

USING INTERSTATE ARMS SALES AS A FOREIGN POLICY INSTRUMENT

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ABSTRACT

USING INTERSTATE ARMS SALES AS A FOREIGN POLICY INSTRUMENT

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This study aimed to explain whether arms sales are used as an instrument in foreign policy with the help of Immanuel Wallerstein's World System Theory. For this purpose, the arms transfers from developed to third world countries have been analyzed within historical periods. It focused on the relationship between arms transfer and its usage as a foreign policy instrument in the pre-Cold War, Cold War, and post-Cold War periods. The study's primary purpose in analyzing a wide period is to examine the role of the capitalist mode of production in the formation of the core, semi-periphery, and periphery countries. By investigating the effect of this tripartite distinction on the arms industry, it is to reveal whether a dependency relationship is established between the core and the periphery countries through arms transfer. As a result of this study, it has been concluded that the peripheral countries' foreign policies that have become dependent on the arms transfers or defense technology can be manipulated by the core country.

Keywords: Dependency, Arms Transfer, Foreign Policy, Capitalist World Economy, Unequal Exchange

ÖZ

DEVLETLERARASI SİLAH SATIŞLARININ BİR DIŞ POLİTİKA ENSTRÜMANI OLARAK KULLANILMASI

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Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü

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Bu çalışma, silah satışlarının dış politikada bir enstrüman olarak kullanılıp kullanılmadığını Immanuel Wallerstein'ın Dünya Sistemi Teorisi yardımıyla açıklamayı amaçlamıştır. Bu amaçla gelişmiş ülkelerin üçüncü dünya ülkelerine yaptıkları silah transferleri tarihsel dönemler içerisinde ele alınarak analiz edilmiştir. Soğuk Savaş öncesi, Soğuk Savaş ve Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde yapılan silah transferleri ve bunların dış politika enstrümanı olarak kullanılması arasındaki ilişkiye odaklanılmıştır. Çalışmanın geniş bir zaman dilimini analiz etmesindeki temel amaç kapitalist üretim şeklinin merkez, yarı-çevre ve çevre ülke oluşumundaki rolünü incelemek ve bu üçlü ayrımın silah sanayisi üzerindeki etkisini araştırarak merkez ile çevre ülkeler arasında silah transferi yoluyla bağımlılık ilişkisi kurulup kurulmadığını ortaya çıkarmaktır. Bu çalışma ile silah transferine veya savunma teknolojisine bağımlı hale gelen çevre ülkelerin dış politikalarının merkez ülke tarafından manipüle edilebileceği sonucuna ulaşılmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Bağımlılık, Silah Transferi, Dış Politika, Kapitalist Dünya Ekonomisi, Eşitsiz Mübadele

To My Parents

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACDA	Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
AWACS	Airborne Warning and Control System
BAC	British Aircraft Corporation
BASIC	British American Security Information Council
CAAT	Campaign Against Arms Trade
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
EOKA	National Organization of Cypriot Fighters
EU	European Union
HIPCs	Highly Indebted Impoverished Countries
IMET	International Military Education and Training
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NRC	National Research Council
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development	
PhD	Doctor of Philosophy
PMSCs	Private Military and Security Companies
R&D	Research and Development
RUF	Revolutionary United Front
SIPRI	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
UAR	United Arab Republics
UAVs	Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
US	United States
USA	United States of America
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Arms transfer as an instrument of foreign policy is as old as the establishment of defense industries. However, understanding the ongoing debate regarding arms sales requires a retrospective analysis. With the industrialization movements, the increasing need for raw materials gave birth to the understanding of colonialism due to geographical discoveries. At that time, the exploitative relations between the developing West and Asian, African, and Latin American countries were constituted sometimes by force of arms and sometimes by missionary activities under the name of spreading religion. The basic logic in these relations, later called capitalism, is that the raw material required for industrial production was procured from the colonial countries at a lower price and, if possible, for free. Then after processing, it was sold to the colonial countries at exorbitant prices as a finished or manufactured product. The constant movement of surplus-value and precious resources from the colonies to continental Europe (and later America) has led to capital accumulation. Western Europe, which managed to use this capital accumulation, has reached a very advanced economy, technology, and science over time. With the developments in firearms and ship technology, it became easier for Western Europe to establish and manage colonies in remote areas. The Industrial Revolution brought new technology to the conduct of war, such as steel-made ships, and steam power technology significantly affected the arms transfer system and the global division of power. Between 1858 and 1888, the entire field of weaponry had its most revolutionary phase since the invention of gunpowder and cannon.¹ Maurice Pearton expresses the Industrial Revolution and the developments after it as follows:

¹ Krause, Keith. *Arms and the State Patterns of Military Production and Trade*. (Cambridge University Press, 1995): 56.

The world system was then separated into certain countries that owned the resources, expertise, and equipment to create the advanced weapons and procedures on the one hand and those who did not on the other. The industrialized countries had considerably greater alternatives; they could use their authority to control the policies of other countries relatively rapidly or aggressively. Non-industrial governments may either build their own limited capacity or rely on those developed countries to meet their military needs.²

Due to the importance of the subject, the historical background summarized above will guide for a better understanding of the study. There are capitalist relations behind the classification of countries, which are explained in more detail in the theoretical framework and categorized as threefold core, periphery, and semi-periphery by Immanuel Wallerstein.³ The Western states, which did not want to lose the superiority they had gained over the third world countries by establishing colonies, want to maintain these relations today through arms transfers. Although colonized countries have gained political independence from Western states, they are still dependent on the West in economic and technological terms. According to Anna Stavrianakis, the underlying reason for such relations is the support of elites in third-world countries as part of the state-building process through arms transfers. From her point of view, this process continues even though the third world countries have officially gained their independence.⁴ Examining the arms transfers in terms of dependency relations is essential in understanding the problems faced by third-world countries in the context of foreign policy.

Those actors have succeeded in producing weapons even within the third world countries, albeit in limited numbers. However, in terms of limiting the subject, the ones to be discussed here will be the first-tier arms-producing states, according to the

² Pearton, Maurice. *Diplomacy, War and Technology since 1830* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1984): 7.

³ Wallerstein, Immanuel. "Medieval Prelude." In *The Modern World-System I: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century*, (1st ed., University of California Press, 2011): 63.

⁴ Stavrianakis, Anna. *Taking aim at the arms trade: NGOs, global civil society, and the world military order*. (London; New York: Zed Books, 2010): 168.

classification of Keith Krause, which produce weapons at the highest level of technology and their relations with the second and third-tier producers. Historically, these first-tier states have been producing weapons for many years. They can manufacture and export weapons without economic concerns. So, it means that, as Krause stated, although the weapons industry of these states does not depend on exports to continue producing and functioning, the demand for the weapons they produce will put them among the world's leading exporters.⁵ States that can achieve this and are self-sufficient, such as America, Russia, France, Germany, and the UK, constitute this study's scope. However, this study is limited to the United States, positioned as the first-tier producer and using its arms transfers as a foreign policy tool.

This study aims to indicate that the dependency relations that appeared in the 16th century between developed and underdeveloped countries manifest themselves in different ways and still continue through arms transfers. Christian Catrina previously conducted a comprehensive study on arms transfers and dependency concepts.⁶ However, since he did not discuss it theoretically, it is insufficient to understand the current foreign policy dilemma that third-world countries face. Again, similar studies on this subject have been conducted by David Kinsella⁷ and John Sislin⁸, but the theoretical framework is not available in these studies as well. For this reason, to establish a connection between what happened in the past and what is happening today, the topic of the thesis was tried to be located on a theoretical ground with the perspective of world-system theory (sometimes it is called as world-system analysis) created by Immanuel Wallerstein in the 1970s. How developed countries with solid defense industries use the dependency relations with third world countries as a tool for

⁵ Krause, *Arms, and the State*, 32.

⁶ Catrina, Christian. *Arms Transfers and Dependence*, (London: Routledge, 1st Edition, 1988), 149.

⁷ Kinsella, David. "Arms Transfer Dependence and Foreign Policy Conflict." *Journal of Peace Research* 35, no. 1 (1998): 7–23. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/425228>.

⁸ Sislin, John. "Arms as Influence: The Determinants of Successful Influence." *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 38, no. 4 (1994): 665–89. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/174334>.

their foreign policy interests through arms transfer is tried to be indicated with the help of world-system theory.

The problem lies in this study's focus; why do the major arms supplying states use arms transfer as an instrument of foreign policy by creating a dependency relationship? Therefore, throughout the study, the data obtained from both primary and secondary sources were examined to find the answer to this problem. Is the underlying reason for the dependency relationship between the developed and underdeveloped world to establish a commercial tie with the arms importing country or create a political influence on that country? Do developed countries impact the armed forces of third-world countries by importing arms equipment? Is the dependency relationship, established due to the arms transfers, suitable for Wallerstein's core, periphery, and semi-periphery classification? In fact, this study's aim is the same as the questions asked above in connection to each other. From this point of view, the dependent and independent variables of this study can be summed up as follows; while the volume of arms import of a country constitutes the independent variable, the manipulation of that country's foreign policy decisions by the arms exporting country constitutes the dependent variable.

This research aims to reveal how a core-periphery-like structure has emerged between the developed and third-world countries. Depending on the volume of arms import, the transfer of arms as a foreign policy instrument has been influenced by the exporting countries. Even if technology transfer from developed to third world countries, through licensed production or co-production, leads to the formation of semi-periphery type countries, it does not seem possible for these countries to reach self-sufficiency level on their own since design and development do not belong to these countries. In summary, with this thesis, it is tried to demonstrate how the transfer of arms is used as a tool in foreign policy by the exporting countries.

Therefore, the main research question asked to find the answer in the thesis is as follows: Why do major arms supplying states want to establish a dependency relation

through arms transfers? In order to complete this main research question, it will be instructive to ask the following secondary questions as follows:

Secondary Questions
• Does arms transfer help the state-building efforts of third-world countries?
• What is the role of third-world elites in arms transfer?
• Why do third-world countries import arms?
• Did arms transfer play a role in the colonial era?
• What was the main motivation behind arms transfer during the Cold War?
• What are the reasons for the global division of defense industries?
• What is the effect of the global division of defense industries on the sustainability of the capitalist world economy?

It can be said that arms transfers between developed and developing countries, which have been generally mentioned up to this point and discussed in detail in the following sections, cause a one-sided dependency relationship (because of the unequal exchange). From this point of view, countries whose defense industry is not developed enough or do not have at all resort to developed countries such as the US, Russia, France, and the UK to meet their security needs. Therefore, a great majority of third-world countries are obliged to import arms to provide necessary equipment for their armed forces. This situation leaves peripheral countries in a state of dependency or semi-dependency.⁹ Developed states have turned this situation into an opportunity and use arms transfers to sustain their one-sided relations with the third world countries, which they have established through colonialism in the past. In other words, supplying of military defense materials with high added value and vital importance for national security from only a few developed countries may put importing or recipient countries in a difficult situation in times such as war and civil conflict. The main reason for the emergence of a core-periphery-like structure due to the need for arms transfer is that

⁹ Guertner, Gary L. " Security Assistance as an Instrument of United States' Foreign Policy." Order No. 7314256, The Claremont Graduate University, 1973. <https://www.proquest.com/dissertations-theses/security-assistance-as-instrument-united-states/docview/302641645/se-2?accountid=13014>.

the third world countries, which import high value-added defense industry products, are either left in a challenging situation financially or devote most of their natural resources to procure arms. Therefore, the main argument of this study is that dependency on arms transfer and defense technology makes it more likely to be open to influence in foreign policy. From this point of view, I hypothesize that the more a country is dependent on arms import, the more it is open to manipulation in its foreign policy.

1.1. Analytical Framework

This study consists of three main titles to test the hypothesis given above and answer the main research question. These are the Theoretical Framework, The Process Leading to the Arms Transfer Dependency, and Foreign Policy Consequences of Arms Import Dependency. In the "Theoretical Framework" section of the study, in order to better understand other parts, Immanuel Wallerstein's World System Theory will be used to explain whether weapon or military material transfer is used as an instrument in foreign policy.¹⁰ In this context, firstly, a historical background is given in order to understand the capitalist relations that constitute the source of arms transfer. World System Theory was defined after the process from geographical discoveries to the industrial revolution and from there to the formation of weapons production industries was presented within the framework of the world system. Wallerstein's capitalist world economic system, which examines the world system in three parts core, semi-periphery, and periphery, is emphasized. Here, it is explained how the core countries, which hold the means of production as a result of capitalist relations, have a monopoly on weapon production technology. It has been mentioned that the periphery countries that have been turned into colonies later provide cheap raw materials to the core countries, and in return, they buy products with high added value. As a result, it was concluded that unequal exchange occurred between core and peripheral countries. Later, under the title of "A Critical Approach to the Modernization Theory," it is mentioned that dependency and world system theory is against modernization theory.

¹⁰ Wallerstein, *The Modern World-System I*, 63

It has been revealed that the classification of society, divided into five parts by Walt W. Rostow¹¹, is not compatible with the development process of third-world countries.

Under the title of “The Process Leading to the Arms Transfer Dependency,” which is the third part of the study, the factors that cause arms transfer dependency were discussed. This process started after the third-world countries gained their independence from Western countries. State-building efforts in the newly independent countries and their relationship with arms transfer are mentioned. Under the title of “Privatization of Security,” it was discussed how the state-building process was damaged due to the delivery of security institutions to private companies. Later, it is mentioned that mercenary and Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) serve Western countries' economic and political purposes in the periphery. Under the title of “The Role of Arms Transfer in Sustaining the Instability in the Third World, ” Western core countries' destabilizing activities in the periphery, both by arms transfer and by PMSCs, were mentioned. Under the title of "Internal Conflicts," it was discussed that the US and the USSR's transfer of weapons to the periphery during the Cold War period turned into an illegal transfer with the end of the Cold War. It was concluded that the internal conflict that emerged as a result of the weapons illegally seized by the rebel organizations undermined the state-building process. Under the title of “The Role of Elites,” the agreements made by the elites in the periphery countries with the Western mining companies in return for the transfer of weapons and their role in the continuation of the exploitation order were mentioned. Under the title of “Military Coups,” it was mentioned that the interaction that started with the transfer of weapons between core and periphery countries was further strengthened by the training of military personnel in core countries. It has been mentioned that transferring weapons to peripheral countries that have not completed the state-building process will increase the power of military elites, and this will pave the way for a military coup.

In the last part of the third chapter, under the title of "Motives Behind Arms Import," three reasons for importing weapons were mentioned. First, a country must import

¹¹ W. Rostow, W. “The Stages of Economic Growth.” *The Economic History Review* 12, no. 1 (1959): 1–16. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2591077>.

weapons because it cannot produce its weapons. The second is those periphery countries, which do not want to be dependent on a single supplier country, import weapons because they want to increase the number of suppliers. Thirdly, periphery countries exposed to embargo or embargo threats import arms because they want to gain autonomy in arms production. Thus, it has been concluded that the third world countries, which also import weapons production technology, have entered various joint production relations with the core countries.

In the fourth chapter, how the transfer of arms was used as a tool in foreign policy was tried to be explained by examining the events from the middle of the 19th century to the present day. For this purpose, firstly, under the title of "Rivalry for Ethiopia in the 19th century", the efforts of western states such as the UK, France, and Italy to obtain colonies by transferring weapons to Ethiopia were examined. Then, under the title of "The Role of Arms Transfers in the Balkans," the role of arms transfer supply to the Christian principalities living in the Balkans of the Ottoman Empire, and the independence of these communities, was discussed. Under the title of "German Arms Transfers to Ottoman Empire," the effects of arms transfer on the foreign policy of the Ottoman Empire, which started with Otto von Bismarck, were examined.

1.2. Significance of the Study

The topic chosen for this study is essential for interpreting the ongoing debate on the difference between arms supplying and arms importing states. In other words, the dependency relationship between core and periphery countries is established through arms transfers. In fact, although the issue is not new, it has not been approached from the perspective of the world system theory/analysis. According to the world system theory, the roots of the dependency relationship between developed and underdeveloped worlds can be traced back to the end of the 15th century with the emergence of capitalism. Expressed as European expansionism, which lasted almost

four and a half centuries, this expansionism took the form of historical capitalism.¹² Based on unilateral exploitative relations, capitalism necessitates a kind of dependency between the parties. Since examining a comprehensive picture of capitalist relations is beyond the scope of this study, I will only focus on the dependency relationship between the developed and underdeveloped countries which is established through arms transfer. The arms dependency relationship has a distinct dimension from other dependency relations. Since the national defense of a country is of vital importance, ignoring it may end up in a catastrophe for the recipient country.

To understand the differences between developed and underdeveloped countries, one might ask how developed countries become developed. What were the underlying reasons for their development? What kind of processes have they gone through? Why are underdeveloped or third-world countries not becoming developed? The answers to these questions are to be sought in the context of arms transfer by referring to the world system theory. As it is evident from the ongoing unilateral arms sales to the third world countries, this type of one-sided relation inevitably causes direct manipulation or exploitation of the foreign policy of the arms recipient countries.

Firstly, the significance of this study stems from the topic itself, which is very relevant to establishing a dependency relation. Apart from other consumer goods, the ability to produce and sell military materials, from a primary gun to a sophisticated military aircraft, requires a particular infrastructure and technological background such as investing in a vast amount of capital on research and development, having a qualified labor force, and cutting-edge technology. Since not all countries have these capabilities, producing and marketing defense-related materials is unique to some privileged countries, later called the first tier. Therefore, possessing the means of production for weapons inevitably put industrialized countries in an advantageous position. Secondly, this study is essential in analyzing the situations encountered by countries that depend on arms transfer. Moreover finally, last but not least, as a result

¹² Wallerstein, Immanuel Maurice. "Modern World-System in the Longue Durée," 8-9, Colorado: Paradigm Publishers, 2004.

of the capitalist world economy, it is essential to understand the dependency relationship among the first, second, and third tiers of arms producers established through arms transfer technology manifest themselves in the 21st century as well. Therefore, it is possible to observe that arms sales are still used as a foreign policy instrument by first-tier arms producers due to their technological superiority in arms production.

1.3. Literature Review

The use of arms transfers as an instrument in foreign policy did not occur immediately. Historically, some states achieved relative superiority in terms of technology, while others did not. When history is examined, it is seen that the states that were superior in a certain period could not maintain this superiority and lost it to other states over time. Therefore, it can be said that superiority and wealth circulate in a sense.

However, this situation started to change at the beginning of the 16th century. Such a cycle of superiority witnessed between states has not been encountered since the 16th century. The underlying reason is that developed countries make third-world countries dependent on them as a result of systematic exploitation. Technologically and politically developed countries have ensured that prosperity and wealth flow towards them thanks to their established colonial order. They have succeeded in intimidating the peoples and governments against or resisting this order, either through direct military interventions or by providing military supplies to various groups such as proxies and allied countries. In other words, this exploitation system is being re-established with the arms transfer once established in the colonial era.

In this part of the thesis, the primary studies that deal with the situation mentioned above in terms of arms transfers are examined in many aspects. It has been revealed how the third world countries, which were made dependent on the developed countries by transferring weapons, are put into a deadlock in foreign policy. Although numerous studies have been conducted on this subject, only those that can touch on the research question are mentioned here.

To this end, firstly, studies that deal with the process leading to foreign policy dependency from a historical perspective were examined. Secondly, the arms dependency-related studies were analyzed in terms of why peripheral states have to import arms and the efforts of third-world countries regarding arms production. Finally, the studies examining the foreign policy situation of the third world countries, which were made dependent on time by transferring arms, are included.

Christian Catrina, who has undertaken a comprehensive study on arms transfers and dependency, argues that both sides will benefit from arms transfers. However, in this study, it has been asserted that the arms supplier is more profitable than the arms importer. Catrina claimed that the word dependency does not always have a negative meaning; however, he ignored that dependency may sometimes have a negative meaning when it comes to arms transfers.¹³ Although the study states that unilateral dependency relations are rare and generally mutual, it will easily be understood that this is not a very meaningful conclusion simply by looking at the relations between the US-Africa and the Europe-Africa in terms of dependency. It is impossible to disagree with Richard M. Emerson's view on this issue. According to Emerson, dependency and power are interrelated concepts. The critical point here is to know that dependency relations are relations of domination.¹⁴

Regarding arms as a tool of influence, Catrina's demonstration of arms supplier influence in a table form has facilitated understanding of arms transfers. According to the table, the way of persuasion through formal or semi-formal negotiations with the government and military representatives; the offering of more advanced weapons or financial means as a reward; privileged financial conditions to arms recipient country in case of acting in line with the wishes of the exporting country; delaying the supply of weapons, restricting the supply of weapons qualitatively and quantitatively, or threatening with a penalty by stating that the supply of weapons may be cut completely

¹³ Catrina, *Arms Transfers*, 149.

¹⁴ Emerson, Richard M. "Power-Dependence Relations." In: *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 27, No. 1, 1962, 32.

if the supplier country's wishes are not complied with; temporarily or permanently cutting off the supply of weapons; applying a carrot and stick approach, where the privileged financial conditions can be withdrawn; and finally, it has demonstrated that the supplier state can go beyond the arms transfer restriction dimension by using force when necessary.¹⁵ In this respect, the information given in the table has made it easy to explain the embargoes and sanctions issues mentioned in the 4th chapter of the thesis, which is the foreign policy consequences of arms transfer.

Keith Krause, who has known for his work on arms production and trade, stated, in the section on why the arms transfer system emerged, that there are differences between states in terms of arms production capacity. He argued that the mere existence of states was insufficient to explain arms production, and there is a need for arms transfer between states because of the different capabilities of states in producing arms.¹⁶ Although I agree with this statement, Krause's explanation of the existing international system as it is, from the beginning of his work, is insufficient to answer the questions in mind. However, if he could explain why only a few developed countries control the world arms production system, the questions would have been answered to some extent. The point to be emphasized here is that Krause's work could not abandon the Eurocentric framework as he approached the arms production and trade issues in parallel with the modern state system that started with Westphalia.

Contrary to Krause, Richard A. Bitzinger clarifies the subject by stating that the world arms production system has a hierarchical structure in his study titled "The Modern Defense Industry."¹⁷ In line with this explanation, Ron Matthews and Curie Maharani stated in the "The Defense Iron Triangle Revisited" section of the study that the arms procurement and bidding process was created with capitalist purposes through the lobby, which indicates that arms transfers have both an economic and a political

¹⁵ Catrina, *Arms Transfers*, 157.

¹⁶ Krause, *Arms, and the State*, 16.

¹⁷ Bitzinger, Richard A. *The Modern Defense Industry; Political, Economic, and Technological Issues*, Praeger; 1st edition (October 15, 2009), 2.

dimension.¹⁸ By stating that this hierarchical structure is led by the US, Bitzinger meant that the global defense industry had become unipolar after the cold war.¹⁹ Again, like Krause, we see the first, second, and third-tier producer distinctions in his study as well. Thus, Bitzinger's work is essential for the subject of this thesis from two perspectives; first, it is relatively up-to-date, and second, it mentions that the arms trade has a colonial past.

On the other hand, in his study "Towards a Brave New Arms Industry?", Bitzinger stated that because the possibility of the arms embargo, sanctions, and other supplier restrictions always exists, there is a perception among arms importing countries that they must have somehow domestic arms production capability. He demonstrated this by giving examples from embargoed states such as South Africa, Israel, Taiwan, South Korea, and China for various reasons caused foreign policy problems due to the dependence of these countries on arms imports. In addition, Bitzinger stated that the globalizing arms industry also brought a global division of labor regarding arms production. Thus, he also mentioned that the classifications previously called first, second, and third-tier may become permanent due to capitalist globalization. As a result, he also stated that a genuinely globalized core-periphery-like industrial structure might emerge.²⁰ In fact, such a structure has already emerged. Wallerstein's classification of the core, periphery, and semi-periphery countries, which is already mentioned in the theoretical framework section, was put forward long before Bitzinger's work. The concept of division of labor has been applied de facto in the defense industry, therefore, in arms production, and in other business lines for years.

Discussing Britain's trade with Iraq and Iran regarding arms transfer, Davina Miller stated that the UK's arms trade with third world countries is actually a foreign policy,

¹⁸ Ron Matthews and Curie Maharani, "The Defense Iron Triangle Revisited," in *The Modern Defense Industry; Political, Economic, and Technological Issues*, Praeger; 1st edition (October 15, 2009), 43.

¹⁹ Ibid, 66.

²⁰ Bitzinger, Richard. *Towards a Brave New Arms Industry?* (The Adelphi Papers. 43. 10.1080/714027876, 2010): 74.

and in this way, Britain maintains its relations with the colonies it previously settled.²¹ One of the arguments put forward by this study, the manipulation of the foreign policies of the third world countries by establishing a dependency relationship through arms transfers, was also demonstrated by Miller. Addressing the issue of arms transfer in the case of the UK, Miller stated that it is possible to influence the third world countries' armed forces through arms transfers. The point of view put forward in this thesis is not very different. Thus, by providing arms to the elite (generally the armed forces of a country), the developed core countries, which have an advanced defense industry, have been able to shape the political structure in the third world countries in line with their interests. This political effect occurred in the form of regime change but mainly through the military coup. Therefore, the arms transfer for Britain was never done for purely commercial purposes.²²

The situation is not different for the US. It can even be said that all arms transfers made by the US after the Second World War was made as a tool of US foreign policy. Because, especially during the cold war years, the US was one of the two superpowers along with the Soviet Union. These transfers, which the US defense industry made without financial concerns, primarily served the US national interests. Richard F. Grimmett's article titled "Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations" on the transfer of conventional weapons to developing countries between 1999-2006 can be assumed as a report to the American Congress. In this study, although the US arms transfers are introduced as maintaining regional stability and supporting friendly and allied nations, the transfers made during the Cold War proved that the power struggle with the Soviet Union turned into proxy wars over the third world countries.²³ Supplying weapons to the vulnerable regions where there is always a possibility of regional military conflict does not solve the region's ongoing problems except to serve

²¹ Miller, Davina. *Export or die: Britain's defence trade with Iran and Iraq*, (London; New York, NY: Cassell, 1996): 8.

²² *Ibid*, 8

²³ Richard F. Grimmett, *Conventional Arms Transfer to Developing Nations, 1999-2006*, CRS Report for Congress, Report Date: 26 Sep 2007, 1-89.

the US national interests. With the arguments it put forward, this study did not go beyond supporting the opinions of the opposition in the states that the US sees as enemies. In other words, since the US sees the governments which act against the US interests, it has used arms transfers as a foreign policy tool.

Similarly, during the Cold War, the US and the Soviet Union's policies towards Southern countries were shaped by ideological affinity. Anna Stavrianakis, who looks at the issue of arms transfers from the perspective of Non-Governmental Organizations and the Global Civil Society, claims that the transferred weapons cause illicit arms transfer, which is the cause of the conflicts over natural resources in the third world countries such as Angola and Afghanistan. However, Stavrianakis, who stated that the technologically underdeveloped Soviet weapons compared to the American weapons could be used more efficiently in conflicts, missed the point. Even if American weapons are more advanced than the Soviets, it should not be forgotten that the US provides technical and usage support along with the transfer of weapons. By mentioning the role of the elites in the South and the process of arms transfers, Stavrianakis emphasizes that these elites act as the representatives of the developed Northern countries in the South, which is also in line with the arguments of this study.²⁴

According to Martin Shaw, a kind of quasi-imperial administration emerged with Indonesia's East Timor and Aceh occupation.²⁵ He points out that the formation and development of the state in Indonesia and its integration with the global capitalist system took place under the direction of the United States. The countries that were integrated into the capitalist world economy by transferring arms were prevented from reaching a self-sufficiency level due to their dependence on the West.²⁶ This study can be regarded as successful since it gives a humanitarian perspective with the views and actions of major non-governmental organizations such as "The Campaign Against Arms Trade" (CAAT), British American Security Information Council (BASIC), and

²⁴ Stavrianakis, *Taking aim at the arms trade*, 168.

²⁵ Shaw, Martin. Post-Imperial and Quasi-Imperial: State and empire in the global era, 2002, (*Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 31 (2): 36.

²⁶ Stavrianakis, *Taking aim at the arms trade*, 54.

Saferworld. However, it falls short of explaining the relationship between arms transfers and foreign policy.

Rachel Stohl and Suzette Grillot's approaches to the international arms trade give some insights. However, the study did not explain the historical development of the arms trade and the underlying causes of the legal and illegal arms trade. For instance, regarding arms transfer, Stohl and Grillot mentioned the arms production, trade, and technological developments in some European countries, such as the UK, Italy, France, Germany, and Sweden, but never mentioned the use of weapons for colonial purposes. Moreover, although it was mentioned that arms transfers were used as an instrument in foreign policy during the Cold War years by the Soviet Union, the USA's political weapon transfers were never mentioned.²⁷ From this point of view, this study can be considered as western-centric, and thus, civil wars and internal conflicts that occur as a result of western arms transfers were not included.

1.4. Methodology

In this study, the books, and articles, which both Turkish and foreign authors wrote, were used as secondary sources. While printed publications such as books and peer-reviewed journals were obtained primarily from the Middle East Technical University library, official printed documents issued by government agencies were acquired from the Presidential Library. Since defense industry-related issues contain classified information for every country, it was, by and large, difficult to obtain them. However, in addition to this, most of the electronic materials available on the internet, such as e-books, e-journals, and articles, were reached through databases to which Middle East Technical University has subscribed. Governmental and non-governmental agency reports, defense industry reports, and statistical data from various institutions were used as primary sources. Along with these sources, some Ph.D. and master level dissertations directly related to this study were also considered. Hence, it can be said that, in this sense, this study is secondary research.

²⁷ Rachel Stohl and Suzette Grillot, *The International Arms Trade*, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2009), 47.

Since this thesis is inherently in international relations, it is more feasible to use the qualitative research method rather than the quantitative one. However, quantitative data was employed to explicitly exhibit the research topic in some parts of the thesis. Furthermore, tables and graphs were used if necessary. The data mentioned above and information gathered from various sources, either visual or printed, were analyzed through qualitative content analysis. The reason for applying qualitative content analysis was to be tested the hypothesis by examining the obtained data. In this context, while the volume of arms import of a country (whether through transfer or sale) constitutes the independent variable, the manipulation of that country's foreign policy decisions (being exposed to an arms embargo or threats of the arms embargo or sanctions since the arms dependency relation) by the arms exporting country constitutes the dependent variable. Thus, because the defense industry, which requires high technology, does not develop in third world countries due to dependency relations, how the transfer or sale of arms is used by the foreign policy interests of the exporting countries was revealed in this study.

CHAPTER 2

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

There have been many approaches to explain interstate arms transfers/sales in the existing literature. Nevertheless, they were content with describing the steady picture instead of clarifying their rationale in detail. The rationale for pursuing this study is to apply Immanuel Wallerstein's world-system theory to explain whether interstate arms sales are used as foreign policy instruments or not. To explain the relations established through arms sales, one should consider that this relation may lead to a dependency between the seller (exporter) and buyer (importer) sides. Since the continuation of exploitative capitalist relations re-established through arms sales, investigating this dependency relationship within the framework of world-system theory will be enlightening.

The consequences of arms sales are different both for supplying and recipient countries. However, in this study, the foreign policy consequences of arms sales will be examined in terms of recipient states. First, the definition of the concept of arms sales (transfer) enables the reader to understand the topic clearly. Arms sales can be defined as selling or transferring different weapons or armaments to other countries that cannot produce them by their ability. In Edward R. Fried's definition: "Arms transfers in the most inclusive sense consist of military goods and services that are given away, sold on credit (either at a market or at concessional rates) or sold for cash."²⁸

²⁸ Edward R, Fried. "An Economic Assessment of the Arms Transfer Problem." In Andrew J. Pierre (Ed.): *Arms Transfers and American Foreign Policy*. (New York: New York University Press, 1979), 262-263.

The United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) makes a more comprehensive definition of arms transfers. Since it is contributive and elaborative, the definition will be used here as well:

Arms transfers (arms imports and exports) represent the international transfer (under terms of grant, credit, barter, or cash) of military equipment, usually referred to as 'conventional', including weapons of war, parts thereof, ammunition, support equipment, and other commodities designed for military use. Among the items included are tactical guided missiles and rockets, military aircraft, naval vessels, armored and non-armored military vehicles, communications and electronic equipment, artillery, infantry weapons, small arms, ammunition, other ordnance, parachutes, and uniforms. Dual-use equipment, which can have application in both military and civilian sectors, is included when its primary mission is identified as military. The building of defense production facilities and licensing fees paid as royalties for the production of military equipment are included when they are contained in military transfer agreements. There have been no international transfers of purely strategic weaponry. Excluded are foodstuffs, medical equipment, petroleum products, and other supplies. Services such as construction, training, and technical support are not included for the United States, whose services consist mainly of construction (primarily for Saudi Arabia). Military services of other countries, which are normally of a much smaller magnitude, are included.²⁹

Unlike many others, interstate arms transfers and their foreign policy consequences will be examined through the lens of Wallerstein's world-systems theory since the subject of arms transfer as a foreign policy instrument has not been discussed within the framework this theory. In order to understand the problems of interstate arms transfer and their natural consequences in terms of recipient countries, it is necessary to go back and look at the historical background.

The history of the events mentioned here began approximately in the 16th century and has continued until today. However, in the process up to the 16th century, with the developments in shipbuilding in Western Europe, the European merchants discovered the continent of America, Asia, and Africa. By constructing permanent bases in these newly discovered places, European merchants transported the wealth of these countries to Europe by sea. These bases later were used for colonial purposes. "In the

²⁹ U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency: World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 144. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1987.

mid 1500s, Portugal, Spain, Italy, and later France, Netherlands, and the UK will accumulate tremendous wealth transported from America and other overseas countries.”³⁰

The raw materials and labor needed for the industry to work, and production, were obtained from the colonies. Western Europe, which has reached enormous wealth with these exploitation activities, sometimes carried out with state support and sometimes individually, will also be the scene of conflicts with each other due to the exploitation race. The main purpose of the world system, which will be called the capitalist world economy later, is to obtain the raw material from the colonies as cheaply as possible, even for free. And then, after processing the raw materials in their industry to transform them into a manufactured product, they will be sold to the colonies at a high price in the form of a commercial commodity. In this way, the third world countries, which have been economically stuck, have been left in debt to the Western European countries because of unequal exchange. Western countries used various means in case colonies did not pay their debts. In later stages of the colonial era, even after their independence, the Western core countries sometimes facilitated military coups by supporting the colonized country's armed forces and appropriating their natural resources in return for their debts. In addition to military intervention, the Western world, which tried to change the colonies' cultures and religions to break their ties with their past, completely broke the resistance power of the third world countries. Here, on the one hand, a world whose spirituality has been erased and its material resistance has been zeroed, thus colonized; on the other hand, a homeland (Fr métropole) reaps the earth's whole wealth: 'Imperialism.'³¹

Western European countries, which succeeded in transforming this wealth into capital obtained from other continents, could manage to use this capital accumulation in accordance with the industrial revolution. In the years when the industrial revolution took place, the third world countries, which were already colonized by the western

³⁰ Duralı, Ş. Teoman. *Çağdaş İngiliz-Yahudi Küresel Medeniyeti*, (Istanbul: Dergah Yayınları, 2011), 74-75.

³¹ Duralı, *Çağdaş İngiliz-Yahudi*, 18

countries, were prevented from having their own weapons by not transferring arms and armament technology. The main purpose pursued by the Western countries with this is not to lose the monopoly of weapons production technology to the third world countries. Thus, even if the colonies gain their independence from western countries, they will continue to depend on western developed countries as they cannot produce weapons. Some of what is now considered as the third world was colonized and prevented from obtaining its own weapons during the period when Europe and North America underwent a technological revolution, which also brought about a radical transformation in weaponry technology.³² Another aim is to prevent third-world countries from having strong armed forces. It was thought that this situation would endanger the existence of the colonies. The European powers' attempt to preserve a monopoly on violence manifested itself repeatedly in the nineteenth century when measures were made to prevent arms supplies to Africa and part of Asia. The stated goal was to avert so-called 'tribe warfare,' but the result was that third-world peoples were incapable of confronting colonialization.³³

However, this situation, that is, preventing the armament of the third world countries, came to an end with the start of the Second World War. As of this date, the motivating force was the industrialized countries' desire to use third world people in the tremendously violent battle between the imperialist states that occurred from 1939 to 1945.³⁴ The Second World War created an impetus for the systematic arming of third-world countries. The industrialized states supported the regimes that would serve their own interests in the third world countries. The most suitable institution to serve this purpose was the armed forces. Because the armed forces in the third world countries had the authority to stage a coup and seize the administration in the name of restoring "democracy" in the western sense, therefore, all kinds of support were provided to the military elites, from military training to the supply of weapons and ammunition, from

³² Eide, Asbjorn. The transfer of arms to Third World countries and their internal uses, *The infernal cycle of armament*, Int. Soc. Sei. J., Vol. XXVIII, No. 2, 1976, 307.

³³ Ibid, 308.

³⁴ Ibid, 309.

intelligence information to military coups. Weapon aids started to support the armed forces in third-world countries. The use of violent means was not intended to defend against external attack (as would have been permissible under the United Nations Charter) but to maintain established control and endure the fighting for self-determination.³⁵ Supporting the armed forces in terms of military material later served to send military units to military bases in third world countries, when necessary, which the USA called flexible response.

In this way, colonial powers, avoiding direct confrontation with each other, preferred to arm the third-world countries. For instance, the United Kingdom trained and equipped the Asian continent with arms, and the French and British established armed forces in many African countries. This process was a preparation for the cold war years. Thus, the use of arms transfers as a foreign policy instrument, which started in the second world war and gained momentum during the Cold War, continued even after the colonial states gained their independence. During the Cold War, together with the arms race between the superpowers, arms transfers were made to aid third-world countries, which were seen as ideologically close. This situation changed in the following years of the cold war due to increased costs and therefore took the form of arms sales by providing appropriate credit opportunities. Third-world countries, which had to buy the major weapon systems that came as an aid at first, were economically left in a difficult situation. In this case, the following options are available to the global South; it may redistribute resources from other areas of government spending, including education and healthcare; it may choose to borrow foreign currency in international financial markets or do a mix of these options.³⁶ In any case, the third world countries have been brought to the position of satellites of developed metropolitan countries. National resources earmarked for reducing poverty are diverted to debt servicing, benefitting the lenders of the wealthy Western world. At least twenty of the world's most highly indebted impoverished countries (HIPCs)

³⁵ Ibid, 311.

³⁶ Susan Willett, *The Arms Trade, Debt & Development*, 1999, Funding for the research was provided by the Trust for Research and Education on the Arms Trade (TREAT), 4.

transmit more than a fifth of their earnings to developed-world lenders for arms procurement expenses.³⁷ For this reason, the state budget, which should be allocated to education and health services, is used for military expenditures.

In the post-Cold War period, with the disappearance of the USSR threat, major weapon systems with very high costs began to be produced in cooperation with third world countries. This was done to take advantage of cheap labor in third-world countries and reduce costs. Thus, today, metropolitan countries defined as the core by Immanuel Wallerstein have cooperated in the fields of the defense industry that do not require high technology such as spare parts production, maintenance, and repair in the periphery and semi-periphery countries. This situation will be examined in detail as a global division of defense industries. Thus, the indigenous people were forced to work as enslaved people in the colonial era; today, the production with low added value has been shifted to third world countries as part of the capitalist division of labor.

2.1. World System Theory

Immanuel Wallerstein defines the world system as a "multiculturally territorial division of labor in which the production and exchange of basic goods and raw materials is necessary for the everyday life of its inhabitants."³⁸ What he means by saying world system is a socio-economic unit that requires division of labor, and the agents of this system consider reciprocity or mutuality in their interactions.³⁹ This world system, inherent in capitalism, consists of all elements and structures without any exception. According to Wallerstein, the root of the problem stems from the

³⁷ Ibid, 9.

³⁸ Wallerstein, Immanuel. "The Modern World-System I: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century".1974. New York: Academic Press, 63.

³⁹ Kakkar, Kanika. "Unit-6 World System Theory." In *World System Theory*, 2021. New Delhi: Indira Gandhi National Open University, 81.

capitalist world economy, and this economy emerged during the early 16th century in Europe and the Americas.⁴⁰

When it is said capitalist world economy, it means an enormous economic zone or area. In this area, the flow of capital and division of labor or exchange of goods should be understood. This capitalist world economy is not a unique structure; instead, it has consisted of many political, economic, and cultural units. In the capitalist world economy, to make the business profitable, the division of regions (in addition to the division of labor) should also be created in different parts of the world. Depending on the mode of production (monopole or competitive), the division emerges in various parts of the world. In Wallerstein's terms, the products can be produced more profitably when there is a monopole market. While these monopole markets are primarily located in the western part of the world, the competitive markets can be seen in the rest of the world. When there is a competitive market, profits of the products will decline.

As a result of this different application of monopole and competitive market, unequal exchange of goods occurs inevitably. In Schouten's words, "A key element here is monopolization versus competition: the more competitive a product is, the more peripheral it is because the less money you can make on it. The more monopolized a product is, the more core-like it will be because you can make more money on it."⁴¹ Wallerstein makes this division the core where monopolized production (generally high-tech products) occurs and peripheral where the competitive market system functions. Moreover, in some cases, since a country may display the characteristics of both core and periphery, they are called semi-periphery countries. The semi-periphery countries can be located between the core and periphery. The roles that semi-periphery countries play are essential for maintaining the capitalist world economic order. Since perpetual unilateral exploitative relations made by the core countries may lead to a

⁴⁰ Wallerstein, Immanuel Maurice (2004). [*World-systems analysis: An introduction*](#). Duke University Press. 23.

⁴¹ Schouten, P. "Theory Talk # 13: Immanuel Wallerstein on World-Systems, the Imminent End of Capitalism and Unifying Social Science", 2008, 6. Theory Talks, <http://www.theory-talks.org/2008/08/theory-talk-13.html> (10-01-2022)

political explosion in peripheral areas against core countries, semi-peripheral countries act as a buffer zone between them. What is more, the existence of a middle area between core and periphery gives a clear message to periphery countries that the likelihood of leveling up to semi-periphery is always possible.⁴² In general, the flow of capital and raw materials occurs from the periphery to core countries because of their mutual interdependence that stems from the colonial history of the core countries.

Unlike dependency theory which divided the world into two as only developed and underdeveloped or metropolis and satellite, Wallerstein's world system theory suggests that exploitation takes place not only between core and periphery countries but also between core and other economic zones.⁴³ Depending on this assumption, surplus-value or added value can be obtained from any part of the world with the effect of a capitalist world economy. With the development of the industrial revolution and geographical discoveries in Western Europe, the need for raw materials and a specialized labor force increased substantially. Western countries met their needs from newly colonized countries since its cheap and easy to get. In later stages, because manufactured or finished products of western Europe were superior to the poorer parts of the world in terms of their quality, the poor periphery countries could not compete with its colonial power. There was even no open ground for this rivalry.

2.2. A Critical Approach to the Modernization Theory

Like dependency theory, world-system theory maintains a stance against modernization theory as well. The discrepancies in their interpretations of the development of the underdeveloped world confronted them. Traditional-Modern society categorization is a distinctive feature of modernization theory. One of the preeminent modernization theorists, Walt W. Rostow, classifies societies into five different categories. The first one is a traditional society where goods are exchanged

⁴² "World-Systems Theory," Key Terms, Last updated Feb 20, 2021, [https://socialsci.libretexts.org/Bookshelves/Sociology/Introduction_to_Sociology/Book%3A_Sociology_\(Boundless\)/08%3A_Global_Stratification_and_Inequality/8.06%3A_Sociological_Theories_and_Global_Inequality/8.6I%3A_World-Systems_Theory](https://socialsci.libretexts.org/Bookshelves/Sociology/Introduction_to_Sociology/Book%3A_Sociology_(Boundless)/08%3A_Global_Stratification_and_Inequality/8.06%3A_Sociological_Theories_and_Global_Inequality/8.6I%3A_World-Systems_Theory)

⁴³ Kakkar, "Unit-6 World System Theory." In *World System Theory*, 79.

through barter, and agriculture has the most important place among other economic activities. The second stage is preconditions for take-off or transitional stage, wherein this stage trade starts gaining importance to create added value. Thanks to the improvements in the transportation system, trade became easier than in the past. The third stage is take-off. Within this stage, the workforce increases with the migration from the rural area to the city center, accelerating the industrialization process in the manufacturing sectors. The fourth stage is called driving to maturity, where the role of technology becomes evident. It can also be called technological maturity. By using technology, economic activities, goods, and services can be provided in various forms. Finally, the fifth stage, or the age of high mass consumption, points out, as the name implies, the mass consumption of modern society, including single-family homes and durable consumer goods and services on a mass basis.⁴⁴ This stage implies a tendency towards the social welfare state where surplus production occurs. Service sectors have become a prevalent branch of activity.

The supporters of modernization theory advocate that development can only be accomplished by proceeding to another phase in the capitalist developmental stages. "In other words, it provided a very optimistic perception of development, bringing to fore that the underdeveloped countries are lagging since they are at an earlier stage of development where the West, particularly Europe, was long ago."⁴⁵ This kind of approach necessarily requires asking some questions about the developmental stages of the modernization theory. Do underdeveloped countries share the same path as the West? Did foreign powers colonize European countries as they did in the past? Were they prohibited from receiving an education? These questions can be increased to demonstrate that the West or underdeveloped countries are not competing under equal circumstances. Ignoring the history of western colonialism over the poorer part of the world may result in misinformation. When interpreting the developmental level of the

⁴⁴ Rostow, W. W. "The Stages of Economic Growth." 1959, *The Economic History Review*, New Series, (Vol. 12, No. 1) 1-16.

⁴⁵ Kakkar, "Unit-6 World System Theory." In *World System Theory*, 78.

underdeveloped countries, one should consider more than two hundred years long colonial exploitation of the underdeveloped world by the Westerners.

It is very natural to expect the same output if the input is the same. However, modernization theory fails to explain the developed and underdeveloped world's economic, political, and social conditions since they do not share the same history. Even the concept of modernization itself derives from the West, which is also an unknown word to the underdeveloped world. For these reasons, modernization theory draws many harsh criticisms from various aspects, such as considering development as a linear way, despite the possibility of ups and downs. Secondly, since every country has a unique characteristic in every aspect, offering only one model for development makes modernization theory restricted. The world-system theory also criticizes the modernization approach for refusing the idea that those deep structural factors might prevent economic progress.⁴⁶ Thirdly, even though modernization and tradition seem different from each other, they may exist together, as in the case of Japan's development. Indeed, the modernization theory fails to address the sources of the contemporary world's international and intersocietal tensions.⁴⁷ A clear answer to the modernization theory comes from Wallerstein himself; the evolution of societies can only be possible by expanding their markets and political powers across the world, which is the main driving force behind the development.⁴⁸

Therefore, expecting a similar development pattern from an underdeveloped world is a futile attempt. Every society should find its development pattern by knowing its strengths and weaknesses in terms of economic, cultural, and political heritage. With an imported developmental model, underdeveloped countries cannot make progress.

⁴⁶ Burhanuddin, Agussalim. (2016). Rethinking World System Theory: A Historical and Conceptual Analysis. 10.

⁴⁷ Lockard, Craig A. "Global History, Modernization and the World-System Approach: A Critique." *The History Teacher* 14, no. 4 (1981): 498. <https://doi.org/10.2307/493686>.

⁴⁸ Cosma Sorinel, "Immanuel Wallerstein'S World System Theory," *Annals of Faculty of Economics, University of Oradea, Faculty of Economics*, vol. 1(2), (2010), 220.

CHAPTER 3

THE PROCESS LEADING TO THE ARMS TRANSFER DEPENDENCY

3.1. Introduction

This part of the study will discuss how ongoing arms transfers between core and peripheral countries turn into dependency relationships. Therefore, in this context, this section reveals how arms transfer dependency was established even after the peripheral countries gained their independence from the western states.

In the colonial period, Western core states did not need to make an extra effort to facilitate the flow of surplus, as they were legally and militarily present in the peripheral countries. However, after the second world war, many countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America gained their independence, and the countries once colonized them traced back to exploitative relations with them. Due to these extensive exploitative relations, the third world countries could not complete the state-building process. It means that it is the absence of democratic institutions in the Western sense, the absence of the right to vote and to be elected, the lack of respect for human rights, and the absence of security, justice, and equal education opportunities, which are among the most fundamental duties of the state. In the third world countries, which are in such a fragile structure nowadays, the borders drawn by the western colonial powers during the colonial period will be the scene of internal conflicts due to ethnic, tribal, and religious disagreements.

Since the security institutions, namely the military and police forces, are insufficient or absent, Western-origin multinational companies engaged in mining operations claim that they do not feel safe and make agreements with mercenary or private

security companies. As a result of these agreements, the third world countries will witness the privatization of security institutions. Mercenaries and PMSCs operating from the West can act in line with the wishes of the western countries they come from, and sometimes they can be a party to the conflicts within the country they operate. Western core states, which take advantage of internal conflicts, cause further intensification of conflicts by transferring weapons. Thus, with the support of military elites trained in the West, they can make a military coup against the incumbent government. On the one hand, the core countries ensure that the regimes that will serve their interests in the peripheral countries come to power; on the other hand, they can use these transfers as a tool in their foreign policy by transferring or not transferring weapons the third world needs.

Therefore, in this chapter, firstly, the state-building process in the third world countries after their independence and its relationship with arms transfers; secondly, the increasing turmoil in the third world countries due to the arms transfer; and finally, what methods the third world countries, which are still dependent on arms transfer, resort to eliminate this arms dependency relationship will be discussed.

3.2. Arms Transfer and State-Building Efforts after Independency

Since the countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, which gained their independence from Western countries, have a colonial past, the primary state institutions seen in democratic and independent states have not been formed. After years of economic, political, cultural, and religious exploitation activities by the colonial powers, the third world countries in the mentioned continents, which lost their consciousness of being a state and a nation, entered the state-building process from the beginning. However, because of the geopolitical borders drawn by the developed western states without considering the ethnic and sectarian differences, third world countries witnessed the emergence of dozens of new countries ready to explode. For example, the Sykes-Picot agreement, which was signed secretly during the First World War, has an important place in the lack of awareness of being a single nation in the Middle Eastern countries. These countries, which were colonized by the Western

colonial powers, were divided into small ethnic-based pieces as much as possible within the framework of the divide and rule tactic.

Since exploitative activities continued in these regions during the colonial era, divided into areas of influence by the colonial powers, constitutional democratic governments could not take place. Instead, ethnic-based nationalist governments trying to eliminate colonial powers came to power. The nationalist governments suppressed these ethnic and sectarian differences created by the western colonial powers with brutality and cruelty. Efforts to establish a civil democratic government led to military regimes coming to power due to military coups supported by western countries. Western colonial countries, which take advantage of these separatist movements that have reached the level of civil war today, continue the capitalist exploitation system they established in the colonial period by supplying arms to both sides in the conflict.

Solid and sustainable state-building is only possible with the existence of democratic institutions that prioritize human rights and the rule of law. However, the existence of democratic institutions and the interests of oppressive regimes conflict with each other in countries that survived long after colonialism. While the latter requires dictatorship, existence of democratic institutions is particularly dependent on political and military power dispersion, at least in representative democracies.⁴⁹ In the third world countries where democratic institutions operate neatly and have no conflicts, the existence of democratic civilian governments is not in the interest of the western colonial countries since it is not possible to exploit natural resources and sell weapons.

For the capitalist system to function and the surplus-value to flow continuously towards western countries, unstable, oppressive, and authoritarian regimes must exist. The authoritarian elites, who hold power in these third-world countries, are now resorting to every way not to lose it. Western democratic states, which state that they support the so-called democracy, support military regimes in third-world countries and

⁴⁹ Dufek, P., Mochtak, M. A case for global democracy? Arms exports and conflicting goals in democracy promotion. *J Int Relat Dev* 22, 610–639 (2019). <https://doi.org/10.1057/s41268-017-0114-0>

continue arms transfer by suspending human rights. Weapons sent by Western states to non-democratic or underdeveloped countries are used arbitrarily by oppressive dictator regimes without considering human rights. These authoritarian regimes, which give concessions to Western natural resource extraction companies in return for bribing them, also ensure their security. Authoritarian regimes can thereby sustain the power structure without relying on resources acquired from people, typically through taxes.⁵⁰ Other adverse outcomes occur, such as possibly aggressive policies toward neighboring countries or unlawful resale of arms to anti-democratic or “anti-Western” forces abroad — the Islamic State being just one recent example.⁵¹ The arms transfers made by the Western arms-producing states indicate that these transfers were made only by considering the exporting country’s economic, political, and strategic interests, not the recipient. From 1945 to 1995, conventional arms are reported to have effectively resulted in the deaths of over 30 million people, the bulk of whom were innocent people and non-combatants.⁵² The vast majority of the weapons that cause these deaths come from western “democratic” countries that claim to be democratic and respect human rights. As these transferred weapons cause armed conflicts in third-world countries, they also undermine democratic regimes and hinder state-building. These authoritarian regimes, who cannot provide security within the country, seek a solution abroad and resort to private military and security companies to suppress the opposition inside the country.

3.2.1. Privatization of Security

In the third world countries that have just gained their independence from the Western colonial powers, the state-building process has been undermined by the privatization

⁵⁰ Bermeo, Nancy (2010) ‘Democracy Assistance and the Search for Security’, in Peter J Burnell and Richard Youngs, eds., *New challenges to democratization*, 89, Milton Park, Abingdon: Routledge.

⁵¹ Harte, Julia and Jeffrey Smith (2010) ‘Investigators find Islamic State used ammo made in 21 countries, including America | Center for Public Integrity’, available at <https://www.publicintegrity.org/2014/10/05/15827/investigators-find-islamic-state-usedammo-made-21-countries-including-America> (accessed 3 March, 2022).

⁵² Sidel, Victor W. (1995) ‘The international arms trade and its impact on health’, *British Medical Journal* 311, 1677–1680.

of the security forces tasked with protecting the state's existence and the people living in it. Therefore, security, one of the most basic and most important duties of the state, has been left to private enterprises. Hence, in the Weberian sense, the authority of the state to hold the monopoly of the use of force has been handed over to private security companies. Commercialization of security has undermined the Westphalian notion of sovereignty and the Weberian sense of the state's monopoly on force. As a result, it has altered the connection between the state and its use of violence, calling into question interstate conflict structures and traditional notions of the state as the sole possessor of coercive authority.⁵³ The provision of security, which is one of the most fundamental duties that make the state a state (as well as justice, education, and health), from external sources causes the concept of "state sovereignty" to be questioned again. While the third world countries, which gained their so-called "independence" after colonialism, were deprived of their sovereignty with mercenary activities in the past, they cannot maintain their national and political integrity today due to the interventions of Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs). Meeting the security needs of a country by private military and security companies does not relieve third-world countries from responsibility, on the contrary, it leaves them more vulnerable to foreign intervention. Moreover, democracy and state-building processes in third-world countries were also suspended due to systematic military interventions.

As J. Harding claims, what the new mercenary organizations and their mining allies have accomplished thus far is to view political instability in Africa as a market issue and place themselves optimally in that market.⁵⁴ Since PMSCs and mercenary companies do not conceive the conflicts in third-world countries as a social and structural problem, they do not consider any inconvenience in arms transfer and physical military intervention. Therefore, the third-world countries' pro-Western corrupt elites have deliberately sought to privatize security. For example, they have

⁵³ Tonkin, Hannah. *State Control over Private Military and Security Companies in Armed Conflict*. Cambridge Studies in International and Comparative Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511993367.

⁵⁴ Harding, J. "Background Briefing on Diamond Mercenaries of Africa," (1996), 11.

reduced military capability by not providing enough food to the army and established innumerable illegal similar security groups operating outside the scope of aid deals with the primary objective of ensuring personal and regime security, crushing civil society dissent, and eliminating threats from a rival dictator. External pressures have provided authoritarian regimes with a convenient justification for completing the privatization of the primary state institutions by handing over any residual responsibility for the development and social services to transnational non-governmental organizations. Furthermore, they are offloading public assets to their loyalists and making lucrative arrangements with dubious foreign private companies to plunder national resources.⁵⁵

These PMSCs, which are tasked with ensuring the security of Western-origin natural resource and mining enterprises operating primarily in third-world countries, serve the political and strategic interests of the core country. These companies can intervene in the state's internal affairs by making a military coup against the country's government, providing direct support to the opposition group, or being a party to the conflicts.

3.2.2. Mercenaries and PMSCs: Covert Foreign Policy Instruments

When examined thoroughly, the history of the mercenary activities dates back to ancient times. In other words, even before the pre-colonial era, mercenaries existed and were used. For instance, the French Foreign Legion or British Gurkhas were recruited as mercenary soldiers. These mercenaries were usually the people of the least developed countries. Moreover, they served alongside the national army of the lessor country. However, with the end of the Second World War, Mercenarism acquired a different meaning in countries that began to gain independence from colonial powers. Thousands of ex-ranking soldiers who were discharged due to the war's end became natural candidates for the mercenary. This type of mercenary soldier was needed in the third world countries since they did not have a regular army or their security forces were weak. Mainly in African countries, mercenaries were used when it was desired

⁵⁵ Musah, Abdel-Fatau. Privatization, 922.

to overthrow the government and replace it with another pro-Western one. What happened in Angola in 1975 was a clear indication of this. The U.S., via its Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and France, via its intelligence service, explicitly took part in the employment of mercenaries to combat the Marxist Movement. Furthermore, as a result of using mercenaries in Angola, a new government replaced the Portuguese.⁵⁶

Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) and mercenary activities are sometimes used synonymously. The privatization of the security forces in the newly independent third world countries and the increasing number of foreign private security companies bring the concepts of mercenary and PMSCs to the agenda again. The PMSCs, which became more widespread after the 1990s, are sometimes rented by the local governments themselves and sometimes by western countries for commercial and political purposes in third-world countries. Making a conceptual definition of PMSCs and mercenary companies and specifying what tasks they perform will clarify these two concepts. According to the United Nations Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries, a private military or security company is a business corporation that delivers military or security services to people or legal entities for a fee. Military services encompass a variety of tasks associated with military activity, such as planning process, intelligence gathering, inquiry, ground, coastline, or air surveillance, manned or unmanned flight operations, satellite surveillance, any information exchange with security uses technical information, and technical assistance to military services, as well as the other similar work. Security services involve armed protection or security of buildings, facilities, assets, individuals, and any information exchange involving security.⁵⁷ Regarding the definition of a mercenary as defined in Article 47 of Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions:

Someone who: (1) is specially recruited in order to fight in an armed conflict; (2) takes a direct part in hostilities; (3) is motivated essentially by the desire for private

⁵⁶ Arnold, Guy. *Mercenaries: The Scourge of the Third World*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999, xi.

⁵⁷ Policy Brief by Nihal El Mquirmi, Private Military and Security Companies: A New Form of Mercenarism? Policy Center for the New South, February 2022, 3-4.

gain; (4) is neither a national of a party to the conflict nor a resident of territory controlled by a party to the conflict; (5) is not a member of the armed forces of a party to the conflict; (6) has not been sent by a State which is not a party to the armed conflict on official duty as a member of its armed forces.⁵⁸

The Working Group also noted that mercenary activity was specifically an ancient tradition that went back to the pre-colonial era; however, it had changed and decreased with the rise of nationalism-based army recruitment in the nineteenth century. The French revolutionary conflicts resulted in the establishment of national armies, and until the nineteenth century, mercenaries began to emerge as lone soldiers who fought in return for money.⁵⁹ With the decolonization battles and subsequent insurgencies, the employment of mercenaries resurfaced.⁶⁰ This new type of mercenaries, which emerged mainly after the Cold War, would be PMSCs. In other words, the general name of companies serving in private military and private security has been PMSCs. The privatization of security, especially in third-world countries on the African continent, has made the distinction between PMSCs and mercenary companies difficult.

Furthermore, because these military and security companies are compensated for their efforts, some private military personnel begin their careers as mercenaries, and it is difficult to separate them whether they are PMSCs or mercenaries. Mercenary activity is also present in the actions of some PMSCs. These companies frequently consist of former soldiers who abandon their warlords due to disappointment, national armies due to horrible working circumstances, or discharged troops who have not been effectively readapted into society.⁶¹ The company headquarters of PMSCs are located in western countries. However, it carries out its activities primarily in countries rich in natural resources. In these countries, which are already prone to ethnic separatist

⁵⁸ Ibid, 3.

⁵⁹ Arnold, *Mercenaries*, x.

⁶⁰ UNHRS, *Mercenarism and Private Military and Security Companies*, HRC/NONE/2018/40, Research Paper, 14.

⁶¹ Musah, Abdel-Fatau. "Citation for: Privatization of Security, Arms Proliferation and the Process of State Collapse in Africa."914.

conflicts, there are groups of retired or former military personnel who operate as mercenaries for various purposes, including waging factional conflicts, collecting debt, settling scores, providing military protection, and engaging in other illegal activities.⁶² As it is difficult to determine which of these companies are legally conducting their activities on the continent, purchasing security from outside has negatively affected the state-building process of African countries. Third-world countries, which cannot have solid-state institutions due to colonial activities, cannot complete the state-building process with the systematic interventions of PMSCs.

Since the authoritarian regimes that came to power in the post-independence states prioritize their security rather than the country's security, these countries import the most weapons. This situation has been in the interest of Western countries. Because in order for the exploitation activities to continue in countries rich in natural resources such as oil, natural gas, gold, and diamonds that western countries need for their industry, there must be political leaders who defend the interests of the West. These corrupt leaders hire PMSCs to ensure their security and that of western companies' mining operations. PMSCs both suppress threats against authoritarian rule in the country and ensure the security of mining operations.

Importing raw materials in return for the transfer of weapons, which can be called a vicious circle, increased the need for security due to ethnic armed conflicts, and this, met by PMSCs, caused pro-western authoritarian regimes to stay in power. The United Kingdom government's national interest in this matter is explicit. The U.K. was for a long time the Gulf region's hegemonic colonial power. Even after the colonialism, it wished to safeguard the survival of pro-Western administrations in the region, which controlled a large amount of the world's oil resources.⁶³ This deadlock in which the third-world countries have entered indicates why these countries have not developed and are dependent on the West. In order to explain it theoretically, third-world

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Halliday, Fred. *Mercenaries: counterinsurgency in the Gulf*. Nottingham: 1977, Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation for Spokesman Books, 10-11.

countries are constantly forced to remain peripheral due to the systematic exploitation of core or developed countries through PMSCs. Former colonial power states such as the U.K. use this as a tool in foreign policy by transferring weapons.

Nevertheless, the arms transfer is not the only method the U.K. assists the authoritarian regimes in the Gulf to maintain their positions of power. A component of post-colonial activities of the U.K. government includes assistance in counter-insurgency and intelligence gathering services. The U.K. undoubtedly has the most specialized knowledge in this type of repressive action, which remains relevant to many countries worldwide while rooted in colonial struggle.⁶⁴ Arms sales, mercenaries, and counter-insurgency operations have all been linked in third-world countries. Regimes with resources rich in raw materials and at the same time oppressive governments have been targeted by countries with colonial pasts such as the UK, America, and France. Numerous military members, both in active duty and retired, are involved in these countries' general flow of arms and assistance. Later on, most of them are used as mercenaries in one way or another.⁶⁵ Even though the British Empire is over, the government, services, and armaments firms of the United Kingdom continue to play a significant part in counter-revolution and counter-insurgency operations worldwide.⁶⁶

3.3. The Role of Arms Transfer in Sustaining the Instability in the Third World

It is stated that mercenaries and PMSCs, which are mentioned in detail in the section on privatization of security, have an essential role in maintaining the economic and political interests of the western countries in the third world countries after their independence. Intervening militarily on the territory of another independent country with the armed forces, without their consent, means a violation of the sovereignty rights of that country. For this reason, the former western colonial powers, who do not

⁶⁴ Halliday, *Mercenaries*, 13.

⁶⁵ Ibid, 15.

⁶⁶ Ibid, 22.

want to draw the international community's reaction, especially the United Nations, hire western origin PMSCs to ensure the security of resource extraction companies that operate intensively in countries such as Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Another task of these companies is to ensure the local government's security, which cannot provide the security of its own country. These companies, which come to the forefront intending to help the third world countries to form a national army, also help the domestic military forces by providing training, consultancy, and military equipment. However, this training aimed to create pro-Western military elites, as mentioned in the following sections. While the Western powers were ruling these countries directly in the colonial period, they did so by the pro-western military elites after gaining their independence. These elites are generally people who received their education abroad and acted in the interests of Western countries. These elites take bribes from Western countries in return for their services and, at the same time, guarantee their security with the arms transferred by the Western countries.

When the role of arms transfers by western developed countries is mentioned at this point, uncontrolled arms transfers to third world countries cause an illicit spread of arms to tribes and ethnic groups and therefore trigger internal conflicts in these countries. Claiming that there was no security, by indicating the political turmoil inside, the former colonial powers transferred more weapons to suppress the rebels with the help of PMSCs and military elites.

Another problematic situation regarding arms transfer is that when so-called democratic western countries observe a democratic movement in third world countries, they perceive it as a threat to their own political and economic interests. Because according to them, a democratic government in the countries where they conduct resource extraction activities means the existence of adequately functioning state institutions. In such a case, third-world countries that have completed their state-building and nation-building processes will not allow their natural resources to be exploited by western mining companies. Since security problems will be minimized in a country where democratic rights exist and democracy works, there will be no need for arms transfer as much as before. However, in the absence of actual combat,

mercenaries, especially PMSCs, would be unnecessary⁶⁷ ; thus, arms transfer. The effort to create a state in the Weberian sense and the monopoly of the use of force by the state will reduce conflicts and pave the way for equality. Creating the ‘governance prior to democracy’ paradigm could be interpreted as an initiative in a Weberian sense of state-making. Some leaders have embraced the ‘governance prior to democracy’ concept in Africa and, thereby, a Weberian sense of state-building. For instance, Ghana’s President Kwame Nkrumah effectively eliminated the country’s north-south split by giving free education and expanding infrastructure to the impoverished north. On a national level, his development-oriented programs created possibilities and eliminated several significant sources of conflict, reducing social and ethnic disparity in the country.⁶⁸ Therefore, Western countries are struggling to keep undemocratic, pro-Western, authoritarian regimes in power as much as possible.

3.3.1. Internal Conflicts

During the Cold War, the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics avoided being a direct party to the conflicts by transferring weapons to Eastern and Western bloc countries. For this reason, the supply of weapons to the conflict areas was mostly provided by the United States and the USSR. Weapons transfers to countries under the umbrella of these two blocs were generally made in the form of aid. However, with the end of the Cold War, states and groups that could not receive weapons as aid felt weak in terms of security and tried to ensure their security. Many states that emerged after the collapse of the USSR tried to remove the remaining old weapons from their inventory. Especially after the Cold War, the weapons left over from the USSR found buyers in conflict zones in third-world countries. The primary purpose of transferring weapons to developing third world countries is to try to maintain the relations established during the cold war and to ensure the security of companies that are currently engaged in mining activities, thus surplus flow towards

⁶⁷ Musah, Abdel-Fatau. Privatization, 914.

⁶⁸ Ibid, 917.

metropole countries, secondly, to use these arms transfers to gain foreign policy benefits.

The monopoly of the use of force is not in the hands of the state, and the augmentation of the privatization of security in these third world countries, most of which have just gained their independence, has caused the rebel, separatist, or opposition groups to ensure their security. For rebel organizations primarily, this ‘privatization’ of armed conflict has meant trading in resources in rebel control regions, which is frequently illicit. Since these groups already operate unlawfully, illicit commerce can provide them with a comparative edge over other dealers regardless of the type of goods sold, whether diamonds, ivory, narcotics, timber products, or arms. The transfers are smoother if the state exerts little or no control over rebel-controlled regions and when cross-border cooperation with friendly communities or governments in neighboring nations is allowed.⁶⁹

With the privatization of security in these third-world countries, which could not complete the State-Building process, disagreements between ethnic and religious groups were sought to be resolved through conflicts. For instance, Sierra Leone’s civil war, which continued from March 1991 to January 2002, was dominated by a non-state armed force known as the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). The U.N. Security Council enforced arms embargoes in October 1997. In order to aid the government’s campaign against the RUF, this ban was removed the following year. The 11-year fight “almost completely devastated core state institutions, such as parliament, the police, and the civil service.”⁷⁰ When state institutions have deteriorated in many nations, groups engaged in this type of conflict and fighting felt compelled to defend themselves against actual or imagined dangers from other groups, governments, or both. This sort of fighting is typically conducted within and against indigenous people

⁶⁹ International Committee of the Red Cross, Arms availability, and the situation of civilians in armed conflict: a study presented by the ICRC, 1999, ICRC publication ref. 0734, 3.

⁷⁰ Garcia, Denise. “Arms Transfers beyond the State-to-State Realm.” *International Studies Perspectives* 10, no. 2 (2009): 151–68. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/44218590>.

instead of military units. As the conflicting groups implement methods like ‘ethnic genocide,’ the primary objective is not to isolate enemy forces from the region but to remove local people from their houses by intimidation, forceful deportation, murder, or all of them. The intense hostility generated by these clashes can cruelly separate communities, neighbors, and even families long after the military combat has finished.⁷¹ Knowing how to provoke all these religious, separatist, and ethnic-based conflicts, the western arms-producing states supplied arms to both conflicting groups indiscriminately with the logic of the market. Exemplified by the violence in Sierra Leone and Congo, the transfer of weapons to non-state actors has far-reaching negative implications. The connection between natural resource extraction and arms transfer deteriorates these situations even more. It provides non-state armed parties with the financial resources necessary to continue the fighting.⁷² These conflicts, which have moved away from their primary purpose over time, have come to serve Western countries’ economic and political interests.

3.3.2. The Role of Elites

The autocratic regimes in the third world countries, which act only by thinking of their interests, make agreements with the western origin mining companies, causing the natural resources to be used to serve the interests of a particular group instead of increasing the country’s welfare. These elites, who act in an isolated manner from the large part of the society, do not share the revenues they receive from multinational mining companies with the rest of the society. It leads to an increase in income inequalities within the society. With the increase in inequality, the local people, who are deprived of meeting their basic needs, seek the solution by participating in rebel movements. However, as mentioned earlier in the state-building section, these elites, who are far from being accountable, do not take responsibility and work only for their welfare and security, are suppressing the opposition movements in the country through armed violence. These elites, who want to guarantee their personal security with the

⁷¹ Ibid, 3.

⁷² Ibid, 158.

income they receive from raw material exports, spend millions of dollars on private security companies and import weapons to suppress anti-western groups.

The role of weapons companies in western core countries is to transfer weapons to third-world countries rich in natural resources and prone to armed conflict, thus ensuring the flow of surplus value from peripheral to core countries. When the relationship between mining activities and arms transfers is examined, it will be found that in order for these multinational mineral extraction companies to operate smoothly, extraordinary conditions must exist in the country. Because under normal conditions, there will not be a suitable environment for mining activities. What is meant by this expression is that due to the social unrest and injustice (income inequality, failure to meet basic needs, lack of social and civil rights, lack of future expectations, etc.) in the country, rebellious and separatist movements can emerge. The indigenous government, seeking to suppress these movements, resorts to western arms companies and PMSCs. The national government, which transfers a large number of weapons, is trying to pay the debt of these weapons with the revenues it receives from the concessions they give to mining companies. However, these Western-origin arms and mining companies understand that it does not seem possible to continue their profitable business without armed conflict within the country.

A study examining the relationship between armed conflict and mineral extraction activities investigated whether armed violence was used in the extraction of 10 mines necessary for the proper functioning of the U.S. economy and arms companies. According to those who conducted this study, armed violence includes the following; military and police forces pushing, detaining, or firing arms at demonstrators, the use of PMSCs to provide resource extraction security, the forced displacement of native residents, and the use of compulsory work to perform mine extraction operations are all examples of violence and threats of violence committed by the army, security forces, mercenaries, and rebel forces.⁷³ Thus, armed violence can be regarded

⁷³ Downey, Liam, Eric Bonds, and Katherine Clark. "Natural Resource Extraction, Armed Violence, and Environmental Degradation." *Organization & Environment* 23, no. 4 (December 2010): 3. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1086026610385903>.

as a critical instrument that gives companies and core states the tools to extract, mine, and enable the flow of surplus from core to peripheral countries, as well as sustain mining activities that are vital to the capitalist world economy's survival.

The study mentioned above used the National Research Council (NRC) to determine how important these mines are to American national security and the economy. Hence, the NRC developed its assessments based on quantitative and subjective measures that included, for each mineral, the extent of that mineral's U.S. utilization that is given to delivering specific types of items (for example, electrical parts, aerospace substances, integrated circuits, and energy-providing materials) and the overall financial significance of "the contemporary era involving the mineral's prominent utilization."⁷⁴ Below, a few minerals indispensable for the American economy will be investigated, and whether armed violence was used in their extraction process. For instance, manganese is a common mineral required in steel production. It can be used in the manufacture of non-steel metals and batteries. According to the NRC (2008), America is virtually completely reliant on imported manganese, and no practical alternatives are recognized. South Africa (19%), Australia (18%), China (13%), Brazil (12%), and Gabon (11 %). These were the top producers of manganese metal in 2006. Armed violence is directly related to manganese extraction in two of these countries (China and Brazil) and indirectly in (Gabon).⁷⁵

The link between manganese extraction activities and armed conflict is less evident in Gabon, which supplied 72 percent of the manganese used in the U. S. in 2006. For instance, even though we saw no direct reports of armed violence being used to help Gabon's manganese business, Gabon is an authoritarian country with a governing elite that both regulate the country's military and paramilitary powers and benefits directly from the country's mineral wealth. The Gabonese regime, which had only one President from 1967 to 2009, also frequently violated its people's

⁷⁴ Ibid, 10.

⁷⁵ Ibid, 13.

fundamental freedoms. Another essential mineral was copper used substantially in the U.S. Due to its significance in the design & construction sectors, the production of transportation instruments, industrial tools, and machinery, and the production of energy, copper is critical to the operation of the U.S. and world markets.⁷⁶ The very close relationship between copper mining and armed violence can be observed in West Papua, Indonesia. Freeport-McMoRan, an American mining company, extracts copper and gold because of an agreement with the Indonesian government. Due to these mining activities, many indigenous peoples were forcibly removed from their settlements. Because of these as well as other reasons, such as pervasive human rights violations by the Indonesian military and the devastation of West Papua's environment and the illegal seizure of its reserves in favor of the mining industry, core countries and Indonesian elites, West Papuans have long advocated autonomy from Indonesia, and several have engaged in a small uprising to accomplish that purpose.⁷⁷ However, the Indonesian government and the mining company acted together to suppress the anti-mining riots and insurgents. In 1977, for instance, after local antimine activists disrupted Freeport's copper field, the Indonesian army "carpet-bombed, strafed, and reputedly napalmed neighboring towns."⁷⁸ As can be seen from the examples given above, there is a very close relationship between the activities of western mining companies in developing third world countries and incidents of armed violence.

3.3.3. Military Coups

Western core countries, which want to maintain their economic and political interests in Third World countries, support military regimes in developing countries using arms transfers. As stated in the previous parts of the thesis, transferring weapons from western core countries to peripheral countries is not just a commercial event. Peripheral countries, whose own weapon industry is not developed and does not have

⁷⁶ Ibid, 15.

⁷⁷ Ibid, 16.

⁷⁸ Leith, D. *The politics of power: Freeport in Suharto's Indonesia*. Honolulu: (University of Hawaii' Press; 2003): 226.

sufficient human resources, also send their own military personnel to the core countries for training to use these imported weapons. Sometimes core countries supply military advisors to indicate how to use weapons. These staff, who got training in core countries and return, have mastered using military materials and military strategies in their own countries. The increased interaction between core and peripheral countries due to arms transfers causes military elites to isolate themselves from the rest of the poorer segment of society. Military facilities and weapon systems began to modernize with increased arms transfers from core to peripheral countries. These military elites will gradually begin to make their power felt in the society.

The intense militarization of peripheral countries and their substantial weapon transfers stems from their colonial past. Thus, a country's colonial past allowed the formation of an elite in those countries that would serve Western colonial countries' economic and political interests. The disproportionate power gained by the military elite through weapon transfers and military training will also bring some problems. The armed forces, who want to overthrow the civilian government and replace it themselves, resort to a military coup. In these countries, where democratic institutions are not developed enough or at all, the professionalization and strengthening of the military elites with the transfer of weapons and training from western countries pave the way for a military coup. For instance, Pakistan received a large amount of military aid after signing the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement with the United States in 1954. Accordingly, America delivered \$175-million-dollar worth of military supplies over four years to modernize Pakistan's military.⁷⁹ In addition, many personnel in the Pakistani armed forces were sent to the United States to receive training under the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program between 1953 and 1961.⁸⁰ The military elites, which took advantage of the political disagreements and conflicts within the country, found the appropriate conditions to overthrow the

⁷⁹ Tahir-Kheli, Shirin. *The United States and Pakistan: The evaluation of an influence relationship*. (New York: Praeger, 1982), 5.

⁸⁰ Agency for International Development. *U.S. overseas loans and Grants and from international organizations*, (1984), 24.

government. After four years of American military aid, the Pakistani army, which became sufficiently solid and professional, seized the government in 1958 with a military coup under the leadership of General Ayub Khan.⁸¹ The military coup can be described as follows; overthrowing an incumbent government by the armed forces and replacing it with a military administration, namely a junta.

Ethiopia is another example of the relationship between arms transfers and a military coup. Ethiopia was the country that received the most American and Soviet military aid among all sub-Saharan African countries. Between 1953 and 1974, the United States transferred approximately \$224 million worth of weapons to Ethiopia.⁸² In addition, between 1977 and 1984, 3 billion dollars of military aid was given to Ethiopia by the USSR.⁸³ The Ethiopian army, which became more robust due to these aids, took over the government. As can be seen in the examples of Pakistan and Ethiopia, arms transfer from core to peripheral countries rich in natural resources, where democratic institutions have not yet been formed and which have not realized the state-building process, cause the armed forces to strengthen and overthrow the civilian government in these countries.

The role of the armed forces in transferring natural resources from peripheral countries to core states can only be possible if they become more robust due to weapon transfers and carry out a military coup. For example, according to a report published by Global Witness in 2009, multinational companies such as Bangkok-based THAISARCO (a branch of British mining company AMC), Afrimex (UK), and Trademet (Belgium), which purchased minerals from the Democratic Republic of Congo, supported the

⁸¹ Maniruzzaman, Talukder. Arms Transfers, Military Coups, and Military Rule in Developing States, *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Dec., 1992, Vol. 36, No. 4 (Dec., 1992), 743.

⁸² Agency for International Development, 92.

⁸³ Schawab, Peter. Political change and famine in Ethiopia. *Current History*, May 1985, 223.

armed groups within the country and thus, triggered the conflicts.⁸⁴ Therefore, the dependency relationship between the core and peripheral countries will be ensured by justifying the arms transfer.

On the other hand, the transfer of weapons by the western core countries to the third world countries, most of which are already in the conflict zone and some of them are prone to conflict, can be used as an instrument in foreign policy by the core countries. For example, a third-world country will need arms transfers to suppress non-state actors or rebel opposition groups in constant conflict. When this third-world country, which cannot produce weapons with its means, resort to western core countries for arms supply, they can set conditions before supplying weapons. Generally, core countries either put forward political terms compatible with their foreign policy interests or try to obtain concessions for the use of natural resources. When the support of mercenary groups is needed to suppress the rebellion movements, they may change sides during the conflict and even help the coup plotters. The United Nations Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries has demonstrated how harmful mercenary activities in peripheral countries can be for national security. For instance, when the group members went to Comoros to observe the situation in 2014, they saw the devastation caused by repeated military coups carried out with the help of mercenaries who had arrived in the country after it gained independence in 1975. During the first twenty years of the country's independence, at least 20 coups or attempted coups occurred. The Comoros case is a perfect example of mercenary activity resulting in a breach of the right to self-determination.⁸⁵

It is understood from the statements made so far that the western core countries are in an advantageous position with their arms transfers to third world countries and can use them in line with their foreign policy interests as follows:

⁸⁴ Global Witness, "Faced with a gun, what can you do?" War and the Militarisation of Mining in Eastern Congo, 2009, <http://www.globalwitness.org/library/global-witness-report-faced-gun-what-can-you-do>

⁸⁵ UNHRS, Mercenarism and Private Military and Security Companies, HRC/NONE/2018/40, Research Paper, 14.

1. By transferring arms, they implicitly imply their superiority over a third-world country.
2. Peripheral countries, which do not feel the need to invest in their domestic defense industry due to arms transfers from core countries, enter a dependency relationship with western core countries.
3. As a result of arms transfers to countries with little or no democratic institutions, the armed forces become disproportionately stronger and can even seize power.
4. Transferred weapons may fall into the hands of criminal organizations or groups and cause internal conflict in peripheral countries.
5. Military elites, who came to power due to military coups, can resort to mercenary or PMSCs to ensure the continuity of the junta regime by prioritizing their interests.
6. These private security companies operating in peripheral countries cause the privatization of security over time and, therefore, can make the countries vulnerable to external threats.

3.4. Motives Behind Arms Import

3.4.1. Inability to Produce

Why does a country need to import arms? There may be dozens of reasons to import arms since every country's need differs from each other. However, as expected, the first thing that comes to mind is a country's inability to produce munitions or defense equipment with its own means and facility. At the beginning of the study, particularly in the theoretical framework section, it was mentioned that the countries which lagged behind in the land rush or, more precisely, became the victims of the capitalist world economy could not develop their own indigenous defense industry. The capital accumulation race, which began in the 16th century among western countries, entailed the colonization of almost two-thirds of the world with its natural and human resources. These colonized countries were systematically lagged behind western countries in order to ensure the smooth functioning of the capitalist world economic

system. The need to spin the wheels of newly emerged industry in the western world pushed today's developed countries to appropriate whatever they need rapaciously from the so-called third world countries. Since they did not have the necessary environment, third world countries could not develop their defense industry and became dependent on the western part of the world. The dependency rate of third-world countries varies depending on the relations established through the colonial process. In fact, this hypothesis was generated by Immanuel Wallerstein, and he claims that the way a country is integrated into the capitalist world-system determines how economic development takes place in that country.⁸⁶ For instance, if a country was fully integrated into the capitalist system, the dependency rate is the highest. Today, these countries are devoid of producing even the simplest product and, thus, far from establishing an indigenous defense industry. In Wallerstein's terms, these underdeveloped countries constitute the periphery of the world.⁸⁷

When the difficulties are considered in establishing a defense industry, from the high-cost research and development, skilled workers built over the years to the having cutting-edge technology, it seems almost impossible to build an indigenous one for most third-world countries in the foreseeable future. The peripheral countries in this category cannot choose but import arms for their national security.

3.4.2. Increasing the Number of Suppliers

Being aware of the danger of supply interruption as the supplier may withhold transfers of weapon systems, spare parts, or ordnance⁸⁸, periphery countries consider arms import dependency a threat to their national security. In order to free itself from total dependency, the peripheral third world (peripheral/third world can be used

⁸⁶ <https://courses.lumenlearning.com/boundless-sociology/chapter/sociological-theories-and-global-inequality/> accessed 20.01.2022.

⁸⁷ Wallerstein, Immanuel Maurice. *The modern world-system: capitalist agriculture and the origins of the European world-economy in the sixteenth century*. 1976, New York: Academic Press, 63.

⁸⁸ Bitzinger, R. A. "The Globalization of the Arms Industry: The Next Proliferation Challenge." *International Security* 19 (2): 1994. 170–198. doi:10.2307/2539199.

interchangeably in this study) try to diversify its suppliers not to depend on only one or two of them. Dependency rate increases if there is a monopolistic market condition and, in that case, escaping from the domination of suppliers is almost impossible. Contrary to this, recipient states may enhance their bargaining power as long as there is a competitive arms market, and the likelihood of diversification of suppliers may evenly increase. "If the competition to supply arms is between alliance partners, say France and Britain, the recipient may or may not be able to play off one against the other. If the alternative sources of supply cut across the traditional alliance bloc lines, the leverage of the recipient is greatly enhanced."⁸⁹ Furthermore, the efforts to increase arms suppliers stem from the political structure of arms supply mainly observed during the Cold War period.

The motivation to change or diversify the supplier, as mentioned above, is the fear of dependency, and that attempt is developed as a defense mechanism against arms exporting countries. However, not every country has the opportunity to change or increase its suppliers. Actually, many factors prevent countries from making any changes in their arms procurement decisions, and, as a result, they maintain the status quo. For instance, the costs of having a variety of arms suppliers mean that the recipient country must consider employing a variety of foreign experts who deal with the technical problems that stem from different kinds of weapons. Another challenge to diversifying arms suppliers is the integration problem. Integrating and activating all the different weapon systems simultaneously requires their integration during a military operation. U. Alexis Johnson's view on the diversification of weapon systems makes it clear:

Once a pattern is established of arms procurement from a particular source, there is a strong incentive to continue this road. It is difficult and expensive to mix weapons systems. The cost is not only time and money but often in serious decline in military efficiency.⁹⁰

⁸⁹ Cahn, Anne H. (1979b): "United States Arms to the Middle East 1967-76: A Critical Examination." In Milton Leitenberg and Gabriel Sheffer (Eds.): *Great Power Intervention in the Middle East*. New York: Pergamon Press, 108.

⁹⁰ U.S., Senate, Foreign Military Sales Act, Hearings, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 91st Cong., 2nd sess., 1970, 3.

Regarding the diversification of arms suppliers, Johnson draws up three premises: political conditions in the international system, features of the arms market, and domestic economics to specify the influences on the decision to change arms suppliers.⁹¹ Firstly, as an indication of political conditions, arms supply took form under the hegemonic rivalry of the East and West in the years of the Cold War, and it was not easy to change suppliers in this period. The international system of that time could not allow importing parties to make any significant changes in their arms procurement decisions. Secondly, since arms markets, most of the time, are affected by the producing states' defense budget conditions, the availability of the number of arms producers in the arms market may determine the course of events about changing decision of the supplier. If there is a considerable decrease in the number of arms producers in the arms market, then the chance of making supplier change will decrease accordingly. Thirdly, the economic situation of importing or recipient countries determines whether to make any changes in arms suppliers. The last one is a chronic problem in most third-world countries. Due to the ongoing conflicts in and around the third world, the defense share that is allocated from the budget is generally higher than other items. As a result of growing military expenditure, third-world countries resort to taking on debt in order to finance their arms purchases. An analysis conducted by Robert E. Looney indicates that countries with no arms-producing facility are much more reliant on imports of military equipment to meet a given level of defense expenditures. Given the high cost of sophisticated imported weaponry, the high proportion of it is expected (everything else equal) to be financed by external debt.⁹² Since a case in point is peripheral countries, they either produce obsolete weapons with limited technology or cannot produce any kinds of armament.

Albeit, the third world tried to replicate and, sometimes, produce basic war equipment to avoid falling into the arms dependency trap. Although some significant efforts were

⁹¹ Richard A. I. Johnson (2020) Decision-Making in the Arms of a Dependent Relationship: Explaining Shifts in Importer Acquisition Patterns of Major Weapon Systems, 1955–2007, *Defense and Peace Economics*, 31:7, 851-868, DOI: [10.1080/10242694.2019.1618651](https://doi.org/10.1080/10242694.2019.1618651)

⁹² Looney, Robert E. "The Influence of Arms Imports on Third World Debt." *The Journal of Developing Areas* 23, no. 2 (1989): 221–32. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4191744>.

made to establish the indigenous defense industry, they failed for insufficient research and development (R&D) and resource shortages, at least for the major weapon systems.

3.4.3. Desire to Self-Sufficiency in Arms Production

Many different factors can explain third-world arms production desire. However, seeking autonomy, threat perception from other countries, economic advantages of exporting arms, and security of arms supply are just the primary motives behind the arms production efforts in the third world. The foremost among these can be said the autonomy in arms production. Most third-world countries perceive having an indigenous arms production facility and capacity as a sign of political independence. Therefore, every attempt toward an indigenous defense industry is welcomed by public opinion in the third world. The efforts of establishing a domestic defense industry are accelerated among countries that are exposed to arms embargoes or sanctions in one way or another. The remarks of Raimo Vayrynen regarding the nature of establishing a domestic defense industry are as follows:

The establishment of the domestic arms industry is often predominantly a political act which naturally has strong economic and technological underpinnings. The domestic capacity to produce weapons is a means of isolating oneself from the political and commercial pressures that the suppliers of advanced weapon systems, both governments, and firms, can apply. That is why the arms-production capacity is concentrated in those developing countries that have faced an actual or a threat of an arms embargo and/or have become involved in protracted regional conflicts.⁹³

Indeed, among other things, the impact of the arms embargo motivates most third-world countries to initiate an indigenous arms production. As Keith Krause determines, a "near-perfect relationship between the state's having been involved in a conflict and/or subjected to embargoes and its initiation of weapons production." Relationship between what two phenomena? Conflict/embargo and what⁹⁴ Since any

⁹³ Vayrynen, Raimo. *The Arab Organization of Industrialization: A Case Study in the Multinational Production of Arms*, *Current Research on Peace and Violence*, 1979, 66-79.

⁹⁴ Krause, *Arms, and the State*, 162.

kind of restriction regarding arms import may have an immense impact on the recipient country, the impulse to have an indigenous arms production is much higher in those countries that were imposed on arms embargoes. For instance, as a result of the arms embargo exerted by the UN, South Africa undertook domestic weapons production and, till the end of the 1980s, it became 95 percent self-reliant in arms production.⁹⁵ Again, the efforts to secure its arms procurement, Israel turned to building a domestic defense industry after being exposed to arms sales prohibition by France in 1967 and the UK's arms transfer interruption in 1969. Until the end of the 1980s, Israel was self-reliant in the production of most of the military equipment. Israel has become a world leader in unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).⁹⁶

Moreover, Turkey can be a significant example regarding the arms embargo and, thus, attempting to establish an indigenous defense industry. The US arms embargo in 1975 on Turkey was a turning point for rearing up the Turkish defense industry. After World War II, the military needs of Turkey were met in large part by the US and NATO allies. This military equipment consisted of mostly obsolete leftovers from World War II. Turkey had used these military materials for a long time and never felt to make any supply changes since she was also a member of NATO. As a result of the Cyprus Peace Operation, Turkey had to face a US arms embargo, and thereafter, Turkey understood how vital being self-reliant in arms production. By 2020, Turkey was self-reliant on many military products, and her indigenoussness level reached at least 70 percent.⁹⁷

The countries mentioned above may not have reached their current level of arms production capacity were it not for technology that was imported along with weapon systems. One way of obtaining technology from outside is licensed production. Most third-world countries believe that acquiring technology via arms import is a departure

⁹⁵ Bitzinger, Richard. Towards a Brave New Arms Industry? (The Adelphi Papers. 43. 10.1080/714027876, 2010), 11-12.

⁹⁶ Bitzinger, Towards a Brave New Arms Industry? 12.

⁹⁷ Cem Karatay, "Yerlilik Oranı Yüzde 70'lere Ulaştı," Haber Ortak, last modified December 31, 2020, <https://www.stendustri.com.tr/haberortak/yerlilik-orani-yuzde-70-lere-ulasti-h110656.html>

point from being an importing one to being an exporting country. For instance, at the beginning of the 1960s, India's disappointment with the promised F-104 fighters from the United States caused India to seek alternative suppliers to meet its military needs. The underlying reason for choosing the USSR's MIG-21s instead of the UK's BAC Lightning was the desire to take the USSR's production capability to assemble part of the aircraft indigenously.⁹⁸ Apart from this, there are other ways of obtaining military technology rather than getting licenses for indigenous arms production. For instance, the whole production line can be bought, as was the case when Israel got the production right of the Commodore Jet from the USA. Domestic defense equipment production can also be conducted totally by foreign companies. The other example is on the condition that the necessary finance provided, the intended arms production can be made in one of the industrial countries. France developed South Africa's air defense system can be given as an example of the last one.⁹⁹ Lastly, China's way of copying or reverse engineering appears to be one of the methods to produce arms. With the production licenses of Soviet aircraft, China conducted its arms production processes even in the absence of an official license contract.¹⁰⁰

3.5. Conclusion

Under this section, “Does arms transfer help the state-building efforts of third-world countries?” “What is the role of third-world elites in arms transfer?” “Why do third-world countries import arms?” the answers to these research questions were sought. The process of arms transfer dependency of third-world or periphery countries has been examined. The factors in this process complement each other with the factors that will be mentioned in the fourth chapter. Accordingly, it was mentioned that the arms transfers to the third world countries, which have just gained their independence, adversely affected the state-building process and suspended it.

⁹⁸ Johnson, Richard A. I. “Decision-Making in the Arms of a Dependent Relationship: Explaining Shifts in Importer Acquisition Patterns of Major Weapon Systems, 1955–2007”, (Defense and Peace Economics, 2020), 851.

⁹⁹ Landgren-Backström, Signe. “The Transfer of Military Technology to Third World Countries.” *Bulletin of Peace Proposals* 8, no. 2 (1977): 110. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/44480586>.

¹⁰⁰ Backström, “The Transfer of Military Technology,” 110-111.

Armed forces personnel from third world countries, who were sent to the Western states to receive training on military equipment, took an active role in the process of arms transfer. These elites, who acted as representatives of the western core states, later became the leading actors of military coups and military regimes. These elites, who came to power due to the coup, both transferred weapons and had to become indebted millions of dollars to private security companies to protect their personal interests and security. Later, in return for these debts, they rent the country's natural resources to Western mineral exploration companies. Military elites took an active role in this process, which started with the arms transfer.

Finally, the reasons behind the importation of arms by the Third World countries are emphasized. The first of these reasons is that a country does not have the capacity to produce weapons at all. The second reason is that countries try to increase the number of suppliers in order to reduce their dependency levels. Finally, it can be shown that trying to reach self-sufficiency in weapon production by importing weapon technology.

CHAPTER 4

FOREIGN POLICY CONSEQUENCES OF ARMS IMPORT DEPENDENCY

4.1. Introduction

This chapter aims to find answers to four research questions. The first of these questions is, “did arms transfer play a role in the colonial era?” First of all, starting from the middle of the 19th century, the efforts of countries such as the UK, France, and Italy to acquire a colony by transferring weapons to Ethiopia were tried to be answered. Then, with the weakening of the Ottoman Empire, the arms supply to the Christian principalities living in the Balkans by France, the UK, and Russia and thus the role of arms transfers in the rebellion and independence of these communities was discussed. Finally, to answer this question, the effects of the transfer of arms to the Ottoman Empire by Germany, which started with Otto von Bismarck, were examined.

The other research question to be answered in this chapter is “what was the main motivation behind arms transfer during the Cold War?” The answer to this question was sought by focusing on how the US and USSR rivalry, which started in the Cold War years, used arms transfer as a tool in foreign policy. However, because America followed containment policy towards the Soviet Union with both military aid and its active role for establishing various international organizations such as Baghdad Pact brought the US to the fore in this period. For this reason, in this section, firstly, the relations between the US and Israel through arms transfer and Israel's military dependence on the US were examined. Then, Turkey's dependency started with the aid it received within the framework of the Marshall Plan and the Truman Doctrine, and then the process until the 1975 military embargo of the US was examined in terms of arms transfers and their effects on Turkish foreign policy. Again, it has been tried to find an answer by considering how the AWACS sales made by the US to Saudi Arabia

during the Cold War years were used for the purpose of obtaining political and economic benefits.

The third research question is, “what are the reasons for the global division of defense industries?” An answer to this question was sought by referring to the core-periphery approach of Immanuel Wallerstein in the post-Cold War period. The fourth research question is, “what is the effect of the global division of industries on the capitalist world economy's sustainability?” The answer to this question has been sought by discussing the dependency of the arms-producing states, which are divided into first, second, and third tiers, on technology transfer and how this is used as an instrument in foreign policy by the US.

4.2. Colonial Struggles Through Arms Transfer

Although the studies on the use of arms transfers as an instrument in foreign policy generally start by addressing the cold war years, the formation of the arms industry and its worldwide spread can be traced back to the beginning of the 19th century. Because imperial expansionism, which took place after scientific and technological developments in Western Europe, and then the transition to mass production with the Industrial Revolution brought a different dimension to the transfer of arms and wars. The arms industry also took its share from this period, in which the capitalist mode of production gained momentum. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the modern armaments industry was developed incrementally into a global fact.¹⁰¹ In order to understand the importance and place of arms transfers in world history and international relations, it is necessary to know the dynamics of mercantilism that emerged in Western Europe. Mercantilism can be briefly defined as: It is the economic approach that claims that states should bring their own economies to a better level, even at the expense of other states.¹⁰² The essence of this economic model, which

¹⁰¹ Chew, Emrys. *Arming the Periphery*. 2012th edition. London: Palgrave Macmillan, (June 12, 2012), 2.

¹⁰² <https://www.britannica.com/topic/mercantilism>, accessed 02.01.2022.

started in the UK and was adopted by other countries, is 'trade'. Mercantilism, which paved the way for production for the market instead of subsistence agriculture, has led to the departure of traditional production methods. Mercantilism, which sees keeping precious metals such as gold and silver in the country inevitable for the country's enrichment, argued that exports should be more than imports.¹⁰³ Therefore, this situation had to be considered in trade with other countries. The task of the governments was to ensure that regulations were made in such a way as to give export surpluses. According to Maurice Dobb, Mercantilism was a mechanism of state-controlled exploitation via commerce that played a critical part in the development of the capitalist economy: it was primarily the economic policy of a capital accumulation period.¹⁰⁴ The trade of Western European countries with African, Asian, and Latin American countries within the framework of mercantilist rules had become systemic exploitation. Because, with the Mercantilist approach, Western European countries plundered the wealth of the countries mentioned above and carried them to their country. Western European countries that adopted mercantilism had gained the upper hand in trade by transporting precious metals such as gold and silver to their own countries.

Advances in steam technology accelerated Mercantilist practices. Western European countries, whose need for raw materials increased due to the transition of production from hand labor to machinery, tried to obtain more colonies. This situation brought with it imperial movements. As a result, Western countries wanted to occupy territories where natural resources were plentiful and could be obtained at low or even for free.¹⁰⁵ As a result of the Industrial Revolution, the Western powers, which were able to produce advanced weapons, took over a significant part of the world by using

¹⁰³ Sarkar, Nafisa. Mercantilism and European economics, Concept of Mercantilism, Rise of the Modern West-II.

http://www.govtgirlsekbalpur.com/Study_Materials/History/DEPARTMENT_OF_HISTORY_4TH_SEMESTER_CC-8_MERCANTILISM.pdf

¹⁰⁴ Magnusson, Lars. The Scandinavian Economic History Review, 1978, Volume, XXVI.No.2, 111.

¹⁰⁵ Parvanova, Deyna. "The industrial revolution was the force behind the New Imperialism," ESSAI: Vol. 15, Article 30. 2017. Available at: <https://dc.cod.edu/essai/vol15/iss1/30>

their superiority.¹⁰⁶ The first modernization of arms production took place through Europe's industrialized factories and machinery; With the imperial expansion and consequent crises in peripheral countries, arms supplies have become global; Arms control gained an international dimension for the first time, with the subsequently increased violence due to arms proliferation.¹⁰⁷ This situation has also increased the demand for arms, especially since the second half of the 19th century. Due to surplus production, we see a transition from the mercantilist economy model to a free-market economy. The state had to intervene in the economy as little as possible, and the trade goods produced should be sold freely. Weapon manufacturers operating in Western Europe and America could not continue their production by only meeting the demand of their own countries. European and American arms companies, which were looking for a foreign market due to the excessive production of weapons with the capitalist production logic, would discover Africa and Asian countries as profitable. According to Jonathan Grant, these arms companies convinced their governments that arms sales would bring national prestige to their country and could be used as a political influence mechanism on other countries.¹⁰⁸ Accordingly, Western core countries could gain political and economic benefits by selling weapons to peripheral countries.

4.2.1. Rivalry for Ethiopia in the 19th century

This part of the study will touch on how colonial powers such as Italy and France triggered power struggles between leaders and tribes by transferring weapons to Ethiopia and how they benefited politically. Accordingly, it is seen that the western powers are trying to increase their influence on Ethiopia. Thus, Ethiopia is an essential example of arms transfers for colonial purposes in the 19th century. Weapons transfers had a significant impact on Ethiopia, which remained independent from western powers in the African continent during the colonial period. Ethiopian leaders believed

¹⁰⁶ Ibid, 97.

¹⁰⁷ Chew, Emrys. *Arming the Periphery*, 3.

¹⁰⁸ Grant, Jonathan A. *Rulers, Guns, and Money the Global Arms Trade in the Age of Imperialism*, Harvard University Press, 2007, Cambridge, Mass, 8.

in the importance of having weapons to create a modern state. For this purpose, they were trying to supply arms from European states. The rivalry between the Shewa and Tigre regions in Ethiopia also triggered this situation. King Menilek of Shewa applied to France to buy weapons, but the British did not allow this. The British opposed the transfer of arms to Ethiopia because of support for the Ottoman Empire's status quo. Because the transfer of weapons to Ethiopia via Egypt, which formed the southern border of the Ottoman Empire, could have a disruptive effect on the status quo. However, Italy had a positive attitude to Menilek's request to obtain weapons. In 1876, the Italians brought 200 Remington rifles as gifts during a campaign to Ethiopia. Menilek, who stated that he needed more weapons, had also ordered 11,000 Remington cartridges and two mountain guns from the Italians.¹⁰⁹

By the 1880s, arms transfers to Ethiopia had turned into a rivalry between Italy and France. Uncontrolled arms transfers by Italy and France endangered security in the region and triggered conflicts between tribes. Being aware of this situation, the British and Italians considered it necessary to restrict the arms trade in the Red Sea. However, Italian Foreign Minister Pasquale Mancini stated that this time, the French influence in the region would increase due to the excessive transfer of arms by the French.¹¹⁰ This would have made the French arms dealers a monopoly. While the Italians were helping King Menilek with weapons, they saw the emperor Yohannes, who was on good terms with the British, as a threat. Promising to supply 5000 Remington rifles within six months, the Italians continued to ship weapons to Menilek.¹¹¹ By the end of 1887, Ethiopia was rich in weapons.

Meanwhile, the Italians and the French continued to supply weapons incessantly. The rivalry between the French and the Italians over Ethiopia helped Yohannes and Menilek increase their arsenal. After the death of the emperor Yohannes in 1889,

¹⁰⁹ Pankhurst, *Economic History*, 590; Marcus, *History of Ethiopia*, 78.

¹¹⁰ Lumley to Granville, 5 Jan. 1885; *ibid.*, Lumley to Granville, 13 Jan. 1885.

¹¹¹ Pankhurst, *Economic History*, 592-594; Marcus, *History of Ethiopia*, 83-84.

Menilek claimed to be the new emperor. In May 1889, Menilek signed the Treaty of Wichale with Italy. The Italians claimed to be the new patrons of Ethiopia with this agreement. France and Russia condemned this agreement. Neither France nor Russia had recognized the Treaty of Wichale on the terms of the 1885 Berlin Conference.

Meanwhile, Menilek supplied more weapons from Italy, citing the Wichale Agreement.¹¹² France's supply of too many weapons to Menilek caused France to be perceived as trying to break the Italian influence in Ethiopia. According to the Italian government, these actions of France meant that France and Russia were trying to establish their own colonies in Ethiopia.¹¹³ Taking advantage of the rivalry between the Italians and the French, Menilek was able to take control of Ethiopia and keep the European imperialist powers at bay. In 1896, Menilek used the weapons he had acquired for many years against the Italian attack in the Battle of Adwa and was victorious. Therefore, neither Italy nor France became successful in colonizing Ethiopia.

As a result, it can be said that the struggle of great powers such as France and Italy to obtain colonies by supplying weapons clearly demonstrates that the arms trade was used as a foreign policy tool in the 19th century.

4.2.2. The Role of Arms Transfers in the Balkans

Due to the development of the arms industry with the capitalist production model in Europe, obsolete weapons were finding buyers in Eastern Europe and the Balkan countries. Because, according to the Great Powers, the arms transfer had an important place in solving the "eastern problem." The collapse of the Ottoman Empire, which was the essence of the Eastern problem and described as the sick man of Europe, could disrupt the balance of power created in the 19th century among the Great Powers. The Great Powers, who wanted to influence the lands remaining from the Ottoman Empire,

¹¹² Caulk, "Between the Jaws of Hyenas," 179, 226, 240.

¹¹³ Vivian to Rosebery, 24 May 1893; Clare Ford to Kimberley, 4 Jan. 1895; BDF, vol. 13, 148 in Grant.

would be able to use arms transfers as an effective tool. Since the British were in favor of the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire, they wanted the status quo to be preserved after the Crimean War.

For this reason, Britain opposed the transfer of arms to the regions where the Christian peoples of the Ottoman Empire lived. However, Russia and France were displaying a revisionist stance. While France was acting with a nationalist approach in Eastern Europe and the Balkans, Russia wanted to return to its position before the 1856 Crimean War and its former position on the principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia. Acting for these purposes, Russia and France supplied arms to the Christian principalities of the Ottoman Empire.¹¹⁴

In this section, it will be mentioned how the arms transfers were used as an instrument by Russia and France in the uprising and subsequently in the independence of the Christian principalities under the rule of the Ottoman State in the Balkans. For Serbia, Wallachia, and Moldavia, which were Orthodox Christians, the way to gain independence from the Ottoman Empire was to enter an armed struggle. Arms transfers had an important place in this armed struggle. Alexander Cuza became the prince of Wallachia and Moldavia in 1859. While the French and Russians were satisfied with this situation, the Turks and the British objected. From the beginning of his reign, Cuza emphasized strengthening his armed forces because the Ottoman influence could only be broken in this way. At the beginning of 1859, Cuza had sent two of his staff to France to ask for help. France responded positively to this request and signed a contract for 10,000 rifles and 40,000 weapons to be sent later. The French government had proven that it was interested in this armament demand of Cuza.¹¹⁵ In 1860, 2 million cartridges worth 500,000 francs and 2,000 rifles departed from the port

¹¹⁴ Grant, Jonathan A. *Rulers*, 37-38.

¹¹⁵ Radu R. Florescu, "Cuza, Florescu, and Army Reform, 1859-1866" in Kiraly, ed., *The Crucial Decade*, 406; Gerald J. Bobango, "Foundations of the Independence Army: The Romanian Military," 389.

of Marseille to be delivered to Prince Cuza with the flag of Sardinia.¹¹⁶ After receiving the weapons, Cuza refused the Ottomans' request to give them back. The military equipment was mainly imported from Russia, Austria, and France, a trade strongly opposed by both the Ottomans and the British, who still intended the Ottoman Empire to remain as it was.¹¹⁷

Although the Ottoman Empire prohibited the transfer of military equipment, France started to send weapons to Serbia this time. Moreover, despite this ban, Russia began to send military supplies such as cannons and rifles to be delivered to Serbia.¹¹⁸ Russia's continued arms supplies to Serbia caused conflict between the British and Russians. Because Russia was also helping Serbia to produce these weapons indigenously, the fact that a small principality had such weapons was causing concern for the security of the Balkans. By 1863, Russia continued to supply arms to Serbia through Wallachia and Moldavia.¹¹⁹ Prior to 1878, Wallachia-Moldavia, which would later become Romania, was a critical transfer path for the European arms delivery and European surplus armaments to Serbia and Bulgarian insurgents in the Danube region.¹²⁰

Due to the Russian victory in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878, Bulgaria gained the status of an autonomous principality. Thereupon, Russia began to supply the Bulgarian armed forces with heavy weapons, rifles, and gunpowder. With the Berlin Treaty of 1878, many independent and autonomous states emerged in the Balkans. The establishment of these Balkan states was facilitated through arms transfer by France and Russia. Indeed, arms transfers to the Balkans until the Treaty of Berlin of 1878

¹¹⁶ Bulwer to Russell, 5 Dec. 1860 in Grant.

¹¹⁷ Grant, Jonathan A. *Rulers*, 37-47.

¹¹⁸ Bulwer to Russell, 16 April 1861 in Grant.

¹¹⁹ Elliot to Lord Stanley, 24 Oct. 1868 in Grant.

¹²⁰ Öztan, Ramazan Hakkı. Tools of Revolution: Global Military Surplus, Arms Dealers and Smugglers in the Late Ottoman Balkans, 1878–1908, *Past & Present*, Volume 237, Issue 1, November 2017, Pages 167–195, <https://doi.org/10.1093/pastj/gtx034>

played an encouraging role in the uprising of the Balkan states. The UK, which was in favor of the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire until this treaty, has now abandoned this policy. Therefore, the British occupation of Cyprus in 1878 and then Egypt in 1882 is clear evidence of this.¹²¹

The Balkan States, which managed to create their own armed forces with the transfer of weapons provided by Russia, France, Germany, and Austria, and stockpiled weapons at an extraordinary level, in a sense, felt ready for the war of independence. In 1912, the Ottoman Empire, which suffered a heavy defeat against four Balkan countries in the First Balkan War, lost a significant part of its lands in Europe. Weapon transfers made by the Great Powers have an important place in this victory. Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece, and Montenegro gained their independence with this war. National states in the Balkans were founded not by the public uprising but through the support of the Great Powers, which encouraged the emergence of new sovereign countries for various reasons.¹²²

4.2.3. German Arms Transfers to Ottoman Empire

Western powers and their diplomats believed they could influence the foreign policy of peripheral countries by selling weapons. These countries, acting with an imperialist understanding, thought they would get their support and loyalty by selling weapons to periphery countries.¹²³ Indeed, as stated in the military coups section, it is possible to directly influence the armed forces in that country by selling weapons. This was the reason behind the intense German arms transfers in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Germany believed in making the country economically dependent rather than the direct colonial activities that Western colonial powers did in African and Asian countries. This can be easily understood from the words of the German

¹²¹ Turk, Fahri. "Türkiye İle Almanya Arasındaki Silah Ticareti.", 74.

¹²² Karpat, Kemal H. "The Balkan National States And Nationalism: Image and Reality." *Islamic Studies* 36, no. 2/3 (1997): 356. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/23076200>.

¹²³ *Ibid*, 7.

politician and liberal thinker Friedrich Naumann; “in order to control a country politically, we must first make it dependent on us economically.”¹²⁴

European states that had completed the industrial revolution, such as the UK, France, and the Netherlands, could obtain the raw materials necessary for their industries from their colonies. However, Germany, which could only complete its political unity in 1871 under the leadership of Otto von Bismarck, was late in the colonial race, unlike other Great Powers. By the 19th century, the Ottoman Empire, which had lost its former power and tried to survive by following a policy of balance among other European states, was described as the sick man of Europe. Sultan II. Abdulhamid sought the support of a European state that did not have political and colonial ambitions on the Ottoman Empire.

On the other hand, Germany looked for an ally to act as a barrier between Germany and Russia. Unlike the German Chancellor Bismarck, Kaiser II. Wilhelm wanted Germany to become a World Power (Weltmacht) and therefore wanted to benefit from the geostrategic position of the Ottoman State. While the Ottoman lands, rich in raw materials, could provide the resources needed by the German industry, the Ottoman lands could also be a good market for German manufactured goods.

Abdulhamid wanted to reform the Ottoman army in a western-style which was backward compared to the modern European armies. Due to his victory in the 1870 Franco-Prussian War, Germany caught Abdulhamid's attention. Seeking a strong ally for itself against the European Great Powers, the Ottoman Empire had a favorable view of rapprochement with Germany. Under the spirit of the time, the two countries did not see any harm in cooperating in defense and military. Unlike other Western powers, Germany wanted to dominate the Ottoman market economically through soft

¹²⁴ Naumann, Friedrich, *Asia: Eine Orientreise uber Athen, Konstantinopel, Baalbek, Nazareth, Jerusalem, Kairo, Neapel* (Berlin, 1913), 164.

diplomacy. Naci Yorulmaz, who uses the term "German-Style Arms Trade"¹²⁵ to describe the success of the Germans in the arms market, expresses how the Ottoman arms market was dominated by using personal diplomacy tools unique to the Germans with this term. One of the most prominent elements of this type of arms trade is the German state's support of German arms companies operating abroad. This situation, which we did not encounter in other arms-producing states such as the UK and France, is the most important reason the Germans entered and dominated the Ottoman arms market. As stated before, the Great Powers' way of gaining colonies by force and war was implemented by Germany by using economic tools and personal diplomacy methods.

Since the Ottoman Empire lagged behind militarily and administratively from other European states, it requested Germany to send advisors to these areas. Germany, which initially did not look favorably upon this demand of the Ottomans so as not to disturb Russia, later approved the arrival of Captain Helmut von Moltke to Turkey.¹²⁶ Having left the 1877-1878 Ottoman-Russian War with defeat, Turkey lost most of its lands in the European continent with the 1878 Berlin Treaty and asked Germany to send new military advisers. Germany initially sent four officers, but since they could not reach their goal, Major Colmar von der Goltz was sent to Istanbul as the head of the military mission in 1883.¹²⁷ The most important thing that distinguishes Goltz Pasha from other military advisers is that he knew the needs of the Turkish army very well and could do good lobbying and marketing for German arms companies due to his personal friendships with Turkish statesmen. Therefore, the military advisors' arrival in Turkey can be considered as the first steps of the German expansionist movement. Thanks to these advisors, Germany not only enabled German arms companies to dominate the Ottoman market but also gained an ally in the process leading up to the First World War.

¹²⁵ Yorulmaz, Naci. *Arming the Sultan: German Arms Trade and Personal Diplomacy in the Ottoman Empire Before World War I*, I.B. Tauris (October 30, 2014), 17.

¹²⁶ Turk, Fahri. "Türkiye İle Almanya Arasındaki Silah Ticareti.", 91.

¹²⁷ *Ibid*, 92.

German arms companies Krupp, Mauser, and Ludwig Loewe, benefited from Bismarck's official support in their arms trade with the Ottoman Empire.¹²⁸ According to Goltz Pasha, arms sales to foreign countries could be used as an effective tool in foreign policy. Goltz Pasha believed that the war could be won with weapons received in peacetime, and the country from which you bought the weapon could even become your ally in the future.¹²⁹ German bureaucrats in foreign countries could influence the decision-making mechanisms of governments in favor of Germany through import-export relations.

The Ottoman Empire was an excellent opportunity for German statesmen who believed that the way to dominate a country politically was to dominate economically. Because the Ottoman Empire, which was insufficient in heavy industrialization and railway construction and weapon production, which required a qualified workforce, could be penetrated through these ways. From this point of view, the dominance of German arms companies in the Ottoman market is not just an economic event. On the contrary, according to Wilhelm II., German diplomats and arms companies operating in foreign countries served Germany's World Policy. These arms companies have an important place in the German expansionist policy.¹³⁰ The effective sales methods utilized by Krupp (a German armament company) and other German arms industries were followed by orders for military materiel acquired from foreign governments; the German Foreign Office regarded such sales as foreign policy accomplishments and enhancements of 'national prestige.'¹³¹ For this reason, Goltz Pasha was one of the most influential advocates of the Baghdad railway project due to its relationship with the arms trade.

¹²⁸ Yorulmaz, Naci. *Arming the Sultan*, 15.

¹²⁹ Ibid, 132-133.

¹³⁰ Ibid, 53.

¹³¹ Willi, A. Boelcke, *Krupp und die Hohenzollern in Dokumenten. Krupp-Korrespondenz mit Kaisern, Kabinettschefs und Ministern 1850–1918* (Frankfurt am Main, 1970), 20.

The slow domination of the Ottoman market by German arms companies from the 1870s reached its peak at the beginning of the 20th century. The final effect of German political expansionism was the bombardment of the Russian port in the Black Sea in 1914, shortly after purchasing two German warships, Goeben and Breslau. With this event, the Ottoman Empire entered the First World War on the side of Germany. The Ottoman Empire, which became dependent on Germany from the education in the military schools to the weapons used in the army and the military strategy to be applied in the war, found itself brother-in-arms with the Germans in the First World War.¹³² As a result, Germany's systematic penetration of the Ottoman market through arms sales and the participation of the Ottoman Empire, which became entirely dependent on Germany in the military sense, in the First World War on the side of Germany, is an excellent example of how interstate arms sales were used as an instrument in foreign policy.

4.3. Cold War Arms Transfer as a Foreign Policy Tool

As mentioned in the Pre-Cold War period, Western European countries that have completed their industrialization maintain their dependency relations with the third world countries by taking advantage of their technological superiority. This dependency relationship is ensured by transferring the weapon systems that require high technology and qualified human resources to the developing third world countries. Most of these newly independent third-world countries, which cannot produce these weapon systems by their own means, have to resort to developed western countries to meet their security needs. As Immanuel Wallerstein stated in his world-system analysis, countries that produce products with high added value, attract a qualified workforce, and have capital-intensive business lines are called core. In contrast, those that do not have skilled labor resources work labor-intensively and generally export raw materials are called periphery.¹³³

¹³² Yorulmaz, Naci. *Arming the Sultan*, 25.

¹³³ "Globalization Theories," World-System Theory, accessed June 30, 2022, <https://web.archive.org/web/20130429010208/http://www.sociology.emory.edu/globalization/theories01.html>

This situation, namely that peripheral countries export raw materials and buy high-tech products from developed core countries, causes an unequal exchange between core and periphery. However, some periphery countries may gain semi-periphery status over time due to the products imported from the core countries and the developments in transportation technology. These countries, in a sense, act as mediators between the core and the periphery and have an important place in ensuring the continuation of the capitalist world economy. This core, periphery, and semi-periphery distinction, which was created to maintain inequality on a global scale, has created a hierarchical structure throughout the world. This hierarchical structure also led to the global division of labor.

During the Cold War, weapons that were transferred from the core to peripheral and semi-peripheral countries played an important role in maintaining the capitalist world economy. One of the most important features that distinguish the weapon systems transferred in this period from other commercial goods is that they have a monopoly and oligopoly market. In other words, while the USSR was leading the Eastern bloc, the US was leading the Western bloc in the postwar period. In this bipolar order, the USA was supplying arms to countries close to itself to eliminate the Soviet threat, while the USSR was sending weapons to countries close to its own ideology. This situation became more evident with the establishment of NATO¹³⁴ in 1949 and the Warsaw Pact¹³⁵ in 1955.

The security needs of the countries under the influence of two superpowers were provided by the US and USSR. Countries that did not have their own defense industry before the Cold War became more dependent on these two superpowers in this period. Because periphery countries that meet their security needs with these weapons, which are often sent in the form of military aid, will eventually become dependent on these

¹³⁴ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and Hastings Lionel Ismay. 1954. NATO, the first five years, 1949-1954, 50.

¹³⁵ "Warsaw Pact Treaty," May 14, 1955, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic Documents Vol 1, Department of State Publication 6446, General Foreign Policy Series 117 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 19). <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/123891>

supplier states. One of the most important reasons for this dependency is not needing to produce his own weapon due to the transferred weapons, and the other is the standardization of weapon systems due to importing from a single source. For the first reason, countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, which do not attempt to produce their own arms, have been subjected to the most manipulation in foreign policy by core countries, as they are highly dependent on arms transfers. While these countries constitute the periphery and semi-periphery, the USA and USSR, which supply them with weapons, are the core countries.

4.3.1. The United States' Leverage as a Superpower

Unlike European states, the United States' emergence from the Second World War, by increasing its power, has an important place in determining its post-war foreign policy. Since the beginning of the Cold War, the competition with the USSR has pushed the USA to be more interested in third-world countries. The aim here was to prevent the spread of communism to the surrounding countries and the expansion of the Soviet sphere of influence. However, the foreign policy relationship of the US with the third world countries has been determined to serve the national security and interests of the U.S. What is meant by this sentence is that the purpose of every military aid made by the USA to the third world countries is to serve a different interest for the USA. The United States must consider its security benefits while transferring arms to periphery countries; however, the reason for military supplies must be established regarding America's specific goals. Arms transfers served the US interests in terms of base rights, access to raw materials such as oil, and maintaining regional stability. The U.S., which appeared as the founding actor of the new world order, has tried to be active everywhere, from Europe to Asia, Africa to Latin America. Both the weapons left over from the Second World War and the arms race with the Soviets during the Cold War years caused the defense industry, especially the arms transfers, to have an important place in America's foreign policy.

When the main research question of this thesis is considered – why do major arms supplying states want to establish a dependency relation through arms transfer? – it

makes sense to expect the US (the top arms exporter in the world) to pursue its interests while transferring arms to third-world countries. While arms transfers constitute only one of the foreign policy instruments, they are among the most important. The first example of the use of arms transfers by the USA as a foreign policy instrument can be given as "Base Rights." This situation became more evident during the Cold War years. For example, the Philippines demanded billions of dollars worth of military supplies in exchange for giving the United States a military base on its territory.¹³⁶ The second example of arms transfers as a foreign policy instrument is that the USA sends weapons and military supplies to the Third World countries, which it sees as friends and allies. In this way, America can achieve its foreign policy goals without sending its own army. Countries that can become self-sufficient with arms transfers do not need direct US intervention. For example, Iran perceived the Soviets as a potential threat as it has more than two thousand kilometers of common border with the USSR. For this reason, Iran was among the major countries to which the USA transferred arms during the Cold War.¹³⁷

"Balance of Payments" is another area where arms transfers are used for foreign policy purposes. Although it is a superpower, arms exports make significant contributions to the US economy. Defense industry companies that manufacture weapons employ thousands of people, help the balance of payments, and open foreign markets for non-military business.¹³⁸ In the 1960s, the US was experiencing difficulties in the balance of payments as its imports exceeded its exports. US arms orders from foreign countries helped the US balance of payments for the 1974 and 1975 fiscal years.¹³⁹

¹³⁶ "Marcos Deals for Billions in Arms," Chicago Tribune, 22 October 1976, 5.

¹³⁷ See U.S. Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Military Sales to Iran, 94th Cong., 2nd sess. 1976, 11.

¹³⁸ Dale R. Tahtinen, *Arms Transfers and U.S. National Security* (Washington, D.C.; American Enterprise Institute, 1976), 9.

¹³⁹ Defense Security Assistance Agency (DOD), *Foreign Military Sales and Military Assistance Program*, Congressional Presentation Document (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 1975): 110.

Perhaps the most important reason for using arms transfers as a tool in foreign policy is purchasing oil or raw materials from foreign countries in exchange for weapons. The true motives ["to legitimize arms transfers to so-called regional powers"] are to ensure access to raw materials, primarily oil, and to dominate general political control over these countries.¹⁴⁰ The main interest of the United States in the Persian Gulf is to ensure the uninterrupted transfer of oil.¹⁴¹ Raw material supply from Third World countries is also closely related to "Political Influence." Because a country that supplies military equipment may politically affect the recipient country in the following areas by providing or not providing support such as maintenance and repair of these materials, spare parts supply, and military training. For example, The Military Assistance Training Program (as a foreign policy tool) allowed the USA to keep the communication channels open with the elites in the Third World countries and influence them.¹⁴² Therefore, the USA's ability to influence countries' foreign policies, especially in the Middle East, is closely related to the number of weapons it transfers.¹⁴³ For instance, as a result of the military aid provided by the US to Georgia under the name of Georgia Train and Equip Program, Georgia sent 2000 soldiers to Iraq and supported the US in the Iraq War.¹⁴⁴

4.3.2. Israel's Security Dilemma

America's relationship with Israel in the field of defense demonstrates how arms transfers were made a matter of negotiation by the USA. As stated in the previous sections, American arms transfers, whether in grants or cash sales, were always made with the expectation of a return. Depending on the country's situation, these

¹⁴⁰ Gelb, Leslie. "Arms Sales," *Foreign Policy*, no. 25 (Winter 1976-77): 11-19.

¹⁴¹ Dale R. Tahtinen, *Arms in the Persian Gulf* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1974): 22.

¹⁴² Ernest W. Lefever, "The Military Assistance Training Program," *The Annals* 424 (March 1976): 85.

¹⁴³ Mayer, Laurel A. *Third World Arms Transfers and U.S. Foreign Policy*, Miami University, Oxford, Ohio, Ph.D. Dissertation, 111.

¹⁴⁴ Sullivan, Patricia Lynne, Brock F. Tessman and Xiaojun Li. "US Military Aid and Recipient State Cooperation." *Foreign Policy Analysis* 7 (2011): 279-280.

expectations can be in the form of foreign policy concessions or the form of access to strategic resources such as oil, gold, and diamonds. Moreover, the fact that arms transfers are made from a single source can leave the recipient country in a difficult situation in critical times such as war. Israel has had good relations with the United States since 1948. However, the fact that the Middle East geography has rich oil resources is important not only for the USA but also for all industrialized countries. This has brought arms transfers to the fore in the foreign policy of a superpower like the USA. It would not be wrong to say that America's interests in the Middle East region are generally economic. However, America's relationship with Israel as a democratic and balancing element to prevent the spread of Soviet influence in the Middle East is political.¹⁴⁵ Israel, a newly established state, was thought to meet its security needs through a partnership with the U.S. The U.S. has supported Israel in the Middle East, but only in exchange for concessions in its foreign policy.

Since the beginning of the Cold War, the US has wanted to achieve two main goals in the Middle East: First, to secure the oil supply to the West, and the second is to prevent the spread of Soviet influence in the region. Due to the Arab-Israeli conflict and wars, the arms race began in the region, further increasing the influence of the US and the Soviets. The United States, especially the Johnson Administration, was concerned about Israel's nuclear weapons program. The US stated that it could give the M-48 Patton tanks to the Israeli government if it abandoned its nuclear weapons development program.¹⁴⁶ In response, the Israeli government demanded that the US arms transfers be kept separate from the nuclear weapons program. Again, the Johnson administration, which tied the sale of F-4 Phantom aircraft to certain conditions, stated that it could approve the sale of these aircraft in return for Israel not being the first party to use its nuclear weapons. If the Israeli government does not comply with these

¹⁴⁵ Blema S. Steinberg, "American Foreign Policy in the Middle East: A Study in Changing Priorities", in Janice Gross Stem and David B. Dewitt, eds., *The Middle East at the Crossroads*. (Oakville. Ont.: Mosaic Press, 1983), 111-112.

¹⁴⁶ Rodman, David. *Arms transfers to Israel: the strategic logic behind American military assistance / David Rodman*, 2007, Sussex Academic Press Brighton; Portland, 42.

conditions, the United States has stated that it has the right to take back the Phantom aircraft.¹⁴⁷




Figure 1 The spread of supersonic aircraft among third world countries
Source: SIPRI unpublished worksheets on arms transfers 1950-1968.

By the 1960s, before and after the 1967 Six-Day War, the Soviets were shipping large quantities of weapons to the United Arab Republics (UAR), while the United States was shipping weapons to Israel.

Table 1. Middle East: Long and short-term trends in the volume of military expenditure

	Average per cent change per year					Budgeted change in 1970	Size of military expenditure in 1969 US \$ mn, current prices and exchange-rates
	Long-term trend 1949-69	Year-to-year changes					
		1965-66	1966-67	1967-68	1968-69		
UAR	+11.2	+ 3.0	+23.2	+27.4	+27.5	+19.9	982.1
Israel	+17.7	+22.1	+28.6	+26.3	+27.7	+26.7	790.0
Iran	+11.7	+34.4	+21.0	+ 6.7	+ 4.6	+32.5	531.4
Saudi Arabia	+18.0 ^b	- 0.9	+107.6	+ 9.0	+ 3.8	+ 9.5	343.3
Iraq	+13.7	+ 8.4	- 0.1	+ 5.9	- 2.0	..	292.6
Syria	+13.2	-18.1	+44.6	+20.7	+26.3	..	193.7
Jordan	+11.2	+19.7	+ 5.8	+17.4	+61.8	- 1.5	126.0
Kuwait	+19.1 ^c	+18.2	+65.4	+ 7.0	+ 9.2	..	70.3
Lebanon	+ 9.9	+23.1	+ 8.2	+ 2.2	+13.7	+ 4.3	49.2

Source: SIPRI unpublished worksheets on arms transfers 1949-1970.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid, 44.

On the other hand, America increased the transfer of arms to Israel and Jordan.¹⁴⁸ However, despite this, the armies of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria were not successful in the war. President Nixon, who had a disagreement with Israel over arms transfers, took a tough stance, unlike previous presidents. When encountered internal dissent, the US Administrations (Nixon in 1970 and Ford in 1975) resorted to coercive means during disagreements between the US and Israel. Despite incurring internal political risks, US authorities continued to exercise restrictions in their policies against Israel. This implies that factors (the developments in the Middle East such as the War of Attrition and the possibility of superpower confrontation) other than internal politics (the influence of pro-Israel lobbies on the US politics) hampered politicians' use of coercive influence.¹⁴⁹

1969-1970 War of Attrition changed the perspective of the Nixon administration, which took office in 1969. Because there was a possibility that the violence of the war would increase and the Soviet Union would enter the war on Egypt's side, there was a concern about the confrontation of the superpowers. Due to Israel's active advance in this war, the USA again put pressure on Israel over future American arms sales. Due to the USA's failure to give Israel a solid security guarantee and the possibility of Soviet intervention, Israel had to end the war in line with the US's terms. When it came to the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the Arabs, who rejected the 1969-1970 War of Attrition status quo, thought of recapturing Sinai and the Golan. The Israeli army, which succeeded in advancing against the Arabs in the war, had to withdraw from some of the Sinai and Golan due to its dependence on American arms transfers.¹⁵⁰ Israel had to make many concessions in its foreign policy, especially in times of war, due to its dependence on the transfer of arms to promise a security guarantee from the US.

¹⁴⁸ "SIPRI Yearbook 1968-69: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security." SIPRI Yearbook 1969: Armaments, Disarmament, and International Security. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016). Retrieved 4 Jan. 2022, from <https://www.sipriyearbook.org/view/9780198821557/sipri-9780198821557.xml>

¹⁴⁹ Wheelock, Thomas R. "Arms for Israel: The Limit of Leverage." *International Security* 3, no. 2 (1978): 123–137. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2626686>.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 80.

4.3.3. Turkey's Disappointment

Since the beginning of the Cold War, the US, worried about the expansion of the Soviet sphere of influence, has implemented some mechanisms to prevent the spread of the communist threat. First of all, the US made a radical change in its foreign policy.¹⁵¹ In order to contain the increasing influence of the Soviets in other countries, the US foreign policy has put the issues of defense and weapon aid on its agenda. For this purpose, the US, which took some economic and military measures, aimed to surround the Soviets. The US was convinced that the USSR was determined to dominate the world. If people of the free world were to be protected from the Soviet danger, the containment strategy must be used, and no other state had the means to do it except the United States.¹⁵²

Table 2. Military grant aid to forward defense areas under Military Assistance and Loans

A. Military grant aid to forward defence areas

US \$ mn, at 1960 prices and 1960 exchange-rates

	Military expenditure 1950-67	Military grant aid 1950-67	Grant aid as per cent of military expenditure
South Korea	3 319.8	2 699.6	80.4
Taiwan	2 787.1	2 932.4	105.2
Thailand	1 147.6	654.2	57.0
Turkey	4 585.0	2 847.0	62.1
Greece	2 961.0	1 689.5	57.0

Source: SIPRI unpublished worksheets on military grant aid.

Truman Doctrine and Marshal Plan were put forward for this purpose. The postwar policy of the USA in Europe aimed to prevent both physical and psychological attacks

¹⁵¹ Sümer, Gültekin. "Amerikan Dış Politikasının Kökenleri ve Amerikan Dış Politik Kültürü". 2008. *Uluslararası İlişkiler Dergisi*, 5(19), 130.

¹⁵² Haru, Terry T. *An Inquiry into the Social Basis of the Acceptance and Rejection of Modernization Theory, Dependency Theory, and World-Systems Theory*, University of Missouri-Columbia, Faculty of the Graduate School, 1981. Ph.D. Dissertation, 116.

from the Soviets. For this purpose, the Truman Doctrine, which aimed to help both Turkey and Greece, entered into force in 1947. The Truman Doctrine, which was declared in 1947, aimed first to strengthen the countries around the Soviets, especially militarily, second, to prevent the spread of communism, and third, to show the influence of the US in the West, can also be perceived as the promise of the USA to support Turkey and Greece in terms of security.¹⁵³ In order to provide the necessary economic and military aid to Turkey and Greece, it was authorized to send military experts to these countries and use 400 million dollars from the budget for this aid. However, the aid in question was limited to 337 million dollars (268 million dollars to Greece, 69 million dollars to Turkey). While nearly half of the aid was used for military purposes in Greece, almost all of the aid expenditures in Turkey were used for military purposes.¹⁵⁴

Table 3. Arms Trade Register: register of major weapons transfers to developing countries, 1968

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1D. Arms Trade Register. Continued

Part II. Trade in major weapons

Recipient	Supplier	Number	Item	Description	Comment	Date ordered	Date delivered
	France	12	Alouette III	Helicopter	\$3.15 mn. For COIN in Mozambique and Portuguese Guinea	Sep. 1968	..
		4	Frigate, "Nantes" class		For COIN in Portuguese Guinea	..	1968: 2 Later: 2
		4	Submarine, "Daphne" class	Displacement: 869 t.		(1964)	1968: 2 Later: 2
	West Germany	6	Corvettes		Construction delayed because of West German fears that they would be used in Portuguese colonies
Turkey	USA	25	F-102 Delta Dagger	Fighter	MAP, from surplus USAF stocks	..	Oct. 1968
		50	F-5 Freedom Fighter	Fighter		1967	1968: 25 1969: 25
		..	Bell OH-13	Helicopter		(1965)	1968
	West Germany	15	Siat 223 Flamingo	Basic trainer	Option on further 30	(July 1968)	..
	Italy	50	Agusta-Bell 206A	Helicopter	For Army and Police	July 1968	..

Source: SIPRI unpublished worksheets on arms trade register in 1968.

¹⁵³ Mustafa Zengin, Truman Doktrininin ve Soğuk Savaşın DP Dönemi Dış Politikasına ABD Bazlı Karar Alma Noktasında Etkisi, Bahçeşehir Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, Yayımlanmamış Yüksek Lisans Tezi, İstanbul 2018, 29.

¹⁵⁴ Akkor, Mahmut. "İkinci Dünya Savaşının Sonu ve Truman Doktrininin Ortaya Çıkışı", *Uluslararası Tarih Araştırmaları Dergisi*, Güz 2017, Cilt: 2, Sayı: 2, 9-12.

The dependency relations between Turkey and the USA, which started with the Truman Doctrine, continued to increase in the following years. As it will do when transferring weapons in the future, the USA has tied its aid to Turkey on certain political strings. The first of these conditions is the use of aids in accordance with their purpose. Second, informing the United States while using the aid as specified by the USA. Third, the American administration and the press must be informed continually.¹⁵⁵ It will be revealed later that these aids have caused great harm to the defense industry of the country. Former Prime Minister Ferit Melen evaluated the aid provided within the framework of the Truman Doctrine as follows:

It does not stop with receiving aid. Receiving aid creates a dependency. In other words, being dependent on another country in terms of weapons does not allow that country to carry out its foreign and national policy. After being dependent on foreign arms, your neck is always bent, and you talk as much as the arms they give you; this is an element.¹⁵⁶

As Melen clearly stated, the process that started with American weapons aid made Turkey more dependent on the United States under the umbrella of NATO in the coming years. However, Turkey's dependence on the USA can be understood in the famous letter sent by US President Lyndon Johnson in 1964. Until then, Turkey, which had acted in the spirit of alliance with NATO and the USA, was disappointed by the Johnson's letter. Although the letter, in general, was about the prevention of Turkish intervention in Cyprus, the insulting tone of the letter caused Turkish officials and the public to begin questioning whether the United States was a true ally and NATO was a reliable organization. Because Turkey, along with Greece and the UK, was responsible for restoring the constitutional order based on the London Treaty and its guarantor state status. Without discrimination between women and children, many Turks, who were taken hostage by the National Organization of Cypriot Fighters

¹⁵⁵ Kalyon, L. "Truman Doktrini Üzerine Bir Analiz". 2010. Güvenlik Stratejileri Dergisi 6: 18.

¹⁵⁶ T.B.M.M. Tutanak Dergisi, Cilt 20, 6 Kasım 1985, 230.

(EOKA), were later killed in their homes.¹⁵⁷ However, the USA has tried to prevent Turkey from acting freely in its foreign policy.

Table 4. Summary of three lists of post-World War II conflicts

		3. Bilateral negotiations 4. Resolutions passed (UN)		5. Intervention (UN) 6. Mediation (UN)		7. Other mediation 8. Multilateral conferences		9. Judicial 10. Continued hostilities		11. Instrument of settlement							
No.	Conflict	Type	Size	Duration	Parties		Procedures attempted for settlement										
					1	2	U.N. action										
						3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11			
Europe																	
1	Greek military coup	C		21.IV.67-	Civil Government and Political parties	Military Junta	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			
2	Cyprus question	CI		15.XI.67- 16.I.68	Civil Government and Greece	Turkish minority and Turkey	0	+	+	+	+	0	0	0	+		
3	Czechoslovakian crisis	I		21-27.VIII.68	Czechoslovakia	Soviet Union, Poland, East Germany, Bulgaria and Hungary	+	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	+		

Source: SIPRI unpublished worksheets on conflicts between 1965-1968

In summary, Johnson's letter stated that NATO countries could not wage war against each other, that Turkey's intervention in Cyprus would lead to the direct intervention of the Soviets, and in this case, NATO allies would not be able to help Turkey. In the continuation of the letter, Johnson also referred to the bilateral agreement signed between the USA and Turkey in the military field, and it was written that if the military aids are used beyond their intended purpose, the approval of the USA must be obtained and the use of American weapons to intervene in Cyprus is not allowed.¹⁵⁸ In Johnson's letter, these humiliating and commanding attitudes and expressions caused an anti-American mood to blow in the Turkish public opinion.

¹⁵⁷ Nancy Crawshaw, "Cyprus: Collapse of the Zurich Agreement," *The World Today* 20, no. 8 (1964): 341, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40393645>.

¹⁵⁸ The White House, "Correspondence between President Johnson and Prime Minister Inonu," *Middle East Journal* 20, no. 3 (Summer, 1966): 387, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4324028>.

With this letter, Turkey, which better understood how dependent it was on the United States in terms of military supplies, was experiencing the shock of not even being able to intervene in a foreign policy issue concerning its security. This state of dependency was criticized so much that it was said that Turkey surrendered its independence to the United States by becoming a member of NATO and opening its military bases.¹⁵⁹ It has even been said that the USA determines Turkey's domestic and foreign policy because of this crisis.¹⁶⁰ In 1967, the tension on the island started to rise again due to the coup d'état in Greece, and then the coup plotters sent troops to Cyprus.¹⁶¹ After the EOKA organization, which had problems with President Makarios, staged a coup against the government of Makarios with the soldiers from the Greek army in 1974, Turkey started to worry about the situation on the island. Despite all the warnings from Turkey, the Junta did not withdraw. As a guarantor state, Turkey intervened in Cyprus on 20 July 1974 to restore the constitutional order on the island. However, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) requested a ceasefire. As a result of the unsuccessful meetings, Turkey resumed the operation and captured at least one-third of the island within two days.¹⁶²

The US Congress, which put forward the Foreign Assistance and Military Sales Act, forced President Gerald Ford to sign the law containing the arms embargo against Turkey. Due to the arms embargo that started on February 5, 1975, although the money was paid, the military equipment worth 200 million was not delivered to Turkey, and the embargo lasted for about four years. Both the southern wing of NATO and the Turkish Armed Forces have been seriously damaged due to the arms embargo imposed

¹⁵⁹ Durmaz, Mahmut. The U.S. arms embargo of 1975-1978 and its effects on the development of the Turkish defense industry, 2014, Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, 17.

¹⁶⁰ Aylin Guney, "Anti-Americanism in Turkey: Past and Present." *Middle Eastern Studies* 44, no. 3 (2008): 474, doi:10.1080/00263200802021632.

¹⁶¹ Durmaz, Mahmut. The U.S. arms embargo of 1975-1978 and its effects, 19.

¹⁶² Ucarol, Rifat. *Siyasi Tarih* (Political History) (Istanbul: Der Press, 2008), 982.

on Turkey, which considers protecting the Turkish population living on the island of Cyprus as a matter of national defense.¹⁶³

As a result, Turkey, which could not take decisions freely in its foreign policy due to its excessive dependence on arms transfers, had to change its foreign and defense policies when faced first with the embargo threat in the 1960s and then with the arms embargo in 1974.¹⁶⁴ With this embargo, it is seen that the US used arms transfers as a foreign policy instrument and caused the dependent country to make some changes in its foreign policy decisions.

4.3.4. The AWACS Sales: Securing Access to Saudi Oil

America's technological superiority over third-world countries cannot be questioned as a superpower. The USA did not hesitate to use this advantage against the third-world countries that could not produce their own weapons. The USA, which provides access to the strategic materials it needs by selling arms, continues these relations with the countries it has integrated into the capitalist world economy. The relationship established between the core and the periphery in the defense industry creates a relationship beyond a commercial exchange between the seller and the buyer country. Especially if the military equipment supplied by the developed country requires high technology, that is, if its substitute is limited, this relationship between the buyer and the seller country turns into a dependency relationship. There will be a dependency on the supplier country in terms of maintenance, repair, spare parts guarantee, development, and training on how to use this supplied military product. It is possible to observe such a dependency relationship in the relations established by the USA with the Middle East countries in accordance with the core-periphery approach.

¹⁶³ Nasuh Uslu, *The Turkish-American Relationship Between 1947 and 2003: The History of a Distinctive Alliance* (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2003), 215.

¹⁶⁴ Bağcı, Hüseyin & Kurç, Çağlar. Turkey's strategic choice: buy or make weapons?, *Defence Studies*, (2017): 17:1, 38-62, DOI: 10.1080/14702436.2016.1262742

Perhaps the most striking example of arms sales as a political instrument in foreign policy is the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) that the USA made to Saudi Arabia. The basis of America's relations with Saudi Arabia is the uninterrupted flow of oil to the United States and its allies. However, this is not the only reason.¹⁶⁵ The importance of oil for the US industry and weapons production is indispensable. By 1981, as the world's largest oil importing country, the USA was importing 6.431 billion dollars of 8.896 billion dollars of oil from Saudi Arabia.¹⁶⁶ At the same time, ensuring the uninterrupted supply of oil is closely related to the oil-producing country's stability. Saudi Arabia, the country to which the USA exports the most weapons in the Middle East, purchased 1.2 billion dollars' worth of arms between 1950 and 1972, while this amount reached 34 billion dollars between 1973 and 1980, despite the restrictions of President Jimmy Carter.¹⁶⁷ The withdrawal of British troops from the Persian Gulf, the threat to the interests of the US in the Gulf, the implementation of the 1970 Nixon Doctrine, and the increase in world oil prices with the 1973 Oil Crisis were influential in the USA's decision to increase the transfer of arms to the region. Especially the reactions to the Vietnam War and the increasing cost of sending troops were decisive in adopting the Nixon Doctrine. Accordingly, instead of directly intervening, the United States has committed to providing military material aid to countries it sees as friends and allies. Under the Nixon Doctrine, the USA adopted the "Twin Pillars" policy to protect its interests in the Persian Gulf. According to this policy, the USA would support the two Gulf countries, Iran and Saudi Arabia, militarily and economically, which it sees as friends.¹⁶⁸ The increase in oil prices has also increased the purchasing power of the gulf countries. The oil relationship between the USA and the Gulf countries in exchange for the transfer of arms has also been to the advantage of the USA. Because, instead of sending troops directly to protect its

¹⁶⁵ Doreen Orr, Katherine. *American Arms Transfers to the Middle East: An Effective Foreign Policy Tool?*, Dalhousie University, Department of Political Science, 1992, Master's Thesis, 58.

¹⁶⁶ United Nations, 1981 Yearbook of International Trade Statistics Volume I. (New York: United Nations, 1982), 390.

¹⁶⁷ Detning, Angus. "The Saudi Connection", *Newsweek* (October 12, 1981), 38.

¹⁶⁸ Katherine. *American Arms Transfers*, 60.

interests in the region, the USA has both secured its oil needs and succeeded in attracting Iran and Arabia in terms of military equipment by transferring arms.

The Persian Gulf has become more important in the foreign policy of the USA due to the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the overthrow of the Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi administration, which is close to the USA, and the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviets in 1979. Because the physical presence of the Soviets in the Gulf directly threatened the interests of the USA. Again, the one pillar in the "Twin Pillars" policy had collapsed due to the revolution in Iran. While the Carter Administration initially did not consider the AWACS sales demanded by Saudi Arabia positively, the Ronald Reagan Administration, which came after it, thought entirely differently.¹⁶⁹ However, later on, the Carter administration changed its stance and stated the importance of arms transfers in American foreign policy with the following words: "Arms transfers serve important American interests as well as fulfill US security commitments, and these transfers are an integral part of US foreign policy."¹⁷⁰

Unlike Carter, the Reagan administration thought that unilaterally restricting sales of AWACS would endanger US interests in the region. The Reagan administration stated that sales of AWACS were the only option available rather than the best way to protect US foreign policy interests. Since Iran was lost in the region, the only option that remained was Saudi Arabia. The U.S. Congress and pro-Israel lobbies opposed the sale of AWACS because of concerns that it would excessively endanger Israel's security. It was also claimed that these sales would cast a shadow over Israel's military superiority in the region.¹⁷¹ However, Reagan defended the importance of AWACS sales in terms of American foreign policy interests in the region with the following words:

¹⁶⁹ Ibid, 67.

¹⁷⁰ Text of President Reagan's July 8, 1981, Arms Transfer Policy Directive", 127-128.

¹⁷¹ William F. Deegan, "AWACS: American Foreign Policy in Conflict", 14.

Making these sales to Saudi Arabia will increase the security of our friends in the region, strengthen the US position in the region, and be a clear message to the Soviets and local governments about the US determination to maintain security and stability in the region.¹⁷²

The sales of AWACS aircraft were of interest to the American defense industry companies and politicians. For example, Boeing and other US companies, the main contractor of AWACS aircraft, were actively lobbying for the realization of sales. According to them, relations with Saudi Arabia in the field of defense industry were much more than oil; it provides job opportunities for hundreds of thousands of people, trade is developing, and the American dollar is getting stronger.¹⁷³

Despite all the objections of Congress and the pro-Israel lobbies, the sales of AWACS took place in 1981, and these sales paved the way for America's arms transfers to the region in the coming years. Thus, the US ensured its oil security and increased its influence in the region by using AWACS aircraft as an instrument in foreign policy in its relations with the Gulf countries.

4.4. Modern World System in the Context of Arms Sales

The explanations and examples given so far are to test the hypothesis (the more a country depends on arms import, the more it is open to manipulation in its foreign policy) and to answer the research question (Why do the major arms supplying states want to establish a dependency relation through arms transfers?). Accordingly, the use of arms sales as an instrument in foreign policy is closely related to a country's dependence on arms imports. While the third world countries, which were colonized and not allowed to build states, remain as agricultural societies today, developed countries sell high value-added

¹⁷² Ronald Reagan, "Letter to the Congress, Aug. 5, 1981", Department of State Bulletin. (Volume 81, October 1981), 52

¹⁷³ Blema S. Steinberg, "American Foreign Policy in the Middle East: A Study in Changing Priorities", *The Middle East at the Crossroads*. Janice Gross Stem and David B. Dewitt, eds., (Oakville, Ont.: Mosaic Press, 1983), 140.

products to ensure the continuation of dependency relations. Today, this dependency relationship is realized through the arms sales between core and periphery countries.

So, how is the dependency relationship established with arms sales? How does the US implement this as a superpower? First of all, in order to sell arms, it is necessary to produce them. This requires heavy industry, technology, and a qualified workforce. Today, this heavy industry, technology, and qualified workforce are available in the USA, which is defined as the core and holds more than one-third of the world's arms market. The technological advantage that the Netherlands, the UK, and France had in the colonial period, today, the USA has as a global power. Since the capitalist world system first emerged in the 16th century, the Netherlands in the 17th century, the UK in the 19th century, and America in the 20th century have the competitive advantage as a dominant power.¹⁷⁴

US defense industry companies are in the top 5 among the top 100 companies today. Since the beginning of the Cold War, the USA has been selling these weapons to third-world countries in accordance with its national security interests, and in return, it has obtained some privileges according to the situation of the buyer country. Relations established through arms transfers are long-term relations as they also require maintenance-repair of weapons, supply of spare parts, and technical support. For this reason, the arms importing country enters into a kind of dependency relationship with the exporting country. If this situation is to be explained in the context of core-periphery, America, which holds the weapons production tools and technology, uses this superiority to sell the weapons it produces in exchange for raw materials imported from periphery countries. To give an example from Africa, the US mining companies Chevron, Devon Energy, Exxon Mobil, Marathon Oil, Occidental Petroleum, and Vaalco

¹⁷⁴ Andrews, Bruce. "Social Change in the Capitalist World Economy. Edited by Barbara Hockey Kaplan. (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1978. Pp. 239. \$18.50, Cloth; \$7.95, Paper.)" *American Political Science Review* 73, no. 3 (1979): 943–45. doi:10.2307/1955498.

Energy extract oil and diamonds in Angola and sell weapons to Angola in return.¹⁷⁵ Because, Angola's economy is primarily dependent on oil and diamond extraction. The economy of Equatorial Guinea is dependent on oil and natural gas exports. Of these, natural gas is extracted by the US company Marathon Oil, while Exxon Mobil extracts the oil.¹⁷⁶ Nigeria has high oil reserves both at sea and on land. Nigeria owns 40% of these reserves, but more than half are owned and operated by foreign companies. Among these foreign companies are US Chevron, Exxon Mobil, and Esso.¹⁷⁷

Non-industrialized periphery countries become dependent on industrialized core societies in one way or another. Predominantly African and Asian continents have been areas where core countries continue their dependency relations due to rich mines and colonial past. Data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) will be used to examine these dependency relationships. Accordingly, the third world countries that cannot have their own defense industry products are dependent on the military materials sold by the core countries, and the natural resources of these countries that have difficulty in paying their debt are taken over. This is related to the economic dimension of arms sales. However, considering that not all third-world countries are rich in natural resources, arms transfer takes place for geographical location, ideological proximity, and the support of friendly civilian and military elites. The dependency relationship established over time with these arms transfers can be used as an instrument in foreign policy.

¹⁷⁵ Wilczyński, P.L. Arms trade and resources exploitation – survey of neocolonialism and neo-imperialism in Africa, 2021. *European Journal of Geopolitics*, 9, 75.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid, 77.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid.

4.4.1. The Global Division of Defense Industries

In accordance with Immanuel Wallerstein's core, periphery, and semi-periphery model, countries producing arms are divided into three or sometimes four due to the limitations in their capabilities and capacities. However, a tripartite distinction will be made in this study, as Keith Krause did.¹⁷⁸ Before explaining this tripartite distinction, it would be helpful to briefly mention the "Global Division of Labor" to understand the subject better.

Third-world or periphery countries, which previously provided only cheap raw materials and agricultural products, started to provide cheap labor to core countries after integrating into the capitalist world economy with the increase in the intensity of globalization. The transfer of high value-added products to the periphery and semi-periphery countries, which has been seen since the beginning of the 19th century, has begun to lose importance since the end of this century. One of the most important factors is the developments in transportation technology. Another factor is that labor-intensive production costs are low in periphery countries and higher in core countries. For the reasons mentioned above, labor-intensive manufacturing industries that do not require high technology have shifted from developed core capitalist countries to less-developed peripheral countries. Due to the increasing competition in the globalizing world, labor-intensive production has shifted to peripheral countries due to the idea of maximizing profit, which constitutes the main logic of the capitalist mode of production. As Çağlar Kurç claims, while manufacturing and mass production have moved to developing countries in the periphery, the capitalist core countries have restructured their economy to focus on the service sector and finance.¹⁷⁹ With the developments in the transportation and

¹⁷⁸ Krause, *Arms, and the State*, 31.

¹⁷⁹ Çağlar Kurç, "Critical Approach to Turkey's Defense Procurement Behavior: 1923-2013" (PhD Diss., Middle East Technical University, 2013), 193.

communication system, geographical distances for production lost their importance, and the capital could easily find new markets and cheap labor.¹⁸⁰

If the relationship with the global division in the defense industries is mentioned, the periphery, which has industrial branches that do not require high technology, makes labor-intensive production. Therefore, these countries with cheap labor and little or no research and development (R&D) investments are called the third tier. While having a certain level of technology, countries with relatively high R&D investments are called the second tier. Countries that can design a product entirely using high technology, make capital-intensive products and allocate a high share to research and development are called the first tier.¹⁸¹ The USA and Russia, which entered the arms race since the beginning of the Cold War, are in the first tier of this tripartite category. These two countries, which allocate the most significant share to military technological investment, were able to produce jet planes and their engines, the most advanced weapons such as precision-guided missiles, and the latest technological developments such as invisible planes and the most advanced ballistic missiles also came from these countries. Western European countries such as the UK, France, and Germany were included in the second tier. Since these countries are not self-sufficient in every sense like the first tier and their R&D investment costs are high, they had to participate in co-production and licensed production with first-tier arms producers. Developing countries such as Israel, Taiwan, Turkey, and Singapore are among the third-tier producers. Since these third-tier countries do not have a completely indigenous defense industry, they are dependent on first and second-tier producers for essential parts such as engines and radar systems.¹⁸² Since the industries in these countries cannot produce high-tech fighter aircraft, tanks, and

¹⁸⁰ "Chapter 2. Rethinking the International Division of Labor" In *the Globalization Syndrome: Transformation and Resistance*, 33-57. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000. <https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400823697.33>

¹⁸¹ Krause, Arms, and the State, 32.

¹⁸² Ibid, 88.

radar systems, the dependency relationship is inevitable. According to Krause, “the division of arms producers into tiers is based not only on export market shares, but also on underlying factor and industrial capability in military production and innovation, with first-tier countries being hubs of advanced technological innovation, second-tier countries staying near the technological production edge, and third-tier countries simply producing basic armaments.”¹⁸³ One of the best ways to distinguish this group is their spending on R&D investments. Since R&D, which requires high cost, is an investment that only developed core countries can make, neither second nor third-tier arms producers are at a level to compete with first-tier countries.

As shown in Table 5 below, while the USA and the Soviet Union stand out in the first tier due to their high investments in R&D, Japan, Britain, and France can be considered second-tier countries since their expenditures have dropped significantly compared to the first tier. Countries such as Poland, Israel, India, and Turkey are naturally in the third tier. However, since this table belongs to 1984, there have been transitions between the second and third tiers today. For example, while South Korea is in the third-tier category in this table, it is in the second tier currently.

¹⁸³ Ibid.

Table 5. Estimated military research and development expenditures, 1984 (or nearest available year)

Country	million US dollars	% of military spending
United States	37,300 ^a	12.9
Soviet Union	(55,000–75,000) ^b	(20–8) ^b
Japan	7,430 ^c (1987)	1.0
Britain	3,700	14.3
France	3,300	11.4
Czechoslovakia	1,290 [*]	15.1
West Germany	1,260 ^d	3.9
China	(750–1,250)	(15.0)
East Germany	580 [*]	4.8
Poland	525 [*]	3.3
Sweden	360	5.6
Israel	300 [*] (1980)	5.8
Italy	600 ^e	3.6
India	250	2.0
South Korea	70 ^f	1.6
Argentina	30 [*]	1.2
Thailand	2	0.2
Turkey	1	—
Total	(113,000–133,000)	12.0

Sources: Column 1 derived from SIPRI, *Yearbook 1987*, 154-6. Starred figures are derived from Ulrich Albrecht, the aborted UN study on the military use of research and development: an editorial essay', *Bulletin of Peace Proposals*, 19:3-4 (1988), 25. Column 2 derived from Albrecht, 253-4.

Since the table above reflects the situation in the last years of the Cold War, with the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, America has kept its place as the first tier on the list alone. In Table 6 below, Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries with the highest defense R&D expenditures in 2017 are given. Among these countries, the USA is seen to be at the top with 55.4 billion dollars. Especially after the Cold War, changing threat perceptions and new technological developments caused increased R&D investment expenditures in the USA. Since the USA is the first-tier producer in the globalizing defense industry, other second and third-tier countries have become even more dependent on the USA in terms of critical parts and technology transfer. In other words, developing and underdeveloped

countries with limited material capability and limited/no defense industry depend on developed countries to acquire military technology.¹⁸⁴

Table 6. Top Ten OECD Countries by Government Defense R&D Funding, 2017

(in millions of purchasing power parity dollars)

Country	R&D
United States	\$55,441.0
South Korea	3,377.3
United Kingdom	2,379.4
Germany	1,530.2
France	1,431.1
Turkey	1,350.9
Japan	1,199.1
Poland	379.2
Australia	358.7
Canada	183.1
Other OECD Countries	675.5
Total, OECD	\$68,305.5

Source: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Research and Development Statistics (RDS) Database, https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=GBARD_NABS2007.

According to Table 6, while the USA maintained its first-tier position, South Korea took place in the second-tier category along with the UK, Germany, France, Turkey, and Japan. Other OECD countries such as Poland, Australia, and Canada remained in the third tier. As mentioned before, while there may be transitions between second and third tiers, becoming the first tier does not seem possible in the short term (because it requires a high cost).

A similarity can be drawn between Wallerstein's concept of core, semi-periphery, and periphery and the global division of defense industries into first, second, and third tiers. When core countries are compared with first-tier

¹⁸⁴ Kurç, "Critical Approach," 71.

countries, both come to the fore as countries that make capital-intensive production, can produce products that require high technology, and can allocate a high share of the budget to research and development. When semi-periphery and second-tier countries are compared with each other, they are countries with a certain level of technology and industry, where both capital and labor-intensive production are seen together, and which allocates a small share to research and development. Finally, when periphery and third-tier countries are considered, it will be seen that they are countries where labor-intensive production is dominant, products with low added value are produced due to very little research and development investments, and their production depends on first and second-tier producers' technology transfer.

The main purpose of this comparison given above is to demonstrate how the defense industries operating in the third world countries integrated into the capitalist world economy are dependent on the developed countries. Although efforts to establish an independent defense industry are observed in the periphery and semi-periphery countries, they will not be completely independent as the dependency on first-tier countries in terms of critical technology continues. The main point to be made here is, as will be seen in more detail in the following section (Third World Defense Industries' Dependency on Technology Transfer: Implications for Foreign Policy), in an increasingly globalized and more interdependent world, the defense industries are gradually moving away from their goals of remaining national and self-sufficient. Therefore, the third world defense industries' dependency on critical parts continues within the capitalist world economy.

4.4.2. Patron-Client Relationship

In the context of core and periphery countries, the effects of being dependent on arms transfer are also seen in the patron-client relationship. It is possible to observe a patron-client relationship especially established through arms transfer with third-world countries during the Cold War. However, when mentioning

arms transfer, grants, sales, and loans should be distinguished from each other.¹⁸⁵ Because although all three are within the scope of arms transfer, their effects on the recipient country are different. The effects of an arms transfer made as a grant and a transfer made as sales are very different. Dependency level may increase if the buyer country does not pay cash for the weapons and must depend on the supplier's grants or loans.¹⁸⁶ While the dependency is at the highest level when the arms are given as a grant, the dependency is at the lowest when purchased. For instance, although Japan has obtained more weaponry from the US than Israel, allowing Japan to purchase US armaments with Japanese money is far less of a patron's favor to a client than providing Israel money to purchase American weapons.¹⁸⁷ According to the patron-client approach, the relationship between the arms supplier and the recipient country will not deteriorate as long as the client country acts according to the patron's objectives. However, when the client country wants to procure arms from a country other than the patron, the patron may want to punish the client country. A client country that obtained a significant number of weapons from third parties or if it is the patron's adversary, the client country would be punished with less weaponry in the upcoming arms delivery by the patron.¹⁸⁸ On the contrary, the patron may reward the client country when it acts in line with the patron's foreign policy objectives.

The relationship that India and Pakistan established with the US and the USSR during the Cold War can be evaluated in the context of patron-client. Both superpowers wanted to increase their power projection and interests in South

¹⁸⁵ Tongfi Kim, Keren Yarhi-Milo, Alexander Lanoszka, Zack Cooper; Arms, Alliances, and Patron-Client Relationships. *International Security* 2018; 42 (3): 183–186.

¹⁸⁶ Paul, T. V. "Influence through Arms Transfers: Lessons from the U.S.-Pakistani Relationship." *Asian Survey* 32, no. 12 (1992): 1078–92. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2645039>.

¹⁸⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸⁸ Sanjian, Gregory S. "Cold War Imperatives and Quarrelsome Clients: Modeling U.S. and USSR Arms Transfers to India and Pakistan." *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42, no. 1 (1998): 97–127. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/174555>.

Asia through these two countries. Therefore, both the US and the Soviet Union regarded arms transfer as essential for establishing dependency, patron-client linkages, and alliance relationships.¹⁸⁹ According to SIPRI, these two superpowers delivered weapons to Pakistan and India in order to gain a geostrategic advantage and create a patron-client arms transfer dependency.

The negative effects of the dependency relationship established as a result of arms transfers become more evident in times of embargo. As a matter of fact, the US imposed an arms embargo on both countries due to the 1965 India-Pakistani war. Considering that India has been a client country of the Soviets for a long time, India did not have any difficulties supplying weapons. However, when Pakistan wanted to buy weapons from the Soviet Union during the embargo period, it negatively responded. Because Pakistan was a client country of the US up to that time and had an ongoing patron-client relationship, the US embargo was effective in shortening the war between India and Pakistan due to Pakistan's weapons dependence on the US.¹⁹⁰ As a result of the relationship established through arms transfer between the US as a patron and Pakistan as a client, embargoes could be an efficient foreign policy instrument when the client is entirely reliant on a single provider or is in desperate need of specific arms that only one supplying country can procure.¹⁹¹

4.4.3. Third World Defense Industry's Dependency on Technology Transfer: Implications for Foreign Policy

The countries in the first-tier category are technologically advantageous compared to the second and third-tier arms producers since they have been producing arms for many years. As mentioned earlier, first-tier status can only

¹⁸⁹ Paul, T. V. "Influence through Arms, 1080-1081.

¹⁹⁰ John Sislín, "Arms as influence: The elusive link between military assistance and political compliance" (PhD Diss., Indiana University, 1993), 221.

¹⁹¹ Ibid.

be attributed to the United States since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The US can use this advantageous position as a supplier state in its arms transfer relations with peripheral third world countries, either in off-the-shelf procurement or joint projects such as co-development, co-production, or licensed production. As the major supplying state, it must be evaluated why the US is trying to establish a dependency relationship through arms transfers by using this advantageous situation, and thus the research question will be answered.

From the very beginning, as stated in the previous sections of the study, importing weapons brings with its dependency on the exporting country. This dependency relationship is generally examined in two parts. According to Geoffrey Kemp, while the dependency before the weapon transfer is “front-end,” the dependency related to the logistical support after the transfer of the weapon is called the “back-end.”¹⁹² When a country that wants to import weapons expresses that it wants to buy the materials it needs, the supplier country may not want to procure them. It can be renounced even after the arms deal is done. Alternatively, the supplier can tie up arms transfers with economic or political concessions. This dependence of the buyer country before the arms transfer is called the front-end.

After the arms transfer takes place, the dependency of the buyer country on the seller does not end. This dependency sometimes increases even more after major defense equipment is imported. The dependency at this stage is called logistical support and includes elements such as spare parts guarantee, maintenance, repair, technical support, and training. When the supplier country does not provide this after-sales support, the army of the recipient country may face serious problems, especially in wartime. Regarding this, as mentioned in detail in the third chapter of the study, “The Role of Elites” can be used as an effective tool to penetrate the armed forces of the receiving countries.

¹⁹² Kemp, Geoffrey. "Arms Transfers and the 'Back-End' Problem in Developing Countries." In Stephanie G. Neuman and Robert E. Harkavy (Eds.): *Arms Transfers in the Modern World*. (New York: Praeger, 1979): 265.

When the spare parts or weapons needed by the recipient country during the war are not provided by the supplying country, it will directly affect the war's outcome.¹⁹³ Robert Harkavy describes the dependency situation of the recipient country during the war as follows:

The Third World's persistent reliance on weapons transfer is most visible during wars. The possibility of war requires arms replenishment, spare parts, ordnance, and systems replacement. Since almost all arms deliveries require the confirmation of supplying states, arms procurement becomes possibly the most important driver of wars' consequences.¹⁹⁴

Although the dependency relations have given above still exist, a new type of dependency has emerged after the Cold War, especially with the decrease in defense budgets, the increase in R&D costs, and the change in threat perception. This type of dependency has manifested itself in the programs jointly made by the core and periphery arms-producing states. The unequal exchange, which is formed by the nature of the capitalist world economy, can also be observed among the arms-producing states. As in Krause's classification, the differences in development levels of the countries have led to the formation of first, second, and third-tier arms producers. However, the problem does not stem from such a hierarchical structure; instead, the problem stems from second and third-tier arms producers' consent to the dependence on the first-tier country. More clearly, while first-tier arms producers (namely the United States) make the most advanced technological innovations, second-tier arms producers can only do this thanks to the technology they receive through capacity transfer from first-tier countries. Third-tier producers copy and reproduce the weapons produced by first and second-tier countries, but they cannot innovate and design independently.¹⁹⁵ In other words, the defense industries of the second and third-

¹⁹³ Catrina, *Arms Transfers*, 171.

¹⁹⁴ Harkavy, Robert E. *Great Power Competition for Overseas Bases: The Geopolitics of Access Diplomacy*. (New York: Pergamon Press, 1982): 341.

¹⁹⁵ Krause, *Arms, and the State*, 31.

tier countries are, in a sense, dependent on the technology transfer of the first-tier country. As Wallerstein stated, as the capitalist world economy expanded in the historical process due to its internal needs, it included new regions in the global division of labor.¹⁹⁶ Therefore, the second and third-tier arms producers take place within this division, sustaining the dependency relationship.

The decrease in countries' armament needs after the 1990s caused a decline in their defense budgets as well. Domestic procurement alone was not enough for second-tier arms producers to survive. Therefore, the second and third-tier producers have to decide between reliance on technology transfer from first-tier producers, specialization in armaments of national interest, or quit staying on the cutting edge of technology. These reasons were the main driving forces behind second-tier producers participating in the global arms transfer system.¹⁹⁷ While first-tier arms producers can produce without worrying about exporting, second tiers' production is dependent primarily on export revenue.

As can be seen in Table 7 below, major second-tier arms producers have followed an export-oriented policy to meet the increasing R&D and unit costs. However, this has not been a solution to the problems of second-tier producers. Therefore, the second-tier arms producers started to seek different solutions such as collaboration with foreign companies on sophisticated arms development and manufacturing, joint production regulations and rationalized and reorganized defense industrial sectors.¹⁹⁸

¹⁹⁶ Wallerstein, Immanuel. *The Politics of the World-Economy: The States, the Movements, and the Civilizations (Studies in Modern Capitalism)*, Cambridge University Press (June 29, 1984): 80.

¹⁹⁷ Krause, *Arms, and the State*, 137.

¹⁹⁸ *Ibid*, 147.

Table 7. Arms export dependency of second-tier producers in the 1980s

Firm	Country and rank	Products	Arms production % of production	Arms exports % of arms production	World rank
Thomson	Fr 1	Electronics	36	60	12
Aérospatiale	Fr 2	Helicopters/missiles	49	50	22
DTN	Fr 3	Ships	100	5	24
Dassault	Fr 4	Aircraft	70	70	28
GIAT	Fr 5	Tanks	100	40	45
SNECMA	Fr 6	Engines	45	53 ^a	59
Matra	Fr 8	Missiles	14	75	81
British Aerospace	Br 1	Aircraft	54	55	7
GEC	Br 2	Electronics	35	45 ^b	14
Rolls-Royce	Br 3	Engines	40	42 ^b	39
Thorn EMI	Br 4	Electronics	20	35 ^b	41
Ferranti	Br 5	Electronics	80	40	44
VSEL	Br 6	Ships	100	30	55
Aeritalia	It 1	Aircraft	64	65	53
Fiat Aviazione	It 2	Engines	81	60 ^c	63
Oto Melara	It 3	Vehicles	98	55	74
Agusta	It 4	Helicopters	72	80	75
MBB	Ge 1	Aircraft	49	n/a	29
AEG	Ge 2	Electronics	18	n/a	41
MTU	Ge 3	Engines	52	n/a	50
Siemens	Ge 4	Electronics	2	n/a	57
Rheinmetall	Ge 5	Artillery	35	n/a	62
Krauss-Maffei	Ge 10	Vehicles	53	(33) ^d	91
Casa	Sp 1	Aircraft	65	(70) ^e	49
ENASA	Sp 2	Vehicles	55	(45) ^f	—
Bofors	Sw 1	Artillery	50	50 ^g	—
Nobel	Sw 2	Artillery/missiles	23	n/a	—

Source: SIPRI Yearbook 1990, 326-8.

Whatever the result, these decisions indicate that technological advancements and the evolution of the arms production and transfer system have meant that prominent second-tier arms producers can no longer maintain independent, all-encompassing manufacture of advanced weapons.¹⁹⁹ Deficits at almost all levels – national science and technology infrastructure, R&D, and sophisticated production – remain significant obstacles to creating, absorbing, and using advanced technologies for military purposes, particularly in third-

¹⁹⁹ Ibid, 150.

tier countries.²⁰⁰ Due to these reasons, the defense industry, which was previously seen as a national field, started to lose this meaning, and second and third-tier manufacturers gradually moved away from the goal of self-sufficiency. Therefore, numerous second-tier arms producers actively consider foreign partnerships and collaboration agreements.²⁰¹ For example, the Tornado supersonic ground attack bomber was a Franco-German-Italian fighter that was later pursued by the Euro fighter Typhoon, which included Spain in the aircraft production program. Furthermore, the A400M tactical airlifter cooperated with France, Belgium, Germany, Italy, Turkey, Spain, the United Kingdom, and Luxembourg.²⁰²

This type of cooperation and co-production approach in the first and second-tier arms producers left a different mark and impact on the third-tier producers. Developing countries such as Indonesia, South Africa, Brazil, and Chile, which had a completely domestic production target at the beginning, had to make changes to these targets later on. During the Iraq-Iran war, significant arms exporters such as Brazil and Chile abandoned the defense sector. Embraer, based in Brazil, has prioritized regional jets over military production. Indonesia's airplane dreams were dashed by austerity measures that reduced the industrial support that kept it afloat. South Africa has been attempting to incorporate its military production sector as a subcontractor to Western arms companies.²⁰³ The hierarchical structure of the global defense industry in the form of first, second, and third-tier producers is a natural result of the capitalist world economy. However, the point to be underlined here is that second and third-tier weapon manufacturers are increasingly moving away from their goals of autonomy and

²⁰⁰ Bitzinger, Richard A. Chapter 3: Towards a Brave New Arms Industry?, *The Adelphi Papers*, (2003), 43:356, 63-79, DOI: 10.1080/714027876

²⁰¹ Bitzinger, *Towards a Brave*, 69.

²⁰² Bitzinger, *The Modern Defense Industry*, 98.

²⁰³ *Ibid*, 99.

self-sufficiency. Technological competence and capacity differences between core, semi-periphery, and periphery countries make second and especially third-tier arms producers the subsidiary and junior partners of first-tier countries.²⁰⁴ This situation can be observed in the subcontracting, joint venture and foreign equity ownership relations established by second and third-tier arms manufacturers with first-tier arms companies.²⁰⁵

Table 8. Globalizing of arms industry among the second and third-tier arms producers

Country	Company	First-tier company	Products
Brazil	Helibras	Aerospatiale Matra (France)	Helicopters
Brazil	Imbel	BAE Systems (UK)	Ordnance
Israel	Israeli Military Industries	Primex (US)	Ordnance
Malaysia	Sapura	Thales (France)	Communications equipment
Singapore	ST Aerospace	BAE Systems (UK)	Aircraft parts
Singapore	ST Aerospace	Messier-Dowty (France)	Landing gear
Singapore	ST Aerospace, SBE	BAE Systems (UK)	Military/civil training facility
Singapore	ST Chartered Industries	Thales (France)	Electronics
South Africa	Grintek Comms	EADS (France, Germany, Spain)	Communications equipment
South Africa, Sweden	Grintek, Saab	n/a	'Grintek Avionics' (avionics)
Sweden, Norway, Finland	Bofors, Kongsberg, Patria	n/a	'Nammo' (ordnance)
Turkey	Nurol	United Defense (US)	'FNSS' (armoured vehicles)
Turkey	TAI	Lockheed Martin (US)	'TUSAS' (F-16 co-production)

Source: Data from Bitzinger, Richard A. Chapter 3: Towards a Brave New Arms Industry? (The Adelphi Papers, 2003): 72.

Table 8 above indicates the joint ventures of second and third-tier arms producers with first-tier companies. As it can be seen from this table, although most second and third-tier weapons companies state that they are committed to their so-called domestic production targets, they depend on first-tier manufacturers in at least one or a few critical areas such as engine, critical design, information technology to continue their weapon production. This

²⁰⁴ Bitzinger, Towards a Brave, 74.

²⁰⁵ Ibid.

dependency relationship with first-tier arms producers stems from off-the-shelf imports, licensed production, or co-development programs.²⁰⁶

In the globalizing world, second and third-tier countries will increasingly need the technologies and partnerships of first-tier countries to produce weapons, and its effects will be inevitable in terms of foreign policy. First and foremost, a country's armed forces cannot launch a full spectrum of military actions unless it is part of an alliance or coalition due to abandoning to produce one or more armament types.²⁰⁷ For instance, the United Kingdom government has accepted that the design, development, and manufacture of network-centric technology "would unavoidably be driven by the United States."²⁰⁸ For second-tier arms manufacturers, accessing the US military industry for selling and partnering initiatives is vital for the financial survival of national defense industries and the technological developments of their military services.²⁰⁹

The dependency of the second-tier arms producers on the US increases even more, when it comes to third-tier producers. Most third tiers of arms producers have only learned how to build and disassemble military equipment and cannot design and manufacture on their own. Foreign input dependency of third-tier producers in terms of electronic parts and sub-units continues.²¹⁰ Except for America, which is a first-tier producer, no arms-producing country, including second-tier manufacturers, has reduced defense industry imports in important

²⁰⁶ Ibid.

²⁰⁷ David L. I. Kirkpatrick. Trends in the costs of weapon systems and the consequences, *Defence and Peace Economics*, (15:3, 2004): 259-273. DOI: [10.1080/1024269032000123203](https://doi.org/10.1080/1024269032000123203)

²⁰⁸ Andrew D. James, "European Military Capabilities, the Defense Industry and the Future Shape of Armaments Co-operation," *Defense and Security Analysis* 21:1 (March 2005): 8.

²⁰⁹ Stephanie G. Neuman, *Defense Industries and Global Dependency*, *Orbis*, Volume 50, Issue 3, 2006, 429-451.

²¹⁰ Brauer, Jurgens. *The Arms Industry in Developing Nations: History and Post-Cold War Assessment*, Middlesex University, London, 1998, March 13-14.

areas such as weapons design and development, engineering, crucial components, sub-systems, machine tools, and production know-how.²¹¹

Secondly, second and third-tier countries dependent on the United States in technology transfer may face strict export restrictions from the US. Indeed, this inequality in the defense industry between America and the rest of the world is to the advantage of the United States. It is a known fact that the US exploits this advantage in influencing the foreign policy decisions of the countries that depend on it. In 2005, the US gave a harsh response to the arms exports that Israel and the European Union (EU) countries wanted to make to China. For example, Israel's covert sale of military technology to China has resulted in severe American sanctions. The sanctions against the Israeli government involved stopping US-Israeli common programs such as the Joint Strike Fighter; canceling Israel's role in the Joint Direct Attack Munitions initiative; prohibiting Israeli shares to the US Army's Future Combat Systems; freezing data exchange on the advancement of an attack drone, and prohibiting the sale of US night-vision devices to Israel.²¹² This dependence of Israel on America caused it to take a step back, and as a result, it did not make any more military sales to China.

Again, the EU's intention of lifting the arms embargo on China, which started with China's brutal suppression of the demonstrators in Tiananmen Square in 1989, received a heavy response from the US Senate. On March 17, 2005, a Senate resolution stated that removing the arms embargo "would possibly harm transatlantic military partnership, involving future exports of US weapons technology, services, and materials to EU countries."²¹³ As result of this stern

²¹¹ Neuman, Defense Industries, 440.

²¹² Ibid, 449.

²¹³ Ibid, 450.

warning, European Parliament decided not to lift the military embargo against China.²¹⁴

In brief, a one-way dependency relationship emerges in an increasingly globalized world due to the capacity differences between the arms-producing countries. Since the second and third-tier arms-producing countries depend on the United States in terms of technology transfer and critical parts, the US uses this superiority as a foreign policy tool in the defense industry.

4.5. Conclusion

This section examines the effects of arms transfer and dependence on arms imports in three historical processes. Accordingly, starting from the middle of the 19th century, the efforts of countries such as the UK, France, and Italy to acquire colonies by transferring weapons to Ethiopia were examined. Then, the struggles between the Western states that wanted to influence the lands of the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans were discussed. The role of arms transferred by France, the UK, and Russia to the Christian communities living in Balkan lands of the Ottoman Empire and thus the rebellion and independence of these communities were discussed. After that, starting with Otto von Bismarck, it was examined how the German arms transfer brought the Ottomans into the First World War on the side of Germany.

The study then focused on how the US and USSR rivalry, which started during the Cold War, used arms transfer as a tool in foreign policy. However, America's containment policy of the Soviet Union along with its military aid and support for the establishment of various international organizations, brought it to the fore. For this reason, firstly, the arms transfer relations between the US and Israel and Israel's military dependence on the US were examined. Then, Turkey's dependency, which started with the aid it received within the framework of the

²¹⁴ Mark Lauder, "Europe Wants China Sales but not Just of Weapons," *The New York Times*, 24 February 2005.

Marshall Plan and the Truman Doctrine, and the process until the 1975 military embargo of the US were examined in terms of arms transfers and their effects on foreign policy. Finally, it was discussed how the AWACS sales made by the US to Saudi Arabia were used to obtain political and economic benefits.

Finally, it was examined how the defense industries are divided into first, second, and third tiers due to capacity differences by referring to the core-periphery approach of Immanuel Wallerstein. Then, the effects of being dependent on arms transfer on foreign policy are discussed through the concept of patron-client. In the last section of the thesis, the relations between the arms-producing states, which are divided into first, second, and third tiers, dependence on technology transfer and how it is used as an instrument in foreign policy by the United States are discussed.

As a result, in the pre-Cold War period, the arms transfer was made for colonial purposes by states such as the UK and France. During the Cold War, it was used by the United States to contain the Soviet ideology. Finally, in the post-Cold War period, the efforts to establish an independent defense industry caused a new kind of dependency among the arms-producing countries. The division of defense industries into first, second, and third tiers due to the differences in their capacity and capabilities was a sign of this dependency. The globalizing defense industry has made it impossible for second and third-tier manufacturers to produce major weapons systems that require high technology due to increasing R&D costs. This global division of the defense industry has made the second and third-tier manufacturers more dependent on the first-tier manufacturer in terms of technology transfer, and the US has used this advantage as an essential tool in influencing the foreign policy decisions of the countries that are dependent on technology transfer in the field of the defense industry.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

The use of arms sales as a foreign policy instrument demonstrates the ongoing unequal exchange situation between developed and third world countries. It is known that the transfer of surplus value from the periphery to core countries, which began in the colonial period and accelerated with the industrial revolution, causes unequal exchange. In this way, since Western capitalist countries have a monopoly on the means of production, they import raw materials from third world countries and sell products with high added value in return. This situation of unequal exchange leads to excessive capital accumulation in the core countries. This situation is valid for the arms industry and technology with high added value. Because in order to produce arms, many factors such as a qualified workforce and high-cost research and development investments must be available. Since core capitalist countries have the means of production, they can achieve arms production by gathering these factors. As Immanuel Wallerstein stated in his world-system theory, third-world countries integrated into the capitalist world economy can only have arms production technology to the extent that the system allows.²¹⁵ First in the colonial period, then in the cold war years, and finally, from the end of the cold war until today, the countries that have the arms production tools and technology have used this superiority as a tool in foreign policy. However, since the beginning of the Cold War, the US has maintained its leading position in terms of arms transfer and has used its transfer as a foreign policy instrument. Therefore, the arms transfers made by the United States to the third world countries constitute the limit of this study.

²¹⁵ Wallerstein, Immanuel. "The Rise and Future Demise of the World Capitalist System: Concepts for Comparative Analysis." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 16, no. 4 (1974): 387–415. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/178015>.

In order to answer the research questions and test the hypothesis, this study consists of three main parts: Theoretical Framework, The Process Leading to the Arms Transfer Dependency, and Foreign Policy Consequences of Arms Import Dependency. Firstly, in the Theoretical Framework chapter, Wallerstein's core, semi-periphery, and periphery distinctions were explained.²¹⁶ Based on the world system theory, it was concluded that the arms sales between the core and periphery countries cause a one-sided dependency relationship. Afterward, it was critically discussed that the third world countries could not develop according to the capitalist developmental stages suggested by the Modernization theory.

The third chapter mentions the factors that cause dependency relations in third-world countries. For this purpose, firstly, the question of “Does arms transfer help the state-building efforts of third-world countries?” was asked, and it was concluded that the arms transfer interrupted the state-building process. Secondly, the question of “What is the role of third-world elites in arms transfer?” was asked, and it was concluded that the elites transferred arms to ensure their own security and the security of western mining companies. Finally, in this section, the question of “Why do third-world countries import arms?” was asked, and three reasons were given as an answer. They can be summarized as follows; insufficient capacity of third world countries to produce arms, increasing the number of suppliers to reduce the dependency relationship due to arms transfer, and the desire of third world countries that want to reach self-sufficiency in arms production.

In the fourth chapter of the thesis, the consequences of being dependent on arms transfer in terms of foreign policy are examined. For this purpose, the question of “Did arms transfer play a role in colonial-era?” was asked, and the answer was examined in three historical processes. Accordingly, starting from the middle of the 19th century, the efforts of states such as the UK, France, and Italy to obtain colonies by transferring weapons to Ethiopia were examined. Then, the struggles between the Western states that wanted to influence the lands of the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans were

²¹⁶ Wallerstein, “Medieval Prelude.” In *The Modern World-System I*, 63.

discussed. The role of arms transfers to the Christian communities living in the Ottoman lands in the Balkans by France, the UK, and Russia, and thus the rebellion and independence of these communities, is discussed. Finally, starting with Otto von Bismarck, then continued with the German chancellor Kaiser Wilhelm II. it has been examined how the German arms transfer brought the Ottomans into the First World War on the side of Germany.

The study then focused on how the US and USSR rivalry that started during the Cold War years used arms transfer as a tool in foreign policy. Therefore, it focused on the question of "What was the main motivation behind arms transfer during the Cold War?" and answered it through the examples of Israel, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia. The structure of the national defense industries, which started to change with the end of the Cold War, was examined by answering the question, "What are the reasons for the global division of defense industries?" Accordingly, it has been concluded that the defense industries are divided into three as first, second, and third tiers because of the increased research and development investments, the decrease in national defense budgets, and the high technology requirement of major defense systems. Finally, in this section, the question "What is the effect of the global division of defense industries on the sustainability of the capitalist world economy?" was asked. This question was answered by discussing the division of defense industries and the consequences of their dependency in terms of foreign policy. As a result, it has been concluded that the third world countries' arms transfer dependency can be considered as one of the most essential factors in the continuation of the capitalist world economy and the United States use this as a foreign policy instrument.

In order to test the hypothesis, the arms transfers of major arms supplying states (in this study, America) to third world countries were examined. "It has been concluded that the United States influences the foreign policy decisions of the third world countries such as Turkey, Israel and Saudi Arabia depending on the number of arms imports from the United States," and thus, the hypothesis has been confirmed. With the help of quantitative and qualitative data, the main research question was answered. Accordingly, since the continuation of exploitative capitalist relations depends on

arms transfer, major arms supplying states, namely the US, want to establish a dependency relationship through arms sales. Thus, the main research question of this study was answered. In this context, it can be said that the independent variable (the arms import volume of a third world country) is successful in explaining the dependent variable (America's influence on foreign policy decisions of the importing country).

From the beginning, this study's research question and hypothesis have been tried to be explained within the framework of Wallerstein's world-system theory. America, the major arms supplying state, acted as this theory predicts and used its arms transfers to third world countries as a foreign policy tool. For this reason, especially during the Cold War years, as in the examples of Turkey and Israel, the US was able to make changes in the foreign policy decisions of third world countries either with the arms embargo or the threat of an arms embargo. Arms transfers to third-world countries (through a grant, loan, or sale) demonstrate that the US considers these transfers as an important element of its foreign policy. As William Louis Dickinson, the former Republican Representative of the United States of America, stated this situation in a panel he attended with former U.S. Senator Joseph R. Biden:

Whether we like it or not, arms sales are a foreign policy instrument, and we cannot ignore it. As this is the case, it is best to use it vigilantly, as Senator Biden has pointed out. We will have to influence our foreign policy through arms sales, whether to our allies or potential enemies, just as the French do. I am not in favor of an arms race, but to claim that arms sales are not a foreign policy tool is to reject the truth.²¹⁷

In this direction, while the use of arms transfers as a foreign policy instrument was implemented by states such as the UK, France, Germany, and Italy before the Second World War, the US dominated the post-war era of arms transfer as a foreign policy instrument. Based on its technological superiority in the defense industry, the United States has tied the arms transfers to political strings and punished the recipient country with an arms embargo or threat of embargo if the recipient country does not comply with these conditions. It is also among the research findings of the thesis that the US

²¹⁷ Arms Sales: A Useful Foreign Policy Tool? The American Enterprise Institute, September 9, 1981, <https://www.aei.org/research-products/book/arms-sales-a-useful-foreign-policy-tool/>

arms transfer to third world countries can be economically motivated. Indeed, America considered both its political and economic interests when making the decision to sell its AWACS aircraft to Saudi Arabia.

Following Wallerstein's core, semi-periphery, and periphery concepts, technology and capacity differences between third world and American defense industry companies have led to the formation of first, second, and third-tier arms producers. Especially in the post-Cold War period, the change in threat perception, the decrease in defense budgets, and high R&D investments required by major defense systems have pushed many second and third-tier arms producers to joint ventures with the US. Second and third-tier producers, which are involved in joint projects such as co-production, co-development, and licensed production, have become dependent on the United States for technology transfer and critical part transfers.

In summary, the technology and capacity differences between America and other arms-producing states have made the second and third-tier arms producers dependent on the US. Due to this dependency relationship, the United States can influence the foreign policy decisions of third-world countries according to its own interests.

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APPENDICES

A. TURKISH SUMMARY / TÜRKE ÖZET

Batı Avrupa'da 16. yüzyılın başında sanayi devriminin temelleri atılmış ve 18. yüzyılda hızlanmıştır. Sanayileşme hareketleri ile birlikte artan hammadde ihtiyacı, coğrafi keşiflere bağı olarak sömürgecilik anlayışını doğurmuştur. O dönemde gelişen Batı ile Asya, Afrika ve Latin Amerika ülkeleri arasındaki sömürgeci ilişkiler, bazen silah zoruyla, bazen de dini yayma adı altında misyonerlik faaliyetleriyle oluşturulmuştur. Daha sonra kapitalizm olarak adlandırılan bu ilişkilerdeki temel mantık, sanayi üretimi için gerekli olan ham maddenin sömürge ülkelerden daha düşük fiyata veya mümkünse ücretsiz olarak temin edilmesidir. Daha sonra işlendikten sonra bitmiş veya imal edilmiş bir ürün olarak fahiş fiyatlarla sömürge ülkelere satılan ürünler ile eşitsiz bir durum ortaya çıkacaktır. Bu şekilde, artı-değer ve değerli kaynakların sömürgelerden Kıta Avrupası'na (ve daha sonra Amerika'ya) sürekli hareketi sermaye birikimine yol açmıştır. Bu sermaye birikiminden yararlanmayı başaran Batı Avrupa, zaman içinde çok ileri bir ekonomi, teknoloji ve bilime ulaşmıştır. Ateşli silahlar ve gemi teknolojisindeki gelişmelerle birlikte Batı Avrupa'nın uzak bölgelerde koloniler kurması ve yönetmesi kolaylaştı.

Sanayi Devrimi, çelikten yapılmış gemi ve buhar gücü teknolojisi gibi savaşın yürütülmesine yeni teknolojiler getirmiştir. Bu durum silah transfer sistemi ve küresel güç dağılımı üzerinde büyük bir etkiye sahip olmuştur. 1858 ve 1888 arasında, tüm silah alanı, barut ve topun icadından bu yana en devrimci aşamasını yaşadı. Bu bağımlılık ilişkileri, Asya, Afrika ve Latin Amerika ülkelerinde ekonomik, politik ve sosyal eşitsizlik sorunlarına neden oldu. Sistemik sömürü nedeniyle bağımsızlıklarını yitirdiler ve hemen her anlamda Batılı merkez ülkelere bağımlı hale geldiler. Konunun önemi nedeniyle yukarıda özetlenen tarihsel arka plan, çalışmanın daha iyi anlaşılması için yol gösterici olacaktır. Immanuel Wallerstein'ın merkez,

çevre ve yarı çevre olmak üzere üçe ayırdığı ülkelerin sınıflandırılmasının arkasında kapitalist ilişkiler vardır. Sömürgeler kurarak üçüncü dünya ülkeleri karşısında elde ettikleri üstünlüğü kaybetmek istemeyen Batılı devletler, bugün de bu ilişkilerini silah transferleri yoluyla sürdürmektedir. Sömürge ülkeler, siyasi bağımsızlıklarını Batılı devletlerden kazanmış olsalar da ekonomik ve teknolojik açıdan halen Batı'ya bağımlıdırlar.

Anna Stavrianakis'e göre, bu tür ilişkilerin altında yatan neden, üçüncü dünya ülkelerindeki elitlerin devlet kurma sürecinin bir parçası olarak silah transferleri yoluyla desteklenmesidir. Onun bakış açısına göre, üçüncü dünya ülkeleri resmen bağımsızlıklarını kazanmış olsalar da bu süreç devam ediyor. Silah transferlerini bağımlılık ilişkileri açısından incelemek, üçüncü dünya ülkelerinin dış ilişkiler bağlamında karşılaştıkları sorunları anlamak için elzemdir. Üçüncü dünya ülkelerinde bile sınırlı sayıda da olsa silah üretmeyi başaran aktörler var. Ancak konunun sınırlandırılması açısından burada tartışılacak olanlar, Keith Krause'nin sınıflandırmasına göre en üst düzeyde teknolojiyle silah üreten devletler ve bunların ikinci ve üçüncü kademe silah üretici devletler ile ilişkileri olacaktır. Tarihsel olarak, bu birinci kademe devletler uzun yıllardır silah üretiyorlar. Bu ülkeler ekonomik kaygı duymadan silah üretebilir ve ihraç edebilirler. Demek ki Krause'un da belirttiği gibi bu devletlerin silah sanayii üretim ve işleyişini sürdürmek için ihracata bağlı olmasa da ürettikleri silahlara olan talep onları dünyanın önde gelen ihracatçıları arasına sokacaktır. Başta Amerika, ancak kısmen de olsa Rusya, Fransa, Almanya, İngiltere gibi bunu başarabilen ve kendi kendine yeten devletler bu çalışmanın kapsamını oluşturmaktadır. Ancak bu çalışma, birinci kademe üretici konumunda yer alan ve silah transferlerini bir dış politika aracı olarak kullanan ABD ile sınırlandırılmıştır.

Bu çalışmanın temel amacı, 16. yüzyılda gelişmiş ve azgelişmiş ülkeler arasında ortaya çıkan bağımlılık ilişkilerinin farklı biçimlerde kendini gösterdiğini ve bunun halen silah transferleri üzerinden devam ettiğini göstermeye çalışmaktadır. Christian Catrina daha önce silah transferleri ve bağımlılık kavramları üzerine kapsamlı bir çalışma yürütmüştür. Ancak teorik bir çerçeveden ele almadığı için günümüzde üçüncü dünya ülkelerinin karşı karşıya olduğu dış politika ikilemini anlamakta yetersiz kalmaktadır.

Yine bu konuda David Kinsella ve John Sislin tarafından benzer çalışmalar yapılmıştır ancak teorik çerçeve bu çalışmalarda da mevcut değildir. Bu nedenle geçmişte yaşananlar ile bugün yaşananlar arasında bağlantı kurulabilmesi için tezin konusu dünya-sistem teorisi (bazen dünya-sistem analizi olarak da anılır) perspektifiyle teorik bir zemine oturtulmaya çalışılmıştır. Bu teori 1970'lerde Immanuel Wallerstein tarafından ortaya atılmıştır. Bu çalışmada güçlü savunma sanayilerine sahip gelişmiş ülkelerin, üçüncü dünya ülkeleriyle olan bağımlılık ilişkilerini silah transferi yoluyla kendi dış politika çıkarlarına nasıl bir araç olarak kullandıkları dünya-sistem teorisi yardımıyla gösterilmeye çalışılmaktadır.

Bu çalışmanın odak noktasında “Neden büyük silah tedarik eden devletler bir bağımlılık ilişkisi yaratarak silah transferini bir dış politika aracı olarak kullanıyorlar?” sorusuna aranan cevap yatmaktadır; bu nedenle çalışma boyunca bu sorunun cevabını bulmak için hem birincil hem de ikincil kaynaklardan elde edilen veriler incelenmiştir. Gelişmiş ve azgelişmiş dünya arasındaki bağımlılık ilişkisinin altında yatan sebep, silah ithal eden ülke ile ticari bir bağ kurmak mı yoksa o ülke üzerinde siyasi bir etki yaratmak mı? Gelişmiş ülkeler, silah teçhizatı ihraç ederek üçüncü dünya ülkelerinin silahlı kuvvetlerini etkileyebilir mi? Silah transferleri nedeniyle kurulan bağımlılık ilişkisi Wallerstein'ın merkez, çevre ve yarı çevre sınıflandırmasına uygun mu? Aslında bu çalışmanın amacı, yukarıda birbiri ile bağlantılı olarak sorulan sorularla aynıdır. Bu noktadan hareketle bu çalışmanın bağımlı ve bağımsız değişkenleri şu şekilde özetlenebilir; bir ülkenin silah ithalat hacmi bağımsız değişkeni oluştururken, o ülkenin dış politika kararlarının silah ihracatçısı ülke tarafından manipüle edilmesi bağımlı değişkeni oluşturmaktadır.

Bu araştırma, gelişmiş ve üçüncü dünya ülkeleri arasında silah transferleri yoluyla merkez-çevre benzeri bir yapının nasıl ortaya çıktığını ortaya koymayı amaçlamaktadır. Gelişmiş ülkelere üçüncü dünya ülkelerine lisanslı üretim ve ortak üretim yöntemleriyle teknoloji transferi, yarı-çevre tipi ülkelerin oluşmasına yol açsa da bu ülkelerin kendi kendilerine yeterlik düzeyine ulaşmaları mümkün görünmemektedir. Özetle bu tez, silah transferlerinin merkez, çevre ve yarı-çevre gibi

lkelerin oluřunu zerindeki etkisinden dolayı ihracat yapan lkeler tarafından silah transferinin dıř politikada nasıl bir ara olarak kullanıldıđı ortaya koymaya alıřmıřtır.

Dolayısıyla tezde cevabını bulmak iin sorulan temel arařtırma sorusu řudur: Byk silah tedarik eden devletler neden silah transferi yoluyla bađımlılık iliřkisi kurmak isterler? Bu ana arařtırma sorusunu tamamlamak iin ařađıdaki ikincil soruların ařađıdaki řekilde sorulması yol gsterici olacaktır:

İkincil Sorular
• Silah transferi nc dnya lkelerinin devlet kurma abalarına yardımcı olur mu?
• Silah transferinde nc dnya elitlerinin rol nedir?
• nc dnya lkeleri neden silah ithal etmektedirler?
• Smrge dneminde silah transferinin rol oldu mu?
• Sođuk Savař yıllarında silah transferi yapmanın arkasındaki ana motivasyon neydi?
• Savunma sanayilerinin kresel olarak blnmesinin nedenleri nelerdir?
• Savunma sanayilerinin kresel blnmesinin kapitalist dnya ekonomisinin srdrlebilirliđi zerindeki etkisi nedir?

Buraya kadar genel olarak deđinilen ve ilerleyen blmlerde ayrıntılı olarak ele alınan geliřmiř ve geliřmekte olan lkeler arasındaki silah transferlerinin (eřitsiz mbadele nedeniyle) tek taraflı bir bađımlılık iliřkisine neden olduđu sylenbilir. Bu aıdan bakıldıđında savunma sanayii yeterince geliřmemiř veya hi geliřmemiř lkeler gvenlik ihtiyalarını karřılamak iin ABD, Rusya, Fransa, İngiltere gibi geliřmiř lkelere bařvurmaktadır. Bu nedenle, nc dnya lkelerinin byk bir ođunluđu, silahlı kuvvetlerine gerekli tehizatı sađlamak iin silah ithal etmek zorundadır. Bu durum, evre lkelerini bađımlılık ya da yarı-bađımlılık durumunda bırakmaktadır.

Geliřmiř devletler bu durumu fırsata evirmiř ve gemiřte smrgecilik yoluyla kurdukları tek taraflı iliřkilerini srdrmek iin silah transferlerini kullanmaktadırlar. Diđer bir deyiřle, katma deđerini yksek ve ulusal gvenlik aısından hayati neme

sahip askeri savunma malzemelerinin sadece birkaç gelişmiş ülkeden tedarik edilmesi, savaş ve iç çatışma gibi dönemlerde ithalatçı veya alıcı ülkeleri zor durumda bırakabilmektedir. Silah transferine duyulan ihtiyaç nedeniyle merkez-çevre benzeri bir yapının ortaya çıkmasının temel nedeni, katma değeri yüksek savunma sanayi ürünleri ithal eden üçüncü dünya ülkelerinin ya finansal olarak zor durumda bırakılması ya da kaynaklarının büyük bir bölümünü silah temin etmek için ayırmasıdır. Bu noktadan hareketle, bir ülke silah ithalatına ne kadar bağımlıysa, dış politikasında da o kadar manipülasyona açık olduğu ileri sürülebilir.

Bu çalışma, yukarıda verilen hipotezin test edilmesi ve ana araştırma sorusuna cevap bulabilmek için üç ana başlıktan meydana gelmektedir ve bunlar sırasıyla: Kuramsal Çerçeve, Silah Transferi Bağımlılığına Giden Süreç ve Silah İthalatına Bağımlı Olmanın Dış Politika Sonuçları. Çalışmanın “Kuramsal Çerçeve” bölümünde diğer bölümleri daha iyi anlamak için Immanuel Wallerstein’ın Dünya Sistemi teorisi silah ya da askeri malzeme transferinin dış politikada bir enstrüman olarak kullanılıp kullanılmadığını açıklamak için kullanılmıştır. Bu çerçevede silah transferinin kaynağını oluşturan kapitalist ilişkileri anlayabilmek için ilk olarak tarihsel bir arka plan verilmiştir. Coğrafi keşiflerden sanayi devrimine oradan da silah üretim sanayilerinin oluşuna kadar olan süreç dünya sistemi çerçevesinde ortaya konulduktan sonra dünya sistemi teorisinin tanımı yapılmıştır. Dünya Sistemini merkez, yarı-çevre ve çevre olarak üç kısımda inceleyen Wallerstein’ın kapitalist dünya ekonomi sistemine vurgu yapılmıştır. Burada kapitalist ilişkiler sonucu üretim araçlarını elinde bulunduran merkez ülkelerin silah üretim teknolojisi tekeline nasıl sahip olduğu açıklanmıştır. Sömürge haline getirilen çevre ülkelerin merkez ülkelere ucuz ham madde sağladığından ve bunun karşılığında da katma değeri yüksek ürünler satın aldığından bahsedilmiştir. Bunun sonucu olarak merkez ülkeler ile çevre ülkeler arasında eşitsiz bir değişimin olduğu sonucuna ulaşılmıştır. Daha sonra “Modernleşme Teorisine Eleştirel Bir Yaklaşım” başlığı altında ise hem bağımlılık hem de dünya sistemi teorisinin modernleşme teorisine karşı olduğundan bahsedilmiştir. Walt W. Rostow tarafından beş kısıma ayrılan toplum sınıflandırmasının üçüncü dünya ülkelerinin gelişme süreci ile uyumlu olmadığı ortaya konulmuştur.

Çalışmanın üçüncü bölümü olan “Silah Transferi Bağımlılığına Giden Süreç” başlığı altında ise silah transferi bağımlılığına neden olan faktörler ele alınmıştır. Bu süreç üçüncü dünya ülkelerinin Batılı ülkelere bağımsızlıklarını kazanmalarından sonrası ile başlatılmıştır. Sömürge yönetimlerden yeni kurtulan ülkelerdeki devlet-kurma çabaları ve bunun silah transferi ile olan ilişkisine değinilmiştir. “Güvenliğin Özelleştirilmesi” başlığı altında ise devlet-kurma sürecinin güvenliğin özel şirketlere teslim edilmesi nedeniyle nasıl zarar gördüğü tartışılmıştır. Daha sonra paralı asker ve Özel Askeri ve Güvenlik Şirketleri’nin çevre ülkelerde Batılı ülkelerin ekonomik ve siyasi amaçlarına hizmet ettiğinden bahsedilmiştir. “Üçüncü Dünyada İstikrarsızlığı Sürdürmede Silah Transferinin Rolü” başlığı altında ise yine önceki bölümle ilişkili olarak Batılı merkez ülkelerin hem silah transferi hem de Özel Askeri ve Güvenlik Şirketleri eli ile çevre ülkelerdeki istikrarsızlaştırıcı faaliyetlerine değinilmiştir.

“İç Çatışma” başlığı altında ise Soğuk Savaş döneminde Amerika ve Sovyetler Birliği tarafından sağlanan silahların Soğuk Savaş’ın sona ermesi ile birlikte elde arta kalan silahların çevre ülkelere transferinin yasadışı transfere dönüştüğü ele alınmıştır. İsyancı örgütlerin yasadışı olarak eline geçirdiği silahlar neticesinde ortaya çıkan iç çatışmanın devlet-kurma sürecini baltaladığı sonucuna ulaşılmıştır. “Askeri Elitlerin Rolü” başlığı altında ise çevre ülkelerdeki bu elitlerin Batılı maden arama şirketleri ile silah transferi karşılığında yaptıkları anlaşmaların sömürü düzeninin devamındaki rolüne değinilmiştir. “Askeri Darbeler” başlığı altında ise merkez ve çevre ülkeler arasında silah transferi ile başlayan etkileşimin askeri personellerin merkez ülkelerde eğitim alması ile daha da pekiştiğinden bahsedilmiştir. Devlet-kurma sürecini tamamlayamamış çevre ülkelere silah transferi yapmanın askeri elitlerin gücünü artıracığına bunun da askeri bir darbeye zemin hazırlayacağından bahsedilmiştir.

Üçüncü bölümün son kısmı “Silah İthalatının Ardındaki Güdüler” başlığı altında ise silah ithal etmenin üç nedeninden bahsedilmiştir. Bunlardan birincisi bir ülkenin kendi silahını üretme kapasitesi olmadığı için silah ithal etmek zorunda kalmasıdır. İkincisi, tek bir tedarikçi ülkeye bağımlı olmak istemeyen çevre ülkelerin tedarikçi sayısını artırmak istemesi nedeniyle silah ithal etmesidir. Üçüncüsü ise ambargoya veya ambargo tehdidinde maruz kalan çevre ülkelerin silah üretiminde özerklik kazanmak

istememesi nedeniyle silah ithal etmesidir. Böylece silah üretim teknolojisini de ithal eden üçüncü dünya ülkelerinin merkez ülkeler ile çeşitli ortak üretim ilişkilerine girdiği sonucuna ulaşılmıştır.

Dördüncü bölümde ise silah transferinin dış politikada bir araç olarak nasıl kullanıldığı 19. yüzyılın ortalarından başlanarak günümüze kadar olan olaylar incelenerek açıklanmaya çalışılmıştır. Bu amaçla ilk olarak “19. yüzyılda Etiyopya için rekabet” başlığı altında batılı silah üreten İngiltere, Fransa ve İtalya gibi ülkelerin Etiyopya’ya silah transfer etmek suretiyle koloni elde çabaları incelenmiştir. Daha sonra “Balkanlar'da Silah Transferinin Rolü” başlığı altında Osmanlı Devleti’nin zayıflaması ile Balkanlardaki topraklarında yaşayan Hristiyan prensliklere Fransa, İngiltere ve Rusya gibi devletlerin silah tedarik etmesi ve dolayısıyla bu toplulukların isyan edip bağımsızlıklarını kazanmalarında silah transferlerinin rolü ele alınmıştır. “Alman Silahlarının Osmanlı İmparatorluğuna Transferi” başlığı altında ise sömürge yarışına geç katılan Almanya’nın Otto von Bismarck ile başlayan Osmanlıya silah transferinin etkilerinin dış politikadaki etkileri incelenmiştir.

Batılı ülkelere bağımsızlığını kazanan Afrika, Asya ve Latin Amerika’daki ülkelere sömürge zamanlarda bağımsız olmadıkları için egemen devletlerde görülen devlet kurumları oluşmamıştır. Sömürgeci güçler tarafından yıllar süren ekonomik, politik, kültürel ve dinsel sömürü faaliyetleri sonrası devlet ve millet olma bilincini kaybeden bahsedilen kıtalardaki üçüncü dünya ülkeleri her şeyi sıfırdan inşa sürecine girmişlerdir. Ancak gelişmiş batılı devletler bu sömürge ülkelere ayrılmadan önce etnik ve mezhepsel farklılıkları dikkate almadan çizdikleri jeopolitik sınırlar neticesinde patlamaya hazır onlarca yeni ülke ortaya çıkmasına neden olmuşlardır. Tüm farklılıklarına rağmen bu ülkelere tek bir millet olma bilinci oluşamamasının da Birinci Dünya Savaşı yıllarında gizlice oluşturulan Sykes-Picot antlaşmasının önemli bir yeri vardır. Batılı sömürgeci güçler tarafından koloni haline getirilen bu ülkeler böl parçala yönet mantığı çerçevesinde olabildiğince etnik temelli küçük parçalara bölünmüşlerdir.

Kapitalist sistemin işlemediği ve artı değer sürekli olarak batılı ülkelere doğru akması için istikrarsız, baskıcı ve otoriter rejimlerin var olması gerekmektedir. Bu üçüncü dünya ülkelerinde yönetimi elinde bulunduran otoriter elitler artık onu kaybetmemek için her yola başvurumaktadırlar. Sözde demokrasiyi desteklediğini belirten batılı demokratik devletler söz konusu üçüncü dünya ülkeleri olduğu zaman darbe rejimlerini desteklemekte ve insan haklarını askıya alarak silah transferlerine devam etmektedirler. Batılı gelişmiş devletlerin demokratik olmayan veya demokratik kurumların iyice gelişmediği ülkelere gönderdikleri silahlar, baskıcı diktatör rejimler tarafından insan hakları dikkate alınmadan keyfi bir biçimde kullanılmaktadır.

Batılı sömürgeci güçlerden bağımsızlıklarını yeni kazanan üçüncü dünya ülkelerinde devlet-inşa etme süreci devletin ve içinde yaşayan halkın varlığını korumakla görevli güvenlik güçlerinin özelleştirilmesi ile baltalanmıştır. Dolayısıyla devletin en temel ve en önemli görevlerinden biri olan güvenlik özel teşebbüslerin eline bırakılmıştır. Bu nedenle, Weberci anlamda devletin güç kullanma tekeli elinde bulundurma yetkisi özel güvenlik şirketlerine teslim edilmiştir. Çoğunlukla üçüncü dünya ülkelerinde faaliyet gösteren Batı menşeli doğal kaynak ve maden işletmelerinin güvenliğini sağlamakla görevlendirilen bu özel güvenlik şirketleri geldikleri metropol ülkenin siyasi ve stratejik çıkarları doğrultusunda ülke yönetimine askeri darbe yapmak, muhalefete doğrudan destek sağlamak ya da çatışmalara taraf olma yoluyla devletin iç işlerine müdahale edebilmektedirler.

Tarihi olarak incelendiğinde paralı asker olarak adlandırılan grupların geçmişi çok eskiye dayanmaktadır. Yani sömürge dönemi öncesinde de paralı askerlik vardı ve kullanılmaktaydı. Örneğin, Fransız Yabancı Lejyonu veya İngiliz Gurkalar paralı asker olarak kullanılmaktaydı. Bu paralı askerler genellikle en az gelişmiş ülkelerin halklarından oluşmaktaydı. Ve kiralayan ülkenin milli ordusunun yanı sıra görev yapmaktaydı. Ancak, İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nın sona ermesi ile birlikte sömürgeci güçlerden bağımsızlığını kazanmaya başlayan ülkelere paralı askerlik farklı bir anlam kazanmıştı. Savaşın son bulması nedeniyle terhis edilen binlerce eski rütbeli asker paralı askerlik için aday olmuşlardır. Uzun yıllar Batı'nın sömürgesi olarak

kalmış bu üçüncü dünya ülkelerinin kendilerine ait düzenli bir ordusu olmayınca ya da güvenlik güçleri zayıf olunca bu tür paralı askerlere ihtiyaç duyulmuştur.

Buna göre, bağımsızlık sonrası oluşan devletlerde yönetime gelen otoriter rejimler ülke güvenliğinden ziyade kendi güvenliklerini ön plana aldıkları için en fazla silah ithalatını da bu ülkeler yapmaktadır. Bu durum Batılı ülkelerinde çıkarına olmuştur. Çünkü, batılı ülkelerin endüstrisi için ihtiyaç duyduğu petrol, doğal gaz, altın, elmas gibi doğal kaynak yönünden zengin ülkelerde sömürü faaliyetlerinin devam edebilmesi için ülke yönetiminde batının çıkarlarını savunan siyasi liderlerin var olması gerekmektedir. Bu liderler hem kendi güvenliğini hem de batılı şirketlerin maden işletmelerinin güvenliği sağlamak için özel güvenlik şirketleri kiralamaktadır. Bu özel güvenlik şirketleri hem ülkede otoriter yönetime karşı oluşabilecek tehditleri bastırmakta hem de maden işletmelerinin güvenliğini sağlamaktadırlar. Bir anlamda kısır döngü olarak da adlandırılabilir silah transferi karşılığında ham madde ithalatı ve dolayısıyla etnik silahlı çatışmalar nedeniyle güvenliğe duyulan ihtiyacın artması ve bunun da özel güvenlik şirketleri eliyle karşılanması batı yanlısı otoriter rejimlerin iktidarda kalmasına neden olmuştur.

Silahlı kuvvetler ile bağımsız başka bir ülkenin topraklarına rızası olmadan askeri müdahale de bulunmak o ülkenin egemenlik haklarının ihlali anlamına gelmektedir. Bu nedenle, uluslararası toplumun, özellikle United Nations, tepkisini üzerlerine çekmek istemeyen eski batılı sömürgeci güçler, Afrika, Asya ve Latin Amerika gibi ülkelerde yoğun faaliyet gösteren maden çıkarma şirketlerinin güvenliğini sağlamak adına batı menşeli özel güvenlik şirketleri kiralamaktadır. Bu şirketlerin bir diğer görevi de aynı zamanda kendi ülkesinin güvenliğini sağlamaktan yoksun yerel hükümetin de güvenliğini sağlamak için kullanılmaktır. Batılı ülkeler tarafından üçüncü dünya ülkelerinin milli bir ordu oluşturmalarına yardım etmek amacıyla da ön plana çıkan bu şirketler yerli askeri kuvvetlere eğitim, danışmanlık ve askeri ekipman temin etmek suretiyle de yardım etmektedir.

Batılı gelişmiş ülkeler tarafından yapılan silah transferlerinin bu noktadaki rolüne değinilecek olursa, kontrolsüz bir şekilde üçüncü dünya ülkelerine yapılan silah

transferleri ile kabileler ve etnik gruplar yasa dışı bir şekilde silahlandırılmakta ve zaten sınır sorunları yaşayan bu ülkelerde iç çatışma tetiklenmektedir. İçerideki siyasi kargaşayı gerekçe göstererek güvenliğin olmadığını öne süren eski sömürgeci güçler, özel güvenlik şirketleri ve askeri elitlerin de yardımıyla, ülkedeki olayların bastırılması için daha çok silah transferi yapmaktadırlar.

Çoğu bağımsızlığını yeni kazanmış olan bu üçüncü dünya ülkelerinde güç kullanma tekelinin devlet elinde olmaması ve güvenliğin de özelleştirilmesi isyancı, ayrılıkçı ya da muhalif grupların kendi güvenliklerini kendilerinin sağlamasına neden olmuştur. Devlet-kurma sürecini tamamlayamamış bu üçüncü dünya ülkelerinde güvenliğin özelleştirilmesi ile birlikte etnik ve dini gruplar arasındaki anlaşmazlıklar çatışmalar yoluyla çözülmek istenmiştir.

Silah transferlerinin dış politikada bir enstrüman olarak kullanılması ile ilgili yapılan çalışmalar genellikle süreci soğuk savaş yılları ve sonrası dönemleri ele alarak başlatsa da silah sanayinin oluşması ve dünya çapına yayılması 19. Yüzyılın başlarına kadar geri götürülebilir. Çünkü Batı Avrupa'da bilimsel ve teknolojik gelişmeler sonrası gerçekleşen emperyalist yayılmacılık ve sonrasında Sanayi Devrimi ile seri üretime geçilmesi silah transferine ve savaşlara da farklı bir boyut kazandırmıştır. Kapitalist üretim şeklinin hız kazandığı bu dönemden silah endüstrisi de payını almıştır.

İtalya ve Fransa gibi sömürgeci güçlerin Etiyopya'ya silah transfer etmek suretiyle nasıl liderler ve kabileler arası güç mücadelelerini tetiklediğine ve bundan siyasi olarak nasıl faydalandıklarına değinilmiştir. Buna bağlı olarak batılı güçlerin Etiyopya üzerinde etkilerini artırmaya çalıştıkları görülmektedir. Bu nedenle, Etiyopya, silah transferlerinin 19. yüzyılda sömürgeci amaçlarla kullanılmasına güzel bir örnektir. Sömürge döneminde Afrika kıtasında batılı güçlerden bağımsız kalabilmeyi başarabilmiş olan Etiyopya'da silah transferlerinin önemli bir etkisi vardır.

Soğuk Savaş öncesi dönemde de bahsedildiği gibi sanayileşme sürecini tamamlamış batı Avrupalı ülkeler Üçüncü Dünya ülkeleri ile kurdukları bağımlılık ilişkilerini teknolojik anlamda üstünlüklerinden faydalanarak devam ettirmektedirler.

Dolayısıyla, katma değeri yüksek ürünlerin üretimi için gerekli olan üretim araçlarını elinde bulunduran Batılı emperyalist güçler yüksek teknoloji ve nitelikli insan kaynağı gerektiren silah sistemlerini geliştirmekte olan 3. Dünya ülkelerine transfer ederek bağımlılık ilişkilerinin devamını sağlamaktadırlar. Kendi imkanları ile bu silah sistemlerini üretmekten yoksun çoğu yeni bağımsızlığını kazanmış bu 3. Dünya ülkeleri güvenlik ihtiyaçlarının karşılanması için mecburen gelişmiş batılı ülkelere başvurmuşlardır. Immanuel Wallerstein'nın dünya sistemi analizinde de belirttiği gibi yüksek katma değere sahip ürünler üretebilen, nitelikli iş gücünü kendine çekebilen ve sermaye yoğun iş kollarına sahip ülkeler merkez olarak adlandırılırken, yetenekli iş gücü kaynağına sahip olmayan, emek yoğun çalışan ve genellikle ham madde ihracatı ile gelir sağlayan ülkeler çevre olarak adlandırılmaktadır. Bu durum yani çevre ülkelerin ham madde ihraç ederek karşılığında gelişmiş merkez ülkelere yüksek teknoloji ürünleri satın alması merkez ve çevre ülkeler arasındaki eşitsizliğin günümüzde de devam etmesine neden olmaktadır. Ancak, hem merkez ülkelere ithal edilen ürünler hem de ulaşım teknolojisindeki gelişmelerden dolayı bazı çevre ülkeler zamanla yarı-çevre statüsü kazanabilmektedirler. Bu ülkeler bir anlamda merkez ve çevre arasında arabuluculuk işlevi görürler ve kapitalist dünya ekonomisinin devamını sağlamada önemli bir yere sahiptirler. Küresel ölçekte eşitsizliğin sürdürülebilmesi için meydana getirilen bu merkez, çevre ve yarı- çevre ayrımı dünya genelinde hiyerarşik bir yapı meydana getirmiştir. Bu hiyerarşik yapı da global iş bölümüne sebep olmuştur.

Çalışmanın giriş kısmında ortaya atılan hipotezi test etmek için büyük silah tedarik edici devletlerin (bu çalışmada Amerika) üçüncü dünya ülkelere yaptıkları silah transferleri incelenmiştir. “Üçüncü dünya ülkelerinin Amerika'dan yaptıkları silah ithalatının miktarına bağlı olarak dış politika kararlarının Amerika tarafından etkilendiği sonucuna ulaşılmış” ve böylelikle hipotez doğrulanmıştır. Toplanan nicel ve nitel veriler yardımıyla da ana araştırma sorusu cevaplanmıştır. Buna göre kapitalist sömürü ilişkilerinin devamı silah transferine bağlı olduğundan, büyük silah tedarik eden devletler, yani ABD, silah satışı üzerinden bir bağımlılık ilişkisi kurmak istemektedir. Böylece bu çalışmanın ana araştırma sorusuna cevap verilmiş oldu. Bu bağlamda, bağımsız değişkenin (üçüncü dünya ülkesinin silah ithalat hacmi) bağımlı

değişkeni (Amerika'nın ithalatçı ülkenin dış politika kararlarına etkisi) açıklamada başarılı olduğu söylenebilir.

Bu çalışmanın araştırma sorusu ve hipotezi başından itibaren Wallerstein'nın dünya sistemi hipotezi çerçevesinde açıklanmaya çalışılmıştır. Büyük silah tedarik edici devlet olan Amerika bu teorinin ön gördüğü şekilde hareket etmiş ve üçüncü dünya ülkelerine yaptığı silah transferlerini dış politikada bir araç olarak kullanmıştır. Bu nedenle, özellikle Soğuk Savaş yıllarında Türkiye ve İsrail örneklerinde olduğu gibi ABD silah ambargosu veya ambargo tehdidiyle üçüncü dünya ülkelerinin dış politika kararlarında değişiklik yapabilmiştir. Üçüncü dünya ülkelerine yapılan silah transferleri (hibe, kredi ya da satış yoluyla) göstermektedir ki ABD bu transferleri dış politikasının önemli bir unsuru olarak görmektedir.

Bu doğrultuda İkinci Dünya Savaşı öncesi İngiltere, Fransa, Almanya ve İtalya gibi devletlerin üçüncü dünya ülkelere silah transferini dış politikada bir enstrüman olarak kullanmasını Soğuk Savaş ve sonrası dönemde ABD'de görüyoruz. Amerika savunma sanayindeki teknolojik üstünlüğüne dayanarak çevre ülkelere yaptığı silah transferlerini siyasi şartlara bağlamış ve alıcı ülkenin bu şartlara uymaması durumunda silah ambargosu ya da ambargo tehdidi ile cezalandırmıştır. ABD'nin üçüncü dünya ülkelere silah transfer etmesinin bir diğer nedeninin de ekonomik olduğu tezin araştırma bulgularından bir diğeridir. Nitekim, Amerika AWACS uçaklarını Suudi Arabistan'a satma kararını alırken hem siyasi hem de ekonomik çıkarlarını göz önünde bulundurmıştır.

Wallerstein'nın merkez, yarı çevre ve çevre konseptine uygun olarak üçüncü dünya ülkeleri ile Amerikan savunma sanayi şirketleri arasındaki teknoloji ve kapasite farklılıkları birinci, ikinci ve üçüncü kademe silah üreticilerinin oluşmasına neden olmuştur. Özellikle Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde tehdit algısının değişmesi, savunma bütçelerinin azalmasına ve buna ilaveten, büyük savunma sistemlerinin yüksek ARGE yatırımlarını gerektirmesi birçok ikinci ve üçüncü kademe silah üreticilerini ABD ile ortak girişimlere itmiştir. Ortak üretim, ortak geliştirme, lisanslı üretim, ortak girişim

gibi projelere dahil olan ikinci ve üçüncü kademe üreticiler bu seferde teknoloji transferi ve kritik parça transferleri açısından Amerika'ya bağımlı hale gelmiştir.

Özetle, Amerika ve diğer silah üretici devletler arasındaki teknoloji ve kapasite farklılıkları ikinci ve üçüncü kademe silah üreticilerini bir ya da birkaç yönden ABD'ye bağımlı hale getirmiştir. Bu bağımlılık ilişkisi nedeniyle ABD kendi çıkarlarına uygun olarak üçüncü dünya ülkelerinin dış politika kararlarını etkileyebilmektedir.

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