IMPLEMENTATION OF R2P IN LIBYA AND THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE
MILITARY INTERVENTION

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ABSTRACT

IMPLEMENTATION OF R2P IN LIBYA AND THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE MILITARY INTERVENTION

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This thesis focuses on 2011 NATO intervention and its consequences. In doing so, it aims to present comprehensive understanding of the responsibility to protect and Libya's political history together. Based on the responsibility to protect doctrine, coalition forces in Libya facilitated the dethronement of Gaddafi and put an end to the regime's crimes against its own people. The undiluted NATO intervention led to occurrence of a power vacuum in Libya. The lack of institutionalization, the formation of the regime around Gaddafi, and efforts to prevent the formation of autonomous groups such as political parties have shaped Libya on a fragmented social structure. The interveners carried out the intervention without paying any attention to this social structure. After the intervention, the consensus against Gaddafi began to disintegrate, and the international and regional powers began to act in line with their own interests. As a result of the power vacuum, competition emerged among Libya's highly fragmented tribal society, and Libya's fragmented social structure paved the way for power struggles. By supporting local actors, international

actors turned Libya into playground for their competition and settling the conflict has become more difficult.

ÖZ

LİBYA'DA KORUMA SORUMLULUĞUNUN UYGULANMASI VE ASKERİ MÜDAHALENİN SONUÇLARI

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Bu tez 2011 NATO müdahalesine ve sonuçlarına odaklanmaktadır. Bunu yaparken, koruma sorumluluğu anlayışını ve Libya'nın siyasi tarihini kapsamlı bir şekilde bir arada sunmayı amaçlamaktadır. Koruma sorumluluğu doktrinine dayanarak, Libya'da koalisyon güçleri Kaddafi'nin devrilmesini kolaylaştırdı ve rejimin kendi halkına karşı işlediği suçlara son verdi. NATO müdahalesi, Libya'da bir güç boşluğunun ortaya çıkmasına neden oldu. Libya'da düzenleyici devlet kurumlarının yokluğu, rejimin Kaddafi etrafında şekillenmesi ve siyasi partiler gibi özerk grupların oluşmasını engelleme çabaları, Libya'yı parçalanmış bir sosyal yapı üzerine şekillendirmiştir. Müdahaleciler Libya'nın bu sosyal yapısını hiç dikkat almadan müdahaleyi gerçekleştirdiler. Müdahalenin ardından Kaddafi'ye karşı oluşan uzlaşı dağılmaya, uluslararası ve bölgesel güçler kendi çıkarları doğrultusunda hareket etmeye başladı. Müdahale sonrası oluşan güç boşluğunun bir sonucu olarak, Libya'nın son derece parçalanmış aşiret toplumu arasında rekabet ortaya çıktı ve Libya'nın parçalanmış sosyal yapısı güç mücadelesinin önünü açtı. Uluslararası

aktörler yerel aktörleri destekleyerek Libya'yı bir rekabet alanına dönüştürdü ve çatışmayı çözmek daha da zorlaştı.

Anahtar Kelimeler: R2P, Libya, Arap Baharı, NATO Müdahalesi, Parçalanma

To My Mother and My Father for their endless support

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Although humanitarian military interventions have a long history, the debate about the intentions of humanitarian interveners goes hand in hand with it. In the 1990s and early 2000s, especially with Kofi Annan's Millennium Report in 2000, the discussion evolved into another dimension that ultimately led to the emergence of the responsibility to protect (R2P). The R2P doctrine has become an emerging international norm in a very short period of time and has been in continuous progress. The doctrine is basically based on three main pillars: a) states have the responsibility to protect their citizens from mass atrocity crimes, b) the international community has the responsibility to help states fulfill their responsibility, and c) the international community has the responsibility to intervene when the state is not protecting its citizens (ICISS, 2001, p.17).

Since the adoption of R2P at the UN World Summit in 2005, several resolutions have been passed referring to this doctrine. However, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 is the first resolution that allowed military intervention with reference to the R2P doctrine. Thus, a specific importance has been attributed to the Libyan intervention in 2011.

In 2011, the wave of Arab Spring movements spread into Libya, and the government's reaction to the protestors paved the way to bigger protests. The international community responded to the regime's oppression so quickly that have never been seen before. The UN Security Council Resolution 1973, which authorized the international community "to take all necessary measures" in order to protect Libyan

civilians, found support. NATO's military operation was conducted to protect demonstrators from the regime's brutality. The operation later evolved into a regime-change operation against Gaddafi and, in the end, led to his death. UNSC Resolution 1973 is the first resolution which allowed military intervention with reference to the R2P. Thus, specific importance has been attributed to 2011 Libya intervention. The military intervention on Libya took place in order to prevent Gaddafi's mass atrocity crimes. However, R2P had limited effect in Libya due to its political history and social structure.

Libya is a political outlier because it has chosen a course that has severely restricted the development of a modern state and its institutions, first through a policy of benign neglect during the monarchy and then more consciously following the 1969 coup. This "anomaly" can only be explained if one considers the circumstances that led to a multilayered combination of variables that encouraged Libyan rulers to believe that statelessness was both conceivable and desirable, while oil provided the enabling atmosphere for them to act on that belief (Vandewalle, 2012, p.3).

Traditional values influenced social life well after independence. King Idris' policies and personal manner reflected established religious and tribal norms. The discovery of oil unleashed societal forces traditionally repressed and, in the meantime, gave power to the King to maintain his order without being accountable. In the wake of increasing wealth and mass immigration, values began to shift (Metz, 1989, p.57). When Gaddafi and his colleagues executed coup d'état in 1969, there was almost no proper state institution to regulate the existing authority and any organization leading people to join the political process. Traditional society's attitudes and behaviors needed to be shifted by a political socialization program. Gaddafi's regime tried to implement new policies and inaugurated new political organs to increase the political participation of Libyan citizens, but at the same time, in order to consolidate his power, he relied on existing traditional bonds. Patterns of the traditional Libyan society are defined by EI-Fathaly and Palmer as: "particularistic, lacking in civic responsibility (atomistic), tribalistic, fatalistic, nonparticipatory, and engrained with the values of ascription and distrust" (quoted in Obeidi, 2001, p.51).

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2011 Libyan intervention and its consequences are the main themes of this thesis. The mainstream analysis on R2P in Libya focuses on the results of the intervention by classifying it as successful or unsuccessful (Daalder and Stavridis 2012; Borghard and Pischedda, 2013; Hamid, 2016), while criticisms are focusing on the legality (VanLandingham, 2011; Ulfstein and Christiansen, 2013; Morton and Hernandez-Ramos, 2015) of it. There is not sufficient scholarly discussion which adopts a comprehensive perspective that includes the domestic structure of Libya and the international military intervention at the same time. The thesis aims to fill the gap by focusing on the history of Libya and the intervention together in order to understand consequences of the 2011 NATO intervention in Libya. Blaming only NATO intervention for the current conflict is not righteous, likewise arguing that Libya is prone to conflict due to its social structure. A rise in the influx of weapons from outside sources and assiduous efforts of international actors has undoubtedly contributed to the fragmentation of Libyan rebels (Strazzari and Tholens, 2014). However, the social fragmentation and lack of formal state institutions are significant as much as the intervention. The biggest failure of the NATO was not paying enough attention to Libyan social structure. Thus, in order to discuss the situation Libya after 2011, it is necessary to consider Libya's history.

The thesis asks the following questions in order to develop more comprehensive understanding on Libya's ongoing conflict. How did the NATO intervention affect Libya? What are the consequences of NATO intervention in Libya? Why did Libyan Civil War become playground for external actors? In order to answer these questions, qualitative methods will be used throughout this thesis, and in order to support arguments, primary sources, as well as secondary sources, will be referred to. In an aim to explore opinions and motives, translations of Gaddafi's, Obama's, Ban Ki-Moon's and some other leaders' speeches will be quoted on several occasions. UN documents, newspapers, and reports are going to be presented to describe ongoing circumstances.

In order to develop an analytical background, the second chapter of the thesis will focus on humanitarian military interventions and the change in discourse from

humanitarian interventions to R2P doctrine. Following a review of the literature and the main criticisms of humanitarian interventions, the chapter is going to examine the factors affecting outcomes of the humanitarian interventions by referring to specific cases. The chapter will continue with the process of institutionalization of the R2P and be concluded with an R2P literature review.

In the following third chapter, Libya's state characteristics and the state-building process will be presented by giving a specific focus on the Gaddafi era. In order to be comprehensive, the chapter exclusively focuses on the political culture and roots of the fragmented society. It argues that Libya's fragmented society and tribalism have been cultivated since the Ottoman rule. The rulers of Libya had mainly focused on controlling the country, and by doing so, they favored some tribes over other ones. After Libya gained its independence, King Idris relied on this tribal structure and in favor of his close circle, he neglected the building state institutions. After a successful coup in 1969, Gaddafi came to power and in his forty-two years regime, he relied on bossism. Thus, at the end of his reign, Libya was a state without any proper state institutions.

The fourth chapter is going to start with a brief narration of 2011 Libyan Uprisings and subsequently will analyze the process of intervention. The chapter will be focusing on actors, motives, methods, as well as problems and deficiencies of the military intervention. After providing a solid context for the intervention, the chapter will discuss the newly emerging R2P doctrine. The chapter mainly argues that the military intervention is conducted in a very quick and offhand manner without considering other options. The interveners did not pay attention to Libya's social and political features. The fragmented structure of Libya was not unknown and the consequences of the intervention without proper rebuilding efforts was not unpredictable.

The fifth chapter's focus is on Libya after 2011. After the description of fragmentation of a country to have a better grip on the continuation of the conflict,

the Second Libyan Civil War will be discussed through the chapter. Then brief narrative on the Civil War will be presented before analyzing the internationalization of the ongoing conflict. The last part of the chapter will unpack foreign actors and their motives and methods

The last chapter is a conclusion chapter and aims to summarize findings and briefly presents the current situation in order to show what is happening in Libya after eleven years. This chapter is making connections between what is happening now and how it confirms the main argument of the thesis.

CHAPTER 2

ANALYTICAL BACKGROUND: EMERGENCE OF RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT

2.1. Introduction

Despite the advancement of international regulations outlawing mass atrocity crimes, little was done to halt them or to protect the most vulnerable during the Cold War. Because the Cold War ambiance made states prioritize security policies and push down human rights issues from the priority list, and violators were often sheltered by the superpowers. Human protection was not the main aim of the interventions (Bellamy and Dunne, 2016, pp.4-5).

As protection failures increased and international society has begun to learn from its own failures and have begun to develop new ideas and concepts like "protection of civilians" and "sovereignty as responsibility" (Bellamy, 2016, p.5). By developing the idea of responsibility to protect (R2P), the aim is to define the international community's role in the need of response to mass atrocities and to elucidate the idea of sovereignty (Torun, 2017, p.31).

This chapter firstly examines the humanitarian intervention via literature review and main criticisms on it and then presents the process of institutionalization of R2P. Since the main focus of the thesis is 2011 NATO intervention in Libya, the chapter aims to present analytical background for military interventions conducted with humanitarian aims/discourses. In order to present a holistic approach, the chapter starts with the concept of humanitarian intervention and continues with measurement

of success of humanitarian interventions. The components of success and failure will be presented through humanitarian military intervention cases. Introducing the humanitarian intervention will help us to understand better the change in discourse to R2P. The 2011 Libya intervention was conducted by referring to the R2P and thus, the rest of the chapter will be on R2P; its emergence, its differences from humanitarian intervention and criticisms against it.

2.2. Humanitarian Intervention

First of all, like other concepts of social sciences, it is hard to find out a well-agreed definition of humanitarian intervention and there has been an ongoing debate on different aspects of the notion of humanitarian intervention in the IR scholarly community. Halberstam defines humanitarian intervention as:

> [t]he use of force by one state in the territory of another to protect persons who are in imminent danger of death or grave injury when the state in whose territory they are is unwilling or unable to protect them (Halberstam, 1995, p.1).

The definition used by Jennifer Welsh uses the kind of similar definition but there is a highlight on the interference in domestic affairs:

> [c]oercive interference in the internal affairs of a state, involving the use of armed force, with the purposes of addressing massive human rights violations or preventing widespread human suffering (Welsh, 2004, p.3).

Holzgrefe comes up with a similar definition but sees the threat of use of force as a humanitarian intervention too, he defines it as:

> [t]he threat or use of force across state borders by a state (or group of states) aimed at preventing or ending widespread and grave violations of the fundamental human rights of individuals other than its own citizens, without

the permission of the state within whose territory force is applied (Holzgrefe and Keohane, 2003, p.18)

Fernanda Tesón includes some more details to the definition and defines it as:

[p]roportionate international use or threat of military force, undertaken in principle by a liberal government or alliance, aimed at ending tyranny or anarchy, welcomed by the victims, and consistent with the doctrine of double effect (Tesón, 2001, p.3).

Even though said definitions contain different focuses, there is a clear emphasis on the use of force to halt human rights violations outside the interveners' territory. Interfering in another state's domestic sphere and conducting military operations inside its territorial boundaries is a challenge to a mainstream understanding of the international order based on Weberian understanding of the state which recognizes the state monopoly on violence within its borders.

The acceptance of state sovereignty is the very basic unit of modern international relations such that for some disregarding this notion would lead to undesirable outcomes. As the principle of sovereignty is stated in Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter and it clearly refrains the members from "the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State". From this point of view, intervening actors are considered violating the sovereignty of the engaged state.

However, the disunity between humanitarian intervention and sovereignty is caused by the different interpretations of the notion: while one side is reading sovereignty as absolute authority over the territory, the other side is considering "sovereignty as responsibility (respect for a minimum standard of human rights)" (Welsh, 2004, p.2). There are other arguments against the absolute sovereignty of the state, especially in the last decades. For example, Inge Kaul sees state security and national sovereignty as means to achieve human security and therefore states should not hide behind that idea while violating human rights. Furthermore, according to her, if a government

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cannot guarantee human security, it is the international community's duty to respond to the needs (Kaul, 1995, p.316).

In addition to the sovereignty argument, there are criticisms about instrumentalization of the humanitarian intervention, it is not like they are questioning the features of it but the idea itself. Fear of abuse is at the center to some scholars who believe that the notion might turn to be a cover for states' hidden agendas. According to the realist understanding of international relations, states are in constant competition with each other, and they seek to maximize their self-interest. The statist perspective to humanitarian intervention is coming from this very basic assumption: despite the fact that the intervention consists of some humanitarian motivations, it is primarily self-interest motivated and 'humanitarian' features are going to be used as a discourse (Donnelly, 1993, p.618). Similarly, Ayoob states that humanitarian intervention might end up as a tool for powerful states to intervene in weaker ones' internal affairs and it may debase the international order. Thus, "the international order will revert to the state where it is merely a 'system' but no longer a 'society'" (Ayoob, 2002, p.92). As Morgenthau indicates in his article, during the Cold War, US and USSR used third party weak states for their competing areas and while the interventions were serving to the national interests of the superpowers, they had been "masked by the ideologies of communism and anti-communism" (1967, p.428). So, it can be argued that humanitarian intervention can be used in the same way communism and anti-communism were used during the Cold War. Moreover, there is an article written during the Cold War era and argues that "the nuclear stalemate between the Big Powers, proxy wars and interventions have become the means to enhance influence … The doctrine of humanitarian intervention could be used to confer legitimacy upon an intervention initiated merely to achieve or maintain supremacy in a region" (Sornarajah, 1981, pp.63-64).

Furthermore, some scholars debate that unconditional support for opposition groups that are claimed to be oppressed under current regimes would create instability throughout the globe. As Kupperman writes, in case of internal conflicts:

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[i]f the state eschews retaliation, the rebels win; if the state does retaliate, the international community intervenes and the rebels still win … it has proved sufficient to trigger some rebellion without deterring all state retaliation, thereby causing some genocidal violence that otherwise would not have occurred (2008, p. 75).

Nicolas Wheeler also raises concerns in this debate and sees the humanitarian intervention as representing "the West's assertion of a new "standard of civilization" that will be used to justify intervention against weaker states'" (Atack, 2002, p.282). Even if involvement is purely for humanitarian reasons, it is very hard for governments involved to be completely uninterested. Not that, human rights will never play a role in a decision to intervene, but it is quite possible that there will be other interests and even it is possible that humanitarian reasons will be just "an accessory motive to an intervention" (Pommier, 2011, p.1082). Moreover, as it was experienced before for European states, state-making itself is a violent process, and third world countries, mostly which gained their independence in the previous century, carry a concern over the humanitarian intervention. They see the intervention as a threat to their newly gained sovereignty since the violation to some extent is seen as inevitable for creating an order inside the country (Ayoob, 2004, p.101). Furthermore, the implication of the humanitarian intervention might lead to further misunderstandings and misconduct as some argue that it can be understood as 'right to intervene' even when there is no big scale of human rights violation. Even more, propaganda can be used to justify the intervention by exaggerating the situation or using the broader understanding of human security.

Moreover, Barnett argues that the concept of humanitarianism was instrumentalized and mixed with military intervention. He elaborates his argument by giving example from the Iraq invasion. US forces took part in a number of activities that muddled military and humanitarian missions, including parachuting relief supplies in packages that looked a lot like those used to transport ordnance and allowing soldiers to give aid in civilian clothes. (Barnett, 2011, p. 192-193).

2.3. Success of the Humanitarian Intervention

There is no exact measurement tool to decide on the success of humanitarian military interventions. As mentioned above, the topic itself is a very controversial one. There are number of ways to measure the success of an intervention, including looking at how many lives are saved, how effective it is, and what the long-term effects are. However, it is almost impossible to take into consideration of all aspects and outcomes of the interventions, especially in the long term. In this part of the chapter, first more general approaches to success of a humanitarian intervention will be put forward. Later on, some of the factors influencing the success of a humanitarian intervention will be discussed in the light of previous humanitarian military interventions.

Seybolt argues that even though it is debatable, quantitative indicators have the benefit of being generally objective and allowing for the comparison of results. The relative efficacy of any intervention can only be measured by comparing it to what would have happened if the intervention had not occurred or occurred in a different manner. According to him, the political outcome is noteworthy, but its evaluation is pretty problematic. He asks, "How long after an intervention should a political judgment be made?" because the international influence after the intervention stays for a while and makes judging the political outcome difficult (Seybolt, 2008, pp.30-32).

Dobos makes a contribution to Seybolt's definition of success and argues that "If in a humanitarian crisis some people would have been killed or enslaved or expelled without assistance but were not killed or enslaved or expelled because of the actions of intervening military personnel, the intervention succeeded" (Dobos, 2016, p.498).

 On the other hand, Pattison measures the success of humanitarian intervention by looking into the effectiveness of the intervener and notes that the intervention is not for solving all the problems of intervened society faces. According to him, the efficacy of an intervener is judged by whether or not it is adequate to tussle with the widespread violations of fundamental human rights. The intervention should be

contrasted to what would have happened if the international community had not interfered and examined in the long run, which necessitates the intervener resolving the humanitarian situation as well as preventing an immediate repeat. The intervention should produce a meaningful and enduring change in the human rights status of those in need. However, this does not imply that short-term results are of less value than they once were (Pattison, 2008, pp. 265-266).

Butler focuses on the idea of "selling" the war by presenting the features of the "just war". The idea of just war is not something new and discussed widely by Augustine and later by Aquinas, according to the argument the criteria for waging war are: "just cause, competent authority, right intention, reasonable hope for success and proportionality" (Butler, 2012, p.74). Butler notes that the interventions that have a legal basis are most likely to be deemed successful. In order to make the intervention legitimate, it is needed to provide sufficient evidence in the public sphere, and legitimization is reasonably related to the five criteria aforementioned (ibid, pp.73-74). From Butler's point of view, for a successful humanitarian military intervention, these criteria must be met.

Heinze focuses on the intervening actors and the legitimacy at the same time. According to him, decisive force is required to prevent the crisis, and besides decisiveness, it is crucial to collaborate with regional and international organizations in order to conduct intervention successfully. He deems the Nigerian-led interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone as successful ones because these cases show that they gained legitimacy and efficacy by working through a formal global structure in order to counter the predominance of Nigeria. Moreover, it is important to note that these interventions received retroactive approval from the UN Security Council after they had already been implemented. It can be derived from his argument that the intervention's success depends on decisive force and international support while observing the conduct of the military operation (Heinze, 2009, p.123).

However, Nigerian led intervention in Sierra Leone did not cease the conflict completely, the implemented political solution was "short-lived" (Humphreys and Weinstein, 2008, p.51). David Ucko sees the British humanitarian intervention in

Sierra Leone as a perfect example of success and explains its reasons in his article. Britain intervened in the conflict with high awareness of the country thanks to its colonial past, and in order to meet the political objectives, British forces worked with both regional countries and international organizations. Furthermore, with the UN, they put an effort to stabilize the country during the post-conflict phase (Ucko, 2016, pp.866-872).

Three key criteria shine out in Ucko's definition of success in Sierra Leone: awareness of the country, collaboration with regional and international actors, and support during the post-conflict phase. Looking into the post-intervention phase and especially disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programs are also helping us to measure success of the humanitarian intervention. For example, since the end of the conflict in 2002, Sierra Leone has been at peace. When the Revolutionary United Front was abolished, there was a massive decrease in the number of weapons in circulation. Moreover, the participation in DDR programs was remarkable in the post-conflict phase. From this point of view, Sierra Leone's situation can be considered a success (Humphreys and Weinstein, 2008, p.54).

Robert Pape suggests that humanitarian intervention must be calculated beforehand and be pragmatic. The international community, through the UN, must agree on the aggressor and the affected population before intervening on behalf of the vulnerable as a humanitarian mission. Despite the threatened group's desire to take down the current regime, military action is not necessary to overthrow the government. So long as humanitarian intervention stays focused on its primary aim, it needs not to get sucked into an endless cycle of turmoil. According to him, the intervention should only occur in "…the intersection of the obligations to stop mass homicide, to keep the cost of intervention low, and to act only in cases with promising conditions for lasting" (Pape, 2012, p.75). Moreover, keeping the cost of intervention low is a measure of success because it takes place at the expense of intervening states' citizens' welfare. From this cost-efficiency view, the mission in Kosovo was successful one because the cost was kept low (ibid, p.41).

There is also another argument considered by Beitz, and he does not only focus on the perspectives of the intervener and intervened. As Pape, he argues that the intervention must have been strategically calculated beforehand, and he adds that the humanitarian intervention cannot be deemed successful if it "upsets international stability" (Beitz, 1979, p.415). In the Kosovo case, if we look from Beitz's perspective of protecting international stability, we can say that the engagement of powerful alliance to the small country in the Balkan region, not surprisingly, was quite attractive at the global scale and caused unrest in the region. For example, NATO's Kosovo air campaign impacted Russia's threat perception. Furthermore, as a result of the bombing of its Belgrade embassy, even China has expressed concern about the foreign interventionist policy (Steinbruner, 1999, p.287).

Moreover, so many Kosovo Albanians fled to neighboring countries in 1999 due to oncoming NATO intervention as NATO and the UNHCR were caught off guard. As a result, the distribution of help to the displaced people was hampered. Spectators were concerned that the inflow of Albanians into Macedonia might break the country's "delicate ethnic balance" (Lischer, 2007, p.148). However, due to NATO's continuous presence in Kosovo, refugees returned quickly following the end of the fighting (ibid, p.149). Despite the fact that, NATO intervention in Kosovo disturbed the international stability, at the same time, NATO's presence prevented the further instability in the region.

Benjamin Valentino looks at the Kosovo intervention from another perspective; according to him, the NATO intervention made the situation worse in Kosovo because it has changed the course of public opinion inside the intervened country (Valentino, 2011, p.65). In Kosovo, the aerial bombing was conducted for the sake of legitimacy in the domestic sphere of the US and the president's legitimacy in the long run (Butler, 2012, p.179). The NATO planes were flying on the high attitude and too fast while protecting civilians, but it had resulted in many civilian casualties at the expense of minimizing military losses, as mentioned by Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International (Valentino, 2011, p.64). Also, according to the UNMIK report, "the Mission demonstrated a lack of cultural sensitivity and an insufficient understanding of the dynamics of the society, in terms both of power structures and

of negotiations" (quoted in Lemay- Hébert, 2011, p.21). Many Serbs, who were not supporters of Milosevic at the beginning, started to attend anti-West campaigns and showed their support to him, and it resulted in the escalation of the conflict inside the country (Valentino, 2011, p.65 and Butler 2012, p.143). However, even though there were numerous civilian casualties due to the air campaign, military forces "performed a remarkable job" to help refugees with relief operations and by providing shelter (Seybolt, 2008, p.85).

Seybolt agrees with Valentino for the short-term outcomes of the Kosovo intervention. NATO's involvement escalated the conflict and led to an increase in the number of deaths. However, it also led Milosevic to withdraw its soldiers, allowing an international stabilization force to enter the region, and facilitated extraordinary repatriation of refugees. Another noteworthy point demonstrated in Kosovo is that the humanitarian logistical capacity of the military forces exceeds the humanitarian organizations' capabilities, and it is crucial for the success of the humanitarian intervention (Seybolt, 2008, p.86).

To sum up, the practice of humanitarian intervention is approached from different perspectives while defining its success. The intervention can be deemed successful by a group of scholars or policymakers, and at the same time, there can be strong opposition to its success. Opinions on the success of the intervention vary and include analysis of every aspect of it: the legality, interveners' point of view, number of saved lives, stability of the international system, assistance in the post-conflict phase, collaboration with regional and international actors are some of the factors discussed above.

The thesis argues that post-intervention aid, especially for building stable state, is crucial as much as intervention for deeming the humanitarian intervention successful. However, the assistance for building state institutions in the post-conflict phase must be conducted successfully. To fill the power gap in state-building contexts, the international community needs to carefully step between external legitimacy and local context intervention. In the context of direct international administration, it is extremely difficult to meet these requirements (Lemay-Hébert, 2009, p.66).

2.4. Change in Discourse: From Humanitarian Intervention to Responsibility to Protect

The idea of humanitarian intervention has already existed for centuries and has been considerably discussed in the last decades but responsibility to protect (R2P) as a notion is rather new and going forward to become an international norm. When the Cold War ended, there was optimism that the abolition of global ideological conflict would lead to a "New World Order" in which "cooperative arrangements" could be created in support to uphold human rights (Bellamy, 2016, p.5).

As protection failures increased and the wide gap between declaratory intentions and actual practices widened, international society has begun to learn from its own failures and has begun to develop new ideas and concepts like "protection of civilians" and "sovereignty as responsibility" (Bellamy, 2016, p.5). As Kofi Annan stated in his article published in The Economist in 1999: "State sovereignty, in its most basic sense, is being redefined—not least by the forces of globalisation and international co-operation" (Annan, 1999). R2P came up as an idea to solve some of the criticisms by institutionalizing the humanitarian intervention and implementing a new kind of understanding of the role of the international community. By focusing on states' obligations to defend its citizens, R2P is distinct from humanitarian action. The notion introduced a "novel idea": that the international community should aid governments in fulfilling their responsibilities (Torun, 2017, pp.32-33). The need to develop an "international norm in favour of intervention to protect civilians" should not be seen as a response to humanitarian intervention, rather it shows commitment and move to way forward (Annan, 1999). Despite the obstacles inherent in implementing the emerging international norm, it does demonstrate that humanity is less inclined than in the past to accept suffering in its presence and more willing to act to alleviate it (ibid).

The terms, humanitarian intervention and R2P are not contradicting with each other and even sometimes they are used in the same context. However, the reason for the

struggle to change the discourse is not only limited to institutionalizing the term but also for not using the term 'humanitarian' for military operations. The usage of humanitarian discourse for the military interventions was seen as a cover to justify the operations. States frequently utilize humanitarian discourse, even while acting in their own self-interest, and their true motivations are hard to determine (Parekh, 1997, p.54). This situation had created awry understanding of humanitarian intervention and led the public to approach the notion disbelievingly. Some NGOs and intellectuals argue that by naming military interventions as humanitarian intervention, the term humanitarian is distorted, and the change of the discourse is required. That the need to change in discourse is coming from the concern not to darken the understanding of *humanitarian* was uttered explicitly in the Kofi Annan's millennium report:

> [We must] get right away from using the term 'humanitarian' to describe military operations … military intervention should not … in my view, be confused with humanitarian action. Otherwise, we will find ourselves using phrases like 'humanitarian bombing' and people will soon get very cynical about the whole idea (quoted in Hehir, 2010, p.13).

Other than criticizing the misusage of the humanitarian, in his new millennium report Kofi Annan, United Nations Secretary General at that time, also put an emphasis on a broader understanding of human security, better governance by challenging the role of states and the international community and brought this challenge to the consideration at international level. Annan aimed to lead "member states to reconsider the rules governing humanitarian intervention" (Finnemore and Barnett, 2004, p. 155). He argued that states have a responsibility towards their own citizens and to the life on the planet so, the international community should find better ways to protect the vulnerable and enforce international law. The notion of sovereignty should not be an aegis for "violations of people's rights, and the Security Council should consider armed intervention in cases of mass murder" (UNGA, 2000). By publishing the new millennium report, Annan aimed to corroborate the understanding of sovereignty with responsibility and to encourage the international community to

find solutions of the 21st century's problems which include the mass atrocities like that happened in Rwanda and Srebrenica in the 1990s.

After the publication of the millennium report, the Canadian government took an initiative to instigate an ad hoc independent international commission to work on Annan's statement on the UNSC's failure on Kosovo and Rwanda and to answer the question: "If humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica, to the gross and systematic violation of human rights that offend every precept of our common humanity?" (Annan, 2000). The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) was founded in September 2000 in order to "build a broader understanding of the problem of reconciling intervention for human protection purposes and sovereignty" (ICISS, 2001, p.2).

The idea of R2P seeks to ensure that the international community will prevent further violations of human life like "genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity" (Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect). The change in the discourse of humanitarian intervention to the R2P blatantly denotes those perpetrators of mass atrocity crimes should not fall back upon the sovereignty. According to the ICISS report, there is no absolute sovereignty, states have rights with responsibilities, and the concept relies on two basic principles:

1. State sovereignty implies responsibility, and the primary responsibility for the protection of its people lies with the state itself.
2. Where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect (ICISS, 2001, p,XI).

Moreover, there are three specific responsibilities of the states covered in the ICISS report, which are:

1. Responsibility to prevent - which is to address causes of the internal conflict,
2. Responsibility to react - which means to respond to the situations with appropriate measures,
3. Responsibility to rebuild - which is a duty to provide needed assistance on recovery, reconstruction, and reconciliation after the intervention.

It should not be seen as that R2P gives rights to other states to exercise military interventions abroad or to involve in the domestic affairs of other states by instrumentalizing the responsibility. The task to decide should be carried out 'via the United Nations', notably through "Chapters VI (peaceful measures), VII (enforcement measures) and VIII (regional arrangements) of the UN Charter" (Gözen Ercan, 2022, p.17). As the ICISS report suggests there is no better body than UNSC as a decision-making authority for interventions but there is a need to carry out some reforms to make the UNSC work better for the process.

The series of debates has started with Kofi Annan's report and later on a systematical document published in 2001 by ICISS and eventually at the 2005 World Summit, the leaders of the world took a serious step to decide on a resolution. At end of the summit, the heads of state and government unanimously agreed upon the World Summit Outcome Document which is deemed as a milestone for the R2P. In the document, the responsibility of states is clearly indicated as: "Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity" (UNGA, 2005). In the same document, the international community took responsibility in case of forementioned mass atrocities, as it is written in the next paragraph: "In this context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII…" (ibid).

Since the adoption of the World Summit Outcome Document at the UN in 2005, the R2P has been an important but discussed emerging norm. Some of the criticisms against humanitarian intervention is still applicable for the new norm but the UN

Document erases some concerns over the states' authority by translating the meaning of sovereignty in a more solid way. Moreover, it creates new programmatic opportunities for the UN to assist states in preventing the mass atrocity crimes and protecting affected populations through capacity building, early warning, and other preventive and protective measures, rather than simply responding if they fail (UN R2P). Further studies and meetings also worked on the formation of a durable principle by addressing the ways and measures of the implementation. In 2009, the first report on R2P was released by UNGA, namely *Implementing the Responsibility to Protect*, and it outlines three pillars of the R2P as:

> Pillar One: The protection responsibilities of the State (sect. II)
> Pillar Two: International assistance and capacity-building (sect. III)
> Pillar Three: Timely and decisive response (sect. IV) (UNSG, 2009).

One of the major points indicated in the 2009 Document is the emphasis on prevention and "flexible response tailored to the specific circumstances of each case" if the prevention fails (ibid). The 2009 document also underscores "… the best way to discourage States or groups of States from misusing the responsibility to protect for inappropriate purposes would be to develop fully the United Nations strategy, standards, processes, tools and practices for the responsibility to protect" (ibid). Furthermore, the report provides "examples of policies and practices that are contributing, or could contribute, to the advancement of goals relating to the responsibility to protect under each of the pillars" (ibid).

In which ways R2P differs from humanitarian intervention are widely discussed before 2011 Libyan intervention and it is argued that R2P is an overemphasized concept (Hehir and Murray, 2013, p.222). Despite the arguments on the similarity of R2P and humanitarian intervention, on the theoretical level there are authentic differences. Humanitarian intervention is defined by John Vincent as "that activity undertaken by a state, a group within a state, a group of states or an international organization which interferes coercively in the domestic affairs of another state"

(quoted in Roberts, 1993, p.431). On at least three fronts, this is not the same as the R2P. First, humanitarian intervention's scope is much broader than R2P's, which is narrowly focused on preventing the four types of mass atrocity crimes (Adams, 2012, p.11). Secondly, the use of force is prominent feature of the humanitarian intervention while for R2P takes into account a wide range of non-coercive measures, such as prevention and negotiation (ibid). Moreover, the military intervention is the last resort in the R2P doctrine. Lastly, even though the line in-between the notions is very gray, R2P doctrine comes up as a responsibility to intervene in which it differs from the previous discourse on humanitarian intervention that was seen as 'right to intervene' (ICISS, 2001, p.17). However, this last argument is still contradictory, especially after 2011 Libya Intervention (Martinez, 2011).

2.5. Responsibility to Protect

The notion of R2P emerged in a stunning way which "sounds almost like a fairy tale" (Stahn, 2007, p.99). The presence of the principle in the 2005 Outcome Document is not only one of the most significant outcomes of the summit, but also a sign of a growing tendency to re-limit the principle of sovereignty in the concern of human security (ibid, pp. 100-101). After the explaining the processes of establishing the R2P doctrine, in this part of the chapter the debates and discussions on R2P will be presented. We can divide the criticisms into two different but related categories.

Firstly, the novelty of the responsibility to protect has been widely discussed and the debate mainly revolves around the how innovative the doctrine is especially in terms of sovereignty with responsibility. For example, Carsten Stahn sees most of the components of the R2P not as an innovation but rather "old wine in new bottles". He argues that a state's role as an "agent and trustee" for the people impacted by its actions goes back to Hugo Grotius and John Locke. Individual human beings are the ultimate beneficiaries in Grotius' view of law, as the laws regulating the governments are ultimately designed to protect individuals' rights and responsibilities (Stahn, 2007, pp.111-114). Moreover, Hobbes in 1651, notably asserted the responsibility of

the sovereign to ensure individuals' safety and security. From Hobbesian point of view, this is why people handed over their liberties to a sovereign, who was given unrestricted power to rule them; "as he shall think expedient, for their peace and common defence" (Glanville, 2016, p.155). Furthermore, states' authority is not completely unconditional, a state cannot act in its own jurisdiction without considering of the consequences for another state. There are references to this in the UN Charter from 1947, as well as in the ICJ's acceptance of the idea of *erga omnes* liabilities "(obligations of a State towards the international community as a whole)" and the International Law Commission's subsequent adoptions of standards related to state responsibility. Numerous components of the notion of R2P are not unique; rather, they are entrenched in a larger ideological and legal heritage; and it appears that it is this connection that has aided the concept's adoption (Stahn, 2007, pp. 111-114).

However, it might not be so innovative as Stahn argued but the concept of R2P is not only relying on the basic understanding of states' responsibility to other states or the relationship between state and its citizens. Moreover, the aforementioned kind of understanding of sovereignty was mainly abandoned after 1945, when a strong "non-interventionist interpretation of sovereignty" was adopted by the international community, even if it meant permitting atrocities against certain segments of the population (Glanville, 2016, p.157). In addition to that, while the notion of "sovereignty as responsibility" helped to justify international action, R2P is unusual in its explicit statement of a common responsibility to protect. That proponents of R2P were able to get international support because it showed jointness and a new concept based on sovereignty as responsibility. According to the ICISS, the three basic qualities of the state in the "Westphalian system (territory, authority, and population) have been supplemented by a fourth, respect for human rights'—in other words, sovereignty is also responsibility" (Cohen and Deng, 2016, p.88). Moreover, it should be also noted that R2P has contributed to raising worldwide standards for prevention and protection. It is all about having common expectations when it comes to norms. Clearly despite the challenges, many people believe that the UNSC has a

moral obligation to defend the people of Syria which demonstrates the "deep sense of shared expectation" (Bellamy, 2022, p.26).

Second group of the criticisms focus on the implementation process of the R2P. As it mentioned before, decision making process should be carried out via the UN Charter, which assigns a specific function to the UNSC (Bellamy, 2022, p.17). However, the decision-making and selectivity are two of the main discussion points on implementation of R2P. Especially after 2011 Libyan Case, the military application has raised some concerns and affected the further decisions like in Syria and Yemen. With R2P the appropriate behavior for states is pointed out, but it does not mean that political will of the states will be appropriate (Gözen Ercan, 2014, p.45). The doctrine is open to interpretations and is not legally binding rather it is a moral duty and as Ziegler argues R2P can be accepted or invoked by great powers if it fits the country's interests (Ziegler, 2016, p.94). Gözen Ercan sees the problem of selectiveness as a result of the "lack of genuine intent" of the states (2022, p.294). As she argues R2P techniques are sometimes hampered by a state-centric perspective by "blocking investigations and/or further action" for their allies or for their national interests. Thus, hindrance in processes of implementation is unavoidable (ibid, p.295-296). Mr. D'Escoto Brockmann, president of the UNGA at 97th plenary meeting, points out the same problem and he argues that the reason for difficulties on implementing the R2P as:

> The problem for many nations, I believe, is that our system of collective security is not yet sufficiently evolved to allow the doctrine of responsibility to protect (R2P) to operate in the way its proponents intend, in view of the prevailing lack of trust in developing countries when it comes to the use of force for humanitarian reasons (A/63/PV.97, 2009, p. 3).

Brosig looks the implementation problem in a more systematic level, and he argues that there is presently no international system capable of shouldering responsibility for the burden of implementing R2P effectively. Rather than that, distinct aspects are executed at distinct levels by distinct players (2013, p.19). Also, he accepts the difficulty of a "collective effort", and he suggests that despite the inadequacies on

implementing R2P at global and regional levels, "strong inter-organizational links" can help us to overcome this problem (ibid, p.20). Importance of including regional actors and IOs is also emphasized by Gözen Ercan. According to her, the inclusion of private sector, civil society and NGOs is noteworthy for the implementation of the R2P (Gözen Ercan, 2022, p.297).

While acknowledging the political and practical restrictions associated with the R2P, it represents an important and workable standard for confronting human insecurity. However, international community must realize that significant political obstacles must be overcome for responsibility to protect to be implemented effectively in order "to provide the necessary sustainable protection to population" (Gözen Ercan, 2022, p.299).

2.6. Conclusion

R2P came up as a desire to institutionalize humanitarian intervention doctrine and be ready for further crises. Even though, UN charter puts a clearer picture in front of the international community, it takes its share from the criticisms like humanitarian intervention and there are lots of questions waiting to be answered. However, it is better to have a developing understanding than having nothing.

Despite the criticisms on humanitarian intervention to halt mass atrocities, it has shown us that the most efficacious way is to conduct military intervention. There are various cases where the intervention was not successful enough to prevent the crimes like in Rwanda and Kosovo, but it has to be seen that the interventions also helped to ease tension and hindered offenders from committing further mass atrocities. By analyzing the previous military interventions, international community can come up with the factors affecting the outcome and take lessons from the failures and so be better prepared next time.

Since the adoption of the R2P in the UN, more than 80 UNSC resolutions referred to it (Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect). However, the doctrine's first military application is in Libya in 2011. In the further chapters, this intervention will be analyzed in terms of implementation of responsibility to protect, and the debate will be presented through valid criticisms while focusing on the reasons behind the failure and the international involvement in the ensuing civil war.

CHAPTER 3

HISTORY OF LIBYA: FRAGMENTED COUNTRY

3.1. Introduction

Despite the fact that Libya has a short history as a sovereign state, it was exposed to foreign interventions throughout its past and hosted various foreign actors; each of them contributed to the current decentralized structure of Libya by giving patronage to the different local collaborators. Thus, many years of foreign invasion, fed the fragmented structure of Libyan society as Vandewalle states "Libyans share a tumultuous history of state-building that continues to leave them perplexed even today" (Vandewalle, 2012, p.1).

This chapter focuses on Libya's history and state-building process. At the outset, there is a brief summary of the pre-Gaddafi era by focusing on the dynamics of the formation of modern Libya and significant historical events considered to be crossroads in the history of Libya. Along the pre-Gaddafi era part, it is intended to set sight on how little was made to build state institutions and state capacity.

Even though, Libya became an independent state under the rule of King Idris, it would be a mistake to consider Libya as a sovereign state before the Gaddafi era. The existence of very little and weak state institutions was not enough to deem Libya as a state in terms of modern understanding. Even though Gaddafi was an authoritarian dictator, he managed to consolidate power, decrease foreign influence, and made the government the only legitimate source of use of power. He contributed to the

development of state institutions and understanding of social state. However, what was common between the pre-Gaddafi era and Gaddafi's reign is that the path government chose to follow was deliberately estranging modern state construction (Vandewalle, 2012, p.2). To comprehend this decomposition, it is needed to understand the effect of the tribalism and the discovery of oil because it enabled Libya's rulers to draw a way in the direction of not consolidation but fragmentation (Vandewalle, 2012, p.3).

My central argument focuses on that from colonial times traces of tribalism and nonparticipatory society were inherited to independent Libya. King Idris and subsequently Gaddafi were not able to or did not intend to overcome this social structure and they did not promote the proper regularity state institutions. The failure in the state-building process led to the fragmented society of Libya that could not pose a monolithic architecture. Therefore, it is crucial to understand this fragmented structure of Libya to have a better grasp of current inner turmoil.

3.2. From Colonial Rule to Independent United Kingdom of Libya

3.2.1. Ottoman Era

The classical Ottoman administration system, namely *wilayet* system, was embraced in Libya as well. The system involved the sultan in Istanbul appointing governor (wali) and there were officials accountable to him. However, Ottomans did not give enough importance to the deserted country far from the capital and the system was never applied properly (Metz, 1987, p.23). Furthermore, the empire did not show any interest in holding three different regions of Libya, the control was mostly over the coastal areas where the population was concentrated. In order to maintain order, the Ottoman governors were in need of assistance from local tribal leaders. "[The Ottoman army] … incorporated its [Libya's] tribes into a tributary system that supported the Ottoman regency's economy and dominance" (Ahmida, 2005, p.5). Therefore, adjuvant tribes were rewarded by the capital, and they enjoyed their

privileged status. As a matter of fact, the 19th-20th century Ottoman Empire was recognized by its corrupt statesmen and uprisings broke out in all over the empire due to structural disorder in the state system. Thus, the attempt to restore power and stimulate agriculture was unsuccessful in Libya like any other part of the empire (Metz, 1987, p.24).

3.2.2. Italian Colony

Before World War I, the Western powers started to take control of the Ottoman Empire's territories. Tunisia was under the patronage of France; Egypt was under the patronage of Britain, and Libya was under the patronage of Italy. As Western powers started to seize and colonize more African territories, Libya's current borders started to take shape which consisted of three main historical regions, Tripolitania, Fezzan, and Cyrenaica.

Italy took over a fragmented, pluralistic society that possesses strong tribal bonds from the Ottoman Empire era. The Ottoman rule in Libya was highly decentralized, and the tribes were influential strong actors. "… a weak to nonexistent central state structure" was inherited by the Ottoman Empire (Ahmida, 2005, p.6). Later, to a greater extent, Italian rule hindered the emergence of state institutions by limiting the governance to only appointing governors and allying with various local powers.

Italy used indirect rule to oversee its colonial holdings in Libya between 1912 and 1934. Indirect rule is a kind of governance in which conquered people maintain administrative power over their communities in some extent (Oyeniyi, 2019, p.55). Even though Libyan tribe leaders had an influence on some local matters, all the top-level government officials were directly appointed by Italy. Representatives of Italy in Libya developed a relationship with some tribal leaders in order to facilitate their operations and secure their positions. The appointed military and civil leaders showed no interest in forming state institutions in Libya, the ground for their existence was to exploit the country's resources and its people. An effective administration did not

need proper institutions, the only aim was to dominate the country, "… using divide-and-conquer tactics, Italian colonial administrators created new differences, as they played one ethnoreligious group against the other" (Oyeniyi, 2019, p.53). However, Italian approach to the administration of Libya fostered tribal bonds and loyalty to the nation was precluded. Its effects were later becoming more visible (ibid, p.92).

Local collaborators were enjoying their privileged status as it happened during the Ottoman era but there were some other groups who are against the fascist Italy's rule, and they formed up a resistance. For the sake of military "pacification," a period of extreme repression was instituted by Italy to lay the groundwork for a colonial effort, which had profound effect on Libya's social and economic dynamics (Collins, 1974, p.9). Resistance to the Italian existence was met with ferocity, and the Libyan leaders and people who fought against Italian colonization were brutally killed. Needless to say, the technological differences between Italy and the resistance forces were immeasurable. While Italians had high technology military equipment like weapons, Libyans were still using spears, swords, arrows, and hand-crafted rifles (Oyeniyi, 2019, pp.54-55). The war in Europe between Axis power and Allies eventually spread into the African colonies, and the resistance in Libya was supported by Britain and France (ibid, p.76).

The urbanization had not taken place and very little investment was made on the civil infrastructure and industrialization under the rule of Ottomans and Italians. Direct Italian control not only precluded the establishment of indigenous state institutions, but it also exacerbated the political power necessary to rule Libya without such institutions (Mundy, 2018). Moreover, the possessed infrastructure was destroyed during the World War II (Oyeniyi, 2019, p.77).

3.2.3. Sanusi Monarchy and The United Kingdom of Libya

After the Axis Powers lost the war, British and French powers took Libya under their control. Even though Italy governed Libya as a single country, under the patronage of France and Britain, three main regions of Libya were separated into three governorates by the agreement. While Tripolitania and Cyrenaica were governed by British military administration, Fezzan was governed by French military administration (Genugten, 2016, p.45).

Between World War II and 1951, the brief era of tripartite international administration not only concentrated state authority in the hands of foreigners, but also these foreign administrations frequently ruled Libya by fostering or worsening tensions among Libya's traditional elites (Mundy, 2018, p.35). Unlike other colonized neighbors like Egypt and Tunisia, Libya had been greatly deprived of modern governance.

Besides several political shortcomings, the economic situation in the country was further worsened, and the Libyan people were hardly supplying their basic needs. Each region was in different circumstances. While some regions had better conditions like agricultural areas and coastal parts, most of the Libyan people were having poor conditions. The main sources of income for the people of this deserted country were agricultural production and scrap metal they sell which they acquired from war leftovers and they were not enough for Libyans to maintain their lives in a proper way (Vandewalle, 2012, p.51).

After the war, the hate for the Italian administration was ingrained and majority of the Libyans were against the recurrence of ruthless Italian rule (Stafford, 1949, p.53). Three historical regions of Libya had different political positions and even inside the regions there was not a proper leader to represent them. However, in Cyrenaica the situation was different than rest of the regions, there was unifying actor in Cyrenaica who allied with Britain in return for independence. Idris as-Senussi would reap the

fruits of this collaboration after the war. Thereafter the commission of "Big Four" were discussing the situation of ex-Italian colony Libya's future. Soviet Union, France, United States and Britain had struggled with the problem to come up with a solution and decided to take the matter to UNGA (Rivlin, 1949, p.460).

The independence was granted to Cyrenaica in 1949 by UN, and Sayyid Idris from Sanusiyyah order became its leader. Afterwards, on December 24, 1951, Libya, consisting of the three regions, gained its independence as the United Kingdom of Libya under the rule of King Idris and was proclaimed as an independent sovereign kingdom. Although it was independent in political manner, Libya was mainly dependent on international aid to maintain its economy. When Libya gained its independence in 1951, it was one of the world's poorest countries to join the UN's new family of states (Mundy, 2018, p.36).

Though the ex-Italian colony gained its independence and became a sovereign nation, Libya had been under the alien rule for a long time that halted emergence of vibrant political environment. Thus, political consciousness could not get off the ground until independence (Rivlin, 1949, p.463). Nevertheless, some might argue that during the colonial times, a kind of political consciousness had developed but not in the shape of national identity, it was an attachment to the tribal identity (Oyeniyi, 2019, p.92).

In the early stage of United Kingdom of Libya, one of the UN economists argued that "If Libya can be brought to a stage of sustained growth, there is hope for every country in the world" (quoted in Mundy, 2018, p.24). The circumstances in the newly created state were far away from the notion of the modern state. Poor economic conditions, lack of national identity and bred in the bone tribal relations were helping and feeding the maintenance of fragmented society. On the other hand, the monarch of the United Kingdom of Libya showed little interest on treating the above-mentioned three historical regions as a unified political community (Vandewalle, 2012, p.4). He tried to strengthen his authority by having tribal and external relations which bear resemblance to the colonial past.

Two of the most important agreements for the King were military agreements with Britain and the United States which contributed to the Libya's budget and helped to maintain security. Thanks to these agreements, Britain and the US had the right to have a military base in Libyan territories (Vandewalle, 2012, p.45). Thus, it can be argued that King Idris aligned with the Western powers in order to stay in power.

Very few institutions were founded and developed during King Idris' reign and the created institutions were raised by the consultations and initiatives of Britain, the US, and the UN, not by the Libyan government (Mundy, 2018, pp.22-26). In terms of political features of the Kingdom, King Idris and collaborator tribes were enjoying power and the majority of people were excluded from the political life and decision making. Prohibition of multi-party elections in 1952, the first and only in Libyan history, and abolishing the federal system in 1963 were powerful demonstrations of King's approach to the regimen of Libya. Especially after annulling elections and banning political parties in 1952, people in major cities went into the streets to protest it but, these violent protests were quelled brutally by the police forces (Oyeniyi, 2019, p.92-98).

The most significant milestone in Libya's history happened in 1959. The American company named Esso, later called Exxon, discovered oil in different parts of Libya (Oyeniyi, 2019, p.94). Under King Idris, "many independent producers and a handful of major producers" were granted oil prospecting and exploring licenses (ibid, p.125). An oligopoly of major oil companies called Seven Sisters ("Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, Gulf Oil, Royal Dutch Shell, Standard Oil Company of California, Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, Standard Oil Company of New York, and Texaco") controlled majority of global oil commerce from 1940 to 1970 (ibid, p.125). King Idris' advisers were conscious of the Seven Sisters' activities and hence barred them from establishing a stronghold in Libya's oil sector and granted permits to independent producers too. To incentivize the small-scale independent producers, the Petroleum Amendments of 1961 reduced their per-barrel taxes, whereas big producers faced higher taxes and levies. During the Gaddafi's reign, this regulation, favoring small producers, proved extremely valuable (ibid, p.126).

Both quantity and quality of the oil were good enough to change the course of history for Libya at least for more than a century. This crucial landmark affected Libya's international status and domestic structure. The country that depended on international aid became one of the biggest oil exporters. Moreover, after the discovery of oil, King Idris acquired the opportunity to enjoy his absolute power in a broader sense. The oil revenue was a convenient tool to strengthen and enhance tribal alliances in favor of his monarchy while not developing state institutions and public welfare (Vandewalle, 2012, p.44). Through the discovery of this high revenue bringer, he found a ground to vacate federal governments. King Idris was arguing that abolishing the federal system will make oil deals with foreign powers easier. The decision was right and helped to make deals easier and prevented further conflicts between provinces and federal governments but, it also paved a way to increase in corruption by letting tribes and small groups to profit extraordinarily "at the expense of the country as a whole" (ibid, p.53).

The discovery of oil not only influenced political sphere but also, changed the course of demographic and social structure. Despite the fact that King Idris was not bothered too much to develop state institutions and enhance underdeveloped economic situation after the discovery oil he made investments in roads, housing, health care and education (Oyeniyi, 2019, pp.96-97). The main recipients of the governmental investments were big cities, and they attracted the young population. For example, the young population migrated from rural parts of the country to the major cities and oil fields in order to have a better job and social life (Oyeniyi, 2019, p.97). While Benghazi and Tripoli were getting wealthier and more populated thanks to investments, other rural areas of Libya were experiencing stagnation or decline. Since early 1950s, there was a constant migration from rural areas to city centers and the developing oil sector accelerated this flow. However, momentum of the development could not catch the pace of migration in the big cities. Thus, it led to the formation of shanty districts where crime rates are high, and the economic condition is poor (Clarke, 1963, pp.54-55).

In the meantime, in 1950s and 1960s, there was another thing shaping the Arab people's minds. The pan-Arabist ideology was so influential among the Arabic nations, especially during Arab-Israeli conflict. According to the Libyans, their monarch was an incompetent ruler and not acting according to his role. However, King Idris had a close relationship with the Western powers, especially with British and American officials and he was not too much keen on being an active player in the Arab-Israeli conflict as Libyans were expecting. On the other hand, Libya's neighbor country, Egypt was playing a leading role both in the Arab-Israeli conflict and spreading pan-Arabism. Gamal Abdel Nasser was a prominent figure in terms of enamoring Arab nations (Genugten, 2016, p.66). The unrest among Libyan people was growing day by day; corruption, nepotism, unequal distribution of wealth, close relations with the West and king's unhelpfulness to the conflict spiced up with pan-Arabism. As late as 1968, many Libyans saw King Idris's rule in Libya as a failure (Oyeniyi, 2019, p.101). This was the situation before Gaddafi came to power by a coup.

3.3. Coup D'état

On September 1, 1969, a group of army officials called the "Free Unionist Officers Movement" led by Captain Muammar Gaddafi overthrew King Idris and abolished the monarchy. The Libyan nationals, who were unhappy with the monarch, welcomed the change; Britain and the US also did not involve in helping their unpopular ally. So, the new rulers of Libya did not face the opposition except in the vicinity of Tabruq. The Western powers already knew that King Idris's reign was unlikely to continue and supported another group of army officials formed around Colonel Abdul Aziz el Shalhi. However, the Free Unionist Officers Movement perfectly executed the coup in timing (Genugten, 2016, p.79). The young population, especially from the urban areas, felt hopeful about the coup, and as a result of that "No deaths or violent incidents related to the coup were reported" (Metz, 1987, p.36). The Free Unionist Officers Movement formed the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), which consisted of twelve members, and later on, the body of RCC "constituted the

Libyan Government" (Metz, 1987, p.36). Here, there are first three articles of the proclamation of RCC:

1. Libya is an Arab, democratic, and free republic in which sovereignty is vested in the people. The Libyan people are part of the Arab nation, and their goal is total Arab unity. The Libyan territory is a part of Africa. The name of the country is the Libyan Arab Republic.
2. Islam is the religion of the State and Arabic is its official language. The State protects religious freedom in conformity with established customs.
3. Social solidarity is the foundation of national unity. Family is the foundation of society; religion, ethics and patriotism are its pillars (Constitutional Declaration of 1969).

The young leader of the RCC, who was 27 years old at that time, Captain Muammar Gaddafi, was revealed as the coup leader and promoted to the military rank colonel and commander in chief of the Libyan Armed Forces. The common traits of the RCC members were not only limited to their unit in the military as signal corps but they also came from the middle class and less powerful tribes. Their socioeconomic background and political views were sharply distinct from King Idris' circle. They were under the influence of Nasser's ideas and Arab nationalism (Vandewalle, 2012, pp. 78-79). Considering that Arab nationalism was dominating the region and King Idris was deemed as a Western ally, it was not surprising that the Libyan public welcomed the coup (Craig-Harris, 1986, p.36).

In the following forty-two years, without doubt, Gaddafi was the most prominent figure of Libya and an influential autocratic leader in the region. His ideas shaped Libya both domestically and internationally. In order to understand state characteristics and Libya's evolution after the coup, we have to examine the person who shaped it. In his youth, he started to develop an interest in politics. Of course, Egypt's influence in the Arab countries via broadcasting and newspapers cannot be denied in it. At that time, the popular radio station, "Voice of the Arabs" was broadcasting from Cairo and spreading pan-Arabist ideology by bringing Arab nations' problems to the front. Even though he was a politically active young man,

he did not have any known affiliation but, he was charmed by the "Arab Socialist Resurrection (Ba'athist) Party, the Muslim Brotherhood, and the Arab Nationalist Movement" (Oyeniyi, 2019, p.104). He wanted to carry on a revolution similar to happened in Egypt in 1952 and to establish a socialist and anti-imperialist country. These ideas were not unique to Gaddafi; during that time Arab young generation was mainly carrying the same thoughts and the incompetence of their rulers, colonial past, pro-Western governments, and Arab-Israeli conflict were feeding them. Some of these youths who shared similar ideas decided that Libya cannot be fixed as long as the monarchy stays there. Free Unionist Officers Movement came to existence with a motive to make Libya an independent Arab nation that will struggle for Arab cause. In 1970, Gaddafi declared it in his speech: "Tell President Nasser we made this revolution for him. He can take everything of ours and add it to the rest of the Arab world's resources to be used for the battle against Israel, and for Arab unity" (Oyeniyi, 2019, p.106).

3.4. Gaddafi Era

3.4.1. From 1969 to 1977

The Constitutional Proclamation of Libya was adopted on December 11, 1969, formed RCC as the highest authority in Libya. It was responsible for the army and ministerial appointments. It wielded a significant amount of power that anyone who opposed RCC decisions would be sentenced to death (Genugten, 2016, p.83). One week after the coup, RCC appointed ministers in order to ensure that the government functions properly. The newly appointed cabinet of ministers consisted of six civilians and two RCC members. They were instructed to "implement the state's general policy as drawn up by the RCC" since RCC wanted to show where real power comes from (Metz, 1987, p.37).

One of the goals behind the coup was to merge Libya with Egypt to form a Nasserist state to serve the Arab cause (Simons, 1996, pp.209-210). However, the plans did not

go as expected, Nasser died in 1970 as a result of a heart attack. The failure of merging directed Gaddafi and his colleagues to see themselves as the guardians of Nasser's legacy (Vandewalle, 2012, p.79).

In the early days of the coup, Gaddafi ensured the security of foreigners and guaranteed adherence to the international treaties except for British and American military bases, which he wanted to drive them out of Libya. However, starting with the following year after the revolution, more radical implementations took place. British and American armies accelerated the evacuation of their military bases, and due to agricultural and some other reforms, Italians had to leave their homes and businesses (Genugten, 2016, pp.93-94). Furthermore, the new regime's displeasure with the level of listed prices set by the oil companies prompted the establishment of a committee in December 1969 to discuss the prices with the oil corporations. Thus, oil companies had to sit at the table for new regulations on the oil industry (Vandewalle, 2012, p.89). The regime took advantage of small-scale enterprises' poor bargaining position to impose its own measures. Because small producers were relying heavily on Libyan oil for earnings, they were unable to disagree with the government. After dealing with small-scale independent producers, the government shifted its focus to the big producers (Oyeniyi, 2019, pp.126-127). At the beginning, Gaddafi regime tried to get a bigger share of the profits by threatening to nationalize the oil fields. In December 1971, BP's Libyan operations were taken over by the government and the new regime withdrew funds worth about US$550 million from British banks (Metz, 1987, p.41). Furthermore, as a show of retaliation for the US' support for Israel during October 1973, Libya took over all US oil companies that were operating in the country at that time (Mundy, 2018, pp.32-35).

Gaddafi or, in a broader sense, RCC built their revolution on getting rid of foreign influence in Libya and empowering the Libyan nation as free folks (Genugten, 2016, p.91). On the contrary to King Idris' times, the new regime increased their spending on the public sector as a governmental policy, there was a visible augmentation on education and healthcare disbursement, land allocation, and state subsidies for farmers and new housing projects (ibid, p.84). Francis Boyle states that Gaddafi

supplied Libyan citizens with the highest "per-capita standard of living on the Continent of Africa" and compatible with other Mediterranean countries (Boyle, 2013, p.85).

At the beginning, Gaddafi and his allies asserted that "their government would not rest on individual leadership, but rather on collegial decision making" (Metz, 1987, p.38). Therefore, administrative boundaries were redrawn, and new local leaders were appointed in order to challenge the traditional way of ruling and decrease the influence of tribal leaders (Alexander, 1981, p.214). However, the challenges the regime faced and the efforts to consolidate power made the RCC rule more authoritarian (Gengugten, 2016, p.83). Furthermore, Libya's apolitical and fractionalized society was not actively participating in governance as Gaddafi envisioned. Gaddafi made different attempts to detect and overcome challenges that hindered Libyans' political participation, but his efforts and desires were neither fruitful nor progressive (Vandewalle, 2012, p.96).

As it was stated before, very little had been done before 1969 in terms of state-building so, Gaddafi and his colleagues did not take over a stable and established country, there were so many things to handle for this inexperienced group, and yet so many things they wanted to change. Moreover, establishing their authority was another challenge for them. In December 1969, two ministers were accused of planning a coup against the new regime, and subsequently, in July 1970, a cousin of overthrown King Idris was accused of plotting a coup by taking support from some of the tribes from the Fezzan region (Oyeniyi, 2019, pp.114-115). Also, in 1975, Umar al-Muhaysi and Bashir Hawadi, tried to seize power and plotted coup against Gaddafi but, it failed. Coup attempts had increased Gaddafi's distrust to military and political figures including some RCC members and with every attempt to challenge the new regime, the more authoritarian Gaddafi became. He seized the opportunity enforce his agenda (Vandewalle, 2012, pp.99-100).

Even though Gaddafi remained the sole prominent figure in the following four decades, as Simons argue: "the Libyan revolution has involved a continuous period of change lasting more than two decades" (1996, p.209). The main reason behind these changes was that RCC members, who did not have any political background or education, were not ready to govern Libya. Furthermore, the tribal bonds were so strong, and it was still shaping the internal politics. TIME narrates the situation from December 26, 1969, as it follows:

> …the army officers, who range in age from the mid-30s down to 23, are not yet prepared to handle a complex national economy. Also, the regime is still beset by internal rivalries. Gaddafi, however, apparently feels firmly in control, since he left the country at week's end to take part in the Rabat summit.

The future of Libya was highly unknown, and there was no clear socio-economic policy from the government. Of course, there were some ideas and designs on the discourse level, but the way to reach them was unclear. In the first phase of the revolution, RCC wanted to transform society, and they began with getting rid of the old system which was associated with the old regime. Gaddafi and his colleagues deemed the Sannusi Monarchy's reign as a continuation of the Western domination and colonialism in Libya. After a brief time of transferring experience to newly appointed officials, the old bureaucracy was sidelined (Genugten, 2016, p.82). The overthrown monarch, who was on vacation abroad during the coup, did not come back to Libya, and his supporters escaped and took shelter in London, Rome and Cairo. Gaddafi and his cadre attempted to consolidate power and implemented ad hoc policies during the first phase of the revolution with the exception of the oil business. Libya's primary source of income was oil, so it was understandable that RCC did not want to touch it at the beginning of its revolution in order to maintain its business as usual (Genugten, 2016, p.82 and Oyeniyi, 2019, p.116).

Another obstacle before Gaddafi was the established religious authority which may prevent the public from taking his messages properly as he desired. Thus, by interpreting Islam in a nationalist and revolutionary understanding, he promoted his

way of Islam (Genugten, 2016, p.82). He focused on nationalism and socialism in his interpretation. The religious organizations and scholars (ulama), usually followers of Sanussi order, were discredited, and their power was impoverished. Political parties, trade unions, and professional associations were banned and abolished. Gaddafi's implementation of his understanding of Islam, social and economic reforms to change state structure had shifted Libya "from the camp of conservative Arab traditionalist states to that of the radical nationalist states" (Metz, 1987, p.37).

Notwithstanding pan-Arabism remained ascendant among Arab countries, Libya was still carrying features of a highly fractionated country, and that's why RCC wanted to consolidate Libyan people more firmly. While getting rid of the old system, RCC was attempting to change social structures from tribal apolitical society to a nation with political consciousness by promoting and instilling pan-Arabist and nationalist ideology. RCC's desire to explain themselves and make people loyal to them impelled them to organize seminar series to spread their understanding. On June 11, 1971, the Libyan Arab Socialist Union (ASU) had been established as the "organ of the working forces of the revolution (defined as peasants, labourers, soldiers, intellectuals, and national capitalists)" (Simons, 1996, p.211). By isolating traditional chiefs and party leaders from their usual bases of support, it was intended to fill the "gap" caused by the outlawing of parties and the dismantling of tribal systems (Hinnebusch, 1984, p.61,68). Being the only political organization allowed in Libya, the Union played an important role to formulate consciousness of national unity. The leaders of the revolution were considering ASU, not as a political party but rather "a mass organization that formed an activist alliance comprising members of various social forces within the population … that were committed to the principles of the revolution" (Metz, 1987, p.114). Moreover, ASU had planned to be as primary "link between the government and the people and thus fill the void left after abolishing the tribal system" (Alexander, 1981, p.215). Some of the roles that ASU focused on were eliminating the past, Arab Unity, socialism, and increasing production (Simons, 1996, pp.216-217). Until its extinguishment to form Basic Popular Congresses, it played an important role in shaping loyal revolutionary society as a sole political structure for the Libyans.

In 1973, the desired political attendance was not achieved yet, and political participation was still low. People were not keen on joining the political process, and ASU was too complex to attract ordinary citizens. Moreover, the coordination in-between ASU and subnational authorities was low (Metz, 1987, p.114). Gaddafi was thinking that something has to be done in order to attract citizens and increase the participation on political process. The Popular/Cultural Revolution was designed in 1973, which aimed to "combat bureaucratic inefficiency, lack of public interest and participation in the subnational governmental system, and problems of national political coordination" (Metz, 1987, p.39). According to Gaddafi, one of the obstacles for people to join the political process was bureaucrats and other power holders so, it is needed to eliminate them. Thus, old government officials were forced to retire, and "youthful enthusiasts" were hired instead (Anderson, 1987, p.263). The Popular Committees, directly elected by people, were formed to increase the political attendance of citizens. After the formation of Basic Popular Congresses, these popular committees continued their work under the Congresses. Gaddafi again could not find what he was seeking for from the Popular Revolution and he was attributing the problem to the new political leaders as Hinnebusch states:

> [the new political leaders] were often poorly prepared to exercise their tasks, were guilty of negligence, incompetence or indiscipline, or took the Popular Revolution as merely an opportunity to leap to positions of power, without showing much concern for popular service (quoted in Obeidi, 2001, p.140).

3.4.2. The Green Book

After the revolution, Gaddafi developed a set of ideas on governing and world problems and experimented these ideas in Libya. He theorized his ideas as an alternative to the capitalist and Marxist worldview and proposed it as a guidance to the third world countries. His theory, namely *Third International Theory*, is a set of criticisms and solutions to the governance, economy, and social life. In 1975, he published the first chapter of his famous "The Green Book". His intention by publishing this book was to be read by all the people and to reach each part of the

society and for this reason the book was placed in Libyan national education curriculum (Vandewalle, 2012, p.110).

The book has extreme importance on Libya's state-building process on a theoretical level. Besides its implications on the ground, it shows us a clear picture of Gaddafi's ideas which shaped Libya for more than four decades. As Obeidi argues in his book *Political Culture in Libya:* "It [the Green Book] formalises the new line in establishing a 'state of the masses'" (Obeidi, 2001, p.48). Especially, the formation of Popular Congresses was a big step in the creation of a new political structure in Libya.

The book consists of three separate chapters, published respectively in 1975, 1977, and 1981. The first part is called *The Solution of the Problem of Democracy: The Authority of the People*. In this chapter, he examines how the way of governance should be. He answers these following questions: "What form should the exercise of authority assume?" and "How ought societies to organize themselves politically in the modern world?" (Gaddafi, 1981, p.7). The book considers current mainstream application of democracy not as a proper instrument of governance and argues that the elected candidate might take the majority of votes, but the minority of voters are affected by the decisions of the majority, and it is not fair to impose decisions on the minority of voters. In the book Gaddafi states that "In actual fact, dictatorship is established under the cover of false democracy" (Gaddafi, 1981, p.8). In order to become freed from this "false democracy", there should be another system that includes every individual into the political process. Thus, he proposes a new kind of governance to include the masses and gives them power by implementing "direct democracy". He emphasizes the importance specific political organs to achieve democracy. According to him the people's authority takes on just one form, which can be achieved only "through Popular Conferences and People's Committees" (Gaddafi, 1981, p.25). Thus, without Popular Conferences and Committees located throughout the country, there will be no democracy. For this very reason, Gaddafi inaugurated Basic Popular Congresses (BPC) at a local level and handed over the authority of choosing its secretariat to the congress itself. The secretariats came together to form Non-Basic Popular Conferences. Basic Popular Congresses also

appointed the administration for People's Committees which is commissioned to run public institutions and responsible to Basic Popular Congresses. By doing so, he argued that both administration and supervision would be on the people directly (ibid, p.25).

BPC restructured the political system in Libya, especially after disassembling of ASU. One of the aims of disbanding ASU and creating a new system was to overcome the very low political attendance of ordinary citizens of Libya.

In his discourse, Gaddafi was setting his face against tribalism but, he was still dependent on this relationship. It is possible to argue that Gaddafi's struggle to disarrange tribal bonds was not only for the people of Libya, who would become the rulers of themselves, but also for eliminating the organized structures that could oppose him. One way or another, it was looking like; he was trying to shape the political system in favor of the masses by encouraging them to join political life. On the other side, the masses did not show huge interest in joining the politics due to fear of incarceration, distrust, and loss of motivation. Moreover, the General People's Congresses (GPC) were offering limited options to its participants, and General Secretariat was disbanding the GPC when its political activities caused turmoil. Since all other forms of political organizations were banned, GPCs were working as surveillance units for the citizens. Moreover, crucial areas like oil, finance and foreign policy were excluded from the GPC's authority (Alexander, 1981, p.220).

Two years after the publication of first chapter of the Green Book, Declaration on the Establishment of the Authority of the People announced in Sabha. With this declaration the main decision-making group of Libyan Arab Republic, RCC, was discharged from politics and transferred its duties to newly established BPC (Obeidi, 2011, p.50). The official name of the country was changed to *The Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya*. The declaration indicates the motive of it as: "this declaration proclaiming the establishment of the People's authority and announcing to the peoples of the earth the emergence of the era of the masses" and also declares

that Holy Quran as the constitution of the country (Declaration on the Establishment of the Authority of the People, 1977).

Second chapter of the Green Book namely *The Solution of the Economic Problem: Socialism* was focusing on the problems of capitalism and comes up with most suitable economic system for the people. Main argument behind this chapter is simply that wage earners are the slaves of the employers. While employers are enjoying the private ownership and high profits, workers are like slaves without determined labor codes like "fixed working hours, overtime pay, leaves, minimal wages, profit sharing, the participation of workers in administration, the banning of arbitrary dismissal, social security, the right to strike, and other provisions" (Gaddafi, 1981, p.41). In this chapter, Gaddafi does not only criticize the private ownership but also state ownership; when state owns the means of production, workers still suffer because only the owner of the business changes. His solution is to completely abolish wage-system and let the workers administrate the factories by themselves. The main reason lies behind the exploitation and the lack of freedom is the being in need of something and so responding to the needs of human being is a way to eliminate exploitation. Thus, the need of housing, stable income, land and means of transportation should be met. As he indicates in his book, "socialist establishments operate only for the satisfaction of the needs of society" (Gaddafi, 1981, p. 60). These economic policies led to substantial changes in the country. The existing small number of manufacturers to landowners, shop owners to homeowners were overcome by the new regulations. As in the first chapter of the book, the main aim is giving power to the people so they can decide on their destiny.

Third chapter focuses on the social bases of Third International Theory by referring to the various aspects of life. Family, tribes, role of women, minorities, education, and sports are some of the subtitles of this chapter, but one can argue that the most prominent subtitle is the one about nation. Gaddafi describes nation as: "The nation is the individual's national political "umbrella"; it is wider than the social "umbrella" provided by the tribe to its members" (1981, p.22). The countries made up from different nations are pregnant to conflicts until all nations gain their independence.

Moreover, political system created without considering the social reality of the society is destined to collapse (Gaddafi, 1981, p.83). These ideas show us how he sees the relationship with tribes and nation, the nation is an upper authority and tribes form the social reality which the nation relies on. He was not accepting the idea of strong tribes which shapes the national policies and thus impoverishing the power of the tribes is visible on his domestic policies.

However, despite all the regulations inaugurated in The Green Book which aimed to form an egalitarian socialist society in the favor of Libya's ordinary citizens and getting rid of tribal bonds by creating a society loyal to the nation, Gaddafi's aim did not materialize. Gaddafi and his colleagues theorized and struggled to realize this idea because in order to consolidate power, the regime had to stick to the already existing political structure by allying with various tribes and favoring them in the domestic life. The intelligence service, army and police forces were the main areas where officials were appointed from his tribe and other ally tribes. Moreover, people were not free from expressing their discontentment and there was not any place to express dissenting opinions. The Popular Committee system was only "centralizing all political expression" and serving as a control mechanism. The desire to create a state of masses by decreasing the role of state ended in failure and the state penetrated more into the economic, political and social life of Libyans (Vandewalle, 2012, pp.134-135).

3.4.3. Libya's Foreign Policy and International Isolation

Explaining the state formation only with domestic factors is not a solid understanding of how the things are shaped inside the country. As well as, focusing only on external factors is quite superficial understanding of international relations. What is required to have a better grip on the reasons of current circumstances is a mixed understanding of both domestic and external factors. For Libya, its colonial past, the West-friendly King Idris' reign and long-term international isolation of Gaddafi highly contributed to the Libya's current problems and conjuncture. In this part of the chapter, the focus

is on Libya's foreign policy under Gaddafi and the way to the international isolation of Libya.

In the early times of the revolution, Gaddafi insistently tried to unite Libya with Arab and African countries. First with Egypt, later tried with Algeria in 1973, with Tunisia in 1974 and in early 1980s with Chad, and Sudan. He even tried to unite with Morocco despite the fact that he had not good relations with Morocco's King Hassan II (Genugten, 2016, p.87). Especially after the death of Gamal Abdel Nasser, he located himself as the leader of Arab and African nations who struggle for unity. However, all his efforts had failed, and he could not reach what he desired. After 1973, thanks to the US endeavors, Egypt has started to follow a more pragmatic relationship with Israel which caused frustration for Gaddafi. It is possible that this situation led Gaddafi to be more authoritarian to materialize/protect his goals. Moreover, it can be said that his foreign policy, like his domestic policy, had an ad hoc manner and was an extension of his personal beliefs which he stated in his book (ibid, p.88).

Furthermore, he was "assigning himself a universal mission" to help exploited nations for their independence as it happened in Libya by him (ibid, p.87). According to Gaddafi, the Western powers hindered the development of Arab world and instead of going forward they focused on dominating the other lands to exploit. Thus, it is needed for these nations to extricate themselves from colonial powers and their puppet regimes. He saw his coup as a liberation movement against the Western powers' exploitations and colonialism and so other nations should follow the same path against imperialist powers. He also stated that in his famous Green Book; "all states made up of diverse nationalities for religious, economic, military or ideological reasons will eventually be ripped apart by national conflict until every nationality gains its independence" (Gaddafi, 1981, p. 73). As a result, Gaddafi embraced anti-colonial and anti-imperial policies on the African continent and had a significant role in African independence movements (Oyeniyi, 2019, p.XVI). In this cause, he used Libya's oil revenue to support advancement of civil commotions in different parts of the World and "…to develop his own military posture by buying weapons, by funding research into the atomic bomb" (Simons, 1996, p.207). His support was including

military training, arming, providing safe house and money for separatist groups. All the arrangement for supporting rebels was run by *Maktub Tasdir al-Thawra* (Office for the Export of the Revolution) (Genugten, 2016, p.88). In the research paper prepared for the CIA by University of Michigan, Gaddafi's support to terrorist organizations was described as:

> The government of Colonel Gaddafi is the most prominent state sponsor of and participant in international terrorism. Despite Gaddafi's repeated public pronouncements that he does not support terrorist groups, there has been a clear and consistent pattern of Libyan aid to almost every major international terrorist group, from the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) to the Popular Front for the Palestine (PFLP) (Patterns of International Terrorism, 1981, p.19).

Intervening in other countries' domestic sphere and supporting armed non state actors led to the international isolation of the country at the end. Especially, the US was seeing Libya as a terrorist state who hosts and supports the terrorists and was blaming Gaddafi for it. It is not surprising that the US was seeing him as a "cancer to be cut out", "mad dog of the Middle East" and "the beast" when we consider killed Libyans by Gaddafi in Libya and abroad (Hersh, 1987).

Two terror attacks contributed to Libya's international notoriety and led West to take harsher stand against Gaddafi. At West Berlin's La Belle discotheque on April 5, 1986, a bomb detonated and led to death and injury of American military personnel. Within the same day, President Ronald Reagan ordered retaliatory attacks on Benghazi and Tripoli. It was widely believed that the retaliating attacks were an attempt to kill Gaddafi. Despite Libya's denial of involvement of the attack, the trial, which lasted from 1997 to 2001, Libyan secret service's involvement was revealed (Oyeniyi, 2019, pp.152-153).

So far, one of the most disputed terror attacks in the world was Lockerbie Bombing and had a huge impact on Libya. Pan Am Flight 103 detonated over Lockerbie, Scotland, on December 21, 1988, killing all 259 persons on board and 11 on the

ground (Oyeniyi, 2019, p.153-154). Most of the casualties were Americans returning home for Christmas. On June 14, 1989, the UNSC issued Resolution 635, expressing concern about the rise of aviation terrorism, and later Resolutions 731 and 748, requesting the suspects' extradition. Libya, on the other hand, desired to employ the fair trial option and saw the demands as a violation of its sovereignty, but the US and Britain opposed it, as a result Libya did not turn over the suspects (Genugten, 2016, pp.119-120). Francis Boyle, who was an adviser of Libya for the Lockerbie dispute at the World Court, criticizes the US government and UNSC Resolutions related to Lockerbie. Accordingly, the US and the UK rejected the applicability Montreal Sabotage Convention and pursued an illegal process which is a demonstration of their imperial power over international law. According to him, there was not enough evidence to blame Libya and the US did not have any intention to reveal the truth and scapegoated Libya (Boyle, 2013, pp.108-109).

Furthermore, the UNSC adopted Resolution 883 in November 1993, which placed additional sanctions on the supply of some oil technologies and tools to Libya. Notably, the US was unable to impose a blanket ban on Libyan oil sales. However, in August 1996, the US Congress passed the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA), the most severe move to date. It restricted international commerce with Libya and included measures for doing business with or investing in Libya's oil industry worth more than $40 million (Vandewalle, 2012, pp.153-154).

Gaddafi was not the only authoritarian leader in the region who commits atrocities, maybe the biggest mistake of him was not allying with the US in a broader sense. Gaddafi's "eccentric, manipulative, and frequently violent" behavior would quickly come to symbolize all Third-World rulers who lack respect for American authority (Genugten, 2016, p.105). The US imposed sanctions against Gaddafi's Libya and put pressure on the US allies and the UN to do the same. Some of the European countries opposed the sanctions to some extent since Libya was one of the major energy suppliers of the Europe. While seeking to isolate Gaddafi's administration, especially because of the energy demands and geographical proximity the West searched for methods to maintain commercial ties with Libya (Genugten, 2016, p.104). Moreover,

the Arab League and the Organization of African States urged the US and the UK to hold fair trial for Lockerbie Bombing by alleviating or not enforcing the sanctions. In August 1998, the US and the UK agreed to hold the trial in The Hague as part of a settlement to halt the eroding sanctions. In April 1999 after some negotiations, Libya turned up the two suspects to the Netherlands and later agreed to pay compensation to victims' families. The Lockerbie bombing epitomized the Libyan regime's participation in global terrorism and constituted a watershed moment in the regime's use of terrorism for political ends (Vandewalle, 2012, p.169).

Gaddafi was able to exert a substantial impact on regional and international affairs thanks to his support of terrorist groups but the price to Libya were tremendous. In response to international outcry from the US and global economic sanctions, the Libyan economy, military capabilities, and image were drastically undermined (Berkowitz, 2018, p.710).

Due to international isolation and sanctions after the early 1990s, Gaddafi had to focus more on economic policies rather than state-building. With the poor economic conditions, the unrest among Libyan citizens were growing. Gaddafi's policy to provide Libyan citizens with financial support in return for loyalty was not working anymore, the living standards of the citizens started to decline. The private enterprises were allowed to ease tension inside the country. Citizens started to engage in imports and exports and even foreign investors were welcomed to the country. However, the efforts were not enough to overcome effects of sanctions and lack of proper regulatory state institutions was dragging Libyan economy into tangled situation (Vandewalle, 2012, pp.183-184).

Worsening economic situation in Libya due to economic sanctions led Gaddafi to reapproach with international community. Gaddafi and his son Saif al-Islam attempted to depict Libya's changing policies, in contrast to the previous rhetoric, as a fresh beginning in a series of deft speeches (Vandewalle 2012, p.187). In order to do so, he paid compensations for previous terror attacks for which he was blamed and

decommissioned the Weapons of Mass Destruction program. "With few if any of Libya's policy" objectives realized, the regime had abandoned terrorist sponsorship as an international policy (Berkowitz, 2018, p.710). The US, UN and the Jamahiriyya solved most of the high issues in the early 2000s. In the new millennium, Gaddafi was aware of the entailment of new social and economic reforms, and it led him to put an effort for inclusion to the international system and privatization. However, as of 2005, the Jamahiriyya was still grappling with the consequences of "personal politics" and a "lack of institutionalization" (Vandewalle, 2012, p.188).

3.5. Conclusion

Ottoman rule and later Italian rule focused on taking maximum benefit from Libya rather than focusing on improving the state institutions. King Idris from Sanusiyah order was dominating the Cyrenaica region and allied with the Britain in return for independence. After Italy lost the World War II, Libya became under the auspices of France and Britain and administration zones were divided among three regions. In 1949 Cyrenaica gained its independence (UNGA, 1949) and in 1951 Libya consisted of whole three regions, became an independent sovereign state by UNGA decision.

King Idris did not put an effort to improve or build state institutions and relied on tribal relations to consolidate his power like Ottomans and Italians did during their ascendency. Especially after the discovery of high-quality crude oil in Libya, King Idris found an important source to extend his authority. He also invested on housing, roads, and infrastructure projects but most of the investments were made on major cities. This situation led to big migration waves from rural areas and deserts to the cities. The pace of development could not catch the pace of migration and it paved a way to formation of rookeries.

Besides economic problems, pan-Arabism was dominating the region, especially existence of Arab-Israeli conflict was contributing to the spread of it. King Idris' passivity to help other Arab nations was disturbing the Libyan people. Moreover, he

had good relations with the Western powers and was hosting the American and British military bases in the country. Libyans were not happy with the rule of King Idris, and they were deeming him as an unsuccessful leader.

The coup in 1969 was a starting point of the reign of Gaddafi. A group of army members successfully initiated the coup and came to power without any big confrontation. The revolution in Libya shifted the regional power balance. While Gaddafi's initial goal was to undermine Libya's tribal tissue in the name of modernization, his government ultimately stayed tribal. With each threat to Gaddafi's power, the dictatorship tightened its grip. Gaddafi sought Arab-African alliances, promoted anti-colonial and anti-imperialist fights, and claimed Cold War non-alignment. Gaddafi's fixation with erasing the colonial history was a recurring subject in his speeches. Seizing a global mission, he eagerly supported nationalist revolts (Genugten, 2016, p.86-88).

Gaddafi's aim to create stateless society moved in the exactly opposite way. Libyan political, social, and economic life was structured around Gaddafi and his small circle. Moreover, not only his domestic policies but also international policies had a huge impact on the political and socio-economic life of Libyans. Without proper regularity institutions and check and balances, Gaddafi ruled Libya more than four decades.

CHAPTER 4

NATO INTERVENTION IN LIBYA

4.1.Introduction

"beware of opening Pandora's box"

Idriss Déby

The analyses on failures of humanitarian intervention focus on inadequacy of military usage and the authorization process itself. After embracing the responsibility to protect (R2P) doctrine at 2005 World Summit and releasing the 2009 Implementing the Responsibility to Protect document, international community took a serious step on institutionalizing the norm. The first resolution in this context that includes military intervention is Resolution 1973. Historic significance has been attributed to the passage of UN Security Council Resolution 1973 and the subsequent military action in Libya. Because "it is the first time that the Council authorized the use of force for the purpose of human protection against the will of the acting government of a functioning state" (Dembinski and Reinold, 2011, p.1).

As an extension of the Arab Spring, the demonstrations in Libya started on February 15, 2011, later turned into civil conflict in Libya and paved a way for NATO intervention thanks to the Resolution 1973. In this chapter, after presenting the beginning of the Libyan uprisings, NATO's intervention will be discussed with specific focus on actors, motives, and methods. Subsequently, problems and deficiencies of the military intervention will be reviewed. Lastly, the intervention will be evaluated from the perspective of the R2P doctrine.

In addition, the discussion on the rightfulness of the intervention, international media's exaggeration of the situation will be touched upon briefly in this chapter. However, there are serious allegations on international involvement (like arming and training or sending mercenaries) in the uprisings before the NATO intervention and exaggerating the narrative against Gaddafi (Prashad, 2012, pp.149-150). Especially Qatar was openly accused by Gaddafi in his speech for their support to rebels (Muammar Gaddafi Speech Translated, 2011). This chapter intends to analyze the process of intervention and the implications on the R2P doctrine.

4.2.2011 Libya Uprisings

Root causes of the revolution can be traced back to Libya's history of oppression and nepotism, as was discussed in the previous chapter. Although the regime had oil revenue, it had made very little for the people and had fed their misery for regime's own survival and security. Furthermore, international isolation and sanctions did not help the people's plight. Every day, the new generation was fed by the failures of socioeconomic reforms, torture, killings, and uncertainty.

The anti-government protest started in Tunisia and later spread into other countries in the region are called Arab Spring. In Libya, demonstrators called the February 17, 2011, as "the day of rage". On that day, the families of 1996 Abu Salim Prison massacre, and other Libyan people used the fifteenth anniversary of the massacre to organize rallies around the country. However, Fathi Terbil, the lawyer of the victims and human rights activist, was detained by Libyan officials in Benghazi on February 15, to disrupt the demonstrations and he is asked to stop planned protests (Oyeniyi, 2019, p.178). Terbil's arrest caused unrest among the Libyan people and the victims' families and therefore the arrest had the reverse effect of what was intended: it sparked popular outrage and led to protests in eastern Libya before the planned date, they started to protest this political detention in Benghazi on February 15, 2011. The protestors had faced with police forces' ill treatment. The repression in eastern Libya did not deter people from participating in the protests in other parts of the country.

Wave of protests throughout the country had erupted to show solidarity; from Nalut and Zintan in the Nafusa (western) Mountain area, to Zawiya and Zuwara in the west, to Tripoli and Kufra in the south-east (Amnesty International, 2011, p.16).

To disperse the protesters, police used tear gas, batons, water cannons, and rubber bullets, but by February 16, as protesters demanded an end to a forty-two years rule of Gaddafi, live ammunition and heavy weapons had been used against them (Amnesty International, 2011, p.7). Gaddafi regime responded the uprisings with his military power which led to bigger protests in other parts of Libya. Opposition against Colonel Gaddafi's reign soon overtook security troops in certain regions and stole weapons that had been left unprotected by the armed services. Many public facilities linked with state persecution, such as the Revolutionary Committees and the Internal Security Agency, were destroyed by the protesters. From that point on, what began as peaceful rallies over Terbil's detention transformed into a call for a regime change. According to Human Rights Watch Report, thousands of Libyans were detained, including prominent politicians and public figures in order to prevent further protests. By the end of the month, the opposition had taken control of the majority of eastern Libya, including Benghazi and Misratah. Libyans were subjected to increased violence as the civil turmoil turned into an armed insurrection (HRW, 2012).

The reaction from Gaddafi family was not surprising, Saif Al-Islam, Gaddafi's son, defended the government's arrests and detentions as an attempt to avoid new demonstrations. He laid the responsibility for the rallies and demonstrations on foreign provocateurs, most notably the US and its Western allies (Oyeniyi, 2019, p.181). Muammar Gaddafi had addressed to his nation couple times during the protests and in his famous speech, he vowed to hunt down armed dissidents "alley by alley, road by road", who he blamed for the unrest on foreign intervention (Tomasky, 2011).

Rebels in the eastern Libya were eventually driven back by Gaddafi after an early breakthrough. A crucial oil port was bombarded by the regime and the nearby town of Brega was taken. Gaddafi's soldiers rapidly put down the small revolt in Zawiya, around 50 kilometers east of Tripoli (Battle for Libya: Key Moments, 2011).

The National Transitional Council (NTC) was established on February 27, 2011, and after the first meeting in Benghazi on March 5, 2011, the council published a statement declaring itself as "the sole representative of all Libya with its different social and political strata and all its geographical sections" (NTC, 2011). The goal of NTC was to unite with other anti-Gaddafi rebel groups and reach out to areas that were still ruled by the government. The NTC was situated in Benghazi at the time and played an important role in establishing contact with other countries and enlisting their assistance (Salem and Kadlec, 2012, pp.3-4). The council was recognized by the world community as Libya's legitimate government and took the country's place at the UN. In the founding statement of the NTC published on March 5, 2011, there is a clear message to international community by referring to the responsibility to protect principle:

> [we] request from the international community to fulfil its obligations to protect the Libyan people from any further genocide and crimes against humanity without any direct military intervention on Libya soil (Achcar, 2011).

4.3.2011 NATO Intervention

It was less than ten days after demonstrations began, the Western nations had begun to call on Gaddafi to stand down "now, without further violence or delay" (Clinton urges unified action in Libya, 2011); "Mr. Gaddafi must leave" (France's Sarkozy says Gaddafi must go, 2011). On February 25, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon has called on the Security Council to think about taking immediate concrete steps against Libyan President Gaddafi's government for its brutal violence and oppression of protesters, with options ranging from sanctions to assured punishment:

When a State is manifestly failing to protect its population from serious international crimes, the international community has the responsibility to step in and take protective action in a collective, timely and decisive manner … The challenge for us now is how to provide real protection and do all we can to halt the ongoing violence. As you look to your next steps, I urge you to consider a wide range of options for action (Ki-Moon, 2011).

Furthermore, France and the League of Arab States have been putting pressure on the UNSC to enforce a no-fly zone. Also, after the Arab League's support for UNSC resolution, the US shifted its policy to support military intervention with the "representation from Arab states" (Mueller, 2015, p.187). International community took a further step and responded calls on protecting Libyans by passing Resolution 1970 in UN Security Council on February 26, 2011.

As well as the Libyan government's persecution and abuse of human rights, the resolution denounced the regime's use of force against civilians. Such assaults on demonstrators were viewed as crimes against humanity at the time of their occurrence. International condemnation from the Arab League, African Union and Organization of the Islamic Conference was welcomed by the Council (Resolution 1970, 2011).

"Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations and taking measures under its Article 41": The Council called on the leadership of Libya to heed the "legitimate demands of the populace" and put an end to the violence there immediately. Respect for international humanitarian and human rights legislation was demanded, according to the statement. In addition, an embargo on the export or import of weapons into or out of Libya was put in place. Individuals associated with Gaddafi's government were also subject to a travel ban and an asset freeze, with any frozen assets being made accessible to the general public. All countries were asked to assist Libya with humanitarian aid. Council members said they will remain actively seized of the matter (Resolution 1970, 2011).

The UNSC Resolution 1970 essentially took the initiative away from the African Union or any other regional organization in relation to the Libyan conflict and opened the path for a military intervention in the country (Capasso et al., 2019, p.6). African leaders' access to Gaddafi and NATO's influence over the NTC may have laid the groundwork for a diplomatic solution but it was never really looked into (DeWaal, 2012).

Subsequently, on March 17, 2011, the UNSC approved Resolution 1973. Ten members of the Security Council voted in the affirmative, including permanent members France, the United Kingdom, and the United States; five members, including permanent members China and Russia, abstained, and resolution passed with no opposition vote. The Resolution 1973 demanded "the immediate establishment of a cease-fire and a complete end to violence and all attacks against, and abuses of, civilians"; authorized member states "to take all necessary measures, notwithstanding paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011), to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya" and established a no-fly zone over the country (Resolution 1973, 2011).

4.3.1. Actors, Motives and Methods

"Nationally or via regional organizations" the Council permitted member states to take "all necessary measures" to safeguard civilians and civilian-populated regions in Libya by creating the no-fly zone. The required actions could not be taken by the UN, the African Union, or the Arab League. As the Russian and Chinese delegates criticized "how and by whom the measures would be enforced and what the limits of engagement would be" were valid questions to be answered (Prashad, 2012, p.168). The calling on off all member nations to act in the UN Resolution was "falsely universal" because the US alone or in cooperation with his allies and NATO was the only power capable of such an attack (ibid, p.168).

Nicolas Sarkozy, the French president at the time of the Libyan crisis, was the most vocal advocate for involvement in Libya. Far ahead of most other nations, he

condemned Gaddafi's crimes and urged for his removal. British Prime Minister David Cameron quickly joined him in speaking out against the suppression of the Libyan people (Chivvis, 2015, p.14). With the Arab revolutions, France, like the US, was caught between its self-image as a supporter of "universal rights" and its "cozy relationships with conservative regimes in the region" (Chivvis, 2014, p.35). France's inability to respond immediately to the upheavals in Tunisia and Egypt and its colonial and postcolonial involvement in Africa pushed Sarkozy to show strong support for the Arab Spring in Libya by not allowing the Gaddafi dictatorship to smash the insurrection in its early stages (Chivvis, 2015, p.14). It was also a chance for some Europeans to show that they could take the lead in managing a major Mediterranean crisis at a time when the US was viewed as unwilling to join in another operation when its strategic interests were not clearly engaged. Taking advantage of the alliance between Sarkozy and himself, the British Prime Minister Cameron sent a message about the potential use of force in managing international crises and that they could still work together in the event of an emergency near Europe (ibid, p.14). However, in order to take support of international community and to prepare a ground for military intervention, a narrative on Gaddafi's harshness was promoted and exaggerated. Some of the news published before the intervention later came out as a lie. Prashad argues that: "The discourse on genocide in Libya was either fanciful or based entirely on speculation. It simply did not happen" (2012, p.158).

While French and British campaigning for intervention kept the world's concentration on Libya, it was not sufficient to shift the argument inside the US government. The government and public approached reluctantly to involvement "in additional foreign intervention" (Kidwell, 2014, p.108). Moreover, there was some doubt inside the US government over the intervention with a particular emphasis on burden sharing in NATO between the US and its European allies, and particularly on "who should take the lead in such an operation" (Petersson, 2015, p.29) NATO was often presented in a moderate manner throughout the Obama administration, it was meant to develop "collective security" and, to a lesser extent, "values", but rarely "pure US interests" (ibid, p.30). However, as events unfolded and debates proceeded, it became clear that there was a justification for the

intervention. Numerous reasons contributed to the decision, including France and Britain's pressure, the Arab League's vote, the impending assault on Benghazi, and the possibility of the military option that offered a chance of success (Chivvis, 2015, pp.18-19).

At the outset of intervention Sarkozy did not want the involvement NATO (Willsher, 2011). France's stance against NATO's involvement was mainly carrying two reasons. In case of NATO's involvement, France was addressing to possible delays in decision making process. Moreover, Sarkozy administration wanted to minimize influence of other countries especially Italy and Turkey (Chivvis, 2014, p.76). Sarkozy's ideal scenario would be combined Franco-British attacks, without the US and ideally under the EU flag. Moreover, "keeping NATO out would underscore the role of French power and minimize the risk that the United States would get the lion's share of the credit for intervening" (ibid, p.36).

On March 19, the roads to peaceful route were blocked as the bombardment took place in an intention to end reign of Gaddafi. The UK, the US, and France have taken the initial steps toward enforcing UN-mandated no-fly zone in Libya. At least 48 people were killed and 150 injured in the strikes, according to Libyan state television. However, there was no independent confirmation of the casualties. Several military vehicles and air-defense sites were damaged in the initial strike. Immediately following the airstrikes and missile assault, Colonel Gaddafi gave a brief speech in which he urged the people to resist. He called the attacks "a colonialist crusade of aggression. This can lead to open a new crusade war" (Libya: US, UK And France Attack Gaddafi Forces, 2011). As a result of the military intervention, the rebels were able to prevent the recapture of Benghazi and other cities in eastern Libya by the regime.

The operation was conducted not as Sarkozy desired, eventually the command was carried out by NATO and on March 31, the operations conducted by France, the UK, Canada, and the US encompassed under the name of "Operation Unified Protector" (NATO Fact Sheet, 2011). In his address to the nation and world, in relation to the

involvement to the Libyan conflict, on March 28, 2011, Obama noted the motivation and role of US as:

> In just one month, the United States has worked with our international partners to mobilize a broad coalition, secure an international mandate to protect civilians, stop an advancing army, prevent a massacre, and establish a no-fly zone with our allies and partners … In that effort, the United States will play a supporting role -- including intelligence, logistical support, search and rescue assistance, and capabilities to jam regime communications (Obama, 2011).

It is important to point out that, Obama in his speech indicated that, US "will play a supporting role". "Leading from the behind" was a phrase used to describe the role of the United States, which supported France and the United Kingdom throughout the intervention (Krauthammer, 2011). The US's approach as leading from behind minimized both political and financial costs and risks for the country which was already overwhelmed by the Afghanistan and Iraq wars. Additionally, it tightened the NATO members, compelling them to commit more to achieve common security objectives (Chivvis, 2014, pp.177-178).

Another crucial point was that, while defining the motivation and the scope of military intervention Obama argued that the operation does not carry out the mission of regime change:

> Of course, there is no question that Libya –– and the world –- would be better off with Qaddafi out of power. I, along with many other world leaders, have embraced that goal, and will actively pursue it through non -military means. But broadening our military mission to include regime change would be a mistake (Obama, 2011).

Another explanation on the motives of the Western actors focuses on export of liberal values and protection of oil supply. There was excitement at the potential for regional liberalization and democracy brought on by regime collapse, but there was also apprehension about the extent of the Western influence. In the discourse, actors' efforts were motivated by genuine concern for human security. However, there was

an opportunity to topple a disliked and feared dictator who possess high quality crude oil in a very close location to the Europe. As German minister of defense argued Europe also wanted to protect its oil supply (Hendrickson, 2016, p.219).

The NATO military intervention was also supported by regional organizations like the Arab League, it was important to take their support in order not to show the intervention as a crusade against Gaddafi and Libya. We can consider it as a method to conduct military intervention that purifies the intentions in the public eye. However, even though the common motive of the military intervention looks like it was derived from "humanitarian reasons", we cannot assert that the main agendas of each country were the same. As the conflict escalated, the military intervention became more politicized and evolved into a regime-changing operation rather than assisting and protecting civilians. One can argue that Gaddafi's international reputation made the operation more legitimate and did not help him to find support from the international community (Ulrichsen, 2016, pp.123-125 and Weiss, 2016, p.228).

The regime's response to the intervention was underwhelming. A deep-seated distrust of the military had always been a part of the Gaddafi's personality, and he once said that military personnel were 'always prone to dictatorship and even conspiracy'. That the army was often referred to as more of a "military club" than an actual combat force had been done on design. As a result, the army was unable to play a significant part in the crisis (Pargeter, 2012, p.224). Libya's capital Tripoli also lost to a six-month international military operation headed by NATO. Gaddafi barely avoided being hit by a coalition airstrike on his convoy at the beginning of the October and later in the same month he was found hiding. The youthful revolutionaries, who found the confused dictator, took him from his hiding spot attacked him viciously before swiftly killing him (ibid, p.244). The video footage of brutal killing was uploaded online. Eight months after the start of demonstrations, Libyans had accomplished to end 42 years of dictatorship.

4.3.2. Problems and Deficiencies of the Military Intervention

If we consider the early response to the conflict and ending Gaddafi's reign as a success, the NATO military intervention was a successful one. However, the implementation of UNSC Resolution 1973 by NATO had faced with opposition and query from the state leaders and academicians. The criticisms during the intervention were mainly questioning: intervening actors, the scope of intervention and degree of involvement to the conflict. The support to the UNSC Resolution and NATO intervention from regional organizations, like the GCC, the Arab League and to some extent the African Union, decreased the criticisms but they were still valid and had hardened during and after the intervention.

The first public dispute rooted in the interpretation and the practice of the Resolution. The military intervention led by NATO led some leaders to question motivation behind it due to involvement of the Western powers. Even though Russia and China abstained from the vote in the UNSC, they were openly presenting their concerns. Some of the BRICS countries, China and Russia were focusing on the interpretation and implementation of the Resolution. MedRussian president at that time, "Medvedev explained that Russia did not use its veto power to strike down Resolution 1973 "for the simple reason that [he does] not consider the resolution in question wrong." Rather the resolution "reflects [Russia's] understanding of events in Libya too, but not completely" (VanHoose, 2011). And from China's perspective the situation in Libya was worrisome, according to China's Security Council President Li Baodong, China did not use its veto because it took into account the views and regional interests of the Arab League and the African Union, both of which supported a resolution (Rapoza, 2011). However, in response to NATO airstrikes that killed civilians, China has urged for an immediate ceasefire and stated number of times "[China] is always against the use of force" (Garwood-Gowers, 2012, p.386). The Global Times newspaper which mainly presents the perspective of Chinese Communist Party argued that "The air attacks are an announcement that the West still wants to dominate the world. [It] still believes down to its very bones that it's the leader of the world" (Tisdall, 2011).

Second problem comes from the scope of the military intervention. As it is stated in the UNSC Resolution 1973, it "Authorizes Member States ... to take all necessary measures … to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack". However, the targets and people bombed by the coalition forces were not always posing a threat to the civilians, some of the examples presented by media outlets are as follows:

> Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi narrowly survived a NATO air strike that killed his youngest son and three of his grandchildren, a Libyan government spokesman said Sunday ... The missile attack on the home, in a residential part of the city, came hours after Gaddafi called for a ceasefire in a speech delivered live on Libyan state television (Gaddafi's Son and Grandchildren Killed in NATO Airstrike, 2011).

> An international journalists' group sharply criticized NATO air strikes against Libyan television, which killed three people and injured 15 (Media Group Condemns NATO Bombing of Libyan TV, 2011).

> On Aug. 8, four days after destroying the Morabit home, NATO hit buildings occupied by civilians again, this time in Majer, according to survivors, doctors and independent investigators. The strikes were NATO's bloodiest known accidents in the war (Chivers and Schmitt, 2011).

These are only few of the published news about NATO's bombing which is beyond the scope of the Resolution. According to the R2P mission, military actions can only be conducted if they are necessary to prevent or stop attacks or threats of attacks by either side in Libya's conflict. Resolution 1973 does not define the term "attack," nor does the UN Charter (Ulfstein and Christiansen, 2013, pp.163-164). Some of the NATO bombings deemed arbitrary which served the interests of coalition forces. Furthermore, International Law prohibits taking sides in a civil conflict by openly supporting one side. As it was published in Amnesty International's report, there were crimes committed by opposition forces during the intervention:

> Opposition fighters and supporters have abducted, arbitrarily detained, tortured and killed former members of the security forces, suspected al-Gaddafi loyalists, captured soldiers and foreign nationals wrongly suspected of being mercenaries fighting on behalf of al-Gaddafi forces. No independent or credible investigations are known to have been carried out by the NTC, nor

effective measures taken to hold to account those responsible for these abuses (Amnesty International, 2011, p.70).

Furthermore, when the rebels pushed into regime's territories, NATO took sides in the battle through cooperation with the rebels. For as long as the UN has been around, the concept of impartiality has meant that when the Security Council approves the use of force in armed conflict, intervening governments should not take sides with either side (Christiansen, 2013, p.169).

It is crystal clear that NATO and its partners operated completely on the side of the rebels throughout the Libyan crisis. As NATO's duty was "to take all necessary measures to protect civilians", it was including the rebel-controlled areas too. However, neither proper investigation was conducted to punish malefactors nor to protect civilians in these areas. Also, NATO member states and other supporters assumed power in Libya through encouraging a regime change. The ceasefire calls from Gaddafi ignored and as Hugh Roberts pointed out:

> … the British, French and American governments had the right and authority to determine who was part of the Libyan people and who wasn't. No one supporting the Gaddafi regime counted. Because they were not part of 'the Libyan people' they could not be among the civilians to be protected" (Roberts, 2011).

Other than discussions on the military intervention's conduct, the reconciliation efforts from international community were not as fervent as the military intervention. The Unpublished House of Commons Library research perfectly depicts the situation. According to the research "UK spent some £320 million on bombing Libya and approximately £25 million on reconstruction programmes" and also UK contributed to the international programs (The Foreign Affairs Committee, 2016, p.26). However, the amount spent on the reconstruction is far less than the money spent on military intervention (ibid, p.27). The international community and especially the ones who conducted the military intervention bears the responsibility to help post-intervention rebuilding process. Otherwise, as it happened in Libya, the conflict gains momentum

while including international and regional actors and the solution becomes more distant.

The aforementioned problems and deficiencies reveal that despite its righteousness, powerful actors can manipulate the R2P interventions and use them to follow their agenda. The execution of the military intervention raised further questions in the people's minds which can make the next military humanitarian intervention belated. Lack of proper detailed plan and different interpretations of the Resolution resulted in going beyond the scope of 'protecting civilians'.

4.3.3.   Rethinking the Responsibility to Protect

Marcel Boisard, a former UN Assistant Secretary-General, wrote in late October 2011:

> Nothing has been respected. No real negotiations towards a ceasefire have taken place. The exclusive control of the air was used to support the insurgents. Protection of civilians was the pretext to justify any operation. ... It was no longer a question of protection, but of regime change. ... The principle of 'responsibility to protect' died in Libya, just as 'humanitarian intervention' died in Somalia in 1992 (quoted in Pommier, 2011, p.1079).

Since the 2011 Libyan Military Intervention was the first application of the R2P doctrine, there is a strong scholarly focus on Libyan case. Certainly, the speed with which the coalition came together following the UNSC resolution and deployed significant air and naval capabilities may be seen as a success (Dube, 2016, p.11). The discussions mainly focus on the implementation of the doctrine rather than the success. In respect to the legality of the NATO intervention the denunciations mainly focus on the going beyond the scope of the Resolution and violation of it. As it was mentioned before, violating arms embargo, supporting rebel forces rather than protecting civilians and aerial bombings to non-military threats opened a debate about legality of the intervention (Terry, 2015, p.167). These discussions are important

because the ramifications of the intervention will go well beyond Libya. The R2P may have made it tougher to say no, but the implication of it has influenced future leaders' yeses (Chesterman, 2011, p.284).

Besides criticisms about the legality of the intervention there are serious questions about the 'humanitarian' motives of it. Most importantly when the doctrine is used to justify imperialism, preemptive war, or some other nefarious agenda behind the scenes. Humanitarian operations are particularly prone to crises of legitimacy because of the problem of contradictory intentions (Paris, 2014, p.574). Francis Boyle, human rights lawyer and professor of international law, criticizes the military intervention and argues that the US, France and the UK "immediately hijacked a legitimate but very brief "Arab Spring" in Benghazi in order to promote their own imperial agenda" which can be defined as "re-establishing a neo-colonial outpost" and "stealing Libya's oil and gas" (Boyle, 2013, p.179). Without a doubt, it is not possible to distinguish whether states' actions only rely on interests or humanitarian reasons like in Libyan case. Even though, it is impossible to answer this controversy in a certain manner at the outset of the conflict, the post-conflict efforts, and the process itself are main contributors to the debate. Like it happened in Libya, the coalition forces, who helped rebels to overthrow Gaddafi, formed alliances to preserve their interests and as though they are not the ones who worked together for 'humanitarian' intervention, started to fight with each other via proxies.

4.4.Conclusion

After the Arab Spring's achievements in Tunisia and Egypt, many other nations in the region hoped for a similar transformation in their country. For a long time, Libyans have attempted in futile to liberate themselves from Gaddafi's dictatorship, but circumstances have always conspired against them. In the end, a chain of events culminated in the revolt that prompted international military intervention in an intention to ending Gaddafi's rule, and reverting Libya to its pre-intervention state.

Many times, the international community has failed to stop mass atrocity crimes due to late interference, Libya has shown that if political will and operational competence are there, it is possible to act quickly. Limiting a government's ability to perpetrate subsequent mass atrocity crimes may not be enough in some situations and changing a government's leadership can occasionally stop continuing atrocities. It is simple to categorize international actions as either good or bad. However, the authorization and marketing of the NATO intervention was as 'humanitarian' intervention and it evolved into regime changing operation which harmed the credibility of responsibility to protect doctrine. R2P has been criticized by some scholars as a justification for NATO's intervention in Libya, despite the fact that atrocities against humanity were being committed in Syria, Bahrain, and Yemen and no action was being taken (Igwe et al., 2017, p.9).

CHAPTER 5

CONSEQUENCES of the NATO INTERVENTION

5.1.Introduction

In Libya, coalition forces used quite decisive force and eased the way of overthrowing Gaddafi and ended his mass atrocity crimes. The outcome of the intervention was a triumph at the outset since Gaddafi's reign had ended. However, the problems here lie on the process of the intervention and after intervention phase. After overthrowing Gaddafi, a power vacuum occurred in the country. This outcome led to another serious situation; regional and international powers allied with the different warlords in order to fill the vacuum and take a bigger share from Libya's rich and high-quality crude oil wealth.

The fractured society in Libya has been feeding the international involvement because powerful tribal bonds, late state formation and inexistence of proper regularity state institutions created the perfect environment for further conflicts. Moreover, international actors' interest-based involvement during and after the intervention raises other questions about responsibility to protect doctrine on motivations, hidden agendas and process itself.

After demonstrating the fragmentation of Libya, the chapter briefly summarizes the Second Libyan Civil War with specific focus on the roots of the divisions. As a main argument of this thesis, NATO's implementation of responsibility to protect unbound the Libya's fragmentation as well as contributed to the proliferation of the armed

groups. Thus, it is argued that Second Civil War is a consequence of the intervention and fostered with involvement of the international actors. Subsequently, the chapter follows with the internationalization of the Civil War and discusses the international actors and their motives and methods.

5.2.Fragmentation of the Country

Gaddafi's regime operated under the informal leadership of a small group of elites and was based on oil-funded cronyism and brutality to maintain his order. This system was pushed to the fore by revolution and the NATO's regime changing intervention. It resulted in a significant fragmentation of groups and interests. Libyan politics is currently highly fragmented thanks to these constituencies. Unifying authority and an inclusive political structure are still absent in the country (Smits et al., 2013, p.1).

Alexander Downes analyzes the possible outcomes of regime change in the case of humanitarian intervention. According to him, the intervening actor can defeat the existing authority inside the intervened country but in this case the intervener becomes "the victim of its own success" because of high possibility of the civil war. When interveners succeed in building proper state institutions, which is likely to occur in nations with prior conditions for institutional growth, such as "better incomes and ethnic homogeneity", the regime transition is unlikely to lead to civil war. Civil war is more possible in impoverished and ethnically diverse areas if institutions collapse (Downes, 2021, pp.119-127). When we consider 2011 intervention in Libya, the occurrence of the Second Civil War is not surprising. NATO's effort to help rebel groups in order to overthrow Gaddafi resulted in another civil war inside the country.

Chesterman argues that "Do something, do anything, is not a military strategy", there is a need to plan what will happen afterwards (Chesterman, 2011, p.284). In an interview, Obama said the approximately same things and stated that the result is convincing: "It didn't work." (Goldberg, 2016) and in another interview he admitted

that the intervention prevented more deaths but the US and "European partners underestimated the need to come in full force" to establish functioning democratic state (Friedman, 2014). According to Obama the main reason behind the failure is the tribal dynamics:

> The degree of tribal division in Libya was greater than our analysts had expected. And our ability to have any kind of structure there that we could interact with and start training and start providing resources broke down very quickly (Goldberg, 2016).

On the other hand, the primary objective of the military intervention was to protect civilians and from this point of view it is a victory/success. An article published in 2012 argues that: "By any measure, NATO succeeded", it saved the lives of tens of thousands of people (Daalder and Stavridis, 2012). Also, the authors support the argument by praising accuracy and cost of the operation. With some success, it waged an air campaign with unmatched accuracy. It helped the Libyan opposition depose one of the world's longest-serving regimes without allied casualties, and the cost was much less than prior operations (ibid). Shadi Hamid argues that the intervention did not build a stable democracy, which did not exist before the intervention, but this was never the aim, preventing a massacre was the aim. The current anarchy, bloodshed, and overall instability are more likely linked to the international community's failings than to the original intervention (Hamid, 2016). However, intentions of the states are frequently affected by conflicting goals, such as personal gain and societal conformity (Crossley, 2020, p.427). The argument on ending the "bloodshed" is not enough to evaluate the case. In spite of repeated requests from Human Rights Watch, a UN Commission of Inquiry, and others, NATO asserts that all of its targets were military objectives and hence vulnerable to attack. However, NATO has failed to produce enough information to substantiate those claims (HRW, 2012).

Despite all the criticisms before and after the intervention, it took place and Libya is dragged into continuous conflict. Notwithstanding, NATO intervention played crucial role for the further conflicts in Libya. However, it is not fair to blame NATO

nor praise it because the local dynamics of Libya and tribal bonds are so strong and difficult to break that they have made a significant contribution to the subsequent power struggle. The biggest problem is that the intervention took place without considering Libya's social dynamics.

Lacher's definition on fragmentation is a perfect description of Libya after the NATO intervention, he defines it as:

> [I] define fragmentation as the processes through which a multiplicity of competing political and military actors emerge and continue to proliferate, preventing the maintenance or establishment of a credible claim to the monopoly on the concentrated means of violence (Lacher, 2020, p.4).

Since the popular uprisings led to Gaddafi's dethronement, Libya has been facing with the internal unrest. Common aim to overthrow Gaddafi brought together opposition factions and slowed the process of determining the exact composition of the NTC and how decisions were made. In the course of the revolution, the NTC gained "revolutionary legitimacy" in popular view for guiding the removal of the dictatorship. "Transparency, legitimacy, and performance" of the NTC have all come under scrutiny as the nation moves "from revolution to transition" (Salem and Kadlec, 2012, p.4). NTC's inability to represent all voices and regions and later on disagreement in-between groups paved a way to lose its influence (Trauthig, 2018, pp.16-17). The absence of properly functional state and efficient armed forces have resulted in local actors like "notables, civilian and military councils, revolutionary brigades" stepping in to provide security, resolve conflicts, and decide on ceasefires (International Crisis Group, 2012, p.i).

NATO's intervention without doubt played a crucial role in breaking the Libyan puzzle. However, solely and exclusively blaming the military intervention does not offer us a proper perspective on the post-intervention situation. The lack of institutionalization in Libya, and Gaddafi' efforts to obstruct the creation of autonomous groups like political parties can be counted as the main reasons for

fragmentation (Lacher, 2020, p.4). There was a cause for optimism in the self-generated formation of a wide range of tiny civil society organizations around the nation but without state institutions to work with, it did not blossom forth. Gaddafi's remainder was, half-empty of government officials who formerly served in the regime but now fear retaliation for having ever served in it (Chivvis, 2014, p.170).

5.3.Continuation of the Conflict

5.3.1. 2014 – 2020 Second Civil War

The reign of Gaddafi had fallen after the series of events started in 2011. Besides the uprisings against the Gaddafi regime, the NATO intervention had changed the course of events and paved the way for the power struggle of local actors and their international providers. "Localism and fragmentation" have become the most prominent features of Libya's political character (Lacher, 2020, p.59).

As it was presented in the third chapter, Gaddafi entrenched "institutionalized statelessness" (Smits et al., 2013, p.8). With the death of Gaddafi, the political situation in Libya has become more evident. Since there was no authority or alliance to take control all over Libya, the post-revolutionary political system in the country has been plagued by more proximate flaws since its first days. At the starting of 2014, heightened tensions among highly "polarized factions" led to widespread conflict in the country. As a matter of fact, the conflict in Libya is not caused mainly by ideological differences rather the root causes lie on the competition on resources and power (Ilardo, 2019, p.1). Soon after Gaddafi's death, it became evident that the opposition forces' cooperation was quite shaky. The range of rising participants on the political stage was astounding (Lacher, 2013, pp.25-26).

In July 2012, Libya's transitional government, NTC, handed over power to the elected General National Congress (GNC). Protracted talks over the new

government's formation resulted in significant delays. After Mustafa Abushagur's failed attempt to create a government, Ali Zeidan's cabinet was sworn in on November 14, 2012 (Lacher, 2013, p.7). At the same time, the militia forces had grown stronger since political groups and elected representatives in the GNC showed more support for them. GNC's most important political groups, The Justice and Construction Party (affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood) and The National Force Alliance, did not have official armed wings. Rather, they linked up with different "militia groups through common grassroots networks of kin, local, tribe, as well as the religious and ideological cleavages that sustain them" (Report Libya, 2014, p.8). Moreover, the GNC, which was set up as a transitional government, made the political landscape more splintered "by institutionalizing a process of political isolation, itself a product of a Weberian concept of statehood" (Carboni and Moody, 2018, p.457). Post-revolutionary groups rose up and fought against the new political order because there was no authority to centralize the use of force and the GNC was lacking legitimacy across the country (ibid, p.457). The GNC faced many challenges over the following years, such as the September 2012 attack on the US consulate in Benghazi and the sprawl of the armed groups across the country (CFR Global Conflict Tracker, 2022). With time, the GNC's ability to maintain order in Libya deteriorated.

The Operation Dignity was started by Haftar's Libyan National Army (LNA) in May 2014 to fight against Islamist militant groups all over eastern Libya and to support his demand on dissolution of the GNC. To end the conflict, new elections took place amid the turmoil. The resultant House of Representatives (HoR) was dominated by anti Islamist groups linked with Haftar. Elections were unable to fix fundamental concerns, and turnout at election was exceedingly low. Members of the GNC denied the transition and positioned themselves as Libya's legitimate government (Becerra, 2020). As a response, Islamist and other armed groups launched a campaign called Libya Dawn. Eventually the second Libyan Civil War emerged, The Libya Dawn coalition, which controlled most of western Libya, was fighting against the Dignity coalition, which mainly controlled parts of eastern Libya (CFR Global Conflict Tracker, 2022). "By the summer of 2015, the conflict had reached a

stalemate" and Libya had devolved into a country contested by two competing administrations (Becerra, 2020).

Each side of the conflict attempted to claim the revolutionary legitimacy in order to justify their respective acts. Haftar's group claimed to be battling Islamist fanatics, while the Dawn alliance claimed to be attempting to eradicate the Gaddafi regime's vestiges. However, behind this bigger discourse, the ongoing conflict represented long-standing rivalries between rival towns, tribes, and patronage networks. Moreover, despite the fact that groups were unified against a common enemy, the splits in-between the groups were still visible (Wehrey, 2014). According to 2014 Report on Libya, as July 2014, approximately 1600 armed groups were operating in the country (Report Libya, 2014).

The Operation Dignity was effective in decreasing Islamist dominance and won Haftar significant support from secularists, former Gaddafi loyalists and some regional and international actors. Haftar, thanks to his anti-Islamist and secular position, has earned backing from the Egypt, United Arab Emirates, Jordan, Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Russia, and France. Among these, Haftar's most prominent sponsors are Egypt, UAE, Russia, and France. Egypt and the UAE are carrying same anti-Islamist foreign policy, and warlord Haftar's hostility for the Muslim Brotherhood and its linked groups makes him an obvious ally for them (Becerra, 2020).

The appearance of ISIS was an unrecognized constraint on Libyan violence. By 2015, ISIS had seized control of Sirte, Derna and a large crescent to the south. Surprisingly, ISIS's presence in Libya served as a significant mitigating element, enabling international actors to set aside their disagreements and work together to achieve an agreement (Winer, 2019, p.14).

Within the framework of international efforts to mediate the dispute, a series of negotiations were arranged "between the Tobruk-based HoR and the Tripoli-based

GNC" by "then-UN Special Envoy to Libya Bernandino Leon, followed by Martin Kobler" (CFR Global Conflict Tracker, 2022). The talks resulted in the December 2015 Libyan Political Agreement. The accord outlined a path forward for addressing Libya's numerous political and military deadlocks. The agreement mandated the establishment of a provisional administration capable of accommodating contending parliaments, restoring political order, and organizing Libya's militias into a unified organization. Additionally, in early 2016, a UN supported presidential council, chaired by Fayez al Sarraj, was established with the responsibility of forming a new unity government and advisory council comprised of former GNC members. The accord provided for the continued existence of the HoR as the sole legislative body under the auspices of the Government of National Accord (GNA) (Becerra, 2020). However, The GNA has encountered roadblocks in its efforts to establish a stable, cohesive administration in Libya and was not able to end conflict (CFR Global Conflict Tracker, 2022).

The administration from the east and the west were quickly compelled to focus on the ISIS's expanding presence. The GNA launched Operation "Impenetrable Wall" in April 2016 to drive ISIS out of Sirte. General Haftar intensified his assault against Islamists to Derna in the east. By December 2016, the Islamic State has lost both Sirte and Derna. However, Libya remained beset by political conflicts and security vacuums that allowed ISIS to seize part of Libyan territory especially in the desert area. In 2017, the reconciliation between the GNA and Haftar was not accomplished. "Both sides agreed to a conditional ceasefire in July" and an upcoming spring election timeline, but mediation efforts in October collapsed (Rowan, 2019). The political situation worsened further in December, when Haftar claimed that the 2015 Political Accord and the GNA were invalid. At the end of 2018, the likelihood of unification appeared to be increasing after Libyan and international leaders gathered on November 12, 2018, in Italy to resolve the country's political impasse. All parties showed their support for a UN proposal that includes a planning meeting in early 2019 in order to schedule elections. However, the Italian Summit did not reduce the arm proliferation, and organized crime across the country (ibid).

After capturing nearly all of Fezzan, including its oil resources, the LNA had already established authority over around two-thirds of Libya. By consolidating his position in the south, Haftar also reinforced his position within the broader national framework, increasing the likelihood of a military conclusion to the crisis. On April 4, 2019, he announced his intention to seize Tripoli. The attack on the city exposed flaws and internal divisions. Domestic and international support for Haftar has dwindled significantly, with foreign leaders denouncing the move and some local actors defecting to the opposition (Ilardo, 2019, p.4). On the other hand, the GNA, whose authority had been steadily eroding since its original appointment, was recovering strength. The LNA's actions in Fezzan exacerbated Tripoli's marginalization in the south, while Fayez al-Sarraj was more preoccupied with establishing his tenuous authority over the capital. Immediately following Haftar's attack, the government introduced a counterattack to retake all territories captured by the enemy, including vital outposts. Sarraj's announcement strengthened his position by consolidating power by focusing on anti-Haftar campaign (ibid, p.4).

It appears that a variety of political structures have been established in Libya, where violence is employed to achieve a wide range of economic, social, and political objectives rather than only to challenge the rival powers. Despite many attempts toward a political settlement, no central authority has been formed to rule Libya as a whole. Academic and policy assessments describe Libya as a failed state and the nation is divided along numerous "tribal, political, religious, and ideological cleavages that have exacerbated tensions into an all-out conflict escalation" (Carboni and Moody, 2018, p.457). These evaluations describe Libya as an ungoverned environment that enables armed groups to have a shelter and easy access to weapons (ibid, p.457).

5.4.Internationalization of the Civil War

The international intervention played an important role by breaking the state authority and creating political vacuums which at the end led to the involvement of new actors

as well as a continuation of the civil conflict. Militias' refusal to lay down their weapons demonstrates distrust and doubt about who has the right to command during the transition and afterwards (International Crisis Group, 2011, p.6). The international actors are invited by the local actors who are vying for power against their local rivals (Megerisi, 2019, pp.2-3). To some extent it was expected that many internal parties will compete for authority and increasing proportions of oil money, along with a role in the ideological direction of any new Libya (Vira and Cordesman, 2011, p.62). However, the intervention prepared the grounds for new actors and made the external penetration easier. It is rightful to say that the military intervention was conducted at the expense of Libya's future. Because the fragmented structure of Libya was not something unknown before 2011. The decisions were taken, and the action started in a quick manner but the efforts to build post-conflict Libya is still very problematic issue. Following the intervention, consensus began to disintegrate, and international and regional powers began acting in their own self-interest. It is still visible that the alliance formed to put an end to the regime's mass atrocity crimes now has a variety of local collaborators and is competing against one another via proxies. Additionally, regional, and international involvement complicated the possibility of reaching a resolution.

5.4.1. Actors, Motives and Methods

Although Egypt, UAE and Qatar are already included in the Libyan war from its outset, the number of external actors increased significantly after the arrival of Russian mercenaries to side with Haftar and Turkey's forces to intervene in favor of the GNA. Meanwhile, mercenaries from Syria, Sudan and Chad and high-tech military equipment were deployed in favor of each side (Megerisi, 2020a, pp.1-2). In order to understand the fragmentation in Libya, it is required to have an insight on external actors. In this part of the chapter, the main external actors will be presented with specific focus on their motives and methods.

5.4.1.1.Egypt and United Arab Emirates

There are two major factors which contributes to the Haftar and Egypt's alliance. First of all, Egypt's strongman Sisi, came to power after coup against Muslim Brotherhood. The Egyptian case showed Haftar that he would use the common enemy narrative to advance his long-held political goals especially against Islamic groups in Libya by allying with Sisi (Harchaoui and Lazib, 2019, p.5). Secondly, as the country concerned about security concerns presented by extremist organizations operating from Libyan territory, maintaining stability in the neighbor Libya is in Egypt's national interest. Moreover, Egypt is sharing a long border with LNA controlled area which can pose a more serious threat against Egypt than the Western powers of Libya. As a strong actor in the eastern part of the Libya, Haftar can secure Egypt's border (Mezran and Miller, 2018, p.106). Sisi's enmity against Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamic groups and his fear on a state which could host his opposition next to Egypt laid the groundwork for an alliance with Haftar.

With the Cairo summit in 2017, the UAE established itself as a significant actor in the negotiations. The UAE's engagement in the Libyan conflict was not unprecedented. Along with Egypt, Abu Dhabi financially and logistically is backing Haftar and his military since 2014, while supporting the UN led initiatives officially (Mezran and Miller, 2018, p.107). Fear of the spread of the Arab Spring to the UAE was evident in Abu Dhabi's severe attitude on activists and anyone proposing even moderate reforms. "Evolution over revolution" has been the driving force behind the UAE's regional strategy since 2011 (Megerisi, 2020a, p.3). Abu Dhabi's policy on Egypt is a perfect demonstration of the idea of "recreating the old order with new leaders" (ibid, p.3). As a result of this political strategy, having a government in Libya which promotes a hazardous ideology in the region is not something preferable for the Emirates. Furthermore, as part of an oil diversification plan to establish itself as the region's logistics leader, the UAE's efforts demonstrate the country's policy from an economic perspective. Libya's perfect location in Mediterranean and rich oil and gas resources make the country attractive to UAE (ibid, p.8).

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5.4.1.2.Qatar and Turkey

Although the GNA is the internationally recognized administration, The Western government has few international backers who have invested extensively in the conflict except Qatar and Turkey. Their support to the Tripoli administration is largely due to Muslim Brotherhood and Turco-Libyans inside the GNA (Becerra, 2020). Although Qatar carries less belligerent approach, it continues to fund political Islamist groups in the region in order to expand its influence zone. Qatar's methods can be counted as funding the GNA and providing equipment and training for militias (Megerisi, 2020a, p.8). On the other hand, the Turkish government sees Libya as a vital part of its regional plan. Amid continuous maritime tensions with Greece, Turkey was looking to exploit Libya's offshore natural resources. In exchange for military aid, Turkey and the GNA have agreed on a bilateral commercial pact that includes rights to offshore drilling. Turkey's ambition to ensure its energy supply can be deemed as a main driving force for its support to GNA (Becerra, 2020). At the same time, the reason for Turkey's inclusion cannot be limited to the maritime agreement. Haftar's main supporters are Egypt, UAE, and Saudi Arabia and countering these regional players is in the interest of Ankara due to their hostility against Turkey (International Crisis Group, 2020).

Turkey's intervention during Haftar's military campaign against Tripoli, changed the balance of power in favor of GNA and prevented Haftar forces from capturing the city. As in 2020, other than Hisar air defense system and TB2 drones Ankara has sent more than 100 officials and thousands of Syrian mercenaries (International Crisis Group, 2020).

5.4.1.3.Russia

Private military group Wagner "have been deployed in Libya, the Central African Republic, Sudan, and Mozambique" (Siegle, 2021, p.82). Russia realized an opportunity to increase its access in a petroleum-rich country near to Europe and

grasped this ideal chance by sending its Wagner Group to Libya. The group is closely affiliated with Russia's military intelligence service. As in Syria, the Russians backed a fragile leadership dealing with a security crisis in a strategically positioned country. For each case, Russia has officially denied any involvement of Russian mercenaries. The deployments, which normally does not include many soldiers are affordable and more than covered by the fees paid and resource revenue earned. Therefore, Moscow is gaining influence in the region where it earlier had just a limited presence (ibid, p.82).

Moreover, given Moscow's sway over the Libyan peninsula, it created an access to major hubs for migration and human trafficking. Russia therefore "has the ability to provoke humanitarian and political crises for Europe", while also threatening European (mainly French) domains of influence in the African continent (ibid, p.87).

5.4.1.4.Europe

The 2011 intervention was mainly supported by European states, especially by France and Britain. However, after overthrowing Gaddafi, Libya is neglected by the Europe. There was a significant reduction in the Union's attention when the first civil war was put behind in 2011 (Toaldo, 2017, p.57).

We can divide the Europe's approach to Libya into two; first there is an EU policy and secondly, member states are following their own policies. The EU's participation in Libya was mostly non-political and political positions were always an attempt to reinforce UN resolutions at the EU level. Other than supporting political solution, stopping illegal migration and deploying naval forces to conduct Operation Irini, there is no unified approach from the Union (Megerisi, 2020b, pp.30-32). Megerisi anlayzes EU's political agenda as:

1. Reaffirm commitment to sovereign Libya,
2. Block Russian expansion in Mediterranean,
3. Curtail irregular migration and refugee flows (2020a, p.8).

For the country level, we see those two major players are backing two rival groups in Libya. While Italy is supporting the Western government in Libya, France is maintaining its relationship with Haftar forces. Italian policy prioritizes national security considerations, with the primary objective of preventing huge migration flows from Libya (Ilardo, 2018, p.2). As a result, the country takes a side in the conflict and provides the Western Government with security assistance and intelligence (Megerisi, 2020a, p.8).

On the other hand, France is actively trying to redefine his relationship with Libya and provides security assistance via the UAE and Egypt. France relates this regional conflict to a broader war against the Sahel's Islamist insurgency, which poses a danger to French Operation Burkhane. According to Paris-based policymakers, Haftar is the only player capable of establishing order over the Islamist factions who are active in Libya's deserts. Additionally, arms sales with Egypt and the UAE are generating billions of dollars, dispelling any concerns about France's faithfulness to the conflict (Becerra, 2020). At the same time, French policy to the MENA region, which is oriented around fostering stability and supporting regional allies without considering their regime's character, embodies the France's new long-term realist stance in the region (Ilardo, 2018, p.2).

5.4.1.5. United States of America

When it comes to the US, Libya is not the country's top foreign policy priority. During the Obama administration, as well as Trump's term, the US have pushed for the European allies, regional partners, and UN to play leading roles in Libya's post intervention stability and rebuilding. According to Ben Fishman, there are five phases of US engagement in Libya:

1. NATO intervention with the role of "leading from behind",
2. From November 2011 to September 2012 – re-establishing diplomatic presence until the assassination of Ambassador Chris Stevens and three other Americans,
3. From September 2012 to July 2014 – "the United States sought to recover from the loss of Ambassador Sevens until the escalation of violence and civil war forced the evacuation of the American embassy in Tripoli",
4. From July 2014 to January 2017 – supported the efforts of UN on 2014 Libyan Political Agreement and conducted air campaign against ISIS,
5. From January 2017– showed no interest except counterterrorism issues (Fisherman., 2017, pp.91-92).

5.5.Conclusion

Since the end of NATO intervention in October 2011, the conflict has not stopped completely. Especially after 2014, Libyan people has faced the Second Civil War. The ongoing conflict raised serious questions about the success of NATO military intervention.

Were it not for the intervention, Gaddafi would very surely have held on to power, and the uprising would almost certainly have been crushed within weeks (Gazzini, 2011). Generally, the international community's response to the Libyan crisis was praised for its exceptional quickness and uniformity in dealing with the issue. However, this rapidity does not always equate to a better understanding of the country's changing dynamics. The international community only relied on the offensive statements by the Libyan leader and overlooked peaceful pleas (Capasso et al., 2019, p.7).

Due to strong tribal ties, the country's late state formation, and the lack of proper regularity state institutions, Libya has become a breeding ground for more conflict. Moreover, the involvement of international actors to prevent Gaddafi's oppression

contributed to the fragmentation by paving a way to demolish existing power structure. In general, the influence of foreign and regional actors exacerbated the difficulty of creating an effective national reconciliation effort. The battle between forces sponsored by Qatar and Turkey and those backed by Egypt, the UAE, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and later Russia had a significant part in the country's split (Winer, 2019, p.10). However, supporting one side does not mean not supporting the political solutions. Almost every external actor supports reconciliation efforts as a discourse, but the problem is that external actors are not able share the country and give up from their interests in Libya. It is difficult to see constructive external involvement in Libya, given that the state of chaos that has descended upon it since the NATO operation in 2011 (Mezran and Miller, 2017, p.10).

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

Even though, humanitarian military interventions have a long history, the debate on intentions of the humanitarian interveners goes along with it. In 1990s and early 2000s, especially with Kofi Annan's Millennium Report in 2000, the discussion has evolved into another dimension which at the end led to emergence of responsibility to protect (R2P). The R2P doctrine has become an emerging international norm in a very short period of time and has been in ongoing progress. The doctrine basically relies on three main pillars: a) states have a responsibility to protect its citizens from mass atrocity crimes, b) the international community has responsibility to assist states to fulfill their responsibility and c) the international community has responsibility to intervene when the state is not protecting its citizens and when required, it lays three responsibilities on states and international community: to prevent, to react and to rebuild (ICISS, 2001, p.17).

Since the adoption of the R2P at 2005 UN World Summit, various resolutions have passed by referring to this doctrine. However, UNSC Resolution 1973 is the first resolution which allowed military intervention with reference to the R2P doctrine. Thus, specific importance has attributed to 2011 Libya intervention.

The 2011 NATO intervention halted the Gaddafi's advancement against rebel hold areas and prevented possible mass atrocity crimes. However, the interveners have only focused on the military intervention and not enough importance has been attached to 'rebuild'. Moreover, not enough efforts had been made on preventing Gaddafi with diplomatic means.

The narratives from media outlets and political leaders were deliberately creating an ambiance for the upcoming intervention. The common story before the intervention was focusing on upcoming massacre and arguing that Gaddafi forces were waging "full-bore attack" on the civilians (Prashad, 2012, pp149-150). However, there were other news from the field which were overlooked during the decision-making process. As George Joffé and Alison Pargeter argued during the British Foreign Affairs Committee's meeting on October 12, 2015, there was not any reliable evidence for the possible massacre against Libyan civilians (The Foreign Affairs Committee, 2015). It is also stated in the British Parliamentary Publication on Libya, Sarkozy put an effort on the military intervention on Libya due to French interests and Britain followed France's decision. In the same publication it is argued that the UK Government participated to the intervention because incomplete evidence was presented and the "elements of Muammar Gaddafi's rhetoric at face value" was selectively taken (The Foreign Affairs Committee, 2016, pp.11-15).

The decision on the intervention had been made with expedition thanks to France's and Britain's endeavors. Interveners took side with the rebels and conducted regime changing operation instead of preventing mass atrocity crimes. Moreover, the interveners disappeared or supported their proxies after the death of Gaddafi. Therefore, Libya, which carries highly fragmented social structures, slid into highly internationalized conflict.

Libya's tribal society and fragmented social structure was not something of a puzzle before 2011. There are various reports, books and articles which are showing Libya's social and political composition. As this thesis showed, the interveners did not pay any attention to this composition and the intervention took place at the expense of Libyan people who desired for a change in their country. The undiluted NATO intervention led to occurrence of a power vacuum in Libya. Moreover, lack of keenness and readiness on rebuilding efforts, fed the power struggle. As a result of the power struggle, the old rivalries unpacked amongst Libya's highly fragmented tribal society and settling the conflict has become more difficult.

The conflict has grown violent after 2014 and the Second Libyan Civil War started. The major consequences of the NATO intervention became visible in this period. The fragmented country with so many local actors made the external penetration easier. By supporting local actors with funds, military equipment and intelligence international actors turned Libya into playground for their competition. Natural resources, regional rivalries, as well as ideological reasons have played significant role in foreign actors' involvement. As the conflict has progressed, the solution became harder due to complexity of the situation.

After Haftar's offensive was halted around Tripoli by GNA thanks to Turkey's support, the conflict reached its stalemate and it led parties to discuss possibility of agreements. Thanks to UN efforts, the conflict has settled, and the process showed promise for a reconciliation. The parties agreed upon ceasefire in October 2020. After series of talks at the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LDPF) with the sides of the Libyan conflict, interim authority, the Government of National Unity (GNU) set forth. Abdul Hamid Dbeibah, a businessman from Misrata, was designated as prime minster to the interim government (UN News, 2021). Main duty of the GNU was carrying out elections on December 24, 2021. However, the elections did not take place on the scheduled date due to disagreements on legal issues as well as security problems. In February 2022, the House of Representatives appointed new prime minister, Fathi Bashagha, and formed new government due to objections on GNU's Prime Minister. However, Abdul Hamid Dbeibah, refused to abandon his position and stated that he only leaves the power to an elected government (UN News, 2022). Currently, even though there is no ongoing armed conflict, with two governments' threatening rhetoric and the fragmentation, the possibility of recurrence of the conflict is not low (ibid).

Report of the Independent Fact-finding Mission on Libya confirms the current turmoil and the political problems. The existence of power vacuum makes a significant contribution to the fragmentation and heightens the tension in the country. Especially the power struggle between Bashaga and Dbeibah, has created new political strife. Moreover, the postponement of the elections is evidence of the

inability or reluctance of the Libya's prominent figures. Because, according to same report, the Libyan people are in favor of the elections, but the power holders are deliberately sabotage the elections by threating the officials, citizens, and candidates. Furthermore, there is a constant intimidation effort to judiciary, which casts a shadow upon the fairness of the trials. As the up-to-date report shows, the insecurity and the political fragility are still present in Libya and even though the efforts towards the stabilizing Libya are there, in order to achieve it, there has to be more support for capacity building in Libya (A/HRC/49/4, 2022, pp. 2-18).

As a result of the decade long conflict in the country, tortures, detentions, sexual assaults, missing people, illegal migration, sinking refugee ships on the Mediterranean Sea are the most common news headlines about Libya. Moreover, the landmines used during the civil conflict, still poses danger to the civilians. Most of the infrastructure had been demolished, the basic services like healthcare and education are not functioning enough.

The current situation is confirming the main argument of this thesis. The fragmentation in Libya is not going to fade away easily. The latest developments may look promising because the number of local actors is not large as much as in 2014 and there is not ongoing armed conflict. However, even though there are fewer local actors, the fragmentation is profound and probability of the occurrence of new conflicts is not low. Because the NATO intervention was lacking quality and efforts to rebuild Libya was not enough, the fragmentation has become deep and embedded in Libya. Thus, overcoming the main reasons of the conflict is still difficult. When we look at the current situation and reconciliation efforts, we see fragmentation's hampering effects. As in Lacher's definition of fragmentation local actors, with the external actors' support, are "preventing the maintenance or establishment of a credible claim" (Lacher, 2020, p.4). In order to find a solution, the influence of the international actors must be reduced. Otherwise, the local actors will continue their power struggle thanks to support from external actors. For the compromise, each actor has to give up from some of their claims and as the current situation shows, it is not happening for now.

To sum up, the NATO intervention's major effect on Libya is the disruption of the social structure by not paying attention to the country's history. As a result of the regime changing intervention, the power gap has occurred, and Libya has dragged into the civil war. When geopolitical position, high quality oil, fragmented structure, power vacuum and civil war came together, the inclusion of the international actors were inevitable. If there were solid state structure or early reconciliation efforts, the situation might be different now.

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APPENDICES

A. TURKISH SUMMARY / TÜRKÇE ÖZET

Toplu vahşet suçlarını yasaklayan uluslararası düzenlemelerin ilerlemesine rağmen, Soğuk Savaş sırasında işlenen suçları durdurmak veya en savunmasız olanları korumak için çok az şey yapıldı. Çünkü Soğuk Savaş ortamı devletleri güvenlik politikalarına öncelik vermeye ve insan hakları konularını öncelik listesinden aşağı çekmeye yöneltti ya da ihlal edenler genellikle süper güçler tarafından korunuyordu. Müdahalelerin temel amacı insanın korunması değildi. Soğuk Savaş sona erdiğinde, küresel ideolojik çatışmanın ortadan kaldırılmasına ve insan haklarını desteklemek için yeni düzenlemelerin oluşturulabileceği yeni bir Dünya düzenine yol açacağına dair bir iyimserlik vardı.

Koruma başarısızlıkları arttıkça ve beyan edilen niyetler ile fiili uygulamalar arasındaki uçurum genişledikçe, uluslararası toplum kendi başarısızlıklarından ders almaya başlamış ve "sivillerin korunması" ve "sorumluluk olarak egemenlik" gibi yeni fikir ve kavramlar geliştirmeye başlamıştır. Kofi Annan'ın 1999'da The Economist'te yayınlanan makalesinde de belirttiği gibi: Devlet egemenliği, özellikle küreselleşme ve uluslararası iş birliği faktörleri etkisinde en temel anlamıyla yeniden tanımlanmaya başlamıştır. Koruma sorumluluğu, insani müdahale kavramını kurumsallaştırarak ve uluslararası toplumun rolüne dair yeni bir anlayış öne sürerek bazı eleştirileri çözme fikri olarak ortaya çıktı. Devletlerin vatandaşlarını savunma yükümlülüklerine odaklanan koruma sorumluluğu doktrini, insani yardım eylemlerinden farklıdır. Bu kavram uluslararası toplumun sorumluluklarını yerine getirmede hükümetlere yardım etmesi gerektiği üzerine yeni bir fikir öne

sürmektedir. Sivilleri korumak için uluslararası bir norm geliştirme ihtiyacı, insani müdahaleye bir yanıt olarak görülmemeli, daha çok kararlılığı ve ileriye doğru ilerlemeyi göstermektedir. Bu uluslararası normun uygulanmasının doğasında var olan engellere rağmen, insanlığın acıyı kendi varlığında kabul etmeye geçmişte olduğundan daha az meyilli olduğunu ve onu hafifletmek için harekete geçmeye daha istekli olduğunu göstermektedir.

İnsani müdahale fikri yüzyıllardır var olmuştur ve son on yılda önemli ölçüde tartışılmıştır, ancak koruma sorumluluğu bir kavram olarak oldukça yenidir ve uluslararası bir norm olma yolunda ilerlemektedir. Koruma sorumluluğu fikrini geliştirerek, kitlesel mezalimlere yanıt verme ihtiyacında uluslararası toplumun rolünü tanımlamak ve egemenlik fikrini aydınlatmak amaçlanmaktadır.

Koruma Sorumluluğu fikri, uluslararası toplumun soykırım, savaş suçları, etnik temizlik ve insanlığa karşı suçlar gibi insan yaşamının daha fazla ihlal edilmesinin önüne geçmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Söylemin insani müdahaleden koruma sorumluluğuna dönüşmesi, kitlesel vahşet suçlarının faillerinin mutlak egemenlik anlayışına dayanmaması gerektiğini açıkça göstermektedir. ICISS raporuna göre, mutlak egemenlik yoktur, devletlerin haklarla beraber sorumlulukları vardır ve egemenlik iki temel ilkeye dayanmaktadır:

1. Devlet egemenliği sorumluluk gerektirir ve halkının korunmasının birincil sorumluluğu devletin kendisine aittir.

2. Bir nüfus, iç savaş, isyan, baskı veya devletin başarısızlığı sonucunda ciddi zarar görüyorsa ve söz konusu devlet bunu durdurmak veya önlemek konusunda isteksiz veya yetersiz ise; devletlerin iç işlerine müdahale etmeme ilkesi uluslararası sorumluluğa teslim olur.

Ayrıca, ICISS raporuna göre devletlerin üç özel sorumluluğu vardır:

1. İç çatışmanın nedenlerini ele alan: önleme sorumluluğu,

2. Durumlara uygun önlemlerle yanıt vermek anlamına gelen: tepki verme sorumluluğu,

3. Müdahaleden sonra toparlanma, yeniden inşa ve uzlaşma konularında ihtiyaç duyulan yardımı sağlama görevi olarak: yeniden inşa etme sorumluluğu.

Koruma sorumluluğu diğer devletlere yurtdışında askeri müdahaleler yapma veya diğer devletlerin içişlerine karışma hakkı verdiği şeklinde görülmemelidir. ICISS raporunun önerdiği gibi, müdahaleler için karar verme makamı olarak BM Güvenlik Konseyi'nden daha iyi bir organ yoktur, ancak sürecin daha iyi işlemesini sağlamak için, BMGK'da bazı reformların yapılmasına ihtiyaç vardır.

2005 yılında BM'de Dünya Zirvesi Sonuç Belgesi'nin kabul edilmesinden bu yana, koruma sorumluluğu önemli ancak tartışılan bir norm olmuştur. İnsani müdahaleye yönelik eleştirilerin bir kısmı koruma sorumluluğu için de geçerlidir; ancak BM egemenliğin anlamını daha sağlam bir şekilde yorumlayarak devletlerin otoritesine ilişkin bazı endişeleri ortadan kaldırmıştır. Ayrıca, BM'nin, yalnızca suç işleme durumunda yanıt vermek yerine, kapasite geliştirme, erken uyarı ve diğer önleyici ve koruyucu önlemler yoluyla kitlesel vahşet suçlarını önlemede ve etkilenen toplulukları korumada devletlere yardımcı olması için yeni programatik fırsatlar yaratmayı amaçlamaktadır. Daha sonraki çalışmalar ve toplantılar da uygulamanın ölçü ve tedbirlerine değinilerek kalıcı bir ilkenin oluşturulması yönünde ileriye yönelik adımlar atılmıştır. 2009 yılında, koruma sorumluluğu ile ilgili ilk rapor BMGK tarafından yayınlandı, bu rapor koruma sorumluluğunun üç sütununu şu şekilde özetlemektedir:

Birinci Sütun: Devletin koruma sorumlulukları, (bölüm II)

İkinci Sütun: Uluslararası yardım ve kapasite geliştirme, (bölüm III)

Üçüncü Sütun: Zamanında ve kararlı müdahale. (kısım IV)

2011 Libya müdahalesinden önce koruma sorumluluğunun, insani müdahaleden hangi yönleriyle ayrıldığı geniş bir şekilde tartışılmakta ve bu yeni ilkenin aşırı vurgulanan bir kavram olduğu ileri sürülmekteydi. Koruma sorumluluğu ilkesi ile insani müdahale arasında bir fark bulunmadığı noktasına vurgu yapılmaktaydı. Ancak, koruma sorumluluğu ve insani müdahalenin benzerliğine ilişkin tartışmalara rağmen, teorik düzeyde farklılıklar vardır. İnsani müdahale, John Vincent tarafından, devlet, devlet içinde bir grup, bir grup devlet veya bir uluslararası örgüt tarafından üstlenilen ve başka bir devletin içişlerine cebri müdahale eden faaliyet, olarak tanımlanmaktadır. Bu tanım en az üç şekilde koruma sorumluluğundan ayrılır. Birincisi, insani müdahalenin kapsamı daha genişken, koruma sorumluluğu, dar bir şekilde dört tür toplu vahşet suçunu önlemeye odaklanmaktadır. İkinci olarak, güç kullanımı insani müdahalenin öne çıkan özelliği iken, koruma sorumluluğu için önleme ve müzakere gibi çeşitli ve askeri müdahale içermeyen öneriler vardır ve askeri müdahale, koruma sorumluluğu doktrininde son çaredir. Son olarak, kavramların arasındaki çizgi çok muğlak olsa da koruma sorumluluğu, askeri müdahale hakkı olarak görülen insani müdahale söyleminden farklılaşmaktadır. Ancak bu son argüman, özellikle 2011 Libya Müdahalesinden sonra hala tartışılmaktadır. BM'de koruma sorumluluğunun kabul edilmesinden bu yana, 80'den fazla BMGK kararı bu doktrine atıfta bulunmuştur. Ancak doktrinin ilk askeri uygulaması 2011 yılında Libya'dadır.

Libya'da var olan güncel durumu anlamak ve NATO müdahalesinin sonuçlarını daha iyi analiz edebilmek için, Libya'nın politik tarihine bakmak gerekmektedir. Osmanlı yönetimi ve daha sonra İtalyan yönetimi, devlet kurumlarını iyileştirmeye odaklanmak yerine Libya'dan maksimum fayda sağlamaya odaklanmıştır. İtalya'nın II. Dünya Savaşı'nı kaybetmesinden sonra Libya, Fransa ve İngiltere'nin himayesine girmiş ve yönetim bölgeleri üç bölge arasında bölünmüştür. Daha sonrasında iktidara gelen Senusi tarikatından İdris, Sirenkaya bölgesine hakimdi ve bağımsızlık karşılığında İngiltere ile ittifak kurmuştu. 1949'da Sirenkaya bağımsızlığını kazandı ve 1951'de Libya, BMGK kararıyla üç bölgeden oluşan bağımsız egemen bir devlet olarak kabul edildi.

Kral İdris, devlet kurumlarını geliştirmek veya inşa etmek için çaba sarf etmemiş, Osmanlı ve İtalyanların egemenlik döneminde yaptıkları gibi gücünü pekiştirmek için aşiret ilişkilerine güvenmiştir. Özellikle Libya'da yüksek kaliteli ham petrolün bulunmasından sonra Kral İdris otoritesini genişletmek için önemli bir kaynak bulmuştu. Otoritesini genişletmenin yanı sıra, konut, yol ve altyapı projelerine de yatırım yapmış ancak yatırımların çoğu büyük şehirlere yapılmıştı. Bu durum kırsal ve çöllerden kentlere büyük göç dalgalarına neden olmuştur. Gelişme hızı, göçün hızına yetişememiş ve gecekondulaşmaya zemin hazırlamıştır.

Kral İdris zamanında, petrol gelirine bağlı olan ülke, gelirlerin adil bir şekilde dağıtılmamasından kaynaklı olarak ekonomik sorunlar yaşamaya başlamıştır. Ekonomik sorunların yanı sıra pan-Arabizm, Arap coğrafyasında etkisini hızlı bir şekilde arttırmaktaydı. Kral İdris'in diğer Arap milletlerine yardım etme ve Filistin konusundaki pasifliği Libya halkını rahatsız ediyordu. Ayrıca Kral İdris'in Batılı güçlerle iyi ilişkileri ve ülkedeki Amerikan ve İngiliz askeri üslerine ev sahipliği yapması başka bir rahatsızlık konusuydu. Libyalılar, Kral İdris'in yönetiminden memnun değildi ve onu başarısız bir lider olarak görüyorlardı.

1969'daki darbe, Kaddafi'nin saltanatının başlangıç noktasıydı. Bir grup ordu mensubu darbeyi başarıyla yürüttü ve büyük bir çatışma olmadan iktidara geldi. Libya'daki devrim bölgesel güç dengesini değiştirdi. Kaddafi'nin ilk hedefi modernleşme adına Libya'nın aşiret dokusunu zayıflatmak olsa da hükümeti nihayetinde aşiret ilişkilerine bağlı olarak kaldı. Kaddafi'nin otoritesine yönelik her tehditle birlikte otoriter tutum sıkılaştırıldı. Kaddafi, sömürgecilik karşıtı ve emperyalizm karşıtı mücadeleleri destekledi ve Soğuk Savaş sürecinde bağlantısız olduğunu iddia etti. Kaddafi'nin sömürge tarihini silme takıntısı, konuşmalarında yinelenen bir konuydu. Kendisine küresel bir misyon edinerek milliyetçi isyanları hevesle destekledi.

Kaddafi'nin devletsiz toplum yaratma amacı tam tersi yönde hareket etti. Libya'nın siyasi, sosyal ve ekonomik hayatı, Kaddafi ve onun küçük çevresi etrafında

şekillendi. Ayrıca Libyalıların siyasi ve sosyoekonomik yaşamında sadece Kaddafi'nin iç politikalarının değil, uluslararası politikalarının da etkisi büyük olmuştur. Kaddafi'nin kendisine evrensel bir misyon yükleyip, diğer ülkelerdeki bağımsız hareketleri desteklemesi, uluslararası toplumun Libya'ya karşı bir tutum izlemesine sebep olmuştur. Özellikle Berlin Disko Saldırısı ve Lockerbie Faciası, Libya'ya yönelik sert yaptırımların önünü açmıştır. Kaddafi'nin dış politikası sebebi ile Libya uzun bir süre dış dünyadan izole edilmeye çalışılmıştır.

Uygun düzenleyici ve kontrol edici kurumlar olmadan Kaddafi, Libya'yı kırk yıldan fazla bir süre yönetti. Arap Baharı'nın Tunus ve Mısır'daki başarılarından sonra, bölgedeki diğer birçok vatandaşlar, kendi ülkelerinde benzer bir dönüşümü umuyordu. Uzun süredir Libyalılar kendilerini Kaddafi'nin diktatörlüğünden kurtarmak için nafile girişimlerde bulundular, ancak bu çabalar her zaman başarısızlıkla sonuçlanmıştı. 2011 Libya devriminde, baskı, yozlaşma ve adam kayırma gibi faktörler büyük rol oynamıştır. Ülkenin petrol geliri olmasına rağmen, rejim, halka çok az şey kazandırmış ve kendi bekası ve güvenliği için halkın sefaletini beslemekteydi. Ayrıca, uluslararası izolasyon ve yaptırımlar insanların içinde bulunduğu kötü durumu daha da perçinlemiştir. Yeni nesil, sosyoekonomik reformların başarısızlıkları, işkenceler, cinayetler ve belirsizlikle karşılaşıyordu. Bu durum, sonunda, Kaddafi yönetimini sona erdirmek ve uluslararası askeri müdahaleye yol açan bir isyana yol açtı.

17 Şubat 2011'de, 1996 Ebu Salim Hapishanesi katliamında ölenlerin aileleri ve Libya halkı, katliamın on beşinci yıldönümünde ülke çapında mitingler düzenlemek istediler. Göstericiler 17 Şubat'ı "öfke günü" olarak nitelendirdi. Ancak 15 Şubat'ta mağdurların avukatı ve insan hakları aktivisti olan Fathi Terbil, Libyalı yetkililer tarafından gösterileri engellemek amacıyla Bingazi'de gözaltına alındı ve planlanan protestoları durdurması istendi. Terbil'in tutuklanması, Libya halkı ve kurbanların aileleri arasında huzursuzluğa neden oldu ve bu nedenle tutuklama, amaçlananın tersini yaptı: Halkın öfkesine yol açtı ve Doğu Libya'da planlanan tarihten önce halk bu siyasi tutuklamayı protesto etmeye başladı.

Kaddafi ailesinin tepkisi şaşırtıcı değildi, Kaddafi'nin oğlu Seyfülislam yeni gösterilerden kaçınmak için hükümetin tutuklama ve gözaltılarını savundu. Miting ve gösterilerin sorumluluğunu başta ABD ve Batılı müttefikleri olmak üzere yabancı provokatörlere yükledi. Muammer Kaddafi, protestolar sırasında birkaç kez milletine seslenmiş ve ünlü konuşmasında, huzursuzluktan dış müdahaleyi sorumlu tuttuğu silahlı muhalifleri "sokak sokak" avlama sözü vermişti.

Batılı uluslar çok kısa süre içerisinde Kaddafi'nin bir an önce görevden ayrılmasına yönelik çağrılarda bulundular. Özellikle dönemin Fransa Başkanı Sarkozy, Kaddafi'nin gitmesi konusunda istekli açıklamalarda bulundu. 25 Şubat'ta BM Genel Sekreteri Ban Ki-Moon, Güvenlik Konseyi'ni, yaptırımlardan cezaya kadar çeşitli seçeneklerle, acımasız şiddeti ve protestoculara uyguladığı baskı nedeniyle Libya Devlet Başkanı Kaddafi'nin hükümetine karşı acil somut adımlar atmayı düşünmeye çağırdı.

Ayrıca, Fransa ve Arap Ligi, BMGK'ya uçuşa yasak bölge uygulaması için baskı yapmaktaydı. İlk başta daha çekinceli davranan ABD, Arap Ligi'nin BMGK kararına verdiği desteğin ardından, politikasını "Arap devletlerinin temsili" ile askeri müdahaleyi destekleme yönünde değiştirmiştir. Uluslararası toplum 26 Şubat 2011'de bir adım attı ve BMGK'da 1970 sayılı kararı kabul ederek Libyalıların korunması çağrılarına yanıt verdi.

Libya hükümetinin zulmü ve insan hakları ihlallerinin yanı sıra, 1970 sayılı karar, rejimin sivillere karşı güç kullanımını kınadı. Göstericilere yönelik bu tür saldırılar, meydana geldikleri tarihte insanlığa karşı suçlar olarak görülüyordu. Ayrıca, Arap Birliği, Afrika Birliği ve İslam Konferansı Örgütü'nden gelen uluslararası kınama Konsey tarafından memnuniyetle karşılanmıştı.

Daha sonra, 17 Mart 2011'de BMGK 1973 sayılı kararı onayladı. Bu karar derhal ateşkesin kurulmasını ve sivillere yönelik tüm saldırılara tamamen son verilmesini

talep etmekteydi. Üye devletlere "Libya Arap Cemahiriyesi'nde saldırı tehdidi altındaki sivilleri ve sivil nüfuslu bölgeleri korumak için gerekli tüm önlemleri alma" yetkisi verdi ve Libya üzerinde uçuşa yasak bölge kuruldu.

19 Mart'ta, Kaddafi'nin saltanatını sona erdirmek amacıyla yapılan bombardımandan sonra barışçıl rotaya giden tüm yollar kapatıldı. Birleşik Krallık, ABD ve Fransa, Libya'da BM tarafından zorunlu kılınan uçuşa yasak bölgenin uygulanmasına yönelik ilk adımları attı. İlk saldırıda rejime ait çok sayıda askeri araç ve hava savunma tesisi hasar gördü. Hava saldırılarının ve füze saldırılarının hemen ardından Kaddafi kısa bir konuşma yaparak halkı direnmeye çağırdı. Saldırıları sömürgeci bir saldırganlık ve haçlı seferi olarak nitelendirdi. Askeri müdahalenin sayesinde, isyancılar, Bingazi ve doğu Libya'daki diğer şehirlerin rejim tarafından geri alınmasını engelleyebildi. 31 Mart'ta Fransa, Birleşik Krallık, Kanada ve ABD tarafından ayrı ayrı yürütülen operasyonlar Unified Protector Operasyonu adı altında birleştirildi.

NATO askeri müdahalesi, Arap Ligi gibi bölgesel kuruluşlar tarafından da desteklendi, müdahalenin Kaddafi ve Libya'ya karşı bir haçlı seferi olarak gösterilmemesi için bölgedeki Müslüman devletlerin desteğini almak önemliydi. Bu desteğin özellikle vurgulanmasını, kamuoyunda niyetleri arındıran bir yöntem olarak değerlendirebiliriz. Ancak askeri müdahalenin ortak güdüsü "insani nedenlerden" kaynaklanmış gibi görünse de her ülkenin ana gündeminin aynı olduğunu söyleyemeyiz. Çatışma tırmandıkça, askeri müdahale daha politize hale geldi ve sivillere yardım etmek ve onları korumaktan ziyade bir rejim değişikliği operasyonuna dönüştü. Kaddafi'nin uluslararası itibarının operasyonu daha da meşru kıldığı ve uluslararası toplumdan operasyonu engellemek için gerekli desteği bulmasına yardımcı olmadığı söylenebilir.

Birçok kez uluslararası toplum geç müdahale nedeniyle toplu vahşet suçlarını durdurmayı başaramadı. Ancak Libya gerekli siyasi irade sayesinde hızlı hareket etmenin mümkün olduğunu gösterdi. Bir devletin kendi topraklarında toplu vahşet suçlarını işleme kabiliyetini sınırlamak bazı durumlarda yeterli olmayabilir ve ancak

rejim değişikliği devam eden vahşetleri durdurabilir. NATO müdahalesinin yetkilendirilmesi ve pazarlanması koruma sorumluluğu doktrinine dayanıyordu. Çatışmaya erken müdahaleyi ve Kaddafi'nin saltanatını sona erdirmeyi bir başarı olarak kabul edersek, NATO askeri müdahalesi başarılı oldu. Ancak 1973 tarihli BMGK Kararı'nın NATO tarafından uygulanması, devlet liderleri ve akademisyenlerin koruma sorumluluğuna karşı daha sorgulayıcı yaklaşmasına yol açtı ve Libya'daki müdahalenin rejim değişikliği operasyonuna dönüşmesi, bu yeni gelişen doktrinin inandırıcılığını zedelemiştir. Koruma sorumluluğunun Suriye, Bahreyn ve Yemen gibi insanlığa karşı vahşet işlenen diğer vakalarda olmaması bazı akademisyenler tarafından NATO'nun Libya'ya müdahalesini bir sonucu olarak görülmektedir.

Müdahale öncesinde ve sonrasında yapılan tüm eleştirilere rağmen gerçekleşti. Libya'da koalisyon güçleri oldukça kararlı bir şekilde güç kullanarak Kaddafi'nin devrilmesini kolaylaştırdı ve rejimin kendi halkına karşı işlediği suçlara son verdi. Kaddafi'nin saltanatının sona ermesi, operasyonu başta bir zafer olarak tanımlanmasını sağladı. Ancak, Libya süregelen bir çatışma ortamına sürüklendi. NATO askeri müdahalesi Libya'da devam eden çatışmalar için uygun ortamın oluşmasına sebep oldu. Ancak Libya'nın yerel dinamikleri ve aşiret bağları o kadar güçlü ve kırılması zor olduğu için sadece NATO'yu suçlamak ya da övmek adil değil. En büyük sorun, müdahalenin Libya'nın toplumsal dinamikleri dikkate alınmadan gerçekleşmesidir.

Kaddafi'nin devrilmesinden sonra ülkede bir iktidar boşluğu oluştu. Bu sonuç başka ciddi bir duruma yol açtı; bölgesel ve uluslararası güçler, boşluğu doldurmak ve Libya'nın zengin ve kaliteli ham petrol zenginliğinden daha fazla pay almak için farklı savaş ağalarıyla ittifak kurdu. Libya'daki parçalanmış toplum, güçlü aşiret bağları, geç devlet oluşumu ve uygun devlet kurumlarının yokluğu, daha fazla çatışma için mükemmel ortamı yarattı. Ayrıca, müdahale sırasında ve sonrasında uluslararası aktörlerin çıkar temelli katılımı; motivasyonlar, gizli gündemler ve koruma sorumluluğunun uygulanması sürecine ilişkin başka soruları da gündeme getirdi.

Halk ayaklanmaları Kaddafi'nin tahttan indirilmesine yol açtığından beri, Libya iç huzursuzlukla karşı karşıya. Kaddafi'yi devirmeye yönelik ortak amaç, muhalif grupları bir araya getirdi ancak Ulusal Geçiş Konseyi (UGK)'nin kesin bileşenlerinin belirlenmesini ve kararların nasıl alındığını belirleme sürecini göz ardı etti. Devrim sırasında UGK, diktatörlüğün ortadan kaldırılmasına rehberlik etmesi için devrimci bir meşruiyet kazanmıştı. Libya halkı Kaddafi'nin devrilmesinden sonra, UGK'nın şeffaflığı, meşruiyeti ve performansının tümü inceleme altına alındı. UGK'nın tüm bileşenleri ve bölgeleri temsil edememesi ve daha sonra gruplar arasındaki anlaşmazlıklar, bu konseyin etkisini kaybetmesine yol açtı. Düzgün işleyen bir devletin ve etkin silahlı kuvvetlerin yokluğu, aşiret liderleri, sivil ve askeri konseyler, devrimci tugaylar gibi yerel aktörlerin güvenliği sağlamak, çatışmaları çözmek ve ateşkes kararı almak için devreye girmesiyle sonuçlandı. Ancak bu durum, savaş ağalarının ve bölgesel liderlerin etkilerini arttırmasına ve bunun sonucu olarak çok aktörlü bir çatışma ortamı oluşmasına yol açmıştır.

Uluslararası müdahale, devlet otoritesini kırarak ve sonunda yeni aktörlerin katılımına ve iç çatışmanın devam etmesine yol açan siyasi boşluklar yaratarak önemli bir rol oynadı. Geçiş sırasında ve sonrasında Libya'da kimin komuta etme hakkına sahip olduğu konusunda güvensizlik ve şüphe ortamı milislerin silah bırakmasının önüne geçti. Yerel aktöreler, kendi aralarındaki güç müdahalesinin bir sonucu olarak, Libya'daki çatışmalarda ve siyasi olarak kendilerini desteklemeleri için uluslararası aktörleri davet etti. Askeri müdahalenin Libya'nın geleceği pahasına yapıldığını söylemek doğru olur. Çünkü Libya'nın parçalı yapısı 2011'den önce bilinmeyen bir şey değildi. Askeri müdahaleye yönelik kararlar hızlı bir şekilde alındı ve harekete geçildi ancak çatışma sonrası Libya'yı inşa etme çabaları hala çok sorunlu bir konu. Müdahalenin ardından konsensüs dağılmaya başlamış, uluslararası ve bölgesel güçler kendi çıkarları doğrultusunda hareket etmeye başlamıştır. Rejimin toplu vahşet suçlarına son vermek için kurulan ittifak üyelerinin artık çeşitli yerel işbirlikçilere sahip olduğu ve Libya'daki vekilleri aracılığıyla birbirleriyle rekabet ettiği görülüyor. Ek olarak, bölgesel ve uluslararası katılım, bir çözüme ulaşma olasılığını karmaşıklaştırmakta.

Güçlü aşiret bağları, geç devlet oluşum süreci ve düzenli devlet kurumlarının eksikliği nedeniyle Libya, daha fazla çatışma için uygun bir alan haline geldi. Genel olarak, yabancı ve bölgesel aktörlerin etkisi, etkili bir uzlaşma çabası yaratmanın zorluğunu artırdı. Katar ve Türkiye tarafından desteklenen güçler ile Mısır, BAE, Ürdün, Suudi Arabistan ve daha sonra Rusya tarafından desteklenen güçler arasındaki savaş, ülkenin bölünmesinde önemli bir rol oynadı. Ancak bir tarafı desteklemek, siyasi çözümleri desteklememek anlamına gelmez. Hemen hemen her dış aktör bir söylem olarak uzlaşma çabalarını desteklemekte ama sorun şu ki dış aktörler ülkeyi paylaşamıyor ve Libya'daki çıkarlarından vazgeçemiyor. 2011'deki NATO operasyonundan bu yana üzerine çöken kaos durumu göz önüne alındığında, Libya'da yapıcı bir dış müdahale görmek zor.

Ülkede on yıldan fazladır devam eden çatışma sonucunda işkenceler, gözaltılar, cinsel saldırılar, kayıp kişiler, yasadışı göç, Akdeniz'de mülteci gemilerinin batması Libya ile ilgili en çok konuşulan haber başlıkları haline geldi. Ayrıca iç çatışmalar sırasında kullanılan mayınlar da siviller için tehlike oluşturmaya devam ediyor. Altyapının çoğu yıkılmış durumda, sağlık ve eğitim gibi temel hizmetler yeterli değil.

2021'de BM'nin çabaları sayesinde ihtilafların çözülmesi ve uzlaşma için bir umut doğdu. Taraflar Ekim 2020'de ateşkes üzerinde anlaşmaya vardılar. Libya Siyasi Diyalog Forumu'nda Libya ihtilafının taraflarıyla yapılan bir dizi görüşmenin ardından, geçici otorite olan Ulusal Birlik Hükümeti 24 Aralık 2021'de seçimleri gerçekleştirme için karar aldı ve taraflar tüm yabancı savaşçıların çıkarılması konusunda anlaştılar. Ancak bu karara rağmen binlerce yabancı savaşçının varlığı devam ediyor. Seçimler, güvenlik sorunlarının yanı sıra yasal konulardaki anlaşmazlıklar nedeniyle planlanan tarihte yapılmadı. Şubat 2022'de Temsilciler Meclisi yeni başbakan Fathi Bashagha'yı atadı ancak uluslararası kabul görmüş Abdul Hamid Dbeiba görevinden ayrılmayı reddetti. Halihazırda devam eden bir silahlı çatışma olmamasına rağmen, iki hükümetin söylemleri ve sosyal yapı göz önüne alındığında çatışmanın tekrarlama olasılığı hiç de düşük değil. Libya'daki parçalanmış toplumsal yapı ve güvensizlik ortamı her an olabilecek bir çatışmayı

tetiklemektedir. Ayrıca uluslararası aktörlerin kendi çıkarlarından vazgeçmemesi de yerel aktörlerin kendi aralarındaki mücadelesini perçinlemektedir.

Mevcut durum, bu tezin ana argümanını doğrulamaktadır. Libya'daki parçalanmanın ortadan kalkması kolay gözükmüyor. Son gelişmeler umut verici görünebilir çünkü yerel aktörlerin sayısı 2014'teki kadar fazla değil ve devam eden bir çatışma yok. Ancak daha az yerel aktör olmasına rağmen, parçalanma derin ve yeni çatışmaların olasılığı düşük değil. NATO müdahalesinin niteliksiz olması ve Libya'yı yeniden inşa etme çabaları yetersiz kaldığından, parçalanma derinleşti. Bu nedenle, çatışmanın ana nedenlerini ortadan kaldırmak zor olmaya devam ediyor. Mevcut duruma ve uzlaşma çabalarına baktığımızda parçalanmanın yıpratıcı etkilerini görüyoruz. Lacher'in parçalanma tanımında olduğu gibi, yerel aktörler, dış aktörlerin desteğiyle güvenilir bir sistemin sürdürülmesini veya kurulmasını engelliyor. Çözüm bulmak için uluslararası aktörlerin etkisi azaltılmalıdır. Aksi takdirde yerel aktörler dış aktörlerin desteğiyle iktidar mücadelesini sürdürecektir. Anlaşmaya varmak için aktörlerin bazı iddialarından vazgeçmesi gerekiyor ve mevcut durumun da gösterdiği gibi şimdilik bu mümkün gözükmüyor.

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<u>TEZİN TÜRÜ</u> / <u>DEGREE:</u>   **Yüksek Lisans** / Master ☒   **Doktora** / PhD ☐

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