> Bookchin, 82.

<sup>25</sup> Bookchin, 83.

unequally. They make "power the privilege of an elect few, a group that only carefully chosen apprentices can hope to enter, not the community as a whole."<sup>26</sup>

They attribute themselves magical powers that can control certain forces of nature and are rewarded for their magical services. However, if their techniques fail, they might be attacked, perhaps killed. They have to form alliances and thus create power centers in the community to protect themselves. Bookchin accuses the shamans of disrupting humans' unity with nature. He states that the shamans explain drought, diseases, floods, locust infestation, and defeat in war as nature's punishment for the community's moral failure.<sup>27</sup> They depict nature as the community's participant, but it is the respected but also feared 'other' of the community. For Bookchin, urban life began with walls that distinguished a sacred space from the natural world.<sup>28</sup>

Bookchin thinks he has adequately proved the historical priority of social domination to the domination of nature and showed that this priority was not merely accidental. Therefore, eliminating social domination is strategically prior to eliminating the domination of nature. Bookchin develops a political theory that aims to liberate humans, called libertarian municipalism.<sup>29</sup> He formulates the political structure of less hierarchical, classless, and stateless societies. He believes that changing our social relationships to a less hierarchical one will eliminate the conditions of domination of nature and encourage a more harmonical relationship with nature.<sup>30</sup>

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<sup>26</sup> Bookchin, 83.

<sup>27</sup> Bookchin, 91.

<sup>28</sup> Bookchin, 92.

<sup>29</sup> Bookchin, *Social Ecology and Communalism*.

<sup>30</sup> Bookchin, *The Ecology of Freedom*, 126.

In the *Ecology of Freedom*, published in 1982, Bookchin makes worthwhile and promising assessments on the repressing role of reason in domination and humans' role in the liberation of nature. Nevertheless, his ideas about rationalism and humanism have become sectarian over the years. In *Remaking Society*, published in 1989, he accuses feminist and ecologist scholars' criticisms of the western rationalist and humanist tradition for attempting "to collapse culture into nature in an orgy of irrationalism, theism, and mysticism, to equate the human with mere animality, or to impose a contrived "natural law" on an obedient human society."<sup>31</sup> In the *Philosophy of Social Ecology* and *Re-Enchanting Humanity*, published in 1990 and 1995, respectively, he seems to be the vigorous advocator of the traditional and hierarchical definition of humans as rational stewards of nature who could manage nature in a way to recover the negative effects of ecological destruction and increase biodiversity. For him, ecological societies should defend humanist and rationalist values.

### 2.3. Ecofeminism

Plumwood accuses Bookchin's interpretation of the social and ecological problems of being reductive and his priority thesis, which claims the historical and strategical priority, of being "the familiar but problematic way of creating a hierarchy of oppressions."<sup>32</sup> According to Plumwood, because Bookchin tries to understand these forms of exploitation by implementing a historical analysis, he could not see that human liberation and the liberation of nature are not separable from each other.<sup>33</sup> His insistence on the defense of rationalist and humanist tradition that upholds the supremacy of reason over nature and humans over nonhumans prevents him from addressing and reconciling various critiques of domination.

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<sup>31</sup> Bookchin, *Remaking Society*, 38–39.

<sup>32</sup> Plumwood, *Feminism and the Mastery of Nature*, 14.

<sup>33</sup> Plumwood, 15.

I also find explaining the social and ecological problems with a historical analysis highly problematic. In addition to agreeing with Plumwood that historical research has the risk of being reductive and overlooking differences in different cultures' social and cultural developments, I also do not think we have enough reason to believe Bookchin's historical explanations. Our knowledge of history is and will always be limited. Even if he is right, his research does not illustrate a clear historical priority between those forms of domination. In fact, what we see is nothing more than a parallel between the emergence and progress of the domination of nature and social domination. Because his historical priority thesis is weak, so is his strategic priority thesis. I do not think we have enough reason to believe that eliminating social domination will lead to the elimination of domination of nature.

Both deep ecology and social ecology appear in an infertile state by following the western thought tradition as they seek an answer to the cause of the problem. Although deep ecologists try to break out of this tradition, their monist approach that affirms the wild nature or the natural order falls into an even more dangerous position which has caused them to take a racist and sexist position, as mentioned above. On the other hand, in arguing that the domination of nature follows from the domination over humans, social ecology misses how extensive and deep-rooted the environmental problems are and finds the solution only in changing the social relations. Moreover, by protecting humanism and rationalism, social ecology stays within the tradition of western thought, which is the primary reason for the problem. Of course, Bookchin's political imagination that aims to liberate humans deserves enough faith and praise. However, by insisting on the defense of humanism and rationalism without settling an account with this tradition, social ecology searches for the solution by standing within the tradition of western thought, which is the root of these problems, and it prevents him from sustaining liberation of humans permanently. As an example, one of the problems of humanism, as I will show in the next chapter, is that 'human' is not only a descriptive term but also a normative concept. The scope of human identity is determined only by those in power. In fact,

as Davies says, "All Humanisms, until now, have been imperial. They speak of the human in the accents and the interests of a class, a sex, a race, a genome. Their embrace suffocates those whom it does not ignore. [. . .] It is almost impossible to think of a crime that has not been committed in the name of humanity."<sup>34</sup>

The great virtue of ecofeminist philosophy is its' capturing the conceptual and logical interconnection between those forms of human domination and the domination of nature, which enable ecofeminists to go beyond finding historical and empirical parallels and similarities between different modes of dominations. Greta Gaard says:

At the root of ecofeminism is the understanding that the many systems of oppression are mutually reinforcing. Building on the socialist feminist insight that racism, classism, and sexism are interconnected, ecofeminists recognized additional similarities between those forms of human oppression and the oppressive structures of speciesism and naturism.<sup>35</sup>

In this discussion, I defend ecofeminist philosophy, which has "worked to show the linkages within the devalued category of the other," while "demonstrating how the association of qualities from one oppressed group with another serves to reinforce their subordination."<sup>36</sup> Gaard says that the dualist structure of colonisation is at the core of western culture, which is the reason for western culture's alienation from and domination of nature. Following Plumwood, she argues that colonial logic and master identity depend on the dualized structure of negation and the conceptualization of otherness.<sup>37</sup> These distinctions appear as a hierarchy of

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<sup>34</sup> Braidotti, *The Posthuman*, 15.

<sup>35</sup> Gaard, "Toward a Queer Ecofeminism," 114.

<sup>36</sup> Gaard, 116.

<sup>37</sup> Gaard, 116.

superiority-inferiority, as the subject's superiority is established on its negation of the other's differences, and this superiority justifies oppression.

In this thesis, I will use the two ecofeminist positions articulated by Karen Warren and Val Plumwood since they both extend the scope of ecofeminism by including racial modes of oppression in their criticism. After analyzing their philosophical grounds, introducing fundamental concepts they developed, and approaching social and environmental problems, I show how I will relate their works in this thesis.

### **2.3.1. Karen Warren's Ecofeminist Philosophy**

Warren characterizes her version of ecofeminist philosophy "as being concerned with conceptual analysis and argumentative proof about women-other human Others-nature interconnections."<sup>38</sup> To understand the conceptual interconnections between different forms of oppression, she offers an analysis of the conceptual framework that functions to "maintain, perpetuate, and "justify" the dominations of women, other subordinated humans, and nonhuman nature." She defines 'a conceptual framework' as:

a set of basic beliefs, values, attitudes, and assumptions which shape and reflect how one views oneself and one's world. A conceptual framework functions as a socially constructed lens through which one perceives reality. It is affected and shaped by such factors as sex-gender, race/ethnicity, class, age, affectional orientation, marital status, religion, nationality, colonial influences, and culture.

Some conceptual frameworks are oppressive. An oppressive conceptual framework is one that functions to explain, maintain, and "justify" relationships of unjustified domination and subordination. When an oppressive conceptual framework is patriarchal, it functions to justify the subordination of women by men.<sup>39</sup>

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<sup>38</sup> Warren, *Ecofeminist Philosophy*, 46.

<sup>39</sup> Warren, 46.

She defines five common features of oppressive conceptual frameworks (which I call oppressive subjectivities). The first is *value-hierarchical thinking*, which transforms the difference between subjects into an Up-Down hierarchy by attributing greater value to that which is higher than to that which is lower. The second is *oppositional value dualism*, which emphasizes the differences between subjects, ignores their commonalities, and radicalizes the Up-Down relationship by conceiving subjects as exclusive and oppositional within a dichotomy. The third characteristic is conceiving power as "power-over," as the power of Ups over Downs. Power, in oppressive conceptual frameworks, is used to maintain the Up-Down hierarchy. The fourth is creating and maintaining privileges that systematically advantage those in the Upper position.<sup>40</sup>

These four conditions do not necessarily make a conceptual framework oppressive, as there are non-oppressive relationships that include each of them (e.g., parent-infant relationship). The fifth feature, the logic of domination that assumes superiority, justifies subordination (domination, enslaving), and makes a conceptual framework inevitably oppressive. However, she defines the logic of domination as "a structure of argumentation which leads to a justification of subordination," and says it "is not just a logical structure. It also involves a substantive value system, since an ethical premise is needed to permit or sanction the "just" subordination of that which is subordinate. This justification typically is given on grounds of some alleged characteristic (e.g., rationality) which the dominant (e.g., men) have and the subordinate (e.g., women) lack."<sup>41</sup>

She claims that the logic of domination is the key concept to understand the nature of oppression and oppressive conceptual frameworks, the link between different forms

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<sup>40</sup> Warren, 46–47.

<sup>41</sup> Warren, *Ecofeminist Philosophy*.



of oppression, and to develop strategies to fight against oppression.<sup>42</sup> Without the logic of domination, diversity would be just diversity. The logic of domination transforms differences between subjects (e.g., gender differences) into moral distinction, superiority (e.g., rationality) into moral superiority, and diversity into justified domination. However, while Warren's analysis lays the groundwork for (or inspires) much of ecofeminist analysis, it can be criticized as being too simplistic. The problem of oppression is more complex than it seems at first glance, and it cannot be reduced to any single concept. Before explaining why I find Warren's approach problematic and the way I will use the logic of domination in this thesis, I will show why I agree with Warren in that the logic of domination is explanatorily basic to oppression and oppressive subjectivities.

Warren rightly points out that the logic of domination is a particular metaphysical and moral commitment; it is a conditional, subjective interpretation of reality, but questioning the legitimacy and role of the logic of domination has been overlooked and taken for granted by many philosophers. As an example, Peter Singer does not question the legitimacy of excluding animals from the realm of morality because of their inferiority; instead, he aims to show that "any such set of characteristics which covers all humans will not be possessed only by humans" that makes all humans superior to animals.<sup>43</sup> In other words, he contends that there is no such set of characteristics that makes the defense of equality of all humans consistent with the defense of animals' inferiority. However, he fails to question whether superiority, even moral superiority, by itself, inherently legitimizes oppression. If we can find such a set of characteristics, it seems, there would be no moral problem of oppression of animals for Singer. However, the problem of oppression should not be considered a mere consistency problem. As we will see in this chapter, the epistemology or logic of oppression is full of paradoxes, but it is protected by several strategies, which also

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<sup>42</sup> Warren, 48.

<sup>43</sup> Singer, "All Animals Are Equal," 111.

include paradoxes. Besides, it is not enough to argue against an idea that assumes one group's superiority to another; it is always possible to find a superior feature of, let us say, men over women, white over nonwhite, human over nonhuman, and vice versa. Hence, it is essential to question the legitimacy (or value) of the idea that superiority justifies oppression. As Warren says, "in fact one could argue that such moral superiority imposes on humans' extraordinary responsibilities toward (rather than unjustified domination over) others less capable." <sup>44</sup>

In the fifth chapter where I will discuss the link between oppression human-others and oppression of nature through contract theories, and I will try to extend Pateman's theory, the Sexual Contract,<sup>45</sup> which explains how the patriarchal system of societies are created and justified, to the oppression of nature. Pateman does not approve such an attempt: "One difficulty is that hypothetical contracts preclude the possibility that parties may refuse to enter them. That is to say, the basic criterion for the existence of a genuine practice of contract is lacking. A major problem with arguments about contracts with animals is that humans, but not animals, can (potentially) engage in such refusals."<sup>46</sup> (At least) Pateman seems to be right in her idea that there is an essential difference between the oppression of women and the oppression of animals. Warren made a distinction between oppression and domination. Oppression establishes institutional structures, strategies, and processes to limit the choices and options of some groups. Domination aims to protect a hierarchy between Ups and Downs and privileges of Ups over Downs. "All oppression involves domination ... but not all domination involves oppression."<sup>47</sup> For example, in a relationship of

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<sup>44</sup> Warren, *Ecofeminist Philosophy*, 49.

<sup>45</sup> Pateman, *The Sexual Contract*.

<sup>46</sup> Pateman, "The Sexual Contract and the Animals," 72.

<sup>47</sup> Warren, *Ecofeminist Philosophy*, 55.

oppression, the oppressor forces the oppressed to adopt the subjectivity he produces by using physical and ideological violence to secure the oppressive system of societies and maintain and reproduce oppression. On the other hand, in a relationship of domination, the oppressor is not interested in the perspective of the other. Since most nonhuman nature do not have options and cannot make choices, they cannot be oppressed but dominated. Hence, as Warren thinks, despite the essential differences between oppression and domination and different forms of oppression, the logic of domination enables us to analyze and understand them together since all forms of oppression and domination include the logic of domination. Hence, I will use the term oppression that covers both humans and nonhumans for the sake of the consistency of the conceptual framework of this thesis.

Showing the role the logic of domination plays in oppressive subjectivity, Warren states that "all feminists (including ecofeminists) must oppose at least the logic of domination" and strategies against oppression should include rejecting the logic of domination.<sup>48</sup> However, although I also think that the logic of domination is the common condition of all modes of oppression, once we begin questioning the legitimacy of the logic of domination, we will see that the problem is not as simple as it seems at first glance. As we will see in the fourth chapter, philosophers have many 'rational' and 'logical' explanations and justifications of domination based on superiority, which always demands a particular way of thinking, which I call dualist thinking, that construes diversity hierarchically, oppositionally, and exclusively. Warren says, the "problem is not simply that value-hierarchical thinking and value dualisms are used, but the way in which each has been used in oppressive conceptual frameworks to establish inferiority and to justify subordination. It is the logic of domination, coupled with value-hierarchical thinking and value dualisms, which 'justifies' subordination."<sup>49</sup> However, she does not analyze dualist thinking (or value

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<sup>48</sup> Warren, "The Power and the Promise of Ecological Feminism," 131.

<sup>49</sup> Warren, 128–29.

dualism as she calls it) deeply enough to reveal its' relationship with the logic of domination. Once we take a closer look at how the logic of domination functions in an oppressive subjectivity, we will see that, the first thing the oppressor has to do in order to justify oppression is to justify his superiority and the other's inferiority, which will be possible only through construing diversity hierarchically, asymmetrically, and exclusively. In an oppressive subjectivity, the logic of domination demands dualist thinking that creates, maintains, and justifies the superiority of the oppressor to create, maintain, and justify oppression.

### **2.3.2. Val Plumwood's Ecofeminist Philosophy**

While Warren thinks that the logic of domination is what links different forms of oppression, Plumwood contends that the logical structure of dualism, which is a way of construing diversity in terms of the logic of hierarchy, "forms a major basis for the connection between forms of oppression."<sup>50</sup> For Warren, the logic of domination should be rejected by all feminists and ecofeminists, while Plumwood emphasizes the importance of developing a pluralist paradigm that affirms diversity. The concept of dualism has been criticized by many feminist and decolonial thinkers, "yet is usually vaguely articulated."<sup>51</sup> Plumwood states that analyzing the logical structure of dualism in a more connected and complete way provides a deeper understanding of the nature of oppression and the interconnection between different forms of oppression by respecting their differences without attempting reduction.<sup>52</sup> Plumwood defines dualism as follows:

A dualism is an intense, established and developed cultural expression of such a hierarchical relationship, constructing central cultural concepts and identities so as to make equality and mutuality literally unthinkable. Dualism

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<sup>50</sup> Plumwood, *Feminism and the Mastery of Nature*, 3.

<sup>51</sup> Plumwood, 2.

<sup>52</sup> Plumwood, "Ecofeminism as a General Theory of Oppression," 225.

is a relation of separation and domination inscribed and naturalized in culture and characterized by radical exclusion, distancing and opposition between orders construed as systematically higher and lower, as inferior and superior, ruler and ruled, center and periphery. It treats the division as part of the natures of beings construed as not merely different but as belonging to radically different orders or kinds, and hence as not open to change.<sup>53</sup>

She identifies five characteristics of the logical structure of dualism: backgrounding (denial), radical exclusion (hyperseparation), incorporation (relational definition), instrumentalism (objectification), homogenisation (stereotyping).<sup>54</sup> The oppressor denies his dependency on the other, obscures or denies the other's contribution in culture and economic relation and denies the other's worth or views it as not worth noticing. Through radical exclusion, which is the key indicator of dualism as Plumwood contends, the oppressor denies or minimizes his similarity with the other and aims to maximize their differences to prevent sympathy between those groups of oppression and sustain the justification of his superiority. Third, the oppressor defines the other only in relation to the oppressor's superior identity. He conceives his identity as ideal and difference from his identity as a lack or deficiency. Fourthly, the oppressor conceives the other only in relation to his needs and desires, as a means to his ends. Lastly, the oppressor disregards the differences among the oppressed groups, and he conceives the other as homogenized to confirm and support his dualist way of thinking.

Plumwood has succeeded to go beyond claiming and introducing historical, empirical, or cultural parallels between forms of oppression, and shows that the "connections between these forms of domination in the west are thus partly the result of chance and of specific historical evolution, and partly formed from a necessity inherent in the dynamic and logic of domination between self and other, reason and

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<sup>53</sup> Plumwood, *Environmental Culture*, 19.

<sup>54</sup> Plumwood, "Nature, Self, and Gender"; Plumwood, "Androcentrism and Anthrocentrism"; Plumwood, *Environmental Culture*; Plumwood, *Feminism and the Mastery of Nature*.

nature."<sup>55</sup> She strengthens her theory of the conceptual interconnection between different modes of oppression provided by her brilliant analysis of the logical structure of dualism, by showing that (at least in western societies) reason/nature dualism has a key role for the "constant reassurance of superiority and hence constant reassertion of hierarchy" of identities' dualist construction."<sup>56</sup> Warren also says, while explaining the logic of domination, that "this justification typically is given on grounds of some alleged characteristic (e.g., rationality) which the dominant (e.g., men) have and the subordinate (e.g., women) lack";<sup>57</sup> however, she does not present a detailed investigation of the role of reason/nature and other dualist pairs in the oppressive subjectivity. In fact, many decolonial, feminist, and environmental thinkers assert that, in Western societies, inequality and inferiority of oppressed groups (women, Jewish, enslaved people, people of color etc.) are explained and justified by identifying the oppressed with nature and the realm of the physical, and the oppressor with culture and the realm of the mental. Many philosophers have criticized the dualism and binary thinking in the western thought tradition. It is Plumwood who maintains both the philosophical analysis of dualist thinking and the critique of the role of reason/nature dualism in Western thought; and connects them to show the interconnection between forms of oppression, and how the reason/nature dualism provides the systematical production and reproduction of oppression and the interconnections between different modes of oppression.

One may ask if there is any difference between Bookchin's historical analysis that explains the historical priority of domination of humans and Plumwood's analysis of the history of philosophy that shows the interconnection between forms of oppressions. I believe that there are necessary conditions for a philosophical idea to

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<sup>55</sup> Plumwood, *Feminism and the Mastery of Nature*, 4.

<sup>56</sup> Plumwood, 51.

<sup>57</sup> Warren, "The Power and the Promise of Ecological Feminism," 47.

be the dominant paradigm of society. The fundamental reason Western societies approve of philosophers, such as Plato, Aristotle, and Descartes, is that their ideas are compatible with the core values of those societies. In other words, these philosophers not only affected western society but also reflected the values of their societies. Therefore, I believe that analyzing the major figures of western philosophy provides us with more coherent and reliable ideas to understand the interconnection between and the roots of the social and ecological problems. This idea will be clarified at the beginning of the fourth chapter where I will introduce the Valladolid Debate.

## CHAPTER 3

### THE CRITIQUE OF OPPRESSIVE SUBJECTIVITY AND THE KEY ROLE OF THE OPPRESSION OF NATURE IN THE WESTERN TRADITION

In this chapter, by constructing a bridge between the works of these two philosophers, I will develop a concept that I will call 'oppressive subjectivity.' Oppressive subjectivity, I shall argue, includes the logic of domination as a moral assumption, and dualist thinking as an epistemological and aesthetic perspective. I think these two concepts complement each other, and Warren and Plumwood should be read together to understand the nature of oppression and the interconnection between different modes of oppression. The oppressor has a moral assumption that "superiority justifies subordination." However, the oppressor needs to justify his superiority to justify subordination. It is dualist thinking that justifies the superiority of the oppressor by construing diversity in terms of the logic of hierarchy.

For the definition of oppressive subjectivity, I interpret Barış Ünlü's definition of 'Turkishness,' and Karen Warren's definition of 'oppressive conceptual framework.' I define subjectivity as a particular way of thinking, feeling, conceiving, perceiving that reflects and shapes how one views oneself and others and their social, moral, or political values.<sup>58</sup> A subjectivity reflects and shapes one's epistemology, morality, and political values. Some subjectivities are oppressive. An oppressive subjectivity "is one that functions to create, maintain, and justify oppression."<sup>59</sup>

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<sup>58</sup> Ünlü, *Türklük sözleşmesi*, 7.

<sup>59</sup> Warren, *Ecofeminist Philosophy*, 46.



While I benefit from Warren's analysis of 'oppressive conceptual frameworks,' I prefer to use the concept of "oppressive subjectivity" as the central concept of this chapter because I think that Warren's analysis of oppressive conceptual frameworks reduces oppression to a merely logical, or epistemological issue, and overlooks the role of desire in oppression. Subjectivity, as I will try to show, is not only a way of thinking but also a way of feeling; it codes desire in a particular way, but both Warren and Plumwood underestimated the role of desire in oppression. Plumwood rarely mentions how oppression affects the desire of the oppressor; however, oppression provides not only material benefits for oppressors, but the superiority feelings also provide effectual seduction. Nevertheless, she does not give enough weight to the role of desire in oppression. Dualism works not only to sustain the legitimacy of or justification of oppression but also provides necessary motivation for oppression by coding the desire of the oppressor in a particular way. This role of dualist thinking will be apparent in the last pages of this chapter, where I will be discussing the role of dehumanization in mass violence and genocides.

Plumwood makes a brilliant philosophical analysis of the logical structure of dualism in her texts, and she successfully explains the perspective, the point of view of the oppressor; however, she brings dualism into play too hastily, which sometimes makes her discussion ambiguous and challenging, and it prevents the reader from understanding the differences between diversity, dichotomy, dualism, and the defining characteristics of dualist thinking. I hope to tackle these difficulties by making a distinction between image and identity. After defining the concepts of image and identity, and the differences between them, I will explain the steps to form dualist thinking. I define three common characteristics of dualist thinking: conceiving of the other hierarchically, oppositionally, and exclusively. Dualist thinking includes dualist image and desire production concerning identities of oppressor and oppressed.

Neither Plumwood nor Warren explains the oppressor's metaphysical and epistemological power that enables creating a dualist reality and its transformative power that associates human-others with animals and nonhuman nature. There are also necessary conditions that create, maintain, and justify the logic of domination and dualist thinking. Using decolonial scholars' works,<sup>60</sup> I will introduce three concepts: coloniality of power, being, and knowledge. Examining oppressive subjectivity with these concepts will afford us a deeper understanding of the nature of oppression and how different modes of oppression are linked to each other.

It is impossible to claim to have the last word in the discussion on oppression; studying and examining it is an endless project. I have nothing to object to Plumwood, and my aim is nothing more than contributing to her philosophy.

### **3.1. Image and Identity**

Homi Bhabha points out a distinction between image and identity. He writes: "Finally, the question of identification is never the affirmation of a pre-given identity, never a self-fulfilling prophecy – it is always the production of an image of identity and the transformation of the subject in assuming that image."<sup>61</sup> I will not follow Bhabha's discussion on identity and image; however, I find his explanation of identification through pre-given identity and production of image concerning identity precious for the aim of this thesis. Proceeding from this quotation, I will make a distinction between identity and image, and I will explain the identification process of oppressor and oppressed.

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<sup>60</sup> Dussel, "Eurocentrism and Modernity (Introduction to the Frankfurt Lectures)"; Maldonado-Torres, "On the Coloniality of Being"; Wynter, "Unsettling the Coloniality of Being/Power/Truth/Freedom"; Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*.

<sup>61</sup> Bhabha, *The Location of Culture*, 43.

I suggest defining identity as primarily a virtual and pre-given set of data that finds the possibility of actualization by recognizing biological, geographic, or socioeconomic differences. The assignment of identity, that is, its actualization, requires an encounter with someone else, who is the Other, making it possible to realize these differences. For example, a tribe living in a particular region in their own way, having their own rituals, traditions, and language, acquires an *identity* as a result of encountering the Other, realizing that the tradition and language they have are their differences. On the other hand, the *image* is an attribution of a qualitative value (basically, superior and inferior values) to identities. The condition of producing images is a subjective and conditional interpretation of identity, and its' production requires something more than the mediation between the I and the Other.

I suggest that this distinction between identity and image is significantly helpful for feminist philosophy, decolonial philosophy, and environmental philosophy. With this distinction, it becomes much more precise and more straightforward to formulate the problems and issues discussed in oppression studies. It is possible to list the importance of this distinction as follows: Firstly, identity (male/female, white/black, human/animal) is presented as a pre-given, objective, and neutral data, or noun and has no qualitative value; on the other hand, image (good/evil, moral/immoral, beautiful/ugly, rational/irrational, civilized/uncivilized), relays a subjective, conditional qualitative value. An image can be ethical, epistemological, political, or aesthetic, but images include multiple values in most cases. Thus, in a relationship of oppression, identity is not the concept directly targeted by the oppressor. The oppressor attacks the identity always with the mediation of the image. For example, the oppressor utters "Negro" as he implicitly attributes inferiority to being Black. Secondly, identity is fixed data, while the image is dynamic and conditional value. The history of two subjects can be read through the movement of images they attribute to each other. In identity politics, the oppressed try not to change their identity but to change their image produced by the oppressor. Thirdly, identity cannot legitimize the oppressor's persecution, domination, and exploitation either in

his own or the Other's eyes; legitimizing the oppression is possible only with the production of asymmetric images. Lastly, identity does not explain the question of desire in oppression; image, on the other hand, is always and directly related to desire since it determines and encodes the desires of subjects in a way to admire or disgust identities.

An image can carry an ethical (immoral), aesthetic (ugly), epistemological (irrational), or political (uncivilized) value. Nevertheless, these values cannot be separated from each other; they feed, justify, and engender each other, and most of the time, an image includes multiple values. For example, the image of the oppressed as uncivilized may be considered a merely political value, but an uncivilized person will also be judged as disgusting, immoral, and irrational. Hence, in a relationship of oppression, specific values may step forward depending on the current conditions of this relationship. For example, an image of the uncivilized, as a political value, may come into prominence to detach the oppressor from nature. In contrast, as a moral value, the immoral image may step forward in justifying the oppression.

### **3.2. Hierarchical Thinking**

The first defining characteristic of oppressive subjectivity is hierarchical thinking, hierarchical image, and desire production. Since the logic of domination, which assumes superiority justifies oppression,<sup>62</sup> is the primary moral assumption of the oppressor, the oppressor has to justify his superiority to justify subordination which demands his subjectivity to construe diversity hierarchically.

The fundamental premise of oppressive subjectivity is that superiority justifies subordination. To justify oppression, the first thing the oppressor has to do is justify his superiority. In relationships of domination, the oppressor dominates the other depending on their identities. What makes the oppressor superior to the other is his identity (a man is superior to a woman because of his male identity). Nevertheless,

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<sup>62</sup> Warren, *Ecofeminist Philosophy*, 47.

identity is non-qualitative data, and it does not have any value that can make an identity superior to another. An identity may obtain a value by means of the attribution of an image that expresses a subjective and conditional qualitative value. It is hierarchical image production, attributing images to the oppressor's identity, which is superior to the images attributed to the oppressed's identity, that provides the legitimacy of the oppression by sustaining the superiority of the oppressor's identity.

The oppressive subjectivity transforms diversity into a hierarchy; "when, in fact, prior to the metaphor of Up-Down one would have said only that there existed diversity."<sup>63</sup> An image can hold a moral, ontological, political, or aesthetic value. By attributing superior images to his identity, the oppressor claims his moral, political, ontological, or aesthetic superiority that justifies his oppression: "The basic legitimation of conquest over native peoples is the conviction of our superiority, not merely our mechanical, economic, and military superiority, but our moral superiority."<sup>64</sup>

Image production always accompanies desire production. Hierarchical thinking produces desire hierarchically; that is, it encodes the desire of the oppressor in a way to make him admire his identity. Hierarchical desire production provides an effectual seduction from the oppressor's superior identity. Memmi observes the colonialist who does not want to go back to their country after savoring the seduction of superiority: "If he should go home, it would lose its sublime nature, and he cease to be a superior man. Although he is everything in the colony, the colonialist knows that in his own country he would be nothing; he would go back to being a mediocre man."<sup>65</sup>

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<sup>63</sup> Warren, 46.

<sup>64</sup> Mills, *Racial Contract*, 25.

<sup>65</sup> Memmi, *The Colonizer and the Colonized*, 104.

### 3.3. Asymmetrical Thinking

The second defining characteristic of oppressive subjectivity is asymmetrical thinking, asymmetrical image and desire production. The oppressive subjectivity construes identities both hierarchically and oppositionally. In oppressive subjectivity, hierarchical thinking demands asymmetrical thinking to justify oppression.

In an oppression relationship, the superior locus is generated through the mediation of the inferior locus. The reference to the superior locus of the oppressor is the inferior locus of the oppressed; as Edward Said says, "the secondariness is, paradoxically, essential to the primariness of the European."<sup>66</sup> The oppressor confirms his superiority by producing superior images for his identity through the mediation of attributing inferior images to the oppressed's identity. This logic of the oppressor affirming himself in the mediation of the negation of the Other ("You are evil; I am the opposite of what you are; therefore I am good"<sup>67</sup> is a slave mentality in the Deleuzian sense, while Yancy will call it a reactive value production.<sup>68</sup> In this mediation, the oppressor, whose superiority depends on the Other's inferiority, defines himself "by the reference to what one is not. Who are we? We are the nonsavages."<sup>69</sup>

The fundamental premise of oppressive subjectivity is that superiority justifies subordination. For oppressive subjectivity, hierarchical thinking inherently includes asymmetrical thinking because the oppressor claims his superiority in the mediation of the inferiority of the oppressed. Furthermore, to justify subordination, justifying

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<sup>66</sup> Said, *Culture and Imperialism*, 59.

<sup>67</sup> Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, 122.

<sup>68</sup> Yancy, "Colonial Gazing," 2.

<sup>69</sup> Mills, *Racial Contract*, 43.

the superiority of the oppressor falls short of justifying oppression, and claiming and emphasizing the inferiority, immorality, irrationality of the oppressed is vital. This necessity is expressed by Memmi as follows:

How? How can usurpation try to pass for legitimacy? One attempt can be made by demonstrating the usurper's eminent merits, so eminent that they deserve such compensation. Another is to harp on the usurped's demerits, so deep that they cannot help leading to misfortune. His disquiet and resulting thirst for justification require the usurper to extol himself to the skies and to drive the usurped below the ground at the same time. In effect, these two attempts at legitimacy are actually inseparable.<sup>70</sup>

Besides the inseparability of producing superior images for the oppressor's identity and inferior images for the oppressed's identity, encoding the desire of the oppressor in a way to admire his identity always demands disgust with the identity of the oppressed. Since image and desire production are inseparable, asymmetrical image production comes with asymmetrical desire production. Hence, the admiration of the identity of the oppressor depends on his disgust for the identity of the oppressed. Yancy quotes, "It is clear, then, in a wickedly ironic way, that perhaps the world would have been more just if their identity [whiteness] had not emerged since their identity is fundamentally conditioned by hating mine. And why should anyone continue to defend any identity that is premised upon being the primary agent of hate?"<sup>71</sup> The asymmetrical desire production is essential to motivate oppression and prevent any remorse the oppressor may feel, which I will explain in detail in the coming pages.

Making a distinction between image and identity thus enables us to distinguish oppressive relationships from non-oppressive ones. The condition of actualization of identity is recognizing one's difference in an encounter with the other. There are

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<sup>70</sup> Memmi, *The Colonizer and the Colonized*, 96–97.

<sup>71</sup> Yancy, *What White Looks Like*, 133.

countless differences between any two subjects and countless virtual identities which have not been actualized yet. To recognize the other is to recognize someone who has at least one difference from me. In an encounter between two subjects, recognizing differences means that actualizing at least one identity is inevitable. Consequently, no subject, including those belonging to the privileged group, is exempt from the actualization of an identity.

Hierarchical relationships are part of our lives and most modern societies. A commander has a hierarchical superiority over a soldier. What provides him superior locus is not his identity but his individual successes. On the other hand, a man may claim his superiority or may have a superior locus over a woman, but his superiority depends on his pre-given, male identity. The oppressive subjectivity creates, maintains, and justifies domination depending on hierarchically interpreting biological, geographical, and cultural differences.

One might even attribute a positive or negative value to their identity, but this would still not be the condition that distinguishes the non-oppressor from the oppressor since each encounter entails an affection. It is almost impossible to be indifferent to a difference. A world in which all individuals attribute only positive images would be just a utopia. A subject may admire his identity; to admire one's identity does not always necessitate being disgusted with the others' identity.

One may also disgust the other's identity, but it may not motivate him for oppression. Besides, we may regard a white's displeasure of the black identity as oppressive; however, that would also mean that a black's displeasure of the white identity is necessarily oppressive. The oppressed groups may hate the oppressor's identities but hating the oppressor is not necessary to maintain their relationship. Nevertheless, the oppressor's disgust for the other is necessary for providing motivation and moral clarity.



In the actualization of identity, negation plays an ordinary and necessary role in any two subjects' encounter. Nevertheless, an asymmetry is not essential for image production; this contrast distinguishes the relationship of oppression from other relationships. In other words, this contrast is the primary determinant of the oppressor subject's production of the image and the coding of his desire. The oppressor's production of the superior image concerning himself is conditioned in the Other's inferior image, whose admiration for his identity is conditioned by the hatred against the Other.

### **3.4. Dualist Thinking**

The third defining characteristic of the oppressive subjectivity is dualist thinking: dualist image and desire production. Dualist thinking construes diversity vertically, oppositionally, and exclusively. The self and the other represent two vertical, oppositional, exclusive, and homogenized modes of beings. Oppressive subjectivity negates differences and transforms and reduces diversity into dualism. It is the ultimate strategy of the oppressive subjectivity to explain and justify domination, which includes multiple strategies to provide the certainty of the justification of the oppression. During this discussion, I will mainly benefit from Plumwood's works, which regard dualism as the central concept that explains oppressive subjectivity's logic and structure.

The oppressive subjectivity always conceives the other, and interests, needs, and desires of the other exclusively, rather than inclusively. What makes the oppressor able to dominate the other is the other's being excluded from his self and having differences from him. A mother exercises power over her baby and determines and limits her baby's acts. Because of infants' epistemological and moral inferiority, indeed, parents subordinate their infants. Hence, their subordination serves the interests of infants. They do not regard infants, and their interests, happiness exclusively from their happiness and interests. On the other hand, in relationships of

oppression, the oppressor dominates the other for their own sake and instrumentalizes the other for their own interests, needs, and desires.

For the certainty of the justification of oppression, dualist thinking has to achieve radical exclusion between the oppressor and the oppressed. Alongside their differences, there are inevitably commonalities between any two subjects. The commonalities between the oppressor and the oppressed cause a crisis and a conflict in the oppressive subjectivity. Since the oppressed "is never considered in a positive light, or if he is, the quality which is conceded is the result of a psychological or ethical failing."<sup>72</sup> the oppressor cannot affirm their commonalities because it will mean affirming the oppressed and may cause a sympathy with the oppressed. The oppressor cannot negate their commonalities because this will also mean negating himself and harming his superior identity. There is only one way out of the oppressor's conflict; ignoring and eliminating these commonalities and treating them as inessential shared qualities, hence achieving radical exclusion. The asymmetry between the images of I and the other is transformed into a dualism between two modes of being, which have nothing in common. "'I am nothing at all like this inferior other' is the motto" associated with dualist thinking.<sup>73</sup>

According to Plumwood, radical exclusion is a key indicator of dualism, and she continues: "A major aim of dualistic construction is polarisation, to maximise distance or separation between the dualised spheres and to prevent their being seen as continuous or contiguous. Separation may be established by denying or minimising overlap qualities and activities, and by the erection of rigid barriers to prevent contact."<sup>74</sup> In this sense, dualist thinking can be present in denying or minimizing

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<sup>72</sup> Memmi, *The Colonizer and the Colonized*, 127–28.

<sup>73</sup> Plumwood, *Feminism and the Mastery of Nature*, 49.

<sup>74</sup> Plumwood, 50.

commonalities between the oppressor and the oppressed. All modes and domination demand exclusion from the other, but denying all commonalities and overlap qualities is not the necessity of all modes of domination. I will discuss the different consequences and conditions that necessitate denying and minimizing commonalities in the coming pages. For now, it will be enough to state that the oppressive subjectivity always aims to ignore and overlook the commonalities and reach exclusion as radical as possible. The degree of exclusion and the distance from the other is determined depending on the needs of the oppression.

Plumwood says that "dualism can be seen as an alienated form of differentiation, in which power construes and constructs difference in terms of an inferior and alien realm."<sup>75</sup> By eliminating the commonalities and emphasizing the differences, the oppressor transforms the differences in the degree to differences in nature. By attributing dualist images concerning their identities, the difference between the self and the other, their identities are transformed into two different worlds, modes of being in which there is nothing in common.

Dualist thinking "treats the division as part of the natures of beings construed as not merely different but as belonging to radically different orders or kinds, and hence as not open to change."<sup>76</sup> A mother is superior to her baby, but the inferiority of the baby is not conceived as the baby's nature. However, "The woman is set apart as having a different nature, is seen as part of a different, lower order of being, lesser or lacking in reason,"<sup>77</sup> while men claim their superiority to women based on their male identity; and their superiority is conceived as belonging to their nature. In other words, the oppressor's identity, which was only his difference from the other, became his nature.

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<sup>75</sup> Plumwood, "The Politics of Reason," 19.

<sup>76</sup> Plumwood, 29.

<sup>77</sup> Plumwood, "Androcentrism and Anthrocentrism," 134.

His superior identity justifies his superiority and domination; the oppressor is superior to the oppressed, morally permitted to dominate the other by his nature. Dualist thinking inscribes the inferiority of the oppressed and the legitimacy of oppression into the identity and nature of the oppressed. "'Killability' and 'rapeability' are part of their essence understood in a phenomenological way."<sup>78</sup>

Dualist thinking includes and demands homogenization which is a part of the logical and epistemological strategies for justifying subordination. The oppressive subjectivity creates, maintains, and justifies domination depending on the oppressed's particular identity (or identities). For example, a white man dominates a black woman depending on the sexual and racial identities of the oppressed. Since each person has countless differences and thus countless identities, there are other differences and identities of the oppressed which the oppressor does not target. The oppressor not only eliminates their commonalities with the oppressed, but he also melts the other differences and identities of the oppressed in the identity which he targets. This strategy of oppressive subjectivity is called 'homogenization' by Plumwood:

To the master, residing at what he takes to be the centre, differences among those of lesser status at the periphery are of little interest or importance, and might undermine comfortable stereotypes of superiority. To the master, all the rest are just that: 'the rest', the Others, the background to his achievements and the resources for his needs. Diversity and multiplicity which are surplus to his desires need not be acknowledged. The other is not seen as a unique individual bound to the self by specific ties. It is related to as a universal rather than a particular, as a member of a class of interchangeable items which can be used as resources to satisfy the master's needs.<sup>79</sup>

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<sup>78</sup> Maldonado-Torres, "On the Coloniality of Being," 255.

<sup>79</sup> Plumwood, *Feminism and the Mastery of Nature*, 54.

The oppressor conceives the oppressed groups as homogenised because he defines the other only in relation to his needs and desires.<sup>80</sup> Because the other is defined and perceived in relation to the master, he or she is not encountered fully as an independent other, and the qualities attributed to or perceived are those which reflect the master's desires, needs and lacks."<sup>81</sup> He does not need to see anything other than the inferior identity of the oppressed, but he also should not see anything other than the inferior identity of the oppressed. Homogenisation is an inevitable outcome of oppressive subjectivity, but it is also necessary to the certainty of the justification of oppression. Because, for the oppressive subjectivity, the other is judged only in terms of their availability for oppression; the oppressor pretends to not to see differences among oppressed groups but perceive only inferiorized identity of the oppressed. "The dominated class must appear suitably homogeneous if it is to be able to conform to and confirm its 'nature.'"<sup>82</sup>

Dualist thinking includes dualist image and desire production. The oppressive subjectivity encodes the desire of the oppressor dualistically. The oppressor defines himself completely and ultimately with his superior identity by investing his entire desire in a pre-given identity through the image he produced. Deleuze and Guattari will call this investment of desire a reactionary or fascist libidinal investment.<sup>83</sup> For the question of "who are you?" the oppressor

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<sup>80</sup> Plumwood, 52.

<sup>81</sup> Plumwood, 52.

<sup>82</sup> Plumwood, 53.

<sup>83</sup> "We define the reactionary unconscious investment as the investment that conforms to the interest of the dominant class, but operates on its own account, according to the terms of desire, through the segregative use of the conjunctive syntheses from which Oedipus is derived: I am of the superior race" (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 105).

answers with his 'paranoiac formula,' 'I am one of your kind, from the same place as you, I am a pure Aryan, of a superior race for all time.'<sup>84</sup>

He finds his power in his superior image, in the representation of his power, but independently of his individual power and capacity to act. For this reason, ignoring one's own individual power, finding his power only in his image, and investing his entire desire in his image will provide him with an effectual seduction. As Beauvoir states: "One of the benefits that oppression confers upon the oppressors is that the most humble among them is made to feel superior; [...] the most mediocre of males feels himself a demigod as compared with women."<sup>85</sup>

Dualist image and desire production provide seduction for the oppressor and provide him motivation to overcome his guilt for his cruel deeds. The oppressor invests his entire desire in his superior image and defines himself only with his superior identity and invests his entire disgust in the inferior image of the oppressed and defines the oppressed only with his inferior identity. This way of conceiving the oppressed provides the moral legitimacy of the violence inflicted on the oppressed, motivating cruel acts. Salecl quotes from Australian training instruction pamphlet: "The enemy in the game, we the hunters. The Jap is a barbarian, little better than an animal, in fact, his actions are those of a wild beast, and he must, therefore, be dealt with accordingly." She states: "This training tried to incite the subject's inner aggression and to control his anxiety and guilt" and prevents any remorse the oppressor may feel.<sup>86</sup>

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<sup>84</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, 340.

<sup>85</sup> Beauvoir, *The Second Sex*, 23.

<sup>86</sup> Salecl, *On Anxiety*, 21.

### 3.5. Oppressor's Colonial Self

Oppressive relationships have three common features: hierarchy, privilege, and power-over. The oppressor obtains a superior locus, and exercising power over the oppressed, obtains economic, political, and social privileges. Subjectivity is a particular way of seeing, hearing, and knowing but some subjectivities are oppressive. Oppressive subjectivity functions to create, maintain and justify a relationship of oppression. Oppressive subjectivity produces dualist images and desires to sustain a relationship of oppression by providing motivation, moral justification, and political legitimacy. Plumwood and Warren examine oppressive subjectivity (though they use different but similar concepts), but none of them have questioned how an oppressive subjectivity is created, maintained, and justified. While they mostly examined the problem of oppressive subjectivity (oppressive conceptual framework or the colonial logic) as a pure epistemological problem, they have largely overlooked the decolonial philosophers' contributions to the discussion of the transformative power of the oppressor that creates a dualist reality in which some human groups are viewed as less than human.<sup>87</sup> I believe that we can read decolonial philosophers' concepts, which are coloniality of power, coloniality of Being, and coloniality of knowledge,<sup>88</sup> to understand the oppressor's metaphysical and epistemological forces that create, maintain, and justify an oppressive subjectivity.

Dussel finds the origin of the 'ego cogito' in the 'ego conquiro' that emerged after discovering America in the 15th century.<sup>89</sup> His critique of the ego conquiro reveals the first defining characteristics of the formation of an oppressive subjectivity who

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<sup>87</sup> Eichler, "Dehumanization and the Metaphysics of Genocide: A New Theory for Genocide Prevention," 53.

<sup>88</sup> Ndlovu-Gatsheni, "Why Decoloniality in the 21st Century," 11.

<sup>89</sup> Dussel, "Europe, Modernity, and Eurocentrism," 471.

positions himself against the other by dichotomies: the coloniality of power. According to the paradigm of *ego conquiro*, attaining self-consciousness is achieved not by thinking but by conquering the other; in other words, the condition of being a subject is the objectification of the other. There are differences in the degree of the power possessed by beings, but it is not the case that all-powerful beings dominate the other.

Warren says that one of the characteristics of an oppressive subjectivity "is that power is conceived (and exercised) as "power-over" power."<sup>90</sup> The oppressor conceives power and superiority as a means of domination, while he thinks what justifies domination is his superiority. The oppressor attributes superior images to his identity to justify his superiority and conceives these images as part of his identity or nature. His superiority becomes his identity, but the certainty of his superiority and identity depends on the inferiority of the other. The oppressor proves his superior identity by conquering the other, which demands colonizing and monopolizing power. Therefore, the self of the oppressor is colonial; "I conquer, therefore I am" is the phrase that realizes, justifies his self, and the superiority of his self by colonizing the body and power of the other.<sup>91</sup>

### **3.6. Coloniality of Being**

One of the crucial differences between asymmetrical thinking and dualist thinking is that dualist thinking, which includes dualist image and desire production, affects the metaphysical perspective of the oppressor since he conceives reality and values in terms of dualism. The world of the oppressor is the Manichean world<sup>92</sup>; he perceives reality only within dichotomies; good/evil, beautiful/ugly, rational/irrational. There

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<sup>90</sup> Warren, *Ecofeminist Philosophy*, 46.

<sup>91</sup> Maldonado-Torres, "On the Coloniality of Being," 245.

<sup>92</sup> Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, 6.



is not only self-other dualism for the oppressor but also a dualism between two worlds representing the two poles of all values: the superior and inferior. There are two modes of beings who are the citizens of these worlds: the oppressor and the oppressed. Dualist image production corresponds to the production and attribution of ethical, aesthetical, epistemological, and political images or values dualistically. In fact, dualist thinking conceives images or values in a dualist way. While oppressor and oppressed are conceived as they have different natures, they also represent two different worlds of values.

The oppressor not only transforms the diversity of the self and the other into dualism, but he also transforms the diversity of all values into dualism. He colonizes the body of the oppressed and justifies his oppression by producing dualist images, but what makes him able to produce dualist images is his dualist conception of reality. The oppressor colonizes being, splits the reality into two, and manifests himself as the conqueror of the superior world representing all superior values.

I am white: that is to say that I possess beauty and virtue, which have never been black. I am the color of the daylight.

I am black: I am the incarnation of a complete fusion with the world, an intuitive understanding of the earth, and abandonment of my ego in the heart of the cosmos, and no white man, no matter how intelligent he may be, can ever understand Louis Armstrong and the music of the Congo. If I am black, it is not the result of a curse, but it is because, having offered my skin, I have been able to absorb all the cosmic effluvia. I am truly a ray of sunlight under the earth.<sup>93</sup>

Superior locus, image, and the world of values of the oppressor are dependent on the inferior locus, image, and world of the oppressed. While the oppressed claims himself as the reference point of beauty, virtue, and truth, the other represents not only the inferior values or absence of the values, but also the negation of values; "He is, let us

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<sup>93</sup> Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks*, 41.

dare to admit, the enemy of values, and in this sense, he is the absolute evil."<sup>94</sup> The other is not morally inferior or less rational, but an immoral or irrational being. By conquering the other and colonizing the power, the oppressor obtains the metaphysical power to create a dualist reality that makes him able to produce dualist images, then he transforms and reduces diversity into dualism. Then, he claims himself as the sovereign, conqueror of the superior world of values. While oppressive subjectivity and its' dualist way of thinking create, maintain, and justify subordination, coloniality of Being, the dualist way of interpreting reality is the second condition for creating, maintaining, and justifying oppressive subjectivity and its' dualist thinking.

### **3.7. Coloniality of Knowledge**

Coloniality of Being includes coloniality of power and coloniality of knowledge; by colonizing Being, the oppressor attains the metaphysical power to create a dualist reality that explains and justifies his dualist way of seeing, hearing, perceiving, feeling, and knowing. Coloniality of knowledge should be understood as epistemological forces of the oppressor that enables him to create a reality where he can produce any image of identity of the oppressed in relation to his needs and desires. Moreover, the oppressor has to colonize and monopolize the truth to prove and protect the certainty of the legitimacy of the truth he produces and the reality he creates. Plumwood says:

the master more than the slave requires the other in order to define his boundaries and identity, since these are defined against the inferiorised other; it is the slave who makes the master a master, the colonised who make the coloniser, the periphery which makes the centre.<sup>95</sup>

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<sup>94</sup> Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, 41.

<sup>95</sup> Plumwood, *Feminism and the Mastery of Nature*, 49.

Nevertheless, his superior, robust self is dependent on the inferiority of the other, and this dependency contradicts his robust, all-mighty image. In this contradiction, where his mighty and self-legitimated image accompanies his fragile and defenseless self, the oppressor is crushed by the burden of his image, suffers from his anxiety. "But this dependency is also hated and feared by the master, for it subtly challenges his dominance, and is denied in a variety of indirect and direct ways, with all the consequences of repression."<sup>96</sup> In fact, this is only one paradox or contradiction among many others we find in the logic of oppressor. However, as stated before, the logical structure of the oppressive subjectivity is full of paradoxes. To overcome these contradictions and paradoxes, the first and foremost strategy of the oppressor is the coloniality of truth.

The oppressor takes power to construct this truth regime from the subjectified, divine, and rational image he produces concerning himself by colonizing Being. Since the oppressor claims himself as the sovereign of the superior world of values, he, then, claims his point of view as a divine point, absolute objectivity, and the reference point of being a subject: "He imposes a new alliance system and places himself in direct filiation with the deity: the people must follow."<sup>97</sup> Thus, for the oppressor, who declares himself as the reference point of truth, an exit from his truth regime is explained by the irrational, cognitively incapable images produced concerning the Other. In other words, moving away from the axis of truth he drew is regarded as being mistaken by external forces, that is, being manipulated. "If you are not one of us (either European or at least supportive of the coloniality of power), you are against what is right and true."<sup>98</sup>

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<sup>96</sup> Plumwood, 48–49.

<sup>97</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, 193.

<sup>98</sup> Burkhart, *Indigenizing Philosophy through the Land*, 12.

He colonizes the truth; his perception is set up as universal, and "that it never occurs to him that there might be other perspectives from which he is background."<sup>99</sup> As an example, defining himself as the absolute point of view, the oppressor does not recognize that his specific situatedness has shaped his thoughts as a male subject, then he will tell Beauvoir, "You think thus and so *because you are a woman*."<sup>100</sup> In this way, he perceives this truth regime, which he produces through his image, and aims to re-produce his image as self-legitimated. His self-referential, paradoxical truth regime is secured by being completely closed to the other's attacks and contact. The oppressor, who legitimizes, moralizes, rationalizes the relationship of oppression with the truth regime and encloses this regime with the strategy of subjectivation and objectivation, thus making it impossible for the other to harm this truth regime.

Coloniality of power, being, and knowledge are not separable from each other, and there is no logical or chronological priority among the presence of them. The oppressor dares to manifest himself as the reference point of truth by colonizing the power on the body of the earth. However, he also finds the moral permission to colonize the body of the other by conceiving the other in terms of dualism. Here, the crucial role of the coloniality of knowledge is that the oppressor has to repress the contradictions by conquering knowledge and constructing a truth regime and claims himself as the reference point of truth. By setting his perception as the universal point of view, he views himself as expressing only truth. What he expresses becomes the truth for the oppressor, and there is no distance between his expression and the truth. The other, whose truth differs from him, differs from the truth, and is distanced from being subject.

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<sup>99</sup> Plumwood, *Feminism and the Mastery of Nature*, 43.

<sup>100</sup> Beauvoir, *The Second Sex*, 15.

### 3.8. The Key Role of Reason/Nature Dualism

In the history of western philosophy, reason/nature dualism plays a key role. "The line of fracture between reason and nature runs deeply through the key concepts of western culture. In the contrast set, virtually everything on the 'superior' side can be represented as forms of reason, and virtually everything on the underside can be represented as forms of nature."<sup>101</sup> Tracing any dualist pair will bring us to reason/nature dualism. I believe making a distinction between two types of dualism, concept dualism and identity dualism, and defining their features and how they relate to each other will be helpful to understand the key role of reason/nature dualism. This distinction will also enable a deeper understanding of the relationship between identity and image, and the interconnection between different modes of oppression. Plumwood lists key dualisms that reflect the major forms of oppression in western culture:

culture/nature, reason/nature, male/female, mind/body (nature),  
master/slave, reason/matter (physicality), rationality/animality (nature),  
reason/emotion (nature), mind, spirit/nature, freedom/necessity (nature),  
human/nature (nonhuman), civilized/primitive (nature),  
production/reproduction (nature), public/private, subject/object, self/other.<sup>102</sup>

Concepts are nouns that express a mode of being, and they have moral, ontological, epistemological, aesthetic, or political values. Examples of concepts are culture, nature, reason, spirit, freedom, necessity, rationality, animality, civilized, primitive. Identity can be a biological, geographical, or cultural difference. Male, female, white, nonwhite, human, and nonhuman are identities. Images are like concepts, and they link concepts to identities. Rational, irrational, moral, immoral, beautiful, ugly, civilized, primitive are images. Rationality is a concept that can be identified with an identity by attributing the rational image to it. The value of an identity or a concept

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<sup>101</sup> Plumwood, *Feminism and the Mastery of Nature*, 44.

<sup>102</sup> Plumwood, 44.

is arbitrary, subjective, and conditional. The values of concepts and identities change in the historical process; the history of two concepts or identities can be read through the movement of values or images attributed to them.

Different concept dualisms have been hegemonic in different periods. Hegemonic concept dualisms have significant impacts on the world of ideas of their periods. Reason/nature dualism, which was hegemonic in Ancient Greek, has a crucial role in shaping the ancient philosophers' ideas on ontology, morality, politics, and epistemology. In modern philosophy, mind/body dualism was hegemonic dualism, while private/public, rational/irrational were associated with the post-Enlightenment period.

Different identity dualisms have been hegemonic in different periods. Master/slave, civilized/barbarian dualisms are vital in determining Ancient Greece's moral and social norms. Early modern societies were occupied with European/native dualism, while white/nonwhite dualism was at the center of the political discussions of the west for the last two centuries.

Concept pairs are not dualisms by themselves; a pair of concepts may become a dualist pair once their values are interpreted as hierarchically, oppositional, and mutually exclusive. Reason/nature dualism, which claims the superiority of reason over nature, is the fundamental idea of the western rationalist tradition. Rationalism transforms reason/nature concept pair to the reason/nature dualism by construing their values vertically, oppositionally, and exclusively. As an example, in the philosophy of Plato, reason and nature represent two different worlds of values. Reason represents the superior world of values; the heaven, the world of gods, angels, immortal, wise, and moral souls, while nature represents the inferior world of values; the earth, the world of the body, humans, animals, mortal, ignorant, and immoral beings.

Concepts and concept dualisms can be linked to each other, and they always represent multiple values. Mind and reason are similar but different concepts. Descartes links reason to the mind by claiming that only beings who have a mind can possess reason. He claims the superiority of the mind over the body following the traditional idea of the superiority of reason over nature, and links reason/nature dualism to mind/body dualism. The ontological value of mind/body dualism thus becomes prominent rational/irrational dualism also acquires an epistemological meaning.

The idea that only rational beings have political and moral deliberative elements links reason/nature dualism to moral/immoral, public/private, state of nature/civil society dualisms. From Plato and Aristotle to the contemporary moral philosophers, western rationalist tradition claims only rational beings can be moral agents, have moral status, and deserve moral consideration; reason/nature dualism is thus linked to moral/immoral dualism. From Aristotle to Hobbes and the other contractarianists, irrational beings are excluded from the public sphere with the idea that only rational beings have deliberative elements and political status; and the link between reason/nature dualism and public/private, state of nature/civil society dualisms are thus established.

In the Manichean world of the oppressor, reason represents the superior world of values, and nature represents the world of the inferior values and the negation and absence of values. "In all the other senses, nature is the interiorized and dualised contrast to the realm of reason, which is also the realm of goodness and the source of value."<sup>103</sup> The rationalist western tradition associates reason to the superior concepts of mind, rationality, spirit, public, civilized, freedom, and subject; on the other hand, nature is linked to the inferior concepts of body, irrationality, emotion, private, primitive, necessity and object. The long and the short of it, rationalist tradition defends the superiority of reason over nature and connects this dualism to the other

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<sup>103</sup> Plumwood, 81.

dualisms, such as mind/body, freedom/necessity, public/private, and claims ontological, moral, political superiority of reason over nature.

To be defined as 'nature' in this context is to be defined as passive, as non-agent and non-subject, as the 'environment' or invisible background conditions against which the 'foreground' achievements of reason or culture (provided typically by the white, western, male expert or entrepreneur) take place. It is to be defined as a terra nullius, a resource empty of its own purposes or meanings, and hence available to be annexed for the purposes of those supposedly identified with reason or intellect, and to be conceived and moulded in relation to these purposes.<sup>104</sup>

### **3.9. The Key Role of Human/Nature Dualism**

From Ancient Greek to post-Enlightenment, European humanism defends humans' ontological, moral, political superiority by associating reason with humans and denying reason in animals. Humans and nonhuman animals are construed as superior, oppositional, and exclusive from each other. Traditionally, in western philosophy, reason is conceived as the defining characteristic of humans, and it is what makes humans superior, oppositional, and exclusive from animals. Rationalist and humanist tradition denies reason in animals and limits the sphere of reason to humans. Since reason is superior to nature in terms of ontology, epistemology, morality, and politics, humans are considered superior to animals in many ways. With this superiority, the domination of nature by humans is created, maintained, and justified by sustaining necessary motivation, political legitimacy, and moral justification for it.

Nevertheless, in the rationalist and humanist tradition, all oppressed identities are excluded from the realm of reason and placed in the sphere of nature. Traditionally in western societies, women are conceived of as less rational or irrational, and the sphere of reason is defined as masculine, which "maps the reason/body pair on to the

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<sup>104</sup> Plumwood, 4.



male/female pair."<sup>105</sup> Alongside women, slaves, blacks, and all other human-others are excluded from the sphere of reason in different ways and degrees, while the oppressor claims for himself reason.

The oppressor, who colonizes knowledge and claims himself as the reference of the truth, monopolizes reason and the superior world. Monopolizing reason corresponds to the monopolization of human identity. The oppressor claims himself as the reference to the truth and rejects the other's rationality in the degree of their distance from his truth axis. The other is far from the truth in the degree of distance from his point of view. By coloniality of Being and knowledge, the oppressor has the power to create a reality in relation to his needs and desires. Like Cartesian methodic doubt which aims to prove the certainty of his truth, and reaches the universal point of view, misanthropic skepticism questions the humanity of the other to prove the certainty of his conquest and the certainty of the legitimacy of his conquest to the other and claims himself as the reference point of humanity: "Misanthropic skepticism doubts in a way the most obvious. Statements like 'you are a human' take the form of cynical rhetorical questions: Are you completely human? 'You have rights' becomes 'why do you think that you have rights?' Likewise 'You are a rational being' takes the form of the question 'are you really rational?'"<sup>106</sup> The oppressor colonizes Being and conquers the superior world of values represented by reason. Since reason is associated with human identity, the human identity is what makes him the sovereign of the superior world of values. From his universal perspective, he is the reference point of being human, while the other is less than human to the extent of their differences from the oppressor. The other's "superiority is premised on the degree of humanity attributed to the identities in question," and "the 'lighter' one's skin is, the closer to full humanity

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<sup>105</sup> Plumwood, 45.

<sup>106</sup> Maldonado-Torres, "On the Coloniality of Being," 246.

one is, and vice versa."<sup>107</sup> On the other hand, woman "is the incidental, the inessential as opposed to the essential. He is the Subject, he is the Absolute — she is the Other."<sup>108</sup> In other words, reason is the superior value, and it is possessed only by humans. Human is the superior identity, but to be human is to be free, white, European male, while women, blacks, slaves, and other human-others are less than human or nonhuman, and less rational or irrational.

### 3.10. Dehumanization

Analyzing dehumanization provides important conveniences for this thesis which is to show the interrelationship between the forms of dominations and the essential role of the domination of nature in this interrelationship. Understanding dehumanization enables us to understand the key role of the reason/nature dualism in Western culture, the role of dualist thinking for justification of domination, the interconnection between different modes of dominations, and most importantly, the role of the oppression of nonhuman animals.

Dehumanization represents all dimensions of oppressive subjectivity and the colonial self of the oppressor; it is a way of thinking, and a logical strategy that creates, maintains, and justifies oppression. It includes:

conceiving of others less than human than members of one's ingroup, conceiving of others as subhuman creatures, treating others in such a way as to erode, obstruct, or extinguish some of their distinctively human attributes, denying the subjectivity, individuality, agency, or distinctively human attributes of others, verbally likening others to nonhuman animals or inanimate objects.<sup>109</sup>

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<sup>107</sup> Maldonado-Torres, 257.

<sup>108</sup> Beauvoir, *The Second Sex*, 11.

<sup>109</sup> Smith, "Paradoxes of Dehumanization," 418–19.

There are different definitions of dehumanization and its roles in oppression. Paulo Freire says that oppression dehumanizes the oppressed; dehumanizing the oppressed is the aim and the consequence of oppression.<sup>110</sup> Besides that, by dehumanizing the oppressed, the oppressor, too, loses his humanity.

They prove that colonization, I repeat, dehumanizes even the most civilized man; that colonial activity, colonial enterprise, colonial conquest, which is based on contempt for the native and justified by that contempt, inevitably tends to change him who undertakes it; that the colonizer, who in order to ease his conscience gets into the habit of seeing the other man as an animal accustoms himself to treating him like an animal, and tends objectively to transform himself into an animal.<sup>111</sup>

Dehumanization can be an important part of oppression. This thesis, however, does not aim at a comprehensive analysis of oppression or the consequences of oppression for oppressed or oppressor groups. It is focused on and limited to an analysis of oppressive subjectivity, a particular way of thinking that functions to create, maintain, and justify oppression. Therefore, I am interested in dehumanization only to understand the logical, epistemological, and moral strategies of oppressive subjectivity. Smith says:

Finally, dehumanization is sometimes equated with cruel or degrading treatment. It's said, for instance, that torturing a person, or systematically disrespecting them, is tantamount to dehumanizing them. This puts the cart before the horse. Doing violence to people doesn't make them subhuman, but conceiving of people as subhuman often makes them objects of violence and victims of degradation. The important thing to keep in mind is that dehumanization is something psychological. It occurs in people's heads. It's an attitude—a way of thinking about people—whereas harming them is a form of behavior, a kind of doing rather than a kind of thinking.<sup>112</sup>

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<sup>110</sup> Freire, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, 43.

<sup>111</sup> Cesaire, *Discourse on Colonialism*, 41.

<sup>112</sup> Smith, *Less than Human*, 33.

As we have seen, dualist thinking construes diversity vertically, oppositionally, and exclusively to justify oppression. The oppressive subjectivity produces dualist images concerning the identities of the oppressor and the oppressed to justify the superiority of the oppressor. Dualist image production provides moral justification, political legitimacy, and motivation, and it helps the oppressor prevent any remorse he may feel. Western rationalist and humanist tradition produces inferior images of nonhuman animals by linking the reason/nature dualism to human/nonhuman dualism. Nonhumans are conceived as inferior to humans in terms of morality, ontology, epistemology. In the Manichean world of the oppressor, nonhumans represent the inferior world of values; they do not represent the lack of values but the negation of all values. Nonhumans are morally inferior to humans, but they are immoral beings, making it morally permissible for humans to dominate them.

In other words, the ancient and absolute superior identity in the western tradition is human identity. Nevertheless, human/nonhuman dualism does not contend with sustaining the oppression of nonhumans; constructing the oppressive human identity sets the stage for justification of the oppression of human-others. However, besides being descriptive terms that have pre-given contents, human and nonhuman identities are also normative terms:

'Human' as normative prescribes standards in terms of how one ought to act towards one designated as 'human', but also prescribes certain standards to the actor designated as human, in terms of actions and behavior befitting a human.<sup>113</sup>

If those in power colonize truth and produces uninspectable truth, what can prevent the oppressor, who has the power to deny reason in animals (attribute the irrational image to animals) from denying reason in human-others? The oppressor who justifies his domination questions the humanity of the other and proves the certainty of his superior identity by questioning the humanity of the other. The oppressor colonizes

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<sup>113</sup> Oelofsen, "De- and Rehumanization in the Wake of Atrocities," 179.

and monopolizes the definition of humanity. The other is less than human in the degree of their differences with the oppressor.

Smith claims that the objectification of women, "sexual minorities (notably gay people), immigrants, mentally and physically handicapped people, and various specific ethnic groups," are "produced by a different concatenation of forces", and their "analysis demands a somewhat different set of conceptual tools" than "with the kind of dehumanization associated with war, genocide, and other forms of mass violence."<sup>114</sup> Eichler responds in her dissertation; in fact:

the same epistemological and metaphysical forces are also at work in the dehumanization of women and that there is a long history of equating women with animals and nonhuman nature as well as objects.<sup>115</sup>

I agree with Eichler because, as she states, "The real issue with dehumanization is its transformative power—its power to create a reality in which some groups of humans are actually less than."<sup>116</sup> I have shown these epistemological and metaphysical forces in my analysis of the coloniality of Being and knowledge. It is the same subjectivity that defines the other as less than human or nonhuman, and the same subjectivity that demands to minimize or deny any commonalities with the other.

Besides that, the central problem is that it is the same subjectivity that has the power to question or deny the humanity of the other, that has a colonial relationship with life, Being, and the other. Smith defines dehumanization as "a way of thinking—a way of thinking that, sadly, comes all too easily to us," and he continues: "We are all

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<sup>114</sup> Smith, *Less than Human*, 11–12.

<sup>115</sup> Eichler, "Dehumanization and the Metaphysics of Genocide: A New Theory for Genocide Prevention," 52.

<sup>116</sup> Eichler, 53.

potential dehumanizers, just as we are all potential objects of dehumanization. The problem of dehumanization is everyone's problem." <sup>117</sup> Hence, if we limit dehumanization to only those conditions such as mass violence, we will overlook and may not be able to see our potentiality of being dehumanizer.

I suggest two primary versions of dehumanization: conceiving of others as less than human by minimizing commonalities and conceiving the other nonhuman by denying all commonalities. The oppressive subjectivity defines the other in relation to his needs and desire. Dualist thinking can present itself in two ways; minimizing or denying commonalities between the oppressor and the oppressed. To deny all commonalities with the other may not be necessary for all modes of oppression, such as those societies where oppression of women, blacks, or slaves is institutionalized. Conceiving of the other less than human can be seen in societies where oppression is institutionalized. Maldonado-Torres defines dehumanization as the primary expression of the coloniality of Being. By conceiving of the other as less than human, dehumanization "serves a crucial role in the naturalization of the non-ethics of war through the practices of colonialism and (racial) slavery."<sup>118</sup> In those societies where oppression of women, blacks, or slaves is normalized, oppressed groups are considered less than human. Their humanity is denied largely but not completely; they are granted some rights and privileges, albeit less than fully humans.

However, in mass violence, such as genocide and war conditions, the savagery of the oppression demands to deny all commonalities with the oppressed and conceive of them as nonhuman because, in such conditions, the necessary motivation and moral justification are not the same as those modes of conditions that the oppression is institutionalized. Conceiving the other as nonhuman removes all moral boundaries and the limits of cruelty. Because the oppressor defines and has the power to define

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<sup>117</sup> Smith, *Less than Human*, 30.

<sup>118</sup> Maldonado-Torres, "On the Coloniality of Being," 257.

the other only in relation to his needs and desires, in such situations, the oppressed are not defined as *like* animals, but as animals. Dehumanizing the other provides the moral legitimacy of the violence inflicted on the oppressed: conceiving the other as "having a different essence from ourselves is not quite human, and such a group can be used, abused, and eliminated as if it were another species of animal."<sup>119</sup> Dehumanization is the extreme mode of radical exclusion from the other, which functions to ignore the commonalities and conceive him as if there is a difference in nature to prevent sympathy with the other that may cause any remorse he may feel.

### 3.11. Nonhuman Nature and Dehumanization

Eichler says, "Yet, no matter how dehumanization is addressed, it is always considered, first and foremost, a problem for humans. The animal Other that represents the lack of humanity remains largely in the shadows."<sup>120</sup> I will conclude this section where I aimed to show the interconnection between forms of oppression and the unique role of oppression of animals by emphasizing the role of animals in dehumanization.

Whatever responsibilities we have toward nonhuman animals, they are not the same as those we have toward members of our own species. So, if human-looking creatures are not really people, then we don't have to treat them as people. They can be used instrumentally, with complete disregard for their human worth—they can be killed, tortured, raped, experimented upon, and even eaten.<sup>121</sup>

Here, Smith speaks from the purest and absolute humanist point of view. The motto of humanism is "human rights are for humans." The humanist ideology conceives

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<sup>119</sup> Chirof and McCauley, *Why Not Kill Them All?*, 84.

<sup>120</sup> Eichler, "Dehumanization and the Metaphysics of Genocide: A New Theory for Genocide Prevention," 46–47.

<sup>121</sup> Smith, *Less than Human*, 159.

morality as only a human norm and limits the realm of moral consideration only to humans. From the perspective of absolute humanism, nonhuman animals do not deserve any moral consideration. If the oppressor resorts to rejecting the humanity of the other to justify his oppression, therefore, the moral value and ethical perspective of dehumanizers are at best humanism. Hence, "European humanism usually meant that only Europeans were human."<sup>122</sup> For the Western colonial self, to be human is to be a white, free, European male, while the others are less than human or nonhuman. If human identity is oppressive, it is first and foremost speciesist. It is not only because human identity is constructed with the negation of animal identity, but the Western colonial self, or oppressive subjectivity, considers himself superior to animal based on reason/nature dualism and assumes that superiority justifies subordination. Hence, dehumanization shows us that the same logic, metaphysical and epistemological power, and subjectivity are at work in creating, maintaining, and justifying the oppression of human-others and nature (or nonhuman animals). The same colonial self has the power to deny the reason in animals and deny the humanity of human-others and exclude them from the realm of morality.

The role of dehumanization in oppression shows the interconnection between forms of oppression and underlines how "social construction of the 'natural'" is used for legitimizing oppression.<sup>123</sup> If conceiving of the other as less than human or nonhuman provides moral justification and motivation for oppression, it shows that domination or the moral justification of motivation for the oppression of nonhuman animals are already provided. Nonhuman animals are available for oppression in any way without needing too much effort for its' justification. In other words, if dehumanization "serves a crucial role in the naturalization of the non-ethics of war,"<sup>124</sup>

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<sup>122</sup> Mills, *Racial Contract*, 27.

<sup>123</sup> Gaard, "Toward a Queer Ecofeminism," 114.

<sup>124</sup> Maldonado-Torres, "On the Coloniality of Being," 257.



then we can say that the domination and exploitation of nonhuman animals is naturalized and has become an ordinary way of living of most societies for thousands of centuries. In the Manichean world of the oppressor, the other does not only represent the lack of values but also represents the negation of values; "what lies beyond Being produces its contrary, not nothing, but a nonhuman or rather an inhuman world."<sup>125</sup> The negation of the nonhuman animals actualizes human identity, and, in the western tradition, nonhumans represent the inferior world of values that reference all the superior values of humans.

To conclude, I have analyzed oppressive subjectivity depending on three fundamental concepts: the logic of domination, dualist thinking, and the colonial self of the oppressor. The logic of domination is a moral assumption that superiority justifies oppression. To justify oppression, the oppressor has to justify his superiority, which demands dualist thinking. Dualist thinking includes dualist image and desire production. The oppressor attributes dualist images to his and the other's identities and codes his desire in such a way that he becomes disgusted with the identity of the other and praises his identity. By construing diversity hierarchically, oppositionally, and exclusively, the oppressor provides moral justification, political legitimacy, and motivation for oppression. After that, I have introduced three concepts that create, maintain, and justify oppressive subjectivity: coloniality of power, coloniality of being, and coloniality of knowledge. These concepts reveal the oppressor's epistemological and metaphysical power that enables him to create a dualist reality and associate some human groups with animals and nonhuman nature.

Plumwood, at the beginning of her book, says, "I try to show the importance of nature as the missing piece in this framework, and its vital contribution to a more complete understanding of domination and colonisation."<sup>126</sup> I think this missing piece can be

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<sup>125</sup> Maldonado-Torres, 257.

<sup>126</sup> Plumwood, *Feminism and the Mastery of Nature*, 2.

understood explicitly by taking a close look at the role of animals in dehumanization. Dehumanization shows how the conceptualization of nature has been used as the fundamental basis for legitimizing the other modes of oppression. The oppression of human-others is explained and justified by excluding them from the category of human and attributing them animal-like images; therefore, their domination is mediated by human/nonhuman dualism. Hence, the domination of nonhuman animals is not mediated in any identity dualism. Since nature is the zero point of legitimizing coloniality, and the exploitation of nature is conceived as an indisputable and fundamental right of humans, humans have the purest form of colonial subjectivity in their relationship with nature.

## CHAPTER 4

### THE FORMATION OF REASON/NATURE AND HUMAN/NATURE DUALISMS IN THE PHILOSOPHIES OF PLATO, ARISTOTLE, AND DESCARTES

I analyzed the oppressive subjectivity's moral and epistemological perspective in the third chapter; this chapter will focus on its' moral and ontological dimensions. Following Plumwood, I will analyze the formation and development of reason/nature and human/nature dualisms in Western philosophical thought's rationalist and humanist tradition. I will support my idea articulated in the third chapter that reason/nature and human/nature dualisms sustain the systematical production and reproduction of oppressive subjectivity in this tradition. Since rationalism and humanism are the prevailing traditions of the 2500 years of Western philosophy, it is impossible to analyze all rationalist and humanist philosophers; hence, it is also not necessary to do that. We can study the genesis and formation of rationalist and humanist philosophy, reason/nature and human/nature dualisms through the philosophies of Plato, Aristotle, and Descartes. I will show that we can find defining characteristics of oppressive subjectivity in their philosophies. Furthermore, by reading these philosophers, we will see how the images of nature in their philosophies affect their understanding of the right relationship between self and other. Concerning the formation of human/nature dualism, Plumwood says:

The first step in the evolution of human/nature dualism, is the construction of the normative (the best or ideal) human identity as mind or reason, excluding or inferiorising the whole rich range of other human and non-human characteristics or construing them as inessential. The construction of mind or reason in terms exclusive of and oppositional to nature is the second step. The

construction of nature itself as mindless is the third step, one which both reinforces the opposition and constructs nature as ineluctably alien, disposing of an important area of continuity and overlap between humans and animals and non-human nature. This last step, which is the one Descartes makes explicit, is frequently focused upon as the problematic element introduced by the Enlightenment. This is not entirely wrong: there is a major intensification of human/nature dualism at this time. The first two steps are clear in Plato, and the third is implicit in his treatment of original matter as chaos, the mindless material or primitive form of the world on which rational order must be imposed. The Cartesian contribution builds on and presupposes the earlier steps, and together they construct the great gulf between the human and the natural which has become characteristic of the western tradition.<sup>127</sup>

I defined dualism as a way of construing diversity hierarchically, oppositionally, and exclusively. Plumwood too conceives the formation of human/nature dualism in three steps in a similar but different way; the first step implies hierarchy, the second step covers both opposition and exclusion, while the third step corresponds to radical exclusion. I use exclusion as covering also radical exclusion. Nevertheless, Plumwood finds only continuity in the formation of human/nature dualism because, as I stated before, she uses dualism too hastily in her texts. She does not question how and why these steps are taken or the consequences of dualist thinking in the metaphysical and epistemological perspective of the oppressor's self.

Ultimately, this chapter aims to analyze the formation of oppressive subjectivity in Western philosophy. While doing that, I will follow my analysis maintained in the third chapter through the logic of domination and dualist thinking. In my analysis of dualist thinking, where I search for the continuity between hierarchical, asymmetrical, and dualist thinking, I often resorted to Plumwood's philosophy. Hence, to understand the differences in the self of the oppressor and its' epistemological and metaphysical perspective demanded and caused by dualist thinking, I appealed to decolonial philosophy. I will follow the same route in this chapter. While analyzing the continuity between Plato, Aristotle, and Descartes on the formation of reason/nature and human/nature dualisms, I will follow

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<sup>127</sup> Plumwood, 107.

Plumwood's reading of the history of western philosophy. However, as she overlooks the differences between hierarchical, asymmetrical, and dualist thinking, she mostly overlooks the differences between the philosophies of Plato, Aristotle, and Descartes in the formation of reason/nature and human/nature dualisms. As I contributed Plumwood's studies on dualism with my reading of decolonial philosophers' criticisms of the colonial self, in this chapter, I will contribute her readings of western philosophy by chasing up the changes in the self, metaphysical and epistemological forces and perspectives of the Cartesian subject, and the breaking points between Plato, Aristotle, and Descartes by appealing to decolonial philosophers' criticisms of Cartesian philosophy, and I will show the relationship between Cartesian philosophy and the formation of Western colonial self.

We are all familiar with these philosophers, and we are also familiar with Plato's misogyny, Aristotle's justification of slavery, and Descartes' speciesism. Nevertheless, we do not take their oppressive ideas seriously and consider them as if they are insignificant details, malfunctions, or aberrations in their philosophies. We do not even mention these ideas in the lectures; at best, these are the part of students' canteen conversations, where they are shared as fun facts. Of course, philosophers may be influenced by their periods and societies' moral and political norms. Slavery, speciesism, misogyny, and racism have always been Western societies' prevailing moral and political norms. Therefore, one may argue that their oppressive ideas are not their or their philosophies' fault; thus, we should not blame them, but we can read their philosophies by ignoring their misogynist, racist, slavery, and speciesist ideas.

Once we take the trouble to take a look at their philosophy from this perspective, however, we will see that their oppressive ideas are perfectly coherent and consistent in their philosophies. It is not only their ideas about, let us say, women are oppressive, but their very philosophies are oppressive in that they create, maintain, and justify oppression. In other words, it would be a miracle if a dualist philosophy would not include oppressive ideas. This chapter aims to show the risk of dualist philosophies

explaining and justifying the oppression of nature and human-others. Reading these philosophers from another perspective will enable us to understand that their oppressive ideas are not just an insignificant detail of their philosophies; nor are sexism, slavery, racism, or speciesism only accidental ideas caused by their societies' moral and political norms. My aim in this chapter is to show that the rationalist and humanist philosophical tradition that defends the supremacy of reason and human over nature depending on reason/nature, human/nature dualisms provides the necessary philosophical ground to create, maintain, and justify sexism, speciesism, racism and all other modes of oppression relationships.

Moreover, I study these philosophies because they have always been the major paradigm of Western philosophy. Hence, we should ask why, let us say, Western societies have approved Descartes while Spinoza has been 'persona non grata' of Western philosophy for centuries. Even an undergraduate philosophy student can see Cartesian philosophy as more contradictory and inconsistent than Spinozist philosophy. There are necessary conditions for a philosophical idea to be the dominant paradigm of society. The fundamental reason Western societies approve of philosophers, such as Plato, Aristotle, and Descartes, is that their ideas are compatible with the core values of those societies. In other words, these philosophers not only affected Western society but also reflect the core values of their societies. Neither was/is racism an unexpected/accidental event in the West nor was the oppressive thinking of philosophers an insignificant detail; in fact, everything went as might be expected. I will begin this chapter by describing one of the strangest events in the history of thought, the Valladolid debate, in order to show both how moral and political values affect philosophers and how philosophers affect and reflect the moral values of their societies, and thus how their values confirm the domination of both humans and animals.

#### 4.1. The Valladolid Debate

Bartolome de Las Casas was appointed as a bishop to the Americas in 1512. After arriving there, he witnessed the crimes and abuses committed by colonists against the indigenous peoples. He felt compelled to oppose this violence and wrote a book, *Brevisima Relacion de la Desturucion de las Indias* (A Short Account of the Destruction of the Indies) where he described the atrocities he has witnessed and advocated their rights. He got returns on his efforts, and V. Charles, the King of Spain, ordered a debate between Las Casas and Juan Gines de Sepúlveda to discuss the legitimacy of using force against the indigenous people of the Americas. The debate took place in Valladolid, a Spanish city, in the year 1550, made history with the name the Valladolid Debate.<sup>128</sup>

The Valladolid Debate is the first moral and theological debate about the rights and treatment of indigenous people and the conquest of the Americas. An important detail that makes this debate one of the most extraordinary events in western political history is that both sides of the debate were humanist (which is also why I am interested). Indeed, the central issue of the debate was whether the natives were humans or not. While Sepulveda claims that the natives are less than human or nonhuman and therefore the massacre is legitimate, Las Casas argues that the natives are humans (or can be fully human) and therefore the massacre is wrong. If it had been agreed that the natives were not human, the legitimacy of the massacre would have been agreed on. I am not interested in the objections and arguments of Las Casas. I will only summarize Sepúlveda's ideas by collecting them under three arguments that explain and justify the oppression of the indigenous peoples.

Sepulveda states that "we can call barbarians with respect to our rules of reason." Dussel cites from Sepúlveda:

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<sup>128</sup> Smith, *Less than Human*, 84.

It will always be just and in conformity with natural law that such [barbaric] peoples be subjected to the empire of princes and nations that are more cultured and humane, so that by their virtues and the prudence of their laws, they abandon barbarism and are subdued by a more humane life and the cult of virtue.<sup>129</sup>

To banish the portentous crime of eating human flesh, which is a special offense to nature, and to stop the worship of demons instead of God, which above all else provokes His wrath, together with the monstrous rite of sacrificing men... War on the infidels is justified because it opens the way to the propagation of the Christian religion and eases the task of the missionaries.<sup>130</sup>

Therefore, the Spaniards should convert the natives to humanity and Christianity. Because Sepúlveda does not seem to reject the possibility of the indigenous peoples' having a more human life, we should read this idea with Plato and Aristotle's ideas which will be synthesized by Plotinus and formulated as the Great Chain of Being. Plato and Aristotle conceive the universe as a vast hierarchy with God sitting astride its apex followed by angels, men, women, slaves, barbarians, domestic animals, wild animals, simple animals like worms and snails, and plants.<sup>131</sup> The one who has a higher rank has the right to rule, enslave and dominate their inferiors since God created the world in the rational order that the lowers to be subservient to their higher. Therefore, humans are morally permissible slaves, barbarians, and nonhuman beings.

However, for Plato, this hierarchy is not defined as static, unchangeable, and complete, as we will see in the coming pages. Men are superior to women since they have more rational souls than women. Hence, "Plato admits people with female bodies to the extent that they conform to a male model of excellence'... Only elite

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<sup>129</sup> Dussel, "Anti-Cartesian Meditations," 11.

<sup>130</sup> Friede and Keen, *Bartolomé de Las Casas in History*, 287–99.

<sup>131</sup> Steiner, *Anthropocentrism and Its Discontents*, 2005, 117.



women who have been successfully colonised by reason will" deserve respect.<sup>132</sup> Sepúlveda thinks that the Spaniards are superior to the natives, and they are morally permissible to dominate the natives. The Spaniards can force them to abandon barbarism and cannibalism, and to become more human. Dussel cites from Sepúlveda:

When the pagans are no more than pagans [...] there is no just cause to punish them, nor to attack them with arms: such that, if some cultured, civilized, and humane people are found in the New World, that do not adore idols, but instead the true God [...] war would be unlawful.<sup>133</sup>

Sepúlveda's second argument is that Indians are "slaves by nature, uncivilized, barbarian and inhuman."<sup>134</sup> He defends this idea by referring to Aristotle's theory of slavery. For Aristotle, some people, who live like beasts, are slaves by nature. Humans are morally permissible to rule them. Smith thinks that Sepúlveda defines natives not only as barbarians but also as animals.

However, Sepúlveda pressed the idea of Indian barbarism further than his predecessors had done. He insisted that there is almost as great a difference between Indians and Spaniards as between monkeys and men, and assured the jury that 'you will scarcely find even vestiges of humanity' in them, and that, although the natives are not 'monkeys and bears,' their mental abilities are like those of 'bees and spiders'... Aristotle believed that only humans can think. So, in comparing the behavior of Indians to that of spiders and ants, Sepúlveda implicitly denied that they are rational—and therefore human—beings.<sup>135</sup>

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<sup>132</sup> Plumwood, *Feminism and the Mastery of Nature*, 78.

<sup>133</sup> Dussel, "Anti-Cartesian Meditations," 12.

<sup>134</sup> Smith, *Less than Human*, 84.

<sup>135</sup> Smith, 84.

As I will show below, for Aristotle, in the cosmic order, humans are morally permissible to enslave, dominate and use slaves, animals, and barbarians. Therefore, Sepúlveda's claim on the legitimacy of oppression of the Natives is coherent with Aristotelian philosophy.

The third argument of Sepúlveda is that Indians are homunculi. They are human-looking animals. Smith says that the notion of "the homunculus was a fixture of the medieval imagination. Homunculi were thought to be humanoid entities produced in an unnatural manner from human sperm."<sup>136</sup> There were two theories about their nature. Some alchemists claimed that they do not have human souls and were not descended from Adam and Eve, but some thought they have no soul. Smith says that we cannot "be certain why Sepúlveda called Native Americans homunculi, but it seems likely that he was trying to convey the idea that they did not have human souls. Sepúlveda's image of the Indians was not exceptional."<sup>137</sup> What is essential in this argument is that either Sepúlveda thought that they have no soul or have an inhuman soul; we can see that before a century of Descartes, there was an idea about the existence of human-looking animals who had no soul. It should not be surprising to see that after a century of this debate, a philosopher named Descartes will claim that animals have no soul, emotions, desires and are not capable of feeling pain and pleasure.

In the Valladolid Debate, we can see the continuity between Ancient Greek philosophy and Modern philosophy, or Plato, Aristotle, and Descartes through reason/nature and human/nature dualisms. Sepúlveda, an Aristotelian humanist scholar, claims a hierarchy based on rationality and conceives this hierarchy as justifying oppression. Besides his Platonist and Aristotelian ideas, he also questions the soul of natives either implicitly or explicitly. The idea that some human-looking

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<sup>136</sup> Smith, 44.

<sup>137</sup> Smith, 86.

being with a nonhuman soul may be an acceptable idea, but we cannot find the idea of the existence of some soulless being until Cartesian thought.

#### **4.2. The Seeds of Cartesian Dualism in the Ancient Philosophy**

In the New Materialism seminars, Oğuz Karayemiş compares the meaning of thinking and philosophical activity in the Ancient Greek philosophy and Modern, Cartesian philosophy.<sup>138</sup> For the Greeks, thinking or philosophizing means contemplation on cosmos, which is thought to be perfect and flawless. By attaining the truth of cosmos and understanding the cosmic order, they can sustain the inner harmony and practice the cosmic order in their lives and societies to live a virtuous life and have an ideal society. In other words, for ancient philosophers, to harmonize with cosmos was the ultimate aim of the philosophy of morality and politics, while the perfection of the cosmos was the starting point of their philosophy.

Can we find ecological thought in the Greek philosophers or portray Greek society as environmentally friendly? Plumwood challenges this kind of readings of Plato and Aristotle who, she thinks, spreaded the seeds of Cartesian human/nature and reason/nature dualisms.<sup>139</sup> Although none of the ancient philosophers developed a strict humanist philosophy that claims a superior quality possessed by all humans but none of nonhumans beings, humans' growing away from nature have been led off in the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle. It is mainly because both Plato and Aristotle conceive a hierarchy between cosmos and chaos, and Plumwood thinks that cosmos is logos, the sphere of reason and rational principle that persuades, orders, and subjugates chaos, which is primal nature and material necessity, to sustain the harmony in the universe.<sup>140</sup> Their hierarchical imagination of the universe and the

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<sup>138</sup> Karayemiş, "Yeni Materyalizm 1: Giriş, Bağlamlar 1."

<sup>139</sup> Plumwood, *Feminism and the Mastery of Nature*, 83.

<sup>140</sup> Plumwood, 83.

hierarchical relationship between the rational sphere and material sphere or the sphere of nature made Plato and Aristotle affirm hierarchy and discipline. As we will see in the coming pages where I will follow Plumwood's reading of Plato and Aristotle, domination and subjugation of irrational or less rational beings by rational or more rational beings are conceived to be the way to harmonize with universe, live ethical life, and have an ideal society.

Plato conceives soul and rational beings as superior to the body and less rational beings, respectively. However, he does not deny the rationality of nonhuman animals; even animals are rational, albeit low; in other words, humans and nature are not hyperseparated or radically excluded from each other. Aristotle conceives an opposition between humans and nature since he thinks nonhuman animals lack reason, and rationality is the defining characteristic of humans while the distance from logos is a deficiency.

Besides the differences between Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy on the conception of human, reason, and nature, they are in tune with three essential ideas. Firstly, they agree on the legitimacy of domination between beings based on rationality. Secondly, although Aristotle denies reason in animals, he also finds a rational order in the universe, and we cannot find reason and nature as hyperseparated in the Aristotelian philosophy. Lastly, neither Plato nor Aristotle rejects the continuity between humans and nature since they think there is no crucial difference between a slave and an animal because both of them are deprived of reason. As a result, we can find the logic of domination and hierarchical and asymmetrical thinking in the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle, but dualist thinking is not developed in their philosophies.

#### **4.2.1. Plato and the Hierarchy Between Reason and Nature**

Deleuze uses three tools as metaphors that represent three images of philosophers in ancient philosophy: the hammer of the pre-Socratics, the staff of the Cynics, the wing

of Plato. The pre-Socratics philosophized with a hammer and sought the truth in the deep, under the earth. They sought the secret of water and fire.<sup>141</sup> The Cynics philosophized with a stick; there is no longer depth or height; only the ground for them without expecting anything from the depths of the earth or heaven. Plato has wings; "he is the one who leaves the cave and rises up. The more he rises the more he is purified... there are properly philosophical diseases. Idealism is the illness congenital to the Platonic philosophy, with its litany of ascents and downfalls, it is even philosophy's manic-depressive form."<sup>142</sup> He sought the secret of heaven aims to rise beyond the Earth. He pointed out the beyond of the earth, and once he did it, he created the dualism between heaven and the earth, the sphere of reason and the sphere of nature.

In the western tradition, Plato takes the first step in proposing a dualist philosophy. He splits reality into two, heaven and the earth, or the world of ideas and the world of senses. If we define dualism as a division of reality into two hierarchical and opposed aspects or the state of being, a hierarchy between two different modes of being has always been assumed from the beginning of the Western philosophical tradition. Dualism, in the context of this thesis, is defined not only as the division of reality into two, but also as covering the conception of diversity in terms of a hierarchy to justify subordination. After showing how Platonic philosophy confirms domination in his Chariot allegory, I will primarily make use of Plumwood's exceptional reading of Plato in my interpretation.

In the philosophy of Plato, heaven, the sphere of reason and soul, is the superior world; it is "the timeless immaterial world of abstractions and numbers, which Plato called the ideas or Forms, that was the true and real world, perfect, gleaming and

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<sup>141</sup> Deleuze, *Logic of Sense*, 127–33.

<sup>142</sup> Deleuze, 128.

immaculate to those who saw it in the brilliant light of reason."<sup>143</sup> The earth, the sphere of nature and the body, is the inferior world; it is "the world of body, the senses and nature, the world of coming-to-be and passing away, was unreal, a shadow world."<sup>144</sup> Plato's reason/nature dualism, whereby he defends the superiority of reason over nature, runs deeply through his key concepts: "In each of these cases the lower side is that associated with nature, the body, and the realm of becoming, as well as of the feminine, and the higher with the realm of reason."<sup>145</sup> Reason (logos) and nature (chaos) represent the two hierarchical and oppositional spheres; proximity to logos determines superiority and the rank of a being in the hierarchy of the universe. Since reason and rational beings are superior to nature and irrational or less rational beings not only in terms of ontology but also epistemology, morality, aesthetics, and politics.

Plato defines humans as the union of soul and body. He defines soul and body as follows: the soul is in the very likeness of the divine, and immortal, and intellectual, and uniform, and indissoluble, and unchangeable; and the body is in the very likeness of the human, and mortal, and unintellectual, and multiform, and dissoluble, and changeable.<sup>146</sup> He claims the immortality and eternality of the soul. The soul belongs to heaven, which makes humans belong to heaven, and the body is the earthly part of humans.

Now we ought to think of the most sovereign part of our soul as god's gift to us, given to be our guiding spirit. This, of course, is the type of soul that, as we maintain, resides in the top part of our bodies. It raises us up away from the earth and toward what is akin to us in heaven, as though we are plants grown not from the earth but from heaven. In saying this, we speak absolutely

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<sup>143</sup> Plumwood, *Environmental Culture*, 97.

<sup>144</sup> Plumwood, 97.

<sup>145</sup> Plumwood, *Feminism and the Mastery of Nature*, 81.

<sup>146</sup> Plato, *Complete Works*, 70.

correctly. For it is from heaven, the place from which our souls were originally born, that the divine part suspends our head, i.e., our root, and so keeps our whole body erect.<sup>147</sup>

What Plato means by 'the most sovereign part of our soul' can be understood in the tripartite theory of soul that explains how humans came to the earth and their missions and status in the world with the Chariot allegory. In *Phaedrus*,<sup>148</sup> Plato describes the soul as a natural union of a team of winged horses and their charioteer: "To begin with, our driver is in charge of a pair of horses; second, one of his horses is beautiful and good and from stock of the same sort, while the other is the opposite and has the opposite sort of bloodline."<sup>149</sup> The Charioteer, the white horse, and the black horse represent three faculties of the soul: logos, thumos, eros. The charioteer represents the higher part of soul: logos, the rational part of soul. It controls the chariot and horses. The white horse is thumos, the noble, spirited part of the soul. It is the source of courage and bravery settled in the heart of humans. Eros, the lower part of the soul, is represented by the black horse. Appetite, hunger, erotic love, and other bodily, earthly passions take their source from eros. The charioteer is supposed to control the chariot, restrain, and subjugate the black horse to achieve an inner harmony of the soul.

He continues: "The heaviness of the bad horse drags its charioteer toward the earth and weighs him down if he has failed to train it well, and this causes the most extreme toil and struggle that a soul will face."<sup>150</sup> If logos cannot control the chariot and rule eros, the soul will fall into the earth and be put into a body. The earth is the human's

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<sup>147</sup> Plato, 1288–89.

<sup>148</sup> Plato, 524–33.

<sup>149</sup> Plato, 524.

<sup>150</sup> Plato, 524.

detention colony, and the body is the jail of the soul. Because logos, the higher part of the soul, could not have ruled eros, the lower part of the soul, the soul falls into the earth.

When the soul falls into the earth, it is not born into a wild animal in its first incarnation; the best of them will be planted in the seed of a human who will become a lover of wisdom, beauty, arts. The others, respectively, will be put into a lawful king, warlike commander, statesman, manager of a household, financier, doctor, priest of the mysteries, poet, representational artist, laborer, farmer, sophist, and lastly a tyrant.<sup>151</sup> Once a soul is settled into a body, it will be exposed by violent emotions, which is the bodily passions, appetites of human, represented by eros. To go back home, the soul should sustain inner harmony and live a virtuous life, which demands logos to rule eros, and the soul to rule the body. The soul should subjugate, control, and rule the body to live a virtuous life. If it could manage to live a virtuous life, it would return to its' home. If emotions and passions override the soul, it will be punished by settling into a woman's body in its next life. If it cannot live justly in a woman's body, it will be reincarnated in the body of an animal. The soul will be in exile until it can live justly, depending on ruling and conquering body and bodily passions.<sup>152</sup>

Falling into the earth and being placed into the body is the punishment of soul but being placed into the body of a woman or animal is a heavier punishment than being placed into the body of a man. Therefore, besides the hierarchy between heaven and earth, reason and nature, there is a hierarchy between earthly creatures. The one associated with reason, or closer to logos, is superior to the other, associated with nature, body, or closer to nature, or the values that nature represents. Because of their proximity to logos and being more rational, men are superior to women, the master

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<sup>151</sup> Plato, 526.

<sup>152</sup> Plato, 1245.



is superior to the slave, and humans are superior to animals. In this sense, heaven, reason, men, and humans are superior to earth, body, women, and nonhuman, respectively. Because the rational capacities of women, slaves, and animals are lower than men, the volume of the bodily passions and the difficulty of a virtuous life will make their salvation more difficult.

In the hierarchy of the universe, the superiors have the right to and ought to dominate their inferiors. We can find this idea in Plato's explanation on the relationship between soul and body: "The god, however, gave priority and seniority to the soul, both in its coming to be and in the degree of its excellence, to be the body's mistress and to rule over it as her subject."<sup>153</sup> The soul is superior to the body; it rules the body as the master rules the slave. Moreover, besides it being permissible to rule the body, the soul ought to rule it for its salvation. To go back home, the soul should manage to conquer the body's appetite control by commands, threats, and discipline to overcome the moral and epistemological preventions that the body creates. The body is the alien of the self and the enemy of the soul; it prevents the soul from finding the truth and living a virtuous life. To soul has to overcome the epistemological and moral preventions of the body by repressing it and limiting its relationship with it.

Plato's political and moral metaphors include the master/slave relationship to exemplify the responsibility of humans or kings. A king takes responsibility and uses control as a master, or the soul should rule the body as master rules slave. The body should serve the needs and desires of the soul, as slaves serve the needs and desires of their master. Hence, Plato thinks that domination and subjugation are for the benefit of the dominated and subjugated one. A slave "can have true belief, but cannot know the truth of his belief... He can neither give nor follow a rational account."<sup>154</sup>

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<sup>153</sup> Plato, 1239.

<sup>154</sup> Vlastos, "Slavery in Plato's Thought," 289.

Because of his deficiency of rationality and distance from logos, the slave needs to be ruled by the master.

Plato uses the female as a metaphor that represents the inferior sides of his dualist pairs. However, he does not claim an essential difference or differences in nature between men and women: "Women share by nature in every way of life just as men do, but in all of them women are weaker than men."<sup>155</sup> Therefore, men and women differ in the degree of their capacities but not in nature. Plumwood states, "it is not women themselves as a sex, then, who are the problem so much as the feminine: the behavior, characteristics and areas of life associated with women. Such behavior is equally or even more problematic when indulged in by men."<sup>156</sup> Plato associates femininity with the lower order of nature, bodily passions, distance from logos, slave-like and animal nature.<sup>157</sup> He never affirms their sexual differences from men, but he admits them to the extent they follow the male model of excellence. We can say that the traditional definition of women as incidental and men as the absolute model of human can be traced back to Plato.

There is no essential difference between slaves and animals; for Plato, irrational humans do not significantly differ from animals. He claims that even animals have reason and the capacity for belief. In his theory of reincarnation, although movement from human to animal form is viewed as a punishment for evil, movement from the body of an animal to the body of a human is possible "because animals at least potentially (and in some cases actually) contain the souls of beings who can be liberated to human form and perhaps eventually to pure communion with the

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<sup>155</sup> Plato, *Complete Works*, 1083.

<sup>156</sup> Plumwood, *Feminism and the Mastery of Nature*, 76.

<sup>157</sup> Plumwood, 77.

gods."<sup>158</sup> In fact, there is also a hierarchy between animals to the extent of their distance from logos. Domestic animals who accept to be ruled to by humans are superior to wild animals that refuse the subjugation by humans. Wild animal is associated with the lower part of the soul by Plato and is used as a metaphor to exemplify the extreme distance from logos.

To conclude, most of the traditional ideas of western thought on the domination of nature and human-others, reason/nature and human/nature dualisms can be found in Plato. While he construes diversity in terms of hierarchy, he also defines the right relationship between beings in terms of subjugation, control, ruling, or domination of reason. The logic of domination, which assumes that superiority justifies subordination, can be found even in his definition of the relation between soul and body. The soul, the rational part of humans, is the self, while the body is treated as alien to the self; it is the 'other' of the self. The soul should command, control, and subjugate the body for its' salvation.<sup>159</sup> Plato defines health, justice, virtue, and all other relationships (such as men-women, master-slave relationships) in the same way.<sup>160</sup>

However, it is also important to note that Plato does not develop a distinct humanist philosophy. Human/nature dualism does not exclude reason in nature, nor does he claim a unique and superior feature of humans that nonhuman nature is not shared

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<sup>158</sup> Steiner, *Anthropocentrism and Its Discontents*, 2010, 56.

<sup>159</sup> Plato, *Complete Works*, 1271.

<sup>160</sup> In Republic, Plato says that: "To produce health is to establish the components of the body in a natural relation of control and being controlled, one by another, while to produce disease is to establish a relation of ruling and being ruled contrary to nature... Then, isn't to produce justice to establish the parts of the soul in a natural relation of control, one by another, while to produce injustice is to establish a relation of ruling and being ruled contrary to nature? ... Virtue seems, then, to be a kind of health, fine condition, and well-being e of the soul, while vice is disease, shameful condition, and weakness" (1997, 1076).

with nonhuman nature. Human identity is defined by rationality, and as superior to nature, but nature is still not constructed as mindless, and the continuity between humans and animals is not eliminated/annihilated since even animals have rationality, albeit low. Plato takes the first step of reason/nature and human/nature dualisms by construing their differences hierarchically and assuming this hierarchy justifies oppression. The second step of humanist philosophy and the development of human/nature dualism will be taken by Aristotle, who claims only humans, but none of nonhuman animals, have rationality.

#### **4.2.2. Aristotle and the Asymmetry Between Human and Nature**

The starting point of Plato that covers and shapes all of his ideas is the dualism of two ontological realms: heaven or the world of ideas and earth or the world of phenomena. Humans' place, rank, duty, differences from the other beings are all explained based on this dualism. Aristotle, on the other hand, does not appeal to heaven/earth dualism. If not going back to heaven, then what is the end of humans? If it is the earth, what is humans' position, duty, or purpose on this earth? These are the main questions Aristotle has to answer.

Aristotle yields "a tripartite division of the world in terms of the intellectual nature (which was seen as exclusive to the human), the soul (which characterised animate beings and even in its vegetative form had psychic elements), and the rest of inanimate nature."<sup>161</sup> He then finds this division in the soul and divides it into three parts: perception, intellect, and desire.<sup>162</sup> Both humans and animals have perception and desire. However, unlike Plato, Aristotle denies reason in animals. Rationality, for Aristotle, is the defining characteristic of human beings. Perception, intellect, and desire are the three-parts of the soul that determines actions. Animals lack intellect and do not have the power of choice or calculation. They move only with a basic

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<sup>161</sup> Plumwood, *Feminism and the Mastery of Nature*, 105.

<sup>162</sup> Aristotle, *The Nicomachean Ethics*, 104.

principle: avoiding pain and pursuing pleasure. Humans can exceed this basic principle with their rational capacity. They can determine higher ends and move toward them. We can say that the rational/irrational pair that creates the fundamental distinction between humans and animals corresponds to the freedom/necessity pair.

Rationality, the capacity of rational contemplation, makes humans not only different from animals, but it also makes most like the gods and superior to all animals. After explaining the position of humans, who have the highest rank in nature, Aristotle tries to understand the mission, duty, or purpose of humans in this life. He contemplates nature and finds a rational order there. Each creature has different organs and abilities that these organs provide them. These abilities determine their purpose and characteristic in this life. Birds, insects, and butterflies have wings because they share a common purpose: flying. The defining characteristic of humans is rationality; therefore, the purpose of a human in this life is to live in accordance with rationality.

Aristotle thinks that happiness is the highest good and the end of human beings; happiness "by which he means not pleasure or material prosperity but rather a complex ideal of moral virtue achieved in community by dint of long practice and reflection."<sup>163</sup> Happiness depends on the capacity for rational deliberation. It is "a certain kind of activity of the soul in accordance with complete virtue."<sup>164</sup> In other words, happiness is possible by exercising moral virtues. Since only rational beings can have a capacity of choice, irrational beings cannot be virtuous. Unlike Plato, Aristotle thinks that nonhuman animals are not morally inferior but immoral beings. Virtue is possible only with living in a society, and it can be exercised in interaction

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<sup>163</sup> Steiner, *Anthropocentrism and Its Discontents*, 2005, 60.

<sup>164</sup> Aristotle, *The Nicomachean ethics*, 16.

with moral agents. Individuals who live out of society cannot be virtuous.<sup>165</sup> For the same reason, there cannot be a moral relationship between humans and animals. A human cannot be unjust to an animal.<sup>166</sup> Thereby, Aristotle excludes animals from the realm of morality. Animals are not morally inferior to humans, but they are immoral beings, so humans do not have any moral responsibility to animals.

After explaining the differences between beings and their purposes in this life, Aristotle is now able to explain the relationships between creatures in this world. He finds out that there is a rational order in the universe: "plants are for the sake of animals, and that the other animals are for the sake of humans, domestic ones both for using and eating, and if not all, nonetheless most, wild ones for food and other sorts of support, so that clothes and other instruments may be got from them. If then nature makes nothing incomplete and nothing pointlessly, it must be that nature made all of them for the sake of humans."<sup>167</sup> There is a hierarchy between creatures, and their rank is determined based on their abilities and the degree of these abilities. In this hierarchy, each being has a duty to the other to be subservient to their superiors. Based on these ideas, Aristotle develops his famous theory: the natural slavery theory.

For Plato, even animals possess rationality and have the capacity of belief, albeit to a low degree.<sup>168</sup> Besides, a human may be an animal in their next lives, or they could have been an animal in their previous life. Since animals need to live a virtuous life for their salvation, even animals are moral agents. Therefore, in Platonic philosophy,

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<sup>165</sup> Aristotle, *Politics*, 5.

<sup>166</sup> Aristotle, 4.

<sup>167</sup> Aristotle, 12.

<sup>168</sup> Steiner, *Anthropocentrism and Its Discontents*, 2005, 56.

the continuity between humans and animals is not denied. Although Aristotle has flawed this continuity and has increased the gap between humans and animals by conceiving rationality as the defining characteristics of humans and denying reason in animals, this continuity has not been annihilated yet. Rationality is not a substance, but it is a capacity; beings may differ in the degree of capacity. Nevertheless, the continuity between humans and animals is maintained with human-others viewed as less rational beings. In other words, the gap between humans and animals is filled by human-others who differ from fully humans by the degree of their participation in rationality.

Like Plato, Aristotle defines a living being as composed of soul and body, "and of these, the first is by nature the ruler, the latter by nature the ruled."<sup>169</sup> He thinks that "for the affective part to be ruled by the understanding and the part that has reason" who can make a rational choice for the benefit of both sides.<sup>170</sup> Therefore "it is in accord with nature and advantageous for the body to be ruled by the soul,"<sup>171</sup> the slave to be ruled by the master, and the irrational or less rational beings to be ruled by rational beings. For example, domestic animals are better than wild ones, and to be ruled by human beings is better for all of them to secure their preservation. Based on this idea, Aristotle develops his famous natural slavery theory that affirms domination of less rational beings by rational beings: "it must be the same way in the case of all human beings."<sup>172</sup> Aristotle continues:

Further, the relation of male to female is that of what is better by nature to what is worse, and that of ruler to ruled... Those people, then, who are as

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<sup>169</sup> Aristotle, *Politics*, 7.

<sup>170</sup> Aristotle, 7.

<sup>171</sup> Aristotle, 7.

<sup>172</sup> Aristotle, 7.

different [from others] as body is from soul or beast from human (and they are in this condition if their function is to use their bodies, and this the best thing to come from them)— those people are by nature slaves. It is evident, therefore, that by nature some people are free, and others are slaves, for whom slavery is both advantageous and just.<sup>173</sup>

Aristotle thinks slaves are a little different from animals since a slave "participates in reason enough to apprehend, but not have" it.<sup>174</sup> Because they do not have a reason, they also do not have the capacity for rational deliberation, and thus they cannot be virtuous. They can be owned and need to be ruled by the master. On the other hand, women have reason, but they do not have authority. He thinks that their degree of rationality is not enough to control their emotions. In a sense, women are less free than men by nature; therefore, their virtue is to obey men. Charlotte Witt cites from Cynthia Freeland as follows:

Aristotle says that the courage of a man lies in commanding, a woman's lies in obeying; that "matter yearns for form, as the female for the male and the ugly for the beautiful;" that women have fewer teeth than men; that a female is an incomplete male or "as it were, a deformity": which contributes only matter and not form to the generation of offspring; that in general "a woman is perhaps an inferior being"; that female characters in a tragedy will be inappropriate if they are too brave or too clever.<sup>175</sup>

Domination, in Aristotelian philosophy, is in accordance with the natural and rational order of nature. It is for the sake of both ruled and ruler, since being subservient to their superiors is in accordance with the hierarchical order of cosmos. Because humans are at the highest rank in the hierarchy of nature, they are morally

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<sup>173</sup> Aristotle, 6–7.

<sup>174</sup> Steiner, *Anthropocentrism and Its Discontents*, 2005, 61.

<sup>175</sup> Witt, "Feminist History of Philosophy," 3.



permissible to use, dominate and rule animals. Besides, the capacity of rationality determines the hierarchy between humans. In fact, for Aristotle, only free men are fully rational beings, and thus only they are fully human beings since rationality is the defining characteristic of humans while women who are less rational than men are inferior to men but superior to slaves who do not have reason. Slaves, who can apprehend reason but not have it, are superior to animals who do not have reason at all. While excluding animals from the realm of morality, Aristotle, by using the same way but in different degrees, also excludes human-others from the realm of morality by questioning or rejecting their rationality, and thus their humanity.

Aristotle takes forward Plato's rationalist tradition, which defines reason in opposition to the sphere of nature and defends the supremacy of reason over nature by maintaining "the traditional role of reason as the basis of human difference and identity and the chief justification of human superiority over nature."<sup>176</sup> He develops the rationalist-humanist western tradition, which will be one of the central ideologies of western societies for centuries. In this tradition, the realm of morality is limited only to humans. Humans are the source of all values, and nonhuman nature does not deserve moral consideration. Nevertheless, as we have seen, even the ancient version of humanist ideology is oppressive since the limit of the realm of human identity is at the mercy of the one who possesses the power to produce truth. Gines de Sepúlveda, an Aristotelian humanist scholar, defends the legitimacy of domination of natives depending on primarily the natural slavery theory of Aristotle. He claims that natives are not humans; they are barbarian and deserve domination. Western societies accept the theory of natural slavery during the medieval and early modern periods. Women, slaves, blacks, and all other human-others are conceived as less than human or nonhuman, and fully humans conceived themselves as morally permissible to dominate human-others.

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<sup>176</sup> Plumwood, *Feminism and the Mastery of Nature*, 15.

### 4.3. Descartes and Mind/Body Dualism

Descartes takes the third step in the formation of reason/nature and human/nature dualisms with his construction of nature itself as mindless. According to Descartes, nonhuman beings are not only devoid of reason but also lack all noncorporeal qualities such as mind and spirit. Animals are nothing but bodies as flesh, and they are defined as inanimate beings without a soul. Although Plato and Aristotle describe reason and nature as hierarchical and oppositionally, rationality can be present in the universe in different ways and degrees. However, Descartes abolished any commonalities between reason and nature; there is no question of having the capacity of reasoning, a soul among different beings, and he arrived at an absolute dualist philosophy.

How does Descartes arrive at an extreme dualist conception of mind and body, reason and nature, human and nonhuman? There are two ways to answer this question. First, we can answer it by following Plumwood's reading which focuses on the continuity between Plato, Aristotle, and Descartes; second, we can think on the differences and breaking points between hierarchical, asymmetrical, and dualist thinking while appealing to decolonial philosophers' criticism of Cartesian philosophy and Karayemiş's comparison between the image of thought of ancient philosophy and modern philosophy. After following Plumwood's reading of Descartes, I will discuss decolonial philosophers' criticism of Cartesian philosophy at the end of the chapter.

Plumwood thinks that Descartes developed this extreme dualist conception of mind and body by offering a different interpretation of reason. He "shifts the basis of mind from rationality to consciousness."<sup>177</sup> The nature of a mind, for Descartes, is thinking, and the term thought includes "everything that is in us in such a way that we are

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<sup>177</sup> Plumwood, 112.

immediately conscious of it."<sup>178</sup> Thinking is a conscious deed of consciousness, and "that there can be nothing in me of which I am in no way aware."<sup>179</sup>

The phrase of Descartes, I as a thinking thing that covers his philosophy from the beginning to end implies that ego, I, is identified only with the mind. I, as a subject, am a thinking thing.<sup>180</sup> To be subject, one needs to be a thinking thing and be conscious of the thought that the subject thinks. There is no "I" for one that has no mind. While the ego is associated with the mind, then the body is not the part of I; it is disjointed and alienated from "I." However, defining the nature of mind as thinking cannot provide the radical exclusion between mind and body. Descartes takes the third step of the dualist construction of mind and body with his definition of bodily sensations and mental sensations.

Descartes seems to follow the traditional distinction between sense perception and reason. What distinguishes Descartes from his antecedents is his interpreting bodily sensations as activities of the mind. He distinguishes sensations as modes of thought from sensations as modes of body. There are two kinds of sensations: an external substance's effect on the body and the mind's awareness, consciousness, contemplation of this effect. Only the second of these, the mind's consciousness of the effect, is construed as the activity of the self. Descartes says:

But it is also the case that the 'I' who imagines is the same 'I'. For even if, as I have supposed, none of the objects of imagination are real, the power of imagination is something which really exists and is part of my thinking. Lastly, it is also the same 'I' who has sensory perceptions, or is aware of bodily things as it were through the senses. For example, I am now seeing light, hearing a noise, feeling heat. But I am asleep, so all this is false. Yet I certainly

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<sup>178</sup> Descartes, *Meditations on first philosophy with selections from the Objections and replies*, 102.

<sup>179</sup> Descartes, 80.

<sup>180</sup> Descartes, 20.

seem to see, to hear, and to be warmed. This cannot be false; what is called 'having a sensory perception' is strictly just this, and in this restricted sense of the term it is simply thinking.... I now know that even bodies are not strictly perceived by the senses or the faculty of imagination but by the intellect alone, and that this perception derives not from their being touched or seen but from their being understood.<sup>181</sup>

Descartes reduces bodily sensations to mental sensations. An effect of an external matter on the body is not perception or sensation unless the mind reflects on this effect and understands it consciously. In this way, he claims the condition of sensation is the capacity of thinking and thus having a mind. In other words, if a being does not have a mind, it cannot think and be conscious of a sensation. Therefore, there is no perception or sensation for a being who does not have a mind. Cartesian conceptualization of mind, body, consciousness, and bodily sensations give rise to the three main ideas about animals.

Firstly, the Cartesian definition of mind eliminated differences in degree between beings. Before Descartes, rationality could present in nature in different ways and degrees. Rationality is a capacity; beings may differ in the degree of their capacity of rationality. According to Plato, even animals have rationality, albeit low. For Aristotle, there is a rational order in nature. However, once the mind is associated with thought and understanding, and once the mind is conceptualized as a substance, a being either has a mind or has not. There cannot be a difference in the degree of having a mind. This idea should be understood with Descartes' thought about methodology. Since there is no difference in the degree of having a mind, Descartes thinks that we can develop a philosophical methodology that enables even women to reach the truth.<sup>182</sup>

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<sup>181</sup> Descartes, 19.

<sup>182</sup> Lloyd, *The Man of Reason*, 43.

Secondly, Descartes rejects the capacity of perception and sensation of mindless beings by reducing perception and sensation to understanding. If a being does not have a mind, it cannot feel pain and pleasure. According to Aristotle, animals lack reason, but they have a soul and some mental capacities such as appetite, desire, sense perception, imagination. Reason and sense perception do not exclude each other, and they can present separately from each other. Descartes differs from Aristotle and his other predecessors by limiting the mental sphere to reason and consciousness. By doing that, he annihilates the continuum between mind and body, mental sensations and bodily sensations. The condition of sense-perception has a mind. If a being lacks reason (which is the idea defended by Aristotle), then it does not have a mind, and mental, noncorporeal capacities (which Aristotle does not defend). Because it does not have mental capacities, it cannot experience pain, pleasure, and bodily sensations. However, Descartes says that the condition of sense perception is the mind, and he rejects that animals have sense perception because they do not have a mind. He follows the traditional approach towards animals that denies their rationality, but he takes a step further and claims that animals do not have a mind, and thus a soul. Because they do not have a mind, they cannot feel pain and pleasure.<sup>183</sup>

Thirdly, the phrase "I think, therefore I am" says that the condition of being a subject, that is, of the existence of an I, is thinking. A being that cannot think has no mind is not a subject but only an object. When there is an effect on the body of a being who does not possess a mind, there is no subject, no I for this being, who will notice this effect. Pain or pleasure can be possible only with the presence and reference of a subject; it is a subjective experience of a subject. There is no difference between hitting a table and an animal, for Descartes, because there is no 'one' who can experience pain.

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<sup>183</sup> Descartes, *A Discourse on the Method of Correctly Conducting One's Reason and Seeking Truth in the Sciences*, 46–48.

The Aristotelian justification of oppression of nonhuman animals based on the superior rank of humans sustained by their proximity to logos is provided within a moral framework. In other words, for Aristotle, the domination of animals by humans is a moral relationship. On the other hand, Descartes rejects a rational order or a cosmic scheme of nature and the idea that each being has a purpose, agency, or autonomy. Therefore, nature "can be seen as merely our thing... it can impose no constraints on our treatment of it; it can be seen as something utterly neutral on which humans can and even must impose their own goals, purposes and significance."<sup>184</sup> Hereafter, there is no moral value of nature and no necessity of justifying domination of nature. There is infinite freedom for humans in their domination of nature.

I believe that the Cartesian image of nature that does not leave any space for independence, agency, and diversity is so cruel that his denial of the capacity of animals to feel pain and pleasure is of secondary importance. Even the idea that animals do not deserve moral considerations because they do not have the capacity and self to experience pain is a moral explanation; in fact, this is not a cruel idea since there is a moral explanation for the domination of nonhumans. What is truly terrifying in Descartes' philosophy is that he does not recognize any independence, value, self-direction area to nature and encodes human's relation to nature only as a relation of domination.

Plato, Aristotle, and Descartes agree about the relationship between soul and body. For Descartes, too, the body is the other of the mind; it is disjoined to the whole body.<sup>185</sup> The body is the very first other of the self. The mind (the self) is the ruler of the body (the very first other); therefore, the relationship of the self with the very first other is fundamentally a relationship of the ruling. It is not surprising, then, that in

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<sup>184</sup> Plumwood, *Feminism and the Mastery of Nature*, 110.

<sup>185</sup> Descartes, *A Discourse on the Method of Correctly Conducting One's Reason and Seeking Truth in the Sciences*, 340.

the rationalist tradition, the self's relationship with the sphere of nature, or bodily sphere, has been formed as a relationship of domination. Hence, Descartes advances this construction of self as a ruler of the bodily sphere by depicting nature as a machine. Since nature is devoid of teleology, origination power, agency, Descartes explains the movement of nature with mechanism. The new image of nature (and the body) is a mindless machine, and it changes the severity and dimension of humans' domination of nature, as Plumwood states:

The machine image confirms the new confidence in control as well as the narrow and instrumental view of nature associated with a technological outlook. The machine's properties are contrived for its maker's benefit, and its canons of virtue reflect its users' interests. If well made, it contains few surprises and superfluities: it does not outrun us, and we can hope to attain a complete knowledge of it. A machine is made to be controlled, and knowledge of its operation is the means to power over it.<sup>186</sup>

The depiction of nature as a mechanism increases the power and importance of knowledge and confidence in reason. Once they attain complete knowledge of it, humans can be the master and possessors of nature and control and direct it concerning their needs and desires. With the change of the image of nature, the image of humans in their relationship with nature changes too. Hereafter, the new image of humans is the master of nature:

For these notions have made me see that it is possible to attain knowledge which is very useful in life, and that unlike the speculative philosophy that is taught in the schools, it can be turned into a practice by which, knowing the power and action of fire, water, air, stars, the heavens, and all the other bodies that are around us as distinctly as we know the different trades of our craftsmen, we could put them to all the uses for which they are suited and thus make ourselves as it were the masters and possessors of nature.<sup>187</sup>

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<sup>186</sup> Plumwood, *Feminism and the Mastery of Nature*, 109.

<sup>187</sup> Descartes, *A Discourse on the Method of Correctly Conducting One's Reason and Seeking Truth in the Sciences*, 51.

For Plato, the bodily, material sphere is an epistemological and moral obstacle for human beings, the union of the soul and the body, to learn the truth and live a virtuous life for their salvation by the soul's subjugation of the body. However, the truth is still sought in the universe, which can be thought of as the union of cosmos and chaos, where cosmos subjugates chaos to sustain harmony in the universe. For Plato and Aristotle, humans have the highest rank in the hierarchy of the earth, while the value of nonhuman nature is assessed in terms of their being subjugated by humans to serve their goods and benefits. To state again, Plato's Republic, there is no place for wild animals whom humans cannot subjugate. Domination is the part of the rational order of nature; it is for the benefit of both ruled and ruler since irrational beings need to be ruled by rational beings, as we have seen both in the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle.

As I mentioned Plato and Aristotle's effects on Christian thought, we can think of Cartesian philosophy as the secularization of dualist philosophy. Christianity separates body and soul, and the soul is seen as superior as it is defined as eternal while the body is earthly, mortal, and so, inferior. In a sense, Descartes, who has been educated at the Jesuit School, has secularized this mind-body dualism of Christianity. The second defining characteristic of the colonial self is the coloniality of Being that divides the reality into two and monopolizes the superior sphere. After Christianity separated God from nature, Cartesian dualism separated humans from nature and split reality into two substances: mind and body. Mignolo states:

Secularization was able to detach God from Nature (which was unthinkable among Indigenous and Sub-Saharan Africans, for example; and unknown among Jews and Muslims). The next step was to detach, consequently, Nature from Man (e.g., Frances Bacon's *Novum Organum*, 1620). 'Nature' became the sphere of living organisms to be conquered and vanquished by Man.<sup>188</sup>

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<sup>188</sup> Mignolo, "Dispensable and Bare Lives: Coloniality and the Hidden Political/Economic Agenda of Modernity," 87.



Descartes' philosophy changes humans' relationship with nature radically. By rejecting vitality, soul, and the moral worth of nature, he opens infinite freedom of nature in their relationship with nature. By constructing nature as a machine, he envisages a new mission/role for humans; to be the master of nature by attaining knowledge of its operation. For Aristotle, dominating nature is a moral relationship, but for Descartes, there is no more moral status of nature whose all meanings emptied and intrinsic values denied. I think Cartesian philosophy has made a great contribution to the development of the repressive role of reason in western culture. Modern colonial self conceives humans mastery of nature, and conquering the other as the condition of being recognized, achieving self-consciousness, and development and actualization of one's potential,<sup>189</sup> as I will explain in a moment. As Plumwood says, "The continual and cumulative overcoming of the domain of nature by reason engenders the western concept of progress and development."<sup>190</sup>

#### **4.4. Cartesian Dualism and the Western Colonial Self**

Cartesian mind/body dualism, and the new mission of human, which is to be the master of nature by attaining knowledge of it, have significant effects on shaping the modern colonial subjectivity and its conception of the other. Hereafter, nature is the object of knowledge, and the new relation of the self and the other is the subject/object relationship. Decolonial philosophers criticized the effect of changing the image of nature and the relationship of human/nature in modern colonial subjectivity. While identities of women, people of color, slaves, animals, nature are associated with physicality and nature, free, European, men are associated with mental and rationality in the philosophies of Plato, Aristotle, and Christian thought that has been shaped and affected by Plato and Aristotle. Thus, "Descartes only adds a layer of

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<sup>189</sup> Burkhart, *Indigenizing Philosophy through the Land*, 18.

<sup>190</sup> Plumwood, *Feminism and the Mastery of Nature*, 3.

illusory philosophical universality to this local European and Christian ideology."<sup>191</sup>

Burkhart continues:

Because of their bodily and natural state, non-European people become "dominable and exploitable" and "considered as an object of knowledge" (Quijano, 2000, 555). Indigenous people, because they are only bodily and natural, have no rationality since this resides solely in the mind. Indigenous people are then not capable of having knowledge but only being objects of knowledge because they are bodily and not rational.<sup>192</sup>

As we have seen, in the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle, domination of nature and domination of human-others are explained and justified on the same moral ground. However, while examining the philosophy of Descartes, I showed only his justification of the domination of nature because, in fact, we do not see anything about the domination of humans in his philosophy. Quite the contrary, Cartesian philosophy is the state of the art of the rationalist-humanist philosophy with the idea that "all humanity possesses a common nature or potential,"<sup>193</sup> which is the mind. Descartes aims to eliminate inequality between humans by developing a philosophical methodology that all humans can reach the truth regardless of their sexes and races. This is because his philosophy considers the mind as a substance that does not include any differences in the degree of the capacity of rationality.

Since we have found the interconnection between the oppression of humans and oppression of nature, as changing the conception of nature is affiliated with the colonists' perception of the colonized, and the conception of humans affiliated with colonists' perception of his self, the new image of nature (as the old ones) serves both the legitimization of the exploitation of nature and also the exploitation of other

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<sup>191</sup> Burkhart, *Indigenizing Philosophy through the Land*, 15.

<sup>192</sup> Burkhart, 15.

<sup>193</sup> Plumwood, *Feminism and the Mastery of Nature*, 105.

identities. In other words, the change of the definition of reason and images attributed to human identity does not change the scope (extension) of this identity. However, it furthers oppression and the self's repressive relations with the human-others whose humanity is denied. Maldonado-Torres says:

The Cartesian idea about the division between *res cogitans* and *res extensa* (consciousness and matter) which translates itself into a divide between the mind and the body or between the human and nature is preceded and even, one has the temptation to say, to some extent built upon an anthropological colonial difference between the *ego conquistador* and the *ego conquistado*. The very relationship between colonizer and colonized provided a new model to understand the relationship between the soul or mind and the body; and likewise, modern articulations of the mind/body are used as models to conceive the colonizer/colonized relation, as well as the relation between man and woman, particularly the woman of color.<sup>194</sup>

Images of nature are used to legitimize oppression of both nature and humans, and Cartesian dualism secularized the way of legitimizing the exploitation, colonization, and domination of the indigenous people by changing the image of nature. As Quijano puts it, "objectification of the body as nature"<sup>195</sup> makes domination and exploitation of the Indians and the violence inflicted on them legitimized because, as we have seen in the Valladolid Debate, of the idea that the Indians are barbaric, animal-like, soulless and irrational beings. I analyzed Sepúlveda's arguments in this chapter, but the last argument is particularly critical to understanding the development of the repressive mode of reason in western civilization.

Sepúlveda, in his second argument, denies reason in natives. Aristotle believes that only humans can think. Therefore, if the Indians cannot think, they are not human beings. However, Aristotle thinks a slight difference between irrational humans (such as slaves) and animals, and he does not deny the soul of irrational beings. The third

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<sup>194</sup> Maldonado-Torres, "On the Coloniality of Being," 245–46.

<sup>195</sup> Quijano and Ennis, "Coloniality of Power, Eurocentrism, and Latin America," 555.

argument of Sepúlveda, which is that the natives are homunculi, confirms Dussel's idea that we can find the preliminary findings of Cartesian ego in the Valladolid Debate. Homunculi are human-looking animals, and "they have no soul."<sup>196</sup> The previous argument of Sepúlveda, which reflects Aristotelian philosophy's approach to women and slaves, calls the other who differs from him as less than human. Hence, in this argument, he denies the humanity and soul of the Indians. Two questions complement each other I want to ask. First, how can Sepúlveda dare to deny the humanity of natives at all and question the existence of their souls? Second, is there anything that can prevent the Cartesian subject, who thinks that animals lack sensation because they cannot think, from rejecting the humanity of the Indians?

For Plato and Aristotle, rationalism can be understood as defending the supremacy of reason over nature since they have no complete dualist conception of reason and nature. For Descartes, who completed the formation of mind/body, human/nature dualisms by defining reason and nature, mind and body, and human and nonhuman nature radically exclusive from each other, there is a radical change in the meaning of rationalism and humanism since, as stated before, dualist thinking demands and causes radical changes in the epistemological and metaphysical perspective of the self.

Firstly, for ancient philosophers, thinking is contemplating the cosmos, questioning the cosmic order which is thought to be perfect and excellent, to imitate it in their lives and societies. On the other hand, Descartes begins his meditations with the allegory of the evil demon who tries to deceive him. Karayemiş says that this evil demon is none other than nature.<sup>197</sup> While trying to avoid the deceptions of the sphere of nature and body, in search of truth, the first truth Descartes finds is his existence that provides him a reliable ground to found his philosophy. In other words,

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<sup>196</sup> Smith, *Less than Human*, 217.

<sup>197</sup> Karayemiş, "Yeni Materyalizm 1: Giriş, Bağlamlar 1."

Descartes shifts the basis of philosophy from the cosmos to the subject. In Cartesian philosophy, the new image of thought and the new meaning of thinking is making connections between ideas no matter whose existence by themselves are unimportant or of secondary importance but in any case, provided by subjects who can think and make connections. The truth is not something to be found but something produced by the subject.

Secondly, for Plato and Aristotle, the philosopher contemplates the sphere of nature, cosmos, and its' order to practice it in their lives and societies. For Descartes, the philosopher contemplates on nature to attain its' complete knowledge as the means of power over it and calls humans to be the master of nature who controls it concerning their needs and desire. Cartesian philosophy links human/nature dualism to subject/object dualism; the sphere of nature deprived of all noncorporeal qualities is nothing more than the object of knowledge.

Lastly, the Cartesian subject colonizes truth; nothing can inspect the truth of the one who considers himself settling on the universal point of view. The one who settles in the universal point of view, the reference of truth, speaks only truth. As we have seen in the previous chapter, the oppressive subjectivity colonizes truth to both provide and secure the validity of dualist reality and the legitimacy of oppression by developing epistemological strategies that are mostly inconsistent and paradoxical. Since the oppressor conceives his point of view as the reference of truth, his truth cannot be checked and inspected. The value of the oppressor's truth is not assessed in terms of consistency but to the extent of serving for his goods and benefits.

Likewise, Aristotle denies reason in animals, but he never loses his head to deny soul in animals because his philosophy is checked and inspected by the sphere of nature. However, Descartes is able to reject the soul of animals easily. While doing that, he "does not argue that animals have sensation, and therefore must think, but instead that they cannot think (reason), and therefore must lack true sensation."<sup>198</sup> Cartesian

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<sup>198</sup> Plumwood, *Feminism and the Mastery of Nature*, 113.

rationalism claims its' point of view as universal, and it has the power to produce a truth that does not need to be checked and inspected by the material sphere. As a result, we can see that the radical changes in the self of the oppressor caused by the dualist thinking discussed in the previous chapter correspond to the Cartesian dualist philosophy.

To conclude, since oppressive subjectivity is mainly based on dualist contrasts and dichotomies such as mind/body, human/nature, rational/irrational, self/other, and subject/object, by re-reading the rationalist tradition in western tradition through Plato, Aristotle, and Descartes, I tried to show the ontological and moral contexts of the interconnection between different modes of oppression, and the development of reason/nature, human/nature dualisms in this philosophical tradition. All these philosophers can find the logic of domination, even in their definition of the self-other as a ruling or property relations. These philosophers assert that the superior sides of dualist pairs have the right to (or should) subjugate the other by giving different but similar accounts for their justification.

In the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle, the legitimacy of the oppression is provided by conceiving of the other as less rational, irrational, and thus the dehumanizing of the other. In Cartesian philosophy, nature is perceived as passive, devoid of mental abilities and agency, an inanimate, soulless object the conqueror over which achieves his humanity with this conquest, consequently defining the human as the only one who has rationality and agency. I also tried to show the unique role and the reflection of the change and development of reason/nature dualism in the justification and conception of oppression made by these philosophers. Decolonial philosophers' criticism of Cartesian philosophy and its' effect on the development of western colonial ego shows the interconnection between the oppression of humans and oppression of nature as changing the conception of nature is affiliated with the oppressor's perception of the other, the conception of humans affiliated with oppressor's perception of his self. I claim that Descartes develops the most repressive

image of reason. For the Cartesian subject who denies soul in animals, nothing can constrain him to deny the soul of the Indians. I believe that we should read Sepulveda's last argument in this manner. The consequences of rejecting the soul of Indians were ways crueller than Plato and Aristotle's conceiving of human-others as less than human, as Bartolome de Las Casas depicts in his book.<sup>199</sup> Indigenous people are not believed to have a soul and mind during the early modern and modern periods, so a being who cannot suffer, feel, or think will fall outside the legal norms applicable to humans or any sentient beings.

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<sup>199</sup> Casas, *la Desturucion de las Indias*

## CHAPTER 5

### ANALYZING THE INTERCONNECTIONS BETWEEN FORMS OF OPPRESSION THROUGH CONTRACT THEORIES

I have examined the epistemological, metaphysical, moral interconnections between forms of oppression by developing oppressive subjectivity that functions to create, maintain, and justify oppression in the previous chapters. In this chapter, I will try to understand how oppression is socialized and institutionalized by offering a way of reading Hobbes' and Locke's ideal contract theories that explain and justify social and moral norms and provide a method to establish ideal societies, and Pateman's and Mills' non-ideal contract theories that questions how the oppression of women, and nonwhites are created, maintained, and justified. I suggest that we can read social contract theories as they produce a particular subjectivity which I shall show is oppressive since these theories justify oppression of nonhuman nature by construing humans as superior to nonhuman nature. As I will show, Hobbes' and Locke's social contract theories and their ideas on morality and politics can be read as reflecting Western rationalist and humanist tradition.

Contractarianism, a prevailing social and political theory for the last four centuries of western societies, is a generative framework that provides a holistic and consistent view for studying both the moral and political dimensions of a particular topic. It is mainly known as a political theory since it questions the legitimacy of the political authority. However, it is also a moral theory that questions the origin, legitimacy of moral norms, and the scope of moral consideration. It is clear that the crisis Leviathan responds to is primarily political, and its central theme is the legitimization of political



authority. The traditional idea that God appoints monarchs as a political authority began to be questioned during the Renaissance and Enlightenment.

For this reason, Hobbesian and the other classical contract theories<sup>200</sup> are primarily discussed in political philosophy and political science. In a system of thought in which the existence of a god does not provide its basis, it is necessary to provide an account of the legitimacy of both legal and moral norms. If there is no God, why should anyone continue to obey the legal or moral norms? In other words, the denial of God demolishes the legitimacy of both political and moral norms. Furthermore, in the classical contract theories, the state's first and foremost responsibility is to keep humans in awe and "tie them by fear of punishment to the performance of their covenants," which are agreements on the goodness of moral values.<sup>201</sup> Therefore, after giving an account for morality and moral norms, contractarianists began to discuss the responsibility and legitimacy of political authority and norms. In fact, they also discuss the nature and principle of morality, though they do not cover much of its' ground. In this sense, it can be said that moral norms regulate relations between individuals while legal norms regulate the relationship between the state and society.

The great virtue of contract theory is its capturing of the factual truth that morality, state, politics are socially constructed; "society and the polity are human-made – not organic 'natural' growths or the product of divine creation."<sup>202</sup> Although the classical contractarianist (Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau) accounts of morality are superficial and sometimes vague, it is indisputably clear that contractarianism is used and recommended as a methodology in explaining and determining moral norms. Yet,

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<sup>200</sup> Hobbes, *Leviathan*; Rousseau, *The Social Contract; and the First and Second Discourses*; Locke, *Second Treatise of Government and A Letter Concerning Toleration*.

<sup>201</sup> Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 111.

<sup>202</sup> Pateman and Mills, *Contract and Domination*, 85.

until contemporary philosophers, contractarianism has not been developed as a distinctive methodology of moral philosophy. This methodology is expressed by Darwall as follows:

Morality can be thought of as an especially broad and pervasive form of cooperation. Principles of moral right and wrong can then be understood as rules, specifying requirements, permissions, and so on, that underlie the broadest possible cooperation, namely a cooperative scheme that involves not just this or that group, community, or political unit, but all competent human or rational agents. According to contractarianism, therefore, whether an action is right or wrong is determined by rules of cooperation of this broadest sort.<sup>203</sup>

Moral and social norms are not intrinsically good, but they are good because these norms are humans' ways out of war, means of peace, and a secured and sociable life. Hobbes enunciates these virtues are humans' "conclusions or theorems concerning what conduceth to the conservation and defence of themselves."<sup>204</sup> The legitimacy of morality consists of humans' agreement on the goodness of these virtues. In other words, contract theory claims that moral norms are the result of an agreement by equal individuals; "so that whether an action is right or wrong must depend on whether the act accords with or violates principles that are, or would be, the object of a suitable agreement between equals."<sup>205</sup> Thus, the value of social and political norms comes from their serving for a better life of humans, and their validity comes from the agreement of humans on their goodness.

Mills emphasizes the role of epistemology for the contract theories. He says that the social contract includes an epistemological contract which we most of the time overlook of it:

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<sup>203</sup> Darwall, *Contractarianism, Contractualism*, 3.

<sup>204</sup> Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 106.

<sup>205</sup> Darwall, *Contractarianism, Contractualism*, 4.

The "social contract" is actually several contracts in one. Contemporary contractarians usually distinguish, to begin with, between the political contract and the moral contract, before going on to make (subsidiary) distinctions within both. I contend, however, that the orthodox social contract also tacitly presupposes an "epistemological" contract, and that for the Racial Contract it is crucial to make this explicit.<sup>206</sup>

The political contract describes the origin and the legitimacy of the state, the political norms and obligations to it, while the moral contract describes the nature of the moral norms that regulate the social life and the relationship between individuals. The epistemological contract is a set of agreements on interpreting diversity to determine and make a distinction between full persons and subpersons. It makes a definition of a full person who has the capacity to make a contract and considers some individuals as having these criteria.

Consequently, moral and political contracts regulate the distribution of rights and freedom of individuals who make the contract, while epistemological contract determines who are to be considered as individuals in the realm of morality and politics. Based on the connection between morality, politics, and epistemology in contract theories, I claim that a contract corresponds to a particular subjectivity; by making a contract, parties produce a subjectivity; by signing a contract, individuals adopt a particular subjectivity. Therefore, the contract theories can be read as a framework that explains how a subjectivity is produced and socialized. I have defined subjectivity as a particular way of thinking, feeling, conceiving, perceiving that reflects and shapes how one views oneself and others and their social, moral, or political values. A subjectivity reflects and shapes one's epistemology, morality, and political values. The contract, then, determines moral and political norms, and also construes identities of subjects in terms of their moral and political status.

An oppressive subjectivity creates, maintains, and justifies oppression. I argue that classical contract theories are oppressive, and the subjectivity their contracts produce

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<sup>206</sup> Mills, *Racial Contract*, 9.

are oppressive since they, as I will show, create, maintain, and justify oppression of (at least animals). Their theories include both the logic of domination and the dualist way of thinking, which are the two primary conditions of oppressive subjectivity. Furthermore, signing by subjects the oppressor's contract establishes a social order, but also this order is arranged to ensure the sustainability of re-production of this subjectivity.

Unsurprisingly, as Pateman<sup>207</sup> will show, in the classical contract theories (except Hobbes), women are not viewed as having the criteria of making a contract. Since they are excluded from the bargaining process of the social contract, their rights and benefits are not considered by those who make the contract, and men's oppression of women is justified and explained in this way. These theories reflect the moral values of western societies. Although contractarianists introduce a new methodology for establishing an ideal society and determining ideal social and political norms, they never question the established social values of their societies. They continued to defend the traditional approach towards women, slaves, other human-others, and animals in their theories. Pateman's criticism of the classical contract theories deserve a lengthy quotation:

When individuals must freely agree or contract to be governed, the corollary is that they may refuse to be bound. Since the seventeenth century, when doctrines of individual freedom and equality and or contract first became the basis for general theories of social life, conservatives of all kinds have feared that this possibility would become reality and that contract theory would therefore become destructive of social order. Children, servants, wives, peasants, workers and subjects and citizens in the state would, it was feared, cease to obey their superiors if the bond between them came to be understood as merely conventional or contractual, and thus open to the whim and caprice of voluntary commitment. Conservatives had both cause to be alarmed and very little cause at all. The cause for alarm was that, in principle, it is hard to see why a free and equal individual should have sufficiently good reason to subordinate herself to another. Moreover, in practice, political movements have arisen over the past three centuries that have attempted to replace institutions structured by subordination with institutions constituted by free

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<sup>207</sup> Pateman, *The Sexual Contract*.

relationships. However, the anxiety was misplaced, not only because these political movements have rarely been successful, but because the alarm about contract theory was groundless. Rather than undermining subordination, contract theories justified modern civil subjection.<sup>208</sup>

We have seen a similar approach in Plato and Aristotle. While the major philosophers of the Western societies questioned the nature of morality, the good, the right, or the ideal society, they preserved the established values of their societies. I claimed that these philosophers were accepted by their society for this reason. Likewise, while questioning the possibility of the ideal society, the state, the contracting philosophers preserved the established values of their societies. This does not mean that these philosophers did not bring anything new in philosophy; however, they did not say anything critical about domination; on the contrary, they justified domination with the theory they developed.

All social contract theories, and the subjectivity they produce, exclude animals from the realm of morality and justify oppression of nature, as I will show below. Moreover, the social contract theories can be read as fiction that tells how humans separated themselves from nature and created human/nature, the state of nature/civil society dualisms. Nevertheless, if one subjectivity is oppressive and conceives power as power-over and legitimizes oppression of any identity, we cannot limit the realm of oppression. The one who takes power for oppression, centralizes, and monopolizes power, will also monopolize the truth and can change the definition or scope of full personhood, and thus make an epistemological contract. In other words, since the contract serves for the benefits of equal individuals who make the contract, it is clear that neither animals nor women or other human-others are considered as equal individuals but only those in power who have the epistemological and metaphysical power to create dualist moral and political spheres and exclude some (either human or nonhuman) beings from the moral and political sphere.

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<sup>208</sup> Pateman, 40.

Of course, I am not the first who articulates the idea that the social contract theories are oppressive. In *The Sexual Contract*, Pateman is the first to develop a non-ideal contract theory showing that the social contract theories are patriarchal. She reads the social contract theories to show how they have legitimized the oppression of women and what is the reflection of these theories in the patriarchal structure of modern societies. Charles Mills, in his book *The Racial Contract*, follows the non-ideal contract tradition initiated by Pateman. However, he instead uses the contract as a metaphor to reveal the racist structure of modern societies. Whites made the Racial Contract on nonwhites to create, maintain, and justify oppression of nonwhites. This contract also includes an epistemological contract that conceives nonwhites as less than human, nonhuman, or animal-like beings. To understand the moral and political dimensions of the interconnection between forms of oppression and the role of oppression of nature, I will first introduce Hobbesian and Lockean contract theories and the moral state of animals in these theories.

### **5.1. Ideal Contract Theories**

The classical contract theories are both descriptive and prescriptive since they "intended simultaneously to describe the nature of political societies and prescribe a new and more defensible form for such societies."<sup>209</sup> They describe the origin of society, morality, state, and politics and explain why humans felt the necessity to establish a society, state, and form moral and political norms. To give account for these questions, they begin their theories by implementing a thought experiment to depict the conditions of humans before establishing the state and civilization. They have different depictions of the state of nature, and these differences caused them to give different explanations about the nature of morality and politics. It is not important to question the rightness of their depiction of the state of nature for this research. Yet, it is essential to understand the differences between the state of nature and civil society and its' parallel with the articulated differences between humans and nonhuman animals.

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<sup>209</sup> Hampton, *The Intrinsic Worth of Persons*, 382.

### 5.1.1. Hobbes' Social Contract

For Hobbes, in the state of nature, the right of nature, the unlimited freedom of pursuing any deed that will preserve his or her life, is the only right humans possess. Because human nature is "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short," in the state of nature, individuals "are in that condition which is called war; and such a war as is of every man against every man."<sup>210</sup> The state of nature was not individuals' best interests, and they find it "as an undesirable circumstance and therefore successfully attempt to avoid it, and their way of avoiding it would involve contracting."<sup>211</sup>

Hobbes tries to understand humans' unique capacity that makes them able to make the contract. While he compares humans' capacities with animals, he does not deny reason in animals. Understanding is common to animals and humans, and animals too have the capacity of prudence and deliberation<sup>212</sup> but, the degree of the capacity of the rationality of humans is higher than animals: humans excel in their capacity of understanding, rationality by their ability to recognize the consequences of their action. The other fundamental difference between humans and nonhuman animals is speaking capacity. To make a contract, one needs to have the ability to speak. Therefore, for Hobbes, "To make covenants with brute beasts, is impossible; because not understanding our speech, they understand not, nor accept of any translation of right; nor can translate any right to another: and without mutual acceptation, there is no covenant."<sup>213</sup>

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<sup>210</sup> Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 84.

<sup>211</sup> Sachs, *Contractarianism, Role Obligations, and Political Morality*, 3.

<sup>212</sup> Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 15.

<sup>213</sup> Hobbes, 92.

Since the realm of morality is limited to those who are the parties to the contract, animals, who do not have the ability to make a contract, are excluded from morality. If one is not the subject of a contract, it is the object of the contract. Subjects of the contract have the right to use the objects of the contract, and the contract regulates how they share and distribute their rights on the objects of the contract. Nonhuman nature, with all animals and plants, is given and created for the sake of humans: "For the matter of this nutriment, consisting in animals, vegetals, and minerals, God hath freely laid them before us, in or near to the face of the earth; so as there needeth no more but the labour, and industry of receiving them. Insomuch as plenty dependeth (next to God's favour) merely on the labour and industry of men."<sup>214</sup>

### 5.1.2. Locke's Social Contract

Lockean social contract theory differs from Hobbes' fundamentally in his depiction of the state of nature. Locke, contrary to Hobbes, does not define the state of nature as the amoral situation of humans. In the state of nature, humans are morally bound to each other since "the state of nature has a law of nature to govern it, which obliges every one: and reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind, who will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions..."<sup>215</sup> In the state of nature, the law of nature, reason, regulates the relationship between free and equal individuals. Hence, humans may commit a crime by violating the law of nature and stray from the right rule of reason. A victim has the right to punishment, and reparation, however, "that ill nature, passion and revenge will carry them too far in punishing others; and hence nothing but confusion and disorder will follow, and that therefore God hath certainly appointed government to restrain the partiality and violence of men."<sup>216</sup> In other

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<sup>214</sup> Hobbes, 163.

<sup>215</sup> Locke, *Second Treatise of Government and A Letter Concerning Toleration*, 8.

<sup>216</sup> Locke, 12.



words, humans establish a state, civil government by "agreeing together mutually to enter into one community, and make one body politic"<sup>217</sup> to prevent crimes, and protect freedom, equality, and properties of individuals.

Property is the central concept of Lockean social contract theory. The definition of human and the difference between human and animal is having the capacity to own his self. While the state of nature is moral, and the fundamental difference between the state of nature and civil society is establishing a state, the chief end" of civil society "is the preservation of property."<sup>218</sup> Civil society is the sphere of individuals who have property in their own persons<sup>219</sup> and where the individuals' rights and properties are protected and regulated by laws. Animals whose rationality is denied do not have the capacity of having property in their own persons; this makes them the property of humans and the object of the contract that aims to protect the property of the subject of the contract.

The relation between the state of nature and civil society is defined as a property relation. Locke says that the "earth, and all that is therein, is given to men for the support and comfort of their being... Though the earth, and all inferior creatures, be common to all men, yet every man has a property in his own person: this no body has any right to but himself."<sup>220</sup> All humans have equal rights in nature, and animals, plants, and all nonhuman nature are the common property of humans in civil society. Through labor, an individual annexes a part of nature, an animal, or land, and excludes the common right of other humans: "for being a beast that is still looked

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<sup>217</sup> Locke, 13.

<sup>218</sup> Locke, 45.

<sup>219</sup> Locke, 19.

<sup>220</sup> Locke, 18.

upon as common, and no man's private possession; whoever has employed so much labour about any of that kind, as to find and pursue her, has thereby removed her from the state of nature, wherein she was common, and hath begun a property."<sup>221</sup> In other words, animals, plants, and other nonhuman nature can be present in civil society only by being a property of a particular individual.

### 5.1.3. Nonhuman Nature and Ideal Contract Theories

As we have seen in the theories of Hobbes and Locke, the social contract established the social order to protect and distribute equal individuals' rights and freedoms. Since only humans have the capacity to make the contract, and it is not possible to make a contract with nonhumans, then the social contract excludes nonhumans from the domain of justice:

As such, animals remain outside of the contracting process, and thus outside of the domain of justice. While some contemporary thinkers have attempted to reconcile contractarianism with the extension of justice to animals, the legacy of contract-based political theory for animals has primarily been exclusion.<sup>222</sup>

As stated before, the social contract includes an epistemological contract that determines who are to be considered persons who have the capacity to be the party of the contract (and rationality is the shared criteria for all of them). It is clear that the epistemological contract of Hobbes, Locke, and the other classical contractarianists, namely Rousseau and Kant, reject animals for being party to the contract. Some scholars argue against the idea that animals do not have this capacity, such as Erasmus Darwin: "does not daily observation convince us that they form contracts of friendship with each other, [and] with mankind? ... And does not your favorite dog

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<sup>221</sup> Locke, 20.

<sup>222</sup> Cochrane, *An Introduction to Animals and Political Theory*, 23.

expect you should give him his daily food, for his services and attention to you?"<sup>223</sup> However, this thesis does not attempt to argue against or try to confute an idea; it only evaluates ideas in terms of oppression. I have stated that social contracts produce an oppressive subjectivity, and people make an agreement on an oppressive subjectivity by making a contract. I believe we can find two common features of oppressive subjectivity, the logic of domination and dualist thinking, in the social contract theories.

The social contract theories have the logic of domination, which assumes that superiority justifies subordination, as their moral assumption, yet their way of explaining the logic of domination is different. For Plato and Aristotle, as an example, in the hierarchy of the universe, the superiors have right to rule their inferiors; moreover, the ruling is also for the benefit of the one that is ruled. For contractarianists, because moral norms are socially constructed, and they are created and determined for the benefits of the makers of the contract, animals who are irrational or less rational beings are not viewed in the realm of morality. Therefore, humans do not have any moral consideration for animals.

The logic of domination transforms differences between species into moral and political difference, superiority (rationality) into moral and political superiority, and diversity into a dualism of two realms: the state of nature and civil society. Here, we see that reason/nature dualism is linked to the state of nature/civil society dualism. State of nature/civil society dualism corresponds to moral/immoral dualism since only beings in civil society deserve moral consideration. It is slavery/freedom dualism and political difference, since only beings in the civil society deserve equal rights, justice, and freedom.

We can also think of the similarities between Hobbes' philosophy with Plato and Aristotle. There is no complete human/nature dualism in the Hobbesian social

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<sup>223</sup> Pateman, "The Sexual Contract and the Animals," 71.

contract theory since animals are thought to have rationality, and their commonalities with humans are not denied. However, similar to Plato, humans are superior to animals with their higher rational capacity, which justifies their oppression of animals. Besides, similar to Aristotle, animals lack the capacity to speak, which makes them excluded from the realm of morality and politics and annihilates humans' moral responsibility to animals. For Aristotle, "what makes human beings peculiarly suited to the form of political association in which happiness is the end, is the fact that human beings have been endowed by nature 'with the gift of speech' whereas other animals merely possess 'voice'..."<sup>224</sup> On the other hand, human/nature dualism is more explicit in Locke's social contract theory. Like Descartes, Locke thinks of nonhuman nature as devoid of rationality. As I will discuss later in this chapter, he reduces their status to mere property, which has no intrinsic value.

Thus, I showed the interconnection between forms of oppression through oppressive subjectivity and how the oppression of nature is used to explain and justify the oppression of human-others by conceiving them as less than human or nonhuman. That will go the same for contractarianism. Those in power produce subjectivity, determining the scope of equal individuals considered in civil society. At first glance, we see that all humans are in the civil society, but as non-ideal contract theories show, women and other human-others are not conceived as fully humans; they share a common (or similar) fate with animals. After introducing two non-ideal contract theories, The Sexual Contract and The Racial Contract, I will question if we can develop another contract, namely The Nature Contract, that creates, maintains, and justifies the speciesist structure of societies.

## **5.2. Non-Ideal Contract Theories**

While the classical contract theories in the liberal tradition have developed on the basis of the notion of a contract that maintains a social order to protect the rights of

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<sup>224</sup> Steiner, *Anthropocentrism and Its Discontents*, 2005, 62.

equal individuals, contemporary philosophical thinkers such as Carole Pateman<sup>225</sup> and Charles Mills<sup>226</sup> have challenged this traditional framework by developing their non-ideal contracts that maintain a social order that is based on protecting the profits and privileges of a sexual, or racially dominant class. The fundamental difference between ideal and non-ideal contract theories is expressed in the words of Mills as follows:

Whereas the ideal contract explains how a just society would be formed, ruled by a moral government, and regulated by a defensible moral code, this nonideal/naturalized contract explains how an unjust, exploitative society, ruled by an oppressive government and regulated by an immoral code, comes into existence.<sup>227</sup>

The social contract theories describe the nature of moral and political norms by presenting a political fiction about the emergence of civil society established by making a contract between equal individuals. Their description prescribes how an ideal society, moral and political norms can be formed. On the other hand, non-ideal contract theories are not prescriptive but are merely descriptive theories. As their very name signifies, what they describe is not an ideal society that does not exist, but the current, actual, real, non-ideal, oppressive (patriarchal or racist) systems of societies that exist here and now. Pateman and Mills develop their theories in multiple ways. They may read the classical theories and show that in these theories, women and people of color are not viewed as equal individuals, and they are not considered the parties of the contract. They also use the contract concept as a metaphor or political fiction to conceptualize and narrate the emergence and reproduction of the oppressive structure of modern societies.

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<sup>225</sup> Pateman, *The Sexual Contract*.

<sup>226</sup> Mills, *Racial Contract*.

<sup>227</sup> Mills, 5.

Their explanations are based on the assumption that equal individuals established civil society, government, moral and political norms by making a contract. Non-ideal contract theories claim that women or black people are not viewed as equal or individuals, and they are not parties to the contract. Since the contract determines the social and political norms to create a better life for its parties, the rights and freedom of human-others who are not parties are not considered by the social contract, and the oppression of human-others are justified and explained by making another contract. Pateman, as an example, claims that men made the sexual contract with the social contract on the rights of women, and with this contract, the object of the contract is women and objectified.

### 5.2.1. The Sexual Contract

Carole Pateman explains the oppression of women by men and the patriarchal social order by modeling the male-dominant societies' inner dynamics, using the framework of contract theory "to excavate the hidden, unjust male covenant upon which the ostensibly gender-neutral social contract actually rests."<sup>228</sup> Pateman brings to light the missing part of the story told by the contractarian philosophers; the original contract is both a social and sexual pact as it created a patriarchal social order, "but the story of the sexual contract has been repressed."<sup>229</sup> The social contract is presented as a story about freedom, but it also includes a story of subjection, the subjection of women.<sup>230</sup>

Pateman says that her interest "in the sexual contract is not primarily in interpreting texts, although the classic works of social contract theory figure largely in my

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<sup>228</sup> Mills, 6.

<sup>229</sup> Pateman, *The Sexual Contract*, 1.

<sup>230</sup> Pateman, 2.

discussion."<sup>231</sup> She resurrects the story of the sexual contract in order to elucidate the patriarchal structure of social institutions in Britain, Australia, and the United States, "which, we are told, can properly be seen as if they had originated in a social contract."<sup>232</sup> Hence, I am primarily interested in the conceptual and logical interconnections between forms of oppression; therefore, I will only examine her analysis of two of the classical contract theories, Hobbes' and Locke's contract theories.<sup>233</sup>

The sexual contract is "about the genesis of political right, and explains why exercise of the right is legitimate- but this story is about political right as patriarchal right or sex-right, the power that men exercise over women."<sup>234</sup> While the social contract is made to protect the rights and freedoms of equal individuals, it also legitimizes the patriarchal social order where women are oppressed, subjugated, and deprived of the same political rights as men. For Pateman, this can be understood in the description of 'individual' and differences between men and women stated in the classical contract theories. Women are excluded from the social contract; only men make the original contract. Pateman continues:

The device of the state of nature is used to explain why, given the characteristics of the inhabitants of the natural condition, entry into the original contract is a rational act. The crucial point is omitted is that the

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<sup>231</sup> Pateman, 4.

<sup>232</sup> Pateman, 4.

<sup>233</sup> Pateman is a political theorist, and she says that "the examples I have just provided are not about morality (which is not to say that moral considerations are irrelevant), they are about social and political institutions and the political right of individual self-government" (Pateman & Mills, 2007, 20). Her primary aim is explaining the exclusion of women from the public sphere and incorporate them in the private sphere through the sexual contract, and she is not interested in moral inferiority of women in the patriarchal societies.

<sup>234</sup> Pateman, *The Sexual Contract*, 1.

inhabitants are sexually differentiated and, for all the classic writers (except Hobbes), a difference in rationality follows from natural sexual difference. Commentaries on the texts gloss over the fact that the classic theorists construct a patriarchal account of masculinity and femininity, of what it is to be men and women. Only masculine beings are endowed with the attributes and capacities necessary to enter into contracts, the most important of which is ownership of property in person; only men, that is to say, are 'individuals.'<sup>235</sup>

Pateman discusses the texts of classical contractarianists, such as Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, and Kant. As I introduced only Hobbes' and Locke's contract theories above, I will limit this discussion to her reading of these two philosophers. There are other reasons that made me limit this chapter to only these two philosophers. As Pateman stated, at first glance, Hobbes is the only philosopher who does not mention sexual differences in the state of nature. Because of the oppressive logic of the social contract, Hobbes has no problem with affirming the patriarchal structure of societies. In other words, it is essential to see how the logic of contract enables those in power to legitimize oppression of human-others nearby animals. All contract theorists conceive rationality as fundamental criteria, and, except Hobbes, all of them exclude women from the original contract by denying them as having the same rational capacity. This idea is much clearer in the theories of Rousseau and Kant. However, I will examine Locke's contract theory because his conception of the individual is central to Pateman's theory.

For Hobbes, there is no physical or mental difference between humans in the state of nature, nor men as superior to women in any term. However, it is clear that for Hobbes, civil society is masculine; Pateman quotes from Hobbes, "because for the most part commonwealths have been erected by the fathers, not by the mothers of families" "in all cities, ... constituted fathers, not mothers, governing their families, the domestical command belongs to the man; and such a contract, if it be made according

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<sup>235</sup> Pateman, 5.



to the civil laws, is called 'matrimony.'<sup>236</sup> In other words, men monopolized the civil sphere somehow and became the civil masters who made the contract which includes the sexual contract that protects and ensures the mastery of men and their patriarchal political rights.

Although Hobbes does not state significant differences between men and women, yet the logic of the Hobbesian contract is oppressive: if one signs a contract because of fear, the contract is valid. "For example, if I covenant to pay a ransom, or service for my life, to an enemy; I am bound by it."<sup>237</sup> Therefore, there is no difference between conquest and contract for Hobbes. In this case, there are two ways of sexual relations between men and women: they mutually make a contract, or men subjugate women by force. If women and men do not significantly differ in their power (physical or mental), how could men succeed to subjugate women and create a society where men have domination in families, state, and all civil sphere? Pateman finds the answer in the condition of mother: "When a woman becomes a mother and decides to raise her child, her position changes; she is put at a slight disadvantage against men, since now she has her infant to defend too. A man is then able to defeat the woman he had initially to treat with as an equal (so he obtains a 'family')."<sup>238</sup> In other words, in the Hobbesian contract theory, the state of nature is where all beings are equal and free. Thus, Pateman thinks that women were subjugated by men in the state of nature, so that they are excluded from the original contract. Since Hobbes thinks there is no difference between conquest and contract, it can be said that men subjugated women and made the sexual contract in the state of nature before the social contract.

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<sup>236</sup> Pateman, 49.

<sup>237</sup> Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 91.

<sup>238</sup> Pateman, *The Sexual Contract*, 50.

Pateman's assumption may not sound reliable; thus, I think, it is not essential to find a specific event or reason that sustains the domination of men over women in government or family. Hobbes is the only contractarianist who does not claim a sexual difference in the state of nature, nor does he claim women as less rational men. Therefore, this chapter might not seem the best contract theory to examine to show the interconnection between forms of oppression through contract theories. Hence, I think exactly the opposite. It is helpful to understand that once a moral or political theory is oppressive, it is not possible to limit the realm of oppression. At the end of the third chapter, I have asked a question: is there anything that can prevent the Cartesian subject, who thinks that animals lack sensation because they cannot think, from rejecting the humanity of the Indians? Here, the question is: is there anything that can prevent a social contract theory, which is absolutist, aims to legitimize monarchy, and equates conquest and contract, to justify the patriarchal structure of societies? If the social contract produces a subjectivity, and this subjectivity is an oppressive one, then it is clear that men colonized and monopolized power and truth to produce and impose this subjectivity. Hence, it seems that Hobbes does not have any problem with it.

The logic of the Hobbesian social contract is oppressive in two ways. First, it explains and justifies oppression by stating the necessary capacities for making a contract, which excludes animals from the contract. Secondly, it explains and justifies oppression by equating conquest and contract. Even if women have the capacity to make a contract, men subjugated and excluded women from the bargaining process. Therefore, as Pateman says, "in the natural state all women become servants, and all women are excluded from the original pact. That is to say, all women are also excluded from becoming civil individuals."<sup>239</sup>

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<sup>239</sup> Pateman, 50.

For Locke, oppression of women is explicitly justified: "The matter is more straightforward in the state of nature pictured by Locke."<sup>240</sup> For Hobbes, the state of nature is amoral, and he does not claim a significant difference between humans and animals in the state of nature. On the other hand, Locke thinks that there was no such a time that humans and animals were equal in terms of morality; humans were morally bound to each other even in the state of nature, and humans are superior to animals in terms of rationality and morality. The same goes for women; women, who are inferior to men by their nature, are excluded from the status of the individual in the state of nature; "only men naturally have the characteristics of free and equal beings. Women are naturally subordinate to men and the order of nature is reflected in the structure of conjugal relations."<sup>241</sup> It is possible to understand the image attributed to women in Locke's theory with two quotations:

how by his providence he would order it so, that she should be subject to her husband, as we see that generally the laws of mankind and customs of nations have ordered it so: and there is, I grant, a foundation in nature for it.<sup>242</sup>

But the husband and wife, though they have but one common concern, yet having different understandings, will unavoidably sometimes have different wills too; it therefore being necessary that the last determination, i.e. the rule, should be placed somewhere; it naturally falls to the man's share, as the abler and the stronger.<sup>243</sup>

Therefore, for Locke, men subjugated women in the state of nature since they were superior to women. Humans had families before civil society, and fathers were their chief because of their superiority. Therefore, it was men who created civil society by

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<sup>240</sup> Pateman, 52.

<sup>241</sup> Pateman, 52.

<sup>242</sup> Locke, *Two Treatises of Government*, 33.

<sup>243</sup> Locke, *Second Treatise of Government and A Letter Concerning Toleration*, 44.

making the contract. "Women cannot be incorporated into civil society on the same basis as men because women naturally lack the capacities required to become civil individuals." Pateman asks, "But what exactly do women lack?"<sup>244</sup> She thinks that Locke gives no clear explanations, but "the elaboration that they provide merely consists in references to the man's greater strength of body and mind, or his greater strength and ability."<sup>245</sup> By making a contract, both differences in species and differences in gender turn into moral and political differences: "Sexual difference is political difference, the difference between mastery and subjection."<sup>246</sup> The status of women excluded from the original contract expressed with these words of Pateman:

Women have no part in the original contract, but they are not left behind in the state of nature - that would defeat the purpose of the sexual contract! Women are incorporated into a sphere that is and is not in civil society. The private sphere is part of civil society but is separated from the 'civil sphere'. The antinomy private/public is another expression of natural/civil and women/men. The private, womanly sphere (natural) and the public, masculine sphere (civil) are opposed but gain their meaning from each other, and the meaning of the civil freedom of public life is thrown into relief when counterposed to the natural subjection that characterizes the private realm (Locke misleads by presenting the contrast in patriarchal terms as between paternal and political power). What it means to be an 'individual', a maker of contracts and civilly free, is revealed by the subjection of women within the private sphere.<sup>247</sup>

Plumwood thinks that the philosophy of Locke, his conception of nature, and the individual are primarily affected by Cartesian philosophy, mind/body dualism, and the distinction between primary and secondary qualities. She quotes from Locke:

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<sup>244</sup> Pateman, *The Sexual Contract*, 94.

<sup>245</sup> Pateman, 94.

<sup>246</sup> Pateman, 6.

<sup>247</sup> Pateman, 11.

"only the particular bulk, number, figure and motion of the parts of fire or snow are really in them—whether anyone's senses perceive them or no: and therefore they may be called real qualities.... But light, heat, whiteness, or coldness, are no more really in them than sickness or pain is in manna."<sup>248</sup> For Locke, secondary qualities are relational; he denies reality to them. By reducing the world only to solidity, extension, figure, and mobility, Locke contributes the Cartesian image of nature that is already deprived of all meanings. While Descartes calls humans to be the master and possessor of nature, for Locke, political "particles extend themselves into the world not by forming relationships but by annexation, the incorporation of the other into self as 'property,' obtained through the mixing of labour as selfsubstance."<sup>249</sup>

For Plumwood, the division made by Locke between the hard, rational sphere, and the soft, sphere of relationships, such as feeling and dependency, replaces by Plato's division between the eternal world of forms and the world of changes. This distinction affects gender ideals and the characteristics of public and private spheres. Only those who are associated with reason have the capacity to survive hard evolutionary and social competition, while the "contrasting 'soft' exclusions include ethics (flabby sentimentality), beauty and meaningfulness (speculation), as well as the ideals of the private sphere, the home and the feminine, of altruism, values, emotionality, relationship and care."<sup>250</sup>

Like animals who enter civil society by being the property of humans, women are in civil society by being wives of husbands, and their rights are defined only in relation to their husbands. While humans make the contract to regulate their rights on nonhuman nature (animals, plants, lands), Pateman says that the sexual contract

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<sup>248</sup> Plumwood, *Feminism and the Mastery of Nature*, 118.

<sup>249</sup> Plumwood, 118.

<sup>250</sup> Mills, *Racial Contract*, 11.

made by men regulates their rights to access women's bodies. The social contract creates the state of nature/civil society dualism, yet civil society includes public/private dualism. By attributing inferior images to women's identity and conceiving them as less than human (as only humans have the capacity to make the contract), the sexual contract links men/women dualism to public/private dualism to explain and justify depriving women of political rights and status. "Women are property, but also persons; women are held both to possess and to lack the capacities required for contract ~ and contract demands that their womanhood be both denied and affirmed."<sup>251</sup> If only humans are ownerships of property in person, therefore, women are stated in a position between human and animal, or they are considered the missing link between human and animal as they are both human and animal.

### 5.2.2. The Racial Contract

Charles Mills, in his book *The Racial Contract*, recognizes racism as "a political system, a particular power structure of formal or informal rule, socioeconomic privilege, and norms for the differential distribution of material wealth and opportunities, benefits and burdens, rights and duties" and he displays the modern social and political system's racist structures in which the white people have social, political, and economic privileges over nonwhite people by using the same vocabulary and apparatus developed for contractarianism.<sup>252</sup> The Racial Contract functions to create, maintain, and justify global white supremacy that aims to privilege the whites with respect to the nonwhites and, exploit their bodies, lands, and prevent them from having equal socioeconomic opportunities. The notion of the Racial Contract rests on three simple claims:

the existential claim-white supremacy, both local and global, exists and has existed for many years; the conceptual claim-white supremacy should be thought of as itself a political system; the methodological claim-as a political

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<sup>251</sup> Pateman, *The Sexual Contract*, 60.

<sup>252</sup> Mills, *Racial Contract*, 2.

system, white supremacy can illuminatingly be theorized as based on a "contract" between whites, a Racial Contract.<sup>253</sup>

The oppression of women is ancient, but the issue of oppression of nonwhites emerges after the 16-17th century. Pateman develops the sexual contract by analyzing the classical contract theories and tries to understand the story of the subjugation of women by men in metamorphosis from the state of nature to civil society. Mills does not appeal to the classical contract theories as much as Pateman does. He uses the contract as a metaphor to tell the story of the encounter between civilized humans (whites) and natural humans (nonwhites), who are savage residents of nature, and the genesis and reproduction of the racist structure of modern societies. While the social contract tells the story of the metamorphosis of natural humans from the state of nature to civil society, in the Racial Contract, Mills says, "the crucial metamorphosis is the preliminary conceptual partitioning and corresponding transformation of human populations into "white" and "nonwhite" men."<sup>254</sup> So, the role played by the state of nature becomes different. The state of nature does not demarcate a temporary pre-political state of humans but a permanent pre-political (or nonpolitical) state of nonwhites.

The Racial Contract is a set of agreements that categorize humans into whites as full humans and nonwhites as subhumans, who are morally inferior and have subordinate political status. By making this categorization, the racial contract excludes nonwhites from the realm of moral and political norms defined by the social contract. Since the social contract plays a decisive role for the distribution of rights and freedoms of humans in the civil sphere, "the moral and juridical rules normally regulating the behavior of whites in their dealings with one another either do not

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<sup>253</sup> Mills, 7.

<sup>254</sup> Mills, 11–12.

apply at all in dealings with nonwhites" who are in the state of nature: "They are in the state of nature, and we are not."<sup>255</sup>

Mills writes, "[a]ll whites are *beneficiaries* of the Contract, though some whites are not *signatories* to it."<sup>256</sup> If so, what distinguishes the signatory white from the one who is not signatory to the contract? I have claimed that signing the contract corresponds to adopting a particular subjectivity. The signatories of the contract adopt a particular moral assumption (the logic of domination) and a particular way of thinking, feeling, perceiving (dualist thinking that includes dualist image and desire production). The subjectivity produced by the Racial Contract has common features of oppressive subjectivities, especially the logic of domination and dualist thinking. Indeed, the Racial Contract has the same moral assumption as the Social Contract. Only humans in civil society deserve moral consideration, and nonwhites who are in the state of nature are excluded from morality and politics. The epistemological contract in the racial contract describes and conceives nonwhites as humanoid entities who are not fully humans, with different, inferior political rights and moral statuses. White identity is defined in respect to the opposition of black identity "so that white self-conceptions of identity, personhood, and self-respect are then intimately tied up with the repudiation of the black Other."<sup>257</sup> Blacks are considered irrational beings, and they are associated with only the body: "blacks are at best 'talking bodies.'"<sup>258</sup> Since rationality is the defining characteristic of humans, distinguishing humans from animals, blacks are viewed as less than humans, animal-like beings, or subhumans by denying the rationality of blacks or considering them cognitively inferior.

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<sup>255</sup> Mills, 43.

<sup>256</sup> Mills, 11.

<sup>257</sup> Mills, 58–59.

<sup>258</sup> Mills, 50.



White and black do not designate only a difference in the color of bodies but a difference in rationality and morality. In other words, what makes nonwhites morally or rationally inferior is their skin color. Mills quotes from Kant: "'a clear proof that what [a Negro] said was stupid' was that 'this fellow was quite black from head to foot.'"<sup>259</sup> This shows that, for Kant, only those who have white skin is fully humans: to be human is to be white while the others who have darker skin colors are less than human. Consequently, the Racial Contract turns diversity of skin colors into white/nonwhite dualism and links it to rational/irrational, human/nonhuman, civilized/natural dualisms.

### 5.2.3. Nonhuman Nature and Non-Ideal Contract Theories

In the *Sexual Politics of Meat*, Carols Adams<sup>260</sup> claims animals and women share a common fate; both are seen as objects and are exploited, oppressed, instrumentalized by those in power. Women are treated like animals, and animals are feminized in the discourses and practices of patriarchal and speciesist modern societies. McKenna summarizes the strategies implemented by Adams to show interconnections between the oppression of women and oppression of animals:

looking at past feminists who were vegetarians, or discussed the connection between the treatment of women and the treatment of nonhuman animals; examining literature by women with vegetarian themes; examining literature that connects with women the disapproval of meat eating and violence against nonhuman animals ... social norms of associating the consumption of meat with men and the consumption of vegetables with women; examining language that associates activity and power with meat and men, and passivity and weakness with women; and telling the story of precontract society, which asserts that the attainment and distribution of meat was a male activity and was the primary source of their social power.<sup>261</sup>

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<sup>259</sup> Mills, 70.

<sup>260</sup> Adams, *The Sexual Politics of Meat*.

<sup>261</sup> McKenna, "Women, Power, and Meat," 55.

McKenna thinks connections made by Adams are weak and she states that what Adams show is nothing more than parallels between these forms of oppression. However, she says, if we take Pateman's book as background, "Adams' claims begin to carry more weight."<sup>262</sup> After summarizing the positions of Adams and Pateman, she ends her discussion by stating that "the argument can be made that the two forms of oppression parallel each other. Though not causally linked, they do reinforce each other. Our language indicates this connection."<sup>263</sup> While McKenna thinks Adams' theory is not convincing because she could not show the link between the oppression of women and the oppression of animals, she could not go beyond Adams' claim as well. She upholds her argument by claiming the parallel in language use.

If one wants to see a 'parallel' between the oppression of nonwhites and oppression of animals in the framework developed by Mills, Robert E. Lucius suggest developing the species contract:

The species contract can also be described as having three central elements. First, human domination of nonhumans has shown itself to be an existential global and local phenomenon not for centuries, but for millennia. Second, human domination and privilege, sometimes called "anthroparchy" (Calvo, 2008; Cudworth, 2014, 2005), can be thought of as an anthropocentric political system that promotes a particular power structure of formal and informal rule, socioeconomic privilege, and norms that distribute material resources, benefits and burdens, teleological opportunities, and moral rights and duties on the basis of species categorization. Finally, human domination can be understood as a "species contract" established among humans to further their own perceived material interests through the physical domination of other species, as well as through the exploitation of their labor and habitats, and the appropriation of their very bodies for food and medical testing.<sup>264</sup>

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<sup>262</sup> McKenna, 48.

<sup>263</sup> McKenna, 59.

<sup>264</sup> Lucius, "The Oppression of Non-Human Animals as a Crisis of Social and Ecological Justice - Draft," 29–30.

However, I am not interested in pursuing a parallel between forms of oppression. Indeed, in the Racial Contract, the conceptual link between the oppression of nonwhites and the oppression of animals is much clearer. There is not much need to add ideas articulated in the second chapter. Men make the contract to conceive nonwhites as less than human, animal-like beings. Because humans (and civil society) are superior to nonwhites who are in the state of nature, the logic of contract assumes that beings in the civil society do not have moral and juridical responsibility for the beings in the state of nature. Whites monopolize the epistemological and metaphysical power to consider animals as morally inferior beings, associate nonwhites with animals, and settle nonwhites into the state of nature.

Unsurprisingly, Pateman, in her article where she replies to McKenna's arguments, says that the links made by both McKenna and Adams are not convincing. Thus, she says:

I would resist the suggestion that the individual as owner can be somehow "applied" to Adams' book, but there are at least two ways in which it is linked to animals and their treatment. First, there are clearly similarities between the commodification of (pieces of) persons and the commodification of animals. I take commodification to be close to the notion of objectification stressed by both Adams and McKenna. Second, a mechanistic view of the relations between, or, more accurately, separation between, mind (humans), body and nature (animals) brings together 'the individual' and the logic of contract with the controversies over the status and treatment of animals.<sup>265</sup>

In other words, both women and animals are objectified, associated with body and nature, while men are associated with mind and rationality. Then she says that, if there were a connection between these forms of oppression in the context of the Sexual Contract, McKenna would suggest developing another contract, the Bestial Contract:

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<sup>265</sup> Pateman, "The Sexual Contract and the Animals," 68.

The gist of a bestial contract would be as follows: as men transform the state of nature into civil society through an original contract, their relationship to the animals changes. Men cease to be natural beings, one of many animal species, and create themselves as civil beings, so separating themselves from the other animals. The bestial contract legitimizes men's dominion over the animals and creates a right to use them as food. Animals are not party to the original contract, but, as in the case of women and the sexual contract, the bestial contract incorporates animals into the new political order under the government of men.<sup>266</sup>

However, Pateman too thinks that "it is a mistake to extend my argument by constructing a bestial contract. Introduction of a bestial contract is best avoided because the parallels between characterizations of, and treatment of, animals and women too quickly break down."<sup>267</sup> The primary reason that may prevent us from extending the sexual contract to the bestial contract is that animals do not have the capacity to refuse the contract.

Second, resort to notions of tacit contracts (or consent) give rise to the problems that I explored in detail in *The Problem of Political Obligation*. One difficulty is that hypothetical contracts preclude the possibility that parties may refuse to enter them. That is to say, the basic criterion for the existence of a genuine practice of contract is lacking. A major problem with arguments about contracts with animals is that humans, but not animals, can (potentially) engage in such refusals.<sup>268</sup>

At the beginning of this thesis, I have stated that Pateman is right to claim differences between the oppression of women and oppression of animals by introducing a distinction between oppression and domination. As Warren says, all oppression involves domination, and nonhuman animals cannot be oppressed but dominated. I am trying to understand how oppressors create, maintain, and justify oppression. I

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<sup>266</sup> Pateman, 71.

<sup>267</sup> Pateman, 71.

<sup>268</sup> Pateman, 72.

think these conditions, which are primarily the logic of domination and dualist thinking, are the same for oppression and domination. After stating these differences, I used oppression and domination in the same sense during this thesis, analyzing only half of the issue of oppression while avoiding analyzing anything not shared by both oppression and domination.

In the third chapter, I have already shown the conceptual and logical interconnections, not only parallels, between forms of oppression by analyzing oppressive subjectivity that creates, maintains, and justifies oppression. As I showed in the previous chapters, the same moral assumption, logical and argumentative structure, way of thinking, perceiving, feeling, and the same metaphysical and epistemological forces are at play in all forms of oppression. In this chapter, I claim that the function of making a contract is producing, adopting, and socializing a particular subjectivity.

As an example, men make the sexual contract about women, and this contract includes an epistemological contract that produces dualist images concerning male and female identities, conceives women as less capable, less rational, and so not 'individuals' who can make a contract and is "master of his property-his body or nature."<sup>269</sup> Because they do not have the necessary attributes and qualities to be considered individuals, they are not considered to deserve the same moral and political rights. They are closed in the public sphere as properties of their husbands. The sexual contract reproduces and protects the patriarchal structure of societies that privileges men over women.

Now, substitute the term "men" for every occurrence of "human" and "animal" for every occurrence of "women" in this passage, and substitute "husbands" for "owners" and change the sexual contract to bestial contract. Now re-read the passage. The same logic of domination assumes superiority (of beings in the civil sphere) justifies

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<sup>269</sup> Pateman, 76.

oppression. Of course, women are not left in the state of nature, as Pateman says, but in the private sphere. As animals can enter the civil sphere by being a property of humans, women too enter into the private sphere only by being property, wives of husbands.

It is the same logic and the same metaphysical and epistemological power that makes the social contract (or bestial contract) that creates dualism between humans and animals to explain and justify oppression of animals, and the sexual contract that makes dualism between men and women to explain and justify oppression of women. If the sexual contract is included in the social contract, why can we not say that the social contract includes the bestial contract? Therefore, if we try to analyze oppressive subjectivity that functions to explain and justify oppression, its' connection with the sexual contract that produces and socializes oppressive subjectivity to explain and justify the oppressive structure of societies, there is a clear conceptual link between forms of oppression and contracts (though they begin to differ in the strategies developed by men to force women to adopt the subjectivity produced in the social contract).

## CHAPTER 6

### CONCLUDING REMARKS

The strands interwoven by this master story of colonisation form a mesh so strong, so finely knit and familiar it could almost pass for our own bodies, but it is an imprisoning web which encloses us.<sup>270</sup>

This thesis can be read through a simple question: how does the oppressor justify oppression? While trying to answer this question without appealing to any particular form of oppression, what we have seen is a formation of a particular subjectivity that proceeds with a chain of legitimizations; through the concepts of image, identity, desire, coloniality of power, truth, and being, and many others, where each of the conditions legitimizes the preceding one, and calls the next one for its legitimacy and certainty. Let us summarize this chain of legitimacy.

The journey of the oppressor begins with a simple moral assumption: superiority justifies oppression. Since the oppressor claims his superiority based on his identity, the first thing he has to do is explaining and justifying the superiority of his identity. To do that, he attributes an image concerning his identity, which is superior to the identity of the oppressed. However, the oppressor has to demonstrate the inferiority of the oppressor because his superiority depends on the inferiority of the other, and also justifying oppression demands emphasizing the inferiority of the other. What provides the justification of oppression is the differences between the oppressor and the oppressed; therefore, the oppressor has to eliminate all commonalities between

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<sup>270</sup> Plumwood, *Feminism and the Mastery of Nature*, 195.

his and the other's identities to prevent sympathy with the oppressor and provide the certainty of the legitimacy of oppression.

Nevertheless, the chain of legitimacy does not end with dualist thinking; the oppressor has to explain and justify his subjectivity. I have introduced three concepts that create, maintain, and justify oppressive subjectivity: coloniality of power, coloniality of being, and knowledge. These concepts reveal the oppressor's epistemological and metaphysical power, enabling him to create a dualist reality and associate some human groups with animals and nonhuman nature. The self of the oppressor is colonial; he realizes his power, his superiority, his self by conquering the other. The world of the oppressor is Manichean; he perceives reality in terms of dichotomies. He colonizes Being and divides it into two dualist spheres, the world of superior values and the world of inferior values, that creates, maintains, and justifies dualist images he produces and attributes to his and the other's identities. He colonizes the superior world and claims himself as the representator of all superior values. Then, the oppressor colonizes knowledge to create, maintain, and justify his subjectivity. He conceives his point of view as the reference point of truth and conceives the other who rejects his truth as apocryphal.

An identity does not include an intrinsic value; they have values by attributing subjective and conditional images to identities. In western tradition, reason/nature dualism sustains the systematical production and reproduction of values of the identities of oppressor and oppressed. Humans are the settler of the world of reason, the superior world of values, while nonhuman nature is settled in the inferior world of values. To be exiled from the superior world is to be exiled from the world of privileges, rights, freedom, and moral consideration. Consequently, we find the reason/nature dualism at the end of the chain of legitimacy. Oppression of nature is self-legitimized, and reason/nature dualism is his security blanket.



Why is the oppression of nature self-legitimated? Why not male/female dualism but reason/nature dualism is the security blanket of the oppressor? We may come up with many reasons, and I discussed philosophers' rational and logical explanations, but I would like to offer another perspective to think of the oppression of nature.

The fundamental difference between the oppression of human-others and oppression of nature is that the oppressor has to force, for example, nonwhites to adopt the images that the oppressor produces and include the nonwhite in his truth regime. What is expected is the oppressed's consent; however, the oppressor's contract "... is not a contract to which the nonwhite subset of humans can be a genuinely consenting party...."<sup>271</sup> In this case, consent must be obtained by force. To provide the consent, the mechanism of physical and ideological violence comes into play to create the desired oppressed: the oppressed who does not notice any inconsistency in the system in question, who feels all exploitation, the injustice is ordinary and right. The difficulty of obtaining this consent and the possible risks that the oppressor may experience in case of not providing the consent cause distortions in the oppressor's self and lead to pathological affections, such as anxiety and paranoia.

However, nature does not have the capacity for resistance and refusal. Because there is no need to obtain the consent of nature, oppression of nature is the least conflicted oppressive relationship. The oppressor finds a way to minimize the conflicts he experiences in a relationship of oppression of human-others by identifying them with nature. Here, I gave a speculative account for the role of oppression of nature in the interconnection between forms of oppression. However, I have already analyzed the formation and development of reason/nature dualism in western philosophy in the third chapter and showed that oppression and inferior image of nature is definitively a de-conflicted zone in the philosophies of Plato, Aristotle, and Descartes. They use 'nature' as the reference point of moral, epistemological, or ontological inferiority of human-others.

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<sup>271</sup> Mills, *Racial Contract*, 11.

Maybe, the first thing we should do is ceasing image and oppression of nature of being a de-conflicted zone of the oppressor. I do not claim a strategic priority of decoloniality of nature; however, oppression of nature is a deeply rooted problem. The strategies for liberating oppression of nature inevitably include the strategies for the liberation of humans. As the oppression of nature is the purest and least mediated form of oppression, analyzing it improves our insights about the structure of oppressive subjectivity; in fact, thinking about the strategies for decolonizing nature provides us with a clearer understanding of the strategies of the liberation of humans. Although this topic exceeds the scope of this thesis, I would like to make an introductory remark.

Massumi tells the story of Jesse, who points out not to his body but at the ground where he fell when asked where does it hurt.<sup>272</sup> Today, we need to regain our ecological embodiment with nature to cease distinguishing our bodies from nature and feel the pain of the destruction of nature. To do that, there is already an alternative and critical philosophical tradition of the dominant philosophical paradigm. I believe we can find the necessary philosophical paradigm, tool-set for developing decolonial subjectivity in Spinozist monist philosophy and its' contemporary pluralist readings that challenges Cartesian dualism, Nietzsche's critics of human identity and consciousness, Deleuze's project of the body without organs that aims to remove the border of the body and overcome the self/other dichotomy, New Materialism's challenging with the conception of matter as passive substance and devoid of meaning.

Regaining our ecological embodiment with nature is possible by dismantling dichotomies and dualisms such as self/other, reason/nature, human/nature. Hence, regaining our ecological embodiment with nature inevitably ends with regaining our embodiment with other humans; dismantling dualisms abandoning binary thinking leaves the logic of oppression flat.

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<sup>272</sup> Massumi, *Politics of Affect*, 125.

What is at issue in the analysis of the logical and conceptual interconnections between different forms of oppression in Western thought tradition is the dualist construction of reason and nature that provides the reference point to claim the superiority of identities to the extent of their distance from reason. What we need is to cease to treat reason as the basis of superiority and domination, without rejection of all achievements of rationality, and "a less colonising approach to nature that does not involve denying human reason or human difference."<sup>273</sup>

In this interconnection, as Plumwood says, "Human domination of nature wears a garment cut from the same cloth as intra-human domination, but one which, like each of the others, has a specific form and shape of its own."<sup>274</sup> Thus, the interconnection between different forms of domination does not demand "... that each form of oppression submerges its hard-won identity in a single, amorphous, oceanic movement. In other words, the role of oppression of nature does not mean that the liberation of nonhumans will lead to the liberation of humans. Rather it asks that each form of oppression develop sensitivity to other forms, both at the level of practice and that of theory."<sup>275</sup> The logic of oppressive subjectivity covers all forms of exploitation, and all forms of exploitation are closely related to each other; it is important not to separate the decolonial struggles sharply from each other, not to reduce them in one and main movement, but to organize the solidarity of the oppressed groups as its dualist way of thinking that is unable to affirm diversity, his conception of power, that demands the conquest of the other in its realization, his moral ground that assumes superiority justifies oppression, his colonial logic that affirms himself in the mediation of the negation of the other are the common enemies for all of them.

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<sup>273</sup> Plumwood, *Feminism and the Mastery of Nature*, 15.

<sup>274</sup> Plumwood, 13.

<sup>275</sup> Maldonado-Torres, "On the Coloniality of Being," 14.

In other words, the problem is not males, whites, or humans, nor the solution is females, people of color, or nonhuman animals. The problem is a particular subjectivity which is a particular ethical, epistemological, ontological, and aesthetical perspective, and the solution is decolonizing our oppressive subjectivity and our oppressive ethics.

In the fifth chapter, I have introduced social contract theories that account for the nature of moral and legal norms, and non-ideal contract theories that explain the genesis and reproduction of oppressive structures of modern societies, particularly patriarchy and white supremacy. The classical social contract theories have developed a new methodology for determining ideal moral and political norms; in fact, their novelty provides a different methodology or argumentative structure for justifying established oppressive values of their societies. Pateman explains the genesis of patriarchy through the sexual contract. She claims that the sexual contract is the missing part of the social contract. Mills tells the story of white supremacy by using the conceptual framework of contractarianism. I have interpreted ideal and non-ideal contract theories through oppressive subjectivity and used them to explain how oppressive subjectivity is socialized, and oppressive values became traditional norms. Hence, there are essential ideas/intuitions we can find both in ideal and non-ideal contract theories to think about strategies for liberation movements. To point out the last concluding remarks of this thesis, let me re-formulate the discussion of the last chapter.

Ideal social contract theories provide essential insight into the nature of moral and legal norms; these norms are socially constructed. Individuals come together, and they consent on particular norms which they believe their goodness for their lives. Then, they make a contract on the value of particular moral and legal norms. Charles Mills remarks that the social contract includes an epistemological contract that determines criteria to be considered as individuals who can participate in bargaining to defend and demand their rights and benefits. Those excluded from the contract are

also excluded from the realm of morality and become the object and property of the makers of the contract. As we have seen, the first article of the epistemological contract excludes nonhumans from the contract.

Then, Pateman says that women were excluded from the contract; men made the contract and established civil society, while they made the sexual contract to have equal access to women's bodies. It can be said that the second article of the epistemological contract excludes women from the contract. Mills says after encountering nonwhites, whites made the racial contract that conceives nonwhites as less than human, inhuman, or animal-like beings. The racial contract constructs a racist social structure that privileges whites over nonwhites. Then, the third article of the epistemological contract excludes nonwhites from the contract. We do not have to formulate different contracts for each form of oppression. Civil society is established by making an oppressive contract that produces and reproduces oppressive subjectivity. The sexual contract is not the missing half of the original contract, but it is only one article of the epistemological contract included in the original contract.

Therefore, rejecting to sign the sexual contract is rejecting only one article of the original contract. However, the oppressive contract that we were born into, the oppressive subjectivity it systematically produces and re-writes, and its oppressive standard of judgment, way of thinking, feeling, perceiving are here. We need to reject the oppressive contract and make our own decolonized contract that produces decolonial subjectivity.

While making a decolonial contract, we do not have to follow the oppressor's power model; for example, we do not have to fight for conquering truth, or we do not need to realize our power by conquering the oppressor. The only thing the oppressors, racists, sexists, speciesists, deserve faith and serve as a model for liberation struggles is their epistemological, moral, political, aesthetical alliance; there is only one

oppressive contract with many articles in it that excludes different identities from their contract. Different liberation movements can make one decolonial contract that includes many articles that can develop sensitivity to each other and enhance their solidarity both in theory and practice.

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## APPENDICES

### APPENDIX A: TURKISH SUMMARY / TÜRKÇE ÖZET

Felsefe tarihinin bütün dönüm noktalarında, yeni bir dönemin başlangıcında bir krizi ve bu krize yöneltilen bir kritiği görebiliriz. Orta çağ felsefesini derinden etkilemiş Platoncu felsefeyi Sofistlerin relativist felsefesinin yarattığı krizden, Aydınlanmanın başat figürü ve çağdaş felsefenin tartışmalarını önemli ölçüde belirlemiş olan Kant'ın felsefesini Hume'un bilginin zeminini sarsan tek bir sorudan (yarın güneşin doğacağını kesin olarak nasıl bilebiliriz?) ayrı okuyamayız. Bugün insanlık tarihinin en büyük krizi olan iklim krizi ile karşı karşıyayız. İklim krizi bizleri insanı, doğayı, ben ve öteki farkını kavramsallaştırma ve anlama biçimimizi sorgulamaya zorluyor. Zira bu krizin karşısında yaşadığımız aciziyetin temel sebebi insan ve doğayı, ben ve ötekini hiyerarşik, zıt ve ayrık bir şekilde kurgulayan hâkim felsefi paradigma ve bu paradigmanın üzerinde şekillenen tahakkümcü öznelliğimizdir. Öyle ki, bugüne kadar krizler hâkim paradigmanın onarılması ile aşılmış iken, iklim krizinin kritiği paradigmanın onarılmasını kabul etmemekte ve bir paradigma değişimini gerektirmektedir.

Hâkim paradigma yalnızca insanın doğa üzerindeki tahakkümünü değil, aynı zamanda toplumsal tahakkümü, yani erkeğin kadın üzerinde, efendinin köle üzerinde, beyazın siyah üzerindeki tahakkümünü de kurmakta, sürdürmekte ve haklı göstermektedir. Haliyle, bu paradigma değişimi yalnızca doğanın tahakkümünün değil, toplumsal tahakkümün de sonlandırılması için gereklidir. Bir paradigma değişiminin eşliğinde olduğumuz süreçte tahakküm ilişkileri arasındaki ilişkiselliği, farklı tahakküm biçimlerinin sonlanmasının birbirinden ayıramazlığını ve doğanın bu ilişkisellikteki oynadığı rolü göstererek farklı mücadele hareketleri arasındaki teorik ve pratik duyarlılığı ve dayanışmayı arttırmayı amaçlıyorum. Bu

ilişkiselliği incelemek için uygulayacağım yöntem tahakkümü kuran, sürdüren ve meşrulaştıran görme, duyma, algılama, hissetme biçimi olan tahakkümcü öznelliğin kavramsal ve mantıksal analizini yapmaktır. Ekofeminist felsefe ve dekolonyal felsefe literatürü üzerinden geliştirilecek tahakkümcü öznellik kavramının bu analizinde göreceğimiz şey son halkasında akıl/doğa ve insan/doğa düalizmlerinin olduğu bir meşruiyetler zinciridir.

İçerisinde birçok farklı görüş barındıran ekofeminist felsefe literatürü kadınlar üzerindeki tahakküm ile doğa üzerindeki tahakküm arasındaki kavramsal, mantıksal, tarihsel, empirik paralellikleri incelemişse de çalışmalarına kadınların yanında kölelerin, siyahların ve diğer ezilen insan kesimlerinin tahakkümünü de dahil eden ve bu paralelliklerin altında yatan kavramsal ve mantıksal ilişkiselliği gösteren sayılı filozoflardan ikisi Karen Warren ve Val Plumwood'tur. Bu iki filozofun fikirleri arasında önemli benzerlikler olsa da tahakküm biçimleri arasındaki ilişkiselliği sağlayan merkezi kavram konusunda birbirlerinden farklılaşmaktadırlar. Karen Warren tahakkümü kuran, sürdüren ve haklı gösteren tahakkümcü kavramsal çerçevenin kavramsal analizini yaparak *tahakküm mantığı* diye isimlendirdiği üstünlüğün tahakkümü meşrulaştırdığı ahlaki varsayımının bir kavramsal çerçeveyi tahakkümcü yapan ve farklı tahakküm ilişkileri arasındaki ilişkiselliği kuran en önemli kavram olduğunu söylemektedir. Val Plumwood ise farklılığı hiyerarşinin mantığı açısından kurgulamanın yolu olarak tanımladığı düalizmin mantığının birçok açıdan farklı olan tahakküm şekillerini ortak bir kavramsal çerçevede birleştirdiğini söylemektedir.

Barış Ünlü'nün Türklük tanımı ile Karen Warren'in tahakkümcü kavramsal çerçeve tanımından faydalanarak geliştireceğim *tahakkümcü öznellik* kavramı ile Warren ve Plumwood'un felsefelerini birlikte okumamız mümkün olacaktır. Tahakkümcü öznelliği tahakkümü kurmak, sürdürmek ve haklı göstermek için işleyen belirli bir görme, duyma, algılama, hissetme biçimi olarak tanımlıyorum. Tahakkümcü öznelliklerin başlıca iki özelliği üstünlüğün tahakkümü meşrulaştırdığı ahlaki



varsayımı, yani tahakküm mantığı, ve farklılığı hiyerarşik, zıt, ve dışlayıcı bir şekilde kurgulayan düalist düşünce biçimidir. Tahakküm mantığı ve düalist düşünce biçimi arasındaki ilişki ise şu şekilde anlaşılmalıdır: eğer ezenler üstünlüğün tahakkümü meşrulaştırdığını düşünüyor ise, yapmaları gereken ilk şey üstünlüklerini kanıtlamalarıdır. Ezenlerin tahakkümü nasıl meşrulaştırdığı sorusuna cevap arayarak tahakkümcü öznellik adım adım incelendiğinde görülecektir ki, tahakkümün meşruiyeti ve meşruiyetinin kesinliği düalist düşünce biçimini gerektirir.

Kimlik ve imge arasında yapacağımız bir ayırım tahakkümcü özneliğin tahakkümün meşruiyetini sağlamak için uyguladığı stratejileri anlamamız için faydalı olacaktır. Zira bu çalışmada kimlikler üzerinden inşa edilen tahakküm ilişkileri incelenmektedir. Örneğin, erkeğin kadın üzerindeki tahakkümü kimlikler üzerinden yani erkek kimliğinin üstünlüğüne dayanarak açıklanır ve haklı gösterilir. Fakat kimlik (erkek, kadın, siyah, beyaz, insan, hayvan vb.) kendisini başka bir kimlikten daha üstün kılacak niteliksel bir değeri kendiliğinden taşımaz. Zira kimlik aktüelleşmesinin imkanını cinsel, biyolojik, coğrafik, etnik, kültürel ya da dini farklılıkların farkına varılmasında bulan, herhangi bir niteliksel değer taşımayan, virtüel ve önceden verili bir veri setidir. Bir kimliği üstün ya da aşağı kılan şey o kimliğe atanan imgelerdir (iyi, kötü, güzel, çirkin, rasyonel, irrasyonel, medeni, ilkel vb.). Bir imge üretilmesinin koşulu kimliğin öznel, koşullu ve rastlantısal yorumu olan, öznelere dair üstün ya da aşağı niteliksel değerlerin atfıdır. İmge atanması aynı zamanda öznelere dair duyulacak hayranlık ya da tiksinti hislerine, yani arzunun belirli bir şekilde kodlanmasına karşılık gelir.

Temel amacı tahakkümü meşrulaştırmak olan tahakkümcü öznellik ilk olarak ezenin kimliğinin üstünlüğünü açıklamak ve haklı göstermek için kendisinin ve ötekinin kimliğine dair hiyerarşik bir şekilde, yani kendi kimliğine ötekinin kimliğine atadığından daha üstün imgeler atar. Gel gelelim, tahakkümün meşruiyeti yalnızca ezenin üstünlüğünün açıklanması ile sağlanamaz; zira, meşruiyet ezenin

üstünlüğünün yanında ezilenin aşağılığını da göstermeyi, yani imgelerin asimetrik bir şekilde atanmasını gerektirir. İmgenin atanmasına arzunun belirli bir şekilde kodlanması eşlik ettiği için asimetrik imge ataması arzuyu da asimetrik bir şekilde, yani ezene hayranlık ezilene tiksinti duyacak şekilde kodlar. Tahakkümcü öznelliği imge ve kimlik ayırımında okumanın bir önemi de bu şekilde anlaşılmalıdır; tahakküm ezenlere yalnızca ekonomik faydalar sağlamaz, ezenlerin kimliklerini üstün bir şekilde kurgulaması onlara son derece güçlü bir haz sağlar. Dahası, tahakkümcü öznellik yalnızca tahakkümü açıklamak ve meşrulaştırmak için faaliyette bulunmaz, aynı zamanda tahakküm için gerekli olan motivasyonu ezenlerin arzusunu ezilenlerden tiksinti duyacakları şekilde kodlayarak sağlar.

Farklılığı hiyerarşik, asimetrik ve dışlayıcı bir şekilde kurgulayan düalist düşünce biçimi tahakkümcü öznelliğin nihai stratejisidir. Tahakkümcü öznellik tahakkümü özneler arasındaki farklılıklara dayanarak açıklar; fakat herhangi iki özne arasında kaçınılmaz bir şekilde ortaklıklar ve benzerlikler söz konusudur. Tahakkümcü öznellik tahakkümün meşruiyetinin kesinliğini sağlamak ve ezenlerin ezilenlere duyacağı bir sempatinin ya da empatinin önüne geçebilmek adına Val Plumwood'un deyişiyle radikal dışlamayı sağlamak, yani bu benzerlikleri yok saymak, ortadan kaldırmak ya da asgari düzeye indirmek zorundadır. Günün sonunda tahakkümcü öznellik düalist imgeler atamak yoluyla özneler arasındaki farklılıkları derece farkından ziyade aralarında hiçbir ortaklığın olmadığı doğa farklılıkları olarak kurgular ve tahakkümün meşruiyetini, ezenlerin üstünlüğünü ve ezilenlerin aşağılığını öznelerin bedenine, doğasına kazır.

Tahakkümcü öznellik tahakkümü kurmak, sürdürmek ve haklı göstermek için çalışır iken, tahakkümcü öznelliği kuran, sürdüren ve haklı gösteren metafizik ve epistemolojik kuvvetler ne Warren ne de Plumwood tarafından sorgulanmıştır. Dekolonial filozofların gücün, varlığın ve bilginin sömürgeleştirilmesi üzerine tartışmaları bu kuvvetleri anlamamız için faydalı olacaktır. İlk olarak, ezenin benliği sömürgecidir. Kimliğini, kimliğinin üstünlüğünü ötekinin zapt edilmesinde, gücün,

güç ilişkilerinin fethedilmesinde, sömürgeleştirilmesinde ve tekelleştirilmesinde sağlar. Dussel'in dediği gibi, ezenlerin mottosu "fethediyorum, öyleyse varım"dır. İkincisi, ezenlerin düalist imge ataması bütün değerleri düalist bir şekilde algılamalarında koşulludur. Ezen düalist bir gerçeklik yaratabilmesini mümkün kılan metafizik gücü varlığı sömürgeleştirerek elde eder. Fanon'un da dediği gibi, sömürgecinin dünyası manikidir. O dünyayı dikotomilerle algılar: bir tarafta kendisinin temsilcisi olduğu üstün değerler dünyası, diğer tarafta ezenin temsilcisi olduğu aşağı değerler dünyası vardır. Son olarak, ezenler bilgiyi ve hakikati sömürgeleştirirler. Bakış açılarını evrensel bakış açısı olarak, hakikatini eksenlerini hakikatin referans noktası olarak algırlar. Öyleyse, ezenlerin hakikat ekseninden uzaklaşmak demek hakikatten uzaklaşmak demektir. Ezenlerin yarattıkları düalist gerçeklikte, birazdan göreceğimiz gibi, insanların bir kısmını insan kategorisinden dışlamasını mümkün kılan metafizik ve epistemolojik kuvvetler ezenlerin gücü, varlığı ve hakikati sömürgeleştirmeleriyle birlikte düşünülmelidir.

Şu ana kadar geldiğimiz noktada tahakkümcü öznelliğin ortak ve evrensel özelliklerini incelemiş olsak da tahakküm ilişkileri arasındaki ilişkiselliği tam olarak ifade etmiş değiliz. Batı düşünce geleneğini incelediğimizde bir birbirine sıkıca bağlanmış bir düalist çiftler ağını görebiliriz. Bu ağ içerisinde akıl/doğa düalizminin özel bir rolü vardır zira herhangi bir düalist çiftin izi sürüldüğünde varılacak nihai nokta akıl/doğa düalizmidir ve her bir düalist düalist çiftin üstün tarafı aklın biçimi olarak kurgulanır iken, aşağı tarafı doğa kategorisinin altına düşer.

Akl/doğa düalizminin kilit rolünün daha iyi anlaşılması için kavram düalizmleri ve kimlik düalizmleri arasında bir ayırım yapmayı öneriyorum. Birer var oluş biçimini ifade eden kavramlara örnek olarak kültür, doğa, akıl, ruh, özgürlük, rasyonaliteyi örnek olarak verebiliriz. Kimlik, tekrar söylemek gerekirse, biyolojik, coğrafik, ya da kültürel farklılıklar iken imgeler ise birer isim olan kavramların sıfat halidir. Rasyonel, güzel, ahlaki, uygar, özgür imgelere örnek olarak verilebilir. İmgeler

kavramları kimliklere bağlarlar. Örneğin, rasyonel imgesi rasyonalite kavramını insan kimliğine bağlayabilir.

Ne kavram çiftleri ne de kimlik çiftleri kendiliğinden düalisttir. Bir kavram çifti hiyerarşik, zıt ve dışlayıcı değerlerin atanması ile kavram düalizmi haline gelir. Batı felsefesinin kadim geleneği olan rasyonalizm akı doğadan üstün, zıt ve dışlayıcı bir şekilde kurgular. Dahası, bir kavram düalizmi başka bir kavram düalizmine bağlanabilir ve bu sebeple kavram düalizmleri her zaman birden çok değere sahiptir. Kavramların kimliklere bağlanmasının en belirgin ve önemli örneğini rasyonalizm ve hümanizm arasındaki ilişkide görebiliriz. Batı geleneğinde yalnızca insanın akıl sahibi olduğu düşüncesi ile akıl/doğa düalizmi insan/insan olmayan kimlik düalizmine bağlanır. Örneğin yalnızca akıl sahibi olan varlıkların uygar olduğu düşüncesi akıl/doğa düalizmini uygar/ilkel düalizmine bağlar; böylelikle akıl/doğa düalizmi politik bir değere sahip olur. Descartes ise akı zihne, doğayı bedene bağlar ve akıl/doğa düalizmi zihin/beden düalizmine bağlanır. Haliyle akıl/doğa düalizmi ahlaki, epistemolojik, ontolojik, politik değere sahiptir ve akıl doğadan ahlaki, epistemolojik, ontolojik ve politik olarak üstün olarak kurgulanır.

Batı geleneğinde, ezenlerin maniki dünyasının üstün değerler dünyası aklın dünyası aşağı değerler dünyası ise doğanın dünyası iken, üstün dünyanın temsilcisi insan, aşağı dünyanın temsilcisi ise insan olmayan doğadır. Rasyonalist ve hümanist gelenek insan kimliğini insandışı doğadan ahlaki, epistemolojik, ontolojik ve politik olarak üstün bir biçimde inşa eder. Gel gelelim, hümanizmin problemi kimin insan olduğu sorusuna verilecek cevap hakikati üretme gücünü eline geçirmiş iktidarın insafına kalmış olmasıdır. Ötekini yalnızca kendi istek ve arzularına göre tasarlayan ezenler ezilen insanları insandan az, ya da insan dışı olarak imgelemekle, yani doğa ile özdeşleştirmek yoluyla tahakkümü meşrulaştırırlar.

Öyleyse, tahakkümcü özneliğin kurduğu meşruiyetler zincirinin son halkasında (batı geleneğinde) akıl/doğa düalizmi, ya da doğa imgesi bulunur. İnsandılaştırma

tartışmalarını da bu açıdan anlayabiliriz. Başta batı düşünce geleneği olmak üzere birçok gelenekte ötekini insan kategorisinden dışlamak, hayvan olarak imgelemek toplu katliamlar ya da savaş durumlarında söz konusu olan son derece vahşi eylemleri haklı göstermek ve bu eylemler için gerekli olan motivasyonu sağlamak, ezenlerin ahlaki çelişkilerini önlemek için uygulanan bir stratejidir. Bu durum bizlere hayvanların, doğanın tahakkümününün meşruiyetinin kendinden menkulmüş gibi algılandığını gösterir.

Batı geleneğinde akıl/doğa düalizminin gelişimini üç filozof üzerinden incelememiz mümkündür. Düalist düşünce farklılığı hiyerarşik, zıt ve dışlayıcı bir şekilde kurgulamak olarak tanımladık. Akıl/doğa düalizminin gelişiminin ilk iki adımı Platon ve Aristoteles'te görülür iken, son adım Descartes tarafından atılmıştır. Kozmosun düzeninin kusursuz olduğu düşüncesinde olan Yunan filozofları için düşünmek demek kozmos hakkında tefekkür etmek demektir. İnsan kozmosun düzenini anlayarak bu düzeni kendi yaşamında ve toplumsal yaşamda taklit ederek erdemli bir yaşama ya da topluma sahip olabilir. Varlığın düzeninde ise hiyerarşiyi gören Platon ve Aristoteles'in etik, ontoloji, politika hakkındaki düşüncelerinde hiyerarşik düşüncenin etkilerini görebiliriz.

Platon'un formlar dünyası ve görüngüler dünyası düalizminin üstün tarafı olan formlar dünyası aklın ve aklın temsil ettiği değerlerin dünyası iken görüngüler dünyası maddesel, bedensel, ya da doğa alanıdır; yani Platon için akıl ve doğa üstünlüğün ve aşağılığın iki kutbunu temsil eder. Öyle ki, doğadaki varlıklar arasındaki hiyerarşide de akıldan daha çok pay alanlar akıldan daha az pay alanlardan üstündür. Platon'un at arabası alegorisinde görebileceğimiz üç parçalı ruh teorisine göre ruhun en üstün kısmı olan logosun, yani aklın, ruhun alt kısmı olan eros, yani iştihâ, üzerinde hakimiyet sağlayamamasının cezası olarak ruh dünyaya düşer. Ruh ilk olarak bir erkek bedenine yerleşir ve ruh son derece kuvvetli bedensel arzulara maruz kalır. Ruhun kurtuluşunun koşulu logosun eros, ruhun beden üzerindeki hakimiyetini sağlayarak erdemli bir yaşam sürdürmesidir. Eğer kişi kendi

içinde bu disiplini sağlayamazsa erdemli bir yaşam süremez ve bir sonraki yaşamında daha büyük bir ceza olarak bir kadın bedenine yerleşir. Bir kadın bedenine yerleşmenin daha büyük bir ceza olmasının sebebi kadın bedeninde ruhun maruz kalacağı bedensel duyguların şiddetinin daha yüksek olması yani aklın beden üzerindeki hakimiyetinin daha zor olmasıdır. Sonrasında ise ruh erdemli bir yaşam sürdüremese bir kölenin, evcil bir hayvanın, sonrasında vahşi bir hayvanın bedenine yerleşecektir. Akıldan daha çok pay alanın daha az pay alandan ahlaki ve epistemolojik olarak üstün olduğu bu düşüncede yine de varlıklar arasında bir mutlak doğa farkı kurgulanmamıştır. Zira bir hayvan da az da olsa akıldan pay alır, ne de bir köle ile bir hayvan arasında önemli bir fark vardır.

Aristoteles'in Platon'un akıl/doğa düalizmine getirdiği katkı hayvanların akıldan pay aldığı düşüncesinin reddiyle sağlanmıştır. Aristoteles'e göre yalnızca insanlar akıl sahibi varlıklardır ve yalnızca akıl sahibi varlıklar ahlaki faillerdir. Yalnızca ahlaki failler ahlakın alanında oldukları için insanların hayvanlara karşı hiçbir ahlaki sorumluluğu yoktur. Aristoteles de Platon gibi erkeğin kadından, efendinin köleden akıl yönüyle üstün olduğunu düşünmektedir. Fakat o insanın bu dünyadaki konumunun ve görevinin ne olduğu sorularını cevaplarken Platon'dan farklı olarak dünyanın ötesindeki aşkınsal bir alana başvuramaz. Varlığın kendisinde kozmik bir düzen olduğunu düşünen Aristoteles, aklın insanın tanımlayıcı özelliği olduğunu ve insanı diğer bütün varlıklardan üstün kıldığını düşünür. Kozmik düzende her varlık kendisinden üstün bir varlığa hizmet etmektedir. Bitkiler hayvanlar için, hayvanlar insanlara hizmet ederler. Aristoteles'in ünlü doğal köle teorisine göre erkek kadından, efendi köleden, insan hayvandan doğası itibariyle logosa daha yakın olduğu için üstündür ve doğası itibariyle efendisidir. Hiyerarşinin altında olanın üstündekine hizmet etmesi ise onun erdemidir ve bu ilişkinin her iki tarafının da iyiliği içindir.

Fakat ne Platon ne de Aristoteles'te akıl ve doğa arasında mutlak bir düalizm kurgulanmıştır, ne de bütün insanlarda bulunan ve hiçbir insandışı varlıkta

bulunmayan bir özellik iddia edilmiştir. Hem Platon hem de Aristoteles için kölenin hayvandan önemli ölçüde bir farkı yoktur. Aristoteles hayvanlardan akıl yetisini reddetmiş olsa da varlığın kendisinde bir rasyonel düzenin olduğu düşüncesindedir. Haliyle, akıl ve doğa, insan ve doğa hiyerarşik ve hatta yer yer asimetrik bir biçimde kurgulansa da bu çiftler arasında tam anlamıyla bir dışlama söz konusu değildir. Descartes'a gelindiğinde ise akıl/doğa ve insan/doğa düalizmlerinin ve rasyonalist ve hümanist düşünce geleneğinin gelişimindeki nihai adımın atıldığına bununla beraber felsefi etkinliğin objesinin ve amacının, düşünmenin anlamının değişimine tanık oluruz.

Plumwood'a göre Descartes'ın insan/hayvan, akıl/doğa ya da zihin/beden, düalizmlerini geliştirmek ve bunlar arasındaki sürekliliği ortadan kaldırmak için uyguladığı yöntem düşünme kavramını yeniden yorumlamak, zihnin temelini rasyonaliteden bilince geçirmek ve böylelikle zihni bir töz olarak kurgulamaktır. Rasyonalite bir kapasitedir ve varlıklar bir kapasiteye sahip olma açısından birbirlerinden farklılaşabilirler. Plumwood'un da dediği gibi, Aristoteles rasyonalitenin insani alanı belirleyen özellik olduğunu düşünse de onun için doğada buna denk düşen bir rasyonel düzen vardı. Fakat zihin bir tözdür ve bir töz bölünemez. Varlıklar töze sahip olma açısından birbirinden derece olarak farklılaşamazlar; bir kişinin zihni ya vardır ya da yoktur. Hayvanlar akıl sahibi olmadıkları gibi zihin sahibi de değildir ve yalnızca ama yalnızca insanlar zihin sahibidirler. İşte Kartezyen metodolojiyi ise bu şekilde anlayabiliriz; zihin bir töz olduğu için insanlar potansiyel olarak anlama kapasitelerinde eşittirler ve var olan eşitsizlikler uygun metodolojinin elde edilmesiyle ortadan kaldırılabilir. Descartes'a göre uygun metodoloji ile kadınlar bile hakikate erkeklerle eşit ölçüde erişebilirler.

Descartes'a göre zihnin doğası düşüncedir ve düşünce zihinde var olanlar hakkındaki bilinçliliklerdir. Descartes bedensel duyumlar ile zihinsel duyumları birbirinden ayırarak zihinsel duyumların imkanının düşünme yetisi olduğunu söyler. Zihin sahibi olmayan varlıklar düşünemeyeceği için herhangi bir zihinsel duyum

kapasitesine sahip değildirler. Kartezyen zihin/beden düalizmi akıl alanından dışlanan varlıklar faillik, acı ya da haz hissetme, arzu duyma, bir inanca sahip olma gibi maddesel olmayan yetilerden yoksun olarak kurgular ve doğayı ve maddesel alanı ve bu alanın hareketini mekanizma ile açıklar. Bu durumda felsefe hakikati kozmos hakkında tefekkür ederek aramaz zira kozmosta insan yaşamı için model olabilecek hiçbir şey yoktur artık. Doğanın makine olarak imgenmesiyle birlikte insanın doğa üzerindeki tahakkümünü sınırlayabilecek ahlaki zemini tamamıyla ortadan kaldırır Fakat doğaya dair atfedilen bu makinesel imge insana doğanın işleyişi hakkında yeterli bilgiyi elde edilmesi durumunda doğayı kendi niyet ve amaçlarına göre kullanabileceği efendisi olabileceğine dair bir düşünceyi doğurur.

Fakat insanın doğa üzerindeki tahakkümünün meşruiyeti mutlak olarak sağlanmış iken, tam anlamıyla hümanist bir felsefe geliştirmiş olan Descartes'ın felsefesinde insan ötekileri hakkında, yani kadınlar ya da köleler hakkında bir yorum yapıldığına şahit olmayız. Bu durumda doğanın tahakkümü ile insanın tahakkümü arasındaki ilişkinin burada kopmuş olduğu gibi bir düşünceye kapılabiliriz. Fakat özellikle dekolonyal filozofların Kartezyen felsefe eleştirileri bizlere Kartezyen zihin/beden, insan/hayvan, insan/doğa düalizmlerinin insan tanımını değiştirmiş olmasına rağmen insan kimliğinin kapsamını değiştirmedini fakat bu kimlikten dışlanan insan-ötekilerinin imgesinde doğa imgesine paralel olarak bir değişime yol açtığını ve bu imgenin değişimi ile birlikte ezilenlerin üzerindeki tahakkümün boyutunu ve şiddetini arttırdığını söylemektedir.

Tahakkümün toplumsallaşmasını ve kurumsallaşmasını tahakkümcü öznellik üzerinden okuyabilmek ve tahakkümcü öznelğin politik bağlamlarını anlamak adına Hobbes'tan bu yana batının siyaset felsefesinde önemli bir yer tutan, ahlakın, devletin, toplumun doğası hakkındaki fikirlerimizi önemli ölçüde etkilemiş olan sözleşmeciliğin son derece önemli düşünce imkanlarını barındırdığını düşünüyorum. Sözleşmeci düşünce toplumsal ve siyasal normların insanların bir araya gelerek üzerinde anlaşması ile belirlendiği görüşündedir. Yani, bu normlar



toplumsal inşadılar ve bu normların değeri bu normları belirleyen ve bu normların ahlakiliği üzerine sözleşme yapan insanlara daha iyi bir hayat sağlamalarından kaynaklanır. Gel gelelim, klasik sözleşme teorileri ilk bakışta sözleşmenin eşit bireyler tarafından yapıldığını söylese de detaylı bir okumanın göstereceği gibi burada bahsedilen insan Platon, Aristoteles ve Descartes'ın bahsettiği insandan pek de farklı değildir.

Mills klasik sözleşme teorilerinin ahlaki ve politik normları belirleyen ahlak ve politik sözleşmelerin yanında kimin sözleşme yapabilecek niteliklere sahip olduğuna dair yapılan epistemolojik bir sözleşme içerdiğinin altını çizer. Klasik sözleşme teorilerinin epistemolojik sözleşmeleri kadınları ve siyahları kişi ya da birey statüsünden dışladığı düşüncesinden hareketle ideal olmayan sözleşme teorilerini geliştiren Pateman ve Mills klasik sözleşmelerin ilk olarak hayvanları kişi ya da birey statüsünden dışladığını gözden kaçırmaktadır. İlk olarak hayvanları ahlakın alanından dışlayan ve haliyle tahakkümcü bir öznellik üreten sözleşmelerde kimin birey statüsüne sahip olduğunun kararını bu özneliği üretecek metafizik ve epistemolojik gücü ele geçirmiş olan ezenlerdir.

Hobbes'a göre doğa durumundaki insanın tek hakkı yaşamını koruyabilmek için istediği her şeyi yapabileceği doğa hakkıdır. İnsan doğası itibariyle bencil ve kötücül olduğu için doğa durumunda bu özgürlük hali kaçınılmaz bir şekilde savaş durumuna yol açar. Kimsenin çıkarına olmayan bu savaş durumundan kurtulmak ise bireylerin bir araya gelerek belirli ahlaki ve toplumsal normlar üzerinde bir sözleşme yapmasını gerektirir. Yani, insanlar kendilerine daha iyi bir hayat sağlaması adına belirli normların iyiliği üzerine bir sözleşme yaparlar. Devletin görevi ise insanların bu sözleşmeye bağlı kalmalarını sağlamak, aksi durumda ise sözleşmeyi ihlal edenleri cezalandırmaktır.

Hobbes insanın sözleşme yapabilmesini sağlayan özgün kapasitesini anlamak adına insanla hayvanı kıyaslar. Hayvanların akıl sahibi olduğunu reddetmese, insanlar

rasyonel kapasitesinin hayvandan üstündür. Örneğin, insanlar hayvanlardan farklı olarak eylemlerinin sonucunu tahmin edebilirler. İnsan ve hayvan arasındaki diğer temel farklılık ise insanın konuşma yeteneğidir. Sözleşme yapabilmek için konuşma yeteneği gereklidir. Hayvanlar dilimizi anlamadıkları için ve karşılıklı anlaşma sağlayamayacağımız için hayvanlarla sözleşme yapılamaz. Ahlakın alanı yalnızca sözleşmenin tarafları ile sınırlı olduğu için ve ahlaki değerlerin değeri sözleşmeyi yapanlara sağladığı fayda ile belirlendiği için sözleşmenin öznesi olmayanlar ahlakın alanından dışlanırlar ve sözleşmenin nesnesi, sözleşmenin taraflarının mülkiyeti haline gelirler. Öyle ki, Hobbes'a göre hayvanlar ve diğer insandıışı doğa insanlar için yaratılmıştır.

Locke'un toplumsal sözleşme düşüncesi Hobbes'tan doğa durumunun tasviriyle ayrılmaya başlar. Locke'a göre insanlar rasyonel varlıklar oldukları için doğa durumunda da aslında ahlaki olarak birbirlerine bağlıydılar. Yani, akıl doğa durumunda da insan ilişkilerini düzenlemektedir. Fakat aklın koyduğu kuralların ihlal edilmesi sonucunda yaşanan çatışmaların, kin ve intikam duygularının önlenmesi için bir devletin inşasına ihtiyaç duyarlar. Sözleşme yaparak insanlar amacı bireylerin haklarını ve en önemlisi de mülkiyeti korumak olan devleti inşa eder ve sivil topluma geçerler.

Locke'un sözleşme teorisinde mülkiyet merkezi kavramdır. İnsanın tanımı, insan ve hayvan arasındaki farklar, ya da sözleşme yapabilmek için gerekli olan yetiler mülkiyet kavramı üzerinden açıklanır. Birey olmanın koşulu mülkiyet sahibi olabilecek, ya da kendi kişinin sahibi olabilme yetisine sahip olmaktır. Devletin en temel görevi ise mülkiyetin korunmasıdır. Sivil toplum mülkiyet sahibi bireylerin mülkiyet haklarının kanunlarla korunduğu ve düzenlendiği bir alandır. Locke hayvanların akıl sahibi olduğunu tamamen reddetmiş iken onların kendi kişisine sahip olamayacaklarını, haliyle mülkiyet olacaklarını söyler. Aslında sözleşme bir anlamda insanların hayvanlar ve insandıışı doğa üzerindeki hak paylaşımının adil bir

şekilde yapılmasının ve insanların doğa üzerindeki mülkiyet haklarını korumayı amaçlar.

Öyleyse, sözleşmenin tahakkümcü bir öznelik ürettiğini, sözleşme imza atmanın tahakkümcü özneliği benimsemeye karşılık geldiği böylelikle anlaşılabilir. Sözleşmecilik hem tahakküm mantığına hem de düalist düşünce biçimine sahiptir. İlk olarak, sözleşme üstünlüğü tahakkümün meşruiyetini sağladığı düşüncesine sahiptir ve sözleşmecilik tahakküm mantığının farklı bir versiyonunu sunmaktadır. İkincisi, sözleşme insan ve hayvan arasındaki farklılıkları ahlaki farklılıklara dönüştürür. Özellikle Locke'ta belirgin bir şekilde gördüğümüz gibi insan ve hayvan farkı düalist bir şekilde kavranır.

Eğer bir öznelik tahakkümcü ise, tahakkümün objesini bu özneliği üreten iktidarın ihtiyaç ve arzularına göre belirlenir. Yani, en temelde hayvanların tahakkümünü açıklayan ve meşrulaştıran sözleşme teorisinin insan-ötekilerinin tahakkümüne genişlemesi de sürpriz olmayacaktır. Carole Pateman Cinsel Sözleşme isimli kitabında erkeklerin kadınların bedenine erişim hakkını sağlayan ve güvence altına alan, erkeklerin kadınlar üzerindeki tahakkümünü kuran, meşrulaştıran ve sürdüren patriyarkal toplumsal yapının cinsel sözleşme tarafından kurulduğunu söylemektedir. Pateman'a göre cinsel sözleşme toplumsal sözleşmenin görünmeyen yarısıdır ve bu sözleşme kadınları toplumsal sözleşmenin tarafı olmaktan haliyle erkekler ile kadınlar arasındaki eşitsizliği sağlamaktadır. Pateman sözleşme teorisini geliştirirken klasik sözleşme teorilerini inceleyerek kadınların toplumsal sözleşmeden nasıl ve hangi gerekçelere dayanarak dışlandığını anlamaya çalışır.

Hobbes erkek ve kadın arasında doğası itibariyle bir farklılık olmadığını söyleyen tek sözleşmeci filozoftur. Fakat yine de günün sonunda Hobbes'un sözleşme teorisinde de sivil toplum maskülen bir alandır. Pateman bu durumda kadınların doğa durumundayken erkekler tarafından zapt edildiğini ve sözleşmeden dışlanmış olduğunu söyler. Hobbes erkek ve kadın arasında zihinsel ve fiziksel yetiler arasında

önemli bir farklılık olmadığını düşünüyor iken, Pateman kadınların erkekler tarafından zapt edilmesini mümkün kılan koşulları kadınların hamilelik ve bebeğin bakımı sürecindeki dezavantajı ile açıklar. Pateman'ın bu varsayımının doğruluk değerinin bir önemi yoktur. Hobbes'un sözleşmesi tahakkümcü bir sözleşmedir ve Hobbes için sözleşme ile fetih arasında bir fark yoktur. Zira, Hobbes korku durumunda yapılan sözleşmenin geçerli olduğunu söylemektedir. İlk başta hayvanların dışlandığı sözleşmede gücü ele geçiren kişinin çıkar ve amaçlarına hizmet edecek bir sözleşmenin ve bu sözleşmeyle inşa edilen tahakkümcü bir toplumsal düzenin meşruiyeti konusunda Hobbes için bir problem görünmemektedir.

Locke için erkekler doğa durumunda kadınlardan hem fiziksel hem de zihinsel yetileri bakımından üstündür, ve kadınlar birey olabilecek, kendi kişilerine sahip olacak yetiye sahip değildirler. Pateman, Locke'un teorisinde de kadınların doğa durumundayken erkekler tarafından zapt edilmiş olduğunu ve cinsel sözleşmenin toplumsal sözleşmenin öncesinde yapılmış olduğunu düşünür. Haliyle sözleşmenin öznesi olmayan kadınlar, sözleşmenin nesnesi olurlar. Fakat kadınlar doğa durumunda bırakılmazlar; Pateman'a göre bu cinsel sözleşmenin amacına aykırıdır. Cinsel sözleşme ile kadınlar doğa durumu ile sivil toplum arasında bir yerde, sivil toplumun içerisinde oluşturulan kamusal alan ve özel alan ayrımında özel alana kapatılmışlardır. Kadınlar da tıpkı hayvanlar gibi sözleşmenin öznesi olmadıkları için, tıpkı hayvanlar gibi sivil toplumun içerisinde bir mülkiyet olarak, kocanın karısı olarak var olurlar.

Pateman'dan farklı olarak klasik sözleşme teorilerine daha az değinerek beyaz üstünlüğüne dayanan toplumsal yapıyı açıklamak için sözleşmeyi bir metafor olarak kullanan Mills, siyah adamlarla karşılaşan beyazların aralarında yaptıkları ırksal sözleşme ile siyahları insan ya da kişi statüsünden dışladıklarını ve altkisi olarak tanımlandıklarını söyler. Toplumsal sözleşme doğa durumundaki insanın sivil

topluma geçişi hakkındaki hikâyeyi anlatıyor iken, Irksal Sözleşme siyahların kalıcı sivil toplum öncesi halini tasvir eder.

Irksal sözleşme kişi ile altkişi ayrımını yaparak siyahları alt kişi olarak tanımlar; yani ahlaki olarak düşük ve politik olarak tabi bir konuma yerleştirir. Siyahların sözleşme yapabilecek kapasitelerinin olduğunu reddeden, bilişsel yetilerini düşük olarak algılayan ve onları hayvan gibi imgeleyen Irksal Sözleşme, siyahları sözleşmenin nesnesi haline getirerek onları eşit hak ve özgürlük dağıtımından dışlar ve beyazları siyahlara göre politik, ekonomik ve toplumsal olarak imtiyazlandırır. Böylelikle Irksal Sözleşme ırk farklılığını doğa farkına çevirerek beyazları siyahlardan epistemolojik, ahlaki ve politik olarak üstün bir biçimde konumlandırır.

Tekrar söylemek gerekirse, ideal ve ideal olmayan sözleşme teorilerini öznellik üzerinden okuduğumuzda göreceğimiz şey şudur ki sözleşmeler bir öznellik üretir ve ürettikleri öznellik tahakkümcüdür. Tahakkümcü öznelğin toplumsal sözleşmeler ile toplumsallaştırıldığını ve tahakkümün bu şekilde kurumsallaştığını ve normalleştiğini söyleyebiliriz. Toplumsal sözleşmeler ilk olarak insanı hayvandan üstün olarak kurgulamış, insan/hayvan düalizmini doğa durumu/sivil toplum düalizmine bağlamış, hayvanları ahlakın alanından dışlamış ve bir mülk statüsüne indirgemıştır. Batı felsefesi geleneğiyle son derece uyumlu bir şekilde insan/doğa düalizmi zemininde kurulan toplumsal sözleşme teorileri insan-ötekilerini bu insan ve doğa arasına yerleştirerek, yani onları insandan az ya da insandışı olarak kurgulayarak toplumsal tahakkümü kurar ve açıklar. Nasıl batıda insan kimliği ırkçı ve cinsiyetçi ama hepsinden önce türcü ise, toplumsal sözleşme teorileri de ırkçı ve cinsiyetçi ama hepsinden önce de türcü sözleşmelerdir.

## APPENDIX B: THESIS PERMISSION FORM / TEZ İZİN FORMU

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**Bölümü** / Department : Felsefe / Philosophy

**TEZİN ADI / TITLE OF THE THESIS (İngilizce / English):** AN ANALYSIS OF INTERCONNECTIONS BETWEEN FORMS OF OPPRESSION FROM AN ECOFEMINIST AND DECOLONIAL PERSPECTIVE

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