JAMES JOYCE'S EXTIMATE MODERNISM IN *ULYSSES*:
A LACANIAN TAKE ON LANGUAGE, SUBJECTIVITY AND TEMPORALITY

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ABSTRACT

JAMES JOYCE'S EXTIMATE MODERNISM IN *ULYSSES*:
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The high modernist struggle to represent the modern individual and their predicament finds its best form in the works of James Joyce, whose writing discloses a radical departure from and a challenge to Cartesian epistemology, and linearity as its keyword as well as realism as its literary reflection. Joyce's break away from linearity is reflected both in the form and the content of his writing to such an extent that his narrative style acts out the subject matter of his works. I claim that the psychoanalytical theories of Jacques Lacan and his concept of *extimité* enable a thorough exploration of the Joycean subject in a non-linear temporality and non-causal language. *Ulysses* is the impeccable embodiment of *extimité* not only due to its meticulous display of the extimate inter/intra-subjective relations, but also because its form is the extimate of its content. *Extimité* emerges as the defining characteristics of Joycean writing in its treatment of subjectivity, language and temporality, and it becomes possible to decipher the ways by which Joyce's reconfiguration of reality is reflected in his use of content and form in their extimate relation. Therefore, this dissertation

argues that reading Joyce's *Ulysses* through the Lacanian concept of *extimité*, along with its relation to *sinthome*, *objet a* and *desire/lack* as exemplified in the topological images containing Möbian relations, unifies the fragmentary elements in the novel on a new hermeneutical ground, not by assigning semantic dimensions to these fragments but by casting a new hermeneutics over the extimate relationality between them.

Keywords: *Ulysses*, *extimité*, Jacques Lacan, Cartesian epistemology, linearity.

ÖZ

JAMES JOYCE'UN *ULYSSES* ROMANINDAKİ HAR/İÇ/SEL MODERNİZM: DİL, ÖZNELLİK VE ZAMANSALLIK TEMALARINA LAKANCI BİR BAKIŞ

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Modern bireyi ve çıkmazlarını temsil etmeye yönelik yüksek modernist mücadele, en iyi biçimini, yazılarında Kartezyen epistemolojiden ve onun özü olan doğrusallık ve edebi yansıması olan gerçekçilikten radikal bir kopuşu ve meydan okumayı ortaya koyan James Joyce'un eserlerinde bulur. Joyce'un doğrusallıktan kopuşu, yazılarının hem biçemine hem de içeriğine öylesine yansır ki, anlatı tarzı eserlerinin konusunun sahnelenmesi şeklini alır. Bu çalışmada Jacques Lacan'ın psikanalitik teorilerinin ve har/iç/sellik kavramının, Joyce'un öznesinin doğrusal olmayan bir zamansallık ve nedensel olmayan bir dil düzleminde derinlemesine incelenmesine olanak sağladığını öne sürmekteyim. *Ulysses*, yalnızca öznelerarası/özneiçi har/iç/sel ilişkileri titizlikle sergilemesi nedeniyle değil, aynı zamanda biçemi içeriğinin har/iç/seli olduğu için de har/iç/selliğin kusursuz bir örneğidir. Har/iç/sellik, Joyce yazınının öznellik, dil ve zamansallığı ele alışında belirleyici bir özellik olarak ortaya çıkar ve Joyce'un gerçekliği yeniden yapılandırmasının, birbirleriyle har/iç/sellik ilişkisi içinde olan içerik ve

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biçemi kullanmasına nasıl yansıdığını deşifre etmek mümkün hale gelir. Bu nedenle bu tez, Joyce'un *Ulysses* romanını Mobian ilişkiler içeren topolojik şekillerde örneklendiği haliyle Lacan'ın har/iç/sellik kavramı ve bu kavramın *sinthome, nesne a* ve *arzu/eksik*le olan ilişkisi üzerinden okumanın romandaki parçalı yapıyı, onlara anlamsal boyutlar yükleyerek değil, aralarındaki har/iç/sel[1] ilişkisellik üzerine yeni bir yorum katarak farklı bir hermeneutik zeminde birleştirdiğini savunur.

Anahtar Sözcükler: *Ulysses, har/iç/sellik,* Jacques Lacan, Kartezyen epistemoloji, doğrusallık.

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[1] Jacques Lacan'ın harici (*exterieur*) ve içsel olan (*intimité*) sözcüklerini birleştirerek ürettiği *extimité* teriminin Türkçe karşılığı olarak kullanılmıştır.
Lacan'ın *extimité* kavramı daha önce Türkçede karşılığını MonoKL'un Lacan Seçkisi kitabındaki Lacan Sözlüğünde "dış-yakınlık" olarak bulmuştur (Keskin 817). Bunun dışında Işık Barış Fidaner, terimin Türkçesini "uzaklık" olarak çevirmiştir. Lacan'ın kendi ürettiği birleşik kelimelerin diğer dillere çevrilmesi konusunda tereddütleri olsa da (Evans Önsöz), hem Fransızca aslına uygun şekilde birleştirilen iki kelimenin de anlamını karşıladığından, hem de biçem olarak aslına uygun olmakla kalmayıp bu tezin de konusu olan Joycecu dil oyunlarının tabiatını temsil ettiğinden ötürü kendi çevirim olan har/iç/sellik terimini kullanmayı tercih ettim.

To Joyce and all that made me who I am

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feel so privileged to have been among such wonderful academics throughout this journey. Lastly, I would like to take the chance to express my deepest gratitude to Prof. Dr. Nursel İçöz simply for her existence. She has taught me so much about literature and professional life and I cannot imagine a post-grad world where she was not my professor. Yet, she has taught me more by just being who she is, and I will forever be grateful for the day I walked into her room where she embraced me with all the kindness, humility and elegance in the world. Thank you Nursel Hocam for your unconditional support, understanding and love.

I have grown and changed so much along the way and a special thank is due to my fellow travelers who have been instrumental in shaping the direction, the stops and the end of this journey. In the beginning were Şule and Şermin, and I cannot remember how many times we pulled each other out of the pits of academic anxiety and jumped into a pool of joy and jouissance hand in hand. We sent each other off to new cities, countries and continents several times, and welcomed and embraced each other again and again. Long-distance video calls witnessed all our subject positions, and words really fall short to describe the many affects we shared☺ I feel so lucky to have walked this road with you side by side. Here's to the stories we may tell when we're old☺

Serkan was probably there long before I was, and Şafak's arrival completed our 'mnemonic' trio, where we laughed, sang, cried and danced through countless long nights and sleepy days. Şafak's big, beautiful child eyes questioning my emotions were actually a mnemonic code that connected me to other *me*s that I had forgotten, and Serkan, with his actor's voice and healing words, has taught me so much in embracing the things I had known all along but could not remember or name. Cheers to the many more trips we may take☺

My heartfelt thanks go to Zeynep, who has been another great company that has supported me all along. I am lucky to have shared so many

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My family are probably the ones who are happiest to see the end of the road☺ I thank my mother Nuran Korkmaz for being there whenever I needed help, having my back against any problems I may come across and believing in me unconditionally. She has contributed to this journey a lot and I would not have been who I am if it were not for her. Although it is her perfectionism that caused mine which made this journey much longer than intended, the time spent on the road has taught us both how to be at home with our imperfections. Thank you mom. I thank my father Hayrettin Korkmaz who left this world too soon to witness how I look up to him and how his shadow has lightened up my way in the darkest moments. His integrity, dignity and wisdom will always be the goals I will strive for. My memories with him are still the safest place to retreat. Melih has always been my confidant and my rock, and I always feel I am the luckiest person ever to have a brother who can make me feel that there is nothing we cannot sort out. I admire his observational skills and practicality which bring me back to balance whenever I get lost in my rambling ideas. Although I did not take up his suggestion of writing this acknowledgement as an excel chart, he will always be the one who I run to first with excitement to share whatever life brings.

I owe a great debt of gratitude to my aunt Gülsüm Hasdemir and uncle Kadir Hasdemir for everything they have done for me. My uncle's amazing stories in our mother tongue have always made me appreciate

the power of literature and I learnt so many things from him which would have taken forever to learn on my own. My aunt has been my friend, my teacher, my mentor and much more, and I cannot thank her enough for the unconditional love, care and support she has given me. I feel blessed to have them in my life.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1. Aim and Scope of the Study

In the wake of its hundred-year birthday, James Joyce's *Ulysses* still stands out as one of the most controversial novels of all times. While considered by many critics, philosophers and scholars as one of the greatest novels in the history of literature, from the day it was first published in *The Little Review* it caused severe reactions and criticism by Joyce's contemporaries and the public to such an extent that it was banned even before it was published as a novel. Narrating the story of the modern human condition in an ordinary Dublin day on June 16th, 1904, the novel manages to fuse the mythical with the modern, the trivial with the sublime, the religious with the obscene. Joyce's aim at reaching immortality through his novel seems to have worked. Although he was many times publicly called a genius and a schizophrene, innumerable studies regarding the Irish novelist and his oeuvre have been carried out by people from various disciplines and areas: not only the literary figures, or 'professors' as Joyce stated, and many prominent theorists such as Carl Gustave Jung, Jacques Derrida, Frederic Jameson and Jacques Lacan made him the focus of their works, but many readers all over the world celebrate Bloomsday each year, with workshops and activities to experience the spirit of the novel again. The novel has been discussed in numerous aspects; there are countless dissertations written for any single chapter in the book, not to mention academic papers and articles for a single phrase or even a word in the narrative. Hence, the ultimate question surfaces: why does one still study Joyce's *Ulysses*?

The answer is probably that which makes *Ulysses* great: it is the story of the modern *everyman* who is split between their responsibilities and wishes, or in psychoanalytic terms, between their conscious thoughts/deeds and unconscious drives and desires. To be more specific, in the Lacanian parlance, it displays the problematization of the speaking subject in terms of their split position in the symbolic network with their imaginary bearings against the constant irruptions of the real. The peculiarity of *Ulysses* and Joyce, in portraying this predicament, stems from the fact that the novel does this in a form that mimics the workings of such dynamics, that is, what is told and how it is told work on the same surface in an inseparable mode. The language of the narrative, the numerous styles employed, and the formal techniques used are the materialization of the content to the extent that it occasionally becomes impossible to analyze one without the other. Likewise, the novel's preoccupation with language, temporality and the subjectivities of the characters cannot be treated as subject matters in-themselves, or distinctively from the formal mechanisms in their narration. This relation between the form and the content of the novel is the relation that predominates the economy of the Lacanian speaking subject: *the extimité* of the *parlêtre* is mirrored in the *extimité* of *Ulysses*. The extimate relation between the subject and language, between desire and *jouissance*, between the subject and *objet a*, finds its correspondence in *Ulysses* in the dynamics between the characters, their relations with other subjects and objects, their relation to births and deaths, religion and race, myths and anti-heroes, spatial and temporal (dis)continuities, and also the relation between the author and its work as well as the work and the reader. *Ulysses* with its form acting out its content is the impeccable embodiment of *extimité*, which also acts out the *extimité* of the relation between the *parlêtre*'s body and language.

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This study aims to discuss the peculiar subjective positions in *Ulysses* by using a Lacanian framework, stress falling on the later years of Lacan in which his interest in both the topology in explaining

subjectivity and the importance of the *real* and its relation/effects to language increased. Lacan delivered lectures on "Joyce the Symptom" (1975) and his seminar in 1975-76 was named in relation to Joyce, *Le Sinthome* in which he discusses the relation of the subject to language with the help of the topological features and the Borromean knot with reference to Joyce and *Finnegans Wake*. In very simplistic terms, Lacan argues that Joyce was able to avoid psychosis by making up for his lack of the Name of the Father by building himself a Name through his *sinthomatique* writing. Lacan's *sinthome* worked as the fourth ring of the Borromean knot that glued together the registers of the imaginary, symbolic and the real which would otherwise float apart. Lacan's interest in Joyce and his writing within a psychoanalytical frame is in itself, although not the primary motive in this dissertation, reason enough for studies that explore the Joycean heritage from a Lacanian perspective. With the growing interest in Lacanian psychoanalytic theory and the increase in Lacan's work due to transcriptions and translations, many scholarly studies and books have been written discussing the relation between Joyce's work and Lacanian theories. Roberto Harari's detailed book *How James Joyce Made His Name* (1995) focused on Lacan's reading of Joyce Seminar XXIII, drawing on the similarities between the works of the two authors. Luke Thurston's 2004 book *James Joyce and the Problem of Psychoanalysis* suggests that Lacan's interest in Joyce was motivated by the psychoanalyst's desire to comprehend how Joyce was able to produce such an unanalyzable 'writing'. Shelly Brivic's *The Veil of Signs: Joyce, Lacan, and Perception* (1991) and *Joyce through Lacan and Žižek: Explorations* (2008) use the Lacanian and Žižekian psychoanalytical framework to explore how Joyce's works reveal the primacy of language and the signifier in the subject's relations and the perception of the world. Daniel Bristow's study *Joyce and Lacan: Reading, Writing, and Psychoanalysis* (2017) skillfully demonstrates in a thorough analysis how Lacanian concepts like *enverity, sinthome, half-saying* find their correspondence in Joyce and his work with a close reading of *Finnegans Wake*. Colette Soler's *Lacan Reading Joyce* (2019) takes Lacan's seminar

on Joyce as its pivotal point and displays how Lacan can be discussed in terms of Joyce's influence on him. There are many other prominent figures and scholars like Julia Kristeva, Ellie Ragland- Sullivan, Jean-Michel Rabaté, Suzette A. Henke, Christine van Boheemen and Ehsan Azari who use Lacanian conceptual tools to analyze Joycean writing.

The common ground this study shares with many other theses, dissertations, articles and books that analyze the relationship between the works of Lacan and Joyce is the undeniable premise that Joycean writing opens itself to a Lacanian reading in terms of the representation of the subject and intra/intersubjective relations through the idiosyncratic use of language. On the other hand, this study does not attempt or endorse a personal analysis of James Joyce on account of his works. The theories of Lacan or his followers on Joyce himself are employed in so far as they reveal a relation between Joyce's works and his authorship, or to the extent that they help form and develop the Lacanian psychoanalytic concepts such as *sinthome*, *lalangue* or *nomination*. The main reason for this study to opt for the Lacanian framework to analyze Joyce's *Ulysses* lies in the fact that the theories of later Lacan, especially the relations depicted in the topology of the Möbius strip, the torus and the Borromean knot display the workings of both the content and the form of the novel as much as they explain the structure of subjectivity and its relation to language and temporality. *Extimité*, although a rather recent concept expressing the spatio-temporal or topological relation in Lacanian theory which has not found its rightful place among the other concepts in the work of Lacan's followers, stands out to be the most appropriate ground on which a Lacanian reading of Joyce's works can be practiced in terms of its peculiar relation that disrupts the dynamics of linearity, as well as causality, sequentiality, progress, referentiality etc. as its subsets. The Möbian relation embodied in *extimité* not only effaces the antagonism between the binaries starting with interior/exterior and intimate/foreign, but it also helps materialize the shift from Cartesian epistemology and realism as its reflection in the literary arena to the

post-Cartesian understanding of subjectivity and high modernism. The linearity of Cartesian logic is therefore challenged by the relations of *extimité* in Joyce's works, particularly in *Ulysses*, although the main stress falls on *Finnegans Wake* in most of the academic work on the Lacanian analysis of Joyce.

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This study has focused on Joyce's *Ulysses* for a Lacanian discussion of intra/intersubjective relations and language in the text for several reasons, the first of which is the misconception that *Finnegans Wake* is the primary text that lends itself to a Lacanian reading. *Finnegans Wake*, Joyce's *opus magnum*, has been the center of attention for many Lacanians not only because it has been the point of departure in Lacan's reading of Joyce and his analysis of his *sinthomatique* writing, but also because of the Joycean innovations such as the lack of a conventional plot and timeline, the invented language, the cyclical structure of the narration and characters, etc. Moreover, in tracing the geneology of Joycean writing, there is a tendency to recognize the writer's earlier works- *Dubliners*, *Stephen Hero* and *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*- as dominated by realism, *Ulysses* by modernism and *Finnegans Wake* by postmodernist tools and techniques. This might have led to a confusion resulting with a judgement that *Finnegans Wake* is the work in which Joyce destroyed the bonds of linearity. This study, maintaining that Joyce rebels against linearity in all his works in different degrees deems *Ulysses* as a novel in which the concept of linearity (and all its subsets) as a keyword in Cartesian epistemology becomes a plaything in the hands of Joyce who, by juxtaposing all possible forms and styles and by managing to translate the material from the Imaginary Real in the Symbolic, reveals the extimate relationship between the subject and language. This study limits itself to the study of *Ulysses* so as to enable a more comprehensive discussion of the lengthy novel and more accurate conclusion within the totality of the novel. Likewise, in the chapters, several themes or concepts are discussed in the framework of a single chapter not only to abide by the different dynamics, designs and mechanisms at work in

different chapters, but also to limit and avert the possible digressions stemming from the multiplicity of the styles, techniques and subject matters of the eighteen episodes. As seen in the skeletons/schemas Joyce himself provided for two of his friends/translators regarding the complex and detailed plan he wrote the novel with, each of the eighteen chapters has their own time, scene, color, technic, science/art, meaning, symbol, and correspondence with the Homeric *Odyssey*. However, these schemas have not been used as departure points in the discussion of the novels, nor have they been used to categorize the novel according to certain categories in a totalizing structure. This study makes use of the Linati and Gilbert schemas either to help give introductory background information, or as supporting detail in the discussion of an argument. The correspondence between the Homeric and Joycean parallels is also avoided unless they are significant in the framework of psychoanalytical theory.

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This study mainly follows Lacanian psychoanalytical theory to discuss the literary reflections of Joyce's radical departure from and challenge to the Cartesian epistemology. Therefore, there are many specific terms that are used in the chapters. A theoretical introduction is provided in the second chapter to facilitate the rather complex and multiple meanings and relations of the Lacanian epistemology which itself shows a considerable fluctuation in the terminology and prioritization of certain concepts throughout his career. Although the main inspiration for this study springs from Lacan's later theories and attempts to follow the theories of later Lacan, many concepts from his earlier years, which form the basis of his psychoanalytical framework, have been employed in an attempt to delineate how the development of his theories paved the way to the final seminars where he shifts the stress from the dominancy of the symbolic or the imaginary to the interrelation of the three registers in which the real emerges as an undeniable effect on the subject's relations within themselves, with the other subjects and objects, with language and spatio-temporality of the subjective processes. The Lacanian terminology used in this study includes, but is

not limited to, *lalangue, sinthome, jouissance, objet a, Name of the Father, nomination, signifier,* the three registers, *point de capitone,* logical time, synchrony and diachrony, etc. As Lacan borrowed many terms from other fields of thought, many common concepts with linguistics, philosophy, mathematics (especially set theory) or topology can be found in Lacanian terminology. In such uses, the difference is highlighted within the text or in the footnotes. Also, as Lacan based his whole oeuvre until mid 60ies on Freud, many Freudian concepts such as *ego, uncanny, preconscious, primary and secondary processes* etc. are employed taking note of their importance or change in the Lacanian framework. Lastly, the Lacanian concept of *extimité* that carves out the composition of this study is delineated under a separate subheading in the theory chapter.

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This study sets out to display the *extimité* of *Ulysses* under the headings of language, subjectivity and temporality. These topics are chosen not only because they are the primary occupations of literary (high) modernism and Joyce in particular, but also they emerge as the points of rupture in the epistemological change that influenced Joyce as many others in the later decades of the 19th and the early decades of the 20th centuries. With the shift that goes hand in hand in industry, technology, science, economics, philosophy, religion, and their social, cultural and literary projections in practical life, the scene in which Joyce was born into was marked by the rupture in linearity which this study takes as the keyword for Cartesian epistemology. To lay bare the spirit of the time and how Joyce as the forerunner of high modernism reacted against the Cartesian self, it seems necessary to map the development that forms the background to the genesis of *Ulysses* in more detail.

The 20th century, the era of disappointment, hope and change in all fields, stands out as a specifically complex one in the literary field that sets out to narrate everything related to human, partially due to the unprecedented pace of progress and decline in hands of ideology-science and technology on one hand and politics and murder on the

other, and partially due to the impossibility of expressing all these synchronic changes from within. The modern/ist writer's endeavor (or motive) to voice her/his experience in the midst of crisis and to make meaning out of it is deeply imprinted in the works of James Joyce, an Irish writer educated with a Catholic worldview and classical literary heritage, living in a modern metropolis charged with not only myths, history and a rich cultural un/conscience but also a constant action for political, social and cultural freedom, and writing in the other's language. In a post-Cartesian world whose dynamics are exceedingly felt but yet to be named, Joyce's inability to belong, neither to the previous epistemologies prevailing in the century he was born to nor to their representational equivalent in literature as realism, marks his mutiny in his works against linearity which protrudes as a central element in Cartesian epistemology. Temporality, language and subjectivity are the three categories through which James Joyce reconfigures reality in his fiction and it is through his problematization/overthrow of their previous signification that his modernist art acts out its content in language and form.

James Joyce was eighteen when the 19th century drew to an end and by the end of World War I, the first chapter of *Ulysses* was published in *The Little Review* in New York. Both as an ordinary citizen and a writer, Joyce was subject to the excitement and anxiety of being modern in all senses. The experience of the modern Europeans in the later decades of the 19th and the early decades of the 20th century was manifold. Express urbanization due to industrialization, shift of balance in the social strata, a severe critique of Victorian values and norms as a result of philosophical, psychological, scientific and economic developments and a subsequent modern awareness in sexuality, gender roles, social undertakings or marital duties, the loss of faith in the religious sphere, international politics and the effects of imperialism as well as globalization all affected and changed the way individuals experienced the world, and how they perceived modernity and reality. Education and the rate of literacy had improved after the Education Act of 1870 making

elementary schools obligatory and the 1882 Married Woman's Property Act had assured that married women could possess their own property. *The Origin of Species* was published in 1859 and the theories of Marx were already in the air. Nietzsche had already pronounced God dead and Saussure had given his Premier Conference at the University of Geneva before the end of the 19th century. The turn of the century was also marked by the technological and scientific changes: in 1900, the year Nietzsche died and Freud published *The Interpretation of Dreams*, the first Zeppelin launched in Germany while Max Planck's radiation law, which implies 'quanta' of energy, announced a major step towards the development of quantum theory in physics. Next year, Queen Victoria died after 63 years on the throne and Roosevelt became the US President after McKinley was shot by an anarchist while wireless signals were transmitted across the Atlantic for the first time by Guglielmo Marconi. Two years later first hormone, secretin, was discovered by Bayliss and Starling. In 1905, a year after the invention of photo-electric cell and the substantiation of the probability that chemically identical atoms may have different masses, Albert Einstein formulated a special theory of relativity, explained photo-electric effect in terms of light quanta and developed Brownian theory of motion while Freud published *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality,* which was about to revolutionize psychoanalysis and the views about human psyche forever.

All these changes are both the effects of and the signals for the ruptures in the Enlightenment epistemology and the 'Cartesian self/subject', which gave rise to the suitable grounds in modernist art to flourish. As Terry Eagleton argues, modernism

> occupies a particular moment within modernity- the moment, roughly speaking, of the transition from classical laissez-faire to international monopoly capitalism, the moment of imperial wars and political insurrections, of social crisis and upheaval, all of which is of course registered, either euphorically or gloomily, by modernist art itself and remarks that the years of high

modernism in Europe are also the years of a crack in 'the high liberal enlightened modernity'. ("Contradictions" 38)

As the former epistemological principles collapsed, so did the individual's former understanding and perception of reality, and the death of previously unquestionable epistemological and ontological 'truths' was paralleled by the death of many myths. As Jane Flax proposes, one important argumentation in postmodernist rhetoric is "that Western culture is about to experience or has already experienced, but has been denying, an interrelated series of deaths. These include the deaths of Man, History, and Metaphysics" (*Thinking* 32). Although the widespread realization and denouncement of these deaths may be attributed to postmodernism, their footsteps were heard as early as the beginnings of the 19th century[2], even before Nietzsche's famous announcement of the death of God in 1882 in his *The Gay Science.* As such, following Flax's statement, it is possible to argue that if postmodernism/post-modernism deals with the post-mortem, modernism was the ante-mortem; it was the mortal wound, the suffering, the hopeless toil for survival. This chaotic stage, this epistemological slide, this 20th century of human progress and decline which was later to be diagnosed and analyzed by the postmodernist philosophers- like Derrida, Foucault, Deleuze and Lyotard to name a few- as an era in which many metanarratives (first and foremost that of the Enlightenment) collapsed, was actually 'happening' at the time Joyce and other modernists were producing their works. Their experience, then, unlike those who lived before or after them, was, first of all, an intrinsically impossible one: to express what they could not name in a language they did not feel at home, or as Lyotard puts it, to present 'the unpresentable' (71-82). Be it called *jouissance* or 'sublime', their reality in the face of modern life, in the shadow of the collapsing episteme and in the wake of the most horrible wars the world was ever to witness, as much as they did not know how to make sense of it, was

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[2] See James Kellenberger's book *Kierkegaard and Nietzsche: Faith and Eternal Acceptance* for examples from Hegel, Heine and Ernest Renan. (72)

both painful and joyful synchronously, and as uncanny as it is, different from those of the previous generation for whom to a certain degree meaning-making mechanisms were still not crippled. Upon the vanishing of the image of a world in which the individual had the sole authority and control over his consciousness, the new 'reality' of the artist was loss of religious faith, the unknown, uncontrolled and unconquered territories of the unconscious, the isolated but intellectually nourishing life in the urban capitals, the no-more-promising discourses of politics, economics and religion. Therefore, although the modernist movement is at its core an attack on the premises and values of the Enlightenment project and realism as its formal literary representation, it would be very deceitful to argue that modernism did not seek to represent reality, or its aesthetics was disconnected from reality. The aim of the modernist artist was no different than their predecessors: they still wrote to represent reality but both their reality and the way they perceived it had altered. Thus, as the previous discursive style was falling short in their self-expressive travail, these artists wallowing in their "crisis of representation" turned away from aesthetic realism to anti-realist techniques, language and contexts, which were later to be called 'high modernism'. However, apprehending and presenting reality was still their desire, as impossible to meet as it is like all other 'desires' that aim at replacing loss with something meaningful, with the exception that their reality was now more complex, fragmented, insecure, subjective, multiple and non-linear. The quest for the articulation of this new reality found its form in a new language/poetics: stream of consciousness, interior monologues, fragmentariness, language games, rhythmic plays, and self-conscious language and art.

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Therefore, this study suggests that Joyce's high modernism as opposed to the realism of the previous century cannot be separated from his revolt against linearity and Cartesian understanding of the self. Joyce managed to create an ontological site in language through weaving his words in an unprecedented style by which he narrated the antique story

of the modern human condition. This novel representation of subjectivity and the relations weaved around the gap in the heart of the human can best be analyzed in a Lacanian framework which itself builds its theories around a *lack*. As such, this study argues that *extimité* is the defining characteristics of Joycean writing in *Ulysses* and aims to analyze how James Joyce in *Ulysses* disrupts the dynamics of linearity by portraying an *extimate* understanding of subjectivity, language and temporality, and to decipher the ways in which his reconfiguration of reality is reflected in his use of content and form in their *extimate* relation.

1.2. Modernity, Modernism, Modernist Novel

In the remaining part of the Introduction chapter, an analysis of the terms 'modern, modernism and modernity' will be made and a definitive framework of 'Enlightenment ideology' and 'Cartesian self' will be drawn in order to clarify certain points that are crucial for the development of the argument in this study. No matter how wholeheartedly one might adopt such a view and agree that modernity/modernism is a concept that cannot be fixed, defined and limited to a Eurocentric/western point of view, it is necessary to build a definitive framework to develop a solid argumentation. In the following section, therefore, while the distinction between these concepts will be made and their intricate- sometimes painful- relationship will be highlighted in order to portray an adequate picture of Joyce's anti-realist aesthetic approach in his fiction, the 'modernity' that will be specifically referred to in this dissertation is that of the West, especially central Europe, which is reciprocally related to Enlightenment ideals. This distinction is necessary so as to highlight how Joyce's (high) modernism and his modern consciousness in his fiction disrupt, mock and undermine the dynamics of modernity, the traces of which, both as an experience and as an ideology, are abundantly to be found in James Joyce's work.

'Modern' is a complex word that has come to connote various, sometimes contrary, meanings at different times. "The notion of the 'modern' undergoes semantic shift much faster than similar terms of comparable function, like 'romantic' or 'neo-classical'; indeed, as Lionel Trilling says, it can swing round in meaning until it is facing in the opposite direction" (Bradbury, *Modernism* 22). Modern comes to connote a different meaning in every field or discipline, and there are more than one modern traditions in 20th century novel. The word 'modern', as Susan Stanford Friedman states, is usually associated with "the initial break with medieval institutions and outlooks that evolved over time" by social sciences critics following the historians of Europe who tend to categorize European history as "classical, medieval, early modern, and modern" ("Definitional"19). Similarly, Howard in *The Oxford History of the Twentieth Century* argues that the word "had previously been used to distinguish the post-Enlightenment period from that which had looked back to the classics for its authorities" (5). In the second half of the 19th century its meaning began to change. 'Modern' was now used to signify many 'things': the new means of communication, of transportation, new materials, energy and power sources. Its definition also entailed fresh connotations: mass-produced commodities, crowded and busy cities with houses as 'machine-à-habiter', unprecedented, unfamiliar and challenging art forms. Retrospective use of the word 'modern' has brought on further and usually contrary meanings. Looking back from the 21st century, regardless of the necessity born by its semantic quality that required the modern's becoming old, many critics have alternative views about the modern. While Marshall Berman argues that "to be modern is to find ourselves in an environment that promises adventure, power, joy, growth, transformation of ourselves and the world—and, at the same time, that threatens to destroy everything we have, everything we know, everything we are" (15), Lyotard uses it to refer "to designate any science that legitimates itself with reference to a metadiscourse (of this kind) making an explicit appeal to some grand narrative, such as the dialectics of Spirit, the hermeneutics of meaning, the emancipation of the rational or working subject, or the creation of

wealth" (XXIII). Same multiplicity reigns in the literary arena as well. Although the term 'modern novel' is used by many critics for both the products of the avant-garde movement that reached its peak in the 1920s, and novels of the 20th century in general, including even the contemporary ones, this dissertation assumes a distinction between the uses of the terms 'modern novel' and 'modernist novel' on the ground that although modernist novels are modern, not all modern novels are modernist either in their form or content. Even a basic comparison of the leading modernist novelists like Joyce, Woolf or Lawrence with their younger contemporaries such as Robert Graves (1895-1985), Evelyn Waugh (1903-1966) or Graham Greene (1904-1991) would show that not only the latter's realism or formal characteristics but also the former's aesthetic positioning of themselves and/or artistic perceptions are quite distant despite the fact that both groups share a similar modern consciousness. Therefore, the term 'modernist novel' will be used in this study when referring to the avant-garde movement that started towards the end of the 19th century and diminished with the Second World War and 'modern novel' will be preferred while referring to the novels of the 20th century that bear a modern consciousness and tension.

Treating 'modern' as a temporally-bound quality makes modern-ity "a specific set of historical conditions developing in the West, including the industrial revolution, conquest of and expansion economically and politically into other continents, the transition to urban culture, the rise of the nation state, and growing power of the bourgeoisie" (Friedman 19). Although meaning-wise plural and controversial, 'modernity' can be taken as a condition which many important philosophers and critics trace back to the Enlightenment era, be it for its economic bases or modes of production as in Marx's critique, or its ideological functions or social institutions as in Foucault's analysis and/ or its philosophical and conceptual core as in Nietzsche's works. Reason, progress, self-discipline, control and knowledge can be some of the keywords which can be associated with modernity. In his essay "What is

Enlightenment?" Foucault interrogates the Kantian notion that describes the Enlightenment as the moment when humanity is going to put its own reason to use, without subjecting itself to any authority. Departing from Kant's ideas on the Enlightenment, Foucault inquires the extent to which using one's reason would mean freedom in a society and how to prioritize the personal, universal and the public uses of reason. According to Foucault,

> We must never forget that the Enlightenment is an event, or a set of events and complex historical processes, that is located at a certain point in the development of European societies. As such, it includes elements of social transformation, types of political institution, forms of knowledge, projects of rationalization of knowledge and practices, technological mutations that are very difficult to sum up in a word, even if many of these phenomena remain important today. (*Foucault* 43)

Foucault examines the condition of modernity by the example of Baudelaire as "his consciousness of modernity is widely recognized as one of the most acute in the nineteenth century" (39). Foucault first remarks that modernity is "often spoken of as an epoch, or at least as a set of features characteristic of an epoch; situated on a calendar" and underlines the question "whether modernity constitutes the sequel to the Enlightenment and its development, or whether we are to see it as a rupture or a deviation with respect to the basic principles of the eighteenth century" (39). Then, instead of taking modernity as a period, he proposes to view it as an attitude- 'a mode of relating to contemporary reality'. He cites the most important characteristics of Baudelaire's modernity, or his mode of relating to the then present reality, as the "ironic heroization of the present," "transfiguring play of freedom with reality" and "ascetic elaboration of the self."

On the other hand, Marx in his *Communist Manifesto* argues that after the industrial revolution, the modern modes of production of capitalism and the subsequent increase in consumption and globalization led to the exploitation of labor, harsh social stratification, social and economic injustice as well as alienation of man from himself in the modern sense.

His analysis shows the strong relation between modernity and many problematized concepts such as bourgeoisie and its political discourse, urbanization, machinery and bourgeois technology which causes alienation and poverty:

> The bourgeoisie has at last, since the establishment of Modern Industry and of the world-market, conquered for itself, in the modern representative State, exclusive political sway. The executive of the modern State is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie (...) Modern bourgeois society with its relations of production, of exchange and of property, a society that has conjured up such gigantic means of production and of exchange, is like the sorcerer, who is no longer able to control the powers of the nether world whom he has called up by his spells. (82, 85)

Bohemian English modernist writers of that bourgeois society, ironically, reacted against the results of the same ideology and the same condition of modernity half a century later, and this universality of modern condition, while making a general definition impossible, makes it easier to understand why modernism as a reaction to modernity flourished in many countries in the world at about the same time and in many branches of art such as music, painting and literature.

Călinescu argues that in the second half of the nineteenth century, there was a split and two modernities emerged: the first one is "a stage in the history of Western civilization, a product of scientific and technological progress, of the industrial revolution, of the sweeping social and economic changes brought about by capitalism" which has been " kept alive and promoted as the key value in the triumphant civilization established by the middle class" (41). The second modernity is an aesthetic concept which, to the contrary, marked by an inclination towards 'radical antibourgeois attitudes' and expressed its disgust of 'middle-class scale of values' through diverse means "ranging from rebellion, anarchy, and apocalypticism to aristocratic self-exile" (41). Marshall Berman makes a more detailed distinction in his iconoclastic

work on modernity *All That is Solid Melts Into Air* by analyzing it in three different phases:

> In the first phase, which goes roughly from the start of the sixteenth century to the end of the eighteenth, people are just beginning to experience modern life; they hardly know what has hit them. They grope, desperately but half blindly, for an adequate vocabulary; they have little or no sense of a modern public or community within which their trials and hopes can be shared. (17)

According to Berman, the second phase started with the great revolutionary wave of the 1790s. With the French Revolution and its reverberations was the abrupt emergence of a great modern public which shares "the feeling of living in a revolutionary age" when it was possible to witness upheavals in every dimension of personal, social and political life. Moreover, 19th century modern public could remember what it was like to live in a world which was not modern. Berman argues that "from this inner dichotomy, this sense of living in two worlds simultaneously, the ideas of modernization and modernism emerge and unfold" (16). The last and final phase is still continuing and quite problematic for Berman: "In the twentieth century, the process of modernization expands to take in virtually the whole world, and the developing world culture of modernism achieves spectacular triumphs in art and thought" (17). Not only the process but also the public expand in number, leading to fragmentation and multiplicity. Therefore, the idea of modernity, which is now experienced in various fragmentary ways, loses much of its "vividness, resonance and depth," and no longer organizes and adds meaning to people's lives: "As a result of all this, we find ourselves today in the midst of a modern age that has lost touch with the roots of its own modernity" (17). Before digging deeper into modernism and its aesthetics, the reaction against the traditional forms of the novel and formal realism in general must be examined further to highlight the quandary and the mindset of the modernist writers including James Joyce. As discussed in this study, Joyce's writing displays a manifest rebellion against Enlightenment philosophy and a

dramatic detachment from literary realism that embodies most of the values and hierarchies it prioritized. Watt argues, "Modern realism, of course, begins from the position that truth can be discovered by the individual through his senses: it has its origins in Descartes and Locke, and received its first full formulation by Thomas Reid in the middle of the eighteenth century" (12). Watt's well-known and much-disputed account of the rise of the novel and consequently realism in the 18th and 19th centuries sets forth the social, cultural and economic foundations that gave way to the emergence and popularization of this literary phenomenon, but does not really make space for a discussion of its ideological function in a critical framework. Literary realism, which set about to present life as it is, became in a very short time one of the most influential movements in literary history. There are, as Watt lists, numerous reasons behind this fast adaption but its importance for this dissertation lies in its ideological function which is already present in its definition: "a mode of writing that gives the impression of recording or 'reflecting' faithfully an actual way of life" (Baldick 212) with "its emphasis on the author's objectivity" (Quinn 353). Therefore, realism's definitive claim that it presents 'reality' as it is from an objective point of view hints its agenda as a means of establishing a 'new' reality (of a specific class- namely the bourgeoisie- in many critiques benefited from in this study) so invisibly and successfully that it becomes the reality itself soon. However, it is very important to make a difference between realism as a movement and a technique. As a technique, method or even an attitude, realism is present to a certain extent almost in every mode of writing in literary history as an element that facilitates the communication between the author and the reader. We can find realistic depictions in *Beowulf, Don Quixote, Inferno, Mrs. Dalloway* or *Catch 22*. However, such an employment of this technique does not make these literary works examples of the realist genre. In *A New Handbook of Literary Terms*, realism as a genre is claimed to include Joyce's *Ulysses:*

> In its classic nineteenth-century form, realism requires the detailed recording of characters' sensory impressions, their styles of dress, and their visual or auditory perceptions, as well as the

look of the houses and streets they inhabit. Such detail makes up what Henry James in "The Art of Fiction" (1884) calls "solidity of specification." In this respect, Joyce's *Ulysses* (1922), with its endlessly rich panoply of real-life details, fulfills the realist genre. (Mikics 256)

It seems impossible for a work of art not to include the elements of a previous movement that it reacts, and it is the same for each literary movement; modernism is no exception. However, *Ulysses*, and Joyce's writing in general, providing that all his works to different extents recruit realist technicality, sets out to subvert realism and the ideology enacting it profoundly. This brings us back to the subject of the ideology and the functionality of literature in general and realism in particular.

It has been acknowledged widely especially after the 20th century that everything is ideological, and naturally literature is no exception. All literature regardless of/including the form it embodies is ideological in what it says or chooses not to say; all its form and content as well as its target audience take shape according to the zeitgeist of its production time and the ideological bonding of its author. At this point, both the dominant ideology (and the power structures in control) and the reader's predicament (not only physical but socio-cultural and economic) are among the determining forces of the success or failure of a novel, a formal technique or method, and even a whole literary current. As Eagleton explains, literature is "highly-valued writing" and even this description is self-evident in that any value judgment is loaded with preoccupations, interests and intents, and also is doomed to change in time as it depends on the taste of a specific group of people under specific circumstances fitting certain criteria (*Literary* 9-11). Thus, it is almost axiomatic to say that what one takes for fact, even what one regards as true knowledge, is indeed what one comes to believe in or wishes to be true. Such was the case with literary realism that swept the literary ground in the 18th and 19th centuries. Literary realism like the novel itself was an ideological product that expressed the value judgments of a certain group and helped them to make what they believed in/wished for come true. Through the realist novel, a world

whose one-to-one reflection the reader was able to witness on the page was built and it felt (read) so real that it became real. At this point the ideas of Roland Barthes on realism and 'the reality effect' realist writing produces can shed light on the ideological function of realism.

Barthes's focus on the importance of realist literature and its effects prevails in all his works throughout his career from *Writing Degree Zero* (1953) to *S/Z* (1970). In *Writing Degree Zero,* Barthes is influenced by both Marxism and Existentialism, and especially by Sartre, on whose influential "What is Literature?" (1947) Barthes based his conception of literary history and 'committed writing': as Allen explains, while Sartre considers writing an exchange, a form of communication between the writer and the reader in which their "commitment to address, to call upon, their own and other people's human freedom" (10) is limited by the changes in literary history (specifically in France) and the bourgeoisie's rise to power as the dominant class in society, Barthes, although he employs most of Sartre's main argumentation, sees writing as a form of 'anti-communication', whose concern is "that which is communicated outside or beyond any message or content" (16). For Sartre in *What is Literature?* poetry, which engages in style and therefore lacks the power of action and activation of prose, belongs to a different category than prose, together with painting, sculpture and music, and the poet, whose "business [is] to contemplate words in a disinterested fashion" (21), cannot engage in writing as the prose-writer does, for he "does not utilise the word" (15), whereas the function of the prose-writer "as a man who *makes use* of words" (19) is "to act in such a way that nobody can be ignorant of the world and nobody may say that he is innocent of what it's all about" (24). Barthes, on the other hand, focuses his exploration of literature on the very element that Sartre undervalues: form. Barthes starts *Writing Degree Zero* by referring to Hebert and the obscenities he employs in his mode of writing (*Ecriture* in the French original as usually employed in Barthesian terminology) which signify something more than its content, and mentions that, although a writer is dependent on the previous literary forms to a

certain extent, the form the writers use and ideology are closely interconnected:

> History, then, confronts the writer with a necessary option between several moral attitudes connected with language; it forces him to signify Literature in terms of possibilities outside his control. We shall see, for example, that the ideological unity of the bourgeoisie gave rise to a single mode of writing, and that in the bourgeois periods (classical and romantic), literary form could not be divided because consciousness was not; whereas, as soon as the writer ceased to be a witness to the universal, to become the incarnation of a tragic awareness (around 1850), his first gesture was to choose the commitment of his form, either by adopting or rejecting the writing of his past. Classical writing therefore disintegrated, and the whole of Literature, from Flaubert to the present day, became the problematics of language (2-3).

Barthes indeed explains in detail that only one mode of writing prevailed before the French Revolution of 1848, which was "a class writing" (57) embedded with the bourgeois ideology, and "with the cynicism customary in the first flush of political victory", it was at first presented "as the language of a privileged minority" (58). Barthes cites that although "Vaugelas recommends classical writing as a *de facto*, not a *de jure*, state of affairs" in 1647, in the *Grammaire* of Port-Royal in 1660 "classical language wears a universal look, and clarity has become a value" (58). This, according to Barthes, hints classical language's continuous design 'to persuade' and it is via this mode of writing a unified and universal essentialist mythology of man was produced by the bourgeoisie, and "Political authority, spiritualistic dogmatism, and unity in the language of classicism are therefore various aspects of the same historical movement" (58). This theme reappears in Barthes' later writing: in *Mythologies* (1957), where Barthes delineates the working mechanisms of myths in general and also gives many specific contemporary examples from wrestling to detergents, he displays myths as "second-order semiological systems" and decipher how the dominant ideology (bourgeoisie) transforms a sign/meaning into a myth:

> it is the bourgeois ideology itself, the process through which the bourgeoisie transforms the reality of the world into an image of

the world, History into Nature. And this image has a remarkable feature: it is upside down. The status of the bourgeoisie is particular, historical: man as represented by it is universal, eternal. The bourgeois class has precisely built its power on technical, scientific progress, on an unlimited transformation of nature: bourgeois ideology yields in return an unchangeable nature. The first bourgeois philosophers pervaded the world with significations, subjected all things to an idea of the rational, and decreed that they were meant for man: bourgeois ideology is of the scientistic or the intuitive kind, it records facts or perceives values, but refuses explanations; the order of the world can be seen as sufficient or ineffable, it is never seen as significant. Finally, the basic idea of a perfectible mobile world, produces the inverted image of an unchanging humanity, characterized by an indefinite repetition of its identity. In a word, in the contemporary bourgeois society, the passage from the real to the ideological is defined as that from an anti-physis to a pseudo-physis. (140-1)

Within this framework, Barthes's critique of 19th century realist novel as an ideological tool that establishes the bourgeois values is not surprising. In *Writing Degree Zero*, Barthes, as he specifies how the modern writer was detached from the audience whom he used to write for and how he, no longer wholly identifying with his/her bourgeois audience, "torn between his social condition and his intellectual vocation", tries to find a way out of this "tragic predicament peculiar to Literature" (60), talks about Flaubert and his attempts to overcome his sense of alienation (his work corresponds to the peak of the French Revolution of 1848) through his signification of his work as hard work/craft and himself as a craftsman. Regardless of the pains or endeavors at stake, Barthes argues, the modern Literature captures this attempt and renders it neutral -or even natural- by adding it its giant reservoir of cliche forms of writing, as it does to all other avant-guard ventures. It is at this point that he underlines the function of the realist novel as what will in a future work be called 'the reality effect'. Barthes connects the writings of Maupassant, Zola and Daudet as an extension of the tradition of Flaubert and calls it "the realist mode of writing", "a combination of the formal signs of Literature (preterite, indirect speech, the rhythm of written language) and of the no less formal signs of realism (incongruous snippets of popular speech, strong language or dialect words, etc.)" (67). Barthes contends that this mode of writing,

which has become the criteria of "the image *par excellence* of a Literature which has all the striking and intelligible signs of its identity" (70) for the lower-middle class (the petite bourgeois) education, functions as a means of producing a reality through formal techniques of literary realism.

Barthes speculates further about such techniques and illustrates how they work in his seminal essay *The Reality Effect* (1968). Citing the overuse of notations- "system of signs"- or descriptive details in Flaubert's "A simple Heart" and Michele's "Histoire de France", Barthes argues that such notations which prevail in almost every contemporary Western narrative are actually enigmatic as "'pure' word does not exist" ("Reality" 142). By showing that such a set of descriptive details does not have a predictive value and "is justified by no finality of action or communication", Barthes contends that the significance of such notations in realist texts lies in their "finality of the beautiful" (142). Their use is justified by the aesthetic in Rhetoric, by the "cultural rules of representation" that have reigned since antiquity in forms like epideictic discourse or ecphrasis (142). Thus, "by positing the referential as the real, by pretending to follow it in a submissive fashion" (145) realism, being "any discourse which accepts 'speech-acts' justified by their referent alone" (147), produces "the reality effect" that is "the basis of that unavowed verisimilitude which forms the aesthetic of all the standard works of modernity" (148). As such, the referent that is described in detail in such novels is not actually of a representative nature: it is a means to persuade the reader of what Literature claims to possess -the truth.

From a Barthesian perspective of realism as an ideological function, therefore, it becomes clearer why Joyce's formal techniques, his languages, his styles, and his *ecriture* are marked by the footprints of an absolute revolt. Joyce disrupts in his works not only the ideological integrity of realist literature through his choice of content as the mundane, the quotidian, the obscene, the fescennine, shortly the

unspoken reality that was rare to find in realist literature but he also deconstructs what Barthes calls "the reality effect" by employing the detailed realist descriptive language to describe the unspoken, the unconscious, the semi-mythical, or by using such language along with modernist techniques that aims at undermining "the truth" that realist literature claims to possess. Actually, it is the use of new techniques that led the way for Joyce to be named amongst the forerunners of 'high modernism'. Although the movement cannot be completely mapped out or excluded from modernism in its literary sense, 'high modernism' has come to connote a different sort of technicality and motivation that made some artists of the age including Joyce to be distinguished from the others in both positive and notorious ways.

'High modernism' is a term used generally to refer to modernist works, written roughly in between the two world wars - though its peak is considered to be the 1920s, a period which is technically more intricate and refined. As Kavaloski explains, the two different associations regarding high modernism lies in the distinction between the aesthetic and the historical qualities of these works. For some critics such as Maria DiBattista, these works are categorized as such due to their quality and seriousness that differentiates them from 'low' or popular works, while other critics think 'high modernism' as a literary period which lies between the early modernism, the pre-war avant-garde that lasts roughly from the late nineteenth century to the First World War, and the late modernism that started with the Great Depression in the 1930s (Kavaloski 1-2). The second view, which would place Joyce's each novel in a different phase of modernism, falls rather short as it disregards the artistic qualities and the rationale beneath them. Although the term 'high modernism' is a label that came into use around the 1970s and cannot be agreed on as to what it includes or leaves out, many critics hold that the works of T.S. Eliot, James Joyce, Virginia Woolf, Marcel Proust, André Gide and Thomas Mann are the paragons of high modernism (yet many others can be added to the list). Despite the accusations regarding high modernism's being "elitist,

inaccessible, and overly aestheticized", it is generally accepted as the epitome of aestheticism and the milestone of 20th century literature (Kavaloski 5). Each author aligned within this framework has such unique characteristics and essential differences that most of these authors are subjects of separate classes in English departments; yet there are some aspects of their works - except the fact that they lived and produced around the same years - which unite them under the same umbrella: their intentional and sometimes extreme experimentation with innovative form and language, their preoccupation with philosophical and psychological issues, human consciousness and subjectivity, and their desire to find unity in fragmentariness - both technically and contextually.

As Dettmar points out, some 'high modernist' writers and poets like T.S. Eliot, W.B. Yeats, Virginia Woolf and James Joyce took their experimentation with narrative and formal techniques to such extremes that their work led to controversy not only among many readers but also many literary critics who "charged the new work with formlessness" (3). However, as this study aspires to evince, beneath such 'formlessness' there was a certain attempt to produce 'real' art in a way that expressed the spirit of the 'new' age and the 'modern' artist. At that point it is important to note T. S. Eliot, another prominent name in the movement, and his defense of Joyce against the critics who condemned his chaotic style. Arguing for a method he calls 'mythic method', T. S. Eliot underlines how form (or what critics of the age called 'formlessness') is actually one of the most solid elements the modernist writers used to capture the fluidity of the chaotic modern mode of being that they strive to express through their art.

Lukács argues that modernist texts are disengaged from reality and they ignore historicity in two ways: the hero of modernist novels is confined in his own world existing for himself, and due to his "thrownness-into-being" in Heidegger's terms, he does not have a personal history; he is disconnected from the world and "he neither forms nor is formed by it"

(762). Modernist literature takes solitariness as the universal human condition of its characters, which renders meaningful human relations improbable. He accuses modern subjectivism to take abstract potentialities, which are richer than life but not even concrete or 'real' as they exist only in the imaginative mind of the author, as facts. Modern subjectivism thus alternates between "melancholy and fascination", and Lukács claims that melancholy ends up with disdain when the potentialities are not realized.

"The rejection of narrative objectivity, the surrender to subjectivity" which the reader in Joyce's case witnesses in the form of stream of consciousness is ideological for Lukács, and it disintegrates human personality which in return disintegrates the objective external world by showing it as something that is inexplicable by default (1221). "Lack of a consistent view of human nature" is the reason underlying this mutual and dynamic disintegration, and such dissolution of personality is symptomatic of modernist literature's agenda to disengage men from his environment, reduce his being into nothing and announce this as a *conditione humaine* (1222).

According to Lukács, naturalism and modernism share the common ground of an engagement with psychopathology, which in the former's case "sprang from an artistic need (...) an attempt to escape from the dreariness of life under capitalism" (1224), became an obsession in the latter's case: it is a purpose rather than a cause in modernist literature which it shares with Freudian psychoanalysis which, unlike that of Pavlov with his Hippocratic oath who correctly regards that "mental abnormality is a deviation from a norm" (1224), proposes that normal psychology can be explained by the abnormalities of the psyche. Such a purpose- *terminus ad quem*- which holds psychopathology its goal of artistic creation rather than one of its starting points- and therefore doomed to fail- works hand in hand with the formalistic and stylistic distortions.   That is, dethroning "hierarchy of significance" and perspective (which, by selecting the necessary elements that build a

character's/plot's development, both "determines the course and content" and denies history and historicity), such modernist techniques render any chance of a future impossible and/or pointless. Thus, they present, ironically, a static understanding of reality and social and historical conditions. However, says Lukács, realistic literature which properly positioned change and development of individuals and/or societies at the center of its subject matter (it is rather interesting at this point how Lukács as a leading Marxist critique reanimates the Enlightenment myth of progress through which he embraces realism on account of historicity) "had always assumed the unity of the world it described and seen it as a living whole inseparable from man himself" (1229). The descriptive detail in realistic literature "is both *individual* and *typical*" whereas in modernist literature, although descriptive detail is abundant and "is often of an extraordinary, sensuous power", it denies the 'typical': "Modernist literature thus replaces concrete typicality with abstract particularity" (1230). Modernist literature's employment of allegory, which Lukács explains by using Walter Benjamin's analysis of Baroque texts, helps the abstraction of concepts represented through details and deprive them of their typicality.

Another crucial point Lukács mentions as the essential feature of modernist literature, which happens to be one focus of this study, is the subjectivizing of temporality. Lukács claims that Subjective Idealism and figures such as Bergson and Proust caused a divide between subjective time and objective temporality, and decomposed the natural sequence of temporality respectively, which culminated in the disintegration of the artist's world (as depicted in her/his novels) "into a multiplicity of partial worlds" that neither represent reality nor adhere to the objective temporality crucial for a correct understanding of history (1228).

As a result, for Lukács, the depiction in modernist novels of this meaninglessness of human life, this inseparability of abstract potentiality from concrete potentiality, this glorification of neurosis, this

intended rift created between objective reality and subjective alienation, and last but not least the disjunction of history resulting in the evasion of hope for change and development are manifested in all kinds of formal features of modernist literature such as the display of 'angst' in 'the transcendence of Nothingness' through devices such as the supreme judges in *The Trial* or the castle administration in *The Castle* in Kafka, the narration and focalization technique in *The Counterfeiters* in Gide, or stream of consciousness in Joyce's novels. As stated by Booker, modernist texts for Lukács "are sterile artifacts, divorced from history and totally caught up in the inexorable drive of capitalist society to convert all it touches into mere commodities" (53).

Starting off from what it reacts to and what it is criticized for, it is possible to assert that literary modernism was both a product of and a reaction to modernity: it was created by the writers/poets who were exiles from the old paradise: from their hometowns, their languages, their beliefs and hopes. They were at odds with time and space now, and their 'crisis of representation' encompassed not only their quest for meaning in myths, cities or subjective sensations on trivia, but also the way these writers/poets sought to express themselves. The experiment with language and form in literary modernism represented their answer to modernity in a sense: empowered by its hallmark for innovation, its motive to find out, its belief in individual but rage against its over-rationalization, its standardization, its alienation. Although every writer's modernism is different, when examined closely, the prose works of modernist movement reveal some similar attitudes in form reflecting their stance towards life, experience and what to make out of it. Norman Cantor, as cited by Childs, suggests that what he calls "a model of Modernism" could be defined by the following characteristics: modernism affirmed anti-historicism because truth is not 'evolutionary and progressive' but something which needs serious analysis, focused on the micro- rather than the macrocosm/ the individual more than the social. It generated self-referential and self-contained texts rather than representational authoritative ones. In contrast to the Victorian

harmony, its tendency was towards 'the disjointed, disintegrating and discordant' in a culture which changed in reaction to the machine age. Modernist art emphasized difficulty and complexity so at times it was elitist, and most of the time sympathetic to feminism, homosexuality, androgyny and bisexuality as it interrogates the limitations of the nuclear family which obstructed the individual's search for personal values. It brought a fresh frankness in description to issues such as sexuality, family and religion. Modernists regarded art as "the highest form of human achievement" and did not regard morality or ethics above aesthetics. Cantor's last remark draws attention to the modernist inclination towards projections of apocalypse and despair in consequence of 'decades of creeping Victorian doubt'. In this manner, modernist writings usually combine mythology and symbolism with history, and handle the themes of social, spiritual or personal collapse. (Childs 18-9)

Modernism, particularly in terms of narrative technique, character portrayal, self-referentiality and linearity, challenged many of the conventions such as a reliable narrator; the depiction of a fixed stable self; history as a progressive linear process; bourgeois politics that advocated reform not radical change; the tying up of all narrative strands or 'closure'. Modernist fiction is thus "associated with attempts to render human subjectivity in ways more real than realism: to represent consciousness, perception, emotion, meaning and the individual's relation to society through interior monologue, stream of consciousness, tunnelling, defamiliarisation, rhythm, irresolution" (Childs 3).

Stream of consciousness is probably the most influential of the techniques that emerged in Modernist literature. The term was first used by the psychologist William James, Henry James's brother, in *The Principles of Psychology* in 1890, where he proposed, while talking about how the mind has its own motions and structures, to "call it the stream of thought, of consciousness, or of the subjective life" (qtd. in Bradbury,

Modern 27). Stream of consciousness can briefly be summed as "a literary rendering of the thoughts that flow through a character's mind at any given time" and it refers to "the more experimental style of representing consciousness in an apparently raw or unedited form, sometimes sacrificing intelligibility and conventional grammar in the process" (Hanna 77). Such a technique allowed modernist writers not only to reflect the aesthetic quality of their art which they thought was lacking in the realist mode of representation but also to express the trivial but epiphanic traces of the daily life which they thought was lacking in poetry. Thus, they achieved this poetic triviality in their novels by employing stream of consciousness technique in which the thoughts of the characters flow like undammed rivers which carry trivial traces of the daily world in their beautiful undulant fluidity.

Epiphany is another modern technique which is mastered by James Joyce, who in *Stephen Hero*- the draft of what later became *A Portrait*- gave an explanation of the term: "By an epiphany he meant a sudden spiritual manifestation, whether in the vulgarity of speech or of gesture or in a memorable phase of the mind itself. He believed that it was for the man of letters to record these epiphanies with extreme care, seeing that they themselves are the most delicate and evanescent of moments" (*Stephen* 216). Such sudden manifestations usually strike at the most unexpected moments amidst the mind's memories or thoughts of the most trivial things. The value of these revelations, these artistic disclosures, no matter what negative or positive connotations they may transport, is that they not only open a direct door to the inner vaults of the character's mind, but also give the artist a chance to reveal the subject matter of his hopes as a unifying power: art. For instance, in *A Portrait* after Stephen encounters a girl on the shore, her presence and appearance make him experience such a transcendental moment which is densely charged with artistic resonances, and which eventually paves the way for Stephen's determination to become an artist: "Her eyes had called him and his soul had leaped at the call. To live, to err, to fall, to triumph, to recreate life out of life! A wild angel had appeared to him,

the angel of mortal youth and beauty, an envoy from the fair courts of life, to throw open before him an instant of ecstasy the gates of all the ways of error and glory. On and on and on and on!" (145)

The use of free indirect discourse is another important device which is perfected in the Modernist era. It is "a technique for presenting a character's thoughts or speech without obvious mediation by an external narrator" (Parsons 29). It is "a combination of two modes of discourse" (M. Miller 57): direct and indirect discourse. But at the same time, it is different from direct speech or indirect speech in that it does not have a mediator whose presence the reader feels as he does in direct discourse from the quotation marks and other punctuations used – He halted suddenly and asked: "How far have I walked? What hour is it?""- or in indirect discourse from the reporting verbs which, while bearing the narratorial comments, judgments or thoughts, put an invisible barrier between the narrator and the character - He halted suddenly and asked himself how far he had walked and what time it was. What free indirect speech does is that "it uses the third-person and past tense while moving inside the character's consciousness to take on the style and tone of their own immediate speaking voice" (Parsons 29): "He halted suddenly and heard his heart in the silence. How far had he walked? What hour was it?" (*Portrait* 145)

1.3. Modernism, Lacan and Joyce

The theories of Lacan, which have usually been studied within the framework of structuralist-poststructuralist debate in literary criticism (other than the psychoanalytic approach and application), offer a productive ground for the discussion of Joyce's *Ulysses* and the modernist sensitivities presented and highlighted in it. Joyce's observations and concerns about the human condition and the modern subject, and his reaction to the 'new' reality in literary representation are matched in psychoanalytical field with the theories of Lacan, whose "unparalleled appreciation of the paradoxical nature of human

experience, together with his treatment of paradox as (paradoxically enough) almost a criterion of truth" and "the essential nature of Lacan's overall style of thinking, as well as his most fundamental intellectual commitments and contributions, can be understood as expressions of an essentially modernist sensibility" (Sass 409,10). Lacan's stress on language as the foundation stone of subjectivity, and metaphor and metonymy as the basic elements of signification as well as love and desire are substantiated in Joyce's writing in both its narrative form and subject matter. Joyce's treatment of his characters in relation to themselves, their bodies and others as well as their social exchanges and sexual liaisons which depict the different positions the subject assumes in the face of different o/Others are in accord with the Lacanian theories on subjectivity which approach the subject of unconscious as a split subject of speech driven by *desire, lack* and *jouissance.* Joyce's undermining of numerous master signifiers such as God, Irishness or Jewishness, marriage, success, beauty, etc., along with his depiction of 'reality' as fragmented and subjective, finds its correspondence in Lacan's arguments on discourses. The later topological works of Lacan apply to not only the extimate subjective and inter/subjective formations and relations but also the spatio-temporal extimacy found at the heart of Joyce's *Ulysses*, and Dublin on June 16th1904.

Joyce as a modern subject and a modernist writer was, like his contemporaries, troubled by and restless to analyze and delineate the paradoxicality of human nature and condition which "had largely been shunted aside, first by the demands for coherence inherent in Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment rationalism and scientism and later (though to a more limited and ambivalent extent) by Romantic and post-Romantic yearnings for synthesis and union" (Sass[3] 415). As Sass

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[3] For a more detailed explanation of Lacan's 'modernism' in relation to the theories of Kant, Freud, Heidegger, Kojeve, Husserl and Foucault, and in comparison with anti-humanism, phenomenology and ontology, see Sass, 2015.

argues, the modernism of Lacan is revealed in his theories on the dynamics of human subjectivity represented in the "three conflicting yet interdependent modalities or 'registers' that define human existence" (426), on the relation of desire and language and their dependence on the Other, and on dominance of the conflict between 'reality' and the Real which the subject strives to overcome within the limits of their own symptomatic endeavors. The emphasis Lacan puts on "self-consciousness, language, awareness of mortality" in relation to his three registers of the Imaginary, Symbolic and Real represents "a distinct mode of Being that is bound up with uniquely human forms of desire" and the uniqueness of the human subjectivity and experience that is interdependent on language, the others/Other and mortality as opposed to the Cartesian understanding of the subject places him in a peculiar modernist position that is "very far indeed from espousing an anti-humanist position" (438). This peculiar modernism seems to fall on the same wavelength as that of Joyce's, which stands out as a unique case within high modernist movement in its predilection for language, especially in word plays, metaphors, onomatopoeia (a feature which is shared by Lacan himself), temporality and the temporal nature of human inter-subjectivity and experience, and the different positions the subject assumes in the face of the o/Other(s). As such, the peculiar modernism of Lacan emerges as an apt and 'daedalian' means that seems to share the same sensitivities and paradoxes represented in Joyce's works and to explain them from ontological, psychoanalytical and even *linguisteric* aspects.

1.4. *Extimité* and Extimate Relations Defining *Ulysses*

Extimité is a fundamental characteristic of both the Lacanian subject who is marked by an essential split and the Joycean world whose wholeness is marked by such an alterity, namely an intimate exteriority, an exterior intimacy. *Extimité* (translated to English as *extimacy*) is a neologism coined by Lacan from the terms 'intimacy' (*intimité*) and 'exterior' (*exterieur*). Lacan used the word initially in *Seminar VII, The*

Ethics of Psychoanalysis (1959-1960) to talk about the extimacy of the Thing (*das Ding*). Later, in *Seminar XVI* (1968-1969), the word is used in its adjective form 'extime' as the features of *jouissance* and *objet a.* Although the term has rather a low frequency of use compared to other widely used terminology by Lacan, it is of great significance especially in the topology of late Lacan as it is the basic feature of both the topology of the subject and the dynamics of desire. Jacque- Alain Miller, the editor of Lacan, who considered *extimacy* "so structural of the speaking being" (*parlêtre*) took it a task "to transform this term into an articulation, a structure, to produce it as an S1" ("Extimité" 74) and gave a course in the department of psychoanalysis at the University of Paris Vlll during the 1985-86 academic year to pursue further "the paradoxical relationship between the subject and what is other, which includes the relation of language to what is not language, that is, of the Symbolic to the Real" (2) as he believes Lacan used the term "to designate in a problematic manner the real in the symbolic" (75).

As Pavón-Cuéllar suggests *extimacy* may be used in critical psychology for the purpose of problematizing, questioning, challenging, and even rejecting and going beyond the traditional psychological distinction between exteriority and psychic interiority or intimacy. Instead of this fundamental distinction and the resultant fixed conceptual dualities that cross and constitute psychology, extimacy indicates the non-distinction and essential identity between the dual terms of the outside and the deepest inside, the exterior and the most interior of the psyche, the outer world and the inner world of the subject, culture and the core of personality, the social and the mental, surface and depth, behavior and thoughts or feelings. (*Encyclopedia* 661)

Starting off from Lacan's signification of the term *extimacy* in his theories and topology on subjectivity, and with the help of other critics such as Jacques Alain-Miller and Ellie Ragland, this study aims to employ the term as a key concept in the discussion of Joyce's *Ulysses* as a work of art where such *extimacy* is penned out in multiple ways.

Reading *Ulysses* through the Lacanian concept of extimacy makes it possible to cast a new hermeneutics on the novel, where the form acts out the subject matter, and the non-linearity expressed in the content of the book is mimicked by the stylistics employed. This doubled effect is given in stylistics by the use of numerous devices such as the stream of consciousness, free indirect speech, interior monologue, repetition, or even narrating one whole chapter of *Ulysses* in different styles of the prominent authors in British literature which Joyce uses as the turning points on the Möbius strip where the twist from one side to the other happens on the same surface. As such, the stylistics of James Joyce is also of *extimate* quality: Joyce breaks the interior/exterior duality in his novels by using many *nouvelle* modernist techniques by which he transcends the boundary of the "interiority" of the unconscious to the "exteriority" of the physical world, making them parts on the same surface on a Möbius which is crossed by the twists of such stylistic tools.

CHAPTER 2

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

2.1. Cartesian Epistemology and Linearity

A clear understanding of the theoretical background of Cartesian epistemology, Enlightenment ideology in relation to Western metaphysics and a well-defined frame of how this dissertation addresses them is vital in terms of relating Joyce's writing and technique without divergence to 'linearity' that stands out as their most prominent and powerful element.

2.1.1. Cartesian Epistemology and Its Subject

Rene Descartes (1596-1650) was the French philosopher, scientist and mathematician whose theories have probably had the greatest effect on the philosophical arena and the Enlightenment ideology as well as modern philosophy. His work triggered debates about the theory of knowledge in the Enlightenment in which the basic elements of present Western epistemology were founded. Schouls argues that "the spreading of the Enlightenment amounted to the growing acceptance of an integral part of Descartes's position, the Cartesian concepts of freedom, mastery, and progress" (l2) and that Descartes stands with Locke and Newton as "the Enlightenment trinity of greatest men in history" (173). Descartes began his search for knowledge by doubting every belief he has and "ironically, in pursuing the farthest reaches of what can be doubted, Descartes found the basis of knowledge itself" (Alcoff 3). By following this skeptic logic, he ended up with the theory that all beliefs must be tested and affirmed by way of reason and logic. In his *Meditations*, "in which are demonstrated the existence of God and the distinction between the human soul and the body" (Descartes 5), he argues that

one needs to doubt all his propositions by first creating a case in which they are false and then test them with reasoning and logic. No knowledge is possible unless it successfully passes through the filter of logic and gains clarity. Others' reasonings are not enough for a man to believe in some knowledge, and nor are his senses. Descartes thus states: "[F]rom time to time I have found that senses deceive, and it is prudent never to trust completely those who have deceived us even once" (*Meditations* 5). Casting aside the credibility of the senses, Descartes builds the essentials of the Cartesian physics on a body-mind duality which has been troubling the mankind ever since as the Cartesian idea of the self is based on the same strict division in which mind dominates matter- including man's own body. Descartes states in his *Principles* that all created substances are either mental or physical in nature (20); that is, they are either minds or bodies, which respectively attribute to thought and extension. Thus, mind and body are two distinct substances, each with its own essence. Mind has the capacity of reasoning, and body (matter) has two basic characters: extension (length, breadth, and depth) and motion. By these principles, Descartes was not only forming the foundations of the modern science and mathematics on which Newton and many others would build their theories, but also overthrowing the Aristotelian physics in that he disregarded the Aristotelian categorization of matter and its qualities like hot, cold, wet or dry. In one of his many letters (dated 28 January 1641) to Father Marin Mersenne about his *Meditations*, Descartes reveals his consciousness in doing so:

> These six meditations contain all the foundations of my physics. But please do not tell people, for that might make it harder for supporters of Aristotle to approve them. I hope that readers will gradually get used to my principles, and recognize their truth, before they notice that they destroy the principles of Aristotle. (*Philosophical* 173)

Considering the fact that his rationalist system of philosophy constitutes the basis of the Enlightenment, both in ideological/philosophical and scientific terms, it is possible to say that

Descartes was right. His skeptic methodology to filter data through reason regardless of immediate sensory perceptions to achieve knowledge became the methodology of the modern science, and his positioning of reason over any bodily feelings, urges or passions became the primary binary in the system of binaries which operate the Western metaphysics. Descartes's famous deduction "Cogito ergo sum" therefore becomes the catchphrase which summarize the Enlightenment epistemology: I exist only if and as long as I reason.

It might be useful to elaborate more on the meaning of the Cartesian epistemology, the Enlightenment and its key concepts before proceeding further. Cartesian epistemology, Cartesian dualism or Cartesian metaphysics are some of the phrases that have frequently been employed in literary criticism, especially in the 20th and 21st centuries. 'Cartesian epistemology', however, does not refer to the ideas that belong to the French philosopher Rene Descartes only. Rather, it is used to signify a set of ideas that constitute a specific mode of thinking, leading to the nourishment and empowerment of a specific ideology, which can be generalized roughly under Descartes argument that the mind and body are separate and different substances, and that the mind is prior and superior to the body as it is the one which can control. Naturally, there have been many philosophers, scientists and thinkers, preceding and following Descartes, whose opinions about several epistemological and ontological matters coincide with or oppose to, and therefore somehow affect or were affected by those of Descartes. However, when the term 'Cartesian epistemology' is employed in this study, neither does it aim to mean the personal philosophy of mind that can be extracted from the works of Descartes, nor does it imply those followers who refer to, or admit being influenced by, Descartes in their works. What the term denotes in this study is rather the ideology which was initially rationalized in Descartes's works and then flourished with the Enlightenment to such an extent that it has become the invisible, conquering, dominant, 'normal' mode of thinking not only in philosophy but also in practical human life.

'Enlightenment' is a controversial term and as all other concepts, its meaning shifts significantly, carrying affirmative or negative connotations according to the discourse/discipline it is employed in. This dissertation approaches Enlightenment as a process in which certain political, social, economic and philosophical ideals are reinforced through the assistance of philosophy, social sciences, natural sciences, ecclesiastic appropriations, the mode of production at work and polity, all of which are reflected in/ nourished by art. For the sake of clarity and brevity, I will take Jane Flax's list of the major themes and characters of 'the Enlightenment story' as a starting point (*Thinking* 30-1) and build the framework to be used in this study by adding a few elements to the list, combining and/or accentuating some features more than the others. Flax's list includes eight main characteristics/themes, which of course can be multiplied and ramified, however, only the ones that are of high relevance for this study will be discussed in detail in the following chapters.

First of all, the Enlightenment imposes the idea of "a coherent, stable self (the author)" who is masterly, through reason and will, at comprehending and governing himself and nature. Reason, becoming the instrument through which all worldly and metaphysical phenomena could make sense, was the new master signifier, and 'the rational man' had never been closer to the image of God before. The second is philosophy/philosopher's privileged position as "a privileged mode of story telling", as the critic/judge, as "an objective, reliable, and universalizable 'foundation' for knowledge and for judging all truth claims" (Flax 30). The third ideal fed by the Enlightenment ideology is "a particular notion of truth (the hero)" that is self-subsistent, constant, eternal, and 'real'. 'Truth' could be discovered through philosophy and science, and was universally applicable, thus it marginalized the discordances as 'untruth', ending up always in dichotomies which ensured the functionality of the system by its 'true' leg dominating the 'other'. Another feature is "a distinctive political philosophy (the moral)" which suggests a special relationship between reason and progress.

Reasoning leads to knowledge, which in the service of legitimate power leads to freedom and progress, a route justifying not only political authority but also individual and social injustice, pampering the illusion of 'progress'. The fifth one is "a transparent medium of expression (language)" which secures a direct, one-to-one correspondence between the signifier and the signified. The Enlightenment idea of language is a medium of transparence and neutrality, and physical/transcendental reality can be completely transferred to the addressee through language. In addition, man is capable of naming -thus recognizing/owning/ conquering objects or concepts and through reasoning capable of categorizing them in 'correct' linguistic and semantic binaries. "A rationalist and teleological philosophy of history (the plot)" is the sixth characteristic which validates temporal sequentiality, causality and progress. Interrelated events with causes and corresponding effects form a linear history in which man can ensure progress and realize his full potential through his reasoning, will and power. The seventh one is "an optimistic and rationalist philosophy of human nature (character development)" which advocates that man's inherent qualities of goodness, reason, morals and hard work helps him find the 'truth' and the 'real'. The last one, "a philosophy of knowledge (an ideal form)", appoints science as the sole authority towards knowledge, which leads the way to progress and power.

Therefore, centered on the reason of Man is the whole epistemological system that forms binaries, normalizing one while negating the other, and that decides right and wrong, true and false, here and there, yesterday and tomorrow, just and unjust, normal and abnormal, sane and insane, legal and illegal, sacred and profane etc. Thus, all the epistemological categories, such as time, space, religion, language, self, consciousness, history, identity, nature, culture etc., were re-configured by and around reason. This epistemology by default posits a hierarchy and linearity on any kind of knowledge, category, or principle it gives meaning to. Thus, the understanding of time is chronological: it has an irreversible chronology, a strict temporal system that can be measured

by seconds, minutes, years; it implies causality as the present events are related to past causes, or present actions will lead to future effects. The concept of space is reconfigured as well: external world of the body/matter which is linear- either here or there-, and which is hierarchical in terms of presence/absence- better here than there-, and hence the intellectual space of the noble mind: that is, the self, the consciousness - the reign of reason- which is all-knowing (man as the center of the universe) and capable of inventing (atom bombs?), naming (natives?), making sense (religion?), deciding (politics and war?), controlling (his language?), conquering (nature?), civilizing (colonies?) etc. Remembering is also one of this almighty, self-sufficient, self-dependent man's grand abilities. John Locke's theories about memory are important in this sense. Locke (1632-1704), who is one of the most prominent figures in Enlightenment philosophy, puts forward that the mind is a *tabula rasa,* and sensations and reflections are the only source of human knowledge. His empiricist philosophy is a counterargument to Cartesian rationalism, but his humanist attitude, that is his positioning the thinking/remembering man in the center, contributed greatly to the development of Enlightenment epistemology. According to Locke, memory is essential for one to have consciousness: it is the power of the mind "to revive Perceptions, which it has once had, with this additional perception annexed to them, that it has had them before" (133) and it implies that mind, which was a blank sheet at birth, is a warehouse where the memories are stored to be called on duty when necessary. This idea of the memory essential for a sense of selfhood as a repertoire of experiences which can be retrieved in their precise nature gave the individuals, according to Ferguson, "a vision of their own possible progress and development" (qtd. in Alcoff 71), which stands out as not only the keywords of the Enlightenment project, but also those of modern Western epistemology.

The understanding of 'man' prevalent in the Enlightenment, the roots of which can be traced back to Plato, and later reinforced by Descartes and many others, is referred to as the Idealist subject, the transcendental

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subject, the Cartesian subject (Cartesian I) in different discourses or critics' works. Likewise, the term that is used to refer to the concept of 'subject' also depends on the discourse/field it is used in. There are many discussions around the terms 'subject', 'subjectivity' 'self', 'consciousness', 'individuality', 'personality' etc. in many fields such as psychology, psychoanalysis, philosophy, economy, politics, linguistics or cultural studies and usually one term is preferred over the others in certain disciplines (i.e., 'self' in psychology and 'subject' in cultural studies). As it is neither feasible nor directly related to the aim of this study to include such discussions, although admitting relational differences in different uses, the terms 'self' and 'selfhood' will be used interchangeably with 'subject' and 'subjectivity' in order to make possible an interdisciplinary and eclectic perspective. What is meant by 'Cartesian subject' in this study does not solely refer to the views of Descartes- although it is rooted in his famous *Cogito* argument, but frames an overall picture of 'the rational man' which was formed with different emphases by many Enlightenment critics such as Jean Jack Rousseau, Immanuel Kant, John Locke etc. The "emphasis on the self as the origin of all experience and knowledge" and the signification of *cogito ergo sum*, which Enlightenment thought laid much stress on and developed intensively, was twofold according to Mansfield: "firstly, the image of the self as the ground of all knowledge and experience of the world (*before I am anything, I am I*) and secondly, the self as defined by the rational faculties it can use to order the world (*I make sense*)" (15). As he points out, Rousseau's work that draws on the sufficiency of the human as an individual and Kant's ideas[4] on the uniqueness of human consciousness (a sense of 'I') in perception solidify and centralize these two premises respectively. Therefore, the Cartesian subject emerges as an entity as a self-sufficient, self-conscious being: the center from which all truth, meaning and value judgments can be defined and concepts like will, individuality, equality, humanity, freedom, duty, responsibility

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[4] Although Kant objected to Descartes's constitution of the subject and reformulated the grounds on which subjectivity and consciousness are based, his prioritization of human consciousness in his 'transcendental subject' as the knower of all perception reinforces such rationality.

and sociality are derived. This conception has haunted the Western world ever since and it is against this understanding that many modernist (and postmodernist) works of art react. The myth of the rational man- be it in its relation to temporality, language or his consciousness- which is created by the Enlightenment project is thus closely related to 'linearity' and this myth easily shatters in case of a disequilibrium in one of these dynamics. Within this framework, a clear definition of the term and its contextual meaning in this study can be useful.

2.1.2. Linearity in Its Cartesian Context

The term 'linearity' seems to have a fairly simple and straightforward explanation. According to Oxford English Dictionary, linearity may refer to being "arranged in or extending along a straight line" (1) or the state of "involving one dimension only" (2). Under Mathematics subsection, 'linear' may refer to "involving or exhibiting directly proportional change in two relational quantities" (3) or "progressing from one stage to another in a single series of steps; sequential" (4). In Cambridge English Dictionary, linearity may denote a condition "involving a series of events or thoughts in which one follows another directly" (5) or a linear relationship between two things as "direct and clear" (6). When these definitions are expanded, it is understood that when something is linear, it has the quality of being arranged on a continuous line that goes both ways (1) and that it does not have a second dimension except that of the line (2). Moreover, there is a pattern of a certain ratio in question (3) when two things are considered, e.g., one thing is as double the size as the second one, and there is a specific manner in its progress as one thing follows the other. Besides, it does not necessarily relate to mathematics only; it may be about events or actions that are of the same sequential quality (5), and the relationship between such things and events would be 'direct and clear' (6). One can extend the scope of this interrogation by taking into account the linear equations in mathematics or linear references in logic. In mathematics, linear

equations, which are the equations for a straight line, such as x=2y-2, have certain characteristics and no exponents (x^2) or cube roots ($3\sqrt{x}$). They can be used to find the midpoint of a line segment, a parallel or perpendicular line, or the equation of a line from two points. Simply, they are basic equations that denote qualities like pattern within a determined scope and can be used to calculate the value of given certain basic constants and variables. Therefore, linearity in mathematics can be summed up with words such as pattern, value, calculation, categorization, direction, etc. In logic, linearity (not to be confused with linear logic) or linear thinking can be explained as a logical mode of reasoning conducted in a step-by-step fashion. Through reasoning, therefore, one that employs linear thinking ends up with a final condition that can be traced back to an initial cause and probable stages/causes in between. Similarly, in philosophy, linear logic can be employed when a conclusion is drawn by negating the opposite views as not true.

No matter in which context linearity is addressed to, it is necessary by definition then that some certain features be essentially attached to the nature of linearity. First of all, there is a sequential relation at hand: one point in the line follows the other and precedes the one that comes after itself. In a temporal lane, it creates a chronology, which is the typical way of handling temporal relations both in practical life and in disciplines such as history, anthropology, theology and -to a certain extent- literature. More importantly, the sequential characteristic of linearity is embedded in a more basic and critical tool for humanity: not only the academic language used in these disciplines, but also the language on which the fundamental human communication is based is coded sequentially. The past, present and future tenses that prevail in almost all languages in the world, or the time adverbs like 'after', 'before', 'soon', 'later', which are the indispensable elements of any narration, are the most obvious examples to begin with. This crucial feature is connected to another one that is equally important: referentiality. On a linear train, the values of two points are determined

by their reference to each other, as in the examples of time adverbs. In order to use the adverb 'after', one has to have a reference point to compare and signify such a referential temporal relation, e.g., in a phrase such as 'after Friday' Friday is the reference point that gives 'after' its semantic meaning. However, in such a relation, the reference point acts as the center of this relation. When one says 'later', the reference point is 'now'; 'now' becomes the pivot for the protractor that delineates the meaning of the relation; it becomes the center according to which the term comes to signify an orderly meaning. This brings forth another aspect that lies at the heart of linearity: order. Linearity connotes a certain fashion of order: it can be backward or forward, or the relation between elements can be arranged and rearranged according to different priority values; but their order cannot be changed independently from their positional value on that particular line. So, no matter how they are categorized, e.g., 'Firstly, secondly, thirdly', or 'most importantly, another important element, still an important one", any linear thing or concept includes a system of order. So, these three aspects lead to a fourth one that complicates the matter further: Causality, the state where a cause that leads to an effect, is one of the principal elements in any method, system or discourse, and it is notoriously powerful in that it occupies the central position in the meaning-making mechanisms of any kind. Human brain tends to look for, find and explain the relationship between things in a causal manner: a statement is usually followed by a 'because', 'so', 'so that', etc. when further explanation is to be made. Causality is how knowledge is transferred: children are taught in schools that a day is approximately twenty-four hours because that is the time for the earth to finish its span around itself. It is the principle the law is based on; it is the foundation religions are built on; it is the life source of science and technology. Ergo, these four aspects, namely sequentiality, referentiality, order, and causality can be detected in any linear mechanism that works well.

In the light of these aspects, it is not difficult to spot the substantial ties between linearity and Western metaphysics. More importantly, linearity is best reflected in temporal dimensions that modernist writers are obsessively at odds with. The change in perception of temporality, the present, the past and the future is signaled in the works of Nietzsche, Bergson, Husserl, Wittgenstein and Heidegger and later found its place in the modernist writer's work. To lay bare the importance of this change from the Enlightenment narratives to the modernist perspective, especially the Joycean perspective, the remaining of this chapter will discuss the concepts of temporality, subjectivity and language within a Lacanian framework which overthrows linearity in its Cartesian implications.

2.2. The Lacanian Subject

The Lacanian subject, in contrast with the Cartesian *cogito* that assumes a consciousness transparent to itself by its sheer ability of thought, resides in the unconscious and is not static; it is a work in progress that is being rewritten/spoken in the Other's language and in relation to the Other, to the Other's desire, both in the sense of the subject's desire for the Other and the subject's desire to be the Other's desire. The *cogito* argument for Lacan is not only a rhetorical *zugzwang* but also self-revealing in nature in terms of its apparent split:

> The type of people that we shall define, using a conventional notation, as *dentists* are very confident about the order of the universe because they think that Mr Descartes made manifest the laws and the procedures of limpid reason in the *Discourse on Method*. His *I think, therefore, I am*, so essential to the new subjectivity, is not as simple, however, as it would appear to these dentists, and some even think they detect in it a pure and simple sleight of hand. If it is in fact true that consciousness is transparent to itself, and grasps itself as such, it does seem that the *I* is not on that account transparent to it. It is not given to it as different from an object. The apprehension of an object by consciousness does not by the same token reveal to it its properties. The same is true for the *I*. (*Ego* 6)

According to Lacan, the subject is not the same as the conscious individual, nor is it the equivalent of the unconscious: the subject is 'of the unconscious', constituted in/because of the split between his thinking and being: his conscious thinking (as in the Cartesian *cogito* as a transparent agent) and his being (authentic self) are neither compatible nor possible. As Susanne Barnard suggests, for Lacan, when the subject takes up her/his 'preinscribed position' in the Other's language, it "constitutes an original division or 'split' in subjectivity between the subject 'in' language (the ego, in psychoanalytic parlance) and the subject 'of' language (the subject)" (73). The condition that one is constituted and attains the subject position by the desire, gaze and the language of the Other also means that one attains her/his subjectivity through an identification with an object position: the infant's desire to be the desire of the m(O)ther as her object/cause of desire, the realization of the subject-infant in the mirror stage by the gaze of the m(O)ther, and the subject as an effect of language both in the sense that the moment s/he is encoded in it s/he speaks her/himself through it, and the fact that s/he speaks through language meaning s/he is already objectified- all point to the dramatic situation of the conscious as subordinate and the subject as split. And this is an irreversible division:

> The split denotes the impossibility of the ideal of a fully present self-consciousness; the subject will never know himself completely, but will always be cut off from his own knowledge. It thus indicates the presence of the unconscious, and is an effect of the signifier. The subject is split by the very fact that he is a speaking being, since speech divides the subject of the enunciation from the subject of the statement. (Evans 195)

Lacan argues that the subject of enunciation (*énonciation*) is not only different from the subject of statement (*énoncé*) but it also creates a gap, a split, for the former through the medium of language objectifies her/himself as the latter in order to be recognized as a subject. Furthermore, Lacan speculates further on this split between the speaking subject and the subject of statement by employing linguistics

so as to show that this division is not only exemplary of the split subject but it also is that very split. In his "The Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire in the Freudian Unconscious" where, with several sentences in French (especially with the use of word 'ne' which can roughly be translated into English as 'but' in some sentences, e.g. I cannot help *but* hope for his failure), Lacan displays that "a conflict seems to be played out in such expressions between a conscious or ego discourse, and another 'agency' (...) This other agency, this non-ego or unconscious 'discourse' interrupts the former—almost saying "No!"— much in the same way as does a slip of the tongue" (Fink, *The Lacanian Subject* 39). According to Lacan, this 'but' signifies the subject of enunciation, "announcing the unconscious subject of enunciation, and thereby showing that the subject is split—of two minds, so to speak, for and against, conscious and unconscious" (40). Speech, being the battlefield where this duel of conscious and the unconscious is most apparent, is very significant in the sense that the unconscious (or its symptoms) can be detected, or at least traced. Moreover, "the unconscious is constituted by the effects of speech on the subject, it is the dimension in which the subject is determined in the development of the effects of speech, consequently the unconscious is structured like a language" (*The Four* 149), and thus the subject which resides in the split between the unconscious and the ego must be recognized as a signification chain in which one signifier directs to another. The Cartesian *cogito,* however, "does not account for the whole of the human subject: It leaves out the unconscious; it leaves out the question of the subject's being; it leaves out something that is never covered when someone says 'I want this' or 'I am that'" (Fink, *Lacan to the Letter* 134). The ego imposed by the Cartesian *cogito* is a 'false being', and the mastery, certainty or the direct route from the signifier to the signified posited by *cogito* is an illusion. Thus, Lacan remarks that the 'I am' in Descartes's *cogito* is "an affirmation of a false self at the expense of the unconscious seat of subjectivity" (Neill 25).

According to Lacan, the subject is a barred subject, $, since "a speaking being's two 'parts' or avatars share no common ground: they are radically separated (the ego or false being requiring a refusal of unconscious thoughts, unconscious thought having no concern whatsoever for the ego's fine opinion of itself)" (Fink, *The Lacanian Subject* 45). Thus, the Lacanian subject is not the *I* in Descartes' *cogito*, neither is it tantamount to the Freudian ego, but it is the unconscious that displays itself at different times in different ways after having been killed by the signifier once it is positioned in language. The Lacanian subject is constituted by and through three different registers all of which have colossal impact on the subject's relations with others and the Other. These three registers, the real, the imaginary and the symbolic, which were represented by the 'Borromean Knot' figure (figure 1) in Lacan's later years, are of equal importance in the subject formation. They are interdependent, with common elements in their intersections, and all registers would collapse if one were to be unraveled as in the case of psychosis.

Figure 1. The Borromean Knot (The three central field of the RSI diagram)

The real is the register that precedes language, so it is actually inexpressible in language: "the Real is what is strictly unthinkable" (Lacan, "RSI" 7). As thinking occurs with language and meaning is constituted retrospectively, the real refers to the register that is supposed to exist before one is killed by the letter, but that one cannot

know in certainty, for what s/he can understand/express postdates language unlike the real which antedates language and even birth. The real is closely connected to the 'dimensions of sexuality and death' and it is "where the subject meets inexpressible enjoyment and death" (Sarup 85). The infant's initial stages- where it does not know the boundaries between itself and its mother, where there is no orientation except for the satisfaction of its physical demands, where its world consists of only physical materiality and biological wholeness in the absence of any conceptualizations such as subjectivity, gender, abstractions or *lack,* and where there is no libidinal investment to 'other'- all lie within the realm of the real. As the infant does not suffer from/ is not aware of a *lack*, the loss of *phallus*, or the sense of autonomy, it is yet outside of the dialectic that forms the subject on the basis of lack/wholeness, self/ m(O)ther. Lacan states that "there is no absence in the real" (*Ego* 313) and that it resists symbolization and thus it is 'impossible'. The real can be called a pre-ontological state whereas the imaginary and the symbolic are the registers that generate 'reality' in which one attains her/his subjectivity. The departure from the real is thus necessary in terms of one's becoming oneself, but the real is not a stage to be dispensed with/ completed in one's childhood moving on to the next stages; it is interdependent with the other registers as the Borromean knot suggests and continues to influence the subject throughout her/his life in different ways.

The imaginary is the register in which the boundary between 'me and other(s)' appears and the ego is formed, and Lacan's mirror stage can be called the gate one has to pass through to become a 'subject'. Lacan states that one's knowledge of oneself is built on '*méconnaissance*', a misrecognition/misconstruction in the mirror stage where the infant is mistaken to identify its 'fragmented' body that he cannot control autonomously with that of the autonomous, unified image in the mirror, 'a salutary *imago*' (and/or the image of the caregiver-usually the mother). This misrecognition is the milestone in one's ego formation, and it has several effects, two of which are of uttermost importance

regarding the subject's future positioning in the symbolic: the birth of the *ideal-ego* and the alienation of the subject (and hence its aggressivity and narcissism). The *ideal-ego*, which is constituted by the (false) identification of the infant with the specular image in the mirror stage, is the product of the imaginary register and throughout the subject's life, it "will also be the source of secondary identifications" (*Écrits Selection* 2). It is also "a promise of future synthesis towards which the ego tends, the illusion of unity on which the ego is built" (Evans 53). Lacan remarks:

> The mirror stage is a drama whose internal thrust is precipitated from insufficiency to anticipation – and which manufactures for the subject, caught up in the lure of spatial identification, the succession of phantasies that extends from a fragmented body-image to a form of its totality that I shall call orthopaedic – and, lastly, to the assumption of the armour of an alienating identity, which will mark with its rigid structure the subject's entire mental development. (*Écrits Selection* 3)

Alienation is thus "constitutive of the imaginary order" (*Seminar III* 146) in that the infant identifies with an image that is external and quite opposite of what it is at that st/age in terms of autonomy, unity and capability, and the *ideal-ego* is constituted on this *captation* of the specular image (both in the sense that it captivates the infant and that it captures the infant in a fixation which will disable it in the future). Lacan reminds "the evident connection between the narcissistic libido and the alienating function of the *I*" (*Écrits Selection* 4) and suggests that the alienated subject's aggressivity is rooted in the imaginary- in the formation of the narcissistic ego- and adds that 'specific images', *imago*s, which can be found in social practices, children's games, art or dreams, accompany these aggressive intentions: "the images of castration, mutilation, dismemberment, dislocation, evisceration, devouring, bursting open of the body, in short, the *imagos* that I have grouped together under the apparently structural term of *imagos of the fragmented body*" (*Écrits Selection* 9). This aggressivity is significant in terms of the subject's future behavior and reactions as the impulse to

aggress can surface in the subject whenever his/her narcissistic ego is challenged. As Muller states:

> The unifying effect of the original identification serves to bind the infantile image of the fragmented body; when this identification is challenged by the image of competing with another, or when the subject's demand for recognition is refused, or when the bodily coherence, so maintained, is attacked physically, the response is aggression. Thus, the aggressive imagery of bodily fragmentation is the inverse of the Gestalt of the unifying ego and, thereby, aggression is held in correlative tension with narcissism. (51)

Another important keyword of the imaginary register that is related to the narcissistic ego is the gaze. In addition to the fact that the m(O)ther's gaze is that which helps constitute the infant's ego through recognition, gaze is what enables "the subject sustaining himself in a function of desire" (*Four* 85). Lacan argues that at the level of the scopic field there is a split between the eye (corresponding to the subject of representation) and the gaze and "this is for us the split in which the drive is manifested" (73); hence, the gaze is the *objet a* in the scopic field. As such, the gaze, unlike the eye which can find its representation in the symbolic world, is something ungraspable, elusive: "In our relation to things, in so far as this relation is constituted by the way of vision, and ordered in the figures of representation, something slips, passes, is transmitted, from stage to stage, and is always to some degree eluded in it-that is what we call the gaze" (73). Thus, the concept of gaze in Lacan occupies a critical position both in terms of its effect in the dynamics of desire and in that it is connected to an ontological quality of coming to existence in object-subject relationship.

The last register in Lacanian theory, the Symbolic, is the order where the subject is socialized, civilized and regularized. By the end of the Oedipal stage, the infant is to submit to the Name of the Father, which regulates, allows or denies the infant's instincts and desires. The entry to language- with its rules and norms, which predates the subject, is also usually concurrent and congruent with the submission to the Other's Law. Lacan states:

The Oedipus complex means that the imaginary, in itself an incestuous and conflictual relation, is doomed to conflict and ruin. In order for the human being to be able to establish the most natural of relations, that between male and female, a third party has to intervene, one that is the image of something successful, the model of some harmony. This does not go far enough - there has to be a law, a chain, a symbolic order, the intervention of the order of speech, that is, of the father. Not the natural father, but what is called the father. The order that prevents the collision and explosion of the situation as a whole is founded on the existence of this name of the father. (*Psychoses* 96)

The symbolic (secondary) identification with the Father is what initiates the Ego-ideal and the Symbolic is thus the stage of the final castration, indispensible for the formation of the subject, for her/him to function in culture, yet one that marks a further split with one's authentic being, the mark of the abiding closure of the gates of heaven, the mark of an everlasting enslavement in the hands of desire. The symbolic stands for Language, Law, Structure, Signifier, Culture, the Other and the unconscious. Lacan states that 'the unconscious is structured as a function of the symbolic' (*Ethics* 12), and suggests that the unconscious is an effect on the subject of the signifier which returns in symptoms, dreams, slips of tongue, parapraxes, jokes etc. Therefore, the unconscious according to Lacan is "the determination of the subject by the symbolic order" and although it seems interior, it is 'outside' as it is 'transindividual': "If the unconscious seems interior, this is an effect of the imaginary, which blocks the relationship between the subject and the Other and which inverts the message of the Other" (Evans 220).

To have a better understanding of the Lacanian key terms, especially those which this study will benefit from in the discussion chapters, Lacan's 'Graph of Desire' is significant because not only some very critical concepts such as desire, demand, ideal-ego, ego-ideal, *point de capiton*, barred subject, signifier of a lack in the Other, fantasy, *jouissance*, castration, voice etc. but also their relationship to each other and to the unconscious/conscious is displayed. The first version of the graph appeared in *The Seminar, Book V* (1957–8) and later in some other

seminars (1958–9 and 1960–1), and it is in many different forms. However, the version in "The Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire in the Freudian Unconscious" (1966) is the most well-known and it is the main source in this part. In this essay there are four graphs but they are complementary rather than sequential.

Figure 2. Lacan's "Graph 1"

Graph 1 displays Lacan's formula of the subject's voyage; the triangle Δ, a rather impossible location, one's pre-symbolic, pre-subjective state of being which is impossible to return to. The arch at the top is the signifying chain, from one signifier to the other, through which one gains her/his subjectivity and becomes a barred subject, both in the sense of the gap between the ego and the unconscious, and the inevitable division required for the subject's representation in language/a system of signification to be a subject (e.g., subject of enunciation/ subject of statement). Moreover, this signification is a retroactive one as Lacan disagrees with the Saussurian idea that "the signified unfolds contemporaneously with speech, meaning being accretive or additive in nature, each later part of a sentence adding a portion of the meaning to the portions already provided at the beginning of the sentence" (Fink, *Lacan to the Letter* 112), and suggest that meaning-making is rather formed by the "incessant sliding of the signified under the signifier" (*Écrits Complete* 503). Thus, the subject becomes the barred subject (now speaking and being spoken in the language of the other) through (retroactive) signification in which meaning gains a temporary residence that Lacan calls *point de capiton*

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(usually translated as 'anchoring point', 'upholstery button' or 'button tie'). It is important to note that the meaning is not fixed; *point de capiton* is an intersection "by which the signifier stops the otherwise indefinite sliding of signification" (*Écrits Complete* 806); however, this is not only transitory but also illusionary, although it is a necessary illusion which, otherwise, would be symptomatic of a psychosis: "A certain minimum number of these points are 'necessary for a person to be called normal', and 'when they are not established, or when they give way' the result is psychosis" (Evans 151). These anchoring points, as they function in the signifying chain, have both diachronic and synchronic qualities:

> The diachronic function of this button tie can be found in a sentence, insofar as a sentence closes its signification only with its last term, each term being anticipated in the construction constituted by the other terms and, inversely, sealing their meaning by its retroactive effect. But the synchronic structure is more hidden, and it is this structure that brings us to the beginning. It is metaphor insofar as the first attribution is constituted in it. (*Écrits Complete* 806)

Figure 3. Lacan's "Graph 2"

In the second graph, Lacan presents a more complex relationship in which the subject's (barred) acquisition of its ego-ideal is displayed through the signification process. The vector from signifier to voice is the conscious signifying chain that constitutes the subject. In this graph, however, there is a short-cut that bypasses the signification process and through i(a) (specular image/ideal ego) and m(ego) the

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barred subject finds its way to the ego-ideal. Neill argues that this 'short-circuit' may indicate that "there is something pertaining to the subject which does not fall entirely within the realm of the symbolic, which escapes to an extent, the full mediation of language" and that it is "that of the subject which is of the imaginary realm" (36). When the infant's sense of itself is constituted in the mirror stage by a misrecognition of an external image (that in the mirror, that of the mother or any external image that projects uniformity and autonomy), there is a split both between the *ideal-ego* as the function of the imaginary realm and the ego-ideal as the function of the symbolic real, and between the object and the (barred) subject. Therefore, the ego-ideal is directly related to speech, located in the realm of the symbolic, and functions as a mediator which gives meaning to every relation and 'structuration' in the imaginary, including the *ideal-ego* which "is figured as the idealised image which is internalized in one, that towards which one's desire is necessarily directed" (Neill, 37). Hence, in Graph 2, it is possible to see both the formation of the ego ideal, I(A) by means of a retroactive process through the place of the Other (A) at which point the meaning is temporarily captured and the signification of the Other S(A), and "the necessary short-circuit of imaginary identification which will account for the formation of the ego and helps us to understand the double identification in action; the image of the (non)self, i(a), and the symbolisation of the (non)self, I(A)" (38).

Figure 4. Lacan's "Graph 3"

In the third graph, Lacan puts the dynamics of desire and fantasy at work and asks the question "Che Vuoi?" (What do you want?). This graph is closely related to Lacan's differentiation of need/demand/desire and their function in the formation of the subject and subjectivity. Needs, having an organic root, are supposed to be fulfilled by the attainment of the object they are directed at. When the child is born, its needs can usually be (at least temporarily) satisfied with the accommodation of its object of need, eg. breastfeeding, changing diapers, removing that which causes disturbance or pain, etc. But in later stages, this need is turned into demand, that is, it becomes the demand for the proof of love from the Other: when the baby cries, it is no more (solely) due to hunger or thirst but to make sure that the m(O)ther would attend to it. Thus, one's dependency of the Other mutilates need and transforms it to something that is devoid of its object, both in the sense that it cannot be fulfilled anymore with the attainment of its object and that the proof of love is unattainable:

> Demand in itself bears on something other than the satisfactions it calls for. It is demand for a presence or an absence (...) The Other's privilege here thus outlines the radical form of the gift of what the Other does not have—namely, what is known as its love. In this way, demand annuls the particularity of everything that can be granted, by transmuting it into a proof of love, and the very satisfactions demand obtains for need are debased to the point of being no more than the crushing brought on by the demand for love (all of which is perfectly apparent in the psychology of early child-care, which our analyst/ nannies have latched on to). (*Écrits Complete* 579-80)

Lacan argues that it is required for this abolished particularity to emerge again in a different form, as desire, that is which remains when the satisfaction of a need is extracted from the demand for love: "desire is neither the appetite for satisfaction nor the demand for love, but the difference that results from the subtraction of the first from the second, the very phenomenon of their splitting" (580). Whereas need is directed at satisfaction and demand at the proof of unconditional love from the (M)Other on whom one is reliant, desire is always 'the desire of the Other'. From the many implications this premise suggests, the first

would be a child's desire to be the object of desire of the M(O)ther: it desires the mother to desire it. As it is, desire is by its nature radically related to recognition. Another implication would be that "it is qua Other that man desires (this is what provides the true scope of human passion)" (*Écrits Complete* 690). Therefore, not only does one desire the Other in its otherness, or that desires from the viewpoint of another, but he also desires what the Other desires. Evans underlines the importance of Kojève's reading of Hegel in Lacan's theory and states that Lacan takes some of his ideas from Hegel (39). In Kojève's reading of Hegel, " (T)he very being of man, the self-conscious being, therefore, implies and presupposes Desire" (4); "Desire directed toward a natural object is human only to the extent that it is 'mediated' by the Desire of another directed toward the same object: it is human to desire what others desire, because they desire it" (6), and desire is the desire for the recognition of the other, and that only by desiring what the other desires, one can "make the other recognize his superiority over the other" (40). Furthermore, desire is for that which can never be attained: it is always towards the impossible. And as soon as one is close to attaining the object of desire, its direction changes to some other object. Thus, desire can never be satisfied; it is always deferred as a form of metonymy. Lastly, desire is the desire of the Other as it is located in the Other, that is, it is always an unconscious desire.

Within this dialectic, the third graph leads the subject through desire and takes him/her to the formula of fantasy, ($\lozenge$a), in response to/together with the question 'Chè vuoi?': Both 'What does the Other want me to be?' and 'What is it that I desire?'. In such a dialectic in which both the subject and the Other have a lack, and thus desire each other, fantasy serves as a shelter which would protect one from encountering the lack/incompleteness of the Other and her/himself. The algorithm ($\lozenge$a) designates the barred subject's relation to/desire for the *objet petit a,* 'the imaginary cause of desire', which "allows a fantasmic sense of wholeness otherwise denied to the subject" (Neill 42). As Fink suggests: "With object *a* understood as the traumatic experience

of *jouissance* that brings the subject into being in the encounter with the Other's desire, the formula for fantasy suggests that the subject tries to maintain just the right distance from that dangerous desire, delicately balancing the attraction and the repulsion" (*Lacanian* 174). Lacan argues that "fantasy is really the 'stuff' of the *I* that is primally repressed, because it can be indicated only in the fading of enunciation" (*Écrits Complete* 691). Thus, the subject before the primal repression, the subject before the first signifier was repressed, the subject before it was barred, or the subject before it was alienated when needs were articulated in demand, can only be momentarily sensed via fantasy. As such, fantasy seems to work on two levels: it keeps the subject's desire for wholeness alive while it protects her/him against the lack the Other threatens her/him with.

The fourth and complete graph adds a last layer to this dynamics of desire where the terms drive ($\$\lozenge D$) and signifier of a lack in the Other [S(barred A)] which lies on a second vector from *jouissance* to *castration*. S(barred A) is the closing of the unconscious enunciation and it is "a lack inherent in the Other's very function as the treasure trove of signifiers" (*Écrits Complete* 693). Lacan states that this signifier is the signifier "to which all the other signifiers represent the subject—which means that if this signifier is missing, all the other signifiers represent nothing", and as the 'battery of signifiers' is a complete set, this signifier can be assumed as "a line that is drawn from its circle without being able to be counted in it", and as such, S(barred A) "can be symbolized by the inherence of a (-1) in the set of signifiers" (*Écrits Complete* 694). This signifier is different than all other signifiers in the sense that although it is not in the locus of the signifier, it is one without which all signifiers come to fail to make sense. As Lacan remarks "there is no Other of the Other" (*Écrits Complete* 693), and this may suggest that the subject does not constitute the Other for the Other (Neill 47), or that there is no meta-language (guarantee) for the Other to be signified as the Other (Eidelzstein 235-252). Eidelzstein states that as 'subjects',

> We know that we are slaves of the punctuation of our message made by the Other, and we know that the signification is of the Other, s(A). In this sense, we already find here a lack of power at the level of the speaking being, who cannot produce his own message without the Other. But despite this, we keep on trusting in the guarantee of the Other: it is thus the Other who imposes the message (given that I, the subject, am impotent for it). What Lacan posits is that this Other, who we suppose is a guarantee, lacks himself a guarantee (237).

Therefore, this signifier of a lack in the other is a signifier that signifies to the subject the incompleteness of the Other and as the closing point of the unconscious enunciation, "it is only by means of the drive that we get out of the Other, A, arriving at this point where the circle is closed, through S(barred A)" (Eidelzstein 238). Drive, ($◊D), explains Lacan, is 'the treasure trove of signifiers' which is "what becomes of demand when the subject vanishes from it" (*Écrits Complete* 692). As Eidelzstein points out, "every time a certain drive satisfaction is forbidden for the Subject (S) by the Other (A), the subject will inevitably localize itself in this clamour of the prohibition, as *jouissance*" (251). In this context, *jouissance*, according to Lacan, who used the term with multiple meanings in the course of his theoretical works, is a place without which the universe would be 'vain'; it is "the place from which 'the universe is a flaw in the purity of Non-Being'" (*Écrits Complete* 694). As shown in the complete graph, the vector at the top of the graph, which is the unconscious signifying chain, locates *jouissance* coming into S(barred A) and going through drives to castration. The retroactive route of the subject from A to S(barred A) on this vector is similar to the one in the first graph where the pre-symbolic state of being, Δ, can only find its signification in a future-perfect tense on the vector of signification. Likewise, "*jouissance* can only be posited retroactively as the mythic starting point of completion or wholeness which is assumed to have been annulled as an effect of castration" (Neill 49).

Figure 5. Lacan's "Graph 4" (Complete graph)

What is also important in this dynamic is that when the need is interrupted by the demand of the Other, what survives as a form of a Symbolic function is the drive, which is related to organic needs but not only based on biological functionalities. Lacan highlights the importance of drive's 'grammatical artifice', its linguistic quality. The erogenous zones that were once essential for the infant in satisfying its needs now have another meaning: "The various erogenous zones obtain their meaning from the signifiers of the Other. They are, as it were, 'cut out' of the body ('the effect of a cut') by a relation to the Other that is primarily linguistically structured" (Haute 144). What follows is, therefore, that a drive's function is targeted less at arriving at its object than trying to arrive at its object. Lacan states in another lesson, "The Deconstruction of the Drive", that the function of the object of the drive is *'la pulsion en fait le tour'*, which Alan Sheridan explains by highlighting the pun in the phrase in the French original: "What the formula means, then, is a combination of (i) 'the drive moves around the object' and (a) 'the drive tricks the object" (*Four* 168). Hence, drives are satisfied, rather than attempting to attain their objects, by a repetitive circling and tricking their objects. Van Haute draws attention to the similarity between Lacan's notion that some objects, such as the breast, the faeces, the gaze, the voice etc. which are lost at places where the body opens and

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closes, remind one of her/his mortality and that of the subject being lost in between signifiers, and suggests that

> The phantasy is the place where the connection (◊) comes into being between this subject that loses itself in the order of signifiers ($) and the object that can give this experience of loss a concrete form on the level of the body. It follows from this that the object a of the drive is not itself a signifier, but rather is what concretely (bodily) inscribes the lack in the psychic economy. It stages in the order of the body the loss that entry into language inevitably brings. (145-6)

Although the "Graph of Desire" seems to be abandoned by Lacan in his later years, the concepts and their relationship are handled in a more subtle way. The dynamics that are in play in the subject's formation, between her/his consciousness and unconscious, in her/his sexual, personal and social lives are dependent on many different factors but 'the rational man' is not one of them. According to Lacan, human unconscious is capable of taking control of the subject, not vice versa. This entails that a subject cannot be considered to have an independent free will, or in other words, contrary to what Descartes and his followers over the ages have fought for so diligently, the idea that a subject is the master of both themselves and the world is imaginary, a delusion, an outcome of the lack s/he starts to feel when s/he was still a baby, and the result of great effort they make to overcome their incompleteness. The desire they have is the desire of the Other: they desire to be desired, they desire to be the object of the other's desire. The nature of desire necessitates recognition: unlike needs which can only be satisfied when they are met, desire calls out for recognition, for attention, for acknowledgement, for a voice in return that denotes awareness of one's (desire's) presence. Thus, the nature of desire implicates dependence on another: human desire is the desire to have her/his desire recognized by the Other. This desire may be the desire for recognition, or the desire for what one believes the Other desires; in either case this dependence on the other for recognition of one's desire shapes their life, actions, and psychology (both the unconscious and consciousness).

Setting out from the Freudian premise arguing that the dreams are the discourse of the unconscious, Lacan suggests that language and unconscious are alike; that language is also the discourse of the unconscious as the human subject is positioned in language, and can never be independent from it: language, just like the other symbolic structures, shapes the subject. Language is not a tool humans use to express themselves or communicate (which according to Lacan is not probable): subjects are actually subjects of language; they are language's byproducts. The fact that language is the main medium one uses in signifying oneself implies that the subject is always in need/ under the effect of a symbolic system which is imposed on her/him by the Other, a system that is alien to her/his authentic being but one which s/he is encoded through the Other's gaze/authority/rule. Therefore, it is no coincidence that the subject is castrated when s/he enters the symbolic order: this alienation of the subject from itself and this positioning in the symbolic register that is consolidated by the Other is the prerequisite of the unconscious, of its emergence and presence.

To conclude, the Lacanian subject is in contrast with the Cartesian self in many ways but one can say that there is a split in both. The subject is split in Lacan psychoanalytically (consciousness/unconscious), linguistically (subject of enunciation and statement), and even on scopic level (eye/gaze), but as Lacan states, the Cartesian subject is also split, not only for the apparent problematization in his *cogito* (referred to earlier in this chapter) but also for the split that caused the dualism between the body and the mind:

> It is very strange to be localised in a body, and this strangeness can't be minimised, despite the fact that a great deal of time is spent puffing ourselves up and boasting about having reinvented human unity, which that idiot Descartes had cut in two. It is completely useless to make great declarations about returning to the unity of the human being, to the soul as the body's form, with large dosages of Thomism and Aristotelianism. The division is here to stay. (*Ego* 73)

2.3. Conception of Temporality and Lacanian Understanding of Time

2.3.1. Conception of Temporality before Modernism

"Time is the most profound and the most tragic subject which human beings can talk about. One might even say: the only thing that is tragic. All the tragedies which we can imagine return in the end to the one and only tragedy: the passage of time. Time is also the origin of all forms of enslavement. It is the source of the feeling that existence is nothing."

(Simone Weil 197)

From the Greek myths to modern quantum physics, time maintains its significance as the most powerful yet invisible organizer of human existence. The questions about time and its spatial analogues have occupied the human mind for ages and this has led to many more questions that have extended the scope of the concept, and its enigma has ramified with the developments in science and philosophy. Although it is almost impossible to make a general statement about time without taking into consideration its possible connotations, implications and/or contradictions in other fields, it is equally unrealistic and naive to think that one can talk about time from a singular perspective in a single field, e.q. physics. However, no matter how inseparable and interpenetrated its existential realms are, temporality is one of the most phenomenal aspects in Joyce's writing, and in order to discuss the approach to temporality in his novels, a brief explanation about the concept of time and its genealogy has to be provided, which is doomed to be inadequate due to its very nature.

The concept of time varies in different geographies or cultures in different eras, but its existence and the qualities attributed to it generally seem to take the primary position in the meaning-making process in both individual and social life. Mythology, which is a source of value not only for its universality but also for Joyce turns to it innumerable times in his works, may offer the initial point for

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inspection. In Pre-Socratic philosophy and mythology Chronos was the personification of time. As the story goes, Chronos, who was also known as Aeon-the eternal time, or in the Greco-Roman art- the man who turns the wheel that holds the Zodiac, was associated with Ananke- the goddess of inevitability, who exists since the beginning of time. Together, they were responsible for "the primeval 'egg' whence came, under their direction, the land, the seas, and the sky" and they basically controlled everything, invincible against the mighty Greco-Roman gods (*Fanthorpe* 89). The exact relation between the Pre-Socratic Chronos and ancient Greek Cronus is not definite, but apparently not arbitrary either. Many scholars "identified Cronus with the Greek chronos, 'time', rationalizing his cannibalism as a symbol of the devouring effects of time; hence he develops into the traditional figure of Old Father time, the old man with his scythe (rather than sickle) and hourglass" (*Classical Mythology in English Literature* 32). This figure will reappear in the course of this study as the time of the Father (Other) in its Lacanian context while discussing the characters' relation to temporality.

Although the early philosophical records about temporal matters go back to centuries before philosophy in our sense of the word was invented, Husserl, in his introduction to *Lectures on the Consciousness of Internal Time*, tells us that 'The analysis of time-consciousness is an ancient burden for descriptive psychology and epistemology. The first thinker who sensed profoundly the enormous difficulties inherent in this analysis, and who struggled with them almost to despair, was Augustine' (3). Before Augustine, of course, many philosophers, including Pre-Socratics, Plato, Aristotle and the ones that follow, speculated about time in many different contexts. Let alone its qualities, the question regarding its existence still remains unanswered. Muldoon states that as early as 475 B.C.E. Parmenides of Elea was opposing the idea that time exists (Notes to Chapter 1, 259). Actually, not only Parmenides but also his student Zeno, two of the most prominent philosophers of the Eleatic school of thought "denied the reality of

change" (Bardon 9). Unlike their contemporary Heraclitus, whose memorable dictum "No man ever steps into the same river twice" expressed his belief in an ever-changing world and human consciousness, the Eleatics advocated a world where there is no change at all: a world as a timeless unity in which time existed only in the mind. Bardon, by giving, as example, some of Zeno's paradoxes which are passed on thanks to Aristotle's refutations of them in his works, remarks that this 'idealist' view of time, despite its seeming apparent contradictions, concluded that motion and change- thus time which does not exist unless motion does- do not really exist: it is an illusion of sensory data, and reality can only be accessed through one's faculty of reason and logic (12). Hence, it is possible to see that since the earliest philosophers who worked on the topic of temporality, the discussions on time have developed around the concepts of perceptions, senses, motion and reason, which will be discussed in *Ulysses* in both Stephen's and Bloom's uneasy relationship with not only linear temporality but also atemporal state of 'things'.

Plato before Aristotle contended that time existed independently and before man, and is eternal and outside physical reality; that is, as seen in the traditional readings of his famous *Timaeus*, Plato regarded time as an effect of the motion of heavenly bodies, such as the Sun, the Moon and the planets whose halt would also stop time; it is a moving image of eternity; it moves according to number and it is "immovably the same forever" (3696). However, it was Aristotle's thoughts on time which have influenced many philosophers, scientists and artists including Joyce who consults them in many instances in *Ulysses,* which will be discussed in the following chapters. Aristotle discusses time mainly in *Physics* where he tries to answer questions related to nature and suggests after long speculations that time, although more difficult to define by its nature for its existence is 'obscure' as the parts which form her ('now's) keep becoming non-existent- 'has been's and 'is going to be's, is not actually a movement or change, but it is not independent of it either: it is the "'number of movement in respect of the before and

after', and is continuous since it is an attribute of what is continuous" (*Book IV* 712). Moreover, he states that there are things that are "outside of time" (715) and suggests that the reason why time is considered to be the movement of the sphere and is regarded as a cycle lies in the fact that movement, which time counts, is continuous, and that circular motion is the primary measure of movement because it is the measure of locomotion in which "everything is measured by some one thing homogeneous with it" (720).

The fifth century Saint Augustine is another important figure who not only appears as a main influence on Joyce but also many other thinkers who produced a philosophy of temporality like Kant, Bergson and Lacan. Augustine spared his Book XI in *Confessions* on speculating about time in which he starts with the premise that God is eternal and before God there existed nothing, including time, and suggests that the world, its processes and all earthly phenomena are temporal whereas in the Eternal "nothing passes away, but the whole is simultaneously present" (Chapter XI). He states that that time abides in one's mind and argues that the only three probable modes of time can be "a time present of things past; a time present of things present; and a time present of things future" which correspond to memory, direct experience and expectation respectively (*memoria, contuitus*, and *expectatio*) (Chapter XX). Augustine's (then) innovative conclusion that "time is nothing other than extendedness (*distentionem*)" (Chapter XXVI) insinuates that an extendedness of mind, or an extension of memory, is the thing that enables one to conceptualize time, and that what one measures is not time but the impressions of things that flow from the future to the past through the agency of the present (Chapter XXVII).

Schleifer quotes Elizabeth Ermart and explains that in the pre-Enlightenment understanding of temporality, a meaningful comprehension of time was possible only with a differentiation of time and eternity (37), which were binaries usually attributed to humankind and God as seen in the example of Augustus. However, as Bardon

argues, neither Aristotle's nor Augustine's ideas about temporality, although they provided some rational explanations about time and change and to what extent they were real, answered the more epistemological question of how one happens to have these concepts of temporality in mind, and it is exactly these points that were the focus of philosophical enquiry in the Enlightenment era of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (28). In the Enlightenment, an understanding based on the dichotomy of time and eternity shifted position and stress not only from God to man but also from eternity to 'now'. And this shift formed the basis of temporal conception in modernity. Arguing modernity to be the re-naming of Enlightenment as an eighteenth-century theory, Lushaba states that "the concept of Enlightenment dates back to the fifteenth century in Europe but was given a decisive formulation by classical social thinkers in the eighteenth century, who then gave it the name Modernity" (5). The Enlightenment era is generally regarded as a natural effect of the Age of Reason when, as an accumulation of all the developments and shifts in science, philosophy and religion, as well as the changes in social, political and economic orders, the human mind was discovered with maze to be capable of analyzing, knowing, naming and even controlling the worldly phenomena on its own. The former Medieval *sine quo non* of meaning-making in all kinds of physical-metaphysical, natural-supernatural realms- that is God Almighty and his footprints- were replaced by the omnipotent human reason and its unique capacity to realize, apprehend and communicate. Temporality, thus, attained a new meaning in the hands of scientists, mathematicians and philosophers as a concept that was in line with both the innovations and discoveries of the natural sciences and the purpose of the Enlightenment project that replaced man with God as the center of the universe.

The idea of time prevalent in the Enlightenment is in line with the characteristics of the era: it is linear, progressive and homogeneous so that it can be calculated, estimated and used rationally in service of the improvement of the humankind. As all other elements that were subject

to close rational scrutiny by science and philosophy, temporality was also a favorite topic during and after the Enlightenment and it needed to be explained precisely so that its mystic and theological resonances could be silenced appropriately, and in a world where the previous orders did not hold any more in any sphere, it could be 'saved'- not 'wasted', 'spent' reasonably and 'turned' to money. From Rene Descartes to Newton, John Locke to Immanuel Kant there were numerous and extensive attempts to give a through and complete explanation of epistemology of time and its relation to human experience, not only in its relation to human mind such as memories, but also to daily practices which were gaining importance with the development in science and technology. It is no surprise that the introduction of the standard time - time zones and mass production of watches date to the 19th century. Time, more than any other concept in the new world order, was the most precious commodity: it was the modern *lapis philosophorum*, the magical catalyzer that turned knowledge/labor to money.

As the literary reflection of the Enlightenment philosophy, literary realism and realist narration in general is widely considered to embody the temporal characteristics of this ideology in its acceptance in representation of linear chronology and causal relations as a pre-determined assumption- as an apriorism:

> By offering the articulation of time (before and after), narrative realism presents time as simple given, another 'thing' in a world of things; it situates temporality as something that can be simply alluded to within the discourse of a more or less omniscient narrator whose resources of observation and understanding appear to transcend time. (Schleifer 70-1)

Such a Cartesian representation of time, like representation of the any object through the objectified language, corresponds to the very foundations of the modernity that Joyce and the other modernist reacted to. Therefore, it is no surprise that the modernist infatuation with time- and its representation in literary modernism- is the

highlighting feature that differentiates the modern subject (of unconscious) from its predecessors.

The relation of literary modernism to temporality is both fascinating and complex. It is evident that temporality is one of the main concerns of modernist literature which treated it both as a subject matter to react against or respond to and as a concept on which it can build up its formal techniques. Schleifer and many others go so far as to claim that the break between the Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment expresses itself in the change of the perception of temporality (2000). Kavaloski also states that 'time', both with its practical and philosophical aspects, was a major concern of the high modernist literature and temporal issues were "often explicitly articulated in character dialogue, narrative description, plot and theme" (7). The works of high modernist authors such as Proust, T. S. Eliot, Pound, Joyce, Woolf, Mann, Kafka, and Faulkner are all engaged with temporality, and Kavaloski supports this idea by giving the name of Margaret Church, who in her 1963 book cited the names of most of these authors sharing the common characteristics of exploring "alternative manifestations of temporality" (8). Kavaloski states: "Modernist artists were particularly aware of time due to their devotion to renewal and innovation, which they achieved in part through their use of nonconventional temporal modes in contradistinction to the normative and linear model of time that had largely dominated Western culture until then" (8). But what was the reason behind such a passionate- in some cases even obsessive - commitment to time? Why did it become the subject matter of paintings, plaything of novels, parody of plays all of a sudden? Of course this mania, like all others when it comes to literature, was a reflection of deeper mechanisms that included the philosophies of Hegel, Husserl, Heidegger and Bergson, the political and economic developments in the world including the fall of the empires and resurrection of nationality, the wars for dominance in the changing global order (including the two World Wars), the scientific and technological developments and of course the rise of psychoanalysis. Esty argues that imperialism and its

fall was one of the reasons that led to this difference in temporality:

> With the semicollapse of the universalist and evolutionist discourses of the Western Enlightenment, with the faltering of historical positivism, with increased political recognition of anticolonial struggle, with the obviously strained resources of European hegemony in the tropics, and with the rise of anthropological concepts of difference, it becomes difficult to imagine, at the turn of the twentieth century, a realism that could in any straightforward way to conform evolutionary or teleological models of world history. (37)

As Esty suggests, the idea of progress stumbled completely by the end of the 19th century and the dream of a homogenous, linear time that perfectly contains in itself causality, sequentiality and linearity faded away. After Einstein did away with Newtonian physics and requisites such as absolute time, space and motion by showing that previous scientifically-secured, rational data was not scientific at all: simultaneity, duration, the rate of the passage of time as well as velocity and motion, are all relative; that is, there is no objective, universal, true time that is valid to count on. The philosophical reflection of this change in the understanding of temporality in the works of thinkers like Bergson and Wittgenstein is paralleled in psychological field with the works of Freud, who clearly set forth that the (subject of) unconscious is non-temporal and does not function according to linear, causal or chronological temporality: "The processes of the system *Usc.* is *timeless*: i. e., they are not chronologically ordered, are not altered by the passage of time, they have no reference to time at all. (…) The *Usc.* processes pay just as little regard to *reality*" (*Complete* 3010). Lacan, who revised and developed Freud's arguments, presents an understanding of temporality that is decisive in the formation of the subject. The understanding of the Lacanian intersubjective subject determined by the temporality of the o/Other as well as the temporal tension between the Real, Imaginary and the Symbolic matches the temporality of Joyce in *Ulysses* where the temporal inter/intra-subjective relations are underlined by a particular kind of temporality that defies the linear/causal Cartesian temporality and replaces it with a particular kind of temporality that is marked by

its Moebian characteristics, namely, an extimate temporality.

2.3.2. Lacanian Temporality

Lacan's understanding of temporality is shaped by his concept of the human psyche and subjectivity. Just as the unconscious that does not work by the same rules as the consciousness, the logical time that the subject is constructed by does not work by the same rules as the chronological linear clock time. This separation does not necessarily signify a temporality that is uniquely subjective; it rather emphasizes the fact that subjects' presumptions, assumptions, any kind of logical deductions may require temporal calculations that do not coincide with the linear temporality but rather an exquisite *stochastics*, "the intersubjective time that structures human subjectivity" (*Écrits Selection* 56). Although the roots of this temporality lie in his 1945 article "Logical Time and the Assertion of Anticipated Certainty" where he introduces the three moments of logical time as the instant of seeing, the time for understanding and the moment of concluding whose relation is "based on a tension between waiting and haste, between hesitation and urgency" (Evans 208), the traces of such a temporality can actually be seen in not only his other theoretical teachings such as the structure of language and the formations in the mirror stage, but also his psychoanalytic practices the most famous of which is his refusal of the standardized analytical session which resulted in his dismissal from the IPA. His centonization from Strauss, Jacobson and Saussure in linguistics, Hegel, Heidegger and Kojeve in philosophy and mainly Freud in psychoanalysis culminates in his elaborations on signification, particularly on the nature of the signifying chain as both diachronic and synchronic which respectively reflect the metonymic (syntagmatic) and metaphoric (paradigmatic) qualities of displacement and condensation. The inclusion of both the temporal (chronological/ historical/ linear) and atemporal (associative/ non-linear) qualities in signification highlights the importance of a complex understanding of temporality that cannot be reduced to a "subjective time" by which the unconscious

works differently in each subject, but also an intersubjective one in which one is acted on both by the others and the Other, as signification in Lacan does not only underpin language as a signifying system but also the subject- with its consciousness and unconscious- who is the very effect of that system. Moreover, the aspects attributed to the most important concepts in Lacanian theory of the subject such as the symptom as a metaphor and/or desire as metonymic manifests the importance of a non-linear, intersubjective understanding of temporality that works through retroaction and anticipation, a condition which actually enables the co-presence of multiple temporalities. The chronological connection between the past, the present and the future does not exist in the psyche where all temporal positions are in active interaction with one another. One's history is not only constituted by the sequential events that happen one after another which are later revealed in the subject's memories but is seen under the modified color of a light shed by a projection that is conditioned by the present *a posteriori.* Just like any kind of discourse whose signification shifts with conjectural addenda or a sentence whose meaning (*pro parte* and *in toto*) is continuously altered by a word that is added to the end, the subject's history is reconstituted- its meaning is reformed- by the present events taking place in her/ his life. Thus, history becomes the past, as Lacan suggests, "in so far as it is historicised in the present" (*Book I* 12) and the past is "a subjective reproduction of the past in the present" (*Écrits Selection* 56).

This retroactive/retrospective meaning-making mechanism presupposes another crucial effect: anticipation. As the past (re)gains meaning in the light of future (later) events/ thoughts/ feelings, and as today is the future of the past, the present events actually stand in a "future perfect" relation to the events past. This makes the following analogy a *sine qua non*: in relation to future temporality, the subject's existence is conjugated in future perfect: "What is realized in my history is not the past definite of what was, since it is no more, or even the present perfect of what has been in what I am, but the future anterior of what I shall

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have been for what I am in the process of becoming" (*Écrits Selection* 64). Again, this anticipatory aspect is already inherent in the signifier, "[F]or the signifier, by its very nature, always anticipates meaning by unfolding its dimension before it" (*Écrits Selection* 117). Therefore, just as the words standing in the beginning of a sentence that take on their meaning in anticipation of the words to come, the subject takes on meaning in anticipation of future projections. The *méconnaissance* in the mirror stage of the infant's fragmented reality as the ideal ego by way of anticipation is an illustrative example as it is "a promise of future synthesis towards which the ego tends, the illusion of unity on which the ego is built" (Evans 53). As such, these qualities make Lacan's "future perfect" "an intricate figure that binds together the three temporal dimensions in a knot which exceeds both a linear and a circular representation of time" (Croci 11).

As Johnston states, the three prominent works in Lacanian theory dealing with his temporal logic, although from distinct periods, "reveal an underlying consistency in his alleged marginalization of time: 'Logical Time and the Assertion of Anticipated Certainty: A New Sophism' (1946), the 'Tuché and Automaton' material from the eleventh seminar (1964), and the twenty-sixth seminar on Topology and Time (1978–1979)" (24). Although the first essay dates back to the very beginning of Lacan's career, it was extensively revised by Lacan for its 1966 publication. The last one is valuable on account of its being a sign which shows Lacan's obsession with time in his last years and his endeavor of theorizing further on the intricate relation between temporality and topology, yet, unfortunately "the amount of information to be gleaned from this text is minimal" as it was in the twenty-sixth seminar which was "practically unpublishable by virtue of 'Lacan's immense weariness, his absences, his silences'" (Marini qtd. in Johnston 51).

In "Logical Time", Lacan deals with the prisoners' paradox[5] and concludes that there are three distinct temporal structures: the "instant of the glance," the "time for comprehending," and the "moment of concluding", the latter of which is Lacan's "precipitation of subjectivity": drawing on the analogy of the paradox where five discs were present (two black and three white) and one was put at the back of the three prisoners, each of whom tries to realize the color of the disc tapped on his back by just seeing the color of the other two, and who needs to make a logical explanation to the Ward to break free of the prison, Lacan suggests that the subject is in a position where they cannot realize their identity in a spatio-temporality that is constituted by the Other (the ward or the prison management in this case) without seeing themselves through the eyes/gaze of the other (the other prisoners) whom they have to compete and corporate with in a retrospective temporality (*Écrits Complete* 167). Johnston states:

> For Lacan, the moment of concluding is that point at which the unconscious "I"—what "I" was according to the big Other without knowing it, that is, the invisible disc outside one's own field of vision - suddenly emerges in an anxious flash (…) The "I" comes to be in recognizing how it itself was already marked by the *grand Autre*, in seeing how the "unary trait" (Freud's *ein einziger Zug*) reflecting one's identity is a pre-given signifier fashioned within the framework of the symbolic order. (28-9)

This analogy lays bare how the subject is constructed in a peculiar non-linear temporality. With retroaction and anticipation at work, the subject is always-already split and will never have been complete. It is an indeterminate subject that will always be in formation. Lacan states in *Seminar XI*:

> It is in the dimension of synchrony that you must situate the unconscious – at the level of a being, but in the sense that it can spread over everything, that is to say, at the level of subject of

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5 Due to its technicality and immersion in mathematics and logic, the rather lengthy details of Lacan's logical induction are not to be covered in this study. Please see Fink (1996), Johnston (2005) and Castagna (2016) for extensive analysis.

enunciation, in so far as, according to the sentences, according to the modes, it loses itself as much as it finds itself again, and in the sense that, in an interjection, in an imperative, in an invocation, even in a hesitation, it is always the unconscious that presents you with this enigma, and it speaks- in short, at the level at which everything that blossoms in the unconscious spreads, like mycelium, as Freud says about the dream, around a central point. It is always a question of the subject *qua* indeterminate. (*Four* 26)

By placing the unconscious in the dimension of synchrony, Lacan discloses why the unconscious does not work in accord with linear time. Although diachrony is part of the process as seen in the prisoners' paradox, it is in the synchrony of the unconscious that the structure of the signifier reveals itself. Soler states in his reading of Lacan's first and second seminars that "The temporality of the subject is neither clock time, nor the temporality of living beings; it is the temporality of the signifier":

It is a twofold temporality between anticipation and retroaction; it is what Lacan called reversible time. In other words, the temporality of speech is a time shared between the anticipation, while you are speaking, of the moment of conclusion (the moment at which you can grasp what you meant), and retroaction, for when you arrive at the anticipated end point, all previous speech takes on new meaning, that is to say, new meaning emerges retroactively. It is a time split between "I don't know yet" and "Oh yes, I already knew that." (64)

Lacan interrogates about the relation between the split time and the split subject further in his eleventh seminar, where, concluding on Aristotle's elements of chance, *tuché* and *automaton*, he presents the reconceptualization of these terms in their relation to the Symbolic and the Real. As Johnston expounds, *tuché*, or "chance" (*hasard*) as Lacan puts it, is "the impossible Real qua the irruptive time of the undetermined, unanticipatable event" (42). *Automaton* in its Lacanian context is "the compulsive subjectivization-effect whereby the unconscious immediately weaves the Real event into the texture of a Symbolic fabric" (42). As such, it means that the unconscious which has the "dimension of synchrony" in Lacan's words, "operates so as to

foreclose any encounter with events 'in themselves', with the uniqueness of a disruptive, traumatic now-point devoid of meaning through any reference to the past":

> Lacan contends that the true subject of psychoanalysis—the subject of the unconscious— is defined, in part, by its incapacity with respect to what Bergson might call the intuiting of durée; in Bergsonian parlance, the "spatial" subject of the synchronic unconscious automatically thwarts a direct confrontation with the Real of the pure flux of durationality. To put it poetically, the psychic operates so as to exclude the "tychic". (42)

Another important link that connects Lacan's understanding of temporality in relation to *tuché* and *automaton* to the extimacy of his topology is the concept of "Cause" which he mentioned in several different contexts throughout his seminars. Johston states that in the mid-sixties, Lacan usually used the concept in a dichotomous manner: "cause (Real) versus law (Symbolic), and *tuché* (Real) versus *automaton* (Symbolic)" (37). Drawing on Lacan's pronunciation of the cause of the unconscious as "a lost cause", he argues that the "Lacanian recuperation of time here, after its loss in the Symbolic overdetermination of the Other's logical time, entails elaborating the means by which time is always–already lost in the Symbolic digestion of the Real" (37). In his analysis, Žižek touches upon a similar point and puts down an argument unraveling the extimacy of Lacanian time.

Žižek suggests that Lacan, who was in search for a Cause- just like Freud who tried to find a cause for trauma, saw the signifying structure (its formal mechanism) as the decentered cause of signification: "As we move *from signification to its cause,* signification is conceived of as the *effect*-of-sense: it is the imaginary experience-of-meaning whose inherent constituent is the misrecognition of its determining cause" (*Metastases* 30). He argues that the reason such a shift cannot be reduced to a step from a hermeneutic approach to a deterministic one is the presence of the "gap that separates the Symbolic from the Real". The

gap between the Real and the Symbolic functions as "the *inherent* limitation" of the Symbolic order:

> The symbolic order is 'barred', the signifying chain is inherently inconsistent, 'non-all', structured around a hole. This inherent non-symbolizable reef maintains the gap between the Symbolic and the Real - that is, it prevents the Symbolic from 'falling into' the Real (...) the Real is the absent Cause of the Symbolic. The Freudian and Lacanian name for this cause is, of course, trauma. (*Metastases* 30)

"The Cause qua the Real" and "the law of causality, of symbolic determination" are antinomies: the Cause is at work when the symbolic is not, i.e. "where a signifier falls out". It is the reason why the Cause has to exert its power in a disguised manner, that is, it can be detected in the Symbolic "only under the guise of its disturbances". Žižek argues that "the absent Cause which perturbs the causality of the symbolic law" as such "exercises its influence only as redoubled, through a certain discrepancy or time-lag - that is, if the 'original' trauma of the Real is to become effective, it must hook on to, find an echo in, some present deadlock" (30-1). As seen in Freud's example of the Wolf Man, there is an ambiguity in the Cause as, although it is the real that resists and disrupts signification, it becomes so only after a retrospective process: it is "the retroactive product of its own effects" and it is not the Cause until after its symbolization (31).

Such an example might come in handy to understand the relationship between Lacan's topological theory and temporality, as such a non-linear temporality completely goes hand in hand with the peculiarities of Lacan's topological structures. Žižek observes that to understand "this paradox of the traumatic object-cause (the Lacanian *objet petit a*)", a topological model "in which *the limit that separates Inside from Outside coincides with the internal limit*" is necessary:

> Viewed from within the symbolic order, the object appears as its irreducible/constitutive Outside, as a reef that bends the symbolic space, disturbs the symbolic circuit; as a trauma that

cannot be integrated into it, a foreign body that prevents the symbolic order from fully constituting itself. However, the moment we 'step out' in order to grasp the trauma as it is in itself and not through its distorted reflections within the symbolic space, the traumatic object evaporates into nothingness. (31)

Such an understanding of trauma *qua* Cause as that which is put into being retroactively by its effects creates a "temporal loop" whose "repetition" and "echoes within the signifying structure" makes the Cause "what it always-already was" (32). This temporality- this temporal loop- through which the Cause is experienced retrospectively by the echoes of the initial trauma in the symbolic order is actually that which Lacan presents not only through his "logical time", but also in the unfolding of his topological theories throughout his career:

> This is what Lacan has in mind when he speaks of the signifier's *synchrony* as opposed to simple atemporal simultaneity: synchrony designates such a paradoxical synchronization, coincidence, of present and past - that is, such a temporal loop where, by progressing forward, we return to where we always-already were. Herein resides the sense of Lacan's obsession with topological models of 'curved' space in the 1960s and 1970s (Möbius band, Klein 's bottle, inner eight, etc.): what all these models have in common is the fact that they cannot be seized 'at a glance', 'in one view'- they all involve a kind of logical temporality– that is, we must first let ourselves be caught in a trap, become the victim of an optical illusion, in order to reach the turning point at which, all of a sudden, the entire perspective shifts and we discover that we are already 'on the other side', on another surface. In the case of the Möbius band, for example, 'synchrony' occurs when, after passing through the whole circle, we find ourselves at the same point, yet on the opposite surface. (32)

Žižek suggests that this structure is also the one that conditions the relation between the subject and *objet a* as the latter is that which the subject loses - expels from its wholeness, cuts off - in order to be a subject but yet which remains the most intimate to it: that is the *extimate* which erases the distinction between both the interior/exterior and the subject/object while maintaining it so that the subject can exist:

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Such a 'curved' surface-structure is the structure of the subject: what we call 'subject' can emerge only within the structure of overdetermination - that is, in this vicious cycle where the Cause itself is (presup)posed by its effects. The subject is strictly correlative to this real *qua* Cause: $ - *a*. In order to grasp the constitutive paradox of the subject, therefore, we must move beyond the standard opposition of 'subjective' and 'objective', the order of 'appearances' (of what is 'only for the subject') and the 'In-itself'. Likewise, we must reject the concomitant notion of the subject as the agency that 'subjectivizes', moulds and makes sense of the inert-senseless In-itself. The *objet a* as cause is an In-itself that resists subjectivization-symbolization, yet far from being 'independent of the subject', it is *stricto sensu* the subject's shadow among the objects, a kind of stand-in for the subject, a pure semblance lacking any consistency of its own. (33)

This being the case, *extimacy* is therefore the quality of the *objet a* as an object of the Real which cannot be symbolized or subjectivized, yet has to be encountered and experienced, necessary not only for subjectification but also objectification: "This uncanny object is the subject itself in the mode of objectivity, an object which is the subject's absolute otherness precisely in so far as it is closer to the subject than anything the subject can set against itself in the domain of objectivity" (33). As such, the retroactive signification that bears the Cause, in its multiplication as the traumatic real and as *objet a-* occurs in a non-linear temporality that twists around the hole *qua* Lacan's Möbius band which knots *l'homme* as the *sinthome* while unknotting the prevailing notions of linearity, causality or identity:

The traumatic Real is *stricto sensu* the cause of the subject - not the initial impetus in the linear chain of causes that brings about the subject, but, on the - contrary, the missing link in the chain - that is, the cause as remainder, as 'the object that cannot be swallowed, as it were, which remains stuck in the gullet of the signifier'. As such, it is correlative to the subject *qua* break in the chain of the signifying causality, hole in the signifying network: 'the subject sees himself caused as a lack by *a*'. (33)

As such, Lacan's understanding of temporality cannot be treated outside the framework of his psychoanalytical theories of the dynamics between the subject and language in terms of the effect of the signifier and its relation to the unconscious. Although Lacan did not produce a

separate philosophy of time in his oeuvre, as a follower of Freud, he has dwelled on the subject of temporality throughout his career, especially with regard to the unconscious and its workings. Although his theory of the logical time stands out as the only separate work in which he allocates the whole work to the temporality of the subject, temporality plays a substantial role in Lacan's teaching especially when his reconfiguration of the Cartesian *cogito* is taken into consideration. As well as his exploration of *tuché* and *automaton* in *Seminar XI* (1964), many of Lacan's works, especially when he deals with the effects of language on the subject such as "The Insistence of the Letter in the Unconscious" or "The Agency of The Letter in The Unconscious or Reason Since Freud", actually deal with temporality in a way. In the end of his career, Lacan's *Seminar XXVI* is titled "Topology and Time" (1978-9), which displays his ongoing occupation with the peculiar position of time in the subjectivization of the *parlêtre*. Although a thorough transcription of the seminar is not available, Lacan's endeavor to theorize the temporal dimension of the processes that affect the subject with the distinctive spatial characteristics of his theorization of the subject with the mobius strip, torus and the cross-cap suggests the importance of the spatio-temporal dimension of the speaking subject from the perspective of not only the Symbolic Other which prevailed his earlier years, but also the Real that became the focus of his later years. As Adrian Johnston states, Lacan's understanding of temporality

> is to be situated in the register of the Real, as something foreclosed from the accessible texture of reality: Time-as-Real is never directly engaged with by the subject, but, nonetheless, it invisibly buffets and batters the images and signifiers shaping the contours of the subject's being. Like Freud, Lacan posits a fundamental ignorance regarding temporality at the level of the unconscious; however, he insists that this ignorance is not without its tangibly manifest effects and consequences. "Real time" is the forever vanishing motor of psychical dynamics. (25)

The present synthesis of the past and the future synthesis of the present thus reveals the peculiarities of a temporality that undoes the dualities and/or oppositions between/among any of these modalities.

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This entails several other nuances that disrupt the phenomenon of linearity: such a multi-directional flow in temporality suggests the debacle of linear sequentiality, causality and progress. As such, it is a perfect medium to explore and explain the Joycean *sinthomatique* writing as his work both formally and in its subject matter intimately mingles in such temporality where the co-existence of temporal layers and their relation as perceived in the psyche is expressed via the extimate nature of many of the topological figures presented by Lacan including the Möbius strip.

2.4. *Extimité* and Its Relation to Modernist Sensitivities

Extimacy, in its simplest sense, is a term that blurs the boundary between the exterior and the interior. It is a multi-faceted concept that is tied closely to Lacanian theory and topology in its entirety as it elucidates how the subject is formed. It features the nature of the unconscious, the split subject, and their relation to the three registers as well as their imprisonment in the domain of his desire. It is also related to his symptom, his being as symptom, and his object relations in his way to *jouissance.*

In *Seminar VII*, Lacan's first use of the term is related to the nature of Freud's *das Ding* where he differentiates between Sache, the thing that can be presented in the signifying chain of the Symbolic, and *das Ding,* the alien, uncanny Thing which cannot be translated into the Symbolic realm- that which is "the beyond-of-the-signified" (Lacan, *Ethics* 54). Referring to the distinction made by Freud in which the subject "cognizes" the stimuli either "by the activity of the memory" which s/he can relate through her/himself or experience, or those s/he cannot recognize, and perceive as a Thing, Lacan states that the Thing is that which cannot be found to the subject as a thing in itself but only in its co-ordinates of pleasure, that is, only through signifiers that bear traces of its pleasure (52). As Kesel puts forth, although not a signifier itself, the Thing is the center around which the entirety of signifiers, and

hence the subject, revolves (90). However, this Thing, despite being located "at the centre, with the subjective world of the unconscious organized in a series of signifying relations around it", nevertheless "has to be posited as exterior, as the prehistoric Other that it is impossible to forget (…) (as) something strange to me, although it is the heart of me, something that on the level of the unconscious only a representation can represent" (Lacan, *Ethics* 71). This paradoxical quality of the thing is what Lacan calls *extimité*: it is a center that is decentered, an exterior center, an "excluded interior" (Lacan, *Ethics* 101). Although not as a developed term, *extimacy*, was already a significant feature of the split subject as early as in the Rome Discourse (1953):

> To say that this mortal meaning reveals in speech a centre exterior to language is more than a metaphor; it manifests a structure. This structure is different from the spatialization of the circumference or of the sphere in which some people like to schematize the limits of the living being and his milieu: it corresponds rather to the relational group that symbolic logic designates topologically as an annulus.
>
> If I wished to give an intuitive representation of it, it seems that, rather than have recourse to the surface aspect of a zone, I should call on the three-dimensional form of a torus, in so far as its peripheral exteriority and its central exteriority constitute only one single region. (*Écrits Selection* 78)

As such, this "center exterior to language" where one meets with the mortality of the real bears the quality of *extimacy.* Later, in his teachings after the 1960s, not only Lacan extends his theories on *Das Ding* into the real, but he also develops the topology to explicate this paradoxical quality of extimacy through several figures such as the Möbius band, the torus or the cross-cap.

Other than *Das Ding* (the Thing), Lacan's *extimacy* has intricate relations with several other Freudian concepts, especially *das unheimlich* (uncanny). Although their meanings do not overlap, *extimacy* shines out as a quality of *das unheimlich* as well as many Lacanian concepts such as *jouissance, objet petit a*, the Real etc. In his essay "The

Uncanny" Freud, through a detailed etymologic–comparative study, underlines that the relationship between *heimlich* and *unheimlich* are not antinomic but rather inclusive: "*heimlich* is a word the meaning of which develops towards an ambivalence, until it finally coincides with its opposite, *unheimlich*" (*The Uncanny* 4). The train of thought in this conclusion follows that as *heimlich,* which means "not strange, familiar, tame, intimate, comfortable, homely", "belonging to the house or the family", "arousing a sense of peaceful pleasure and security as in one within the four walls of his house", by extension signifies "of something withdrawn from the eyes of others, something concealed, secret", which gives way to its meaning as "of something hidden and dangerous", "uneasy, gloomy, dismal, uncanny, ghastly", which is what *unheimlich* signifies. As such, it already contains the ambiguity of the interior/exterior relation that Lacan imposes on his new concept.

Lacan's *extimité*, along with its relation to the object and the subject, is studied at length by Miller who gives an explanatory speech about this "question of the real in the symbolic" and says that such an explanation would help "escape the common ravings about a psychism supposedly located in a bipartition between interior and exterior" ("Extimité" 75). Miller presents the proper drawing that represents the relation of the real in symbolic which suggests, according to Lacan, the presence of the exterior in the interior and signifies how the most intimate, the most interior has "the quality of exteriority". Miller argues that the most intimate is not a matter of transparency but of opacity as it is also the most hidden one, and thus this opacity requires the "necessity of certain covers", the most important one being religion (76).

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
Figure 6. *Extimité 1*

"The exterior is present in the interior" (Miller 75).

Figure 7. *Extimité 2*

"The circle of the subject contains as the most intimate of its intimacy the extimacy of the Other" (Miller 77).

Figure 8. *Extimité 3*

"What is the Other of the Other?" (Miller 78)

Extimacy and intimacy are not opposite terms: on the contrary, they are intimately related, for extimacy means that the most intimate is the Other, "the intimate that is radically the Other" (77). In that sense,

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extimacy suggests that the Other, "like a foreign body", occupies the center of the interior of the subject like a parasite.

In "The Agency of the Letter," Lacan explains this Other as "this other to whom I am more attached than to myself, since, at the heart of my assent to my identity to myself, it is he who stirs me" (*Écrits Selection*, 172; translation modified). This justifies the formula A→$ as it shows that the extimacy of the Other is tied to the vacillation of the subject's identity to himself. Thus, Miller suggests that one way of using the term would equate it to the unconscious itself as "the extimacy of the subject is the Other" (76). This is revealing in Lacan's catchphrase "the unconscious is the discourse of the Other" (*Écrits Selection* 130) as the subject is formed through language, through the Other's discourse and his unconscious is the effect of the signifier. That is why the unconscious, the most intimate is actually exterior, that is, its extimacy is the result of the fact that the unconscious, while being the most intimate and considered interior, is exterior to the subject as it is "structured as a function of the Symbolic" (*Seminar VII* 12) and "this exteriority of the symbolic in relation to man is the very notion of the unconscious" (qtd. in Evans 220).

Miller states that the extimacy of the Other as the most intimate exterior finds body in religion which is one of the many covers that veils extimacy. As is apparent in Saint Augustine, as in many other religious doctrines, the idea of God as *interior intimo meo*, "more interior than my innermost being" works as a proper, gracious substitute to the extimacy of the Other which "in itself has nothing likeable" ("Extimité" 77). Thus the uncanniness of such extimacy is veiled under the cover of religion. Moreover, the Other the subject experiences under the religious veils is "omnivalent": called "the neighbor" in Christianity, it is "a way to nullify extimacy; it grounds what is common, what conforms, conformity" (79). The alterity of this Other lies in its *jouissance.*

Miller suggests that the otherness of the Other and *jouissance* are closely related. Questioning the alterity of the Other, that is, "why the Other is really other", or in other words what gives the Other its otherness as "there is no Other of the Other", the answer one reaches is *jouissance*: "It is in its relation to *jouissance* that the Other is really Other" (79). This is why racism and extimacy are interconnected. Racism is what comes to play in this sense of the Other's extimacy. It is always the *jouissance* of the Other that racism is directed at, it is grounded on one's imagination of how the Other's *jouissance* is different from his, the hatred of the Other's particular way of enjoying his *jouissance*. Miller says that the closer the Other is, the stronger the hatred grows: "the Other's proximity exacerbates racism: as soon as there is closeness, there is a confrontation of incompatible modes of *jouissance*" (79). As such, the reason why one hates their "different" neighbor is due to the difference in the way "in which the Other obtains a *plus-de-jouir*": the difference in the way they work, talk, love, live, enjoy themselves "always endowed with a part of *joujssance* that he does not deserve" (80). Hence, "true intolerance is the intolerance of the Other's *jouissance*" (80).

Miller also talks about "what in the Other is object" and states that *objet a*, this *plus-de-jouir*, the surplus *jouissance*, has in defining *extimacy* a peculiar position as it is a subset of the Other. Although the Other is of the register of the Symbolic and functions as such, it includes the object in it. *Objet a* is "what is real in the symbolic Other" as an articulation of extimacy (81). As such, *objet a* is both what founds the alterity of the Other and what is real in the symbolic Other. This relation "is not a matter of a link of integration, of interiorization, but of an articulation of extimacy" (81).

Miller gives a false bomb alarm in one of his lectures as an example of how the Other can be emptied while the object remains. The nature of *objet a* is different from that of other objects whose structures resemble the *enoncé* in that it escapes all categories of representation, and

therefore remains outside of ontology. *objet a* is like quod without quid, it exists but the essence cannot be known.

Mladen Dolar argues that unlike the traditional tendency to sharply separate the interior from the exterior in psychoanalysis as in philosophy where all the classical conceptual pairs like "essence/appearance, mind/body, subject/object, spirit/matter, etc. can be seen as just so many transcriptions of the division between interiority and exteriority", the concept of extimacy obfuscates such a distinction, pointing "neither to the interior nor to the exterior, but [is] located there where the most intimate interiority coincides with the exterior and becomes threatening, provoking horror and anxiety" ("I Shall" 6). As such, the adjective *extimate* not only applies to contextual elements in the shape of uncanny encounters with the Real in the Symbolic but also as stylistic tools which blur the binaries mentioned above, displaying an intimate exteriority like the twists in the Möbius strip which itself reveals the *extimacy* of the subject. Freud specifies the instances of uncanny in his essay as the encounter with the double, the gaze and the evil eye, dismembered limbs or sights of evil powers attributed to a person that may reveal themselves in epilepsy or madness, etc. From a Lacanian perspective, there are many concepts of the subject that are not only closely connected to each other but also of *extimate* quality: the symptom, the Real in the Symbolic, *objet petit a*, fantasy, *jouissance*, etc. By their extension, the expression of the unconscious desires in dreams or elsewhere, death, any bodily transgressions- especially in regard with drives and partial objects that may include visual and auditory input, eating, excretion, sex, etc., or any repetitive symptom may show traces of *extimacy* (of the Real).

On the other hand, temporal and mnemonic operations of the Lacanian subject- especially in her/his relation to the unconscious- are *extimate* in their nature as the way they are formed and expressed in the subject. The Lacanian notion of the *logical time* of the subject in which the subject is split between the "always-already" lost state of authenticity

and "never-will have-been complete" state of self-realization reveals the extimacy of temporality. Lacan's distinction between *mémoire* (memory) and *remémoration* (remembering), very much in relation to this temporality, also underlines how the unconscious act of remembering does not follow a sequential, causal logic and how the repressed memories are *extimate* especially in their return.

CHAPTER 3

LANGUAGE AS AN ONTOLOGICAL SITE IN *ULYSSES*

Lacan's theories on subjectivity are built upon the relation of the subject with language. Language is what kills the subject and also that thanks to which the subject survives in the Symbolic. Language is what causes the split in the subject and what binds him to the symbolic. In a sense, the subject is born in the gap between the body and language. Throughout his oeuvre, Lacan explained this relationship with many differences to the letter, the signifier, the name, the sound, the voice, all of which point to the predominance of language in subjectivization processes. The extimate relationship between the subject and language lies at the heart of the Borromean knot both figuratively and literally: not only language as the discourse of the Other is the most extimate to the subject, but also *objet a* is the most extimate relation that is located at the center yet outside the pure totality of each ring in the Borromean knot. This chapter aims to display the *extimité* of language to the subject in terms of the *signifier as a name* and *lalangue* as imprinted by the real. The problematization of the common name and the name of the father in Stephen and Bloom's cases point to the position of the name/signifier as a structural element in the formation of the subject yet devoid of any essence of the bearer. As such, the name is like any signifier in the battery of signifiers untied to any fixed meaning as is the subject. The discussion of the letter, the sound, the voice as embodied in *lalangue* that highlights language and the subject matter of the "Sirens" episode reveals how the *sinthomatique* writing of Joyce reveals the *extimité* of the subject in the face of the real.

3.1. The Signifier as the Bearer of Existence

3.1.1. Names, Naming, Nomination

"Nomination is invocation of presence, and sustaining of presence in absence."

(Lacan *Book II* 255)

The famous Lacanian phrase which states that "the letter kills" summarizes the effect of language on the subject regarding their separation from the authentic being they once would have been (*Écrits Complete* 719). This phrase might as well be continued with the statement that "it also gives birth/ crates/ makes work". Language, according to Lacanian theory, is the material that brings stuff into existence: without language, nothing could exist. The real world as it is understood in its general sense, and the phenomena, the people, anything that can be named, are the byproducts of language. In his *Seminar XXI*, Lacan states that the speaking-being is "a pleonasm, because there is no being except from speaking; if there were not the verb 'to be', there would be no being at all" (107). Language creates existence and the power of naming *qua* giving a proper name not only cojoins the Imaginary and the Symbolic, but, through the cut it creates in the Real, touches the Thing.

In his "The Ego in Freud's Theory and in the Technique of Psychoanalysis" (1954-55), Lacan states:

> That is where the symbolic relation comes in. The power of naming objects structures the perception itself. The *percipi* of man can only be sustained within a zone of nomination. It is through nomination that man makes objects subsist with a certain consistence. If objects had only a narcissistic relationship with the subject, they would only ever be perceived in a momentary fashion. The word, the word which names, is the identical. The word doesn't answer to the spatial distinctiveness of the object, which is always ready to be dissolved in an identification with the subject, but to its temporal dimension. The object, at one instant constituted as a semblance of the human subject, a double of himself, nonetheless has a certain

permanence of appearance over time, which however does not endure indefinitely, since all objects are perishable. This appearance which lasts a certain length of time is strictly only recognizable through the intermediary of the name. The name is the time of the object. Naming constitutes a pact, by which two subjects simultaneously come to an agreement to recognise the same object. If the human subject didn't name – as Genesis says it was done in earthly Paradise - the major species first, if the subjects do not come to an agreement over this recognition, no world, not even a perception, could be sustained for more than one instant. That is the joint. The emergence of the dimension of the symbolic in relation to the imaginary. (*Book II* 169)

Lacan's discussion, while emphasizing the power of nomination in terms of bringing into existence things by giving them temporality and consistence, also points back to Plato's *Cratylus* in which the ancient philosopher first explores the relationship between *onoma* and *pragma*- name and the thing it names, and the proper name and the person bearing it. Unlike Plato, who in his discussion regarding the ontological status of the names argues through Cralytus, Hermogenes and Socrates that names reflect the essence of the things/persons they depict, Lacan, in several works including his *Seminar XII- Crucial Problems for Psychoanalysis*, states that such a relation between the name and the essence of the thing/person it names is illusionary, that is, it is an effect of the signifier, and that the reason why the name seems to touch the essence of somebody is because it covers a lack in the subject:

that the particular is denominated with a proper name, it is in the fact that it is irreplaceable, namely that it can be lacking, that it suggests at the level of lack, the level of the hole, and that it is it not qua individual that I am called Jacques Lacan, but qua something which may be lacking, which means that this name will be for what? To cover over another lack. The proper name (…) is designed to fill the holes, to be a shutter, to close it down, to give it a false appearance of suture. (50)

Lacan argues that a subject is never "an autonomous entity" but "only the proper name can give the illusion of it" (*Seminar XIV* 216). No matter how special the relation of the name to its bearer in terms of denoting her/his properties, features, social standing or background, its ability to supposedly give 'wholeness'- or an identity- to its bearer stems from the

simple fact that it functions to cover a hole in the subject, a surplus X that it cannot grasp. As Krecic states, this X for Lacan is *objet petit a*, and the paradox is that although this X seems to refer to the essence of the subject, it does not precede the subject, that is, it is the effect of the nomination function: "Naming cuts a void, a hole in its bearer" (146). This void is in the realm of the Real, and it needs to be covered as it destabilizes the Symbolic. As Krecic denotes, "In this sense, a proper name is a signifier, but at the same time it forms a link to the real, to *objet petit a*. It is a paradoxical structure since it enables its bearer to function in the symbolic, to participate in society, but at the same time it connects the bearer to the dimension of the real" (147).

Naming or proper names are also an important part of the alienation process in a Lacanian sense. As the alienated subject is founded by the signifier, the name they bear is what inscribes them in the Symbolic. The name stands as the signifier of the subject's absence, calling upon them to endorse it, striking roots in their existence. As the signifier is "what wields ontic clout, wresting existence from the real that it marks and annuls" (Fink, *Lacanian* 53), the act of naming is like bringing something/someone into existence from the void. Naming is holding the power to not only create, but to conquer: whoever holds the letter in their possession subjugates the others as in Lacan's *The Purloined Letter*. When the subject, whose name precedes her/him and represents the desire of the Other, problematizes her/his name, s/he may actually be struggling to identify with the desire of the Other that finds its first and foremost representation in what makes her/him exist: "The subject is called upon to assume or subjectify that name, make it his or her own; the frequency with which people fail to do so is witnessed by the large number of people who change their names (when this is not done for strictly political or commercial purposes). (Fink, *Lacanian* 185 n5)

Moreover, the act of "giving things their names" is what the Father does as an agency which through both his "*nom*" and his "*non*" gives existence to the subject in the Symbolic. In his seminar on Joyce, this

act of giving a name becomes important more than ever for Lacan as it summarizes the success and prodigy of Joyce's work: Lacan suggests that what made Joyce (and his work) great was his talent in giving himself a name in the absence of the other Name. Nomination, thus, emerges as what holds the three registers intact in the absence of the Name of the Father. Even in Lacan's changing the name of the Joycean symptom of writing to *sinthome*, which, among several others, is an allusion to St. Thomas Acquinas whose ideas about the subject of knowledge and art abound in Joyce's work (Harari 35, 50), it is possible to detect the importance of naming related to creation and art, which will be discussed in the names of several persons that wander in Stephen's and Bloom's un/consciouses.

3.1.2. Hamlet, Shakespeare, Joyce and Paternity

As Luke Thurston indicates, the "adoption and adaptation, transplantation and translation of names form a central preoccupation, almost a signature, of Joyce's art" and the 'proper' name "entails semiotic possibilities that are ceaselessly exploited, exposed, transmuted and displaced in Joycean writing" (*James* 67). The problematization of names, nomination and its relation to subjectivity and paternity is multifold in Joyce's work and can be and has been analyzed connected to many social, historical, cultural, ideological, individual or psychoanalytical factors. Yet, all such analysis points to the significance of the relationship between the subject and language, precisely the signifier in its purity. The Joycean obsession with names and naming in the textual framework of *Ulysses* is thus at its heart the obsession with the signifier, its power and its in/ability to rip through the Real. It is also what makes Joyce the *sinthome*: the acquisition of a name as a symptom that compensates for the lack of the Name Joyce could identify with, that is, as a name that would present his singularity and tie a knot around the dynamics of the mobile registers constituting his psychic totality.

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Moreover, the Name as the law is also problematized throughout the novel where the line between the Symbolic and the other two registers occasionally blurs for the characters. As Mulligan remarks in the very early pages of the novel, Stephen is still in search of a 'father' to fill in the position his biologic father could not fill (*U* 21). The first chapter named "Telemachus" aligns Stephen with Odysseus's neglected son Telemachus, who tried to survive in the long absence of his father. Stephen's repeated references to Hamlet, and Haines's comment alluding to the Christian trinity further highlights Stephen's search for a spiritual father that is consubstantial with his son: "-I read a theological interpretation of it somewhere, he said bemused. The Father and the Son idea. The Son striving to be atoned with the Father" (*U* 22). This search will later in the novel mingle with Leopold Bloom's search of a son. The problematization of father-son relationship, however, is more than the discontent with the biological father or the search for a spiritual father in the novel. The problematization of the father's name, Daedalus, signals the problematization of the Name of the Father and the paternal function.

To begin with the famous question borrowed from Shakespeare's *Romeo and Juliet* and used several times in the novel: "What's in a name?" *Ulysses* might actually be read as a philosophical quest to answer this crucial dilemma: What does a name involve for the subject that signifies what is singular in them for the others?

Stephen in "Scylla and Charybdis" while explaining his theory on Hamlet's relation to Shakespeare to the librarian and the other literary intellectuals at the national library, including Mr. Best, John Eglinton (Magee), Mr. George Russell (A.E.), and later Mulligan, says of Shakespeare in the ghost role:

> He speaks the words to Burbage, the young player who stands
> before him beyond the rack of cerecloth, calling him by a name:

> *Hamlet, I am thy father's spirit* bidding him list. To a son he speaks, the son of his soul, the prince, young Hamlet and to the son of his body, Hamnet Shakespeare, who has died in Stratford that his namesake may live for ever. (*U* 241)

The incarnation of Shakespeare's son Hamnet in Prince Hamlet and thus Shakespeare himself in the ghost of the late King Hamlet, although rather unusual considering the common literary tendency to pair Shakespeare himself with Hamlet, is actually not the most interesting aspect of Stephen's theory that begins with this quotation. First of all, in the actual play, the ghost does not call his son by his name, and although it might appear to be "a misquotation" as Gifford argues (204), it is striking that not only Bloom repeats it exactly in the same manner once earlier in the novel (*U* 192) and again through Zoe later in "Circe" (*U* 667), but also Stephen narrates his theory by specifically stressing the ghost's calling his son by "a" name and Hamnet's surviving through his "namesake", the name of the son of the body surviving through the name of the son of the spirit. Moreover, this act of speaking through the name becomes a loop that connects the past, present and the future:

> As we, or mother Dana, weave and unweave our bodies, Stephen said, from day to day, their molecules shuttled to and fro, so does the artist weave and unweave his image. And as the mole on my right breast is where it was when I was born, though all my body has been woven of new stuff time after time, so *through the ghost of the unquiet father the image of the unliving son looks forth.* In the intense instant of imagination, when the mind, Shelley says, is a fading coal, that which I was is that which I am and that which in possibility I may come to be. So in the future, the sister of the past, I may see myself as I sit here now but by reflection from that which then I shall be. (*U* 249 my emphasis)

These insightful images of the artist re-weaving his body and the unliving son's reaching out to the future through the ghost of the 'unquiet' father, which also indicate a retroactive image of Stephen the narrator through Joyce the *sinthome,* work as both an interrogation of paternity through name/naming and an extimate relation of art that uses imagination through a temporality founded in retroaction-anticipation. A few lines later when Mr. Best comments on the above

quotation by saying that he feels the bitter language comes from King Hamlet but in scenes with Ophelia the language belongs to Prince Hamlet, Stephen's corrective remark stresses this intricate relation once more in a completely personal level: "Has the wrong sow by the lug. He is in my father. I am in his son" (*U* 249). This personal affinity drawn between Stephen and Hamlet, along with Telemachus and Jesus, and connoted several times throughout the novel, is revealed in the remark Stephen makes, explaining a father as "a necessary evil":

> The corpse of John Shakespeare does not walk the night. From hour to hour it rots and rots. He rests, disarmed of fatherhood, having devised that mystical estate upon his son. Boccaccio's Calandrino was the first and last man who felt himself with child. Fatherhood, in the sense of conscious begetting, is unknown to man. It is a mystical estate, an apostolic succession, from only begetter to only begotten. On that mystery and not on the Madonna which the cunning Italian intellect flung to the mob of Europe the church is founded and founded irremovably because founded, like the world, macro- and microcosm, upon the void. Upon incertitude, upon unlikelihood. *Amor matris*, subjective and objective genitive, may be the only true thing in life. Paternity may be a legal fiction. (*U* 266)

The rotting image of William Shakespeare's biological father in the grave versus the father who bequeaths the mystical estate to his consubstantial son is a compelling collation that underlies the difference between the relation of the son to the father as the mother's mate, which is also uncertain and speculative, and as "the apostolic succession, from only begetter to only begotten" which defies paternity as a legal fiction and places it as the rock[6] on which the Catholic church is founded. The paternal function Stephen refers to has nothing to do with the biological function of the father, or the love in between for that matter, but with the law of the father that does not necessitate a familial

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[6] Gifford remarks: "In Catholic tradition, the founding of the Catholic church is identified with Matthew 16: 18, when Jesus speaks to Simon Peter, since Peter was to be the first bishop of Rome (and the first pope): "And I say unto thee, that thou art Peter, and upon this rock I will build my church; and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it"" (241). Quoting John Hunt, Gifford argues that "the contrast between Jesus' "rock" and Stephen's "void" suggests the rock of Scylla and the whirlpool of Charybdis" (241).

connection. John Shakespeare's death, disarming him of fatherhood and his son of sonship, takes hold on a different level, as a heritage. Moreover, the biological aspect of fatherhood which is reduced to an "instant of blind rut" emerges as a fierce rivalry between the father and the son in the following paragraph: "The son unborn mars beauty: born, he brings pain, divides affection, increases care. He is a male: his growth is his father's decline, his youth his father's envy, his friend his father's enemy" (*U* 267). Therefore, the name that the son inherits from the father is related less with the bloodline than with a symbolic function. However, very much in line with what Lacan argues in his later years with the addition of the *sinthome* as the fourth term in his theory of the Borromean Knot, in the absence of such a name, one can invent a name through art for himself to compensate for the missing Name of the Father: upon all the discussions as to what name was behind the works attributed to Shakespeare, Stephen combines the names of three possible alternatives with that of Shakespeare in one name[7] and suggests that regardless of the proper name, one can acquire a name through art and in that way, they can identify with the paternal function and become "himself his own father":

> When Rutlandbaconsouthamptonshakespeare or another poet of the same name in the comedy of errors wrote Hamlet he was not the father of his own son merely but, being no more a son, he was and felt himself the father of all his race, the father of his own grandfather, the father of his unborn grandson. (*U* 267)

Throughout the following pages, what Stephen suggests is revealed as an intricate attempt to coincide the real with the symbolic: Shakespeare, not in the position of a son anymore on account of the death of his father not long ago in the same year (1601), and historically recorded to have played the role of the ghost in his own play (Gifford 204), calls through the ghost on the stage to his own son Hamnet, who died when

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[7] Gifford identifies these names as Roger Manners (1576-1612), fifth earl of Rutland; Sir Francis Bacon (1561-1626); and Henry Wriothesley (1573-1624), third earl of Southampton and mentions other theories as to who actually wrote the plays (241-2).

he was 11 years old in 1596; yet, by calling the name of his son "Hamlet", he is not only fathering his dead son but all his race, like a consubstantial unity where the son and the father become One. So, in Stephen's account, Shakespeare did something Freud argued to be a taboo in the pre-historic societies where it was forbidden to pronounce the name of the deceased as such an act would mean to contact something that has passed, in Lacanian terms, out of the Symbolic into the Real (*Complete* 2699). Thus Shakespeare, by calling the name of his deceased son, evokes something, something related to *Das Ding*, something from the real where both the son and the Father become One, that is, one in its wholesome totality.

Stephen's preoccupation with names and paternal relation prevails throughout *Ulysses* where his attempts at identification (both on imaginary and symbolic levels) with several figures from myths, religion and history occasionally fail. "What's in a name? That is what we ask ourselves in childhood when we write the name that we are told is ours" (*U* 269). It is challenging for Stephen to answer his own question because unlike Shakespeare, or whichever name was there behind the plays, neither having lost his biological father nor having ever been a father himself, he still could not fully occupy the position where the Name of the Father castrates and baptizes the subject. In his questioning Stephen not only foreshadows his upcoming meeting with Bloom who is a father with an unliving son, but also questions his own position as a son: "Well: if the father who has not a son be not a father can the son who has not a father be a son?" (*U* 267) Stephen also questions his status as a father a few lines earlier and this question immediately leads to his memory of touching the hand of his father: "Am I father? If I were? Shrunken uncertain hand" (*U* 267). This image of the "shrunken uncertain hand" is imbued with a lot of connotations significant in analyzing Stephen's relation to his father and fatherhood. Two pages earlier, upon a comment on Shakespeare's father he remembers his own father: "Hurrying to her squalid deathlair from gay Paris on the quayside I touched his hand. The voice, new warmth,

speaking. Dr Bob Kenny is attending her. The eyes that wish me well. But do not know me" (*U* 265). His father's eyes that do not know him, like his uncertain hand, hint Stephen's inability to identify with the gaze of his father despite a "new warmth" in his voice that tells him about his dying mother. Therefore, it is no surprise that just after he says *amor matris* is the only thing that truly matters in life and paternity is "a legal fiction", Stephen says: "Who is the father of any son that any son should love him or he any son?" (*U* 266) from his inner dialogue- not a monologue in this case as it appears as a conversation between *je* and *moi*- it is clear that this is something which finds itself out of Stephen's unconscious: "What the hell are you driving at? I know. Shut up. Blast you! I have reasons" (*U* 266). With an attempt to get help from Logos for his reasons, that is, the rational, linear, causal principle that controls the logocentric relation in language, he cites the possible words for causality from Latin- "*Amplius. Adhuc. Iterum. Postea*" (*U* 266) meaning "Furthermore. Heretofore. Once again. Hereafter" - he realizes it is of no help: he is "condemned" to feel estranged from his father as they are "sundered by a bodily shame so steadfast" (*U* 266).

While trying to sell his sophistry of how a W shaped super-nova was related to William Shakespeare's holding his name "dearer than his glory of greatest shakescene in the country" (*U* 269), Stephen's inner monologue surfaces again, this time contemplating on his name and initials: "Read the skies. *Autontimerumenos. Bous Stephanoumenos.* Where's your configuration? Stephen, Stephen, cut the bread even. S. D.: *sua donna. Gia: di lui. Gelindo risolve di non amar S. D.*" (*U* 269). Stephen's ironical stance to his own name is accompanied by his memories from his childhood: *Autontimerumenos* means "self-tormentor", and *Bous Stephanoumenos*, which means a 'crowned bull' that is sacrificed in rituals, is the name by which his school-friends call him in the fourth chapter of *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man* (Thornton 208). Stephen's configuration, the state of the sky at the moment he was born, takes on a double meaning here, with the following line from a children's doggerel rhyme and his initials. Lacan

argues that the letter kills the subject, but he also asks "how the spirit could live without the letter" (*Écrits Selection* 121). As he argues in "Seminar on The Purloined Letter", the subject falls into the possession of the letter, that is, the letter possesses the subject for her/him to possess its meaning: "By coming into the letter's possession—an admirably ambiguous bit of language—its meaning possesses them" (*Écrits Complete* 21). The possession of Stephen by the letter (S. D.) in this scene thus brings along many other signifiers which were linked to the Italian words for 'his lady' (sua donna) along with the need to confirm the possession: "'S.D.: his lady. Yes: his. Gelindo resolves not to love S.D." (Notes *Alma Classics* 1218). S. D. not only stands for his own initials, Stephen Dedalus, but also those of his father Simon Dedalus. Moreover, the remembrance of *Autontimerumenos,* whose relation to Baudelaire's poem "L'Hautontimoroumenos" in *Les Fleurs du Mal* is underlined by Sidney Feshbach[8], along with the letters S. D. opens up multiple possible readings of this signification chain. In "L'Hautontimoroumenos", which is the work Joyce must have based his concept of self-tormentor on (Feshbach 475), Baudelaire portrays a subject who is both the executioner and the victim. In the stanza below, the similarities between Stephen's reflection on his name and the speaker's point of view in the poem are worth considering:

> I am the knife and the wound it deals,
> I am the slap and the cheek,
> I am the wheel and the broken limbs,
> hangman and victim both I. (*Les Fleurs* 80)

Bearing in mind that 'Kinch' the knife-blade is another name given to Stephen by Mulligan, and that Stephen is known for his sharp cynicism, skepticism and ironical stance, and that he is a man of letters who is striving hard to build himself a name, it is not difficult to see how Stephen recognizes in his constellation this connection to *Autontimerumenos.* Stephen, as an artist, is the letter that cuts- the

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8 For a detailed exploration of the relation between Joyce's use of the word "*Autontimerumenos*" and Baudelaire's "L'Hautontimoroumenos," see Sidney Feshbach's article.

sharp words that mark- and the wound that the letter causes, the wound that stems from his creative failure. As the Lacanian subject, he comes to existence in the wound that the letter tears, in the letters of his name which, in the chain of signifiers, reminds him of his sacrificial position, his attempt and failure to identify with his father's name, yet his unceasing need of approval from him, and even his ambivalent position against the death of his mother (*sua donna*) and the law of the father (yes: his). The poem's in-betweenness is very much in line with the guilt and anger he feels after his refusal of Catholicism and his mother's last wish. On the other hand, his guilt and rage are not only against the mother but the father/Father, who finds itself in the novel in many different shapes, including God as the hangman, *dio boia*, a blood-thirsty butcher. Maud Ellman in her analysis of the relation between identity and naming in *Odyssey* and *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man* argues that what Joyce does is to "interweave the naming and the creation of the universe with the fury of the father and the son" ("Polytropic" 74). In that sense, as Feshbach remarks, the poem reminds us of the prevailing theme of 'agenbite of inwit', Middle English for 'remorse of conscience', which is usually taken "as a sign to mark a host of very painful memories and emotions" (Gottfried 121). Lacan, on the other hand, states that this phrase denotes "the witticism, the internal witticism, the bite of a joke, the bite of the unconscious" (*Sinthome* 144). As such, the letter, that is, the proper name as the signifier, is the "agenbite of inwit" for Stephen: His name, his initial letters, S. D., reaches out to him from a cut and bites him, leaving its prints, those of signifiers, on his flesh. Lacan likens the proper name to a fake *suture* that appears to close the lack, the void in the subject's existence (*Seminar XII* 50). It is in a way a suture that gives the illusionary effect of stitching the subject to the Symbolic. What Stephen, and Joyce throughout his oeuvre, does with this inquisition of the names, this obsession to divide, multiply, deconstruct and reconstruct the names, is actually an extimate act of scratching the wound, hollowing out the suture, to blur the line between interior and exterior. It is an act of extimacy because it builds a name on the void of the real and sutures it

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to the symbolic register: an attempt to open an ontological site, a particular tempo/spatiality which is as intersubjective as it is intra-subjective. That is, by playing with names, Joyce, through his characters, plays with time. As Lacan argues "the name is the time of the object" and the extimacy of the subject to language that gives birth to them by killing them simultaneously also mirrors the extimate relation between the subject and *objet a* that drives their desire against both life and death.

The numerous attempts at playing with the names appear as a pledge of the subject to suture the cut between the subject and language, between the real and the symbolic, between the subject and the O/other. It is the attempt to create the space for the neurotic subject to thrive in the symbolic which does not let them thrive under the proper name that is deemed right for them. In that sense, the extimacy of the name is the reflection of the extimacy of the subject. The proper name that the subject assigns/ builds up for themselves removes for the subject the untraversable gap between the subject and the object, suturing the cut, covering the lack, setting the spatiotemporal site where the subject can become the father and the son to themselves and the entire humanity simultaneously and atemporally. Thus, "the name becomes the point where word and flesh meet in a single scar" (Ellman 77).

3.2. Signifier as a Name or the Name of the Signifier

Lacan distinguishes the nature of the signifier from the sign, the signified or the trace by underlining its power/ability to substitute not for the disappeared object itself but for the signifier of the disappeared object. Unlike the "natural meaning", "the biological sign" or "the code" in the animal kingdom which means the same for all perceivers- here Lacan gives the example of "the red of the robin redbreast"- the trace does not require a perceiver to be a sign. A signifier, on the other hand, is a substitute intended to signify. As such, the signifier also marks one

of the most distinguishing features of any kind of signifying system in that it reveals binary oppositions that language is built upon, the most foundational of which is the opposition between presence and absence:

> Then there is the trace, the footprint in the sand, the sign about which Robinson Crusoe makes no mistake. Here sign and object separate. The trace, in its negative aspect, draws the natural sign to a limit at which it becomes evanescent. The distinction between sign and object is quite clear here, since the trace is precisely what the object leaves behind once it has gone off somewhere else. Objectively there is no need for any subject to recognize a sign for it to be there - a trace exists even if there is nobody to look at it.

> When have we passed over into the order of the signifier? The signifier may extend over many of the elements within the domain of the sign. But the signifier is a sign that doesn't refer to any object, not even to one in the form of a trace, even though the trace nevertheless heralds the signifier's essential feature. It, too, is the sign of an absence. But insofar as it forms part of language, the signifier is a sign which refers to another sign, which is as such structured to signify the absence of another sign, in other words, to be opposed to it in a couple. (*Seminar III* 167)

Lacan contends that although both the trace and the sign mark the absence of a disappeared object, the distinguishing feature of the signifier is that it does not have an object as its referent: it refers to another signifier that substitutes for the absent sign. Unlike the trace that marks the absence of a missing object, the signifier does not need an object to be a signifier; it just needs another signifier to represent. And to whom does this signifier represent the sign of the absent object? The most significant point in Lacanian understanding of language and its relation to subjectivity probably lies in the fact that the signifier is a signifier as long as it is connected to other signifiers in the chain and that it is there to represent: unlike the footprint Friday left on the sand without the intention to be noticed, the signifier is there with the intention to represent/be represented for. Lacan in his later seminars returns to offer a further explanation:

> I spoke to you about Robinson Crusoe and about the footstep, the trace of Friday's footprint, and we dwelt a little while on the

following: is this already the signifier, and I told you that the signifier begins, not with the trace, but with whatever effaces the trace, and it is not the effaced trace which constitutes the signifier, it is something which poses itself as being able to be effaced, which inaugurates the signifier. In other words, Robinson Crusoe effaces the trace of Friday's footprint, but what does he put in its place? If he wants to preserve the place of Friday's footprint, he needs at least a cross, namely a bar and another bar across it. This is the specific signifier. The specific signifier is something which presents itself as being itself able to be effaced and which subsists precisely in this operation of effacing as such. I mean that the effaced signifier already presents itself as such with the properties proper to the unsaid. In so far as I cancel the signifier with the bar, I perpetuate it as such indefinitely, I inaugurate the dimension of the signifier as such. Making a cross is properly speaking something that does not exist in any form of locating that is permitted in any way. You must not think that non-speaking beings, the animals, do not locate things, but they do not do it intentionally with something said, but with traces of traces. We will come back when we have time to the practice of the hippopotamus, we will see what he leaves behind him for his fellows. What man leaves behind him is a signifier, it is a cross, it is a bar, qua barred, qua overlaid by another bar which indicates on the one hand that as such it has been effaced. (*Seminar VI* 71)

As Lacan states, the effaceability of the signifier, its random nature in replacing/being replaceable, the intentionality behind this act of substitution (regardless of whether or not there is someone that perceives the cross as the location where the footprint of Friday once was), its paradoxical power to form presence out of absence, and its endless referral to other signifiers are what makes a signifier. In the non-presence of the signified (meaning) as fixed/certain, the signifier appears as an unsubstantial, floating denominator that functions only because of its sheer ability to realize something consistent -a voice that marks presence- out of the empty space of something lost. Lacan speculates further:

(…) it is also at this level that there emerges what corresponds to what we have first of all designated in the signifier as testifying to a presence which is past inversely in a real passage which manifests itself, it is something which deepens it, which is beyond and which can be trusted.

In fact there again what we rediscover, is that just as after it is effaced, what remains, if there is a text, namely if this signifier is inscribed among other signifiers, what remains, is the place where it has been effaced, and it is indeed this place also which sustains the transmission, which is this essential thing thanks to which that which succeeds it in the passage takes on the consistency of something that can be trusted. (*Seminar V* 263-4)

As Maria Balaska states, when "there is no way to guarantee that the signifier, and thus meaning, is grounded in something external that can resist this substitution", for Lacan, the thing that upholds signification, that is, "the only thing that remains constant and allows us to trust that sense is not entirely contingent, in this incessant sliding of the signifier, is the place of the effacing itself" (71). That is, the signifier comes to function on the absence of the signified, just as the hypothetical cross Robinson locates functions in the absence of Friday's footprint. Balaska hence concludes:

> The cross only refers to an empty place, or, to put it more radically, it engenders the empty place (the place that can be effaced) as such. In Lacan's words, "[t]he signifier does not designate what is not there, it engenders it". The signifier is based on an absence (the absence of any referential relation to the signified) and yet generates a place that introduces the idea of a presence (of a ground for meaning), given that the empty place marks the possibility of something being placed there. (72)

3.2.1. M'Intosh

That Bloom recalls Robinson and Friday right after he takes notice of the man in the brown mackintosh for the first time is both surprising and ironic, to say the least, when one considers how this mysterious man embodies in his name the condensation of Lacan's formulation of 'the' signifier:

> Now who is that lankylooking galoot over there in the macintosh? Now who is he I'd like to know? Now, I'd give a trifle to know who he is. Always someone turns up you never dreamt of. A fellow could live on his lonesome all his life. Yes, he could. Still he'd have to get someone to sod him after he died though he could dig his own grave. We all do. Only man buries. No ants too. First

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> thing strikes anybody. Bury the dead. Say Robinson Crusoe was true to life. Well then Friday buried him. Every Friday buries a Thursday if you come to look at it.
> *O, poor Robinson Crusoe,*
> *How could you possibly do so?* (*U* 138)

As Bloom speculates, and as Lacan underlines, "only man buries", and as in the case of both Lacan's example of Robinson Crusoe and the funeral of Patrick Dingam in *Ulysses*, whether effaced from the face of the earth as in the case of Dingam or absent for any trivial reason-probably hunting in Friday's case, man places a substitute for the object that s/he buries, that s/he no longer perceives: a cross, to make a signifier out of the disappearance of someone, to engender an empty place. Very similar to Bloom's reflection that "Every Friday buries a Thursday", every engendered signifier buries another signifier in an endless chain of signifiers not only in the sense that every signifier consumes the other until it flies off for another signifier but also that unless the signifiers are placed together in a network, that is unless Friday comes after Thursday and Wednesday before that, they are "truly senseless, 'stupid', and, just like a character on a type-writer keyboard": "it makes sense only by effacing another signifier, taking its *place* on the written page, *next to* other signifiers (with all the other, no less stupid, 'typos' that this may imply—slips of the tongue and the pen, *Witz,* and so on)" (Lacan qtd. in Borch-Jacobsen 177). And this act of engendering, besides being oppositional as it is born out of the production of presence upon absence, is arbitrary as there is no direct relation of the signifier to the signified whatsoever. That is, a circle instead of a cross would work the same way for Robinson.

These features of the signifier are enacted in the emergence of the name of the man in mackintosh when Joe Hynes notes down the people who have attended Patrick Dingam's funeral. He asks Bloom the name of a man nobody seems to recognize, and misunderstanding Bloom's reply he registers the mysterious attendant as "M'Intosh":

> -And tell us, Hynes said, do you know that fellow in the, fellow was over there in the . . .

He looked around.
-Macintosh. Yes, I saw him, Mr Bloom said. Where is he now?
-M'Intosh, Hynes said, scribbling, I don't know who he is. Is that his name?
He moved away, looking about him.
-No, Mr Bloom began, turning and stopping. I say, Hynes!
Didn't hear. What? Where has he disappeared to? Not a sign. Well of all the. Has anybody here seen? Kay ee double ell. Become invisible. Good Lord, what became of him? (*U* 141)

Not only does this scene aptly summarize the Lacanian notion of the signifier regarding both its relation to linguistics and subjectivity, but it also displays how the name operates as an empty signifier that gives presence to the subject. Bloom's completing Hynes's sentence inaugurates the mysterious man into the Symbolic register right after the man is lost out of sight. The disappearance of the man followed by the signifier mackintosh/"M'Intosh" that replaces him represents him as a signifier/subject to other signifiers/subjects. The waterproofing process that was invented by Charles Macintosh, which gave the waterproof raincoat its name that later became common in generic use, becomes the Symbolic inscription of the unknown man in the funeral that by chance was wearing a raincoat on a regular Dublin day. The origin of the name is from Gaelic "*Mac an toisich*" which means "Son of the chieftain" [9]. This sliding of meaning, this flight from one signifier to another that engenders a Mr. M'Intosh for the readers of the evening newspaper is totally arbitrary: had it been for another inventor that found the waterproofing process, the mysterious man would assume another name, another signification. Or had he been in more distinctive attire, he would have been a Mr. Burberry or a Mr. Cartier. As such "the ploughshare of the signifier opens up in the real what can be called the signified, literally evokes it, makes it emerge, manipulates it, engenders it" (Lacan, *Seminar V* 17). When Hynes too disappears after the man in mackintosh, all Bloom is left with is letters that do not signify anything in the absence of other signifiers: "Has anybody here seen? Kay ee double ell. Become invisible. Good Lord, what became of him?" (*U* 141-

[9]https://www.etymonline.com/word/mackintosh#:~:text=mackintosh%20(n.),%22Son%20of%20the%20chieftain.%22

2). What has become of the disappeared signifier is that he is replaced and accompanied by other signifiers.

The operation of the signifier is displayed in the operation of Bloom's unconscious: the ambiguity, multiplicity of meaning and signification as floating from one word to another. The letters Bloom spells- "kell"- may be read as coming from another name of an attendant at the funeral, Cornelius Kelleher, whose name Hynes probably spelled as he was noting it down before asking about M'Intosh. On the other hand, as Gifford states, it is from "Has Anybody Here Seen Kelly?" an American adaptation of "Kelly from the Isle of Man", an English song dated 1908 by C. W. Murphy and Will Letters (113). The lyrics, which Bloom recalled earlier on the way to the funeral (*U* 121), tell the story of a Michael Kelly who comes to New York with his sweetheart Mary and who loses her on the streets as thousands of marchers celebrate St. Patrick's day. Upon hearing Michael Kelly's favorite song played, Mary calls out for Kelly, only to be responded by many Kellys in the crowd: "She climbed upon the grandstand in hopes her Mike she'd see, / Five hundred Kellys left the ranks in answer to her plea" (Gifford, *Ulysses* 113). Just like Michael Kelly of the lyrics, in the non-presence of Hynes, M'Intosh, Dignam and even Bloom's own Kellys, that is his long lost first love Bridie Kelly and his wife Molly who is almost lost to Bloom, are signifiers which, when called out as names in their absence, are counteracted/interacted with many countless others in the restless floating of the signification chain. Thus, going back to Bloom's question, in the disappearance and invisibility of the subject/signifiers, in the replacement of them by signifiers, in the presence they are given by the act of effacing, the subjects continue to exist in the signification network, gaining and losing new signification in every connection they make with other signifiers, but always coming to existence in the desire of the Other.

When the news of the funeral appears in the evening newspaper later in the novel in "Eumaeus" chapter, Joyce's stressing the name as an empty

signifier and the subject as an effect of language is acted out once more: not only that M'Intosh finds its inscription in the Symbolic register of the Other, but the names written on the paper make those absent present, and unfortunately for Bloom, vice versa:

> *The mourners included: Patk. Dignam (son), Bernard Corrigan (brother-in-law), John Henry Menton, solr., Martin Cunningham, John Power eatondph 1/8 ador dorador douradora* (must be where he called Monks the dayfather about Keyes's ad)*, Thomas Kernan, Simon Dedalus, Stephen Dedalus, B. A., Edward J. Lambert, Cornelius Kelleher, Joseph M'C. Hynes, L. Boom, C. P. M'Coy,- M'Intosh, and several others.* (*U* 751)

Although Stephen and M'Coy did not attend the funeral, their names are on the list: not only does the Symbolic enable their presence as subjects but it also makes them present at the place of their absence at least for the readers of the paper. And this playfulness of naming turns to an almost ontological joke by the pen of Joyce: Bloom, who provided not only M'Coy's name to Hynes but also provided a name for M'Intosh, is erased, turned to another signifier, an empty voice due to a 'stupid' typo:

> Nettled not a little by L. Boom (as it incorrectly stated) and the line of bitched type, but tickled to death simultaneously by *C. P.* M'Coy and Stephen Dedalus, B. A., who were conspicuous, needless to say, by their total absence (to say nothing of M'Intosh), L. Boom pointed *it* out to his companion B. A., engaged in stifling another yawn, half nervousness, not forgetting the usual crop of nonsensical howlers of misprints. (*U* 751-2)

Boom! Just like Stephen's identification of God with a shout on the street earlier in the novel (*U* 42), Bloom becomes an empty voice, a noise among others with the drop of a single letter. As such, this exemplifies how the subject is not only a floating signifier but also the discourse of the Other. As Bloom be/comes Boom, the mysterious man be/comes M'Intosh, Stephen and M'Coy be/come present in the Other's discourse, the bar between them as signifieds and their signifiers as names draws a line that is impossible to cross back: that is, they become impossible subjects as that which is internal and external, unconscious and

conscious, language and real are forever separated for them. Hence the subject ex-sists[10] in language. As Hendrix explains:

> The bar also reifies the presence of the subject in the mechanisms of signification, as that absence which is present in every signifier. It is language which produces the subject, rather than the subject which produces language. But it also renders the subject impossible as soon as it comes into that language, because the subject is immediately divided between the concept and the word. The subject is only possible in language, and as soon as that possibility is realized in signification, the subject becomes impossible, because of the inaccessibility of the signifier to the signified, the premise of the presence of the subject. As the presence of the absence in the signifier, the subject fades into the signifier, and as the subject can only be represented by a signifier to another signifier, it cannot be present in the process of signification, the shifting or sliding of signifiers above the bar of the signified. (22)

The ex-sistence of the subject in language thus underlines the extimacy of the relation of the subject to the name. The subject as represented in language with the proper name, which is as in many examples shown above accidental, ex-sists in "self-alienation and lack of self-knowledge in the pretense of representation" (Hendrix 23). In line with Lacan's well-known maxim "the subject is what the signifier represents" (*Écrits Complete* 708), Miller underlines that the consciousness of the subject has nothing to do with their existence in the signification chain as a signifier, and reminds Lacan's doctrine that the relation between the

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[10] As Fink explains in the complete edition of *Écrits*, Lacan uses 'ex-sistence' in a different meaning than existence:

> Lacan uses a term here, ex-sistence, which was first introduced into French in translations of Heidegger's work (e.g., *Being and Time*), as a translation for the Greek *ekstasis* and the German *Ekstase*. The root meaning of the term in Greek is standing outside of or standing apart from something. In Greek, it was generally used for the "removal" or "displacement" of something, but it also came to be applied to states of mind which we would now call "ecstatic" (Thus a derivative meaning of the word is "ecstasy"). Heidegger often played on the root meaning of the word, "standing outside" or "stepping outside oneself," but also on its close connection in Greek with the root of the word for "existence". Lacan uses it to talk about "an existence which stands apart from," which insists as it were from the outside, to talk about something not included on the inside, something which, rather than being intimate, is "extimate". (767)

signifier and subject, that is, the relation of the subject to the field of the Other "cannot be integrated into any definition of objectivity" ("Suture" 7). This relation is not a structuralist relation that consists only of the signifier and the signified, but one that displays the subject as a lack and signifier that represents the subject as such. Hence Miller concludes:

> When Lacan faces the definition of the sign as that which represents something for someone, with that of the signifier as that which represents the subject for another signifier, he is stressing that in so far as the signifying chain is concerned, it is on the level of its effects and not of its cause that consciousness is to be situated. The insertion of the subject into the chain is representation, necessarily correlative to an exclusion which is a vanishing. ("Suture" 8)

The subject is thus an impossible subject in the register of the Other represented by a signifier, a proper name, effected not by their consciousness but for another signifier in the chain as a form of presence of the absence cut in the extimacy of the real. This is what Lacan means when he says "One therefore does not speak to the subject. It speaks of him, and this is how he apprehends himself; he does so all the more necessarily in that, before he disappears as a subject beneath the signifier he becomes, due to the simple fact that it addresses him, he is absolutely nothing" (*Écrits Complete* 708).

3.2.2. Throwaway

The signifier, as Lacan explains, thus has a short lifespan regarding the context it operates in as it vanishes as soon as it is replaced by another signifier. This singularity of the signifier is delicately displayed in Joyce's use of the word "throwaway" and the multiple signifiers attached to it, which shift unflaggingly throughout the novel. The slipperiness of language and its paradoxical power to procreate and obliterate finds shape in the name "throwaway" as the signifier flies off from one *point de capiton* to another, changing form in not only an epistemological but almost ontological way from a pamphlet to a part of speech and a

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winner horse like a shapeshifter phoenix that lands on and flies off to every other mountaintop looking unavailingly for the meaning of life. As Hendrix states, the value of the signifier, which is found not only "within the rules which govern the shifting of phonic signifiers, but within the rules of the interactions of the entire system of networks between sound and thought", is "determined at a certain point in the flux of the interaction of networks, the flux of the play of differences, which Lacan calls the "anchoring point" (15). As such, *point de capiton,* which momentarily stops the free sliding of the signifiers in the network, is a prerequisite "for a relationship between a signifier in speech and a signifier in thought, and it reveals the presence of the unconscious in speech" (15).

Joyce first employs the word "throwaway" (*U* 190) as a noun to signify "A printed sheet, handbill, etc., not intended to be kept after it has been read; a pamphlet, leaflet, newspaper, etc., given away for free and usually discarded after reading" (*OED*). OED also cites other explanations for the word: "An item designed to be discarded after use, or one having a short lifespan", "A person who has been abandoned; *esp.* a child or teenager thrown out or forced out of his or her home. Sometimes contrasted with *runaway*", "A trivial or insignificant line of speech, remark, etc.; (also) a remark or comment that is delivered in a casual way, or that is understated or played-down, often for increased dramatic effect", "Of a price: so low as to represent very little or no profit to the seller; very low"[11]. What Joyce does in various scenes throughout the novel with these multiple significations in the chain of signifiers of the word "throwaway" is like the enactment of the operational logic behind the signification process.

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[11] These are the relevant ones among the many entries given for the word "throwaway". Although the uses of some are commonly attributed to US English, it is unlikely that Joyce the linguaphile used them unaware of their many connotations.
https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/201417?rskey=dk5Ktb&result=1&isAdvanced=true#firstMatch

In the beginning of "Lestrygonians", Bloom is given by "a dark man" a throwaway "advertising Elijah, restorer of the church in Zion" (*U* 789): "A sombre Y. M. C. A. young man, watchful among the warm sweet fumes of Graham Lemon's, placed a throwaway in a hand of Mr Bloom" (*U* 190). On the throwaway, Bloom reads that Elijah, who is washed in the Blood of the Lamb, is coming back in the body of the evangelist John Alexander Dowie[12]:

> Heart to heart talks.
> Bloo . . . Me? No.
> Blood of the Lamb.
> His slow feet walked him riverward, reading. Are you saved? All are washed in the blood of the lamb. God wants blood victim. Birth, hymen, martyr, war, foundation of a building, sacrifice, kidney burntoffering, druid's altars. Elijah is coming. Dr John Alexander Dowie, restorer of the church in Zion, is coming.
> *Is coming! Is coming!! Is coming!!!*
> *All heartily welcome.* (*U* 190)

The initial confusion of Bloom's name with the Blood of the Lamb is another Joycean play with letters, which draws a similarity between the prophetical powers of Bloom and Elijah the prophet, which, despite Bloom's negation above with a simple "No", will be revealed with the win of *Throwaway* in the race. Bloom's subsequent allusion to God as that who wants blood victims, along with his use of the Joycean portmanteau word 'kidney burntoffering' right after 'sacrifice' in his stream of thought, is reminiscent of his preparing breakfast to Molly in the same morning, and also of his self-victimization and sacrifice due to Molly's affair with Boylan. Besides, the words in italics can very well be read as Bloom's unconscious announcement of Boylan's arrival and Molly's hearty welcome, which is hinted in almost all of Bloom's actions after he has seen the letter.

The 'throwaway' thus enters the novel as a trivia whose unconscious significance is played out again and again in the course of the day as it

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[12] Thornton states that Dowie proclaimed himself 'Elijah the Restorer' in 1902 and 'The First Apostle' in 1904 (130). See Thornton for more detail.

is connected to other signifiers that represent other subjects. Not only does Joyce use it as an intricate example of a modernist anchoring device that conjoins the un/consciouses of the subjects as the throwaway travels through multiple spatio-temporalities after it is thrown away over the bridge by Bloom, but he also displays through this word (and the different signifiers attached to it in its journey in the chain of signifiers) the Lacanian understanding of language as that which 'speaks' the subject.

Shortly after Bloom receives the pamphlet, he sees the gulls flying under O'Connell bridge, and he throws away the throwaway advertising Elijah over the bridge as he contemplates about throwing himself down:

> Looking down he saw flapping strongly, wheeling between the gaunt quay walls, gulls. Rough weather outside. If I threw myself down? (...) He threw down among them a crumpled paper ball. Elijah thirtytwo feet per sec is com. Not a bit. The ball bobbed unheeded on the wake of swells, Boated under by the bridge piers. (*U* 192)

The travel of the throwaway binds different subjectivities and their stories together as many characters in the chapter flash out and fade as subject-signifiers in "Wandering Rocks", two chapters after Bloom throws down the throwaway. The Dedalus children, Boody, Katey and Maggy are portrayed in their house, struggling to find food without the provision of their father "who art not in heaven" as the throwaway continues its journey: "A skiff, a crumpled throwaway, Elijah is coming, rode lightly down the Liffey, under Loopline bridge, shooting the rapids where water chafed around the bridgepiers, sailing eastward past hulls and anchorchains, between the Customhouse old dock and George's quay" (*U* 291). Some ten pages later, as Dilly, the other Dedalus girl, asks her father for money in the streets of Dublin, Mr Kernan, Father Cowley and many others are portrayed to wander as the progress of the throwaway continues: "North wall and sir John Rogerson's quay, with hulls and anchorchains, sailing westward, sailed by a skiff, a crumpled throwaway, rocked on the ferry-wash, Elijah is coming" (*U* 308). As

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Haines and Buck Mulligan converse about Stephen's doomed failure as an artist in Dublin Bakery Co.'s tearoom, the throwaway is still on its way: "Elijah, skiff, light crumpled throwaway, sailed eastward by flanks of ships and trawlers, amid an archipelago of corks, beyond new Wapping street past Benson's ferry, and by the threemasted schooner *Rosevean* from Bridgwater with bricks" (*U* 321).

Throwaway, as the name of the horse that wins the gold cup in the race that took place at Ascot Heath on 16th June at 3 p.m. appears in the novel much later in the "Cyclops" chapter where it is revealed that the horse unexpectedly left many several other favorites behind. The rumor in Dublin that day has it that Bloom won at least a hundred shillings on that horse, a tip he supposedly gave Lyons as well. As the nameless narrator, the citizen and several others drink and chat in Barney Kiernan's pub on Brittany Street, Bloom spends some time with them, mostly defending himself on the racist pejorative remarks of the citizen and his friends. While the party is chatting, Lenehan reveals that "a dark horse" named *Throwaway*, a stranger, a nobody, has won the race at a 20-to-1 ratio, wreaking havoc on everybody's expectations and investments:

> -What's up with you, says I to Lenehan. You look like a fellow that had lost a bob and found a tanner.
> -Gold cup, says he.
> -Who won, Mr Lenehan ? says Terry.
> -*Throwaway*, says he, at twenty to one. A rank outsider. And the rest nowhere.
> -And Bass's mare? says Terry.
> -Still running, says he. We're all in a cart. Boylan plunged two quid on my tip *Sceptre* for himself and a lady friend.
> -I had half a crown myself, says Terry, on *Zinfandel* that Mr Flynn gave me. Lord Howard de Walden's.
> -Twenty to one, says Lenehan. Such is life in an outhouse. *Throwaway*, says he. Takes the biscuit and talking about bunions. Frailty, thy name is *Sceptre*. (*U* 422)

Although Bloom is present at the scene, he is busy talking to the citizen and does not make a remark. When Bloom leaves to look for Martin

Cunningham, Lenehan says that he is sure Bloom has won a 20 to 1 bet at the Ascot race and has left to get his winnings:

> -I know where he's gone, says Lenehan, cracking his fingers.
> -Who? says I.
> -Bloom, says he, the courthouse is a blind. He had a few bob on *Throwaway* and he's gone to gather in the shekels.
> -Is it that whiteyed kaffir? says the citizen, that never backed a horse in anger in his life.
> -That's where he's gone, says Lenehan. I met Bantam Lyons going to back that horse only I put him off it and he told me Bloom gave him the tip. Bet you what you like he has a hundred shillings to five on. He's the only man in Dublin has it. A dark horse.
> -He's a bloody dark horse himself, says Joe. (*U* 435)

Later in "Circe" episode, when Kelleher tells the two watches on the street that he knows Bloom, it becomes obvious that the rumor about Bloom's win has circulated, for Kelleher also states that Bloom has won in the race:

> CORNY KELLEHER: (To the watch, with drawling eye) That's all right. I know him. Won a bit on the races. Gold cup. *Throwaway*. (He laughs) Twenty to one. Do you follow me? (*U* 698)

A retrospective reading of the scene between Bloom and Lyons towards the end of "Lotus Eaters" chapter reveals that the tip he supposedly gave Lyons was actually a misunderstanding, a treachery of language: referring to the newspaper that Lyons took under his arm to look at the news about the race, Bloom, avoiding spending more time in his presence, says that he can "throw away" the paper:

> -I want to see about that French horse that's running today, Bantam Lyons said. Where the bugger is it?
> He rustled the pleated pages, jerking his chin on his high collar. Barber's itch. Tight collar he'll lose his hair. Better leave him the paper and get shut of him.
> -You can keep it, Mr Bloom said.
> -Ascot. Gold cup. Wait, Bantam Lyons muttered. Half a mo. Maximum the second.
> -I was just going to throw it away, Mr Bloom said.
> Bantam Lyons raised his eyes suddenly and leered weakly.
> -What's that? his sharp voice said.

-I say you can keep it, Mr Bloom answered. I was going to throw it away that moment.
Bantam Lyons doubted an instant, leering: then thrust the outspread sheets back on Mr Bloom's arms.
-I'll risk it, he said. Here, thanks. (*U* 106)

Later in the novel, both from Bloom's "leisure moments" in the cabman's shelter with Stephen in "Eumaeus" chapter, and in "Ithaca", where the events leading to such a misunderstanding are narrated, the details of the misunderstanding are revealed:

> While the other was reading it on page two Boom (to give him for the nonce his new misnomer) whiled away a few odd leisure moments in fits and starts with the account of the third event at Ascot on page three, his sidevalue 1,000 sovs., with 3,000 sovs. in specie added for entire colts and fillies, Mr F. Alexander's *Throwaway*, b. h. 20 by *Rightaway*, 5 yrs, 9 st 4 lbs, Thrale (W. Lane) 1. Lord Howard de Walden's *Zinfandel* (M. Cannon) 2. Mr W. Bass's *Sceptre*, 3. Betting 5 to 4 on *Zinfandel*, 20 to 1 *Throwaway* (off). *Throwaway* and *Zinfandel* stood close order. It was anybody's race then the rank outsider drew to the fore got long lead, beating lord Howard de Walden's chestnut colt and Mr W. Bass's bay filly *Sceptre* on a 2f mile course. Winner trained by Braine so that Lenehan's version of the business was all pure buncombe. Secured the verdict cleverly by a length. 1,000 sovs., with 30 3,000 in specie. Also ran J. de Bremond's (French horse Bantam Lyons was anxiously inquiring after not in yet but expected any minute) *Maximum II*. Different ways of bringing off a coup. Lovemaking damages. Though that halfbaked Lyons ran off at a tangent in his impetuosity to get left. Of course, gambling eminently lent itself to that sort of thing though, as the event turned out, the poor fool hadn't much reason to congratulate himself on his pick, the forlorn hope. Guesswork it reduced itself to eventually. (*U* 752)

Just as the logic of the signifier, which finds its quilting point in anticipation and retrospection, the word "throwaway" finds its meaning in the retrospective operations in the novel. Only does its meaning become clear when Bloom, seeing some old fragments of betting tickets on the dresser, remembers the details of the coincidence that caused the rumor about his win from the race. In the chapter's catechetical method of question-and-answer, both the questions and the answers are worthy of inspection in understanding how the dynamics of the

signifier is acted out in the instances of *Throwaway* and Elijah. The question below reveals the ambiguous tone regarding Bloom's tip to Lyons, and the answer justifies the connection drawn between the throwaway advocating Elijah and Bloom's tip on *Throwaway*:

> Where had previous intimations of the result, effected or projected, been received by him?
>
> In Bernard Kiernan's licensed premises 8, 9 and 10 Little Britain street: in David Byrne's licensed premises, 14 Duke street: in O'Connell street lower, outside Graham Lemon's when a dark man had placed in his hand a throwaway (subsequently thrown away), advertising Elijah, restorer of the church in Zion: in Lincoln place outside the premises of F. W. Sweny and Co (Limited) dispensing chemists, when, when Frederick M. (Bantam) Lyons had rapidly and successively requested, perused and restituted the copy of the current issue of the *Freeman's Journal* and *National Press* which he had been about to throw away (subsequently thrown away), he had proceeded towards the oriental edifice of the Turkish and Warm Baths, II Leinster street, with the light of inspiration shining in his countenance and bearing in his arms the secret of the race, graven in the language of prediction. (*U* 789-90)

All these details portray the specific instances which Bloom encountered regarding the tip he supposedly gave Lyons about the race, and with a retrospective reading it is possible to see how the meaning was constructed around an empty signifier, a void that assumed the function of an upholstery button by interacting with other signifiers in the chain throughout the day. As his wish to get away from Lyons as soon as possible finds its 'secret' in his words "graven in the language of prediction", not only does the meaning of "throw away" pave the way to a new anchoring point that would affect the course of the events he experiences throughout the day, but the word also condenses other signifiers in its name: as the race which in the beginning was "anybody's race" becomes *Throwaway*'s win, not only *Throwaway qua* the outsider/outcast becomes the signifier that is imbued in victory, but also Bloom *qua* the outsider, the Jew, "the dark horse" becomes the victorious Elijah on account of this "truth stranger than fiction" (*U* 435).

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The parallelism which links Bloom to Elijah is thus drawn first by the content of the thrown away throwaway and then the subsequent win of *Throwaway*, and it is reinforced in the end of the "Cyclops" chapter where Bloom is hastily taken away by Martin Cunningham in a car from the rage of the citizen who got out of control by Bloom's final words indicating that Jesus and God were also Jewish like him:

> When, lo, there came about them all a great brightness and they beheld the chariot wherein He stood ascend to heaven. And they beheld Him in the chariot, clothed upon in the glory of the brightness, having raiment as of the sun, fair as the moon and terrible that for awe they durst not look upon Him. And there came a voice out of heaven, calling: *Elijah! Elijah!* And he answered with a main cry: *Abba! Adonai!* And they beheld Him even Him, ben Bloom Elijah, amid clouds of angels ascend to the glory of the brightness at an angle of fortyfive degrees over Donohoe's in Little Green Street like a shot off a shovel. (*U* 449)

Thus, Bloom, whose prophetical power has been approved by the win of *Throwaway*, indeed becomes the Elijah in the throwaway (and a Christ figure with the description mimicking that of Jesus in Matthew 17:1-5)[13] and rises to heaven.

On a final note, it is significant to underline the relation of all this network of the signifiers that attaches itself to Bloom in his search for the paternal signifier, that is, his signifying position as the father of a son, which went null after the death of his son Rudolf, and his signifying position as the son of a father, which went null after the suicide of his father Rudolph. As a signifier that attaches Rudolph the father to Rudolph the son, Bloom also goes null; it runs out its life as a signifier, yet as the perfect epitome of the proper name, it connects to other signifiers/proper names in the signification process, first to Elijah with his power of bringing sons and fathers together, and then to a list including many others, which can be extended to Joyce the author. The last passage in the Old Testament announces that Elijah is sure to

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[13] For the parodic references in the last paragraph of the Cyclops chapter quoted above, Gifford refers to II Kings 2:11-12 describing Elijah ascending to heaven, the song of Solomon 6:10, and Matthew 17:1-5 (Gifford 381).

return to "turn the hearts" of the children and their fathers towards each other, or that God would lay a total destruction upon them with a curse, that is, with his Word that bans, excludes, damns: "Behold, I will send you Elijah the prophet before the coming of the great and dreadful day of the Lord: And he shall turn the heart of the fathers to the children, and the heart of the children to their fathers, lest I come and smite the earth with a curse" (*Old Testament* Malachi 4:5-6[14]). Gifford says that this passage is the reason why the second coming of Elijah symbolizes the second coming of Christ in Christianity, and of the messiah in Jewish tradition which in practice includes the custom of sparing an extra chair for Elijah in Passover in case he shows up (157). On the other hand, Richard Lehan, along with many other critics, suggests that the similarity between Bloom and Elijah is drawn by Joyce in connection to the myth of the Wandering Jew which Joyce had in mind since his youth. Lehan explains that, for one thing, it is related to the ancient story where the Jew, who told Jesus to walk faster when the prophet carrying his cross to Calvary stopped on his doorway to rest for a second, was cursed by Jesus to walk until the day he would return (the second coming). Secondly, this image of the Wandering Jew also points to the later versions of the myth where it turns to Enoch in the Old Testament, Elijah the wanderer, Al Khadir in Semitic mythology, and even Sinbad the Sailor which he states was in Joyce's scope when he was writing *Ulysses*[15] (36). Moreover, Elijah's role as the one that restores the love between fathers and sons not only links Bloom with Elijah of the throwaway, but also with Moses, Jesus, Hamlet, and of course Stephen, who is portrayed by Joyce as the least promising figure in his search of a father.

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[14] https://www.bible.com/bible/1/MAL.4.5-6.KJV

[15] Lehan argues that this shift is in line with the Viconian theory of history and does a reading that explores the parallax view in Joyce. See Lehan for further detail.

In *Seminar XII*, Lacan argues that signifier *qua* proper name, although "undoubtedly, it is more specially indicative, denotative, than an other (name)", is actually "precisely what is displaced, what travels, what one bequeaths" (48). Krecic explains the relation further:

> The properties of a proper name (and its bearer) belong to the field of the signifier: we can describe a person with an endless series of signifiers- however, it seems that the "essence" of the bearer of the proper name is displaced in this chain and cannot fully exhaust the referent it is signifying. A "displacement" or a "jump", as Lacan calls it, is thus connected to proper names; we may find an endless chain of descriptors that denote a person, but something- the essence- will always elude the signifying chain. (147)

Therefore, as Krecic argues, the proper name does not reveal an essence of the bearer: neither M'Intosh, nor *Throwaway*, nor any name that depicts Bloom, Stephen or any other character in the novel has a direct or referential relation to a signified. The subject *qua* signifier is just another signifier in the chain which exists in the presence of the other signifiers and which, although momentarily caught in stable meanings in *points de capiton,* eventually leads to other signifiers in its 'jump' or 'travel' through the signification process. As shown in the examples above, a common noun can become a proper noun or vice versa in this flow, and the subject *qua* signifier, whatever name s/he can bear, as the instances of both Stephen and Bloom suggest, is actually in search of a name that would become her/his *sinthome.*

Lacan says of Joyce:

> The name that is proper to him is what Joyce valorizes at the expense of the father. It is to this name that he wanted homage to be paid, a homage that he refused to anyone else (...) It's quite clear that the fact that there are two names that are proper to the subject was an invention that spread as the story unfolded. That Joyce was also called James links up in a succession only with the use of the alias - James Joyce *also known as* Dedalus.

> The fact that we can pile up a whole stack of them ultimately leads to one thing - it introduces the proper noun back into the common nouns. (*Sinthome* 73)

Thus, the voyage of the proper name exemplified in the voyage of the throwaway also showcases the voyage of the proper noun back into the common nouns as soon as its meaning as *point de capiton* is exhausted. The proper name has the power to represent the subject, and to bring the subject into existence in the symbolic register, but it does not contain the essence of the subject. The proper name stands out as a structural element in the subject's search in their symbolic voyage, and as Lacan points out explaining the Borromean knot, nomination or the *sinthome* as a Name, that is, the acquisition of a name that functions in case the knot does not hold, is how the subject ex-sists. When the proper name is reduced to the common noun as Lacan suggests, something 'tychic' is revealed, as "The Name has to fall from its exalted ego-ideal position, to become something ordinary and out of this ordinary place something splendid may be revealed" (Moncayo 70). Thus, the play with the proper name, its voyage in the subject's search, its alteration within the dynamics of the Borromean knot suggests the essence of the subject more than does the proper name itself. This attempt of the subject at the name reveals the subject's attempt at their real: the ability to build their *escabeau*, in Lacan's words, points to the subject's attempt at ex-sisting, that is, their extimate existence in the real of language.

This brings along the theme of the rest of this chapter: Joyce's attempt in *Ulysses* to reveal the attempt at ex-sistence in the *extimité* of language. As Moncayo states, "The Real lives or 'ex-sists' within the Symbolic in the form of *lalangue* or the language of the One that appears in the holes of the symbolic structure" (73) and *Ulysses* is made up of such holes.

3.3. *Lalangue*, the Sound and the Voice

3.3.1. *Ulysses* and its Roads to *Lalangue*

The language of the narrative in *Ulysses* is in parallel with the quest of the characters: there is a variety of psychodynamic elements, at times totally contradictory yet complementary on the larger scale of the narrative, which display the subject's search for and failure in arriving at wholeness. The narrative employs a cyclical use of different language combinations and is written in the Symbolic Real, Arche Language, Associational Logic, and *Lalangue*, which will be explored before going into the textual analysis of "Sirens", which will reveal how certain sounds break the wall of the Symbolic and outrun the signifier in translating the Lacanian subject's *sinthome*.

3.3.1.1. The Symbolic Real

Žižek, expanding the theory of the Lacanian Real, states that there are several modalities of the Real. Although Lacan's concentration on the importance of the Real increased more and more over the course of his career, especially in his later years with his interest in topology, the Lacanian Real that is commonly referred to is the abject Real, the Real that is not symbolizable; that is, the pre-symbolic material of *Das Ding* that cannot enter the Symbolic realm. Žižek, basing his argument on the overlappings of the Borromean knot, argues that there are in total nine different configurations of the triad of the Lacanian registers, some of which coincide (the symbolic Real and the real Symbolic for instance), and states that the three modalities of the Real are the real Real (abject), the symbolic Real, "the signifier reduced to a senseless formula, like the quantum physics formulae which can no longer be translated back into – or related to – the everyday experience of our life-world", and the imaginary Real, which is "the mysterious *je ne sais quoi*, the unfathomable 'something' that introduces a self-division into an ordinary object, so that the sublime dimension shines through it" (*On

Belief 82). Žižek states in the foreword to the second edition in his *For They Know not What They Do*:

> The Real is thus, in effect, all three dimensions at the same time: the abyssal vortex which ruins every consistent structure; the mathematized consistent structure of reality; the fragile pure appearance. And, in a strictly homologous way, there are three modalities of the Symbolic (the real- the signifier reduced to a senseless formula; the imaginary-the Jungian "symbols"; and the symbolic- speech, meaningful language); and three modalities of the Imaginary (the real- fantasy, which is precisely an imaginary scenario occupying the place of the Real; the imaginary- image as such in its fundamental function of a decoy; and the symbolic - again, the Jungian "symbols" or New Age archetypes). (xii)

The symbolic real, therefore, is the real found in the signifying system that infused through the breaches in the Symbolic without the filter of the Imaginary. Duane Rousselle suggests that the symbolic real which can be best described with the example of the language of quantum physics, although realistic from the scientific viewpoint, is doomed to "remain senseless and unimaginable to us in our common everyday experience," and that it is in a sense like the well-known paradox of Bertrand Russell where "a barber shaves all those who do not shave themselves", that is, the set of all sets which excludes itself, which explains everything but itself due to the paradoxical gap that separates itself from itself ("Real" 216). In other words, the symbolic Real as a system of signification "can never be properly integrated into the existing horizon of sense of a subject (or of a collective), and so which dumbly repeat" (Sharpe, *Slavoj* 201). As such the symbolic real corresponds to a narrative where there is structured, organized, even detailed signification, yet the meaning of this signification is lost in the larger symbolic realm of inter-subjective reality. It does not include the abject, which remains unsymbolizable anyway, but it also does not include the disgust/horror that it causes.

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3.3.1.2. Arche Language

As Gullatz notes, Lacan identifies the Jungian archetypes on which Jung built "his 'analytical psychology' with its characteristic reliance on myth, its focus on authenticity, the seamless gliding from visual imagery to thought that reveals a powerful tendency to naturalize the constructs of culture" with the Imaginary realm that alludes to the subject before their entrance to the Symbolic, dialectically constructing their imaginary ego "in reference to the abstracted form, or *Gestalt,* of the m(other), as an *imago* which is taken in as one's own, the stage is set for a continual reciprocal alienation in the *other* that prefigures the later alienation into the symbol" (691-2). Gullatz states:

> In the field of imaginary symmetries in which it is constituted, the ego constantly requires another—to verify its existence. This structure is extended to the 'objects' of the ego which, too, can never be grasped as whole or self-contained, but always point to something else outside of themselves, as if they were placed into the infinite regress induced by a hall of mirrors. Thus, consciousness at the level of the ego is embedded in a fundamental imaginary matrix, so that man will be inclined to situate his specular objects in terms of the 'echoes' they produce. At this basic level, archetypes (be they Jungian or Platonic) spring from a tendency towards 'reminiscences' that is tied to the dialectical dynamics of the imaginary order. (693)

Thus, the presence of archetypes in any symbolic signification points to the 'reminiscences' of the dialectics of the imaginary, its 'illusionary' dynamics and problematics. Žižek, as mentioned earlier, places the use of Jungian symbols and archetypes, or arche language in general, in the imaginary Symbolic (*For They* xii). Unlike the symbolic Real where the material from the Real enters the symbolic language without the filter of the Imaginary, the imaginary Symbolic is imbued by the elements which the subject is attracted to before the construction/split/castration of their subjectivity by the Symbolic. Such language is marked by the images of the imaginary confusions and identifications, especially the conflicting yet constructive duel between the images of the m(other) and

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the father, the former from which the infant must be separated to be re-configured under the latter's Name.

3.3.1.3. Associational Logic

One of the most striking features of not only literary modernism but also the language of Joyce is the employment of associational logic in narrative. The use of associational logic, especially in the stream of consciousness, highlights the modern subject's semantic quest in the world of floating signifiers, mimicking the qualities of perspectivism and subjectivity as well as the working mechanism of the unconscious, the mysterious psyche. Being the signifiers in a metonymic chain, which are "rings of a necklace that is a ring in another necklace made of rings" (*Écrits Selection* 116), the meaning of Joyce's words 'insists' not in the word-in-itself at a specific moment but in the movement of the signifiers: "it is in the chain of the signifier that the meaning 'insists' but that none of its elements 'consists' in the signification of which it is at the moment capable" (117). Thus, in the symbolic realm that makes up the subject's world in which meaning is elusive, incomplete, and illusionary, the process of meaning shifting from one signifier to another actually displays how the meaning-making mechanisms work against the linear logic of the Word. Throughout the narrative, the symbolic and the imaginary associations are intertwined and become one, disrupting the linear, causal, dichotomous logic, just as in the Mobius strip. The unraveling of the binaries of inside/outside, fact/fantasy, personal/social into the continuous non-linearity of the narrative enables the narrator to voice his subjectivity in a narrative universe of cacophony that acts out the crucial dynamics of post-Cartesian understanding of subjectivity.

3.3.1.4. *Lalangue*

Lalangue is a term Lacan makes up by joining the words of the feminine article in French 'la' and language 'langue' to denote the ambiguous,

polysemic and bodily aspects of language, which he also attributes to the "psychotic language" of Joyce in his Seminar. Lacan says in his *Encore*: "What I put forward, by writing *lalangue* as one word, is that by which I distinguish myself from structuralism, insofar as the latter would like to integrate language into semiology" (*On Feminine* 101). The increasing use of puns and neologisms in Lacan's own language in his later years seems to affirm his statement. For Lacan, "language is, no doubt, made up of *lalangue*. It is knowledge's harebrained lucubration (*élucubration*) about *lalangue*. But the unconscious is knowledge, a knowing how to do things (savoir-faire) with *lalangue*. And what we know how to do with *lalangue* goes well beyond what we can account for under the heading of language" (*On Feminine* 139).

Evans states that Lacan

> coins the term *lalangue* (from the definite article *la* and the noun *langue*) to refer to these non-communicative aspects of language which, by playing on ambiguity and homophony, give rise to a kind of *jouissance*. The term 'language' now becomes opposed to *lalangue*. *Lalangue* is like the primary chaotic substrate of polysemy out of which language is constructed, almost as if language is some ordered superstructure sitting on top of this substrate. (100)

Bruce Fink, who relates *lalangue* "with the acoustic level of language, the level at which polysemy is possible due to the existence of homonyms" states that he prefers to use Russel Grigg's translation 'llanguage', because it is connected to "the level at which an infant (or songwriter) may endlessly repeat one syllable of a word (for example, "la la la"), the level at which language may 'stutter'" (*On Feminine* 44n15)

Raul Moncayo defines *lalangue* as "the language of the unconscious based on homophony (words that sound the same), and to the alliterations and obliterations of language that circle around the *objet a* as object of the drive, and the object cause of desire" (27). He states that *lalangue* is "the language of the One, and how the real appears in language and not only in mathematical formalization or *jouissance*" (27)

and explains the relationship between *lalangue* and language by forming an analogy with *sinthome* - symptom and $S_1 - S_2$ (*Lalangue* 27-45). In *Seminar XXV*, Lacan states:

> Is neurosis natural? It is only natural inasmuch as in man there is a Symbolic; and the fact that there is a Symbolic implies that a new signifier emerges, a new signifier to which the Ego, namely, consciousness would identify itself; but what is proper to the signifier, which I called by the name of S_1, is that there is only one relationship that defines it, the relationship with S_2: $S_1 - S_2$. It is inasmuch as the subject is divided between this S_1 and this S_2 that it is supported, so that one cannot say that it is a single one of the two signifiers that represents it. (6)

This division between $S_1 - S_2$ is significative both in terms of the formation of subjectivity and psychical structure, and also how the subject relates to and locates in language. Moncayo underlines the indefinability of *lalangue* and states that a 'relationship' requires by nature not only a connection/relation between the two terms but also "a prior division, separation, and differentiation" resulting in "a homogenous binary, a dual unity or a duality of oneness, or one dividing into 0 and 1, and 1 and 2":

> Here 1 is 1 and 0 because 1 has to be 1 and at the same time not 1 (undefined) to become 2. S_2 turns S_1 into something different than the original S_1. S_2 defines S_1, yet the undefined face of S_1 centripetally pulls S_2 back to S_1 that is both S_1 and S_0. The undefined S_1 that is S_0 refers back to the question of the nebula of the real that contains *jouissance*, a mass of contradictory feelings, and undifferentiated ideas and sound images. (27)

Thus, between the different faces of S_1, that is S_1-S_2 and S_1-S_0, *lalangue* is "S_1 which equals S_0 or the senseless or without meaning or outside the S_2 of language" (*Lalangue* 28). As S_2 redefines S_1 and turns it into S_2, that is *lalangue* to language, the signifier into the signified (as another signifier), *lalangue* is what remains outside this gravitational force of S_2. Outside the gravity force of S_2, not only is S_1 "undefinable and ambiguous", but also there is a residue of it that was once defined by S_2 which stays outside S_2 categories:

> The *act* of speech and the *sound* of speech remain behind language or the content of speech and what the other hears or understands, although the act and the sound is also heard or has an impact on the body of the receiver. *Lalangue* is associated with the voice and phonation, and the phoneme as an *objet a*, and both say more than the statement. (Moncayo 27)

As such, *lalangue* is associated with "the mother, desire, the mother's desire and the language of desire" and with something dangerous related to "the object of drive that needs to be curtailed by the introduction of the NoF (Name of the Father)" (Moncayo 31).

Jean-Gerard Bursztein differentiates in a similar way between the trace letters which bear the now lost fusion with the mother and the S1 which are "the first signifiers hollowed out of *jouissance*", saying that the trace letters "conform to *lalangue,* that is, to the chaotic modality of incorporation of language transmitted by the mother, language reduced to bursts of *jouissance*, stripped of any signification, whether imaginary or symbolic", which is why these trace letters induce an *effect of existence* and an *effect of lack-in-having some jouissance* (15). This also implies that *lalangue* is somehow connected to that temporality of the subject which precedes castration where the subject is still identified with (the imaginary) object, the Thing. As such, *lalangue* characterizes "the elements linked to the *jouissance* transmitted by the mother" (64), which according to Lacan, is linked to the subject-of-speech, or *parlêtre*, who is divided in the different modalities of *jouissance*, that is:

> *phallic jouissance* (JΦ), which is permitted, erotic or intellectual desire; the *jouissance of the big Other* (JO), prohibited, which puts the subject in a masochistic position by making him the object of the big Other; the *jouissance of Sense,* which permits the subject to orient himself and to *joir* the knowledge of his position, in the unconscious choice of *jouissance*; finally the j*ouissance* that Lacan calls *Other jouissance*, that of mnesic trace-letters which evoke lost presence, collecting *bodily jouissance marked by lack.* (Bursztein 22-23)

The *parlêtre*, therefore, is the subject who speaks *lalangue* and who, with this stress on the insistence of the 'trace letters', or the S_1 which

equals S_0, is defined by its Borromean and Möbian extimacy that is "no longer uniquely the *pure barred effect of the signifying play*" that prevailed the Lacanian theory of the subject before the 1970s (Bursztein 42). Lacan in his seminar on *Sinthome* states that the works of Joyce, which is written in *lalangue*, produces *jouissance* (S*inthome* 146), and that in the style of his use of English "language becomes *lalangue* (*elangue*) and symptom also reverts back to *sinthome*, as reflected in the style of his writing" (Moncayo 30). Moncayo states that Lacan differentiates between the malign and benign forms of *lalangue*: contrary to the "malevolent example of *lalangue* within language represented by clanging associations in psychosis" which one has to free himself from, Joyce allows himself "to be invaded by the constructive phonemic and polyphonic properties of the word (i.e., benevolent *lalangue* within poetic speech or language) (73).

3.3.2. *Ulysses* Written in *Lalangue*

As Cixous states, one does not have to be a woman to write in bodily language (*The Laugh* 878-80). On some occasions, the urge to write comes from the body- not the mind. On rare occasions, one can turn this bodily writing into their *sinthome* and pursue their existence in the symbolic through the walls they open on its very kernel. James Joyce was one of them.

In "Of Chrematology: Joyce and Money", Critchley and McCarthy argue: "If the symbolic is the order of language, which is given priority in Lacan's earlier structuralist inspired work, then *lalangue* is his nickname for an experience of language that is itself a form of *jouissance* and sheer material affect that precedes and resists symbolization" and add that this shift also points to Lacan's drift away from structuralism (188). A similar parallelism between the language of the realist novel and *lalangue* of Joycean writing can be seen: if the realist narrative/novel is all about the symbolic order of language which enables the reader to form imaginary identifications with the characters

and/or the narrator, thus help engendering an enjoyable, ego-affirmative form of fulfillment, the high modernism of Joyce enables a Real experience of language, that is, a painful, unanalyzable, bodily (both in its relation to the sound and the letter in its materiality) *jouissance* that positions the reader in the midst of uncanny suffering which yet provides equally uncanny satisfaction. As Critchley and McCarthy state, Lacan's remark about Joyce- that Joyce unsubscribed from the unconscious[16] and deserted the order of the symbolic- means both that he "affirmed the lack in the big Other and experienced the *jouissance* of the Real" and that he "progressively shed the legitimating narrative conventions and expectations of the nineteenth-century realist novel" (250). Therefore, *lalangue* in *Ulysses*, as the material medium of this form of Joycean *jouissance*, appears not only as the reason for the readerly frustration but also as the manifestation of the extimacy the *parlêtre* experiences in their relation to the *objet a* (or the Thing that does not cease to call for a pre-symbolic fusion).

Finnegans Wake is abundant with Joyce's use of unintelligible play of sounds, equivocations, portmanteau words, garbled speech and lapsus: the whole narrative can be analyzed as an attempt to speak *lalangue*. In *Ulysses*, one can see a similar undertaking at work, which, when compared to the former, appears as an arrhythmic pulsation that takes hold of the narrative at some points and releases at others. "Sirens", the most musical chapter in the novel both in its form and content, is a chapter where the beat of such pulsation gets stronger: not only that the chapter is associated with music as an art or the ear as an organ in the Gilbert schema, or that the 'technic' is *fuga per canonem*[17]- and that the spatial setting is the concert room at the Ormond Hotel, but also the language of the chapter parallels that of the sirens: a luring, bodily,

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[16] See Lacan, *The Sinthome* 144.

[17] A musical term -Joyce defines it as a form which involves eight voices.
Joyce's letter to Harriet Weaver, 6 August 1919 (quoted in Nadya Zimmerman's "Musical Form as Narrator: The Fugue of the Sirens in James Joyce's *Ulysses*).

female form of *lalangue* that is reminiscent of lullabies of the threateningly desirous sea women.

The chapter begins with a two-page long narrative, an overture, where Joyce translates the discourse of the unconscious into *lalangue*: the sound and the letter become the protagonists here, and accordingly, many examples of onomatopoeia, paronomasia, alliteration, portmanteau words, etc. form a chain of signification where the signifier does not correspond to a signified. The absence of an overlap of words and meaning and the multiplication of each letter and sound in the metonymy of *lalangue* point to a different kind of language where the spatio-temporal dynamics are reconfigured: the temporality of consciousness does not hold; the causality between the signifier and the signified- or even the letter and meaning- is broken, and the narrative becomes an ontological site where an uncanny set of material from the Real, which has no correspondence in the symbolic order, prevail in the form of *lalangue* that is full of sounds, play of letters and combination of words. Along with the references to several songs, and with the company of 'Goodbye, Sweetheart, Goodbye' and 'The Crappy Boy', the letter/sound acts as the trace letters that defy any kind of correspondence between the word and the meaning. The narrative thus becomes an ontological site where the production of meaning, which Lacan states as generated in the imaginary (*Seminar III*, 54), is surpassed, and the letter/sound points to something in the real, which is forgotten but yet felt.

3.3.2.1. Jingle Jingle Jaunted Jingling

The first sentence of the chapter, "Bronze by gold heard the hoofirons, steelyringing" (*U*) starts with four metals of bronze, gold, iron and steel, and the effect of the sounds the latter two produce on the former two. Bronze and gold stand for the two sirens/barmaids behind the counter at the bar in Ormond Hotel, Miss Lydia Douce and Miss Kennedy, respectively, with allusion to their hair colors. The iron hooves and the

ringing steel refer to the sounds the viceregal carriages make outside the hotel. This musical allusion that sets the tone of the chapter will prevail, and the 'jingling' sound will mark the strongest pulsation moments in the body of the text, which will peak in the company of the increasing drumming of 'tap's of the approaching blind tuner and the inevitable crowing/cuckooing of the cock, ending the chapter with a physical sound of "Pprrpffrrppfff" (*U* 376).

The jingling sound, along with its variations, stands as a signifier for sexual desire not only in "Sirens" but throughout the novel. Bloom hears earlier in the novel the jingling sound of "the loose brass quoits" of Molly's bed as she turns over or raises herself from the bed (*U* 67,76) and later on in her monologue, Molly, while lying on it with the sleeping Bloom beside her, remembers "the lumpy old jingly bed" (*U* 917) which she and Boylan had to leave and continue their activity on the floor due to the loud noise it made: "this damned old bed too jingling like the dickens I suppose they could hear us away over the other side of the park till I suggested to put the quilt on the floor with the pillow under my bottom" (*U* 914). Although Bloom believed that the bed was bought for Molly by her father from the governor of Gibraltar at the time, it actually belonged to some "old Cohen": "the lumpy old jingly bed always reminds me of old Cohen I suppose he scratched himself in it often enough and he thinks father bought it from Lord Napier that I used to admire when I was a little girl because I told him easy piano O I like my bed" (*U* 917-8). The jingling sound (of the bed) therefore signifies the desire of/for the Other all along and this is once again when Joyce uses it for the jingling sound of the jaunting car or the jingling of the horse harnesses Bloom associates with the opportunity to see the stockings of women. In "Lotus-Eaters" he observes and fantasizes about the "silk flash rich stockings white" of a rich-looking woman as she climbs up to the jaunting car (*U* 90), while in "Lestrygonians" the association becomes more vivid as other objects of desire come into the picture:

> Muslin prints, silk; dames and dowagers, jingle of harnesses, hoofthuds lowringing in the baking causeway. Thick feet that woman has in the white stockings. Hope the rain mucks them up on her. (*U* 213)

> High voices. Sunwarm silk. Jingling harnesses. All for a woman, home and houses, silk webs, silver, rich fruits, spicy from Jaffa. (…) Jingling hoofthuds. Perfumed bodies, warm, full. All kissed, yielded: in deep summer fields, tangled pressed grass, in trickling hallways of tenements, along sofas, creaking beds. (*U* 214)

The relation of jingling to women's underwear is not limited to jaunting cars and harnesses: as will be seen in "Sirens" and "Circe", there is a Joycean association between the jingling sound and the sound the garner makes when it is whacked against a woman's thighs, that is, the sound when the imperative "*Sonnez la Cloche*!"[18] is acted on, when *the bell rings/sounds*. Therefore, it is no coincidence that Miss Douce, upon the request of Lenehan, rings her bell at the bar at almost four o'clock, just before the jingling of Boylan's jaunty car is heard, departing for his rendezvous with Molly (*U* 343).

Arriving at the bar earlier, "With patience Lenehan waited for Boylan with impatience, for jingle jaunty blazes boy" (*U* 339). The narrative heralds the arrival of Boylan with a single sentence, "Jingle jaunted by the curb and stopped" (*U* 340), and Lenehan greets Boylan as "the conquering hero comes" in to the bar, and just outside "Between the car and window, warily walking, went Bloom, unconquered hero" (*U* 340). As Bloom watches Boylan secretly and tries to make sense of his every movement from the corner table at Ormond, in addition to repetitive 'dʒ', 'g' and 'ŋ', the alliteration of the sounds this time are related to the ticking of time for the hand of the clock approaches four: "coin rang" (*U* 341). Boylan's "winking and drinking" (*U* 342), "clock clacked" (*U* 342). The "clacking" sounds abide the text as "k" sound becomes more and more audible and just as before the clock strikes four:

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18 French phrase for "Ring the bell!" or "Sound the bell!"

> Miss Douce took Boylan's coin, struck boldly the cashregister. It clanged. Clock clacked. Fair one of Egypt teased and sorted in the till and hummed and handed coins in change. Look to the west. A clack. For me.
> -What time is that? asked Blazes Boylan. Four?
> O'clock. (*U* 342)

As the clock strikes four, Miss Douce rings her bell:

> -No, now, urged Lenehan. *Sonnezlacloche*! O do! There's no-one.
> She looked. Quick. Miss Kenn out of earshot. Sudden bent. Two kindling faces watched her bend.
> Quavering the chords strayed from the air, found it again, lost chord, and lost and found it faltering.
> -Go on! Do! *Sonnez!*
> Bending, she nipped a peak of skirt above her knee. Delayed. Taunted them still, bending, suspending, with wilful eyes.
> -*Sonnez*!
> Smack. She let free sudden in rebound her nipped elastic garter smackwarm against her smackable woman's warmhosed thigh. (*U* 343)

The sounds in 'looked', 'quick', 'Kenn', 'kindling', 'quavering', 'chord', 'skirt', 'smack', 'smackwarm', 'smackable' join the tinkling sound of jiggy elastic of the garter slapping on flesh and as "Jingle a tinkle jaunted", "Bloom heard a jing, a little sound. He's off. Light sob of breath Bloom sighed on the silent bluehued flowers. Jingling. He's gone. Jingle. Hear" (*U* 345).

The jingling leitmotif appears in the overture many times and sets the tone of the chapter along with the other leitmotifs, soundplays and wordplays, such as the bronze-gold associations, tap/pat sounds, clacks and carras. Throughout the chapter, even before Bloom or Boylan comes to the Ormond bar, the jingling acts as the return of the repressed by intruding at intervals: "Jingle" (*U* 335); "Jingle jaunty jingle" (*U* 337). When Bloom is at Daly's to get paper and envelope for his reply to Martha, he notices a mermaid poster promoting tobacco, which brings back the emotions related to Molly and the sweets of sin. At this point comes into the narrative the jingling of the jaunty car which Bloom spots on Essex bridge from afar. His conversation with

the shop assistant is interrupted as are his conscious activities, and the narrative shifts to *lalangue* as if the jingling sound triggers something mater(n)ial: "At four she. Winsomely she on Bloohimwhom smiled. Bloo smi qui go. Ternoon" (*U* 339).

The jingling sound haunts Bloom as he eats the inner organs of an animal and all sorts of signifiers related to Molly and Boylan abide in his mind: "Mrs Marion met him pike hoses. Smell of burn of Paul de Kock. Nice name he" (*U* 346). The question Lenehan asked Boylan referring to his state of hurry to leave the bar as the clocks strike four- "Got the horn or what?" (*U* 344) becomes another repetition from this point on in the text as Boylan keeps jingling: "By Bachelor's walk jogjaunty jingled Blazes Boylan, bachelor, in sun, in heat, mare's glossy rump atrot, with flick of whip, on bounding tyres: sprawled, warmseated, Boylan impatience, ardentbold. Horn. Have you the?[19] Horn. Have you the? Haw haw horn" (*U* 347).

The horn takes its place among the others in the net of signifiers Bloom reminisces, the piano, the cello, the trombone and the harp, the music of each of which is continuously juxtaposed and combined through letters with – first the jiggedy trousers of the conductor and then- the jingling of course. The realization Bloom comes to, that he and the other men are harps played by the women, is again narrated in a language where the dominant sounds overcome the syntax as the juxtaposition this time is between Bloom and Boylan, and probably their sounds:

> Jiggedy jingle jaunty jaunty.
>
> Only the harp. Lovely gold glowering light. Girl touched it. Poop of a lovely. Gravy's rather good fit for a. Golden ship. Erin. The harp

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[19] This is another example of the invisible narrative bond that connects Bloom's unconscious to that of Stephen's as Lenehan's question "Got the horn or what?" (*U* 344) turns to "Have you the (horn)" which was actually asked to Stephen in the first chapter "-Have you the key? a voice asked" (*U* 12) by another conquering hero, Haines, and which cost Stephen his home but also led to his union with Bloom.

that once or twice. Cool hands. Ben Howth, the rhododendrons. We are their harps. I. He. Old. Young. (*U* 349)

Boylan keeps jogging in his jingle through the streets which Bloom visited after his kidney feast in the morning, this time as prince Bloom (*U* 350) is having his "liv" (*U* 349) with prince Richie Goulding. As a characteristic of *lalangue,* the linearity and causality of the narrational logic shatters again when he hears Goulding whistling the tune of 'Tutto è sciolto' ('All is lost') from the opera *La Sonnambula* (The Sleepwalker, 1831) by Vincenzo Bellini (Gifford 292), and as the words of the song whose tune Goulding whistles storm into his thoughts, his current actions and conscious course of thoughts, that is, the (socio)symbolic register begins to rupture with the tune he hears and the doyly he touches:

> Bloom bent leopold ear, turning a fringe of doyley down under the vase. Order. Yes, I remember. Lovely air. In sleep she went to him. Innocence in the moon. Still hold her back. Brave, don't know their danger. Call name. Touch water. Jingle jaunty. Too late. She longed to go. That's why. Woman. As easy stop the sea. Yes: all is lost.

> — A beautiful air, said Bloom lost Leopold. I know it well. (*U* 351)

Meanwhile, Simon Dedalus performs the song "M'appari" from Flotow's aria *Martha* in which Lionel bewails the absence of his beloved Martha (who is actually a noblewoman, Lady Harriet, in disguise) (Alma Classics 1295nn198-11). The words of the English version sung by Dedalus unleash other memories while the linearity in syntax is broken further, and the times past, present, future and possible commingle as do the sounds of jingling and tinkling:

> Tenors get women by the score. Increase their flow. Throw flower at his feet when will we meet? My head it simply. Jingle all delighted. He can't sing for tall hats. You head it simply swurls. Perfumed for him. What perfume does your wife? I want to know. Jing. Stop.

> Knock. Last look at mirror always before she answers the door. The hall. There? How do you? I do well. There? What? Or? Phila of

cachous, kissing comfits, in her satchel. Yes? Hands felt for the opulent. (*U* 353)

As the piece sung by Dedalus fills Bloom with tenderness and hardness, both at the same time, the throbbing is now the tupping, flowing in and flooding the body and the narrative, the ear and the eye. Not the words, not even the music but "what's behind" takes hold of the narrative as Joyce's words in *lalangue* read aloud generate more *jouissance* than its language read in silence in an attempt to grasp the meaning of each reference. Not only Bloom but also the language loops and unloops, nodes and disnodes, knots and unknots:

> Tenderness it welled: slow, swelling. Full it throbbed. That's the chat. Ha, give! Take! Throb, a throb, a pulsing proud erect.
> Words? Music? No: it's what's behind.
> Bloom looped, unlooped, noded, disnoded. (*U* 354)

The language of the following lines is the actualization of the "flow in" of the real from the "pores" in the symbolic, starting with the association of blood of Bloom/Flood pair and the blurring of in/out boundary, as if the language turns the body inside out, traversing the Möbian portal, attesting to "the language of love":

> Bloom. Flood of warm jimjam lickitup secretness flowed to flow in music out, in desire, dark to lick flow, invading. Tipping her tepping her tapping her topping her. Tup. Pores to dilate dilating. Tup. The joy the feel the warm the. Tup. To pour o'er sluices pouring gushes. Flood, gush, flow, joygush, tupthrop. Now! Language of love. (*U* 354)

In addition to the dominance of t-p verbs which Gifford highlights as meaning "to copulate *as* animals" (*U* 303, my emphasis), the word "tipping[20]" might be worthy of attention here, as it signifies the double-tonguing in wind instruments, which is produced by alternating the t-k

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[20] Gifford argues that the t-p verbs all signify the archaic meaning of copulating as animals: "To 'tup' and to 'tip' mean to copulate as a ram does. To 'top' means to cover as an animal covers, and both 'tap' and 'tep' are dialect variants for 'top' (303).

sounds while blowing the instrument. Therefore, it is multiple-play at work here again: not only does Joyce play with the musicality and acoustics of the text with interchanging t-k sounds, as he once more acts out the content of the chapter in form, but he also literally realizes the double-tongue in the sense that he achieves *lalangue* which forms the language. Therefore, "the ray of hope" in the song ["Not one ray of hope is gleaming" (*U* Alma Classics 1299)] which is denied- that is "unsqueaked"- to the subject by the letter beams the real through the holes in the symbolic via the sound/voice as the beer Miss Douce pours "o'er sluices" flows and gushes, generating "joygush, tupthrop", or just as a wind instrument that goes through the holes to transgress the inside/outside boundary by turning bodily material into tunes which in return marks the body:

> *- . . . ray of hope . . .*
>
> Beaming. Lydia for Lidwell squeak scarcely hear so ladylike the muse unsqueaked a ray of hope. (*U* 354)

As Boylan's jaunty car approaches Eccles street more and more, the creaking, the jingling and the smacking of the garter (*sonnez la cloche*) keep forming loops in the narrative, ringing the bells for Bloom the doomed:

> Blazes Boylan's smart tan shoes creaked on the barfloor, said before. Jingle by monuments of sir John Gray, Horatio onehandled Nelson, reverend father Theobald Matthew, jaunted as said before just now. Atrot, in heat, heatseated. *Cloche. Sonnez la. Cloche. Sonnez la.* Slower the mare went up the hill by the Rotunda, Rutland square. Too slow for Boylan, blazes Boylan, impatience Boylan, joggled the mare. (*U* 356)

As the flow from the pre-symbolic enters the narrative more and more, the syntax and the semantics are blurred further. Thus, it is no surprise when the rat in the graveyard from earlier that day in Dignam's funeral, a figure both uncanny and beyond symbolic, is combined with the two Latin terms "*corpus*" (99) and "*paradisum*" (*U* 131) Bloom heard earlier in the morning before and during the funeral, *Corpus paradisum* (body

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of paradise) which bears not only the Thing on its body as a signifier, but also relates back to the paradise in body which *lalangue* springs from:

> Thou lost one. All songs on that theme. Yet more Bloom stretched his string. Cruel it seems. Let people get fond of each other: lure them on. Then tear asunder. Death. Explos. Knock on the head. Outtohelloutofthat. Human life. Dignam. Ugh, that rat's tail wriggling!
>
> Five bob I gave. *Corpus paradisum.* Corncrake croaker: belly like a poisoned pup. Gone. (*U* 358)

At such textual points, while the alliteration of certain sounds continues throughout, the use of cut words or portmanteau vocabulary increases and linearity is continuously disrupted as the sound of the snapping string which Bloom keeps stretching is added to the jingling and tinkling.

> They sing. Forgotten. I too. And one day she with. Leave her: get tired. Suffer then. Snivel.
> Big Spanishy eyes goggling at nothing. Her wavyavyeavyheavyeavyevyevy hair un comb:'d.
> Yet too much happy bores. He stretched more, more. Are you not happy in your? Twang. It snapped.
> Jingle into Dorset street. (*U* 358)

The language of the narrative following these lines displays not only how the bond between the signifier and the signified is snapped off, but also how the chain among the sequential signifiers is failed when the battery of signifiers falls short against the material leaking from the pre-symbolic:

> Miss Douce, Miss Lydia, did not believe: Miss Kennedy, Mina, did not believe: George Lidwell, no: Miss Dou did not: the first, the first: gent with the tank: believe, no, no: did not, Miss Kenn: Lidlydiawell: the tank. (*U* 358)

As the sentences, phrases and words are cut, and the signifiers float around, the sound and acoustics are the main elements that speak, that is the jingling, tinkling, tankling the only "true":

> On. Know what I mean. No, change that ee. Accept my poor little pres enclos. Ask her no answ. Hold on. Five Dig. Two about here. Penny the gulls. Elijah is com. Seven Davy Byrne's. Is eight about. Say half a crown. My poor little pres: p. o. two and six. Write me a long. Do you despise? Jingle, have you the? So excited. Why do you call me naught? You naughty too? O, Mairy lost the pin of her. Bye for today. Yes, yes, will tell you. Want to. To keep it up. Call me that other. Other world she wrote. My patience are exhaust. To keep it up. You must believe. Believe. The tank. It. Is. True. (*U* 360)

As "the jingle that joggled and jingled" (*U* 361) arrives its destination, Joyce's endeavor with sounds and acoustics in the form of the narrative becomes apparent in the content as well, again from the level of the symbolic real, with a vain attempt of Bloom to account for an empty scientific signification for the chamber music, which stands for not only the title of the book for Joyce's attempt at poetry, but also the association with the chamber pot Molly uses and the sexual connotations it refers to; and as the jingling stops, the tinkling becomes sublime, like the music of rhapsodies or the music of Molly's rain, while the tap on the door, which ultimately signifies the presence of the "cock" in the house, is succeeded by the tapping that will take hold of the narrative until the end of the chapter, that is, the tapping that the blind piano tuner's cane produces as he approaches the Ormond bar:

> Jog jig jogged stopped. Dandy tan shoe of dandy Boylan socks skyblue clocks came light to earth.

> O, look we are so! Chamber music. Could make a kind of pun on that. It is a kind of music I often thought when she. Acoustics that is. Tinkling. Empty vessels make most noise. Because the acoustics, the resonance changes according as the weight of the water is equal to the law of falling water. Like those rhapsodies of Liszt's, Hungarian, gipsyeyed. Pearls. Drops. Rain. Diddle iddle addle addle oodle oodle. Hiss. Now. Maybe now. Before.

> One rapped on a door, one tapped with a knock, did he knock
> Paul de Kock, with a loud proud knocker, with a cock
> carracarracarra cock. Cockcock.
> Tap. (*U* 364)

The tapping and the cocking go hand in hand, becoming the dominant leitmotif in the narrative, setting the tone like the jingling, tearing the textual symbolic, becoming more intense as the blind tuner approaches. This tapping sound, which takes hold of the narrative from then on finds body on the body of the blind tuner, who becomes the object gaze in its opposite yet complementary embodiment in Pat's silence as the object voice.

3.3.2.2. Patting the Voice, Tapping the Gaze

The juxtaposition between the waiter, Pat, and the piano tuner's tap is made not only with regard to the reversal of the letters in the two words but also their difference in their relation to drive objects of the gaze and the voice: Pat is deaf while the tuner is blind, that is, there is a bodily lack, often regarded as opposites, in each man. This is a theme that is prevalent in the novel: Joyce, who himself was gradually losing his eyesight and using a cane, makes Stephen ponder about the "ineluctable modality of the visible" throughout "Proteus" chapter, and in "Sirens", we see Bloom, during his time at the Ormond bar, giving some thought to Pat and his world, just as he did to the blind tuner when he helped him cross the street in "Lestrygonians". The significance of these two figures and the relation between the gaze and the voice is apparent from the beginning as both the "Deaf bald Pat" and the tapping of the tuner appear among the voices in the overture.

Jacques Alain Miller drawing upon Lacan's treatment of Saussurean structuralism states in "Jacques Lacan and the Voice" that there appears to be an antinomy between the signifier and the voice:

> We can start from the fact that the function of speech is the
> function that confers a sense on the individual's functions.

Speech knots signified— or rather the 'to be signified', what is to be signified—and signifier to one another; and this knotting always entails a third term, that of the voice. If we say that one cannot talk without a voice, we can, just by saying that, inscribe the residue, the remainder of the subtraction of signification from the signifier in the register of the voice. And we can, in a first approach, define the voice as everything in the signifier that does not partake in the effect of signification. (141)

This antinomy between the signifier as the word and the voice as the sound can be analyzed in terms of the juxtaposition between the deaf waiter Pat, as his symbolic figure as writing, and the blind tuner/tapper, who goes beyond the signifier by his tunes. Pat, who is agent to the only writing activity in the chapter, brings Bloom ink, and a blotting pad which Bloom uses to compose his letter to Martha, and the highly musical language pairs Pat with all these signifiers related to signification itself:

Bald Pat at a sign drew nigh. A pen and ink. He went. A pad. He went. A pad to blot. He heard, deaf Pat. (*U* 358)

Bald deaf Pat brought quite Hat pad ink. Pat set with ink pen quite flat pad. Pat took plate dish knife fork. Pat went. (*U* 359)

Such a preoccupancy with writing and Pat's standing for the signifier in the antinomy referred to above is visible in his need to make sense of things in order to wait, that is, to pursue his vocation as a waiter. The blind tuner on the other hand, with his stand-out instrument being the tuning-fork, is aimed at going beyond meaning, be it with the fork or the piano. Even the sound of the tuning-fork he forgot in the bar invites the hearer beyond the realm of the signifier as a pronging buzz, as a pure call longing dying:

From the saloon a call came, long in dying. That was a tuningfork the tuner had that he forgot that he now struck. A call again. That he now poised that it now throbbed. You hear? It throbbed, pure, purer, softly and softlier, its buzzing prongs. Longer in dying call. (*U* 339-40)

Yet, the narrative always turns to music when Pat becomes the subject matter; there is material musicality, some real in bits and pieces in the scenes revolving around Pat, and Joyce makes this clear in content as well: we find Bloom thinking of Pat that "he seehears lipspeech" (*U* 365). This thought reappears when Bloom reflects that Pat can nonetheless accompany Dedalus's piece "Goodbye, Sweetheart, Goodbye": "A voiceless song sang from within, singing" (*U* 340). Pat's seehearing lipspeech and seesinging a voiceless song reminds Freud's "hearsing". In *The Interpretation of Dreams* Freud narrates his own dream which included a place called "Hearsing" on a sea voyage he takes and explains how the compound word is a combination of the English word 'hearsay' and the names of the railway stations outside Vienna that end in '-ing' like Hietzing, Liesing, Mödling (*Complete* 771). Dolar finds such a compound a very "economical description of the way the signifier works in the unconscious" in that "The element of singing in saying, that which does not contribute to signification, is the stuff that enables the flash of the appearance of the unconscious" (*A Voice* 143). The phrase "seehears lipspeech" is connected via sound play to many other phrases that point to the emergence of unconscious: "see here is lip's peach" (as in peach for singing) or "see here slip speech" and its other probable variations. This flash of the unconscious in Pat's ability to seehear lipspeech and the combination of seeing with hearing, the eye with the ear is significant in that it points back to the Lacanian objects of gaze and voice. Žižek highlights the paradoxical nature of the objects of gaze and voice as follows: "the object gaze is a blind spot within the field of the visible, whereas the object voice *par excellence*, of course, is silence" ("I Hear" 92).

The deaf waiter, who seems to stick onto the signifier rather than voice on the level of the content, embodies the object voice in his "voiceless singing", in his silent voice whose song echoes in Bloom's mind throughout his own "wait". The laughing sound of "Pat open mouth ear waiting, to wait" comes as the laugh of the Other as this "hee, hee"

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signifies another "he" who does not wait on his desire but makes Bloom wait.

> Bald Pat who is bothered mitred the napkins. Pat is a waiter hard of his hearing. Pat is a waiter who waits while you wait. Hee hee hee hee. He waits while you wait. Hee hee. A waiter is he. Hee hee hee hee. He waits while you wait. While you wait if you wait he will wait while you wait. Hee hee hee hee. Hoh. Wait while you wait. (*U* 362)

Pat the deaf waiter emerges as a figure who defies the structural gap that separates the body from its voice when the step into the Symbolic is taken- a gap which in Žižek's words is "as if the speaker's own voice hollows him out and in a sense speaks 'by itself,' through him" ("I Hear" 92). Žižek's reply to the question why people listen to music as "*in order to avoid the horror of the encounter of the voice* qua *object*" ("I Hear" 93) echoes in Bloom's reflection "Wish they'd sing more. Keep my mind off" (*U* 362) which is followed by the 'hee, hee' quotation given above. In the Ormond bar where music provides him with the necessary distance between him and the object, Pat's silence arises as the voice *qua* object, resonating the tunes of the loss: "The true object voice is mute, 'stuck in the throat,' and what effectively reverberates is the void: resonance always takes place *in a* vacuum- the tone as such is originally a lament for the lost object" ("I Hear" 93).

The object voice finds its body in the silent laugh of Pat the waiter in the sound "hee, hee" against the backdrop of the sound divorced from the signifier. As Dolar explains in *A Voice and Nothing More*, the voice is the perfect exemplar of the object of the drive in clearly embodying the two features of the drive objects: the voice as both denoting the excessive "incorporation and expulsion" mechanism, being the "extra-corporeal, noncorporeal 'supplements' of the body", and as standing on the turnstile of the exterior and the interior, "placed in the zone of overlapping, the crossing, the extimate" (81). The voice thus becomes the object where not only the extimacy of the subject but also the extimacy of the *objet a* is realized, as it is "a bodily missile which has

detached itself from its source, emancipated itself, yet remains corporeal" (Dolar, *A Voice* 73) which acts as an extension of the body yet neither outside nor inside it, floating in the mutually extimate intersection between the body and language. Thus, amidst the voices at the Ormond bar, not Pat's voice but his silence speaks through the void it creates in the Symbolic; speaks *lalangue* in the narrative and sings in Bloom's mind voiceless songs of desire.

The blind piano tuner can also be problematized within this frame of the relation between the voice and the gaze as objects. The narrative does not disclose that the tapping belongs to the cane of the approaching piano tuner until the final pages of the chapter, and the reader is left with an alien 'tap' that comes from nowhere- an uncanny sound that repeats in intervals, increasing in number and frequency.

The blindness of the piano tuner is the perfect embodiment of the Lacanian concept of the discordance between the eye/I (look) and the gaze/object. As Dolar states, "The gaze as the object, cleft from the eye, is precisely what is dissimulated by the image in which one recognizes oneself, it is not something that could be present in the field of vision, yet haunting it from the inside" ("The Object Voice" 15). From Bloom's view, the blind gaze of the tuner is like a mirror that disables the seer to confirm his own image, and although he cannot look back with his eyes, he is always-already gazing back at Bloom from a blank spot he cannot see. It is as if the eyes of the blind boy were the "stains on his coat", one of the first things Bloom notices in their encounter (*U* 231). As Ragland states, Lacan names "the psychic point in the scopic function where the split between the gaze and vision is found" the stain ("The Relation" 199). Thus, the blind eyes become the stain against which he sees himself being gazed at, and his awe is reflected in his following "the eyeless feet" while his anxiety is reflected in his surprise at how the blind stripling can see things: "Mr Bloom walked behind the eyeless feet, a flatcut suit of herringbone tweed. Poor young fellow! How on earth did he know that van was there?" (*U* 231). The reflections of Bloom, who

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himself walks around the streets of Dublin all day long with a tapping in his head[21], continue as he tries to make sense of the uncanniness against such a void, a gap in his innermost self, with the conviction that the blind youth sees him somehow: "Must have felt it. See things in their foreheads perhaps. Kind of sense of volume. Weight. Would he feel it if something was removed? Feel a gap. Queer idea of Dublin he must have, tapping his way round by the stones. Could he walk in a beeline if he hadn't that cane?" (*U* 231). Right at this point, the narrative reveals the name of the person who he has been trying to remember for some time with an associative logic that works like a displacement: "Bloodless pious face like a fellow going in to be a priest. Penrose! That was that chap's name" (*U* 231). Earlier in the chapter, Bloom thinks: "What was the name of that priestylooking chap was always squinting in when he passed? Weak eyes, woman. Stopped in Citron's saint Kevin's parade. Pen something. Pendennis? My memory is getting. Pen...?" (*U* 196). The many layers of the associational logic at work reveal how Bloom's unconscious is indeed structured like a language: Penrose is one of the names which is listed under the series of Molly's lovers in "Ithaca", as the phallic pen and the combinatory "Pendennis" for the penis suggests. He is also an other whose desire for Molly is reflected in his gaze through their house as he passes by. The 'priestylooking' Penrose's weakness of eyes in controlling himself at gazing at women (the art of which Bloom is master of) contributes to the association with the 'weakness' of the tuner's eyes who himself has the looks of a priest. Thus, Bloom's sudden remembrance of the name against the face of the blind stripling is revealing how the tap of the piano tuner is to relate to the object gaze from then on.

It is no coincidence that the free reign of the signifiers in the narrative is added up by the associations regarding Molly, "reincarnation met him pikehoses" (*U* 233), or the associations with the bodily, the uncanny regarding the piano tuner: his hand like a "child's hand" (*U* 231), he is

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[21] Joyce's "tapping his way round by the stones" in Dublin with his "ash plant" echoes at this point in the text.

compared to "a deformed person or a hunchback" (*U* 232), "a thewless body" with a "sickly face" (*U* 321). His bodily senses are also superior, "more": that the blind man's "sense of smell must be stronger too. Smells on all sides bunched together. Each person too. Then the spring, the summer: smells. Tastes" (*U* 232), that there is "kind of a form in his mind's eye. The voice temperature when he touches her with fingers must almost see the lines, the curves" (*U* 232), that he can feel the black of the hair and the white of the skin (*U* 232). In the face of such an uncanny image, Bloom is taken aback by the void in his subjectivity, by the weight of his lack. This can put in the framework of the explanation by Ragland on Lacan's statement that the function of the stain is "both that which governs the gaze most secretly and that which always escapes from the grasp of that form of vision that is satisfied with itself in imagining itself as consciousness" (Lacan, *Four* 74). Ragland explains that "the gaze imposes a materiality of libidinal meanings in meaning itself, placing the roots of the Cartesian *cogito* in the real long before language segments the biological organism Lacan called flesh" and is therefore constructed in the pre-symbolic which "clarifies Lacan's effort to describe an Ur-lining of the real where the subject is first constructed as an object-cause-of-desire" ("The Relation" 195). As such the pre-specular images encountered

> make us take note of discontinuities in conscious life. Splitting our seemingly unified identifications with language and images, these objects of the pre-symbolic real bring the cut itself into perception. ("The Relation" 196)

Bloom's encounter with the object gaze is reinforced in the narrative by the subsequent encounter he has with Boylan in front of the museum: "Straw hat in sunlight. Tan shoes. Turnedup trousers. It is. It is" (*U* 234). The tap of the blind cane is echoed when "his heart quipped softly" and the narrative reveals a space where the obsession "not to be seen" dominates:

> Is it? Almost certain. Won't look. Wine in my face. Why did I? Too heady. Yes, it is. The walk. Not see. Not see. Get on.

> Making for the museum gate with long windy strides he lifted his
> eyes. Handsome building. Sir Thomas Deane designed. Not
> following me?
> Didn't see me perhaps. Light in his eyes.
> The flutter of his breath came forth in short sighs. Quick. Cold
> statues: quiet there. Safe in a minute.
> No, didn't see me. After two. Just at the gate.
> My heart! (*U* 234)

Joyce playfully suggests that the presence of Bloom's being is now in the vicinity of his eyes, as he tries to defy the probability of the killing gaze that renders him null, "undermining its seeming omnipotence, its sense of mastery" (Sbriglia, "The Symptoms" 117), turning him into one of the objects he tries to concentrate or "look for" in his pocket:

> His eyes beating looked steadfastly at cream curves of stone. Sir
> Thomas Deane was the Greek architecture.
> Look for something I.
> His hasty hand went quick into a pocket, took out, read unfolded
> Agendath Netaim. Where did I?
> Busy looking for.
> He thrust back quickly Agendath.
> Afternoon she said.
> I am looking for that. Yes, that. Try all pockets. Handker.
> *Freeman.* Where did I? Ah, yes. Trousers. Purse. Potato. Where
> did I?
> Hurry. Walk quietly. Moment more. My heart. (*U* 234)

The soap, which is analyzed elsewhere in this study, comes once again to his rescue as the incarnated form of the *objet a* by which he can stabilize his consistency against the threat of the void that is opened in the symbolic by the object gaze which "continually perforate our myriad illusions of consistency" (Ragland, "The Relation" 190):

> His hand looking for the where did I put found in his hip pocket
> soap lotion have to call tepid paper stuck. Ah, soap there! Yes.
> Gate.
> Safe! (*U* 234)

The security he temporarily experiences is undone in the course of the day when Bloom spots the blind tuner and hears his tap once again on the street, this time accompanied with a curse which sounds as if it

were directed to him from the very stain beyond the gaze that he was blind to, reminding him of his blindness and shaking his weakened 'I': "God's curse on you, he said sourly, whoever you are! You're blinder nor I am, you bitch's bastard!" (*U* 322). And just before the "Sirens" chapter begins, it is the gaze from the blind man that spots Bloom in the last paragraph of "Wandering Rocks": "He passed a blind stripling opposite Broadbent's" (*U* 328). Therefore, it does not come as a surprise that the tapping sound, although impossible to be heard by the others at the Ormond bar, occupies such a critical role in the narrative. The sentence on their first encounter in "Lestrygonians", "The blind stripling tapped the curbstone and went on his way, drawing his cane back, feeling again" (*U* 231) is rephrased in "Circe" when the source of the tapping is revealed for the first time in the body of the narrative: "Tap blind walked tapping by the tap the curbstone tapping, tap by tap" (*U* 372). The next remark is on the siren figure as the mermaid on the poster on Daly's window, which through the smoke "he couldn't see", which at this point points to the blindBloom rather than the tuner: "Tap. Tap. A stripling, blind, with a tapping cane, came taptaptapping by Daly's window where a mermaid, hair all streaming (but he couldn't see), blew whiffs of a mermaid (blind couldn't), mermaid coolest whiff of all" (*U* 374). Finally, accompanied by the sound of the glasses raised in celebration, the blind tuner's tap and the silent waiter's laugh meet at the door of the Ormond bar, which botheredBloom has just exited:

> Tschink. Tschunk.
> Tip. An unseeing stripling stood in the door. He saw not bronze. He saw not gold. Nor Ben nor Bob nor Tom nor Si nor George nor tanks nor Richie nor Pat. Hee hee hee hee. He did not see. (*U* 375)

Thus, the Lacanian idea of voice and gaze as "the two objectal remainders of an excessive presymbolic *jouissance*" (Salecl and Žižek 4) and "as the two paramount embodiments of the object *a*" (Dolar, "The Object" 13), which are antinomic yet complimentary, which were signified by the signifier and the sound in the body of Pat and the nameless 'tap'- also antinomic yet complimentary- unite in the narrative

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to remain at the Ormond bar which Bloom left in order to unify his sound and signifier, voice and gaze as he produces his bodily sound looking at the epitaph, reading the words: "Seabloom, greaseabloom viewed last words. Softly. *When my country takes her place among.* Prrprr" (*U* 375).

Ragland suggests on the *objet*s voice and gaze that

> vision is divided between the imaginary image and the real of the gaze, which lies outside the imaginary field of vision. The gaze looks at you, Lacan writes, as a function of judgment or idealization. And the voice speaks to you from some point beyond its manifest words, decentering you from the apparent stability of being attached to the ground by words. ("The Practice" 236)

The real that is embedded in the objects of the voice and the gaze is ready to decenter the stability of the subject, reminding them of a threat that breathes over one's neck. The response Joyce finds worthy of such a threat in Bloom's case is the fart that in a way summarizes the whole extimacy of the sound and "Sirens" chapter. Joyce's choice of placing a deaf waiter as a character occupying the most specular spot in a setting which is all about voices (the singing, the music of the piano, the continuous chatter of the guests, the onomatopoeic sounds from the bar and the tables, and of course the calling for the waiter, the ordering, a communication that is totally dependent on the signifier) in a chapter that is composed of nothing but voices is truly compelling. So is the juxtaposition of Pat with the blind tuner, who "played so exquisitely, treat to hear" (*U* 373) and is described as "an exquisite player" and "the real classical" (*U* 338). The tapping of the blind tuner (his bodily, uncanny, mystic voice, the source of which remains unknown to the readers for a long time in the narrative) not only sets the rhythm of the narrative but also sets the tension: as the taps increase in number in the text, as the blind stripling approaches the Ormond bar, the climactic end is also approached. That is, the time of his coming, his arrival at the bar signified with a last tap (as a "tip" this time) corresponds not only to the voice of Bloom's and Boylan's arrivals - the former's bodily tension

relieved by the bodily music released, and the latter's coming by the last 'tipping' at 7 Eccles street - but also to the chapter coming to an end with an epitaph written on the page with the voice:

> *Let my epitaph be*. Karaaaaaaa.
> *Written. I have.*
> Pprrpffrrppffff.
> *Done.* (*U* 376)

Just as the antinomy between the sound and the signifier is overwritten in the narrative by Joyce, the antinomy between language and *jouissance* is undone by Lacan, especially in his work on Joyce the *Sinthome*. As Dolar highlights, the unconscious is now structured not like a language but in *lalangue,* and *jouissance* which Lacan argued were forbidden to the speaking subject now emerges in *lalangue* spoken by the *parlêtre.* The antinomy between the signifier and sound/voice as object, which is built upon their structural features of differentiality and contingency, is overruled in *lalangue*: "this external opposition (...) became the internal split of language as such" and Lacan, from *Encore* on, displays how "*ça parle,*" "it speaks," is displaced or replaced by "*ça jouit,*" "it enjoys," resulting in the realization that *jouissance* is an inner factor of speech, that "it inundates speech, yet without engulfing it; it invades it in such a way that the logic of difference constantly intersects with the logic of similarities and reverberations, to the point where the former can no longer be isolated as a sphere on its own (the symbolic)" (*A Voice* 144-5).

Dolar draws on Freud's case where a patient, during her time alone with her lover, assumes having heard a clicking sound (resembling the clicking of a camera that relates to the object of gaze as well) which for Freud becomes the clue of a retrospective paranoid fantasy construction (*A Voice* 131). Dolar suggests that a sound like "a click, a knock, a beat, a tick" is "like a grain of desire" can trigger off the unconscious in various ways in that "desire ticks": "in the unconscious it doesn't only speak, it ticks, and perhaps there is no *ça parle* without a *ça cliquète*" (*A*

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Voice 131). This ticking appears in *Ulysses* throughout the narrative in different, and almost always onomatopoeic sounds such as jingling, clacking, tapping, cuckooing, etc., displaying the intricate relations between language and desire, subject and object, fact and fantasy. As Dolar states, in a Lacanian frame, formations such as symptoms, fantasies, desire- that is, "the basic structures which underlie and organize the vast ramifications of human enjoyment"- are produced in the temporality between the instant of seeing and the instant of understanding (*A Voice* 137). Fantasy, which is organized and formed around "the voice, the noise, things heard", is the supplement that works between the time of the initial moment of seeing and the final moment of understanding, a moment at which one never actually arrives, for when the moment of conclusion comes, "it is 'always-already' too late, everything has happened in between: the new understanding cannot dislodge and supplant fantasy— on the contrary, it necessarily becomes its prolongation and supplement, its hostage" (*A Voice* 137). The snapping of the string in the hands of Bloom was an example of this in "Sirens". Strikingly, a far more extensive scene is portrayed later in the novel when all Pat (and his laugh), the blind stripling (and his tap), Molly's bed and its jingling, Penrose and Paul de Knock, bronzlid and minagold, and the songs and the sounds, and many more are revoked later in "Circe" again upon the sound of the wall clock:

> DAVY STEPHENS: Messenger of the Sacred Heart and Evening Telegraph with Saint Patrick's Day Supplement. Containing the new addresses of all the cuckolds in Dublin.
> (The very reverend Canon O'Hanlon in cloth of gold cope elevates and exposes a marble timepiece. Before him Father Conroy and the reverend John Hughes S. J. bend low.)
> THE TIMEPIECE: (Unportalling)
> Cuckoo
> Cuckoo
> Cuckoo
> (The brass quoits of a bed are heard to jingle)
> THE QUOITS: Jigjag, Jigajiga. Jigjag. (*U* 595)

In conclusion, the discussion in this chapter shows that the signifier emerges as the bearer of existence or non-existence in the Symbolic

register, as the name (of the Father) that approves and vivifies, whose lack prevents the lack and mortifies, and in its stripping, as the bodily sounds that pave the way to *lalangue* and the partial objects that give the subject a glimpse of the real of the voice and the gaze. In each case, *extimité* stands out as the key characteristic that marks the relation between the signifier and the subject, the signifier and the three register of the Symbolic, Imaginary and Real, and the signifier and meaning. Moreover, in addition to their conscious significations and discourses, the subject is extimately bound up with the signifier in their unconscious dispositions, bodily expressions, desires and fantasies, unknown sexual associations and investments, that is, with the pre-symbolic material from the motherly space. Lastly, there is an extimate relation between the signifier and *sinthome* as the fourth register: the signifier is what makes up for the lack of the connection between the registers- it is the paradoxical needle that sutures the subject to reality where they can function and socialize. As such, the signifier in all its forms lies at the heart of both the Joycean language and narration in *Ulysses,* and its Lacanian discussion that opens up the space for further associations between the melody and rhythm of the text and the unconscious object causes of desire.

CHAPTER 4

THE SUBJECT AS AN EFFECT IN *ULYSSES*

This chapter discusses how the characters in James Joyce's *Ulysses* display an objectification of Lacanian subjectivity that disrupts the Cartesian subject as a 'man' of reason who has the power, will and ability to control his speech, his relations and his actions. Both Stephen and Bloom are portrayed by Joyce as split subjects which take different positions in the face of shifting dynamics of desire throughout the novel. "Circe" episode emerges as an apt choice to start such a discussion in that not only does it deal with the surfacing of the characters' unconscious in the uncanny setting of a nighthouse, but it also uses the formal stylistics of a play which enables Joyce to construct the dream-like tempora-spatial setting, giving voice to all animate and inanimate subjects/objects in the staging of the extimate relationship between 'fact' and fantasy, which mimics the extimacy of the Lacanian subject and *objet a.*

The subjectivity delineated in this chapter by Joyce in the cases of Stephen and Bloom completely shatters the Cartesian illusion of the subject. Joyce's depiction of these characters, in opposition to the rational, all-knowing, all-controlling representation of the subject that was created in the image of God, can be explored within the framework of Lacanian understanding of subjectivity in which the subject is represented in its extimate position in the Borromean knot of intersecting realms of the Real, Imaginary and Symbolic. This is revealed in Bloom's and Stephen's intersubjective relations with each other and others, as well as their relations with the objects, both the ones that stand out as the materialization of the *objet a* and the real of the *objet a* itself in the void it ex-sists.

The Lacanian subject as the effect of the trauma in its encounter with the real is displayed in the losses of Bloom's and Stephen's loved ones, and their handling of the mourning process that is bound by the affects varying from anxiety and sadness to shame and guilt.

4.1. The Extimacy of Words and Things

"Circe" can be called the chapter of the revelation of the unconscious for many reasons. This lengthy part which mimics the staging of a play through its formal stylistics also stages the irruption of the repressed in such a way that all the imagery and symbols take on the impossible task of signifying the confrontation with the real. The loaded imagery prevailing the stage directions at the start keeps shaping the following hallucinations by both Bloom and Stephen. These instances where it gets difficult for not only the characters but also the readers to follow the line that separates what is actual from the dream display the intricate relations between the subject and the Other in terms of desire. The secret wishes and fears of the two men are never revealed in the course of the novel in a more lucid manner. The perversity and impudence of the content of these hallucinations reveal in a deeper and more complicated level the affects Bloom and Stephen have formed and been repressing so far. Such affects like guilt and shame, superiority and inferiority, etc. can be detected in their manifestations in practice as fetishism, masochism, exhibitionism, etc. "Circe" chapter is thus the part where the extimacy of both the structure of the subject and their object cause of desire, and the relation in between surface.

The intricate recount of events is significant on several levels regarding the display of the extimate quality of "Circe" chapter. Unlike the rather conforming features of conscious spatiality and temporality which follow chronological, Euclidean parameters, the unconscious has its own peculiar spatio-temporality, that is, an extimate spatio-temporal quality, as in the Möbius strip, which actually defies the rules of traditional topography in that it displays a surface where the inside-outside binary

dissolves on the same, continuous yet a different layer of the topographical real of the object. "Circe" chapter in its treating the works of the unconscious and mimicking its working through its formal style reveals the co-existence of the two different yet mutually pre-determining realms of reality and the Real. The intermingling of the actual and fantasy is kneaded so playfully in the text that it requires the utmost attention to differentiate the events from imagination, which at some points is yet rendered as a futile effort. The line between reality and fantasy is blurred; the fantasmatic material diffuses the body of actual events; the mimetic and the diegetic elements merge and swirl. Moreover, although the content of the dream-work occasionally points whom the hallucination might belong to, there are several cases where the decision is left to the reader in the absence of supporting material in the text.

This section will lay bare how the "Circe" chapter in *Ulysses* objectifies the subject's sexuality as a position taken against the desire of the Other. It will focus initially on Joyce's setting, choice of words, narration and formal techniques which hint at the start of a passage through a fantasy-work where the distinction between the three Lacanian realms of the Real, Imaginary and Symbolic is blurred. The initial part of the chapter, which includes the stage directions, events, thoughts and dreams until the characters arrive at Bella Cohen's house, is discussed as an introduction to the uncanny and pre-symbolic nature of the fantasy-work that gets more and more intimate during the time spent in the house. This second part is discussed in terms of the multiple fantasies by Bloom and Stephen which display the different relations the characters form with their symptoms.

4.1.1. Words as a Möbian Portal into the Uncanny

"Circe", the most surreal chapter in the novel with abundant material from the unconscious revealed in the symbolic, takes place at midnight in the night district area of Dublin, including Montgomery Street,

Mecklenburgh Street (Tyrone Street in 1904) and Mabbot Street, known as Monto by its inhabitants back then, where the thin boundary between fantasy and reality is ready to be transgressed. The drunken Stephen and Lynch, joined shortly later by the following Bloom, go to "the disorderly house of Mrs Bella Cohen, 82 Tyrone street, lower" (*U* 860) after having left the hospital and then the pub. The beginning of the chapter, where the setting is laid in theatrical stage directions, is pressing in that the vocabulary and the symbols chosen by Joyce indeed direct the reader into an eerie realm slowly drifting away from the reality and practicality of the daily practices narrated so far in the novel. The very first set of the stage directions given amply throughout the chapter signals the proximity of something uncanny: "gaping doors" opening to "flimsy houses" under the semi-darkness of the "rare lamps with faint rainbow fins" (*U* 561) and sounds of whistle which "call and answer" (*U* 562), all indeed prepare the stage for the wandering couple and the reader to flee from the symbolic register through those gaping doors into the dim and colorful space where the whistles from their past and future will be called forth and answered. This imagery in the very beginning will get heavier as the chapter proceeds and will itself work as a gaping port where the internal is mirrored by the external, where the shift from the symbolic to the non-symbolic is engendered by the flooding imagery from the pre-symbolic.

The uncanny path to Bella's house is full of such references: "*a deafmute idiot with goggle eyes, his shapeless mouth dribbling*" that is imprisoned at the "*chain of children's hands*"; a "*pigmy woman*" on a rope between rail tracks swinging and counting; a "*form sprawled against a dustbin and muffled by its arm and hat*" snoring, groaning, "*grinding growling teeth*"; "*a gnome totting among a rubbishtip*" collecting rags and bones into his sack receiving the last bottle of "*a crone standing by with a smoky oillamp*" onto whom, then, "*a bandy child, asquat on the doorstep with a paper shuttlecock*" scrambles; "*a drunken navy*" and "*two night watch in shouldercapes*"; and "*in a room lit by a candle stuck in a bottleneck a slut comb(ing) out the tatts from the hair of*

a scrofulous child" (*U* 562-3). All these non-normative characters with either deformed bodies or heretic standings that go against any kind of symbolic law, be it religious or governmental, have transgressed the boundary in one way or another: from the pigmy woman who not only misfits the standard bodily imagery of the gaze but also literally swings on a tense rope between two railings, to the almost romanticized loving mother figure of a slut tidying affectionately the hair of her son (who stands probably with horrid open neck sores due to scrofula [a common disease at the period which was a kind of tuberculosis affecting the lymph nodes in the neck]) under the dim candlelight, such figures controvert the standardized, causal, linear functioning of the phallus/logos which realism mostly embraces and Joyce constantly attacks. Moreover, these images shatter the stable, orderly establishment of the symbolic through holes that allow the pre-symbolic flow which muddies its clear waters. "*A plate crashes: a woman screams: a child wails. Oaths of a man roar, mutter, cease. Figures wander, lurk, peer from warrens.*" (*U* 562) The sounds of the night mimic the sounds of the repressed: crashing, wailing, swearing, roaring, muttering, yet secretly peering (*U* 562).

Meanwhile, the depiction of Stephen, who is called "*a parson*" probably due to his "Latin quarter hat" and black outfit by two passer-by privates, as he recites verses in Latin and "*chants with joy the* introit *for paschal time*" (*U* 563) reinforces this theme of uncanniness suggested by the use of the motifs, words, especially verbs and adjectives, given at the onset of the chapter, hinting the shift from the symbolic to the pre-symbolic, and/or from the Father to the m(O)ther. Regarding the verses uttered by Stephen at this instance in the text, Gifford refers to *The Layman's Missal* for this entrance chant of the Mass for the paschal time, which is the season of "joy, rebirth and baptism" from the Easter day to Pentecost, and suggests that although what Stephen quotes in the passage that follows is different, the corresponding translation would be "The risen Christ thanks his Father for rescuing him from the grave" (452-3). Unable to identify with either Christ or his father as the

reflection of God in its symbolic function earlier in the "Proteus" chapter, Stephen, by quoting several passages from the ceremonial antiphons that gradually change the focus from the Father to the m(O)ther with the familiar imagery of water, reinforces this parodic yet veritable allusion to the rescue from the grave of the Law and escape to the pre-symbolic as a s*econd coming*: "*Vidi aquam egredientem de templo a latere dextro. Alleluia*" (*U* 564) which translates as "I saw a stream of water welling forth from the right of the temple. Alleluia" and the following line "*(Altius aliquantulum.) Et omnes ad quos pervenit aqua ista*" (*U* 564) translating as "(with considerable profundity.) And all among them came to that water" and the final "*(Triumphaliter.) Salvi facti sunt*" (*U* 564) which reads as "(triumphantly.) And they are made whole [saved]" (Gifford 453). The one who makes him whole, however, is not God but goddess, the merciless m(O)ther, "*la belle dame sans merci*" (*U* 565). Twisting the original words of the Catholic Mass in which "the celebrant says, "Introibo ad altare Dei" (I will go up to God's altar), and the minister or server replies, "Ad **Deum** qui laetificat iuventutem meam" (To God who has gladdened the days of my youth) (Gifford 454, my emphasis), Stephen quotes "*ad **deam** qui laetificat iuventutem meam.*" (*U* 565, my emphasis) as an answer to Lynch's question considering their destination: "to the goddess who has gladdened the days of my youth" (Gifford 454). The merciless goddess instead of the almighty Father that finalizes the references to the religious ritual is significant in that not only does it signify the attempt from the symbolic to the pre-symbolic, from the Father to the m(O)ther, but it also disrupts the causality of the Logos/Telos: the primordial word that was supposed to be in the beginning dissolves into the primordial Thing in the end as the destination that which makes whole. Both Stephen as a subject and the spatio/temporal setting of the text are thus raided by the material from the pre-symbolic in distorted images, sounds and smells as the uncanny reveals itself more and more. Stephen, who "*flourishes his ashplant, shivering the lamp image, shattering light over the world*" (*U* 564) thus acts out the crossing over to the other side of the Möbius band through the employment of his religious language which Miller

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suggests to be working as an undercover for *extimacy* against the language of movement, of gesture, of the non-symbolic ("Extimité" 79). As his failed endeavors to go beyond the ineluctable Aristotelian modalities of the visible and audible in "Proteus" have now become more possible through the non-modality of the bodily, of the movement, of the non-symbolic, so has the edgy narration of the chapter which spirals around the alternating Lacanian registers, filled with imagery and sounds that toil to narrate the extimacy of subject.

4.1.2. The Object-Thing as a Shield against Excessive Desire

The hallucinations in "Circe" by Bloom are the disclosure of his fantasies and fears. Although the boundaries about the source of the hallucinations blur at some points in the text, Bloom's hallucinations in general are ridden with shame, guilt, embarrassment on the one hand and glory, pride and even saintliness on the other, whose opposing nature will be analyzed in the following pages. What is of importance in the initial pages is the status of the talisman which signifies the object that is used by Bloom as a remainder of *Das Ding*. The potato, which was given to Bloom by his deceased mother as a charm to defy all that is unlucky and evil, is already a magical object in itself in that it is a signifier that has direct access to the subject's unconscious: it halts the signification chain for those signifiers which the subject fears or avoids consciously and/or unconsciously. In that sense, it has a natural link that connects to not only Bloom's fears and insecurities but also his unconscious wishes and fantasies. As such, in "Circe", the chapter which emerges as the fantasy-work of the novel, the potato functions as a paradoxical portal that works like a cat flap: while it enables Bloom's unconscious to pass through towards the intimate material of the pre-symbolic, its external presence still protects him from the over-proximity of the Thing that may otherwise devour the subject. Thus, it is an object that has the implications of the Lacanian concepts such as *objet a*, desire, lack, fantasy, etc.

Lacan's *objet a* can be defined as the object cause of desire which is formed at the onset of the loss of *Das Ding*: the gap produced by the impossibility of an overlapping of the child's and the mOther's desires creates a remainder which the subject clings to throughout their life so that s/he can feel the trace of that primordial, pre-symbolic sense of wholeness, the sense of *Das Ding*. Fink states that the Lacanian concept of *fantasy*, $A a, is all about the way the split subject is related to *objet a*; in that s/he reaches "a phantasmatic sense of wholeness, completeness, fulfillment, and well-being", in other words, "the way they would like to be positioned with respect to the Other's desire" (*Lacanian* 60). As Fink argues, "*Objet a*, as it enters into their fantasies, is an instrument or plaything with which subjects do as they like, manipulating it as it pleases them, orchestrating things in the fantasy scenario in such a way as to derive a maximum of excitement therefrom" (60). Within this frame, the dream work, or rather the fantasy work, of "Circe" chapter depicts Bloom and Stephen not as subjects of the ego, of the rational men of the Law, but as the subjects of the unconscious by unveiling their positioning against the desire of the Other. In a parallel fashion, Bloom's talisman acts as the paradoxical physical object that is directly connected to Bloom's unconscious dynamics of lack and desire, the presence of which works as a shield that on the one hand reminds him of his pre-symbolic sense of wholeness, while on the other secures his return to the symbolic position.

Žižek defines this object as "another type of object", an exchange object "circulating among subjects, serving as a kind of guarantee, pawn, on their symbolic relationship" and which functions by its non-absence: "what matters here is precisely its presence, the material presence of a fragment of reality- it is a leftover, remnants which cannot be reduced to a network of formal relations proper to the symbolic structure, but it is paradoxically, at the same time, the positive condition for the effectuation of the formal structure" (*Sublime* 206). Žižek thus highlights the importance of its status as a paradoxical object: "although it is a

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leftover of the Real, an 'excrement', it functions as a positive condition of the restoration of a symbolic structure: the structure of symbolic exchanges between the subjects can take place only in so far as it is embodied in this pure material element which acts as its guarantee" (207).

Although the potato is mentioned quite earlier in the novel, when Bloom checks to make sure he has it in his pocket before he leaves the house (*U* 67), its gravity comes to light within the context of the fantasy-work. The fantasy-work for Bloom starts even before he arrives at Bella Cohen's house: barely surviving a crash by "a dragon sandstrewer", Bloom initially "*feels his trouser pocket*" and holds "poor mama's panacea", the potato talisman she had given to him, the touch of which starts a stream of consciousness that starts with his parents and inevitably links to Molly (*U* 567). Once he was run into by two small children chasing one another, he touches the items in his pocket one by one, as if trying to ensure their safety: "*Bloom pats with parcelled hands watch fobpocket, bookpocket, pursepocket, sweets of sin, potato soap*" (*U* 568). All these objects trigger the dynamics of desire for Bloom, which is presented in the metonymic chain of signifiers of the pockets and items in a language that defies grammar and punctuation rules more and more by each word, ending in the disappearance of the coma, hence the "potato soap", and he immediately is visited by the apparitions of the other: Rudolph Bloom, his deceased father who, although Bloom alters the cause of his death in public, committed suicide, appears to reprimand him for his whereabouts as a "*stooped bearded figure (...) garbed in the long caftan of an elder in Zion and a smokingcap with magenta tassels*" with "*Horned spectacles*" and "*yellow poison streaks*" on his "*drawn face*" (*U 568*). His mother Ellen Bloom follows him, "*in pantomime dame's stringed mobcap, widow Twankey's crinoline and bustle, blouse with muttonleg sleeves buttoned behind, grey mittens and cameo brooch, her plaited hair in a crispine net, appears over the staircase banisters, a slanted candlestick in her hand, and cries out in shrill alarm*" and with "*a phial, an Agnus Dei, a shrivelled potato and a*

celluloid doll" falling out under her skirt, she joins her husband in lamenting his debased situation (*U* 569-70). Then he hears his wife, Marion Bloom, calling for him next to a date palm in a Turkish costume: "*Opulent curves fill out her scarlet trousers and jacket, slashed with gold. A wide yellow cummerbund girdles her. A white yashmak, violet in the night, covers her face, leaving free only her large dark eyes and raven hair*" (*U* 570). With Molly in the picture, Bloom's anxiety has risen: "*He breathes in deep agitation, swallowing gulps of air, questions, hopes, crubeens for her supper, things to tell her, excuse, desire, spellbound*" (*U* 570). While Molly orders a camel to offer her a mango from a nearby tree in Moorish, Bloom becomes Molly's business manager and tries to offer her things, which, after Molly's pitiful advice to go and see the wider world, ends up offering only the soap he ordered for her in the morning, after he wandered in the streets of Dublin. The lines uttered by the soap, "We're a capital couple are Bloom and I; /He brightens the earth. I polish the sky" (*U* 571), as with many other objects which speak and signify the object relations of the subject in *Ulysses*, highlight how these objects link the subject to his "capital couple", to the object of desire. The potato, the soap or the book *Sweets of Sin* all act as reminders of this desire, hence his lack. Especially the potato, which, as revealed in the coming pages, is the objectification of the Thing: it exemplifies how the objects are linked with fantasy and perversion, and how the psychic structure of the subject is extimately bound to its object. Thus, as foreshadowed in the part until Bloom and Stephen arrive at Bella's house, which works like an introduction into the most hidden, most intimate fantasies by Bloom and Stephen displayed in the exteriority of Bella's house, it is possible to witness not only the exposure of many drives as partial manifestation of desire but also how the split subject strives to achieve *jouissance* through these fantasies in particular ways, ranging from perversion to masochism, which, according to Lacan, are different positions of subjectivity.

4.2. Fantasy and Perversion as a Subjective Position

4.2.1. Bloom's Fantasies as *Coincidentia Oppositorum*

Evans states that while Freud used *fantasy* as a term that marks "a scene which is presented to the imagination and which stages an unconscious desire", Lacan stresses the significance of the protective function and the signifying structure in fantasy (as all imaginary formations are underpinned by the symbolic structure) (61). *Fantasy* is a subjective construct that helps the subject achieve a momentary sense of wholeness while protecting them from the threat of castration or the lack in the Other. Each subject has a "particular fantasmatic scenario" with a unique formation which displays the subject's "particular mode of *jouissance*" in a distorted manner that underlines it as a "compromise formation": "the fantasy is thus both that which enables the subject to sustain his desire, and 'that by which the subject sustains himself at the level of his vanishing desire'" (Evans 61). In other words, fantasy is the subject's answer to the question by the Other "*Che vuoi?*", and while the fantasy of the neurotic regards the barred subject in relation to the object ($\$\Delta a$), the perverse fantasy overturns this position and reads as the object in relation to the barred subject ($a\Delta\$$). Regardless of the specifics of the fantasy, however, the function of the fantasy to make the impossible object accessible for the subject is only pleasurable for the subject as long as the object remains impossible: an encounter with the object will probably shatter the symbolic register which assures the being of the barred subject.

Žižek argues that the Lacanian notions of the master signifier, S1, or "the symbolic fiction" and *objet a*, "the phantasmatic *specter*" are of importance when talking about fantasy, the real and reality, and the line between fact and fantasy ("I Hear" *111*). The symbolically, socially and culturally constructed reality, or the symbolic fiction, is never capable of signification in its fullest: it always falls short of symbolizing the real, which returns in the phantasmatic scepter. As Žižek suggests

what is experienced as reality is "not the thing itself": the specter and reality always have to co-exist and they are-co-dependent in that "the circle of reality can be closed only by means of an uncanny spectral supplement" ("I Hear" *112*). As such, the real which can never be accessed directly can be experienced in the gap that separates the symbolic and spectral fictions.

One peculiar feature of fantasy according to Žižek is its existence in opposing poles which can be seen in the peculiar modality of fantasies which have an ambiguous structural duality, one soothing and the other unsettling:

> the notion of fantasy offers an exemplary case of the dialectical *coincidentia oppositorum*: on the one hand, fantasy in its beatific side, in its stabilizing dimension, the dream of a state without disturbances, out of reach of human depravity; on the other hand, fantasy in its destabilizing dimension, whose elementary form is envy—all that "irritates" me about the Other, images that haunt me of what he or she is doing when out of my sight, of how he or she deceives me and plots against me, of how he or she ignores me and indulges in an enjoyment that is intensive beyond my capacity of representation, and so on and so forth. ("I Hear" 116)

This duality can be discerned in Bloom's fantasies where he oscillates between the myriad images of the saintly and the sinner. Throughout "Circe", the reader witnesses numerous scenes where Bloom is raised to the utmost levels of the "good" regarding not only his body, looks, physical traits but also his characteristics, intellectuality, mind, family and upbringing, and personal and divine success: he was "the lion of the night" and "always a favourite with the ladies" (*U* 574), he "scarcely looks thirtyone" (*U* 604); he is "a respectable married man, without a stain on [his] character" (*U* 583), he is "Dr Bloom, Leopold, dental surgeon", the cousin of von Bloom Pasha who owns half of Austria" (*U* 582), he is an "author-journalist", who is "connected with the British and Irish press" , bringing out a collection of prize stories" (*U* 584), he "fought with the colours for king and country in the absentminded war under General Gough in the park and was disabled at Spion Kop and

Bloemfontein, was mentioned in dispatches" (*U* 584), his wife is "the daughter of a most distinguished commander, a gallant upstanding gentleman, who do you call him, Majorgeneral Brian Tweedy, one of Britain's fighting men who helped to win (our) battles" (*U* 584), his "old dad too was a J. P." (*U* 584); he is "Leopold! Lord mayor of Dublin!" (*U* 601), "the world's greatest reformer" (*U* 604), he is even "Leopold the First", the "undoubted emperor president and king chairman, the most serene and potent and very puissant ruler of this realm" (*U* 604).

These fantasies containing the beautiful, successful, heroic and saintly are always in a dialectical relationship with the obscene fantasies, one following (or preceding) the other. Bloom is continuously blamed, trialed and punished for his sexual thoughts, advances and misdeeds in his hallucinations throughout the chapter. Following the nostalgic and flattening hallucinatory scene of Mrs. Breen which ends with her significant "(Eagerly) Yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes." (*U* 578) that anticipates *Ulysses*'s last words by Molly, Bloom finds himself in a difficult predicament where he, as Henry Flower, is accused by first Martha and then by many other women in a scene of trial of "The King versus Bloom" (*U* 586). After the servant girl Mary Driscoll's accusations against him of improper advances, the respectable upper class ladies Mrs. Yelverton Barry, Mrs. Bellingham and the Honourable Mrs. Mervyn Talboys also witness his vicious manners. They attest that under the alias of James Lovebirch, Bloom sent Mrs. Yelverton Barry a love letter making "improper overtures (to me) to misconduct myself at half past four p.m. on the following Thursday, Dunsink time" (*U* 591). He gave Mrs. Bellingham "a bloom of edelweiss culled on the heights" which was identified by a Botanist she later contacted as "a blossom of the homegrown potato plant purloined from a forcingcase of the model farm" (*U* 592) and wrote her several letters complementing her as "a Venus in furs" and urging her "to commit adultery at the earliest possible opportunity" (*U* 592). He also gave the Honourable Mrs. Mervyn Talboys an obscene photograph of his wife "practising illicit intercourse with a muscular torero, evidently a blackguard" and asked her to apply the

same and even more sadistic fantasies on him while she was "on the polo ground of the Phœnix park at the match All Ireland versus the Rest of Ireland" watching admiringly "Captain Slogger Dennehy of the lnniskillings win the final chukkar on his darling cob *Centaur*" (*U* 593). Thus, these three virtuous high-class women request Bloom be punished in the severest way possible. However, as the trial goes on, the color of both the punishment and of their true nature changes.

Mrs. Yelverton insists that "he should be soundly trounced", while Mrs. Bellingham cheers for Mrs. Mervyn Talboys to whip Bloom: "Make him smart, Hanna dear. Give him ginger. Thrash the mongrel within an inch of his life. The cat-o'-nine-tails. Geld him. Vivisect him" (*U* 594). The Honourable Mrs. Mervyn Talboys states that Bloom has "lashed the dormant tigress in [my] nature into fury" and announces: "I'll flog him black and blue in the public streets. I'll dig my spurs in him up to the rowel. He is a wellknown cuckold. (*She swishes her huntingcrop savagely in the air*) Take down his trousers without loss of time. Come here, sir! Quick! Ready?" (*U* 594).

This depiction of the dialectical nature of opposing fantasies by Bloom unearths the dynamics of his subjective positioning against the desire of the Other. The different positions Bloom takes against the desire of the Other supports the Lacanian premise that fantasy is the relation the subject is involved against the object cause of his desire. In the fantasies where Bloom imagines himself as superior, powerful, all-mighty, almost as a version of a 20th century modern God, he in a way substitutes the phantasmatic specter for the symbolic fiction- that is the material, socio-cultural symbolic reality which never lets him identify with the Name of the Father, as seen throughout the novel in several scenes the most memorable of which is when Bloom as Elijah the Prophet, chased by the Citizen for his 'Jewishness', ascends to the sky in a chariot at the end of "Cyclops" chapter (*U* 449).

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As Žižek recounts, "When the subject is endowed with symbolic authority, he acts as an appendix of his symbolic title, that is, it is the big Other who acts through him" ("I Hear" 111), that is, his actions, his words are those of the Law once he takes on the image of the Law bearer; and Bloom, the wandering Jew, can never feel that he is truly endowed with symbolic authority and can never utter the words of Law. His racial and religious status, the suicide of his father and the death of his son, the lack of sexual relationship with Molly and her affair, his professional dissatisfaction, etc. all suggest that despite his desire, the Other does not act through him. Thus, the phantasmatic material of the holly, heroic, even godly images reveal his desire to be the desire of the Other in the symbolic. On the other hand, the real desire of the Other reveals itself in more perverse ways, hinted by the content of Bloom's fantasies where he appears as desperately in need of obscene physical punishment from the ladies. As Žižek states, when one gives in to the object-cause of their desire, they are driven by something "in me more than myself": "an indestructible foreign body that stands for the presymbolic life substance, a nauseous mucous parasite that invades my interior and dominates me" ("I Hear" 111). This relation to *objet a* is discussed below further and its connection to the desire of the Law is underlined, but Joyce's choice of mingling the saintly and the pervert in the initial phantasms of Bloom foreshadows how the split subject becomes the plaything against the desire of the Other in many varying, and in this case, opposing ways. As Žižek recounts in *The Art of the Ridiculous Sublime* through numerous analyses, the notion of "inherent transgression" of the Law operates through a subversive manner, promoting in a tricky way the very thing it seems to be undermining: that is, in order for the Law to operate it needs its "obscene supplement", so it produces it to be sustained by it (*The Art* 10). Inherent transgression thus "provides the direct phantasmatic support to the conjugal link and thus participates in what it purports to subvert" ("I Hear" 215). Žižek states that in psychoanalytical terms, this is actually the very opposition between the symbolic Law (Ego-Ideal), which reflects the subject's self-image through the Other's gaze, and the

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obscene superego injunction which tells the subject "Enjoy!" Applying Žižek's notion of "inherent transgression" to this equation of fantasy, then, it is apparent how these two modes of fantasy are not only dependent on each other but are also inherently prerequisites for each other: one cannot be realized in its totality unless the other exerts its force. The flowing co-existence of the saintly and sinner fantasies in "Circe" reveals how the subject is both conditioned and doomed to the relationship between the Other and desire, the sense of lack and wholeness, reality and the Real, 'normal' and fantasy.

4.2.2. Perversion as an Answer to *Che Vuoi*?

In "Circe" episode, both Bloom and Stephen, who are revealed as trying hard to sustain the stability they need to hang onto the Symbolic throughout the novel, experience a drastic lapse back to the Imaginary, a register which, by the way, is not without interruptions from the Real: the "Circe" episode is marked by the fantasies of the two characters where what they lack, what they desire and how they relate to the Other's desire are portrayed in a language which mimics the workings of the unconscious. "Circe" chapter in general can be treated as the intersection in which the Imaginary Real and the Symbolic Real merge into each other: it is the translation of the Imaginary material into the Joycean network of signification with constant irruptions from the traumatic Real. However, in the second part of the chapter which is usually referred to as the Bella or Bello episode, these fantasies become a lot more perverted, representing the oral, anal, scopic and invocatory drives, which according to Lacan are the partial manifestations of desire, in a wide range of sexual practices including, but not limited to, sadomasochism, fetishism, voyeurism, master-slave relations, cross-dressing, exhibitionism, erotic humiliation, scopophilia, etc. The Other in this episode occasionally becomes the Other of demand as Bloom completely disconnects from the Symbolic and relapses into the motherly space of the pre-symbolic heaven where there is neither gender differentiation nor gender roles: in the very beginning of the Bella

episode, as soon as Bella Cohen, the "massive whoremistress", enters the room, whatever symbolic ground that was left under Bloom's feet slides and in an almost psychotic manner, he is drawn into the lure of Bella, the phallic m(O)ther. From the moment Bella's gaze falls upon him, the objects start talking to Bloom, which suggests not only his disengagement from the Symbolic, but also his regression to the Imaginary, where he assumes the perverse subject structure which, disavowing lack and castration, assumes the role of *objet a*, aiming to complete the Other's- and also his own- lack with himself. In the scenes with Bella, and later Bello, the perverse structures of sadism and masochism as well as fetishism, and the related practices and acts are staged.

Bella's initial gaze on Bloom acts as the Möbius twist that enables his transition from the Symbolic to the Imaginary as well as from the external to the internal. Bella's "falcon eyes" which "rest on Bloom with hard insistence" and her sizable fan which "winnows wind towards her heated face, neck and embonpoint" (*U* 641) take him to a register where the separation between the subject and the object disappears. The fan starts flirting with Bloom, its first remark being his having a wife, to which he can give half an answer "Yes... Partly, I have mislaid..." (*U* 642). This 'partiality' is of importance in terms of Bloom's shifting relation to desire. This partial answer is followed by an increase in ambivalence, as the narration not only narrates the phantasmic material but also points to the partial drives which relate to the subject's position as *objet a*: as the fan continues to talk "(*Half opening, then closing*)", it suggests that Bloom is the submissive one in marriage, to which Bloom replies with an affirmative "sheepish grin"; and in response to the fan's question "Have you forgotten me?", which is given with the stage directions "(*Folding together, rests against her eardrop*)", Bloom says "Yes. No." (*U* 642). As the fan is "folded akimbo against her waist" (*U* 642), the Other as language also disappears: the linear, casual, dichotomous language of Logos which executes secondary processes is replaced by the non-linear, non-casual, ambivalent

discourse of the unconscious where the primary processes fail, and all opposites can co-exist without confliction. As the internal reality of Bloom completely takes over his external reality, the language he is bundled up with springs more and more from the body:

> THE FAN: (*Folded akimbo against her waist*) Is me her was you dreamed before? Was then she him you us since knew? Am all them and the same now we?
> (*Bella approaches, gently tapping with the fan*)
> BLOOM: (*Wincing*) Powerful being. In my eyes read that slumber which women love.
> THE FAN: (*Tapping*) We have met. You are mine. It is fate.
> BLOOM: (*Cowed)* Exuberant female. Enormously I desiderate your domination. I am exhausted, abandoned, no more young. I stand, so to speak, with an unposted letter bearing the extra regulation fee before the too late box of the general postoffice of human life. (*U* 642)

The letter in Bloom's hand indeed bears the regulation fee but is now unposted as his relapse from the symbolic and his subjective position as disavowing the paternal metaphor suggests. The insufficiency of the paternal metaphor and the inadequacy of the letter is apparent in the garbled speech of the fan: the confusion, collision and fusion of the subject and object pronouns, *me, her, you, she, him, you, us, them, we* with the implied question "Are all these same now?", lay bare the shift in the dynamics of the relation between the barred subject and the object: the Lacanian formula for fantasy, which reads as (Δa) is now perverse, as in the formula of (a$\Delta$$). At this point, Bloom's reply to the fan's request "All things end. Be mine. Now." (*U* 642) by referring to his missing potato "All now? I should not have parted with my talisman." (*U* 643) underlines the Lacanian premise that the object which is the remainder of the pre-symbolic *jouissance* provides the subject with the necessary distance from *the Thing*. Bloom, up until Zoe's intervention, has clung to his talisman just like an infant who clings to an object belonging to and/or reminiscent of their mother- a jumper, a hairband, or even a teddy bear- in the mother's absence as a kind of her organic extension. For the infant, the presence of this substitute object in close proximity provides the essential security they need to avoid the

castration anxiety and has the magical power to soothe and protect him/her from any potential drama. So does the potato do for Bloom: after its loss, the limit needed for him to be at a safe distance from the phallic m(O)ther whose position in this case is filled with Bella is transgressed, and Bloom's fantasies sporadically reveal a shift from the register of desire into the register of demand where there is neither a coordinated libidinal investment from the subject towards the object, nor gender differentiation. Hence come the following scenes where Bloom is in communication with many objects who talk to him as the extension of the phallic m(O)ther, such as her hoof, or hears voices that manage to reach him from the Real through the rifts in the Symbolic. Moreover, Bella soon turns to Bello as Bloom is feminized, and the rest of the fantasy scenes are stuffed with pre-symbolic material where the oral and the anal drives go on the stage along with the scopic and invocatory drives which have haunted Bloom throughout the chapter. In the scenes with Bella/Bello, Bloom loses his potency: he is forced to put on woman's clothes, wear woman's perfume, is ridden by Bello and the other girls in the room with many other sexual practices from which she (Bloom the woman) takes extensive masochistic pleasure. In this episode, where Bloom is almost completely disconnected from the Symbolic and is retracted to the realm of the phallic m(O)ther, the incest details can also be found in Bello's calling Bloom "Ruby Cohen[22]" (*U* 647), or Bloom's fantasizing about her daughter Milly, mistaking her with Molly (*U* 653). Throughout this episode, Bloom's fantasies reveal not only his lack of being but also his lack of having: the masochistic fantasies and hallucinations he experiences reveal the subject structure

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[22] Cohen is Bella's last name and since Bloom is now Bello's woman, it becomes her last name, too. Ruby is of importance here as it is the name of the book Molly reads early in the novel, **"**Ruby: the Pride of the Ring", which tells the story of the masochist character Ruby. Molly's question of "met him pike hoses" was also from this book. On the other hand, I suggest that Ruby is also metronomically related to Rudy, Bloom's deceased son, who was buried in a sweater of ruby color that Molly knitted for him. This connection is repeated in the novel where Bello "places a ruby ring on her finger" (*U* 650) to own Bloom, or when Bloom dreams about Rudy at the end of the "Circe" chapter with "diamond and ruby buttons" on his suit.

he assumes against the m(O)ther he has come across with. Lacan argues that "the perverse subject, whilst remaining oblivious to the way this functions, offers himself loyally to the Other's *jouissance*" (*Anxiety* 49). He also states that "to recognize oneself as the object of one's desire (...) is always masochistic", and explains that the masochist consciously wants to become the object of the Other while unconsciously strives to be its *objet a* in his search for completing the Other with his body, as his position is that:

> for whom this embodiment of himself as object is the declared goal- whether he becomes a dog under the table or a piece of merchandise, an item dealt with by contract, sold amongst other objects put on the market. In sum, what he seeks is his identification with the common object, the object of exchange. It remains impossible for him to grasp himself for what he is, inasmuch as, like all of us, he is an *a*. (*Anxiety* 105)

This position of the subject is called by Lacan "the function of the dejectum" which is exemplified in Bloom's offering his body to Bella/Bello as an object of humiliation, and as such, it is closely related to his disavowal of lack in himself, and his attempt to achieve *jouissance*, both for himself and for the Other. As Hendrickx suggests, in the Lacanian theory of perverse subject structure:

> desire presents itself as what lays down the law, and thus as subversion of the law, as satisfaction without restraint, as will to *jouissance.* But, this is only so on the surface: in fact, in perversion, desire is the support of the law, of the complete Other as the source of the law, a bringing in action of a law that stops on the path of this *jouissance*, a defense against the Real. (*Freud* 450)

This explains why Bloom could never satisfy Bella/Bello. The death of Bloom in the following pages at the hands of the phallic m(O)ther figure, the vicious Bello, who, with her unsatiable desire, has devoured many men, suggests that no matter how hard Bloom tries -even in his fantasies- Bella/Bello's gratification would mean his death in the symbolic; that is, a dyadic *jouissance* of Bloom and Bella/Bello would totally unhinge the leash that harnesses flow from the Real. Thus,

Bloom's death in his fantasy is actually a defense against the possibility of his death in the Symbolic. As Lacan suggests, what the masochist subject paradoxically aims for is the execution of the law and castration:

> Even in perversion, where desire is given as what lays down the law, that is, as a subversion of the law, it is in fact truly and verily the support of a law. If we know something now about the pervert, it is that what appears from the outside to be an unbounded satisfaction is actually a defence and an implementation of a law inasmuch as it curbs, suspends, and halts the subject on the path to *jouissance*. For the perverts, the will to *jouissance* is, as for anyone else, a will that fails, that encounters its own limit, its own reining-in, in the very exercise of desire. (*Anxiety* 150)

This brings along a second important element in the perverse subject structure: the relation of the execution of law to the superego as in the case of voice *qua objet a*. Throughout the fantasies of Bloom, he always submissively receives commands from the figures of dominance, first and foremost the Sadean master Bella/Bello, who always speaks to him in the imperative. As Lacan suggests, this is the "the voice as an imperative, a voice that demands obedience or conviction" (*Anxiety* 276). Lacan suggests that "if masochism is involved then it is because the superego is quite meanie" (*Anxiety* 105), and that "superego is the cause of masochism"- that is, the *cause* in its Lacanian sense. The imperative voice, which Lacan identifies as a form of *objet a* in which "the desire of the Other has taken the form of a command" (*Anxiety* 277), is related to the Kantian "form of moral conscience" (231), and "its parasitic character" can be seen "in the form of the broken off imperatives of the superego (251). As Hendrickx states, the superego is "the carrier of the voice as *object a*" and it "figures the fact that speech precedes the subject, always contains an enigmatic command, a law that figures our lack, our structural incompleteness; a voice that figures the object a, a -heteronomous- law that turns us as such into its object -into its object a, into the object a of the Other" (*Freud* 464). Therefore, "the function of the dejectum" which the subject in masochism occupies underlines the lack in the subject himself, while the *objet a qua* the voice of the Other

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which the subject in masochism tries to invoke underlines the lack in the Other. Thus, why Bloom hears the haunting imperative voice not only from Bella/Bello but also from other objects in his fantasy, or not only demanding from him but also from the other figures in the dreamwork becomes clear: the enigmatic imperative of the superego functions as the *objet a* which Bloom tries to invoke at the locus of the Other in the image of Bella/Bello in an attempt "to make an Other appear whose desire lays down the law" (*Freud* 477). The commands Bloom hears from Bella/Bello's mouth directed to himself, "Down!" (*U* 644), "Do it standing, sir!" (*U* 649), "O get out, you skunk! Hold your tongue! Speak when you're spoken to" (*U* 650), "Beg up!" (*U* 651), or to others, "BELLO: Hold him down, girls, till I squat on him." (*U* 646), or the imperative voices by several objects that command Bloom to practice various- and usually humiliating- actions, "THE FAN: (*Points downwards quickly*) You must." (*U* 643), "THE HOOF: Smell my hot goathide. Feel my royal weight." (*U* 643), "A VOICE: Swear!" (*U* 654), "THE YEWS: Ssh! Sister, speak!" (*U* 661), function for Bloom as an attempt to bring an Other to life which can lay down the law. As Lacan says, this is the only value of masochism for the subject: "When desire and the law find themselves together again, what the masochist means to show - and I'll add, on his little stage, because this dimension should never be lost sight of - is that the desire of the Other lays down the law" (*Anxiety* 106). As Fabio Vighie explains:

> the ultimate aim of the masochist is to draw out of the Other so much *jouissance* that it becomes unbearable, thus forcing this Other to evoke a law that might limit *jouissance*. The whole point is that, by making the Other anxious, the masochist subject succeeds in finding a defense against his own potentially unlimited perverse enjoyment. Ultimately, as Lacan indeed underlined in later texts, perversion is a *père-version*, in other words a desperate and disavowed attempt at establishing the law of the father. ("Subversion" 222)

This connection is clearly displayed in Bloom's fantasizing about his grandfather Virag, whose name as a signifier plays a significant role in Bloom's shifting subject positions, especially with regard to his

relationship with lack and desire, as explained elsewhere in this study. What appears to be of importance here is, no matter how much material is drawn out of the real, even the fantasies of the perverse subject structure aim at the re-institution of law rather than *jouissance,* an excess of which kills the subject in the Symbolic. Thus, Bloom's body as 'dejectum', which he sacrifices to Bella/Bello to fill the lack in the m(O)ther, was doomed to fall short against the insatiable desire of the m(O)ther. He is another piece of waste in the cesspool where the victims of the desire of the m(O)ther are thrown in:

> BELLO: Die and be damned to you if you have any sense of decency or grace about you. I can give you a rare old wine that'll send you skipping to hell and back. Sign a will and leave us any coin you have. If you have none see you damn well get it, steal it, rob it! We'll bury you in our shrubbery jakes where you'll be dead and dirty with old Cuck Cohen, my stepnephew I married, the bloody old gouty procurator and sodomite with a crick in his neck, and my other ten or eleven husbands, whatever the buggers' names were, suffocated in the one cesspool. (*He explodes in a loud phlegmy laugh*) We'll manure you, Mr Flower! (*He pipes scoffingly*) Byby, Poldy! Byby, Papli!
> BLOOM: (*Clasps his head*) My will power! Memory! I have sinned! I have suff... (*He weeps tearlessly*)
> BELLO: (*Sneers*) Crybabby! Crocodile tears! (*U* 654-5)

As the m(O)ther's desire devours Bloom, he once again becomes the manure that can only be used to blossom the seeds of desire for the Thing, as the metonymy of desire always circles and never reaches. Bloom's request from Zoe to get his potato back is a remarkable detail at this point in that it underlines how the dynamics of desire functions: the access to the phallic m(O)ther's body is once again substituted with the access to the remainder object. It is a "superfine thing", as Zoe states, an object of "forfeit": a "no/thing" with which Bloom forfeits the *jouissance* of the m(O)ther.

> BLOOM: (*Gently*) Give me back that potato, will you?
> ZOE: Forfeits, a fine thing and a superfine thing.
> BLOOM: (*With feeling*) It is nothing, but still a relic of poor mamma.
>
> (*U* 663)

Zoe's response in verse to Bloom's comment explicitly answers the Lacanian question "*Che vuoi?*" which lies at the heart of the barred subject's relationship with desire. When the subject's illusion of fulfilling the m(O)ther's lack with themselves is shattered, that is, when a thing is given and taken back, the idyllic state of pre-symbolic *jouissance* is lost forever and the subject is left alone with the existential question "What do you want?", which the subject does not have any knowledge of whatsoever:

ZOE:

> Give a thing and take it back
> God'll ask you where is that
> You'll say you don't know
> God'll send you down below. (*U* 663)

Lacan, following the footsteps of Freud, states that one directly asks God this question "What wouldst thou with me?", and equates this question to that of "What's desire's relation to law?" to which he replies by stating that it's the same thing:

> [T]he terms that seem to stand in a relation of antithesis desire and law are but one and the same barrier to bar our access to the Thing. *Nolens, volens*, desiring, I go down the path of the law. This is why Freud refers the origin of the law back to the ungraspable desire of the father (...) Whether or not one normalizes my objects, so long as I desire, I know nothing of what I desire. And then, from time to time, an object appears amongst the others, and I really don't know why it's there (...) On the other hand, there's the one for which I really can't find any justification as to why this is the one I desire - and why, not being one who detests girls, I'm even fonder of a little shoe. (*Anxiety* 81-2)

Thus, Zoe's reply implies the impossibility of the subject's answering this question once they are "sent below" to the Symbolic world from the bliss of the m(O)ther. What can be known by the subject is that the object which they are fond of is somehow related to desire, which is related to lack and which in turn relates to the Law. Bloom explains why he wants to have the potato back: "BLOOM: There is a memory attached to it. I should like to have it" (*U* 663). The memory attached to the

remainder that connects him to his fantasy, his desire is his only solution to the paradoxical "*Che vuoi*?" and as Stephen comments, it is related to "having" rather than "being" at the mirror stage: "STEPHEN: To have or not to have, that is the question" (*U* 663). When Zoe gives the talisman back, the enigmatic statement she makes actually clarifies that the Other is the only one to lead the subject back to what they have lost, as the desire of the subject is actually the desire of the Other:

> ZOE: Here. (*She hauls up a reef of her slip, revealing her bare thigh and unrolls the potato from the top of her stocking*) Those that hides knows where to find. (*U* 663-4)

As Bloom is re-united with his phantasmatic potato, the dynamics of desire and lack are rearranged and the distance necessary for Bloom to survive against the desire of the Other is reestablished, and the rest of the chapter mainly narrates the hallucinations by Stephen except for the voyeurism fantasy of Bloom.

In conclusion, "Circe" chapter is the most Möbian chapter in the novel in terms of its mimicking the topological structure of the Möbius band by employing the stream of consciousness technique and the theatre play form with stage setting and directions which create textual and contextual twists that both the characters and readers use to switch sides from the externality of reality to the intimacy of the real. The juxtaposition of the factual details/ trivia of the daily consciousness registered by Logos and the deepest, darkest phantasmatic secrets of the unconscious generates a textual space where the diachronic and the synchronic, the rational and the irrational co-exist. The factual symbolic data Joyce uses while depicting the fantasies of the characters create a multi-layered universe where time-space continuum is convoluted, which is precisely how the unconscious works: the details of the ordinary reality and the "impossible-to-be-symbolized" material from the real seep through the holes and meet, in varying proportions throughout the chapter, forming a text which ranges from pure fantasy to pure fictive reality. This intangible, invisible, tricky yet existing transition

from one layer to the other also acts out the Lacanian understanding of the split subject who is driven by extimacy, that is, by their unconscious (desires) which is the most intimate yet completely external as it is the plaything of the Other.

CHAPTER 5

NON-LINEAR TREATMENT OF TEMPORALITY IN *ULYSSES*

Mark Currie notes that the events of a single day, as in the case of Virginia Woolf's *Mrs. Dalloway*, is used in the novel as "a principle of unity" and suggests that Joyce's *Ulysses* "is concerned with the circularity of the day, with the fact that it starts where it finishes, and therefore that it reproduces the circular structure of the 'homecoming' which it parallels in Homer's *Odyssey*" (129). He also argues that the novel is "concerned at a thematic and technical level with the opposition between internal and external time, and with the enormous quantity of mind activity that fills the smallest units of time" (129). The first argument suggests that the circularity of temporality in the novel stems from not only the fact that it takes place in the circularity of a day, but also that it mimics the circularity of the Homeric homecoming theme. However, both of these premises of circularity are accompanied by several alternate temporalities: there is the depiction of linear time according to which the novel's chapters are organized, or, the temporality of the subject which disrupts both circularity and linearity with its dependence on the Other. Moreover, this temporality of the subject is multi-layered: it is dependent on the Other as the language, on the other(s) in its intersubjectivity, and on the unconscious in its peculiar relations with memory, trauma and desire. This being the case, the novel presents itself as a surrealist painting of temporality where several temporalities are portrayed to co-exist by clashing, cutting, circulating or even immersing in each other. This portrayal of temporality is related to the second argument made by Currie: both the many kinds of external and internal temporalities find their depiction at technical and thematic levels in the novel; however, rather than being at opposition, they reveal a continuation, one that is similar to the different faces of the Möbius strip. This co-existence of multiple temporalities and

their extimate relationship is one of the qualities that makes *Ulysses* unique.

5.1. Intra/Subjective Temporalities

Time is not only a subject but also an actor in *Ulysses*. The simultaneous co-existence of several temporal lanes as well as the representation of intersubjective temporalities through stylistic tools working as the mnemonic codes combined with an intricate quest about the nature of time makes time the hidden protagonist of the novel. From the very beginning in the Castello Tower till the last lines of Molly's soliloquy, time reveals itself as the most intimate yet the strangest dimension to the subject. The novel, consisting of many losses of o/(O)thers, including deaths of mothers, fathers, sons and lovers, homes and homelands, beliefs and dreams as well many hopes of recovering new ones, is knitted with the thick yarn of time- a multi-color yarn that contains all the shades of the past, present and future twisting together, overlapping, intensifying or wanning at times, forming the last knot in Joyce's *sinthome*. The relation among the colors of past-present-future displays the logical time of Lacan: the subjects are in a dialectic motion of becoming through the passages of temporality, retrospectively, anticipatorily or simultaneously reconstructing themselves, their experiences and others in all temporal lanes. This motion is also bounded by the workings of unconscious desire and the subject's relation to the Other as the subject's position in any register is conditioned by her/his unconscious proximity to the Other, or its substitutes, and the *jouissance* one never stops anticipating. Therefore, the characters in the novel are marked by their states, actions, thoughts and feelings which also portray the temporalities they are immersed in.

Although all characters in *Ulysses* are somehow revealing the extimacy of time in differing degrees in different realms, Stephen is the character who is the most occupied with the idea of time in the Symbolic realm. In the first three chapters, along with the portrayal of his current state and

relationships, his ruminations about the nature of phenomena including time are the foci. Especially in "Proteus", the last one of the three chapters allocated to Stephen only, his interior monologues not only transcend the boundaries between the chapters, but also create a topological space that brings together the sensations and thoughts as well as the three temporal modalities. The imagery and the symbolism used in this chapter help generate a twist in the inside/outside duality, and the intense intertextuality along with intratextual repetitions causes a spiraling whirlpool of signification.

Walking on Sandymount Strand around 11 a.m. after leaving Mr. Deasy's office at the School for Protestant boys where he teaches, Stephen in this chapter is portrayed by Joyce as a modern city wanderer/ philosopher, usurped of his home, ridden by guilt and disappointment and very much under the influence of the early events of the day. "Proteus" opens up with Stephen's thoughts on his immediate sensations: "Ineluctable modality of the visible: at least that if no more, thought through my eyes" (*U* 45). Sight is the first inescapable sensory relation for Stephen, who is there to read "the signature of all things": "seaspawn and seawrack, the nearing tide, that rusty boot. Snotgreen, bluesilver, rust: colored signs. Limits of the diaphane" (*U* 45). Remembering Aristotle, and contemplating the limits of the essence, he closes his eyes to see – "Shut your eyes and see"- only to be imprisoned this time to "the ineluctable modality of the audible". He reminisces about *nacheinander* and *nebeneinander,* the terms German dramatist and critic Gotthold Ephraim Lessing used in his book *Laocoön* to differentiate between the appropriate subjects of poetry and visual arts: "In the one case, the action is visible and progressive, its different parts occurring one after the other (*nacheinander*) in a *sequence of time*, and in the other the action is visible and stationary, its different parts developing in *co-existence* (*nebeneinander*) *in space*" (in Gifford, 45) (my emphasis). These two terms can also be traced back to diachrony and synchrony in relation to temporality and spatiality: the former as temporal sequentiality and the latter as spatial co-presence.

Thus, trying to surpass the boundaries set by the physical world to enable himself to read "beyond" the signs, Stephen is also attempting to go beyond the spatio-temporality of his surroundings, going beyond his immediate reality which he calls "A very short space of time through very short times of space": "Am I walking into eternity along Sandymount strand?" This juxtaposition of time and space (as eternity and Sandymont strand) as the vertical and horizontal elements in a vector reveals Stephen's effort to go beyond the limitations of the signifier. However, when he opens his eyes again, nothing has disappeared and he is not "for ever in the black adiaphane". All the physical reality prevails. Stephen's little experiment to test the penetrability of the limits of physical phenomena fails as do his little flight attempt from the boundaries of desire: the gaze and the voice, as part objects- or as *objet petit a* in late Lacan- are what Stephen puts to test respectively, but as apparent from the following lines, desire has always been and will always be there for the subject: "See now. There all the time without you: and ever shall be, world without end" (*U* 46).

This realization is followed by another visual sensation; the sight of two women, one of which turns out to be a midwife Stephen has knowledge of, walking towards the beach, descending "the steps from Leahy's terrace". Stephen forms a parallelism between himself and the women: "Like me, like Algy, coming down to our mighty mother"- a reference to Algernon Charles Swinburne's poem *The Triumph of Time* (1866). Thus, the imagery related to the sea that marked the beginning of the chapter continues with references to the sea as the mother that embraces, and a few pages later as the murderer that devours its lovers in the instance of the drowned man; a parallelism between Swinburne's poem in which the sea is depicted as the source of both an edenic wholeness and a cold grave of loss is thus fortified. The intensifying allusion to the sea as the m(O)ther with its dual capacity as the pre-symbolic real object that provides wholeness in its *jouissance* and the post-symbolic object of the real whose *jouissance* would kill if one is too close can actually be found in the lines of Swinburn: Stephen's urge to unite with his m(O)ther "I

will go down to her, I and none other, /Close with her, kiss her and mix her with me; /Cling to her, strive with her, hold her fast" (*Selected* 213) is juxtaposed with his fear of being consumed by her intimacy: "Thy sweet hard kisses are strong like wine, /Thy large embraces are keen like pain" (214). The imagery continues to build up by the depiction of Stephen's thoughts about the contents of the midwife's bag: "What has she in the bag? A misbirth with a trailing navelcord, hushed in ruddy wool" (*U* 46). Besides working as a portal that connects this "rudy wool" to Bloom's son Rudolph, Rudy as Bloom calls him, who was buried "in that little woolly jacket" Molly knitted for him, this image of a bloody navelcord is also a portal through which the subject's desire for the pre-symbolic *jouissance* is cut. The image of the navel/cord, which is repeated several times in Joyce's works, acts here both as a reminder of the Edenic time of the pre-symbolic real and the impossibility of returning to it in an instance of Joycean sarcasm: "The cords of all link back, strandentwining cable of all flesh. That is why mystic monks. Will you be as gods? Gaze in your omphalos. Hello! Kinch here. Put me on to Edenville. Aleph, alpha: nought, nought, one" (*U* 46). The time of the real in the m(O)ther's bliss to which the strand/entwining cords of all subjects testify, is not the time of the mortals but only gods. No matter how hard Stephen desires to transgress that temporal portal to Eden/ville, no matter how long one gazes at their navel as the reminder of the Thing, no matter how many attempts are made to go back to the primal letter in the archaic alphabets ("aleph" in Hebrew and "alpha" in Greek) or to the oneness/wholeness through nothingness ("nought, nought, one"), the temporality of the real falls beyond the reach of the subject as it is beyond, not before, the invention of the letter: it is what makes the letter. As such, Stephen is doomed to stay and suffer in the time of the Symbolic as a signifier that occupies many positions in the signifying chain, one of which is Kinch for Mulligan. Thus, the telephone with the "strandentwining" navelcord cable only operates within the borders of the Symbolic for Stephen, which is not reason enough for him to stop trying to get the signals from the time of the real via the objects of gaze or voice as he does.

A paragraph later, Stephen, still contemplating on Eve and her lack of navel and her "womb of sin" contends that he too was a creation of sin: "Wombed in sin darkness I was too, made not begotten. By them, the man with my voice and my eyes and a ghostwoman with ashes on her breath. They clasped and sundered, did the coupler's will. From before the ages He willed me and now may not will me away or ever. A *lex eterna* stays about Him". These words imbued with a heavy religious accent open up in many layers regarding Stephen's temporal subjectivity. According to the Nicene Creed (325), Jesus, unlike the rest of the mankind, was "begotten, but not made, of one essence consubstantial with the Father" (Gifford 47). Stephen, on the other hand, states that "Wombed in sin darkness I was too, made not begotten" (*U* 46), that is, not formed through the same essence of the Father. Although his father has Stephen's voice and eyes, as the m(O)ther's desire is reflected on the father through partial objects which Stephen claims his right, his mother as a ghost from the time of the real, breathing the ashes of the burnt down paradise, haunts and taints the time of the symbolic Father. Although his mother and father "clasped and sundered", Stephen could not sunder from the m(Other) completely. The Father's *lex eternal*, the eternal Law which sets the time of the Symbolic with his castrating clock, cannot unset it, although Stephen wishes otherwise: "now may not will me away or ever" is what he says, as if there were a probability that He "may" will him "away" from his eternal Law or "ever", to an archaic atemporality which stands outside the time of the Symbolic but at the core of Stephen's most intimate being.

Another significant point that needs attention is the peculiar nature of the Father's *lex eternal*. Gifford refers to St. Thomas Acquinas who explains in *Summa Theologica* that

> The ruling idea of things which exists in God as the effective sovereign of them all has the nature of law. Then since God's mind does not conceive in time, but has an eternal concept…it follows that this law should be called eternal. Hence: 1. While not

as yet existing in themselves things nevertheless exist in God in so far as they are foreseen and preordained by Him: so St. Paul speaks of God summoning *things that are not yet in existence as if they already were*. Thus the eternal concept of divine law bears the character of a law that is eternal as being God's ordination for the governance of the things he foreknows. (in Gifford 47)

As such, the temporality of the Father (as the symbolic Father) is eternal for himself (in-itself), yet preordaining, summoning, determining for its subjects. That is, Father as the Name has an eternal temporality in its certainty, in its determination, in its predomination, in the precondition that it is all-encompassing for each subject: it precedes the subject and will outlive them. However, from the side of the subject, it is not an eternal temporality at all: on the contrary, Father is the one who temporalizes them. It is the Father's *lex eternal* which seals the subject's rupture from the atemporality of object of the real. As such, the temporality of the subject in Stephen's case, although shaped by the Father, does not operate harmoniously in accordance with the dynamics of the Father's clock: it may tick back and forth, skip, jump or stop temporarily in search of the other time, the lost time of the m(O)ther. As Stephen meditates on the Father's law, the lines follow:

> Airs romped round him, nipping and eager airs. They are coming, waves. The whitemaned seahorses, champing, brightwindbridled, the steeds of Mananaan.
>
> I mustn't forget his letter for the press. And after? The Ship, half twelve. By the way go easy with that money like a good young imbecile. Yes, I must.
>
> His pace slackened. Here. Am I going to aunt Sara's or not? My consubstantial father's voice. Did you see anything of your artist brother Stephen lately? No? Sure he's not down in Strasburg terrace with his aunt Sally? Couldn't he fly a bit higher than that, eh? (*U* 47)

The "nipping and eager airs" (*Hamlet* I. iv.2), Horatio's lines to Hamlet, blowing around Stephen points to another prince of procrastination, hindered by the images of "the steeds of Mananaan": the horses of Mananaan Maclir, the Irish god of the sea "who had Proteus's ability for

self-transformation" (Gifford 48). In the next line, he is back to the material temporality of the Clock, with the "musts" and "mustn'ts" of the Law, with "half twelves" of the clock and calculations on the money in his pocket. Not surprisingly, his father's voice takes the lead next: even in his anticipation of his probable visit to his aunt and uncle, the Other acts upon Stephen's temporality. Just as in the example of the three prisoners by Lacan, Stephen in this section is seen lagging in the synchronic temporality of the unconscious between anticipation and retroaction: starting with the lines "I pull the wheezy bell of their shuttered cottage: and wait. They take me for a dun, peer out from a coign of vantage" and ending with "His tuneful whistle sounds again, finely shaded, with rushes of the air, his fists bigdrumming on his padded knees" the reader witnesses Stephen's visit to his "aunt Sara's" with all the details and dialogues only to realize many paragraphs later he has not been to the place but just anticipated it: "He halted. I have passed the way to aunt Sara's. Am I not going there? Seems not. No-one about. He turned northeast and crossed the firmer sand towards the Pigeonhouse" (*U* 51). Thus, the moment of anticipation ends with the moment of retroaction which shapes the temporality of the subject: Stephen's split temporality between the "I don't know yet" and "Oh yes, I already knew that" is shadowed by the Other's gaze, without which it is impossible for the subject to realize his spatio-temporality. Just like the Warden whose gaze acts upon the temporality of the prisoner's (their decision on who they are), Stephen's temporality is shaped by his [F]ather's gaze that interrogates, judges and determines: "Did you see anything of your artist brother Stephen lately? No? Sure he's not down in Strasburg terrace with his aunt Sally? Couldn't he fly a bit higher than that, eh?" (*U* 47). Referring to his son's symbolic position as Icarus, whose wings melted for flying too close to the sun and ridiculing his late wife's family ("O weeping God, the things I married into!") Simon Dedalus acts as the Other that predetermines Stephen's spatio-temporality unbeknownst to him. Thus, Stephen, at the end of this anticipated memory, identified by the Other in "the moment of conclusion" in which he realizes the decision has already been made,

"Am I not going there? Seems not", thinks in Shakespearean terms again, alluding this time to *Macbeth*: "This wind is sweeter" (I. vi.10).

5.2. Co-existence of Temporal Layers

In "Ithaca", as an answer to a question regarding Bloom's fall while trying to get into his house with the drunk Stephen after failing to find his house keys, the omniscient narrator says that Bloom fell with the weight of his "eleven stone and four pounds" body which was measured almost five weeks ago. The overloading of precise temporal data in the following part of his answer exhausts the concept of temporality while displaying the multiplicity and probable incompatibility of the multiple temporal systems in Dublin. Bloom learned how much he weighed precisely "on the last feast of the Ascension, to wit, the twelfth day of May of the bissextile year one thousand nine hundred and four of the christian era (jewish era five thousand six hundred and sixtyfour, mohammadan era one thousand three hundred and twentytwo), golden number 5, epact 13, solar cycle 9, dominical letters C B, Roman indication 2, Julian period 6617, MXMIV" (*U* 621-2). The presentation of many calendars, which Gifford explains as the methods used to determine the date of the Easter Sunday "an exercise of considerable importance, since the date of that movable feast determines liturgical calendar of the Christian year" (568), as well as the addition of the Roman astrological details to hold down time all point to the co-existence of different temporalities and the futile effort to standardize only one. The temporal position of the event of falling as "almost five weeks ago" also flows from one signifier to another until it exhausts its meaning and only stops momentarily on page, while its signification in the readers' minds continues to wander as such a signification has now become less to do with the exact temporality of the event than the impossibility of pinning it down.

Such a futility presents itself in the example of the timeball on the Ballast Office which the wandering Bloom sees on his way to first his

lunch at Davy Byrne's pub at 21 Duke Street and then the National Library to trace back an advertisement for one of his clients. The sight of the timeball reminds Bloom of the word *parallax* in Sir Robert Ball's "Story of the Heavens", which reminds him of the word *metempsychosis* Molly asked about earlier, which reminds him of Molly from whom he has been trying to keep his mind off:

> Mr Bloom moved forward raising his troubled eyes. Think no more about that. After one. Time ball on the ballast office is down. Dunsink time. Fascinating little book that is of sir Robert Ball's. Parallax. I never exactly understood. There's a priest. Could ask him. Par it's Greek: parallel, parallax. Met him pike hoses she called it till I told her about the transmigration. O rocks! (*U* 147).

The peculiarity of the Ballast Office, which ignites this chain of associations, is the dual temporality it implicates. As Gifford explains in the annotations, the Ballast Office was the headquarters for the supervision of Dublin Harbor and its clock was directly connected to Dunsink Observatory via a telegraph line, which is why it was considered the most reliable temporal sign in the city. The time ball, which is "a ball on a pole rigged to drop at a specific mean time", was dropped at 1:00 p.m. Greenwich time for ships to set their chronometers accordingly. Therefore, Bloom's observation "Time ball on the ballast office is down. Dunsink time." and his conclusion "After one" (which is given backwards in the text) cannot be correct because the ball was dropped according to Greenwich time, which is twenty-five minutes ahead of the local Dunsink time. And since "from where he is in the street Bloom could not have seen the clock face that would tell him Dublin time" (Gifford 160), he mistakes the time which he realizes later in the novel and corrects himself "Now that I come to think of it, that ball falls at Greenwich time. It's the clock is worked by an electric wire from Dunsink" (*U* 159).

The switch to the Greenwich Mean Time took place in 1916 in Ireland, and Warner notes that for almost 40 years from 1874 till then, "some

clocks in Dublin read Greenwich time, and some read Dunsink time"
(862). Warner suggests Bloom's mistake reveals that "such meaning is
relative to the system by which time is measured" and that "time proved
to be contested terrain, even among people less contentious than
Dubliners" (862). In addition to the individual subjective temporalities
amongst the Dubliners, even the materialized, systematic clock-time
cannot escape such subjectivity. This visible duality represented in the
Ballast time ball is in one way different from the Christian, Muslim or
Roman means to determine time where the signifiers cannot be pinned
down in their flow into others in the impossible quest for the signified
that is the question of exact transitory moment. The difference in
markers of chrono-transience materializes as the solidification of the
conflict not between signifiers this time, but signs: both the Greenwich
time and the Dunsink time were presented by the Ballast office
simultaneously, "Greenwich time by the ball for mariners, Dunsink time
by the dial for pedestrians" (Kenner 75). Nevertheless, just as the other
religious and cultural signifiers, these scientific, mechanical signs turn
into floating signifiers which fail in their attempt to reach a signified.
They emerge as *points de capiton* where the illusionary meaning is
temporarily produced for Dubliners only to alter again depending on the
position of the gazer.

Joyce underlines that Bloom's current temporality would have changed
if he stood in a different spatiality, and this hint not only underlines the
coexistence of multiple temporal meanings, but also signals why he
correlates the Ballast time ball with *parallax*. *Parallax*, in its common
definition, is "the effect by which the position or direction of an object
appears to change when the object is seen from different positions"
(*Oxford Learners Dictionary*[23]). Kenner suggests that although Bloom
claims to have never understood the meaning of the term in Sir Robert
Ball's *The Story of the Heavens,* which the reader learns more than 500
pages later to sit in Bloom's shelf (*U* 661), he indeed "has just let slip

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[23] https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/definition/english/parallax

through his mind unnoticed a homely example of parallax: two standpoints, two different alignments of phenomena" as the simultaneous presentation of two different times by the Ballast office clock "itself presents parallactic readings" (75). Kenner notes: "Greenwich time and Dunsink time differ by twenty-five minutes because astronomers in those two places observe the sun from stations separated by 6¼° of longitude; this is, precisely and technically, parallax" (75). As such, *parallax* is both the subject matter and a method Joyce uses throughout the novel, which renders possible a "stereoscopic vision" that is created by the narration of the same scene by at least two different versions. Warner also argues "parallax was both a symbol of absolute knowledge and a metaphor for subjectivity, a notion that recurs often in *Ulysses*" (863). As a symbol that enables both multiplicity of perspective/perception and construction of temporal variety, *parallax* stands out as a concept that adorns the Joycean subject.

In "Hades", when Bloom drives in the carriage for the funeral cortege of Paddy Dignam, he sequences the things he sees. "National school. Meade's yard. The hazard" (*U* 114). The hazard is the Irish word for a cabstand. The reader realizes that it is the same cabstand Bloom passed by in the previous chapter "Lotus Eaters" when Bloom thinks: "An hour ago I was passing there. The jarvies raised their hats" (*U* 114). However, it is impossible for Bloom to be there an hour ago as not much later he announces the time as "Twenty past eleven" (*U 116*). This means he had to be passing by the cabin around 10.15, which we know is not true as he left home for the post office at "Quarter to" [nine] in the last lines of "Calypso" chapter. Not only from Linati's schema which shows the temporal setting of the following chapter as starting at 9 a.m. (different than that of Gilbert), but mainly from the fact that it would be impossible for Bloom to be at Dignam's funeral at 11 a.m. after his time spent in the Turkish baths, it becomes clear that the one hour of Bloom

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does not match the one hour of clock time[24]. For a text and a meticulous writer so much preoccupied with the workings of time, this detail seems to be another accent on his emphasis of the non-liner time of the subject.

Gifford in the introduction of his detailed annotations to *Ulysses* suggests that the narrative time in the novel "takes place at the confluence of two orders of literary time: dramatic time and epic time" (1). He argues that although the novel comprises the Aristotelian unities of time, place and action of tragedy, as its title suggests, it also has the qualities of an epic on account of its action as "the whole course of a major phase in the (hero's) life" (2) and of its beginning *in medias res.* However, says Gifford, the action stays *in medias res* unlike the progressive one in epic, and it is just any other day in Dublin as far as the characters in the novel are concerned:

> Only we as readers know that the characters are both acting in the dramatic time of a play, complete with *peripeteia*, and, by implication rather than by action, completing a major phase of their lives in the narrative medium of epic time. So while we judge significance in relation to our expectation of dramatic and epic time, the characters move in what might be called mimetic time: various implications of time: a rich mix of clock time, psychological time, and mnemonic time. (2)

Gifford's commentary points to the complexity of the narrative time of *Ulysses* even when it is stripped of other contextual and stylistic tools used to depict the multiple temporalities. As a narrative of a single day in a single city "imitate(ing) the actions of a single day", the narrative temporality of the novel exponentially multiplies its temporal setting. Having both epic and dramatic qualities with three central characters as in a "good Sophoclean drama" (Stephen, Leopold and Molly), "as well as a chorus (of Dubliners) that, as Aristotle said it should, functions collectively as a fourth character" (2), the narrative time of *Ulysses* exceeds the limitations of epic and drama, while it disrupts and

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[24] For a detailed argument on the subject see Gilbert, and Paziński.

conflates the chronotopic frames of both genres in their Bakhtinian sense.

5.3. The Synchrony of the Unconscious and the Real of Time

"Penelope", the last chapter of *Ulysses*, famous for its excellent use of stream of consciousness technique where Molly Bloom voices her experience in a non-linear, non-casual manner with lots of details, free association, gaps and silences in between the lines stands out as a text which exemplifies the spatio-temporality of the unconscious in both content and form as it voices the experience of Molly, whom the reader has not met until the last episode, just before she goes into sleep in the early hours of the morning. Molly's self-dialogue strikes the reader as an honest, obscene and politically incorrect form of narrations where the whole chapter is written in the form of a stream of unconscious with no punctuation marks except for the final dot. There appear to be eight sentences formed by an indention on the pages, in accord with the recumbent eight- ∞- the symbol of infinity which Linati schema gives as the time of the chapter. The scene is 'the bed', the color is 'starry, milky, *then new dawn*', the organ is 'fat/flesh', the symbol as 'earth', the meaning is 'the past sleeps' and the correspondences as between 'Penelope-Earth' and 'Web-Movement'. Thus, while Molly makes a dialogue with herself in bed as she was trying to put herself into sleep in an hour which suggests the transition from the night to the dawn, she was troubled with the bodily and psychological interruptions. As such, the web of her past forms a synchronous movement of her experienced and reconstructed memories, and it creates the perfect site for the unearthing of the spatio-temporality of the unconscious. Her self-dialogue is the speech of the subject of the enunciation (*Le sujet de l'énonciation*), which Lacan explains as the speech that comes from the unconscious, from the Other, as opposed to that of the subject of statement, *le sujet de l'énoncé*, which can be called the speech from the conscious register of the psyche. Furthermore, the unconscious, which according to Lacan, is structured like a language works within the

economy of the signifier. The meaning in language occurs in a "deferring" fashion when the last floating signifier in the chain is pronounced, which in return, forms a *point de capiton*, a point of temporary meaning that is constructed retrospectively, say, when the last word in a sentence is uttered. In Molly's self-dialogue, however, the signifiers never stop sliding: the whole chapter consists of a gigantic sentence with eight seemingly random intervals where almost no punctuation or grammar rules are applied. Her identity as a subject is also sliding: the ambivalence she experiences throughout the narration regarding her marriage, her standing in society, her body, her sexual and social gender roles suggests a search for a *cappitonage* that would help give anchor to a meaning in her existence as well as her words' ever-lasting sentence. As such, both the content of her self-dialogue as the display of the unconscious *remémoration* of the Lacanian "logical I" in addition to the *mémoires* of the "psychological I" (*Écrits Complete* 170), and the form of the narrative in which the battery of the signifiers in their diachronous sliding works retrospectively and anticipatorily present an extimate relationship between the spatio-temporality of the subject of unconscious and language.

Lacan in *Seminar XI* states that the unconscious must be located in a synchronic temporality as opposed to a diachronic, historical temporality:

> it is in the dimension of a synchrony that you must situate the unconscious—at the level of a being, but in the sense that it can spread over everything, that is to say, at the level of the subject of the enunciation, in so far as, according to the sentences, according to the modes, it loses itself as much as it finds itself again, and in the sense that, in an interjection, in an imperative, in an invocation, even in a hesitation it is always the unconscious that presents you with its enigma, and speaks—in short, at the level at which everything at blossoms in the unconscious spreads, like mycelium, as Freud says about the dream, around a central point. It is always a question of the subject *qua* indeterminate. (*Four* 26)

The synchrony of the unconscious suggests that the speaking subject's linear history does not count when it comes to the workings of the unconscious, that is, in cases of dreams, or psychoanalysis, or in the speech of the subject of enunciation where the flow runs with the free associations that do not aim at following a teleological, causal economy, the synchrony of the unconscious reveals itself in a pulsating manner where repetitions, and/or the return of the repressed material, the traumatic and the Real, are in a dynamic relationship in the diachrony of the signifying chain. In "Penelope" it is possible to see this temporal synchrony of the unconscious as Molly talks to herself in her head abounding with the signifiers of endless free associations that prevent her from going into sleep.

Yes.

The word 'yes' has been the focus of interest among scholars and readers in terms of its affirmatory quality and ambiguity. It has been suggested that 'yes' is "a reaffirmation of Molly's acceptance of and oneness with Bloom" (Lyman 94), or a gesture of welcome "to the 'awful deepdown torrent' of sexual passion and to the dance of life and love" (Henke 160), or "reinforces the fairytale submissive of the girl in need of rescuing" (McMullen 10). Whether taken as a romantic or an orgasmic affirmation, the ambivalent nature of the word is reinforced by Joyce's comment that it is a female word that is "human, all too human" which stands as "the indispensable countersign to Bloom's passport to eternity" (*Selected Letters* 274). Joyce states that the last episode of the novel "begins and ends with the female word Yes.... It turns like the huge earthball slowly surely and evenly round and round spinning" (*Letters*, 170). Joyce's correspondence of the *womb* with *woman* and the female genitalia with the word 'yes' does not make it easier to explain the rather obscure signification of the word throughout the chapter as the signification of the word seems to be changing in every context it is used in. As such, it has been suggested that Molly's yesses are not as affirmative as they might sound (Ellmann, "Penelope" 98). In fact, her

yesses may even be read more like noes in their use within the context of the text. It is, therefore, a word which is important regarding function rather than semantics. The word 'yes' emerges as a *point de capiton* in the veloce stream of Molly's free associations which provide her with some sort of spatio-temporal anchorage that conduces to the continuation of her train of thoughts which otherwise would be too psychotic to endure. The use of the word 'yes' for ninety times in the chapter points to Molly's unconscious attempt at *capitonnage* in the flow of the stream, and when read together with the use of the word in other chapters, it hints at why Joyce viewed it as an indication of fleshly affirmation[25] (*Letters* 170).

The initial yes which the chapter begins with seems like Molly's answer to a question the reader does not see, yet comes to realize in the course of the chapter: Does Bloom have a relationship with another woman or other women? However, when read together, the 'yes' of the sentence emerges as an answer to the question "Where?" that closes the previous chapter (*U* 871). The last paragraph of the previous chapter requires attention here as it hints that the matter of "when-where" will surface in the following lines. The question "when" is answered in the narrative suggesting that the tired Bloom, who has returned home from his travels is about to go to sleep; however, the whereabouts is left unanswered as the response to the temporal quality of the question is filled with spatial references:

> When?
> Going to a dark bed there was a square round Sinbad the Sailor roc's auk's egg in the night of the bed of all the auks of the rocs of Darkinbad the Brightdayler.
> Where? (*U* 871)

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[25] From Joyce's letter to Frank Budgen dated 16 August 1921: "*Ich bin der Fleisch der stets bejaht*" (I am the flesh that always affirms). This phrase is a reference to a sentence in Goethe's *Faust* where Mephistopheles says, "I am the spirit that Denies" (Goethe 47).

The peculiar spatio-temporality produced by the conflation of the bed in Blooms' house with the square round egg of rocs' in Simbad story to the question "When?" is expanded in the spatio-temporality produced by Molly's self-dialogue as an answer to the question "Where?" in the following chapter. The catechistic question "Where?" can thus be answered via "Penelope" suggesting that the answer is in Molly's free speech which generates a temporality of its own which, like the previous response, embeds the temporal into the spatial. The spatio-temporality of the chapter is completely different from the previous chapter as the final questions suggest: "Penelope", starting with an affirmative "Yes because he never did a thing like that before (...)" (*U* 871) as opposed to the final word "Where?" in the previous section, signals a shift from the cold, scientific language of "Ithaca" sticking to a one-to-one correspondence between what is outside and inside, which almost tragically parodies in a Sternian manner the realistic effort to represent the "truth" out there on the page, to a narration that becomes the very thing that is outside and inside.

Starting "Penelope" with a 'yes' seems appropriate and wise when it is read in comparison with the use of the word in "Ithaca" only 3 times always as an affirmative answer to the few closed questions among the countless others that inquire the wheres, whats, hows and whys. The 90 yesses in Molly's self-dialogue, the first of which replaces a "Why?" ("Yes because..") underline from the beginning that "Penelope" has its own peculiar working mechanisms when it comes to causality and/or linearity. The obsessional effort parodied in "Ithaca" to account for every detail, every question in the most exact manner possible is juxtaposed with the peculiar narration in "Penelope" to not account for anything other than the flowing, bodily, *flesh*y, non-linear, non-logical accounts of the only female narrator of the novel in the most extimate manner possible: the linear spatio-temporality that tries omnipotently to give an illusion of full control of the one-to-one, "true-to-life", unerringly causal representation mimicked in "Ithaca" dissolves smoothly to the ever-sliding signification in Molly's unconscious language that is ready to slip

to the land of sleep from awareness, and more significantly, that is repeatedly excitated by the bodily impulses Molly experiences. As Jean Oury presents Lacan in *Seminar XII*,

> In the unconscious structured like a language it is not easy to have it express itself in a common language. The articulated language of common discourse is outside, with respect to the subject of the unconscious; an outside which conjoins in itself what we call our intimate thoughts. This language which carries on outside and not in an immaterial fashion, this discourse is entirely homogenisable as something which happens outside; language fills the street and there is effectively there an inscription; the problem of what happens in consciousness comes to make itself heard and there is the problem of the mimicry between the unconscious and the preconscious. And again: "if we should consider the unconscious as the locus of the subject where something is profoundly restructured without the subject knowing it by the retroactive effects of the signifier implied in the word, it is in so far as and for the least of these words, that the subject speaks, that he can do no more than always once more name himself without knowing it and without knowing by what name." And finally "the status of the unconscious is established at a more radical level, the emergence of the act of enunciating." (173)

As the extimacy of her bodily fluids- her urine and menstrual blood which transgress the inside/outside boundaries in the most uncanny way in that they are something most intimate in the Real of the body yet stand for the most foreign in the Symbolic of the womanhood- disrupt her unconscious *remémoration*s and conscious memories that she tries to take hold of from time to time, alas in vain, the narration itself forms an extimate spatio-temporality which function in Mobian relationality: in technicality, the outside of the Symbolic language is traversed by the inner self-dialogue of Molly in its excelled form of stream of consciousness, while simultaneously, the externality of the Symbolic spatio-temporality is traversed by the extimate spatio-temporality that is created by the slips from the Real of Molly's *lalangue* into her act of enunciating. As such, it becomes possible to experience Molly's narration as an extimate readerly experience: the causality/linearity can follow a sometimes spiraling, sometimes traversing route from the looks of her maid in the first years of her marriage to graphic images of nuns

in photo bits, from her personal memories in Gibraltar as a young, blooming girl to her *remémoration*s of her first sexual rapports, almost always interrupted with a libidinal/bodily stimuli that brings uncanny material from the real of the body and/or the pre-symbolic which does not counteract the tempo/spatiality of the narration, nor does it create an secondary one, but beautifully traverses the Mobian layers of different temporal/spatial settings, Penelope's narration becoming an extimate spatio-temporality itself, which is pinned through the gates between the Lacanian registers of Symbolic, Imaginary and the Real via the affirmative nail-words of "yes".

Lastly, it can be concluded that the last two chapters of the novel display both the talent of Joyce in revealing the different discourses of the subject and how language can shape, hide and/ construct 'reality' in ways that alter/create peculiar spatio-temporalities. In an earlier schema published by Richard Ellmann it is stated under the "Vichian parallels" section that for Penelope the language is "vernacular (natural speech)" and for "Ithaca" it is "symbolic (geometry)" (*Ulysses* 181-3), while the techniques of these chapters are given in the Gilbert schema as "monologue (female)" and "catechism (impersonal)" (in Ellman187-l). Also in the same schema, the organ is stated as "skeleton" and the art "science" for the latter, whereas the organ is "flesh" for the former (art column is empty for "Penelope"). All these details are noteworthy in that they point to Joyce's meticulous planning in his endeavor to lay bare the different subject structures and the significance of language in their formation. Moreover, his choice to place the "Ithaca" chapter before the famous "Penelope" underlines the striking contrast between these two, highlighting the human mind's misguided illusion of employing, regulating and owning language in expressing what really goes on in one's psyche. As the reader passes from the overpopulated realm of facts and details of "Ithaca" to the floating, chaotic, unruly realm of Molly's half-awake state of mind, Joyce's narration shifts from the discourse of the subject-supposed-to-know to the bodily, extimate discourse of the split subject.

Fink states that science and scientific discourse do not take into consideration the post-Cartesian modern concept of the subject who is driven by not their reason but unconscious drives and desires:

> If science can be said to deal with the subject, it is only the conscious Cartesian subject, master of its own thoughts, whose thought is correlative to its being. Existing sciences certainly do not take into account the split subject for whom "I am where I am not thinking" and "I think where I am not". (*Lacanian* 140)

The cathetic language of "Ithaca" not only displays that such a discourse is doomed to fail against the conflicting predicament of the split subject, but also works against the promise of realism to represent the 'truth'. The whole chapter can be viewed as an attempt by Joyce to parody such a promise where the endless scientific data and rationalization processes produce sole knowledge which does not come anywhere near the 'truth' of the subject. That is one of the reasons why the episode is generally regarded by critics as an end which does not end anything. Neither Stephen nor Bloom find what they are looking for by the end of the episode and although Joyce regards this part as the ending of the novel, the last words are told by Molly, which counteracts the rational scientific Cartesian discourse in its fluid, erratic, bodily manner. As such, it can be argued that not only does Molly's inner monologue work as a representation of high modernism against the problematization of the pretentious parody of the realist narrative of the previous episode, but it also makes an analogy that places Molly's discourse as the discourse of the subject of enunciation that forms the upper chain in Lacan's graph of desire and "Ithaca" as that of the enunciated which forms the conscious, lower part of speech in the same graph. Therefore, it can be argued that these two episodes can be read as the discourses representing the Cartesian *cogito* and Lacanian *cogito* respectively. Dawson says that the *cogito* according to Lacan "provides 'the best inverse' to the status of the unconscious (...) understood in terms of the topology of the Möbius strip, a surface upon which it is impossible to have one without the other, conscious and the unconscious (37). As such, it can be concluded that the last narrative

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part by Molly is Joyce's attempt to represent the crossing over on the Möbius strip where the narration crosses over to something more intimately exterior.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

This study has set out to answer the question of how Joyce's *Ulysses* displays the writer's revolt against linearity and a Cartesian understanding of self via its form acting out its content, both of which reflect the *extimité* of the Möbian relation. It has been suggested that the peculiar relation of the characters in *Ulysses* to each other and to the external world finds its reflection in the Lacanian understanding of subjectivity and the concept of *extimité* as its defining characteristics. Lacanian theory of subjectivity makes it possible to explore the main characters of Stephen Dedalus, Leopold Bloom and Molly Bloom with regard to their relations to each other and the other characters drawing on their in(ability) to be positioned in the symbolic register. The problematization of language in terms of its constitutive effect in each of these characters' experience points to the fact that the (inter)subjective dynamics can shift momentarily depending on the subject's relation with the Other. Linearity emerges as the biggest illusion in the split speaking subject's floating universe: neither *lalangue* as the subject's language fused with pre-symbolic material, nor the subjective *jouissance* the *parlêtre* achieves through language can account for a meaningful, mutual communication between subjects. Language comes from the Other, it is that kills the subject to give them life, yet it always stumbles upon the pre-symbolic material that discloses itself through the language of drives, drives *qua* voice and gaze that emerge in Joyce's writing. The *parlêtre* is spoken in the gap between their desires and their misconception of the real of spatio-temporality where they believe they lacked a *lack*. Such a reading generates space that enables one to analyze the fantasies, wishes and affects of the Joycean characters in their *extimité*, and reveal how the most intimate can be the most exterior or how the most foreign can lie at the heart of subjectivity

simultaneously. From a Lacanian point of view, this study discusses that it is the unconscious that speaks, and the unconscious is neither interior nor intimate: it is a relation of *extimité* that defies the linear temporality or Euclidian spatial coordinates, working in its own Möbian spatio-temporality which challenges any chronological history. The discussion of the novel has shown that there is no structural progress in the character's journey from childhood to adulthood as the cause *qua* the real of trauma does not work in a chronological or causal manner but in a retrospective fashion, which defies Cartesian logic in that it disrupts any possibility of teleology. The subject is always-already called by the Other in the logical temporality of subjectivity and their memories are shaped through a tension between the *tuché* of the real and the *automaton* of the symbolic. Such a relation of *extimité* also makes it possible to comprehend the modernist obsession with time and language in the quest for the representation of the subjective experience.

This study has laid bare how the ground on which Joyce built his *sinthome* and name becomes the ground that forms the extimate relations in the textual spatio-temporality of *Ulysses*. Lacan's reading of Joyce suggests that the author was able to turn his *sinthome* into his name and manage the economy of his *jouissance* through his writing. The hermeneutical framework of *extimité* in this study interprets Lacan's comment on Joyce as Joyce's endeavor to translate 'the most intimate yet exterior' into 'the most external yet from within', that is, his attempt to translate the discourse of the unconscious into the symbolic. The discussion of the novel points to a similarity between Lacan's theories on Joyce and the predicament of the characters: there appears to be a tension repeatedly felt at certain points in the text that point to the character's anxiety about a discontinuum, or a break, a non-referential relation between what they experience and what they know. That is, the language of *Ulysses* telling the stories of its characters is driven by the energy to translate an ontological experience into an epistemological register. This study suggests that this attempt is a common anxiety that

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underlines the modern human condition, expressed by the modernist writers', particularly Joyce's, obsession and sensitivity about the representation of multiple subjectivities, non-linear spatio-temporalities and a quest for innovative language games, stylistics and techniques. The findings of this study suggests that both Joyce's and *Ulysses's* success in such an extimate translation lies in their ability to traverse the Möbian relation in the passage from the internal to the external, from the intimate to the foreign. *Ulysses* is the actualization the Joycean *sinthome* in managing to achieve what Joyce achieved, that is to enable a transition between the registers without leaving the same surface; to do what the Möbius relation does and to do it as the Möbius relation does.

This study has taken extimate relations as the characteristics of the Lacanian definition of subjectivity. This approach suggests that the question that carries significance in Lacan's theories has shifted from the topography of the Freudian unconscious to the topology of the Lacanian unconscious for which the questions regarding where this unconscious lies is not as relevant or worthy of attention as is the question of how this unconscious functions so that the subject is spoken by language and controlled by something so foreign yet so intimate. In other words, *extimité* emerges as a mode of relation that nullifies the questions regarding the origin or telos of the subject and the causality dominating their deeds by underlining the peculiar relation that embodies the psychic and symbolic spatio-temporalities of the speaking subject's exterior intimacy and intimate exteriority regarding the dynamics of desire, fantasy, *sinthome* and the economy of *jouissance.*

The contribution of this dissertation to Joyce studies and studies on modernist texts in general would be the novel approach it aims to take in making a symptomatic reading of the novel not based on the problematization/analysis of the characters/the author but of language/*lalangue* which stands out as what makes both the psychic

material and its transliteration possible in Lacanian theory. Along with numerous studies that discuss the symptoms of the characters in Joyce's works from a psychoanalytical framework- Lacanian or otherwise, Lacan himself discusses the symptom and the Joycean *sinthome* in his seminar on Joyce from rather a limited viewpoint as the discussions either proceed with Lacan's diagnoses/contentions on Joyce depending on certain events recounted or phrases used in his novels, mostly in *Finnegans Wake*, taking what is on the page as Joyce's symptom/*sinthome*, or providing very few literary discussions/resolutions on the reasons of this symptom. This study hopes to contribute to Joycean scholarship by enabling a literary discussion on Joyce's *Ulysses* through a symptomatic reading where the symptom is the signifier itself. Signifier in Joyce emerges as an extimate relation which works as a means to transliterate the unconscious into symbolic codes and thus paradoxically functions as not an organizing principle that gives unity to the text, but as an organizing principle nonetheless in enabling both the unconscious/conscious and the transliteration in between possible.

In the light of the discussions made in this study, it becomes possible to argue that the modernist concerns of Joyce, as those of his contemporaries, which are imbued with a problematization and a challenge to the Enlightenment understanding of the self in its Cartesian linearity find its correspondence best in the Lacanian concept of *extimité*, which responds to both the paradoxical nature of human subjectivity and experience as relentlessly discussed as the subject matter of the works in modernist literature, and obsession and/or experimentation with language that is reflected in the stylistics of modernist writing. While there are many opposing ideas regarding the position of Lacan in the structuralist-poststructuralist and/or humanist/anti-humanist debate, regardless of the many paradoxical yet usually complementary changes and developments in Lacan's oeuvre throughout his career, this study argues that the theories of Lacan, especially with regard to the formation of subjectivity and language's

determining role in the different positions the subject assumes in the face of the O/other(s), respond to the modernist struggle both in discussing the shift in the epistemological and ontological categories represented in the works of the modernists, and in deciphering their reaction to realism as the reflection of the linear, causal, sequential understanding of temporality and language which functions on the level of Imaginary identifications that provide the reader with narcissistic/egoistic satisfaction.

In this respect, Lacan's concept of *extimité* emerges as a polyvalent tool as not only does it enable an analysis of the limitations that hinder the modernist subject from making sense in a strange reality where "the center cannot hold", but in the extension of the concept from a topological figure to a hermeneutic ground, it also grants a fresh means to discuss and interpret the modernist sensitivities, which in the case of *Ulysses*, present itself as an act of *extimité*, that is, an extimate relation between the content and the form. The concept is relevant to both the existential dilemma that the modern subject suffers from, and the inter/intrasubjective relations that one develops against the background of a failing language that never suffices to represent the human experience. The former dilemma positions the subject's semantic quest amidst the clash between the most intimate and the strange external, which finds its voice in the modernist predilection to narrate external reality from a subjective stance that is imbued with individual experience and unconscious desires. The latter is reflected in the modernists' linguistic overexertion to come up with new ways to narrate their sense of failure, which was initially met with a highly critical reaction for its unintelligible nature. The potential of Lacan's *extimité* to discuss both the content and the form of the modernist struggle proves it to be a promising and versatile tool in modernist literary studies.

As such, this study suggests that by borrowing a mode of thinking from Lacan regarding the topological relation of *extimité*, there opens a space for a new hermeneutics to interpret not only *Ulysses* but also other

modernist texts that share the same *zeitgeist* and similar concerns. Setting a model that allows for a new generic framework that enables the analysis of the extimate relationship within the text which treat form and content as co-existing on the same surface in the modern subject's repeated attempt to express the inexpressible would pave the way for a reconceptualization of Lacan's psychoanalytical concept into a literary mode of interpretation that connotes the modernist pre-occupation with the peculiarities regarding non-linear spatio-temporalities, flowing signifiers and subjects that exist upon the rock of a *lack*. This study has aimed to present a new set of vocabulary that would provide the means to interpret the modernist infatuation to transliterate a modern awareness of a foreign real that sleeps in the core of human subjectivity, an ontological experience that does not find its correspondence in the pre-existing epistemologies.

A possible lack in this study would be the question of where the reading process of such an extimate form of language, of *lalangue*, leaves the reader at. The 'affect' side of the readerly extimacy, that is, the intrasubjective processes and/or changes upon confronting the real of *Ulysses*, and of Joyce, has not been under the focus of this dissertation, and can be suggested for further studies on *Ulysses* as well as other modernist texts. Such a discussion of an extimate relation between the text and the reader in terms of how the extimacy of *lalangue* works on the affects of the reading subject, in other words, how, once again, what is most foreign interacts with and shapes the most intimate of the subject, and vice versa, can be an asset in interdisciplinary studies where the psychoanalytical and the literary meet, and help voice the human predicament against language and time clearer and louder.

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A. CURRICULUM VITAE

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WORK EXPERIENCE

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Gendarmerie and Coastguard Academy; Ankara, Turkey	English Instructor	2017-2019
TED University, English Language School, Ankara, Turkey	English Instructor	2013-2015
ASO Technical College, Ankara, Turkey	English Instructor	2012-2013
Middle East Technical University, Department of Foreign Language Education, Ankara, Turkey	Research Assistant	2007-2012
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PUBLICATIONS, PAPERS AND PRESENTATIONS

Korkmaz, Tuba. "Zadie Smith's *White Teeth*: A Multiple Play on the Concept of History". *22nd METU British Novelists Conference: Zadie Smith and Her Work,* Middle East Technical University, Ankara/Turkey, 26-27 March 2015.

Korkmaz, Tuba. "The Subversive Use of Fairy Tales and Myths in Liz Lochhead's "Three Twists"". *Post-Graduate Conference on English Literature and Translation Studies.* Çankaya University, Ankara, Turkey, 17-18 May 2012.

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EDITORSHIP

Elif Öztabak-Avcı, **F. Tuba Korkmaz Karaman**, Aslı Kutluk, Şule Okuroğlu Özün, eds. *Proceedings of the 20th METU British Novelists Conference: Salman Rushdie and His Work.* Kardelen Ofset,2013. (ISBN: 978-605-125-748-8)

CURRENT RESEARCH INTERESTS

Modernist Novel, Psychoanalytical Literary Theory and Criticism, Comparative Literature, Women's Studies.

B. TURKISH SUMMARY / TÜRKÇE ÖZET

The Little Review'da yayımlandığı ilk günden itibaren Joyce'un çağdaşları ve kamuoyu tarafından şiddetli tepki ve eleştirilere neden olan ve daha roman olarak yayımlanmadan yasaklanan *Ulysses*, birçok eleştirmen, filozof ve akademisyen tarafından edebiyat tarihinin en büyük romanlarından biri olarak kabul edilmiş, kamuoyunda pek çok kez dâhi ve şizofren olarak anılmasına rağmen, İrlandalı yazar ve eserleri üzerine farklı disiplinlerden ve alanlardan kişiler tarafından sayısız çalışma yapılmıştır. Sadece edebiyatçılar ya da Joyce'un deyimiyle 'profesörler' değil, Carl Gustave Jung, Jacques Derrida, Frederic Jameson ve Jacques Lacan gibi pek çok önemli kuramcı onu çalışmalarının odağına almıştır. Modernist edebiyatın en tepe noktası addedilen *Ulysses* sorumlulukları ve istekleri arasında ya da psikanalitik terimlerle, bilinçli düşünceleri/eylemleri ve bilinçdışı dürtüleri ve arzuları arasında bölünmüş modern 'herkes'in hikayesidir. Roman, Lacancı tabirle, konuşan öznenin gerçeğin sürekli sızıntılarına karşı imgesel mevcudiyeti ile simgesel boyuttaki bölünmüş konumu açısından sorunsallaştırılmasını gösterir. *Ulysses* ve Joyce'un bu çıkmazı resmetmedeki becerisi, romanın bu anlatıyı bu tür dinamiklerin işleyişini taklit eden bir biçimde yapmasından, yani neyin nasıl anlatıldığının ayrılmaz bir tarzda aynı yüzeyde işlemesinden kaynaklanır. Anlatının dili ve kullanılan sayısız üslup/biçimsel teknikler içeriğin cisimleşmiş halidir, öyle ki zaman zaman birini diğeri olmadan analiz etmek imkânsız hale gelir. Aynı şekilde, romanın dil, zamansallık ve karakterlerin öznellikleri ile meşguliyeti, kendi başlarına ya da anlatımlarındaki biçimsel mekanizmalardan ayrı olarak ele alınamaz. Romanın biçimi ve içeriği arasındaki bu ilişki Lacancı konuşan öznenin ekonomisine hâkim olan ilişkidir: konuşan varlığın (*parlêtre*) har/iç/selliği[26] *Ulysses*'in har/iç/selliğinde yansıtılır. Özne ve dil arasındaki, arzu ve jouissance arasındaki, özne ve küçük a nesnesi (*objet a*) arasındaki har/iç/sel ilişki, *Ulysses*'te karşılığını karakterler

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[26] Lacan'da *extimité*- kendi çevirim.

arasındaki dinamiklerde, öznenin diğer özneler ve nesneler ile ilişkilerinde, doğum ve ölümlerle, din ve ırkla, mitler ve anti-kahramanlarla, mekânsal ve zamansal süreklilik/süreksizliklerle ilişkilerinde ve ayrıca yazar ve eseri ile eser ve okur arasındaki ilişkilerde bulur. *Ulysses*, içeriğini sahneleyen biçemiyle, aynı zamanda konuşan varlığın bedeni ile dil arasındaki har/iç/sel ilişkiyi de sahneleyen har/iç/selliğin kusursuz bir somutlaşmasıdır.

Bu çalışma, Lacan'ın hem öznelliği açıklamada topolojiye başvurduğu hem de gerçek olanın ve onun dille ilişkisinin/etkilerinin önemine ilgisinin arttığı son yıllarına vurgu yaparak, *Ulysses*'teki kendine özgü öznel konumları Lacancı bir çerçevede tartışmayı amaçlamaktadır. Lacan "Joyce the Symptom" (1975) üzerine dersler vermiş ve öznenin dille ilişkisini topolojik özellikler ve Borromean düğümü yardımıyla tartıştığı 1975-76'daki seminerini Joyce ve *Finnegans Wake*'e referansla *Le Sinthome* olarak adlandırılmıştır. Çok basit bir ifadeyle Lacan, Joyce'un sentomatik (*sinthomatique*) yazıları aracılığıyla kendine bir Ad inşa etmek suretiyle Baba'nın Ad'ından yoksunluğunu telafi ederek psikozdan kaçınabildiğini savunur. Lacan'ın sentomu Borromean düğümünün dördüncü halkası olarak iş görür ve aksi takdirde birbirinden ayrı düşecek olan imgesel, simgesel ve gerçek boyutlarını birbirine diker. Lacan'ın Joyce'a ve psikanalitik bir çerçevede Joyce'un yazdıklarına duyduğu ilgi, bu tezin temel amacı olmasa da Joyce mirasını Lacancı bir perspektiften inceleyen çalışmalar için başlı başına yeterli bir nedendir.

Bu çalışmanın Lacan ve Joyce'un eserleri arasındaki ilişkiyi analiz eden diğer pek çok tez, makale ve kitapla paylaştığı ortak nokta, Joyce yazınının dilin kendine özgü kullanımı aracılığıyla öznenin temsili ve özne-içi/özneler-arası ilişkiler açısından kendisini Lacancı bir okumaya açtığı yönündeki yadsınamaz önermedir. Öte yandan, bu çalışma James Joyce'un eserlerinden hareketle kişisel bir analizine girişmemekte ya da bunu desteklememektedir. Lacan'ın ya da takipçilerinin Joyce hakkındaki teorileri, Joyce'un eserleri ile yazarlığı arasında bir ilişki

ortaya koydukları ya da *sinthome*, *lalangue* ya da *nomination* gibi Lacancı psikanalitik kavramların oluşmasına ve gelişmesine yardımcı oldukları ölçüde kullanılmaktadır. Bu çalışmanın Joyce'un *Ulysses*'ini analiz etmek için Lacancı çerçeveyi tercih etmesinin temel nedeni, daha sonraki Lacan teorilerinin, özellikle de Möbius şeridi, torus ve Borromean düğümü topolojisinde tasvir edilen ilişkilerin, yalnızca öznelliğin yapısını ve dil ve zamansallıkla ilişkisini açıklamakla kalmayıp romanın hem içeriğinin hem de biçiminin işleyişini göstermelerinde yatmaktadır. Har/iç/sellik, Lacancı kuramda uzam-zamansal ya da topolojik ilişkiyi ifade eder ve Lacan'ın takipçilerinin çalışmalarında diğer kavramlar arasında hak ettiği yeri bulamamış nispeten yeni bir kavram olsa da, doğrusallığın dinamiklerini bozan kendine özgü ilişkisi ve bunun alt kümeleri olan nedensellik, ardışıklık, ilerleme, göndergesellik vb. açısından Joyce'un eserlerinin Lacancı bir okumasının yapılabileceği en uygun zemin olarak öne çıkar. Har/iç/sellikte somutlaşan Möbian ilişki, iç/dış ve mahrem/yabancı ile başlayan ikilikler arasındaki karşıtlığı ortadan kaldırmakla kalmaz, Kartezyen epistemoloji ve onun edebi alandaki yansıması olan realizmden post-Kartezyen öznellik anlayışına ve yüksek modernizme geçişin somutlaşmasına da yardımcı olur. Bu nedenle Kartezyen mantığın doğrusallığına Joyce'un eserlerindeki, özellikle de *Ulysses*'teki har/iç/sel ilişkiler tarafından meydan okunmaktadır, ancak Joyce'un Lacancı analizi üzerine yapılan akademik çalışmaların çoğunda asıl vurgu *Finnegans Wake* romanına yapılmaktadır. Bu çalışmanın Joyce'un *Ulysses*'ine odaklanmasının temel sebebi *Finnegans Wake*'in Lacancı bir okumaya elverişli birincil metin olduğu yanılgısıdır. Joyce'un *opus magnum*'u olan *Finnegans Wake*, sadece Lacan'ın Joyce okumasında ve onun sentomatik yazımını analiz etmesinde çıkış noktası olduğu için değil, aynı zamanda geleneksel bir olay örgüsü ve zaman çizelgesinin olmaması, Joyce tarafından oluşturulan kendine özgü dil, anlatının ve karakterlerin döngüsel yapısı vb. gibi yenilikleri nedeniyle de birçok Lacancı için ilgi odağı olmuştur. Dahası, Joyce yazınının şeceresinin izini sürerken, yazarın *Dublinliler*, *Stephen Hero* ve *Sanatçının Bir Genç Adam Olarak Portresi* gibi önceki eserlerini

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gerçekçiliğin, *Ulysses*'i modernizmin ve *Finnegans Wake*'i postmodernist araç ve tekniklerin egemenliği altında sınıflandırma eğilimi vardır. Bu durum, *Finnegans Wake*'in Joyce'un doğrusallığın bağlarını yıktığı tek eser olduğu yargısıyla sonuçlanan bir kafa karışıklığına yol açmış olabilir. Joyce'un tüm eserlerinde farklı derecelerde doğrusallığa başkaldırdığını savunan bu çalışma, *Ulysses* romanını, Kartezyen epistemolojinin anahtar kelimesi olan doğrusallık kavramının ve bu kavramın tüm alt kümelerinin Joyce'un elinde bir oyuncağa dönüştüğü, Joyce'un olası tüm biçim ve üslupları yan yana getirerek ve İmgesel Gerçek'ten gelen akışı Simgesel olana tercüme etmeyi başararak özne ve dil arasındaki yakın ilişkiyi ortaya koyduğu bir roman olarak görmektedir.

Bu çalışma, Joyce'un Kartezyen epistemolojiden radikal bir şekilde ayrılmasının ve ona meydan okumasının edebi yansımalarını tartışmak için temel olarak Lacancı psikanalitik teoriyi takip etmektedir. Bu nedenle, bölümlerde kullanılan birçok özel terim vardır. İkinci bölümde, Joyce'un kariyeri boyunca terminolojisinde ve belirli kavramların önceliklendirilmesinde önemli bir dalgalanma gösteren Lacancı epistemolojinin oldukça karmaşık ve çoklu anlamlarını ve ilişkilerini kolaylaştırmak için teorik bir giriş yapılmıştır. Bu çalışmanın ana ilham kaynağı Lacan'ın kariyerinin son kısmındaki teorilerinden kaynaklansa ve bu teorilerini takip etmeye çalışsa da, psikanalitik çerçevesinin temelini oluşturan ilk yıllarından birçok kavram, Lacan'ın teorilerinin gelişiminin, vurguyu simgesel ya da imgesel olanın baskınlığından, gerçek olanın öznenin kendisiyle, diğer özneler ve nesnelerle, dille ve öznel süreçlerin uzam-zamansallığıyla ilişkilerinde yadsınamaz bir etki olarak ortaya çıktığı üç düzen arasındaki karşılıklı ilişkiye kaydırdığı son seminerlere giden yolu nasıl açtığını tasvir etmek amacıyla kullanılmıştır. Bu çalışmada kullanılan Lacancı terminoloji, bunlarla sınırlı olmamakla birlikte, *lalangue*, *sinthome*, *jouissance*, *objet a*, Babanın Adı, Ad atama (*nomination*), gösteren, üç düzen, *point de capitone*, mantıksal zaman, senkroni ve diyakroni vb. içerir. Lacan diğer düşünce alanlarından pek çok terim ödünç aldığı için, Lacancı

terminolojide dilbilim, felsefe, matematik (özellikle küme teorisi) veya topoloji ile ortak pek çok kavram bulunabilir. Bu tür kullanımlarda, farklılık metin içinde veya dipnotlarda vurgulanmıştır. Ayrıca, Lacan 60'lı yılların ortalarına kadar tüm eserlerini Freud'a dayandırdığı için, ego, tekinsizlik (*uncanny*), bilinç öncesi, birincil ve ikincil süreçler gibi birçok Freudyen kavram, Lacancı çerçevedeki önemlerine veya değişimlerine dikkat edilerek kullanılmıştır. Son olarak, bu çalışmanın kompozisyonunu belirleyen Lacancı har/iç/sellik kavramı, kuram bölümünde ayrı bir alt başlık altında tanımlanmıştır.

Bu çalışma *Ulysses*'in har/iç/selliğini dil, öznellik ve zamansallık başlıkları altında tartışmak üzere yola çıkmaktadır. Bu başlıklar yalnızca edebi (yüksek) modernizmin ve özelde Joyce'un başlıca uğraşları oldukları için değil, aynı zamanda kabaca 19. yüzyılın son çeyreği ve 20. yüzyılın ilk çeyreğinde yaşayan pek çok kişi gibi Joyce'u da etkileyen epistemolojik değişimin kırılma noktaları olarak ortaya çıktıkları için seçilmiştir. Endüstri, teknoloji, bilim, ekonomi, felsefe, din ve bunların pratik hayattaki sosyal, kültürel ve edebi izdüşümlerinde kol kola giden değişimle birlikte, Joyce'un içine doğduğu bu sahneye, bu çalışmanın Kartezyen epistemolojinin anahtar kelimesi olarak aldığı doğrusallıktaki kırılma damgasını vurmuştur.

Her alanda hayal kırıklığının, umudun ve değişimin çağı olan 20. yüzyıl, insana dair her şeyi anlatmak üzere yola çıkan edebiyat alanında, bir yandan ideoloji-bilim ve teknolojinin, diğer yandan siyaset ve cinayetin elindeki görülmemiş ilerleme ve çöküş hızı, diğer yandan da tüm bu eşzamanlı değişimleri içeriden ifade etmenin imkânsızlığı nedeniyle özellikle karmaşık bir dönem olarak öne çıkıyor. Modern/ist yazarın krizin ortasında deneyimini dile getirme ve bundan bir anlam çıkarma çabası (ya da güdüsü), Katolik bir dünya görüşü ve klasik edebi mirasla yetişmiş, modern bir metropolde yaşayan, sadece mitler, tarih ve zengin bir kültürel bilince değil, aynı zamanda siyasi, sosyal ve kültürel özgürlük için sürekli bir eylem isteğine ve ötekinin dilinde yazma mecburiyetine sahip İrlandalı bir yazar olan James Joyce'un eserlerinde

derin izler bırakır. Dinamikleri fazlasıyla hissedilen ama henüz adlandırılmamış post-Kartezyen bir dünyada, Joyce'un ne doğduğu yüzyılda hüküm süren önceki epistemolojilere ne de onların edebiyattaki temsili karşılığı olan gerçekçiliğe ait olamaması, eserlerinde Kartezyen epistemolojide merkezi bir unsur olarak öne çıkan doğrusallığa karşı isyanına işaret eder. Zamansallık, dil ve öznellik, James Joyce'un kurmacasında gerçekliği yeniden yapılandırdığı araçlardır ve modernist sanatının içeriğinin dil ve biçem yoluyla sahnelenmesi, yazarın bunların önceki anlamlarını sorunsallaştırması / alaşağı etmesi yoluyla gerçekleşir.

19. ve 20. Yüzyıllarda yaşanan değişimler, Aydınlanma epistemolojisinde ve modernist sanatın gelişmesi için uygun zemini hazırlayan 'Kartezyen benlik/özne'de yaşanan kırılmaların hem etkileri hem de sinyalleriydi. Terry Eagleton'ın belirttiği gibi, modernizm

> modernitenin belirli bir anını, kabaca klasik *laissez-faire*'den uluslararası tekelci kapitalizme geçiş anını, emperyal savaşlar ve siyasi ayaklanmalar anını, toplumsal kriz ve çalkantı anını, tüm bunların elbette modernist sanatın kendisi tarafından coşkulu ya da kasvetli bir şekilde kaydedildiği bir anı ele alır ve Avrupa'daki yüksek modernizm yıllarının aynı zamanda 'yüksek liberal aydınlanmış modernite' içindeki çatlak yılları olduğunu belirtir. ("Contradictions" 38)[27]

Eski epistemolojik ilkeler çöktükçe, bireyin eski gerçeklik anlayışı ve algısı da çöktü ve daha önce sorgulanamayan epistemolojik ve ontolojik 'hakikatlerin' ölümü, birçok mitin ölümüyle paralel hale geldi. Jane Flax'ın önerdiği gibi, postmodernist retoriğin önemli argümanlarından biri şudur: "Batı kültürü, bunu inkâr etmekte olsa da, birbiriyle ilişkili bir dizi ölümü deneyimlemek üzeredir ya da zaten deneyimlemiştir. Bunlar İnsanın, Tarihin ve Metafiziğin ölümleridir " (*Thinking* 32). Bu ölümlerin yaygın olarak fark edilmesi ve kınanması postmodernizme atfedilse de, ayak sesleri 19. yüzyılın başlarında, hatta Nietzsche'nin 1882'de *The Gay Science* adlı eserinde Tanrı'nın ölümüne dair ünlü

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[27] Yabancı kaynaklardan alınan tüm alıntıların çevirileri tarafıma aittir.

duyurusundan önce bile duyulmuştur. Bu nedenle, Flax'ın ifadesini takip ederek, postmodernizm/post-modernizm *post-mortem* ile ilgileniyorsa, modernizmin *ante-mortem* olduğunu iddia etmek mümkündür; bu bağlamda modernizm ölümcül yara, acı, hayatta kalmak için umutsuz çaba olarak karşımıza çıkar. Bu kaotik aşama, bu epistemolojik kayma, daha sonra Derrida, Foucault, Deleuze ve Lyotard gibi postmodernist filozoflar tarafından birçok üst anlatının (en başta Aydınlanma'nınki olmak üzere) çöktüğü bir çağ olarak teşhis ve analiz edilecek olan insanlığın ilerleme ve çöküşünün bu 20. yüzyılı, Joyce ve diğer modernistlerin eserlerini ürettikleri sırada aslında 'yaşanmaktaydı'. O halde onların deneyimi, kendilerinden önce ya da sonra yaşayanlardan farklı olarak, her şeyden önce özünde imkânsız bir deneyimdi: Adını koyamadıkları şeyi, kendilerini rahat hissetmedikleri bir dilde ifade etmek ya da Lyotard'ın deyişiyle 'sunulamaz olanı' sunmak (71-82). Adına ister jouissance ister 'yüce' densin, modern yaşam karşısında, çöken epistemin gölgesinde ve dünyanın tanık olduğu/olacağı en korkunç savaşların ortasında, nasıl anlamlandıracaklarını bilemeseler de, hem acı hem de sevinci eşzamanlı olarak yaşıyorlardı ve her ne kadar tekinsiz olsa da, anlamlandırma yetileri bir dereceye kadar hala sağlam kalabilmiş olan bir önceki kuşaktan farklı bir deneyim yaşıyorlardı. Bireyin bilinci üzerinde tek otorite ve kontrol sahibi olduğu bir dünya imgesinin ortadan kalkmasıyla birlikte sanatçının yeni 'gerçekliği' dini inancın kaybı, bilinçdışının bilinmeyen, kontrolsüz ve fethedilmemiş bölgeleri, büyük kentlerindeki yalnızlaşmış ama entelektüel açıdan besleyici yaşam, siyaset, ekonomi ve dinin artık umut vaat etmeyen söylemleriydi. Bu nedenle, modernist hareket özünde Aydınlanma projesinin öncüllerine ve değerlerine ve onun biçimsel edebi temsili olarak gerçekçiliğe bir saldırı olsa da, modernizmin gerçekliği temsil etmeye çalışmadığını ya da estetiğinin gerçeklikten kopuk olduğunu iddia etmek çok yanıltıcı olacaktır. Modernist sanatçının amacı öncekilerden farklı değildi: Hâlâ gerçekliği temsil etmek için yazıyorlardı ama hem gerçeklik hem de onu algılama biçimleri değişmişti. Böylece, önceki söylemsel üslup kendilerini ifade etme çabalarında yetersiz kaldığından, "temsil krizi"

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içinde debelenen bu sanatçılar estetik gerçekçilikten uzaklaşarak, daha sonra "yüksek modernizm" olarak adlandırılacak olan anti-realist tekniklere, dile ve bağlamlara yöneldiler. Ancak, gerçekliği kavramak ve sunmak hâlâ arzularıydı, ve tıpkı kaybın yerine anlamlı bir şey koymayı amaçlayan diğer tüm 'arzular' gibi karşılanması imkânsızdı; ve geride bıraktıkları gerçekliğe kıyasla onların gerçeklikleri artık daha karmaşık, parçalı, güvensiz, öznel, çoklu idi, ve doğrusal değildi. Bu yeni gerçekliği ifade etme arayışı yeni bir dilde/poetikada biçimini buldu: bilinç akışı, iç monologlar, parçalılık, dil oyunları, ritmik oyunlar ve öz-bilinçli dil ve sanat.

Dolayısıyla bu çalışma, Joyce'un bir önceki yüzyılın gerçekçiliğinin aksine yüksek modernizminin, onun çizgiselliğe ve Kartezyen benlik anlayışına karşı başkaldırısından ayrı tutulamayacağını öne sürmektedir. Joyce, modern insanlık durumunun antik hikâyesini anlattığı sözcüklerini daha önce görülmemiş bir üslupla örerek dilde ontolojik bir alan yaratmayı başarmıştır. Öznelliğin bu yeni temsili ve öznenin özündeki boşluk etrafında örülen ilişkiler, en iyi şekilde, teorilerini bir eksiklik etrafında inşa eden Lacancı bir çerçevede analiz edilebilir. Bu nedenle, bu çalışma *Ulysses*'te Joyce yazımının belirleyici özelliğinin har/iç/sellik olduğunu savunmakta ve James Joyce'un *Ulysses*'te har/iç/sel bir öznellik, dil ve zamansallık anlayışı tasvir ederek doğrusallığın dinamiklerini nasıl bozduğunu analiz etmeyi ve gerçekliği yeniden yapılandırmasının içerik ve biçemi har/iç/sel ilişkileri içinde kullanmasına nasıl yansıdığını deşifre etmeyi amaçlamaktadır.

Edebiyat eleştirisinde (psikanalitik yaklaşım ve uygulama dışında) genellikle yapısalcı-postyapısalcı tartışmalar çerçevesinde incelenen Lacan'ın kuramları, Joyce'un *Ulysses*'i ve bu eserde sunulan ve vurgulanan modernist duyarlılıkların tartışılması için verimli bir zemin sunmaktadır. Joyce'un öznenin içinde bulunduğu durumu ve modern özne hakkındaki gözlemleri ve kaygıları ile edebi temsildeki 'yeni' gerçekliğe tepkisi, psikanalitik alanda Lacan'ın " paradoksu (paradoksal

bir şekilde) neredeyse bir hakikat ölçütü olarak ele alan, insan deneyiminin paradoksal doğasını benzersiz bir şekilde takdir eden" teorileriyle eşleşir, ve "Lacan'ın genel düşünme tarzının temel doğası ve en temel entelektüel taahhütleri ve katkıları, esasen modernist bir duyarlılığın ifadeleri olarak anlaşılabilir" (Sass 409,10). Lacan'ın öznelliğin temel taşı olarak dile, anlamlandırmanın temel unsurları olarak metafor ve metonime, aşk ve arzuya yaptığı vurgu Joyce'un yazılarında hem anlatı biçimi hem de konu bakımından doğrulanır. Joyce'un karakterlerini kendileriyle, bedenleriyle ve diğerleriyle ilişkili olarak ele alması ve öznenin farklı Ötekiler karşısında aldığı farklı konumları betimleyen sosyal alışverişlere ve cinsel ilişkilere yaptığı vurgu, bilinçdışının öznesini arzu, eksiklik ve jouissance tarafından yönlendirilen bölünmüş bir konuşma öznesi olarak ele alan Lacancı öznellik teorileriyle uyumludur. Joyce'un Tanrı, İrlandalılık ya da Yahudilik, evlilik, başarı, güzellik gibi birçok ana göstergenin altını oyması ve 'gerçekliği' parçalanmış ve öznel olarak betimlemesi, Lacan'ın söylemler üzerine argümanlarında karşılığını bulur. Lacan'ın geç yıllarındaki topolojik çalışmaları sadece dışa dönük öznel ve özneler arası oluşumlar ve ilişkiler için değil, aynı zamanda Joyce'un *Ulysses*'inin ve 16 Haziran 1904 Dublin'inin özünde bulunan uzamsal-zamansal dışa dönüklük için de geçerlidir.

Modern bir özne ve modernist bir yazar olarak Joyce, çağdaşları gibi, "önce Aydınlanma ve Aydınlanma sonrası rasyonalizm ve bilimciliğin doğasında var olan tutarlılık talepleri, ve daha sonra (daha sınırlı ve muğlak bir ölçüde de olsa) sentez ve birlik kavramlarına yönelik Romantik ve post-Romantik arzu tarafından büyük ölçüde bir kenara itilmiş olan" (Sass 415) insan tabiatı ve durumunun paradoksal doğası konusunda hem sıkıntılı hem de bunları analiz ve tasvir etmek için sabırsızdı. Sass'ın ileri sürdüğü gibi, Lacan'ın modernizmi, "insan varoluşunu tanımlayan üç çatışan ancak birbirine bağlı modalite veya 'kayıt'" (426), arzu ve dil ilişkisi ve bunların Öteki'ne bağımlılığı ve öznenin kendi semptomatik çabalarının sınırları içinde üstesinden gelmeye çalıştığı 'gerçeklik' ve Gerçek arasındaki çatışmanın baskınlığı

ile temsil edilen insan öznelliğinin dinamikleri üzerine geliştirdiği teorilerinde ortaya çıkar. Lacan'ın İmgesel, Simgesel ve Gerçek olarak adlandırdığı üç düzenle ilişkili olarak "öz-bilinç, dil, ölümlülüğün farkındalığı" üzerine yaptığı vurgu, "benzersiz insani arzu biçimleriyle bağlantılı olan farklı bir Varlık tarzını" ve Kartezyen özne anlayışının aksine dile, ötekine/Ötekine ve ölümlülüğe bağımlı olan insan öznelliğinin ve deneyiminin biricikliğini temsil eder ve onu "anti-hümanist bir pozisyonu benimsemekten çok uzak" (438) olan kendine özgü modernist bir konuma yerleştirir. Bu tuhaf modernizm, Joyce'unki ile aynı dalga boyuna düşüyor gibi görünmektedir; Joyce'un modernizmi dile, özellikle kelime oyunlarına, metaforlara, yansıma sözcüklere (*onomatopoeia*) (Lacan'ın da paylaştığı bir özellik), zamansallığa ve insanın özneler-arasılığının ve deneyiminin zamansal doğasına ve öznenin öteki/Öteki(ler) karşısında aldığı farklı konumlarını yansıtmaya yönelik tutkusuyla yüksek modernist hareket içinde benzersiz bir vaka olarak öne çıkmaktadır. Bu nedenle, Lacan'ın kendine özgü modernizmi, Joyce'un eserlerinde temsil edilen, aynı hassasiyetleri ve paradoksları paylaşan ve bunları ontolojik, psikanalitik ve hatta *linguisteric*[28] açılardan açıklayan uygun ve ustaca (*daedalian*) bir araç olarak ortaya çıkmaktadır.

Har/iç/sellik hem özsel bir bölünmeyle işaretlenen Lacancı öznenin hem de bütünlüğü böyle bir başkalıkla, yani mahrem bir dışsallıkla, dışsal bir yakınlıkla işaretlenen Joyce dünyasının temel bir özelliğidir. Har/iç/sel kelimesi, yani Fransızca orijinalinde *extimité* (İngilizceye extimacy olarak çevrilmiştir) Lacan tarafından 'yakınlık, içsel, mahrem' anlamlarına gelen *intimité* ve 'dış, harici' anlamlarına gelen *exterieur* terimlerinden türetilmiş bir neolojizmdir. Lacan bu kelimeyi ilk olarak *Seminer VII, Psikanalizin Etiği*'nde (1959-1960) Şey'in (*das Ding*) har/iç/selliğinden bahsetmek için kullanmıştır. Daha sonra, *Seminer*

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[28] Lacan'ın dilin bilinçdışı-öznenin oluşumundaki rolünü vurgulamak amacı ile birkaç farklı kelimeyi birleştirerek oluşturduğu *linguisterie* kavramına atıfta bulunulmaktadır. Bkz: *Seminar XX,* s.15.

XVI'da (1968-1969), aynı kavram jouissance ve *objet a*'nın özellikleri olarak har/iç/sel (*extime*) şeklinde sıfat formunda kullanılır. Terim, Lacan tarafından yaygın olarak kullanılan diğer terminolojiye kıyasla oldukça düşük bir kullanım sıklığına sahip olsa da, hem öznenin topolojisinin hem de arzunun dinamiklerinin temel özelliği olduğu için özellikle geç dönem Lacan topolojisinde büyük öneme sahiptir. Lacan'ın editörü Jacque- Alain Miller, hir/iç/selliği "konuşan varlığın (*parlêtre*) yapısal bir özelliği" olarak görür ve "bu terimi bir eklemlenmeye, bir yapıya dönüştürmeyi, onu bir S1 olarak üretmeyi" ("Extimité" 74) görev edinerek 1985-86 akademik yılında Paris Vlll Üniversitesi psikanaliz bölümünde, Lacan'ın bu terimi "simgesel olanın içindeki gerçek olanı sorunlu bir şekilde belirtmek için" (75) kullandığına inandığı için "dilin dil olmayanla, yani Simgesel olanın Gerçek olanla ilişkisini içeren özne ile öteki olan arasındaki paradoksal ilişkiyi" (2) daha fazla araştırmak üzere bir ders verdi.

Pavón-Cuéllar'ın öne sürdüğü gibi, har/iç/sellik eleştirel psikolojide dışsallık ile psişik içsellik veya yakınlık arasındaki geleneksel psikolojik ayrımı sorunsallaştırmak, sorgulamak, meydan okumak ve hatta reddetmek ve ötesine geçmek amacıyla kullanılabilir. Psikolojiyi kesen ve oluşturan bu temel ayrım ve bunun sonucunda ortaya çıkan sabit kavramsal ikilikler yerine, har/iç/sellik, dışardaki ve en derin içerideki, dış dünya ve öznenin iç dünyası, kültür ve kişiliğin özü, sosyal ve zihinsel, yüzey ve derinlik, davranış ve düşünceler veya duygular gibi ikili terimler arasındaki ayrımın olmadığını ve temel özdeşliği gösterir. (Ansiklopedi 661)

Bu çalışma, Lacan'ın öznellik üzerine kuram ve topolojisinde har/iç/sellik terimini anlamlandırmasından yola çıkarak ve Jacques Alain-Miller ve Ellie Ragland gibi diğer eleştirmenlerin yardımıyla, bu terimi, Joyce'un *Ulysses*'ini, söz konusu har/iç/selliğin çeşitli şekillerde kaleme alındığı bir sanat eseri olarak tartışırken anahtar bir kavram olarak kullanmayı amaçlamaktadır. *Ulysses*'i Lacancı har/iç/sellik kavramı üzerinden okumak, romana yeni bir hermenötik atfetmeyi

mümkün kılar; burada biçem konunun dışavurumudur ve kitabın içeriğinde ifade edilen doğrusal olmama durumu, kullanılan üslup tarafından taklit edilir. Bu ikiye katlanmış etki, biçemde, Joyce'un Möbius şeridindeki bir taraftan diğerine bükülmenin aynı yüzey üzerinde gerçekleştiği dönüm noktaları olarak kullandığı bilinç akışı, serbest dolaylı konuşma, iç monolog, tekrarlama, hatta *Ulysses*'in bir bölümünü İngiliz edebiyatının önde gelen yazarlarının farklı üsluplarıyla anlatma gibi çok sayıda edebi aracın kullanılmasıyla verilir. Bu haliyle James Joyce'un biçembilimi de har/iç/sel niteliktedir: Joyce, romanlarındaki iç/dış ikiliğini, bilinçdışının 'içselliği' ile fiziksel dünyanın 'dışsallığı' arasındaki sınırı yıkarak, bu tür biçemsel araçların yarattığı dönüşler ile kat edilen bir Möbius üzerinde onları aynı yüzeyin parçaları haline getirdiği birçok yeni modernist teknik kullanarak kırar.

Bu çalışmanın ikinci bölümünde verilen teorik altyapıda hem Kartezyen epistemolojinin, Aydınlanmanın ve anahtar kavramlarının anlamı üzerine, hem de Lacan'ın özne anlayışının dil ve zamansallık ile olan ilişkisi ve bu ilişkiyi niteleyen har/iç/sellik kavramı üzerine ayrıntılı bilgi verilmiştir. Kartezyen epistemoloji, Kartezyen düalizm veya Kartezyen metafizik, özellikle 20. ve 21. yüzyıllarda edebiyat eleştirisinde sıklıkla kullanılan ifadelerden bazılarıdır. Ancak 'Kartezyen epistemoloji' yalnızca Fransız filozof Rene Descartes'a ait fikirlere atıfta bulunmaz. Daha ziyade, belirli bir düşünce tarzını oluşturan, belirli bir ideolojinin beslenmesine ve güçlenmesine yol açan, kabaca Descartes'ın zihin ve bedenin ayrı ve farklı tözler olduğu ve zihnin kontrol edebilen olduğu için bedenden önce ve üstün olduğu argümanı altında genelleştirilebilecek bir dizi fikri ifade etmek için kullanılır. Doğal olarak, Descartes'tan önce ve sonra, birçok epistemolojik ve ontolojik meseleye ilişkin görüşleri Descartes'ınkilerle örtüşen veya karşı çıkan, dolayısıyla bir şekilde bu teorileri etkileyen veya onlardan etkilenen birçok filozof, bilim insanı ve düşünür olmuştur. Bununla birlikte, bu çalışmada 'Kartezyen epistemoloji' terimi kullanıldığında, ne Descartes'ın eserlerinden çıkarılabilecek kişisel zihin felsefesi ne de eserlerinde Descartes'a atıfta bulunan veya ondan etkilendiğini kabul eden

takipçileri kastedilmektedir. Bu çalışmada terimin işaret ettiği şey, daha ziyade, başlangıçta Descartes'ın eserlerinde rasyonelleştirilen ve daha sonra Aydınlanma ile birlikte yalnızca felsefede değil, pratik insan yaşamında da görünmez, 'muzaffer', baskın, 'normal' düşünce tarzı haline gelecek kadar gelişen ideolojidir.

'Aydınlanma' tartışmalı bir terimdir ve diğer tüm kavramlar gibi anlamı önemli ölçüde değişir, kullanıldığı söyleme/disipline göre olumlu ya da olumsuz çağrışımlar taşır. Bu tez, Aydınlanma'yı belirli siyasi, sosyal, ekonomik ve felsefi ideallerin felsefe, sosyal bilimler, doğa bilimleri, kilise, iş ve siyaset üretim biçimleri aracılığıyla pekiştirildiği ve tüm bunların sanata yansıdığı/sanattan beslendiği bir süreç olarak ele almaktadır. Kısalık ve netlik adına bu çalışmada Jane Flax'ın 'Aydınlanma hikayesinin' ana temaları ve karakterleri listesi (*Thinking* 30-1) bir başlangıç noktası olarak kabul edilmiştir. Flax'ın listesi, elbette çoğaltılabilecek ve dallanıp budaklandırılabilecek sekiz ana özellik/tema içermektedir, ancak yalnızca bu çalışma için yüksek öneme sahip olanlar ayrıntılı olarak ele alınacaktır.

Öncelikle Aydınlanma, akıl ve irade yoluyla kendini ve doğayı kavrama ve yönetme konusunda ustalaşmış "tutarlı, istikrarlı bir benlik (yazar)" fikrini dayatır. Tüm dünyevi ve metafizik olguların anlamlandırılabileceği bir araç haline gelen akıl, yeni ana göstergedir ve 'rasyonel insan' daha önce Tanrı imgesine hiç bu kadar yakın olmamıştır. İkincisi, felsefenin/filozofun "ayrıcalıklı bir hikâye anlatma kipi", eleştirmen/yargıç, ve "bilgiyi ve tüm hakikat iddialarını yargılamak için nesnel, güvenilir ve evrenselleştirilebilir bir 'temel'" olarak ayrıcalıklı konumudur (Flax 30). Aydınlanma ideolojisinin beslediği üçüncü ideal, kendi kendine yeten, sabit, ebedi ve 'gerçek' olan "belirli bir hakikat kavramıdır (kahraman)". Aydınlanma'da 'Hakikat' felsefe ve bilim yoluyla keşfedilebilir ve evrensel olarak uygulanabilirdi, bu nedenle bu felsefe uyumsuzlukları 'hakikat dışı' olarak marjinalleştirdi, her zaman 'doğru' ayağının 'diğerine' hükmetmesiyle sistemin işlevselliğini sağlayan ikiliklerle sonuçlandı. Bir diğer özellik de akıl ve ilerleme arasında özel

bir ilişki olduğunu öne süren "kendine özgü bir siyaset felsefesi (ahlak)" olarak ortaya çıkar. Akıl yürütme bilgiye götürür, bu da meşru iktidarın hizmetinde özgürlüğe ve ilerlemeye götürür, sadece siyasi otoriteyi değil, aynı zamanda bireysel ve toplumsal adaletsizliği de meşrulaştıran, 'ilerleme' yanılsamasını şımartan bir yoldur. Beşincisi, dildir, yani gösteren ile gösterilen arasında doğrudan, bire bir tekabüliyeti güvence altına alan "şeffaf bir ifade aracı". Aydınlanmadaki dil (kavramı) şeffaf ve tarafsızdır ve fiziksel/aşkın gerçeklik dil aracılığıyla muhatabına tamamen aktarılabilir. Buna ek olarak, insan ad atfetme -dolayısıyla nesneleri veya kavramları tanıma/sahip olma/ fethetme- ve akıl yürütme yoluyla onları 'doğru' dilsel ve anlamsal ikilikler içinde kategorize etme yeteneğine sahiptir. "Rasyonalist ve teleolojik bir tarih felsefesi (olay örgüsü)" zamansal ardışıklığı, nedenselliği ve ilerlemeyi doğrulayan altıncı özelliktir. Nedenleri ve sonuçlarıyla birbiriyle ilişkili olaylar, insanın muhakemesi, iradesi ve gücüyle ilerleme sağlayabileceği ve tüm potansiyelini gerçekleştirebileceği doğrusal bir tarih oluşturur. Yedincisi "iyimser ve akılcı bir insan doğası felsefesi (karakter gelişimi)" olup, insanın doğasında var olan iyilik, akıl, ahlak ve çalışkanlık gibi niteliklerin 'doğruyu' ve 'gerçeği' bulmasına yardımcı olduğunu savunur. Sonuncu özellik olan "bilgi felsefesi (ideal bir form)", bilimi, ilerleme ve güce giden yolu açan bilgiye yönelik tek otorite olarak atar.

Dolayısıyla, Aydınlanma düşüncesindeki insan aklının merkezinde, ikilikler oluşturan, birini normalleştirirken diğerini olumsuzlayan, doğru ve yanlış, burada ve orada, dün ve yarın, adil ve adaletsiz, normal ve anormal, aklı başında ve deli, yasal ve yasadışı, kutsal ve profan vb. kararları veren epistemolojik bir sistem yer almaktadır. Böylece zaman, mekân, din, dil, benlik, bilinç, tarih, kimlik, doğa, kültür vb. gibi tüm epistemolojik kategoriler akıl tarafından ve akıl etrafında yeniden yapılandırılmıştır. Bu epistemoloji, anlam verdiği her türlü bilgi, kategori ya da ilke üzerinde önceden tanımlanmış bir hiyerarşi ve doğrusallık ortaya koyar. Dolayısıyla zaman anlayışı kronolojiktir: geri döndürülemez bir kronolojiye, saniyeler, dakikalar, yıllarla ölçülebilen katı bir zamansal sisteme sahiptir; mevcut olaylar geçmiş nedenlerle

ilişkili olduğundan ya da mevcut eylemler gelecekteki etkilere yol açacağından nedenselliği ima eder. Mekân kavramı da yeniden yapılandırılır: doğrusal olan - ya burada ya orada - ve varlık/yokluk açısından hiyerarşik olan - burada olmak orada olmaktan daha iyidir - bedenin/maddenin dış dünyası ve dolayısıyla asil aklın entelektüel mekânı: yani benlik, bilinç - aklın hükümranlığı - her şeyi bilen (evrenin merkezi olarak insan) ve icat edebilen (atom bombaları?), isimlendirme (yerliler?), anlamlandırma (din?), karar verme (siyaset ve savaş?), kontrol etme (dili?), fethetme (doğa?), uygarlaştırma (koloniler?) vb.

Kökleri Platon'a kadar uzanan ve daha sonra Descartes ve diğerleri tarafından pekiştirilen Aydınlanma felsefesindeki 'insan' anlayışı, farklı söylemlerde veya eleştirmenlerin eserlerinde İdealist özne, aşkın özne, Kartezyen özne (Kartezyen Ben) olarak anılmaktadır. Bu çalışmada 'Kartezyen özne' ile kastedilen, kökleri ünlü *Cogito* argümanına dayansa da, yalnızca Descartes'ın görüşlerine atıfta bulunmamakta, Jean Jack Rousseau, Immanuel Kant, John Locke gibi birçok Aydınlanma eleştirmeni tarafından farklı vurgularla şekillendirilen genel bir 'rasyonel insan' resmini çerçevelemektedir. Aydınlanma düşüncesinin üzerinde çok durduğu ve yoğun bir şekilde geliştirdiği "tüm deneyim ve bilginin kaynağı olarak benlik vurgusu" ve *cogito ergo sum*'un anlamı Mansfield'e göre iki yönlüdür: "Birincisi, dünyaya dair tüm bilgi ve deneyimin temeli olarak benlik imgesi (herhangi bir şey olmadan önce, ben benim) ve ikincisi, dünyayı düzenlemek için kullanabileceği rasyonel yetiler tarafından tanımlanan benlik (anlamlandırıyorum)" (15). Onun da işaret ettiği gibi, Rousseau'nun birey olarak insanın yeterliliğinden hareket eden çalışması ve Kant'ın algıda insan bilincinin ('ben' duygusu) biricikliğine dair fikirleri sırasıyla bu iki önermeyi sağlamlaştırır ve merkezileştirir. Böylece Kartezyen özne, kendi kendine yeten, kendi bilincine sahip bir varlık olarak ortaya çıkar: tüm hakikat, anlam ve değer yargılarının tanımlanabildiği ve irade, bireysellik, eşitlik, insanlık, özgürlük, ödev, sorumluluk ve toplumsallık gibi kavramların türetildiği bir merkez. Bu anlayış o zamandan beri Batı dünyasının merkezindedir ve birçok modernist (ve postmodernist) sanat eseri bu anlayışa karşı

tepki vermektedir. Aydınlanma projesinin yarattığı rasyonel insan miti - ister zamansallıkla, ister dille, isterse de bilinçle ilişkisi içinde olsun- bu nedenle 'doğrusallık' ile yakından ilişkilidir ve bu dinamiklerden birinde bir dengesizlik olması durumunda bu mit kolayca paramparça olur.

Lacancı özne, salt düşünme yetisiyle kendisine şeffaf bir bilinç varsayan Kartezyen *cogito*'nun aksine, bilinçdışında ikamet eder ve durağan değildir; hem öznenin Öteki'ne yönelik arzusu hem de öznenin Öteki'nin arzusu olma arzusu anlamında, Öteki'nin dilinde ve Öteki'yle, Öteki'nin arzusuyla ilişkili olarak yeniden yazılan/söylenen, devam etmekte olan bir eserdir. Lacan için *cogito* argümanı sadece retorik bir hamle değil, aynı zamanda görünürdeki bölünmüşlüğü bakımından doğası gereği kendini açığa çıkaran bir argümandır.

Lacan'a göre özne ne bilinçli bireyle aynıdır ne de bilinçdışının eşdeğeridir: özne 'bilinçdışınındır', düşüncesi ve varlığı arasındaki bölünme içinde/nedeniyle oluşur: bilinçli düşüncesi (şeffaf bir fail olarak Kartezyen *cogito*'da olduğu gibi) ile kendi varoluşu (otantik benlik) ne uyumludur ne de mümkündür. Susanne Barnard'ın belirttiği gibi, Lacan'a göre, özne Öteki'nin dilinde 'önceden belirlenmiş konumunu' aldığında, bu "öznellikte dil 'içinde' olan özne (psikanalitik deyişle ego) ile dilin öznesi (özne) arasında orijinal bir bölünme ya da 'yarılma' oluşturur" (73). Kişinin Öteki'nin arzusu, bakışı ve dili tarafından oluşturulduğu ve özne konumuna eriştiği koşul, aynı zamanda kişinin öznelliğini bir nesne konumuyla özdeşleşerek elde ettiği anlamına gelir: Bebeğin arzu nesnesi/nedeni olarak Öteki konumundaki Anne'nin (*m(O)ther*) arzusu olma arzusu, ayna evresinde özne-bebeğin Annenin bakışı tarafından gerçekleştirilmesi ve hem dilin içinde kodlandığı anda kendini dil aracılığıyla konuşması anlamında hem de dil aracılığıyla konuşmasının zaten nesneleşmiş olduğu anlamına gelmesi anlamında dilin bir etkisi olarak özne, bilincin ikincil durumda olduğu ve öznenin bölünmüş olduğu dramatik varoluşa işaret eder -ki bu bölünme geri dönüşü olmayan bir bölünmedir.

Lacan'ın zamansallık anlayışı, gösterenin etkisi ve bilinçdışıyla ilişkisi açısından özne ile dil arasındaki dinamiklere dair psikanalitik teorilerinin çerçevesi dışında ele alınamaz. Lacan, eserlerinde ayrı bir zaman felsefesi üretmemiş olsa da, Freud'un bir takipçisi olarak, kariyeri boyunca özellikle bilinçdışı ve onun işleyişiyle ilgili olarak zamansallık konusu üzerinde durmuştur. Mantıksal zaman teorisi, tüm çalışmasını öznenin zamansallığına ayırdığı tek ayrı çalışma olarak öne çıksa da, özellikle Kartezyen *cogito*'yu yeniden yapılandırması göz önünde bulundurulduğunda, zamansallık Lacan'ın öğretisinde önemli bir rol oynar. Lacan'ın kariyerinin son semineri olan *Seminer XXVI* "Topoloji ve Zaman" (1978-9) başlığını taşır ve konuşan varlığın (*parlêtre*) öznelleştirilmesinde zamanın kendine özgü konumuyla süregelen meşguliyetini gösterir. Seminerin tam bir transkripsiyonu mevcut olmasa da, Lacan'ın özneyi etkileyen süreçlerin zamansal boyutunu, özneyi Mobius şeridi, torus ve *crosscap* ile teorileştirmesinin ayırt edici uzamsal özellikleriyle teorileştirme çabası, konuşan öznenin uzamsal-zamansal boyutunun yalnızca ilk yıllarına hakim olan Simgesel Öteki'nin değil, aynı zamanda sonraki yıllarının odak noktası haline gelen Gerçek'in perspektifinden önemini göstermektedir. Adrian Johnston'ın belirttiği gibi, Lacan'ın zamansallık anlayışı

> Gerçek'in kayıtlarında, gerçekliğin erişilebilir dokusundan dışlanmış bir şey olarak konumlandırılmaktır: Gerçek-olarak-Zaman özne tarafından asla doğrudan ele alınmaz, ancak yine de öznenin varlığının hatlarını şekillendiren imgeleri ve göstergeleri görünmez bir şekilde paramparça eder ve hırpalar. Freud gibi Lacan da bilinçdışı düzeyinde zamansallıkla ilgili temel bir cehalet olduğunu öne sürer; ancak bu cehaletin elle tutulur derecede belirgin etkileri ve sonuçları olmadığında ısrar eder. "Gerçek zaman" psişik dinamiklerin sonsuza dek kaybolan motorudur. (25)

Geçmişin şimdiki zaman sentezi ve şimdiki zamanın gelecek sentezi, bu kipliklerden herhangi biri arasındaki ikilikleri ve/veya karşıtlıkları ortadan kaldıran bir zamansallığın özelliklerini ortaya koyar. Bu, doğrusallık olgusunu bozan başka nüansları da beraberinde getirir: zamansallıktaki böylesi çok yönlü bir akış, doğrusal ardışıklığın,

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nedenselliğin ve ilerlemenin iflasına işaret eder. Bu nedenle, Joycean'ın sentomatik yazısını keşfetmek ve açıklamak için mükemmel bir araçtır, çünkü çalışmaları hem biçemsel olarak hem de konusu itibariyle, zamansal katmanların bir arada varoluşunun ve bunların psişede algılandığı şekliyle ilişkilerinin, Möbius şeridi de dahil olmak üzere Lacan tarafından sunulan birçok topolojik figürün har/iç/sel doğası aracılığıyla ifade edildiği bu tür bir zamansallıkla iç içe geçmektedir.

Bu çalışmadaki üçüncü bölüm *Ulysses* romanını öznelliğin dil ile olan ilişkisi bakımından tartışır. Lacan'ın öznellik üzerine teorileri, öznenin dil ile ilişkisi üzerine kuruludur. Dil, özneyi öldüren şeydir ve aynı zamanda öznenin Simgesel düzende hayatta kalmasını sağlayan şeydir. Dil, öznenin bölünmesine neden olan ve onu simgesel olana bağlayan şeydir. Bir anlamda özne, beden ile dil arasındaki boşlukta doğar. Lacan, eserleri boyunca bu ilişkiyi harf, gösteren, isim, ses, harf gibi pek çok farklılıkla açıklamıştır ve bunların hepsi öznleştirme süreçlerinde dilin baskınlığına işaret eder. Özne ve dil arasındaki har/iç/sel ilişki hem mecazi hem de gerçek anlamda Borromean düğümünün kalbinde yer alır: Öteki'nin söylemi olarak dil özneye en har/iç/sel olan olduğu gibi, *objet a* da Borromean düğümündeki her bir halkanın merkezinde ama saf bütünlüğünün dışında yer alan en har/iç/sel ilişkidir. Bu bölüm, bir ad olarak gösteren ve gerçek tarafından mühürlenmiş *lalangue* açısından dilin özneye en har/iç/sel olduğunu göstermeyi amaçlamaktadır. Stephen ve Bloom'un vakalarında adlarının ve Babanın Adının sorunsallaştırılması, adın/gösterenin öznenin oluşumunda yapısal bir unsur olduğuna, ancak taşıyıcının özünden herhangi bir iz taşımadığına işaret etmektedir. Bu haliyle ad, özne gibi sabit bir anlama bağlı olmayan göstergeler ağındaki herhangi bir gösterge gibidir. Dili ve "Sirenler" bölümünün konusunu vurgulayan *lalangue*'da somutlaşan harf (*la lettre/letter*) ses (*la voix/voice*), seda (*le son/sound*) tartışması, Joyce'un sentomatik yazısının gerçek karşısında öznenin sınırsızlığını nasıl ortaya koyduğunu gösterir.

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Çalışmanın dördüncü bölümünde, James Joyce'un *Ulysses*'indeki karakterlerin, konuşmasını, ilişkilerini ve eylemlerini kontrol etme gücüne, iradesine ve yeteneğine sahip bir akıl 'adamı' olan Kartezyen özne anlayışını tersyüz eden Lacancı öznelliğin temsili oldukları tartışılmaktadır. Hem Stephen hem de Bloom, Joyce tarafından roman boyunca değişen arzu dinamikleri karşısında farklı pozisyonlar alan bölünmüş özneler olarak tasvir edilir. "Circe" bölümü böyle bir tartışmayı başlatmak için uygun bir seçim olarak ortaya çıkar, çünkü sadece karakterlerin bilinçdışının bir gece kulübünün tekinsiz ortamında su yüzüne çıkmasını ele almakla kalmaz, aynı zamanda Joyce'un rüya benzeri zamansal-mekânsal ortamı inşa etmesini sağlayan bir oyunun biçimsel üslubunu kullanır, Lacancı özne ve *objet a*'nın har/iç/selliğini taklit eden 'gerçek' ve fantezi arasındaki har/iç/sel ilişkinin sahnelenmesinde canlı ve cansız tüm öznelere/nesnelere ses verir.

Joyce'un bu bölümde Stephen ve Bloom örneklerinde betimlediği öznellik, Kartezyen özne yanılsamasını tamamen paramparça eder. Joyce'un bu karakterleri, Tanrı'nın suretinde yaratılan öznenin rasyonel, her şeyi bilen, her şeyi kontrol eden temsiline karşıt olarak tasvir etmesi, öznenin Gerçek, İmgesel ve Simgeselin kesiştiği Borromean düğümündeki har/iç/sel konumunda temsil edildiği Lacancı öznellik anlayışı çerçevesinde incelenebilir. Bu, Bloom ve Stephen'ın birbirleriyle ve diğerleriyle olan öznelerarası ilişkilerinin yanı sıra, hem *objet a*'nın cisimleşmesi olarak beliren nesne ile hem de var olduğu boşlukta gerçek olarak *objet a*'nın nesne ilişkilerinde ortaya çıkar. Travmanın etkisi olarak Lacancı öznenin gerçekle karşılaşması, Bloom ve Stephen'ın sevdiklerini kaybetmelerinde ve kaygı ve üzüntüden utanç ve suçluluğa kadar değişen duygulanımlara bağlı yas sürecini ele alışlarında sergilenir.

Son analiz bölümü olan beşinci bölümde *Ulysses*'teki zamansallık Lacan'ın zaman anlayışı zemininde tartışmya açılmıştır. *Ulysses*'te zaman sadece bir özne değil, aynı zamanda bir aktördür. Birçok

zamansal şeridin eşzamanlı olarak bir arada bulunması ve öznelerarası zamansallıkların anımsatıcı kodlar olarak işleyen üslup araçlarıyla temsil edilmesi, zamanın doğasına dair girift bir arayışla birleşince, zaman romanın gizli kahramanı haline gelir. Castello Kulesi'ndeki başlangıçtan Molly'nin monoloğunun son satırlarına kadar zaman, öznenin en mahrem ama en yabancı boyutu olarak kendini gösteriyor. Annelerin, babaların, oğulların ve sevgililerin, evlerin ve yurtların, inançların ve hayallerin ölümü de dahil olmak üzere pek çok ö/Ötekinin kaybının yanı sıra yenilerine kavuşma umutlarının da yer aldığı roman, Joyce'un sentomundaki son düğümü oluşturan, geçmişin, şimdinin ve geleceğin tüm tonlarının birbirine dolandığı, üst üste bindiği, yoğunlaştığı ya da zaman zaman solduğu çok renkli bir iplik olan zamanın kalın ipliğiyle örülmüştür. Geçmiş-şimdi-gelecek renkleri arasındaki ilişki Lacan'ın mantıksal zamanını sergiler: özneler zamansallığın geçitleri boyunca diyalektik bir oluş hareketi içindedirler, geriye dönük, ileriye dönük ya da eşzamanlı olarak kendilerini, deneyimlerini ve diğerlerini tüm zamansal şeritlerde yeniden inşa ederler. Bu hareket aynı zamanda bilinçdışı arzunun işleyişi ve öznenin Öteki'yle ilişkisi tarafından da sınırlandırılmıştır, çünkü öznenin herhangi bir düzlemdeki konumu, Öteki'ne ya da onun ikamelerine olan bilinçdışı yakınlığı ve beklemekten asla vazgeçmediği jouissance tarafından koşullandırılır. Dolayısıyla romandaki karakterler, içinde bulundukları zamansallıkları da resmeden halleri, eylemleri, düşünceleri ve duygularıyla belirlenirler.

Sonuç olarak bu çalışma, Joyce'un *Ulysses*'inin, yazarın doğrusallığa ve Kartezyen bir benlik anlayışına karşı isyanını, her ikisi de Möbiyen ilişkinin har/iç/selliğini yansıtan içerik ve biçem birlikteliğinde, içeriğinin vücut bulmuş hali olan biçemi aracılığıyla nasıl sergilediği sorusunu yanıtlamak üzere yola çıkmıştır. *Ulysses*'teki karakterlerin birbirleriyle ve dış dünyayla olan kendine özgü ilişkilerinin, Lacancı öznellik anlayışında ve onun tanımlayıcı özelliği olan har/iç/sellik kavramında yansımasını bulduğu öne sürülmüştür. Lacancı öznellik teorisi, Stephen Dedalus, Leopold Bloom ve Molly Bloom gibi ana

karakterlerin birbirleriyle ve diğer karakterlerle olan ilişkilerini, simgesel düzlemde konumlan(dırıl)malarından yola çıkarak incelemeyi mümkün kılar. Dilin, bu karakterlerin her birinin deneyimindeki kurucu etkisi açısından sorunsallaştırılması, öznenin Öteki ile ilişkisine bağlı olarak (öznelerarası) dinamiklerin anlık olarak değişebileceğine işaret eder. Doğrusallık, bölünmüş konuşan öznenin kaygan evrenindeki en büyük yanılsama olarak ortaya çıkar: ne öznenin simgesel öncesi malzemeyle kaynaşmış dili olarak *lalangue*, ne de konuşan varlığın (*parlêtre*) dil aracılığıyla elde ettiği öznel jouissance, özneler arasında anlamlı, karşılıklı bir iletişimi sağlayabilir. Dil Öteki'nden gelir, özneye hayat vermek için onu öldürür, ancak Joyce'un yazılarında ortaya çıkan dürtülerin -ses (*voice*) ve bakış (*gaze*) olarak dürtülerin- dili aracılığıyla kendini ifşa eden simgesel öncesi malzemeye her zaman çarpar. Konuşan varlık, arzuları ile eksikliğin eksikliğini duyduklarına inandıkları gerçeğin mekân-zamansallığına dair yanlış algıları arasındaki boşlukta konuşulur. Böyle bir okuma, Joyce'un karakterlerinin fantezilerini, arzularını ve duygulanımlarını har/iç/sellikleri içinde analiz etmeyi sağlayan bir alan yaratır ve en içselolanın nasıl en harici olabileceğini ya da en yabancı olanın nasıl aynı anda öznelliğin kalbinde yatabileceğini ortaya çıkarır. Lacancı bir bakış açısıyla, bu çalışma konuşanın bilinçdışı olduğunu ve bilinçdışının ne içsel ne de mahrem olduğunu öne sürmektedir: bilinçdışı, doğrusal zamansallığa veya Öklidyen uzamsal koordinatlara ve her türlü kronolojik tarihe meydan okuyan kendi Möbiyen uzam-zamansallığı içinde çalışan bir har/iç/sellik ilişkisidir. Romanın incelemesi, karakterin çocukluktan yetişkinliğe uzanan yolculuğunda yapısal bir ilerleme olmadığını göstermiştir, çünkü travmanın gerçek nedeni kronolojik veya nedensel bir şekilde değil, her türlü teleoloji olasılığını bozduğu için Kartezyen mantığa meydan okuyan retrospektif bir şekilde işlemektedir. Özne, öznelliğin mantıksal zamansallığı içinde Öteki tarafından her zaman-halihazırda seslenilmiş durumdadır ve anıları gerçeğin *tuché*'si ile simgeselin *automaton*'u arasındaki bir gerilimle şekillenir. Böylesi bir har/iç/sellik ilişkisi, öznel deneyimin

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temsili arayışındaki modernist zaman ve dil takıntısını anlamayı da mümkün kılar.

Bu çalışma, Joyce'un sentomunu ve Adını üzerine inşa ettiği zeminin, *Ulysses*'in metinsel uzam-zamansallığındaki har/iç/sel ilişkileri oluşturan zemine nasıl dönüştüğünü ortaya koymuştur. Lacan'ın Joyce okuması, yazarın sentomunu ismine dönüştürebildiğini ve yazıları aracılığıyla jouissance ekonomisini yönetebildiğini öne sürer. Bu çalışmadaki har/iç/sellik hermenötik çerçevesi, Lacan'ın Joyce hakkındaki yorumunu, Joyce'un 'en mahrem ama dışsal olanı' 'en dışsal ama içeriden olana' çevirme çabası, yani bilinçdışının söylemini simgesel olana çevirme girişimi olarak yorumlamaktadır. Romanın tartışması, Lacan'ın Joyce üzerine teorileri ile karakterlerin çıkmazı arasında bir benzerliğe işaret etmektedir: metnin belirli noktalarında tekrar tekrar hissedilen bir gerilim görülmektedir ve bu da karakterin bir süreksizlik ya da bir kopuş, deneyimledikleri ile bildikleri arasında referanssal olmayan bir ilişki hakkındaki endişesine işaret etmektedir. Yani, *Ulysses*'in karakterlerinin hikâyelerini anlattığı dil, ontolojik bir deneyimi epistemolojik bir düzleme tercüme etme enerjisiyle hareket eder. Bu çalışma, bu çabanın, modernist yazarların, özellikle de Joyce'un, çoklu öznelliklerin temsili, doğrusal olmayan uzam-zamansallıklar ve yenilikçi dil oyunları, üslup ve teknik arayışları konusundaki takıntı ve duyarlılıklarıyla ifade edilen modern insanlık durumunun altını çizen ortak bir kaygı olduğunu öne sürmektedir. Bu çalışmanın bulguları, hem Joyce'un hem de *Ulysses*'in böylesi bir har/iç/sel bir tercümedeki başarısının, içten dışa, mahremden yabancıya geçişte Möbiyen ilişkiyi aşma becerilerinde yattığını göstermektedir. *Ulysses*, Joyce'un başardığını, yani aynı yüzeyi terk etmeden kayıtlar arasında geçişi mümkün kılmayı; Möbius bandının yaptığını Möbiyen ilişki şeklinde yapmayı başaran Joyce'un sentomunun hayata geçirilmesidir.

Bu tezin Joyce çalışmalarına ve genel olarak modernist metinler üzerine yapılan çalışmalara katkısı, romanın semptomatik bir okumasını

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karakterlerin/yazarın sorunsallaştırılması/analizi üzerinden değil, Lacancı kuramda hem psişik malzemeyi hem de onun çevriyazısını mümkün kılan şey olarak öne çıkan dil/*lalangue* üzerinden yapmayı amaçlamasıdır. Joyce'un eserlerindeki karakterlerin semptomlarını Lacancı ya da başka türlü psikanalitik bir çerçeveden tartışan çok sayıda çalışma olmakla birlikte, Lacan'ın kendisi Joyce üzerine seminerinde semptomu ve Joyce sentomunu oldukça sınırlı bir bakış açısıyla tartışır, çünkü tartışmalar ya anlatılan belirli olaylara ya da romanlarında kullanılan ifadelere bağlı olarak Lacan'ın Joyce'a koyduğu teşhisler/önermeler üzerinden ilerler, çoğunlukla *Finnegans Wake*'te, sayfadakini Joyce'un semptomu/sentomu olarak almakta ya da bu semptomun nedenleri üzerine çok az edebi tartışma/çözüm sunmaktadır. Bu çalışma, Joyce'un *Ulysses*'i üzerine, semptomun gösterenin kendisi olduğu semptomatik bir okuma yoluyla edebi bir tartışma sağlayarak Joyce çalışmalarına katkıda bulunmayı ummaktadır. Joyce'ta gösteren, bilinçdışını simgesel kodlara çevirmenin bir aracı olarak işleyen ve böylece, metne bütünlük kazandıran bir düzenleyici ilke olarak değilse de yine de hem bilinçdışını/bilinci hem de aradaki çeviriyi mümkün kılan bir düzenleyici ilke olarak paradoksal bir şekilde işlev gören har/iç/sel bir ilişki olarak ortaya çıkar.

Bu çalışmada yapılan tartışmalar ışığında, Joyce'un da çağdaşları gibi, Kartezyen çizgiselliği içinde Aydınlanmacı benlik anlayışını sorunsallaştıran ve ona meydan okuyan modernist kaygılarının en iyi karşılığını Lacancı har/iç/sellik kavramında bulduğunu söylemek mümkün hale gelmektedir zira bu yaklaşım hem modernist edebiyattaki eserlerin konusu olarak durmaksızın tartışılan insan öznelliğinin ve deneyiminin paradoksal doğasına hem de modernist yazının biçemine yansıyan dil takıntısına ve/veya deneyselliğine yanıt verir. Lacan'ın kariyeri boyunca devam eden yapısalcı-postyapısalcı ve/veya hümanist/anti-hümanist tartışmalarındaki konumuna ilişkin birçok karşıt fikir olsa da, kariyeri boyunca eserlerindeki birçok paradoksal ancak genellikle birbirini tamamlayan değişim ve gelişmelere bakılmaksızın, bu çalışma Lacan'ın özellikle öznelliğin oluşumu ve dilin

öznenin Ö/öteki(ler) karşısında aldığı farklı konumlardaki belirleyici rolüne ilişkin teorilerinin, Lacan'ın modernist yazınının üslubuna yansıdığını savunmaktadır, hem modernistlerin eserlerinde temsil edilen epistemolojik ve ontolojik kategorilerdeki değişimi tartışarak, hem de edebi gerçekçiliğe karşı tepkilerini, okura narsisistik/egoistik tatmin sağlayan İmgesel özdeşleşmeler düzeyinde işleyen doğrusal, nedensel, ardışık zamansallık ve dil anlayışının yansıması olarak deşifre ederek modernist mücadeleye yanıt verir.

Bu bakımdan Lacan'ın har/iç/sellik kavramı, modernist öznenin "merkezin tutamadığı" tuhaf bir gerçeklikte anlam kurmasını engelleyen sınırlamaların analizini mümkün kılmakla kalmayıp, kavramın topolojik bir figürden hermeneutik bir zemine genişletilmesiyle, *Ulysses* örneğinde kendisini bir har/iç/sellik eylemi, yani içerik ile biçem arasındaki har/iç/sel bir ilişki olarak sunan modernist duyarlılıkları tartışmak ve yorumlamak için yeni bir zemin sağladığı için çokyönlü bir araç olarak ortaya çıkar. Bu kavram hem modern öznenin yaşadığı varoluşsal ikilemle hem de insan deneyimini temsil etmeye asla yetmeyen başarısız bir dilin arka planında geliştirilen özneler arası/özneler ötesi ilişkilerle ilgilidir. İlk ikilem, öznenin anlam arayışını, en mahrem olan ile en tuhaf dışsal olan arasındaki çatışmanın ortasında konumlandırır ki bu da dışsal gerçekliği bireysel deneyim ve bilinçdışı arzularla dolu öznel bir duruştan anlatma yönündeki modernist uğraşıda karşılığını bulur. İkincisi, modernistlerin başarısızlık duygularını anlatmak için yeni yollar bulma konusundaki dilsel çabalarındaki aşırılıkta kendini gösterir. Lacan'ın har/iç/sellik kavramının modernist mücadelenin hem içeriğini hem de biçimini tartışma potansiyeli, modernist edebiyat çalışmalarında umut verici ve çok yönlü bir araç olduğunu kanıtlamaktadır.

Dolayısıyla bu çalışma, Lacan'dan har/iç/selliğin topolojik ilişkisine dair bir düşünme biçimi ödünç alarak, sadece *Ulysses*'i değil, aynı *zeitgeist*'ı ve benzer kaygıları paylaşan diğer modernist metinleri de yorumlamak için yeni bir hermenötik zemine alan açıldığını öne sürmektedir. Modern

öznenin ifade edilemez olanı ifade etmeye yönelik tekrarlanan girişiminde biçem ve içeriği aynı yüzeyde bir arada var olduğu haliyle ele alan, metnin içindeki har/iç/sel ilişkinin analizine olanak tanıyan yeni bir genel çerçeveye izin veren bir model oluşturmak, Lacan'ın psikanalitik kavramının, doğrusal olmayan uzam-zamansallıklar, uçuşan gösterenler ve bir eksikliğin gediğinde var olan öznelerle ilgili modernist meşguliyeti çağrıştıran edebi bir yorumlama tarzı yönünde yeniden kavramsallaştırılmasının önünü açacaktır. Bu çalışma, önceden var olan epistemolojilerde karşılığını bulamayan ontolojik bir deneyim olan, insan öznelliğinin çekirdeğinde uyuyan yabancı bir gerçekliğe dair modern bir farkındalığı tercüme etmeye yönelik modernist tutkuyu yorumlama araçları sağlayacak yeni bir kelime dağarcığı seti sunmayı amaçlamıştır.

Bu çalışmadaki olası bir eksiklik, dilin böylesine soyut bir biçiminin, *lalangue*'ın okuma sürecinin okuru nerede bıraktığı sorusu olacaktır. Okur har/iç/selliğin 'duygulanım' tarafı, yani *Ulysses*'in ve Joyce'un gerçekliğiyle yüzleşmenin özne-içi süreçleri ve/veya değişimleri, bu tezin odağında yer almamaktadır ve *Ulysses*'in yanı sıra diğer modernist metinler üzerine daha ileri çalışmalar için önerilebilir. *Lalangue*'ın har/iç/selliğini okuyan öznenin duygulanımları üzerinde nasıl işlediğine, başka bir deyişle, bir kez daha, en yabancı/harici olanın öznenin en mahrem/içsel olanıyla nasıl karşılıklı etkileşime girip birbirini şekillendirdiğine ve metin ile okur arasındaki har/iç/sel ilişkiye dair böyle bir tartışma, psikanalitik ve edebi olanın buluştuğu disiplinler arası çalışmalar için bir kazanç olabilir ve insanın dil ve zaman karşısındaki açmazını daha net ve yüksek sesle dile getirmeye yardımcı olabilir.

C. THESIS PERMISSION FORM / TEZ İZİN FORMU

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