

SECURITIZATION OF REFUGEES IN THE HOST STATE: A STUDY OF
AFGHAN REFUGEES IN PAKISTAN

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ABSTRACT

SECURITIZATION OF REFUGEES IN THE HOST STATE: A STUDY OF AFGHAN REFUGEES IN PAKISTAN

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Pakistan is a signatory to neither the 1951 Geneva Convention of refugees nor its 1967 Protocol. Still, it has been accommodating the Afghan refugees since the 1970s. It warmly welcomed the Afghan Muhajireen and assisted Afghan Mujahedeen in defeating the Soviets in Afghanistan. However, in the aftermath of 9/11, Pakistan sided with the United States in the Global War on Terror and fought against the Mujahedeen. Consequently, the conflict spilled over to the territory of Pakistan. Centred on the literature on securitization theory, the primary purpose of this thesis is to study the securitization of Afghan refugees in Pakistan. For this, the existential threats constructed by the state of Pakistan that transformed the Afghan refugees in Pakistan into a strategic threat and liability from that of the asset will assist in analysing the process. The Copenhagen school will assist in classifying discourses and speech acts of the bureaucratic machinery and the political elite of Pakistan to convince not only the citizens of the country but the citizens of the world. On the other hand, the Paris school will look upon the practices and tools employed as securitizing moves

or emergency measures to construct Afghan refugees as a security threat in Pakistan by various securitizing agents from time to time, particularly in the aftermath of the school attack in Peshawar in 2014. The study finds that the state's national interest compels it to either embrace the refugees and manipulate them for its advantage or present them as a security threat and demand their repatriation. The study recommends that refugees belong to a vulnerable category of people, so the state should keep the humanitarian aspect within its purview in its dealings with them.

Keywords: Afghanistan, Securitization, Copenhagen School, Paris School, Pakistan, Refugees.

ÖZ

EV SAHİBİ DEVLETTE MÜLTECİLERİN GÜVENLİKLEŞTİRİLMESİ: PAKİSTAN'DAKİ AFGAN MÜLTECİLER ÜZERİNE BİR ARAŞTIRMA

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Pakistan 1951 Cenevre Mülteci Sözleşmesine ve 1967 Protokolüne taraf olmasa da 1970'lerden beri Afgan mültecilere ev sahipliği yapmaktadır. Ülke ilk etapta Afgan mültecileri sıcak bir şekilde karşılamış ve Afgan Mücahitlere de Afganistan'da Sovyetler Birliğine karşı mücadelelerinde yardımcı olmuştur. Ancak, 11 Eylül sonrasında Pakistan, Teröre Karşı Küresel Savaş'ta Mücahitlere karşı ABD'nin yanında yer almıştır. Sonuç olarak, çatışma Pakistan topraklarına sıçramıştır. Güvenikleştirme teorisi literatürüne odaklanan bu tezin temel amacı, Pakistan'daki Afgan mültecilerin güvenikleştirilmesini incelemektir. Bu bağlamda, Pakistan devletinin inşa ettiği ve Pakistan'daki Afgan mültecileri stratejik bir tehdide dönüştüren ve bir kaynak olmaktan çıkarıp bir yükümlülük haline getiren varoluşsal tehditler, sürecin analizinde irdelenen temel unsurlar olmuştur. Kopenhag okulu, Pakistan'ın bürokratik mekanizmasının ve siyasi elitlerinin gerek ülke vatandaşlarını gerekse dünya kamuoyunu ikna etmeye yönelik söylemlerini ve konuşma eylemlerini sınıflandırmaya yardımcı olacaktır. Öte yandan Paris okulunun perspektifinden zaman içinde ve bilhassa 2014'te Peşaver'deki liseye düzenlenen saldırı sonrasında güvenikleştirme ajanlarının Afgan mültecileri Pakistan'da bir güvenlik tehdidi olarak tanımlamak amacıyla uygulamaya koydukları güvenikleştirme adımı ya da acil durum

tedbiri niteliğindeki uygulama ve araçları irdelenecektir. Çalışmada devletin ulusal çıkarlarının, onu ya mültecileri kucaklamaya ve onları kendi yararına manipüle etmeye, ya da onları bir güvenlik tehdidi olarak sunmaya ve ülkelerine geri gönderilmelerini talep etmeye zorladığı tespit edilmiştir. Çalışma, mültecilerin savunmasız bir kitle olduğu ve bu nedenle devletin onlarla ilişkilerinde insani boyutu her daim dikkate alması gerektiği sonucuna varmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Afganistan, Güvenikleştirme, Kopenhag Okulu, Paris Okulu, Pakistan, Mülteciler.

To my late maternal grandfather, who always wanted to see me fly...

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AfPak	Afghanistan and Pakistan
ANP	Awami National Party
APS	Army Public School
BNP	Balochistan Awami Party
CCAR	Chief Commissionerate of Afghan Refugees
CIA	Centre Intelligence Agency
CNIC	Citizen National Identity Card
COAS	Chief of Army Staff
COPRI	Copenhagen Peace Research Institute
CS	Copenhagen School
CTD	Counter Terrorism Department
EU	European Union
FATA	Federally Administered Tribal Areas
GOP	Government of Pakistan
GWT	Global War on Terror
HRCF	Human Rights Commission for Refugees Pakistan
ID Cards	Identification Cards
IGOs	International Governmental Organizations
IPS	International Political Organization
IR	International Relations
KPK	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa

MOFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MOUs	Memorandum of Understanding
NACTA	National Counter Terrorism Authority
NADRA	National Database Registration Authority
NAP	National Action Plan
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organizations
NISP	National Internal Security Plan
PM	Prime Minister
PML-N	Pakistan Muslim League – Nawaz
PoR	Proof of Registration
PPP	People’s Party Pakistan
PTI	Pakistan Tehrik-e-Insaf
RAHA	Refugee Affected and Hosting Areas
SAFRON	State and Frontier Regions
SS	Security Studies
SSAR	Solutions Strategy for Afghan Refugees
TSS	Traditional Security Studies
TTP	Tehrik -e- Taliban Pakistan
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations Higher Commission for Refugees
US	United States
USSR	United Soviet Socialist Republic
WWI	World War 1

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

We are living in times in which moving from one place to another is the norm, an era in which disputes and oppression push masses from dwellings every year, and forced migration keeps on lingering for years with no proper solution getting in sight. Today's world exists in a perplexing and enigmatic "Era of Migration."¹ "According to the World Migration Report, the total number of international migrants in 2020 was 281 million."²

Forced migration is truly a crucial matter in the contemporary globalised world. It is a persistent humanitarian concern of today's epoch. Over 68 million people are internally and internationally displaced, striving to start over their lives after horrendous experiences.³ States are liable to safeguard and defend the underlying human rights of their citizens. When they are incapable or reluctant to do so – primarily for political motives or centred on bigotry, discrimination, and prejudice – a particular population may undergo grave human rights abuses.

Consequently, they are left with no option but to leave behind their homes, families, and neighbourhoods to seek haven in another country.⁴ According to a report published by the Refugee Council Australia, "UNHCR most recently estimated that, by mid-2021, for the first time in recorded history, the number of people forcibly

¹ Adam McKeown, "Global Migration: 1846-1940," *Journal of World History* (2004): 155-189.

² IOM, "World Migration Report," <https://worldmigrationreport.iom.int/wmr-2022-interactive/>.

³ Alex Braithwaite, Idean Salehyan, and Burcu Savun, "Refugees, Forced Migration, and Conflict: Introduction to the Special Issue," *Journal of Peace Research* 56, no. 1 (2019): 5-11.

⁴ Alexander Betts, ed., "*Global Migration Governance*," (London: Oxford University Press, 2011).

displaced is now 89.3 million, and over 27.1 million refugees.”⁵ The massive influx of such a population poses a burden or a security threat to the host states or is sometimes constructed as one. It is due to this reason that migration is categorised or framed under non-traditional security threats.

Afghan refugees are one such population that is a victim of the protracted nature of forced migration. Hence, this thesis will focus on the Afghan refugee population in the host country, Pakistan. Pakistan is neither party to the 1951 Geneva Convention nor the 1961 Geneva Protocol. It has also not endorsed any rule or regulation with regard to the safety and security of the refugees or set up national legislation to define the refugee status of people seeking protection within its boundaries.⁶ The Foreigners Act 1946 determines the procedures for the treatment of such people. Also, the UNHCR is responsible for “conducting refugee status determination under its mandate and on behalf of Pakistan’s government in accordance with the 1993 cooperation agreement between the two.”⁷ Based on the security studies literature, this research delves into answering the research question of this thesis that is “how have Afghan refugees been securitised in Pakistan?” Hence, the response would explain “the securitizing moves” in the form of discourse and policies employed by the state of Pakistan towards the refugees.

The literature on the migration of Afghan refugees to Pakistan is split into several periods or waves. The formal first period of enormous migration occurred in 1978 when the martial take-over was conducted by the “Marxist group of the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan against Daoud’s government.”⁸ In 1979, the Soviet

⁵ Refugee Council Australia, “How Many Refugees Are There in The World?”, July 4, 2022, <https://www.refugeecouncil.org.au/how-many-refugees/#:~:text=UNHCR%20most%20recently%20estimated%20that,and%20over%2027.1%20million%20refugees>

⁶ Ilyas Chattha, “Refugee Resettlement from Pakistan: Findings from Afghan Refugee Camps in the NWFP,” *Know Reset Research Report*, January, 2013, http://www.knowreset.eu/files/texts/00696_20130530122128_carim-knowresettr-2013-01.pdf.

⁷ Daniel A. Kronenfield, “Afghan Refugees in Pakistan: Not All Refugees, Not Always in Pakistan, Not Necessarily Afghan?,” *Journal of Refugee Studies* 21, no.1, (2008): 43-63.

⁸ Florian P. Kühn, “Afghanistan’s Security Hurdle: Competition and Co-operation Amongst Political Rentiers and Drug Rentiers,” *ECPR* (2007): 12-15.

invasion of Afghanistan further added fuel to the fire of the migration crisis. The situation also deteriorated due to the ongoing cold war between the USA and the USSR. The USSR invasion of Afghanistan led to the USA's direct involvement and other allies.⁹

Hence, all of this resulted in instability in Afghanistan, thus forcing millions of Afghans to migrate to neighbouring countries, especially Iran and Pakistan.¹⁰ The United States, the other superpower seeing this, was compelled to do something to stop the USSR. Therefore, it utilized the covert means of “proxy warfare.”¹¹ It aided, assisted, and facilitated the Mujahideen¹² against the Soviets in Afghanistan. Approximately two million Afghans took refuge in Pakistan initially, with many following suit afterwards, leading to governmental uncertainty, the communist composition of the Afghan government and the administration’s policies.¹³

The decade from 1979 till 1989 is evident of the second wave of refugees and migrants entering Pakistani soil. This era witnessed a considerable refugee influx, as per the estimates. It is said that 1/3 of the total populace of Afghanistan moved out to evade the Mujahideen-Soviet theatre of war in the country. As per the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, around 3.5 million refugees migrated to Pakistan.¹⁴ Fifty percent of the population reached Pakistani borders from 1979-80. An average of 80 to 90 thousand had been arriving in Pakistan monthly to seek shelter and basic

⁹ Muhibullah Durrani and Ashraf Khan, “Pakistan-Afghan Relations: Historic Mirror,” *The Dialogue* 4, no. 1 (2002): 90-98.

¹⁰ Saba Gul Khattak, “Afghan Refugees and Politics in Pakistan,” *Critical Asia Studies* 35, no. 2 (2003): 195-208.

¹¹ Andrew Mumford, “Proxy Warfare and the Future of Conflict,” *The RUSI Journal* 158 no. 2 (2013): 40-46.

¹² Members of a number of guerrilla groups operating in Afghanistan during the Afghan War (1978–92) that opposed the invading Soviet forces and eventually toppled the Afghan communist government.

¹³ Abraham Rhea, “The Afghanistan Refugee Crisis: Implications for Pakistan and Iran,” *Air Power Journal* 8, no. 3 (2013): 192– 193,

¹⁴ M.K. Afridi and R. Ali, “Instability in Afghanistan and its Impact on the Security of Pakistan,” *Global Social Sciences Review* 5, no. 2 (2020).

necessities.¹⁵ At one stage, the Pakistani Afghan refugee population was anticipated to be somewhat “more than 3 % of the overall demographics of Pakistan.”¹⁶ During 1986-89, Pakistan took the opportunity to send the refugees back to Afghanistan since the troops of the USSR had pulled out and left Afghanistan. With the assistance of UNHCR, Pakistan initiated the repatriation of Afghan refugees to Afghanistan; however, Afghanistan's unscrupulous and debauched internal situation preceded the perpetuation of migration of Afghan refugees to neighbouring countries.¹⁷

The third wave of Afghan refugee influx witnessed by the state of Pakistan began from 1989 till 1996. The migration during this time occurred due to the internal instability in Afghanistan. 1992 was the most devastating one due to the Civil War in Afghanistan. Robert Kaplan declared that “the 1992 civil war between different Afghan militia groups was not for a national cause but the mere collection of strongholds.”¹⁸ Several militant factions took part in this war to get hold of the Afghan government. Finally, the civil war culminated in 1996, and the Taliban took hold of the country. The total Afghan population in Pakistan in 1990 was around 3.25 million, dropping to 1.7 million in 1992, hoping peace would prevail with the arrival of the Taliban's rule. This drop continued to increase as the refugee population reached one million in 1994.¹⁹ While the refugees had been returning, many of them kept returning due to the unending civil conflict, uncertainty, and deprivation of food and basic necessities of life.

The fourth wave of the Afghan refugee influx was witnessed from 1994 to 2001, as a huge number of highly educated and erudite lot from the liberal upper and middle class moved to Europe, North America and other parts of the world, mostly fleeing from the

¹⁵ Nasreen Ghufraan, “The Role of UNHCR and Afghan Refugees in Pakistan,” *Strategic Analysis* 35, no. 6 (2011): 945-954.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ Valentina Hiegemann, “Repatriation of Afghan Refugees in Pakistan: Voluntary?,” *Oxford Monitor of Forced Migration* 4, no. 1 (2014): 1-4.

¹⁸ Anders Fänge, Anders, “Afghanistan After April 1992: A Struggle for State and Ethnicity,” *Central Asian Survey* 14, no. 1 (1995): 17-24.

¹⁹ Muhammad Najam ud din Farani, “Perspectives on Afghan Refugee Identity in Pakistan,” *Journal of Political Studies* 27, no. 1 (2020): 159-181.

Taliban regime. Installing a radical and tyrannical rule together with constitutional volatility and financial turmoil steered approximately two million refugees to escape during this time.²⁰

The fifth wave began in 2001 after the 9/11 incident due to the downfall of the Taliban regime and a new era in the political situation of Afghanistan. This unfortunate incident was deemed a direct assault on American prestige and position as the only superpower. This attack necessitated a timely and swift reaction. As a result, the USA initiated War against Terrorism and invaded Afghanistan. Hence, the fifth phase of Afghan mass migration began due to an intense battle between the “Taliban and the USA-led forces.”²¹ The post-2001 era was filled with political, economic and security chaos. The UNHCR, in collaboration with the Government of Pakistan, conducted a census of the Afghan refugee population in Pakistan in 2002. According to that census, “more than three million Afghan refugees had been dwelling in Pakistan, in which 42% lived in shelters, and 58% lived in cities.” Among them, “81% were Pashtuns, with minor fractions of Tajiks, Uzbeks, Turkmen, and other ethnic factions.”²²

Pakistan had openly welcomed the refugees in 1979. However, over time, “Pakistan’s open border and supportive policy for the Afghan refugees striving for resettlement began to transition to close borders and non-supportive.”²³ In the aftermath of 9/11, Pakistan sided with the US in the GWOT after careful assessment. This deliberate shift in approach preceded the rise of “neo-existential security threats”²⁴ in the shape of non-state violent terrorist organisations in Pakistan. Such organisations secured their foothold in Pakistan due to the unsettled nature of Afghan refugee policies in Pakistan. These terrorists, because of their disseminative kind, quickly discovered influence and

²⁰ Zachary Laub, “The Taliban in Afghanistan,” *Council on Foreign Relations* 4, no. 7 (2014): 1-9.

²¹ Amy Belasco, “Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11,” (Pennsylvania Diane Publishing, 2009).

²² Sanam Noor, “Afghan Refugees After 9/11,” *Pakistan Horizon* 59, no. 1 (2006): 59-78.

²³ Zia David L. Leal, Nestor P. Rodriguez and Gary P. Freeman, “Introduction: The New Era of Restriction,” *Migration in an Era of Restriction and Recession*, Springer, Cham (2016); 1-23.

²⁴ Zia Mian, Iftikha Ahmad, eds., “Making Enemies, Creating Conflicts: Pakistan’s Crisis of State and Society,” (Lahore: Mashal, 1997).

clout in the permeable and spongy terrain of the Pak-Afghan frontier and, therefore, utilised it as a ground for cross-border uprisings in the two countries.²⁵

Due to this, in place of the migration-security nexus, Pakistan has rendered the residing Afghan refugees a plausible cause or resource line for terrorist infiltrations in its homeland.²⁶ It regards Afghan refugees as possibly detrimental to homeland security. Not only this, but the government of Pakistan also compelled the inhabiting refugees to return in the aftermath of a terrorist attack in a school in Peshawar in 2014 that left hundreds of children, along with teachers, dead. In the aftermath of this attack, Pakistan's government initiated a Plan that led to the securitization of Afghan refugees on a massive scale.

Consequently, this shift from “open door” to “expeditious repatriation” led to the shutting of campsites and education institutions, along with the issuing of deadlines and time limits to depart from Pakistan to repatriate back to Afghanistan.²⁷ The declarations and assertions of the political elite and media depictions of refugees have instituted a public bitterness and antipathy towards the Afghan refugees as the outside ‘other’ terrorizing the state and society in Pakistan. This policy change is attributed to a “weak economy, terrorism, drug trafficking, increase in crimes and declining donor assistance for the refugees”²⁸ by the state of Pakistan.

Therefore, the securitisation lens will be utilized to explain the rhetoric and policies adopted to morph refugees “as a security threat.” It would assist in understanding how “politics of fear” plays a vital role in converting a humanitarian problem into a security one through speech acts, adoption of policies and mechanisms, and allowance of discrimination of the “other.” In this case, Afghan refugees in Pakistan who technically shared certain commonalities with Pakistan and were deemed as siblings had been seen

²⁵ Amina Khan, “Protracted Afghan Refugee Situation,” *Strategic Studies* 37, no. 1 (2017): 42-65.

²⁶ Saifullah Taye and Zahid Ahmed, “Dynamics of Trust and Mistrust in the Afghanistan-Pakistan Relationship,” *Asian Studies Review* 45, no. 4 (2021): 557-575.

²⁷ Catherine Putz, “What About Afghan Refugees?,” *The Diplomat*, November 03, 2015, <http://www.thediplomat.com/2015/11/what-about-afghan-refugees/>.

²⁸ Marvin G. Weinbaum, “Pakistan and Afghanistan: The Strategic Relationship,” *Asian Survey* 31, no. 6 (1991): 496-511.

as the “outsider or the other.” Hence, the “inter-subjective nature” of a refugee as a threat in Pakistan is induced.²⁹

According to securitisation theory, certain governmental matters are instituted as extreme security issues. They are to be proximately handled when categorised as “precarious, intimidating, threatening, alarming” and so on by a “securitising actor” who has the communal and official supremacy to transfer the matter “beyond politics.”³⁰ So, security problems are not just out there but instead be enunciated as challenges by securitising players. Describing migration as a threat to national security, for example, swings it from a minimal important political matter to an urgent matter requiring swift action, such as safeguarding frontiers. This theory defies conventional methodologies to security in IR and contends that matters are not fundamentally menacing in themselves; instead, by mentioning them as ‘security’ concerns, they turn out to be security challenges.³¹

The thesis will employ the “Copenhagen School” and the “Paris School” of Securitization to account for the political discourse and the practices when analysing the securitization of Afghan refugees in Pakistan, particularly after 9/11. When applied to this case, it means that securitising practices can be defined as activities that, in themselves, convey the idea that the Afghan refugees are a security threat to the state of Pakistan. Considering the role of security actors and their practices, it is, therefore, necessary to consider the practices of the government agencies, such as the military, political parties etc., to assess the extent to and how they securitize migration.

The Copenhagen school relies on the “speech acts.” According to this school, “it is the articulation of a security threat that forms the security action in the first place, hence, the ‘utterance’ of security itself.” This indicates the vernacular enunciation that pushes

²⁹ Waseem Ahmad, "The Fate of Durable Solutions in Protracted Refugee Situations: The Odyssey of Afghan Refugees in Pakistan." *Seattle J. Soc. Just.* 15 (2016): 591.

³⁰ Bary Buzan, Ole Waever and J. De Wilde, “Security: A New Framework of Analysis,” (USA: Lynne Rienner, 1998).

³¹ Holger Stritzel, “Towards a Theory of Securitization: Copenhagen and Beyond,” *European Journal of International Relations* 13, no. 3 (2007): 357-383.

a specific matter into the security domain and facilitates dealing with it through “emergency measures.” Consequently, securitization depends on the speech acts by a securitizing actor, but the rhetoric itself is not enough for the securitisation process to happen. The “securitizing moves” should be acknowledged by the “targeted audience.” Therefore, the Copenhagen School’s interpretation of securitization supports the approval of special procedures to deal with an issue deemed a security threat.

On the other hand, The Paris School focuses on the role of security and bureaucratic practices along with the political discourse in securitization. The Paris school believes that a policy's “empirical referents,” tools, and securitisation instruments are deeply embedded. Hence, Paris School is based on the “logic of routine,” where the leading routinized practices of the government and security institutions are the main drivers of securitization along with the “logic of exception.” This “logic of routine” is considered a part of the “process of governmentality” in which technological usage produces threat perception and insecurities against the targeted audience. Hence the usage of Paris School along with Copenhagen will be a good fit.

This thesis will be based upon qualitative research to describe and analyse the situation of the Afghan Refugees along with the incidents, players and events motivating and leading to the securitization of Afghan refugees residing in Pakistan. It will acknowledge the subjective and skewed nature of the social realm contextualized by the constructivist worldview. The methodological limitations have been emphasized by the intricate and delicate governmental situations that regulate the accessibility and subject matter of information online and other related data and information on the Afghan population in Pakistan. The security situation, the scenario, everything has changed after the pull out of the American troops. Hence it is difficult to add this period due to different dimensions and constituents, so it will not be a part of this analysis. The research study encounters certain restrictions due to the “undocumented and unregistered description of about half of the refugee population residing in Pakistan.” This drawback can be encountered by classifying this constraint as a security concern for Pakistan, leading to the securitisation of these refugees. This study is also

constrained due to the dearth of information on migration-related security concerns, especially on the securitization of Afghan refugees in Pakistan.

This study will be significant because it will contribute to the literature on the securitization of Afghan refugees in Pakistan. Most of the literature available regarding Afghan refugees relates to the security concerns that these refugees pose to the state of Pakistan. A few articles have been penned down to elaborate on the true causes of the security situation in Pakistan. This study will also be one of a kind because it will utilise the Paris School of Securitization, which the writer believes has not been done earlier.

This piece of research will include six chapters. Following the introduction in chapter one, chapter two of this study will be based on the Theoretical Framework. After a brief analysis of what constitutes security and the approaches followed by the concise study of the Securitization theory and the Copenhagen and Paris schools, the writer will dive into explaining the “migration-security nexus.” The chapter will briefly explain the essential tenets of the Copenhagen School and the Paris School to learn the construction of migration by social and political actors. Consequently, securitization is the consequence of societal and political dialogues and practices that will be pinpointed in the analysis of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan’s practices in the fourth chapter. In this respect, this chapter will devise the study's theoretical basis to identify and comprehend how security is embedded and entrenched in Pakistan’s migration policy.

Chapter three will explain the domestic policies and the international assistance provided for the treatment of Afghan refugees in the country. Pakistan is not a signatory to the 1951 Convention; hence the chapter will dig out the national policies and strategies adopted for the treatment of Afghan refugees seeking shelter in Pakistan since the 1970s, as well as the contributions of the international agencies. In this chapter, relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan will be briefly discussed. It will also contextualize the state of affairs and the instances in which Afghan refugees entered Pakistan.

Chapter four of this thesis will be significant because it will provide details regarding the theoretical implication of the Copenhagen School's interpretation of the securitization theory. This chapter will account for the policy discourses and the speech acts of the bureaucratic figures and the political elite with regard to the securitization of Afghan refugees in Pakistan

Chapter five similarly will deal with the Paris School's understanding of the securitization theory to account for the securitized practices and tools employed by the state of Pakistan against the Afghan refugees. The securitization practices will demonstrate the construction of threats posed toward the Afghan refugee community residing in Pakistan. Policies adopted and initiated by the Pakistani government and the agencies will be mentioned as proof to support the examples of securitised acts and measures taken against these refugees.

Chapter six will finally be based on the conclusion. The conclusion will comprise findings and recommendations based upon the analysis of the aforementioned research questions. The study will conclude, based on findings, that Afghan refugees cannot be held accountable for aggravating the security situation in Pakistan. They also do not posit a security threat to the country in which they were securitized. Nevertheless, other radical and fanatical groups in Pakistan's territory have caused security threats and manipulated Afghan refugees as a 'play card.' This critical aspect needs to be highlighted in future studies. There is no clear and solid authentication of Afghan refugees' involvement in such atrocious indiscretions. Thus, security becomes an issue of safeguarding the credibility of the state's locale against perilous outside others. The writer will also provide a few necessary recommendations that may aid in resolving this matter.

CHAPTER 2

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This chapter aims to provide the details of the theoretical lens utilized in this study. In this regard, the “theory of Securitization” will be utilized. It will help us understand how a certain non-political matter is politicized and then constructed as a security issue by the states or governmental agencies. The theoretical implications of the Copenhagen and the Paris School of Securitization theory will assist in tracing the process of securitisation of Afghan refugees in Pakistan after 9/11. The Copenhagen school will help highlight the political discourses, public opinion, and the statements of the political leaders. In contrast, the Paris school would help indicate the securitizing moves, practices and policies adopted by the government of Pakistan and other institutions in creating the securitization process of Afghan refugees in Pakistan.

2.1 The Concept of Security

The world is constantly mobile, and so are the security threats, consequences, and trials. The concept of security is one of the fundamental ideas in global political discourse, but it remains a contested theme. The traditional notion of security that puts states as the primary referent has been up for wide-ranging discussion. Walter Lipmann and Arnold Wolfers opine that “a nation’s security is defined by its competence to protect itself from scourges and coercions to “core” or “acquired values”, in war if necessary.”³²

According to Barry Buzan, “the notion of security has been deemed a quest for liberty and autonomy from risks and perils. States can retain their sovereign distinctiveness

³² John Baylis, “The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations,” (London: Oxford University Press, 2020).

and practical veracity against hostile forces of change.” In short, security is about survival and existence.³³ Thus, security is of crucial value. It is not an autonomous idea; somewhat, it is always connected to individual or societal structures. Security has two elements: an “objective” one that states the absence of threat and a “subjective” one that translates into the absence of fear. Security is accomplished when both of the elements occur. Here, this should also be kept in mind that security cannot be accomplished at the expense of others.³⁴

2.1.1 The Traditional Security Studies (TSS)

It predominantly coincides with “the realist view on security” in that they associate the concept of security with having strong military power. In this world, there is anarchy; hence, the state is a chief player in international relations that can safeguard the security of its inhabitants both nationally and globally.³⁵ Within this anarchical world of politics, states always tend to pursue their national interest. Joseph Nye and Lynn Jones define security studies in this perspective as “the studies of the threat, use and control of military force.”³⁶ The approach follows “an ontological point of view” that “the social relations, as well as security threats, are a result of material factors and that they exist objectively.”³⁷ As far as the “epistemological” postulation is concerned, it uses positivist methods.

2.1.2 Non-Traditional School of Security Studies

³³Barry Buzan, “People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era,” (United States: ECPR, 2008).

³⁴Hans Günter Brauch, Peter H. Liotta, Antonio Marquina, Paul F. Roger and Mohammad El-Sayed Selim, eds., “Security and Environment in the Mediterranean: Conceptualising Security and Environmental Conflicts,” (Berlin: Springer, 2003).

³⁵Stephen M. Walt, “The Renaissance of Security Studies,” *International Studies Quarterly* 35, no. 2 (1991): 211-239.

³⁶Joseph S. Nye Jr and Sean M. Lynn-Jones, “International Security Studies: A Report of a Conference on the State of the Field,” *International Security* 12, no. 4 (1988): 5-27.

³⁷Filip Ejdus, “Security, Culture, and Identity in Serbia,” *W. Balkans Sec. Observer* 2 (2007): 38.

It supports the expanding and widening of the scope and focus of the subject matter of security studies in IR theory. That is why they are also referred to as wideners. The scholars of this school believe that security implicitly is not objective but subjective and that the state's survival should not be the only key concern; agents, structures, and subject matters other than the state should also be the focus. Thus, 'humanity' is synonymous with this school of thought, just as 'statism' is synonymous with the traditional school of security. That is why it is also known by the name Human security.³⁸

By the end of the Cold War, the notion of non-traditional security studies challenged the traditional one in the aftermath of the revolution in the Western political agendas. The international events, with their global influences, exposed the gap in the literature on TSS more apparent.³⁹ "Rise of ethnic, religious or identity-related conflicts within states, national liberation movements, economic crisis and ecological devastations"⁴⁰ surfaced the need for non-traditional school and highlighted the major downsides of TSS due to the limitation in its analysis to military conflicts only.

Other proponents of this school, along with Barry Buzan, have widened the concept of security at both horizontal and vertical levels. When it comes to expanding horizontally, the security concept has run down into five major sectors: military, political, economic, societal, and environmental. Vertically, security also focuses on referents other than the state, such as individuals, social groups, and humanity. Ontologically, the focus is subjective, and the methods utilized are that of post-positivists.⁴¹

³⁸Naila Maier-Knapp, "The Non-Traditional Security Concept and the EU-ASEAN Relationship Against the Backdrop of China's Rise," *The Pacific Review* 29, no. 3 (2016): 411-430.

³⁹Ibid.

⁴⁰J. Ann Tickner, "Gender in International Relations: Feminist Perspectives on Achieving Global Security," (New York: Columbia University Press): 1992.

⁴¹Marysia Zalewski and Cynthia Enloe, "Questions about Identity in International Relations," *International Relations Theory Today* (1995): 279-305.

2.2 Securitization Theory

Sulovic defines securitization as,

*“The positioning through speech acts (usually by a political leader) of a particular issue as a threat to survival, which in turn (with the consent of the relevant constituency) enables emergency measures and the suspension of ‘normal politics’ in dealing with that issue.”*⁴²

Securitization is a concept devised by Ole Waever⁴³, who argues that security should be analysed as a “speech act.” The embryonic study of securitization of migration has presented exceptional opuses and launched new boulevards in migration studies. Specifically, it attracts consideration to how the movement of the populace is dispensed or enclosed as a security issue and triggers withering critique against “illiberal” migration procedures of “liberal” states.⁴⁴ It entails a pronouncement by the upper echelons of a concerned state that an issue is a security problem. For securitization to occur, the audience of this speech act must acknowledge that the matter is of great magnitude and essence to warrant prioritization.⁴⁵

Proponents of securitization claim that the political or governmental agents construct issues as security threats; in other words, they securitize them and present them as threats to provide a legal ground for their aims. The fundamental objective of securitization is to “clarify who, why, and under what conditions the political actors securitize any problem. Instead of correlating with the military and security aspects, securitization is viewed as a political outcome.”⁴⁶ Popovic contends that “security is an outcome of some social processes instead of being embedded in any objective

⁴² V. Sulovic, “Meaning of Security and Theory of Securitization,” *Belgrade Centre for Security Policy* (2010).

⁴³ Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and J. De Wilde, “Security: A New Framework of Analysis,” (USA: Lynne Rienner, 1998).

⁴⁴ Michael S. Teitelbaum, “Right Versus Right: Immigration and Refugee Policy in the United States,” *Foreign Affairs* 59 (1980): 21.

⁴⁵ Holger Stritzel, “Security in Translation: Securitization Theory and the Localization of Threat,” (Berlin: Springer, 2014).

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

reality. The securitization theory argues the same; security is socially and inter-subjectively constructed.”⁴⁷ Hayes has recognized “three elements of a successful securitization process; existential threat, referents object, and means for resolving the threat.”⁴⁸

According to Waeber and Buzan, securitization is the effective interpretation of a problem as an ‘existential threat’ to the specified referent entity through ‘speech acts’ of securitizing players that validates security strategies such as using enlistment, confidentiality, and other resources only authentic while handling a ‘security matter’. The major concern is not whether the security risk is real but how that particular risk is constructed as a threat.⁴⁹

Securitization can be considered “an extreme version of politicization.” The effectiveness of securitization is decided by the audience and not by the securitizing agent. If a certain percentage of the audience responds positively to a constructed threat, it becomes an existential threat. This gives the securitizing actors the authority to invoke ‘politics of exception’. In this approach, a speech act meant for securitization must adhere to a rhetorical theme drawn from conflict and its chronological nuances of survival, urgency, intimidation, and security. It is an extensive course of action by which an actor asserts that a referent entity is existentially jeopardized, stresses the right to adopt precautionary steps to deal with that threat, and persuades an audience that breaking the rules to counteract the threat is reasonable.⁵⁰

In short, by categorizing something as ‘security’, a concern is sensationalized as a matter of absolute urgency. One can therefore contemplate securitization as the

⁴⁷ Goran Popovic, “Securitization of EU development policy: To What Extent Has the EU Development Policy Become Securitized in the Post-9/11 Environment?,” (2007).

⁴⁸ Jarrod Hayes, “Constructing national security: US relations with India and China,” (London: Cambridge University Press, 2013).

⁴⁹ Matt McDonald, “Securitization and the Construction of Security,” *European Journal of International Relations* 14, no. 4 (2008): 563-587, <http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1354066108097553>.

⁵⁰ Ali Diskaya, “Towards a Critical Securitization Theory: the Copenhagen and Aberystwyth Schools of Security Studies,” *E-International Relations* (2013).

progression through which non-politicized or politicized problems are elevated to security concerns that require to be tackled immediately, which authorizes the circumventing of public debate and democratic practices. Integrating the functions of persuading and contention in the creation of threats overrides the complications that afflict the “objectivist and subjectivist” interpretations of security because it unites cultural influences that assist in elucidating contradictory responses between states to analogous advances and categorizes an influential position for an agency in the erection of threats.⁵¹ The securitizing agents consider enabling the circumstances to take the applicable methods concerning controlling and dealing with the “existential or neo-existential threats”. This demands the securitizing agents to scrutinize different courses of action accessible to deal with the crisis, develop a suitable speech act, and assess the threat's strength.⁵²

2.2.1 The Copenhagen School of Securitization

Social constructivism promotes the idea that people construct social existence and that it can and will change. There is no empirical reality in this regard, but the twisted truth carries great weight with people’s approaches and tactics. Consequently, ideas, beliefs, discussions, and visions are essential. “Security: A new framework for analysis” is the biblical textbook to comprehend the academic prelude. The concept is theoretically constructivist as it is a type of social practice.⁵³

The Copenhagen School, based on the Constructivist approach school is related to the “Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI)” which was founded in 1985 by the Parliament of Denmark. It has played a significant part in the growth and progress of peace and security studies in the Scandinavian Peninsula.⁵⁴ Barry Buzan is known to

⁵¹ Michael Collyer, “Migrants, Emigrants and the Security Paradigm: Constraints and Opportunities,” *Mediterranean Politics* 11, no. 2 (2006): 255-270.

⁵² Constantinos Adamides, “Securitization and De-Securitization Processes in Protracted Conflicts,” (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2020).

⁵³ Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and J. De Wilde, “Security: A New Framework of Analysis,” (USA: Lynne Rienner, 1998).

⁵⁴ Stefano Guzzini, and Dietrich Jung, “Copenhagen Peace Research,” In *Contemporary Security Analysis and Copenhagen Peace Research*, (London: Routledge, 2003): 17-28.

be the founding father of the Copenhagen School. Other proponents and contributors are Weaver and de Wilde. This particular school supplies another fundamental lens to study non-traditional security threats. It grew from “Social Constructivism” and “Neo-realism”.⁵⁵ The CS has thus offered a pioneering assessment of security issues other than military threats. The proponents of this school, in short, favour the wideners’ side.

According to Kaunert and Leonard, in Copenhagen school, a certain issue is presented as a security matter after its ‘politicization’. If the targeted audience perceives the issue as an ‘existential threat’ and supports it, the ‘securitizing move’ then moves to the stage of becoming ‘securitized’. Once the securitization stage is achieved, the ‘securitizing actor or agent’ adopts ‘the emergency measures’ to deal with the matter securitized.⁵⁶ The measures and steps adopted to deal with the securitized issue may surpass the boundaries of any democratic system. Hence, to effectively implement the securitization process, it is necessary to differentiate and identify the audience.⁵⁷ The following diagram illustrates the process of securitization followed by the Copenhagen school.

In this thesis, the writer will utilize the Copenhagen school to analyse the speeches, debates, and official statements of the politicians of Pakistan regarding the securitization of Afghan refugees. The security discourse adopted after the Army Public school attack will be part of the analysis. Along with this, the speeches of the Prime Ministers, political statements on terrorism and militancy and National Action Policy (NAP) by the Interior Minister of Pakistan, and opinions published in the newspapers will be part of the analysis. The analysis will also include the opinions, outlooks, and beliefs of the general public as an audience. Although the statements and speeches of the Interior Minister, Prime Minister, and the military personnel (primarily the Army Chief and the Director General of the Inter Service Public Relations organization-ISPR) were aimed at the general public audience; they provided a crucial

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Sarah Léonard and Christian Kaunert, “Reconceptualizing the Audience in Securitization Theory,” In *Securitization Theory*, (London: Routledge, 2010): 71-90.

⁵⁷ Edwin Ezeokafor, “The Securitization Processes and West African Security: Regime-Led Neo-Patrimonial Threats?,” PhD diss., (Dundee: University of Dundee, 2015).

objective of affirming the “emergency measures” in the country to deal with the threat. Consequently, it is essential to examine this data to analyse the security rhetoric of the securitizing actor.

2.2.2 The Paris School Understanding of Securitization

The International Political Sociology (IPS) developed from the argument adjacent to the European security studies in the 1990s and the steps headed to its “structuration”.⁵⁸ The IPS is an imperative enhancement in the theory of securitization as it sheds light on three important avenues that the Copenhagen School did not address: 1. the fundamental character of securitizing actor and audience; 2. the socio-historical perspective that affects the social impression of implication and simplifies the (securitizing) discussions to turn into predominant and prompt policy rejoinders; and, 3. the capability of security experts to develop their strategies to other societal subtleties thus marking them with icons of security.⁵⁹

The Paris School was at the outset of this approach related to the “academic journal *Cultures et Conflits*.”⁶⁰ It attracted significant limelight from the writings of Foucault and Bourdieu. This approach came up as a consequence of Copenhagen’s excess stress on speech acts. It does not mean that the Paris School nullified the relevance of speech acts; it also underscored the value of non-discursive practices. According to Bigo, one of the proponents of the Sociological approach, “the securitization of migration also comes from a range of administrative practices such as population profiling, risk assessment, and what may be termed a specific habitus of the security professional with its ethos of secrecy and concern for the management of fear or unease.”⁶¹ For Bigo, administrative methods, specialized knowledge of security and the technology utilized to implement the knowledge of that security are the key driving forces behind

⁵⁸ Trine Villumsen Berling, “The International Political Sociology of Security: Rethinking Theory and Practice,” (London: Routledge, 2015).

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Didier Bigo and Emma McCluskey, “What is a PARIS Approach to (in) Securitization? Political Anthropological Research for,” *The Oxford handbook of international security* (2018): 116.

⁶¹ Didier Bigo and Anastasia Tsoukala, “Understanding in Security,” In *Terror, Insecurity and Liberty* (London: Routledge, 2008): 11-19

the process of securitization. Securitizing requires re-encapsulation through “sociological and criminological lenses” rather than the narrow analysis used by the Copenhagen School.⁶²

The Paris School trails a “Foucauldian understanding of discourse”. It implies that discourses are developed through the application of supremacy and generate a precise market of data. Hence, it shows that security agencies have the power to securitize a certain issue with the help of the data they retain and the technology they use.⁶³ According to Bigo, it is not the public deliberation or discourse that securitizes an issue but an extremely enigmatic, devolved, opaque and clandestine sphere of governmental associations that denote the policy as well as securitization.⁶⁴ For this purpose, they do not just imply discourse but also securitizing practices.

Compared to the Copenhagen School, ‘politics of exception’ is not the central matter of concern; “the technocratic practices invoking a politics of unease not set up through emergency, but to fabricate fear to justify certain governmental practices” is the matter of concern.⁶⁵ Therefore, migration is securitized by coupling it with a broad perspective of apprehension identifying and managing the portent as security issues. Such a perspective then validates the commencement of various administrative and technical procedures such as “discriminatory visa policies, surveillance practices based on extensive databases or increasing role of police and intelligence bodies in migration.”⁶⁶

Balzacq, another advocate of the Paris School, has put forward a model called “tool of securitization” or “instrument of securitization”. He claims that the “tool of

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Michel Foucault, “Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977,” (New York: Vintage, 1980).

⁶⁴ Jef Huysmans, “Revisiting Copenhagen: Or, on the Creative Development of a Security Studies Agenda in Europe,” *European Journal of International Relations* 4, no. 4 (1998): 479-505.

⁶⁵ Thomas Diez and Ian Manners, “10 Reflecting on Normative-Power Europe,” *Power in World Politics* 173 (2007).

⁶⁶ Ole Waever, “Securitization and De-Securitization,” (Copenhagen: Centre for Peace and Conflict Research, 1993).

securitization” is “an identifiable social and technical ‘dispositif’ or device embodying a specific threat image through which public action is configured in order to address a security issue.”⁶⁷ Put another way, the practices of securitization can be any sort of activity by the securitizing agents that would transmit a message to its audience regarding the security threat regardless of the communication process being direct or indirect. Also, as claimed by Thierry Balzacq,⁶⁸ “a speech view of security does not provide adequate grounding upon which to examine security practices in real situations.”⁶⁹

According to Reckwitz,⁷⁰ “practices are a kind of routine behaviour consisting of many interconnected elements. For those who analyse security practices, securitization is not necessarily the result of a rational design in which the targets are pre-determined by following a pre-determined agenda.” As Pouliot puts it, “social action is not necessarily preceded by a premeditated design. A practice can be oriented toward a goal without consciously being informed.”⁷¹

The analysis of Brochmann will help understand the mechanisms for migration control. This analysis will be helpful in the analytical part of this thesis. Brochmann has analysed migration control mechanisms into two types: external and internal.⁷² The external refers to the more visible measures taken to control entry by states before departure or arrival. At the same time, the internal mechanisms are exercised from the first entry till repatriation or the possible fulfilment of citizenship. Hence, from this table, the following analytical distribution can be made to investigate the securitization

⁶⁷ Thierry Balzacq, “The Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience and Context,” *European Journal of International Relations* 11, no. 2 (2005): 171-201.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Thierry Balzacq, “A Theory of Securitization: Origins, Core, Assumptions, and Variants,” In *Securitization Theory* (London: Routledge, 2010): 15-44.

⁷⁰ Andreas Reckwitz, “Toward a Theory of Social Practices: A Development in Culturalist Theorizing,” *European Journal of Social Theory* 5, no.2 (2002): 243-263.

⁷¹ Vincent Pouliot, “The Logic of Practicality: A Theory of Security Communities,” *International Organization* 62, no. 2 (2008): 257-288.

⁷² Greete Brochmann and Tomas Hammar, eds, “Mechanisms of Immigration Control: A Comparative Analysis of European Regulation Policies,” (London: Routledge, 2020).

process: a) External Securitization includes praxes aimed at the refugees entering the host state and comprises a preventive approach. b) Internal Securitization comprises the procedures and exercises for the refugees already present in the host state.⁷³

Due to the extensiveness of the practices, this thesis will consider only the relevant and important practices existing in the literature on the securitization of Afghan refugees in Pakistan for the sake of the point analysis under these two rubrics. This drawback will aid in shaping an in-depth analysis of the securitization process. The writer would evaluate the official documents, the policies adopted by the state, the amendments in the constitution, the establishment of NAP, actions taken by the enforcement agencies and the erection of the fencing along the border as policies adopted by the state of Pakistan as part of its securitizing moves against the Afghan refugees.

2.3 Migration-Security Nexus

The connection between migration and security dates back to ancient times. In the olden days, distress and panic related to the movement of people provoked the building of giant town barriers and the concept of permits and visas to monitor migration in the contemporary period.⁷⁴ Anxieties associated with the international movement have aided in a varied scale of projects and programmes, from international cooperation on migration, such as the creation of the EU, to the spread of right-wing anti-immigrant political factions. Since time immemorial, migration has often been interpreted and rendered as threatening. During the Cold War, migration from the Eastern bloc was viewed as a national security matter, leading to efforts expended to avert it.⁷⁵ On the other hand, migration was consigned to the sphere of “low politics and of the security

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ Malcolm Anderson, Maria-Elena Alcaraz, Roland Freudenstein, Virginie Guiraudon, Leszek Jesien, Rey Koslowski, Gallya Lahav et al., “The Wall Around the West: State Borders and Immigration Controls in North America and Europe,” (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000).

⁷⁵ Marc A. Levy, Oran R. Young and Michael Zürn, “The Study of International Regimes,” *European Journal of International Relations* 1, no. 3 (1995): 267-330.

agenda” in the Western bloc. The renaissance of migration back to the security memo in the West overlapped with the termination of the Cold War.⁷⁶

A number of non-military risks started to be included conspicuously in the security analysis, comprising climate change, pandemics, and migration.⁷⁷ The rationale behind including the so-called low-profile issues on the list of top-notch security issues has been to offer a prima facie example that the issue does appear to be a threat to national security and also, to persuade countries to pay attention and dedicate more funds to regulate and manage them.

Migration, in short, has been allied to security in several cases; from promoting fierce skirmish and ecological dilapidation, manufacturing criticism in host countries, apprehensions of over-regulation and management of borders and the absorptive ability of host states to the persistence of cultures and civilizations.⁷⁸ The notion of the Migration-Security nexus connection delineates migration as a security nuisance. States, due to this reason, make use of this tactic to obstruct the crossing of unwanted refugees into their territories. The nexus between migration and security was coined in Europe after the culmination of the Cold War. It earned significant popularity in the aftermath of September 11, after which migration was depicted as a “neo-existential security threat”.⁷⁹ Tom Tancredo, a Republican member of the House of Representatives (HOR), termed the admission of asylum seekers in the USA as a “silent invasion.”⁸⁰

⁷⁶ Thomas F. Homer Dixon, “Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence from Cases,” *International Security* 19, no. 1 (1994): 5-40.

⁷⁷ Simon Dalby, “Security and Ecology in the Age of Globalization,” *Environmental Change and Security Project Report* 8, no. 101 (2002): 4.

⁷⁸ Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?,” In *Culture and politics* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000) 99-118.

⁷⁹ Michael Humphrey, “Migration, Security and Insecurity,” *Journal of Intercultural Studies* 34, no. 2 (2013): 178-195.

⁸⁰ Patrick J. Buchanan, “State of Emergency: The Third World Invasion and Conquest of America,” (New York: Macmillan, 2006).

Such sensitivity towards outlining migration as a security menace has resulted in the penning down of legislation and legal procedures to impede and reduce the burst of refugees entering their borders. Those procedures may include surveillance, policing, border management, protocols, detaining of immigrants, restraining refugees to camps, biometrics, etc.⁸¹ Almost all the member countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) have conscripted migration as a security matter in their threat list.⁸² The nexus between migration and security exhibits the commitment of state agencies as the driving force behind securitizing migrants. In attaining the goals related to this nexus, stringent procedures are implemented to curb and tackle the human rights of refugees.⁸³

As per the analysis of Ceyhan and Tsoukala, the securitization of migration comprises a figurative course of action and political discourses expressed in four axes: “socioeconomic, securitarian, identitarian and political”.⁸⁴ The socioeconomic axis connects the phenomenon of migration with poverty, unemployment, growth of the informal economy, issues of the welfare state and environmental degradation. Migration is gradually more interpreted as a risk to the financial system.⁸⁵ The economic setting of concern is strongly correlated with the globalization that has stimulated local reactions to migration movements, especially the irregular types.

The securitarian axis entails discussions on a deficit of power that connects security and defence with two frontiers: internal and external. Migration is also interpreted as a risk to political identity. The political axis leads to the agenda of anti-immigrants’

⁸¹ Rey Koslowski, “International Migration and European Security in the Context of EU Enlargement,” *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 12, no. 1 (1998): 30-48.

⁸² Philippe Bourbeau, “Migration and Security: Securitization Theory and its Refinement,” In *Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Town & Country Resort and Convention Centre* (San Diego, 2006).

⁸³ Thomas Faist, “The Migration-Security Nexus: International Migration and Security Before and After 9/11,” In *Migration, Citizenship, Ethnos* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006): 103-119.

⁸⁴ Ayse Ceyhan and Anastassia Tsoukala, “The Securitization of Migration in Western Societies: Ambivalent Discourses and Policies,” *Alternatives* 27 no.1 (2002): 21-39.

⁸⁵ Gergios Karyotis, “European Migration Policy in the aftermath of September 11: The Security-Migration Nexus,” *Innovation: The European Journal of Social Science Research* 20, no. 1 (2007): 1-17.

rants and strategies, racist and xenophobic discourses, stereotyping, and the generation of prejudices against migrants to acquire political gains.⁸⁶ The last one is the identarian axis, in which the immigrant population is deemed dangerous and a risk to the host society's culture, national identity, traditions, and demographic balance. Consequently, these factors lead states or multinational organizations (EU, for instance) to approve and implement strict measures against migration flows, constructing the phenomenon of migration as a threat to their security.⁸⁷

2.4 Securitization of Afghan Refugees in Pakistan

The Afghan refugee exodus to the state of Pakistan is an intricate matter with composite connotations. This exodus became a security matter due to: “the international security framework of irregular migration and trafficking”; “the internal security propositions regarding the image of migrants as a risk factor to employment, economic resources, social peace and order of the host country.”⁸⁸ Since Pakistan has not been a signatory to the 1951 Convention and still aided the refugees in the 1970s, it filled the legal gap with the assistance of securitization of religious (Islamic) and ethnic (Pashtun) sentiments. The military dictator of Pakistan, Gen. Zia, housed refugees by labelling them as “Muhajireen”.⁸⁹ The political discourse was constructed to eliminate the isolation of Pakistan in the international community and portray its image as a hospitable state hosting the largest refugee populace.⁹⁰

⁸⁶ Thierry Balzacq, Sarah Léonard and Jan Ruzicka, “Securitization Revisited: Theory and Cases,” *International relations* 30, no. 4 (2016): 494-531.

⁸⁷ Elena Tilovska-Kechedji, “Migrants and Terrorism: A link or Misconception,” *Journal of Advanced Research in Social Sciences and Humanities* 3, no. 2 (2018): 59-67.

⁸⁸ R. Lohrmann, “Migrants, Refugees, and Insecurity: Current Threats to Peace?,” *International Migration* 38, no. 4, (2000): 3-22.

⁸⁹ The term muhajir/mohajereen, an Arab term is translated as 'refugee(s)' in all Islamic countries. Muhajir has the same root as Hijra, or Hejira, which refers to Muhammad's flight from Mecca to Medina. A muhajir is one who voluntarily goes into exile, and who has severed the ties with his own people and his possessions to take refuge in a land of Islam. Thus, we have a term (and a model of behaviour) which dates back precisely to the year of the foundation of the Islamic era, 622 A.D., and thus has very deep religious connotations. The historic-religious notion of muhajir is the object of strong identification on the part of the Afghan Refugees.

⁹⁰ M. Zieck, “The Legal Status of Afghan Refugees in Pakistan, a Story of Eight Agreements and Two Suppressed Premises,” *International Journal of Refugee Law* 20, no. 2, (2008), <https://doi.org/10.1093/ijrl/een0147> .

The securitization of Afghan refugees gained momentum in Pakistan in the aftermath of 9/11. Pakistan changed its stance from open borders to that of closed borders and strict border controls. The connection between securitization and the Afghan refugee movement to Pakistan reveals a vigorous notion prompted by political, social, and economic events over the last few decades. Placing the Afghan refugees in a similar band of “criminality and terrorism” hauled the securitization cords among government officials and the agencies of Pakistan, eventually leading to the fencing of a porous border between Pakistan and Afghanistan against juxtaposing threats of terrorist factions identified as incoming migration flows.⁹¹ The common agendas in the discursive interpretation included Pakistan as a compassionate state hosting the Afghan refugees over a long duration. The image of Afghan refugees is portrayed as “the dangerous other” responsible for introducing social evils to Pakistani society. The imageries and metaphors constructed regarding the Afghan refugees depict fear erected through “the law of exception”, stumbling on the populist narratives and discourses on terrorism and militancy.⁹²

The state utilised the dichotomies of “us versus them” as a substitute boundary politically and culturally. Likewise, the spotlight on identities and ethnicities extended the security discourse into the communities. The identity focus has extended the security discourses beyond the state into the communities. According to Huysmans, “nations are built at the spot of the practice of management and control by the government. By securitising the culture and society, the state expands its ‘governmentality’ to the controlling of sense of risk and threat that translates into unanimity amongst its people by omitting the risky ‘other’.”⁹³ “Securitising migration forms political confidence, devotion, and identity through the dissemination of terror and strengthening of isolation. The entirety and uniformity of cultures precede this plot

⁹¹ J. A. Vuori, “Illocutionary Logic and Strands of Securitization: Applying the Theory of Securitization to the Study of Non-Democratic Political Orders,” *European Journal of International Relations* 14, no. 1, (2008): 65-99

⁹² UNHCR, “Boosting Refugee Protection in Pakistan,” (2004), www.unhcr.org/4ee210d89.pdf

⁹³ J. Huysmans, “A Foucaultian View on Spill-Over: Freedom and Security in the EU,” *Journal of International Relations and Development* 7, no. 3, (2004): 307.

of menace to the integrity of national identity.’⁹⁴ The decline of the national interest of Pakistan in Afghanistan stemmed from the securitisation of the protracted Afghan refugee exodus, signifying them as an extremist risk to the passive state of Pakistan.

The terrorist attack at the Army Public School in 2014, followed by the killings of university students at the Bacha Khan university, Peshawar, in 2016, provided a sense of urgency for further securitization. In this regard, NAP came under the purview that led to the initiation of different securitization moves by the military, followed by operations at smaller scales conducted in the north western frontier of Pakistan to clear out the hideouts of terrorists. Other emergency measures included the “militarization of borders, introduction of the surveillance tools, biometric registration of the refugees etc.” which will be analysed in detail in chapter five. In a nutshell, this thesis will be based on the chronological and contextual approach in its analysis of the securitization of migration in the post-September 11 period. More specifically, it will establish a link between the developments before and after 9/11. It will evaluate the securitization of migration regarding terrorism in light of these patterns.

2.5 Conclusion

This chapter has attempted to analyse the “migration-security nexus” to highlight a gamut from the administration of migration to the illicit concerns, hence delivering a foundation for connecting the offences with migration. In this regard, border controls, security checks, surveillance technologies and many other material practices can be considered securitization mechanisms. The chapter then examines the securitization theory utilized as a theoretical framework to study the discourse and practices employed to construct security threats. The magnitude of the collective usage of the discursive policies arises from their capacity to influence the audience. In this study, the securitization of Afghan refugees in Pakistan will be evaluated through both the discursive and non-discursive aspects of the securitization, and mentions “visual images, violent performative acts, policy tools, institutional configurations, and forms

⁹⁴ Ibid.

of governmentality” as some of the “individual and collective framing strategies.”⁹⁵ Countries often securitize refugees present in their territories by reprimanding and alleging them liable for the presence of poverty and other socials in the host society.

⁹⁵Ayse Ceyhan and Anastassia Tsoukala, “The Securitization of Migration in Western Societies: Ambivalent Discourses and Policies.” *Alternatives* 27, no. 1 (2002): 21-39.

CHAPTER 3

MIGRATION OF AFGHAN REFUGEES AND THE MANAGEMENT POLICIES OF PAKISTAN

The beginning of this chapter deals with the historical background that will explain the events leading up to the Afghan refugee exodus to Pakistan. After briefly shedding light on the see-saw relationship between the two countries, and the migration of Afghan refugees to Pakistan, the writer will then move on to elucidate the policies, mechanisms, and regulations adopted to deal with those refugees. There exists a global framework that includes legislation for the states to deal with the refugee crises, also known as the international refugee regime. This regime comprises the institutions of the 1951 Geneva Convention and the 1967 protocol regarding the dealings of refugees. UNHCR is the organization that deals with the application. Since Pakistan is not a signatory to the convention or the protocol, the writer will highlight the policies adopted at the state level to deal with the refugee exodus. The chapter will conclude by including the literature on the assistance provided by international humanitarian organizations and donor agencies since bearing the economic burden of millions of refugees by a single state is impossible.

3.1 Background

*“Asia is like a body made of water and clay
The Afghan nation is like a heart in the body
Peace in Afghanistan brings tranquillity in Asia
Chaos in Afghanistan brings disorder in all Asia”*
(Iqbal)⁹⁶

⁹⁶ Huma and Nausheen Wasi, “Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations: Pitfalls and the Way Forward,” (2021), Retrieved from <https://ir.iba.edu.pk/faculty-research-books/5>.

Through several annals of history, the prominence of Afghanistan's geostrategic locality and its financial dependence on others has subjected it to foreign manoeuvrings. Russia and Great Britain, two great powers that embarked on the "The Great Game"⁹⁷ in the 19th century, had profound interests in the country. Due to the dogmatic and military compulsions, the two powers turned the Afghan state into a "buffer zone"⁹⁸ between them. Afghanistan was transformed into a combat zone of proxy wars in the twentieth century among regional and outside powers. The nation of Afghanistan has faced frequent domestic political and ethnic strikes, acute corruption, a highly fragile rule of law, uncertainty, warlords, Islamic extremism, and whatnot.

The geostrategic setting of this tiny state also indicates the challenges and intimidations. There has been sturdy tribal clout, poor infrastructure, rocky and dry geography, dearth of employment, and non-existence of education. In the aftermath of 9/11, Afghanistan again drew the concentration of the world powers. The characteristics and intricacy of the Great Powers' stakes in Afghanistan have transmuted over time. These powers have now been battling against the budding menaces of fanaticism, radicalism, terrorism, and drug trafficking, making the confrontation more complex, and challenging.⁹⁹

Friedrich Engels described the topography of Afghanistan in his appraisal of John William Kaye's *The Afghan War* as "An extensive country of Asia between Persia and the Indies, and in the other direction between the Hindu Kush and the Indian Ocean. It formerly included the Persian provinces of Khorasan and Kohistan, together with Herat, Baluchistan, Cashmere, and Sindh, and a considerable part of Punjab. Its principal cities are Kabul, the capital, Ghazni, Peshawar, and Kandahar."¹⁰⁰

⁹⁷ David Fromkin, "The Great Game in Asia," *Foreign Affairs* no. 58, (1979): 936.

⁹⁸ A buffer zone is a neutral zonal area that lies between two or more bodies of land, usually pertaining to countries. Depending on the type of buffer zone, it may serve to separate regions or conjoin them.

⁹⁹ Milan L. Hauner, "Afghanistan Between the Great Powers: 1938–1945," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 14, no. 4 (1982): 481-499.

¹⁰⁰ Friedrich Engels, "Afghanistan", *The New American Cyclopaedia*, Vol. 1, retrieved August 25, 2010.

Pakistan and Afghanistan, the two neighbouring countries, share embedded chronological connections, affinity, religious bondage, and ethnocultural identity. Unfortunately, the two countries have hardly revelled in smooth and convivial affairs. There has prevailed a constant clash of interest, mistrust, scepticism, misperceptions, divergent security views, and policy deadlocks between each other. This trust deficit can be dated back to the subcontinent's partition and Pakistan's independence in 1947.¹⁰¹ When Pakistan became independent, the only state that did not want to recognise its existence on the face of the earth was Afghanistan. At the forum of the United Nations, Kabul's regime opposed Pakistan's membership. Kabul's posture was driven by its resistance regarding the validity of "the Durand Line agreement between Afghanistan and the British Raj."¹⁰²

The populace of the ethnic Pashtun tribe in Afghanistan is contiguous to the frontier of Pakistan. The tribe has been divided due to the existence of an international boundary between Afghanistan and Pakistan. This telluric division of Pashtuns stemmed from the Anglo-Afghan wars. Resultantly, the Durand Line Agreement was signed between the British Lord Sir Henry Mortimer Durand and the Afghan King. Pakistan now shares an elongated and permeable boundary with Afghanistan, which is thought to be the most provocative, risky, and inadequately delineated in most spots. Earlier, after the independence of Pakistan, the issue of "the creation of Pakhtunistan"¹⁰³ and then Durand Line became the bones of contention, thus hindering the development of amity and liqueur between the two. Later, political dogmas resulting from 'the Cold War and then the 'War on Terror' turned out to be the stumbling blocks. Nevertheless, the empathy and enthusiasm to a people-to-people degree have persisted in being commonly jovial, if not idyllic.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰¹ Muhibullah Durrani and Ashraf Khan, "Pakistan-Afghan Relations: Historic Mirror," *The Dialogue* 4, no. 1 (2002): 90-98.

¹⁰² Ibid.

¹⁰³ Saifullah Taye and Zahid Ahmed, "Dynamics of Trust and Mistrust in the Afghanistan-Pakistan Relationship," *Asian Studies Review* 45, no. 4 (2021): 557-575.

¹⁰⁴ Ghulam Umar, "The Refugee Problem: An Overview," *Pakistan Horizon* 38, no. 1 (1985): 25, www.jstore.org/stable/41404025

Pakistan, since the beginning, has strived to achieve two of its major goals involving Afghanistan: maintaining peace and cordial relations with Afghanistan and averting the “Kabul-Delhi connexion”¹⁰⁵ from happening because it could be one of the causes leading to impending Pakistan’s growth, development, and stability. On the other hand, many Afghan leaders had reservations regarding the survival of the nascent state of Pakistan due to its complex dynamics. These leaders attempted to resist shaking hands with the leaders of Pakistan and were worried about seeing Pakistan functioning as a “fully functional democratic country.”¹⁰⁶

They wanted to witness Pakistan turning into a failed state, as this would have allowed Afghans to effortlessly capture major chunks of Pakistan's regions closer to the Afghanistan border. Also, the Afghan leaders dreaded the democratic vision of Pakistan as this could spawn revolutionary and rebellious zeal and fervour in the Afghan populace for freedom from those monarchs. However, no deliberate policy of Afghanistan barred Pakistan from becoming a democratic policy since the fall of the monarchy in 1973. The religious and ethnic connexions across the border offered a collaborative exchange and steadily enriched their bond until the invasion of the Soviets in 1979.¹⁰⁷

Stephen Tanner, author of “Afghanistan: A Military History from Alexander the Great to the Fall of the Taliban,” connects the invasion to “the Soviet-Afghan Friendship Treaty of 1921”, which okayed the Russians to take into consideration that they had a legitimate and legal obligation and prerogative to manipulate and manoeuvre their southern neighbour.¹⁰⁸ Nevertheless, the decision-makers of Pakistan took the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan as an opportunity to terminate its isolation of Pakistan. The

¹⁰⁵ Abraham Rhea, “The Afghanistan Refugee Crisis: Implications for Pakistan and Iran,” *Air Power Journal* 8, no. 3 (2013): 192– 193, http://www.academia.edu/6010791/THE_AFGHANISTAN_REFUGEE_CRISIS_Implications_for_Pakistan_and_Iran.

¹⁰⁶ Abdul Sattar, “Afghanistan: Past, Present and Future, From Jihad to Civil War,” (Islamabad: The Institute of Regional Studies, 1997).

¹⁰⁷ A. Ghafoor Liwal, “Areas Between Afghanistan and Pakistan and the Present Turmoil,” *Eurasia Border Review* 1, no. 1 (2010): 75-86.

¹⁰⁸ Stephen Tanner, “Afghanistan: A Military History from Alexander the Great to the Fall of the Taliban,” (New York: Da Capo Press, 2002).

political environment of Asia was also not in favour of the Western bloc, particularly after the removal of the Shah of Iran in the Iranian Revolution. It was, therefore, in the best interests of both the United States and Pakistan to be on the same page in opposition to the Soviet Union to accomplish their national aspirations and ambitions.¹⁰⁹ The former Foreign Minister of Pakistan, Abdul Sattar, commenting on the premeditated aftermaths of the invasion, explained that “the Soviet military interference triggered a profound shock in Pakistan. Out of the blue, the buffer vanished, and as the Soviets established their power and influence in Afghanistan, they employed it as a springboard to get to a warm water harbour on the Arabian Sea [through Pakistan]. Pakistan was in no position to accede to the Soviet intrusion, nor could it encounter a superpower.”¹¹⁰

Ten years later, when the Soviets pulled out from Afghanistan, a civil war broke out as to who would take charge. The civil war raged for four years between different factions from 1992 to 1996; the Taliban captured the capital city Kabul and established their government, declaring the country as the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan in 1996.¹¹¹ Pakistan was among the only three countries that recognised the Government of the Taliban. The other two countries were the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.¹¹²

The year 2001 thus transformed into a turning point in the Pak-Afghan liaison. This particular year witnessed the 9/11 incident culminating in another invasion of Afghanistan, but this time by the world's superpower, the United States, which supported Afghanistan during the Soviet invasion. The invasion completely altered the subtleties of the Pak-Afghan bilateral relationship and regional political affairs. Since

¹⁰⁹ S.V. Salahuddin, “Militancy in Pakistan and Afghanistan: A Brief History of Causes and Effects,” (New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2012): 50-78.

¹¹⁰ Raza Rumi, “Charting Pakistan’s Internal Security Policy,” (Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 2015), <https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR368-Charting-Pakistans-Internal-Security-Policy.pdf>.

¹¹¹ Ralph H. Magnus, “Afghanistan in 1996: Year of the Taliban,” *Asian Survey* 37, no. 2, (1997): 111-117.

¹¹² Naseem Ahmed, “Pakistan Taliban Policy: 1994-1999,” *Dialogue (Pakistan)* 7, no. 1 (2012).

then, the connected present-day security concerns comprising border safety, defence, and extremism, along with the ‘non-traditional security dangers’, are major worries of the legislators at both ends.¹¹³

3.2 Afghan Refugees in Pakistan

*One refugee is a novelty, ten refugees are boring, and a hundred refugees are a menace.*¹¹⁴

A refugee is the twentieth century’s classification of a forced migrant. Geddes describes refugees as entrapped populace restricted by the governments of nation-states.¹¹⁵ Said opines that the origin of the notion of a refugee has been conventionally controlled by the bureaucratic arrangements of states to operate and manage powerless and destitute populace.¹¹⁶ Kushner has emphasised how the issue of refugees has been neglected in the realms of history until the Great World Wars happened and millions of people migrated.¹¹⁷

This issue was brought into the limelight in world politics during the Cold War and was utilised as a soft power tool. In the aftermath of 9/11, the issue of refugees acquired substantial attention in the international arena.¹¹⁸ Refugees, conspicuously, have been moved beyond the transnational boundaries, escaping radical oppression, running into bordering countries or travelling thousands of kilometres to other continents to seek

¹¹³ Maria Sultan, Aamir Hashmi and Manzoor Ahmed Abbasi, eds., “Afghanistan 2014: The Decision Point” (Islamabad: South Asian Strategic Stability Institute, 2013): 89.

¹¹⁴ Kelly M. Greenhill, “Weapons of Mass Migration,” In *Weapons of Mass Migration* (New York: Cornell University Press, 2010).

¹¹⁵ Andrew Geddes, “Governing Migration from a Distance: Interactions Between Climate, Migration, and Security in the South Mediterranean,” *European Security* 24, no. 3 (2015): 473-490.

¹¹⁶ Anonio Golini, Mohammed Said, Oliviero Casacchia, Cecilia Reynaud, Sara Basso, Lorenzo Cassata and Massimiliano Crisci., “Migration and Urbanization in Ethiopia, with Special Reference to Addis Ababa,” (Addis Ababa: CSA, 2001).

¹¹⁷ Katharine Knox, and Tony Kushner, “Refugees in an Age of Genocide: Global, National and Local Perspectives During the Twentieth Century” (London: Routledge, 2012).

¹¹⁸ Tony Kushner, “Hostility to Refugees and Asylum Seekers,” In *Routledge International Handbook of Contemporary Racisms* (London: Routledge, 2020): 89-96.

protection and refuge.¹¹⁹ According to article 1a of the “1951 Convention on the status of Refugees”, refugees are defined as, “people who owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, on the grounds of race, religion, nationality or membership of a social group, find themselves outside their country of origin, and are unable or unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of that country.”¹²⁰

The movement of Afghans into the Pakistani region of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa dates back to the 10th millennium.¹²¹ During the 19th century, Afghanistan was ruled by the “Durrani Empire”. The kings of this empire had their capitals in the Kabul and Kandhar regions of today’s Afghanistan and the Peshawar region of today’s Pakistan, respectively.¹²² However, the arrival of Afghans on the soil of Pakistan as refugees can be dated back to when King Zahir Shah was overthrown, followed by the coup of Mohammad Daoud in 1973. Around 2000, partisans of the exiled regime sought shelter in Pakistan.¹²³

The incessant flow of Afghans into Pakistan has been influenced by a blend of conflict, security, political and economic factors. From the Soviet invasion in December 1979 until the invasion led by the US in late 2001, “about six million Afghan refugees fled to neighbouring Iran and Pakistan mainly to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, making Afghanistan the largest refugee-producing country of its time.” There is no count of the undocumented refugees as the number could be more than the documented ones. Pakistan has been aiding Afghan’s displaced population from the very beginning. Amnesty International's report states, “Pakistan stands in the third place, facilitating 1.6 million Afghan exiles among those nations that are composed of half the world’s

¹¹⁹ Catherine Putz, “What About Afghan Refugees?,” *The Diplomat*, November 03, 2015, <http://thediplomat.com/2015/11/what-about-afghan-refugees/>.

¹²⁰ “Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 1951”.

¹²¹ Huma Baqi and Nausheen Wasi, eds., “Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations: Pitfalls and the Way Forward,” (2021), Retrieved from <https://ir.iba.edu.pk/faculty-research-books/5>

¹²² EFSAS, “The Making of the Durand Line, Irredentism, and the Rise of the Taliban,” *EFSAS Study Papers* 3 (2022).

¹²³ R. Synovitz, “Afghanistan: History of 1973 Coup Sheds Light on Relations with Pakistan,” *Radio Free Europe* (2003).

displaced population. Many Afghan evacuees live in displaced person's grounds, outcast's towns, and urban zones of Pakistan.”¹²⁴

Afghans that migrated to Pakistan can be divided into four different categories: in the first category lie the affluent Afghans that brought their wealth and assets to Pakistan along with their merchandise that assisted them in living a comfortable life in Pakistan. They opened up their businesses in Pakistan and bought residences or rented houses, flats etc., to live in instead of camps.¹²⁵ The second category of refugees belongs to the educated lot who did not have the assets like the first category, but they earned their living by looking for jobs or by assisting the management of camps in several different tasks, such as teaching, camp management and so on.¹²⁶ The third group of Afghan refugees consisted of the uneducated labour class that fled with little household supplies or belongings or small herds of cattle. They mostly belonged to the agricultural background and resided mostly in camps. Quite a number of them worked in “refugee-related projects” such as replantation and small-scale agriculture. The last group of refugees belonged to predominantly older men, women, and children. This class had just about managed to flee the war and relied on Pakistan's government.¹²⁷

3.3 Pakistan and the Management of Afghan Refugees:

The National Policy of Pakistan regarding the presence of Afghan refugees in the country can be split into three different segments: 1979-1989: During this period, Pakistan adopted a supportive policy for the Afghan refugees. It called Afghan refugees siblings and opened the doors to give access. Not just this, Pakistan also provided the basic amenities of life to the refugees; 1990-2001: At this time, although Pakistan kept up with its policy of “open doors”, however, it did not support the

¹²⁴ Muhammad Abbas Khan, “Afghanistan’s Displaced People: Pakistan’s National Refugee Policy,” *Forced Migration Review* 46 (London: University of Oxford, 2014): 22-23, <http://www.fmreview.org/sites/fmr/files/FMRdownloads/en/afghanistan/khan.pdf>.

¹²⁵ Daniel A. Kronenfield, “Afghan Refugees in Pakistan: Not All Refugees, Not Always in Pakistan, Not Necessarily Afghan?,” *Journal of Refugee Studies* 21, no.1, (2008): 43-63.

¹²⁶ Ibid

¹²⁷ Hasan Askari Rizvi, “Afghan Refugees in Pakistan: Influx, Humanitarian Assistance and Implications,” *Pakistan Horizon* 37, no. 1 (1984): 40-61.

refugees the way it did earlier; that is with the same zeal and fervour; 2001 onwards: The incident of 9/11 turned the tables. Pakistan took a complete U-turn, became wholly non-supportive and adopted a policy of closed doors.

3.3.1 The 1951 Geneva Convention and the Afghan Refugees in Pakistan

The International Refugee Regime comprises the 1951 Geneva Convention and the 1967 Protocol that lead out the mechanisms for treating refugees in a host state. All those states that are party to the Convention must collaborate with the UNHCR. UNHCR accompanies states in playing a role in the safety of refugees.¹²⁸ States' primary responsibility is to guarantee their citizens' basic human rights and security. However, if civilians become exiles or refugees, the security umbrella provided by the homeland vanishes. Here, the international community steps in to secure the protection of these exiles or refugees.

The purpose of UNHCR is to ensure that the states party to it are aware of their fundamental responsibilities and follow up on their pledges to provide refuge to such people seeking safety. These states shall collaborate with UNHCR and shall not send back refugees to places dangerous for them and where they confront peril. States shall guarantee these refugees social rights and monetary benefits. However, UNHCR is not a “supranational organization and hence, cannot be deemed as an alternative for government duty.”¹²⁹

Many states that host a huge population of refugees are not signatories to the 1951 Geneva Convention or ratified its 1967 Protocol. Still, they connect with the refugee regime through different channels. These states not only implement and propagate the mechanisms and norms indicated by the refugee regime but also participate in the growth and progress of laws protecting refugees. Forty-four members of the United Nations have not acceded to the refugee regime. Many of the countries belong to the world's Middle Eastern, South Asian, and Southeast Asian regions. It is generally

¹²⁸ Alexander Betts, ed., “*Global Migration Governance*,” (London: Oxford University Press, 2011).

¹²⁹ Deirdre Hughes, Füsün Akkök, Gideon Arulmani and Helmut Zelloth, “Migration: Theory, Research and Practice in Guidance and Counselling,” *British Journal of Guidance & Counselling* 47, no. 1 (2019): 1-5.

believed that signatory states adhere better to refugee protection than non-signatory states, whereas, in many situations, it is exactly the opposite.¹³⁰

Non-signatory states cooperate with the UNHCR through the “bilateral Memorandum of Understanding (MOU).” These MOUs establish important links between states and refugee regimes. Nevertheless, there is no single approach or methodology to tackle such agreements. Also, the content differs considerably. Taking the case of Pakistan, the substantial matter of the deal has bound it to observe legislation well beyond anything that could be drawn from the Convention itself.¹³¹

Pakistan is one of those non-signatory states and is neither signatory to the 1951 Geneva Convention nor the 1967 Protocol.¹³² Pakistan is not opposed to the moral concerns of the Convention or Protocol. It has to serve its strategic matters and impulses encompassing the presence of the refugee population present in its terrain. The paradox of duality connected to the refugee-warrior group present inside Pakistan during the early years was one of the principal motives that led Pakistan not to join the Convention and the Protocol. Nevertheless, the Afghan refugees in Pakistan in the post-1979 period were considered “de facto considered prima facie refugees.”¹³³

Pakistan, on the other hand, is part of the “International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR, 1966)”, “the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR, 2008)”, and “the Convention on Torture (COT, 1984).” Hence, it shows that Pakistan may not accept the international refugee law from a legal stance but does abide by the moral concerns regarding the civil rights of people who escaped

¹³⁰ M. Jones, “Expanding the Frontiers of Refugee Law: Developing a Broader Law of Asylum in the Middle East and Europe,” *Journal of Human Rights Practice* 9, issue 2 (2017), <https://doi.org/10.1093/jhuman/hux018>.

¹³¹ A. Slaughter and J. Crisp, “A Surrogate State? The Role of UNHCR in Protracted Refugee Situations,” *UNHCR* (2007).

¹³² Muhammad Najam ud din Farani, “Perspectives on Afghan Refugee Identity in Pakistan,” *Journal of Political Studies* 27, no. 1 (2020): 159-181.

¹³³ Rudiger Schoch, “UNHCR and the Afghan Refugees in the Early 1980s: Between Humanitarian Action and Cold War Politics,” *Refugee Survey Quarterly* 27, no. 1 (2008): 45-57.

due to several reasons from a moral point of view and also due to the Principle of Non-Refoulment.¹³⁴

The convention and its protocol have defined the description of refugees and a prerequisite that states shall not send back refugees where their life or freedom is threatened. This is known as ‘the principle of non-refoulment’. It is a rule of Customary International Law, and it is mandatory for all states whether they have or have not acceded and assented to the 1951 Convention. The Convention and the Protocol have also established “the cooperation processes with the UNHCR”. They explain and clarify the civil liberties of refugees and the commitments of the 148 states that have acquiesced to either or both of these instruments.¹³⁵ The figure on the next page illustrates the presence of Afghan refugees in Pakistan as of 2021, according to the statistics provided by the UNHCR.

3.3.2 Domestic Policies of Pakistan for Afghan Refugees

Since Pakistan has neither ratified the Geneva Convention nor endorsed any legislation for refugees, they are treated with reference to the provisions of the Foreigners Act, 1946.¹³⁶ Because there is no legal framework, UNHCR directs the determination of refugees on behalf of the Pakistani government as per the 1993 Cooperation Agreement between the two.¹³⁷ The Foreigner’s Act 1946 controls the entrance, stay and exit of foreigners in Pakistan. This act states, “All foreigners without valid documentation, including refugees and asylum seekers, are subject to arrest, detention, and deportation.”¹³⁸ However, Afghan refugees had been exempted from the treatment accorded in the act due to a circular issued in July 1997. In 2001, the Pakistani Government again dispensed a notice making it clear that this act would apply to

¹³⁴ Marjoleine Zieck, “Accession of Pakistan to the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees: Signing on Could Make All the Difference.,” *PLR* 5 (2010): 1.

¹³⁵ Muhammad Ali, “Soviet Military Involvement in Afghanistan and its Impact on the Security of Pakistan,” PhD diss., (Multan: Bahauddin Zakariya University, 1995).

¹³⁶ Ijaz Hussain, "Pakistan’s International Law Practice On Afghan Refugees,” *Pakistan Horizon* 38, no. 1 (1985): 85-98.

¹³⁷ Marjoleine Zieck, “The Legal Status of Afghan Refugees in Pakistan, a Story of Eight Agreements and Two Suppressed Premises,” *International journal of refugee law* 20, no. 2 (2008): 253-272.

¹³⁸ Muhammad Munir, "Refugee Law in Islam,” *Journal of Social Sciences* 4, no. 2 (2011): 1-18.

illegal immigrants or undocumented refugees. Therefore, the undocumented Afghan refugees have been “subject to arrest and deportation under Section 14A and 14B of the Foreigners Act, 1946 and several associated criminal provisions.”¹³⁹

The Pakistani government settled a registration process for the Afghan refugees living in Pakistan and issued them the Proof of Registration Cards (PoRs) for the provision of legal stay in the territory of Pakistan in February 2007.¹⁴⁰ The refugees residing in Pakistan are split into two distinct categories: “Registered or documented refugees with Proof of Registration (PoR) cards” and the “Unregistered or undocumented refugees Afghan with PoR cards.”¹⁴¹

All Afghan refugees born in Pakistan and who want to attain citizenship in Pakistan may be eligible, provided they are not involved in any criminal offence under “Section 4 of the Pakistan Citizenship Act, 1951.”¹⁴² Similarly, Afghani men or women wedded to Pakistani women or men are also entitled to obtain under “Section 10 of the Citizenship Act.”¹⁴³ “In addition, concessions must be made for those individuals or minors who do not have parents/guardians to look after them. Similarly, widows and women whose husbands are lost or imprisoned should also be given the option of attaining Pakistani citizenship along with their children.”¹⁴⁴ Also, those individuals who have resided in Pakistan for well over the prescribed period mentioned under “Section 3 of the Naturalization Act, 1924”, are familiar with Pakistani languages, and

¹³⁹ Frédéric Grare and William Maley, “The Afghan Refugees in Pakistan,” *J Middle East Institute. Refugees Cooperation* (2011).

¹⁴⁰ Katja Mielke et al, “Figurations of Displacement in and beyond Pakistan: Empirical Findings and Reflections on Protracted Displacement and Trans local Connections of Afghans.” (2021): 42.

¹⁴¹ Nasreen Ghufuran, “Afghan Refugees in Pakistan: Current Situation and Future Scenario.” *Policy perspectives* (2006): 83-104.

¹⁴² P. Centilivers and M.C. Demont, “The Afghan Refugee in Pakistan: An Ambiguous Identity,” *Journal of Refugee Studies* 1, no. 2 (1988): 141-152.

¹⁴³ Ibid.

¹⁴⁴ Syed Nadeem Farhat, “Citizenship Laws of Pakistan: A Critical Review,” *Policy Perspectives* 16, no. 2 (2019): 59-85.

have not been engaged in criminal activity throughout their stay are also accorded eligible to claim Pakistani citizenship.¹⁴⁵

The office of the Chief Commissionerate for Afghan Refugees is responsible for coordinating with international organizations and humanitarian agencies. CCAR also provides approval for other NGOs to function in Pakistan. The Provincial Commissionerate operate under its jurisdiction.¹⁴⁶ National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA) is responsible for conducting the census, keeping a record of the refugees and issuing PoR cards to them.¹⁴⁷ NADRA administers the “Afghan National Registration” project.¹⁴⁸ Through this project, Afghan nationals are issued ID cards so that they can prove their legality in Pakistan. This project is joined by the Government of Pakistan and UNHCR. NADRA has established a “Centralized database to keep the biometric and demographic records of the Afghan refugees. NADRA also provided “Afghan Citizen Cards to undocumented refugees.¹⁴⁹

The Ministry of States and Frontier Regions, known as SAFRON, is the principal national organization that deals with the “bureaucratic administration of the Pakistani Afghan refugee community”. This governmental institution delegates its activities to CCAR, which further oversees and regulates its powers through its provincial departments.¹⁵⁰ The main SAFRON is mainly responsible for the administrative and development initiatives in the Frontier regions of Pakistan, including Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

¹⁴⁶ Ahmed Zeb Khan, ed., “Afghan Refugees in Pakistan,” *Commissionerate of Afghan Refugees* (1982).

¹⁴⁷ Sanaa Alimia, “Performing the Afghanistan–Pakistan border through refugee ID cards,” *Geopolitics* 24, no. 2 (2019): 391-425.

¹⁴⁸ Frédéric Grare and William Maley, “The Afghan Refugees in Pakistan,” *J Middle East Institute. Refugees Cooperation* (2011).

¹⁴⁹ <https://www.nadra.gov.pk/local-projects/national-solutions/afghan-national-registration/>

¹⁵⁰ Muhammad Najam ud din Farani, “Perspectives on Afghan Refugee identity in Pakistan,” *Journal of Political Studies* 27, no. 1 (2020): 159-181.

3.3.3 International Organizations and Agreements Supporting the Afghan Refugees in Pakistan

At the international level, UNHCR has played a vital role in the management of Afghan refugees in Pakistan. It has not only assisted the government of Pakistan in statistical management but also in aid, repatriation, rehabilitation, and resettlement programs for Afghan refugees. UNHCR has also supported and facilitated the “voluntary repatriation programmes” for Afghan refugees from Pakistan. In 2012, the UNHCR, along with the governments of Pakistan, Iran, and Afghanistan, adopted Solutions Strategy for Afghan Refugees (SSAR).¹⁵¹ This program draws attention to the necessity for voluntary repatriation and improved resettlement and relocation as a course of “international responsibility sharing, aid to refugee hosting areas, and provisions for the stay of refugees in Pakistan.

The Solutions Strategy for Afghan Refugees (SSAR) was a quadripartite initiative among Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, and the UNHCR. It was endorsed in 2012. It focused on “voluntary repatriation, sustainable reintegration, and support to host communities to reduce refugee fatigue.”¹⁵² This platform provided investments and extended partnerships with Pakistan and Iran additionally. In 2013, Pakistan harmonised its strategy as per the frameworks specified by SSAR. It aims to encourage “repatriation cum resettlement of Afghan refugees” with an additional emphasis on enrolment, recovery and enhancing basic living services for Afghan refugees residing in Pakistan. RAHA (Refugee Affected and Hosting Areas), in connexion with SSAR, assists the Afghan refugees in resettling when they return to their homeland, Afghanistan. It also acknowledges the fact that Pakistan cannot be laid solely responsible for sharing the burden of hosting Afghan refugees. This has also been emphasised by the current UN Secretary-General and former head of the UNHCR, Antonio Guterres, who says that “we still have Afghan refugees as the second largest refugee group after the Syrians. My appeal is to the international community to

¹⁵¹ Daniel A Kronenfeld, “Afghan Refugees in Pakistan: Not All Refugees, Not Always in Pakistan, Not Necessarily Afghan?”, *Journal of Refugee Studies* 21, no. 1 (2008): 43-63.

¹⁵² Waseem Ahmad, "The Fate of Durable Solutions in Protracted Refugee Situations: The Odyssey of Afghan Refugees in Pakistan." *Seattle J. Soc. Just.* 15 (2016): 591.

understand that this is not only the responsibility for Pakistan or Iran or other neighbouring countries; it is a collective responsibility.”¹⁵³

Later, in the same year, the “Contact Group on Resettlement”, chaired by the government of Australia, was established to summon global assistance and funding for resettlement. Many other states have come forward to donate to the well-being of refugees in Pakistan. Furthermore, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), International non-governmental organizations (INGOs) and International governmental organizations (IGOs) have also played their parts in the economic support concerning the facility of basic survival amenities for Afghan refugees living inside Pakistan.¹⁵⁴

In 2003, UNHCR and the government of Afghanistan and Pakistan contracted a series of Tripartite Agreements to initiate the voluntary repatriation of Afghan refugees from Afghanistan. In 2009, Pakistan cooperated with UNHCR and several other international organizations to launch “the Refugees Affected and Hosting Areas Development (RAHA) in response to the political, socio-economic, financial, and environmental consequences of hosting the Afghan refugees.”¹⁵⁵ The programme was aimed at a tenure of five years. In 2012, “the Afghan Management and Repatriation Strategy (AMRS)” was launched to deal with the “repatriation and management” of Afghan refugees. “Voluntary repatriation” persisted in being the fundamental element of the strategy. This program was enacted for a period of two years.¹⁵⁶

Also, Refugee Affected and Hosting Areas (RAHA) turned out to be a central element in the execution of SSAR in Pakistan. This project continues to be a primary “responsibility-sharing platform” for sustaining “temporary protection space and enhancing community acceptance of Afghan refugees in Pakistan until their voluntary

¹⁵³ Christine Roehrs, “The Refugee Dilemma: Afghans in Pakistan between Expulsion and Failing Aid Schemes,” *Afghanistan Analysts Network* 9 (2015).

¹⁵⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵⁵ Muhammad Abbas Khan, “Pakistan's Urban Refugees: Steps towards Self-reliance,” *Forced Migration Review* 63 (2020): 50-52.

¹⁵⁶ Elca Stigter, “Afghan Migratory Strategies—An Assessment of Repatriation and Sustainable Return in Response to the Convention Plus,” *Refugee Survey Quarterly* 25, no. 2 (2006): 109-122.

repatriation to Afghanistan.”¹⁵⁷ “The overall objective of RAHA is to increase tolerance towards Afghan refugees in Pakistan; improve social cohesion to promote co-existence between Afghan refugees and their hosts; provide both the host Pakistani communities and Afghan refugees with development and humanitarian assistance, and empower youth through skills development and vocational training.”¹⁵⁸

3.4 Conclusion

This chapter has made a valuable contribution to this thesis. In this chapter, the writer has provided details regarding the chronological events that led to the movement of Afghan refugees in Pakistan. Firstly, the relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan has been elaborated. Afterwards, the events that unfolded during the refugee crisis have been elucidated in the chapter. This is done by first describing the ethnic identities of the refugees and their migration to Pakistan in different time periods.

Afterwards, the writer dealt with the policies the state of Pakistan utilized to handle the Afghan migration and the contributions of international agencies and organizations. Pakistan is not a member of the 1951 Geneva Convention, nor has it ratified its 1967 Protocol. Therefore, Pakistan had to develop its mechanisms to tackle the huge influx of refugees coming to Pakistan. Hence, the writer has shed light on the literature on policies and laws dealing with Afghan refugees.

The chapter is significant in the sense that it has provided a baseline for the upcoming chapters. The dealings of Afghan refugees by the state of Pakistan and the subsequent securitization have their connections with the policies adopted by Pakistan. Thus, the loopholes in the policy of Pakistan that will be addressed in the upcoming chapters will have their bases in this chapter.

¹⁵⁷ Muhammad Abbas Khan, “Pakistan’s Urban Refugees: Steps Towards Self-Reliance.” *Forced Migration Review* 63 (2020): 50-52.

¹⁵⁸ Waseem Ahmad, “The Fate of Durable Solutions in Protracted Refugee Situations: The Odyssey of Afghan Refugees in Pakistan.” *Seattle J. Soc. Just.* 15 (2016): 591.

CHAPTER 4

SECURITIZATION OF AFGHAN REFUGEES IN PAKISTAN: THE COPENHAGEN SCHOOL AND THE SPEECH ACTS

“Afghans have not contributed anything positive to society. Whenever something happens, it is attributed to Afghans, especially concerning the law-and-order situation. In one way or another, Afghans can be put in relation to the offenders, even if they only act as the transporters of the latter. The justification of their stay is no longer logical after 40 years.”¹⁵⁹

The above quote draws the increased unenthusiastic opinions of Afghans in Pakistan, culminating in an antagonistic perspective that the refugees have to steer across. This chapter will be the theoretical implication of the Copenhagen school’s interpretation of the securitization of Afghan refugees. It will utilize the political discourses and speech acts of prominent bureaucratic figures and political elites to explain the securitization process of the Afghan refugees, thus explaining to answer the research question that is how Afghan refugees have been securitized in Pakistan. Pakistan’s framing of the Afghan refugees as a security threat has had far-reaching impacts, creating push factors for the Afghan refugees to move out of Pakistan and seek refuge elsewhere or return to their war-torn homeland. The aim of this chapter is to discuss those security constructs in the form of discourses and the policies adopted by Pakistan since the 90s and particularly after the school attack in 2014. Political discourse or speech acts by the state and agencies of Pakistan, blame games by different sectors of Pakistani society, and the negative public opinion constructed against Afghan refugees will be made a part of this chapter.

¹⁵⁹ John F. Sopko, “What We Need to Learn: Lessons from Twenty Years of Afghanistan Reconstruction,” (Washington DC: G.P.O, 2021).

Ever since the Afghan refugees moved to Pakistan, they have been securitized in the country from time to time due to various reasons. Hence this chapter will explain the securitization of Afghan refugees in Pakistan within the realm of the Copenhagen School. To explain this securitization, the Copenhagen school will account for the intersubjective nature of the securitization process by drawing on speech acts and political discourses, presuming that the enunciation of security is a critical type of security act. The enunciation of 'security' involves the prerogative that a certain issue, object or subject is constructed to be a threat to a certain 'referent' which is so pragmatic that it is genuinely rational to transfer the matter outside the traditional politics so as to handle it by strict and urgent security means.¹⁶⁰ Hence, the matter of Afghan refugees has been securitized by the state and agencies of Pakistan during different time periods on the basis of different issues such as economy, security, social, political, and so on. These, along with other issues constructed against the refugees in Pakistan, will be discussed in detail along with the speech acts of several political and elite figures to convince the citizens of Pakistan regarding the problematic nature of the Afghan refugees and their involvement in different issues.

During the 1980s, the Pakistani public opinion was very supportive regarding the provision of assistance, accommodation, and aid to Afghan refugees in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Surveys indicated that "more than 80 percent of Pakistani citizens supported the assistance of Afghan refugees."¹⁶¹ However, this percentage declined with the passage of time. In the wake of the GWOT, the percentage reversed, and this time, "80 percent of Pakistanis were supportive of the opinion that Afghan refugees living inside Pakistan should return back to their home country."¹⁶²

¹⁶⁰ L. Freedman, "The New Security Equation," *Conflict, Security and Development* 4 no. 3 (2004): 245-259.

¹⁶¹ Rauf Khan Khattak, "Afghan Refugees and NAP," *Conflict and Peace Studies* 7 no. 2, (2015): 127-130.

¹⁶² Ibid.

This shows that public opinion gradually declined in favour of the Afghan refugees in the aftermath of 9/11. This was due to the militancy and terrorism faced by the state of Pakistan due to the shift in policies. Pakistan sided with the so-called Mujahedeen in the Soviet invasion but fought against them in the wake of 9/11. Afghan refugees have been blamed for providing sanctuary to those militants and terrorists. The militants carried out suicide attacks in parks, hotels, markets, airports and so on, leading to thousands of local casualties. Therefore, a bottom-up governmental discourse proliferated by the then government, such as “the Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz, the Foreign Minister, the Interior Minister, the Pakistani Ambassador to the US, and the Minister for the States and Frontier Regions, beginning to refer to the refugee camps as “sanctuaries for terrorists.”¹⁶³ In the words of Akbar S. Ahmed, The Pakistani nation also began to call the Afghans a “swaggering, armed, aggressive lot.”¹⁶⁴

Demonstrations from diverse sections of Pakistani culture had been set up demanding swift repatriation of Afghan refugees. Still, many political parties and a major portion of the citizens of Pakistan were in favour of the provision of rights to Afghan refugees in the country. Also, the government took actions mostly against the terrorists. The majority of Afghan refugees lived in the big cities outside the refugee villages and camps, ran their businesses and freely moved about the country.

However, the Army school attack in the Peshawar city of Pakistan on December 16, 2014, in which hundreds of innocent children and teachers got killed, turned out to be the turning point in the lives of Afghan refugees in Pakistan. This attack shook the nation as a whole and brought all political parties and the establishment on one page. The evidence showed that the attack was planned in Afghanistan.¹⁶⁵ Similarly, the Bacha Khan University in Peshawar witnessed a similar situation in 2016. More than

¹⁶³ Sanam Noor, “Afghan Refugees After 9/11,” *Pakistan Horizon* 59, no. 1 (2006): 59-78.

¹⁶⁴ Akbar S. Ahmed, “Resettlement of Afghan refugees and the Social Scientists.” *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies* 4, no. 1 (1980): 77.

¹⁶⁵ Salma Kalim and Fauzia Janjua, “#Weareunited, Cybernationalism During the Time of National Crisis: The Case of Terrorist Attack on a School in Pakistan,” *Discourse and Communication* 13 no.1, (2019): 68-94.

20 students were killed in the attack by terrorists.¹⁶⁶ These incidents sparked the intense securitization of the Afghan refugees leading the state of Pakistan to take strict domestic measures against them. Hence, this chapter will unfold the securitization of Afghan refugees in Pakistan within the scope of the Copenhagen school throughout their stay in general. The Paris School in the next chapter would account for the securitized practices and tools adopted by the state of Pakistan after the army school attack in particular.

4.1 Afghan Refugees and the Economic Aspects:

Afghan refugees have been held as an economic burden in the society of Pakistan by the government as the majority of the refugee population is comprised of old people, women, and children.¹⁶⁷ On the other hand, many refugees also got hold of jobs and began earning money. This aided in the generation of revenue and income; however, that was not sufficient and adequate to uplift the budget. The cheap Afghan labour-initiated competition with the locals over resources such as land, water, food, jobs, and property. The presence of refugees plunged the wages downhill due to their willingness to work for less money.¹⁶⁸ Not only this but the Afghan refugees are also blamed for the fact that Pakistan has suffered from inadequate infrastructure and financial problems due to the large influx of Afghan refugees. There were already limited resources which had to be shared by the local population and refugees. The aid provided by the UNHCR, or other agencies has not been sufficient to keep up with the expenses of refugees.¹⁶⁹

If we talk at the provincial level, then the provinces of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan have been deeply hit by the movement of Afghan refugees as both of these

¹⁶⁶ Declan Walsh and Ihsanullah Tipu Mehsud, "Taliban Attack at Bacha Khan University in Pakistan Renews Fears," *The New York Times* (2016).

¹⁶⁷ Kathleen Howard-Merriam, "Afghan Refugee Women and Their Struggle for Survival," In *Afghan Resistance*, (London: Routledge, 2019): 103-125.

¹⁶⁸ Rhoda Margesson, "Afghan Refugees: Current Status and Future Prospects," (Washington: Library of Congress, 2007).

¹⁶⁹ Asif Javed, Shehryar Khan, Rubab Syed, and Vaqar Ahmad, "Socio-economic Inclusion of Afghan Refugees in Pakistan" *Sustainable Development Policy Institute no. 192* (2020).

provinces are not so developed. As a consequence, the local population of these provinces have claimed that the influx of refugees to their provinces has created difficulties for them. For instance, they alleged that the benefit of the economic activities of these refugees might have been of value to the government, but for citizens with less income, it added to their problems by increasing the economic competition between them and Afghan refugees. The influx of refugees has also been claimed to be one of the reasons behind the rising inflation.¹⁷⁰ Another major economic impact of the Afghan refugees contended by the locals was regarding no tax collection from the Afghan refugee tradesmen.¹⁷¹ This situation created difficulties for the local taxpayers. It also affected the generation of revenue.¹⁷² “Akhtar Mengal, head of BNP-M”, conveyed his anxieties in the statement that, “if we are unable to provide jobs to our own people, how can we lift the load of surplus refugees.”¹⁷³

Nevertheless, there is another side of the story that shows the above-mentioned impacts as constructs and not the real facts. The literature shows that refugees “are often a boon rather a bane for the economy of a state”. Afghan refugees have contributed to the labour market, infrastructure, transportation, carpet weaving and many other economic avenues of Pakistan. If the cheap refugee labour deprived the locals of the job, it also assisted in the growth of several industrial sectors that lead to the boom of the economic sector. Not only this, but a local Urdu newspaper in Pakistan also asserted the fact that Afghan refugees had been pouring 325 million dollars to the economy of Pakistan.¹⁷⁴ Most of this was due to the remittances being sent to the Afghan families residing in Pakistan by the family members working abroad.¹⁷⁵

¹⁷⁰ Sabah Aslam, “The Afghan War,” *Strategic Studies* 31, no. 3 (2011): 153-169.

¹⁷¹ Christine Roehrs, “The Refugee Dilemma: Afghans in Pakistan Between Expulsion and Failing Aid Schemes,” *Afghanistan Analysts Network* 9 (2015).

¹⁷² *Ibid.*

¹⁷³ Javed, 2020.

¹⁷⁴ Jawad Falak, “Dissipating Concerns Related to the Afghan Issue”, *Centre for Strategic and Contemporary Research (Islamabad: 2017)*, <https://cscr.pk/explore/themes/politics-governance/dissipating-concerns-related-to-the-afghan-refugee-issue/>.

¹⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

The reason why Pakistan could not take benefit from the profits is due to pervasive corruption and fraud, inadequate regulations, and little investment. Centre of Intelligence Agency (CIA) published a report in 1984 in which it claimed that the burden of Afghan refugees on the economy of Pakistan was about 180 million dollars, that is 2% of the budget at that time.¹⁷⁶ The Afghan refugees were mostly restricted to “blue-collar jobs”, whereas many of them had initiated their businesses. Many of the vacancies that the Afghan refugees had filled were of the locals that had migrated to Gulf countries to earn a livelihood.¹⁷⁷

Additionally, the UNHCR, as well as other donor agencies, also aided Pakistan with around 150 million dollars per year for the facilitation and sustenance of the Afghan refugees.¹⁷⁸ As far as the black market is concerned, then it was no lie that some Pakistan-based Afghans had been involved in smuggling, but excessive emphasis had been focused on them to divert the attention of the media and public from the involvement of high government officials in Pakistan indulged in the same business.¹⁷⁹

4.2 Afghan Refugees and the Social Problems of Pakistan:

Afghan refugees have been criticized and blamed by the media, political leaders, and the citizens of Pakistan for flourishing the social evils of Afghanistan into Pakistan ever since they first migrated to Pakistan. For instance, they have been accused of flourishing criminalization, drug smuggling and weaponization in Pakistani society. Not only these, but they have also been reprimanded for distressing the demographic, ethnic, lingual, and sectarian balance of the regions of Pakistan in which they settled. This section will deal with the above-mentioned problems in this section.

¹⁷⁶ Adam Rodriques and Alessandro Monsutti. "Beyond insecurity." *Geopolitics, History, and International Relations* 9, no. 1 (2017): 120-127.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid.

¹⁷⁸ Aziz Amin Ahmedzai, "How Refugees Changed the Afghan-Pakistan Dynamic," *The Diplomat* (2016).

¹⁷⁹ Ikramul Haq, "Pak-Afghan Drug Trade in Historical Perspective," *Asian Survey* 36, no. 10 (1996): 945-963.

Firstly, Afghan refugees were considered a source of drug smuggling in Pakistan. The literature tackling drug trafficking in Latin America and Southeast Asia provides the facts that the regions which face political turmoil or military conflicts are mostly prone to social evils such as drug trafficking.¹⁸⁰ Hence, this happened in Afghanistan. The warlords of Afghanistan indulged themselves in these evils leading Afghanistan to become a hotspot of drugs. Drug smuggling also paid off the expenses to fight off the Soviets during the invasion.¹⁸¹

The Pashtuns from Afghanistan and the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa region of Pakistan began poppy cultivation and produced almost 70 percent of the world's high-quality heroin.¹⁸² Thus, they became the biggest suppliers in the world. So, the drug problem that emerged due to the attempts planned to make use of drugs as a method to nurture the anti-Soviet efforts in Afghanistan was blamed on the Afghan refugees by the citizens and the agencies of Pakistan. On the contrary, evidence showed that Pakistan turned out to be a major partner in the large-scale opium production supply chain in the 1980s during the Soviet invasion of Pakistan.¹⁸³ The opium production led to the replacement of the so-called golden trio of Laos, Myanmar and Thailand with Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan as the golden crescent, so much so that a few members of the government were also caught in this illegitimate business of drug trafficking.¹⁸⁴

Later on, drug smuggling did not just remain limited to the border of Pakistan but also flourished in the major cities of Pakistan, including Karachi. The "Afghan Basti, located in Sohrab Goth, Karachi",¹⁸⁵ was once regarded as the biggest drug supply

¹⁸⁰ Razia Sultana, "Pakistan-Afghan Economic Relations: Issues and Prospects," *Pakistan Horizon* 64 no.1 (2011): 21-37.

¹⁸¹ Ahmed Rashid, "The Taliban: Exporting Extremism," *Foreign Affairs* (1999): 22-35.

¹⁸² Qandeel Siddique, "Pakistan's Future Policy Towards Afghanistan: A look at Strategic Depth, Militant Movements and the Role of India and US," *DIIS Report* no. 8 (2011).

¹⁸³ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁴ P.R. Kumaraswamy, "Making Enemies, Creating Conflicts: Pakistan's Crises of State and Society," *Contemporary South Asia* 8, no. 2 (1999): 251.

¹⁸⁵ Jehan ul Mulki Basit Ali and Attaullah, "Impacts of Afghan Refugees on Security Situation of Pakistan," *Pakistan Journal of Society, Education and Language* 6 no. 1 (2020): 37-46.

station in Asia. The business of mafias and drug dealers was not just restricted to drugs but also kidnapping, terrorist activities, supply of weapons, human trafficking, and many other illicit activities.¹⁸⁶ This business of drug trafficking seriously deteriorated the image of Pakistan in the international community. Finally, in 1992, an arduous and meticulous battle was initiated to purify Pakistan of drugs, and the attempts were positive.¹⁸⁷

Secondly, Pakistan has reprimanded Afghan refugees for the induction of social evils such as weaponization and criminalization in its territory. Afghan refugees have been accused of a number of illegal and illicit actions.¹⁸⁸ However, statistics show that a minute fraction of Afghan refugees has been involved in criminal activities. The enforcement and bureaucratic agencies of Pakistan securitized the Afghan refugees. For example, the data from 2014 to 2016 in the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa showed that “out of 23,007 individuals involved in organised crimes, merely 300 were found to be Afghan refugees, which is only 1.3% of the individuals involved in crimes.”¹⁸⁹

Thus, the Pakistani agencies securitize refugees as an existential risk that gets accepted by Pakistan's citizens. Barry Buzan contends that securitization cannot be enforced; hence, the political discourse has not been solely responsible for the securitization of the refugees; rather, the public has acknowledged the danger and transformed it into an inter-subjective existence. Once done, rules and regulations are devised to deal with that specific danger.¹⁹⁰ There is a historical context that explains the indictment of the weaponization of Pakistani society. It dates back to the Soviet invasion, during which the US provided weapons to the refugee-war community in Pakistan to fight against

¹⁸⁶Ibid.

¹⁸⁷ David R Bewley-Taylor, “Cracks in the Conspiracy: the CIA and the Cocaine Trade in South Central Los Angeles.” *International Journal of Drug Policy* 12, no. 2 (2001): 167-180.

¹⁸⁸ Pierre Centlivres and Micheline Centlivres Demont, “The Afghan Refugees in Pakistan: A Nation in Exile,” *Current Sociology* 36, no. 2 (1988): 71-92.

¹⁸⁹ Amina Khan, “Afghan Refugees in Pakistan,” *Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad* (2017).

¹⁹⁰ Barry Buzan, “People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era,” (United States: ECPR, 2008).

the Soviets. After the Soviets left, instead of incorporating de-weaponization, and conflict resolution among the Afghans, the US simply exited the region, leaving Pakistan's debilitated state to clear the mess. This stemmed from a lingering civil war in Afghanistan and proxy warfare across the region. Consequently, “Kalashnikov became a symbol of weapon culture inside Afghanistan and Pakistan, particularly among the Pashtun population.”¹⁹¹ This undermined the culture of Afghans and headed to the incubation of conflicts.

The training of Afghan Mujahedeen on the premises of Pakistan led to the weaponization of Pakistani society. This community also acted as agents of criminalization and was involved in the diffusion of illegal activities across the border. Pakistan heavily paid the price for covertly and overtly supporting the Afghan resistance against the Soviets. There was an absence of proper check and balance at the border, and this led to the free movement of terrorists in and out of Pakistan.¹⁹² The weapon culture flourished in tribal areas of Pakistan. The rifles and pocket-sized weapons that the refugees brought with them were put up for sale in the open market at cheap rates. The former PM, Imran Khan, remarked on the relation between criminality and the existence of Afghan refugees in Pakistan that “the problem is that the locals complain about the crime, which is coming in from refugee camps.”¹⁹³ Pervez Khattak, the former defence minister and former Chief Minister of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), said that “Afghan refugees and their mobility is the constant source of crime in the province.”¹⁹⁴

Nevertheless, there is a counter claim to this argument which proves that the above-mentioned points are mere accusations and constructed facts against the Afghan refugees. It states that indeed these security threats were followed by the Afghan refugees to the Pakistani society; these problems were not caused by them. The

¹⁹¹ Mariam Tahir and Nazir Hussain, “China, Pakistan, and Afghanistan: Partnership for Regional Peace,” *South Asian Studies* 36, no. 1 (2021): 165-178.

¹⁹² A. Zahid Hilali, “The Costs and Benefits of the Afghan War for Pakistan,” *Contemporary South Asia* 11, no. 3 (2002): 291-310.

¹⁹³ The News, 2016.

¹⁹⁴ Ibid.

introduction of weapons was due to the influx of weapons from the state-backed Afghan mercenaries or Mujahedeen (freedom fighters) who fought the Soviet-Afghan war for Pakistan and the West.¹⁹⁵

Thirdly, the regions of FATA, KPK, and Baluchistan of Pakistan were characterized by the traditionalist practices of the religion before the exodus of Afghan refugees. After the refugees arrived to live in these places, the beginning of an era of hard-core interpretation of Islam, Talibanization or radicalisation of Islam came into the purview in these regions. The radical groups residing in these regions of Pakistan before the arrival of Afghans did not have much of the opportunity to gain a foothold as they just operated as a “nuisance factor” and troublemakers.¹⁹⁶ But, after the arrival of Afghan refugees, these groups strengthened their roots in the region and heightened their activities, giving rise to tensions in Pakistani society. Their activities not just remained confined to these regions but began to spill over to other regions of Pakistan as well.¹⁹⁷ Afghan refugees hence became the scapegoats of these radical groups.

Fourthly, the migration of Afghan refugees in the bordering provinces also led to a 10-15 percent increase in the population leading to demographic shifts along with human and health security concerns for the government of Pakistan. For instance, “the Pashtun refugees” surpassed the local Baloch population. This challenged the Baloch dominance in the region.¹⁹⁸ In a report published by the UNHCR in 2016, Pakistan had 76 refugee villages at that time, with 65 in KPK and FATA, 10 in Baluchistan and one in Punjab. Apart from these villages, approximately 67 percent of refugees resided outside these villages.¹⁹⁹ Consequently, the demographic shifts have been apparent in the provincial capital cities of Karachi, Quetta, and Peshawar. Peshawar has an

¹⁹⁵ Pierre Centlivres and Micheline Centlivres-Demont, “The Afghan Refugee: An Ambiguous Identity,” *Journal of Refugee Studies* 1, no.2 (1988).

¹⁹⁶ Muhammad Azam, “Radicalization in Pakistan: Socio-Cultural Realities,” *Conflict and Peace Studies* 2, no. 1 (2009): 1-17.

¹⁹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁹⁸ Zahid Hilali, “The Costs and Benefits of the Afghan War for Pakistan,” *Contemporary South Asia* 11, no. 3 (2002): 291-310.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid.

overwhelming majority as one out of every five people in Peshawar has been of Afghan origin. Not only the demographic shifts but the ethnic strife has also been witnessed due to the presence of Afghan refugees in Pakistan.

The major proportion of the Pashtun population in the major cities of the Baluchistan and Sindh provinces led to the inception of anxieties and doubts related to the marginalisation and downgrading of the local ethnic communities. This fear of ostracism led to major ethnic clashes from the 1980s onward. For instance, in 1985, riots erupted between Afghans and the activists Urdu-speaking Muhajir community 's MQM party²⁰⁰ in Karachi when an Urdu-speaking girl died when she was hit by a Pashtun driver. It led to the killings of hundreds of people from both sides. From 1985 to 1998, the ethnic strives in only the city of Karachi led to approximately 9000 casualties. The main reasons were the economic contests and rivalries due to the diffusion of Pashtuns in the non-Pashtun areas. The contenders of this view assert and maintain the stance that Afghan refugees are a minor factor in the entire equation. The actual rationales have been “underdevelopment, mismanagement, policies of the state, and the subsequent deprivation.”²⁰¹

It was in the course of the government of PML-N (2013-2018) that the strategy of Afghan refugees framed as a security threat was launched. The political factions of BNP-M and BAP in Baluchistan back up the repatriation of Afghan refugees in the aftermath of their worries attached to “the ethnonational imbalance in the population of Baluchistan, particularly in the context of Baluch and Pashtun demographics of Baluchistan.”²⁰² MQM-P also communicated its agitation for the Afghan refugees on two accounts: a threat to national security and a liability to the state budget. Likewise, this party's primary base of assistance remains in the city of Karachi in general and

²⁰⁰ The Urdu-speaking Muhajir community represents populace that migrated from India at the time of the independence of Pakistan and resided mostly in Karachi. Mohajir Quami Movement (MQM), a party established in 1984 claimed to represent the interests of the Urdu-speaking 'Mohajir' community.

²⁰¹ Akbar S. Ahmed, “Pakistani Society: Islam, Ethnicity, and Leadership in South Asia,” (London: Oxford University Press, 1986).

²⁰² Zuha Siddiqui, “For Afghan Refugees, Pakistan is a nightmare-but also home,” *Foreign Policy* 9 (2019).

the “Urdu-speaking Muhajir community” in particular. Hence, MQM-P considers the populace of Afghan refugees in Karachi as perpetrators of a demographic disparity.²⁰³

Finally, the Afghan refugees have also been held responsible for the eruption of sectarian conflicts in Pakistan. These clashes came to the purview when the Sunni Afghan refugees settled themselves in the Shia-dominated areas or vice versa. For instance, in 1987, Afghan refugees were accused of involvement in a clash in Kurram agency in Pakistan in which around 200 people were killed. In 2007, similar incidents took place. On the other hand, the movement of Shia Hazara Afghans in the Sunni-dominated regions of Pakistan led to clashes, a routine affair.²⁰⁴ Pakistan from independence has been composed of both Sunni and Shia sects, but no sectarian clashes have been witnessed. The migration of Afghans into Pakistan provided foreign elements to play proxies in Pakistan to destabilize the peace and harmony inside the country. The Iranian Revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan occurred in the same year that is 1979. These phenomena spilled over to Pakistan, nurturing and encouraging sympathetic factions and feeding sectarian militancy.²⁰⁵

The upswing of sectarian rifts in the society of Pakistan can also be traced back to the manipulation of religion by General Zia-ul-Haq (1977–88).²⁰⁶ The legitimisation and consolidation of his rule, along with the national security objective of structuring warm connexions with the Afghan Mujahideen after 1979, were the reasons behind the rifts. Thus, in the 1980s, Pakistan turned into a proxy combat zone between “Shia-majority Iran and Sunni-dominated Saudi Arabia”. Both of these states exerted their influence on the respective sects by funding Madrasahs (based on sectarian lines) to wage war in opposition to the Soviets.²⁰⁷

²⁰³ F. Chaudhry, “MQM Submits Resolution in NA for Deportation of Afghans Before Census,” *The Dawn*, 08 March 2017, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1319202>.

²⁰⁴ Mariam Abou Zahab, “The Regional Dimension of Sectarian Conflicts in Pakistan,” *Pakistan: Nationalism Without a Nation* (2002): 115-128.

²⁰⁵ H. Abbas, “Shiism and Sectarian Conflict in Pakistan,” *Occasional Paper Series* (USA: 2010).

²⁰⁶ Aliya Talib, “Sectarian Violence and Extremism in Pakistan: A Way Forward,” *Terrorism Studies* 18, no. 78 (2014).

²⁰⁷ Rabia Mehmood and Syed Hassan Akbar, “State of Religious Freedom in Pakistan,” *Jinnah Institute* (Islamabad: 2015).

4.3 The Construction of Afghan Refugees as the Security Threats in Pakistan:

Just like social problems, there also exist a myriad of security problems which are constructed to portray Afghan refugees as a major security threat to the society of Pakistan. Number one, the refugees are accused of militancy and terrorism in Pakistan. This contends that the Afghan refugees are the perpetrators of militant activities in Pakistan or facilitate the terrorist organizations to conduct their illicit activities on the soil of Pakistan. Advocates of these claims provide evidence with regard to the number of Afghan nationals caught. However, the official statistics contend otherwise and indicate that these allegations are often blown out of proportion.²⁰⁸ The statistics show that most of the militants and terrorists are locals who have been waging war in Pakistan due to their ideological differences with the establishments and administration. Such voices stress that most of the terrorist groups waging war against Pakistan consist of locals. The states' role in fostering and promoting proxies going rogue has also been the case in this regard.²⁰⁹

The "National Internal Security Policy (NISP) report (2014-2018)" was published. In that report, the Afghan refugees in Pakistan were portrayed as a probable source of extremism and security in Pakistan. This report, therefore, underscores the government's securitization setting up of the Afghan refugee populace in Pakistan after 9/11.²¹⁰ Ch. Nisar Ali Khan, former Federal Interior Minister of Pakistan, voiced his judgement concerning the existence of Afghan refugees in Pakistan "as a source of facilitating terrorists in conducting violent attacks against the interests and people of Pakistan."²¹¹

²⁰⁸ SATP, "Data Sheet: Pakistan," 20 October 2016, <https://www.satp.org/datasheet-terrorist-attack/fatalities/pakistan/>.

²⁰⁹ Anchita Borthakur, "Afghan refugees: The Impact on Pakistan." *Asian Affairs* 48, no. 3 (2017): 488-509.

²¹⁰ Mukhtar, "Afghan Refugees Used as Facilitators in Terror Attacks: Nisar," *The Nation*, 19 February 2017, <http://nation.com.pk/national/19-Feb-2017/afghan-refugees-used-as-facilitators-in-terror-attacks-nisar>.

²¹¹ Jelena Bjelica, "Caught up in a Regional Tensions? The Mass Return of Afghan Refugees from Pakistan," *Afghanistan Analysis Network* (2016).

The former advisor on foreign policy, Sartaj Aziz, also referred to the security apprehensions linked to the Afghan hamlets in Pakistan by proclaiming them as “safe havens for non-state militant organizations.”²¹² He also commented on the madrassahs established along the border for the education of Afghan refugees in Pakistan. He opined that “the Madrassahs along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border and tribal areas, in particular North Waziristan, had become a hub of terrorist activities” and blamed the Afghan refugees for this.²¹³ Pakistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) has likewise voiced anxieties and unease in relation to refugee communities contributing as a safe haven for terrorists so that they can carry out extremist actions in the country.²¹⁴

Mushtaq Ghani, the former Information Minister of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, also alleged that “about 80 percent of crimes in KP are committed by Afghans. They are involved in murders and kidnapping for ransom, but they disappear after committing these crimes, and we cannot trace them. Therefore, we demand that those having PoR be restricted to camps, and those without [their papers be] sent home.”²¹⁵

Nevertheless, a report issued under the “KPK Right to Information Act on Crime Statistics” declared that “the impact of Afghan refugees on the criminalisation of the Pakistani society is exaggerated; the data in this report show that from 2014 to 2016, just over one per cent of all major crime prosecutions involved Afghan refugees.”²¹⁶ Afghan refugees have been held responsible for “the criminalisation of Pakistani society.”²¹⁷ They have been blamed for numerous high-fi security problems. The

²¹² Christine Roehrs, “The Refugee Dilemma: Afghans in Pakistan Between Expulsion and Failing Aid Schemes,” *Afghanistan Analysts Network* 9 (2015).

²¹³ Dr. Fayyaz, “Pakistan Counter-terrorism (CT)-Afghan Refugee Question,” *South Asian Studies* 33, no. 2 (2020).

²¹⁴ M. Baabar, “Afghan Refugee Camps Being Used for Terrorism: Foreign Office,” *The News*, 24 June 2016, <https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/130355-Afghan-refugee-camps-being-used-for-terrorism-FO>.

²¹⁵ Roehrs, 2015.

²¹⁶ Anchita Borthakur, “Afghan Refugees: The Impact on Pakistan,” *Asian Affairs* 48, no. 3 (2017): 488-509.

²¹⁷ Susanne Schmeidl, “(Human) Security Dilemmas: Long-Term Implications of the Afghan Refugee Crisis,” *Third World Quarterly* 23, no. 1 (2002): 7-29.

governmental authorities, as well as the citizens, became highly aggressive and antagonistic towards them.

Number two, Afghan refugees have also been accused of operating for Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), the Indian Intelligence Agency.²¹⁸ The perceived nexus between the Indian and Afghan intelligence by the security agencies of Pakistan are associated with a security threat. Due to this factor, Afghan refugees residing in Pakistan are securitized in the aftermath of 9/11. This nexus may use the presence of undocumented refugees in the country to achieve its strategic goal.²¹⁹ The security establishment of Pakistan widely believes that Indian existence in Afghanistan is intended and aimed to support instability in Pakistan by funding the militant groups to initiate terrorist activities in Pakistan. In short Indian presence in Afghanistan undermines Pakistan's "doctrine of Strategic depth"²²⁰ and bolsters the notion of the "pincer effect" in opposition to Pakistan's national security agenda.

In the aftermath of the securitization of Afghan refugees in Pakistan, the strengthening ties between India and Afghanistan are evident in the proxy engagement of local actors regarding GWOT. Resultantly it appears rational that the "Indian factor" in relation to the "Kabul-Delhi nexus" in some way has impacted "the security framing of Afghan refugees by the Pakistani security establishment." Indian proxy engagement in Afghanistan with the purpose of infusing insecurity in Pakistan has also been identified by "Chuck Hagel, former Secretary of Defence, USA and US General (retired)."²²¹

Number three, the refugee camps of Afghan refugees have been associated with security threats by the enforcement agencies of Pakistan. Because of the unregulated flow of Afghan refugees to Pakistan, the refugee camps constructed for the shelter of

²¹⁸ Borthakur, 2017.

²¹⁹ Zahid Shahab Ahmed and Stuti Bhatnagar, "Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations and the Indian Factor," *Pakistan Horizon* 60, no. 2 (2007): 159-174.

²²⁰ Strategic depth is a term in military literature that broadly refers to the distances between the front lines or battle sectors and the combatants' industrial core areas, capital cities, heartlands, and other key centres of population or military production.

²²¹ Stanley Wolpert, "Roots of Confrontation in South Asia: Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, and the Superpowers," (London: Oxford University Press, 1982).

the Afghan refugees were then deemed to be the sanctuaries for the extremists and terrorist factions. The investigations conducted after some of the terrorist attacks provide evidence of the connection of Afghan refugees aiding and assisting the terrorists. Baluchistan Home Minister Sarfraz Bugti said that “the security agencies had arrested six Afghan intelligence operatives from Baluchistan, who were involved in attacks on FC personnel and citizens, and bomb blasts in Chaman.”²²² Former Interior Minister Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan in February 2017 said, “The investigations into recent terrorism incidents had brought out the fact that Afghan refugees were used as facilitators in most of the cases. All those involved in Lahore and Peshawar terrorist attacks, including their facilitators, have been identified. Pakistan extended hospitality towards Afghan refugees during the last four decades, and it was desirable that they should come out to help Pakistan.”²²³

These statements provide evidence that the Afghan refugees had either been involved in terrorist incidents or had been harbouring militants inside their residences. A major suicide bombing attack was stymied when Counter Terrorism Department (CTD) captured a suspected terrorist in Peshawar in 2017. CTD organized a raid nearby Achini Khor Rang Road on receiving the information from intelligence bureaus as well as arrested an alleged terrorist from that place.²²⁴ Explosives were also collected from his custody. As per the resources of CTD, the terrorist was a member of an outlawed group and was an Afghan citizen. In 2015, the decades-old Afghan shanty town in the suburbs of the capital was trampled by the Capital Development Authority. This move forced more than fifty thousand refugees to vacate the area. The eviction plan was crafted by NAP as this suburb was deemed to be the hub of criminal activities.²²⁵

²²² Ibid.

²²³ Qandeel Siddique, “Pakistan’s Future Policy Towards Afghanistan: A look at Strategic Depth, Militant Movements and the Role of India and US,” *DIIS Report* no. 8 (2011).

²²⁴ Ibid.

²²⁵ Catherine Putz, “What About Afghan Refugees?,” *The Diplomat*, November 03, 2015, <http://thediplomat.com/2015/11/what-about-afghan-refugees/>.

Research has shown that many refugee camps turned into breeding grounds for terrorists and militants.²²⁶ Quiet a number of terrorist activities and suicide bombings were planned at these camps. Numerous illiterate and unemployed Afghan refugees turned into mercenaries for foreign intelligence services. They were brainwashed using religious sentiments into committing suicide attacks in public places or significant sites.²²⁷ “In 2008 alone, there were a total of 60 suicide bombing attacks in which 889 people died, and 2,072 got injured. The suicide bombings also included a brutal and deadly “Marriot Hotel Blast in the capital city of Pakistan.”²²⁸ At this time, the people of Pakistan felt extremely scared and at risk of even moving around in their neighbourhood. The militants and refugees hold an exceptional ability to disguise themselves among the local population. Now, these militants get their benefit due to the presence of undocumented or illegal refugees residing in Pakistan, as this situation provides them with the window of opportunity to manipulate the legal gap.²²⁹

Pakistan’s ambassador to the UN, Munir Akram, penned a letter to the United Nations Security Council in 2007 and stated that “the problem of cross-border militancy is closely related to the presence of over 3 million Afghan refugees in Pakistan. These camps have often given rise to complaints that they provide shelter to undesirable elements and Taliban.”²³⁰ This viewpoint was also advocated by a Newsweek article in 2007 arguing that “Afghan refugee camps have in fact become sanctuaries for Jihadist elements in the region.”²³¹

²²⁶ Nicholas Wilkey, “Suicide Attacks in Afghanistan and Pakistan,” PhD Thesis, University of Adelaide (2014).

²²⁷ Rohan Gunaratna, “The Islamabad Marriott in Flames: The Attack on the World’s Most Protected Hotel,” *Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism* 3, no.2 (2008): 99-116.

²²⁸ Talal Hassan, “Afghanistan Complex Situation and Its Implications on Pakistan,” (2009).

²²⁹ Madiha Afzal, “Imran Khan’s Incomplete Narrative on the Taliban,” *Brookings* (2019), <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/10/14/imran-khans-incomplete-taliban-narrative/>.

²³⁰ Vasja Badalič, “The Reverse Exodus: The Forced Repatriation of Afghan Refugees in Pakistan,” In *The War Against Civilians* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019): 191-212.

²³¹ Human Rights Watch, “What are you Doing Here?,” *Human Rights Watch*, November 18, 2015, <https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/11/18/what-are-you-doing-here/police-abuses-against-afghans-pakistan>.

Number four, as most of the Afghan refugees did not have the resources to send their children to public or private schools in Pakistan, they studied in the “Madrassahs—where education was much cheaper.”²³² These madrassahs were run by religious organizations at the border areas.²³³ In 1957, there were only 150 of these institutes, whereas, in 1980, the number reached 5500.²³⁴ Evidence shows that many of these institutes received international funding as these institutes were running along sectarian lines.²³⁵ The curriculum taught was mostly related to brainwashing the kids into sectarian lines, creating Jihadi sentiments, and getting them ready to carry out militant activities. Many of the madrassahs were affiliated with terrorist organizations. The Afghans considered schools to be the breeding grounds for Western thoughts and ideas. On the other hand, some deemed schools inculcating Marxist or communist ideas. Hence, they preferred madrassahs over schools for their kids, where they believed their kids had been getting a religious education, unaware of militant training being given to them.²³⁶

Sartaj Aziz, the former foreign affairs advisor to the former Prime Minister of Pakistan, Mian Nawaz Sharif, stated, “Madrassahs along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border and tribal areas, in particular North Waziristan, had become a hub of terrorist activities. Initially, they came to seek refuge, but they soon realised that unless they controlled territory and resources, they can’t survive there. So, they started expanding their activities, and by 2007–08, they had covered most of the tribal areas. They killed the tribal leaders; then they started establishing their communication networks, IED factories, and suicide training centres. It was unbelievable how quickly they expanded and trained themselves in the tribal belt. So, we started getting large-scale attacks in

²³² Admir Skodo, “The Impact of Forced Migration on Afghanistan’s Domestic Politics and Foreign Relations,” (Stockholm: Utrikespolitiska Institutet, 2018).

²³³ Qandeel Siddique, “Pakistan’s Future Policy Towards Afghanistan: A look at Strategic Depth, Militant Movements and the Role of India and US,” *DIIS Report* no. 8 (2011).

²³⁴ *Ibid.*

²³⁵ Skodo, 2018.

²³⁶ Nasreen Ghufuran, “Afghan Refugees in Pakistan: Current Situation and Future Scenario,” *Policy Perspectives* (2006): 83-104.

our cities, suicide attacks and bomb blasts, [adding that] in these 14 years, Pakistan lost about 60,000 people, including 10,000 security personnel.”²³⁷

4.4 Media Representation of the Afghan Refugees

In addition to governments playing a vital role in furthering the opinion that refugees are harbingers of insecurity, the media is also undoubtedly an important tool in society. It targets urgent issues in the community. This has an impact on the readers because, many a time, readers’ opinions may be shaped or influenced by the media. All kinds of media, such as print, digital, and social media, have played their part in the framing of the Afghan refugees. If one takes a peek at the coverage of the Afghan refugee issue by the media of Pakistan, it clearly shows that the national security of the state has been given utmost importance, whereas the problems and issues concerning Afghan refugees have been of the least concern.²³⁸ The media of Pakistan has portrayed the fact that Afghan refugees are of grave concern when it comes to the future sustainability and stability of the friendly relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan. It also sent out the message that millions of Afghan refugees, whether registered or unregistered in Pakistan, remain a burden to the economy and a relentless security risk, mostly in the form of sustenance and backing to terrorist factions functioning in Pakistan.²³⁹

Many newspapers and media outlets published one side of the story. It told people that refugees had been provided money and assistance to go back to Afghanistan. If we talk about counting the number of refugees residing in Pakistan, the political leaders transformed it into a political issue making the whole census process. Now, in this case, the media outlet reported this case making refugees a hurdle. The following statement was published in the newspaper to cover the political hurdles. “Census can’t distinguish between citizens, aliens.”²⁴⁰

²³⁷ Ibid.

²³⁸ Sumera Batool, “Media Representations and Refugees Crises: Framing of Afghan Refugees in Mainstream Print Media of Pakistan,” *Pakistan Social Sciences Review* 3, no. 1 (2019): 461-473.

²³⁹ Ibid.

²⁴⁰ Published in Dawn, 2017.

The terrorist attacks conducted by the militant agencies have been associated with the camps of Afghan refugees. It is a widespread belief among the people of Pakistan that refugee camps are safe havens for terrorists. The Nation, one of Pakistan's reputed English newspapers, reported Afghan refugees as: "Time over for Afghan refugees"²⁴¹ and "Afghan refugees' repatriation at any cost."²⁴² The print media has many a time been found quiet on the concerns of Afghan refugees' right to education, freedom of speech, accommodation and camp facilities for refugees, travel documents and many other issues. The Afghans living in Pakistan, even the second or third generations that have been born and bred in Pakistan, have been reported as a refugee numerous times instead of nationals. The media of Pakistan also has depicted Afghan refugees as a burden on the economy. The contributions of Afghan refugees have been completely unnoticed. Daily Dawn newspaper has been observed to adopt a harsh and strict tone for refugees.²⁴³

4.5 Conclusion

This chapter has accounted for the construction of Afghan refugees as an existential threat to the society of Pakistan. The governmental agencies have built up the ground for exceptional politics. Notably, the establishment of Pakistan is the most powerful securitizing agent directing its securitizing moves towards its targeted audience, the society of Pakistan (which is also one of the referent objects here, and the rest are the infrastructure, enforcement agencies, and the governmental organizations) and sometimes the international public and organizations. This chapter has utilized the Copenhagen school to analyse the fact that the society of Pakistan has faced an imminent threat in several forms by Afghan refugees. These refugees have been constructed as the harbingers of terrorism and militancy in the state of Pakistan as well as the providers of safe havens to terrorist non-state actors. This securitizing narrative has been widely accepted by the citizens of Pakistan. However, the Copenhagen school does not account for the policies and mechanisms adopted as securitizing practices and

²⁴¹ The Nation, June 2016.

²⁴² Ibid.

²⁴³ Terence Wright, "Collateral Coverage: Media Images of Afghan Refugees, 2001," *Visual Studies* 19, no. 1 (2004): 97-112.

tools as securitizing moves by the securitizing agent against the existential threat. Therefore, the next chapter will explain those securitizing practices and tools as explained by the Paris school adopted by the state machinery of Pakistan to securitize Afghan refugees since the 1990s. Special focus will be put on the policies and mechanisms adopted, particularly after the army public school attack in 2014, which accelerated the securitization process

CHAPTER 4

SECURITIZATION OF AFGHAN REFUGEES IN PAKISTAN- THE PARIS SCHOOL

This section will comprise the other elements of securitization acknowledged by the Paris school of securitization, known as the tools and practices since the Copenhagen school does not explain the policies and mechanisms adopted by the securitizing agent. By looking into these tools and practices, this section will work out the implications of the securitization process by analysing the policies of the governmental agencies and the establishment of Pakistan. Firstly, a brief detail regarding the securitization governance of Pakistan will be discussed. Next, the practices of securitization, such as registration of Afghan refugees, harassment, and others, are stressed by Bazlacq and Bigo in their works. Both the internal and external security practices adopted by the enforcement agencies of Pakistan and the military will be highlighted.

Apart from practices, the securitization tools employed to carry out the securitization practices will also be part of this analysis. These tools will assist in understanding how they frame a respective threat and how the structure of a particular threat appraises the securitization process. The employment of these securitizing practices and tools has compelled thousands of Afghan refugees to leave Pakistan. The chapter will analyse different practices and tools utilized from the 1990s, such as the repatriation of Afghan refugees and the closure of camps. Fencing of the Durand line has been on the table since 9/11, but the Afghan government's disagreement prevented Pakistan from doing so. However, the frequent terror attacks, such as the army school one, compelled Pakistan to take measures regarding the fencing of the Pak-Afghan border.

Similarly, the harassment of Afghan refugees began in the aftermath of 9/11, in which the illegal and undocumented Afghan refugees were beleaguered. The process

accelerated after the attack on an army school in which hundreds of school children and teachers were killed. Likewise, the National Action Policy was adopted in the aftermath of the army school attack in 2014.

5.1 Securitized Governance and Policies of Pakistan Concerning Afghan Refugees

The period from 1979-1991 can be called “the period of hospitality.”²⁴⁴ When the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, Pakistan warmly welcomed the Afghan refugees. However, it never accorded them the status of refugees as per the 1951 Geneva Convention and its 1967 Protocol, and neither did Pakistan frame any particular legal framework for them. Afghan refugees were treated as per the regulations already existing in the constitution of Pakistan. Also, Pakistan allowed UNHCR to determine the refugee status of Afghan refugees in Pakistan.²⁴⁵ This gap in the policy framework of Pakistan makes it difficult to manage the protracted refugee crisis.

Afterwards, when the mission of driving the Soviets out of Afghanistan was accomplished, Pakistan instantly began to face “refugee fatigue”²⁴⁶ and demanded the repatriation of Afghan refugees. Not only this, but the western world also simultaneously felt “donor fatigue”²⁴⁷ and left the region in a mess. Different factions of Mujahedeen in Afghanistan began to fight for ruling power, plunging Afghanistan into a civil war. The continuous movement of Afghan refugees into Pakistan heightened the securitization of refugees. The authorities began to blame the refugees for a number of social evils in the society of Pakistan.

Consequently, Pakistan restricted the movement of Afghans and also demolished several campsites to encourage repatriation. US officials who paid a visit to Islamabad

²⁴⁴ Phi Hong Su and Hameed Hakimi, “Securitized Reception: Revisiting Contexts Confronting Afghan and Vietnamese Forced Migrants,” *UNU-WIDER Working Paper no. 190* (Helsinki: 2021).

²⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁴⁶ Amina Khan, “Protracted Afghan Refugee Situation,” *Strategic Studies* 37, no. 1 (2017): 42-65.

²⁴⁷ Nasreen Ghufuran, “Afghan Refugees in Pakistan: Current Situation and Future Scenario,” *Policy Perspectives* 3, no. 2, (2006): 83-104.

before the incident of 9/11 summed up the Pakistani position on Afghans in words, “if donors have donor fatigue... then [Pakistanis] have asylum fatigue. If donors’ patience with the Afghan situation had run out, so had Pakistanis.”²⁴⁸

After the incident of 9/11 and particularly after the school attack in 2014, Pakistan adopted a closed-door policy to the wave of Afghan refugees to Pakistan. It did so due to a major securitization attempt and drew on the logic of economic hardships. Thus, Pakistan adopted increasingly restrictive governance policies. The regionalization of the WOT could be visualized in the region as the Afghans who shared similar religious, ethnic, and linguistic identities with Pakistan, therefore, became constructed as the securitized other. Not only this, but Pakistan also excused Afghan refugees from the provisions of the Citizenship Act, the 1946 Foreigners’ Act, and the 1951 Foreigners’ Order.²⁴⁹ These would have granted Afghans the citizenship of Pakistan, which would have exhibited Afghans as “holders of nonvalid visas and permits. Since the refugees did not attain citizenship, they were subjected to detention or deportation.”

Consequently, Afghan refugees were instrumentalized in achieving political aims in the past. Securitizing employment terms encountering Afghans in Pakistan interfaced with a migration management system that securitizes their labour market prospects. Likewise, the securitization of Afghans’ access to employment opportunities absconded them to prejudice, redundancy, and relegation. The repudiation of the host state intensified this to permit them conduits to perpetual hamlet and residency.

5.2 Registration Process of Afghan Refugees in Pakistan

Afghan refugees were registered in Pakistan for the first time in 2005, during which a census was conducted. Following the census, a comprehensive registration was carried out in 2006-07.²⁵⁰ The process was carried out to determine the number of Afghan

²⁴⁸ David Turton and Peter Marsden, “Taking Refugees for a Ride: The Politics of Refugee Return to Afghanistan,” *Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit* (2002).

²⁴⁹ Phi Hong Su and Hameed Hakimi, “Securitized Reception: Revisiting Contexts Confronting Afghan and Vietnamese Forced Migrants,” *UNU-WIDER Working Paper no. 190* (Helsinki: 2021).

²⁵⁰ UNHCR, “Census of Afghans in Pakistan” (2005), <http://www.unhcr.org/431c7b1a2.pdf>.

refugees residing in Pakistan since 1979. The process was also delayed three months after the final date to provide time to those refugees who had moved to Pakistan after 9/11. Finally, registration results showed that more than three million Afghan refugees dwelled in Pakistan then.²⁵¹ The government of Pakistan asserted that only those who took part in the census would apply for residency in Pakistan. They also received the Proof of Registration (PoR) cards which recognized them as “Afghan citizens temporarily residing in Pakistan.”²⁵²

Many Afghan refugees did not register for the process, possibly out of fear of being deported. Some did not register because they did not comprehend the significance of the process, and lastly, quite a number of refugees did not register because they could not physically appear for the process.²⁵³ Those refugees that obtained the PoR cards were deemed as “*prima facie*”²⁵⁴ by the UNHCR. The Afghan refugees that arrived after the 2005 census did not get the chance to register, so they automatically fell into the criterion of undocumented refugees.

The refugees that portrayed violent attitudes and rash behaviour were those that were undocumented and illegal. They were part of non-state terrorist groups that moved in and out of Pakistan due to the porous border, thus putting the entire refugee community in trouble and giving a bad name to them in the eyes of Pakistanis. Furthermore, not all Afghan refugees in Pakistan were deemed as refugees from a functioning legitimate viewpoint as they kept moving in and out of Pakistan and then returning to Pakistan. They were considered economic migrants.²⁵⁵ As a consequence, the law-abiding refugees had to bear the brunt of the illegal ones.

²⁵¹ Ibid.

²⁵² UNHCR, “Registration report offers insight into Afghans in Pakistan,” May 3, 2007, <http://www.unhcr.org/4639c94b4.html>.

²⁵³ Ibid.

²⁵⁴ Marjoleine Zieck, “The Legal Status of Afghan Refugees in Pakistan, a Story of Eight Agreements and Two Suppressed Premises”, *International Journal of Refugee Law* 20 no. 2 (2008).

²⁵⁵ Daniel A. Kronenfeld, “Afghan refugees in Pakistan: Not All Refugees, Not Always in Pakistan, Not Necessarily Afghan?,” *Journal of Refugee Studies* 21, no. 1 (2008): 43-63.

The government assigned NADRA the task of getting all the undocumented Afghan refugees registered so as to eliminate conflict between documented and undocumented refugees in the aftermath of 9/11. This duty was assigned to NADRA by NAP.²⁵⁶ NADRA would make the Proof of Registration (PoR) cards by collecting refugees' biometric data. This task was initiated in 2006. A mobile application was also developed by the Punjab Information Technology Board for further details and verification of the PoR cards.²⁵⁷

The purpose behind this registration process was to make it easy to identify between the legal and illegal refugees residing in Pakistan. This process also aided in identifying Afghans living inside Pakistan as citizens and those who possessed fake identities and were just posing themselves as refugees to obtain the financial benefits in dollars provided by international organizations. "In this context, NADRA has claimed to block 155,000 fake Citizen National Identity Cards (CNICs)."²⁵⁸ Nevertheless, as per a report published in August 2015 by SIGAR showed that "UNHCR has consistently been unable to independently verify the number of Afghan refugees"²⁵⁹ registered by the Iranian and Pakistani governments. Consequently, it lowballed the number of Afghan refugees residing in both countries.

5.3 The National Action Plan

Terrorists in Peshawar attacked the Army Public School on 16 December 2014. The attack resulted in the killings of hundreds of school children and teachers. This attack raised the alarm among the establishment, governmental and enforcement agencies and prompted the initiation of a grand operation against the terrorist hide-outs in

²⁵⁶ Sanaa Alimia, "Performing the Afghanistan–Pakistan Border Through Refugee ID Cards," *Geopolitics* 24, no. 2 (2019): 391-425.

²⁵⁷ Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, "Afghans in Peshawar Migration, Settlements and Social Networks", (2006), <http://www.unhcr.org/43e754da2.pdf>.

²⁵⁸ W. Ahmed, "155,000 fake CNICs seized in NADRA crackdown," *The Express Tribune*, 30 April, 2019, <https://tribune.com.pk/story/1962410/1-155000-fake-cnics-seized-nadra-crackdown>.

²⁵⁹ Office of the SIGAR, "Afghan Refugees and Returnees: Corruption and Lack of Afghan Ministerial Capacity Have Prevented Implementation of a Long-term Refugee Strategy," (2015), <https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/audits/SIGAR-5-83-AR.pdf>.

Pakistan.²⁶⁰ Following the attack, the then Prime Minister of Pakistan, Mian Nawaz Shareef, convened an All-Party Conference to discuss the procedures indiscriminately to fight off the terrorists. Prime Minister declared the situation extremely critical and demanded a concrete course of action. After debates and discussions, Nawaz Sharif addressed the people of Pakistan in which he presented a twenty-points agenda as a future course of action. “Establishment of Military Courts”²⁶¹ was the most important point.

Apart from this, the Government of Pakistan established the “National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA)”²⁶² for management and synchronisation among all security departments to detect and annihilate terrorism in Pakistan. Under the patronage of NACTA, a comprehensive national security policy was amalgamated to report and handle all sorts of security problems at a national level. This was known as “the National Action Plan.”²⁶³ Afghan refugees were stated in point 19 of this Plan as a probable source of security concern in Pakistan. Point 19 thus built “the narrative securitization of Afghan refugee presence as a security risk referent inside Pakistan”, which states that “formulation of a comprehensive policy to deal with the issue of Afghan refugees, beginning with registration of all refugees.”²⁶⁴

Now this plan did not differentiate between documented and undocumented refugees. It led to the initiation of indiscriminate steps against both groups. It bolstered “anti-Afghan sentiments” in the people of Pakistan. The Chief Minister of the province where the school attack was carried out called for an emergency meeting three days after the attack and demanded immediate action to remove all the Afghan refugees

²⁶⁰ Kalim Bahadur, “Pakistan's Policy Towards Afghanistan,” *International Studies* 19, no. 4 (1980): 643-659.

²⁶¹ Ahmed Ayaz, “The Recent Spike in Terrorism: A Critical Evaluation of NAP,” *Defence Journal* 20, no. 8 (2017): 12.

²⁶² Nasreen Akhter, “Pakistan, Afghanistan and the Taliban,” *International Journey on World Peace* 25 no. 4 (2008): 49-73.

²⁶³ Ayaz, 2017.

²⁶⁴ Zahid, Farhan. “Analysing the Strategic Calculus of Afghan State and Non-State Actors,” *Conflict and Peace Studies* (2016): 87.

from the region.²⁶⁵ The Prime Minister also did not mention why the repatriation of refugees was mentioned in the National Action Plan. As per the plan, the refugees had to register themselves before leaving for documentation purposes. Thus, the process of refugee repatriation was initiated swiftly. As per the estimation, 1500 refugees were sent back the same month of the attack and 22000 undocumented refugees were turned back the following month. Nevertheless, the Afghan refugees did not conduct the attack. They bore the brunt of the fact that revealed that this attack was planned in Afghanistan. Hence, we can analyse that refugees have been connected with the security situation in Pakistan.²⁶⁶

SAFRON Federal Secretary Jamali told Human Rights Watch that the federal government had to intervene to convince the provincial government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa to “display restraint” to prevent mass deportations of Afghans after the December 16, 2014, Peshawar school attack. He said, “the provincial government of K-P wanted to oust the Afghan refugees immediately post-the December 16 attack. The K-P government has become aggressive [towards Afghan refugees], and we also have reports of harassment from Peshawar and other areas of the K-P. We have taken [up] the matter of harassment with the K-P government [but] the K-P government is not maintaining as much oversight over the police on the issue of harassment of Afghans as it should. The threats had an enormous impact. According to UNHCR, nine times as many registered Afghans returned from Pakistan to Afghanistan in January 2015 as in December 2014. As mid-winter is traditionally a low season for repatriation, those who felt they had to return faced additional hardships. Nearly all of those returning came from three Pakistani provinces—Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Azad Kashmir, and Punjab—where an increase in arrests, detentions, and evictions of Afghans was reported during the same period.”²⁶⁷

5.4 Harassment of Afghan Refugees in Pakistan

²⁶⁵ Shahid Ahmad Afridi, “Pakistan’s Counterinsurgency,” *Strategic Studies* 36, no. 3 (2016): 21-37.

²⁶⁶ Rauf Khan Khattak, “Afghan Refugees and NAP,” *Conflict and Peace Studies* 7 no. 2, (2015): 127-130.

²⁶⁷ Sanam Noor, “Afghan Refugees after 9/11,” *Pakistan Horizon* 59, no.1 (2006): 59-78.

“The police did not used to beat us much before December 16, 2014 [when the Taliban attacked a Pakistani school]. Now they [beat] us for no reason. I am afraid that one day when I won’t have bribe money, they will kill me. None of my other family members except me and my brother leave the house now. Our children do not go to school; they do not even go to play outside anymore.... [But] I cannot go back to Afghanistan.”²⁶⁸

Karim (a pseudonym), an Afghan shopkeeper living in Peshawar, July 2015

The above statement belongs to an Afghan shopkeeper who had been the victim of harassment and abuse at the hands of the enforcement agency of Pakistan. The statement shows that the human rights violation of Afghan refugees intensified in Pakistan after the army school attack in 2014. The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) has provided an evaluation in which they have assessed the anti-refugee activities and crackdowns against the presence of Afghan refugees in the wake of “the Voluntary Repatriation programme.”²⁶⁹ Refugees have been harassed, beaten up, and bribed by the police and enforcement agencies under the plan of securitizing Afghan refugees in Pakistan since 9/11. Such evaluations have been extensively recounted at national and international human rights conferences. The US department of State has assessed the discrimination and threats faced by the Afghan refugees by police for extortion purposes and harassment in the form of threats of expulsion and deportation due to illegal settlement.²⁷⁰

Routine detention, harassment and persecution, and indiscriminate arrests of Afghans have become the norm of the day and routine practice. Many cases were registered regarding the arrest of refugees. There have been assaults, raids and incursions led against Afghan refugees. “7,872 Afghans were taken into custody from Peshawar and

²⁶⁸ HRCP, “What Are You Doing Here? Police Abuses Against Afghan in Pakistan,” November 18, 2015, <https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/11/18/what-are-you-doing-here/police-abuses-against-afghans-pakistan>.

²⁶⁹ Brad K. Blitz, Rosemary Sales and Lisa Marzano, “Non-Voluntary Return? The Politics of Return to Afghanistan,” *Political Studies* 53, no. 1 (2005): 182-200.

²⁷⁰ F. Grare and W. Marley, “The Afghan Refugees in Pakistan,” (Washington: Middle East Institute, 2011).

4, 139 cases were registered against Afghans because of illegal settlement in 2016.”²⁷¹
“In 2015, 1133 illegal Afghan refugees were arrested in a singular coordinated operation from Punjab violating Foreigner’s Act.”²⁷²

The Deputy Asia Director of Human Rights Watch, Phelim Kine, opined, “Pakistani officials should not be scapegoating Afghans because of the Taliban’s atrocities in Peshawar. It is inhumane, not to mention unlawful, to return Afghans to places they may face harm and not protect them from harassment and abuse.”²⁷³ Thus, she tried to give her clear opinion that it has not been the Afghan refugees behind the disruption of peace in Pakistan but rather non-state terror organizations responsible for the terrorist attacks conducted in Pakistan. She pointed out that refugees shall not bear the brunt of terrorists’ deeds.

Some Afghans also whined about the police going into their houses and badgering women. Consequently, thousands of Afghan families have been moving out of Pakistan to avoid different kinds of harassment, such as raids on their houses, random detentions, and police intimidation, particularly in the aftermath of the fatal incidents at the Peshawar school and the Bacha Khan University. These refugees, after these attacks, have been alleged to be systematically abused and victimized by enforcement agencies. At that time, Pakistan heralded a “carrot and stick policy” toward these refugees. This policy implicitly gave the Pakistani security forces the authority to beleaguer those Afghan refugees not possessing the official credentials.²⁷⁴

However, even the refugees having the relevant documentation also objected to and protested against the harassment by the local authorities. The members of the

²⁷¹ A. J. Khan, “7,872 Unregistered Afghan Nationals Arrested in Peshawar in 2016,” *The News*, 17 July 2017, <https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/135517-7872-unregistered-Afghan-nationals-arrested-in-Peshawar-in-2016>

²⁷² Punjab Police, “Punjab Police of Pakistan,” *Hand out no. 33*, 08 February 2015, <https://www.punjabpolice.gov.pk/8022015-pr>.

²⁷³ Human Rights Watch, “What Are You Doing Here? Police Abuses Against Afghans in Pakistan,” (2015), <https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/11/18/pakistan-police-abusing-afghans>.

²⁷⁴ Nicholas R. Micinski, “Threats, Deportability and Aid: The Politics of Refugee Rentier States and Regional Stability,” *Security Dialogue* (2021).

enforcement agencies began to wrest money from the refugees. “Many refugees prefer bribes as the police do not care whether someone had proper documents or not.”²⁷⁵ The refugees were limited to gaining access to basic health facilities such as medical, schooling, water, and sanitation. Several NGOs, IGOs and other organizations such as the UNHCR have been accentuating upon the regulation of a coherent strategy in the dealings of Afghan refugees by the government of Pakistan.²⁷⁶

5.5 Fencing the Pak-Afghan Border

Controlling borders to curb refugee flow by the host state is a major component of securitization, sovereignty, and governmentality. The Durand line is a 2600 km long border shared by Pakistan and Afghanistan with around 262 crossing points.²⁷⁷ This border is not an easy one due to the rugged mountainous terrain. Its porous nature has led to the added factors of cross-insurgency, human trafficking, drug smuggling, and most of all, the disputed nature of its legitimacy.²⁷⁸ As per the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (2014), “87 % of the total opium in the world is grown in Afghanistan. Between 300 and 500 heroin-producing factories are operating in the Afghan provinces of Helmand and Nimroz bordering Pakistan.”²⁷⁹ Due to the continuous movement of militants across the border and the launching of operations by the military to eradicate terrorism, the Durand Line has become securitized.²⁸⁰

In the aftermath of the initiation of the National Action Plan, strict measures have been adopted by the government and the establishment of Pakistan for border management.

²⁷⁵ Ayesha Tanzeem, “Afghan Refugees Complain of Harassment in Pakistan,” *Voice of America*, (2015), <https://reliefweb.int/report/pakistan/afghan-refugees-complain-harassment-pakistan>.

²⁷⁶ Nasreen Ghufraan, “The Role of UNHCR and Afghan Refugees in Pakistan,” *Strategic Analysis* 35, no. 6 (2011): 954.

²⁷⁷ Eugene J. Palka, “Afghanistan: A Regional Geography,” (New York: Military Academy, West Point, NY. Dept. of Geography and Environmental Engineering, 2001).

²⁷⁸ Amina Khan and Christian Wagner, “The Changing Character of the Durand Line,” *Strategic Studies* 33, no. 2 (2013): 19-32.

²⁷⁹ James A. Piazza, “The Opium Trade and Patterns of Terrorism in the Provinces of Afghanistan: An Empirical Analysis,” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 24, no. 2 (2012): 213-234.

²⁸⁰ Ibid.

Afghanistan has raised concerns regarding these measures as it believes that they merge with the notion of Durand Line as an international border that Afghanistan does not accept. Afghanistan opines that “the unilateral management of border is not effective unless some bilateral arrangements are agreed upon.”²⁸¹ Pakistan has tightened the border management by constructing the gate at Torkham, adopting a strict visa regime, biometric authentications, and checking consignment automobiles. Pakistan also sealed eight entry points to give an impression of sealing the border, leaving the militants with 254 crossing points.²⁸²

Not only this, but in 2017, Pakistan decided to fence the unpatrolled Pak-Afghan border. It was decided that “the pair of nine-foot chicken wire fences, with a six-foot gap, and topped with barbed wire would be installed. The fence would run along the rocky landscape and snow-capped peaks as high as 12,000 feet.”²⁸³ Furthermore, around 750 new forts and 151 check posts had been erected. It was also reported that a “tech-meshed with a state-of-the-art surveillance system, CCTV cameras, drone cameras and other gadgets for effective day and night monitoring of the border, Biegel radars, IMSAR radars, and search lights for night patrolling would also be installed along the border.”²⁸⁴ This one-sided stringent frontier command and control system subsequently entails a coercive shoving back of the Afghan refugees, which certainly does not seem in accordance with international human rights or humanitarian law.

5.6 Repatriation of Afghan Refugees from Pakistan

The repatriation process of Afghan refugees in Pakistan can be traced back to the 1990s. In 1992, Mujahedeen fighting the Soviets, emerged victorious and drove the Soviets out of Afghanistan. As a result, international funding began to decline once their purpose of driving the Soviets out of Pakistan was achieved. Pakistan also

²⁸¹ Safia Malik, “Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations: Pitfalls and the Way Forward,” *Journal of Security & Strategic Analyses* 8, no. 1 (2022): 160-165.

²⁸² Huma Baqi and Nausheen Wasi, eds., “Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations: Pitfalls and the Way Forward,” (2021), Retrieved from <https://ir.iba.edu.pk/faculty-research-books/5>

²⁸³ Imrana Begum, “Repatriation of Afghan Refugees, Fencing Pak-Afghan border for National Security of Pakistan,” *SSRN* (2022).

²⁸⁴ Sayed Wiqar Ali Shah, “Fencing of the Durand Line and its Impact,” (2013): 85-103.

encouraged the repatriation of Afghan refugees. Therefore, approximately one and a half million were repatriated. However, the repatriation did not remain successful for long as civil war broke out among different Mujahedeen factions for the sake of assuming a charge in Afghanistan. Many refugees moved back to Pakistan. Finally, in 1996, the Taliban came to power, and it was believed that peace would prevail, and refugees would return to their country. Indeed, refugees returned, but many returned due to the radical ideological ruling of the Taliban in Afghanistan. Pakistan did not give refugee status to those Afghans who came to Pakistan after 1995; rather, they were termed as economic migrants.

The aftermath of 9/11 and the essence of the Bonn agreement in 2001 vis-à-vis the formation of an interim administration in Afghanistan instilled hope in many Afghan refugees for the possibilities of peace. Therefore, they opted for voluntary repatriation in huge figures in 2002.²⁸⁵ UNHCR agreed with the states of Pakistan and Afghanistan to facilitate this process. A commission was established in 2003 under the mandate of the UNHCR known as the Tripartite commission. This commission not only assisted in the repatriation process from Pakistan but also “resettlement and reintegration” of the Afghan refugees in Afghanistan.²⁸⁶

The “voluntary nature of the repatriation programme chartered in the Tripartite Commission on Voluntary Repatriation Programme”²⁸⁷ came under direct question in the aftermath of cases of forced migration and deportation of Afghan refugees from Pakistan. This was due to the securitizing policy of Pakistan in the wake of 9/11. Hence, an analysis of the aforementioned process of repatriation by independent ombudspersons such as HRCP deduces that this repatriation programme was initiated in the aftermath of the securitization of Afghan refugees by the government of Pakistan after 9/11.²⁸⁸ Tom Koenigs, the head of the UN support commission for Afghanistan,

²⁸⁵ Marjoleine Zicek, “The Legal Status of Afghan Refugees in Pakistan: A Story of Eight Agreements and Two Suppressed Premises,” *International Journal of Refugee Law* 20, no. 2, (2008): 253-272

²⁸⁶ Ibid.

²⁸⁷ UNHCR, “Afghanistan Tripartite Agreement with Pakistan,” March 18, 2003, <http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/search?page=search&docid=3e77334d1&query=Afghanistan>.

²⁸⁸ Valentina Hiegemann, “Repatriation of Afghan Refugees in Pakistan: Voluntary?,” *Oxford Monitor of Forced Migration* 4, no. 1 (2014): 1-4.

commented, “every extra person who comes here will only increase the poverty. The economic opportunities for someone returning to Afghanistan are exactly zero.”²⁸⁹ Aforesaid opinion shows that the condition in Afghanistan has not been safer and of fair quality for voluntary repatriations. Also, the additional aspects of “cross-insurgency, terrorist attacks, border closures, trust deficit, and a war without an end in sight inside Afghanistan are some of the factors that point towards the fact that repatriation of the Afghan refugees was not suitable at that time.”²⁹⁰

Pakistan bulldozed many larger refugee camps such as “Zarinoor 1 and Zarinoor 2 in Waziristan in 2004, Kacha Garhi in 2007, and Jalozai in KPK province in 2008. The refugees displaced as a result were given the choice of either shifting to the camps in Dir and Chitral (northern areas of Pakistan) or taking 100 dollars per person from then UNHCR.²⁹¹ As per the HRCP, it is shocking that no one chose to relocate to those camps due to their remoteness and lack of basic facilities. UNHCR and Pakistan later published a report signifying that this was not voluntary repatriation as 82% of the registered Afghan refugees did not desire to repatriate; rather, they had no choice but to do so.²⁹² In 2014, the situation took a worse turn in the aftermath of the attack on the Army Public school, followed by the initiation of the National Action Plan.

Despite the lack of evidence, the people of Pakistan believed that TTP had carried out this horrendous attack with the assistance of the Afghan refugees. The National Action Plan led to the initiation of the repatriation of Afghan refugees on a massive scale. Nearly 52 thousand Afghans were repatriated back to Afghanistan ten weeks after the attack. “In the year 2016 alone, 22, 559 Afghans were deported on charges of illegal stay in Pakistan.”²⁹³ The countdown on the validity of PoR cards also began. This

²⁸⁹ Nasreen Ghufuran, “Afghan Refugees in Pakistan: Current Situation and Future Scenario,” *Policy Perspectives* (2006): 83-104.

²⁹⁰ Ibid.

²⁹¹ Vasja Badalič, “The Reverse Exodus: The Forced Repatriation of Afghan refugees in Pakistan,” *In the War Against Civilians*, (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019): 191-212.

²⁹² Ibid.

²⁹³ A. Hashim, “Afghan Refugees Extended Until End of Year,” *Al Jazeera*, 07 February, 2017, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/02/afghan-refugees-status-extended-year-170207180402885.html>

reflects the nature of the repatriation programme that changed from voluntary to forced. Such an atmosphere generates push incentives for Afghans to vacate Pakistan due to intimidation, coercion and oppression from the state and government of Pakistan.

The government made no distinction between the documented and the undocumented Afghan refugees. The repatriation process consequently escalated tension between the government of Pakistan and Afghanistan.²⁹⁴ The graph below demonstrates the number of Afghan refugees that have been repatriated in the aftermath of 9/11. The graph shows the number of refugees from 2002 till 2021. The following graph illustrates the number of Afghan refugees that have been repatriated since 2002, the year after 9/11 took place. The graph shows that the number of repatriations was the highest at that time due to strict policies adopted by the government of policies. Another rise in the number of refugees can be witnessed in 2016. This repatriation was followed by the Army Public School attack. Still, the number of repatriations in the former event is a lot more than in the latter. The former Human Rights Minister, Shireen Mazari, when asked about the Afghan refugee presence in Pakistan, stated that “recommendation 1.6_(c) of the Parliament’s joint resolution on terrorism is that it should be the major priority of the government to repatriate the refugees.”²⁹⁵ A prominent figure head of PPP and a former Senate chairman, Mian Raza Rabbani, also highlighted the view that “it is quiet ideal for that an immediate Afghan repatriation process gets completed, but regional context should always be upheld if any policy has to be implemented keeping in perspective the strategic national interests of Pakistan.”²⁹⁶

5.7 Conclusion

This chapter has focused on the securitizing practices and instruments utilized by Pakistan to securitize the community of Afghan refugees in Pakistan and its

²⁹⁴ Z. Bhutta, “New Policy to Guide Afghan Repatriation Till 2015,” *The Express Tribune* (2015).

²⁹⁵ K. Rahman and I. Shahzad, “Afghans in Pakistan: Plight, Predicament,” *Islamabad Institute of Policy Studies* (2009): 32.

²⁹⁶ Ibid.

implication. The securitization process has been detailed, keeping in perspective the theoretical implications of the Paris School. Though Pakistan has a dilemma of over-population, the burden cannot be solely placed on the shoulders of the Afghan refugee community. The Afghans have also developed family connections with their Pashtun brothers in Pakistan. This makes them liable for the citizenship entitlement as mentioned in the sections of the Naturalization Act of Pakistan.

The former Prime Minister of Pakistan, Imran Khan, proclaimed “the right to citizenship as well as banking facilities for the documented Afghans living inside Pakistan.”²⁹⁷ However, these promises failed to materialize due to the intense reactions and concerns raised by the opposition parties. The approach that the government of Pakistan, its agencies, and the people of Pakistan will put to use in dealings with the Afghan refugees can either make or break the strain on the see-saw nature of the relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Just when the NGOs, IGOs and other international donors stopped assisting the Afghan refugees and aiding them in Pakistan, Afghan refugees turned into an economic burden for Pakistan. Hence, when the humanitarian relief was cut for the Afghan refugees after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, Afghan refugees became an economic burden on Pakistan, due to which cut short the budget for refugees over the years. The “essence of Ansaar e Madinah”²⁹⁸ invoked by Pakistan did not have spiritual connotations to it but economic ones. After the attack on the school in 2014, Pakistan had just not been in a position to accommodate any more of the Afghan refugees. The international community has blamed the state of Pakistan for harbouring terrorists inside its territory. This blame game was turned into an excuse by the government of Pakistan to formulate a framework such as that of NAP mentioned earlier that securitizes the Afghan refugee community inhabiting Pakistan, particularly in the aftermath of the 2014 school attack.

²⁹⁷ M. Barker, “Pakistan’s Imran Khan Pledges Citizenship for 1.5m Afghan Refugees,” *The Guardian* (2018), <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/sep/17/pakistan-imran-khan-citizenship-pledge-afghan-refugee>.

²⁹⁸ M. Nazif, “Afghanistan's Muhajirin: Politics of Mistrust and Distrust of Politics,” *Mistrusting refugees* (1995): 187.

Therefore, the UNHCR has condemned such a policy and reiterates the fact that there is no solid evidence with regard to the connection between terrorists and Afghan refugees.²⁹⁹ Refugees residing in camps can easily be monitored and traced compared to the ones living outside the camps through unlawful channels creating their existence undocumented in nature. That is why the UNHCR has recommended that the national as well as international communities not impose their perspective on redundant details regarding Afghan refugees involved in terrorist activities, thus tagging the entire Afghan community as a risk. It would be discrimination and bigotry against the already vulnerable population, which necessitates humanitarian considerations.

²⁹⁹ A. Abbas, "No Evidence of Afghan Refugees' Involvement in Militancy: UNHCR," *Pakistan Today*, 07 December 2012, <https://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2012/12/07/no-evidence-of-afghan-refugees-involvement-in-militancy-unhcr/>

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

This thesis addressed the securitization of migration by undertaking the analysis of Afghan refugees in Pakistan. More precisely, it aimed to analyse how migration has been integrated with security paradigms stressing policing and defence; how practices that were hitherto employed for dealing with traditional security concerns began to govern matters and concerns regarding migration. This study, in a nutshell, has focused on answering the research question of how Afghan refugees have been securitized in Pakistan. For this, it utilized qualitative methodology and relied on secondary data and resources.

As for the theoretical framework, this thesis utilised the Copenhagen and Paris Schools' understanding of the securitization theory to examine the discourse and policies adopted by various actors (public, different organisations, government, political parties, political leaders etc.) in the security framing of the Afghan refugees in Pakistan. The securitisation model asserts that security is an “essentially contested concept.”³⁰⁰ It is constructed and processed through various steps.

According to the Copenhagen school of thought, securitization is achieved through “speech acts or discourses.” Now, every single issue cannot be securitized. For an issue to be constructed as a security concern, it has to go through three steps: the first step demands the attendance of an existential threat to the referent object, such as something that is under threat; the second step requires a securitizing actor having the power and authority to securitize is the second demand; the third step looks for

³⁰⁰ Bary Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap De Wilde, “Security: A New Framework for Analysis,” (United States: Lynsee Reinner, 1998).

mechanisms and instruments employed to make the audience accept the existence of the issue being securitized. Thus, this school puts forward the notion that entails the framing of an un-politicized issue as a security threat through speech acts and discourses, justifying the usage of extraordinary measures. In short, “securitization deals with who securitizes (securitizing actor), on what issues (threats), for whom (referent object), why, with what results, and not least, under what conditions.”³⁰¹

The proponents of the Paris School adopt a more sociological approach. Though migration is not overtly affirmed as a threat, the modes established to manage it through a security lens could declare it a security dilemma. Bigo is known as the main proponent of this school of thought. He has pointed toward securitization based on bureaucratic and technological practices.³⁰² The Paris School also builds its approach in a Foucauldian manner, which states that a certain matter can be securitized with the non-existence of discursive interpretations.³⁰³

Therefore, this thesis has been established on constructing the power of securitizing tools and instruments to frame migration as a security threat. This posture did not neglect the role of *speech acts* cited to explain practices; rather, it was centred on the notion that the migration of Afghan refugees to Pakistan has been securitized without being alleged. Against this backdrop, by moving analysis from discourses to practices, the research presented *empirical referents of policy*— policies, policy tools, instruments, and operational and institutional set-ups adopted by the state machinery of Pakistan in the fifth chapter. Furthermore, both understandings of securitization theory show that Afghan refugees have been securitized in Pakistan, and more precisely, this process was related to the protracted nature of migration as well as the national interests of the state of Pakistan as in international affairs, all the states act according to their respective national interests since they have the agency to do so.

³⁰¹ Ibid.

³⁰² Didier Bigo and Anastasia Tsoukala, “Understanding in Security,” In *Terror, Insecurity and Liberty* (London: Routledge, 2008): 11-19

³⁰³ Jef Huysmans, “Revisiting Copenhagen: Or, on the Creative Development of a Security Studies Agenda in Europe,” *European Journal of International Relations* 4, no. 4 (1998): 479-505.

Given the securitizing agents, this research study has considered the positions and narratives of the government from a political perspective and the perspectives of the institutional positions in Pakistan. Additionally, positions and voices of voices other than state machinery have been taken into account for evaluating the securitisation process's fairness and transparency, e.g., academics, security experts, journalists, lawyers and human rights activists. In view of facilitating conditions, this study has not only focused on the nature of the threat security apparatus available to deal with it but also the historical contextualization.

The findings indicate that Pakistan is neither party to the 1951 Geneva Convention nor the 1961 Geneva Protocol. It has also not endorsed any rule or regulation with regard to the safety and security of the refugees or set up national legislation to define the refugee status of people seeking protection within its boundaries.³⁰⁴ “The Foreigners Act 1946” determines the procedures for the treatment of such people. Also, the UNHCR is responsible for “conducting refugee status determination under its mandate and on behalf of Pakistan’s government in accordance with the 1993 cooperation agreement between the two.”³⁰⁵

As a result of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, millions of refugees rushed to seek safety, mainly in the territories of Pakistan and Iran. From the beginning, a major refugee assistance program was instigated in Pakistan with the assistance of UNHCR, other major international donor organizations, and states.³⁰⁶ Sheltered in refugee camped villages but free to move around and work in the country, attempts were put together to limit the scope of support supplied to fundamental necessities.³⁰⁷ All these years, Pakistan has been accommodating refugees out of its humanitarian

³⁰⁴ Ilyas Chattha, “Refugee Resettlement from Pakistan: Findings from Afghan Refugee Camps in the NWFP,” Know Reset Research Report, January, 2013.

³⁰⁵ Daniel A. Kronenfield, “Afghan Refugees in Pakistan: Not All Refugees, Not Always in Pakistan, Not Necessarily Afghan?,” *Journal of Refugee Studies* 21, no.1, (2008): 43-63.

³⁰⁶ K. Rahman and I. Shahzad, “Afghans in Pakistan: Plight, Predicament,” *Islamabad Institute of Policy Studies* (2009).

³⁰⁷ Aziz Amin Ahmadzai, “How Refugees Changed the Afghan-Pakistan Dynamic,” *The Diplomat* (2016).

obligation. Pakistan shared this responsibility to acquire recognition as a reliable state and to acknowledge and admit its brotherhood with Afghanistan.³⁰⁸

This thesis has also highlighted that Pakistan has been changed in many different ways due to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Due to the geographical connectivity and similar ethnic and tribal groups across the border, Pakistan was deemed most fitting by Afghan refugees. The most important shift was caused by the mass exodus of Afghans to Pakistan. By the end of 2001, more than four million refugees had been taking refuge in the state of Pakistan.³⁰⁹ The concept of the refuge itself implies a sense of security from turmoil; however, many Afghan refugees have been compelled and indoctrinated to become the strategic assets of the governments of different countries.

For Pakistan, they have been used as opportune tools in managing the relationship with Afghanistan. Since the arrival of Afghan refugees in Pakistan, they have been considered an existential threat in several forms. Mostly, they are securitized for the induction of social evils into Pakistan. From their motherland Afghanistan. The protracted nature of the stay of refugees in Pakistan heightened the locals' concerns due to the introduction of several social problems by Afghanistan into Pakistani society.³¹⁰ They are blamed for being an economic burden on Pakistan. They are accused of being a source of drug smuggling and weaponization in Pakistan. Not only this, but they are also held responsible for the radicalization of Pakistani society, particularly the infiltration of sectarianism in the country. Most of all, they are blamed for all the security problems in the state of Pakistan.

This is the reason that compels many potential host states to put constraints of varying degrees on refugees. The host countries get anxious due to the presence of a refugee

³⁰⁸ Akbar S. Ahmed, "Pakistan Society: Islam, Ethnicity, and Leadership in South Asia," (London: Oxford University Press, 1986).

³⁰⁹ Fazal H. Curmally, "The global village and other examples of wishful thinking," *Defence Journal* 14, no. 4 (2010): 77.

³¹⁰ Pierre Centlivres and Micheline, "The Afghan Refugee Identity in Pakistan: An Ambiguous Identity," *Refugee Studies* 1(1988): 141.

influx rushing towards their territories due to the inherent fact that those refugees would bring along negative externalities, most importantly, increased insecurity. Therefore, the host states ignore and ignore the observation that most refugees seldom participate in aggressive actions. It can be understood from the notion that the principal impetus for refugees to leave their motherland and travel to a foreign country is only and only to evade life-threatening situations; circumvent insecurity, and safeguard survival and wherewithal of life not just for themselves but also for their kith and kins. Apprehensions regarding the safety risks stemming from immigrants and refugees have been humdrum in political debates, yet these anxieties should be disposed of and gotten rid of. In sheer disparity to the nuanced allegations observed in the academic writings, politicians often concoct extensive overviews about migrants that are generally fictitious.³¹¹

In the aftermath of 9/11, Pakistan turned against the Afghan Mujahideen that it had created (along with the US and Saudi Arabia) to fight against the Soviets. Consequently, it had to pay the price for this u-turn in the form of terrorism and militancy conducted by these Mujahideen-turned terrorists in its territory. Unfortunately, the Afghan refugees had to bear the brunt of the actions committed by the terrorists. The exodus of Afghan refugees to Pakistan is believed to have significantly impacted Pakistan's security situation. The government and the public of Pakistan hold Afghan refugees responsible for exacerbating insecurity in Pakistan. The consequences of the Afghan war have led to the growth of “ethnic strife, quarrels amidst Sunni and Shia organizations, Talibanization of the Pakistani society, drugs smuggling, human trafficking, Kalashnikov culture (introduction of AK-47 along with arms and ammunitions to Pakistani society) and many other social problems.” In the aftermath of the army school attack in the Peshawar city of Pakistan on December 14, 2015, by a terrorist organization known as the Tehreek e Taliban Pakistan (TTP), hundreds of innocent children and teachers got killed inhumanely.³¹²

³¹¹ Katharine Knox and Tony Kushner, “Refugees in an Age of Genocide: Global, National, and Local Perspectives During the Twentieth Century,” (London: Routledge, 2012).

³¹² K. Rahman and I. Shahzad, “Afghans in Pakistan: Plight, Predicament,” *Islamabad Institute of Policy Studies* (2009).

This attack led Pakistan to devise a security strategy against the terrorist factions, particularly TTP. The Pakistani government's policy was “the National Action Plan.” This plan led to the securitization of Afghan refugees in Pakistan. It led to the harassment of Afghan refugees through arrests, extortion, and, worse, deportation. The government of Pakistan also initiated programmes for voluntary repatriation. However, the security state of Afghanistan has never been conducive for the Afghan refugees to repatriate, but Pakistan has been in favour of repatriation. It makes sense to deport illegal and undocumented refugees because of the militancy and terrorism concerns. However, as far as the legal and documented refugees are concerned, Pakistan could provide them with work permits and convert them from liabilities to assets.

Furthermore, investing in Afghanistan and welcoming investment from Afghanistan could be viable and have led to a rapprochement between the two states. Instead of shutting down education systems to force the refugees to return, the Pakistani government could have allocated funds, scholarships, and quotas for Afghan students to ensure a constructive contribution to Pakistan. An erudite lot of Afghans should be part of Pakistan’s national debates, repatriation policies, or devising a plan to deal with the refugees. Promoting the well-being of either of the two states shall not neglect refugees' humanistic needs and requirements.

Concluding, the presence of Afghan refugees demands recognition and reconsideration by not only the state of Pakistan and its citizens but also the donor countries and the homeland. The present method of managing Afghans holds them in prolonged displacement, devoid of the prospect of incorporating legitimately or sustainably. This has to change with a different outlook and effective method—one that recognizes Afghans’ inputs to Pakistan’s economy, culture, and society and ensures their right to stay in Pakistan.

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APPENDICES

A. TURKISH SUMMARY / TÜRKÇE ÖZET

Göç olgusu insanlık kadar eski olsa da, ancak son iki yüzyılda iktisadi ve siyasi bir etken olarak analiz konusu haline almıştır. Toplu göçler, bu göçlerden etkilenen bölgelerdeki nüfus yapısını ve kültürel özellikleri kayda değer ölçüde değiştirmektedir. Zorla göç, insanların güvenlik arayışı ya da zulümden kaçma ihtiyacı ile vatanlarını istemeyerek terk etmelerini ifade eden bir terimdir. Son dönemde bu tür göçlerin boyutu, girift niteliği ve çeşitliliği büyük bir artış göstermiştir. Mültecilerin ve yerinden edilmiş kişilerin karşı karşıya olduğu ikilem uygarlık ve insanlık açısından da bir sorun teşkil etmektedir. Burada bahsi geçen yerinden edilme vakalarının ölçeği ve karmaşıklığı giderek artmaktadır. Şiddetli ve felaket niteliğindeki durumlardan ötürü yerlerinden olan insanların güvenlik, destek ve çıkış yoluna ihtiyacı vardır. Afgan mülteciler zorla göçün sürüncemeli ve netameli tabiatının kurbanı olan gruplardan biridir. Bu tez çalışmasında da ev sahibi ülke konumundaki Pakistan'da bulunan Afgan mülteci nüfusa odaklanılmaktadır.

Çarpıcı bir biçimde mülteciler sınırların ötesine uzanan bir meselenin parçası olmuş, ciddi baskı ve zulümden kaçarken komşu ülkelere sığınmış, hatta koruma ve sığınak arayışlarında başka kıtalara kadar uzanan binlerce kilometrelik yolculuklara çıkmak zorunda kalmışlardır. Birleşmiş Milletler Mülteciler Yüksek Komiserliği (UNHCR) 1951 tarihli Sözleşme ve 1967 tarihli Protokolün koruyucusu ve bekçisi konumundadır. Yüksek Komiserlik, Birleşmiş Milletler Genel Kurulunca uluslararası güvenlik ve mülteciler için kalıcı çözümler bulmak için görevlendirilmiştir. Aynı zamanda Taraf Devletlerin 1951 tarihli Sözleşmeyi uygulamasını gözetmek de sorumlulukları arasındadır. Sözleşmeye taraf olan tüm devletler UNHCR ile işbirliği yapmakla yükümlüdür. UNHCR, mültecilerin güvenliği açısından oynadıkları rollerde devletlere eşlik eder.

Pakistan ne 1951 tarihli Cenevre Sözleşmesine, ne de 1961 tarihli Cenevre Protokolüne taraftır. Bir yandan da mültecilerin güvenlik ve emniyetine ilişkin herhangi bir kural veya düzenlemeyi uygulamaya koymamış ve sınırları dâhilinde koruma talebinde bulunan insanların mülteci statüsünü tanımlamaya yönelik herhangi bir yasal mevzuatı da kabul etmemiştir. “1946 tarihli Yabancılar Kanunu” bu tür kişilere yönelik prosedürleri belirlemektedir. Aynı zamanda UNHCR “kendi yetkisi kapsamında ve iki taraf arasındaki 1993 tarihli işbirliği anlaşması uyarınca Pakistan hükûmeti adına mülteci statüsünün uygulanmasından” da sorumludur. Güvenlik çalışmaları literatüründen hareketle bu tez çalışması “Afgan mültecilerin Pakistan’da güvenleştirilmesi nasıl olmuştur?” araştırma sorusuna yanıt aramaktadır. Dolayısıyla Pakistan’daki Afgan mültecilerin güvenleştirilmesini açıklamada bu tez Güvenleştirme teorisinden yararlanmıştır.

Bu teorik kavramsallaştırma ilk olarak Kopenhag okulu kapsamında ortaya konulmuştur. Güvenleştirmeyi yapan tarafın varoluşsal bir tehdit olarak tanımlanan bir soruna yönelik belirli güvenleştirme adımlarını benimsemek için hedef kitleyi ikna etmeye yönelik söz eylemleri bu çerçevede dikkate alınır. Dolayısıyla, güvenleştirme teorisinin başlıca kriteri olan aktör ile hedef kitle arasındaki araözneliği analiz etmek suretiyle bu çalışmada göçün güvenleştirilmesi bağlamında hâkim teorik perspektifleri tamamlayıcı yönde adımlar atılmıştır. Kopenhag okulunun güvenleştirme anlayışı bu tez çalışmasının dördüncü bölümünde analitik ve kavramsal bir araç olarak Pakistan’daki Afgan mültecilerin güvenleştirilmesini açıklamada kullanılmıştır.

Yine de, özellikle Paris güvenleştirme okulunun vurgu yaptığı ‘söz eylemlerine’ kıyasla uygulamalara öncelik vererek kronolojik ve kavramsallaştırılmış bir yaklaşımla müteakip bir sosyolojik bir uygulama ile yanıtlanarak inceleme yoluna gidilmiştir. Paris okulu bir politikanın ‘ampirik göndergelerinin,’ araçlarının ve güvenleştirme enstrümanlarının iç içe geçmiş olduğunu kabul eder. Dolayısıyla Paris Okulu, ‘istisna mantığının’ yanı sıra, önde gelen rutine dökülmüş devlet ve güvenlik kurumları uygulamalarının güvenleştirmenin başta gelen saikleri olduğu ‘rutin mantığını’ esas alır. Bu ‘rutin mantığı,’ teknolojinin kullanımının hedef kitleye

yönelik tehdit algısı ve güvensizlikleri doğurduğu 'yönetim zihniyeti sürecinin' bir parçası olarak değerlendirilir.

Dolayısıyla bu tez Pakistan'daki Afgan mültecilerin güvenleştirilmesini açıklamaktadır. Kırk yılı aşkın bir süredir Pakistan milyonlarca kayıtlı ve kayıtsız Afgan mülteciye ev sahipliği yapmıştır. 27 Nisan 1978'deki komünist darbe ve 27 Aralık 1979'da Sovyetler Birliği'nin Afganistan'a müdahalesi sonrasında sayılarının üç milyonu aştığı tahmin edilen Afgan mülteci Pakistan'a sığınmıştır. 1970'li yıllarda Afganistan kaynaklı ve ardı arkası gelmeyen bir Afgan hareketliliğinde iç içe geçmiş bir dizi güvenlik, çatışma, siyaset ve iktisat olgusu etkili olmuştur.

Meydana gelen büyük nüfus hareketini tetikleyen bir dizi nedenden bahsedilebilirse de bunlar arasında Afganistan'daki otoriter yönetim ve ordunun taraf olduğu silahlı çatışmalar dikkat çekmektedir. Ayrıca Afgan nüfusun meşru görmedikleri bir rejime itaat etmeyi kabul etmediği de bu nedenler arasında sayılmaktadır. Dolayısıyla, Sözleşmeye taraf olmasa da Pakistan, onlarca yıldır Afganistan'dan gelen milyonlarca mülteciyi kabul etmeye ve onlara ev sahipliği yaparak çeşitli hizmetler sunmaya devam etmiştir. İlk etapta Pakistan hükûmeti mültecileri sıcak karşılamış ve onlara ülkede yaşamak ve çalışmak için çeşitli haklar tanımıştır. Ancak 1990'ların ortasına gelindiğinde bu yaklaşımdan vazgeçilmeye başlanmış ve mülteciler hizmet ve işgücü piyasasında baskı oluşturan bir unsur olarak eleştirilir olmuştur. Ayrıca suç ve terördeki artıştan da mülteciler sorumlu tutulmuştur. 'Gönüllülük' esasına dayalı olarak kendi ülkelerine dönmeleri bu noktada temel politika yaklaşımı olmuştur. 2019'un sonuna gelindiğinde iki milyondan fazla Afgan ülke içinde yerinden olmuş konumdayken üç milyon kadar Afgan ise dünyanın ülkesini terk etmek zorunda kalan en büyük nüfusu mahiyetinde mülteci olarak BM Mülteciler Yüksek Komiserliği nezdinde kayıtlıdır. Afganistan'a komşu ülkeler olan Pakistan ve İran, Afgan mültecilerin çok büyük bir kısmına ev sahipliği yapmaktadır.

Pakistan ve Afganistan arasındaki ilişkiler geçmişte güvensizliğin şekillendirdiği bir tablo çizmiştir. Güven tesis etmeye yönelik çabalar da oldukça sınırlı kalmıştır. Afgan mültecileri güvenlik sorunlarının kaynağı olarak gören popüler yaklaşım bir yanda mültecileri 'Pakistan'ın Afganistan ile olan ilişkilerinde bir pazarlık unsuru' olarak

değerlendirmeyi mümkün kılarken, bir yandan da 11 Eylül sonrası dönemde değişen Pakistan-Afganistan ilişkileri ve Afgan mültecilerin güvenlikleştirilmesi arasında da bir korelasyonun temellerini atmaktadır. Burada temel maksat bölgede sağlanan kazanımları azamiye çıkarmak ve bölgedeki hedeflerine ulaşmasını engelleyebilecek planlara yanıt vermektir.

Bu hususların yanında iki ülke arasındaki ilişkilere dair başka etkenler de Afgan mültecilerin güvenlikleştirilmesinde rol oynamıştır. Bu etkenler arasında Durand hattı meselesi, Pakistan'ın uygulamaya koyduğu sınır yönetim sistemi, devlet dışı unsurların desteklenmesi, süregiden sınır aşırı ayaklanma, terörle mücadele ve Hindistan'ın etkisi ilk akla gelenlerdir. İki devlet arasında bir ihtilaf ortaya çıktığında Afgan hükûmeti Pakistan'ı suçlamakta, Pakistan ise yanıt olarak sınırı kapatmakta, yaptırımlar uygulamakta ve diğer yöntemlere de başvurarak Afgan hükûmetini Pakistan'a karşıt tutumdan vazgeçmeye zorlamaktadır. Dolayısıyla Afgan mültecilerin ulusal güvenlik endişeleri doğuran bir unsur olarak değerlendirilmesi hem ulusal bir tepkiye dayanırken hem de dış politika hedeflerine dayanan bir eksen de çizmektedir. Dahası, iki ülke arasındaki ilişkilerin gerilimli tablosu bir yandan da Pakistan devletinin düşmanı olarak gördüğü Hindistan ile Afganistan arasındaki bağların güçlenmesinin alarm verici niteliğini de ön plana çıkarmaktadır.

1980'li yıllarda Pakistan'da kamuoyu Afganistan'ın Sovyetler Birliğince işgali sonrasında Afgan mültecilere destek ve yardım sağlama ve konaklayabilecekleri bir yer vermeye son derece sıcak bakıyordu. O dönemde yapılan anketlerde Pakistan vatandaşlarının %80'inden fazlasının Afgan mültecilere destek vermeye olumlu baktığı tespitine ulaşılmıştır. Ancak bu oran zamanla düşmüştür. Teröre Karşı Global Savaşın başlaması sonrasında destek trendinde yine bir değişiklik yaşanmış ve 'Pakistan vatandaşlarının %80'i Pakistan'da yaşayan Afgan mültecilerin ülkelerine dönmesi gerektiği yönünde görüş dile getirmiştir'. Bu ise 11 Eylül sonrasında kamuoyunun Afgan mültecilere bakışının olumsuz yönde değiştiğini göstermektedir. Pakistan toplumunun çeşitli kesimlerinden yükselen protesto sesleri Afgan mültecilerin hızlı bir biçimde ülkelerine dönmesini talep etmekteydi.

Pakistan Sovyet işgali sonrasında daha da önemli bir rol oynamaya başlamıştır. 1979'da Sovyetlere karşı savaş veren Afgan güçleri mülteci görüntüsü altında Pakistan'a sığınmışlardır. Bu durum Sovyetler ve Afgan direniş güçleri arasındaki mücadelenin 'asimetrik ve gerilla savaşı niteliğinin' bir sonucu idi. Söz konusu direniş güçleri Pakistan devletinin gözünde bir 'stratejik varlık' idi. Ancak yüzyılın sonuna gelindiğinde, 11 Eylül sonrasında Afganistan'ı bu kez ABD işgal etmiştir. Afganistan'ın Amerika tarafından işgali sonrasında Afganistan'daki Taliban hâkimiyeti kırılmıştır. Pakistan bu süreçte ABD'nin yanında yer almış ve ABD ile Afganistan'daki müttefiklerine Teröre Karşı Küresel Savaşta lojistik süreçlerde olanaklar sağlamıştır. Ancak Pakistan'ın bu U dönüşü, Afgan direniş güçleri ile ilişkisine büyük darbe vurmuştur. Ülkenin takındığı bu tutumun bir sonucu 'Tahrik-i Taliban Pakistan (TTP) ve Pakistan'daki diğer İslamcı devlet silahlı terör örgütlerinin yeni varoluşsal tehditleri' şeklinde tezahür etmiştir. İki devlet arasındaki sınırın kontrol edilmesindeki güçlüklerden dolayı militanlar Pakistan'da da varlıklarını pekiştirebilmektedirler. Her ne kadar Afgan mültecilerin sığınak ve kampların dışına çıkmasına olanak tanınmasa da, kontrolsüz sınır Afganların herhangi bir direnişle karşılaşmadan geçiş yapabilmesine olanak tanımaktaydı. Bu militanların Pakistan'da yürüttüğü terör eylemlerinin sonucunda 'Pakistan 2000-2019 döneminde 63.753 can kaybı yaşarken 2001-2016 döneminde de 123,13 milyar ABD doları mali zararlar karşı karşıya kalmıştır.'

Bu devlet dışı silahlı örgütlerin Pakistan'da kök salabilmesinin nedeni ülkedeki Afgan mültecilerin yerleşik bir yapı şemsiyesi altında olmayışıdır denilebilir. Pakistan-Afganistan sınırının geçirgen yapısından ötürü devlet dışı terör örgütleri nüfuz alanlarını genişletebilmiş ve bölgeyi hem Pakistan'da hem de Afganistan'da sınır aşırı ayaklanma zemini olarak değerlendirebilmişlerdir. Bu bağlamda, 11 Eylül sonrası dönemde Pakistan'ın açık sınır ve sınırdan geçmek isteyen Afganlara yönelik destek politikaları zaman içinde kapalı sınır ve Pakistan içindeki mültecilere soğuk yaklaşıma yerini bırakmıştır. Bunların yanında devletin de ülkede yerleşik mültecileri kendi ülkelerine dönme yönünde mültecileri teşvik yaklaşımını benimsediği görülmüştür. Pakistan güvenlik için göç edilebilecek bir yer olmaktan çıkarak, ülkedeki Afgan mültecileri bölgedeki terörist eylemler için muhtemel bir kaynak ya da ikmal hattı olarak görür hale gelmiştir. Afganistan'daki teröre karşı savaşın yansımalarının yerini

alan stratejik nedenler Pakistan'daki Afgan mülteci toplumunun varlığının güvenikleştirilmesini de beraberinde getirmiştir. TTP'nin 16 Aralık 2014'te Peşaver'deki Askeri Liseye düzenlediği terör saldırıları kayıt dışı Afganların teşkil edebildiği terör tehdidine acilen yanıt verilmesi için bir gerekçe olarak görüldü. Bu saldırıda okuldaki yüzlerce çocuk ile öğretmenleri hayatlarını kaybetmişti. Benzer bir biçimde 2016'da da Peşaver'deki Bacha Khan Üniversitesinde düzenlenen terör saldırısında da çok sayıda üniversite öğrencisi öldürülmüştü. Bu olaylar karşısında Pakistan mevcut güvenlik yaklaşımını gözden geçirmek zorunda kalmış ve Ulusal Eylem Planı olarak anılan yeni bir güvenlik çerçeve belgesini uygulamaya koymuştur. Planın 19. maddesinde 'Afgan mülteciler sorununa, tüm mültecilerin kayıt altına alınmasıyla başlamak üzere çözüm getirmeye yönelik kapsamlı bir politikanın oluşturulması' gereği belirtilmiştir. 2015'in Mart ayında kayıt dışı Afgan mültecilerin kayıt altına alınması görevi Ulusal Veritabanı Kayıt İdaresine (NADRA) verilmiştir. Ancak bu, yavaş işleyen bir süreç olacaktı. 2015'te Pakistan mültecilerin gönüllülük esasına dayalı olarak ülkelerine dönmeye yönelik kararlılığını ortaya koymuştur. Aynı dönemde, kolluk kuvvetleri de kayıt dışı Afgan mültecilere karşı tedbirleri hayata geçirmeye başlamıştır. Ulusal Eylem Planı kapsamında binlerce Afgan tutuklanmıştır. Pakistan'daki Afgan mülteci nüfus 11 Eylül sonrasında, ve özellikle de liseye düzenlenen saldırıdan sonra terörle ve güvenlik sorunlarıyla birlikte anılır olmuştur. Bu algısal bağ Pakistan toplumunun görüşünü de etkilemiştir. Birleşmiş Milletler İnsani Yardım Koordinasyon Ofisi (UN OCHA) Eylül 2016'da yayınladığı bir İnsani Yardım Bülteninde 'geri dönen mültecilerin birçoğunun resmi makamlar ve ev sahibi toplumların üzerlerinde uyguladıkları baskıda görülen artışın onları geri dönmeye zorladığını belirttiği' ifade edilmiştir. İnsan Hakları İzleme Örgütü de Pakistan toplumunun Afgan mültecilere karşı düşmanca tavrına raporlarında yer vermiştir. Mültecilerin mevcudiyetinin güvenlik bağlamındaki etkisi ve Pakistan'daki Afgan mülteciler ile suç, uyuşturucu ve silahlanma arasında kurulan bağıntı da bu yaklaşımlardaki değişimde bir rol oynamıştır.

Liseye düzenlenen saldırı Pakistan'ı mültecileri ülkelerine göndermek için adımlar atmaya teşvik eden bir diğer olay olmuştur. Pakistan Hükûmeti söz konusu mültecileri izleme ve tacize tabi tutan bir baskı uygulamasına start vermiştir. Mülteciler, olaylardan sorumlu olan ve Afganistan ile bağlantılı silahlı grupların eylemlerinden

sorumlu tutulmuş ve ‘suçlu’, ‘terörist’ ya da ‘Pakistan düşmanı’ olarak yaftalanmıştır. Aynı dönemde, kolluk kuvvetleri de kayıt dışı Afgan mültecilere karşı tedbirleri hayata geçirmeye başlamıştır. Ulusal Eylem Planı kapsamında binlerce Afgan tutuklanmıştır.. Temmuz 2016’da yayınladığı bir raporda İnsan Hakları İzleme Örgütü Temmuz-Aralık 2015 döneminde Pakistan polisinin Afgan mültecilere karşı olumsuz uygulamalarında bir artış görüldüğünü belirtmiştir. Polis kayıtlı Afgan mültecileri tutuklamış, hareket özgürlüklerine sınırlama getirmiş, ve ‘yasa dışı Afgan yerleşimciler’ olarak anılan kesime karşı da tutuklamalara başlamıştır. İnsan Hakları İzleme Örgütünün Şubat 2017 tarihli raporunda bu durumun Pakistan makamlarının başlattığı bir medya kampanyası ve Afgan mültecilerin daha ne kadar kalacağı konusundaki belirsizliklerden kaynaklandığı ifade edilmiştir. İnsan Hakları İzleme Örgütünün görüştüğü Afgan mülteciler polisin evlerine gece yarısı baskınları düzenlediğini, onları terörist olmak ya da teröristlere yataklık etmekle suçladığını, aileleri birbirlerinden ayırma tehdidinde bulunduğunu ve sınır dışı etme uygulamalarına başvurduğunu, mültecileri saatler hatta günlerce gözaltına aldığını, ve sıklıkla rüşvet aldığını ifade etmişlerdir.

Afgan mülteciler sorunu karşısında hem Pakistan devleti ve vatandaşlarının, hem de bu süreçte yardımda bulunan diğer ülkelerin, ve ayrıca Afganistan’ın da sorunu kabul ederek yeniden değerlendirme yoluna gitmesi gerekmektedir. Sorun karşısında mevcutta başvuru alan uygulamalar Afganları meşru ya da sürdürülebilir bir yaşama kavuşturma ihtimali olmaksızın uzun süreler yerlerinden edilmiş bir biçimde yaşamak zorunda bırakmaktadır. Bunun yerini yeni bir bakış açısı ve etkili yöntemlere bırakması gereği açıktır. Bu çerçevede Afganların Pakistan ekonomisi, kültürü ve toplumuna katkılarının kabul edilmesi ve Pakistan’da kalma haklarının güvence altına alınması elzemdir.

İslamabad yönetimi mültecilerin vatandaşlık olarak Pakistan toplumunun bir parçası olmasına pek sıcak bakmasa da yasal yükümlülüklerini de yerine getirmesi gerekmektedir. Afgan mültecilere somut ve uzun vadeli yasal haklar ve korumalar verecek mevzuatı kabul ederek uygulamaya koymalıdır. Böylelikle topraklarındaki milyonlarca Afgan mültecinin ülkelerine döndüklerinde Pakistan’ın iyi niyet elçileri olarak yaşamlarını sürdürecekleri bir perspektif yakalanmış olacaktır.

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