

THE IMPACT OF FAR-RIGHT PRESENCE ON THE ROLL-CALL VOTING  
BEHAVIOR OF MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT: EVIDENCE FROM THE  
GERMAN BUNDESTAG

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BEHAVIOR OF MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT: EVIDENCE FROM THE  
GERMAN BUNDESTAG**

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## ABSTRACT

### THE IMPACT OF FAR-RIGHT PRESENCE ON THE ROLL-CALL VOTING BEHAVIOR OF MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT: EVIDENCE FROM THE GERMAN BUNDESTAG

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The impact of far-right party presence in national legislatures on the MPs have attracted the interest of scholars for decades. However, the far-right impact on the roll-call voting behavior of members of parliament had stayed as an area that was largely unexplored. In this study I apply correlational methods to discover the far-right impact on the patterns of cooperative voting behavior among the members of the German Bundestag. Through the novel association of the social-psychological phenomenon the “common enemy effect”, I empirically establish that the entry of the far-right party into the German Bundestag had united the MPs against the far-right party and increased the instances of comprehensive cooperation between parties in the roll-call votes.

**Keywords:** legislative cooperation, far-right parties, MP voting behavior, elite behavior, common enemy effect

## ÖZ

### AŞIRI SAĞ PARTİ MEVCUDİYETİNİN VEKİLLERİN YOKLAMA USULÜ OYLAMALARDA OY VERME DAVRANIŞLARI ÜZERİNDEKİ ETKİSİ: ALMANYA FEDERAL PARLAMENTOSUNDAN DELİLLER

ÖZBİLGİÇ, Batur

Yüksek Lisans, Avrupa Çalışmaları Bölümü

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Aşırı sağ parti mevcudiyetinin diğer partilerin vekillerine olan etkisi geçmişte araştırmacıların çokça ilgisini çekmiş bir konudur. Ancak aşırı sağ parti varlığının vekillerin yoklama usulü oylamalarda oy verme davranışları üzerindeki etkisi literatürde yeterli derecede keşfedilmemiş bir alan olarak kalmıştır. Bu çalışmada korelasyonel metotlar kullanarak aşırı sağ parti mevcudiyetinin Almanya Federal Parlamentosu üyelerinin oy verme davranışları üzerindeki etkisini inceliyorum. Temeli sosyal psikolojide bulunan ortak düşman etkisi fenomeni ile oy verme davranışı arasında alışılmışın dışında bir bağlantı kurarak aşırı sağ parti mevcudiyetinin vekilleri aşırı sağ karşısında birleştirdiğini ve aşırı sağ partinin parlamentoya girişini takiben diğer partiler arasında kapsamlı iş birliğinin arttığını ampirik olarak tesis ediyorum.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** yasama iş birliği, aşırı sağ partiler, vekillerin oy verme davranışı, seçkin davranışı, ortak düşman etkisi

To my dear family and my beautiful nephew Giray



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## **LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS**

AfD: Alternative für Deutschland

ANOVA: Analysis of Variance

MP: Member of Parliament

RCV: Roll-Call Vote

## **CHAPTER 1**

### **INTRODUCTION**

This chapter provided the roadmap for this study. Firstly, the background for the study was provided, and the contextual framework was constructed to enable the readers to position the expectations and the findings of the study. Then the purpose of the study was explained and the research question which guided the study was provided. According to the research question, the two hypotheses which were tested in this study were provided. Finally, the significance of the study was evaluated.

#### **1.1. Background and the Contextual Framework**

The modern European political space is no stranger to far-right movements. In fact, it would be a fair statement to say that the endeavors of the European far-right fascist movements led to large-scale consequences for the whole world. Still, after a short intermission, the far-right parties have reappeared in Western European democracies. However, the common pattern regarding this reemergence was that they were met with significant resistance from the established system parties (Von Beyme, 2013). These new parties for the large part of their existence were continuously ostracized and isolated and were left out of coalition arrangements with the exception of some rare cases in Austria and Italy (Zaslave, 2004). Nonetheless, these patterns in party politics and legislative activities had not kept them from having a significant impact on the political space and from attracting a notable proportion of the electorate. Their relative success in elections and their influence on the political and legal regimes of these countries have led to the revitalization of the research field that is interested in the mechanisms behind their success and their influence on the political space (Abou-Chadi & Krause, 2020; Minkenberg, 2001; Mudde, 2013; Van Spanje, 2010; Bale, 2003). This study was also interested in

exploring the influence of far-right party presence on the legislative processes at the national level.

Still, this study worked to narrow down the aperture even more than Western European democracies and focused on an interesting case that was Germany. The Federal Republic of Germany provides a fascinating case study for those who are interested in discovering the far-right impact on the political space, due to its particular background and the existence of a considerable reaction to the success of far-right parties. Thus, to understand the patterns which have emerged through the procedure of this study, one needs to understand the particular properties of the German political space which may explain the characteristics and the magnitude of the response to the far-right from established parties of the federal system. Given its horrific experience with the Nazis, there emerged a prominent negative perception and prejudice against far-right movements both in the German public and especially in the political parties of the system, which made the journey of potential far-right movements and parties perpetually uneasy, and the political and legal responses to them particularly strong. This perspective is demonstrated in the high degree of sensitivity in Germany's institutions that are concerned with national security and justice, against the extreme right-wing ideology and the continuous persecution of its representations in the German public space. After 1945, the far-right parties in Germany continued to exist, however, these parties were relatively less successful than their counterparts in other European countries, although, Germany was also not an example of a country with a lack of a significant far-right movement or party in the political space (Backes, 2018). Germany's particular history with far-right parties can also be defined as a history of containment. The established political parties in Germany have been able to contain and isolate the far-right through policies such as but not limited to a *cordon sanitaire*, or *Ausrenzung* in German, which means exclusion. The political arrangement includes not cooperating with far-right parties on neither local nor the national level, and not cooperating with them in terms of partnering for coalitions or ad-hoc cooperation on legislative procedures. However, there are more ways to isolate far-right parties that were present in Germany, for instance, sustained negative press and powerful social protest which coupled with



the chronic lack of coalition options have led to predictable patterns of infighting, radicalization and organizational decay in the far-right parties throughout post-war German history such as the National Democratic Party, the *Republikaner*, the German People's Union and the Schill Party to name the relatively successful ones (Art, 2018). Still, as we move onto the far-right party as the subject to this study that is the Alternative for Germany (AfD), the party that had become relatively successful in the 2010s and still operates today, a brief exploration as to why the far-right parties are particularly appealing in Germany in previous years, is necessary. Following the so-called Syrian refugee crisis which involved millions of Syrian citizens seeking refuge from the civil war to neighboring countries and then eventually attempting to migrate over to Europe, the government of Germany has taken some bold steps in order to partly alleviate this issue. Under the Merkel administration, Germany had decided to welcome, in total, more than a million Syrian migrants, a number that is unprecedented in Western Europe in recent history. These decisions are hypothesized to have created tensions in the public and political space in Germany, and may have created an anti-immigration sentiment in a significant proportion of the public that in turn, may have boosted the emergence and the endeavors of the AfD concerning electoral success and political influence.

Let us now move onto introducing the contemporary far-right parties which have emerged in Europe in recent years and the specific ideological and political properties which make them the way they are. Firstly, we need to begin by pointing to the characteristics of these parties which position them as a part of the right-wing political party family. The fundamental political and social stance of the far-right like other right-wing parties is political conservatism, an ideology which explains the current state of any society as a continuous regression from an idealized past. The far-right parties are similar to other conservative parties in various ways, they emphasize a somewhat ethno-nationalist view of a society, they are guided by a perpetual threat perception which may degrade the society, and they have a sense of an idealized way of life that needs to be protected from rapid social change. Also, from a social-psychological perspective, conservatives score high on fear of threat and loss, they are intolerant of ambiguities, and they score lower on openness to

experience. All in all, the main social-psychological characteristics of political conservatism are resistance to change and the justification of social inequality which may be pointing to a framework of motivated cognitive mechanisms to manage uncertainty and threat perception (Jost et al., 2018). Still, as mentioned before, there are some key ideological and political characteristics which define the contemporary far-right parties in Europe. The first and most important theme here is immigration. The contemporary far-right parties in Europe may reasonably be defined as single-issue parties, and that single issue relates to immigration, as these parties suggest that either most or all of the pressing issues which concern their respective societies are either caused or exacerbated by overly lenient immigration policies, implying that it is far too easy for individuals from foreign countries to migrate or seek asylum in their countries, which disrupt the way of life in that society. This pattern of a clear anti-immigration sentiment of the Western European far-right has been observed in the most if not all of the countries where a significant far-right party has emerged (Carter, 2016). It is important to note that these parties are not only hostile to those that attempt to migrate to their country but also residents or even citizens of their own country, as these parties are also associated with racism and xenophobia and often create societal categories of “us versus them” and usually exclude the immigrants and sometimes citizens that generationally come from various backgrounds, through their ethno-nationalist exclusionary perspective of society. These exclusionary attitudes inevitably lead to policy stances for these parties which inherently seek to reward their perceived inner group, the so-called real people of the country, and the outgroup who are the immigrants, asylum seekers and those who do not fit in their ethno-nationalist perspective, therefore, these parties often participate in practices such as introducing stricter integration policies and policy approaches such as welfare chauvinism which seeks to assist the welfare of the citizens who deserve it and the deprivation from welfare benefits for those who do not deserve it (Duncan, 2010; Fenger, 2018). Through an economic perspective, the electorate of these parties is often referred to as the losers of globalization, a mostly working-class base who was economically left behind as the global goods production in advanced countries were progressively outsourced to developing countries which

led to a significant loss in job opportunities for the working-class people (Krause & Giebler, 2020). It is due to these patterns and some others, the contemporary far-right parties in Europe have been fairly accurately conceptualized as advocating for the new politics of resentment, as they perceive themselves to be representing a considerable part of society who were left behind by the political and economic elite (Betz, 1993).

These new far-right parties have a significant impact on the political space of their respective countries which from the literature can be evaluated under three main categories, their impact on immigration policy and multiculturalism, their impact on socio-economic policies and finally, their impact on the legislative behavior of other parties and members of parliament which is the subject of this study. Firstly, as well demonstrated in the literature, often the presence or the electoral success of far-right parties have shifted the policy stances of other parties and the conduct of governments on immigration, to the right, meaning, their presence has led to stricter immigration regimes and more draconian legal measures to ensure the integration of migrants and asylum seekers to their respective societies (Muis & Immerzeel, 2017; Minkenberg, 2001; Alonso & Fonseca, 2012; Van Kessel, 2021; Akkerman, 2015). Secondly, the presence and the success of contemporary far-right parties in Western Europe have had several consequences on the socio-economic policies in Western European countries, namely, the welfare policies of these states. The overall impact of the far-right on this policy area has produced mixed findings, as some of the literature shows that they have led to more welfare retrenchment and some of the results demonstrating that they have shifted the policy stances towards pro-welfare attitudes (Röth et al., 2018; Schumacher & Van Kersbergen, 2016; Afonso & Papadopoulos, 2015). The only pattern which becomes quite clear in the literature was the continuous engagement with the practice of welfare chauvinism for these parties (Afonso, 2015; Rovny, 2013). Thirdly, there are some indirect evidence from studies which suggest that either the presence or the success of far-right in these countries has led to more cooperative behavior between other parties and MPs in these countries and at the European level (Kantola & Miller, 2021; Arzheimer, 2019).

However, there is a gap in the far-right literature regarding the impact of the far-right on the legislative behavior of MPs which this study attempted to fill.

While testing the impact of the far-right on the cooperative behavior of MPs, this study had not neglected to attempt to explore the determinants of legislative cooperation that may be classified under four main categories, namely, the institutional determinants, ideological determinants, political determinants, and social determinants. First of all, there was a good amount of evidence to suggest that certain institutional characteristics of the legislatures in Europe have led to an increase in cooperative behavior between political actors, such as the necessity to build legislative coalitions to be able to enact agenda, the convention of legislative agreements, veto threats, bicameral systems with incompatible leanings, traditions of consensual politics, etc. (Hohendorf et al., 2021; Christian & Pedersen, 2014; Schmidt, 2008; Ganghof & Bräuninger, 2006; Miller & Stecker, 2008; Christiansen & Nielsen, 2022; Tsebelis, 1995; Giuliani, 2008). Second of all, there are some predictable ideological determinants which predict cooperative behavior between political actors such as ideological proximity (Campbell, 1982; Klüver & Zubek, 2018; Andeweg et al., 2008). Third of all, an array of political factors promote legislative cooperation, such as governments cooperating with the opposition to avoid their criticisms, preemptive cooperation to sustain electoral alliances, political cultures and conducts of different parties and cooperating to stick it to the opposition when they reject every proposal from the government (Christiansen & Seeberg, 2016; Steinack, 2011; Dewan & Spirling, 2011; Christiansen et al., 2014). Fourth of all, the literature showed that MPs are in fact human and they are susceptible to the social influence of their relationships with other MPs. The general pattern present in this body of literature is that MPs who share close personal relationships are more likely to cooperate in legislations even if they are affiliated with different parties and they are not in close ideological proximity (Curry & Roberts, 2022; Andris et al., 2016; Arnold et al., 2000; Tam Cho & Fowler, 2010; Andeweg, 2013).

Finally, as this study had found that the presence of the far-right party had led to more cooperative legislative behavior in MPs and led them to unite against the far-

right party in considering their legislative proposals, it proposes a theoretical framework which can potentially explain these patterns of legislative behavior, namely, the common enemy effect. Originating from a series of highly influential experimental studies, the common enemy effect suggests that when confronted by a perceived common enemy, competitive or even hostile groups become more likely to set aside their differences and engage in cooperative endeavors to defeat that common enemy (Sherif, 1958). In this study, the common enemy effect is conceptualized as the combination of distinct social psychological mechanisms that constitute the effects that are observed in the testing of the relevant hypotheses. One such mechanism is the utilization of superordinate goals to cooperate against the common enemy. Superordinate goals are particular goals that are highly appealing to different groups but such that cannot be attained by the resources or efforts of any single group, thus, inherently requiring intergroup cooperation (Sherif et al., 1961). There exists a good amount of evidence which supports that the utilization of superordinate goals foster cooperation between different groups (Swaab et al., 2021; Deschamps & Brown, 1983; Brown & Wade, 1987; Johnson & Lewicki, 1969). Another mechanism which is highly relevant to the conceptualization of the European far-right as the common enemy is the concept of parochial altruism, which refers to a mechanism where individuals or groups engage in acts of self-sacrifice for the benefit their ingroup and to hurt their outgroup (De Dreu et al., 2010). In many studies from various scientific disciplines, support was found for the prevalence of this pattern that is parochial altruism (Abbink et al., 2012; Corr et al., 2015; Chiang & Wu, 2015; Ben-Ner et al., 2009; Halevy et al., 2008). I argue that the prevalent practice of cordon sanitaire against the European far-right parties which includes an agreement between established parties prohibiting the cooperation with the far-right on any type of legislative activities is an example of parochial altruism, as established parties commit an act of self-sacrifice by depriving themselves of potential coalition partners in order to benefit their intergroup solidarity and hurt the outgroup by denying the far-right the legitimacy and influence which comes with being a functioning member of the political system. Also, there is a solid amount of evidence from different studies which suggest that the far-right parties in Europe at

both the national and the supranational level are treated as the common enemy by all the established political parties and actors which mainly involves endeavors to contain the far-right and prevent them from influencing the legislative and political processes (Downs, 2001; Ripoll Servent, 2019; Art, 2018; Bolin et al., 2021). Finally, it becomes clear that the common enemy effect is a social phenomenon that operates on some of the most fundamental characteristics of the human experience, and going even further, the common enemy effect is not limited to the literature on humans, in fact, versions of this effect were also observed in animals and even plants (Brooks et al., 2021; Callaway et al., 2002; Krams et al., 2010). Still, even though the common enemy framework is quite suitable to explain the patterns which were observed in this study, it should be recognized that this study did not directly test for the existence of a common enemy effect, and it may very well not be the only mechanism behind this pattern of legislative cooperation against the far-right for several reasons. Political parties are strategic actors, and they make and adjust their political stances through the influence of many factors, and one specific reason to attempt to avoid cooperating with far-right parties especially in countries such as Germany where there is a significant amount of prejudice against the far-right, is to avoid damage to the legitimacy and reputation of their political party. There are many mechanisms such as the aforementioned tendency which would predictably lead to established parties cooperating against the far-right parties that are not explored in this study. Thus, this research gap should be filled by further studies which aim to fully understand and demonstrate the specific mechanisms behind these effects.

## **1.2. The Purpose of the Study and the Research Question**

This study had attempted to explore the impact of the presence of far-right parties on the legislative behavior of MPs in the German Bundestag through the framework of the common enemy effect. This purpose was fulfilled through two hypothesized models and their respective analyses, the first one focusing on the effect of far-right presence on the instances of comprehensive cooperation between parties where all parties excluding the far-right had voted in the same direction, and the second model aimed to discover the response of established parties against the legislative

proposals of the far-right party, testing if all parties unite against the far-right, possibly as an instance of the common enemy effect.

Therefore, this study aimed to answer the following research question. What is the impact of far-right presence on the roll-call voting behavior of the members of the German Bundestag?

### **1.3. Hypotheses of the Study**

To test the impact of far-right presence on the roll-call voting behavior of the members of the German Bundestag, two hypotheses were proposed. The first hypothesis concerns the impact of the entry of the far-right party AfD into the legislature for the first time, and how this development had affected the prevalence of comprehensive cooperation between all parties, with regard to this hypothesis, the representation, also can be referred to as the presence of the AfD in the Bundestag was designated as the treatment variable, and the impact of the treatment variable on the outcome variable, assigned as the likelihood of comprehensive cooperation between all parties, was evaluated. The second hypothesis was developed to test if the MPs from all parties united against the legislative proposals of the far-right party, in a higher magnitude than they unite against the proposals of other opposition parties. In terms of the second hypothesis, the outcome variable was assigned as the group means of vote unity scores, referring to the responses to the legislative proposals of all opposition parties by the MPs of other parties. The predictor variables were the distinct opposition parties by which the legislative bills were proposed. As the post-hoc analysis in line with the hypothesis, pairwise comparisons were conducted to assess the difference between opposition party pairings. The respective hypotheses were as follows.

H1: The instances of comprehensive cooperation between all parties excluding the far-right party have increased following the entry of the far-right party into the Bundestag.

H2: Members of parliament vote in a more unified manner against the legislative proposals of the far-right party compared to the proposals from other opposition parties.

#### **1.4. Significance of the Study**

This study attempted to assess the impact of far-right presence on the roll-call voting behavior of the members of the German Bundestag. This research adopts novel perspectives regarding all of its themes, embarking on fields of research which remain largely unexplored to this day. The first theme of this study is the concept of legislative cooperation in roll-call votes between political actors. Until today, the literature around this theme was concentrated on four main determinants which led to legislative cooperation, namely, institutional determinants such as legislative thresholds to enact laws and build coalitions, bicameral systems and the existence of veto players, electoral systems which gave way to coalition or minority governments, institutional regulations which position parties in consensual positions, secondly, there are ideological factors such as ideological proximity which turned out a reliable predictor of legislative cooperation, thirdly, political determinants such as the impact of electoral alliances, political party cultures and attempts from governments to preemptively avoid criticism, and fourthly, there are social factors such as the impact of personal relationships between members of parliament (Hohendorf et al., 2021; Christian & Pedersen, 2014; Schmidt, 2008; Ganghof & Bräuninger, 2006; Campbell, 1982; Klüver & Zubek, 2018; Andeweg et al., 2008; Christiansen & Seeborg, 2016; Steinack, 2011; Curry & Roberts, 2022; Andris et al., 2016; Arnold et al., 2000). However, having reviewed the current literature regarding legislative cooperation, one realizes that there are no studies which specifically focus on the impact of far-right parties as a determinant of legislative cooperation.

The second theme of the study was the impact of far-right presence on the legislative behavior of political actors. While there is a satisfactory body of research that assesses a myriad of effects of the presence and the success of the far-right parties on political actors, these studies are generally limited to the policy stances of other parties which may or may not have changed as a response to far-right parties, mostly



in the policy area of immigration and integration, with the addition of welfare policy (Abou-Chadi & Krause, 2020; Minkenberg, 2001; Mudde, 2013; Van Spanje, 2010; Bale, 2003; Han, 2015; Duncan, 2010; Fenger, 2018; Krause & Giebler, 2020). Therefore, there are no studies in this field which directly looked at the impact of far-right presence or success on the legislative behavior of the established political actors in legislatures, which makes this study significant as the first of its kind to do so.

The third theme of the study was the common enemy effect, which had existed in the literature for quite a while, however, losing its popularity among researchers in the previous decades. The common enemy effect refers to a social psychological phenomenon which suggests that when competitive or even hostile groups are confronted with a perceived common enemy, this perception would cause them to set aside their differences and cooperate to defeat the common enemy. This effect is well demonstrated in the literature (Sherif, 1958; Sherif et al., 1961; Abbink et al., 2012; Corr et al., 2015; Chiang & Wu, 2015; Ben-Ner et al., 2009; Halevy et al., 2008; Downs, 2001; Ripoll Servent, 2019; Brooks et al., 2021; Callaway et al., 2002; Krams et al., 2010). Still, there are no studies in the literature which implement the framework of the common enemy effect in the field of research on the legislative impact of the far-right parties.

All in all, this study makes a significant contribution to the literature as it evaluates the impact of far-right presence on the legislative behavior of political actors, and through the novel implementation of the common enemy effect in explaining the potential causes of the patterns which were observed in the study.

## **CHAPTER 2**

### **LITERATURE REVIEW**

The second chapter is devoted to exploring the current state of the academic literature concerning the three main themes which lay the foundation for this study. The first subject matter is the concept of legislative cooperation, which refers to the various practices which MPs engage in to collaborate in order to achieve a legislative outcome. Secondly, this review was concerned with the notion of the impact of the far-right on legislative processes, the numerous ways the presence of far-right parties affect the functioning of legislative chambers. Finally, the phenomenon called the common enemy effect was scrutinized, to determine its prevalence in society and its relevance for this study of MP voting behavior.

#### **2.1. Legislative Cooperation**

Legislative cooperation is one of the fundamental practices which ensure the functioning of democratic regimes all over the world. The term is utilized deliberately broad in this study for the purpose of understanding the many forms it presents itself and the various categories which determine its level and form. This study is mainly concerned with the form of roll-call voting cooperation, whereas there are other forms of cooperation, arising from differing circumstances which have also attracted scholarly interest. Perhaps, the form of cooperation that is closest in form to roll-call voting cooperation is the practice of “bill cosponsorship” which simply refers to where MPs decide to support one another’s legislative proposals by cosponsoring and thus supporting its fate in the legislative chamber agenda. This practice of bill

cosponsorship is particularly prevalent in the two chambers of the U.S. Congress and elsewhere and has been the subject of interest for many studies (Rippere, 2016; Micozzi, 2014). Another important category of legislative cooperation is legislative coalitions, which refer to an agreed-upon and typically long-term legislative cooperation between two or more parties with an aim to govern the legislative regime of a country. This type of coalitions has both a functional scope, referring to the function it serves, namely, electoral coalitions or law-making coalitions, and the second dimension concerns its regime, specifically, rule-based coalitions which possess an underlying set of rules and values which govern the continuity and functioning of such coalitions, and lastly the non-rule-based coalitions which operate in the absence of such set rules and values (Ibenskas & Bolleyer, 2018). Perhaps, a type of cooperation which escapes the lists of categories due to its discrete and unrecordable nature is information-sharing. Managing legislative processes is the most fundamental part of a MP's duties, and often they need an assortment of information to be able to effectively participate in these processes. There are mainly two categories of information regarding legislative proposals that MPs need to possess, which are technical and political information regarding the bills on the agenda. While technical may refer to many different aspects of a bill that requires an expert understanding to assess its value, political information may refer to many aspects like the sponsors of a bill and the MPs who are willing to support that bill on the legislative floor (Wonka & Haunss, 2020).

Although, the forms of legislative cooperation rightfully attract attention from the scholars of legislative studies, this study is more concerned with the determinants of legislative cooperation. What factors are the most influential in prompting cooperation between MPs? There are mainly four categories of determinants which induce cooperation between MPs that are explored in this review. The four kinds of determinants are namely, institutional, ideological, political, and social determinants of legislative cooperation.

### **2.1.1. Institutional Determinants of Legislative Cooperation**

The first and perhaps the most influential category of the determinants of legislative cooperation are the various institutional determinants. The institutional determinants refer to a variety of structural properties which either the constitutional regime or the rules of legislative chambers dictate on the law-making processes that are outside the control of the government, parties, and members of parliament. The distinct type of influence of the institutional factors may be likened to the influence of environmental factors on all processes in social settings. The institutional determinants take many forms, however, there are some robust patterns that are highly apparent and common in studies of legislative processes from all around the globe.

The strongest observable pattern which encompasses a large part of the literature suggests that in legislative chambers, governments cooperate with the opposition when they are compelled to do so. This principle alone is enough to explain why the institutional factors are so influential, holding other things constant. For instance, Rippere (2016) assesses the cooperative networks in both chambers of the U.S. Congress, a bicameral legislature system where, putting aside some of the nuances, both houses are authorized to make legislation and the MPs from both houses represent both the federal government and their particular districts, the study finds that cooperative behavior is significantly more common in the Senate than the House of Representatives due to the legislative mechanism called the filibuster, where the only way to pass legislations in the Senate is for the bill to be supported by a qualified majority, therefore, compared to the House where bills are accepted by the simple majority, passing any legislation in the Senate most often requires bipartisan cooperation. This pattern is not unique to the American system though, exploring the determinants of consensual behavior in the Italian parliament, Giuliani (2008) found that when the government is holding onto a slim majority, the opposition is able to invoke a filibuster that essentially led to more cooperation between the government and the opposition.

Obviously, the institutional factors in any given legislative chamber in the world is to an extent, unique to the legal and political characteristics of that country. Therefore, when moving closer to the area of interest for this study, Europe, there is another story. Most of the advanced and established democracies in Europe which have been the subjects of scholarly attention are governed through parliamentary systems that bring to the table their own properties. However, there has been a clear and consistent pattern across many democracies in Europe that emerged following the Second World War which is still relevant today, namely, “consensual democracy” (Lijphart, 1999). Straightforwardly, a consensual democracy refers to a political culture and a legislative system where the legal regime is governed through consensus.

The reasons behind this consensual system of democracy have invoked curiosity in researchers for decades. However, the most acclaimed theoretical framework explaining the factors which led to it was put forward by Katz and Mair, 1995 who cleverly coined the term, the “cartel party”. They wondered why European legislatures were significantly more cooperative than they were confrontational and arrived at the notion which suggests that existing as a party in the system comes with certain privileges such as secure state funding, continuous media coverage and a certain level of patronage over state appointments, because these privileges are guaranteed whether a party wins or loses the elections, parties now are not incentivized to challenge the governments like they used to, thus, we observe more cooperation and less confrontation in these legislatures. Although this framework continues to be quite influential in the literature, it does carry certain weaknesses that cannot be ignored. Firstly, suggesting that the parties are not incentivized to win elections is a bolder argument than that the strength of the evidence allows, and secondly, Katz and Mair make a theoretical argument which they do not support with any empirical evidence. However, there are some early exploratory findings which might be considered as indirectly supporting the cartel party framework, as Hohendorf et al. (2020) find through a longitudinal analysis of the RCV behavior in the German Bundestag that the longer a party is represented in the legislature, the more likely that they demonstrate cooperative behavior with other actors.

Having laid the cornerstones of the conceptual framework regarding the institutional determinants of legislative cooperation, we can move onto the literature which observes this phenomenon in legislatures. Firstly, let us follow the journey of the most robust cooperative framework that is the coalition. Most often, legislative coalitions are born in the beginning of a legislative term, and they allow governments to make the laws which they envision. Coalitions require constant cooperation between different political parties, and they contain unique power balances which lead to the emergence of interesting patterns. For instance, comparing the legislative coalitions where one party holds the majority in the chamber by themselves and where the government holds only the minority of the seats, Christiansen and Pedersen (2014) find that minority governments are more accommodating to the policy goals of their coalition partners, whereas majority governments are not so sensitive. In line with this research, in countries which are chronically governed by coalitions, even the small coalition partners serve an important role, facilitating the effectiveness of the government. For instance, in their study of the German Bundestag, King (1976) has found that by threatening to leave the government, minor parties in coalitions often are able to secure policy concessions from the major party in the coalition. Of course, there are subtler ways through which minor parties in the coalition may be able to compel the largest party into cooperation, for instance, a comparative analysis of the legislatures of Germany and the Netherlands has revealed that when the government attempts to diverge from the points of agreement that form the basis of coalitions, smaller parties utilize institutional procedures to delay the entertainment of controversial bills from the government on the parliamentary floor, necessitating cooperation and concessions from the government on such bills (Martin & Vanberg, 2004). However, the sword cuts both ways, as Patzelt (1997) finds through a survey design conducted with the German MPs, that the MPs from the parties that are partners of a governing coalition regulate their own voting behavior in a certain way to align their preferences with that of the leadership of the coalition, in an attempt to ensure the stability of the government. Also, another study focusing on the institutional positions of parties in the legislative chamber revealed that, being part of the governing coalition in the parliament meant

for small parties that they would have to make concessions on their policy positions in order to ensure the continuation of harmony between the partners in the legislative majority, allowing these parties to keep their influential positions (Ganghof & Bräuninger, 2006)

Continuing the review with the government's institutional impact on the legislative processes, a crucial point of discussion is the parliamentary committees. Parliamentary committees are most often organized around subject matters such as foreign relations, defense etc. The fundamental impact of the government on these committees is the fact that excluding specific cases, these committees are chaired by the members of the largest governing party which allows the government a certain level of control and influence over its activities. Also, in terms of function, committees occupy a special place in the legislative processes, in the sense that it is the primary forum where the specialist MPs flesh out the fundamental principles of the laws, and they are largely thought as panels where legislative cooperation is more commonplace, due to the limited number of participants and that the discussions and dealings are not usually made public. There are some fascinating research on the role of these committees in the legislative process. Firstly, there is some data obtained through a network analysis of the German Bundestag which suggests that the chairpersons of parliamentary committees are more likely to cooperate with the members of the opposition compared to their colleagues with the aim to ensure the continuation of their tenures (Wonka & Haunss, 2020). Still, committees become a platform for cooperation even if they are not chaired by the largest party and in recent history, often they were chaired by the members in an attempt from the governing party to share the power with other parties, helping to level the playing field between parties and leading to more legislative cooperation (King, 1976). In some countries, parliamentary committees are not only influential in the legislative process but decisive. For example, in the Italian parliament, certain bills can be made into law when agreed upon in committees, without ever being considered on the parliamentary floor. Given the cooperative nature of the committees, this factor led to more frequent cooperation between parties (Giuliani, 2008).

Another important framework in understanding the institutional determinants of legislative cooperation has to do with the level of power and influence that is divided between the government and the opposition. This power balance may be determined by different factors and may take different forms in different legislatures, however, there is a clear underlying pattern between the legislative cooperation patterns which are enabled by this determinant. A great example of this type of factor was found in the legislative chamber of New Zealand where the legislative system has gone through significant institutional reforms which increased the influence of the opposition on legislative activities and decreased the capabilities of the government to easily pass the legislations that they proposed. Williams (2012) has found that this fundamental change in the power dynamics between the government and the opposition has led to more legislative cooperation between the different groups in terms of their voting behavior, although, bearing in mind that this study relies on findings that are derived from descriptive statistics, thus, the conclusions should not be considered as strong as a study which utilizes inferential statistics. Still, this pattern of cooperative behavior has been detected by other studies as well. For instance, a comprehensive comparative study which assessed the legislative behavior patterns of eighteen advanced democracies of the world had looked into the fragmentation and cooperation patterns between MPs. This study has found that in legislative systems which enable more influence from the opposition on legislative activities, the opposition is more fragmented in itself and the opposition parties are more likely to diverge from the opposition block to cooperate with the government, whereas, in majoritarian systems where the system is skewed towards allowing any simple majority to easily pass its legislative proposals, has led to cooperative voting behavior patterns on the other side of the aisle, meaning where the government had higher capabilities of passing its agenda, the opposition tended to cooperate against the government and stuck together on substantive votes, possibly to compensate for their lack of influence on the legislative agenda (Maeda, 2015). Also, there are studies which found that the opposition tends to cooperate against the proposals coming from the government, regardless of any other influencing factors (Hix & Noury, 2016). Another fascinating example is the case of Spain, where the electoral system favors



parties that are able to grasp the majority of the seats in the parliament and the legislative system is also majoritarian. An interesting study has attempted to understand the reason behind the high-level of consensual law-making in the Spanish parliament despite the properties of the system which allows majorities to enact laws without achieving a consensus. One of the patterns which emerged assessing the data from Spain was concerning the power balance between the governing party and the main opposition party, the researchers found that the closer the number of seats that are occupied by the government and the main opposition party, the more those two parties were likely to cooperate in RCVs and vice-versa, although, it should be noted that individual MP level voting data from the Spanish parliament is not available, therefore, the researchers were obliged to derive their conclusions from the aggregate voting data for a given legislative proposal, which leaves some room for guessing (Mújica & Sánchez-Cuenca, 2006). Moving further along the lines of the legislative capabilities of a government to enact the legal changes which they would desire, the system of minority governments necessitates further discussion. Electoral systems are a determining factor in shaping the composition of the legislative chambers around the world, and there are particular examples of states where the electoral system significantly favors compositions where no party is able to attain the majority of the seats, which often lead to minority governments, where parties form the executive branch without possessing the majority power in the legislature to enact their agenda. Denmark is a great example of this type of system as the country is often ruled by minority governments which seek to build a legislative majority not by forming coalitions but by making cooperation agreements. A case study of Denmark emphasized this legislative convention of making legislative agreements between the minority government and other parties in the legislature which do not participate in the government. These agreements set a legislative agenda, based on a set of policy goals which the government pledges to promote. These legislative agreements create a framework of cooperation between the government and the opposition parties, and the researchers note that these agreements rarely are violated to ensure further cooperation and are often utilized by the niche parties in the parliament to influence the policy-making process in Denmark (Christiansen &

Nielsen, 2022). The findings of the aforementioned study were quite interesting, although, the work relied on a qualitative analysis, and it does not put forward empirical evidence to support its claims.

Arguably, the strongest pattern that is evident across the literature on the institutional factors of legislative cooperation revolves around the conception of veto power in the legislative chamber. The theoretical framework of this idea was explored perhaps most influentially, by Tsebelis (1995) who coined the term “veto players”, which are political actors in a given legislative system who hold a veto power over the legislative proposals of the government. Tsebelis argued that this power dynamic between the government and other actors had a fundamental impact on the legislative processes, forcing the parties to cooperate in order to participate in effective law-making. In the literature, this pattern was found to be most relevant for the case of Germany, which incidentally is the main focus of this study. Due to Germany’s electoral system which functions in a way that makes it unlikely for any one party to attain a majority in the Bundestag, the federal legislative chamber, and even less likely in the Bundesrat, where the sixteen states that constitute the Federal Republic of Germany are represented. Due to the said properties of the electoral system, the parties which acquire the highest percentage of votes are most often compelled to establish coalition governments with other parties to be able to govern. Secondly, stemming from the bicameral system of legislation, the parties or coalitions which manage to accumulate a majority in the Bundestag still come to lack a legislative majority in the Bundesrat. Therefore, the German legislative system becomes a playground for legislative cooperation and the balancing act that is the relationship between the governing coalitions and the veto players which ultimately determine the functioning of the legislative system. There are various studies which sought to understand the consequences of these legislative patterns and the balance of influence in the German Bundestag, and they have found that due to the bicameral system, in cases where the governing coalition in the Bundestag fails to secure a legislative majority in the Bundesrat, the level of cooperation between the governing coalition and the opposition parties have increased to a significant extent (Hohendorf et al., 2021; Schmidt, 2008). However, it is not only the enactment of laws in where

the governing coalitions of Germany find it difficult to be effective without needing cooperation from the government, as one study points out the position of weakness of the government in Germany in terms of agenda setting in the legislative chamber, coupled with the usual power dynamics between the government and the opposition, compels the governing coalition to negotiate and cooperate with the opposition to set the legislative agenda (Sieberer, 2006). Other studies show that these patterns of cooperative behavior sometimes are implemented in a more preemptive manner, where knowing that there is a veto threat at the end of the line for a given legislative proposal, in the German Bundestag, the government may seek to cooperate with the opposition on said legislative proposals even before they are considered on the parliamentary floor but in the parliamentary committees in an earlier part of the cycle for a legislative bill, this finding also emphasizes the aforementioned importance of parliamentary committees as panels for legislative cooperation (Miller & Stecker, 2008). At this point, it must be noted that there are some studies which focused on the government-opposition cooperation patterns from the opposite perspective, for instance, Green-Pederson and Thomsen (2005) looked at the cooperative voting patterns in the Danish parliament through their concept of “broad cooperation” which refer to cooperation between parties that are on the opposite sides of the ideological spectrum and they find that this type of cooperation increases when the opposition does not hold a veto threat level majority against the government, and assessing the relationship from the lens of the opposition under the presumption that the opposition may be incentivized to cooperate with the government under these circumstances to gain influence on the legislative process. That study may be considered partially in contradiction to the findings which support the “Veto Player Theory”, and more comprehensive research is needed in this field to shed a light on this framework of power dynamics and cooperative or confrontational attitudes between the government and the opposition. Still, at this point in time, the body of work which supports the veto player theory seems to be more robust and plentiful.

All in all, a robust body of research in the area of legislative cooperation suggests that institutional factors play a very important role in determining the cooperative

behavior between different actors in legislatures. There are research from various legislative chambers from numerous countries which support the generalizability of these patterns and findings. However, one must not forget that the institutional factors which govern the legislative processes change significantly from one chamber to another, therefore, case studies of specific legislatures continue to hold an important weight in the discussion.

### **2.1.2. Ideological Determinants of Legislative Cooperation**

It comes as no surprise to the scholars of legislative behavior scholars that the ideological stance of either a MP, party or a government is an important and arguably a reliable predictor of their voting behavior in the legislative processes, and there is a significant amount of literature which supports these claims. In representative democracies, members of parliament normatively represent their voters and their ideological leanings, and this is apparent in the fact that most if not all legislatures in the world are organized around ideological leanings which are represented by the relevant parties. Therefore, in the realm of legislative cooperation, it is perfectly expectable that MPs would cooperate with others with respect to their ideological proximity, and this section reviews the current state of literature which is concerned with the impact of ideology on cooperative behavior in the legislatures.

Starting from the first theme of the previous section, that is bill cosponsorship as a framework of legislative cooperation, there are some studies such as Campbell (1982) who found that MPs whose ideological stances are similar, tended to cosponsor more bills together. Another study that is conducted in the U.S. Senate produced similar findings, as senators who are in close ideological proximity to each other have cooperated on more bills compared to those who were not in close ideological proximity to them (Harward & Moffet, 2010).

It is important to note that the ideological stances in legislatures which predict the cooperative or confrontational behavior between the different legislative actors are, for the most part, organized around the left-right divide. Thus, it can be credibly argued that the left-right divide in terms of legislative cooperation is very much

relevant. In fact, Hix and Noury (2016) conducted a comparative empirical analysis of RCV behavior in numerous legislatures from different countries and found that the left-right divide between parties is even more impactful than the government-opposition divide in terms of voting behavior. A case study of the Danish parliament also underlines this pattern of voting behavior, that most RCV behavior can be organized around the left and right ideological blocs which parties participate in (Green-Pedersen & Thomsen, 2005). Illustrating the point to a greater extent, Klüver and Zubek (2018) conducted a comparative multivariate analysis of the legislatures of Sweden and Denmark to find that ideological proximity between a minority government and any given opposition party predicts their level of cooperation.

There are other studies which evaluate the impact of ideology on the cooperative behavior of MPs with more cutting-edge techniques, such as Bratton and Rouse (2011) implemented a social network analysis and an exponential family random graph models analysis to find that in the U.S. Congress, the strongest predictor of legislative cooperation between MPs was their ideological proximity.

Still, the presence of an ideological divide on a given legislation does not cover all the depth there is in the literature regarding this pattern, meaning, whether there is an ideological divide or not is not the only factor which impacts the legislative process, but the ideological salience of a given policy area is also important in determining the cooperative or confrontational pattern of legislative relationships between actors. For instance, a case study for the determinants of consensual legislative behavior in the Spanish parliament revealed that, the less ideologically salient a policy area is, the more likely that legislations concerning that policy area became a platform for cooperation between the parties (Mújica & Sánchez-Cuenca, 2006).

Finally, there are also some interesting arguments in the literature which point to patterns of legislative behavior that are difficult to conceive. One such study conducted an in-depth comparative analysis of parliamentary opposition in Austria, Belgium and the Netherlands and it found that over time, the parties in the legislatures in these countries had partially lost their ideological distinctiveness, and the result was an opposition which would not oppose the government, therefore,

this pattern had led to more consensual law-making in these countries (Andeweg et al., 2008; Andeweg, 2013). All in all, it is both straightforward and sensible to recognize that ideological determinants are influential and relevant when it comes to the concept of legislative cooperation, and this notion is endorsed by a substantial body of work in the field.

### **2.1.3. Political Determinants of Legislative Cooperation**

The political determinants of legislative cooperation is a category which needs to be defined diligently, since all categories under this review are patterns which occur under the comprehensive umbrella of the political space. Therefore, the political determinants refer to those factors which are either the results of the culture and characteristics of party politics, or stemming from the political actors' aims to influence the political space in a way that would put themselves in a more favorable position in front of the electorate. The political factors can range from a desire of a governing party to be more effective in enacting their agenda in the legislature to two parties collaborating in the legislative processes to nurture their electoral alliances.

Firstly, a great example of how legislative cooperation is utilized for political ends came from a study by Christiansen and Seeberg (2016) who found that governments in legislatures often seek to cooperate with the opposition parties, not because they need the votes to pass the legislation but so that the opposition officially supports the legislative proposal which means that the opposition is going to lose its privilege to criticize the final product of the legislative process.

Another political determinant of cooperation is the desire to achieve legislative success. This takes many forms, such as the study by Kirkland (2011) which looked into the cooperative patterns of the MPs in the U.S. Congress and found that usually, the members cooperate with other members that they have strong ties with, in terms of party, race etc. However, the legislative proposals of those members who choose to cooperate with MPs that they only share weak ties, are more successful. This finding points to a cooperative relationship where MPs build cooperative networks

with those that are not strongly linked to them in order to increase the success of their legislative proposals. Another form of these political factors emerges through the oppositions' strategic legislative behavior to achieve policy success in the chamber, as one study which focused on the relationship between the electoral cycles and legislative cooperation concluded that the opposition parties in legislatures are more likely to cooperate with the government during the early part of the legislative cycle, due to a notion that they would be able to exert a greater influence on the government following elections (Schwalbach, 2022).

Even before the elections take place, the relationships in the political arena between parties start to affect their cooperative behavior in the parliament. Christiansen et al. (2014) suggested that the MPs of different parties start to cooperate more in legislative activities as early as when their parties approach each other to negotiate an electoral alliance, possibly in an effort to show the voters that they are capable of working together, although, this paper lacks the empirical evidence to support its observation of such pattern.

As obviously demonstrated in the literature, whether an opposition party cooperates with the government or confronts them, depends on the political aims and culture of that party. For instance, a case study of the legislative behavior conducted in the Bavarian state parliament in Germany through qualitative interviews with the MPs revealed that, different parties come from different political cultures and this is reflected in their collective actions, comparing two parties, where the more established Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) aimed to influence the policy outcomes and chose to cooperate with the governing majority, The Greens with a grass-root politics background, often chose to confront the government in an effort to get more media attention, while giving up potential influence on the final outcomes in the legislature (Steinack, 2011). However, what happens when the opposition strategically confronts the government as a policy is quite interesting. Dewan and Spirling (2011) conducted a comparative analysis of different legislative chambers in the UK to find that, when the opposition indiscriminately votes "No" on every legislative proposal from the government, this leads to a pattern of

consolidation in the government party lines, increases the level of cooperation between government MPs and enhances their voting cohesion.

Considering the available evidence, it is easy and accurate to assume that political factors in a given space have a multi-faceted and strong impact on the legislative behavior of the MPs which serve in the legislative chambers. However, more research is clearly needed in this area, seeing as none of the patterns in the literature possess a mass of evidence to be considered as established.

#### **2.1.4. Social Determinants of Legislative Cooperation**

The social determinants of legislative cooperation refer to a variety of factors regarding the social relationships of MPs which lead them to cooperate in legislative processes, that cannot be attributed to other factors such as ideological proximity, political aims etc. One misconception in the society is the perception which sees public figures as non-human actors who only act in an instrumental manner. The version regarding the political space suggests that the members of the parliament should only cooperate with other members due to a common ideological stance or to further either their career goals or political aims. However, a robust body of research in the field would beg to differ as there is a good amount of evidence which suggest that one of the influential factors that lead to legislative cooperation is the personal relationships which are developed between colleagues, in this case MPs.

One of the most important ties which impact the cooperative behavior of MPs is friendship, as Arnold et al. (2000) have demonstrated in their mixed-methods research on the Ohio State of Representatives in the U.S. where they have interviewed the members and asked them to reveal who their legislative friends are in the chamber. The empirical analysis has revealed that friendship in the legislature was the most influential factor in predicting who the MPs would collaborate on legislative processes with, surpassing strong factors such as party affiliation, ideological proximity etc. These are remarkable results and surely they do not stand alone. Another mixed-methods research by Curry and Roberts (2022) had revealed that among the members of parliament, those MPs who share stronger relationships



are more likely to cosponsor bills together. Research can be found in this area which utilize a variety of empirical methods, for instance, a study has sought to find the determinants of legislative cooperation with a social network analysis and found that two of the four main factors were firstly, homophily, which refers to a tendency of individuals to seek out with other individuals who are similar to them, and the second factor was transitivity, which refers to a notion of “friends of my friends are also my friends” (Bratton & Rouse, 2011). There are also some other interesting studies coming from the U.S. Senate which scrutinized the social networks that are formed between MPs and found that the more socially connected the people are, the more bills they cosponsored together (Harward & Moffet, 2010; Andris et al., 2016). One might ask why a hefty part of the literature in this field is focused on the legislatures from the U.S. and one answer would come from an interesting study from Andeweg (2000) who suggests that consensual patterns of law-making are more prevalent in smaller legislatures which improve the chances of MPs developing closer personal relationships with each other, thus, increasing their cooperative potential. This finding was indirectly supported by other studies such as Tam Cho and Fowler (2010) who developed a measure called the “small world quotient” and suggested that legislative procedures are more cooperative and more productive when the bills are prepared and proposed by smaller and more tightly-knit groups. Obviously, a good way to conceptualize these social patterns of legislative cooperation is to think of them as elite cooperation between these influential figures and these patterns can obviously produce surprising outcomes as Andeweg (2013) looked at European democracies and attempted to find why the opposition voted with the government in such a high proportion of the substantive votes and argued that the reason was elite cooperation between the MPs. Still, one must recognize that the conclusions in this study rely on anecdotal evidence, weakening the robustness of the findings.

All in all, it is obvious that MPs are human, and they develop personal relationships with each other that influence their legislative behavior. Therefore, it is important for scholars to not only think about the institutional, ideological, and political factors when assessing the cooperative behavior in the legislatures and this body of literature is a good example of how the legislative processes are as complex as the

social patterns we observe in the world. Still, more research is definitely needed to find not only the social determinants of legislative cooperation but every factor which in some shape or form, influences the procedures through the representatives determine the rules which the citizens are required to abide by.

## **2.2. The Impact of the Far-Right on Legislative Processes**

This section is dedicated to assessing the impact of the far-right on legislative processes. Firstly, the kind of far-right which is the subject for this study is defined. Secondly, the impact of the presence and success of far-right is evaluated. Later, the discussion is continued by delineating the specific impact of the far-right observed in the literature, the first policy area is the defining realm of the contemporary far-right that is, immigration and multiculturalism. However, the recent literature clearly demonstrates that the impact of the far-right is not limited to one policy area, rather, they also have a significant impact on the socio-economic policies and more specifically, welfare policies. Therefore, in the final part, the current literature on these effects is reviewed.

### **2.2.1. Defining the Contemporary Far-Right Parties**

The far-right, as the name clearly suggests refers to an ideology that is spatially placed at the right-side margins of the left-right political spectrum. However, while there are some properties of this new political movement which clearly make them a part of the right-wing party family, and in contrast, there are some characteristics of this political movement which distinguish them from the established notion of right-wing parties. Firstly, similar to the right-wing political family, the members of the contemporary far-right are in essence, conservatives who do not fully believe in the notion of social equality and do believe in the existence of a “natural order”, a belief that legitimizes the social hierarchies which are existent in the world. From a socio-psychological standpoint, there are several factors which predict conservatism such as dogmatism, intolerance of uncertainty, anxiety and needs for order and structure (Jost et al., 2018). Moving onto the distinguishing characteristics, perhaps, the most striking one is that they are anti-system parties, and they rebel against the

established socio-cultural, political, and economic norms of a society. Secondly, differing from the right-wing ideology which offers a comprehensive portfolio of normative beliefs regarding the functioning of the world, the contemporary far-right parties are single-issue parties, meaning their reason for existence comprises of a single issue and in the case of the far-right, that issue is immigration. Finally, the contemporary far-right differs from the established political party system is that they do not offer their followers a consistent policy portfolio that is consistent with the left-right ideology scale, for instance, even though the far-right is consistent with its position on the ideological spectrum in terms of immigration and cultural issues, they are not consistent in other policy areas such as welfare policy (Betz, 1993). Mostly, receiving votes from a significant portion of the working class, the far-right parties often contradict the established neoliberal conservative ideology, and may advocate for more left-wing positions with regard to economic issues. In this sense, this new political movement sometimes cuts across political cleavages which is not only apparent in their politics but also a pronounced feature of their diverse and ideologically inconsistent voter base. In the literature, this movement is often referred to as the “politics of resentment” as the far-right is defined as a radical reaction to the social, cultural, and economic changes to post-war Western European societies, carrying resentment towards the established system coupled with perceptions of being left behind during the globalist transformation of the world economy. Perhaps, most important property of this movement is their unique brand of ultra-nationalism, sourced from an anti-universalist myth of a national community (Minkenberg, 2001). At this point, it is important to note that the subject of this study is the particular version of the far-right movement which reemerged in Western Europe following the downfall and persecution of far-right movements following the 2nd World War.

In the literature, there are several terms that are utilized to describe this phenomenon, these parties are most often referred to as the Radical Right Populist Parties (RRPs), also as extreme-right parties and far-right parties. For the sake of brevity, coherence and instant recognizability, the term “far-right” is used in this

study, however, consistent with other scholars in the area, the author considers all aforementioned terms interchangeable (Muis & Immerzeel, 2017).

### **2.2.2. Evaluating Far-Right Impact**

A considerable part of the literature in this field is concerned with how the far-right parties impact the legislative processes. Far-right parties and political movements have been present in Europe for quite some time, however, their existence alone does not mean they are influential. As it is going to be represented in the review, two factors usually lead to a significant far-right impact on legislative processes, policy and the political space, electoral success, and legislative presence.

How the far-right affects the political space in a given country is a multi-faceted question. One important point to recognize is that in all of the countries and political systems of interest, none of the far-right parties have ever attained a level of electoral success that would put them in the primary governing position of a country, other than one instance in Austria, meaning the far-right has never been powerful enough to influence policy on its own. Therefore, when one refers to the impact of the far-right, it is necessary to understand that they are referring to the response of other parties to either the electoral success or the parliamentary presence of the far-right. Following this idea, there are several different ways that parties may choose to respond to the threat of the far-right, namely, they may attempt to fully exclude the far-right from all processes to the best of their ability, they may choose to tolerate the initiatives of the far-right on a case-by-case basis or they may choose to cooperate with the far-right in a legislative manner (Heinze, 2022). The evidence from Western European legislatures here demonstrates a consistent pattern, when far-right parties attain electoral success and enter the legislatures for the first time, the usual reaction of other parties is to isolate them, not to engage them in any way and publicly ostracizing them and their ideological stances, however, as time passes and the parties grow more accustomed to the presence of the far-right, the exclusion partially ends and the parties become more likely to collaborate with the far-right in legislative processes (Heinze, 2018; Heinze, 2022). Also, in some cases, this effect was expanded from collaboration on an ad-hoc basis to more stable and

comprehensive cooperation as Minkenberg (2013) has demonstrated in a comparative analysis of European democracies that the patterns of ostracism became weakened, and parties became more open to participating in coalitions with far-right parties over time. Here is a suitable point to raise the question of why established parties choose to cooperate with the far-right when they are not compelled to do so in any way. To answer this question, De Lange (2012) conducted a comparative case study of European legislatures and claims that the collaborators of the far-right are center-right parties, and they collaborate for two reasons, first, they see the far-right parties as viable coalition partners which enable them to hold onto office, and secondly, they see collaborating with the far-right party as an enabler of materializing their right-wing policy goals. Although, the findings of this study propose intriguing explanations for this pattern, it should be noted that this study did not provide empirical evidence in support of its claims. There are also other findings which emphasize the strategic nature of center-right support for far-right parties, as Bale (2003) finds that when center-right advocates for the sensitivities of the far-right during the electoral cycle to accommodate their voters, and following the elections the far-right party cooperates with the center-right through a coalition, then center-right keeps its promises, however, if these parties do not enter into a coalition relationship, then the center-right party abandons their promises.

Another important question is, to what extent the far-right parties are able to influence other parties once they become successful or enter legislative bodies. Fortunately, there is a substantial body of research which focuses on this question. For instance, the entry of a German far-right party into state parliaments in the 1990s has attracted due scholarly attention, however, the result was that they were effectively isolated, and their greatest efforts only amounted to a negligible impact on legislative processes (Minkenberg, 2001). Another longitudinal comparative analysis has attempted to determine the far-right impact on legislative processes and concluded that their impact remained limited for the time period, this analysis also conducted a comparative analysis to delineate the position of far-right parties compared to other niche parties and found that while the Greens were able to cooperate with other parties to a greater extent by participating in coalitions, the far-

right stayed isolated from the political system (Mudde, 2013). Another interesting study focused on the impact of far-right success on the individual political stances of the members of the German Bundestag by conducting a quantitative text analysis on the speeches of MPs and found that there was no consistent effect of far-right success as some MPs have moved to the right in over time, and some have moved to the left as perhaps in an effort to distance themselves from the far-right (Atzpodien, 2020). Finally, there exists a conceptual boundary to the extent of far-right impact on legislative processes as a literature review article has concluded that the far-right parties in Europe were only able to impact the policy positions of mainstream parties in the realm of immigration and integration policy and in none of the other policy areas (Muis & Immerzeel, 2017)

All in all, the heftiest body of literature has focused on the impact of the success and presence of the far-right parties on other parties in the policy space. For sake of this section, it is crucial to unveil the specific mechanisms and results of this influence. Abou-Chadi (2016) coherently describes the pattern of this influence in terms of the spatial model where parties exist on a political spectrum where they occupy their respective places on the policy dimension, therefore, according to this model, mainstream parties engage in a practice of accommodating the policies of the far-right for two reasons, first, to cover the far-right's policy space in order to appeal to the voters with these sensitivities, and secondly, to abolish the position of issue ownership with regard to these parties by adding themselves to the list of supporters for these policies. The practice of accommodation thus aims to prevent the far-right from having further success and to appeal to their voters. This claim is supported by a significant body of research, including a notable article in this space by Bale (2003) which claimed that when far-right parties rose in electoral success, the mainstream parties started to advocate for their causes to accommodate their voters. However, this article did not support its claims with empirical evidence, though, this does not point to a lack of empirical evidence behind the framework of accommodation by the mainstream parties as Abou-Chadi and Krause (2020) have demonstrated with a quasi-experimental design that when far-right parties in Europe were able to overcome electoral thresholds and entered the legislatures, they have caused the

mainstream parties to shift their policy positions to the right in their respective manifestos, presumably in an effort to accommodate their policies and to win back the votes they have lost to these parties. The current literature in this area clearly limits the extent of applicability for the accommodation hypothesis to mainstream parties as niche parties would neither be incentivized to abandon their policy positions which they strongly represent, nor they would be able to accommodate these voters in the same way that mainstream parties which are located adjacent to the center where they are in a position to reasonably extend their reach on the ideological spectrum. However, the current literature suggests that this pattern may include further limitations. A comparative case study had attempted to assess if the left-wing parties would be tempted to jump on the far-right bandwagon when they are successful, testing the “if you can’t beat them, join them” hypothesis but the findings from several countries were not supportive of this notion and a consistent pattern with regard to the hypothesis was not observed (Bale et al., 2010). Still, other studies have come up with more nuanced findings, for instance, Han (2015) has implemented an empirical design to assess if there existed a left-right distinction when it comes to accommodation and found that while center-right parties generally chose to accommodate the policies of the far-right, in terms of center-left parties, the picture was more complicated as left-wing parties only accommodated the policies of the far-right in two specific conditions, first, when they perceive that the opinions of their voter base have changed in favor of the far-right, and second, when they perceived themselves to be in a losing position against their center-right counterparts in the previous election.

An interesting question to put an end to this section is to what extent, the policy stances of the far-right parties change when they attain success over time. A prominent theoretical framework for this question is the taming hypothesis, which suggests that over time, the more a given far-right party becomes more integrated with the political system, their policy stances would become more moderate over time. Not only there is no support for this hypothesis in the literature but there is evidence against it as one study attempted to assess the taming question and found that while the other parties have moved to the right in the respective time period of

the analysis, the policy stances of far-right parties did not become more moderate (Wagner & Meyer, 2017).

In summary, it becomes fairly clear that the scholars who are interested in the impact of the far-right on democracies should pay close attention not only to the substantive results of this impact but also how this impact occurs, therefore, more research is needed to discover the underlying political, social, and legislative mechanisms behind this phenomenon.

### **2.2.3. Far-Right Impact on Immigration Policy and Multiculturalism**

At this point of the discussion, it is fairly clear that the contemporary far-right parties in Europe are single-issue parties, that is immigration. This is not to mean that according to the far-right parties, the only issue in society is migration, however, the more a scholar becomes well-versed in the studies of the far-right, the more a specific pattern becomes clear. It is not clear if all roads lead to Rome, however, it is clear that the source of all issues leads to immigration from the perspective of far-right parties. They not only claim that immigration is a fundamental threat to the way of life, culture, and identity of a community but for the far-right, as we are going to explore in the next section, even economic issues such as welfare and unemployment also stem from relaxed immigration regimes. Therefore, far-right parties being the issue owners of immigration policy, the greatest portion of scholarly attention was dedicated to assessing their impact on immigration in a given country. This pattern where other parties become stricter on migration policy in response to the success of the entry of the far-right party into legislatures is referred to as contagion. It must be noted that the scholarship in this area has certainly not reached maturity, as many studies find contradicting results. Also, some of the studies in this area are also in contrast with the theme of left-right divide in terms of the far-right impact as several studies find significant far-right impact on the policies of left-wing parties and it is not clear if this is due to focusing on a specific policy area of a given party rather than the full scope of their policy positions.



Firstly, it would be quite reasonable to suggest that perhaps, the far-right parties had the most significant impact on immigration policy in the instances when they were part of governing coalitions. Bear in mind that these instances are quite limited, however, they still provide compelling case studies for the interested scholars. Firstly, Lutz (2019) implemented an empirical design to designate the predictors of the far-right policy impact and found that while the far-right parties are not impactful when they are merely electorally successful but they are only influential when they become a part of the governing coalition, in the sense that they have a small but significant impact on introducing stricter regulations as to who is able to migrate to the country, and they have a larger impact on the rules governing the lives of the immigrants, in terms of the enactment of a more stringent integration policy, still, it is important to note that due to the methodological choices made in this study, there are many possible confounding variables which may have affected the findings, therefore, the robustness of the conclusions became compromised. Some other findings on this topic come from a comparative case study of Austria and Italy, the only two countries in Western Europe which have witnessed far-right parties entering governing coalitions, and the conclusions of the study suggested that in both instances where far-right parties participated in the government, the respective immigration policies of these countries have become stricter, however, the findings reveal that the far-right parties did not get exactly what they desired even in terms of immigration policy, rather, they were compelled to settle on more lenient measures (Zaslove, 2004). Finally, a case study of Austria in the 2000s where the far-right party was in government found that the far-right impact is significant both for stricter immigration and asylum policies that were changed during their tenure but as the previous studies suggested, the far-right impact on more stringent integration policy is also apparent, notwithstanding, Duncan (2010) was not convinced that the effects were solely the result of the far-right impact, claiming the anti-immigration sentiment was already strong in Austria at the time, implying that the changes in immigration policy may be attributed to the trend in public opinion, rather than the far-right participation in government. Later, we will return to this issue of causality in assessing the far-right impact on immigration. Still, participating in the government is reasonably going to

be an avenue for policy influence for the far-right, in fact, one study is indirectly relevant to this topic which focused on the effect of the ideological stance of government on the immigration policy output. Akkerman (2012) conducted a comparative analysis of nine Western European countries between 1996-2010 to assess this impact and found that where the center-right governments tended to introduce more conservative immigration legislation, the social democratic governments tended to enact more liberal immigration legislation.

Here it is appropriate to reintroduce the question of mechanism when discussing the far-right impact on migration. How do the far-right parties impact the policy space in migration? This question becomes significantly more relevant for countries where far-right parties have not participated in governments. One case study of the Netherlands provides a possible answer, as Van Kessel (2021) found that the far-right impacted the policy space of migration through their effect on the agenda of public discussion, as they were quite successful in increasing the salience of non-materialist issues on the legislative agenda which led to the accommodation of monoculturalist political stances by the established center-right parties. Still, other studies on this topic pointed to a different picture when it comes to raising issue salience in the public. One such comparative study focused on the impact of far-right parties on the public discussion in the media regarding immigration and found that the issue-specific effects of the far-right on the media might have been overestimated, as the study found that the statements and actions of mainstream parties captured more space in the media when it comes to the immigration debate (Meyer & Rosenberger, 2015). Still, it must be noted that the evidence on the issue salience debate are not robust and therefore, the verdict on this topic remains inconclusive.

Resuming the discussion on the left-right distinction in mainstream parties in accommodating far-right immigration policy stances, there are significant longitudinal multivariate studies to aid in settling the debate. Firstly, Van Spanje (2010) assessed the effect of the far-right in Europe from the lens of contagion theory and found that the far-right impact which leads to changes in immigration policy towards the right was consistent across all countries and political parties, implying

that the left-wing parties are not immune to this effect, and it is truly contagious. Another study which specifically attempted to explore the left-right divide in far-right impact regarding immigration found a more robust and comprehensive effect, where in the party manifestos across Europe, the issue salience of immigration increased over time even in countries that lacked a notable far-right party, and the study specifically noted that the impact on the left was especially potent. One specific study focusing on the political leanings of the candidates for the German Bundestag by conducting a quantitative text analysis on the longitudinal Bundestag candidate survey between 2013-2017 was particularly successful in isolating the specific far-right impact, as it found that during the respective period, the candidates have significantly moved to the right on the cultural left-right scale, however, during the same period, they did not move on the economic left-right scale which suggests that the particular incoherent brand of contemporary far-right ideology was in full effect, since normally, a shift to the right would be expected to take place in all policy fields, rather than staying limited to the cultural sphere.

In conclusion, there are numerous studies in this field which point to an impact of the far-right on European democracies. One final example comes from Akkerman (2015) who conducted a self-proclaimed “fine grained analysis” on the far-right impact on Western European democracies to find that there is a significant correlation between the rise of the far-right and more stringent immigration policy output in these countries, however, the author also pointed to an issue which underlies the whole body of research concerned with the far-right impact on immigration policy by suggesting that the far-right success may be the symptom of the problem rather than the cause. In almost all of the studies a scholar conducting a thorough examination of the literature must ask themselves whether this effect on immigration policy output is caused by the far-right presence and success or both the far-right success and the stringent immigration policy output is caused by a variety of environmental factors which shape the public opinion in a certain way that leads to these developments. In all studies concerned with this field, the scope of analysis is always quite broad, therefore, it becomes more difficult for reviewers of this literature to get behind these strong claims of far-right impact on immigration, since there are

too many possible confounding variables that might have had an effect, thus, leaving the door open for credible dissenting opinions. All in all, the need for further research is clear in this topic, as further studies may be able to isolate the relationship between far-right success and immigration policy output with cutting-edge research designs and implementation, remedying this issue of causality which stays relevant in the following section of the review.

#### **2.2.4. Far-Right Impact on Socio-Economic Policies**

Although contemporary far-right parties can credibly be considered as single-issue parties, it does not mean that they do not have an impact on the policy space with regard to any other topic apart from immigration. Still, as it was discussed in the previous sections, the ideological stances of the far-right even in a policy area such as welfare are still shaped by notions of anti-immigration attitudes. The socio-economic policy realm is perhaps the only field other than immigration policy that scholars are able to observe fairly consistent patterns of far-right influence in European democracies. What is especially intriguing about this particular effect is that the stances of far-right parties in this area are some that significantly distinguish them from the classic notion of right-wing parties, meaning, as the established right-wing parties most often support a consistent portfolio of policies both in the realms of immigration and socio-economic policies such as support for more restrictive immigration laws and more restrictive welfare legislation that aims to reduce government spending, the contemporary far-right parties are able to display a surprisingly wide array of policies that are off-brand for the conventional conservative politics.

Let us begin with the most important question of this section that is how and why far-right parties make a significant impact on socio-economic policies in Western European democracies. Krause and Giebler (2020) conducted a time-series analysis on the party manifesto data in European democracies and found that the far-right made an impact on the policy stances of other parties beyond the domains of immigration and multiculturalism, rather, they led to a shift to pro-welfare positions in all parties, with a specifically strong effect on economically left parties, and the

authors suggest that the mechanism behind this impact might be the pro-welfare leaning of far-right parties which they move towards since they cater for the self-perceived “losers of globalization” who presumably need or demand compensation. Another study that evaluated far-right impact on the welfare policy output was Schumacher and Van Kersbergen (2016) which provided an empirical cross-country analysis and found that the mainstream parties in Western European democracies have come to take more pro-welfare positions due to the far-right impact, however, in contrast with the previous study, this impact did not hold true for left-wing mainstream parties, and this pattern may be due to the fact that they already take pro-welfare policy positions, therefore, they may not be as sensitive to the treatment as right-wing mainstream parties are. Now, the only impact of the far-right parties in this policy space is not to tip the scale to either left and right, as they were involved in a more complex set of effects. One of those effects was the subject of Afonso & Papadopoulos (2015) who conducted a case study of Switzerland and found that the presence of the far-right party had led to polarization between the left and right parties when it came to the issue of welfare policy, leading to an erosion of consensus politics, further, the authors delineate that far-right parties did not follow consistent policies in this field, making valence judgments regarding who does deserve welfare benefits and who does not, engaging in a practice of so-called “welfare chauvinism” which suggests that welfare policy should be generous in size but limited to an ingroup, the conception of “us” from the ethno-nationalist perspective of these parties. One final study which reinforced the welfare chauvinism pattern came from Fenger (2018) who conducted a comparative case study of several countries including Germany and the US, and it found that one common property of all far-right parties that were subject to this study in terms of welfare policy was the advocacy for welfare chauvinism as these parties continually sought to limit welfare benefits to “their own”, categorically excluding immigrants and asylum seekers.

At this point it becomes clear that determining a welfare policy stance is a complicated practice for contemporary far-right parties for several reasons, and there are other studies which provided a more nuanced picture of the complicated conundrum that the far-right parties find themselves in, specifically, Röth et al. (2018)

conducted a mixed-method analysis to find how the far-right parties impact the economic policy output when they participate in the government, and they found that when they are in coalitions with center-right parties, they act as a curbing force for the classical conservatives attempting to implement anti-welfare policies, and the authors suggest that this effect may be due to an attempt by the far-right parties to protect the welfare benefits of their working-class base, still, overall the results suggest that during these coalitions' tenure, the welfare policy had become deregulated, and the authors claim that this impact may be the result of the balancing act by the far-right parties also trying to satisfy their small business owner base. This balancing act had been the subject of more studies, one such comparative case study evaluated the impact of the far-right in welfare policy reform and found that on the whole, the legacy of the far-right parties up to this point has been to tip the scale of welfare policy towards retrenchment and not expansion, therefore, betraying their working-class base (Afonso, 2015). Though, it is crucial to note that the previous study did not provide empirical evidence for its conclusions. Another study focused on the leanings of far-right voters when it comes to economic policy to reveal the possible predictors of this endeavor to balance, and through a regression analysis they found the political leanings of far-right voters to be quite diverse, keeping these parties from taking clear stances regarding welfare policy and led them to engage in a practice which the authors call "position blurring" in order to avoid backlash from their voter base, which reinforces that welfare policymaking in far-right parties are complicated processes involving many trade-offs (Rovny, 2013).

All in all, environmental factors in the political space of the Western European democracies clearly leave the far-right parties in a complicated position and it is clear that assessing the impact of these parties on socio-economic policies is going to continue to be a fruitful field for the interested scholars. In summary, the jury is still out on determining the specific impact of the far-right on welfare policymaking processes, and further research is needed, especially taking place in the empirical realm in order to create solid patterns in research concerning this topic.

### **2.3. Common Enemy Effect: A Multi-Faceted Social Phenomenon**

The common enemy effect is the primary social phenomenon that underlies the patterns of legislative behavior from the members of the German Bundestag invoked by the presence of the far-right party. Therefore, it is of critical importance that it should be explored to its full extent in this review, both in terms of the variety of social phenomena that constitute this effect, and the multi-disciplinary literature which underlies its implications, applications, and significance. This section will cover these aspects in four parts. Firstly, the literature surrounding the origins and implications of the common enemy effect will be visited. Secondly, the phenomenon of seeking superordinate goals which comprise a crucial part of the common enemy framework, is going to be explored from the perspective of the practice of far-right containment in Western Europe. Thirdly, a concept that is closely related to the patterns which are observed in this study, namely, parochial altruism is going to be investigated, emphasizing its association with the practice of cordon sanitaire, a specific strategy implemented in many countries to isolate far-right parties. Finally, research demonstrating the perception and treatment of far-right parties as common enemies both on the national and supranational level will be reviewed.

#### **2.3.1. Origins and Implications of the Common Enemy Effect**

The definition and operationalization of the common enemy effect are quite straightforward, as it anticipates that, when actors or groups are confronted with the perception of a common enemy, this perception might lead them to overlook their differences and join hands in an effort to overcome the threat. Although the origins of the common enemy effect presumably go further back in history, its first observation in a scientific experiment only goes back several decades. The introduction of this effect in the scientific literature can be traced back to an extraordinarily influential and infamous series of experiments beginning in 1949 and continuing in the better part of the 1950s conducted by the renowned social psychologist Sherif and colleagues. The original experiment in 1949 which introduced the common enemy effect as a social phenomenon, was constructed as follows, a group of adolescent boys was brought to a summer camp called "Robbers Cave"

which gave the series of experiments their name. The children were separated into two groups and each group was assigned its unique identity with identifiable properties such as distinct names and flags. The children firstly were instructed to participate in specific activities which sought to induce competitive behavior between the members of the respective groups and this intervention was not only successful in leading to competitive attitudes, but it even led to hostility between the groups. Then the researchers implemented a series of interventions, aiming to reduce intergroup conflict and to generate cooperative behavior between the two groups. One such intervention proved to be effective in the first round of this experiment, which was the introduction of a common enemy as the researchers expected that when the groups were exposed to a common enemy, they may put aside their differences and act cooperatively against the common enemy. The researchers successfully prompted a perception of a common enemy in the members of the aforementioned groups and observed that the perception of the common enemy effectively reduced intergroup hostilities and led to cooperative behavior between the two groups. The intervention was abandoned for the further experiments since it implied intergroup conflict in a greater manner as a result (Sherif et al., 1961). Still, the findings have continued to be relevant for researchers of intergroup behavior for decades to come, which are the subject of this review.

A common misconception regarding the social and cooperative behavior in humans is that individuals and groups would only display cooperative behavior through positive affect. As demonstrated in the literature, this is not the case. A relevant experimental study looked at the bonding behavior between individuals and found that, sharing a negative as opposed to a positive attitude towards a third party was robustly effective in promoting closer relationships between individuals (Bosson et al., 2006). Another interesting study from the management science literature had reinforced the findings of the previous study and provided evidence for the common enemy effect, where researchers have conducted multiple experiments which involved negotiation between two parties, and they found that a third party which had demonstrated hostility towards both negotiators have caused the negotiators to be less demanding and more willing to reach an agreement (Zhang et al., 2017). The



study relates very well to the aims of this study, as far-right parties can be classified as anti-system parties and generally exhibit indiscriminate hostility to all the established parties in a country, thus, making it sensible that the far-right may be collectively perceived as a hostile third party, by the parties which participate in a legislative regime.

As previously implied, the common enemy effect has been relevant in the scientific community for a long time and has been subject to many experimental studies. One such study was conducted by Flade et al. (2019) through an intriguing design to explore the automatic perceptive behavior in a large representative sample and found that when prompted with a common threat, individuals demonstrated reduced bias towards those from other social groups. Another interesting study had participants playing a public goods game where each participant was endowed a budget to dedicate to differing aims and the subjects were exposed to two categories of threats, namely, an ambiguous asocial threat that was not specified or a social threat that is a competitor with an aim to maximize their own benefits at the expense of the participants, and the results demonstrated higher cooperative behavior between unaffiliated participants in the social threat condition (Barclay & Benard, 2020). This study is particularly relevant as the researchers successfully isolated the perception of a common enemy from a common threat, reinforcing the relevance of this phenomenon.

The common enemy effect is so prevalent, that it has not only been observed in humans, but numerous studies have found evidence for its existence in animals and even plants. Firstly, Brooks et al. (2021) had implemented an experimental design and found that outgroup threat invoked patterns of tolerance and cooperative behavior among chimpanzees that previously demonstrated competitive behavior. Another experimental study had revealed that a perception of high risk of predation had led to cooperative behavior against the aggressor in birds (Krams et al., 2010). Finally, an influential study had demonstrated that environmental stress as a common threat had caused a reduction in competitive behavior and enhanced cooperative behavior in alpine plants through an experiment (Callaway et al., 2002).

All in all, the evidence in support of the existence of a common enemy effect is plentiful, produced by a variety of different research designs and provided by numerous scientific disciplines. Still, as previously implied, the common enemy effect is a multi-faceted framework which includes several social phenomena that are all relevant to its application in this study, which are going to be explored in the following sections.

### **2.3.2. The Containment of the Far-Right as a Superordinate Goal**

Through being aware of the literature focusing on the responses from established parties against the emerging far-right movement and the developments in the recent years concerning the Western European legislations, one becomes accustomed to the constant efforts of containment of the far-right parties by other political parties and actors in Europe both in the national and supranational level. The containment here refers to joint efforts from a group of political parties to restrain the paths to influence of the far-right parties. I argue that the overall patterns of constraining behavior towards the far-right has become a so-called “superordinate goal” for the established parties in European democracies.

The term superordinate goals were coined by the highly influential social psychologist Muzafer Sherif and the term refers to goals that are compelling and highly appealing to members of groups that cannot be attained through the efforts, resources, and authority of any single group, thus, requiring goal-directed, collected effort to be achieved. Going back to the aforementioned series of experiments by Sherif (1958), another intervention which was implemented for the conflicting groups of adolescents in the later experiments was the introduction of a superordinate goal for the groups. The superordinate goal and the common enemy interventions were the two only effective interventions implemented in the series of experiments in reducing intergroup hostility and fostering cooperative behavior between groups. The superordinate goal phenomenon directly relates to the common enemy framework, as for the competing groups, defeating the common enemy becomes the ultimate superordinate goal.

Superordinate goals as a mechanism to reduce intergroup conflict and promote cooperative behavior has been the subject of various studies in the previous decades. There are exceedingly intriguing studies which showcase the nuances of the superordinate goal mechanism. One relevant study had implemented an experimental design to test the superordinate goal framework in differing conditions, as researchers have recruited subjects and separated them into two groups and introduced superordinate goals for the groups in two conditions, in the first condition, the two groups were instructed to complete a joint task for monetary reward with the manipulation where the researchers have assigned two different specialized tasks to two distinct groups while suggesting the final product of their joint efforts may be rewarded, provided that it showcases a higher quality work than other hypothetical groups, and in the second condition, the two groups were instructed to complete a task without division of labor and specificity. The results showed that the perception of friendliness between the two groups increased when the roles were specified, and no such effect was existent for the groups which were working where the roles were not specified (Deschamps & Brown, 1983). A similar experiment was conducted by Brown and Wade (1987) that produced similar findings, as the researchers separated the participants into three groups and through a similar procedure, found that intergroup cooperative endeavors led to enhanced friendliness between groups when the roles during the aforementioned activity were well specified. These findings clearly demonstrate that any given joint effort is not going to lead to cooperative behavior and reduced group bias, but the perception of the goal needs to be truly superordinate, where different actors incorporate their unique capabilities in a joint effort that could not have been achieved solely through the efforts and capabilities of one group.

The literature points to a variety of nuances and conditions which foster cooperative behavior in intergroup goal-directed endeavors other than role specificity. One such experimental study instructed two different groups to negotiate and agree on solution ideas to a common problem and tested the superordinate goal mechanism in two different conditions, one condition involved the introduction of the common problem by one of the groups that was party to the negotiations and in the other

condition, the issue was raised by an ambiguous third party, and the results revealed that when the issue was raised by the third party, the negotiating groups showed more positive attitudes towards the negotiations and the ability of the two groups to complete the assigned task was enhanced, and such effects were not observed following the former setting (Johnson & Lewicki, 1969). This study clearly demonstrated that in order for a goal to be perceived as superordinate by the different groups, it has to appear in an exogenous manner, otherwise, as researchers suggest, the issue might be perceived as a part of a competitive strategy from the initiating group. A recent study which provided further support for the superordinate goal framework came from Swaab et al. (2021) which included several experiments to assess the effects of the superordinate goal phenomenon in negotiations, and they found that when groups take time to discuss their superordinate goals prior to business negotiations, the practice promoted trust between the groups and enabled them to achieve a higher collective gain as a result of the task.

In summary, the superordinate goals framework is closely related to the common enemy framework in the sense that the common enemy effect naturally implies the endeavor to achieve a superordinate goal that cannot be attained by the efforts of a single group alone, and also, it relates to the subject of this study as the commonplace efforts to contain the far-right parties in European democracies can be logically conceived as an endeavor to achieve a superordinate goal which assumes intergroup cooperation.

### **2.3.3. The “Cordon Sanitaire” as Parochial Altruism**

As previously discussed in this review, the established parties in European democracies and supranational parties which operate in the European Parliament have developed practices of containment against the far-right in which they attempt to restrict the ability of far-right parties to influence legislative activity. However, there is one practice that has become commonplace in European democracies which is the “cordon sanitaire”, a term originated from the medical community that refers to containment with an aim to prevent further infections, which perfectly relates to the subject matter at hand as in the literature, there are many instances where the

emergence and influence of the far-right political movement were conceptualized as a contagion (Van Spanje, 2010). The practice in the political literature refers to a particular agreement between political parties and actors to contain the influence of a political group through a specific agreement among parties to systematically rule out cooperation with far-right parties, especially in the form of coalition partnerships, and also includes the practice of categorically rejecting the legislation proposed by far-right parties. (Krause et al., 2022; Ripoll Servent & Panning, 2019).

The social phenomenon that is associated with the cordon sanitaire practice is the concept called parochial altruism, a concept that is well established in the literature in numerous disciplines which refers to a specific behavior, an act of self-sacrifice to the benefit of one's own group and to hurt or sabotage the competing outgroups (De Dreu et al., 2010). The prevalence of this behavioral pattern has been demonstrated through several studies until now. One such study involved a large and representative sample which has demonstrated the existence of parochial altruism in numerous groups and through several studies, aimed to determine the strongest predictors of this phenomenon, and the results suggested that the strongest predictor was family and kinship, followed by common political views, religion etc., and an interesting predictor which turned out to be non-significant was gender (Ben-Ner et al., 2009). Another experimental study which involved the play of economic games between two groups, zero-sum games where the benefit of one group came at the expense of the other group, and the results supported the expectations which suggest that participants tend to sacrifice from their personal gains to a significant amount that cannot be explained by the concept of rationality, to protect the gains of their group against the outgroup competitors (Abbink et al., 2012). Another similar study which had its participants playing public goods games in an experimental design has clearly demonstrated that individuals do not hesitate to make economic decisions at the expense of the outgroup for the benefit of their own groups (Halevy et al., 2008).

This behavioral pattern of self-sacrifice for the benefit of one's own group at the expense of the outgroup may potentially be an innate phenomenon that may be closely tied to the fundamental aspects of human behavior. One interesting study

which provided solid evidence for this assumption was conducted by Chiang and Wu (2015), where children aged between four and fifteen were instructed to play the dictator game, an experimental procedure that is commonplace for studies in behavioral economics, were instructed to distribute their resources through three options, keeping the resources to themselves and giving away resources to their classmates (ingroup) and children from other classes (outgroup), and the results showed that the children tended to favor their ingroup at the expense of the outgroup. This study has an important implication for the literature as it suggests that the behavioral pattern of parochial altruism is either innate to the human experience or learned from a very early age participating in social life. A final study concerning this phenomenon had revealed an interesting insight, as the study attempted to predict the behavior of parochial altruism through individual behaviors and personality traits such as pro-sociality through the rationale which suggested people who have a general bias towards altruism may be more altruistic towards their ingroup at the expense of the outgroup, however, the results demonstrated that the behavior parochial altruism was not predicted by pro-sociality in individuals (Corr et al., 2015). The findings of this study reinforced the phenomenon of parochial altruism as it relates to the subject of this study, as it demonstrated the situational nature of this phenomenon, thus, strengthening its relationship to its implementation in this study.

Since the existence and prevalence of the behavioral pattern called parochial altruism have been thoroughly established, its specific association to the contemporary political practice of the cordon sanitaire needs further explanation. I argue that the cordon sanitaire practice can be considered as an instance of parochial altruism since it is an act by political parties to benefit their group and to hurt the prospects of far-right parties, and this practice can also be regarded sacrificial, since the political parties are restricting their options when it comes to legislative cooperation and partnering in governing coalitions. This is especially relevant for right-wing parties as they sacrifice the possibility of recruiting supporters to pass their right-wing policy goals in legislatures. All in all, the concept of parochial altruism stands as an important phenomenon in the explanation of the commonplace political practices

against a common enemy which we have observed prevalently in European politics in the recent years.

#### **2.3.4. The Contemporary European Far-Right as the Common Enemy**

Following the Second World War, the Western European far-right movements have always displayed an uneasy relationship with the political and legal regimes of their respective countries, and recently, we have been exposed to a similar pattern at the European level politics. In legislatures throughout Western Europe, practices of isolation, ostracization and even persecution of far-right parties have become commonplace. Therefore, this section of the review is dedicated to exploring the instances in the literature where far-right parties in Europe were perceived and treated as the common enemy.

In an attempt to navigate this literature, it would be sensible to move from the national to the supranational level. Firstly, in a study conducted on the Belgian MPs of local parliaments through a survey design had demonstrated that the entry of the far-right party to the local legislatures led to a specific perception on the MPs of other parties where a common pattern from the responses to the survey is that the far-right party was perceived as a threat to the procedural integrity of the institution (Downs, 2001). In another interesting study, Bolin et al. (2021) conducted a survey experiment on a sample of Swedish voters and asked them to react to different policy proposals hypothetically coming from different political actors and found that the participants reacted more negatively to proposals with identical content when told that the policy was proposed by the far-right. These findings suggest that the successful stigmatization of far-right parties in the legislative space had led to a spillover of the common enemy effect to the public.

Moving onto the prime location of interest for this study, Germany, there are two significant studies which successfully showcase the particular treatment which the far-right parties were exposed. The first study focused on the response to far-right parties in Germany throughout recent history and determined that all of the far-right parties which have successfully emerged over time were subject to the same cordon

sanitaire treatment from the established parties, namely, the National Democratic Party, the *Republikaner* and the German People's Union were all collectively isolated and stigmatized in the public space, they were not able to find any legislative or coalition partners during their time, and they were called out by other parties as constituting a threat to democracy and being morally compromised which the author suggested that has led to factional infighting, radicalization and organizational decay in these parties (Art, 2018). The second study was concerned with more recent developments involving the newly emerged far-right party in Germany, the Alternative for Germany (AfD), and the author had focused on the responses of the established parties to the entry of AfD to the Bundestag and found that they were met with the cordon sanitaire treatment by the other parties which has led to some of the rare occurrences in post-war German political history, as the author referred to a specific instance following the commencement of the new session of Bundestag during the election of the members of the parliamentary presidium which normally involves the free nomination of deputy-chairs by all parties and their nominee getting elected without opposition, however, when it came to the election of the AfD's nominees, there was a different story, as the party's nominees were rejected by the parliament one after another and the party has failed to nominate an electable candidate even after three attempts which paint a clear picture of the treatment of the far-right party, the second finding of the study directly relates to the variables of interest for this study, the responses to the legislative proposals of the AfD, as the author noted that they were categorically shut down by the MPs from other parties which clearly supports the findings of this study (Arzheimer, 2019).

Finally, there are some fascinating studies in the literature regarding the responses to far-right presence at the European level, namely, in the European Parliament where political groups from all over the European Union are represented on the basis of ideology and not nationality. Especially in the 2010s the emerging and established far-right parties in Europe were able to amass quite a significant proportion of the seats in the European Parliament, and the responses from other political groups were at least equally significant. Perhaps the most robust study in this field was a field study conducted with the participation of MPs from the European Parliament which



included more than a hundred qualitative interviews with such members and was able to gather some interesting insights into the response of political groups to the far-right presence in the chamber, one particular practice of the established political groups was particularly stimulating, as the researchers have found that, acting out of a common enemy framework, the established parties in the parliament have categorically denied the members of far-right parties from any and all offices within the chamber, and distributing the aforementioned seats in an unprecedented cooperative manner between each other according to the proportion of votes that they have received (Kantola & Miller, 2021). Another study looking into the responses to far-right presence in the European Parliament has produced similar findings, as Ripoll Servent (2019) had found through an analysis of the parliamentary proceedings that unexpectedly the parliament had elected a truly unlikely candidate for a particular high-level position only in order to block the far-right candidate from getting elected to the aforementioned position. One final study has opened a door to a usually secretive process of the European Union, the so-called “trilogue” which refers to the tripartite negotiations between the Parliament, the Commission, and the Council to communicate effectively in an attempt to coordinate their policy goals. Ripoll Servent and Panning (2019) had conducted qualitative interviews with the participants of the trilogue from the parliament, focusing on the preliminary shadow interviews between the MPs of the parliament in an attempt to consolidate a joint position for the parliament before participating in the trilogue. It was the authors’ impression that the nature of these meetings involved listening to all parties that do come forward to make policy suggestions, however, when it came to far-right eurosceptic parties, the patterns differed, as the authors note that the participation of the far-right members to these meetings was effectively discouraged, and when the far-right MPs insisted, their amendments to legislation were categorically shut down to an extent that was met with distraught by some of the interviewees of the study. All in all, the findings from the supranational level are robust and they support the existence and prevalence of a common enemy effect against the far-right on the European Union level policy making.

In conclusion, in this section of the review, the many facets of the common enemy effect were discussed. Slowly and continually building from the origins and evidence directly concerned with the common enemy effect, some related social phenomena was successfully explored and associated with common patterns that are observed in contemporary European politics regarding the far-right, and in the end, specific evidence concerning the perception and treatment of the far-right as the common enemy in the European legislative space was thoroughly explored. Assessing the current state of the literature, the common enemy effect stands as an accurate theoretical framework which might shed some light on the possible mechanisms underlying the empirical observations of this study.

## **CHAPTER 3**

### **METHOD**

This chapter covers the methodology applied in this study. The first section covers the research design. The second section entails data and operationalization. Finally, the statistical analysis is presented, and the limitations of the study are discussed.

#### **3.1. Research Design**

This study attempted to assess the impact of far-right presence on the voting behavior of members of parliament in the German Bundestag and to evaluate the group differences between the responses to legislative proposals from all opposition parties, in terms of roll-call voting unity against the said legislative proposals to determine if the legislative proposals from the far-right party are rejected in a more unified manner by the MPs compared to those proposals from other opposition parties.

Since the purpose of the study was to empirically establish a relationship between the predictor variables and outcome variables, a correlational research design was implemented. Finally, the data were transformed with R (R Core Team, 2019), descriptive statistics and inferential statistics were run with IBM Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS 24).

#### **3.2. Data and Operationalization**

The hypotheses in this study were tested utilizing datasets derived from the Bundestag Roll-Call Vote Datasets (BTVote) from the Harvard Dataverse (Sieberer et al., 2020; Hohendorf & Sieberer, 2022). The dataset consists of three distinct

datasets, namely, "VOTE CHARACTERISTICS" which includes various information regarding every roll-call vote that took place in the Bundestag, "MP CHARACTERISTICS" which entails numerous data points concerning the Members of Parliament in the Bundestag, and finally "VOTING BEHAVIOR" which records every roll-call voting behavior of the said MPs during the time which the dataset covers. Only the "VOTE CHARACTERISTICS" and the "VOTING BEHAVIOR" datasets were utilized in this study. The publicly available "BTVote" dataset covers the period between 1949-2013, however, this study is concerned with the period between 2013-2021, namely, the 18th and 19th sessions of the German Bundestag. To alleviate this issue, I have personally contacted the scholars who work in the making of this dataset at the University of Bamberg and procured the updated dataset that includes the missing period between 2013-2021, which was only released just before the submission of this dissertation. Nevertheless, the aforementioned dataset does not directly include the variables of interest for this study. Therefore, I was compelled to derive the necessary variables from this dataset and to produce two new datasets which are employed in the testing of the two relevant hypotheses of this study.

To test the first hypothesis, it was necessary to assess all roll-call votes during the 18th and 19th sessions of the Bundestag and for each vote, determine whether comprehensive cooperation was evident. Cooperation between all parties in this study is identified as instances where all parties other than the far-right party, in a given roll-call vote, have all voted in the same direction of either "yes", "no" or "abstain". The outcome variable, a categorical variable, was designated as "1" for every roll-call vote during the 18th and the 19th sessions of Bundestag, in all instances where more than 50% of all MPs from all parties in the parliament, excluding the far-right party have voted in the same direction, which is considered to be the end-all-be-all threshold for determining the general will of a party in a given vote (Rice, 1925, p.63). The "1" value of the outcome variable represents comprehensive cooperation according to the definition of all parties excluding the far-right, voting in the same direction on a given RCV in the chamber. The outcome variable was designated as "0" for all other roll-call vote scenarios and represents the lack of comprehensive cooperation between all parties excluding the far-right, in the

chamber. The computation of the outcome variable excluded the votes from the members of AfD for all RCVs during the 19th session of Bundestag since the aim of the study is to assess the impact of the far-right party on MPs from other parties. The treatment variable, also a categorical variable, was designated as “0” for all recorded RCVs during the 18th session of Bundestag for which the far-right party was not represented in the chamber and was designated as “1” for all RCVs during the 19th session of Bundestag for which the far-right party was represented as a party in the parliament. The first hypothesis was tested through the implementation of a logistic regression analysis for the following reasons, first, the outcome variable is a categorical variable, secondly, due to the high specificity of the sample at hand, meaning the sample comprises of not patterns of behavior from the general population but the roll-call voting behavior of an elite group, therefore, the sample not being able to satisfy certain criteria such as the normal distribution of predictor variables or for them to be linearly related to the outcome variable or the equal variance within each group. Considering that logistic regression does not require any of these assumptions, it is one of the more flexible techniques among others, which distinguishes it as the ideal type of analysis for this study (Tabachnick&Fidell, 2007, p.30). Therefore, a logistic regression analysis was implemented according to the following formula to predict the outcome of the RCVs in the 19th session of the Bundestag and to assess whether the instances of comprehensive cooperation have significantly increased subsequent to the entry of the far-right party to the parliament:

$$\hat{Y}_i = \frac{e^{A+B_1X_1}}{1 + e^{A+B_1X_1}}$$

Where  $Y_i$  is the existence of comprehensive cooperation between all parties,  $A$  is the intercept,  $B$  is the effect of the treatment.

For the testing of the second hypothesis, a more sophisticated measure of voting behavior was needed. Therefore, I have developed a “Vote Unity Score” which incidentally turned out similar to the “RICE method” measure of party unity that has been prevalent for a long time (Rice, 1925; Carey, 2007). Since the aim of this study

was to measure the level of unification against the legislative proposals from the opposition parties, and the phrase “against” is emphasized here as all legislative proposals from opposition parties subject to a RCV in both periods were rejected without exception, thus, a score which could determine the level of unity behind such rejections was needed. The “Vote Unity Score” which is a continuous variable that ranges between [0,1] where “0” represents complete division in voting behavior of MPs, meaning an equal number of MPs have voted in opposite directions and “1” represents perfect voting unity between MPs, meaning all MPs without exception have voted in the same direction. Vote Unity Scores were derived from the aforementioned “BTVote, VOTING BEHAVIOR” dataset which included seven categories to record roll-call voting behavior of the MPs, namely, “excused absence”, “yes”, “no”, “abstain”, “unexcused absent”, “invalid vote”, “voting behavior not/wrongly protocolled”. In the making of the relevant dataset for this study, the categories other than “yes”, “no” and “abstain” were removed, which made up only a small number of voting records. The reason for the removal was, their interpretation remaining controversial (Carey, 2007, p.96), and their relative irrelevance to the measure of voting unity where the absence of an action does not signal more or less voting unity against the legislative proposals of the opposition parties. Also, other categories of votes which may hold some meaning for the purposes of this study dependent on the context, namely, “invalid vote” and “voting behavior not/wrongly protocolled” were not included in the analysis since the total amount of votes in these two categories for the time frame of interest was null. All “yes” votes were coded as “1”, all “no” votes were coded as “-1” and all “abstain” votes were coded as “0”. The mean value of all votes for every RCV was produced and since “yes” and “no” votes cancel each other in the calculation of the mean, it is apparent that more MPs voting in the same direction in each RCV would pull the final score to the poles, namely to “-1” or “1”, and “abstain” votes would contribute to anchor the mean value, a trend signaling a lack of will against the legislative proposals of opposition parties. Finally, the absolute value of the mean values is taken since the direction of the voting being either “yes” or “no” is irrelevant to the aims of the study. In terms of the concept of unity, it is obvious that voting in opposite directions can

only signal to a lack of unity where two or more MPs vote to achieve opposite outcomes. The abstain vote is clearly more difficult to categorize in terms of this dichotomy. In principle, it is possible for MPs to vote abstain in a given RCV in a unified manner. However, when scrutinizing the data, one realizes that this is usually not the case. In practice, most often a fraction of MPs of a party vote abstain to avoid taking a stance on a given legislation for a myriad of reasons. Therefore, it seems more sensible to interpret the abstain votes as an anchor which lowers unity scores when deployed rather than introducing it as a third dimension in the relevant scheme for this score.

The vote unity score takes a value between [0,1], a coherent measure for every roll-call vote for every legislative proposal initiated by the opposition parties. The precise formula for the Vote Unity Score is as follows:

$$\text{vote\_unity}_i = |\text{mean}(\text{vote\_beh}_i)|$$

where  $i$  represents the specific roll-call vote and where  $\text{vote\_beh}$  is an integer that ranges between [-1,1]

Considering the testing of the second hypothesis required the comparison of mean differences between several groups on a continuous outcome variable and one discrete independent variable, naturally, a one-way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) seemed the appropriate method (Tabachnick&Fidell, 2007, p.29). A one-way ANOVA allows researchers to detect whether groups of interest differ in terms of the outcome variable in the overall model. Still, the overall model does not demonstrate which groups differ from each other. Therefore, since the second hypothesized model predicts a significant difference between the responses to the legislative proposals of the far-right party compared to other opposition parties, a post-hoc analysis was conducted to reveal such differences (Pallant, 2020).

Keeping with the theme of the study, a higher vote unity score among the MPs represents more cooperative behavior against the legislative proposals from the opposition parties. Therefore, it is clear that both hypotheses attempt to approach

an expectable pattern in voting behavior from two different perspectives which are similar enough to be considered the two sides of the same coin. Also, since the common-enemy effect presumes cooperative behavior against the perceived common enemy, a significantly higher vote unity score against the legislative proposals of the far-right party should be considered applicable evidence for the existence of the common-enemy effect.

### **3.3. Statistical Analysis**

The data was transformed with R. Descriptive statistics and inferential statistics were run with IBM Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS 24). Firstly, descriptive statistics were computed to determine means, standard deviations, and frequencies for the variables of interest. Following the assumption checks for the first analysis, a logistic regression analysis was performed to test if the instances of comprehensive cooperation in the Bundestag have increased subsequent to the entry of the far-right party. Finally, after to the assumption checks for the second analysis, a one-way Analysis of Variance was implemented to assess whether the legislative proposals from the far-right party were rejected by the MPs in a more unified manner compared to the proposals from other opposition parties.

### **3.4. Limitations of the Study**

As well as any other, this study suffers from certain limitations. Firstly, this is a case study that is only concerned with the case of the German Bundestag, therefore, the findings, albeit strong, should not be considered generalizable regarding the patterns of roll-call voting behavior in legislative chambers throughout the world.

Another limitation which applies to this study is the lack of instruments or the lack of standardized measurements in a general dataset regarding MP voting behavior which would allow a researcher to observe patterns of cooperation and voting unity. For these reasons, I was compelled to produce an instrument to represent comprehensive inter-party cooperation for the first analysis, and to create a measure



of voting unity and a conceptualization of MP voting behavior to represent unity against a common enemy for the second analysis.

Another important limitation of this study concerns almost all roll-call voting research. Apart from certain specific examples, in the overwhelming majority of the legislative chambers around the world, including the German Bundestag which is the subject of this study, individual votes are not recorded for every vote in the chamber, instead, individual votes from MPs are only recorded during roll-call votes, which inevitably invites doubts regarding selective sampling of MP voting behavior. However, noting that this is the common parliamentary conduct around the world and recognizing the value of roll-call voting data, the reasonable approach is continuing to pursue insights from this type of data while taking its inherent limitations into account.

In terms of the first analysis, it must be noted that although logistic regression analysis is a flexible technique which allows to extract insights from particular datasets such as the one utilized in this study, the existence of a relationship between the presence of the far-right to the chamber and the significant increase in the instances of comprehensive cooperation in the RCVs do not in any way imply that the entry of the far-right party has caused this change in cooperative behavior from the MPs.

In addition to the limitations regarding the logistic regression analysis, another one for regarding this study needs to be mentioned. A logistic regression analysis is a flexible technique which enables researchers to explore relationships between various variables and allows the control of these relationships with control variables. Thus, in terms of this study, a more sophisticated analysis with multiple independent variables and control variables could have been deployed which may have led to more robust findings. However, due to a lack of resources on the part of the author, unfortunately, a parsimonious design was deployed at this point of the study.

The limitations regarding the second analysis of this study are commonplace in observational research. Comparing voting unity against legislative proposals from the

opposition parties in RCVs entails the assessment of all legislations proposed by such parties. Taking into account, the nature of the legislative processes, it should be expected that different parties propose a different number of legislations, thus, the compared groups inevitably vary in size. Further, given the highly particular nature of RCV data and the relatively small number of observations that are observed, one cannot expect the variances to be equivalent for different groups which is obviously a common assumption in parametric methods of measurement. Finally, one limitation which differentiates roll-call voting research from other kinds of research is that random sampling is not applicable to roll-call voting research. Unlike research concerned with large populations, all RCV data is manageable in size and available to researchers, therefore, this field utilizes all data rather than sampling from a population.

## **CHAPTER 4**

### **RESULTS**

This chapter demonstrated the results of the statistical analyses for the research questions that are subject to this study. First, the descriptive statistics and assumption checks concerning the first analysis were exhibited. Then, the results of the logistic regression analysis concerning the first hypothesized model were presented. Secondly, the descriptive statistics and assumption checks for the second analysis were shown. Finally, the results of the one-way Analysis of Variance and the post-hoc pairwise comparisons with regard to the second hypothesis were revealed.

#### **4.1. First Analysis**

##### **4.1.1. Descriptive Statistics and Assumption Checks**

The outcome variable that is the instances of comprehensive cooperation was coded as “1” while the lack of comprehensive cooperation was coded as “0”. Twelve percent of all RCVs were subject to comprehensive cooperation. The treatment variable was coded as “1” for all RCVs during the 19th session of the Bundestag where the far-right party was present in the chamber, and the treatment variable was coded as “0” for all RCVs during the 18th session of the Bundestag where the far-right party was absent. The proportion of RCVs when the far-right party was present was ( $N = 244$ , 53.50%, ), and the proportion of RCVs when the far-right party was absent was ( $N = 213$ , 46.50%), therefore the two groups were evenly distributed. There was a notable difference between the instances of comprehensive cooperation in the treatment group ( $N = 47$ ), and the control group ( $N = 6$ ). The expected frequency assumption

which is an important necessity for the viability of a logistic regression analysis was checked, and all the expected frequencies turned out to be higher than 5%, in line with the assumption (Peng, 2002).

#### 4.1.2. Hypothesized Model-1

A binomial logistic regression analysis was performed to assess if the instances of comprehensive cooperation in RCVs between all parties in the parliament increase in the presence of the far-right party in Bundestag. This study implements a parsimonious model, with only one predictor variable. The results show that the impact of the presence of the far-right party on the roll-call voting behavior of MPs was significant,  $\chi^2(1) = 22.352$ ,  $p = <.001$  (see Table 4.1). The Cox and Snell's  $R^2$  ( $R^2_{CS} = .07$ ) and Nagelkerke's  $R^2$  ( $R^2_N = .14$ ) values were calculated, and they indicated that this model explained a modest amount of variance in the instances of comprehensive cooperation. The overall classification for this model was 88%. The presence of the far-right had increased the odds of comprehensive cooperation in the chamber to more than eightfold. In sum, this finding clearly demonstrates that in the presence of the far-right party, cooperation between MPs from other parties was enhanced.

Table 4.1.

*The Results of the Logistic Regression Analysis (N = 456)*

Predictor	$\beta$	SE $\beta$	Wald's		95% CI for Odds Ratio		
			$\chi^2$	df	Lower	EXP( $\beta$ )	Upper
Treatment	2.103	.445	22.352*	1	3.425	8.191	19.558
Constant	-3.536	.414	72.901*	1			

Note. \*  $p < .001$

## **4.2. Second Analysis**

### **4.2.1. Descriptive Statistics and Assumption Checks**

The descriptive statistics for the groups of interest, which consisted of the means and the standard deviations for the outcome variable, vote unity in the chamber against the legislative proposals of relevant parties were, FDP ( $M = 0.816$ ,  $SD = 0.195$ ,  $N = 32$ ), GRÜNE ( $M = 0.661$ ,  $SD = 0.132$ ,  $N = 16$ ), Linke ( $M = 0.754$ ,  $SD = 0.127$ ,  $N = 11$ ) and AfD ( $M = 0.999$ ,  $SD = 0.003$ ,  $N = 20$ ), where higher the vote unity score that corresponds to a specific party means that their legislative proposals that were subject to roll-call votes were responded in a more unified manner by the members of parliament for other political parties. Finally, the homogeneity of variance assumption was checked for the relevant groups.

### **4.2.2. Hypothesized Model-2**

A one-way Analysis of Variance was performed to evaluate the relationship between which opposition party a given legislation was proposed by and the voting unity in the chamber against any given legislative proposal. The independent variable was a categorical variable which consisted of four levels, namely, FDP, GRÜNE, Linke and AfD. The dependent variable was a continuous variable ranging between zero and one, indicating the level of unification in RCVs against the legislative proposals of a particular party. A Levene's Test for the equality of variances was conducted (Brown & Forsythe, 1974),  $F(3, 75) = 28.667$ ,  $p < .001$ , the results demonstrate that the equality of variances assumption for the one-way Analysis of Variance was violated. The alpha level for significance which was initially set at ( $\alpha = .05$ ), was adjusted to a more conservative level of ( $\alpha = .04$ ) in order to compensate for the bias in line with the literature (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007).

The test results suggested that the vote unity against the legislative proposals of at least one of the opposition parties had significantly differed from the others,  $F(3,75) = 17.951$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $\eta^2 = .418$ , see Table 4.2.

Table 4.2.

*Test of Between-Subjects Effects (N = 79)*

Source	<i>SS</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>MS</i>	<i>F</i>	Partial $\eta^2$
Opp. Party	1.146	3	.382	17.951*	.418
Error	1.596	75	.021		
Total	2.743	78			

*Note.* \* $p < .001$

Following the main analysis which established that at least one party among the four opposition parties was distinguished among others in terms of the voting unity against their legislative proposals, a post-hoc analysis was performed to assess the pairwise group differences between the vote unity scores for the legislative proposals of the opposition parties in line with the hypothesized model. To decrease Type I error, a Bonferroni correction was applied [ $p = (.04/6 = .006)$ ] (Armstrong, 2014). According to this adjustment, only the pairwise comparisons which demonstrated a difference at ( $\alpha = .006$ ) were considered significant.

The pairwise comparisons between the voting unity against the legislative proposals of opposition parties were calculated. Congruently with the hypothesis, in terms of voting unity against the party's legislative proposals, AfD ranked the highest ( $M = .998$ ,  $SD = .003$ ), followed by FDP ( $M = .816$ ,  $SD = .194$ ), Linke ( $M = .722$ ,  $SD = .126$ ) and GRÜNE ( $M = .661$ ,  $SD = .132$ ). The results of the pairwise comparisons are displayed in Table 4.3.

Table 4.3.

*Post-hoc analysis: pairwise comparisons (N = 79)*

	Vote Unity Score	M	SD	FDP	GRÜNE	Linke
FDP		.816	.194			
GRÜNE		.661	.132	[.027, .283]		
Linke		.722	.126	[-.051, .239]	[-.224, .102]	
AfD		.998	.003	[-.301, -.063*]	[-.477, -.197*]	[-.432, -.119*]

*Note.* \*Bonferroni corrected  $p < .006$

### 4.3. Hypothesis Testing

Hypothesis 1: It was hypothesized that the presence of the far-right party in the legislative chamber would lead to an increase in the instances of comprehensive cooperation between all parties other than the far-right in RCVs. Congruently with the hypothesis, there is a significant correlation between the presence of the far-right party during RCVs and comprehensive cooperation between all parties ( $\beta = 22.352$ ,  $p < .001$ ).

Hypothesis 2: It was hypothesized that the MPs would vote in a more unified manner during the RCVs against the legislative proposals of the far-right party, compared to the legislative proposals from other opposition parties. Consistently with the hypothesis, there is a significant difference between the responses to the legislative proposals from different opposition parties ( $\beta = 17.951$ ,  $p < .001$ ). A post-hoc analysis was conducted to test whether the MPs voted against the proposals of the far-right party in a more unified manner compared to the proposals from other opposition parties. The results reveal a significant difference in voting unity against the far-right party compared to all other parties in pairwise comparisons.

### 4.4. Summary of the Results

Two hypothesized models were tested to assess the impact of the far-right on the cooperative voting behavior of the MPs in the German Bundestag. A logistic regression analysis was performed to test whether the presence of the far-right party had led to an increase in the likelihood of comprehensive cooperation in the chamber where all parties vote in the same direction. The results suggest that there is a strong correlation between the presence of the far-right party during RCVs and comprehensive cooperation between the other parties. A one-way Analysis of Variance was conducted to determine whether there is a difference between the responses to the legislative proposals from different opposition parties. The results demonstrate that at least one of the groups has differed from the others in terms of the voting unity against their proposals. Post-hoc pairwise comparisons were calculated to determine if the MPs vote in a more unified manner against the



legislative proposals of the AfD, compared to other opposition parties. The results revealed a robust difference between all pairings involving the AfD with other parties and non-significant differences between other pairs which did not involve the AfD. Overall, the findings point to a significant impact of the far-right party on the cooperative roll-call voting behavior of the members of parliament.

## **CHAPTER 5**

### **DISCUSSION OF THE FINDINGS**

In this chapter, the interrelated findings of both analyses which were implemented in the study were discussed in the light of the current literature. This study had sought to assess the impact of the presence of the far-right party on the roll-call voting behavior of the members of the German Bundestag. The research question was whether the presence of the far-right had promoted cooperation and fostered unity among the MPs from other parties in the literature with regard to the roll-call votes. The common enemy effect, which is well-established in the scientific literature, was delineated as the potential mechanism underlying the patterns of legislative behavior which were observed in the analyses. Both analyses which aimed to determine the impact of far-right presence turned out significant as were predicted by the respective hypotheses. The next sections of this chapter provide a more in-depth discussion of the findings regarding each of the two hypotheses that were tested through the empirical strategy of this study.

#### **5.1. The Findings of the First Analysis**

The first analysis sought to test whether the presence of the far-right has led to a significant increase in the instances of comprehensive cooperation between parties in the German Bundestag. Comprehensive cooperation as implemented in this study was defined as an instance where all parties in the Bundestag excluding the far-right party voting in the same direction for a given roll-call vote. The legislative processes in Western European countries are considered to possess consensual properties in the current literature where many legislative proposals pass with an overwhelming

majority or an effective consensus (Lijphart, 1999; Andeweg, 2000). This assumption certainly holds for the German Bundestag (Schmidt, 2008). However, it is necessary to note that roll-call votes in the German Bundestag and other legislatures in parliamentary democracies around the world are more conflictual due to an institutional reason, according to regular procedure, the individual votes of MPs are not recorded for substantive votes on legislative proposals, therefore, in the German Bundestag, roll-call votes are performed only if a notable proportion of the MPs demand it, which usually points to that legislative bill carrying some controversial aspects. Thus, it should be expected that the actual instances of comprehensive cooperation should be less common compared to regular substantive votes. The non-availability of regular substantive voting data obviously raises legitimate questions of biased sampling for researchers. However, given that the detailed results of regular votes are not recorded at all, this compels the researchers to make use of the available data, and roll-call voting research continues to be an interesting and reliable method of exploring the parliamentary voting behavior of MPs.

In light of these conditions, a correlational empirical strategy was implemented to compare the number of instances of comprehensive cooperation between two terms of the German Bundestag, the eighteenth term where the far-right party was not represented in the legislature, and the nineteenth term following the entry of the far-right party AfD into the legislature. The results indicated that the instances of comprehensive cooperation between all parties excluding the far-right party have increased significantly in the nineteenth term in the Bundestag, which confirmed the respective hypothesis, demonstrating that the presence of the far-right in the parliament induced enhanced cooperation between parties.

To determine where these findings are positioned compared to the relevant literature is more complicated than it may seem. Currently, there are no studies which the author is aware of, that focuses specifically on the impact of far-right parties on the cooperative voting behavior patterns of MPs in legislatures. Therefore, this study may only be compared to relevant studies which are either loosely

connected to the subject matter or that indirectly produced relevant findings (Sherif et al., 1961; Kantola & Miller, 2021).

## **5.2. The Findings of the Second Analysis**

The second analysis of the study sought to test whether the legislative proposals of the far-right party unify the MPs in a more robust manner, possibly mediated by the common enemy effect, compared the legislative proposals of other opposition parties. The degree of unification in this case is empirically determined through a “Vote-Unity Score”, a quantitative measure created for this study. The logic of the score is straightforward, all legislative proposals by the opposition parties in the nineteenth term of the Bundestag were rejected, thus, the only aspect that is to be measured is the severity of this rejection, where if every MP votes “No” to a legislative proposal, the vote-unity score gets the value of “1” meaning perfect unity, and if there is variation between the votes of MPs, the unity decreases.

To test the group differences between the responses to the legislative proposals by the far-right party as opposed to other opposition parties, a one-way analysis of variance was implemented, and the results demonstrated that there was a significant mean difference between the groups. As a post-hoc analysis, pairwise comparisons were calculated which determined that in every pairing of the far-right party with another opposition party, the MPs were more unified against the legislative proposals of the far-right party as opposed to any other opposition party.

The findings of the second analysis provide are significant in two different aspects. Firstly, the results provided further evidence for the existence of a common enemy effect that was already well demonstrated in the scientific literature (Sherif et al., 1961; Zhang et al., 2017; Bosson et al., 2006; Flade et al., Barclay & Benard, 2020; Brooks et al., 2021; Callaway et al., 2002; Krams et al., 2010). More importantly, these findings make a unique contribution to the literature on the political responses to the far-right as it becomes the first study to quantitatively establish the far-right party under the framework of the common enemy effect, expanding the current literature which indirectly demonstrates the isolated and ostracized position of far-right parties

in Europe (Downs, 2001; Kantola & Miller, 2021; Ripoll Servent, 2019; Ripoll Servent & Panning, 2019; Bolin et al., 2021; Arzheimer, 2019).

## **CHAPTER 6**

### **CONCLUSION**

The final chapter concluded the study. Firstly, the implications of this study were discussed, secondly, an overview of the limitations were provided and thirdly, the recommendations for further research were indicated.

#### **6.1. Implications of the Study**

This study is positioned at the crossroads of several research areas, namely, research on legislative cooperation, far-right parties, and the common enemy effect.

In terms of legislative cooperation, there is a substantial body of research through which the determinants of legislative cooperation between different political actors were explored. Research in this area had identified mainly four unique determinants of legislative cooperation, firstly, institutional determinants, such as parliamentary rules, institutional necessities to build legislative coalitions, bicameral systems, and veto players (Hohendorf et al., 2021; Christian & Pedersen, 2014; Schmidt, 2008; Miller & Stecker, 2008; Tsebelis, 1995; Giuliani, 2008). Secondly, there are ideological determinants such as the effect of ideological proximity between political actors (Klüver & Zubek, 2018; Andeweg et al., 2008). Thirdly, there are political factors such as electoral alliances, manufacturing legitimacy, and political party cultures (Steinack, 2011; Dewan & Spirling, 2011; Christiansen et al., 2014). Fourthly, there are social factors such as the impact of personal relationships between political actors (Curry & Roberts, 2022; Andris et al., 2016; Arnold et al., 2000). What becomes clear through a thorough review of the literature is that there is a lack of studies in this field which evaluates the impact of far-right parties on the cooperative legislative behavior of

other political parties. Therefore, this study became the first of its kind which assessed the impact of the presence of far-right parties on the cooperative roll-call voting behavior of members of parliament in such a way that significantly enhances our understanding of the predictors of legislative cooperation between political actors and designates a potentially fruitful research area to be further explored by the scientific community.

Regarding the impact of far-right parties on the political space in a given country, there are numerous studies in the field which point to several observable effects. Firstly, the literature demonstrated that far-right parties in Europe, as single-issue parties, impact the political space in terms of immigration policy, in the direction of inducing anti-immigration attitudes in political actors and promoting stricter immigration and integration policies in the countries which they operate (Abou-Chadi & Krause, 2020; Minkenberg, 2001; Mudde, 2013; Van Spanje, 2010). Secondly, the presence and success of far-right parties have mixed effects towards welfare policy, as some research revealing that they lead to pro-welfare positions and some demonstrating their promotion of welfare retrenchment, however, the clear pattern suggests that these parties often resort to the stance of welfare chauvinism (Schumacher & Van Kersbergen, 2016; Afonso & Papadopoulos, 2015; Afonso, 2015; Rovny, 2013). All in all, this study marked a new paradigm in the study of the impact of far-right presence and success, as it found that the presence of the far-right had led to the unification of all other political actors against the legislative proposals of the far-right and promoted comprehensive cooperation between all parties in the legislature.

Finally, with regard to the interdisciplinary study of the common enemy effect, there exists a significant body of research originating from numerous disciplines which point to the existence and the prevalence of such effect in group interactions (Sherif, 1958; Sherif et al., 1961). However, this study went beyond the mere evaluation of a common enemy effect regarding the far-right, rather, had built a common enemy framework which included several phenomena and unified them in the confines of this research, namely, the designation of the prevalent efforts of containing the far-

right in Western Europe as a superordinate goal which is appealing to all relevant actors and could not be achieved with the resources of any given actor (Swaab et al., 2021; Deschamps & Brown, 1983; Brown & Wade, 1987). Also, this study generated a novel association between the prevalent practice of a *cordon sanitaire* which accompanies an agreement between all political parties to refrain from cooperating with the far-right party on any grounds, which may be pointed out as an instance of parochial altruism where political parties are sacrificing their potential legislative cooperation opportunities in order to benefit their ingroup and hurt the outgroup that is the far-right movement (Corr et al., 2015; Chiang & Wu, 2015; Ben-Ner et al., 2009; Halevy et al., 2008). Lastly, there exists a body of research which points to patterns of a particular treatment of far-right parties from other political actors at the European and the national level which closely resembles the implications of a common enemy effect (Ripoll Servent, 2019; Ripoll Servent & Panning, 2019; Bolin et al., 2021; Arzheimer, 2019). Thus, this study significantly expanded the reach of the research regarding the common enemy effect by bringing it to the novel area of far-right research by directly positioning the far-right movement as the common enemy in Western European democracies. Also, through a comprehensive evaluation of legislative cooperation and far-right impact, this study also worked to laterally expand the common enemy effect framework through the novel associations of the observed patterns in far-right impact. Merely in terms of the common enemy effect, this study provided support for such effect and revealed evidence from a novel field, thus, enhancing the credibility of the phenomenon in the literature.

## **6.2. Limitations of the Study**

Much like any other, this study suffered from certain limitations and the third chapter of this dissertation provided an in-depth and detailed account of all the limitations. However, it is appropriate to conduct a general discussion of the limitations from which this study had suffered.

The first category of limitations involved the data and operationalization. As stated before, this study opened a new realm in the literature in the study of legislative cooperation under the influence of far-right parties, while there were effectively no



studies which directly assessed the impact of the far-right on legislative cooperation but also, there was a lack of studies in the relevant literature which directly positioned the concept of legislative cooperation as the outcome variable, and there was certainly a lack of research which aimed to provide a quantitative measure of the robustness of legislative cooperation between members of parliament which this study had aimed to generate. Going back to the discussion on the availability of relevant data, there was a lack of published datasets which included the roll-call voting behavior of the members of the German Bundestag, therefore, the author was obliged to utilize extraordinary methods to obtain such dataset due to a lack of resources to collect the data in conducting this study. Secondly, in terms of the operationalization, this study had suffered from a lack of measurements which were developed to measure the exact robustness of legislative cooperation and legislative unity, thus, I was compelled to develop relevant measures to evaluate the existence of comprehensive cooperation, and the robustness of cooperation between MPs as a continuous variable which were suitable for the aims of this study.

The second category of limitations concerned the methods and scope which were delineated in relevance to the aims of the study. Firstly, in the first analysis of this study, a logistic regression analysis was utilized due to its flexibility and suitability for the research. A logistic regression analysis allows the input of numerous predictor and control variables to enhance the robustness of an observed relationship. However, due to the principles of a parsimonious research design and due to a lack of available data, the relevant analysis for this study only included one treatment variable and no control variables, which brings us to discussion on the limitations in terms of scope. Although, this study was interested in finding a general impact of far-right presence on all roll-call votes, in the literature, policy-specific comparisons are often utilized to find if the political actors behave differently when engaging in different policy areas in the legislative process, and this study made no such comparisons, which may be reasonably considered a limitation in terms of the theoretical scope of the study. All in all, the first analysis of the study had somewhat suffered due to a lack of control variables which could have been introduced to isolate the relationship between the variables of interest. Further, this study utilized

a simple logistic regression analysis, a technique which is designed to detect correlations between the variables of interest. However, in the scientific toolkit, there are other more sophisticated methods which could have enhanced the argument for a causal relationship between the variables of interest that this study was in no position to detect. Therefore, the lack of utilization of more sophisticated statistical techniques remained a limitation for this study.

A final limitation of the study concerns the theoretical explanations which were provided for the patterns which were observed in the data. This study had suggested that the so-called common enemy effect possessed substantial explanatory power in terms of the particular response to the presence and initiatives of the far-right which was observed for the German Bundestag. However, the issue at hand is inarguably a multi-faceted one which requires a higher degree of thoroughness in exploring the mechanisms behind these patterns which there may be many factors that might have had an effect. However, such comprehensive and in-depth thoroughness of discovery remains beyond the depth of any one study. Therefore, this study had suffered from a lack of empirical discovery into the realm of mechanism behind the observed effects.

### **6.3. Recommendations for Further Research**

As thoroughly demonstrated in the previous chapters, this study embarked on a scientific journey in a research area which was largely unexplored, through the novel association of far-right impact and legislative cooperation utilizing the common enemy effect framework. Therefore, the exploration of this potentially lucrative research area should in all good conscience, move forward. Thus, this section aimed to provide recommendations for further research in this area.

Firstly, research in this area should be expanded in terms of the geographical scope and with respect to time period. This study essentially aimed to serve as a case study regarding far-right impact on MP voting behavior in the German Bundestag, however, for the evidence to become more generalizable, similar research should be conducted on such legislative patterns including the state parliaments in Germany.

Further, similar research should be conducted assessing these possible patterns in all European democracies, including the supranational level at the European Parliament. Also, similar studies focusing on the legislatures from all around the world might prove quite fruitful and may bring along valuable insights in terms of the assessment of the impact of the far-right on the roll-call voting behavior of members of parliament.

Secondly, further research into this area should definitely include the utilization of more advanced statistical methods. There are plenty of sophisticated techniques which may prove suitable to answer the relevant research question of this study, namely, the quasi-experimental techniques originating from econometrics research might be able to detect certain patterns in legislatures to a greater extent and under the conditions of improved isolation of the variables of interest (Angrist & Pischke, 2014). The utilization of the aforementioned quasi-experimental methods may be able to successfully eliminate the endogenous variation in the data and might provide patterns where there appears an argument for a causal relationship between the variables of interest. Also, further research in this area may develop and utilize more sophisticated measures to evaluate the far-right impact and the degree of legislative cooperation and voting unity. Additionally, the upcoming studies in this area should utilize a wider array of predictor and control variables that may provide a set of findings of a higher resolution and might be able to generate supplementary insights that might enrich our understanding of the topic at hand.

Finally, further research in this area should tackle the mechanisms behind the observed patterns to a greater extent, meaning a thorough exploration of the role of the phenomena that make up the common enemy effect framework. While this study only suggested the common enemy effect framework as an explanatory phenomenon, further research should dig deeper to actually generate evidence for the existence and prevalence of a common enemy effect in terms of the impact of the far-right on legislative activity. This may very well be accomplished through a survey design or through qualitative interviews which would target the political actors themselves as participants. Such research may actually be able to empirically

establish patterns of common perceptions of a common enemy regarding far-right parties among the MPs themselves and may also discover clear notions of cooperating against the common enemy. Further, such research may even be able to detect more intricate motivations for such notions under the common enemy framework such as working towards superordinate goals or engaging in practices of parochial altruism.

All in all, further research in this area should firstly expand the scopes of time and geography to generate more generalizable findings. Secondly, such research should implement more sophisticated research designs that involve a variety of variables through which they may produce an argument for a causal relationship between the far-right impact and legislative cooperation and vote unity. Lastly, further research in the field should aim to provide evidence for the existence and prevalence of a common enemy effect regarding far-right impact on the legislative behavior of political actors.

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## APPENDICES

### A. TURKISH SUMMARY / TRKE ZET

#### 1. Giriř

Avrupa siyasal alanında aşırı sağ partiler özellikle de 20. Yzyıl itibariyle byk bir yer işgal etmişlerdir. 2. Dünya savaşı çerçevesinde aşırı sağ hareketlerin kresel çapta yıkıcı sonuçları ise savaş sonrası siyasette aşırı sağ partilere yönelik olumsuz ön yargılar oluşmasına sebep olmuştur. Ancak bu da onların 20. Yzyılın sonlarında özellikle de Batı Avrupa’da yeniden ortaya çıkışını engelleyememiştir. Buna rağmen bu partiler yeniden ortaya çıkışlarını takiben gnmze kadar Batı Avrupa’da ayrıştırılma ve ötekileştirilmeye mahsur kalmışlar ve savaş sonrası şimdiye kadar sadece iki Batı Avrupa lkesinde iktidarın parçası olabilmışlerdir (Zaslove, 2004). Ancak parti siyaseti çerçevesinde oluşan etkiler bu partilerin siyasal alana kayda değer düzeyde etki etmelerini engellememiştir. Geçtiğimiz yıllarda bu partilerin Batı Avrupa demokrasilerinde elde ettikleri göreceli başarı aşırı sağ partilerin siyasal alana etkilerinin araştırıldığı alanlarda canlanmaya yol açmıştır (Abou-Chadi & Krause, 2020; Minkenberg, 2001; Mudde, 2013; Van Spanje, 2010; Bale, 2003). Bu çalışma da aynı zamanda aşırı sağ parti varlığının yasama faaliyetlerine yönelik etkilerini araştırmıştır.

Bu çalışma Almanya’da federal seviyede bir vaka analizi olması dolayısıyla aşırı sağ siyasetinin Almanya’nın kendine has özellikleriyle etkileşimi de anlam kazanmaktadır, bu nedenle de Almanya’nın özel durumunun incelenmesi gerekliliği doğmuştur. Almanya’nın geçmişte aşırı sağ ile trajik imtihanı nedeniyle İkinci Dünya Savaşı sonrası Almanya siyasetinde aşırı sağ partilerin yolu her zaman zorlu olmuştur, çünkü bu

partiler hem halkın büyük çoğunluğu hem de siyasal partiler çerçevesinde kaçınılmaz bir olumsuz önyargıdan kurtulamamışlardır. Buna Almanya'nın hem ulusal güvenlik hem de adli kurumlarının aşırı sağ hareketleri yakın takibi ve kovuşturması da önemli bir etki göstermiştir. Ancak bütün bunlara rağmen yakın tarihte de her ne kadar diğer Avrupa ülkelerindeki muadillerinden daha zayıf konumlarda olsalar da Almanya'da aşırı sağ partiler varlıklarını devam ettirmişlerdir (Backes, 2018). Yine de geçtiğimiz yıllarda Almanya'da ortaya çıkan aşırı sağ partiler, siyasal sisteme büyük etkiler gösterecek kadar güçlenememişlerdir. Bunda siyasal partilerin, aşırı sağ partilere karşı uyguladıkları izolasyon politikaları ve 'cordon sanitaire' olarak adlandırılan, bütün siyasal partilerin aşırı sağ partilerle hiçbir şekilde iş birliğine gitmeyeceklerine dair birbirleri arasında yaptıkları anlaşmalar önemli rol oynamıştır. Bunun yanında aşırı sağ partilere karşı gelenek haline gelen halk protestoları ve medyada haklarında mütemadiyen yaratılan olumsuz algı da önemli etki göstermiştir. Bütün bunların sonucunda da yakın tarihte Almanya'da ortaya çıkan aşırı sağ partiler bir dağılma yoluna girmiş, iç kavgalar, radikalizasyon ve örgütsel çürüme nedeniyle başarılı olanları dahi zamanla yok olmuştur (Art, 2018). Bu noktada, bu çalışmanın konusu olan ve Almanya siyasetine günümüze kadar kayda değer bir etki göstermiş Almanya için Alternatif (AfD) partisini tartışmakta yarar vardır. Bu parti 2010'larda yapılan yerel ve federal seviyedeki seçimlerde önemli derecede başarılar göstermiş ve seçim barajını da aşarak Almanya federal parlamentosunda parti düzeyinde temsil edilmeye hak kazanmıştır. Ancak yaptıkları bu çıkışta büyük payı olan bazı çevresel faktörlerin de anılmaları gerekir. 2010'larda Suriye İç Savaşı dolayısıyla ortaya çıkan, Avrupa'ya doğru düzensiz göçmen akımlarının Avrupa siyasetine önemli etkileri olmuştur. Bu etkinin ise Almanya özelinde olağanüstü seviyelere çıktığı söylenebilir. Bu durumda Şansölye Merkel hükümetinin toplamda bir milyon Suriyeli mülteciyi Almanya'ya kabul etme kararının, halkın bir kısmında yarattığı olumsuz etki AfD'nin özellikle 2017 seçimlerindeki başarısında önemli bir pay sahibi olduğu söylenebilir.

Bu çalışmanın araştırma sorusu; "Aşırı sağ parti mevcudiyetinin Almanya federal parlamentosunda vekillerin yoklama usulü oy verme davranışlarına olan etkisi nedir?" olmuştur. Buna göre bu soruya cevap bulabilmek için iki ayrı hipotez üretilmiştir. Bu hipotezler ise aşağıdaki gibidir.

Hipotez 1: Bundestag’da aşırı sağ parti dışındaki partiler arasında geniş çaplı iş birliği, aşırı sağ partinin meclise girişinden sonra artmıştır.

Hipotez 2: Öbür muhalefet partilerinin yasa tekliflerine verilen tepkilere kıyasla aşırı sağ partilerin verdikleri yasa tekliflerine karşı vekiller daha yüksek derecede birlik halinde karşı çıkmışlardır.

## **2. Literatür Taraması**

Literatür taramasının bu özetinde öncelikle yakın tarihte Batı Avrupa siyasetine önemli etkileri bulunmuş aşırı sağ partilerin tanımlanmasıyla başlanması uygundur. Bu partilerin ilgi çekici bir özelliği, bazı karakteristikleriyle alışlagelmiş sağ siyasal parti ailesiyle uyumlu olmakla beraber, bazı politikalarıyla da geleneksel sağ ve muhafazakâr siyaset normlarıyla çatışma halinde olmalarıdır. Tabii ki yine de bu partileri tanımlamak için en iyi çerçeve siyasal muhafazakarlıktır. Bu çerçeveye uygun biçimde çağdaş Batı Avrupa aşırı sağ partileri de tanımlayan özellikler arasında idealize edilmiş bir geçmiş dönem algısı, etnik-milliyetçi sosyal bir anlayış ve kronik bir tehdit algısıdır. Sosyal psikolojik bir bakış açısıyla ise bu siyasal görüşe sahip insanların önemli bir tehdit algısı tecrübe etmesi, bilinmezliğe karşı tavizsiz olmaları, değişime karşı direnç göstermeleri ve sosyal eşitsizliği meşru görmeleri, genel özellikler altında sayılabilir ve bütün bunlar da motive bir bilişsel çerçeveye işaret ediyor olabilir (Jost, et al., 2018). Avrupa’da çağdaş aşırı sağ partilere has özelliklere gelecek olursak ise bu partilerin yegâne sorun partisi olduklarını açıkça görebiliriz.. Bu partilerin ana ve yegâne sorunu içinde bulundukları ülkelerin göç rejimlerinin fazla tavizkar ve açık olduğu yönündeki inançlarıdır. Bu partilerin ideolojik temelini göç sorunu oluşturmakla birlikte, göç dışında üzerinde çalıştıkları toplumsal sorunların da en azından kısmen göç politikaları nedeniyle olageldiğini öne sürerler. Bu göç karşıtı olma örüntüsü Avrupa’da yakın tarihte ortaya çıkan bütün aşırı sağ partilerin ortak özelliğidir (Carter, 2016). Başka vurgulanması gereken bir nokta ise bu partilerin sadece dışarıdan ülkelere göç etmek isteyen insanlara değil, aynı zamanda herhangi bir şekilde kendi etnik-milliyetçi toplumsal anlayışlarına uymayan ülkelerinin bütün sakinlerine karşı da düşmanca bir tavır içerisinde olduklarıdır. Ekonomik açıdan bakıldığında ise bu partilerin temsil ettikleri kesimin, literatürde ifade edildiği üzere

küreselleşen ekonominin kaybedenleri olduğu argümanı ise oldukça yaygındır. Bundan dolayı örnek olarak refah politikalarında normal şartlarda sosyal yardımlara karşı olması beklenen bu partilerin, kendilerine oy veren işçi sınıfı kesimi de tatmin etmek için her zaman bu yönde etki göstermedikleri, hatta bazen ideolojilerinin aksine siyasal teraziye daha fazla sosyal yardım yönünde oynattıkları gözlemlenmiştir (Krause & Giebler, 2020). Bu politikalar üzerine bu partilerin etkileri tek yöne doğru konsolide olmamıştır, ama fazlasıyla yaygın olarak görülen örüntü ise bu partilerin ‘refah şovenizmi’ yani toplumu sosyal yardımları hak edenlerle hak etmeyenler arasında ayırmaya yöneldikleri görülmüştür (Duncan, 2010; Fenger, 2018). Daha önce de ifade edildiği gibi yegâne sorun partileri olarak Avrupa’da aşırı sağ partilerin en büyük etkiyi göç politikası konusunda göstermeleri beklenir, bu alanda da literatürde göreceli bir zenginlik göze çarpmaktadır. Literatürde makul derecede açıklıkta ortaya çıktığı üzere Batı Avrupa siyasetinde aşırı sağ partilerin varlığı ve göreceli başarıları bu ülkelerdeki diğer siyasal partilerde de göç karşıtı yönde bir sağa kayma örüntüsü görülmesine neden olmuştur ve aynı zamanda somut olarak da göç ve entegrasyon politikalarına aynı şekilde etki ettikleri de ortaya çıkmıştır (Muis & Immerzeel, 2017; Minkenberg, 2001; Alonso & Fonseca, 2012; Van Kessel, 2021; Akkerman, 2015). Son olarak ise dolaylı yoldan da olsa alanda bazı önemli çalışmalar aşırı sağ partilerin varlığı ve başarılarının diğer siyasal aktörlerde daha dayanışmacı tavırların ortaya çıktığını ortaya koymuştur (Kantola & Miller, 2021; Arzheimer, 2019).

Daha önce de bahsedildiği üzere bu çalışma aşırı sağ parti varlığının vekillerin yoklama usulü oy verme davranışlarına olan etkisini incelemektedir ve bu kapsamda literatür taramasında vekilleri yasama faaliyetlerinde iş birliği yapmaya iten faktörlerin de dikkatle incelenmesini gerektirmiştir. İnceleme sonucunda ise vekilleri iş birliği yapmaya iten dört ana belirleyici keşfedilmiştir, bunlar kurumsal faktörler, ideolojik faktörler, siyasal faktörler ve sosyal faktörler olarak sıralanabilir. İlk kategoriye daha ayrıntılı olarak bakarsak, koalisyon kurmak için kurumsal gereklilikler, yasama organlarının kendilerine has özellikleri, veto tehditleri, iki meclisli sistemler ve uzlaşmaya dayalı siyasal gelenekler gibi birçok kurumsal faktörün dünya çapında parlamentolarda vekillerin yasama faaliyetlerinde dayanışmalarını sağladıkları görülmüştür (Hohendorf et al., 2021; Christian & Pedersen, 2014; Schmidt, 2008;

Ganghof & Bräuninger, 2006; Miller & Stecker, 2008; Christiansen & Nielsen, 2022; Tsebelis, 1995; Giuliani, 2008). İdeolojik faktörleri gözden geçirecek olursak da literatürde önemli sayıda çalışmalara göre vekiller ve partiler arasındaki ideolojik yakınlığın, bu aktörlerin birlikte çalışmasında belirleyici bir faktör olduğu görülmüştür (Campbell, 1982; Klüver & Zubek, 2018; Andeweg et al., 2008). Siyasal faktörler hakkında literatürde birçok çalışma bulunmaktadır ve bu çalışmalar da hükümetlerin siyasal eleştiriden kaçınma çalışmaları, seçim ittifaklarının etkileri ve siyasal parti kültür farkları gibi birçok siyasal faktörün vekillerin iş birliği yapmasında önemli düzeyde etki gösterdikleri görülmüştür (Christiansen & Seeberg, 2016; Steinack, 2011; Dewan & Spirling, 2011; Christiansen et al., 2014). Sosyal faktörlere değinecek olursak da literatürdeki çok sayıda çalışma, vekiller arasındaki kişisel ilişkilerin onların yasama faaliyetlerinde iş birliği içinde bulunma düzeyini etkileyen önemli bir belirleyici olduğunu göstermiştir, hatta bu etki bazen o kadar güçlü derecede tespit edilmiştir ki, vekillerin iş birliği yapıp yapmadığını belirlemede parti aidiyeti ve ideolojik yakınlıktan dahi daha güçlü tahmin yetisine sahip olduğu görülmüştür (Curry & Roberts, 2022; Andris et al., 2016; Arnold et al., 2000; Tam Cho & Fowler, 2010; Andeweg, 2013).

Literatür taramasının son bölümünde ise bu çalışmada tespit edilen etkileri açıklama potansiyeline mekanizmalar işlenmiştir. Bu çalışmada aşırı sağın diğer parti vekillerinin oy verme davranışlarına olan etkisini açıklamak için sosyal-psikoloji literatürüne yerleşmiş ‘ortak düşman etkisi’ uygun bulunmuştur. Ortak düşman etkisinin kökleri alanda önemli derecede iz bırakmış sosyal psikolog Muzaffer Şerif ve onun önderliğinde 1950 ve 60’larda yapılan deneylere dayanmaktadır. Gruplar arasında rekabet ve çatışmayı inceleyen bu deneylerde, grupların bir ortak düşman algısına sahip olmasının bu gruplar arasında rekabetçi ve düşmanca davranışları azalttığını ve aralarındaki anlaşmazlıkların bir kenara bırakılarak dayanışmacı davranışları arttırdığı görülmüştür (Sherif, 1958). Bunun yanında, bu çalışma kapsamında incelendiği üzere ortak düşman etkisi sınırlı bir örüntü değil, birçok sosyal fenomeni kapsayan bir teorik çerçevedir. Bu teorik yapıya dahil olan başka sosyal fenomenler de bu çalışmanın konusu olmuşlardır. Bunlardan bir tanesi ‘yüksek hedefler’dir. Yüksek hedefler de ortak düşman etkisi teorik yapısına dahil etkilerden

bir tanesidir ve o da grupların arasındaki çatışmayı azaltmak ve onları iş birliğine teşvik etmek için önemli faktörlerden birisidir. Tanım itibariyle yüksek hedefler, birden fazla grup için çekici olan ancak tek bir grubun kaynakları ve emeğiyle ulaşılamayacak hedeflerdir, yani tanımı itibariyle farklı gruplar arasında iş birliği gerektirir (Sherif et al., 1961). Literatürde de ortak yüksek hedeflere sahip olmanın gruplar arasında çatışmayı azaltıp onları iş birliğine teşvik ettiğine dair tatmin edici seviyede delil bulunmaktadır (Swaab et al., 2021; Deschamps & Brown, 1983; Brown & Wade, 1987; Johnson & Lewicki, 1969). Bu çalışmanın teorik çerçevesi içinde de Batı Avrupa siyasi partileri için aşırı sağ partileri izole etme çabalarının yüksek hedef kavramına bir örnek teşkil ettiği ortaya konulmuştur. Ortak düşman teorik çerçevesini oluşturan başka bir fenomen dar görüşlü fedakârlık kavramıdır. Bu kavramın sosyal hayata yansıma şekli bir grup üyesinin kendi grubuna yarar sağlamak ve karşıt gruplara zarar verme amacı taşıyan fedakâr davranışlarıdır (De Dreu et al., 2010). Bu fenomenin varlığını destekleyen birçok bilimsel disiplinden gelen sayıca fazla deneysel çalışma mevcuttur (Abbink et al., 2012; Corr et al., 2015; Chiang & Wu, 2015; Ben-Ner et al., 2009; Halevy et al., 2008). Bu çalışmada da daha önce bahsedilen ve özü itibariyle siyasal partiler arasında aşırı sağ partilerle iş birliğini yasaklayan bir anlaşma olması itibariyle 'cordon sanitaire' uygulaması dar görüşlü fedakârlık uygulamasına benzetilmiştir. Dikkatlice incelenince, aşırı sağ partileri izole etmek için uygulanan bu anlaşmaların, özellikle de aşırı sağ partilerle iş birliği yaparak yasama faaliyetlerinde kendi ajandasını yasalaştırma şansı yakalayacak geleneksel sağ partiler için, kendi gruplarının çıkarına ve aşırı sağ partilerin zararına olan bir fedakârlık örneğidir. Ortak düşman etkisi literatürünün taramasında da son işlenen konu, literatürde aşırı sağ partilerin Avrupa demokrasilerinde ortak düşman olarak konumlandığını destekleyen çalışmaların incelenmesidir. Bu konuda hiç direkt bir çalışma yapılmamasına rağmen dolaylı da olsa araştırmacıların elinde deliller oluşmuştur. Söz konusu araştırmaların bazıları ülke düzeyindeki yasama organlarına odaklanırken, bazıları da milletlerüstü özellikte olan, Avrupa Parlamentosu gibi kurumlara odaklanmıştır. Bu araştırmaların sonuçları ise birçok örnekte, Batı Avrupa demokrasilerinde aşırı sağ partilerin ortak düşman olarak algılandığını ve sistemde yer alan diğer siyasi aktörlerin onları ötekileştirmeye,

etkisiz hale getirmeye ve izole etmeye çalıştıklarını saptamıştır (Downs, 2001; Ripoll Servent, 2019; Art, 2018; Bolin et al., 2021).

### 3. Yöntem

Bu çalışmada Almanya federal parlamentosundaki vekillerin yoklama usulü oy verme davranışlarına aşırı sağ parti varlığının etkisi incelenmiştir. Araştırmada bağımsız değişkenler ve bağımlı değişkenler arasındaki bağlantıyı tespit etmek için ilişkisel yöntemler benimsenmiştir. Eldeki veri R (R Core Team) programı yardımıyla dönüştürülmüş ve betimleyici ve çıkarımsal istatistikler IBM Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) 24 programı yardımıyla hesaplanmıştır.

Çalışmada hipotezleri test edebilmek adına Batı Almanya Cumhuriyetinin kuruluşundan itibaren federal parlamentoda bütün yoklama usulü oylamaların kaydedildiği “BTVote” veri setinin kullanılması uygun görülmüştür (Sieberer et al., 2020; Hohendorf & Sieberer, 2022). Ancak bu araştırmanın yapıldığı sırada bu veri setinin, araştırmanın ilgi alanı olan 2013-2021 yılları arasındaki yoklama usulü oylamalara dair verilerin henüz yayınlanmaması dolayısıyla verilerin elde edilebilmesi için olağandışı yöntemlere başvurmak gerekli olmuştur. Bu çerçevede, veri setini oluşturan araştırmacılara ulaşılmış ve toplanmış ancak henüz yayımlanmamış veri seti elde edilmiştir. Ancak araştırma için bu da yeterli olmamıştır, çünkü bu veri seti de sadece vekiller tarafından yoklama usulü verilen oyların kayıtlarından oluşmaktadır. Ancak bu araştırma çerçevesinde ilgilenilen geniş kapsamlı iş birliği ve oy birliğini ölçen değişkenler literatürde bulunmaması sebebiyle araştırmacı tarafından yaratılmış ve kullanılmıştır.

Bu yöntem ve değişkenler çerçevesinde betimleyici ve çıkarımsal istatistikler hesaplanmıştır. Önce ilgilenilen değişkenlerin ortalama, ortanca, frekans ve standart sapma değerleri betimleyici istatistikler çerçevesinde hesaplanmıştır. Varsayım kontrolleri sonrasında ise ilk analiz kapsamında bir lojistik regresyon analizi uygulanmıştır. Yine varsayım kontrolleri sonrasında ikinci analiz kapsamında varyans analizi (ANOVA) yapılmıştır.

Her çalışmanın olduğu gibi bu çalışmanın da sınırlılıkları vardır ve birkaç başlık altında öne sürülmüştür. Öncelikle, bu araştırma Almanya'ya özgü bir vaka analizidir. Bundan dolayı da bulguları dünyada diğer yasama organları için genellenebilir nitelikte değildir. İkinci sınırlılık ise daha önce bahsedilen, bu araştırmanın bağımlı değişkenlerinin daha önce oluşturulmamış olmasıdır, bundan dolayı da araştırmacının bu değişkenleri oluşturup hesaplamak durumunda kalmasıdır. Başka bir sınırlılık ise yoklama usulü oy verme davranışlarını araştıran çalışmaların tümünü kapsayan bir sınırlılıktır. Dünyadaki yasama organlarının büyük çoğunluğunda bütün oylamalar vekil bazında kayıtlara geçmemekte ve oylar her oylama için sayılmamaktadır. Bunlar sadece yoklama usulü oylamalar için uygulanmaktadır. Bu da yoklama usulü oylamalar çerçevesinde vekillerin oy verme davranışlarını araştıran çalışmalar için bir seçici örnekleme kaygısını beraberinde getirmektedir. Kaygılar makul olmakla birlikte diğer oylamalar aynı şekilde kayda geçmediğine göre araştırmacılar ya yoklama usulü oylamaların kayıtlarından yararlanacaklar, ya da bu çalışmaları yürütemeyeceklerdir. Bundan dolayı faydalarının sınırlılıklarından daha büyük olması dolayısıyla bu çalışmalar yapılmaya devam edilmektedir. İlk analiz kapsamında lojistik regresyon uygulamasında da sınırlılıklar mevcuttur. Bu yöntem araştırmacılara birden fazla bağımsız değişken ve kontrol değişkenleriyle bağımlı değişken arasındaki ilişkiyi tespit etme şansı vermektedir. Ancak araştırmacı yönünden kaynak yokluğu ve öz araştırma prensipleri çerçevesinde sadece tek bir bağımsız değişkenin tek bir bağımlı değişken üzerindeki ilişkisine odaklanılmıştır. Son olarak da ikinci analiz çerçevesinde farklı muhalefet partilerinin birbirinden farklı sayıda yasa teklifi vermesi sebebiyle birbirine oranları dengeli olmayan gruplar oluşmuştur ve bu bir sınırlılıktır. Ancak var olan bütün verilerin kullanılması bu dengesizliğe rağmen bu yöntemin kullanılmasını aklamaktadır.

#### **4. Bulgular**

Birinci analiz kapsamında Almanya federal parlamentosunda aşırı sağ partinin temsil edilmediği ve daha sonra temsil edildiği dönemlerde diğer partiler arasında geniş çaplı iş birliği sıklığı karşılaştırılmıştır. Aşırı sağ partinin mevcut olduğu dönemde daha fazla sayıda yoklama usulü oylama olmuşken ( $N = 244$ ), aşırı sağ parti yokluğunda



daha az oylama olmuştur ( $N = 213$ ). Bunun yanında, aşırı sağ parti varlığında çok daha fazla geniş çaplı iş birliği gözlemlenmişken ( $N = 47$ ), aşırı sağ parti yokluğunda çok daha düşük sayıda ( $N = 6$ ) geniş çaplı iş birliğine rastlanmıştır. Birinci analiz çerçevesinde aşırı sağ partinin varlığının diğer partilerin vekillerinin geniş çaplı iş birliğinde bulunmalarına kayda değer düzeyde etkisinin olduğu görülmüştür  $\chi^2(1) = 22.352, p = <.001$ . Cox ve Snell'in  $R^2$  değeri ( $R^2_{CS} = .07$ ) ve Nagelkerke'nin  $R^2$  değeri ( $R^2_N = .14$ ) görüldüğü şekilde hesaplanmıştır. Modelin genel klasifikasyon değeri %88 olarak hesaplanmıştır.

İkinci analiz kapsamında ise parlamentodaki partiler tarafından farklı muhalefet partilerinin yasa tekliflerinin hangi derecede birlik olarak reddedildiği araştırılmıştır. Farklı muhalefet partilerinin yasa tekliflerine karşı oluşan birlik seviyesi farklı partiler için görüldüğü gibidir, FDP ( $M = 0.816, SD = 0.195, N = 32$ ), GRÜNE ( $M = 0.661, SD = 0.132, N = 16$ ), Linke ( $M = 0.754, SD = 0.127, N = 11$ ), AfD ( $M = 0.999, SD = 0.003, N = 20$ ). İkinci analizin varsayımları kapsamında varyansların eşitliğini tespit eden Levene testi yapılmıştır  $F(3, 75) = 28.667, p <.001$ . Bu test, tek yönlü varyans analizinin bir varsayımının ihlal edildiğini göstermiştir. Bundan dolayı da uygulanan testin kayda değerlik seviyesi daha muhafazakâr olan ( $\alpha = .04$ ) seviyesine çekilmiştir (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). ANOVA testinin sonucu söz konusu muhalefet partilerinin yasa tekliflerine diğer partilerin vekilleri tarafından kayda değer şekilde farklı tepki verildiğini göstermiştir  $F(3,75) = 17.951, p <.001, \eta^2 = .418$ . Başlıca analizin gruplar arasında kayda değer bir fark ortaya koyması dolayısıyla post hoc testler yapılmasına gerek görülmüş ve bu kapsamda çiftli karşılaştırma analizi yapılmıştır. Bu analizin sonucunda ise aşırı sağ partinin yasa tekliflerinin, diğer muhalefet partilerinden gelenlerle karşılaştırılınca daha güçlü bir birlik halinde reddedildiği görülmüştür. Ortaya çıkan bulgulara göre bu araştırmaya konu olan iki hipotezin de doğrulandığı görülmüştür.

## 5. Tartışma ve Sonuç

Çalışmanın ilk analizi çerçevesinde Almanya federal parlamentosunda aşırı sağ partinin varlığının vekillerin yoklama usulü oy verme davranışları üzerindeki etkisi

değerlendirilmiş ve yoklama usulü oylamalarda farklı partiler arasındaki dayanışmayı arttırdığı ortaya çıkmıştır.

Çalışmanın ikinci analizinde ise farklı partilerden vekillerin farklı muhalefet partilerinden gelen yasa tekliflerine tepkileri karşılaştırılmıştır. Analizin ilk kısmında farklı partilerin tekliflerine vekillerin farklı seviyelerde tepki verdikleri görülmüştür. Post hoc analizlerde ise aşırı sağ partinin diğer partilerin vekillerini birlik olmaya sevk etme yönünden diğer muhalefet partilerinden ayrıldığı saptanmıştır.

Bu çalışma sonuç olarak birçok alanda literatüre katkı sağlamıştır. Çalışma öncelikle aşırı sağ parti varlığının bir yasama organında vekillerin oy verme davranışlarını inceleyen ilk çalışmadır. Aynı zamanda vekillerin dayanışma davranışlarını da aşırı sağın etkisi yönünden ele alan da ilk çalışmadır. Bu bakımdan literatüre şu sırada eşi olmayan bir katkı sağladığı görülmektedir. Spesifik olarak ise, öncelikle bu çalışma yasama organlarında vekillerin yasama faaliyetlerinde iş birliği yapip yapmayacaklarını belirleyen faktörlere bir yenisini ekleyip, vekillerin yasama faaliyetlerinde dayanışma davranışlarını inceleyen araştırma alanına katkı yapmıştır (Hohendorf et al., 2021; Christian & Pedersen, 2014; Schmidt, 2008; Miller & Stecker, 2008; Tsebelis, 1995; Giuliani, 2008; Klüver & Zubek, 2018; Andeweg et al., 2008; Steinack, 2011; Dewan & Spirling, 2011; Christiansen et al., 2014; Curry & Roberts, 2022; Andris et al., 2016; Arnold et al., 2000).

Aynı zamanda bu çalışma aşırı sağın ülkelerde siyasal alana yaptıkları etkiyi inceleyen çalışma alanı çerçevesinde de yeni bir ufuk açtığı görülmektedir. Bu yönden de aşırı sağın vekillerin oy verme davranışları üzerindeki etkisini tespit ederek, aşırı sağın siyasal alana yaptığı etkiyi inceleyen çalışmalara da bir yenisini eklemiştir (Abou-Chadi & Krause, 2020; Minkenberg, 2001; Mudde, 2013; Van Spanje, 2010; Schumacher & Van Kersbergen, 2016; Afonso & Papadopoulos, 2015; Afonso, 2015; Rovny, 2013).

Son olarak da bu çalışma ortak düşman etkisini araştıran çalışma alanına da bu etkiyi daha önce yapılan çalışmalardan farklı bir düzleme taşıyıp test ederek katkı yapmıştır. Ortak düşman etkisini aşırı sağ kapsamında direkt olarak inceleyen ilk çalışma olarak daha önce farklı düzlemlerde ve alanlarda bu etkinin varlığını ve yaygınlığına deliller

sunan alıřmalara eklenerek bu etkinin varlıęı ve yaygınlıęı iddiasında destekleyici deliller ortaya ıkarmıřtır (Sherif, 1958; Sherif et al., 1961; Swaab et al., 2021; Deschamps & Brown, 1983; Brown & Wade, 1987; Corr et al., 2015; Chiang & Wu, 2015; Ben-Ner et al., 2009; Halevy et al., 2008).

Son olarak da alıřmada bu alanda yapılacak gelecek arařtırmalar iin tavsiyeler sunulmuřtur. İlk tavsiye bu alıřmanın zaman ynnden ve coęrafik ynden sınırlarının geniřletilerek, daha uzun bir zaman dilimini konu alacak řekilde ncelikle Almanya'daki btn yasama organlarını ierisine alacak řekilde, daha sonra da btn Avrupa'daki yasama organlarını ierisine alacak řekilde yapılması ynndedir. Gelecek arařtırmalar iin ikinci tavsiye, gz nne alınan deęiřkenlerin analizi yapılırken daha geliřmiř ve sofistike yntemler kullanılmasıdır. Bu doęrultuda zellikle de yarı-deneysel arařtırma yntemlerinin kullanılması nem arz etmektedir. Gelecekteki alıřmalar iin son tavsiye de tespit edilen etkilerin mekanizmaları zerine daha derinlemesine arařtırmalar yapılmasıdır. Bu doęrultuda ise zellikle bu alıřmalarda ařırı saęın etkisi kapsamında ortak dřman etkisinin varlıęına iliřkin direkt olarak delil saęlayabilecek niteliksel yntemlerle de desteklenmesi, mekanizma ynnden daha kuvvetli bulgular elde edilebilecek olması amacıyla nem tařımaktadır.

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