ROMANI ORGANIZATION PRACTICE IN TURKEY: BETWEEN SOCIAL
MOVEMENTS AND CIVIL SOCIETY

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ABSTRACT

ROMANI ORGANIZATION PRACTICE IN TURKEY: BETWEEN SOCIAL
MOVEMENTS AND CIVIL SOCIETY

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This thesis aims to understand Romani organization practice in Turkey by examining heterogeneous formations of Romani organizations within four cycles/waves of collective action/protest: the pre-organization and early organization period (2000-2009), the Romani Initiative period (2009-2015), the Romani deputy elections period (2015-2018), and the establishment of Romani youth networks/platforms (2019-present). These cycles/waves coincide with major events that initiated Roma's mobilization and demobilization in Turkey. I suggest that Romani organization in Turkey can be productively studied in terms of the debate on the hybridization of social movements and civil society. In order to grasp these dynamics within a community traditionally closed to outsiders, I conducted 23 in-depth interviews with Romani organization members between 2019 and 2021 and ten months of ethnographic fieldwork working at a Romani NGO between January and September 2021. In my interviews and fieldwork, I focused on the structure of Romani organizations, their internal and external dynamics, collective action strategies, and inter-organizational networks. I argue that Romani organizations in Turkey exhibit hybrid formations on a spectrum between social movement organizations (SMOs)

and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), varying across different cycles/waves of collective action. Furthermore, due to the Romani community's dependency on external resources, lack of collective consciousness, and newly developing collective action strategies and repertoires, the political opportunity structure is the main factor determining Romani organizational dynamics, strategies, and inter-organizational networks. The heterogeneity of Romani organizations in Turkey is reflected in a decentralized structure—a polycephalous network formation based on competitive, conflictual, and cooperative relationships among organizations.

ÖZ

TOPLUMSAL HAREKETLER VE SİVİL TOPLUM ARASINDA: TÜRKİYE'DEKİ ROMAN ÖRGÜTLENME PRATİĞİ

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Mevcut çalışma heterojen formlara sahip çeşitli Roman örgütlerini dört kolektif eylem/protesto döngüsü içinde inceleyerek Türkiye'deki Roman örgütlenme pratiğini anlamayı amaçlamaktadır. Roman örgütlenme sürecinde kolektif eylemlerin yayılma ve azalma safhalarının öncü olaylarına bağlı bu döngüler, örgütlenme öncesi ve erken örgütlenme dönemi (2000-2009), Roman Açılımı dönemi (2009-2015), ilk Roman milletvekili seçimleri dönemi (2015-2018) ve Roman gençlik ağlarının/platformlarının kurulmasını (2019-günümüz) kapsamaktadır. Türkiye'deki Roman örgütlenme sürecinin toplumsal hareketlerin ve sivil toplumun melezleşmesi tartışması açısından verimli bir şekilde çalışılabileceğini öne sürüyorum. Geleneksel olarak yabancılara kapalı bir toplulukta bu dinamikleri kavramak için, 2019-2021 yılları arasında Roman örgüt üyeleriyle 23 derinlemesine görüşme ve Ocak-Eylül 2021 arasında bir Roman STK'sında çalışarak on aylık etnografik saha çalışması gerçekleştirdim. Saha çalışmasında Roman örgütlerinin yapısına, içsel ve dışsal dinamiklerine, kolektif eylem stratejilerine ve örgütler arası ağlara odaklandım. Bu araştırmada, Türkiye'deki Roman örgütlerinin, toplumsal hareket örgütleri (THÖ) ile sivil toplum örgütleri (STK) arasında, farklı kolektif eylem döngülerine göre değişen

bir yelpazede melez oluşumlara sahip olduğunu savunuyorum. Ayrıca, Roman toplumunun düşük sosyo-ekonomik statüsü, kolektif bilincin ve kolektif eylem stratejilerinin ve repertuvarlarının yakın zamanda gelişmeye başlaması, örgütlenme sürecinde dışsal kaynaklara bağımlılığında etkin rol oynamıştır. Bu sebeple, siyasi fırsat yapısı, Roman örgütlenme dinamiklerini, stratejilerini ve örgütler arası ağları şekillendiren temel faktör olmuştur. Bununla birlikte, örgütler arası ağlar, örgütlerin rekabetçi, çatışmalı ve işbirlikçi ilişkileri üzerinden çok yönlü ve ademi merkeziyetçi bir ağ oluşumu içindedir. Bu da Türkiye'deki Roman örgütlerinin heterojen formasyonunu bir kez daha göstermektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: toplumsal hareketler, sivil toplum, Romanlar, melezleşme, Türkiye'de kolektif eylem

To Romani youth and those who say Opre Roma!

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

EHRC	Equality and Human Rights Commission
EU	European Union
HRA	Human Rights Association
JDP	Justice and Development Party
NGO	Non-governmental Organizations
IPA	Pre-Accession Assistance
ROMFO	Roma Rights Forum
RPP	Republican People's Party
SIROMA	Technical Assistance for Promoting Social Inclusion in Densely Roman Populated Areas Project
SMO	Social Movement Organizations
SNA	Social Network Analysis

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The Roma community is one of the ethnic communities marginalized in Turkey. The history of the Roma in Anatolia, dating back to the eleventh century, is extensively recounted in the academic literature (Arayıcı, 2008; Marsh, 2010; Ünaldı, 2012; Uştuk and Cox, 2020). Even though most Roma today have settled, they followed a nomadic and semi-nomadic lifestyle until recently (Avara and Mascitelli, 2014). Due to the discrimination they suffer, they live in segregated and closed neighborhoods in Turkey (Sayan and Duygulu, 2022). After globalization and industrialization, they have faced high rates of unemployment and many related socio-economic problems, as they cannot turn their handmade professions such as tinsmithing, basketry, and blacksmithing into profit, and thus they find very limited job opportunities (Önen, 2013).

Until the 2000s, Roma struggled to organize due to dynamics both internal (low socio-economic status, being a closed group based on neighborhood culture) and external (the political environment in Turkey, including state minority politics and discriminative laws against Roma) to the community. Romani organization practice gained momentum in the early 2000s with the establishment of non-governmental organizations through cooperation with non-Roma activists. This thesis' focus is to understand the organization of Roma in Turkey, its structure, internal and external dynamics, and collective action strategies from the 2000s to the present. I will examine Romani organization in Turkey through the theory of hybridization of social movements and civil society, locating this process within cycles/waves of collective action. Between 2019 and 2021, I conducted 23 semi-structured in-depth interviews with Romani organization members, 18 of whom are chairpersons of the organizations. Furthermore, I spent ten months in the field working for a Romani NGO between January and September 2021.

In this thesis, I argue that Romani organization practice in Turkey encompasses hybrid forms of organization which emerge in different phases of organization along a continuum from social movement organization (SMO) to non-governmental organization (NGO). Hence, I focus on the tension between forms of social movement organizations and non-governmental organizations which have interchangeable relationship with each other. In this study, I draw on Donatella della Porta's discussion of the hybridization of activism in social movements and volunteerism in civil society to explain hybrid forms of organizations within the cycles/waves of protest. According to della Porta, the boundary between social movements and civil society is becoming obscured as a result of the NGOization of social movements and SMOization of civil society (della Porta, 2020). To understand the organization dynamics of Roma in Turkey, I formalized my main research question as:

> How do Roma experience organization through formal and informal Romani organizations in Turkey?

In order to answer this question, I defined three sub-questions:

> How do the political and institutional environment affect the Romani mobilization process throughout the history of Romani organization in Turkey?
>
> What is the relationship between Romani organizations' structures and their organizational strategies?
>
> What are the dynamics of inter-organizational networking among Romani organizations?

Through these questions, I seek to understand how Romani organizations engage in collective action, how the construction of Romani organizations is shaped according to the political and institutional environment, and how various actors within the organization interact with each other through inter-organizational networking.

In order to conceptualize social movement organizations as a loose network, I adopt Mario Diani's conceptualization of social movements as a "distinct social process, consisting of the mechanisms through which actors engaged in collective action are involved in conflictual relations with clearly identified opponents; are linked by

dense informal networks; [and] share a distinct collective identity" (della Porta and Diani, 1999, p. 20). Also, I use Michael Edwards' definition of civil society which emphasizes the latter's autonomy from the state and market, its civility, and cooperative actions within a structured organization (Edwards, 2004). In light of these definitions, social movement organizations (SMOs) are networks in which actors engage in conflictual relations through transgressive actions, while civil society organizations (or non-governmental organizations, NGOs) are structured formations which adopt moderated actions within a space separate from the state and market.

Moreover, the hybridization process in Romani organizations should be evaluated together with the parallel emergence of new social movements and global civil society after the 1980 coup in Turkey. On the one hand, various movements such as the Kurdish movement, Islamism, feminism, the Alevi movement, the environmental movement, and human rights activism evolved (Şimşek, 2007). On the other hand, organizing within civil society organizations was strengthened through international cooperation (Yabancı, 2019). Until the first decade of the 2000s, both the European Union and international organizations as well as Turkish state policies and organs supported the growth of civil society, resulting in increased NGO formation and activism and volunteerism within NGOs (NGOization). During this process, new, more moderate and collaborative action repertoires were adopted by the new social movements (Gümrükçü, 2010). Since women's rights, environmental rights, religious freedom, and minority rights were major concerns of both literatures during the 2000s, the distinction between civil society and social movements has become increasingly blurred. In addition to the influence of political opportunity structure, the NGOization of SMOs was also furthered by the adoption of human rights-based discourse. On the other hand, the SMOization of NGOs can be observed during the OccupyGezi protests in Turkey. With the wave of anti-globalization and anti-austerity protests worldwide, during the OccupyGezi movement NGOs became more transgressive employing direct action such as attending demonstrations, and informal and network formations increased (Kaya, 2017).

Furthermore, the change in the conceptualization of minorities in Turkey also affected the organization of Roma in Turkey. The criteria defining minorities has

moved from a religious one (non-Muslim/Muslim) to an ethnic one (the Kurdish movement), and eventually to a plurality of minority conceptualizations through the influence of new social movements. Although the Turkish Republic still ignores this plural understanding of minority in its legal definition and accepts only Armenians, Rums (Greek Orthodox), and Jews as minorities based on the Lausanne Agreement (Çayır, 2015), women, LGBTIQ+, and ethnic communities are considered minorities through human rights discourse within social movements and civil society in Turkey. The Romani community began organizing later than other minority groups. Some of the causes behind this include the precarity of the Roma's socioeconomic condition, their lack of collective action consciousness, their adoption of conformity as a survival strategy, their marginalization by other minority groups, and the drawbacks of nomadic existence. I will elaborate on minority organizations in Turkey and their relationship with Romani organizations in the literature review below.

Romani Studies in Europe is a well-established field (Marushiakova & Popov, 2015; McGarry, 2010; van Baar, 2012; Vermeersch, 2006). In Turkey, however, the academic curiosity and interest that peaked through the Democratic Initiative Process[1] in 2009 has declined recently. Meanwhile, since the Romani movement in Europe accelerated through the support of international organizations—mostly NGOs situated within global civil society—Romani organization practice has primarily been examined in the civil society literature (Kóczé & Rövid, 2012; Rostas & Rövid, 2015). Although the general argument is that the civil society literature and social movement literature are completely different from each other, the two literatures employ overlapping concepts in their discussions (della Porta, 2020). Therefore, it is necessary to build a more explicit bridge between these literatures to understand the new patterns embedded within them. Some academics have argued for a possible overlap between the two literatures (Cohen and Arato, 1992; Alexander, 2006; Edwards, 2011); however, there has been little empirical research

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[1] The Democratic Initiative Process refers to the initiative initiated by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's government to strengthen Turkey's democratic, freedom, and human rights standards. The Unity and Fraternity Project is the name of the initiative. The initiative's principal aims, according to Interior Minister Beşir Atalay, are to improve democratic norms and to put an end to terrorism in Turkey. It is a project that will focus on the human rights and democratic rights of these groups under sub-titles such as the Kurdish Initiative, the Roma Initiative, the Armenian Initiative and the Alevi Initiative (Ulusoy, 2010).

on the hybridization of activism and volunteerism (della Porta, 2020). Furthermore, no study has looked at Romani organization in Turkey through the lens of the hybridization debate. Thus, this thesis aims to contribute to the social movement and civil society literatures on Roma in Turkey by bridging the gap between these two literatures. Another important point concerning Romani organization practice in Turkey is its late formation compared to that of other minorities. Throughout history, Roma have been marginalized by the state and by other ethnic communities (Çelik, 2012; Halis, 2021). As a result, they suffer from lack of resources both internal (socio-economic status, collective consciousness) and external (support of elites and the state) more than other ethnic groups such as Kurds (Güneş, 2015) and Armenians (Galip, 2021). Due to their late organization, Roma have experienced this organization process swiftly and simultaneously in both civil society and social movements.

This thesis is divided into five chapters. In the first chapter, I introduce the main problem and research question of the study, its significance, and an overview of the thesis. In the second chapter, I provide a literature review in three parts: terminology, theoretical framework, and historical background in Turkey. The Roma/Gypsy dichotomy is one of the main discussions within Romani studies; therefore, I first discuss the issue of terminology and explain why I use the term, Roma. Second, I outline the conceptual framework of the thesis through discussion of the hybridization debate and the concept of protest cycles/waves. These concepts help me to understand heterogeneous formations of Romani organizations in Turkey across different phases of collective action. In the last part of the literature review, I give a historical overview of Romani organization practice in Turkey. I examine the historical background of activism and volunteerism in Turkey and the conceptualization and organization of minorities within this process, focusing particularly on political opportunity structure.

In the third chapter, I outline my methodology, including ethical considerations during the research. In the fourth chapter, I draw on the hybridization and protest cycle discussions to examine the organizational structures and strategies of Romani organization practice in Turkey. I show how these structures and strategies shape Roma's collective claims and how the political opportunity structure affects the

collective action process. Also, I explain the emergence of different organizational types within Romani organizations and their relationship with organization strategies. Lastly, I examine interactions among Romani organizations through inter-organizational networking. Finally, in the concluding chapter, I summarize my arguments and offer fruitful avenues for further research.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1. Terminology: Fundamental Questions in Romani Studies: Roma or Gypsy?

The Roma/Gypsy are one of Europe's and Turkey's most disadvantaged diasporic communities, who often experience extensive exclusion and discrimination. They are politically underrepresented and have few resources to protect their interests in the countries where they have settled. Roma migrated to Europe over centuries using different migration routes and often sustained their nomadic way of living, resulting today in dispersed settlements in different countries worldwide, especially in Central Europe and Turkey. In this section, I will give brief answers to the fundamental question of terminology in Romani studies: whether "Roma" or "Gypsy" is used and how these terms are conceptualized in major and recent discussions in the Romani studies literature. European perspectives are dominant in Romani studies because considerable populations of Roma settled in European countries, and Romani organization was first initiated and developed in these countries.

The traditional debate in Romani studies over use of the term Roma versus Gypsy has more recently lost momentum. Since the eighteenth century, several studies have been conducted on Gypsy/Romani communities, one of the most populous minority groups in Europe. The early studies by non-Roma scholars designated these communities as Gypsy. However, most of these studies contain ethnocentric and discriminative definitions and analyses.

For example, Grellman defines Gypsies as underdeveloped, unreachable, and unable to adapt to European culture. Although some scholars in the late eighteenth century criticized Grellman's approach, this discriminative conceptualization has survived as the dominant conceptualization of "Gypsy culture" until at least the early 1960s (van

Baar, 2011). Van Baar argues that this stereotypical conceptualization also contributed to the late recognition of the Roma and Sinti genocide in Germany (van Baar, 2011). More recently, the trend has shifted from using the term Gypsy to using the term Roma. After the Romani mobilization gained strength in the 1990s, "Roma" was used more by scholars (Gheorghe, 1991; Vermeersch, 2006).

Scholars define the terms Gypsy and Roma according to their divergent usages and connotations. The term Gypsy (Tsigani, Czigany, Cziganye, Atinganoi, and Gitanos) was an external appellation, used to capture a wide variety of individuals and communities. These exonyms, or attributions from outsiders, facilitate discrimination. Unlike Gypsy, Roma is an ethnocultural self-appellation that means "people" in the Romani language, Romanes, and implies an idea of "us." Since the term Roma gained ascendance in political discourse in Europe after the early 1990s, it obtained the stature of political correctness (Gheorghe, 1991; Petrova, 2003). Due to linguistic studies on the Romani language and the word "Roma," as well as the pejorative connotation of Gypsy, the usage of Roma has become standard (Gheorghe, 1991; McGarry, 2014; van Baar, 2014).

Within the discussion surrounding the usage of Roma versus Gypsy in academic literature, another debate has emerged on the question of whether it is possible to perceive Roma as one heterogeneous group. Recently, scholars have used the term Roma as an umbrella term in international literature. Meanwhile, instead of the "Roma or Gypsy" debate, several scholars have turned to the related ontological question, "Who is Roma?" as the focus of their research (Tremlett, 2014). Moreover, McGarry states that stereotypical definitions like Tsigani, Gypsy, or Çingene contradict Roma communities' heterogeneous forms comprising multiple languages and religions, dispersed settlements, and differentiated organization practices and political experiences. Roma are also distinguished by their socio-economic status and cultural practices (McGarry, 2011). In short, most scholars seek to avoid essentialism while using "Roma" to refer to a unity capturing a wide diversity of individuals.

Furthermore, Annabel Tremlett examines two camps of responses to the question "Who is Roma?" which constitute still-valid paradigms on the definition of Romani communities (Tremlett, 2014). The ethnicity-oriented approach focuses on Roma's

Indian origin,[2] their migration routes, and dialects of the Romani language to define the group as a single unity (Bhopal and Myers, 2008: 4; Mayall, 2004: 6; Willems, 1997: 56–61; Matras, 2002 as cited in Tremlett, 2014, p. 836). On the other hand, the "cultural" or "socio-historical" approach accepts the idea of a distinct ethnic identity but takes into consideration its historical formations and influence on current usage rather than positing fixed notions of ethnicity (Okely, 1983; Stewart, 1997; Gay y Blasco, 1999 as cited in Tremlett, 2014). Meanwhile, some scholars emphasize poverty as a common aspect of Roma people's lives rather than romanticizing cultural differences (Ladanyi and Szelenyi, 2003, as cited in Tremlett, 2014). Tremlett argues that these two camps have similar ideological positionings towards Roma as a group. In his studies of the political representation of Roma, Aidan McGarry argues that instead of asking who is an authentic or "real" Roma/Gypsy/Traveller, Roma should be conceptualized as a political identity. This conceptualization allows scholars to examine the meaning of diverse representations of Roma and emphasize the fluidity of belonging for individuals. He also underlines that in order to understand how the subjectivity and relationality of being Roma emerges through socio-cultural exchange processes, scholars must avoid representing Roma as a coherent bloc. Roma are not a solid unit that thinks, acts, and feels the same as the "majority" (McGarry, 2011, p.758). Finally, in his study focusing on minority politics and ethnic mobilization in the Romani Movement, Peter Vermeersch also mentions Gypsies within the historical context. However, he conceptualizes Roma as a political identity centered around ethnicity and shaped through a complex process of labeling and (self-)categorization (Vermeersch, 2006, p. 3).

In Turkey, a similar debate emerged on the use of the terms Roma versus Gypsy. Some scholars and community leaders argue that even though the term Gypsy has an external and pejorative connotation, it engages with the local historical context more than the term Roma does. According to these scholars and leaders, the community

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[2] Besides the Roma/Gypsy dichotomy, another core debate in Romani Studies concerns the Roma's Indian origins (Grellmann, 1787; Hancock, 2000; Marsh, 2008 as cited in McGarry, 2011) and reasons for leaving India, including at what time and under which conditions (Acton and Ryder, 2012; Okely, 1983; Matras, 2002). Due to the lack of documentation of Roma's westward migration, myths about Roma have long been treated as facts, a problem which has also plagued the academic sources (Marušiakova & Popov, 2012; Matras, 2010).

prefers the term Roma to escape discriminative connotations; however, the pejorative meanings do not relate to the word, but rather to the community itself (Aksu, 2010; Mezarcıoğlu, 2010). Even if the term Roma is used, these connotations will be reproduced in conjunction with this term. By contrast, they stress the term Gypsy as an umbrella concept that includes Roma Gypsies, Dom Gypsies, and Lom Gypsies. According to migration paths, it is assumed that three different tribes emerged, namely Lom, Dom, and Rom tribal groups. Specifically, Ali Mezarcıoğlu defines the Gypsy community as nomad craftsmen due to their occupations in craftsmanship throughout history (Mezarcıoğlu, 2010). After the decision at the first Gypsy Congress in 1971 to designate Gypsy communities as Roma, resulting in the rise of Roma as a political subject, both scholars and the community itself began to prefer the term Roma rather than Gypsy (Özateşler, 2013). Recent studies employ Roma as an umbrella term involving Dom, Lom, and Abdal groups (Çağlayan, 2021; Sert and Turhan, 2019). Other studies, primarily in folklore, indicate the communities according to specific Dom, Lom, Roma, or Abdal groups (Yılgür, 2017). In short, whether Gypsy or Roma, there is a continuous and contested use of these terms. Therefore, each case should be evaluated within itself.

Since my interviewees and interlocutors chose to refer to themselves as Roma, I utilize the following terminology: Rom (singular), Roma (plural), and Romani (adjective). Firstly, within the organization, political identity was built through the term Roma. Secondly, most of my interviewees define themselves and the organization practice as Roma, although they do not oppose the term Gypsy unless bearing discriminative meanings. They conceptualize their identity through ties to the Romani language even though few Roma are able to or choose to speak it. Thirdly, the term Roma dominates the recent Romani literature which I engage in this thesis. Like McGarry (2011) and Vermeersch (2006), I approach Roma as a political identity comprising heterogeneous forms, dispersed settlement patterns, and divergent socio-political experiences regarding religion, culture, and political action. In other words, different Romani communities exhibit different organizational practices based on their distinctive ways of interaction with national and transnational authorities.

2.2. Theoretical Framework& Concepts

2.2.1. Hybridization of Social Movements and Civil Society

Romani organizational practice has mostly been studied through the social movement and civil society literatures. These two literatures have paid little attention to each other, each seeing the other as an entirely different phenomenon. Therefore, few studies consider the overlapping concepts and areas of inquiry between social movements and civil society (see Cohen and Arato, 1992; Edwards, 2004; Snow et al., 2004; Alexander, 2006; della Porta and Diani, 1999; and della Porta 2020). Recently, scholars have discussed hybrid forms of organizations in collective action with reference to the SMOization of civil society and NGOization of social movements (della Porta & Diani, 1999; Fowler, 2011; della Porta, 2020). These studies examine the hybridization of social movements and civil society; however, they pay little attention to hybridization's relationship with cycles/waves of protest. This thesis argues that Romani organizations in Turkey should be understood as situated in a field of tension between these two broadly defined organizational forms. Within this field, consecutive protest waves have given rise to hybrid forms of organization based on varying understandings of leadership. Therefore, this thesis focuses on how hybrid organizational forms emerge along a continuum between SMOs and NGOs in relation to cycles/waves of protest, and how such hybrid forms affect organizational practices in Romani communities.

First, I will introduce the theories of the transformation of social movements and define social movement organizations. I will also outline my conceptualization of civil society, distinguishing civil society organizations by their position within the "third sector." Secondly, I will mention the possible overlaps between literatures on social movements and civil society by reference to della Porta's "hybridization of activism and voluntarism" debate. Third, I will link the hybridization debate with the cycles/waves of protest debate, arguing that Romani organizations in Turkey show characteristics of both SMOs and NGOs depending on the protest waves of organizing. Lastly, I will give different conceptualizations of leadership which influence organizational dynamics such as decision-making, strategies and repertoires, and participation within organizations.

Social movements exhibit complex and various formations which scholars have attempted to understand. Definitions of social movements have also changed over time. Buechler argues that the social movement's origins can be considered a qualitative transformation of collective action at a certain point in history, namely that of societal modernization in Europe. This modernization process including the transition from feudalism to capitalism, strengthening of the modern nation-state, urbanization, and globalization gave rise to the social movement as a modern form of collective action that differs from earlier forms through the participants' perception of social order as disputed and flexible rather than natural and accustomed (Buechler, 2000, p. 5).

The various social scientific conceptualizations of social movements emerged as a result of shifts in understandings of the concept of collective action during the late 1960s and 1970s (McAdam et al. 1996; Buechler, 2000; van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2008). Before the 1960s, social movements were perceived mainly negatively as sites of spontaneous, unpredictable, unconventional, and irrational behavior. In the late 1960s, a growth in social movements occurred encompassing a wide range of actors addressing various issues, such as civil rights movements, women's movements, environmental movements, and student movements. After the emergence of various social movements in the 1960s, the topic of social movements became popular in the social sciences in the US and Europe. Moreover, the conceptualization of collective action shifted from "irrational" outbursts to collective action with tangible goals, shared values and interests, and rational strategies.

Early discussions of resource mobilization developed on the concept of collective action argued that social movements need resources to begin and develop themselves. One camp of resource mobilization theories considers social movements as patterned and semi-institutionalized formations capable of managing resources such as formal or informal organizations, money, and people (McCarthy and Zald, 1977), while another camp emphasizes the political aspect of collective action as power struggles over conflicting interests (Tilly, 1978; Tarrow, 1989; McAdam, 1982). While the first camp underlines the economic relationship, the second camp focuses on power struggles. Tilly (1978), for example, explains collective action within two models. The "polity model" defines collective action through the relation

between polity members, who have easy access to power holders, and challengers, who are obliged to engage in collective action in order to have an impact on the political process. This model also indicates alliances between polity members and challengers. Meanwhile, the "mobilization model" divides collective action into four elements: group interest, which fluctuates through interaction with other groups; organization, which facilitates interaction among persons of similar status; control over resources; and the opportunities (or lack thereof) shaped by the exercise of power—facilitation versus repression or threat (Tilly, 1978). He uses the core assumptions of resource mobilization theory, combining them with an attention to power struggles (instrumental, strategic, tactical) among competing groups. Moreover, McAdam critiques the first camp's overemphasis on the role of elites, understatement of the masses' significance, and neglect of the nature of grievances, arguing for an alternative resource mobilization theory (McAdam, 1982). Social movement practices are defined as contentious because they challenge the law and put pressure on power holders through their disruptiveness, which helps attract public attention. Studies of social movements have concentrated on protest, its forms and changes across time, and distinct repertoires of collective action as a toolkit for voicing collective claims. Recently, the distinction between contentious and non-contentious politics has contributed to the sustained focus on social movements by stressing fundamental conflicts (McAdam et al. 2001).

While the US-based social movement literature has developed around the contentious politics debate, European-based new social movement theories (NSMs) bring back cultural processes into the discussion of social movements in Europe. The main argument of NSM theories hinges on the changes characteristic of social movements after the 1960s. Due to these changes, a need arose for a different paradigm for analyzing social movements. Beginning in the late 1970s, the globalization process contributed to an economic and political transformation from national welfare state to post-national workforce (Jessop, 2003). Strengthened by neoliberal policies and the development of new IT technologies and sectors, the new capitalist production system blurred national boundaries and created opportunities for the private sector to penetrate social policies and economic activities. As a result, the individualist view became dominant in the economy and politics, in turn effecting significant changes in social movements. As the social realm also absorbed

the individualistic ideology, actor-focused politics brought actor-focused interventions in the private realm.

Unlikely previous mezzo and macro level theories of social movements, Mario Diani places interaction at the center of his arguments. He defines social movements as "distinct social process, consisting of the mechanisms through which actors engaged in collective action are involved in conflictual relations with clearly identified opponents; are linked by dense informal networks; [and] share a distinct collective identity" (Diani, 1992a; 2003a; 2004a; Diani and Bison 2004 as cited in della Porta & Diani, 1999, p. 20). As a result, social movements extend beyond the confines of any single organization to embrace far larger groups of people and collectivities. The strategic decisions made by movements and the social and political ramifications of collective action are determined by the resources available; for example, networks can provide solidarity linkages to compensate for a lack of material resources. The difference between social movements and other organizations such as political parties and interest groups consists primarily not of differences in organizational characteristics or patterns of behavior, but of the fact that social movements are not organizations—not even of a peculiar kind (Oliver 1989; Tilly 1993). They are networks which may either include formal organizations or not, depending on shifting circumstances. The earliest distinction between social movement and social movement organization was made by Mayer Zald and Roberta Ash in the 1960s. According to Zald and Ash (1966), social movement organizations are the components of social movements. Social movement organizations have goals, adapt to changing environments, and focus on maintaining membership and organizational existence. Moreover, in early discussions, Zald and McCarthy (1979) define the social movement organizations as "complex, or formal, organization which identifies its goals with the preferences of a social movement or a countermovement and attempts to implement those goals" (p. 1218). Gamson (1975) defines the term organization as applying to those social formations which have written documents explaining the organizational structure and different degrees of membership.

After the 1980s, the rethinking of social movements through New Social Movements (NSMs) theories also changed the conceptualization of social movement organizations through New Social Movements (NSMs). The NSM approach

criticizes previous approaches to social movement organization analysis for their rigid definition of SMOs. These previous approaches emphasize the inevitability of bureaucratization by oversimplifying the complexity of organizational phenomena; however, they do not reflect the empirical reality (Melucci, 1996a). With the advent of NSM theories, the definition of social movement organizations shifted from movement organizations to movement networks to include decentralized, informal, and transgressive organizational forms. Social movement organizations are frequently described as loosely organized, decentralized, and inclined to engagement in contentious political issues or countercultural practices. However, research has demonstrated that inside any social movement, a variety of organizational structures coexist (della Porta and Diani, 1999; Cross and Snow, 2012; van Stekelenburg et. al., 2013). Especially within recent social movements like the Global Justice Movements including the Arab Spring, Indignados, and Occupy Movements, the loose and heterogeneous networks of SMOs are offered as a suitable remedy to the shortcomings of formal organizational forms. Therefore, in this study, SMOs are defined as loose networks and SMOization refers to a process by which organizational forms become more informal, decentralized, and transgressive. In short, SMOs are distinguished from NGOs by their conflictual relationship with powerholders and network structure rather than concrete structure.

Meanwhile, civil society is also a complex and controversial term—often poorly connected to and articulated with the others—because of its many diverse definitions and interpretations. Michael Edwards (2004) both explains and critiques three approaches to civil society. Due to its inclusiveness, his starting point Michael Walzer's definition (1998, p.123–24), of civil society as "the sphere of un-coerced human association between the individual and the state, in which people undertake collective action for normative and substantive purposes, relatively independent of government and the market" (p. 4). This definition foregrounds the autonomy of civil society from the state and the market, and is the most widespread interpretation of this concept. For example, Mary Kaldor (2003) points out the prominent emphases on personal autonomy, self-organization, and private space characteristic of civil society (p. 2). As an autonomous realm, civil society is mostly associated with voluntary organizations collectively called "third sector" or "nonprofit." The

emergence of the third sector led to the proliferation of nongovernmental organizations.

Firstly, Edwards argues for a shift from a narrow focus on the number of organizations to "a systems approach of associational existence that examines the various components of civil society and how they interact with each other as well as with public and private institutions" (p. 32). Like Edwards, Ehrenberg (2011) also emphasizes the inadequacy of understanding civil society only as an additional voluntary association space separate from the state and the market, arguing that such an understanding cannot distinguish between associational forms. In this view, emphasis on the requirement of a strong civil society for democracy is inadequate due to civil society's limited effect on securing equality or promoting democracy in the face of historic inequality and massive concentrations of private power. For these scholars, this is the case even though, local activities, voluntary organizations, and "good society" are significant aspects in democracy. Instead, Ehrenberg highlights the importance of sustainable democratic political action for promoting democracy and equality. Moreover, Jeffrey Alexander (2006) argues that the relationship with "non-civil" spheres such as the state, market, and family defines the boundaries of civil society which are continuously negotiated; therefore, the latter has to fight for its autonomy.

Secondly, referencing the limits of Neo-Tocquevillian understanding, Edwards emphasizes that voluntary action cannot define the "good society" by itself (Kaufman, 1999)—contrary to the interpretation of civil society as a form of society based on positive norms, trust, and collaboration values. The notions comprising "good society" are those connoted by the norm of civility, such as promoting joint trust and shared values, cooperative and associational links, and solidarity. Instead, Edwards argues that a combination of actors create society—the state, market, and families, as well as voluntary organizations. Social problems requiring compromise are usually brought up by collective pressure in civil society, which aims to make these issues more acceptable to a greater percentage of the public. Putnam (1993) also draws attention to the role of compromise in sustaining social cohesion in civil society.

Thirdly, Edwards states that the role of civil society in social change can be seen in the "public sphere." In public sphere theories, civil society is considered as a deliberation space which fosters the formation of political agreements and achieves an equilibrium between diversity and the common good. Edwards criticizes the Neo-Tocquevillan neglect of the public sphere and donor agencies' reduction of it to capacity building practices of NGOs or maintenance of independent media institutions. Such considerations of the civil society sphere as only comprising associational life have been bolstered through the rise of global civil society, conceptualized as a formation consisting of professionalized and institutionalized organizations focused on specific issues (Kaldor, 2003).

Although the term has been debated since the mid-1700s, the civil society concept has experienced a significant revival since the 1980s. Considering such dynamics as globalization, the fall of the Soviet Union, and decreasing civic engagement in democratic governance, scholars participating in this revival have started to focus on democracy, accountability, and participation in the public sphere. Scholars generally agree that the term "civil society" refers to the area of voluntary involvement in a public sphere that is discrete from the government.[3] In the light of this global increase in transnational collaboration and focus on voluntary organizations, the definition of civil society in terms of autonomy, the norm of civility, and organizational form is critical to understanding the hybridization process between social movements and civil society.

Thus, Edwards criticizes the conceptualization of civil society as only comprising a third sector and associational life. He defines civil society organizations, broadly as follows:

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[3] Marxism's claimed lack of boundaries, inclination to politicize everything, skepticism of popular democracy, and urge to direct, restrict, or absorb all spontaneous civil society activities grew into a fundamental theoretical antagonism to the state. The civil society debate was revived as a central component of intellectual and political debate throughout the 1990s. This revival included the revisiting of Tocqueville's understanding of voluntary association. A "strong civil society" was considered the foundation of democracy, "good governance," pluralism, and the achievement of important social and economic goals (Edwards, 2009). Civil society benefited from broader political and intellectual tendencies that pursued alternatives to the dulling effects of state centralization—the predominant pattern in the 1960s and 1970s—and the human outcomes of overdependence on the market—the defining topic of the following twenty years (Edwards, 2011).

Civil society organizations cover a huge range of entities of different types, sizes, purposes, and levels of formality, including community or grassroots associations, social movements, labour unions, professional groups, advocacy and developmental NGOs, formally registered nonprofits, social enterprises, and many others (Edwards, 2011, p.7).

Like the distinction between social movement and social movement organization, NGOs are a crucial part of the civil society ecosystem, but civil society and NGOs are not identical concepts. Neoliberal policies and related social and bureaucratic changes have highlighted these forms of association by combining the management methods of the market and the social responsibilities of the state (Kaldor, 2003).

The acceleration of the nonprofit sector is a common trend around the world, although different countries have approached the issue differently[4]. Within the third/nonprofit sector, the notion of volunteerism acquired precedence in 2009-2010, especially in the US and UK. In addition to neoliberal policies, global social and demographic trends such as increasing demand for healthcare services for elders and the need for employment opportunities for people with disabilities and disadvantaged groups also affected the third/nonprofit sector. Hence, Smith (2011) argues that the limited perception of the nonprofit sector as a service provider is due to neoliberal policies, the transformation of bureaucracy by new public management, and global socio-demographic trends.

In addition, various appellations for civil society organizations emerged as a replacement for the negative connotations of "non-governmental"[5](Fowler, 2011, p. 43). I use the term civil society organizations (CSOs) due to its inclusiveness; however, the term non-governmental organizations (NGOs)[6] is more common and makes reference to the nonprofit sector. Also, the term NGOization implies both the

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[4] Discussion of the third sector or nonprofit sector occurred in the United States around the concept of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), while in the United Kingdom they arose around the term "big society" through public-private partnerships with community and nonprofit involvement. These discussions focused on civil society's role in the pursuit of democratic legitimacy and integration (Smith, 2011).

[5] These include "private voluntary organizations (PVOs) in the United States, voluntary development organizations (VDOs) in India, nonprofit organizations (NPOs), third sector organizations, (TSOs) and, more recently, civil society organizations (CSOs) worldwide" (Fowler, 2011).

[6] The definition of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) originates from the United Nations' formal label for international entities after WWII and their focus on social and economic issues. NGOs gained the further label "developmental" with the emergence of foreign aid regimes (Fowler, 2011).

proliferation of NGOs and the domination of this form of organization in politics and bureaucracy.

Allowing for the uniqueness of individual NGOs, Fowler states that NGOs:

> are separate in legitimacy and governance from governmental bodies; acclaim and utilize the tenets of international aid as a substantive basis for their existence; gain direct or tax-based public support, in part because they are not established to generate wealth for their "owners"; operate at any or all levels of socio-political organization from the individual, family, household, and local levels to transnational and global concerns, presence, and relationships; are not partisan in the politics of their endeavors (p. 44-45).

Recently, there is a new conceptualization of civil society as a space for public deliberation, rather than at third sector consisting of voluntary organizations or norms of "good society" (Jordan, 2011). Therefore, civil society organizations or non-governmental organizations can be broadly defined as professional/institutional forms which focus not only on voluntarism but also advocate for specific issues in a field distinct from but interactive with the state and the market. Also, NGOization can be defined as a process whereby organizational forms show a tendency towards formal, voluntary-based moderate action and depoliticization.

Given the variety of definitions of social movements and civil society, the problem arises of how to conceptualize interaction between the two fields. Several scholars argue for this possibility of interaction in their works (Cohen and Arato, 1992; Eschle and Stammers, 2004; Alexander, 2006; Edwards, 2011; Fowler, 2011; della Porta, 2020). One of the most prominent of them, Donatella della Porta (2020) argues that potential interaction between the two fields is possible through certain overlapping concepts. Some recent trends show that the distinction between social movements and civil society approached as third sector or volunteerism becomes blurred by the NGOization of social movements—the subject of more established analyses— and by the SMOization of civil society, which della Porta describes as "the hybridization of established civil society organizations into social movement organizations especially when facing politicization in times of crises and increasing criminalization of solidarity activities" (p. 939).

Parallel with Edwards' definition of civil society and Diani's definition of social movements, della Porta discusses the hybridization of NGOs and SMOs by

highlighting some main tensions—the importance of autonomy of civil society, versus the fundamental role of conflict in social movements; the concept of civility in civil society, versus the transgressive nature of protest in social movements; and the role of structured organizational forms within the third sector, versus loose networks of networks in social movements. On the other hand, she points to similarities between these two fields: interest in the processes that encourage or dissuade persons from participating in collective action (Marwell and Oliver, 1993; Van Deth et al. 1999; Wilson, 2000; Diani and McAdam, 2003 as cited in della Porta, 2020); interest in how organizational forms integrate the search for efficacy with the desire for decentralized, participatory structures (Kriesi, 1996; Jordan and Maloney, 1997; Anheier and Themudo, 2002 as cited in della Porta, 2020); and consideration of political and social changes for the achievement of public goods. Recently, these opposing tensions have given way to a blurring of boundaries between social movements and civil society: while social movements have shown tendencies toward NGOization, civil society has shown tendencies toward SMOization.

Through new social movement theories, the previous focus on power struggles shifted to account for the autonomy of individuals in their relationship with political and institutional spheres. Examples include Habermas' (1971) emphasis on fighting against colonization of lifeworlds, and Melucci's (1996) emphasis on reclaiming identity by opposing penetration of the state and the market in everyday life. In certain instances, civil society's autonomy has been expressed openly in opposition to a repressive governmental system (e.g., in Central Eastern Europe). This demonstrates that civil society is often obliged to fight for its autonomy (Alexander, 2006). Secondly, consideration of deliberative forms of democracy that prioritize consensus and discursive characteristics has led to discussion of civility within social movements. della Porta gives social forums in the Global Justice Movements as an example of discussion arenas whose aim is to create consensus (della Porta, 2020). On the other hand, civil society tends to show contentious activity by forming advocacy initiatives for different issues, thus going beyond the provision of services. Thirdly, both civil society and social movement organizations are composed of organizational structures and networks. While social movements are considered as comprising set of organizations with similar aims as strategic actors (McCarthy and

Zald, 1977), civil society studies have focused on collaboration supported by networks of compatible people concerned with a specific issue or a wider cause. Specifically, such global civil society studies have investigated the cooperation between national and transnational nongovernmental organizations in advocacy efforts on matters such as human rights or ecology (Keck and Sikkink, 1998, as cited in della Porta, 2020).

In the hybridized terrain outlined by della Porta, activism and volunteerism encounter each other and exchange some characteristics with each other. Firstly, in some new social movements, negotiation, litigation, and lobbying as more tamed strategies of collective action have replaced the transgressive protests of pre-1989 social movements (Cohen and Arato, 1992; Kaldor, 2003). Hilson argues that a lack of political opportunity structure led to the use of legal opportunities like litigation and lobbying in the women's rights movement, environmental movement, animal welfare movement, and lesbian and gay movements between the 1980s-1990s (Hilson, 2002). However, transgressive protest came back in recent social movements such as the Occupy Movements. Meanwhile, civil society organizations have adopted more disruptive actions since state austerity politics and anti-democratic practices have increased the pressure on civil society. Volunteerism has been entwined with activism, with attempts to sway public opinion through destructive forms of protest. The expanded freedoms associated with the international dissemination of formal democracies, the spread of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) supporting a range of new social movements, and the cyber-coordinated transnational global justice movement have all contributed to the present round of global contention (Almeida, 2008). Secondly, since the 1980s, SMOs have become well-established at the national and international level. They have amassed significant financial resources, attracted increased public awareness and participation, and established paid staff and formal organizational structures such as Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace, and the World Wildlife Fund in the environmental movement (Heijden, 1997). On the other hand, NGOs have formed alliances with grassroots social movement organizations, recently in global justice movements (della Porta, 2020 For example, environmental civil society organizations in Georgia and Ukraine have established network based-cooperation relations in response to a reduction in financial assets and institutional channels of access to public authorities

(Buzogány, 2022). Moreover, after the political changes in Central and Eastern Europe brought about by the post-1989 post-communist transition, Romani organization in Europe has become active within civil society through proliferation of Romani associations, NGOs, and international organizations that focus on "Roma issues" like discrimination against Roma. Most of the tools for accomplishing the organization's objectives have come from the civil society framework, based on collaboration with public institutions. Therefore, a specific sphere has emerged due to the overspecialization on "Roma issues" through informal and formal organizations, international cooperation, networks, and platforms (Kóczé & Rövid, 2012; Rostas & Rövid, 2015). Romani organizations adopted moderate action repertoires within networks consisting of informal and formal organizations. Lastly, from the 1980s to the 2000s, SMOs and social movements actors tended towards depoliticization in order to preserve public support and public and private resources. Jacobsson, and Saxonberg (2013) present examples of such depoliticization strategies in their edited book analyzing various social movements in Eastern European countries beyond the framework of NGOization. The NGOization of social movements continued until the 2000s, when transgressive networks arose again with Global Justice Movements. Meanwhile, some NGOs politicized their discourses in reaction to the crisis and repression as the resources and opportunities provided by public institutions through lobbying and welfare service provision decreased. Especially, the migration issue became the most politicized issue regarding civil society organization in Europe, due to the perception that migration was shrinking the space of civil society (della Porta and Steinhilper, 2021). Recently, many Romani organizations have adopted network formations which embed a plurality of identities, while many also cooperate with and become part of new social movements such as anti-racist, feminist (Jovanović et.al., 2015), and LGBTI+ movements (Fremlova, 2022).

I argue that Romani organizations in Turkey tend to show as hybrid forms between SMOs and NGOs. They adopt various characteristics from both SMOs and NGOs in relation to the cycles/waves of protest. Therefore, understanding the protest cycles/waves of Romani organization in Turkey will also help to analyze these hybrid forms of organization.

2.2.2. The Concept of Protest Cycles/Waves

Political opportunity structure is an initiator of mobilization in the Romani movement in Turkey. Each cycle or wave is initiated by an opportunity within the political and institutional environment. In social movement studies, Tarrow's conceptualization of cycles of contention is the main starting point for studying protest cycles or waves. In this study, I use the concept of protest cycles/waves to analyze the hybridization dynamics of Romani organization in Turkey. I argue that in the light of globalization and increasing transnational networks in civil society, as well as the dissemination of new social movements research in social movements studies, we can see different hybrid versions of Romani organizations corresponding to these cycles/waves. Leading theoretician Sidney Tarrow (1994, 2011; also see Koopmans, 2007) defines protest cycles/waves as,

> a phase of heightened conflict and contention across the social system that includes: a rapid diffusion of collective action from more mobilized to less mobilized sectors; a quickened pace of innovation in the forms of contention; new or transformed collective action frames; a combination of organized and unorganized participation; and sequences of intensified inter-actions between challengers and authorities which can end in reform, repression and sometimes revolution (1994, p. 153).

Like Tarrow, Paul Almeida (2003) also defines protest waves as "periods of widespread protest activity across multiple collectivities that often encompass a sizable portion of the national territory." He focuses on the emergence of several collective actors clustered together in time and space, rather than a single social movement. In his macro-level analysis of political movements in El Salvador, he examines protest waves through three contention-producing environments: liberalization, intimidation, and globalization.

To understand these cycles/waves, scholars define several mechanisms and processes (Tarrow, 2011; Staggenborg, 2013; della Porta and Diani, 2011). While Tarrow analyzes cycles/waves of contention through the case of the French Revolution, he also predicts their appearance in his depiction of new actors and mobilization repertoires participating in a new "social movement society" in the third edition of his book *Power in Movements* (Tarrow, 2011). Recent studies on protest cycles/waves focus on the major transnational social movements that emerged in the beginning of the 2000s such as anti-authoritarian campaigns in the Arab Spring,

occupy movements, anti-austerity movements in Spain and Greece, anti-corruption demonstrations in Brazil, and protests in Mexico against the drug war's cruelty and impunity (Romanos and Sádaba, 2022[7]; Chang and Lee, 2021; Nunes, 2019; Funke, 2015; Montagna, 2010).

Moreover, during the mobilization phase, seizure of political opportunities creates a space for increasing collective action around claims at both national and transnational levels. The impact of collective action and demonstration by a group of "early risers" promotes a range of diffusion, expansion, emulation, and reaction processes among groups that are less active and have fewer resources to engage in collective action. Thus, collective action diffuses amongst a wider range of social groups. Finally, during times of increased contention, information spreads faster, political attention is focused, and encounters between challenger groups and authorities become more frequent and intense. However, protest cycles/waves must inevitably end due to social, cognitive, and emotional factors. Authorities become repressive and learn how to better mobilize against new actors. They frequently use a combination of co-optation and exclusion to divide the movement (della Porta et al., 1999).[8] In her study of Romani organization in Italy, Gaja Maestri (2019) argues that Pro-Roma[9] third sector organizations which provide social assistance to Roma since the 1990s were co-opted through state policies on public partnership and the involvement of Roma leaders. In turn, this has led to a separation and lack of

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[7] As critics of analyzing widespread protest activities as a whole, Chang and Lee use protest event analysis to understand cycles/waves of South Korea's democracy movement by accepting each protest event as nodes within a protest network, while Romanos and Sádaba use the same methodology for analyzing cycles/waves of protest in Spain.

[8] For example, the Indignados movement, known as 15 M, which emerged in Spain in the second half of the 21st century, is a movement in which many people who had no previous protest experience started to participate in social movements and exercise novel collective action repertoires such as mass demonstrations and protest camps. This movement, which can be evaluated within the umbrella concept of the Global Justice Movement (Funke, 2015), emerged against the rise of anti-democratic governance and austerity politics. For many participants, the starting point of the movement was the Iraq war between 2002-2004 and the protests against the right-wing Partido Popular (PP) government. Mobilization, which started on the transnational level shifted to national and local levels with the 2008 economic and social crisis. As diffusion of mobilization increased, the government employed often repressive counter-tactics to break the contentious politics of protestors (Romanos and Sádaba, 2022).

[9] Pro-Roma civil society means a space for non-governmental, and inter-governmental organizations, foundations, and activists specializing in "Romani issues" within global civil society (Kocze and Rövid, 2012, p.1).

collaboration between third sector actors working as service providers and advocacy groups that campaign against the segregation in camps (Maestri, 2019).

After the peak of contention, exhaustion begins to increase because of a lack of innovative collective action to sustain the cycles/waves of contention. A loosely linked coalition emerges from the multitude of actors that form against and around the state. These alliances may polarize society when they are supported by effective organizations and large master frameworks. Together, these developments contribute to demobilization dynamics. Not all aspects of a movement's participation decline equally. Tarrow states that, after exhaustion and the unequal decline of participation, a "leadership dilemma" emerges about whether to establish strategies and repertoire which are more radicalized or ones which are more institutionalized. Knowing that their power comes in numbers, movement actors may respond to the reduction in participation by adopting more moderate objectives and seeking to negotiate with opponents, producing "a movement away from extreme ideologies and/or the adoption of more conventional and less disruptive forms of contention" (2011, p. 207). This trend, in turn, leads to institutionalization. Conversely, to maintain the support of extremist groups, they may seek to continue to increase contention by making extreme statements and deepening conflict, thereby becoming radicalized. While rivalry, repression, and dissatisfaction drive some activists to extreme kinds of action, others seek compromises with elites for electoral benefit, taming their aims in the process. In any instance, this disparity in support leads to a division between those who are prepared to work with authorities and those who want to fight on. Correspondingly, Ruud Koopmans argues that after the cycles/waves of contention ends, the restabilization process starts which means that the relationship between actors becomes more stabilized (2004, p. 37). Repression and facilitation are the mechanisms for establishing restabilization after responding to the government's attitudes towards protests and demands. With the rise of the anti-globalization movement, a shift occurred to a more repressive approach from the previous tendency toward facilitation as more flexible and tolerant stance alongside the institutionalization of social movements from the 1970s (Romanos and Sádaba,

2022; della Porta et. al., 2006).[10] Angéla Kóczé and Márton Rövid (2012) divide Romani organization in Europe into three phases:[11]: self-determination (the 1970s–1980s), human rights violation (1990s–early 2000s), and social and economic inclusion (from the late 2000s). During the second phase, the mobilization began to be institutionalized through cooperation with transnational organizations in global civil society, such as the Open Society Institute. The US-based Project on Ethnic Relations played a significant role in the emergence of pro-Roma global civil society. Different actors in the pro-Roma microcosm form a transnational advocacy network aimed at influencing government policies *vis-à-vis* Roma. For Eastern European EU candidates, pro-Roma global civil society facilitated the process of EU pre-accession (Kóczé and Rövid, 2012). Moreover, in the last phase characterized by social and economic inclusion, pro-Roma global civil society was commercialized, and organizations become social providers. Similarly to Kóczé and Rövid, Nidhi Trehan (2009) evaluates the development of the Romani movement around human rights discourse as a primarily NGO-driven phenomenon. According to her, social movements are institutionalized through the "professionalization" of NGOs —a consequence of the hegemony of the prevailing neoliberal ideology. Moreover, the main critique of pro-Roma global civil society is that the major international actors (such as the ERRC and OSI) are often labelled "white" or "gajo" (meaning non-

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[10] According to Chang and Lee's (2021) study of the Democracy Movement in South Korea, state repression reduced the total number of protests while motivating new dissidents who were disproportionately eager to link their protests to previous mobilization efforts. Also, the state response to global justice protests in Spain has been a similar rise in the level of repression (Romanos and Sádaba, 2022; Nunes, 2019).

[11] In the European context, several studies point to the downfall of communism as the major catalyst for the development of the Romani movement (Marushiakova and Popov, 2020; van Baar, 2014; Vermeersch, 2006). The first Romani organizations began to emerge in Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Romania, and Greece in the 1920s and 1930s. These groups issued their own publications, provided mutual aid in times of sickness and death, and encouraged Gypsy youth education (Marushiakova and Popov 2004, Klimova 2002; Samer, 2001). However, the First World Roma Congress, held in London in 1971 is widely regarded as signaling the emergence of the worldwide Romani movement. The International Roma Union was founded during this congress, which acknowledged national elements such as the use of the common term Roma for all Gypsies worldwide, the Roma flag, and the Roma anthem (Marishukiova and Popov, 2004). In other words, the institutionalization of the movement started with the First Congress. Until the 1990s and 2000s, Romani mobilization struggled with the legal opportunity structure and policies in Central Europe and a nation-state debate based on the Romani communities in Europe. However, this nation-state claim was in a secondary position and since 1990, a new vision of stateless nationhood combined with human rights discourse has become generally accepted. In this view, rather than the establishment of a nation-state, the major issue is human rights violations and discrimination against Roma (Marishukiova and Popov, 2017).

Roma) due to their hegemonic discourse[12] on human rights and rootedness in EU fund-based organizations rather than volunteerism or membership-based organizations. Another critique points to the creation of brain-drain by international NGOs and the weakening of grassroots initiatives as a result (Kóczé and Rövid, 2012; Trehan, 2009; Maestri, 2019). Furthermore, since these international NGOs negotiate only with the state, they limit Roma civic action repertoires to collaboration with public institutions within civil society (Rostas, 2009).

Governments may not give the same response to different movements. In Turkey, for example, the state tried to repress the Kurdish movement and made the movement more radicalized until the Democratic Initiative period (Yanarocak, 2021), while it chose to make reforms as a response to the Romani movement. Although these two movements may seem similar as ethnic movements, the ethnic nationalist claims of the Kurdish movement (Şimşek, 2004) during the earlier waves of protest differentiate the Kurdish situation from that of the Roma. Meanwhile, reform rarely takes the form requested by challengers. This is due not just to the fact that protestors often make extreme claims, but also to the fact that claims are raised in rivalry with competing and complementary claims and evaluated by a combination of state and non-state actors. Moreover, one of the aspects in Kriesi's typology of social movements organizations is commercialization, meaning the transformation of a movement organization into a service organization or profit-making enterprise as an alternative to radicalization and institutionalization within party politics (Tarrow, 2011, p.213). Paralleling the hybridization of social movements and civil society organizations debate, commercialization accompanies the government's facilitative attitude towards Romani organization in Turkey which also leads to an acceleration of the demobilization phase. However, institutionalization should be considered as a process that permits social movements to survive and remobilize when socioeconomic and political circumstances provide the motivation for new campaigns, rather than as the final stage in their life cycle (Staggenborg, 2013). In Romani organization in Turkey, we can see episodes of protest waves from institutionalization to radicalization which while not as extreme as those of global

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[12] "White" NGO hegemony is not the only cause of the Roma initiatives' weakness. Other causes include "internal" organizational weakness, historical marginalization, and the fragmented and stigmatized nature of Roma identity (Rostas and Rövid, 2015).

justice movements, still demonstrate a radical tendency when considering Romani communities' typical conformity to hegemonic norms as a survival strategy.

Moreover, leadership plays a vital role not only in deciding wheteher movements or organizations become more radicalized or more institutionalized after the demobilization phase, but also in provoking and sustaining mobilization until the demobilization phase. Contrary to the vast discussion on leadership in civil society and organizational studies, the concept of leadership in social movements organizations remains a relatively unexplored issue. While studies of civil society analyze the efficiency of leadership with a managerial understanding of leadership, studies of social movements focus on charismatic leadership and its role in, decision-making processes, building strategies and collective action repertoire, and increasing participation. Furthermore, much of the leadership literature on SMOs has followed "mainstream" leadership theories (Eden and Leviatan, 1975; Probert and Turnbull, 2011; Rush et al., 1977), which regard leadership as the result of individuals with specific attributes, styles, and/or actions (Sutherland et al., 2014). As a result, empirical evidence on how SMOs really engage with leadership is still lacking. Recently, contributions from critical leadership studies have reframed leadership as a relational, socially produced phenomenon, rather than as the outcome of a fixed set of leadership traits that inhere in "the leaders" (Northouse 2007; Bolden, 2011; Collinson, 2017).

In this thesis, I argue that Romani organizations' understanding of leadership shapes the organizational dynamics—including decision-making processes regarding strategies and repertoires, as well as participation—in different ways across cycles/waves of protest. Although the mainstream understanding of leadership dominated from the beginning of the cycles/waves to the institutionalization phase, recently the understanding of leadership as "enactment of leadership work" or "leaderlessness" has emerged through the establishment of youth networks. Moreover, some organizations established within early cycles have started to transform their leadership understandings in parallel with youth networks. Such developments provide important clues about the hybridization of SMOs and NGOs.

Mainstream understandings of leadership place "leaders" at their center (Morris & Staggenborg, 2008; Wenner and Lieberherr, 2022). These studies use Weber's concept of charismatic leadership to explain the legitimization of leadership in social movements (Stutje, 2012). Weber explains leadership through ideal types of authority: "the traditional, culturally grounded authority; the rational-legal bureaucratic authority; and the charismatic authority resulting from enthusiastic interactions among leaders and followers" (Weber, [1922] 1964). According to Ganz and Mckenna (2019),[13] scholars influenced by this tradition defined movement leaders according to such categories.

By contrast, recent studies focus on "leaderlessness leadership", distributed leadership, or collective leadership seen as a process, collective activity, and practice that provides guidance to groups or organizations, rather than as an actor-based concept (Crevani, 2018, p. 88; Simsa and Totter, 2020; Keshtiban, 2021). According to these studies, many activists try to avoid permanent leadership positions, but nevertheless see the necessity for leadership work; thus, they focus more on processes than on persons. These activists, share quite precise views on what good leadership means for them and invest much effort in implementing it. The horizontal character of social movements like OL, according to Sitrin (2011), not only attacks hierarchy and authority, but also allows for development of new structural connections in which process takes precedence over individual interest and goals. The concept of leaderlessness achieved momentum after the Arab Spring and Occupy Movements—also called Global Justice Movements. Meanwhile, critics of decentralized ways of leadership mostly focus on decentralization as an obstacle to efficiency and sustainability. Rojek (2017), for example, states that Occupy movements lacked the structural characteristics and leadership capacities to function successfully in an organized manner, implying that it had the ability for long-term relevance. The counterargument of proponents of leaderlessness is that

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[13] While Ganz points out that leadership in SMOs "exceeds the traditional charismatic public image," the establishment of democratic and participatory frameworks is nevertheless considered as the "obligation" (2000, p. 510) of permanent individual leaders (Sutherland, et.al., 2014). Also, this conceptualization leads an analysis of a binary position between leaders and followers in social movement organizations (Andrews et.al., 2010) and it creates a hierarchical relation within the organization. This distinction is more visible in the discussion of "iron law of oligarchy" of Robert Michels which argues the followers' tendency to voluntarily cede their agency to their political leaders (Michels, [1911] 1962).

leaderlessness does not mean "leadershiplessness." In their view, leadership is more than individual leaders; it is the collective activity of the organization members. Therefore, the leaderlessness concept is free from the binary of leader versus participant, and better suited to studying SMOs' internal dynamics when seeking to understand how leadership is performed in the absence of individual leaders (Crevani, 2018: 88; Simsa and Totter, 2020; Keshtiban, 2021; Sutherland, et.al., 2014).

In short, the transformation of the conceptualization of leadership from leader-based to leadership as a process helps us to understand the internal dynamics and power relations of Romani organizations within the tension between SMO and CSO formations. This is because different forms of organizations adopt particular leadership understandings which in turn shape their decision-making processes, strategies, and repertoires, and participation characteristics.

2.3. Hybridization of Social Movements and Civil Society in Turkey

Although there is a lack of studies focusing on the parallel history of social movements and civil society in Turkey, some studies evaluate together the revivals of civil society, human rights-based organizations, and new social movements following the student and labors movements. (Zihnioğlu, 2019 Şimşek, 2004; Çalı, 2020). The intersection of these literatures first became visible in the 1980s. Before the 1980s, civil society organizations were established based on a two-party system, and neither party considered organizing based on human rights as a strong political impetus (Çalı 2007, 220 as cited in Çalı, 2020). During the 1970s, skepticism toward these organizations was raised within grassroots movements which criticized their non-revolutionary form, parallel to a Marxist critique of civil society. Meanwhile, scholars in social movements studies state that the most significant wave of social protest Turkey witnessed between 1968 and 1971 was prompted by students, workers, peasants, teachers, and white-collar workers against imperialism. When the power balance of organized groups in politics shifted based on the conflict between the Kemalist bureaucracy and the political elite of the center-right, underrepresented groups seized considerable opportunities to organize and raise their voices (Alper,

2010). Boycotts, strikes, and street protests as transgressive repertoires were used throughout the protest cycle, which is common in old social movements.

In the literatures both on social movements and on civil society in Turkey, the 1980 coup is a turning point. Due to heavy censorship, the revolutionary movement lost its momentum and a tendency towards reformist mobilization occurred, which can be examined through New Social Movements. Moreover, against the increase in systematic torture, arbitrary arrests, and enforced disappearances, the concept of human rights was raised in civil society in the late 1980s through the establishment of human rights-based organizations such as the Human Rights Association (HRA; Tr. *İnsan Hakları Derneği*). Meanwhile, the minority issue gained momentum through the Kurdish conflict. After the 1990s and in the early 2000s, the proliferation and divergence have increased through human rights-based policies implemented at national and international levels, as well as globalization, democratization, and Europeanization.

Because of the consequences of globalization and the weakening of the state tradition, civil society grew more diversified and open to alternative views under the first Justice and Development Party (JDP) government (Heper & Yıldırım, 2011; Keyman & Icduygu, 2003; Seckinelgin, 2006). The enlargement of rights-based discourse paved the way for grievances of various groups. Not only left-wing actors, but also conservatives began to adopt human rights rhetoric. In the 1990s, several new organizations focused on headscarf restrictions arose, pushing religious freedom to the forefront of human rights action (Saktanber and Çorbacıoğlu 2008).

Transnational organizations such as Amnesty International and Helsinki Assembly also proliferated in Turkey during the 1990s, continuing in the 2000s. Scholars conceptualize these developments in organization practices in Turkey within different frameworks: the transnational human rights movement (Çalı, 2020), new social movements (Şimşek, 2007), and global civil society (Yabancı, 2019; Zihnioğlu, 2019). Therefore, the Turkish case offers an opportunity to discuss the hybridization of social movements and civil society after the 1990s. At the same time, indirect actions of NSMs, such as reporting human rights violence to the ECHR—which can be considered a creative tactic in the 1990s, civil society

organizations like the HRA were criminalized and suppressed by authorities. Gümrükçü (2010) argues that protest consciousness and experiences from early protests and transnational networks led to the emergence of the anti-globalization movement in Turkey. Like della Porta, she emphasizes new and creative repertoires of movements comprising, mostly indirect actions called "soft actions", such as masks, animals, and symbols; bicycle rides, concerts, and theaters; the use of colorful clothes; and drums. Thus, the distinction between civil society and social movements has become more complex during the 2000s insofar as women's rights, environmental rights, freedom of religion, and minority rights were the central issues in both literatures.

Like social movements, civil society organizations also challenged authorities through protests and marches such as Pride and the Saturday Mothers/People sit-in protests in the 1990s. In the early 2000s, significant potential for close cooperation between governmental agencies and civil society organizations arose. The EU-membership process officially begun in 1999 has had a great effect on the development of civil society in Turkey (Keyman, 2006, p.65).

The institutionalization process followed the proliferation of transnational organizations in the 2000s; together, these processes of proliferation and institutionalization can be called NGOization. Meanwhile, not only NGOs but also informal networks proliferated, such as environmentalist networks in the anti-globalization movement in Turkey (Gümrükçü, 2010). EU funds to manage sustainability became forward in civil society and drawn a framework for organizations (Zihnioğlu, 2019). Throughout the first decade of the 2000s, the European Union and the Council of Europe were strongly involved in legislative reform and training efforts in civil society, cooperating with the Turkish government. They supported organizations in Turkey through various training courses, working groups, projects, and events. EU funds have become a vital dependency for some organizations leading to the creation of "project culture" (Kuzmanovic, 2010), increased skepticism towards volunteerism due to professionalization (Ergun, 2010; Rumelili and Boşnak, 2015), and exclusive devotion of limited staff resources to EU-funded projects (Paker et al., 2013). Scholars argue that the Europeanization process

has made civil society more politicized and its repertoires more contentious, bringing it closer to social movements (Yabancı, 2019; Zihnioğlu, 2020; Babül, 2020).

Moreover, given the rise in contentious engagement by numerous social groups in the post-Gezi period, civil society's organizational reach, structure, and repertory of action have also radically diversified (Bee & Kaya, 2017; Seckinelgin, 2016; Şen & Şen, 2016). For example, KAOS GL became the first officially registered LGBTIA+ organization established in 2005 and started to organize Pride March in the early 2000s with Lambdaistanbul. These organizations, as NGOs, are part of new social movements networks, too. Also, they are involved in other social and political issues, as demonstrated by Lambdaistanbul's Soma statement or the HRA's focus on women's rights and LGBTIA+ issues. Recently scholars have examined the NGOization and depoliticization of civil society in Turkey through a focus on EU funds (Muehlenhoff, 2014; Zihnioğlu, 2019, 2020). For example, Yabancı (2019) argues that the JDP government rendered Turkey's civil society "tamed"—namely politicized, disabled, and segregated—by offering a space for civil society on the one hand while trying to pressure civil society on the other. While the government must value civil society to keep the competitive-authoritarian regime afloat, it must equally suppress it, as civil society is the only place where dissident social forces can still carve out pockets of resistance and challenge the regime's prevailing ideologies.

The transformational impact of Turkish civil society organizations in the 2010s particularly those human rights-based organizations, was greatly hampered by fundamental transformations in the political climate. This is especially the case when compared to civil society organizations founded under similar political conditions. While some movements and organizations have expanded to include human rights-based issues such as environmental and digital rights activism in Colombia (Ángel and Newman Pont 2019 as cited in Çalı, 2020), organizations and networks in Turkey mostly have to work either as short-term troubleshooters dealing with multiple emergent issues such as ill-treatment, judicial harassment, and censorship, or as service providers. They have also been unable to create significant advocacy agendas for long-term issues about economic, social, or environmental rights due to the oppressive climate in which they work.

The indirect actions such as litigation and reporting human rights violations adopted by social movements during the proliferation of civil society were reversed by the OccupyGezi movement, which followed the rise of global justice movements worldwide (Kaya, 2017). Like other GJMs including the Occupy Wall Street, Arab Spring, and Indignados movements, reclaiming the lifeworld against technocracy was the main aim of the Gezi Protests. Kaya summarizes the central conflict, in terms of the "take over" of the lifeworld by the system in Turkey. More specifically, the OccupyGezi movement fought against the government's attempts to take over the lifeworld by means of the "three children" policy, raising of religious (Sunni) and conservative youth, direct intervention in the content of Turkish soap operas, banning of alcohol on university campuses, adoption of a patronizing attitude toward individual lives, building of a mosque at Taksim Square, and deployment of increasingly dictatorial language based on Islamic themes. Kaya evaluates the Gezi Protest and its creative and peaceful content as reflections of the Europeanization of civil society in Turkey, which has increased the expression of claims on pluralist democracy, freedom of speech, and private life. Meanwhile, Keyder (2013) evaluates the Gezi Protest through its participants as a newly emerging middle class and their claims of retaking the lifeworld against "neo-liberal authoritarianism" on the streets. The Gezi demonstrations were not a one-off occurrence but rather part of a longer protest cycle in which political activities started to intensify before 2013. Within this cycle, the demonstrations should not be seen as a movement of anyone socioeconomic layer, such as "the new middle class" or "the proletariat." The common view that the "new middle classes" were the driving force behind the Gezi protests stems from the fact that middle-class protestors had more representational power in social and mainstream media, making them more visible than other groups (Yörük and Yüksel, 2014). The Gezi Protest and resulting increase in the state's repressive policies gave momentum to social and political polarizations which date as far back as the early Republican period (Özler and Obach, 2018). Özler and Obach examine this polarization in the environmentalist movement, looking at Secularist and Islamist networks and organizations. Following the Gezi protests, restrictions on activism and volunteerism around certain issues such as minority and LGBTI+ rights have increased year by year.

Within this authoritarian political environment, Zihnioğlu (2020) argues that the critical and contentious forms of civil society have gradually diminished, and challenging discourses and activities regarding policies and their implementation have declined. She states that EU funds contributed to the depoliticization of civil society organizations by mainly supporting projects that help improve public policies in various areas and rarely supporting rights-based activities.

To summarize, after the end of the 1968-1971 protest cycle and following the 1980 coup, the adaptation of liberal policies led to the emergence of civil society organizations and new social movements. Divergent movements emerged in parallel with the revival of civil society, such as Kurdish ethnic nationalism, Islamism, feminism, the Alevi cultural movement, environmentalism, and human rights activism. Beginning in the early 2000s, institutionalization throughout civil society and social movement organizations became common. Like Staggenborg argues, institutionalization may lead to subsequent mobilizations, which we can see in the case of the Gezi Protest. Within this environment, various kinds of organizations exist from social movement organizations to civil society organizations, networks to institutionalized organizations and networks of these organizations. In short, the argument in the international literature that austerity and anti-democratic policies created a more contentious civil society can be fruitfully applied to civil society in Turkey during the Europeanization process. However, when oppression and authoritarian government policies intensified, these hybrid organizations became more and more depoliticized during the subsequent "de-Europeanization" period.

2.4. Minority Politics and Minority Organizations in Turkey

The discourse on minorities in Turkey expanded after the 1980s, following the absence of an inclusive minority conceptualization since the early republican period in Turkey. As the literature on minorities in Turkey demonstrates, the conceptualization of what constitutes a minority has shifted from a religious one (a division of Muslim and Non-Muslim, to an ethnic one (the Kurdish movement), and finally to a plurality of minority conceptualizations through new social movements.

The minority concept in the Turkish Republic emerged with the Lausanne Agreement in 1923; initially, only Armenians, Rums (Greek Orthodox), and Jews

were accepted as minorities (Çayır, 2015). Besides the Lausanne Agreement, there were no stipulations for minorities in Turkish law. Some scholars point to the Ottoman Empire's *millet system,* which differentiated the non-Muslim and Muslim communities by applying different laws to each (Çelik, 2013). Gareth Jenkins (2004) explains this distinction and evaluates the history of xenophobia against non-Muslim minorities, criticizing the unchanging situation from the Lausanne Agreement to the EU acquis. Meanwhile, Kaya and Baldwin (2004) define minorities in Turkey according to European and international minority rights standards and explain their situation with regards to education rights, political participation, media in minority languages and about minorities, and other issues including language rights, religious education, property rights, right to association and peaceful assembly, freedom of movement, and prohibition of discrimination. The main argument of the article, which refers to the early period of the JDP's governmental process and beginning of the revival of Turkish civil society in the 2000s, is that Turkey has taken essential steps and reforms to meet the Copenhagen criteria. In short, human rights discourse became the most prominent element in the hybridization of activism and volunteerism among minority organizations after the 1990s in Turkey.

Since the emergence of Kurdish communities' demands in the 1980s, the Kurdish movement has eclipsed the issue of non-Muslims as the focus of the minority literature in Turkey and opened a discussion of ethnic minority issues ignored by the Turkish state throughout its history. In contrast to other ethnic minorities in Turkey, Roma were organized and mobilized in the late 1990s and officially in the early 2000s. For several reasons, other minorities mobilized earlier and have more solid organization patterns today. Firstly, some ethnic minorities such as Kurds and Armenians have begun to organize and mobilize earlier, which has provided them with a protest culture and a ready repertoire for collective action. For example, in the 1960s, the Kurdish movement acquired momentum as it combined with the leftist labor and student movements. This momentum continued with the establishment of the PKK in the 1970s. After the 1980s, the Kurdish movement evolved as a new social movement with hybrid forms of organizations; however, Kurds' experience within the leftist movement shaped the repertoire of the new movement (Şimşek, 2004; Güneş, 2015). Secondly, these communities' socioeconomic status is better than the Romani community. Therefore, they have more opportunities to create their

own elites or get the support of political elites, as was the case in the Apology Campaign (*Özür Diliyoruz*) set up by a group of Turkish elites following Hrant Dink's assassination in 2008 (Galip, 2021). Also, their internal community dynamics foster solidarity and increase participation, such as the concentration of a majority of the community population in the same area, in contrast to the Roma's a nomadic lifestyle. With both elite support and increased internal capital, these communities can create transgressive as well as moderate actions, increasing their chances to seize opportunities. In the Armenian case, the strengthening of internal capital by youth within Armenian organizations also bolstered mobilization. Dink's assassination, according to Armenian philologist Sevan Değirmenciyan, was the second occurrence leading to mobilization among Armenian youth, following the proclamation of the Armenian Republic. Meanwhile, young Armenians have also become increasingly aware of other concerns in Turkey, such as Alevi and Kurdish issues, LGBT rights, environmental preservation, and women's rights, despite being the children of a relatively quiet generation. Therefore, Armenian mobilization can be considered an NSM driven by ideological ideals and the pursuit of the common good through hybrid forms of collective actions, rather than mere self-interest (Galip, 2021).

All these aspects help to explain why Roma organized so late relative to other minorities in Turkey. Furthermore, Roma have also evolved into the "other" of all others. For example, on the west side of Turkey, Romani communities are oppressed by Turkish identity discourses, whereas on the east side of Turkey, Domari communities are discriminated against within Kurdish identity discourses (Çelik, 2012). Abdals (Alevi Roma) have also been marginalized from some Alevi spaces (Halis, 2021). As a result of their subordination by all groups, Roma have developed a conformist, conflict-avoidant attitude toward dominant groups, above all the state.

The Kurdish question has opened a path for other ethnic minorities such as Circassians, Laz, and Roma/Gypsies to demand recognition for themselves. Bahar Okçuoğlu (2019) examines the Circassian diaspora through references to the Kurdish people's process of self-expression. The establishment of the Turkish nation-state created several problems for Circassians, such as the lack of native language education and restriction of organization until the late 1970s and 1980s. Because ethnicity-based organization was officially banned, minorities turned to cultural

organizations as a solution to their organizational needs in the 1960s and 1970s. Başak Akgül Kovankaya (2010) also mentions these restrictions to mobilization under the umbrella of ethnicity for the Roma community. According to Okçuoğlu, the Circassian community became politicized through the CSO process, claiming cultural recognition and making some political demands. Her study emphasizes the divergence of Circassian claims from Kurdish demands for independence as well as Circassian perceptions of the Kurdish community, as enjoying better conditions, such as living together as a community and preserving their native language. On the other hand, both groups have been discriminated against and forced to hide their identity. Okçuoğlu thus underlines the importance of NGOization to Circassian efforts to maintain their culture and foster solidarity.

Meanwhile, Zeki Sarıgil (2012) compares Kurdish ethnonationalism in both violent and peaceful forms with Laz minority organizations. The Kurdish movement is generally considered a unique ethnic minority movement in Turkey. Kurdish organizations are regarded politically, whereas Laz organizations are established as cultural and solidarity organizations or associations., whose principle aims are the preservation and promotion of the Laz culture and language. Rather than ethnonationalism, cultural revival is emphasized in Laz ethnic minority organizations.

Moreover, Alevism was recast as a worldwide "social movement" rather than a religious "community" in the 1990s (Sökefeld 2008, p. 37; see also Dressler 2008; Massicard, 2007; Şahin, 2001; Zırh 2012 as cited in Lord, 2022). Studies of the Alevi movement emphasize the development of new voluntary Alevi organizations and the growth of secular elites due to urbanization, migration, and socio-economic changes that began in the 1960s. Like Romani organizations, the many non-governmental organizations established by the Alevi society have been only partially successful in establishing unity among themselves and cooperating in the absence of a common opinion regarding solutions to Alevi problems (Hamurcu & Üste, 2018). Another Alevi Opening study argues that the Alevi community remains reluctant to accept minority status. Instead, Alevis in Turkey are accepted as a group with distinct cultural and religious needs without being considered a minority group (Soner & Toktaş, 2011). The revival of Alevi communities in Europe has given momentum to

the Alevi presence in civil society in Turkey, especially in light of the EU accession agenda. Following the retraction of the ban on ethnic and religious association in 2003, Alevi civil society organizations in Turkey gained legal and political recognition (Soner & Toktaş, 2011). As a result, in an era of right-wing populism with a robust authoritarian component, the Alevi movement's fight for recognition and equal citizenship is essential for Turkey's democratic opposition to authoritarianism. The desire to "seek emotive acknowledgment from institutions and individuals in positions of power" (Shi 2018, 274, as cited in Lord, 2022), on the other hand, might restrict identity movements' democratic potential. Within the cycles/waves of protest, the Alevi movement is divided between radicalized and institutionalized groups. Thus, "traditionalist" Alevi groups who seek reform and integration into state institutions are more prepared to cooperate with the state. Nonetheless, the "progressivist" groups can transcend the limits of identity politics due to their rejection of inclusion as the source of emancipation, favoring more radical demands such as the reformation of Turkish secularism and inclusive democratization (Lord, 2022).

Within the expanded definition of minorities based on human rights discourse, Kardam and Ertürk (1999) examine Women NGOs' diverse positions and missions in dialogue with each other and the Turkish state, focusing on the influence of international women's rights discourses and the openness and diversity of Turkish civil society. According to the article, after the 1980s and 1990s, Women NGOs' common purpose has been women's empowerment, including production of strategies to establish gender-sensitive public opinion and policymaking. The study remarks that the recently founded women's NGOs incline towards advocacy, global networking, external fund-raising, and increasing professionalism (Kardam and Ertürk, 1999). The same emphasis exists in the article of Diner and Toktaş (2010), who argue for the existence of rising trends towards internationalization of local feminist themes, growing influence of international organizations (e.g., the EU, UN, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, WAVE, etc.), and receipt of global aid to combat women's subordination.

To summarize, the Roma were organized relatively late compared to other minority groups in Turkey. Reasons for this include the inadequacy of Roma's socio-

economic situation, their lack of collective action consciousness, their adoption of a conformist attitude as a survival strategy, their marginalization among other minority groups, and the disadvantages brought by nomadic life. In addition, the parallelism between the action repertoires of civil society and social movements can be seen in minority organizations. Since the 1980s, the repertoire of collective action has become interchangeable between activism and volunteerism in minority organizations based on human rights discourse. Some communities apply the old, more transgressive protest tactics, along with new, moderate tactics coming from civil society. The claim to being a "foundational element" (*asli unsur*) of the nation rather than a minority is observed in the Alevi movement like in Romani organization practice. That being said, this study adopts the expanded definition of minority that comes with the NSM approach and human rights discourse.

2.5. Overview of Roma and Romani Organizations in Turkey

Scholars broadly accept that Roma arrived in Europe from India via a number of migration routes. By the end of the fourteenth century, a large proportion of the Roma in Eastern Europe had settled. Many Roma crossed the Bosphorus into the Balkans, while others came via Greece, following the pilgrims' route across Crete, where records attest to a Roma presence as early as 1322 (McGarry, 2010). The initial arrival of Roma in Europe was characterized by tentative acceptance and curiosity on the part of settled Europeans. Soon, however, the mood shifted, and Roma found themselves targeted by repressive measures described as "sustained genocidal persecution and enslavement" (Gheorghe and Acton, 1995, p.31 as cited in McGarry, 2010), which began in earnest from the early sixteenth century. Deportation was one way in which authorities attempted to purge the Roma, who, at one point or another, have been banished from almost every European country.

In the Ottoman period, the majority of the Roma population dwelled in the Thrace/Rumelia region. They were registered in Ottoman taxation documents according to age, gender, and occupation. Though most Roma were employed as musicians and ironworkers, the most respected occupation was membership in the army. Altınöz mentions that Gypsies became a problem in terms of social structure because they are nomadic and do not belong to a specific occupational group. The

state assigned this group heavy work to establish authority over them (Yanıkdağ, 2021). In addition, historical records indicate that some members of this community were seen as *"ehl-i fesad",* that is, people with malicious intent, based on the claim that they disturb the general security of society due to the crimes they commit (Çelik, 2004).

Together with the proclamation of the Turkish Republic and the Lausanne Agreement in 1923, a large Roma population was forcibly relocated from Greece to Turkey in the population exchange between the two nations. As the multiethnic social structure of the Ottoman Empire gave way to a nation-state model of society, a parallel shift occurred in the conceptualization of minorities. In the Ottoman Empire, society was divided into various *millets* based on faith such as Muslim, Jewish, Greek (Rum), and Armenian (Orthodox). In contrast with the current use of *millet* meaning "nation," in Ottoman times the Arabic-derived term referred to a community affiliated with a particular religion or sect. The Ottoman *"millet system"* of organizing and governing communal difference based on religion or sect was embedded as an institution of Islamic law (Başar,2017). According to the Lausanne Agreement, only Rums, Armenians, and Jews were accepted as minorities, whereas other axes of linguistic and religious differentiation were ignored. In other words, minority status was equated to being non-Muslim. Therefore, the Roma community has not been formally acknowledged as a minority under the Turkish Republic. Despite their ongoing presence as one of the main ethnic groups in the Ottoman Empire and Republic of Turkey, Roma have not been accepted as a community for which policy should be made until the 2000s in Turkey. Due to the *millet* system in the Ottoman era and the new conceptualization of minority under the Turkish Republic, throughout history the population of Roma could not be calculated by the state. In the research conducted by Minister Faruk Çelik, the coordinator in charge of Roma, it is mentioned that the Romani population across all 81 provinces is between three and four million. However, this research was carried out only with reference to the name Roma; there is a total population of six to eight million "Gypsies" who express themselves with different definitions (Dom, Lom, Mitrip, Karachi, Elekçi, Aşık, Poşa etc.). According to 2012 data, the estimated ratio of the Romani population to the total population in Turkey is 3.78 percent; however, a clear number cannot be determined (Istanbul Romani Workshop Report, 2019).

With the transition from Empire to Republic, the nation-state ideology became the dominant ideology. This ideology found expression in the 1934 Settlement Law. According to Article 4 of this law,

> A: Those who are not affiliated with Turkish culture, B: Anarchists, C: Spies, Ç: Nomadic Gypsies, D: Those who have been deported; are not accepted as immigrants to Turkey (*T.C. Resmi Gazete,* 1934).

The only ethnicity targeted in Turkish legislation, by legal regulations, openly and by name, is the Roma. This law lent legal support to racialized discrimination against the Roma's nomadic lifestyle, legitimizing violent state intervention in Roma communities and hindering Roma's ability to organize as an ethnic group. Proposals to change this law with motions given in 1993 and 2001 and referring to its discriminative character; were inconclusive. Because of this law, a considerable number of Romani people had to live without an identity record. For a long time, Romani people could not get ID cards and could not benefit from their citizenship rights (Oprişan & Yılmaz, 2004). Furthermore, there are additional similar laws against the Romani community in the Turkish Republic. For example, in the last paragraph of Article 21 of the 1950 Law on Residence and Travel of Foreigners in Turkey, it states: "The Ministry of Internal Affairs is authorized to deport the Gypsies who are stateless or foreign nationals and foreign nomads who are not affiliated with Turkish culture." More recently, the twelfth article of the Ministry of Interior circular on naturalization dated October 23, 2003, states that another issue that needs to be examined about the people who will apply for naturalization is "whether they have relations with begging or gypsy" (Oprişan & Yılmaz, 2004). In the instruction on the "Discipline of the Police, its Role in Ceremonies and Communities, and the Organization of Police Stations and their Duties," the expression "gypsies without a basic profession" is used in relation to the Roma, who are marked as usual suspects due to their ethnicity (Arkılıç, 2008).

Although Roma in Turkey are perceived as a homogeneous community, three different identities exist in relation to three different language groups and migration routes. While Rom groups speak Romani and settled in Thrace and Western Turkey, Lom groups who speak Lomavren are located in the Black Sea region, and Dom groups speak Domari settled in Eastern and Southern Anatolia. In this study, I

worked with the Romani community; therefore, the other group's organizational practices must be the focus of other research.

In studies of Romani community formations, the concept of neighborhood (*mahalle*) becomes prominent for understanding social, political, and organizational relations of Romani communities (Seeman, 2019; Şahin et al., 2020). People in Turkey tend to identify as belonging to a specific neighborhood and express a comparable shared experience with others from the same district. In Turkey, Romani communities place a significant emphasis on their families' neighborhoods as places of local family history and communal affiliation. One of the reasons for the formation of neighborhood culture as a closed culture is the segregation and stigmatization of Roma neighborhoods by non-Roma. For example, researchers have observed that employers do not employ people residing in the Roma neighborhood (Balkız and Göktepe, 2014). As a result, the neighborhood is an essential center and reference resource for culturally expressed and reinforced identity. This is not a phenomenon unique to Roma, but it has a significant impact on how social interactions are formed both inside and beyond the group. Moreover, Roma have used neighborhood culture to elicit a sense of in-group belonging. Romani allusions to certain neighborhoods communicate insider values, beliefs, and knowledges that non-Roma do not have access to (Seeman, 2019).

With the neoliberal economic transformation, the depreciation of traditional occupations, the ongoing stigmatization and limited interaction outside the neighborhood—being a closed community have led to transformation of Romani communities' dynamics such as transition from nomadic to settled life, and power relations within the community and increase the social and economic marginalization of Romani communities. For example, during the Ottoman period (14th-16th centuries), the position of *Çeribaşı*, a military title, controlled the legal and financial relations between the Roman society and the state (Gökbilgen, 1963; Özcan, 1993 as cited in Seeman, 2019). In addition to this, Sonia Seeman (2019) mentions the existence of the *Çeribaşı* as a Roman male authority figure who served as "a community wise man, mediating problems among group members and approving and officiating at marriages in addition to taxation collection responsibility" (Seeman, 2019). Recently, this continued as a tradition in name only, while the

neoliberal transformation of community formations shifted the leadership status of the *Çeribaşı* elsewhere. The *Çeribaşı,* who was appointed by the state to collect taxes, was replaced by prominent people of the neighborhood, usually older men, who generally worked in public institutions or had a certain political background or good relations with institutions. While the *Çeribaşı* had previously worked as the state's instrument of control, these men took on the responsibility of being a mediator between the state and society. In both cases, patriarchal norms dominate the relationship between the community and the political and social environment. In this study, these people are referred to as informal leaders. Such leaders have transformed into the chairpersons of associations through organizing in civil society. Likewise, the task of mediation has also been delegated to the chairpersons of associations.

In Turkey, Roma/Gypsy studies can be divided in three categories: ethnicity, culture, history, and identity (Altıöz, 2013; Cox and Uştuk, 2019; Marsh, 2010; Seeman, 2019; Koptekin, 2017; Yanıkdağ, 2021); discrimination, stigmatization, exclusion, inequality, legal challenges, and human rights activism (Çelik and Tar, 2015; Taylan & Barış, 2015; Egi, 2020; Önen, 2013; Kolukırık and Toktaş, 2007; Somersan and Çubukçu, 2011); and social policy, including marginalization, access to services, poverty, education, health, shelter, and employment (Akkan et.al., 2011; Kılıçoğlu and Kılıçoğlu, 2018). Public institutions and non-governmental groups have also produced extensive studies on these areas (SODEV, 2022; Adaman et. al, 2022; Çuhadar, 2021; Karan, 2017).

Studies of Romani organization practice in Turkey have increased after the NGOization process of Roma in the early 2000s. These studies peaked during the Romani Opening process in 2010 and subsequently decreased. As I mentioned before, Romani organization practice has been examined separately within civil society (Kolukırık and Toktaş, 2007; Akgül Kovankaya, 2010; Sayan and Duygulu, 2022) and as a social movement (Somersan and Çubukçu, 2011; Arkılıç, 2008). Compared to the number of civil society studies, there are only a few studies on Roma participation in social movements. For example, Egemen Yılgür discusses Roma tobacco workers who attended labor movements in the 1970s (Yılgür, 2016). While Roma participated in these protests, their participation was based on class rather than identity. It was only in the period following the 1980 coup that Roma

began to establish NGOs to organize their communities. The increase in human rights-based organization practice after the 1980s also helped bolster the visibility of Roma organizations, particularly since the beginning of the 2000s.

Moreover, the Roma are one of Turkey's most disadvantaged ethnic groups. The social marginalization and discrimination they face in the areas of employment, education, housing, health care, and social life pose substantial challenges (Aşkın, 2017; Bayraktar, 2011; Çubukçu, 2011; Öke ve Topuz, 2010). Most Roma in Turkey live in poverty and social marginalization, which is one of the biggest impediments to their social, cultural, economic, and political engagement as equal citizens (Akkan et al. 2011). The criminalization of Roma neighborhoods by non-Roma people, on the other hand, leads to more discrimination in all areas of social life such as education and work, and further marginalization in socio-economic terms. This becomes a vicious cycle (Güler and Parliyan, 2020). According to research conducted jointly by the Social Democracy Foundation (SODEV), Istanbul Planning Agency (IPA), and Zero Discrimination Association (2022), 77.5 percent of the participants were experiencing unemployment problems. While 12.3 percent of the participants worked as wage laborers, 8.5 percent worked itinerantly, e.g., selling products such as water and flowers on highways. None of the paid employees held a managerial position. More than 50 percent of those with children aged 0-5 stated that they had serious problems feeding their children and accessing educational equipment. The basis of these problems is the discrimination they have been exposed to and internalized for centuries. While 40 percent of the respondents across Turkey said that they have been exposed to discrimination, 19.5 percent said "I was exposed a little." They stated that they faced discrimination primarily in their daily life, and secondarily in government offices and hospitals. The reason why this percentage is low is related to the internalization of discrimination. One of my interviewees explained this as follows:

> They have internalized it so much that they attribute the discrimination they experience to their dirty clothes when they are not allowed to enter a shop or their lack of ability to raise a child when their children are beaten up in school. They normalize the discriminative attitudes others hold against them (Suna, 43).

Another obstacle against organizing as an ethnic identity within civil society organizations was Article 5 of the Association Law of 1983. According to this law,

associations cannot be established in the Republic of Turkey with the aim of creating a minority based on racial, religious, sectarian, or regional differences and thereby destroying the unitary state structure of the Republic of Turkey (siviltoplum.gov.tr). Several initiatives to establish NGOs among Roma using the term Roma or Gypsy were denied based on this law. Thus, as a strategy, Roma communities established occupation-based organizations or hometown associations to provide solidarity. As first attempt, a group of Romani people in İzmir established a non-governmental organization with the word "Roma" in its name in the 1990s, and were put on trial based on this law.

After this first attempt, there were other efforts to establish a Romani NGO. However, they were rejected for the same reason. Mustafa Aksu,[14] who revealed his Gypsy identity after retiring from public service, was another pioneer for establishing ethnic identity-based organizations and creating pressure to change discriminative laws and formal implementations like the 1983 Law of Association. He pushed the bureaucratic system to found a Gypsy Association, made possible by the amendment of the Law of Association in 2004 which allowed for the creation of ethnicity-based associations. Aksu was one of the Romani intellectuals who worked for this change; however, the amendment was possible with other civil society actors' collective pressure such as the Helsinki Citizens' Assembly (*Helsinki Yurttaşlar Derneği*) and the Accessible Life Association (*Ulaşılabilir Yaşam Derneği*) (Uzpeder, 2008). With Aksu's and other non-Roma organizations' support, the first "Gypsy"-named NGOs were established in Samsun, Edirne, and Balıkesir (Aksu, 2014). In his article, Aksu explains the transformation from Gypsy NGOs to Roma NGOs:

> I was invited to the International Gypsy Symposium in Edirne and İstanbul as a guest speaker. International speakers said that if associations and federations change their name to Roma, the EU can support them through grants. Due to the need and hope to become rich, associations and federations changed their name to Roma. New ones were established using "Roma" in their name and their numbers increased in a short period. Even though we know you are Gypsy, you start to call yourselves Roma! But still you cannot find what you expected (Aksu, 2014).

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[14] Aksu adopted the term Gypsy rather than Roma, arguing that embracing and transforming the meaning of the former term was a better way of sustaining identity than adopting the term Roma, which has no historical background within the community in Turkey. The debate about use of the terms Roma or Gypsy has intensified through the establishment of NGOs. One of the first initiatives of Mustafa Aksu was establishing NGOs containing the term "Gypsy" in Edirne, Samsun, and Sakarya (Aksu, 2014).

Shortly after they were opened under the name "Gypsy" in 2004, the associations changed their names to the "Romani" Association in 2006. One reason for this was to benefit from European Union funds, as Aksu stated. Another reason was that the term Gypsy has pejorative meaning. Moreover, some non-Roma organizations such as Helsinki Citizens' Assembly and Accessible Life Association have continued to help Roma in their efforts toward repealing the current law, establishing NGOs, and building instituitons at the beginning of the NGOization process (Akgül Kovankaya, 2010). The associations founded under the name Roma adopted similar language for their names, including at least one or a combination of the words "Mutual Aid" (*Yardımlaşma*), "Solidarity" (*Dayanışma*), "Culture", and "Development" (*Kalkındırma*).

The proliferation of NGOs and federations in civil society increased after the first Romani federation was established in Edirne in 2006. The formal structure of NGOs in Turkey consists of a compulsory general assembly, board of directors, and board of control. Least than seven participants cannot establish an NGO. Moreover, federations are established by the gathering of at least five associations with the same founding purpose (siviltoplum.gov.tr). According to the NGOs' formal structure, such decisions are taken democratically among the board of directors, comprised of formal, legal participants. However, the formal structure and application in practice can be different. Because Roma's organization within the formal structures of civil society occurred with the support of non-Roma, Roma themselves lacked consciousness for institutionalization or professionalization at first. Through capacity-building activities within civil society supported by EU-project based work, Roma have gained a consciousness about civil society, human rights-based work, EU project implementation, and other strategies provided by civil society (Sayan and Duygulu, 2022).

Meanwhile, in 2006, an urban transformation project was planned in Sulukule—a residential area of Roma since the eleventh century—in partnership with Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality, Fatih Municipality, and TOKİ.[15] In order to stop this gentrification project, NGOs and platforms started to organize and act together

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[15] Housing Development Administration of the Republic of Turkey (https://www.toki.gov.tr/en/)

against possible destruction of the neighborhood (Tan, 2007). The mobilization in Sulukule can be interpreted as the initiation of a social movement for several reasons. Firstly, the conflict emerged in the resistance by the residents of Sulukule and non-Roma activists against the gentrification project of public authorities. Based on collective action strategies including sit-in protests, forming human chains, and organizing festivals in the neighborhood, the organization practice adopted transgressive and creative action against power holders. Lastly, the organization structure included different forms and consisted of networks. Following the exclusion of Sulukule residents from the decision-making process and the implementation of unilateral decisions, an informal network called Sulukule Platform consisting of rights holders and various activists in the neighborhood was formed (Uysal, 2012). Established in 2007 during the protests, Sulukule Platform defines itself as a decentralized and borderless formation where everyone contributes according to their own priority and area of expertise, and activists from different backgrounds act in solidarity (http://sulukulegunlugu.blogspot.com). Ülke Evrim Uysal calls the mobilization an "ethno-cultural resistance" and argues,

> The actions organized by the Sulukule Platform in the neighborhood and outside the neighborhood were also "junction points" where activists came together and interacted (Nicholls, 2008). The "strong and weak ties" established between the activists at these junction points made the Sulukule Platform operative. The strong bonds of solidarity among the residents of Sulukule facilitated collective actions and accelerated the flow of information. On the other hand, the weak ties established by independent activists contributed to the resistance in Sulukule at national and international levels (2012, p. 144).

Moreover, Somersan and Çubukçu (2011) argue that since mobilization could not spread throughout the country and receive sufficient support, it could not turn into a social movement and its gains were limited. After the diffusion phase of the mobilization, the organizations became institutionalized and Sulukule Platform was transformed into an NGO called Sulukule Volunteers Association (*Sulukule Gönüllüleri Derneği*) in 2010. In this form, the NGO continued its activities to alleviate the psychosocial effects of destruction caused by the Sulukule Urban Transformation Project and to prevent school dropouts in the region (sulukulegonulluleri.org). Therefore, civil society and social movement organizing run concurrently in Romani organization practice in Turkey.

Such developments in collectivity and solidarity, as well as the requirement of EU membership to develop specific policies for Roma, prompted the state to produce policies. These policies were established as part of the broader Democracy Initiative Process* of the government. Between 2009-2010, several meetings were held by the government as part of this process. The Prime Minister Erdoğan stated that the aim of the initiative was to solve minorities' problems and develop policy implementations for different ethnic and religious minority groups in Turkey such as Kurds, Alevis, and Armenians (today.az, 2010). In 2009, the Roma Initiative was pronounced and several activities commenced by the Ministry of Family and Social Policies. There were meetings and workshops about the Roma community and their fundamental problems. For the first time in the history of Turkey, a prime minister met with Roma citizens, recognized their problems, and offered a policy implementation. The Prime Minister Erdoğan came together with almost 10,000 Roma citizens in March 2010 in a meeting for the Roma Initiative of the Democratic Initiative Process (hürriyet.com, 2010). A few days later at the Extended Provincial Presidents Meeting of the JDP, Erdoğan apologized to the Roma community by saying, "For decades in this country, they could not even benefit from the citizenship law. If anyone deserves an apology, it is my Roma citizens and I apologize to them on behalf of my state."

The government's Romani Initiative was precipitated by the EU's minority policies since the 1990s and the latter's expectations of EU candidate countries regarding minority rights, alongside the progress and increasing gains of Roma collective action through civil and non-governmental organizations. Through the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA), the EU provides financial and technical support for Turkey's political and economic reforms (Çuhadar, 2021). Due to the lack of information and policy implementation concerning Roma in Turkey, the first supported project was the "Technical Assistance for Promoting Social Inclusion in Densely Roman Populated Areas Project" (SIROMA) in 2015, which aimed to develop policy and increase the capacity and employment rate among Roma people

in Turkey. Using this project's outputs, the first Strategic Roma Action Plan (2016-2021)[16] was established.

Moreover, the mobilization of Roma (the Sulukule mobilization and rapid growth of NGOs and federations in the 2000s), the state's launch of the Roma Democratic Initiative, and the EU accession process all came together to create a participatory environment for Roma activists, NGOs, and community leaders in the early years of the Roma Democratic Initiative Process (Akkan, 2018). With awareness of the importance of cooperating in terms of political representation and combating discrimination, 60 associations and four federations established the Roma Rights Forum (ROMFO) in 2012. Most associations or federations within ROMFO are composed of associations opened during the association process in the early 2000s (Akkan, 2018). Within the structured nongovernmental form of organization, ROMFO had a network form. This platform works to increase political participation of Roma in the parliament. In 2015, for the first time in Turkey, a Romani candidate was elected as a deputy by the Republican People's Party (RPP). The fact that the deputy, Özcan Purçu, was the president of a non-governmental organization also led to an increase in the number of NGOs and briefcase associations. After the election of Özcan Purçu, Cemal Bekle who also has a civil society background was elected as a deputy by the ruling party, JDP in 2018. After the first Romani deputy was elected by the main opposition party, the primary aim behind establishing a Romani NGO became the political interests of its founders, who use the NGO as a bridge to create clientelist relationships with the political elite. As a result, such actors exploit the exposure they achieve through Roma NGOs to establish contacts with political parties and find a way into politics through these connections (Akkan, 2018). Recently, there are 336 Romani NGOs in Turkey (Sayan and Duygulu, 2022). Besides these clientelist relationships, this thesis focuses on collective action among Romani organizations in Turkey. Recently, the existence of Romani youth has increased in these organizations. Young Roma who are more educated and professionally qualified aim to develop internal resources, particularly internal solidarity, and sense of community, through organization within informal networks.

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[16] The Strategy Document for Romani Citizens (2016-2021) and the 1st Stage Action Plan (2016-2018) approved by the High Planning Council were published in the Resmi Gazete (romsid.com).

In addition, the EU framework is one of the main dimensions shaping Roma the mobilization in Turkey. Since the 1990s, the European Union's production of policy concerning Roma has opened new discussions around minority legislation and execution of social movement strategies. This EU influence intersects with the complexities of Turkish minority politics and the NGOization process mentioned above to shape the Romani mobilization in Turkey. The Roma community is recognized as a legal minority in most countries in the European Union; therefore, Roma are considered an ethnic minority in the EU policies' context. Throughout Turkey's EU accession process in the 2000s, the Roma communities' position as a "foundational element" (*asli unsur*) of the Turkish nation presented an impediment to the implementation of EU recommendations. The difference in definition of the minority concept became a struggle which complicated the policy implementation process. The government avoided using the term minority, preferring instead the concept of "disadvantaged group" (*hassas gruplar, dezavantajlı gruplar*) (Roma Strategy Action Plan 2016-2021).

Furthermore, the EU's project-based working system has also contributed to Romani organization practice in Turkey by opening new spaces for Romani civic action, leading to the proliferation of Romani NGOs. As a candidate member, Turkey can benefit from EU project funds. The project-based work of the EU has facilitated the Roma community's organization efforts by helping them to establish non-governmental organizations. These Romani NGOs, which gained strength through the projects funded by the EU, have in turn adopted Romani identity and begun claiming human rights with increasing confidence. After the late 1990s, these NGOs have become the Roma's new civic action tools with the assistance of EU human rights-based policies. Thus, the EU framework shapes the current Romani organization practice since it led to minority issues in Turkey becoming more visible again and helped create a space for civic action (Akgül Kovankaya, 2010; Uzpeder, 2008; Önen, 2013). Although EU involvement and funds facilitated the civic space open to Roma in Turkey, it also limited their collective action tools and led organizations to adopt moderate repertoires. In the next chapter, I will elaborate the organizational process of Roma within cycles/waves of contention, since I argue that Romani mobilization within hybrid organizations fluctuated within cycles/waves of contention. Moreover, I suggest that hybrid organization forms from "SMOized"

NGOs to "NGOized" SMOs adopt different strategies according to these cycles/waves.

CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY

Several life experiences led me to work with the Romani community and investigate the organizational dynamics of Roma in Turkey. My father spent his childhood in a Romani neighborhood and still has friends who live there. Like other Romani neighborhoods, the Romani neighborhood in my hometown of Lüleburgaz has been segregated due to the negative outside perception of its inhabitants as a threat. However, my father sustains his good relationships and continues to visit the neighborhood on a regular basis. This situation motivated me to attend the Romani Identities and Antigypsyism Summer School in 2017 at Central European University, where the opportunity to meet with many academics and students working in Romani Studies increased my interest in this field. After writing my term paper for the lecture "Social Movements and Civic Action" at Middle East Technical University about the Romani movement in Europe in 2019, I decided to concentrate my research on Romani organizations' practices in Turkey. My research question is

How do Roma experience organization through Romani formal and informal organizations in Turkey?

I determined three sub-questions:

How do the political and institutional environments affect the Romani mobilization process throughout the history of Romani organization in Turkey since the 2000s?; What is the relationship between Romani organizations' structures and their organizational strategies?; What are the dynamics of inter-organizational networking among Romani organizations?

I conducted qualitative research, adopting ethnographic methodology to examine the impact of internal and external dynamics on Romani organization practice since the

2000s, collective action strategies, and inter-organizational relationships. Qualitative research involves interpreting data in order to understand how people construct the world around them through their actions and responses to the events and situations they encounter (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005a, p.3, as cited in Flick, 2007). The flexibility of qualitative research contributed to my choice of this approach. According to Neuman,

> Flexibility in qualitative research encourages us to continuously focus throughout a study. An emergent research question may become clear only during the research process. We can focus and refine the research question after we gather some data and begin a preliminary analysis (Neuman, 2000, p. 172).

This flexibility manifested itself particularly in the transformation of my research question, themes, and concepts over the course of my research. Moreover, ethnography plays a crucial role in both macro and micro level analysis. It helps social and political scientists analyze the dynamics of interaction between people—including the various ways in which power is exercised, e.g., formally and informally, seen and unseen, direct and indirect—and how these dynamics shape political, economic, and cultural relations. It does not try to influence or control society; rather, it aims to work with society as it is. This approach seeks to interpret how people give meaning to their experiences and to examine behavior in its own context (Campelli, 1996 as cited in Bray, 2008, p. 298). Bray explains the perception of reality in ethnography as follows:

> By assuming an intrinsic link between what is observed objectively, and the subjective interpretation given to it, the researcher explains how people give objects and actions meaning in accordance with their beliefs and the conventions of society. Reality is thus appreciated as inseparable from human experience, with knowledge deemed as existing only in a social context (Bray, 2008, p. 302).

Moreover, ethnography adopts the idea that something must be considered as part of a "whole" system in order to fully understand it and a "whole" must be assumed to constitute more than the sum of its parts. Through this idea, ethnography has a holistic character.

> While the idea of 'whole'-ness is, of course, illusory (see also Schmitter, 2008 ch. 14), the general idea in ethnographic research is that, by studying a phenomenon in its own dynamic context, more can be intrinsically understood about it than by simply examining it in isolation – since everything exists in relation to other things – and reducing it systematically to a list of abstract formulae (Bray, 2008, p. 302).

At the same time, ethnography emphasizes self-reflexivity in the research process as an essential requirement (Clifford and Marcus, 1986). Self-reflexivity in ethnographic research demands that the researcher explicitly mention aspects of her political, social, and personal background that influence the collection and analysis of data, as well as cultivate awareness of the constructed nature of research itself. The researcher can understand the group dynamic she is studying better with a recognition of her position in the field. In ethnographic writing, critical appreciation of the validity of the results is achieved through reflexive evaluation of the researcher's place in the research process and her influence on it (Balsiger & Lambelet, 2014).

As part of my ethnographic research, I conducted semi-structured, in-depth interviews alongside participant-observation fieldwork. At first, I started by conducting interviews, since I did not have enough access to the community to join a Romani neighborhood organization or non-governmental organization as participant-observer. However, my interviews were interrupted by the Covid-19 pandemic lockdown between April 2020 and January 2021. I conducted 23 interviews throughout my research. Therefore, my first 16 interviews were conducted between December 2019 and March 2020, while the rest of my interviews were conducted between February and September 2021. Two of them were conducted via Zoom due to Covid-19 quarantine. From among these 23 interviewees, only five are women, and only one of these women is an NGO chairperson. Among the remaining (male) interviewees, three are members, while the rest are chairpersons (Figure 1).

After the lockdown period, one of the Romani organizations offered me a job in a project funded by the EU. I worked in this project between January 2021 and September 2021. With this job, I was able to develop my own relations with Romani organization members and chairpersons. Therefore, when conducting interviews after the pandemic, I used my own relations I had gained through this job while doing my fieldwork. Drawing on my fieldwork notes and transcripts of interviews, I analyzed the data at the mezzo level in order to examine Romani NGO members' evaluation of the organization process and Romani organizations internal and external dynamics in Turkey.

3.1. Interviews

In order to allow my research participants, the opportunity to suggest directions of inquiry important to them, I conducted semi-structured in-depth interviews. According to Rubin and Rubin,

> There are several important varieties [of semi-structured in-depth interviews], all of which share three characteristics: (1) The researcher is looking for rich and detailed information… looking for examples, for experiences, for narratives and stories. (2) The interviewer does not give the interviewee specific answer categories; rather, the questions are open ended… (3) The questions that are asked are not fixed. The interviewer does not have to stick to a given set of questions or ask them in a given order; s/he can change wording or skip questions if they don't make sense at the time (2012, p. 29).

By using in-depth qualitative interviewing, I was able to "explore in detail the experiences, motives, and opinions of the participants and learn to see the world from perspectives other than my own" (Rubin & Rubin, 2012, p. 3). Since I worked with Roma, a community largely closed off to outsiders, semi-structured in-depth interviews were of crucial importance for me to reconstruct events I had not experienced. Also, by examining interviews side by side, I was able to establish patterns between the experiences of multiple interviewees. Due to the variety of ages and education levels of my interviewees, not all my questions were appropriate for all interviewees; therefore, there were some interviewees to whom I did not ask the whole set of questions. For example, I was not able to ask young interviewees about the historical background of the Romani movement, because they had little knowledge on this topic.

I used the snowball sampling technique to reach participants and collect data. Petersen & Valdez (2005) state that snowball sampling is one of the most effective sampling methods for accessing hidden and/or hard to reach communities. Because I worked with a closed ethnic community that has historically been suspicious of outsiders, it was initially difficult for me to establish contact with members of the community. Since I did not have any personal connections with Romani NGOs, I consulted my former high school teacher who works in the Social Solidarity Center (SODAM) in Lüleburgaz, a center whose activities encompass the Romani community. Thanks to my teacher's network, I was able to reach the person who

helped me access my first research participants. My father's acquaintanceship with this person also helped me to build trust with them more easily.

Since establishing NGOs is a common strategy of Roma civic action in Turkey, my interview participants comprise members from Romani NGOs in Izmir, Edirne, and Istanbul. I chose these cities because they are home to the majority of the Romani community and Romani NGOs in Turkey. Moreover, after reaching my research participants, it was crucial for me to build a trust relationship with them as a researcher. I encouraged interviewees to select the interview location and time in order to avoid putting additional pressure on them. Thus, I sought to balance the power dynamics between myself as researcher and my interviewees as much as possible.

In order to remain sensitive to what was interesting and important for my interlocutors, I did not prepare concrete concepts before beginning my fieldwork. Instead, I used "sensibilizing concepts" (Bray, 2008) or "sensitizing concepts" (Blumer, 1954) related to organization practice in both interviews and ethnographic fieldwork. Such concepts allowed me to lay the foundation for analysis of my research data. While examining codes for developing thematic categories from my data, I used the concepts which resonated with my interlocutors in my interviews and interactions with them. For the interviewing phase, I prepared open-ended questions using the concepts of identity, social and political representation, organization structure and strategies, and interactions among Romani organizations and institutions (see Appendix 2). I divided the questions into two sets corresponding with individual and organizational levels of analysis. First, I created questions related to Romani NGO members' positioning, with reference to concepts such as identity and social and political representation. Second, I generated questions related to the Romani organization process, including concepts such as organization structure, strategies, and internal and external interactions. In addition to these two question sets, I prepared a demographic info sheet for interviewees.

Table 1. Demographic Information of Interviewees

No	Pseudonym	Org.	Position	Location	Age	Education Level	Occupation	Gender
1	Cemil	N1	Chairperson	Kırklareli	48	Primary School	Social Mediator (Ex) Unemployed	M
2	Yusuf	N2	Chairperson	İstanbul	55	Middle School	Municipal adviser for Roma	M
3	Yalçın	N3	Chairperson	İzmir	61	Primary School	Self-employed	M
4	Ahmet	N4	Chairperson	Edirne	51	Primary School	Tradesman	M
5	Emrah	N5	Chairperson	Edirne	50	Primary School	Tradesman	M
6	Hüseyin	N6	Chairperson	Edirne	47	Primary School	Municipality Worker	M
7	Ömer	N7	Chairperson	Edirne	26	MA Student	Project Coordinator in a EU project	M
8	Aylin	N8	Member	İzmir	27	MA Student	Social Worker in a Municipality/History Ma	F
9	Hakkı	N9	Chairperson	İzmir	56	Primary School	Municipality Worker	M
10	Can	N7	Member	Edirne	21	University Student	Mentor in a EU Project	M
11	Hasan	N10	Chairperson	Edirne	52	High School	Technician	M
12	İsmail	N11	Chairperson	Edirne	56	primary School	Waste collector	M
13	Mehmet	N12	Chairperson	Edirne	56	High School	Public servant in a high school	M
14	Ayten	N13	Member	Edirne	34	High school student	Mediator in a EU Project	F
15	Ali	N13	Chairperson	Edirne	38	MA Student	Public servant in a university	M
16	Sibel	N14	Member	İstanbul	25	MA Student	Psychologist/Project Manager in a EU proje	F
17	Barış	N15	Member	Ankara	22	University Student	Lawyer/Mediator in a EU project	M
18	Mahmut	N16	Chairperson	İzmir	41	University	Public servant in a Municipality	M
19	Bayram	N17	Chairperson	İstanbul	56	Primary School	Municipal adviser for Roma	M
20	Cüneyt	N18	Chairperson	İstanbul	33	Primary School	Unemployed	M
21	Osman	N14/N8	Member	İstanbul	20	University Student	Mentor in a EU Project	M
22	Necla	N14/N8	Member	İstanbul	23	University Student	Mentor in a EU Project	F
23	Suna	N19	Chairperson	İstanbul	42	University	Civil Society Worker	F

The first theme's set of questions aims to address interviewees' understandings of Roma identity, conceptualize the main issues related to the Roma community, and think about political representation. My interviewees' differing positions regarding these topics shape their approaches to and positions in collective action. Therefore, I created this thematic question set to help me analyze Roma organization practice from the standpoint of my interviewees. The second theme's set of questions focuses first on the organizational structures and historical background, and second on the relationships of interviewees. These relationships are examined within three contexts: within a single organization itself, between multiple Romani organizations, and between Romani organizations and public and international institutions.

3.2. Participant Observation

While conducting interviews, I had difficulties asking deeper questions and obtaining detailed answers because I was an outsider and had limited time to build a trust relationship with my interviewees. Also, it was challenging to understand some inside phrases or referents. However, thanks to participant-observation methods, I was able to spend more time getting to know my interlocutors. During the project period from January 2021 to September 2021, I had an opportunity to rethink possible preconceptions and adapt myself, my participant-observation process, and

my interviewing accordingly. Cardano defines this characteristic of ethnography as "submissiveness to the object" during fieldwork (Cardano, 2003, p. 19 as cited in Bray, 2008).

This process was made more difficult by the pandemic. In general, many work and social activities moved online during the lockdown, delaying my ability to carry out face-to-face research in the same locality with my interlocutors. Before beginning work in a Romani NGO, I could not conduct zoom interviews due to my lack of acquaintances from the community. After becoming involved in Roma social spaces, however, I was able to understand details and internal references better. I discovered some inconsistencies between what interviewees said in our interviews before the pandemic and what actually happened. Drawing on the themes and concepts I used while preparing my interview questions, I took field notes after various meetings and activities throughout the project. I paid particular attention in my observations to issues related to these themes and concepts, and to issues that were mentioned frequently in my previous interviews. Moreover, there were some small talks for discussing general Romani organization practice among the project crew or other people close to this NGO. I also attended these talks, during which I mostly preferred to remain silent and listen to different people's thoughts on the subject.

On the one hand, the strong relationships I established with my interlocutors during my fieldwork enabled me as an insider to access information that an outsider would have difficulty accessing. On the other hand, they made it difficult for me to look at the field as objectively as an outsider could. During my fieldwork, I tried to keep a balance between subjectivity and objectivity (Bourdieu, 1977) in order to develop a holistic understanding of the object of study. While comprehending the standing of people in the field as an insider, a researcher must also examine the field analytically and with impartiality. As an insider in the field, I tried to be myself as much as I could in order to establish trust relationships with my interlocutors. I tried not to get too involved in discussions that foregrounded competition and criticism. However, when asked for my opinion at one point, I shared my ideas, trying to maintain my impartiality to reflect my own position. Until the end of the project, I had difficulty examining my field notes or transcripts as an outsider. After the project was over, however, I tried to re-establish a balance between subjectivity and objectivity by

moving away from the field and re-examining my data together with the scholarly literature.

During the project period, I lived in Edirne for a month. The Romani NGO I worked for focused on youth issues and was located in a Romani neighborhood in Edirne. We used to come together with young Romani people in the association building during times when the pandemic measures were relaxed. I did not have much chance to go to different Romani neighborhoods in Edirne, but when we went to Izmir for student visits within the scope of the project, I visited different neighborhoods for a short time. I had the opportunity to observe the relations of local municipalities, governorships, and associations in İzmir, such as in Konak where the largest number of Roma people live.

All my interlocutors knew that I was conducting research about Romani organizational practices. While I conducted some of my interviews before joining the project, during the project I met with my interviewees again in different activities and settings. Hence, I subsequently revisited my transcripts in light of my observation field notes and improved upon my previous analysis.

3.3. Coding and Social Network Analysis

I evaluated both my field notes and my transcripts using the MAXQDA2020 program. I did the initial coding according to the sensitizing concepts I had determined. After this first coding, I tried to identify patterns formed by prominent themes and concepts. For the organizational level of analysis, I used social networking analysis (SNA) methods in qualitative research to explain the inter-organizational networking. Systematic investigation of network processes within social movements involves two aspects: examining how actors' embeddedness in preexisting networks affects collective action and showing how social movement actors create new linkages which will determine the purview of subsequent protest and/or subcultural activities (Diani, 2002). Such research requires careful investigation of networks in order to reconstruct the meaning of certain ties (Emirbayer & Goodwin, 1994; Somers, 1994). Diani argues that social movement networks include individuals, organizations, or an integration of both, and advises

that researchers should identify the network's boundaries in order to determine a meaningful unit of analysis (Diani, 2002).

To clarify my application of this method, I will first define the relevant concepts and then explain how I use this method for my analysis. A network is defined as "a set of actors or, in the language of graph theory, nodes, connected by a specific type of relation" (Knoke and Kuklinski, 1989, p.12 as cited in Klandermans and Staggenborg, 2002, p. 175). Social network analysis helps the researcher interpret the structure of networks, that is, the patterns of ties between nodes. Nodes consist of civic action actors, either individual or collective. Network is a broad concept; therefore, the researcher should define the boundaries of the network. In this study, I define the network boundaries as Romani organizations in Edirne, Istanbul, and İzmir which define themselves as Roma and actively work for the community. According to this network definition, each organization represents a node.

Another important concept in SNA is ties, which help to analyze the relations between organizations and/or individuals. Ties help to define what represents a linkage between nodes. Direct ties between organizations may include alliances, exchange of information, joint participation in campaigns, and shared members and volunteers. These organizations may develop a shared understanding of their action and create a shared organizational culture based on emotional connections of individuals and shared identities. Thus, they facilitate further interactions. Meanwhile, indirect ties between organizations may include participation in protest initiatives originally promoted by third parties, co-membership in umbrella organizations, or ties to the same public agencies (Klandermans & Staggenborg, 2002).

Ties may be binary or valued. Before evaluating the strength of a tie, the researcher must determine the existence of linkages, regardless of their intensity. The strength of ties may be evaluated quantitatively by the frequency of interaction (e.g., the number of joint activities between SMOs), or qualitatively by the amount of emotional investment (e.g., analyzing solidarity between SMOs) (Diani, 2002). Although, inter-organizational relations are usually investigated through cooperative ties, it is equally important to examine competitive ties between organizations. While

some organizations cooperate with each other—for example, by jointly promoting the same protests—some organizations compete for the same pool of potential support or for recognition from the same public bodies. Moreover, ideological and practical differences may lead to conflictual ties between nodes.

In my research data analysis, I examined the relations of competition, conflict, and cooperation between nodes in the Romani organizational network. I used M x M matrices containing one actor-by-actor matrix for each relation, and then I mapped these relations. For competitive relations, I focused on those organizations which share the same pool of support from public institutions, apply for the same EU funds, or share the same field of potential participants. I took into consideration interviewees' statements acknowledging competition between their organizations and another organization. For direct ties, I examined the organizations with which interviewees explicitly stated that they have a competitive relationship, classifying these ties according to the aspect in which they compete. For indirect ties, I added to the table relationships that were not mentioned by the interviewees but were nevertheless characterized by competition for the same resources mentioned above. I showed the difference between direct and indirect ties using different arrows during the mapping phase.

For conflictual relations, I looked at the organizations' ideological positions, including their stance in the "Roma/Gypsy" debate, their perspective on the concept of minority, and their political leanings. I considered these as direct ties, applying the same procedure to them as I did for direct competitive relations.

For cooperative relations, I evaluated direct ties such as exchange of information and alliance for specific projects and strategies, and indirect ties such as common members, participation of same members in the same events or actions, and linkages with the same third parties (private or public).

I prepared different matrices for each relationship to evaluate competitive, conflictual, and cooperative relations. In the M x M matrices, I put "1" to indicate a significant relation, "0" to express no relation, and a "_ "sign at the intersection of each association with itself (Appendices C, D, and E).

3.4. Limitations

The lack of Romani women in Romani NGOs was one of the limitations I encountered to my understanding of Roma organization practice. Some women refused to do an interview. They stated that talking about the same struggles with different people is useless and tiresome. In addition, active participation of Romani women in Romani NGOs is rare. The most significant limitation I faced was the Covid-19 pandemic lockdown, which interrupted my field research for approximately one year. Due to the lockdown and restrictions, I could not easily go to Istanbul and Izmir, and I was unable to reach the Roma community gatekeepers on whom I depended for access to research subjects. Hence, my interviewees are unevenly distributed regarding their location.

Working with a Romani NGO had both positive and negative effects on my research. Positively, my job facilitated entrance to the community at a time when the pandemic had made access otherwise more difficult. The trust relationships I built within the work context became a facilitator for my research, allowing me to make detailed observations. The level of trust I earned was such that my Romani colleagues and their social circles called me an "Honorary Roma" (*Fahri Roman*). When they talked in my presence about a non-Roma person, they marked this person as an outsider by calling him or her Gaco (Non-Roma). Then, they immediately assured me, "You are one of us; you are not a Gaco." Being adopted into the community helps the researcher access more detailed information than she would be able to if perceived as an outsider. Being an outsider was particularly challenging for me during the pre-pandemic phase of my fieldwork before I began working at a Romani NGO. Most of the NGO chairpersons initially refused to meet with me if I did not know an insider who served as a gatekeeper. Once I became better known within the field the data collection process accelerated, but I also began to receive more information unrelated to my fieldwork. This sometimes made filtering out the sociologically useful information difficult because I had a hard time keeping my distance and examining the situation objectively. Finally, because of the intensity of competitive relations in Edirne, working for one Romani NGO made it challenging for me to reach and observe other NGOs which had competitive relations with the NGO I was employed by.

3.5. Ethical Considerations

I took seriously my participants' ethical concerns, following several paths to support their confidentiality. In order to ensure voluntary participation and protect participants from any potential harm, I constructed a consent form. This consent form explicitly stated the purpose of the study, the procedures participants would undergo, the steps taken to ensure confidentiality, the participants' rights, and contact information for myself and the advisor of the study. Before undergoing each interview, participants were reminded again of the confidential and voluntary nature of the project verbally in order to protect them from emotional discomfort and help eliminate coercion. Participants were informed before they accepted to give an interview that this interview would be audio recorded.

To protect participants' privacy, personal names, NGO names,[17] and contact information of participants were collected, but this information was not reported in the thesis and was kept separately from transcripts and audio recordings. Participant and organization names were replaced with pseudonyms, since some NGOs are easily associated with their chairpersons. In these cases, giving the name of the organization would have meant revealing my interviewees' identity.

In positioning myself as a researcher in the field of Romani organizations, I sought to follow Bourdieu's methodological principle of "non-violent" communication (Burawoy, 2019). Taking account of the power dynamics shaping my relationship as researcher with my research participants, I tried to balance and equalize these power dynamics as much as possible by leaving the choice of location and time up to them. I asked open-ended questions to give my participants space to speak freely. Meanwhile, I also avoided unnecessary intrusion into my participants' private lives by remaining attentive to and respectful of their personal and cultural boundaries. In the conduct of face-to face interviews, not only verbal data but also gestures, facial expressions, and other nonverbal communication is of significance for the research. In order to equalize the power dynamics and give as much control to my research participants as possible in a relationship that inherently tends to objectify them, I

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[17] For a better understanding of the analysis, the basic aims, establishment dates, working themes and number of members of the associations are given as Appendix.

followed Bourdieu's recommendations by wearing casual clothes, choosing simple daily language, and taking care not to interrupt participants' speech (Bourdieu, 1999). These steps are also valid for my participant-observation process during my fieldwork.

CHAPTER 4

ROMANI ORGANIZATION PRACTICE IN TURKEY

4.1. Hybrid Organizations of Roma in Turkey within Romani Organization Cycles/Waves

I argue that hybrid forms of Romani organizations emerged throughout the organization of Roma since the early 2000s according to cycles/waves of contention. Based on these cycles/waves, I evaluate the organization of Roma in Turkey in two main phases: diffusion and exhaustion. During the diffusion phases, mobilization has diffused in the periods when the political opportunity was seized, while it has decreased by the reformist policies of the state and the lack of internal resources. During the exhaustion phases, the organization develops towards institutionalization rather than radicalization. Moreover, in some cycles/waves, commercialization or transformation of SMOs into service provider organizations can be observed. I will examine the process from the early 2000s to the present within four cycles/waves: the pre-organization and early organization period within civil society and as a social movement (2000-2009), the Romani Initiative period (2009-2015), the Romani deputy elections period (2015-2018), and recent formations within Roma organization in Turkey (2019-present). The first cycle/wave consists of the transition from informal leadership (abilik) to the beginning of institutionalization through NGOs in parallel with the mobilization in Sulukule. This cycle/wave shows how the organization of Roma formed through hybrid forms of organizations. In the second period, the Turkish JDP government introduced the "Romani Initiative" as part of their "Democracy Initiative" (Gençoğlu Onbaşı, 2013). Authorities and policymakers started to take the demands of Roma seriously, leading to the proliferation of Romani NGOs and causing division within the organization of Roma. In the third period, Roma started to get organized within a network to claim political representation, resulting in the election of the first Romani deputy in 2015. In the fourth, most

recent period, within the politicized and polarized environment, Romani youth and some institutionalized establish new forms of organizations such as informal and civil society networks, rather than structured organizations. Before analyzing these cycles/waves in detail, I give a brief summary of the organizations' establishment stories and membership understanding.

The aims of the organizations are similar and the narratives around the organizations' establishment share a common emphasis on certain lacks which are understood to exist in Romani neighborhoods or in wider Roma society. Notably, four fundamental themes—housing, education, employment, and health—are designated within the first workshops about Roma in the early 2000s as constituting the main purposes of the organizations. Moreover, it is rare for these associations to focus on just one theme from among the fundamental problems of Roma in Turkey. Instead, most organizations work to reduce the struggles related to these four themes all at once. The practice of generalizing activities rather than focusing on only a single theme or a specific issue is more common among the associations established before the Initiative. This can be attributed to the need for parallel execution of multiple objectives to improve deficiencies in multiple fields due to the lack of extensive collective action experience within the NGOs and the lack of an organized demand up until that point. Later on in the process, NGOs were increasingly established according to particular thematic orientations. While most of the organizations established before the Initiative state their purpose as producing activities and demanding social policies about the four fundamental issues listed above, post-Initiative organizations point out specific themes and problems in their aim such as improving youth through sportive activities, raising Roma youth awareness and education, or facilitating the capacities of Romani NGOs.

In line with these purposes, several commonalities in the NGOs' establishment stories draw attention. Regardless of the time it was founded, the establishment processes of these NGOs share some things in common. For instance, these NGOs were often founded with the support of more experienced community leaders who were already active in Romani civil society and in some cases had founded their own organizations.

Thanks to brother Hüseyin [my previous interviewer], we decided. (laughs) Thanks to him. Well, we were working with brother Hüseyin, we were together before we founded the association, and we were supporting Brother Hüseyin. We saw what Hüseyin did. Then Hüseyin took us to the field. I don't mean 100 percent, but we know about 80 percent of the associations in Turkey thanks to him (Ömer, 27).

On the other hand, some of my interviewees stated that management of an association was transferred to them by the association's founders after the latter decided they could not manage the NGO themselves.

These friends made a request of me about three months after they founded the association. "Brother Mehmet, we have established an association, but its name is. . . Roma Education Association. We do not understand education. We founded it three months ago, but we don't understand education or anything. We cannot run this association; you are in education, you work at school to run it. You know the job well. Since you know everything, let's make this association a general assembly, we elect you, and you will become the head of this business." They gave me an offer. (Mehmet, 56)

Another founding story conveyed to me involved an association originally focused on music and dance transforming itself into an association focusing on social problems before the Initiative period.

At the beginning of the first phase, the aim was to promote Romani music by forming a Romani Dance, Music, and Folkloric group. When we got together, they offered me the presidency. I said, I don't know dance music too much. In other words, I am not a man to contribute to the dance music business, but if we move this effort to a slightly more social, slightly different area, and if it becomes about opening a framework regarding the economic, health, cultural, employment, and housing problems of our people, this community, and saying something from here, we can work together. And we said, let's say "*Bismillah*" and we start to work (Emrah, 50).

Lastly, I had interviewees who said that they left groups that focus on music and art and opened separate associations which focus on the four fundamental problems of Roma in Turkey—housing, education, employment, and health.

That is, they started to postpone the real problems. So, they started to deal with things, I don't know, let's make music, let's do this, let's do that. You know, they started not dealing with the background stuff, they started not dealing with social problems. We said that there is something here, that is, there is disorder. We then established the . . . Association with those four friends (Hakkı, 56).

The organizations tend to have few registered members. The primary reason for this is the low economic status of Roma, which prevents most Roma from investing in Romani NGOs. Most organizations request membership dues. Although these are low sums, Romani people who struggle to meet their basic needs do not prefer to

prioritize investment in associations and organizations. Besides the economic factor, Roma's neglect of Romani NGOs also derives from a lack of organizational consciousness. Only since the early 2000s have Roma attempted collective action within nongovernmental organizations—a relatively short time period. As a result of their legal exclusion and marginalization since the early Republican era, and especially in the wake of increasing violent intervention and discriminatory labeling of minorities in the 1980s, Roma have approached the issue of organizing around their own ethnic origins with reservations (see the quotation of interviewee Ahmet in Chapter 1 above). This hesitation is also reflected in their understanding of being a member within the association. Some interviewees—mostly association founders from the pre-Initiative (2010) period—stated that a large part of the society still remains indifferent to participation in this organizational practice.

Through the process of NGOization, Romani organizers gained experience in navigating the legal system and implementing various social projects. Romani youth played a particularly important role in overcoming hesitation and indifference towards collective organization and action. Many of my interviewees, who continue to work in the field of youth and education, mentioned that they came together as Romani university graduate youth with the goal of addressing and overcoming the problems of young people in the Roma. They sought to achieve this goal by establishing youth-oriented associations or creating new organizational forms without legal personality. New organizational forms were born in particular out of criticism of the effects of increasing political cleavages on collective action in the post-Initiative period. While the organizations that continue to operate as NGOs defend the possibility of an association beyond politics, Romani youth who have invested in new organizational forms claim that associations established on the old model would not be able to escape the influence of politics, hence necessitating the creation of alternative forms of organization.

Notwithstanding the abovementioned problems, my interviewee Mahmut held that one need not be an official member of an organization in order to organize and work together with a common sense of belonging. He summarized the situation as follows:

> There is an association membership, but we keep it very limited. STGM gave me funds, right? Since STGM funded me, it means it's superior to me, right? STGM has

60 members. In fact, everyone thinks that the more members the association has, the bigger the association. There is no such thing, the more members you make, the more burden it brings. I'm assuming you made 300 members. Where can I hold the general assembly with 300 members? I need to have a hall. I have 60 members. I bought something for myself from STGM[18]. I got an example. (laughs) It's not in the statute, so we don't get dues. We have 60 members, yes, we mostly make voluntary members. S., N., T., B. none of these are our members but our volunteers. In fact, you do not need to be a member to work for a place. We don't get hung up on the member thing at all. We have a board of directors, and they always provide support in the business. We also have faculty volunteers. If we count our trainees, we will have 500 members. It would be increased if we went to the neighborhood (Mahmut, 41).

Like Mahmut, some interviewees also mentioned that the community usually engages with the process of collective action through benefiting from the NGOs. That is, the trust relationship built between the association and the community members it represents is grounded in the latter's experience as beneficiary. Within the broader social context, this trust relationship shapes the participation attitude of the person. Associations that can provide this trust relationship are able to find more participants in their activities in line with their goals. In addition, this relationship is also important for the realization of the collective action towards which NGOization aims. Unfortunately, the number of associations which provide this relationship and manage to sustain it is few. In contrast with the pre-Initiative period, this prejudice against associations in the post-Initiative period is due to the politicization of associations and the transformation of Romani neighborhoods into electoral battlegrounds. This relationship between associations and politics is the reason why many Romani youths have recently preferred platforms or other unincorporated organizational forms over associations as the basis for collective action.

4.1.1. Pre-Organization and Early Organization Period

Most of my interviewees referenced organization practices that existed before the establishment of Romani NGOs. Being a closed group and having a strong neighborhood culture increased the solidarity among the community. They stated that this solidarity was limited to basic needs that community members could afford, such as sharing food, clothes, and attending cultural ceremonies. Nevertheless, some

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[18] The Civil Society Development Center (Sivil Toplum Geliştirme Merkezi Derneği, STGM) was founded in 2004 by a group of opinion leaders and activists who believed in the importance of civil society for the development of participatory democracy in Turkey (stgm.org).

of them emphasized "notables of the neighborhood" (*mahallenin ileri gelenleri*), "informal leaders," and "opinion leaders" (*kanaat önderleri*) who have more political, social, or economic resources than the others, and therefore served as mediators between the Roma community and the larger society. They can be considered as the transformation of Çeribaşı concept through industrialization and neoliberal policies which forces nomad groups to settlement. After the settlement, some community members build their relationship with public institutions and non-community members. Through these relationships, they gain a "informal leader" title.

İsmail gave his father as an example of such notables who have social and economic resources:

> There were notable friends whose economic status is better or who have a wide social circle. For example, let me put it like this: my father was a junk dealer (not collector) in Tahtakale for sixty years. Someone who plans wedding or engagement ceremonies used to come to my father and buy on credit. Or, they used to go to a jeweler and other places with my father as a guarantor. In other words, they held their weddings, furnished their houses, and organized their funerals thanks to such notables (İsmail, 56).

Another interviewee, Emrah linked informal leadership to political power:

> At those times, there were informal leaders called enformal lider. Supporting like a brother or people whose political identity became prominent. . . For instance, there was a feature that our fathers brought to us—maybe we got into this business from there. Ahmet's father was involved in politics; he was a deputy candidate. My father is the person who established the Edirne Industrial Estate in 1974. . . He was the mayoral candidate from the Justice Party. In brief, maybe we are doing something that our fathers were doing as informal leaders in a feudal sense, through NGOs (Emrah, 50).

He continued that their idea for establishing a Romani NGO came from their parents being notables in the community. Defining the NGO as "a structure that is more accepted in a formal framework and that is based on the foundations of expression and gives you an official status," he claimed that NGOs are "more effective to reach more people with similar problems and become powerful." Emrah gave a crucial point about why the Romani organization practice proceeded through non-governmental organizations which is the acceptance from political and institutional environment. As is seen, before Romani NGOs were established, solidarity and organization were achieved through informal leaders and their social, political, and

economic resources rather than a systematic or institutional process. Also, the informal leaders transform to the chairpersons of NGOs through NGOization process with adopting a formal entity.

Furthermore, some of my interviewees stated that Romani people have been involved in movements such as labor movements that have a long history in Turkey. This can also be observed in the work of scholars. For example, in Yılgür's study about Roma tobacco workers as a part of the Turkish Left, he states that the organization practice of Romani tobacco workers comes from their labor experience in the Balkans before the exchange between Greece and the early Turkish Republic. Also, he argues that they expressed themselves within leftist parties in the early Turkish Republic years, attending strikes and becoming unionized—two of the main strategies in the labor movements. The decrease in the labor movement's momentum and the lack of organizational solidarity within Roma neighborhoods led to this organization practice becoming weakened (Yılgür, 2016). However, their involvement came from their class position as manual laborers rather than their Roma identity, although some of them insisted on defining themselves as Roma rather than Gypsy in the context of the labor class. This shows us that Roma have engaged in civic action in multiple capacities over the years, not exclusively based on identity. Also, some of my interviewees stated that the organization practice within NGOs began through musician NGOs or hometown associations before the 2000s.

> There were the first Romani organizations. These were in the 70s and 80s. The organizations mostly existed as solidarity associations (*dayanışma dernekleri*) of drummers (*davulcu*), clarion (*zurna*) players and musicians without using the name Roma. But they could not join forces among themselves, and they dispersed. You know, there were Roman drummers and musicians' associations that were established in the 70s. But there were no associations named Roma. At that time, the laws were also harsh (Mehmet, 56).

Most of my interviewees mentioned the Article 5 of the Associations Law of 1983 that banned establishing an NGO based on ethnic identity. Therefore, they organized within occupation-based or hometown-based organizations.

After the 1980 coup and ensuing transformation of the field of civic action, the first attempt to establish a non-governmental organization whose name included the word "Roma" was made in the 1990s by a group of Romani people in İzmir. This attempt was met with severe legal action, and the group was tried for treason according to the

Law of Associations. One of my interviewees who was a member of this group explained the incident:

> The first Romani Movement started in İzmir. The first Romani NGO was established in İzmir in 1996. No matter who you ask, they will acknowledge it as the first. Y. brother founded it. At that time, I was a student in the last year of secondary school. I wasn't even 18 yet. I had a library card. Brothers said to me, research the history of the Romans and bring us what you find. I said ok, I went to the library, found some resources, and brought them. They made me a member of the association; my age was under 18. At that time, it was forbidden to establish associations under the umbrella of the Romani Association [because] it belonged to an ethnic group. Brother, we were tried in the state security court. In the state security court! My father said, you got my child's fingers burned my child (laughs); we were detained. Anyway, we made a statement. The leftists pumped us up at that time; the oppressed were like this and that. The brothers were emboldened. We were tried by DGM [the state security court] in no time flat. . . . The man looked; we are ignorant; they did not even call me to the second court. They were released immediately. The founders were also hit with fines. This was our first experience (Mahmut, 41).

He added that the NGO was established by someone's encouragement.

> There were many NGOs around Y. brother. Brother Y. hung out among the extreme leftists and unionists. They said, "You should establish an association, you Roma are like this and that (hitting on the table)," but at that time, some EU projects were written about the Roma within a non-Roma NGO. . . . This is what we were told: Money comes from Europe, and this organization had that money to burn. There was an impression like why shouldn't we manage this money rather than them; why shouldn't we spend this money on the Romani people. People knew that either there is such crazy money back then, or you could demand those amounts very quickly, and it will come right away. There is such a thought. Our NGO set out with such a dream. This was also the central theme of the avalanche of associations. So, money was coming from Europe. But it was not easy to get the money as much as they think (Mahmut,41).

This traumatic experience provided both a precedent and a deterrent for the subsequent establishment of Romani NGOs. From one side, this first attempt set an initial precedent for establishing non-governmental organizations to unite the Roma community, although the founders were not entirely in control of the process. Until this attempt, the Roma community organized for solidarity and cooperation within hometown associations or occupation-based associations. At the same time, it shows the beginning of the EU's and grant projects' involvement and its effects on organization. From the other side of the coin, fear of significant penalties has made the majority of Roma skeptical about establishing an NGO based on ethnic identity.

The amendment notwithstanding, hesitations about founding the Romani NGOs still existed. Ahmet, one of my interviewees who is one of the first organization founders,

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states that when they wanted to establish an NGO, most people from the community criticized them badly,

> Then, in Turkey although we said, "Come on guys, let's form a Romani association, Gypsy association, improve ourselves within the society, destroy the prejudice," most of our friends ran away from us. They said "There is one trouble in Turkey, and you want to be a second one. . . .'—you know, they made a connotation about this terrorist organization [i.e., the PKK]. We said that we are not like that, we want to get back our lost rights before the law. We draw the line when anyone disrespects the call to prayer (*ezan*), our flag [i.e., the Turkish flag], and our homeland [i.e., Turkey]. Our Roma won't be traitors, but we've fallen behind and must catch up [i.e., with non-Roma] (Ahmet, 50).

Emrah and Ahmet stated that the first association was established with the term Gypsy (*Çingene*); however, it was changed to Roma (*Roman*) due to the reasons mentioned above. Firstly, Roma comes from Romanes which is the native language of Roma. Secondly, the organization wanted to participate in a common discourse with other Roma communities from other countries, mostly in the EU. Adopting such discourse gave them the chance to obtain support from EU grants.

Some of my interviewees stated that NGOs founded prior to the 2009-2010 period of the Romani Initiative tried to foster solidarity and cooperation amongst each other and with other organizations. Despite ongoing social prejudices, the newfound organization of the Roma community has made it easy to carry out various projects in the field with the support of different non-governmental organizations and international organizations. The first efforts and publications on discrimination and poverty were made with project-based actions in this process. The activities and projects carried out will be given in more detail in the following sections; here, it will suffice to highlight one significant achievement of Romani NGOs. This was the abatement of nomadic Gypsy inscription from the Article 4 of the Settlement Law of 1934 in 2006.

My interviewee Ahmet explained how the amendment of this article paved the way for other studies and workshops and emphasized the role of Romani NGOs in this change:

> Later, during that time, we heard this from our elders in the past: "the child won the police college, but he could not enter with the signature of the police station chief because he was a Roman child." We always heard this from our elders. Then we researched it, we said what is this, what is it. Then, the phrase "anarchists, spies,

nomadic Gypsies. . . . Then, when Abdullah Gül visited Edirne as the Minister of Foreign Affairs in 2006, we presented it to him. Then we conveyed this issue to our President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. He was prime minister at the time. Later, we saw that it was improved in a law. This law has been amended. We changed it. [T: Until 2006, this law continued in this way]. With this law, Roma lived in Turkey for 71 years. With something like this about the rise of prejudices. When you look at it, Roman studies started after that. Romani workshops have begun (Ahmet, 50).

The studies and positive outcomes ensuing from the amendment of this article have led to the establishment of various associations for similar purposes in many cities, and, ultimately, a federation to provide unity between cities and take quick and collective action.

My interviewees who witnessed the establishment of the first federation in Edirne in 2006 asserted that the reasons behind the ability to act together more easily were the low number of Romani NGOs coupled with high motivation to gather around the same goal and act with solidarity. They explained that it was important to gather in a federation since being unified can strengthen collective action and open space for increased political and social representation. Also, the federation ensures that the demands of individual groups which had previously not received a response are heard by the public institutions.

We were all together. Edirne was the only [Roma] federation in Turkey. We used to gather in Edirne. It was the people who left Mersin and came to Edirne for one-day, two-hour meetings. But the aim was to inform this community of people and to explain what its purpose was. Now we can talk. In the past, we couldn't go to the president; [now] we can. We could not meet with the Prime Minister. I could not go to the deputies. [Now] we are eating at the parliament. We can tell our troubles. We couldn't do any of these (Cemil, 48).

The NGOization process that started with these aims was also the beginning of the conflicts about decision-making. During the election of the federation president, a fight occurred between two candidates and some members withdrew from the federation. Then, they established another federation. The conflict comes from the competition for being a key person to access public and private institutions and resources. Since being chairperson of the federation raise the possibilities of access rather than being a member of federation. Therefore, self-interest got in a head of the community-interest. Some interviewees interpreted this situation by saying "We were few back then. We could act together. Our conventions were contentious, but we worked together." (Ahmet, 50). However, some of them argued that "This is the

first time such a separation began. After that, there are thirty or forty federations now." (Ali, 38).

Another interviewee, Ayten described her experience creating the federation which led to the establishment of Turkey's first Roma Confederation as follows:

> Immigrants Association opens in Izmit. Again, not Roman. Because nobody in Izmit accepted being Roma back then. No Romani Opening happened. I am the secretary of that association. Our first to open. We are opening the İzmit Roma Association for the first time. 2008, 2009. Then I was writing the statute; now I am writing many such statutes, and I am writing it in my hand. I am changing the bylaws. I try to match each other, I do. I saw that it (the association law) says at least five associations—if they come together, they become a federation. Now I'm so tired of establishing associations, I say, let's gather these together so that they become something. Anyway, I created the federation. I saw that they are not finished, you know, the work is not done. They are just signage associations (tabela derneği), I said to the federation president and association presidents that day. Again, there are association presidents and federation presidents coming from Çanakkale and Samsun. I said that it would be like this: instead of dealing with each of you separately, I said come on, let's establish a confederation. At least I said it would be a stronger structure. You know, it embraces and unites everyone. Oh, because as it multiplies, it suffers damage. So, the people suffer. They said ok. It's my biggest mistake. Establishing the First Roma Confederation (Ayten, 34).

According to her, it was a mistake because rather than uniting and working for the community, the confederation's president used its power to increase his own political power and status. Except for one or two good projects for Romani children, no significant projects or activities for good cause came from the confederation. Also, she added that this initiative exacerbated the separation between the Romani NGOs and the community.

Meanwhile, within Sulukule mobilization, Roma experienced to get organized within social movement organizations. della Porta's definition of NGOization of SMOs can be discussed within the mobilization. Sulukule Platform which has a social movement organization form due to its transgressive actions—strikes and sit-in protests, and its forms of an informal network and its relationship with other types of organization has transformed a non-governmental organization as Sulukule Gönüllüleri Derneği after the mobilization became stabilized. Moreover, we can observe a commercialization process in this example, since Sulukule Gönüllüleri Derneği works as a service provider with its activities such as psychosocial support, literacy workshops, nutritional support, technological tool support for the

neighborhood residents who forced to migrate another neighborhood (SGD 2020-2021 Report). Thus, a social movement organization was transformed an NGO, like della Porta's NGOization of SMOs discussion. This example is one of the hybridization examples of social movements and civil society.

4.1.2. The Romani Initiative Period

The transformations in the political level with the Initiative gave rise to an increase the number of Romani NGOs. My interviewee Yusuf described the reason behind the proliferation of Romani NGOs as follows:

> After the 2010 Government's Romani Initiative and the saying "I never apologize to anyone, except my Roma brothers,", the governors, the district governors, and Roma jumped over the fire together at Hıdırellez events. While jumping, holding the hand of the president of an association was the trigger for the other man. Before that, there was a snowball's chance in hell (hiç şansı yoktu). Well, when there was a problem in Kuştepe, they used to call President Yusuf again and again. Now there are 13 associations in Kuştepe (Yusuf, 55).

After Roma were recognized as full citizens by the Turkish state and political policies started to be implemented, the prejudices which had plagued the beginning of the association-building process decreased. The community, which had previously experienced problems communicating with and making demands from local institutions, saw that they could be addressed by institutions thanks to NGOs. In a period when the awareness of collective action was not fully gained, these meetings held by the state and workshops held with associations were perceived differently by the grassroots. The idea that establishing an association instead of organizing will bring a political status and representation has increased. Thus, proliferation of Romani NGOs accelerated. On the one hand, the associations that have existed since the first years of the process developed themselves with the help of various funds. On the other hand, the number of associations called "bag associations" (*çanta dernek*) and opened only for the purpose of gaining individual status and power increased considerably. Bag associations refer to formations that could not provide the necessary institutionalization, did not carry out institutionalization processes, are generally affiliated to a single person, and do not have organs such as a charter or board of directors. Also, some of my interviewees stated that creating bag associations could function as a means toward establishing a federation or confederation, as in Ayten's confederation experience.

Until the government's reformist policies, the solidarity of the participants both in mobilization and organization in civil society were higher. The organization was more powerful before the state reforms. The action plans created, the promises made by the government and state's top administrators slowed the pace of the organization and divided it. Moreover, with these policies, the state offers its officially sanctioned activism tools with a cooperation EU project framework and repertoire become moderated like advocacy meetings and awareness rising events. Its co-optation strategies against the mobilization of Roma divided the organization and create conflictual relationships that I will discussed in the next chapter. Although the state interventions gave a limited framework to Romani community, within this framework another political opportunity was seized which is related with political representation of Roma which is another cycle of contention within Romani organization in Turkey.

4.1.3. The Romani Deputy Elections Period

Roma Rights Forum (ROMFO) had a network structure. It consisted of several Romani NGOs linked with each other for demanding their human-rights as Roma. As an organization structure, it differed from the federations due to its informal network-based structure. It was way bigger formation than federations because it also included some Romani federations. The political representation was the focus. Since its SMO-like formation, I argue that ROMFO is an example of SMOization of an NGO. Aside from network formation, ROMFO had a diverse repertory that included documenting human-rights violations and advocating for increased political participation of Roma. As Ahmet said above, although there are contentious meetings, associations that try to act together aim to draw attention to the deficiencies in political representation. The first Romani MP was elected in 2015 because of ROMFO's work on policy making and inclusion in decision-making mechanisms regarding Roma.

> We gathered all the associations and federations in Turkey in one place in Istanbul. We established ROMFO there. A very good thing emerged, but then, after five or six months, the union broke down. There were only 12 or 13 associations left. But we remained good associations, active associations, so qualified people remained. Here we started to put pressure for a deputy nomination. In the meantime, we were going to Europe and the Balkans and observing implementations in Europe. We were watching some processes. Then, in 2011, we placed Özcan in the eleventh place

from İzmir. It was a long shot, but we have taken a step. In the process after that, we started those works right after that, we started from 2011 to the end of 2012, I think. So, we gave all our strength to Özcan. So, everyone worked for Özcan to become a deputy (Hakkı, 56).

In 2015, for the first time in Turkey, a Romani candidate was elected as a deputy in RPP. The fact that the deputy, Özcan Purcu, was the president of a non-governmental organization also led to an increase in the number of NGOs and bag associations. With the presence of a Romani political representative in Parliament and political parties' use of associations to increase their voting potential in the Roma neighborhoods following the Romani Initiative, the Romani organization process became increasingly politicized. One of my interviewees, Ali, explained this politicization as follows:

> The organization of the Roma comes to the beginning of the 2000s, and while we were struggling to seek rights, we suddenly found ourselves in politics while trying to impose our identity and the way we live in this country. And we got two Romani deputies. Unfortunately, these deputies could not develop policies that would have a great impact, since there were no Romani citizens in the bureaucracy. Then these deputies failed in many places because they could not find political power, bureaucratic power and the infrastructure of the Romani associations in the association was insufficient. And when they were unsuccessful, they forgot about this Roma problem and said, "Oh, how can I be elected for the second term, how can I be re-elected for the third term?" They came to this mode and this time, Roma turned to seek rights as RPP and JDP members.[19] So, there is such a political turmoil. And the thing is, this is not actually the problem of the Roma in the local neighborhood. Because no one knows this business. They don't listen, they don't know. This is mostly the fight between the heads of the associations organized above and the members of the deputies (Ali, 35).

Although the main cause of the ideological polarization of Romani associations is related to the recent sharpening of the political polarization that has existed in Turkish politics for years, the lack of recognition of Roma individuals as citizens is also a critical reason behind the politicization and polarization of the associations. For many years, Roma society has been faced with legal discrimination and has suffered from a lack of information about their rights. Until the 2000s, public institutions in Turkey did not recognize Roma's status and existence—both politically and bureaucratically—and therefore did not offer help for their needs. Because of Romani organization within non-governmental organizations, national

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[19] JDP is the ruling party and RPP is the main oppositional party. In the Roma case, the opposition between these two parties conributes to political cleavages in the community.

and international institutions started to consider the demands of the Roma community directly. The importance of NGOs for the Romani organization practice was illustrated by the government's response with such programs as the Romani Initiative and Roma Strategy Action Plans, (Çetin, 2017; Çekiç, 2021) as well as the multiplication of grant announcements coming from the EU and international organizations. During the implementation of these programs, Romani NGOs were considered by national and international bureaucratic and political bodies. This led to a rising perception within the Roma community that the authorities only pay attention to one's concerns if one is a president or member of a Romani NGO. On the other hand, the political parties and the state used cooptation strategies and it caused polarization of the organization. It is an obstacle for a strong organization.

However, according to Ali's argument, the lack of Roma citizens in bureaucratic positions is the reason for inadequate policy making and implementation. Although the lack of Romani bureaucrats and politicians may have contributed to a lack of representation, the vital problem is a structural one having to do with the way minorities in Turkey are (mis)perceived and (mis)understood, which exceeds the predicament of Roma. In other words, top-down implementations and bureaucratic processes are planned according to an official ideological logic which does not consider that people within the same minority or disadvantaged group may have different needs on the same issues. Also, the subtle or direct way of discrimination among the public institutions that Romani people struggle with is another structural problem.

Within this political atmosphere, some of the NGO members argued that everybody can have a political ideology but as a civil society member nobody should use his or her political stance as a tool. In the meantime, they added that in today's civil area it cannot be possible.

> No chance to live anymore. I was one of them (non-partisan association) last and now we have lost our function somewhere. Because why? We had two deputies. Now, when I went to a municipality in Izmir, they said, "You have a deputy." After the process, that is, after the election process, the Roma associations went backwards (Hakkı, 56).

Taken together, Ali's and Hakkı's statements strengthen my interpretation that the problem's root is structural. The same problems continue because there are not

sufficient political and bureaucratic institutions or measures in place for meeting the demands. Instead of offering a solution, the existing officials, who are responsible for fulfilling that demand, emphasize that the only key to the solution is the parliamentarian of Roman origin. During my project meetings, one of my interlocutor chairpersons of a NGO told me, "Before the first Romani deputy was elected, we had 600 deputies, now only 2." This discourse summarizes the real problem experienced by Roma society.

It is inevitable that the practice of organization should not be affected by political polarization in Turkey and the fact that politics is the determining force in the power dynamics between central and local governments. "Even when there is a demand from an institution known as JDP member, RPP member does not receive the request, vice versa." (Ömer, 27)

"Are they going to take advantage of me or am I going to take advantage of them?" is a common question among the interviewees. There are several answers for explaining the political parties' effects on the organization practice. The most common answer is that Roma NGOs have become the backyard of politics (*siyasetin arkabahçesi olmak*). Yusuf criticized the situation,

> If you establish a federation as the back window of a party, this time you will not have a chance to say no when Kılıçdaroğlu says we will do something there. On the other hand, Tayyip Bey turned and said that you will not celebrate the 8th of April, the World Roma Day. He said March 10 (Romani Initiative Day, 2009) will be celebrated as World Roma Day and they celebrated it for three years in a row, despite of our reactions. Because why? You profit from it. When the President gives you the instruction, you follow that instruction (Yusuf, 55).

Within a different perspective Mahmut focused on the NGOs capacities about planning projects that are logical, systematic and sustainable output for taking serious by the public authorities.

> The summary of the situation is: When the situation turns a little bit into a relationship of interest, it goes off the rails. Political parties are also closing the door to you. . . . We went to the Social Assistance Directorate of the Municipality of K. The manager called me to distribute supplies. We said okay. We said, can you send us your lists? They sent the lists. Lists are messy. Lists of years. We sat down and made the lists. The children checked whether this person still lives at this address or not. They made their changes. The woman said to her staff that the children did this in three days, you couldn't do it for months. Then, those who come here to distribute food are escaping the chaos, as they do in every Roman neighborhood. There was no problem when the children distributed supplies. Because we make plans in advance.

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Actually, we have a special feature, they are looking for people who will work rationally in the field. He is looking for an interlocutor in the Roman neighborhood. But while choosing this interlocutor, he really wants someone who is both decent and potential. When he finds it, he already owns it, does not let it go. Our NGOs (others) do not have this potential. I'm telling you, the man did not open it and read the statute. When institutions see that, they cut off communication (Mahmut, 41).

4.1.4. Recent Formations within Organization of Roma in Turkey

For current situation, most interviewees accepted that political cleavages damage the mobilization. "Romani NGOs as a backyard of the political parties" discourse is dominant. While some young Roma states increasing politicization of Roma as an inclination of demanding the political representation and problematic on the implication, some of them bring the strongest critic.

NGOs works like "let's write a project, earn money, let the people in our organization make a living." Vocational workshops were now written not to provide a profession for Romani people, but to receive salaries for the people working on the project. In other words, when you see the background, a reaction occurs inevitably, and you develop an attack against it. The platform is actually an attack against this.

The new organization practices besides the non-governmental organizations of Romani youth show the critical approach of young Roma. In 2019, a group of young Romani university alumni formed a platform. The platform established as an outcome of an EU project of Ömer's youth organization. However, the criticism of *dernekleşme* converted the platform as an independent entity from the association. The platform's name is in Romanes. Aylin states,

> . . . . We don't like the implementation of Romani NGOs and we were disagreeing with them. To give them a little more direction and to make the Romani youth demand something. Yes, there are university graduates on this platform. There are Romani youth who are university students and university graduates. It needs to be demanded in order to be able to influence Turkish politics and policy and to produce this policy. We are on the demanding side. So it's been a year and a half since this platform was established. It was October of last year if I remember correctly. It was founded in Edirne. This is a platform based on Turkey. In other words, it is a platform created by Romani youth living all over Turkey and Romani youth living in very different locations (Aylin, 26).

Another youth formation established in 2020, as a voluntary organization. The difference of this formation is that it is established under an international organization in the Romani civil society. The main purpose of this formation is

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reporting human rights violations against Roma society. Besides the informal networks separated from non-governmental organizations, few non-governmental organizations which are institutionalization process, have been established civil society networks directed by a Romani NGO. Network structure provides an advantage to act quick and to access the autonomy within a network rather than federation due to the strict rules and formations within federations. The first youth platform tends to include transgressive actions within its repertoire such as publishing a youth statement and demand their fundamental rights and criticize the polarization of the Romani NGOs. On the other hand, other networks' supports demand for mother tongue education also can be considered as transgressive within the authoritarian regime. Moreover, their inclusion the other new social movements issues to their repertoire such as environmentalism, women's right and LGBTI+ movements show us a possible tendency of NSM characteristic of the recent Romani organization in Turkey. In the next part of this chapter, these new formations and their repertoires will be mentioned in more detail.

The development of the Romani organizations should be considered within its political and institutional environment. The existent political and legal structure in Turkey affect the organizational formation preference of Roma. Although not the only determinants, the opportunities and limitations shaped by the political and institutional environment lead the Romani actors within the mobilization to choose specific organizational forms—in this case NGOs. While political opportunity structure builds a framework for opportunities and limitations, the Romani actors (chairpersons, participants, activists) develop different strategies within these contexts and how they develop these strategies also should be considered. In the Romani organization practice in Turkey, an opportunity becomes available in the political opportunity structure and opportunities are the initiator of the cycles/waves of contention/protest. Each cycle has its own diffusion and exhaustion phases. During these cycles/waves, hybrid forms of organizations emerged. These organizations locate in the range of heterogeneous forms between SMOs and NGOs.

After the demolishing Soviet Union, the Central European countries developed ethnicity-based politics; therefore, Roma as an ethnic identity adopted more easily and Romani actors organized within organizations that the environment encouraged.

Vermeersch gives Hungary minority self-government system as an example. In Hungary, the system provides political and economic remunerations to internal organizations, so Romani activists abandoned unifying under the non-governmental umbrella organizations and engaging with the international organizations (Vermeersch, 2006).

Like in Hungary, since the relaxation of the ban for establishing non-governmental organizations in Turkey and no tolerance for an alternative organizational form, establishing nongovernmental organizations is the only choice for organizing after the 1980 coup. Until the 2010s, the government also promotes the nongovernmental organizations both politically and financially by recognizing NGOs demands and funding them through projects. The transformations within the political and institutional environment led Roma to establish NGOs based on their occupations or to join hometown organizations to increase solidarity among themselves. Therefore, one of the reasons why Roma chose nongovernmental organizations to form organizational practice is that the political and institutional structure allows and supports the establishing NGOs, only. In addition, the minority politics of Turkey since the early Republican period made Roma ignored their ethnic identity. As Ahmet says, Romani people were afraid of participating Romani NGOs at first due to the fear of being called terrorists or traitors by the government and society. Moreover, the discriminative laws promote the hesitation for claiming rights through their ethnicity. Their lack of socio-economic resources which leads to lack of internal resources production, their lack of organizational consciousness leads them determine a strategy within the political and institutional environment in Turkey to benefit from the opportunities given by the political structure more than other minorities in Turkey. In this sense, they differ from the European context, also. One of the interviewee states, "Roma in Turkey refuse to define themselves in terms of ethnic identity because it is not functional in Turkish case." Therefore, the concept of citizenship and equal rights claim as citizens became common. As Suna (43) states, the concept of citizenship is prioritized within the organization because the political structure recognizes this concept for policymaking. Also, the latter excludes the groups which have ethnic identity or minority claims from opportunities and resources. Meanwhile, changes in the association law have made it easier for groups like Roma to organize within NGOs. Likewise, the European Union has supported

the Romani movement by funded projects. Therefore, Roma who have few internal resources have started to organize within nongovernmental organizations as a movement strategy. Moreover, the relation between political opportunity structure and the Romani organization is not one-sided. Just as the political and institutional environment influences and transforms the Romani movement, the Romani movement transforms the environment. I explain how this interactive relationship transformed through the history of the Romani movement.

According to Diani, the sense of collective belonging and solidarity among individuals, groups, and organizations in a movement is strong during the establishment and strengthening phases (della Porta & Diani, 1999, p. 37) which is the diffusion phase of protest cycles/waves. According to political opportunity structure and seized opportunities, the diffusion phase has started in the Romani organization such as establishing first Romani NGOs, Romani Initiative, first Romani deputy election and new formations within the organization practice in Europe. On the other hand, there are exhaustion phases in the Romani organization cycles/waves influenced by state interventions. In Romani case, the state intervened through reformist policies such as Romani Initiative. From establishing first Romani NGOs to the declaration of Romani Initiative, Romani activists and organizations acted together and ensured that the discriminatory laws regarding Roma were changed. The strong sense of collective belonging among the Romani NGOs and activists increased and caused that the political structure took into consideration of their demands and the government had to amend the law. This act is an attend for accumulation of political resources and for maximization of collective claims on these resources. After the amendment of discriminative laws, the Romani mobilization gained a political success and Romani Initiative followed this success. The Romani Initiative was the first moment which the political and institutional environment recognized the Roma. According to Tilly, for effective mobilization two aspect is significant. Firstly, groups must accumulate as many resources as possible. Secondly, they must increase collective claims on accumulated resources by decreasing competitive claims on them, developing internal fulfillment of participants, and rising the eagerness of participants to share their resources with the group. Thus, the movement took a big step for being an effective mobilization example, like Tilly argues (Buechler, 2011, p. 129). For accumulating resources

within the movement, this new political opportunity structure creates financial and political opportunities. In the second cycle, thanks to the collective pressure and actions such as writing petitions or litigation for changing laws and fighting against discriminative implementations in the society, the Turkish government was compelled to develop a policy regarding Roma. The requirements of the EU candidacy process are another effective development in this decision. After the declaration of Romani Initiative, the government started to prepare the Romani Strategical Action Plan by considering the chairpersons of Romani NGOs as political and social representatives of the Roma communities. This transformed environment led Romani NGO chairpersons to accumulate political and economic resources for the mobilization. However, the second necessity for having an effective mobilization cannot be accomplished widely. The sense of collective belonging was damaged by proliferation of the Romani NGOs. The government's unplanned declaration has seeded the idea to Roma, who have few resources and has been ignored by the state mechanisms until now, that the only way to consider by the state and other institutions is to form an association. With the proliferation of the Romani NGOs, the collectivity and solidarity of the organizations were interrupted. The fact that the organizational process had just begun in the Romani society prevented the creation of a strong solidarity strategy with the grassroots against the suddenly changing structure. This made it difficult for the organizations that existed before the Initiative process to establish a strong collective solidarity which means that state co-optation policies worked, and the strong mobilization of Roma decreased. On the other hand, they have more space to express demands and problems in the field expanded by the changing environment. Moreover, the granted projects provided by the EU, other international organizations and the state framed the collective repertoire of Romani NGOs established in the pre-Initiative period and led them to begin institutionalization.

Another issue caused by this transformation in the political structure is the conceptualization of Roma within the policies. The Turkish government's disaffirmation about minorities in Turkey contradicts with EU's minority politics and Romani politics. The European Union draws a minority framework in the policies and project grants regarding the Roma, which it defines Romani groups as an ethnic or national minority. The strategy developed by the Turkish government against this

situation was to position the Roma among disadvantaged groups such as women, children, the elderly and the disabled. This situation has also led to contradictions within the Romani movement. The sense of collective belonging was affected negatively due to adopting different conceptualizations by different organizations. Another reason for this is that the adoption of the minority concept will cause them not to benefit from the existing political opportunity structure. In other words, most Romani NGOs and NGO chairpersons perceived this as a cost rather than opportunity. For example, the major adopted conceptualization is being one of the essential elements (*asli unsur*) of Turkish Republic. Most of the interviewees who used this concept said that they are Muslim first and then Turkish. Thirdly, they stated that they are Roma. The other adopted concepts are disadvantaged group, vulnerable group, and cultural identity rather than ethnic identity. Most of my interviewees stated that it does not matter which concept is used, and that the vital thing is to reach the solution of existing problems. As I mentioned before, such a strategy has been prioritized to benefit from the resources offered by the political and institutional environment.

Until the selection of the first Romani deputy which is the initiator of the third cycle, the hybridization of activism and volunteerism in Romani organization can be observed in the Sulukule mobilization through NGOization of the SMOs. As I mentioned before, the informal organizations such as Sulukule Gönüllüleri Platformu, became institutionalized and formalized as a non-governmental organization at the exhaustion phase of the mobilization. The transgressive action repertoires of SMOs in the Sulukule mobilization such as strikes and demonstrations, public resistance festivals, have been transformed to moderate actions such as service provides for children in the neighborhood. The organizations' informal network forms shifted to structured organizations and conflict replaced with civility, cooperation, and collaboration with local public institutions.

In the beginning of the third cycle—the selection of the first Romani deputy, the sense of collective belonging increased for the same collective claim which is providing the political representation of Roma among Romani NGOs, especially from pre-Initiative period. This claim cultivates the damaged sense of collective belonging and solidarity in the organization. Thus, Romani NGOs by using lobbying

and creating pressure on main opposition party to nominate a Romani candidate in itself. They have used the resources they have accumulated collectively in the process and the networks that the chairpersons of Romani NGOs and non-Roma activists have acquired to fulfill this demand. With the taking a part in the workshops that the government arranged for creating Romani policies and organizing meetings for increased awareness on the socio-economic and discriminative issues, and conducting projects based on the fundamental problems that Roma faced, Romani NGOs and NGO chairpersons gained social and financial resources. They make contacts with both grassroots and policy holders which gives them political resources. Finally, they used these resources to be selected a Romani deputy. After this achievement, the ruling party have accepted Romani parliamentary candidacy. The critical point here is that there was no political representation policy over their identities before. Following this process, Cemal Bekle became the second Romani MP in the parliament as a Roma deputy from the ruling party in 2018. The deputy elections also show the interactive relationship between the organization and the political opportunity structure. Like the first cycle, the diffusion of the mobilization has declined after the first aim of the mobilization was achieved. If the mobilization could continue to increase with solidarity and collectivity after the first gain—first Romani deputy selection, different claims and gains could be in question, but the exhaustion period came with this gain. Many Roma (mainly men) started to open associations in the hope of taking part in a political party and developing their individual resources, and existing associations tried to seize the opportunity to cooperate with a political party. This leads the decreasing the collective action among the Romani organizations and community. Although the Romani deputy elections is an achievement of the Romani NGOs' collective action for rising political representation and it contributed to increasing the political involvement of Romani NGOs, the political polarization in Turkey has negatively affected this process. The proliferation of NGOs continues increasing in relation of political cleavages. The organizations repertoires, objectives and participation strategies have been shaped and restricted by ruling party JDP and main opposition party RPP politics. My interviewees describe this process that associations have become the backyard of political parties/politics. The political parties use Romani NGOs as the purpose of increasing the voting potential Therefore, most of the NGOs prioritized

party ideologies rather than communities' problems and it let to struggle with establishing new collective claims among the Romani NGOs including the NGOs founded in pre-Initiative period. Even Romani deputies' claims and policy demands became limited with their party politics. On the other hand, this is not a literal process. Some NGOs use this attempt of political parties to create resources for the community, such as Yusuf's using party-oriented resources from different parties focused on the needs of the Roman neighborhood. Ömer's debatable question about parties, "Do they take advantage of us or do we take advantage of them?" The debate also shows that the process does not progress unilaterally. One way or another, the Romani NGOs are losing their autonomy and collectivity within these relationships. Political parties become decision-making authority. Thus, the exhaustion phase of this cycle started with the political cleavages between the organizations. This caused some organizations focused on institutionalization to become commercialized and work as service providers, and the process of producing collective claims and actions with different Romani organizations slowed down. Furthermore, the critics of this process paved the way of establishing informal and network-based organization formation in Romani community which is the initiator of the recent cycle. For evaluating this cycle of Romani organization, further research is needed.

According to Tilly, sometimes challengers gain resources on their own like demolishing discriminative laws. Moreover, they seek to make coalitions or alliances with polity members to increase their possibility of success (Buechler, 2011). In this case, the building relationship with political parties is the strategy for increasing the possibility. However, these alliances may lead to costs. McCarthy and Zald (1977) argue that for gaining resources, the movements rely on external resources may have to conceding their autonomy in exchange of these resources (Buechler, 2011). Through the mobilization process, Roma depends on the external resources. At the beginning, non-Roma NGOs, and EU accession process helped establishing first Romani NGOs. Due to financial incapacity, the EU funds and state projects were necessity for the continuation of the process. Moreover, the lack of political representation and ongoing financial insufficiency led to political cleavages of Romani NGOs. The community is one of the most disadvantaged groups in Turkey. They have unemployment, sheltering and low education level problems for a long time. Thus, the movement depends on the external resources. The dependency of the

external resources gives the authorities, institutions and polity members a vast power on Romani NGOs. Therefore, Romani NGOs and their chairpersons cannot have the full authority for creating demands and being active in decision-making processes. Different parties and institutions' diverse ideologies become another obstacle prevent creating collective demands, accumulating, and canalizing the resources to the same claims. Thus, Romani NGOs and their participants struggle to increase the momentum of the mobilization step by step rather than experience an often-fluctuating process.

Moreover, in the third cycle, ROMFO was the lead organization which consists of several Romani NGOs and federations to strengthen the claim of political representation. ROMFO was an informal network formation; therefore, it is an example of SMOization of NGOs. It was the first example for adaptation of network formation by Romani civil society actors in Turkey.

About the struggle of creating collective claim, the interviewees mentioned the rising self- interests of Romani NGOs chairpersons. Although in some cases, self-interest gets in the way of group interest, in fact, when we look at the activities, this is also inevitable for group interest, because the chairpersons of the period are not strong enough to create internal resources. Suna explained the situation with her experience:

> Well, the mobilization happened too fast but without the right-based approach. [Nobody knows] what an association does, how it is carried on or how division of labor made. For example, I'll tell you a funny story. In 2011, A unity was establishing called Turkish Roma Union (*Türkiye Roman Birliği*). We were invited for the unity. There were 85 association or more. Then, they said let Ahmet be the president, let Mehmet be his assistant, let the other be this or that. A supervisory board was also established. The supervisory board is the most important organ, think about that. After that, they put those who did not enter anywhere on the supervisory board. We just watched in disbelief. One poor man came and said, "The president [calling to her], what does this supervisory board do?" he said, "They put me there." I said paperwork, I said, you examine it, you read it, then you see if it's good or bad, then you give suggestions, you give it back, and so on. He said "The president, I don't know how to read. This is a tragicomic story. And yet, at one point, we expected a rights-based struggle from people who were illiterate, that is, who could not read, and who also could not read where they are (*bulunduğu yeri de okuyamayan*)—I am speaking ironically—(Suna, 43).

Most Romani NGO chairpersons are primary school graduate and tradesmen or professionals with low income. Before the mobilization process, they have few or no political interactions or economic supporters. The participants interest cannot be

provided due to external dependency. Therefore, the participants think that if they become an NGO chairperson, they can access the economic and social resources. This leads to proliferation and political polarization of Romani NGOs. The insufficiency of creating internal resources caused by the chairpersons' lack of socioeconomic status and unskilled position in the organization is relevant to middle class emphasis of new social movements. Like Tilly states, the one of the effective mobilization aspects is increasing the sharing participants' resources with group. At the beginning of the organization, few Romani NGO chairpersons have few economic or politic resources depend on the socioeconomic situation of communities and traditional leadership organization practice. One of the first established associations chairperson, Emrah gives the reason of the proliferation of Romani NGOs interrelating with the absence of the Romani elites during the beginning of the mobilization:

> Inevitably, we [Romani civil-societism] create Romani bourgeoisie which brings someone, a group, specific individuals, or specific structures over to somewhere. We became "elite Roma" . . . Why did it happen? For centuries, Roma have not recognized by any state authorities. When a NGO leader met with them, why wouldn't someone else form the second association? If he sits, other one will sit too. A federation is needed for a slightly higher authority. Then there will be meetings with deputies and politicians. If you became a confederation at that time, you could sit at the same table with the prime minister. In order to do that too, we are currently experiencing the confusion about quality or quantity (Emrah, 50).

Suna explained why the organization needs the bourgeois class as a following of her last quotation,

> On the other way, no matter how the civil society struggle relates to the form of fighting against injustice, having egalitarian approach and so on, I think the state of struggle in civil society, the state of visible struggle is purely bourgeois work. I would like to say why. That is because you need to have stable income, you need to be comfortable to spend time, your money, your connection for there. I mean, poor people cannot earn a living for the family (Suna, 43).

Thus, Romani NGOs have difficulty to produce internal resources for the group interest and participants in the group. As an individual, their socioeconomic status is low. Therefore, they tend to search for external resources. Moreover, strong and entrenched patriarchal relations in the community also is an obstacle for the collective action and mobilization. Male dominance in the organizations subordinated women who want to participate in organizations and prevent the development of woman chairpersons in the organizations. I met very few women

activists during my field, and they all talked about the double discrimination in society because they are Roma and in the field of organizing because they are women. There were those who said that their participation in the organizing process was condemned through gender roles. One Romani woman interlocutor who more educated, told me how she was mansplained and ignored by a Romani man who is a chairperson of a Romani NGO for years. Suna, the chairperson of a Romani NGO, said that she regrets the investment she has made in Roma men as chairpersons of NGOs for years, and that she has been trying to use the resources of the association with a focus on women since 2015.

This tendency has started to change today with Romani youth's existence in the field. More educated and skilled young Roma try to produce internal resources, especially internal solidarity. They try to create a collective consciousness. The number of Roma women in organizations is higher than it used to be. These new alternative organizations have different leadership understandings, organization forms, and collective action strategies than the former organization forms. Therefore, within the last cycle of Romani organization in Turkey, hybrid forms of organizations demonstrate characteristics of SMOs through their network-based informal formations, partial transgressive action repertoires, and plurality and intersectionality with other new social movements.

In the next part of this chapter, I will examine the different organization types according to their leadership approach, their decision-making approaches, their form of hierarchy, and participants' sense of belonging within the organization. Romani youth's new organizational forms will be discussed related with the historical background.

4.2. Romani Organization Types in Turkey

The Romani organizations in Turkey have different formations within a heterogeneous range. At the beginning of my fieldwork, I interviewed chairmen of early established organizations (pre-Initiative period), and these chairpersons mostly tend to have leadership claims as charismatic leadership. They are positioned as the key people for determining strategies and repertoires and other organizational decision-making processes. Towards the end of my fieldwork, when I met with

interlocutors who presided over youth networks and more institutional organizations, I observed a shift from this leadership understanding to a leadership understanding that sees leadership as a process and where leadership tasks are shared. As Romani organizations become institutionalized, leadership as a process tends to replace charismatic leadership. Moreover, youth networks which are new forms of organization, have already adopted leadership as a process understanding. To understand these dynamics, I defined five different Romani organizational types within this heterogeneous range of organizational forms according to their leadership, participation, and decision-making processes: "We" organizations, "I" organizations, Neighborhood organizations, Briefcase organizations and Youth networks/platforms.

The chairpersons of Romani organizations which try to be institutionalized or are institutionalized mostly use "We" discourse when they introduce their activities or plans which underlines the teamwork. Moreover, some chairpersons use "I" discourse when they explain their organizations' activities and strategies. These are Romani people who wants to gain legal entity by establishing an NGO. There are some similarities with NGOs called My Own Organization (MONGO), which emphasize their self-interest (Fowler, 2011). However, "traditional leaders" who are also seen as a gatekeeper by various authorities thought establishing NGOs as a necessity, due to the acceptance of legal entities by national and transnational institutions rather than the acceptance of individuals. Due to the discourse of organizations' chairpersons, I designated "we" and "I" organizations these two organizational forms.

4.2.1. "We" Organizations

Recently, there is a tendency of shifting from charismatic leadership understanding to leadership as a process understanding. The chairpersons of organizations emphasize teamwork rather than claiming being the leader of the organization. This emphasis diffuses the decision-making processes and participation. The decision-making process is an egalitarian process. The decisions about the organization's strategies, activity plan, and other relevant issues are not taken by the chairperson alone. The formal and informal participants are included in the decision-making

process. The future implementation plans are made together. Participants needs are also prioritized in the organizations. Cultivation of participants is provided by various training and activities specific for the needs of participants. While members of some "we" organizations share the leadership responsibilities, chairpersons of some other "we" organizations still have some responsibilities more than board of directors and members as formal participants, and volunteers as informal participants. The responsible one for seizing opportunities, setting strategies and tactics, making the division of labor among the organization, planning and providing resources, and getting in touch with possible donors is still considered as the chairperson. Moreover, the hierarchical formation of "we" organizations are parallel with legal organization scheme of NGOs. Thus, the transition to leadership as a process understanding is in progress. Attendance of the meetings with public and private donors organized as a team and chairpersons and a group of participants join the meeting together to show the power of the organizations. Participants' individual achievements and responsibilities in the organization are introduced by the chairpersons. They reinforce the organizations' demands with their examples. Hence, the participants' existence in these meetings shows whether this organization well-organized and well-planned to the authorities.

For example, after my interview with Mahmut, he invited me to a meeting with the advisor of Metropolitan Municipality Mayor. There was an upcoming public policy activity of the organization, and they have some demand from the municipality such as transportation, accommodation and attendance the activity. They have an activity plan and context. Mahmut also explain to me that there are some bureaucratic procedures that he does not know, and he will also ask for advice and guidance about the process. Mahmut and two volunteers from the organization was preparing the meeting about a week. He underlines the importance of attending meetings by saying that authorities give more attention the projects and demands when visiting them as a group. It shows them the collective and systematic work behind the action. Mahmut works in a district municipality. His position gives him an opportunity to access and achieve these requests even if he demands them all himself. However, he states that he wants to show his team's and his community's collective power and ability to be united. Also, he adds that more people want to attend the organization when they see the participants' inclusivity on the political processes.

This also leads us to another aspect within participation: involvement and sense of belonging. The first involvement of the organizations mostly depends on the social ties. People who know an activist person from the field most likely to participate the collective action. The social ties have critical roles on possible participants among Romani NGOs due to closed community feature. The kinship and friendship are the main sources to participate an organization. Possible participants calculate what has cost them or what they gain from the involvement. The leadership understanding of an organization becomes vital at this point.

In the same organization, youth participation is very high. When we were waiting for the meeting with the municipality, I also asked volunteers how and why they joined this organization. One of them said her uncle also works with this organization, and the other one said that her friends from the organization told her how they actively participate in the decision-making and representation processes and how the organization creates opportunities for their employability and active civil society worker, besides strengthening the Romani community. They mentioned several civil society workshops, such as advocacy and lobbying, which they attend with other Roma or non-Roma organizations.

4.2.2. "I" Organizations

Since Romani people who have networks with institutions and the community establish these organizations to gain legal entity, they sustain charismatic leadership understanding. They claim themselves as leaders of Romani community subtle or direct way. On the one hand, they make the necessary legal obligations for the continuity of the association. On the other hand, they work alone rather than as a team. As opinion leaders, they get in touch with the Romani community and other Romani organizations directly and receive the problems of the community and the demands of the grassroots. About strategies, opportunities, and resources, they evaluated the situations and decide whether s/he does.

They involve participants through employment in project-based work. Apart from that, they use their own personal resources—if they have external resources such as political party resources. These types of organizations emerged before and during the Initiative process. They differ from Bag associations in that they use the political

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opportunity structure for community demands and aim to mobilize the community. They differ from "we" organizations because they do not have participants and a teamwork basis. For this reason, they cannot develop an effective discourse and strategy as "we" organizations. The tendency of these organizations to be established together with the influential work of "we" organizations has decreased, although previously established ones are still in the field.

For example, Yalçın is a leader from an "I" organization. He has a wide range of networks within Romani organizations. During our interview, his phone constantly rang, and people from other organizations asked him for pieces of advice on some issues related to their association. During my fieldwork, he also traveled to other regions and met other NGO chairpersons and neighborhood residents to share his ideas, give solidarity messages, and listen to the problems. He is a primary school graduate. He took advantage of several courses and training provided by EU- based projects like capacity building training for Romani NGOs in the early years of the mobilization. Besides involving EU-based projects, he conducts several projects cooperating with municipalities in İzmir, such as workshops for fighting against drugs in Romani neighborhoods and events for celebrating 8 April World Romani Day. According to him, nobody in the organization is willing to participate actively; therefore, he acts alone in decision-making processes, but he can access most organizations and Romani people from different regions.

4.2.3. Neighborhood Organizations

They are organizations that carry out neighborhood-based activities and where solidarity is carried out on a small scale. For Roma as a closed society, these associations are important organizations for the continuity of collectivity and solidarity within the neighborhood. They work to solve neighborhood-based problems through connections with local governments and other Romani NGOs. It consists of neighborhood residents with similar problems and demands. Although the decision-making processes vary from association to association, decisions are made by the chairpersons and the managers of the association. It is a formalized form of traditional leadership. Although it has a legal association hierarchy, it creates a hierarchy based on the president of the association, as they are composed of a small

number of people. They have strong ties with the locals. They are organizations where needs and demands are followed. Since each neighborhood has its own problems and demands, the relations of these organizations with the community are very important.

4.2.4. Briefcase Organizations

As interviewees mentioned in the previous chapters, briefcase organizations are Romani NGOs established for gaining self-interest. Until the NGOization process, Romani community had no resources, recognition or political opportunities aiming enhancement their socio-economic status. Therefore, many Romani people with lack of education capital considered to establish Romani NGOs to provide economic and social help from institutions. This led to proliferation of Romani NGOs. In this situation, briefcase organizations do not have strategies, or skills to be able to access resources due to their emphasis of self-interest. Thus, they cannot produce any political discourse or collective action and do not have power to mobilize Romani communities. Another aim for establishing such organization is being able to establish federations like Ayten's example in previous chapter. These organizations have function on paper to increase federation organizations accessibility to opportunities. In conclusion, leadership approach, decision making process, and participation are hollow concepts for discussing briefcase organizations.

4.2.5. Romani Youth Networks/Platforms

Romani Youth Networks have been formed very recently. Rather than major NGOization strategy, they prefer informal networks. These organizations have no legal entities. The networks or platforms consist of university students or young university graduates. They adopt leadership as a process understanding, so they share the leadership responsibilities. Participants divide the labor according to meritocracy and distribute leadership responsibilities between each other. Due to egalitarian way of decision-making, the needs and claims transformed a policy offer together. Also, the strategies are determined collectively. Romani youth try to create internal resources through building solidarity among themselves and other organizations.

During my fieldwork, I observed that some NGOs strictly disapprove their core teams work with another NGOs unless these NGOs cooperate with each other and within the field participants are warned as "these people are from Ali's team or Ömer's team" which caused polarization. However, in Romani Youth networks/platforms, there is not such a strict understanding, except some incidents. For increasing solidarity among activists and organization, they assist and work with different Romani NGOs more than their participation to networks/platforms. They do not have economic resources; therefore, they use their other resources such as their time, volunteer works or other required skills they have. The social ties are the strong aspect for producing solidarity and sense of belonging among youths. Being friend and experiencing same struggles through their life combine with the high education level. About the collective action, their consciousness has been raised as university graduates. Analyzing this new form of Romani organizations with more detail needs further research.

Being a chairperson of a Romani NGO is interpreted gaining a leadership status among the community. Social, economic, and political status can be gained by the chairperson in all types of organization discussed above in different degrees. About reaching the different kinds of resources, the chairperson of the NGO is assumed as mediator between resources and community. Thus, on the one hand they provide the necessary resources to the community by negotiating with public and private institutions for further activities, or projects, on the other hand they strengthen their networks and create their own resource. Recently, this trend has started shifting to "leaderlessness" leadership which consider leadership concept as a process and the companionship as a decentralized understanding become increased among Romani organizations.

Lastly, while "we" organizations were in the process of becoming a professional non-governmental organization, they started to establish some networks because of their project-based work, such as the Romani non-governmental organizations solidarity network, of which N17 was the founding organization. In addition, there is an informal Romani youth network (N8) established as a project output of a youth organization (N7). The difference between these two examples is that the former continues its work as a network structure with a focus on third sector understanding

in civil society, while the latter turns into a relatively radical youth network that is independent of the founding association and criticizes the understanding of civil society within Romani community. It shows us the hybridity of social movement and civil society understandings in the Romani organizational practice.

Table 2. Organization Types and Basic Information

Organizations	Organization Type	Established Date	Number of members	Purpose of the Organization	Leadership Understanding
N1	"I" organization	2005	100+	improving four main issues(4MI): health, accommodation, education and	Charismatic leadership
N2	Neighborhood	1998	100+	improving 4MI	Charismatic leadership
N3	"I" organization	2006	50+	improving 4MI	Charismatic leadership
N4	ex"we" organization	2004	NM	improving 4MI	Charismatic leadership
N5	ex"we" organization	2004	NM	improving 4MI	Charismatic leadership
N6	Neighborhood	2015	less than 5	Youth: training young Roma athletes	Charismatic leadership
N7	"I" organization	2017	less than 5	Youth/Education: increasing educational level	
N8	Youth Network	2019	20+	Youth/Education: Policy Change and Rising Solidarity	Leadership as process
N9	Neighborhood	2006	43	improving 4MI	Charismatic leadership
N10	ex"we" organization	2014	NM	Raising international cooperation for 4MI	Charismatic leadership
N11	"I" organization	2009	20+	Employment: Increasing the number and improving conditions	Charismatic leadership
N12	"I" organization	2011	less than 5	Education: increasing educational level	Charismatic leadership
N13	Neighborhood	2007	34	Youth/Education: Producing policy on youth and culture	shift to leadership as process
N14	Youth Network	2021	16	Fighting against discrimination and Hate Speech	Leadership as process
N15	"We" organization	2014	10+	improving 4MI with focus on child rights	shift to leadership as process
N16	"We" organization	2017	50+	improving 4MI with focus on improving youth	shift to leadership as process
N17	Neighborhood	2011	NM	improving 4MI	Charismatic leadership
N18	Neighborhood	2018	7 NGO	improving 4MI	shift to leadership as process
N19	"We" organization	2009	35	improving 4MI/Producing public policy	Leadership as process
N20	Civil Society Network	2015	22 NGO	Improving capacity of Romani organizations	Leadership as process

4.3. Strategies among Romani Organizations in Turkey

Meyer and Staggenborg define a strategy as "includes decisions about tactics, claims, targets, and alliances, and these decisions are interrelated" (Meyer & Staggenborg, 2012). Collective action strategies in the Romani organizations in Turkey have some similarities and differences. Within this heterogeneous range of organization practice, there are two interlinked strategies as major trends of Romani organizations which are organizing within NGOs and EU project-based work. I evaluate them as common strategies by several reasons. Firstly, this trend is not innate within Romani organization practice in Turkey. Since national and transnational institutions reinforce the civil society with institutional and financial resources, NGOization become a major trend for organizing in Turkey. Moreover, the elites also provide support to civil society organizations through the human rights discourse. For the Roma community, which has very limited relations with non-Roma communities, and limited resources both financially and socially, organizing within the NGOs has also enabled the political opportunity structure to be seized. Secondly, the Sulukule mobilization as initiation of a social movement led to commercialization after its demobilization phase which was turned SMO-like organizations to service providers. Lastly, since Romani organization practice is not as rooted as other minorities' organization practice, their collective action strategies and repertoires also are inadequate. With the support of non-Roma elites, their mobilization and civil society organizations processes have been started—Sulukule mobilization and establishment of first Romani NGOs. NGOization process is their first collective action experiences which they sustain it as a strategy later.

Strategies are related with collective action; therefore, briefcase type organizations are outside of this debate. Within the first cycles/waves, the repertoire of organizations was wider due to the parallel organizing within civil society and mobilization. The litigation was used both against discriminative laws on Roma and displacements in Sulukule. Moreover, the transgressive actions such as street protests, occupations, demonstrations and human chain or sit-in protest were organized during the Sulukule mobilization with non-Roma elite supports. Moderated actions adopted from civil society repertoire such as advocacy, lobbying, and publishing statement are more common in Romani organization practice in

Turkey, notwithstanding transgressive action repertoire cannot be observed except for Sulukule mobilization.

While I was working in a Romani NGO, we discussed with other NGO members and workers common trend that adopting a repertoire more compatible with national and transnational authorities. One of them explain the situation like, "the problem is not organizing people to make protests. If I want, I can organize whole neighborhood but for what? How can we sustain it? What can we achieve?" and another one asked me "How can you expect that kind of protest from a community which is afraid of being seen as a threat?" They underline the lack of support from non-Roma. Also, they mention Sulukule mobilization as a legend, an event that can only happen once. They were seemed desperate about a possibility of a mobilization in the future. Even though they criticize the NGOization process of Roma due to increasing political cleavages and raising self-interest among NGO members, they also cannot think any other options except civil society.

Moreover, EU funds also reinforces the tamed civil society because the fundamental outcome that EU donors demand from implementation organization is a policy offer which necessitates cooperation and establishing alliances with public institutions rather than challenging them. Thus, EU funds also shape Romani organizations repertoires and selection of the action type.

I give two examples from different organizations actions for 2 August Roma Holocaust Memorial Day in 2021 for understand the situation better. At first, a Romani civil society network established by a "we" organization, organized a workshop as an EU funded project. Thus, the local government, a non-Roma civil society network and several transnational Romani activists as alliances supported the event with participation and dissemination of the event outcomes. The network also published a statement with its social media accounts demanding an improvement of the dialog between governments, transnational civil society, and Romani community on this issue. On the other hand, an "I" organization also want to read its statement on Romani Holocaust Memorial Day in a public space. Some other neighborhood and "I" organizations and Romani people joint the event. The police force arrived at the public square and wanted to arrest some people from the group. The informal

networks of some members of organizations negotiated the police and nobody got arrested. While similar action such as establishing a statement is considered as proper within an EU funded project framework, alternative actions can be seen inappropriate. In a nutshell, either they think that there is no alternative space to organized without civil society and get funding from EU or until they can sustain the cooperation with public authorities and gain achievements for community, organizations tend to be organized more moderate actions rather than become radicalized. On the other hand, state's reformist response does not offer the communities solid needs. Even though youth networks criticize the current NGOization of organization practice and try to develop alternative strategies, they state that their financial and social resources are limited, therefore, they cannot sustain their strategies in long-term.

However, as I mentioned before, EU projects draw a strict framework for these kinds of actions and do not let organizations using radical terminology, even little critical or conflictual words. On the other hand, the informal network structure of youth platforms gives a flexibility to these organizations unless they do not work within a project. I better observed how EU funding organizations control and reshape the Romani organization in Turkey while preparing a statement paper for the project. Last year one informal youth network published a Romani Youth Statement on April 8th World Romani Day. 100 Roma and non-Roma university students and activists demand equal access to education, improvement of the socio-economic status of Romani youth, and criticize the political cleavages and political parties' selfish attitudes towards the community. On contrast to general compatibility strategy of the community, it can be considered as a contentious approach. On the other hand, a similar youth statement had to be published in the project I was working on. We prepared a statement parallel to the statement that emerged with the solidarity of Roma and non-Roma youth on April 8th. The project team I worked with were the network's members who prepared the previous statement. When I sent it to the funding international organization for approval before the publication, they said that the words "demand" and "criticize" made the paper too harsh and demanded that the version they revised be published. In this revised version, the NGO's promise to cooperate with state institutions and to support these institutions in their work on

Romani issues were emphasized. Moreover, the funding organization's official warned the NGO about its contentious actions such as previous statement.

Within these strategies, my interviewee Ali categorized the Romani NGOs' activities according to protest cycles/waves:

> When the first Roma associations were established, the first stage of the work and association in 2004-2009 was seeking rights. In other words, they were mostly studies on prejudice, ııı stigma on exclusion. However, after 2009, with the Romani Initiative, this turned into a poverty index and studies were carried out on this poverty until 2015. From 2015 to 2020, there is a complete politicization (emphasis) and organizations based on the discourses carried out by the political mechanism (Ali, 38).

Since there was no collective action against discriminatory laws until the beginning of NGO-based organizational practice, one of the central goals in the first years of the NGOization process was to demand reform or abolition of discriminatory laws. Along with such judicial gains, the four main themes which are health, education, employment, and housing determined through the Roma workshops drew on the framework set by the following works of the associations. These four fundamental problems have become the primary foci of and rationale behind the establishment of Romani associations. Of these four issues, my interviewees referred most to employment and education.

Romani NGOs have been responsible for organizing a wide range of activities. In the early organizational period, various studies were conducted by NGOs to identify the needs of the Roma and make appropriate policies. Apart from these studies, needs were also identified through consulting informal leaders. The low literacy rate has led to the opening of literacy courses for adults; the high number of common-law marriages at an early age prompted the organization of mass wedding ceremonies; low school attendance led to the creation of scholarship programs and meal and transportation assistance; insufficient female employment led to the opening of vocational training courses for women and the establishment of nurseries so that women can participate in working life. As the number of NGOs increased and the resources available to each NGO narrowed, some associations decided to specialize on a single theme. The conditions behind the provision of EU funds also favor such specialization. The framework of the open calls for funding defines the direction towards which organizations focus their energies.

In addition, activity preferences vary according to the scale at which the associations operate, whether they are neighborhood-based, national, or international. Neighborhood organizations work as a service provider, mostly. While neighborhood-based associations mostly carry out literacy courses, vocational training courses, and wedding ceremonies, other organization types also research the Roma, workshops for social policy production, and capacity building projects for other Romani associations at the national and international levels. Neighborhood organizations also work as the transmitter organizations that transfer the information about claims and needs of the community to "we" and "I" organizations. "We" and "I" organizations offer them help to develop their organizations with limited resources. The latter is inadequate for assistance to neighborhood organizations compared to the former. The dispersed settlement of Roma has led each neighborhood to have its own problems and demands. The information transfer from neighborhood organizations to "we" organizations conveys the formulation of these demands and needs for creating policy demand. Suna explains this exchange of information relation as a powerful side of their association. They provide sustainability by forming a Romani organization network attached to their association. This process is also valid for "I" organizations; however, "we" organizations' teamwork effectively prepares strategies.

Although there was no sharp transition from the activities against discrimination to poverty-based ones like Ali states, the frequency of poverty-focused activities has increased in the post-Initiative period. The main reason for this is the support of these activities by various national and international institutions within the scope of project-based work and the increasing needs of society. The demand for the creation of policies for minorities that emerged from the EU harmonization process led to the formation of action plans for the needs determined by the state. The associations' projects on the four main problems outlined in these plans supported the government at local and national levels. Meanwhile, within the scope of EU-funded Romani activities, these fundamental problems have been defined among the priority areas of work.

Recently, Romani youth networks/platforms focus on the actions fighting against discrimination and increase solidarity among Romani youth with Romani culture and

shared concerns. One of them like I mentioned before organized a Romani Youth Statement that 100 Roma and non-Roma university students signed. A group of Roma university graduate volunteers, who criticize the legal obligations of associations, their politicization and their commitment to EU funds, have planned university exam preparation courses within this network. Another one reported human rights violation based on discrimination against Roma by working with an international Romani organization. Moreover, they use social media effectively as a collective action tool. They reach both Romani youth and non-Roma civil society environment by publishing statements, writings columns in online newspapers, giving interviews and publishing news on social media. For example, there is an online newspaper called *Roman Medya* established by non-Roma women activists and recently is conducted by four Romani youth activists and focus on news related with Romani issues. Moreover, a young Romani activist and journalist who has articles in several online (non-Roma) newspapers and a column called "Öteki Mahalle" (The Other Neighborhood) writes regularly on Romani issues such as representation, socio-economic problems, culture, and history. Although it was established by non-Roma, former is managed by Romani youth and includes Roma-related news only. However, later creates a space within non-Roma platforms and includes environmental issues, and other minorities human-rights violations on his articles. Also, a theatre community consist of Roma and non-Roma activists and youngsters in Keşan, Edirne prepares plays about Romani history and culture, in addition to perform theater plays that draw attention to issues such as environmental pollution, women's and children's rights. Thus, youth networks and activists have an intersectional strategies and plurality emphasis on their actions, mostly which they draw close approach to new social movement understanding. Youth organizations need a more detailed analysis in further research.

To summarize, Romani organizations in Turkey adopted NGOization as a collective action strategy due to their late organization process, lack of social and financial resources to sustain collectivity and lack of experience on collective action. Moreover, after a short-term mobilization experience, they formalized their strategies and repertoires within a moderate framework by reinforcements of EU funds. While "we" organizations as institutionalized ones execute lobbying and advocacy activities with adopting EU project-based work, neighborhood organizations focus

on working as a service providers and transmitter of communities needs to "we" organizations. Furthermore, youth networks concentrate on discrimination of Roma and solidarity of Romani youth with critic of formal organization structure and plan their strategies and repertoires with a consideration of women's right, environmental rights, other ethnic minorities right and other intersectional issues.

4.3.1. Social and Economical Dimensions of Romani Organization Strategies

Establishing NGOs and working on EU project-based strategies are highly related to the Romani community's lack of internal and external resources. According to the political opportunity structure, this dependency has affected the community's collective action strategies and repertoires. The transformations within the political and institutional environment—the emergence of new social movements, the revival of civil society, the transformation of the concept of minority, and the domination of human rights discourse in activism and volunteerism discourses—create opportunities for Romani organizations. Their seized opportunities in the political and institutional environment within each protest cycle/wave were parallel with the EU framework and the state actions. On the one hand, the political opportunity structure gives a frame for organizing Roma.

On the other hand, it limits the collective action repertoire and strategies. In the Turkish case, Roma have adopted acceptable strategies by the state and the EU. They have developed their collective consciousness through civil society and limited activism space, which the EU's human rights discourse frames both.

On the other hand, the lack of resources for mobilization, such as labor and money, and the ability to mobilize them also lead Roma to adopt these strategies. According to resource mobilization theory, grievances cannot turn into a social movement if they do not have the power to mobilize resources. The critical point is the transformative effects of social movement organizations with their possession of resources and ability to mobilize these resources (Zald & McCarthy, 1977). In the Romani case, the community has not had enough resources that above-mentioned to mobilize them. Therefore, they need external resources such as labor, money, and knowledge to mobilize. Zald and McCarthy explain some stresses on resource mobilization theory, which also helps understand Roma's collective action strategies

in Turkey. Firstly, the accumulation of resources—in this approach, economic resources are emphasized—to challenge the social conflict. Roma have experienced increasing poverty and unemployment. Their priority is earning a living with limited resources. Therefore, they do not have the necessary resources for accumulated and mobilize these resources for collective purposes. Within the first cycle of organizing, Hakkı stated that he sometimes had to spend his child's meal money for the expenses of his association. Also, Sibel talked about the chairpersons of the organizations who had to go to the state authorities in old and torn suits to meet with them. In this case, finding and accumulating external resources became crucial for the emergence and sustainability of mobilization. This is only possible within the political and institutional environment with the state and EU funds that require conducting EU projects and attending capacity-building activities in civil society. Secondly, they point to the requirement of a form of organization (see Chapter 1). Hence, Roma organized through non-governmental organizations. Through the formal organization which is required for applying to EU projects. To accumulate resources, Roma needed to create ones; therefore, they established NGOs and applied EU projects. During the early cycles/waves of protest, the EU funds have become the only source for economic and human resources. Thanks to EU-funded projects, they can accumulate the money and employ people to create collectivity. Recently, the limitations of this source have become more visible since its only offer short-term solutions. Thirdly, the involvement of individuals and organizations which are outsiders to the social movement is crucial for understanding a movement's successes and failures. In the Roma case, the involvement of non-Roma also started with the establishment of Romani NGOs. Rather than economic resources, non-Roma individuals and organizations involved in the organization practice as civil society workers in the EU projects or by organizing capacity-building activities, which are also within the EU framework. Finally, the participation of individuals and organizations in a social movement depends on costs and gains within the movement, which are affected by the formation of society and the stances of authorities. The lack of internal and external resources has led Roma to action for minimum costs. Therefore, they adopted the collective action framework offered by the state and the European Union. Moreover, their activism experience also is limited with Sulukule mobilization for the same reason. Marginalization of street protests by

the government has led not to prefer transgressive action, which also may cause to lose of economic resources provided by the state. Thus, to increase the support from authorities and the larger society, Roma prefers moderate actions within civil society in each cycle/wave of protest, densely.

Lastly, Romani organizations' preferences for collective action strategies have social and economic dimensions. Roma improved their internal and external resources through the cycles/waves of protest. The Çeribaşı position in the community has transformed into chairpersons in Romani NGOs. Recently, Romani youth have worked to increase the internal solidarity among young Roma and other Romani organizations. Through the organizational practice, their collective consciousness and action repertoires have developed. Transition to settled life also reinforced the development of neighborhood-based solidarity. On the other hand, the socio-economic situation of the community has continued to decrease drastically. Therefore, they are dependent on external resources. The economic dependency caused to be dependent on EU funds. However, these funds do not offer a sustainable solution and cause Romani organization strategies to be regulated by the EU framework, like the Romani youth statement example.

4.4. Interorganizational Networks Within Romani Organizations in Turkey

Social movements consist of various actors, organizations, and networks whether they have informal or formal structures. Although there is a tendency that social movement organizations are the basis of the movements, they are one of actors which have effects on social movements. Civil society and civil society organizations have same relationship. The investigation inter-organizational networking within Romani NGOs helps us to understand how these NGOs interact with each other on which basis. Thus, in macro-level, it gives us a picture of social ties and can tell us a lot about the nature of an organization practice at a given point in time (Diani, 1995).

In this chapter, I examine competitive, conflictual, and cooperative relations within Romani NGOs. Although scholars tend to focus on alliances when they analyze networks of collective action within SMOs in a social movement, Diani suggests that competitive relations which include having same pool for possible supports and seeking recognition from same public authorities also should be considered within

social network analysis (Diani, 2002). Due to dependency of external resources, the relationship within Romani organizations tends to be competitive rather than cooperative. On the other hand, recently Romani youth networks aim to increase cooperative relations between other Romani organizations and themselves. Firstly, I examine the competitive relations between Romani organizations through the competition for working with and recognizing from same possible national institutions such as local governments and governorship; the competition for EU-funded projects; and the competition for same field/neighborhoods/participation. Secondly, I analyze the conflictual relations through the ethnicity debate and political cleavages of Romani organizations. Thirdly, I investigate the cooperative relations between Romani organizations through direct ties such as exchange of information, being allies for specific projects and campaigns; and indirect ties such as shared participants to joint participation in specific events or actions, and shared linkages with third parties (private or public). While I asked my interviewees how their relationship with other Romani organizations is, they answered my question according to above-mentioned aspects. Also, thanks to participant observation method through the project I worked, and meetings and trainings I attended, I find a chance to analyze their interactions according to these aspects. I prepared M x M matrices for competitive relations, conflictual relations and cooperative relations within Romani organizations and mapped relations by using these matrices. The dynamic relationship patterns exist in organizations; therefore, these maps are visual tools for explaining the situation during my fieldwork. The mapping helps showing that there are meaningful relations with organizations, however, I will elaborate these relations according to the relational types: competitive, conflictual, and cooperative.

4.4.1. Competitive Relations within Romani Organizations

Interviewees and interlocutors emphasized the competitive relations more than cooperative ones. Beyond the dependency on external resources, the lack or limited resources caused to underline the competitive relations. Each linkage between nodes referring to competitiveness can be different. Sharing the same pool for support from public institutions, applying for the same EU funds, or sharing the same field for potential participation are major linkages for Romani organizations and the focus of this thesis. Moreover, the spatial differentiation and similarity is the other significant

aspect of the competitive relations. The strength of the linkages differs depending on local or national levels. Organizations in the same locality have more intense competitive relationships contrary to two organizations from different cities.

To understand these relations clearly, I divided competitive relations as based on resources and based on participation. The competitive relations based on resources can be examined at local and national level. Organizations sharing the same locality and those working at the local level compete for recognition by government agencies, mostly. Those working at the national level compete more for both local authorities and EU project-based opportunities. Also, competition for members and beneficiaries is the part of the competitive relationships for participants.

Figure 1. Competitive Relations among Romani Organizations in Turkey created by Author

In the map, the arrows with straight line indicate in competitive relations which interviewees claimed that they compete directly for the same resources. The striped arrows show competitive relations which organizations did not mention but refer to the competition between organizations arising from their shared locality or their application to the same EU-funded projects. According to map, the most competitive linkages belonged to N19 and N13. N19 is one of the most institutionalized "we" organizations in the Romani organization in Turkey. It managed the several EU funded projects and its relationship between public and international institutions are strong. Therefore, the other organizations claimed their competitive relations with N19. Also, N13 is the part of N20 which is the civil society network that N19 established. Therefore, N13's cooperative relations with N19 creates competitive relation with other organizations. Furthermore, the striped linkages between N19, N16, and N15 shows the indirect ties based on applying the same EU-funds. Between N16 and N9, there are same ties due to their location in İzmir. Moreover, in the right corner of the map, there are intense linkages among organizations. Being the same locality is the main reason for emerging competitive relations. N4, N5, N6, N7, N10, N12 and N13 are in Edirne and spatiality determined their relationship.

The intensity of the interaction is different depend on the spatial differentiation. The competitive relations' intensity in Edirne is higher than İzmir and İstanbul. Since Edirne has not metropolitan municipality and is a smaller city compared to other cities, this intensity can be seen clearly (see the linkages within N4-N5-N6-N7-N10-N11-N12-N13). The competition for possible support from local public authorities and participation from the same neighborhood are parallel with each other. For example, one organization built cooperative relations with public institutions such as municipality, but it does not have steady communication with the community. On contrary, another organization has strong relationship with community and has participant support, but it does not active relationship with public institutions as much as the former. While one organization emphasizes their participant resources when explaining the competition:

> Well, there is a conflict within the field. If you are good at your work and do not argue with anyone else, they say "This person has become very successful, we should stop him/her. If we won't, s/he can displace us from our positions." . . . We [talking about themselves] are educated and well adapted young people . . . But,

there are other youth organizations which try to press for preventing the formation of new teams. Because there is a solid team [within the organization]. (N7, Ömer).

The other one emphasizes the support from the public authorities:

> Well, our activities and studies are more qualified than other organizations, so everybody [referring to public institutions] likes working with us. Well, we do not make trouble. We issue the required documents immediately. We deliver reports immediately. It is easy for the municipality, the governor's office, and other public institutions to work with us. You know, unfortunately [emphasis] among us we love to put each other down, when someone stands out. Here, when we did good works, we both started to be verbally attacked by people in several activities (N13, Ali).

In that case, the expectation would be establishing cooperative relations within those two organizations. However, in Romani organization case, they compete for resources they lack themselves.

In the metropolitan cities of İzmir (see N3-N8-N9-N16) and İstanbul (see N2-N14-N17-N18-N19-N20-N21-N22), examining this kind of networking through interviews is difficult due to lack of organization interviews from the same neighborhood. However, some interviewees mentioned the neighborhood-based competition relations. Both İstanbul and İzmir have closed neighborhoods which their problems and cultures different. For İzmir, one of my interviewees said that the neighborhoods have occupational differences. While Tepecik is a neighborhood where mostly musician families live, craftsmen live in Karşıyaka. He said that professional differences also differentiate neighborhood formations, and this affects the organizational practices. The Roma in İzmir organize within neighborhood organizations, mostly. The possible support of public institutions is higher than non-metropolitan city municipalities due to the additional possibility of support from metropolitan municipalities. Rather than metropolitan municipalities, organizations apply to metropolitan sub-provincial municipalities firstly and these institutions have become the intense competition points for the possible support. In the neighborhood-based competition, the support from the community plays crucial role. For example, one of my interviewees from İzmir told me the transformation process of the organization from "I" organization which works at national level, to a neighborhood organization. This process corresponds to the period in which the number of associations increased with the political polarization.

I have decided in 2015. I will work this at my neighborhood because an organization was established for each neighborhood. Nobody wanted you to go there and do an activity. They were saying "We exist. What are you doing? What are you messing with?" So, we started to work in a small area. At least, I minimized the area in İzmir. But we worked in national level. So, I started to work at my own neighborhood (N9, Hakkı).

Another interviewee interprets the situation as preferring to "Everyone should pay attention to his/her own neighborhood, first. Before other neighborhoods, I should consider my neighborhood's needs." This also explain how Roma settled dispersedly and the importance of neighborhood-based strategies. The density of the different problems may differ from one neighborhood to another. It can be said that the process in Izmir is similar for the neighborhood organizations in Istanbul.

The last aspect is valid for the organizations which work at national level mostly. The project-based work of EU is the biggest proportion of the external resources. As an EU project, there are very few long-term and large-budget projects specific to the Roma. These projects are seen as a source of achieving the sustainable strategies. These projects are tools that can provide employability, reaching the organizational goals in the long run and meeting the needs of the participants. They are the most important resources that can strengthen collective action and participation in the field. Hence, EU funded projects are the significant aspect of the competition relations within Romani organizations. One interviewee emphasized the crucial role of EU for Romani organization:

Of course, it was a great support for the Roma. If the EU had not supported Roma for organization in 2002 monitoring and evaluation report, and these agreements had not been signed, Romani organization would not be established. The system would never allow associations with the word Roma. I mean, we couldn't talk about our own identity while we were sitting there. So, we couldn't talk (N13, Ali).

Competition for such an important resource within the Roma organization is very intense. One interviewee stated that they had difficulties due to their organizational capacity and the fact that the focus group was a difficult group to work with, as well as the official complaints made by other associations during the project process. International partners in the project I was involved in also stated that these competitive relations in Turkey are more of a challenge than in other countries.

The competitive relations for participants include competition for member and beneficiary. For former, there is a common idea in the field which every organization

has a "the team" and members of "the team" are known from other organizations and competitive organizations do not share their team members. During the project, I also known as a member of one of "the team" and I worked hard to break this idea. Sibel who is considered as the member of İsmet's team—the chairperson of N15, also shared with me that she tried to change this assumption. As I mentioned above the tension between Ömer (N7) and Ali (N13). Ömer has the participation support while Ali has the resource support. This leads to reciprocal competitive relations with each other. Moreover, both local and national level, the beneficiary competition becomes centralized due to the projects.

4.4.2. Conflictual Relations within Romani Organizations

Sometimes competitive relations can turn into conflictual relations depend on the opposite positioning of organizations. The conflictual relations depend on the distinction of the ideology. If their ideologies or positioning themselves conflict each other, they have conflictual relations rather than competitive relations. The conflictual relations emerge from two main aspects: discussion on ethnicity/minority and political cleavages among organizations. Romani organizations interfere with each other due to their opposite political ideologies.

In general, Roma do not consider themselves a minority. Mobilization and studies progress on citizenship and human rights. However, while some organizations do not accept the existence of discrimination based on ethnicity, others adopt an ideology that emphasizes that discrimination based on ethnicity is a violation of human rights. These two different ideologies conflict with each other and create two opposite groups.

Moreover, related to this, there are two different ideologies on Roma/Gypsy conceptualization within these camps. The first camp argues that Roma as one of Gypsy groups in Turkey who lives Western Turkey, especially Marmara and Aegean regions. So, they accept the Gypsy as an umbrella concept and draw boundary with Lom and Dom groups. This camp conceptualizes the demand of Roma through the socio-economic disadvantages and claim the rights through citizenship concept. Moreover, the ethnicity and discrimination based on ethnicity is invisible, sometimes inacceptable for this camp. On the other hand, second camp, although composed of

slightly more heterogeneous ideas, has a conceptualization parallel with each other. Some organizations use the concept of Roma as an umbrella concept. They aim to produce policies and strategies for all Romani groups in their terms by gathering Dom, Lom, Rom, and Abdal groups under the title of Roma. Besides these organizations, second camp includes organizations which have no strict descriptions for Romani identity and include Rom, Lom, and Dom people in their activities as beneficiaries and organizations as members. This camp consists of organizations that work against both citizenship-oriented and ethnic-based discrimination.

Since an official minority rights policy has not been possible due to legal policies in Turkey and Roma have tended to distance themselves from the concept of minority, the ethnic-based policies and claims become subtle. Moreover, some organizations are hesitant for stating a visible claim on this issue. Although they mention the discrimination experienced by Roma in an aware position on ethnicity-based discrimination, they have *asli unsur* claim rather than the minority claim. During the interviews several people mentioned they or their friends had an experience on discrimination when they apply a job. Due to their neighborhood, they could not take the job (Ömer, 26; Hüseyin, 47; and Hakkı, 56). In the map, these conflictual relationships are shown. The first camp includes N1, N4, N5 and N10, while the second camp includes N7, N8, N13, N14, N15, N16, N19 and N20—which involves N13 and N17 due to N20's network formation. The interviewees from rest of the organizations which has no linkages with another organization did not give a clear statement what they think about minority or ethnicity concepts. they stated that they are the *asli unsur* in general, but this does not mean that they think that the Turkish identity adequately represents them. They avoid making a specific definition because they do not want to associate with conflicting relations with different public and transnational institutions (from field notes).

Figure 2. Conflictual Relations among Romani Organizations in Turkey created by Author

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The other aspect for conflict is the political cleavages emerged in the third cycle of the organization. Some chairpersons of Romani organizations involved in ruling and main opposition parties to increase political representations and external resources. After their involvement, they adopt their party politics and prioritize the party politics rather than the community's claims. Therefore, different party memberships create conflict between these organizations due to their membership's effects on the organization strategies. Although I cannot generalize for second camp due to its heterogeneous form, the first camp consists of organizations which support the ruling party. Moreover, second camp have organizations from main opposition party supporters/members and those who do not express any party opinion but cooperate with each party for their strategy and policies focus on Roma. During a meeting about the project in Izmir, we met with Mahmut. He said that he had worked with JDP before and took part in their projects. He said that a candidate received an offer from the RPP to ask for some help with the municipal election process, and that he did not accept it at first. He said that after an authorized person from the RPP said that he would accept their demands, he became a member of the RPP and that the association's activities were progressing in parallel. Their demand from the authority was to create a certain number of employment areas for the Roma youth in the municipality. Furthermore, in Edirne, I found a chance for talking two different chairpersons who member of both JDP and RPP. Both interlocutors spoke negatively about the other interlocutor, saying that he used the public for their own interests and party interests. Yusuf also stated how organizations came across each other due to membership of different parties and obliged to accept some claims of their parties as I mentioned on previous chapters.

The conflictual relationship between these two camps determined through the state co-optation and EU project framework. The first camp adopted the state's disadvantaged group discourse. State accepts Romani culture and their need for socio-economic resources however they defined the framework based on citizenship rather than ethnicity and minority. The discrimination based on the ethnicity is not acceptable for state policies. According to this discourse, if the socio-economic position of Roma enhances with state policies, the problems of Roma become solved. For example, in one project launch I attend in 2021, representatives from four Romani organizations—N5 from first camp and N7, N15, and N16 from second

camp, attended the event as guest-speakers. Before the beginning of the event, as a group of people, we were talking about the current studies on Romani issues. While discussing, discrimination issues, ethnicity-based discrimination was started to debate. Emrah from N5 argued that Roma in Turkey does not need to express themselves as minority; their Turkish identity is enough for discussion the rights. People have opposite view also reject his view and stated the inadequacy of the citizenship concept on discrimination issue. However, he did not accept other approaches and maintained his rejection about ethnicity-based discrimination. This discussion opened again in one of the sessions of the event and members from two different camps shared their arguments in front of the audience. The member of the first camp argued that Roma do not need for an ethnicity claim and socio-economic needs are the main needs of the community. Controversially, other camps members argued that the core problem is ethnicity-based discrimination and other problems are derived from this main problem. It was a dead-end discussion and moderator intervened to end it.

On the other hand, EU literature and EU-funded projects conceptualize Roma as an umbrella term and use a phrase "communities which live like Roma" (*Roman gibi yaşayanlar)* for other groups like Lom, Dom, and Abdals. Some organizations within the second camp (N19, N20 and N13) adopted this terminology for building a relation with Europe and also support other Romani ethnicities who cannot get support from EU by themselves. Moreover, these two aspects are related with each other since the ruling party and state discourse cannot be separated with each other. Thus, the conflict is formed by centered on the ideology of the first camp and the counter camp consists of heterogeneous understandings, but against the first camp directly or indirectly.

4.4.3. Cooperative Relations within Romani Organizations

Although the competition emphasis, Romani organizations have significant cooperative relations with each other. The dispersed settlement also affects the cooperative relations, like competitive ones. Therefore, I examine the cooperative relations within Romani organizations in two levels: local and national. I investigate the cooperative relations between Romani organizations through direct ties such as

exchange of information, being allies for specific projects and strategies; and indirect ties such as shared personnel to joint participation in specific events or actions, and shared linkages with third parties.

Figure 3. Cooperative Relations among Romani Organizations in Turkey created by Author

In the map, there are different centers based on different ties. According to competitive and conflictual relations, some organizations cooperate with other organization which do not have neither competitive nor conflictual ties. N6, N7, N11 and N12—on the right corner, and N1, N4, N5 and N10—on the left corner, have cooperative relations based on similar ideologies. N3 as an "I" organization has different cooperation relations based on the chairperson's informal network. N16 as a "We" organization cooperate other organizations both local level by sharing resources and national level by organizing events or conduction EU-based projects. There are two youth organization (N14 and N7) share members with other organizations, voluntarily help other organizations strategies and attend projects and workshops on transnational level. As another center, N19 as a "We" organization both share its resources with other organizations and also exchanged knowledge with them. The significant difference is that this organization has systematic linkages thanks to civil society network(N20) established by itself. N20 also includes more than 80 Romani organization within itself, and N13 and N17 are parts of this network.

The intensity of cooperative relations increases between two or more Romani organizations from different localities. These organizations do not have the same pool of possible support. Therefore, the alliance structure can be established among them. It also depends on adopting the same ideologies about Roma or political parties. The cooperative relationship between N1, N4, N5 and N10 established even if most of them share the same locality due to adoption of the same ideology. These organizations members are involved in JDP, and they adopted the state discourse.

On the other hand, as an "I" organization, the chairperson of the N3 in Izmir stated his inclusive and solidarity-oriented stand:

> I have actually collectively exhaustive attitude through the language I use, my character and my perspective in this situation. I try to get together with all Romani organizational forms. I am a politician close to the RPP. But many of my AK Party friends, despite my criticism of the system, say let's benefit from the knowledge of brother Yalçın, and invite me to drink their tea. We have earned their respect [talking about himself as we]. They call and ask from all geographies. They called from Balıkesir the day before yesterday. He is going to give an interview about the settlement law, and he feeds on me. They're cheating on us (laughs). I'm transferring my knowledge as much as possible so that he can grow there too. I say write, do this, do that… (N3, Yalçın).

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Yalçın exchanges information with other Romani organizations without establishing any formal network. He cooperates many Romani organizations and becomes a mediator between institutions and Romani organizations. Many of my interviewees stated that they exchanged information as well as getting to know him. However, his involvement in a party politics should be considered.

Like N3, many organizations with a relatively stronger capacity stated that they support the development of newly opened NGOs, if they believe these newly opened NGOs' effective and collective work on their own neighborhoods. The context of the support can be lobbying training, project writing training, teaching the bureaucratic processes of establishing an NGO. These cooperative relations established with informal ties. Kinship, friendship ties, or having common acquaintances convey to cooperation. Thus, these supports do not form a formal network and have no systematic and sustainable process.

Moreover, campaigns against discrimination are the ones with which organizations cooperate the most. For example, many Romani organizations came together and made press releases on the discriminatory words Erman Toroğlu used in a sports program last year (bianet.org, 2021). Also, together they made a denunciation. More than one organization comes together to participate in various interviews for newspaper articles, make documentaries about discrimination, share their thoughts on the subject on social media, and publish notices about people who discriminate against Roma and the media where racism is practiced. The networks that are closed within themselves do these works together with the organizations included in this network, while some organizations come together for these specific campaigns. Also, awareness raising events on special days like 8 April World Romani Day become the periods when collaboration among Romani organizations increased. Various Romani organizations come together or drawing them together to carry out joint work in the activities planned with the resource support of municipalities and political parties.

At the national level, the significant part of the cooperation has been made within EU-funded projects. These projects are required partnerships and collaboration among more than one actor. In other words, projects impose obligation for cooperation among organizations. For example, I wrote a project proposal for the

NGO that I worked and emphasized the need of partner organizations. However, the organization ignored this emphasis. In the rejection mail, the EU Commission that open the project call noted that one of the important inadequacies is insufficient collaborative actors from the field. Moreover, recently formed network (N20) aims to increase capacity of Romani organizations. It was established as a project-based work of N19. The network has a self-enclosed interaction system. Neighborhood-based associations established by various Rom, Lom, Dom, and Abdal groups from very different parts of the country are included in the network. It is planned to produce policies based on the neighborhood-based information provided by these associations. Meanwhile, the founding organization organizes need-based trainings for the development of local organizations and supports the development of local neighborhood organizations by financial resources, trainings, strategies. Neighborhood organizations with similar missions and visions are included in the network by application. This leads to cooperation between local and national level organizations or between neighborhood organizations and "We" organizations. There is a systematic cooperative flow between these organizations.

Recently, new organizational formations try to increase internal resources and strengthen cooperative relations. Young, educated Roma in Romani youth networks offer their skills to other Romani organizations which work as "We" organization or neighborhood organization. They exchange the information mutually. The organizations give information about the current situation in the neighborhoods, share their strategies through the project ideas and youth networks participants work with them voluntarily. They help to organizations for writing projects and share their experiences to produce policies. For example, one of the "We" organization (N16) planned a project for producing Romani youth policy. This project includes training and evaluation sessions of the current policies about Roma and Romani youth. Through the lead of the organization, Romani youth came together and work for policy production. Participants were Roma and non-Roma youth from these Romani youth networks. A similar campaign also conducted another "We" organization (N15). The difference between them is the former one cooperated with another youth network at national level, while the latter used its political and bureaucratic linkages. However, the common point is sharing same participants for these activities. Moreover, the Romani youth networks are open for all kinds of cooperation with

other Romani organizations. There are also competitive relations among themselves; however, it does not intense as much as the competitive relations within other Romani NGOs. Another difference in their relationships with other organizations is the volunteer-based participation. The lack of economic resources is still valid; however, they provide various supports such as writing a project in English, communicating with other associations, and volunteering as trainers on their own expertise, based on the competencies they have acquired. For example, while they were working similar projects like I involved, Roma and non-Roma youths like Sibel, Barış, and Aylin provided volunteer training as trainer based on their professions such as psychological support, mentoring and tutoring.

Both direct and indirect ties show that the network among Romani organizations in Turkey has polyphagous movement network characteristic (Diani, 2003, p. 308). Maps of inter-organizational relations illustrate a centralized and segmented structure. On the one part, the network is partially segmented. Since neighborhood organizations have a few linkages between other neighborhood organizations or "we" organizations through jointly undertaken projects, protests or voluntary works. On the other part, it is centralized because some "we" organizations have more linkages with other organizations and have more control on relational flows within the network.

There is more than one center within the network and these centers emerged according to three different relations among organizations. Although two camps are distinctive in the conflictual relations, other organizations outside of these two camps have heterogeneous subtle ideologies they do not want to mention to me. The two camps formed centers in line with their own ideologies. In the competitive relations, centers are determined through organizations' resources density. For example, N13 is one of the organizations with the highest competitive relations, since it has strong and active relationship with the local government and is a part of civil society network that other organizations are not. The other center in the competitive relations is N19 due to similar reasons. However, the access of transnational resources also important for the N19 case. The same organization is one of the centers for cooperative relations. N7, N14, and N19 and N20 are good examples for several centers and horizontal relationships. Youth organizations are centers of cooperation

through their voluntary-based work, and N19 is another center of cooperation due to its systematic civil society network model which it offers organizational capacity-building for organizations within the network and receive information from these organizations to plan strategies and action repertoire.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

Romani organization practice has been visible since the early 2000s in Turkey. Compared to other minority communities' organization practices, Roma were organized late and experienced rapid mobilization in 2000s. This organization started both in the field of civil society and as a social movement initiative at the same time.

In this study, I examined the internal and external dynamics, structures, and collective action strategies of Romani organizations in Turkey since the early 2000s. In order to better understand the organization dynamics of Roma in Turkey, I formulated my research question as follows: How do Roma experience organization through Romani formal and informal organizations in Turkey? I broke this question down into three sub-questions focusing on the role of the political and institutional environment in the organization practice of Roma, the relationship between Romani organizations' structures and their organizational strategies, and the dynamics of inter-organizational networking among Romani organizations. Framing the study in terms of della Porta's concept of the hybridization of social movements and civil society and Tarrow's notion of cycles/waves of protest, I argued that Romani organizations in Turkey since the 2000s exhibit hybrid forms on a continuum between SMO and NGO formations in correlation with their cycles/waves of organization. Between 2019 and 2021, I conducted 23 semi-structured in-depth interviews with Romani organization members, 18 of whom were chairpersons, and I spent ten months in the field working for a Romani NGO between January and September 2021.

I analyzed Romani organization dynamics in Turkey through this framework of hybridization due to the transformation of the political environment and minority politics in Turkey, as well as the relatively late organization of Roma. Firstly, the

political opportunity structure in Turkey after the 1980s led to an overlap of social movements and civil society based on the spread of human rights discourse. While New Social Movements such as the Kurdish movement, Alevi movement, and environmentalist movement adopted moderated strategies compared to old social movements until the first decade of the 2000s, national and transnational non-governmental organizations proliferated through the production of human rights-based policies accepted at national and international levels, globalization, democratization, and Europeanization between the 1990s and 2000s. On the one hand, Turkey experienced the NGOization of SMOs between the 1990s and 2000s as movements based their action repertoire on cooperation with national and transnational institutions, such as reporting human rights violence to the ECHR and organizing within structured associations such as the IHD. On the other hand, the SMOization of NGOs emerged through the democratization and EU-accession process of Turkey, transgressive action repertoires of NGOs such as the sit-in protests of the Saturday Mothers/People, and formation of civil society networks during the 2000s. Since women's rights, ecological rights, religious freedom, and minority rights were major concerns in both civil society and social movements literatures during the 2000s, the division between civil society and social movements has become more complicated. Various training courses, working groups, initiatives, and events in collaboration with the Turkish government extended the impact of the EU framework on organizational practice in Turkey in the first decade of the 2000s. As a result, EU funding has influenced the collective strategies and repertoires of organizational activity in Turkey (Zihnioğlu, 2019; Kuzmanovic, 2010). According to scholars, the Europeanization process politicized civil society and made its repertoire more controversial, bringing it closer to social movements (Yabancı, 2019; Zihnioğlu, 2020; Babül, 2020). After the 2010s, the transgressive action repertoire reentered social movements with the OccupyGezi mobilization; however, recently, authoritarianism within the political and institutional environment has increased. Contentious formations within civil society have steadily declined, and conflictual discourse and actions on policies and implementations have decreased. Moreover, EU funds have led to the depoliticization of NGOs by framing the enhancement of public policies (Zihnioğlu, 2019). The hybridization of activism and volunteerism in

organization practice in Turkey shapes the political opportunity structure, which in turn shapes Romani organization practice.

Secondly, following the absence since the early republican period of an inclusive minority conceptualization in Turkey, the practice of minorities' organization in Turkey increased after the 1980s. As this literature shows, the definition of a minority has evolved from a religious one (Muslim versus non-Muslim), to an ethnic one (the Kurdish movement), and eventually to a plurality of minority definitions through new social movements. However, in legal terms, the minority definition of the Turkish government only includes Armenians, Rums (Greek Orthodox), and Jews based on the Lausanne Agreement (Çayır, 2015). The transformation of the definition of minority in the 2000s facilitated the organization of Roma based on their ethnic identities.

Thirdly, other minorities in Turkey have organized earlier than the Roma, and as a result their collective organizational solidarity is stronger than that of Romani organizations. Some ethnic minorities, like Kurds and Armenians, have been organizing and mobilizing for a longer period of time, providing them with a protest culture and a ready repertory for collective action. Also, the Romani community suffers from a lack of socio-economic status, since their occupations were not sustainable within the neo-liberal economic system and globalized labor market. Likewise, discrimination and patriarchal society formations have kept most Roma confined to closed community neighborhoods. Together, these circumstances have caused Roma to struggle developing internal resources. As a survival strategy, Roma chose to conform to dominant groups, thereby eschewing the transgressive actions adopted by other minorities such as the Armenian mobilization (Galip, 2021). Moreover, due to being the "other of all others," Roma adopted conformist strategies not only *vis-à-vis* the state but also in relation to other dominant minorities such as Kurds, in the case of Doms in Eastern Turkey (Çelik, 2012). Thus, Romani organization in Turkey emerged later compared to other minority organizations; meanwhile, due to their external dependency, they have been more dependent upon the political opportunity structure.

I analyzed Romani organizations within four cycles/waves from 2000 to the present: the pre-organization and early organization period within civil society and as a social movement (2000-2009), the Romani Initiative period (2009-2015), the Romani deputy elections period (2015-2018), and recent formations within the organization of Roma in Turkey (2019-present). In the first cycle between 2000 and 2009, Roma experienced transition to organizing in non-governmental organizations, alongside mobilization in the case of Sulukule. In this cycle, the organization was in a diffusion phase and Roma began to enhance their collective consciousness and action repertoires. The Sulukule mobilization was considered the initiation of a Romani social movement (Somersan et. al., 2011) due to its transgressive action repertoire, including demonstrations and sit-on protests, as well as the establishment of the informal network Sulukule Platform. This platform was reconfigured as a service-provider NGO, Sulukule Volunteers Organization (*Sulukule Gönüllüleri Derneği*), after the institutionalization of the mobilization. Moreover, the mobilization was commercialized within the exhaustion phase. Therefore, I examined this process in terms of the NGOization of SMOs within Romani organization practice. In the second cycle marked by the Romani Initiative in 2009, the institutionalization and commercialization of the mobilization increased through the proliferation of Romani NGOs, spurred by the reformist policies of the state and EU project-based volunteerism. With these reformist measures, the state provided Romani organizations with legally sanctioned activism tactics such as advocacy meetings and awareness-raising activities within a context that was coordinated with EU project-based volunteerism. The state's co-opting efforts against Roma mobilization splintered the organization and damaged the collectivity. In the third cycle initiated by the election of the first Romani deputy in 2015, Romani organization practice experienced an SMOization of NGOs with the establishment of the Roma Rights Forum (ROMFO), an informal network formed by Romani NGOs and federations. ROMFO demonstrated SMO tendencies through its network formation and its complex repertoire such as reporting human rights violations and creating pressure for political representation by organizing meetings and writing declarations and reports. These actions were successful and the main oppositional party RPP and ruling party both nominated Romani deputies for parliamentary candidacy in turn. Nevertheless, after this achievement of collective action, Romani organizations were

divided by party politics, especially political parties' consideration of Romani neighborhoods as voter blocs and Romani NGOs as mediators for imposing their ideologies on the community. Finally, the recent cycle became visible with the formation of Romani youth networks and platforms. These organizations constitute another example of the SMOization of NGOs because they adopt both transgressive and moderated repertoires, and because they are formed as informal networks. Also, some NGOs established civil society networks within this cycle. In discussing transgressive action repertoire in the context of the current political environment, the increasingly authoritarian regime and EU project framework limited to public policy production must be taken into account. For example, publishing critical declarations and condemning discrimination against Roma via social media became transgressive actions within this environment. Moreover, by engaging with other new social movements and giving a place to other minorities' concerns within their repertoires, youth networks/platforms can be considered as initiators of a new social movement; however, this argument requires further research, since these organizations have been formed only recently.

The heterogeneity of Romani organizations can also be examined based on their leadership understandings, participation forms, and decision-making processes. I determined five organization types: "we" organizations, "I" organizations, neighborhood organizations, briefcase organizations, and youth networks/platforms. Leadership as a process tends to supplant charismatic leadership as Romani organizations become more institutionalized. Furthermore, youth networks/platforms have already embraced leadership as a process. The leadership understanding of organizations also determines their participation and decision-making processes.

Furthermore, I determined two interconnected strategies as significant tendencies of Romani organizations within a heterogeneous range of organizational practice: organizing within NGOs and EU project-based actions. These strategies are implemented for a variety of reasons. Due to the state's, EU's, and elites' support for NGOs in the political opportunity structure, NGOization has become a prominent trend in Turkey. Furthermore, due to their late organization, Roma have only lately developed collective action strategies and repertoires.

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Lastly, I concluded that Romani interorganizational networks in Turkey exhibit a polycephalous network formation dependent upon competitive, conflictual, and cooperative relations among organizations. This decentralized structure is representative of the heterogeneity of Romani organizations in Turkey.

This study has raised important questions about the institutionalization of organizations through the example of Romani organization practice in Turkey. The institutionalization process of organizations or mobilizations brings some challenges. Firstly, the form of organization of closed groups and minorities such as the Roma has been transformed from informal and heterogenous organizational forms to homogenous and state-sanctioned forms due to the Europeanization of activism and volunteerism and the corresponding policies and practices of the state. This homogenization of organizational forms reflects the EU's fixed and short-term framework for activism and volunteerism. Moreover, the organizational prototype created by project-based work and the professionalization of civil society has affected the socialization processes of communities and created new conflicts within them. This has led to the reconstruction of internal hierarchies within the community and the emergence of internal cleavages according to new conflicts. Therefore, the advantages of the institutionalization of organization can be questioned through the Roma case in Turkey. Secondly, such an institutionalization creates a dependency on national and transnational authorities for the sustainability of organizations. It also affects the continuum of organizational practice. Moreover, the tensions between the EU and the state have affected forms of organization and collective action, especially since the early 2000s in Turkey. During the Europeanization process, the state followed a policy that supported the EU-based uniform organizational form, while during the de-Europeanization process, the authoritarian regime increasingly criminalized both transgressive and moderated actions and limited and tamed the space for activism and volunteerism. Thirdly, this research raised the question of representation in light of the institutionalization of organization practice. Although each organization raises a claim to act as a representative of the community, such claims are rarely reflected in the community's reality on the ground. In other words, the responsibility for representation is not given to these organizations by the community itself. This leads us to question the relationship between representation and status. Many organizations claim to represent the community even if they do not

have sufficient interaction with the latter because such claims provide privileged status to the organization and its members. In this way, they both position themselves at the top of the hierarchy within the Roma community and strengthen their positions in the broader society by virtue of their increasing interactions with non-Roma. This often overshadows the collective purpose and common good and causes organization and institutionalization to serve personal interests. Finally, on the one hand, institutionalization of the organization process accelerated the interaction between Roma and non-Roma and increased the visibility of Romani problems. On the other hand, it destroyed the unique dynamics of Roma communities and transformed the organization practices of different communities according to a single prototype and monopolist organization practice. However, institutionalization should not be considered as the final cycle/wave of collective action. Instead, it is a process that a movement or mobilization experiences until it finds new possibilities to remobilize. Hence, it is important to consider organizational practices from different dimensions and to approach them from a critical point of view.

Further studies regarding the influence of Romani youth networks/platforms' organizational dynamics on the Romani organization practice in Turkey would be worthwhile. These organizations have been recently formed; therefore, it is significant to examine in detail the organizational dynamics of these new organizational formations within the Romani organization practice as a whole, including their role in the development of the collective consciousness and action repertoires of the Romani community in Turkey. Moreover, further research needs to examine more closely the links between different Roma/Gypsy communities in Turkey—Dom, Lom, and Abdals (Alevi Roma/Gypsy)—and their organizational dynamics. Since this study only comprises the Romani community and the interviews and ethnographic data stress the Roma community more than other groups, further research should focus on understanding how other Roma/Gypsy communities in Turkey are organized, their organizational dynamics, and the distinctive factors of each communities' organizational experiences.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A. APPROVAL OF THE METU HUMAN SUBJECTS ETHICS COMMITTEE

UYGULAMALI ETİK ARAŞTIRMA MERKEZİ
APPLIED ETHICS RESEARCH CENTER

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16 MART 2020

Konu: Değerlendirme Sonucu

Gönderen: ODTÜ İnsan Araştırmaları Etik Kurulu (İAEK)

İlgi: İnsan Araştırmaları Etik Kurulu Başvurusu

Sayın Mustafa ŞEN

Danışmanlığını yaptığınız **Tuba AKIN'ın** "**Roman Toplumunun Örgütlenme Biçimlerinin Roman Sivil Toplum Örgütleri Üzerinden Değerlendirilmesi**" başlıklı araştırması İnsan Araştırmaları Etik Kurulu tarafından uygun görülmüş ve **449 ODTU 2019** protokol numarası ile onaylanmıştır.

Saygılarımızla bilgilerinize sunarız.

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APPENDIX B. QUESTION SET FOR INTERVIEWS

IDENTITY	What are the problems Roma faced through the history? What does Romani culture mean to you? What are the elements of it? Does your association have any plan for protect it? Roma are defined as ethnic minorities or national minorities in many European countries. What is the position of the Roma in Turkey, how do the Roma define themselves?
SOCIAL & POLITICAL REPRESENTATION	How do you evaluate political and social representation of Roma? What do you think integration is? What kind of a relationship do you establish between the Roma and integration? What do you think about the policies regarding the integration process of Roma in Europe and Turkey? Apart from associations, do municipalities, ministries and institutions in the private sector work for the socio-economic needs and demands of the Roma, and if so, what are they doing? Can you tell us about these processes? Do you know the Romani Strategic Action Plan between 2016-2021 by Family and Social Policies Ministry? How do you evaluate it? What do you mean by Romani Rights? What do you think about activities such as public-NGO dialogue development studies, capacity building workshops? What are the aims of these activities and what practices do they carry out in line with this purpose? Do you have any idea about the position and living conditions of the Roma in Europe? What can you say in terms of similarities and differences?
ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE AND STRATEGIES	What is the purpose of your associations? When did it establish? What is your position in the organization? How did you decide establishing an organization? What kind of problems did you encounter while establishing the association? How did the Roma get organized in non-governmental organizations and how do you evaluate this process? Can you give information about the organizational structure of your association? (How many people does it consist of, number of members, participation, hierarchical structure, etc.) How did the Federation and Confederation process develop? How does this process affect the work of associations on behalf of Roma? How were Roma organized before there were non-governmental organizations? Can you explain the pre-process? What do you think is the position of Roma associations in civil society? How do you evaluate the

	development of associations?
	Who benefits from the opportunities of your association? How is the relationship of the association with its directors and beneficiaries?
	What kind of activities does your organization conduct?
	What do you do in the process of finding financial and social resources to realize these projects? If there are any problems you encounter in this process, what are they and how do you solve them?
	What areas do you think your association is insufficient? What are you doing to improve them?
	What benefits do you think being organized has for your community?
	What do the Roma think about the process of establishing association and organization?
	What kind of activities do you plan to carry out?
INTERACTIONS AMONG ROMANI ORGANIZATIONS	What are the activities of Roma organizations in Turkey regarding the needs of Roma? What do you think about these activities?
	How do you evaluate your relations with other Romani organizations operating in your field?
	Do you organize joint activities with other non-governmental organizations?
INTERACTIONS WITH PUBLIC/PRIVATE INSTITUTIONS	How do you evaluate your relations with state institutions and organizations?
	Did you use government resources to carry out your activities?
	How do you evaluate your relations with political parties?
	What do you think about the role of the European Union in fundraising and the development of Romani organizations?
	Did you benefit from EU funds? How do you evaluate this experience?

Competition	N1	N2	N3	N4	N5	N6	N7	N8	N9	N10	N11	N12	N13	N14	N15	N16	N17	N18	N19	N20
N1	_	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	/
N2	0	_	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	/
N3	0	0	_	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	/
N4	0	0	0	_	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	/
N5	0	0	0	0	_	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	/
N6	0	0	0	1	1	_	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	/
N7	0	0	0	1	1	0	_	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	/
N8	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	_	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	/
N9	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	_	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	/
N10	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	_	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	/
N11	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	_	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	/
N12	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	_	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	/
N13	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	_	1	0	0	0	0	0	/
N14	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	_	0	0	0	0	0	/
N15	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	_	1	0	0	1	/
N16	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	_	0	0	1	/
N17	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	_	0	0	/
N18	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	_	0	/
N19	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	_	/
N20	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	_

Conflict	N1	N2	N3	N4	N5	N6	N7	N8	N9	N10	N11	N12	N13	N14	N15	N16	N17	N18	N19	N20
N1	_	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	/
N2	0	_	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	/
N3	0	0	_	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	/
N4	0	0	0	_	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
N5	0	0	0	0	_	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
N6	0	0	0	1	1	_	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	/
N7	0	0	0	0	0	0	_	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	/
N8	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	_	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	/
N9	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	_	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	/
N10	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	_	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
N11	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	_	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	/
N12	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	_	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	/
N13	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	_	0	0	0	0	0	0	/
N14	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	_	0	0	0	0	0	/
N15	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	_	0	0	0	0	/
N16	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	_	0	0	0	/
N17	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	_	0	0	/
N18	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	_	0	/
N19	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	_	/
N20	/	/	/	1	1	/	/	/	/	1	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	_

Cooperation	N1	N2	N3	N4	N5	N6	N7	N8	N9	N10	N11	N12	N13	N14	N15	N16	N17	N18	N19	N20
N1	_	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	/
N2	0	_	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	/
N3	1	1	_	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	1
N4	0	0	0	_	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	/
N5	0	0	0	1	_	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	/
N6	0	0	0	0	0	_	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	/
N7	0	0	0	0	0	1	_	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	/
N8	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	_	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	/
N9	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	_	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	/
N10	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	_	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	/
N11	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	_	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	/
N12	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	_	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	/
N13	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	_	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
N14	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	_	1	1	0	0	0	/
N15	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	_	1	0	0	0	/
N16	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	_	0	0	0	/
N17	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	_	1	1	1	
N18	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	_	0	/
N19	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	_	1
N20	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	1	/

APPENDIX F. TURKISH SUMMARY / TÜRKÇE ÖZET

GİRİŞ

Roman topluluğu, Türkiye'de marjinalleştirilen etnik topluluklardan biridir. Anadolu'daki Romanların tarihi, 11. yüzyıla kadar uzanmaktadır (Arayıcı, 2008; Marsh, 2010; Ünaldı, 2012; Uştuk ve Cox, 2020). Çoğu yerleşik hayata geçmiş olsa da yakın zamana kadar göçebe ve yarı göçebe bir yaşam sürmüşlerdir (Avara ve Mascitelli, 2014). Maruz kaldıkları ayrımcılık nedeniyle Roman olmayanlar tarafından "Roman mahallesi" olarak tanımlanan ve ayrıştırılan mahallelerde kapalı bir grup olarak yaşamaktadırlar (Duygulu ve Sayan, 2022). Ayrıca küreselleşme ve sanayileşme sonrasında kalaycılık, sepetçilik, nalbantlık gibi el yapımı mesleklerinin neo-liberal ekonomide değer kaybetmesiyle çok kısıtlı iş imkanları buldukları ve istihdama erişimde de ayrımcılığa uğradıkları için işsizlik ve beraberinde gelen birçok sosyo-ekonomik sorunla karşı karşıya kalmaktadırlar (Önen, 2013).

Roman örgütlenme pratiği, 2000'li yılların başında Roman olmayan aktivistler ile işbirliği içinde sivil toplum örgütleri kurarak ivme kazanmıştır. Bu döneme kadar örgütlenememelerinin sebepleri hem topluluk içi dinamikler— düşük sosyo-ekonomik statü, mahalle kültürüne dayalı kapalı bir grup olma ve yakın zamana kadar göçebe olma, hem de Türkiye'deki siyasal ve kurumsal çevredir— devletin azınlık politikaları ve Romanlara yönelik ayrımcı yasalar. Roman örgütlenmesinin ivme kazandığı 2000ler başında Roman örgütlenmesi üzerine yapılan çalışmalar fazlayken, son zamanlarda bu alanda yapılan çalışmalar çok azdır. Bu sebeple, mevcut çalışmada, 2000'li yıllardan günümüze Türkiye'deki Roman örgütlenmesinin yapısına, iç ve dış dinamiklerine, kolektif eylem stratejilerine ve örgütler arası sosyal ağ oluşumlarına odaklanılacaktır. Türkiye'deki Roman örgütlenmesini, kolektif eylem döngüleri içinde "toplumsal hareketler ve sivil toplumun melezleşmesi" tartışması üzerinden inceleyeceğim. Bu dinamikleri anlamak için 2019-2021 yılları

arasında Roman örgüt üyeleriyle 18'i dernek başkanı olmak üzere 23 yarı yapılandırılmış derinlemesine görüşme gerçekleştirdim ve Ocak-Eylül 2021 arasında bir Roman STK'da çalışarak 10 aylık bir etnografik saha çalışması yaptım.

Bu çalışmada, Roman örgütlenme pratiği içerisindeki örgütlerin çok çeşitli biçimlere sahip olduğunu ve bu çeşitliliğin toplumsal hareket örgütleri (STÖ) ve sivil toplum kuruluşları (STK) arasında geniş bir spektrumda oluştuğunu savunuyorum. Bu spektrum içinde melez örgüt biçimlerinin oluştuğunu ve bu örgütlerin dört farklı protesto döngüsü içerisinde ortaya çıktığını Donetella della Porta'nın toplumsal hareketler ve sivil toplumun melezleşmesi tartışması üzerinden açıklayacağım. Ona göre, toplumsal hareketlerin STK'laşması ve sivil toplumun STÖleşmesi sonucunda toplumsal hareketler ve sivil toplum arasındaki sınır belirsizleşmektedir (della Porta, 2020). Romanların Türkiye'deki örgütlenme dinamiklerini anlamak için araştırma sorumu Türkiye'de Romanlar resmi ve gayri resmi kuruluşlar aracılığıyla örgütlenmeyi nasıl deneyimlemektedir? Olarak oluşturdum. Araştırma sorumu desteklemek için üç alt soru belirledim: Türkiye'deki Roman örgütlenme tarihi boyunca siyasi ve kurumsal çevre Roman seferberlik sürecini nasıl etkilemektedir? Roman örgütlerinin yapıları ile örgütsel stratejileri arasındaki ilişki nedir? Roman örgütleri arasında örgütler arası ağ oluşumunun dinamikleri nelerdir? Bu sorular aracılığıyla, Roman örgütlerinin kolektif eyleme nasıl dahil olduğunu; Roman örgütlerinin inşasının siyasi ve kurumsal çevreye göre nasıl şekillendiğini ve örgüt içindeki çeşitli aktörlerin örgütler arası sosyal ağ oluşturma yoluyla birbirleriyle nasıl etkileşime girdiğini anlamaya çalışmaktayım.

Roman örgütlerindeki melezleşme süreci, Türkiye'de 1980 darbesi sonrası yeni toplumsal hareketlerin ve küresel sivil toplumun birbirine paralel olarak ortaya çıkmasıyla birlikte değerlendirilmelidir. Bir yandan Kürt hareketi, İslamcılık, feminizm, Alevi hareketi, çevre hareketi ve insan hakları aktivizmi gibi çeşitli hareketler gelişirken (Şimşek, 2007); öte yandan, uluslararası iş birlikleri ile sivil toplum kuruluşları içinde örgütlenme güçlenmiştir (Bilge, 2019). 2000'li yılların ilk on yılına kadar olan süreçte hem Avrupa Birliği hem de uluslararası kuruluşlar ile devlet politikaları ve organları sivil toplumu desteklemiş, bu destek STK'ların oluşum ve aktivizmini ve STK'larda gönüllülüğü (STKlaşma) artırmıştır. Bu süreçte

yeni toplumsal hareketler tarafından daha ılımlı ve işbirlikçi yeni eylem repertuarları benimsenmiştir (Gümrükçü, 2010). 2000'li yıllarda kadın hakları, çevreci haklar, din özgürlüğü ve azınlık hakları her iki literatürde de önemli konular olduğundan, sivil toplum ve toplumsal hareketler arasındaki ayrım daha da bulanıklaştı. STÖ'lerin STK'laşmasında siyasi fırsat yapısından yararlanmanın yanı sıra insan hakları temelli söylemin benimsenmesi de etkilidir. Öte yandan, Türkiye'de OccupyGezi protestoları sırasında STK'ların STÖleşmesi gözlemlenebilir. Küreselleşme karşıtı ve kemer sıkma karşıtı hareketin dünya çapında dalgasıyla birlikte, OccupyGezi hareketi sırasında STK'lar, gösterilere katılmak gibi doğrudan eylemlerle daha saldırgan hale gelmiştir ve sivil toplum içinde enformel ağ oluşumları artmıştır. (Kaya, 2017).

Ayrıca, Türkiye'deki azınlık kavramsallaştırmasındaki değişim, Türkiye'deki Romanların örgütlenmesini de etkilemiştir. Azınlık tanımı din bazlı bir açıklamadan (Müslüman olmayan/Müslüman) etnisite temelli bir kavramsallaştırmaya (Kürt hareketi) ve nihayetinde yeni toplumsal hareketler aracılığıyla azınlık kavramının çoğullaştırılmasına ve daha geniş bir azınlık tanımına dönüşmüştür. Türkiye Cumhuriyeti bu çoğul azınlık anlayışını hukuki zeminde hala görmezden gelmesine ve Lozan Anlaşması'na göre sadece Ermenileri, Rumları (Rum Ortodoks) ve Yahudileri azınlık olarak kabul etmesine rağmen (Kara ve diğerleri, 2013), kadınlar, LGBTIQ+ ve etnik topluluklar gibi gruplar Türkiye'deki toplumsal hareketler ve sivil toplum içindeki insan hakları söylemi aracılığıyla azınlık olarak kabul edilmektedir. Ayrıca, diğer azınlık grupları Roman topluluğundan daha erken örgütlenmeye başlamıştır. Romanların sosyoekonomik durumunun yetersizliği, kolektif eylem bilincinin olmayışı, uyum sağlamayı bir hayatta kalma stratejisi olarak benimsemeleri, diğer azınlık grupları tarafından ötekileştirilmeleri ve göçebe yaşamın zorlukları bunun sebeplerinden bazılarıdır. Türkiye'deki azınlık örgütleri ve Roman örgütlerinin ilişkisini literatür taramasında daha ayrıntılı ele alacağım.

Avrupa'da Roman Çalışmaları köklü bir alandır (Marushiakova & Popov, 2015; McGarry, 2010; van Baar, 2012; Vermeersch, 2006). Türkiye'de ise 2009 yılında Demokratik Açılım Süreci ile artan akademik merak ve ilgi son zamanlarda azalmıştır. Bu arada Roman toplumunun örgütlenmesi daha çok sivil toplum

literatüründe incelenmiştir. Avrupa'daki Roman hareketi de çoğunlukla küresel sivil toplumla ilgili STK'lar olmak üzere uluslararası kuruluşların desteğiyle hızlandığından, örgütlenme sivil toplum literatürü üzerinden daha fazla incelenmiştir (Kóczé ve Rövid, 2012a; Rostas ve Rövid, 2015).

Genel argüman sivil toplum literatürü ile toplumsal hareket literatürünün birbirinden tamamen farklı olduğu yönünde olsa da her iki literatürün tartışmalarında örtüşen kavramlar vardır (della Porta, 2020). Her iki literatürdeki gömülü yeni kalıpları anlamak için bu alanlar arasında bir köprü kurmaya ihtiyaç vardır. Bazı akademisyenler, her iki literatürün de etkileşiminin mümkün olduğunu ileri sürmüşlerdir (Cohen ve Arato, 1992; Alexander, 2006; Edwards, 2011), ancak aktivizm ve gönüllülüğün melezleşmesi üzerine çok az ampirik araştırma yapılmıştır (della Porta, 2020). Ayrıca, Türkiye'deki Roman örgütlenmesine melezleşme tartışmasının merceğinden bakan hiçbir çalışma yoktur. Bu nedenle bu tez, sivil toplum ve toplumsal hareket literatürü arasında bir köprü kurarak Türkiye'deki Romanlarla ilgili toplumsal hareket ve sivil toplum literatürüne katkıda bulunmayı amaçlamaktadır. Türkiye'de Roman örgütlenme pratiğine odaklanmanın bir diğer sebebi ise, diğer azınlık örgütlenmelerine kıyasla, Roman örgütlenmesinin geç bir örgütlenme olmasıdır. Romanlar tarih boyunca devlet ve diğer etnik topluluklar tarafından marjinalize edilmiş bir grup haline gelmiştir (Çelik, 2012; Halis, 2021). Hem kolektif bilinç ve sosyo-ekonomik statü gibi iç kaynaklara yeterince sahip olamamak hem de elit ya da devlet desteğinden yoksun olmak onları Kürt toplumu (Güneş,2015) ya da Ermeni toplumu (Galip, 2021) gibi erken örgütlenebilmekten mahrum bırakmıştır. Romanlar, geç örgütlenmeleri nedeniyle hem sivil toplumda hem de toplumsal hareketlerde örgütlenmeyi eş zamanlı ve hızlı bir şekilde deneyimlemişlerdir.

TEORİK ÇERÇEVE VE LİTERATÜR TARAMASI

Terminoloji: Roman mı Çingene mi?

Roman araştırmalarındaki geleneksel tartışmalardan biri olan Roman ve Çingene teriminin aşırı kullanımı tartışması son zamanlarda ivme kaybetmiştir. On sekizinci yüzyıldan bu yana, Avrupa'nın en kalabalık azınlık gruplarından biri olan Çingene/Roman toplulukları hakkında çeşitli araştırmalar yapılmıştır. Roman olmayan bilim adamları tarafından yapılan ilk araştırmalar bu toplulukları Çingene olarak belirledi. Ancak bu çalışmaların çoğu ethnosentrik ve ayrımcı tanımlamalar ve analizler içermektedir (van Baar, 2011). 1990'larda Roman seferberliğinin güçlenmesiyle birlikte, "Roma" araştırmacılar tarafından daha çok kullanılmaya başlanmıştır (Gheorghe, 1991; Vermeersch, 2003). Çingene'den farklı olarak, Roman, Roman dili olan Romanes'te "insanlar" anlamına gelen ve bir "biz" fikrini ima eden etnokültürel bir kendi kendini adlandırmadır.

Türkiye'de de Roman ve Çingene terimlerinin kullanımı konusunda benzer bir tartışma ortaya çıkmıştır. Bazı akademisyenler ve toplum liderleri, Çingene'nin dışsal ve aşağılayıcı bir çağrışım olmasına rağmen, Roman teriminden daha çok tarihsel bağlamla ilgilendiğini iddia etmektedir. Onlara göre toplum, ayrımcı çağrışımlardan kaçınmak için Roman terimini tercih etmekte; ancak aşağılayıcı anlamlar söze değil, topluluğa ilişkindir (Aksu, 2010; Mezarcıoğlu, 2010). Roman terimi kullanılsa bile, bu çağrışımlar bu kelime içinde yeniden üretilecektir. Bunun aksine, Çingene teriminin Roman Çingenelerini, Dom Çingenelerini ve Lo Çingenelerini kapsayan bir şemsiye kavram olduğunu vurgularlar. Göç yollarına göre Lom, Dom ve Rom kabile grupları olmak üzere üç farklı kabilenin ortaya çıktığı varsayılmaktadır.

1971 yılındaki birinci Çingene Kongresi'nde Çingene topluluklarının Roman olarak belirlenmesi ve Romanların siyasi bir özne olarak ortaya çıkması kararının ardından hem akademisyenler hem de toplumun kendisi Çingene yerine Roman terimini tercih etmeye başlamıştır (Özateşler, 2013). Son araştırmalar Romanları, Dom, Lom ve Abdal gruplarını içeren bir şemsiye terim olarak kullanmaktadır (Çağlayan, 2021; Yılmaz Sert ve Turhan, 2019). Çeşitli araştırmalar toplulukları belirli Dom, Lom,

Roman veya Abdal gruplarına göre göstermektedir (Yılgür, 2017). İkincisi, çoğunlukla folklorik çalışmaları içerir. Bu terimlerin sürekli ve tartışmalı bir kullanımı vardır. Bu nedenle her vaka kendi içinde değerlendirilmelidir. Görüşmecilerim kendilerini Roman olarak tanımlamayı tercih ettikleri için şu terminolojiyi kullanıyorum: Roman (tekil), Romanlar (çoğul) ve Romani (sıfat).

Toplumsal Hareketler ve Sivil Toplumun Melezleşmesi

Roman örgütlenme pratiği daha çok toplumsal hareket ve sivil toplum literatürü aracılığıyla incelenmektedir. Bu iki literatür, diğerini tamamen farklı bir fenomen olarak görerek birbirlerine çok az ilgi göstermişlerdir. Bu nedenle, sosyal hareket ve sivil toplum arasındaki örtüşen kavramları ve çalışma alanlarını ele alan çalışmalar yetersizdir (Cohen ve Arato, 1994; Edwards, 2004; Snow ve diğerleri, 2004; Alexander, 2006; Diani ve della Porta, 2011; ve della Porta 2020). Son zamanlarda, kolektif eylemdeki melez örgütlenme biçimleri, araştırmacılar tarafından sivil toplumun STÖleşmesi ve sosyal hareketlerin STK'laşması yoluyla tartışılmaktadır (della Porta & Diani, 2011; Fowler, 20011; della Porta, 2020). Bu çalışmalar, toplumsal hareketlerin ve sivil toplumun melezleşmesini incelemektedir; ancak protesto döngüleriyle ilişkisine çok az dikkat ediyorlar. Bu tez, Türkiye'deki Roman örgütlerinin, geniş olarak tanımlanmış bu iki örgütsel biçim arasındaki bir gerilim olarak değerlendirilebileceğini savunmakta ve Roman örgütlerin melezleştiğini protesto döngüleri içerisinde incelenebileceğini vurgulamaktadır.

della Porta melezleşme argümanını toplumsal hareketleri aktivizm, sivil toplumu ise gönüllülük ile ilişkilendirerek kurmaktadır. Toplumsal hareketleri, Mario Diani'nin kavramsallaştırması üzerinden tanımlar. Toplumsal hareket, toplumsal değişim sağlamak veya değişime karşı çıkmak amacıyla oluşturulmuş "siyasal veya kültürel bir çatışma içinde olan birden fazla birey, grup ve/veya organizasyon arasındaki paylaşılan bir kimliğe dayalı enformel etkileşimler ağıdır (Diani, 1992 aktaran Attilla ve Bodur, 2018, p. 790). Bununla birlikte, sivil toplum is devlet ve marketten bağımsız otonom bir alana sahiptir, uyum ve iş birliği odağında dolaylı eylemlilikler tercih eder ve resmi yapılanmalar içerisinde örgütlenmektedir (Edwards, 2011). Melezleşme sürecinde, aktivizm ve gönüllülük karşı karşıya gelmekte ve birbirlerinden bazı özelliklerini benimsemektedirler. Protesto döngüleri ise Sidney

Tarrow'un seferberlik ve demobilizasyon süreçlerini siyasi fırsat yapısı içeriside anlamamıza yardımcı olan bir kavramdır. Kısaca bir kolektif eylemin siyasi fırsat yapısından faydalanarak, dönüştürülen kolektif eylem stratejileriyle organize ve organize olmayan katılımın bir kombinasyonu içinde genişlemesi sonrası reform, baskı ve bazen devrimle sonuçlanabilen meydan okuyanlar ve otoriteler arası yoğun etkileşim dizileri olarak tanımlar (1994, s. 153). Toplumsal hareketler ve sivil toplumun melezleşmesi tartışması ve protesto döngüleri, Roman örgütlenmesini ve örgüt çeşitliliğini anlamak için kullanacağım ana teorik çerçeveyi oluşturmaktadır. Bunun yanı sıra liderlik kavramı da bu örgüt dinamiğini etkilemektedir ve protesto döngüleri içerisinde karizmatik liderlik anlayışından, liderlik sorumluluklarının örgüt içi paylaşımı anlayışına dönüşmektedir.

Türkiye'deki örgütlenme pratiklerini melezleşme tartışması üzerinden değerlendirecek olursak, 1968-1971 protesto döngüsünün sona ermesinden ve 1980 darbesinden sonra benimsenen liberal politikalar, sivil toplum örgütlerinin ve kendilerine özgü birçok boyut ve özellikte yeni toplumsal hareketlerin ortaya çıkmasına neden oldu. Sivil toplumun canlanmasına paralel olarak Kürt etnik milliyetçiliği, İslamcılık, feminizm, Alevi kültür hareketi, çevrecilik ve insan hakları aktivizmi gibi farklı hareketler ortaya çıktı (Şimşek, 2008). 1990'lardan sonra ve 2000'lerin başında sivil toplum ve toplumsal hareket örgütleri genelinde kurumsallaşma yaygınlaştı. Bu ortamda, sosyal hareket örgütlerinden sivil toplum örgütlerine, ağlardan kurumsallaşmış örgütlere ve bu örgütlerin ağlarına kadar çok çeşitli örgütler bulunmaktadır. 2010lardan sonra yoğunlaşan baskı ve otoriter hükümet politikalar sebebiyle bu melez örgütler Avrupa'dan uzaklaşma (de-Europeanization) döneminde giderek daha fazla depolitize oldular.

METODOLOJİ

Bu araştırma, 2000'li yıllardan bu yana Türkiye'deki Roman örgütlenme pratiği üzerindeki iç ve dış dinamiklerin etkisini, kolektif eylem stratejilerini ve örgütler arası ilişkileri incelemek için etnografik metodolojiyi benimseyerek uygulanan bir nitel araştırma örneğidir. Bu etnografik araştırma kapsamında yarı yapılandırılmış, derinlemesine mülakat metodunu ve ayrıca katılımcı gözlem yöntemini kullandım.

İlk etapta mahalleye veya herhangi bir Roman sivil toplum kuruluşuna katılımcı gözlemci olarak katılmak için topluluğa yeterli erişimim yoktu bu yüzden mülakatlarla başladım. Ancak Nisan 2020 ile Ocak 2021 arasında Covid-19 pandemisi nedeniyle görüşmelerim kesintiye uğradı. Araştırma boyunca 23 görüşme gerçekleştirdim. Bu nedenle ilk 16 görüşmem Aralık 2019-Mart 2020 arasında, geri kalan görüşmelerim Şubat-Eylül 2021 arasında yapıldı. İkisi Covid19 karantinası nedeniyle Zoom üzerinden yapıldı. Bu 23 görüşmeciden sadece beşi kadın ve bunlardan sadece biri STK başkanıydı. (Erkek) görüşülen kişilerin geri kalanından üçü üye, geri kalanı ise başkandır. Görüşmelerim sırasında bir Roman sivil toplum kuruluşunda çalışmaya başladım ve katılımcı gözlemci yönetimini bu işte çalışırken Ocak-Eylül 2021 ayları arasında yaptım.

Araştırmamın kısıtlılıklarından birisi yeterince kadın görüşmecimin olmamasıydı. Bazı kadınlar görüşme yapmayı hep aynı dertlerden bahsetmek istemedikleri için reddetti. Başka bir kısıtlılık ise saha çalışmamın yarısında Covid19 pandemisi sebebiyle yaşanılan kapanma oldu. Roman olmayan ve yeterli bağlantısı bulunmayan biri olarak, uzaktan görüşmelerime devam edemedim. Son olarak, bir Roman STK ile çalışmanın araştırmam üzerinde hem olumlu hem de olumsuz etkileri oldu. Olumlu olarak, pandeminin erişimi başka türlü daha zor hale getirdiği bir zamanda işim topluluğa girişi kolaylaştırdı. İş bağlamında kurduğum güven ilişkileri, araştırmamı kolaylaştırdı ve detaylı gözlemler yapmamı sağladı. Bir süre sonra çalışma arkadaşlarım ve mahalleden tanıdığım insanlar bana Fahri Roman demeye başladılar. Toplum içinde benimsendikten sonra daha ayrıntılı bilgilere erişebilmeye başladım. Bir Roman STK'sında çalışmaya başlamadan önce, saha çalışmamın pandemi öncesi aşamasında dışarıdan biri olmak benim için özellikle zorlayıcıydı. STK başkanlarının çoğu, onların da tanıdığı birini tanımıyorsam başlangıçta benimle görüşmeyi reddetti. Sahada daha iyi tanınmaya başladığımda veri toplama süreci hızlandı ama aynı zamanda saha çalışmamla ilgili olmayan daha fazla bilgi almaya başladım. Bu bazen sosyolojik olarak faydalı bilgileri filtrelemeyi zorlaştırıyordu çünkü mesafemi korumakta ve durumu objektif olarak incelemekte zorlanıyordum. Ayrıca Edirne'de rekabet ilişkilerinin yoğun olması sebebiyle, bir Roman STK'sında çalışmak, çalıştığım STK ile rekabet ilişkisi içinde olan başka bir STK'ya ulaşmak ve gözlem yapmayı benim için zorlaştırdı.

Görüşmelerimden önce, gönüllü katılımı sağlamak ve katılımcıları olası zararlardan korumak için bir onay formu oluşturdum. Bu onay formunda araştırmanın amacı, katılımcılardan ne beklendiği, gizliliğin sağlanması için atılacak adımlar, katılımcıların hakları ve bana ve araştırma danışmanına ait iletişim bilgileri açıkça belirtilmiştir. Her görüşmeden önce, katılımcılara sözlü olarak projenin gizli ve gönüllü doğası tekrar hatırlatılmıştır. Katılımcılar, görüşmeyi kabul etmeden önce bu görüşmenin ses kaydına alınacağı konusunda rızaları alınmıştır. Katılımcıların mahremiyetini korumak amacıyla, katılımcıların kişisel adları, STK adları ve iletişim bilgileri toplanmış ancak bu bilgiler tezde rapor edilmemiş ve deşifre ve ses kayıtlarından ayrı tutulmuştur. Bazı STK'lar doğrudan STK başkanlarına bağlı olduğundan, katılımcı ve kuruluş isimleri takma isimlerle değiştirilmiştir. Görüşmecilerimin mahremiyetini korumaya devam etmek için bu değişikliği yaptım.

TÜRKİYE'DEKİ ROMAN ÖRGÜTLENME PRATİĞİ

Literatür taraması ve etnografik alan çalışmamı göz önünde bulundurarak, Roman örgütlerinin melez örgütlenme biçimlerinin 2000'li yılların başından itibaren Roman örgütlenmesi genelinde protesto döngüleri içinde ortaya çıktığını savunmaktayım. Bu örgütleri örgütlenme öncesi ve erken örgütlenme dönemi, Roman Açılımı dönemi, ilk Roman milletvekili seçimleri dönemi ve Türkiye'deki Roman örgütlenmesi içindeki son oluşumlar olmak üzere dört döngü içinde incelemekteyim.

2000-2009 yılları arasındaki ilk döngüde Romanlar sivil toplum kuruluşlarında örgütlenmeye geçiş ve Sulukule seferberliği ile bir toplumsal hareket girişimi tecrübe ettiler. Bu döngüde örgütlenme, yayılma aşamasına geçmiş ve Romanlar kolektif bilinçlerini ve eylem repertuarlarını geliştirmeye başlamışlardır. Sulukule seferberliği, gösteriler ve oturma eylemleri gibi sınır aşan eylem repertuarları ve Sulukule Platformu gibi enformel ağların kurulması nedeniyle toplumsal hareketlerin bir başlangıcı olarak kabul edildi (Somersan ve diğerleri, 2011). Platform, seferberliğin kurumsallaşmasının ardından bir hizmet sağlayıcı STK olan Sulukule Gönüllüleri Derneği (Sulukule Gönüllüleri Derneği) olarak yeniden yapılandırıldı. Ayrıca, seferberlik tükenme aşamasında ticarileştirildi (commercialization).

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Ticarileşme, seferberliğin azaldığı evrede bir STÖ'nün servis sağlayıcı bir STK'ya dönüşmesidir (Tarrow, 2011) Dolayısıyla bu süreç Roman organizasyon pratiği içerisinde STÖ'lerin STK'laşmasına bir örnektir. 2009 yılında Roman Girişimi öncülüğünde ikinci döngüde, Roman STK'larının devletin reformist politikaları ve AB proje temelli gönüllülük vasıtasıyla yaygınlaşmasıyla seferberliğin kurumsallaşması ve ticarileşmesi arttı. Devlet, bu politikalarıyla AB proje tabanlı gönüllülük ile koordineli bir çerçevede savunuculuk toplantıları ve bilinçlendirme faaliyetleri gibi makbul olan aktivizm taktiklerini sunmuştur. Roman seferberliğine karşı devlet ve AB politikaları örgütlenmeyi parçaladı ve kolektiviteye zarar verdi. 2015 yılında ilk Roman milletvekili seçimiyle başlatılan üçüncü döngüde, Roman STK'ları ve federasyonların oluşturduğu gayri resmi bir ağ olan Roman Hakları Forumu (ROMFO) kurularak örgütlenme pratiği içinde STK'ların STÖ'leşmesi deneyimlenmiştir. ROMFO'nun insan hakları ihlallerini raporlamak ve toplantılar düzenleyerek siyasi temsil için baskı oluşturmak, bildiriler ve raporlar yazmak gibi karmaşık repertuarı ve ağ oluşumu, STÖ eğilimleri göstermektedir. Bu eylemler başarılı oldu ve sırasıyla ana muhalefet partisi CHP ve iktidar partisi milletvekili adaylığına aday gösterildi. Bununla birlikte, kolektif eylemin bu başarısından sonra, Roman örgütleri siyasi partilerin parti politikaları ve Roman mahallelerini değişken seçmen olarak görmeleri ve Roman STK'larını ideolojilerini topluluğa empoze etmede aracı olarak gördükleri için bölündü. Son olarak, son döngü Roman gençlik ağlarının ve platformlarının oluşumuyla görünür hale geldi. Bu kuruluşlar aynı zamanda STK'ların STÖ'leşmesine bir diğer örnektir. Hem doğrudan hem de ılımlı repertuarları benimserler ve gayri resmi ağlar olarak örgütlenmişlerdir. Ayrıca bazı STK'lar bu döngü içinde sivil toplum ağları kurmuştur.

Mevcut siyasi ortamda sınırları aşan eylem repertuarını tartışırken, giderek artan otoriter rejim ve kamu politikası üretimi ile sınırlı AB proje çerçevesi dikkate alınmalıdır. Örneğin sosyal medya üzerinden siyasi eleştirel bildiriler yayınlamak ve Romanlara yönelik ayrımcılığı dile getirmek bu ortamda doğrudan eylemler haline geliyor. Ayrıca, diğer yeni toplumsal hareketlerle ilişki kurmaları ve diğer azınlık kaygılarına repertuarlarında yer vermeleri, gençlik ağları/platformlarını yeni bir toplumsal hareketin başlangıcı olarak değerlendirilebilir; ancak, bu kuruluşlar yakın zamanda kurulduğundan, bu argümanın daha fazla araştırmaya ihtiyacı var.

Roman örgütlerinin heterojenliği, liderlik anlayışlarına, katılım biçimlerine ve karar alma süreçlerine göre de incelenebilir. "Biz" örgütleri, "Ben" örgütleri, mahalle örgütleri, evrak çantası örgütleri ve gençlik ağları/platformları olmak üzere beş örgüt türü belirledim. Bir süreç olarak liderlik, Roman örgütleri kurumsallaştıkça karizmatik liderliğin yerini alma eğilimindedir. Ayrıca, gençlik ağları/platformları kuruldukları süreçten itibaren liderliği bir süreç olarak benimsemiştir. Örgütlerin liderlik anlayışı, katılımlarını ve karar alma süreçlerini de belirlemektedir. Kurumsallaşmaya çalışan ya da kurumsallaşan Roman örgütlerinin başkanları, ekip çalışmasının altını çizen etkinliklerini ya da planlarını ortaya koyarken daha çok "Biz" söylemini kullanmışlardır. Diğer yandan, bazı başkanlar örgütlerinin faaliyetlerini ve stratejilerini anlatırken "ben" söylemini kullanmışlardır. Ancak, çeşitli otoriteler tarafından arabulucu olarak da görülen "geleneksel liderler", bireylerin kabulünden ziyade tüzel kişiliklerin ulusal ve ulusötesi kurumlar tarafından kabul edilmesi nedeniyle STK'ların kurulmasını bir gereklilik olarak düşünmüşlerdir. Örgüt başkanlarının söylemlerinden dolayı bu iki örgütlenme biçimini "biz" ve "ben" örgütleri olarak belirledim. Son olarak, Türkiye'deki Roman örgütler arası sosyal ağların, rekabetçi, çatışmalı ve iş birliğine dayalı ilişkilere bağlı çok yönlü bir ağ oluşumuna sahip olduğunu inceledim. Bu merkezi olmayan yapı, Türkiye'deki Roman örgütlerinin heterojenliğini göstermektedir.

Özetle, Türkiye'deki Roman örgütlenme pratiği, STÖ'ler ve STK'lar arasındaki bir yelpazede yer alan melez örgütlenme biçimlerinden oluşmaktadır. Kolektif eylemin farklı döngüleri içinde farklı melez oluşumlar gözlemlenebilir. Politik fırsat yapısı, Roman topluluğunun dış kaynaklara bağımlılığı, kolektif bilinç eksikliği ve yeni gelişen kolektif eylem stratejileri ve repertuarları nedeniyle Roman örgütsel dinamiklerinin ana belirleyici faktörüdür. Roman örgütleri birbirleriyle rekabetçi, çatışmalı ve işbirliğine dayalı ilişkilerini iç kaynaklarından çok siyasi ve kurumsal çevreye göre şekillendirdiğinden, bu bağımlılık örgütler arası ağları da etkiler.

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