

SECURITIZATION OF TURKEY'S BORDER MANAGEMENT PROJECTS:
THE IMPACT OF THE EXTERNALIZATION OF EUROPEAN BORDER
MANAGEMENT POLICIES

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MANAGEMENT POLICIES**

submitted by **BÜŞRA NUR ALKAN** in partial fulfillment of the requirements for
the degree of **Master of Science in International Relations, the Graduate School
of Social Sciences of Middle East Technical University** by,

Prof. Dr. Sadettin KIRAZCI
Dean
Graduate School of Social Sciences

Prof. Dr. Ebru BOYAR
Head of Department
Department of International Relations

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Başak KALE
Supervisor
Department of International Relations

Examining Committee Members:

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Zerrin TORUN (Head of the Examining Committee)
Middle East Technical University
Department of International Relations

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Başak KALE (Supervisor)
Middle East Technical University
Department of International Relations

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Başak YAVÇAN
TOBB University of Economics and Technology
Department of Political Science and International Relations

I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.

Name, Last Name: Būşra Nur ALKAN

Signature

ABSTRACT

SECURITIZATION OF TURKEY’S BORDER MANAGEMENT PROJECTS: THE IMPACT OF THE EXTERNALIZATION OF EUROPEAN BORDER MANAGEMENT POLICIES

ALKAN, Büşra Nur

Master of Science, Department of International Relations

Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Dr. Başak Kale

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This thesis analyzes the contribution of the EU to the border management policies and practices of Turkey. From the lens of the securitization theory, the study questions how the EU contributes to securitizing practices by providing the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA). The thesis argues that the EU externalizes its border management policy to Turkey by stipulating its border management policy, Integrated Border Management (IBM), as a part of the accession process. Within the scope of IPA funds, many projects have been carried out on Turkey’s borders in order to incorporate IBM into Turkish regulations. This thesis questions how and to what extent these projects lead to the securitization of migration and border management.

Key words: Securitization, Securitizing practices, Border security, Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance, Externalization

ÖZ

TÜRKİYE’NİN SINIR YÖNETİMİ PROJELERİNİN GÜVENLİKLEŞTİRİLMESİ: AVRUPA SINIR YÖNETİMİ POLİTİKALARININ DIŞSALLAŞTIRILMASININ ETKİSİ

ALKAN, Büşra Nur

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Bu tez, AB'nin Türkiye'nin sınır yönetimi politikalarına ve uygulamalarına katkısını incelemektedir. Güvenikleştirme teorisinin merceğinden bu çalışma, AB'nin Katılım Öncesi Yardım Aracı sağlayarak güvenikleştirme uygulamalarına nasıl katkıda bulunduğunu sorgulamaktadır. Tez, AB'nin sınır yönetimi politikasını, Katılım sürecinin bir parçası olarak sınır yönetimi politikası olan Entegre Sınır Yönetimi'ni şart koşarak Türkiye'ye dışsallaştırdığını savunmaktadır. Katılım Öncesi Yardım Aracı fonları kapsamında, Entegre Sınır Yönetimi'nin Türk mevzuatına dahil edilmesi için Türkiye sınırlarında birçok proje gerçekleştirilmiştir. Bu tez, bu projelerin göç ve sınır yönetiminin güvenikleştirilmesine nasıl ve ne ölçüde yol açtığını sorgulamaktadır.

Anahtar kelimeler: Güvenikleştirme, Güvenikleştirme uygulamaları, Sınır güvenliği, Katılım Öncesi Yardım Aracı, Dışsallaştırma

To my father who always supports my decisions...

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AP	Accession Partnership
CEPOL	The European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training
DGMM	Directorate General of Migration Management
EASO	European Asylum Support Office
EC	European Commission
ENP	European Neighbourhood Policy
EP	European Parliament
EU	European Union
EURODAC	European Automated Fingerprint Recognitions
EUROPOL	European Police Office
EUROSUR	European Border Surveillance System
FRONTEX	European Border and Coast Guard Agency
IBM	Integrated Border Management
ICMPD	International Centre for Migration Policy
IPA	Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance
IOM	International Organization for Migration
MIFF	Multi-annual Indicative Financial Framework
MIPD	Multi-annual Indicative Planning Document
NACORAC	National Coordination and Joint Risk Analysis Center
NAP	National Action Plan
NCAA	National Programme for the Adoption of the <i>Acquis</i>
PKK	Kurdistan Workers' Party

TAIEX	Technical Assistance Information Exchange Instrument
TURCG	Turkish Coast Guards
UNCHR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Turkey has always been an important location for transnational migratory movements. As a source, transit and destination country, Turkey has been accepting immigrants and responding to the needs of refugees and asylum seekers proactively. In recent years, migratory movements have been significantly trending upwards. According to UNHCR, Turkey hosts the world's biggest refugee population. After the Syrian civil war in 2011, Syrian people had to flee from their country of origin, and they sought asylum in Turkey and other neighbouring countries. Since then, there have been many Syrian nationals under temporary protection in Turkey. The Presidency of Migration Management data shows that there have been 3.735.091 Syrians under temporary protection as of 27.01.2022 (Presidency of Migration Management, 2022a).

In more recent times, there has also been a considerable number of Afghan international protection holders. On August 15, 2021, the control of Kabul, the capital of Afghanistan, was taken by Taliban military fighters. Afghanistan has endured poverty, conflict and instability for more than forty years. As a result of those crises, Afghan people have fled their country and sought refuge in other countries, or they are internally displaced within their country. Turkey is one of the destinations that Afghan asylum seekers seek refuge. Currently, Turkey is one of the leading countries hosting Afghan people. According to the Directorate General of Migration Management (DGMM) data dated 31.12.2021, there were 29.256 international protection applicants (Presidency of Migration Management, 2022). Afghan nationals constitute the largest group of applicants, with 21.926, followed by 4.961 Iraqi nationals and 1.032 Iranian nationals. Afghan nationals also predominate when it comes to the number of irregular migrants. As of the date 27.01.2022, the number of Afghan irregular migrants was

5.506, which is the biggest number when it is classified by nationalities (Presidency of Migration Management, 2022b).

As the numbers reveal, Turkey has been experiencing significant migratory flows for a long while. In such an intense situation, it is ineluctable for Turkey to have difficulties in managing migration. In order to control migration movements, Turkey's financial and technical capacity was and still is limited. Thus, international cooperation on migration management has been imperative. International Organization for Migration (IOM), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICPMD) and several non-governmental organizations are the main international stakeholders in managing migration. In addition to the aforementioned organizations, the European Union is one of the major collaborators of Turkey in managing migratory movements. Turkey and the EU have a multifaceted relationship in terms of neighbourhood, candidacy, and partnership. However, the relations between Turkey and the EU have always been in a state of ebbs and flows. Since Turkey's application to the European Community for membership in 1987, Turkey has been trying to become a full member.

In 1999, the relations improved with the recognition of Turkey as a candidate state at the 1999 Helsinki European Council (Öniş, 2010). After the recognition of candidacy, Turkey made new regulations in many areas. It can be said that from 1999 until today, Turkey has been Europeanized day by day in accordance with the *acquis communautaire* of the EU. Turkey's foreign policy evolved and increased its diplomatic and economical means to comply with the European Union (Müftüler-Baç & Gürsoy, 2010). In November 2000, the European Commission adopted the first Accession Partnership for Turkey (AP). Following that, in March 2001, Turkey prepared the National Programme for the Adoption of the *Acquis* (NPAA). Candidate states are expected to harmonize their national rules and regulations with the EU's rules and regulations during the accession negotiations. As a candidate, Turkey needs to comply with the EU's *acquis* and adjust its legal framework in accordance with the EU's standards. After the 2002 Copenhagen European Council, Turkey adopted three 'harmonization packages' aiming at political and economic arrangements to be harmonized with the *Acquis*. Turkey and the EU relations became enhanced in 2002.

Since then, Turkey has been implementing new regulations as a part of the harmonization process. However, in 2018, the Council of the EU stated that Turkey has been diverging from the EU, and the accession negotiations have been gridlocked. While Turkey's foreign policy has become distant from the EU's foreign policy, cooperation continues in shared interest areas such as energy, the COVID-19 pandemic, and fighting against terrorism and migration (Torun, 2021). Even though accession negotiations seem to have come to a halt, the collaboration between the two parties on immigration and asylum concerns has been the main pillar of TR-EU relations since the Syrian refugee wave coming from Turkey to the EU. The complex relationship between Turkey and the EU gained a new dimension as a result of the sharing of responsibilities for managing irregular migration. Turkey is continually evaluated by the EU as a candidate nation to see if Turkey adopted rules in line with the EU *acquis communautaire* or not. Turkey's progress on issues linked to immigration and asylum is assessed by the Commission in progress reports pertaining to the Justice, Freedom and Security Chapter. Furthermore, Turkey, which shares borders with the EU, is an important strategic partner for the EU.

Due to this aspect, the EU places a high priority on Turkey's security. The EU's internal security is therefore assured by the neighbouring country's secure borders. To the EU, irregular migration is a threat to be detected and solved in the transit and source countries before it reaches the EU's external borders. Because of the accession, Turkey has to integrate the EU's strategy of migration management and also 'Europeanise' its own policies regarding migration management by aligning institutional structures, legal framework and practices with the EU's norms (Dimitriadi, Kaya, Kale, & Zurabishvili, 2018). Thus, Turkey and the EU have created numerous initiatives and have agreed to communicate on Justice, Freedom, and Security concerns under the guise of collaboration in migration issues and the accession process.

Specifically, after the Syrian crisis, the safety of Turkish borders has become the most significant than ever as Syrian people have been trying to reach the EU in undocumented ways. That is why the cooperation between Turkey and the EU was inevitable and crucial. In March 2016, the Turkey-EU Joint Statement was adopted by Turkey and the EU in order to manage the refugee crisis. As a part of the cooperation

created by the Turkey-EU Statement, the EU provided Turkey with economic and technical aid in order to maintain safety on Turkey's borders and prevent irregular migrants and smugglers from entering the EU. This kind of cooperation in preventing irregular migration has become an important part of the EU's migration framework. Through cooperation with third countries, the EU extends its border management practices to third countries and manages external borders by proxy. With the Statement, the EU assured that 6 billion euros would be granted to Turkey, visa liberalisation and the revitalization of accession. (Panebianco, 2016). While giving financial funds, the EU also stipulated certain conditions and monitored closely whether Turkey implemented the conditions or not (Bürgin, 2016a).

This thesis argues that under the entitlement of cooperation, by giving leverage such as opening a new chapter in accession negotiations or promising visa liberalisation, the EU governs third countries through conditionality in order to transfer its standards and policies. In the scope of migration, this process, which is coined as 'external governance by conditionality', is based on the technical and operational cooperation with third countries on regulating migratory flows according to the *acquis* and the EU's standard practices. It is a rather hierarchical process as the EU exports its policies and standards through conditions. With the emergence of new understandings of security, the difference between internal and external threats has become blurry, and new types of cooperation, which extend the line between internal and external policy, have arisen (Lavenex & Wichmann, 2009). The cooperation between the EU and Turkey on migration and border management issues can be an example of this new kind of cooperation in which the EU affects Turkey's border management practices by conditionality. The conditionality gives the EU the power to impose its standards on the candidate and potential candidate countries through the Instrument for Pre-Accession (IPA). Within the process of accession, the EU assists the candidates in achieving alignment with the criteria of *acquis communautaire*. The aim is to increase the standards and the capacity to reach the EU level. Therefore, the EU also allocates financial and technical assistance to its candidate countries. While doing so, there are certain focus points to implement projects related to the determined objectives.

In the three phases of IPA (2007-2013, 2014-2020 and 2021-2024), Turkey has conducted many projects to adjust its economic, political and social state to the EU standards. Particularly, there are several projects related to Migration and Home Affairs policies, such as border management. Through these projects, the EU aims to prevent irregular migration and maintain its border security. However, these projects include practices such as supplying modernised surveillance and data and information systems, using armoured vehicles to detect the movements along the borders, providing training programmes for border guards, carrying out risk analyses, and cooperating with other national and international agencies to control irregular migration. Through the conditionality created by the accession process and financial incentives, the EU imposes its understanding of border security. Regarding border management, Turkey's compliance with the EU *acquis* was principally positioned along a hierarchical axis that showed the unilateral extension of predefined, non-negotiable EU norms to Turkey through a conditionality-driven approach. The conditionality led to the policy transfer primarily through IBM. Turkey's compliance with EU regulations was particularly evident in its improved border infrastructure, staff capabilities, and institutional reforms that called for better cooperation amongst the country's border authorities (Turhan & Yıldız, 2022). In this case, by promoting Integrated Border Management policies through IPA funds, the EU externalizes its border management rules and norms to Turkey through conditionality. In order to continue to give financial aid and recognize Turkey's progress in the accession process, the EU expects Turkey to adopt and implement the European Integrated Border Management policies.

According to the sociological approach to the securitization theory, when a securitizing actor addresses an issue as a security threat and carries out extraordinary activities in day-to-day life in order to eliminate the threat urgently, this actor leads to the securitization of the issue. This perspective takes the Copenhagen School's and the Paris School's ideas and develops them into a more sociological and detailed set of ideas. Contrary to the Copenhagen School's notion that only speech acts lead to securitization, in this understanding, both speech acts and practices are securitizing acts that are part of the securitization process. In this thesis, practices conducted for border security will be analysed.

The main research question of this thesis is how and to what extent the EU contributes to the securitization of migration and border management in Turkey. The main argument of this thesis study is that by providing economic and technical assistance through aid programmes or agreements, the EU externalizes its policies to Turkey and leads to the conduct of projects on border security. By doing so, the EU contributes to the securitizing practices on Turkey's borders. It also investigates the extent to which the EU aids contribute to Turkey's securitizing efforts to get rid of the perceived threat posed by irregular immigrants entering Turkey on their way to EU borders. Going further, it analyses if the EU develops into a securitizing actor by implementing security procedures in Turkey as part of external governance. This thesis will look at the procedures used in the context of the projects aimed at securing Turkey's borders, as well as the EU's involvement in those procedures. This topic is important because, in the literature, there is a gap in the analysis of IPA projects on Integrated Border Management which were conducted or planned to be conducted between 2007 and 2021. Therefore, in this thesis, it is expected to provide an analysis of the securitization process of border management practices funded by IPA.

In this thesis, through the lens of a more interdisciplinary perspective of securitization theory, content analysis will be made. Secondary sources such as the official publications of the EU, The Commission's progress reports of Turkey, legal documents related to IPA funds, The Republic of Turkey Ministry of Interior's official publications, reports and activity bulletins, and the web-based publications of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the EU Delegation to Turkey will be analysed.

In order to analyze the securitizing practices, the cooperation with the EU and the EU-funded projects will be explained in detail. It will be questioned how migration and border management are securitized by creating a threat perception and how it is wanted to be eliminated by applying extraordinary measures. These extraordinary measure can be exemplified as the supply of highly technological and armoured mobile monitoring vehicles, recording every activity on the borders, controlling borders continuously and strictly, providing border experts with extensive training programmes on irregular migration and IBM policies, building a huge wall along the borders, creating an extensive database about information collected from the border areas, sharing the data

with the relevant agencies and authorities to eliminate risk, and conducting risk analyses to reduce threats. This thesis argues that these practices are extraordinary responses since they are preventive and pre-emptive practices that are designed to respond to irregular migratory flows. These practices convey the idea that a threat posed by irregular migrants should be responded to immediately by highly-budgeted and highly-technological, even militarised means.

It is beneficial to note that not all border practices are securitizing, but the practices that create the perception of a threat, which should be eliminated urgently, and through extraordinary means, are securitizing. In the theoretical discussion part, a detailed explanation of securitizing practices will be provided.

In the second chapter, to be able to discuss the main argument, the securitization theory is explained in detail. Initially, the Copenhagen School's understanding of security and securitization will be examined. Then, the perspective of the Paris School will be reviewed. Finally, the sociological approach, which combines and elaborates the ideas of the Copenhagen School and Paris School, will be scrutinized. Also, the concept of externalization will be explained since securitization and externalization are closely linked, and by externalizing the EU's Integrated Border Management policy, the EU contributes to the securitization process in the border management policy area. By adopting the sociological approach and linking the externalization concept with the IPA-financed-projects, the practices that are conducted on Turkey's border will be assessed throughout the thesis. Also, the practices will be evaluated in terms of which tools they include in the securitization process. The instruments used in these practices will be identified and classified, whether they are capacity tools or regulatory tools.

In the third chapter, the legal basis, the foundation, the history, the objectives of IPA and Turkey's IPA journey will be explained in detail. The European Commission's and Turkey's official documents will be analysed in order to understand Turkey's participation in the funding. As IPA funds consist of three periods, each period will be separately explained.

In the fourth chapter, the projects under the scope of Integrated Border Management that the EU finances through IPA will be discussed thoroughly. The EU funded the

projects, and their objectives and results will be analysed in detail. Through the lens of securitization theory, the projects will be evaluated. To that end, secondary sources about EU-funded practices on border security in Turkey, such as academic articles, news, the EU's and Turkey government's official press releases and legal documents, will be analysed.

Lastly, in the fifth chapter, all empirical findings will be discussed. Also, in this chapter, the analyses of the border management projects conducted in Turkey through the assistance of IPA will be concluded.

CHAPTER II

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

In generic terms, securitization theory puts forward how issues are taken by a securitizing actor and presented as a security threat to the being of a referent object. Based on this main argument, different schools have established their notion of securitization. The Copenhagen School's securitization theory is based on specific steps to entitle an issue as a securitizing move. On the other hand, Paris School criticized some ideas of the Copenhagen School's approach and formed its own conception of securitization. The elaboration of the securitization theory is not limited to the Schools mentioned earlier. This thesis will adopt the theoretical conceptualization of a collective of scholars who conceived a critical idea for the traditional securitization theory through an interdisciplinary approach.

This chapter will set the theoretical framework of the thesis study by explaining how different scholars elaborate on securitization theory. First, the Copenhagen School's securitization theory will be discussed. Second, the Paris School's conceptualization of securitization will be explained. Then, the critical approach will be introduced. Finally, the externalization of the EU's border management will be explained to link the EU's presence in the practices that lead to the securitization process.

2.1 The Copenhagen School's Securitization Theory

In the discipline of International Relations, security is a much more different concept than the usage in everyday language. International security is deeply related to power politics and has distinguishing features. Security is a form of action that addresses an

issue as an extraordinary type of politics. Hence, the securitisation process may be regarded as a more extreme kind of politicization. In this regard, in the IR discipline, security is based on the notion of survival. An issue becomes security-related when presented as an existential threat to the survival of a specific referent object which might be a specific group, the state, the government, or national and cultural identities.

Defining an issue or a thing as a security threat justifies using exceptional measures. If state representatives announce an issue as a security threat, they declare a state of emergency which can be dealt with through extraordinary measures. It legitimizes the use of emergency actions beyond the standard policy because it provokes anxiety. It creates the perception that if the problem cannot be solved immediately, it will not be tackled later. That is why security is a self-referential concept; an issue becomes security-related not because it is a certain threat but because it is represented as a threat. Thus, it can be said that securitization is created by the constitution of an existential threat with political consequences (Buzan, Barry; Wæver, Ole; De Wilde, 1998).

The steps of securitization can be summarized as follows. The process of securitization is formed by a securitizing actor through discursive acts. An issue is addressed as an existential threat to the being of a referent object, so it should be tackled urgently. Through discourse, the issue is moved beyond ordinary politics, and the use of extraordinary measures is legitimized. The urgency and the gravity of the danger give the securitizing actor a reason to break the rules in the case of an existential threat. Lastly, these discourses are acknowledged by the audience. Securitization solely occurs when an audience acknowledges an issue as a threat to the vitality of a referent object. If the audience does not accept it, this speech act will only be a securitizing move.

According to this theory, existential threats can be varied in different sectors. In the military sector, the referent object might be the state, the government or the army. In the circumstance of an existential threat to these referent objects, military actions can be taken. In the political sector, the threat can be directed to the legitimacy or the recognition of the authority. Economically, existential threats and referent objects are harder to determine. For instance, companies may be existentially threatened with bankruptcy. In the environmental sector, possible risks to the survival of different

species can be existential threats. Lastly, in the societal sector, an existential threat might be addressed as a risk to the referent object, which is a large-scale collective identity. Beliefs, religions, and nations can be different forms of referent objects in the societal sector. To illustrate, migrants can be regarded as existential threats to the identity of the host community. Migrants might be considered rival identities to the collective identity holders who might think ‘we will not be the way we used to be.’ (Buzan, Barry; Wæver, Ole; De Wilde, 1998, pp. 21-25).

In the societal sector, the values of larger groups are the referent objects. The risk emerges when they feel their sense of ‘us’ is threatened. So, the existential threat is directed at their identities. In this sector, security issues are always essentially about identity, and migration is one of the biggest perceived threats. Society can cope with the threat to their identity by either their own activities or by moving the issue to the political agenda. At the state level, the threat that migrants pose can be eliminated through border controls and legislation (Buzan, Barry; Wæver, Ole; De Wilde, 1998).

Buzan, Wæver, and De Wilde explain five different sectors and the security complexes in these sectors (Buzan, Barry; Wæver, Ole; De Wilde, 1998). Wæver, Buzan, Kelstrup and Lemaitre put an emphasis on the societal sector and the threats within the societal sector. They define social identity as the reason behind people using the word ‘we.’ The size or the intensity of ‘we’ can differ from one another, but the common point is the sense of belonging together. They specifically focus on large-scale ‘we’ identities in which there is a wider level of collectivity. They argue that societal security is about the sustainability of the fundamental features of a society. Societal security becomes problematic when society perceives that its identity is jeopardized. No society can be thoroughly secure; there are always threats. Also, security is always relative, and it is related to the vulnerability of the units and the threats they perceive (Wæver, Buzan, Kelstrup, & Pierre, 1993).

2.2 The Paris School's Approach to Securitization

After the Copenhagen School's definition of security and the explanation of securitization, other scholars reinterpreted the establishment of securitization. Specifically, the research group widely known as Paris School elaborated on the securitization theory. Instead of the city name, PARIS is the abbreviated word for Political Anthropological Research for International Sociology. Essentially, the academics of this group produced collective ideas on security and securitization processes and practices. Having named three different critical security schools after cities can lead to the confusion that Aberystwyth, Copenhagen and Paris schools are rivals. However, the three schools have different lenses to see the same view.

The Paris School adopts political, sociological and anthropological approaches while analysing security. What makes distinctive Political Anthropological Research for International Sociology is that this approach has a transdisciplinary perspective instead of focusing solely on linguistics or political science perspective. There are three elements creating the specific characteristics of the Paris approach. First, according to the Paris approach, security cannot be reduced into a single umbrella category of 'survival' in IR. As a term, security can be used while depicting different practices in many disciplines. For instance, security can cover group thinking in psychology, risk management in sociology, universal human rights in law and so on. That is to say, security cannot be separated into different disciplinary "objects", and there cannot be a single theory of securitization. Secondly, the Paris Approach, thorough political anthropology, investigates the mundane discourses and practices which create (in)security and unease in daily life. In its focal point, there are people affected by the practices of (in)security. Lastly, by combining a transdisciplinary perspective and political anthropology, the Paris approach develops a socio-historical approach. By doing so, it analyses how social dynamics can attribute different meanings to the term "security" at a definite time period (Bigo & McCluskey, 2018).

In the literature, security and insecurity are often contrasted, and the threat comes from the outside. According to the Paris School, insecurity and security are intertwined, and the threat does not always come from the real world. Sometimes, the threat is constructed and deliberately created by securitizing actors. Didier Bigo, who is one of

the prominent figures of the Paris School, criticized and reviewed the Copenhagen School's perspective and included new points by adopting an interdisciplinary notion consisting of anthropological, political and sociological elements. In contrast to the Copenhagen School's perception of security as 'survival', Bigo puts forward that security justifies the actors' strategies. So, security is not about survival and not for the good of everyone. Hence, securitizing practices 'secure' some while they de-securitize others (Bigo, 2008b).

Along with Bigo, Thierry Balzacq considers securitization as a group of interrelated practices generated by a securitizing actor who tries to influence an audience to form a perception of a threat to the being of a referent object that is in accord with the rationale behind the securitizing actor's actions, by creating a so-called emergency that a tailored policy must be adopted in order to prevent the progression of the threat immediately (Balzacq, 2011). Contrary to the Copenhagen School's notion of securitization as a 'speech act', Balzacq argues that besides discourse, practices can lead to securitization, as well.

2.3 A Sociological Approach to the Securitization Theory

This approach is formed by a collective consisting of a group of scholars. According to their approach, which embraces international political sociology and analyses the securitization theory through this perspective, security needs to be discussed in an interdisciplinary way. As these scholars analyse the securitization process from the sociological perspective, they state that this perspective allows a deeper explanation of security practices coined by the Copenhagen School, which restrains securitizing moves to the discourse.

For the collective, security itself is a complicated concept to be discussed. Security is not a concept that comprises a set of practices, but it is the result of a series of (in)securitization practices. Securitization and (in)securitization are the outcomes of the same process. That is to say, securitizing practices, both discursive and non-discursive, secure some while de-secure others. What makes this approach different from the Paris School, this approach concentrates more on practices rather than

conceptual discussions. It focuses on the patterns of both discursive and non-discursive everyday practices (Balzacq et al., 2010, p. 2).

According to this perspective, security practices are employed through specific tools. Security measures have become so complex that discourses and ideologies are getting more and more challenging to unravel, and the difference between securitizing actors and the audience has become blurry. Hence, securitization might be best interpreted by focusing on the policy tools, which are social instruments used by (in)security experts, agents or agencies to handle issues defined as threats. Security practices are mainly based on two types of tools: regulatory and capacity tools (Balzacq et al., 2010).

Regulatory tools are contingent on the policy apparatuses, such as a policy regulation that aims to 'normalize' the conduct of the targeted population. The main objective of these tools is to influence the behaviour of social actors by presenting specific threat perceptions, prohibiting some political actions that portray them as dangerous, and permitting certain activities that reduce the threat. To give an example, since 2002, virtually all documentation pertaining to irregular migration and asylum in Western nations has linked irregular flows to terrorism. Regulatory tools frequently serve as a foundation for capacity mechanisms to function (Balzacq et al., 2010, p. 7)

On the other hand, capacity instruments are defined as particular tools used to impose external discipline on people and groups. They consist of the tools of force, instruction plans, knowledge, data, biometrics, and other resources needed to carry out policy objectives. For instance, in order to expand their role and utilise new resources to handle the uncertainties of a constantly changing environment, EU internal security databases must regularly apply new methods. This means that tools transform practises, and practises change as a result of tools (Balzacq et al., 2010, p. 7).

This thesis study embraces a sociological approach and focuses on both speech acts and practices that are carried out as a part of the specific projects serving for the accession to the EU membership. By adopting the sociological perspective of securitization, probable securitization practices in Turkey in the area of border management and the impact of the European Union on these practices will be

examined. The main focus will be the analysis of securitizing practices as in the characteristics of capacity tools. To that end, practices that are operated on the Eastern and Western borders of Turkey will be exemplified as capacity tools in which agencies, authorities or individuals make decisions and conduct activities in order to exert external discipline over groups or individuals. In this case, this thesis study argues that the practices carried out regarding border management are conducted by Turkish authorities or agencies such as the Directorate General of Provincial Administration, which are capacity tools that impose discipline on irregular migrants by preventing their movements. Thus, these practices lead to the securitization of border management policies in Turkey. However, this process is not only limited to the Turkish agencies or authorities; the EU also has an impact on the securitization process. Through pre-accession assistance, the EU externalizes its border management policies. In this regard, securitization and externalization are intertwined in this process. This is why it will be beneficial to understand the concept of externalization and the EU's way of externalization of its border management policies.

2.4 Externalization and Securitization of European Border Management

The efforts to lift internal border controls within the EU territory have attached particular importance to the security of external borders. To secure external borders, the EU has decided to embrace an integrated system for managing external borders. Therefore, the strategy named European Integrated Border Management strategy was established in order to create a single and coherent system. IBM is a system that is to be formed with the efforts of all member states to create a unified structure for managing external borders (European Commission, 2007b).

In recent years, the rising trend in migratory movements over the years and the increasing undocumented crossings after the Syrian crisis created a big concern about the security of the EU's external borders, and IBM has become an important concept. IBM is not only on the agenda of the EU member states but also the candidates, and the potential candidate states because securing the external borders of the EU was not enough to safeguard the EU. That is why the safety of the neighbouring countries has

also become an important factor in preventing irregular migration and cross-border crimes.

The securitizing practices on the EU's external borders have been extended to the external borders of the candidate and potential candidate countries. At this point, securitization goes hand in hand with externalization. As a part of the externalization process, IBM has become an important part of the accession criteria. Through IPA funds as well as other financing means, the EU has externalized the IBM strategies and policies to the candidate and the potential candidate countries. Within this scope, through IPA funds, many projects have been carried out since 2007 in the home affairs area. Some of these projects are directly related to the IBM strategy. The main aim of those projects is to ensure the compliance of existing border management policies with IBM policies. That is why, in order to understand how the EU is related to the securitization process and how it contributes to the securitizing practices carried out on Turkey's borders.

2.4.1 Externalization of European Integrated Border Management

Border externalization denotes a set of activities of territorial and organizational expansion of a state's migration, asylum and border policies to third countries (Casas-Cortes, Cobarrubias, & Pickles, 2014). Engaging third countries in the management of migratory flows toward Europe is advantageous for the EU member states. If third countries accomplish control of migration flows, it decreases the burden of management at member states' immediate borders. Also, it increases the probability of preventing undesirable inflows before the immigrants arrive at the common territory (Lavenex, 2006, p. 337). Therefore, the externalization of border management policies is an important strategy for the EU in order to deal with irregular migration by benefiting from the efforts of third countries.

Boswell (2003) stated that the EU's cooperation with third countries on migration and asylum issues has become considered the 'external dimension' of the Justice and Home Affairs pillar of the EU. Within this type of cooperation, there are two main approaches

to externalization. The first one includes the sorts of cooperation targeting at externalization of EU migration management apparatuses. The main strategy is to make sending and transit countries adopt policies on reinforcing border controls, fighting irregular crossings or readmission of irregular migrants. The EU exports its migration/border control mechanisms to the transit or sending country by promoting measures to fight irregular migration and cross-border crimes, tight border control, and capacity building of migration control. This externalization process specifically takes place in the accession process to the EU. Candidate countries are obligated to integrate the Schengen *acquis* into the national legislation. Besides the exportation of migration policies, ensuring the return of irregular migrants and asylum seekers to safe third countries. The birth of such a limitative and strict control system is a natural consequence of the Europeanization of migration management. In the late 1980's and 1990's, after abolishing internal borders, the extension of border control, strict asylum policies and cooperation in fighting cross-border crimes became the most efficient tools to secure the EU territory, according to the border police and the interior ministry. It is also the result of the intergovernmental system of the time, which facilitated transnational cooperation on control-based migration management. Lastly, populism is also an important factor in the externalization process. Since 9/11, migration has become correlated with security threats such as terrorist activities, Islamic fundamentalist movements or organized crime. Without considering whether these problems were actually created by immigrants or not, political parties directed their concerns to immigrants. As a result, anti-immigrant sentiments arose and led to stricter border controls. When combined, all factors led to the expansion of border controls beyond the EU's territory to the neighbouring or candidate countries (Boswell, 2003, pp. 622-624). By cooperating with third countries on migration issues, the external migration governance of the EU extended the scope of member states (Lavenex, 2011). The notion of 'governance from a distance' has become an integral component of the EU's external migration governance. It designates policy interventions of the EU in the migration and border management policies of non-member states. Governing from a distance principally carries the objective of making migrants stay in the same place by preventing them from reaching the EU (Geddes, 2015).

Bigo (2008) also puts forward that the inclination to conduct beyond the EU's territorial borders emerges not only by means of practices related to the Schengen surveillance framework. Also, it extends the EU's real borders when the EU stipulates conditions by giving financial assistance to the candidate countries in order to conduct practices related to immigration and borders.

The second approach, which is described by Boswell, can be roughly described as 'preventive' policies designed to alter the circumstances that affect people's intentions to migrate or their determined destination countries. These actions involve the identification of the reasons for migratory flows or enabling refugees to seek protection in the countries closer to their country of origin. Preventive measures entail using a variety of tools to broaden the options available to future refugees or migrants, including assistance in development, trade and foreign direct investment, and foreign policy instruments (Boswell, 2003).

Both in the European and non-European contexts, states are trying to strengthen the existing strict practices focusing on the prevention and deterrence of migratory flows. These practices include the detention of irregular migrants, extended duration of determining asylum status, building walls, fences and externalization of border controls. The externalization of migration and border controls is a prevalent practice in both Europe and outside of Europe. Specifically in Europe, both the EU and member states applied diverse strategies to externalize border controls, such as visa criteria and safe third-country procedures, by making it seem like the main objectives behind these practices are safeguarding human rights and fighting against cross-border crimes or migrant smuggling. However, the result of these practices becomes shifting and externalized borders to prevent entrance to Europe. The EU implements such externalization practices that EU member states can transfer their responsibilities to third countries in situations of human rights violations with cooperation-based policies. These policies consist of the supply of technical equipment and financial assistance to third countries in order to prevent the arrival of migrants to EU territory and the departure of migrants from third countries or their countries of origin. Also, the practices can be more directly involving, such as the delegation of officials to

transit countries or source countries to coordinate or directly manage migration (Liguori, 2019, pp. 1–3).

Since the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam, which led to the development of a European migration policy regarding third countries, border management cooperation between the EU and third countries has been a fundamental component of the security-driven migration policy that the EU has been conducting. With treaties, agreements between the EU and third countries, and readmission agreements, the EU migration and border management policies have been established as means of ‘soft’ power. The EU promotes IBM to third countries as a best practice to be reached. The Schengen Border’s Code conveys the idea that border management should contribute to the fight against irregular migration and human trafficking in order to protect member states from any threat. This perspective has created the security-driven reasoning that characterized the EU’s migration and border policy. There has been this continuous idea that border management is regarded as a set of tools to decrease irregular migration movements. So, IBM is a part of this rationale (Sagrera, 2014).

2.4.2 European Integrated Border Management Strategy

As the migratory flows toward the EU intensified in 2015, border management has become one of the significant and prioritized topics of the European agenda. To handle the challenges of migratory flows, stricter controls at the external borders came into question among European countries. On 23 September 2013, European Council meeting, it was decided to reinforce border controls by providing extra resources to FRONTEX, European Asylum Support Office (EASO), and Europol, as well as human resources and equipment from Member States (European Council, 2015).

Integrated Border Management is a concept requiring collaboration on national and international levels of all relevant authorities and agencies associated with the security of borders and trade facilities to achieve the goal of open but well-controlled and secure borders of the EU. Its primary objective is to create an effectual, functional, and systematized border management mechanism at the external EU borders. Accordingly,

it primarily aims to safeguard internal security by managing the external borders effectively, detecting possible risks and challenges related to migration, and preventing serious crimes on borders, such as human trafficking, terrorist movements and smuggling of migrants. While doing this, the basic criteria are to protect fundamental rights and to ensure free movement within the EU (European Commission Migration and Home Affairs, n.d.).

There is a dilemma for the EU in the border management strategy. On the one hand, the EU wants to increase its trade activities by keeping the borders permeable because economic growth is strongly related to the free flow of goods and people. On the other hand, the EU also has the objective to increase border controls because of the concerns of terrorism, irregular migration and organized crimes. Therefore, there is this paradox in which the purpose of keeping the borders open for free trade contrasts with the efforts to control the borders strictly from the perceived threats coming from outside of the borders (Boulanin & Bellais, 2014). This concept of Integrated Border Management is not only a policy for the management of human flows but also a constructed discourse about the threats for Europe. It creates a division between ‘us’ and ‘them.’ This divergence adds up to European society’s fear of ‘the other’ (Duez, 2014).

In order to understand IBM as a concept, it is necessary to understand its establishment, legal basis and formation over the years. The IBM concept was coined by the European Commission in 2002. The concept was formed in order to establish regionally and internationally accepted standards in collaboration and coordination of all agencies for border security. Over time, IBM has become the basis for border management in many countries (Wagner, 2021). The concept of IBM was re-introduced in October 2004 in the Commission Staff Working Document (Pawlak & Kurowska, 2012).

The framework of IBM was drawn by the Regulation (EU) 2016/1624 of the European Parliament and the Council of 14 September 2016 on the European Border and Coast Guard Regulation. The regulation states that the goal of the EU’s external border management is to establish and implement Integrated Border Management, which is essential to enhance migration management. IBM is based on the four-tier access control model consisting of four sections: measures in third countries, cooperation with

neighbouring countries, external border control procedures such as risk analysis, border check and surveillance, and control mechanisms within the EU, including identification and return of overstayers ('Regulation (EU) 2016/1624 of the European Parliament and of the Council of the European Union of 14 September 2016 on the European Border and Coast Guard', 2016).

The regulation repealed the Council regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 of 26 October 2004, which established the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union as an agency that safeguards the external borders of the EU. With the repeal, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, FRONTEX was established. Finally, Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 of 13 November 2019 amended the previous regulation, and the European Border and Coast Guard's mandate was revised and expanded (Frontex, n.d.).

According to the Regulation (EU) 2019/1896, IBM comprises twelve components. To be concise, they can be summarised as follows: border control for prevention of irregular migration and cross-border crimes, search and rescue operations, risk analysis for the threats at the external borders, inter-agency, intra-agency and international cooperation through information exchange, increasing technical and operational capacity at the Schengen area to deal with migratory risks, return of the nationals from third countries, a mechanism for evaluation of the quality of border management system, and using high technology such as large-scale information systems. Also, fundamental rights, training sessions, and research and development programmes are the comprehensive components in implementing other components of IBM ('Regulation (EU) 2019/1896, 2019).

FRONTEX is the implementing agency of IBM, yet national authorities of member states are also responsible for the implementation of IBM. Along with the shared responsibility, member states are supposed to continue to manage their countries' external borders as well. Moreover, the regulation established the European Border Surveillance system (EUROSUR) as a structure for collaboration and exchange of information between FRONTEX and member states. Its mandate is to prevent irregular migration and cross-border crimes and protect migrants. EUROSUR is operated by

FRONTEX to use in border monitoring and controlling. Border controls, air, land and sea border monitoring, and analysing of migration flows are among the EUROSUR's tasks ('Regulation (EU) 2019/1896, 2019). As it can be inferred from the legal framework, over the years, IBM as a concept has become an official strategy of the EU. As the strategic partner, neighbour and candidate country to the EU, Turkey is also supposed to incorporate the IBM requirements in its legal framework and policies. Through conditionality created by the accession process, the EU expects Turkey to adopt IBM policies thoroughly. This expectation can be clearly seen in the repetitive statements and evaluations made by the EU. In particular, in the annual progress reports, the EU directly states the importance of the implementation of IBM policies by Turkey.

Since 2009, the Progress Reports of Turkey, which are prepared by the European Commission in order to evaluate Turkey's progress during the accession process, assert the necessity to implement IBM policies. In the 2009 report, it is stated that Turkey has not achieved enough progress in the implementation of the National Action Plan on IBM. Also, it is articulated that effective risk analysis and quality management units at the border agencies are significant criteria to be fulfilled in the area of border management (European Commission, 2009). In 2010, for the coordination of IBM, a board was established by prime ministerial decree to follow the implementation process of IBM (European Commission, 2010b). In 2011, the Road Map on Integrated Border Management and the Protocol for Inter-Agency Cooperation were drafted, and training sessions about IBM were programmed. In the report, it is stated that inter-agency cooperation regarding IBM and the foundation of a Border Security Agency is a priority for border management (European Commission, 2011a). In the 2012 report, it was criticized that the draft roadmap for IBM was not accepted yet (European Commission, 2012). In the 2013 Report, it is stated that Border Management Implementation Board should be functioning in order to define the need for the enhancement at borders. It is also stated that intense inter-agency cooperation and risk analyses are required. (European Commission, 2013).

In the 2019 report, the Commission expresses that although Turkey's legislative framework is created in line with the *acquis*, it is not totally in line with the EU level.

To make border management policies more complied with the *acquis*, the Commission advises that Turkey should adopt a law regarding IBM and accelerate the process to establish a border security agency which is an expert in border controls and surveillance of sea and land borders (European Commission, 2019b). In the 2020 report, it is restated that Turkey should adopt the IBM policy and set up civilian and specialized border management agency to monitor green and blue borders (European Commission, 2020b). Finally, in the 2021 report, it is said that to align the border management structure with the *acquis*, Turkey should increase international cooperation on border management, expedite the adoption of IBM policy, update the NAP on IBM and establish the border control agency (European Commission, 2019b). To summarize, it can be said that the adoption, implementation of IBM and alignment with the EU standards of border management have been continuously highlighted by the European Commission. Also, the progress of Turkey in establishing a border management policy has always been assessed by the Commission.

The repeated statements, which are made by the EU in progress reports, demonstrate the importance of Turkey's border management for the EU. The EU, on a repetitive basis, has criticized and tried to change Turkey's border management policies and practices by accentuating that it is a requirement of the accession process. Thus, the EU, since 2009, has created the conditionality of the full implementation of IBM strategy's border management policies and practices for the membership. In this way, the EU have iteratively set objectives and conditions for Turkey's legislative and performative structure on border security, migration management and border control practices. There is an expectation for Turkey to follow the technical assessments made by the EU and take action to implement the advised reforms. If Turkey makes progress, the EU will praise and reward Turkey as the EU's conditionality is based on a reward system (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2004). In this case, the reward is opening new chapters and providing more financial and technical assistance. If Turkey cannot achieve progress in certain points that are determined by the EU, the EU will criticize Turkey's actions and reduce the incentives provided to Turkey. Through this rewarding and punishment system, the EU wants to alter Turkey's policies in accordance with the EU standards and priorities. Specifically for the border management policies, the EU expects Turkey to implement IBM policies thoroughly.

CHAPTER III

THE EUROPEAN UNION'S FINANCIAL AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROVIDED TO TURKEY

The securitization of migration and asylum coexist with the Europeanization process in the EU. The internal borders of the European Union were completely eliminated following the signing of the Schengen Treaty and the formation of the Schengen Information System. The development of the Schengen borderless internal area led to the external borders being given more importance and added to the perception of external threats. Thus, this led to border security and border surveillance becoming strongly related to the securitization of migration in the EU. One of the major factors in monitoring and managing external borders has become irregular migration. In order to prevent irregular immigrants from entering the EU, procedures aimed at doing so are closely tied to border control within the EU. Not only did the security concerns lead to the externalization of migration and border control to third countries, but also the growing concerns related to the management of external borders and employing more border security professionals (Grigoriadis & Dilek, 2019, pp. 173-174).

The everchanging immigration and asylum policies of the EU have an 'external' facet that includes extending laws, standards, and other frameworks to third countries (Lavenex, 2016). The EU has been crucial to Turkey's improvements to its migration policy. With that said, the EU transformed the migration policy of Turkey in two fundamental ways. The first one is the incentives, such as new negotiation chapters and the visa liberalization process, both of which are the main drivers of immigration reforms and cooperation on issues of migration and asylum. The second one is adopting and applying the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance funds. By utilizing IPA funds, the EU significantly impacts the migration policy by means of the conditions set forth for project implementation (Bürgin, 2016b). The conditionality

caused by the IPA funds has a dual character. First, it gives positive conditionality by granting billions of euros as a financial incentive. Second, it has a negative conditionality in which there is a condition to adopt the EU's standards and continue to implement them; otherwise, the assistance is suspended or reduced (Marko, Florence, Emini, Nechev, & Stakić, 2018, p. 19). Therefore, the conditionality, which is two-folded, gives power to the EU while imposing its policies, in this case, its border management and migration policy. So, it may be stated that the EU uses IPA funds and policy incentives to exert control over Turkey's migration and border management policy. The EU technically and financially funds the border control projects in Turkey. This involves securitizing measures including installing monitoring technologies, carrying out risk analysis, installing border fences, and more measures alike. This thesis argues that by establishing requirements to be met in order to obtain visa liberalisation or advance in the accession process as well as by providing funding for security-related projects, the EU contributes to the securitization of migration and asylum in Turkey.

In this chapter, the historical and legal background of IPA funds will be discussed in order to comprehend their roles in the securitization process.

3.1 The Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance

The EU has many funding systems to create regional integrity and welfare, such as European Regional Development Fund, Just Transition Fund, Cohesion Fund, European Social Fund and EU Solidarity Fund. Along with those funds provided to member states, the EU also supports candidate and potential candidate countries under the scope of the European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Policy. Since 2007, the EU has been promoting reforms via pre-accession funds to strengthen the capacities of the beneficiaries. Before 2007, there were several different funds such as PHARE, ISPA, SAPARD, CARDS and the financial instrument for Turkey (European Commission, n.d.-a). In January 2007, through important policy reform, these funds were unified under a single financial instrument called The Instrument for the Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA). IPA is one of the means through which the EU provides

financial and technical assistance to implement political and economic reforms in the enlargement area. The legal structure of this newly introduced instrument was established under Council Regulation 1085/2006 of 17 July 2006. The IPA assistance period is divided into six-year periods as IPA I: 2007-2013, IPA II: 2014-2020 and IPA III: 2021-2027. Under a single instrument, for three periods, beneficiary countries receive funding for development projects from the European Commission. The beneficiaries of the IPA Programme are separated into two groups as the candidate countries: Turkey, Albania, Montenegro, Serbia and the Republic of North Macedonia and potential candidate countries in the Western Balkan (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo under UN Security Council Resolution 1244/99). The distinction between potential candidates for membership of the EU and the candidates is clearly stated in the legal structure. The main aim is to create a basis for both candidates and potential candidates in order to create economic and social prosperity, strengthen democracy and the rule of law, and reinforce institution-building measures in a variety of areas. However, the degree of assistance provided to candidates and potential candidates differs. For candidates, the principal criteria are the adoption and the implementation of the whole *acquis communautaire*. For potential candidates, the main focus is on capacity building and investment projects related to rural development, human resources development and regional development. Along with these projects, assistance might include projects aiming at alignment with the *acquis communautaire* (European Commission, n.d.-b).

IPA Funds have an important place among other financial means provided by the EU because after the unification of different funds, IPA funds have become the primary financial tool to assist a candidate country in ensuring the compliance of the national policies with the EU rules and regulations. The incentives given by the EU have a significant influence on the process of formulating policies. The conditionality for opening new chapters in alignment with the *acquis* is still important for Turkey. The securitization of migration in the EU has led the neighbouring states to benefit from the negotiations on many topics for the sake of migration management. In the case of Turkey, the conditionality for accession continues its advantage, such as carrying on with the financial support under IPA funds (Demiryontar, 2020). Through IPA funds, the EU's effect on Turkey's policies develops gradually, particularly in the policy area

of migration and border management. IPA funds enable the EU to exercise substantial impact through the conditions it stipulates in the process of approval of the project proposals. Therefore, the EU has led to institutional and administrative transformation within the Turkish ministries. To be able to manage the process of accession to the EU and the IPA funding programmes, units that are specialized for the EU were established under the ministries. The personnel for these units are specifically provided with IPA-funded training programmes. Also, IPA funds have a considerable effect on migration management policies. IPA funds have led to reforms in migration and border management legislation. Within the IPA process, in 2005, National Action Plan on Asylum and Migration, and in 2006, National Action Plan on Integrated Border Management were drafted. These two plans, which were created as part of twinning programmes with EU member states, called for the creation of specialized institutions for managing migration and managing borders. The first action for the development of these kinds of specialized organizations was the establishment of the Integrated Border Management Bureau and the Asylum and Migration Bureau. Both bureaux were tasked with creating draft laws in the field of migration and border management in accordance with European standards (Bürgin, 2016b). Therefore, it can be said that the IPA funds have transformed the administrative structure of the Turkish authorities and have affected border and migration management by leading to the acceptance of a new legislation related to asylum, migration and borders.

3.1.1 The Establishment of the EU's Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance

The first period of IPA was legally established by the Council Regulation (EC) 1085/2006, which was adopted on 17 July 2006. The regulation sets the structure of the instrument. It defines the objectives, scope, beneficiaries, types of assistance, management, and implementation of the programme. The regulation is amended by Commission Regulation 80/2010 of 28 January 2010 (European Commission, 2010a). According to the 4th article of the regulation, the assistance is granted in accordance with the framework for pre-accession determined by the European and Accession Partnerships and the Reports and the Strategy Paper in the annual Enlargement package of the Commission. Also, the Commission presents its purposes to the

European Parliament and the Council for the allocation of financial funds in the form of a three-year plan which is called the multi-annual indicative financial framework. While multi-annual indicative planning documents are prepared for three years, they are supposed to be reviewed on an annual basis according to the priorities of countries. The document should be included and prepared on the basis of a group of objective and transparent criteria, such as needs evaluation, absorption capability, conditionalities, and management capacity.

The first period of IPA consists of five components in which the implementation and the programming of the instrument are planned accordingly: transition assistance and institution building, cross-border cooperation, regional development, human resources development and rural development. The first component focuses on institutional development, including the Copenhagen political criteria, legislative alignment, and the fostering of civil society engagement between the beneficiaries and the EU. The second component supports involvement in multi-country and cross-border cooperation initiatives. The third and fourth components prepare for future EU structural funds participation. The regional development component funds infrastructure in the environment and transportation sectors, as well as supports small and medium-sized businesses to boost regional competitiveness. The component of human resources development promotes job creation, education, and social inclusion. The fifth component will encourage future involvement in the Common Agricultural Policy and the related finance mechanisms (Delegation of the European Union to Turkey, 2008).

While the components of Transition Assistance and Institution Building and Cross-Border Cooperation are accessible to both candidate and potential candidate countries, The Regional Development, Human Resources Development, and Rural Development Components are only accessible to the candidate countries in order to contribute to their accession process. The assistance is provided in accordance with the external aid conditions determined in Council Regulation No 1605/2002 of 25 June 2002. The budget is utilized with several pre-accession structures: decentralised management, twinning, TAIEX (Technical Assistance Information Exchange Instrument) and cross-border programmes. By signing financing agreements with the beneficiary country,

the EU sets down country-specific criteria for the management of the funds. The activities of the beneficiaries are closely monitored by the Commission. If a beneficiary does not proceed enough to align with the Copenhagen Criteria or violates the rules of the EU, the EU takes the necessary measures.

On 8 November 2006, the Commission adopted the first Multi-annual Indicative Financial Framework (MIFF) document for the years 2008-2010, which covers the financial envelope by the Commission for the upcoming three years. Then, on 6 November 2007, the Commission adopted the second MIFF, Multi-annual Indicative Financial Framework for 2009-2011. The document mainly sets the allocation of funds between countries and between components. The document shows that due to the fact that Turkey's size and absorption capacity is more than other beneficiaries, there was a gradual growth in per-capita amounts of aid between 2007 and 2011. In total, it rose from 497.200.000 euros to 781.900.000 (Commission of the European Communities, 2007).

For the remaining three years, the Commission adopted Multi-annual Indicative Financial Framework for 2011-2013 on 14 October 2009. The steady rise in the amount of allocation of the fund continued in this period, as well. It increased from 497.200.000 euros in 2007 to 935.500.000 euros in 2013 (Commission of the European Communities, 2009). On 11 July 2008, The Framework Agreement for Cooperation between Turkey and the European Union for Assistance under the Instrument for Pre-accession was signed between the Commission of the European Communities and Turkey. This agreement is the basis of the implementation of the IPA Funds in Turkey. According to the agreement, the method of implementation of IPA assistance is decentralised management that allows the beneficiary to conduct actions, yet the final say belongs to the Commission.

On 30 April 2007, the Commission adopted the Multi-annual Indicative Planning Document (MIPD) 2007-2009 for Turkey. In the annex of the document, the general framework for the 3-year-period was outlined, component-based priorities were set, and the objectives were evaluated. As a part of the institution-building component, security was determined as the main area of the areas of activity. Under the title of security, the areas of border management, migration and visa policy, and international

cooperation among law enforcement agencies were particularly stressed (European Commission, 2007a).

On 27 June 2011, the Commission adopted the Multi-annual Indicative Planning Document Multi-Beneficiary Programmes 2011-2013. In the annex of the document, the Commission evaluated the previous programme's progress and the objectives for the next three years and set the priorities for the next period in light of the lessons learned from the previous period's outcomes. It was stated that the assistance for the determined three years focused particularly on Justice and Home Affairs issues (Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations, 2011).

The mentioned legal documents established and completed the IPA Fund. As the initial form of the funding programme, the first period has a rather distinct component-based structure which changes in the following two periods. The first phase of the financial assistance programme prioritized the policy areas of border management and migration. It signifies the importance that the EU puts on border management policies and practices. As a focused policy area, the EU spared a considerable amount of budget in the preparation and implementation of border management policies and practices through this assistance instrument in order to increase security in the immediate borders of the EU.

3.2 Continuing the IPA Funds in the Second Phase

After the first period of the IPA instrument, the EU recommenced the IPA II instrument. In the communication of the Commission titled *A Budget for Europe 2020 - Part II: Policy fiches*, in which the Commission proposed budget allocations for the implementation of policy objectives, declares that in the period of 2014-2020, the EU will continue to provide candidate and potential candidate countries with pre-accession instrument (European Commission, 2011b).

In 2014, Regulation (EU) No 231/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014 established the second phase of the IPA instrument. The financial aid programme of IPA II intends to achieve four particular goals: assistance for

political reforms, support for economic, social and regional development, and increasing the capacity of the beneficiaries to fulfil the required criteria for Union membership by supporting continuous alignment with, implementation and adoption of the *acquis*. Along with the objectives, five policy areas are determined to work on: policy reforms, institution-building and capacity building efforts for membership, regional and socio-economic development, development in gender equality, education, social policies, employment and human resources, agricultural development, and regional collaboration. Furthermore, during this period, a performance reward system is introduced. The considerable progress towards membership and effective execution of pre-accession objectives are decided to be rewarded with the allocation of additional funds. However, if the beneficiaries underperform in achieving the progress decided targets, the Commission also redetermines the amount of assistance in accordance with the slippage. ('Regulation (EU) No 231/2014', 2014). Therefore, there is not only a reward system but also punishment in the assessment of performance. Moreover, Regulation (EU) No 236/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014, laying down common rules and procedures for the implementation of the Union's instruments for financing external action, complements the IPA legal framework regarding the policies of external action ('Regulation (EU) No 236/2014', 2014).

Lastly, Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 447/2014 of 2 May 2014 on the specific rules for implementing Regulation (EU) No 231/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing an Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA II) sets down the implementing structure of the IPA II. It included implementation methodologies, openness, visibility, budget management, monitoring, assessment, and reporting of the IPA assistance ('Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 447/2014', 2014).

On 11 February 2015, the Framework Agreement for the IPA II period was signed between Turkey and the Commission. The agreement sets the outlines for the assistance implementation. On 04 April 2015, the Agreement was enacted by the Council of Ministers with Law No: 6647, which was published in the Official Gazette

numbered 29340. Finally, the Agreement came into force on 21 June 2015 ('Council of Ministers' Decision: 2015/7708', 2015).

Moreover, the Indicative Strategy Paper for Turkey, which was adopted on 26 August 2014, sets forth the priorities of the IPA II term. According to the document, the amount of financial assistance planned to be allocated for seven years is 4.453,9 million Euros. There is a sector-based structure of the assistance. Seven sectors are determined in the paper: democracy and governance, the rule of law and fundamental rights, environment, climate action and energy, transport, competitiveness and innovation, agriculture and rural development, education, employment and social policies, and territorial and regional cooperation. The rule of law and fundamental rights sector diverges into sub-sectors: judiciary and fundamental rights, and home affairs. The strategy paper stresses the importance of home affairs as a crucial area for fund allocation, which is exactly related to the European Agenda on migration. The sub-sector contains three key areas: migration and asylum, Integrated Border Management, and the fight against terrorism and organised crime. Also, within the sub-sector, the assistance promotes regular migration, the advancement of Integrated Border Management, establishing of a well-performing asylum system, and managing irregular migration efficiently by means of technical aid and focused actions (European Commission, 2018).

As a part of the needs and capacity assessment, the commission says that Turkey should advance its institutional and infrastructural capacity in the integration of refugees and 'remove' irregular migrants (as it is stated in the paper). For this purpose, Turkey should assess the needs comprehensively by considering what has been accomplished so far through IPA assistance. While praising Turkey's efforts to reform migration and asylum policy by establishing DGMM and adopting the Law on Foreigners and International Protection, the Commission states that Turkey should keep on aligning its institutional capacity, legal framework, and administrative structure with the European level. It also highlights the significance of Integrated Border Management by saying that Turkey needs to carry on pursuing IBM policy standards in order to create open and secure borders. It also noted that Turkey should implement the 2016 Turkey-EU Statement in terms of inter-institutional coordination

and cooperation on border management, reinforce cooperation on risk analysis between agencies, and increase the regional collaboration with FRONTEX and neighbouring EU countries Greece and Bulgaria (European Commission, 2018, p. 34).

Furthermore, the strategy paper specifies the objectives and expected results to be reached in the home affairs sub-sector of IPA II. The legal, administrative, and institutional alignment with the European standards and the European Integrated Border Management system is emphasized repetitively throughout the paper. Greater capacity to combat irregular migration and human trafficking is also an expected result. The Commission demands specific actions to attain these expected results, such as being in line with the conditions of the Turkey-EU readmission agreement and visa liberalisation roadmap, institution-building in migration and asylum management, and capacity-building for fighting cross-border crimes. In addition, the commission also requires practices in order to achieve efficient border management. The expected practices are using risk analysis, interchange of information, Integrated Border Management practices, supplying and effective usage of necessary equipment, modernised software and hardware, shared threat assessments, and taking customs measures linked with Integrated Border Management, specifically, risk-based border checks for security measures (European Commission, 2018, p. 36). By elaborating on the details of expected practices, the Commission itself lists the securitizing practices that the thesis deals with from the beginning. What makes this period unique is the reward-punishment system that was brought by this second programme. It can be the extension of the conditionality created by the EU. If the standards are met and the progress is proper, the EU continues to support financially and technically, yet if the progress is not enough, the fund is reduced or stopped. This conditionality gives the EU the power to externalize its policies to the candidate and potential candidates.

3.3 Current IPA Programme for the Period of 2021-2027

As in previous programmes, the third phase of IPA also provides candidate and potential candidate countries with technical and financial support in order to support their institutional, legal, political, socio-cultural, and financial reforms. The

progressive alignment with the EU's *acquis* is the main objective. Thus, the EU support the beneficiaries in order to increase their security, stability, and welfare (Lilyanova & Svášek, 2018).

Regulation (EU) 2021/1529 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 September 2021 establishing the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA III), which is the legal basis of the third phase of IPA, was adopted on 15 September 2021, came into effect on 20 September 2021 and is operative retroactively from 1 January 2021 (European Commission, n.d.-b). For the new period between 2021 and 2027, the EU sets down the prioritized policy areas to work on by considering the current conditions. That is why the regulation states that the assistance should be utilized for peacebuilding and conflict prevention efforts, reinforcing the rule of law and democracy, the measures against the Covid-19 outbreak, public health emergencies, gender equality, green deal objectives and creating employment opportunities for young people. Special emphasis is put on the importance of cooperation on migration and border management. To control irregular migration and combat crimes such as human trafficking and smuggling, the EU and the beneficiary countries will be cooperating on increasing border control and information exchange, enhancing the capacities of border and migration management (Regulation (EU) 2021/1529, 2021). The regulation is complemented with the Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2021/2128 of 1 October 2021 to set more specific objectives for the IPA III period. In this regulation, border and migration management is a specifically described priority policy area to work on. The fundamental aim is to increase the capacity for addressing international and regional migratory challenges and further development of migration and border management. The expected actions are sharing the relevant data, ensuring access to international protection and improving asylum management, bolstering border control, return and reintegration capacities, as well as efforts to combat irregular migration, including migrant smuggling, and addressing forced displacement.

In the annex to the Commission Implementing Decision 2021 adopting the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA III) Programming Framework for the period 2021-2027, it is pointed out that managing migration is one of the biggest challenges for the EU, the Western Balkans and Turkey. Since the refugee crisis of 2015, migration

management has been a significant part of the agenda. As the cooperation between Turkey and the EU has been efficient since the EU-Turkey Statement of 2016, the EU intends to improve cooperation with the IPA funds. Thus, in the IPA III period, the EU continues to support Turkey both technically and financially to advance migration and border management and fight irregular migration and migrant smuggling. Therefore, migration and border management are designated as one of the main priorities for the IPA III period. Under the IPA III assistance, within this thematic priority, the EU expects beneficiaries to align with the European Integrated Border Management by increasing capacities in terms of border checks and surveillance, exchange of information, and developing regional and interagency cooperation mechanisms (Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations, 2021). The further rules and conditions are defined in the Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/2236 of 15 December 2021. The regulation especially explains the management style of the IPA III and sets down rules on cross-border cooperation, agriculture, and rural development assistance. According to the regulation, the National IPA Co-ordinator (NIPAC), which is appointed by the beneficiary, is responsible for ensuring the coordination of assistance programming with the Commission. Through indirect management, the assistance is implemented by signing a financing agreement between the Commission and the beneficiary (European Commission, 2021).

IPA III beneficiaries are expected to prepare Strategic Responses in which they state their situation in terms of the implementing policy requirements of the enlargement process. Also, the beneficiaries explain how their policies and strategies serve the goals of the IPA III Programming Framework. They also include a list of the preliminary version of their project plan, which shows the intended usage of IPA funding and how the projects are relevant to the thematic priorities (Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations, 2021).

Turkey prepared the IPA III Strategic Response 2021-2024 document in 2021 in order to determine its intentions and objectives in implementing IPA funds through specific projects. The strategies that are outlined in the strategic response document are also Turkey's policy priorities that have been determined in National Action Plan for the

EU Accession 2019-2023. In the National Action Plan, under the plans to be in line with the 24th Chapter of the *acquis*, Justice, Freedom and Security, migration management and border management are priority areas to be worked on. Under the migration management category, it is aimed at managing irregular migration flows better. Under the border management category, it is expected to revise the Action Plan on Integrated Border Management in order to implement IBM and ensure the effective working of the NACORAC (NAP, 2019).

As the third period of IPA fund was initiated in 2021, the projects have not been implemented yet. The projects are not in the implementation phase. Therefore, in this thesis, the projects belonging to the third period will not take place. However, the regulatory basis of the IPA III fund shows that the EU still puts an emphasis on border management policies and prioritizes migration and border management as a key policy area and IBM as an important policy for alignment. For instance, as a thematic priority of IPA III, the strategic response document includes a section on migration and border management. Thus, in this chapter, it is explained that migration and border management are the main priority of the IPA III period due to the fact that Turkey is located in a region that has an unstable state of affairs and complicated political agenda, which affects Turkey's borders and territorial unity.

In the EU, migration and border management are major priority areas. The rationale behind the prioritization of border management as a policy area is that European migration management is shaped by security threats which are related to the securitization of migration. Thus, the effects of securitization of migration can be seen in financial and technical assistance priorities. The series of thematic programming on migration issues have frequently put security concerns on the top of the European agenda. This prioritization leads to the funding of capacity-building for stricter border surveillance and check and handling of irregular migration and human smuggling. The internal security of the EU has an important part in the dimension of funding themes. Through financial assistance, external actions are considered as means to support the internal security of the EU. This logic is present in the IPA funds, as well. Through the IPA Funds, which are part of a neighbourhood and enlargement policy, the main idea is to create a circle of stability in the region (Den Hertog, 2016). In this way, there will

be fewer so-called security threats caused by migrants to the internal security of the EU. Especially after the refugee crisis, internal security concerns arose. Therefore, with IPA II funds, more projects were conducted for border security and preventing irregular migration.

The legal framework of the IPA funds also reveals that border management under the home affairs section is a prioritized policy area to make reforms and carry out projects aiming to increase institutional capacity in terms of border management. IPA funds focus more on migration and border management than neighbourhood and development assistance. The IPA also offers a multi-country program in addition to bilateral programs for beneficiary countries. These multi-country projects clearly place a focus on migration-related subjects (Den Hertog, 2016). The regulatory framework for every three periods clearly shows that border management is a primary policy area to carry out projects. The prioritization of border management in IPA Funds demonstrates how border management of candidates and potential candidates is important for the EU. For security-related concerns, the EU invests in the candidate and potential candidate countries' institutional capacities regarding border management. It reveals how the security of Western Balkan countries and Turkey is linked with the EU's internal and external security. The EU tries to control migratory flows by putting conditions for the candidate and potential candidates, financing projects to achieve the conditions under the umbrella of the pre-accession fund.

CHAPTER IV

PROJECTS UNDER THE IPA FUNDING: THE ANALYSIS OF SECURITIZING INSTRUMENTS

In this chapter, the projects that are planned and implemented through IPA funds will be scrutinized. The projects aiming at border security and alignment with the EU's border management policies will be analysed in detail. To that end, by using purposive sampling, relevant projects containing practices, which are considered securitizing by the securitization theory, will be examined in depth. These practices can be exemplified by deploying armoured military vehicles, building border walls, conducting risk analyses, organizing training programmes for officials and guards in order to inform them about border security risks, and using high technology equipment for gathering information about security threats. To be able to explain the practices carried out on border management, annual activity bulletins of the Ministry of Interior and the online publications of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Directorate for EU Affairs' Department of Monitoring and Evaluation will be the main sources for analysis. Additionally, news related to the projects, publications and/or announcements of other beneficiary institutions, and press releases of the related institutions, such as the EU Delegation to Turkey and the EU Commission, will also be supporting sources. After the objectives and the scope of the projects are described, the practices will be interpreted within the framework of securitization theory. Under two sections, divided in accordance with the two IPA fund programmes, the projects will be analysed. Before analysing the IPA projects, a piece of brief background information on the border management activities of Turkey before the IPA assistance will be provided.

4.1 Border Management Policies and Projects before the IPA Assistance

Border and migration management have been challenging policy spheres for Turkey. Initially, Turkey is located in crucial geography in the scope of migratory movements. Due to the instability of the Middle East, it has always been difficult for Turkey to manage its borders since Turkey's borders shared with the region are very long. The mountainous terrain of the borderline makes it even harder to control borders. This difficult situation has been complicated more by Turkey's own problems of protection of the shared borders with Iraq and, to a lesser degree, Iran. Up to the mid-1950s, the Turkish-Syrian border was demarcated by stones, barb wires and fences and the border was controlled by the personnel responsible for patrolling from monitoring towers. In 1956 and 195, Turkish authorities planted land mines around the borders, particularly on the Syrian and Iraqi borders, with the objective of preventing smuggling (Şenoğuz & Pinar, 2015). In the 1980s, terrorist acts performed by the militants of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) on Turkey's borders also challenged Turkey's border control activities. This leads to the prioritization of military means in border protection rather than providing civilian authority in border management, which is also preferred by the EU (Kirişci, Fiesolana, Domenico, & Fiesole, 2007). Recently, organized crime acts and terrorism and radical fights caused by the Syrian conflicts have added to the problematic situation of Turkey in managing borders (Olejárová, 2018). Therefore, due to these challenges, Turkey has always had difficulty in the management of borders.

Moreover, the fragmented character of Turkey's border management, in which the management of borders is undertaken by many institutions, prevents Turkey from forming a single border management policy. The Ministry of Interior is entitled as the main provider of border security. The Turkish National Police is responsible for the control of entries and exit of people at border gates. The Turkish Land Command controls land borders, while the Turkish Coast Command monitors sea borders (Sert, 2013). So, it can be said that there have been several authorities taking part in the management of borders, and the military has been playing a major role in border management. Because of these complex establishments within border management, there has been a more scattered border management process. Also, it has been more

focused on the prevention of terrorist movements. With IPA Funds, although the fragmented structure remains, the main objective has changed into creating an Integrated Border Management system which has a comprehensive set of purposes, such as preventing irregular migration and organised crimes, conducting risk analyses, and using more technological means in the border management activities. In the past, Turkey used more traditional ways to monitor and control flows on the borders. As it will be elaborated on in the next sections, IPA Funds enabled Turkey to use more technological tools in the management of borders.

Everything did not magically change with the IPA assistance. Before IPA Funds, Turkey had also been trying to align its migration and border management policies with the EU standards. Since the 2000s, border control has been one of the main policy areas of the TR-EU agenda (Kaya, Rottmann, Gökalp-Aras, & Şahin-Mencütek, 2021). The important thing is that the assistance provided by IPA prioritizes border management projects, allocates a determined amount of these projects, and conditions Turkey to conduct projects with the purpose of transforming the border management policies and practices in line with the Integrated Border Management Policy.

4.2 Border Management Projects Funded by the First Phase of IPA

Under IPA I fund, projects that are related to border management and migration were programmed within the Transition Assistance and Institution Building component. Therefore, under this component, there are also other projects related to other chapters of the *acquis*, as well as Chapter 24: Justice, Freedom and Security. Because many different projects related to other chapters of the *acquis* were planned under this component, only the projects regarding border management will be analysed in the following sections. Border management projects are under the scope of the Ministry of Interior's central units and subsidiary institutions; therefore, these units programmed the projects regarding Chapter 24 and Chapter 23 of the *acquis*. According to the Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs Directorate for EU Affairs (2017), there were forty projects conducted by the Ministry of Interior during the IPA I period. In this section, projects that are carried out under the category of

Integrated Border Management will be analysed. From the lens of securitization theory, the main instruments of the projects will be examined in depth. As (Balzacq et al., 2010) set forth that security practices are operated via capacity tools, which are the instruments to increase institutional and individual capacities in maintaining security and regulatory tools, which are the tools aiming to provide regulations to reduce threats. In the following sections, the practices will also be scrutinized in terms of the instruments they include. The instruments will be discussed in the scope of the classification of capacity and regulatory.

4.2.1 Cross-Border Cooperation on Border Security

Integrated Border Management is a strategy that requires the contribution of each country and cooperation between the countries (European Commission, 2007b). Therefore, along with the cooperation of member states, cross-border cooperation with the candidates and potential candidates is also important for the EU to achieve the goals within the IBM strategy. Within the strategic security management approach of the European Commission, IBM is affirmed as a priority policy area for reinforcing the cooperation of the EU with third countries. This way, the EU promotes the upgrade of border security, border surveillance, and border management systems to non-EU partners (Wagner, 2021, p. 426). Western Balkan countries (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia, Kosovo and Montenegro) as potential candidates and Turkey as a candidate country, and also regional partners due to their locations, is important for the cooperation to implement IBM.

Within this perspective, to increase the dialogue between the countries and the regional capacity, a project named Regional Support to the Update, Implementation and Monitoring of the Integrated Border Management Strategies and Related Action Plans and Development of Regional and Cross Border Initiatives in the West Balkans was carried out in 2007. Primarily, the intended goal was the establishment of efficient Integrated Border Management systems in the Western Balkans and Turkey, in compliance with the EU standards, through inter-agency, bilateral and regional cooperation. The project was implemented through a direct grant by the European

Commission with a budget of 1.631.694 euros, of which 1.468.524 euros were covered by the EU. As it can be seen, the majority of the project was funded by the EU. The project consisted of the following five components. First, updating and monitoring IBM strategies and action plans for coordination institutions with a regional harmonization approach and supporting their implementation. Second, creating regional cooperation, a communication network, and the establishment of common standards among the beneficiaries. Third, supporting cooperation between customs authorities, border police and inter-agency cooperation. Four, supporting the establishment of compatible information systems in the region. Last, the harmonization of IBM strategies and action plans with EU standards and organizing training on risk analysis. The project was completed in 2011, and as a result of the project, the national policies complied with the EU's IBM strategy, the know-how on risk analysis was increased in the region, and the collaboration between the stakeholders was improved (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Interior EU Affairs and Foreign Relations Department, 2017, p. 26). Within the context of the project, IOM, which is the implementing agency of the project, conducted a comprehensive assessment regarding IBM and organized training programmes about the priority subjects of the assessment, the main rules of IBM and risk management procedures for the border personnel (IOM, n.d.). These five objectives of this project clearly show the importance of IBM in maintaining European border security. In order to fulfil the IBM requirements, inventive practices were created, and more cross-border and multilateral cooperations were deployed by the EU. Specific characteristics of these kinds of cooperations are border guard and police operations that surpass national borders via practices such as information exchange, training programmes given to border personnel, joint operations and support between border officials (Wagner, 2021, p. 439). In general terms, the main duty of the border police is to safeguard the respective territory in an effort to prevent danger at borders and in specifically designated border areas, which can be caused by people (Wagner, 2021, p. 433). In Turkey, there are several institutions that are in charge of border management and security, such as the Presidency of Migration Management, The National Police, Customs Enforcement for border crossing points, the Turkish Land Forces Command for land borders, and the Turkish Coast Guard Command for maritime borders (Delegation of the European

Union to Turkey, n.d.-c). In the border management mechanism, all the personnel of these institutions, such as customs officers, border guards, land forces, and border police, are an integral part of maintaining border security since they check and monitor the flows. In this regard, training border officials is the first step toward implementing the policies and strategies of the EU's Integrated Border Management system. That is why giving training to the border officers is an important component of the alignment projects funded by the IPA funds in order to achieve EU-level border management.

The EU actually exercises policing at a distance by promoting practices of information exchange, organizing training programmes, and creating networks for border activities in order to maintain both internal and external security. As Bigo put forward that European internal security has become more focused on policing at a distance and surveillance of borders. Policing at a distance is a type of control through which distinct practices and technologies are employed to prevent or deter people from entering the respective territory. In policing at a distance, there is deterritorialisation and technologisation of border controls and surveillance systems, and also de-differentiation of internal and external security spheres. Deterritorialization means the control of movements beyond the given territory (Guild & Bigo, 2005). De-differentiation denotes that internal and external security are intertwined because the concept of internal security has expanded to external borders in the globalized world (Bigo, 2006a). In this de-differentiated security structure, external security agencies such as the military and internal security agencies such as the police work on the security of external borders simultaneously, so the spheres are de-differentiated as they serve the same end, sustaining security at borders. Therefore, policing at a distance is not conducted by only a single agency but through networks such as networks of information, the police, customs officials, border officers and gendarmes (Bigo, 2006a). Therefore, cooperation between agencies that are in charge of border security is a part of the EU's practices of policing at a distance. These practices are performed by different (in)security experts such as border guards, the police and military officials, and they are specialized in collecting and analysing particular kinds of knowledge by targeting particular groups. The (in)security experts monitor the borders constantly and detect and predict the 'potential threat' by using intelligence. This hyper-specialization of knowledge, through which a threat or risk is defined, leads to the creation of

delineation and exclusion in societies (Balzacq et al., 2010). Instead of the military operations, mundane activities and bureaucratic practices of the personnel responsible for border security are a part of the (in)securitization process. Policing of borders is operated through filtering, channelling and controlling immigrants. So, the guards or the police are in the position of deciding the illegality of a situation or the danger that immigrants pose. Practices such as risk assessments, intelligence usage and sharing, strict checks, and high technological surveillance activities lead to discriminatory and uncertain calculations (Bigo, 2014). From this perspective, practices carried out by different border experts, who are specifically trained to detect the risk and take precautions accordingly to eliminate or minimize the risk, actually contribute to the division of people as the ones inside and the ones outside since the outsiders are seen as the risk. This divergence actually creates the perception of immigrants as threats. That is why the practices made by border experts are securitizing practices. By engaging in cross-border cooperation practices, the EU promotes specific practices such as risk analysis, controls migratory movements by policing at a distance and contributes to the securitizing practices in Turkey.

Moreover, as another project that was conducted in order to increase the capacity of the border police, the Training of Border Police was carried out in the earlier years of the first phase of the IPA funding period. As the beneficiary institution, the Turkish National Police managed the project in order to acquaint the border police with an Integrated Border Management system and the EU's set of principles regarding border management. As a twinning project, Turkey and Germany co-executed the project in order to provide training to the border police. The main expected results are developing a training programme consisting of a curriculum development system and increasing the effectiveness of the Turkish National Police's practices by making them in line with the EU standards in training (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs Directorate for EU Affairs, 2021). In line with the EU's Integrated Border Management policies and strategies, between 2009 and 2012, several different training programmes were conducted under the project. The project was completed in 2012. The total amount of budget was 1.200.000 euros, of which 1.140.000 euros of EU contribution (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Interior EU Affairs and Foreign Relations Department, 2017, p. 13). As a result of the project, the capacity of the Turkish

National Police has been enhanced so that it will be possible to provide better training programmes for the personnel working at the borders. With an extensive curriculum and diverse training materials, the project concentrated on before-duty and on-duty training. With the cooperation between the German Federal Police and the Turkish National Police, the know-how of the 568 Turkish officers was improved. All the training focused on the foremost practices and strategies of the EU's IBM policy. The German Federal Police assisted the Turkish Police in revising its system in order to meet the criteria of IBM: creating open yet well-controlled and secure borders (Delegation of the European Union to Turkey, 2012). With the IBM policy, the notion of borders as physical beings has shifted into a perception of liquid borders. That is to say, without walls or concrete borders, IBM policy has the objective of keeping the borders open while maintaining them secure by controlling them continuously. So, keeping the borders secure is not about closing the borders completely by constructing walls but monitoring mobility and controlling entrance. IBM's strategy avoids the threats coming with the movements by making risk management and filtering who can enter without borders. In this case, border guards or police are professionals deciding whom to accept in the territory and making risk-based evaluations (Bigo, 2014). As Balzacq et al. (2010) put forward that providing training to border professionals is in the character of a capacity tool. By organizing training sessions, the main aim is to increase the skills and capacity of individuals and groups of staff about IBM policy, risk analysis, irregular migration and cross-border crimes. Through the idea of risk analysis, these training courses convey the perception of the risks coming from the other side of the border and teach the staff the ways to avoid risks and filter the risk. In that sense, as a capacity tool, training courses are securitizing practices.

Last but not least, in order to make progress in alignment with the IBM policies and increase the regional cooperation on border security, cross-border cooperation between Turkey, Bulgaria and Greece was carried out by IOM, and the main beneficiary was the General Directorate of Provincial Administration in 2010. The project mainly aimed to increase the cooperation between Greece, Bulgaria and Turkey in order to apply Integrated Border Management standards through the EU's external borders, increase the coherence between the countries in securing borders and transfer experience between the personnel working on border security. The project was fully

funded by the EU with 1.800.000 euros. As a part of the project, working visits were held in Poland, Bulgaria, Greece, France and Finland, and training programmes were provided to the border officers. The first phase of the project was completed on 7 December 2016 with a ceremony (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Interior EU Affairs and Foreign Relations Department, 2017, p. 29). The second phase of the project was run by IOM through a direct grant, and the main beneficiary institution was the General Directorate of Provincial Administration, as well. As the continuation of the first phase, the second phase also had objectives towards strengthening the Integrated Border Management processes. The project had three components: developing cooperation between border personnel of 3 countries, establishing training and recommendations for a structured framework for cooperation, carrying out studies on the legal and regulatory framework, and procuring advanced technical equipment for institutions operating in the field of border management, and providing support for combating irregular migration and other cross-border crimes within this framework. The project was begun to be carried out in May 2017 after the first phase was completed (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Interior EU Affairs and Foreign Relations Department, 2017, p. 51).

This 3-million-euro project aimed to reinforce border controls and migration management instruments and promote the coordination between Turkey, Greece and Bulgaria in border and migration management. In the project, broad-ranging activities were conducted, such as inspection of travel documents, document security and risk analysis, fundamental human rights considerations in border management, vocational English, Greek, and Bulgarian courses, study abroad trips to EU nations, and cooperation conventions with the co-beneficiaries. The project was completed with an online meeting in December 2021. During the meeting, it was stated that the project has produced excellent outcomes in terms of assuring alignment with the EU's Integrated Border Management system, boosting staff capability, and fostering both domestic and international cooperation (IOM, 2021). The speeches demonstrate that Integrated Border Management is an important strategy in managing borders and dealing with migratory issues. With the main objectives of the project, such as preventing irregular migration, cross-border practices were carried out for a significant time period. Working for stricter border controls along the borders of the EU and

providing training sessions related to the EU type of border management, such as informing the border guards about risk analysis, are securitizing practices that securitize migratory movements. Taking the issue to an international level and making it cross-border cooperation to tackle is a securitizing practice. As capacity tools, information and training enable individuals, groups and institutions to conduct activities in order to attain policy objectives by referencing exceptional conditions, which make these tools securitizing (Balzacq, 2008). Along with the two aforementioned projects, this project includes training sessions as a capacity tool to increase border staff's knowledge of IBM and risk analysis and cooperation on border management.

4.2.2 Practices towards the Adoption and Implementation of IBM Policies

Besides training sessions and cross-border cooperation on risk analyses and IBM policies, projects aiming to make regulatory changes in the adoption of IBM were also on the agenda during the IPA fund periods. Regulatory revisions are important in this process because practices can be easily conducted when regulations serve as a basis for these practices. The first one of the regulatory changes was to draft an action plan for the adoption and implementation of IBM policies. This project was the concrete step to incorporating the IBM system into Turkish border management policies. For the first phase of the project, which was carried out between 2010 and 2012, the total budget was 10.960.000 euros. For a two-year-project, which aims to form a basis for IBM policies, it is a heavily-budgeted project. The high amount of funding provided by the EU shows how the EU values the adoption and implementation of the IBM standards.

The project was designed to orient current border management policies to an integrated policy by adopting necessary principles and taking actions in accordance with the National Action Plan towards the implementation of Turkey's Integrated Border Management Strategy, which was adopted on 27 March 2006. Stronger border checks and harmonisation with IBM were the targets that were expected to be met. The Ministry of Interior, Turkish National Police, Gendarmerie General Command and

Coast Guard Command operated the project. (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs Directorate for EU Affairs, 2022b). To take action in accordance with the EU's practices and policies, the EU's most efficient practices were evaluated. At the end of the project, a model training plan for prototype borders, surveillance and checkpoints, and construction standards were designed. Furthermore, surveillance and border control practices at sea and land borders were enhanced at chosen spots, in line with EU preconditions. Also, EU-level facilities for Integrated Border Management were installed. As a result of the project, technical equipment was provided (Delegation of the European Union to Turkey, n.d.-a). Drafting an action plan on IBM can be considered as a regulatory tool which enables institutions to be capable of implementing security-oriented IBM practices more properly. As it is listed above, many practices followed the regulatory changes. To be aligned with the IBM standards, which allows securitizing practices consisting of risk management, policing at a distance, surveillance, and filtering. In this sense, efforts to adopt IBM thoroughly means creating a regulatory framework for stricter border controls and technologically advanced border check mechanisms in order to eliminate risks on the borders. As Balzacq stated, regulatory instruments present the foundation for capacity instruments to operate (Balzacq, 2010). So, after the draft of the action plan on IBM, as a part of the project, several practices were conducted, such as supplying thermal cameras and technical equipment in order to increase the surveillance of the borders to be able to control the movements on the borders. These technical apparatuses serve as a capacity tool through which irregular migrants can be detected easily, and thus they can be prevented from crossing borders. As a way to filter the risk, irregular migrants are addressed as a risk to be constantly monitored and blocked. These capacity tools show that border anxiety intensified in the EU as the border police use military-means technology such as thermal cameras in searching and monitoring irregular migrants (Lutterbeck, 2005, p. 234).

The project also had another phase in which other capacity tools were utilized. The second phase of the project was the continuation of the first phase. The project consisted of practices aiming at increasing technical and institutional capacity for the implementation of the IBM system. After the first phase, subsequent steps were taken to ensure the compliance of Turkey's border regime with the EU standards. To fight

irregular migration and prevent undocumented crossings, risk management systems were established for the personnel of the ministry of health and the police. The model capacitated the police to better recognize the points that require them to be more careful of risks on duty. Along with risk analysis, the technical equipment used on Turkey's eastern border was modernised by upgraded monitoring and control systems (Delegation of the European Union to Turkey, n.d.-b). As it is seen in the practices conducted, risk analysis is an important part of Turkey's border management project funded by the IPA. Risk analysis, through its operationalization, approaches migration and movement along the borders as a scientifically measured risk, thus presents its negative effects similarly in addressing health risks. This approach justifies the preventive practices which are generally used in emergency situations. Risk analysis, in this sense, is a technique serving the securitization of migration in order to take pre-emptive actions to secure future events. (Paul, 2017). It is an assessment method to predict the risk before a dangerous situation arises. By borrowing scientific methods, risk analysis is a way to reduce the risk caused by migrants.

Practices and speech acts coexist in the securitization of migration and border management in Turkey. As a securitizing discourse, in 2013, in the opening ceremony of the second phase of the project, Muammer Güler, who was the minister of interior at that time, articulated that as Turkey is in the position of a crossroads, all types of security issues and unlawful border crossings have a direct impact on Turkey's internal security. Starting at the borders, internal security measures should be implemented. He also added that better and more effective protection of borders is not only a basic requirement for our country but also of great importance in terms of EU harmonization efforts. As a matter of fact, the implementation of Integrated Border Management efforts has been accepted as one of the opening criteria of the 24th chapter. He stated that the main objective of this project is to ensure the security of all land borders of Turkey and monitor the borders on a 24/7 basis. In the second phase, the supply of equipment continued. With this project, 187 thermal cameras and 30 mobile thermal cameras were purchased for the land forces. Therefore, the technical infrastructure of the General Directorate of Police at the border gates has been strengthened (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Department of Interior Press and Public Affairs, 2013). His words truly reflect the influence of the EU on Turkey's border management

preferences. He states that irregular migration affects security in Turkey, thus, the EU as well. As an accession requirement, IBM is necessary to implement. He also mentioned the continuous surveillance of the borders as a part of the project. Taking migration to the security agenda and presenting migrants as a security problem does not necessarily reflect reality. When addressing migrants as a security issue, migrants become actors in a drama on security. The drama is about a system of inclusion and exclusion, which is a part of a struggle for survival (Huysmans, 1995). In this case, Güler expresses that irregular movements directly threaten the internal security of Turkey. Therefore, migrants are transformed into existential threats to the security, integrity and stability of the country. By defining irregular migrants as a threat, they are grouped into the same category as irregular immigrants, and they are abstracted from their individual characters. Securitization is actually a de-humanizing process. Migrants are detached from their human qualities, and they are reduced to migrants. As Huysmans (1995) stated, they become a part of the dialectic of exclusion and inclusion in which they are separated from the natives as the cultural other and even an unwanted weed in the backyard. Calling migrants threats to be prevented is a pure way of exclusion. Along with addressing irregular migration as a security threat, showing practices, such as installing constant surveillance systems as a solution to the security problem, legitimizes the usage of extra-ordinary means to deal with irregular migration. Güler also highlights the importance of the EU and IBM strategy in the migration and border management process. Apart from deducting and inferring that the EU contributes to the securitization of migration and border management in Turkey, Güler's words reveal the EU's part in this securitization process as an actor by solid articulation. Both discursively and practically, in the scope of the project, there is securitization in dealing with irregular migration, and the EU contributes to this process.

The securitizing articulations continued in the following events, as well. In 2013, Muammer Güler also participated in the delivery ceremony of coast guard control boats. Ten coast guard control boats were delivered to the Coast Guard Command with a ceremony attended by Muammer Güler, within the scope of 'Turkey's Land and Sea Border Surveillance Equipment Supply Component in Pilot and Prototype Regions LOT 1 Project' supported by the EU. Speaking at the delivery ceremony held in

Antalya Free Zone, the Interior Minister of that time, Muammer Güler, said that as a ministry, their main duty is to ensure the safety of life and property of citizens. Emphasizing that all kinds of irregular crossings at the borders are related to internal security, Muammer Güler stated that they think that internal security measures should start from the borders. Explaining that many EU projects have been carried out under the name of border management as a Ministry, Interior Minister Muammer Güler stated that technical and equipment support had been provided to institutions on this subject. Mentioning that many projects have been carried out to ensure the security of the coasts, Minister of Interior Muammer Güler said that they delivered the third of the 1,700-ton open sea search and rescue vessels to the Coast Guard Command. He added that they are trying to put into use the first phase of the coastal surveillance radar system project, which includes all our coasts, including the Aegean and Marmara, in the coming period. Noting that illegal immigrants use Turkey as a transit route, Muammer Güler said that their aim with all these works they carry out is to change the image of Turkey as a country that can be easily crossed and to make an irregular migration route with deterrent measures. Better and more effective protection of our borders is important for our country, as well as for EU harmonization. As a matter of fact, the implementation of Integrated Border Management is accepted as one of the opening criteria of Chapter 24. In addition, he added that in order to provide Turkish citizens with visa exemption and visa exemption in EU countries, it is necessary to make progress on border security with the readmission agreement to be signed soon. Lastly, he stated that their efforts to activate border security would continue increasingly (Turkish Republic Ministry of Interior, 2013).

As a discursive act, his words demonstrate that leverages given by the EU, such as visa-free travel, financial assistance and progress in accession, were the main motive behind the conduct of the projects on border management. He clearly stated that in order to sustain internal security, measures should be taken at the borders, and all kinds of irregular crossings impact internal security. So, actually, he also addressed irregular migrants as a threat to internal security. To manage border security, deploying surveillance boats and coastal surveillance radar systems and monitoring the borders on a constant basis were the measures that were taken. By speech acts, he securitizes migration by addressing irregular migrants as threats to internal security. Also, the

practices that were adopted to cope with the risk brought by irregular flows are capacity tools aiming to increase the institutional capacity of the Coast Guard Command. That is why both practically and discursively, the project contributed to the securitization of migration and border management.

4.2.3 Individual and Institutional Capacity Increase for Better Surveillance of Borders

Moreover, after the first years of the IPA programme, more and more projects, which contain capacity tools in order to strengthen the physical capacity and the personnel capacity for the monitoring of the borders, were carried out. First, the project Demining and Increasing the Border Surveillance Capacity at the Eastern Borders was one of the mentioned projects, which was first programmed in 2011 by the National Mine Action Centre and the Border Management Bureau of the Ministry of Interior. The project was planned in order to contribute to the prevention of irregular immigration and all cross-border crimes by clearing Turkey's eastern borders of mines, in line with the EU's IBM policies and strategies, and the provision of humane and effective border surveillance tools for the establishment of a technologically supported modern border surveillance system. Within the scope of the project, determined lands along the Armenian and Iranian borders were cleared from mines, and mobile surveillance vehicles were deployed (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Interior EU Affairs and Foreign Relations Department, 2017). Removing the mines is important in terms of the EU's IBM policy since the landmines impede Turkey's operating capacity in border areas, in addition to humanitarian problems. Land mines were previously planted along the borders to prevent irregular migration, human and migrant smuggling, and other security challenges. However, according to the IBM system, the mines obstruct the implementation of effective border monitoring systems, reducing the effectiveness of the battle against unlawful movements, cross-border crimes, and smuggling. Due to the physical and climate characteristics of the Eastern region, managing Turkey's eastern borders is a difficult task to achieve. In terms of the viability of IBM, land mines pose a severe threat to border management in the region. Thus, demining is seen as an essential component of border management changes. To that end, the project was

developed. With this project, Turkey aims to clear the landmines in order to offer a more secure border protection system based on technologically enabled border surveillance systems, as well as meet the European Union's standards for a well-functioning border management system.

Technology is an essential kind of capacity tool. The military, the police, and intelligence agencies frequently use technology tools, such as drones and biometrics. Technology is typically considered the instrument that would achieve higher security (Balzacq et al., 2010). Although technology is an effective tool for immigrants to provide communication with their families and it makes their journey to find a safe place easier, it also presents new obstacles to their movement as countries are increasing their monitoring and controlling capacities day by day (Nedelcu & Soysüren, 2020). Apart from the practicality of technology in border management processes, the transition to more technologically managed borders is also a way to monitor and control the borders more. Recording every moment with high-resolution cameras, and thermal cameras, collecting data, and analysing data to create risk analysis is a modern but stricter control of borders. In that sense, instead of a traditional way of border control, which is planting mines along the borders, creating a more modern and more humane-seemingly mechanism that serves human rights but in the long run, it also contributes to the securitization process. Aiming to prevent irregular migration, ensuring the surveillance of the borders on a 24/7 basis, and finding high technological means to tackle irregular migration leads to the securitization of migration. That is why, as a capacity tool, the practices that are part of this project are securitizing practices.

Secondly, another project aiming to increase border surveillance capacity was conducted in order to monitor the borders between Turkey and Greece. Turkey-Greece borders are strategic in terms of border security and management. It has been particularly important for the EU's border management agenda since the refugee flow after the Syrian Crisis. Refugees have frequently been trying to cross the EU external borders by departing from Turkey and reaching Greece's sea borders. That is why, to reduce irregular migration, the bilateral cooperation between Turkey and Greece is crucial for the EU in security terms. For security purposes, this project was prepared in order to enhance border surveillance mechanisms between Turkey and Greece. The

project had two components, procurement and training, which were implemented by UNDP through a direct grant. The procurement included the provision of technical equipment to the border control points, while the training component consisted of training sessions provided to border officers. The project had diverse practices, such as the procurement of fixed surveillance unit, 4x4 surveillance vehicle, wireless sensor network, communication and energy network, and providing border surveillance, control and legislation training to 500 personnel working in the border units of the Land Forces Command. As a result of the project, it was aimed to improve the response and response time by 20 per cent after the detection of irregular crossings (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Interior EU Affairs and Foreign Relations Department, 2017, p. 50).

The training component's implementing agency, UNDP, carried out training sessions between 2017 and 2019 to increase the know-how of the border guards working in the Turkey-Greece Border region and increase the institutional capacity of the Land Forces Command. To that end, UNDP prepared tailor-made training curricula and materials according to the needs assessment. In line with the IBM strategy, the particular objective of the project is to make a contribution to the fight against irregular migration, cross-border crimes and migrant smuggling. The project is comprised of two components: one focuses on institutional capacity building while the other focuses on individual capacity increase. The institutional capacity building included the institutional enhancement of the Turkish Land Forces, and the individual capacity building included the development of the personnel regarding the process of handling irregular migratory flows at the border area through specific training sessions. Through the project, the experience of FRONTEX and CEPOL related to border security and surveillance was shared with the Turkish officers, modern surveillance tools were introduced, foundation-level training was given to 517 officers, advanced level training was provided to 102 officers, and intensive training programme was held for the freshly assigned 152 personnel of the Land Forces Command (UNDP, 2019a).

Surveillance tools and mechanisms are important parts of the Integrated Border Management system. Thus, the projects that have been carried out in the scope of IBM have components regarding the enhancement of surveillance and controlling

mechanisms. The constant surveillance mechanism resembles Foucault's notion of the panopticon. Inspired by Jeremy Bentham's architectural concept of prison, Foucault explains the power relations in daily life and the process of disciplining people by surveillance in a panoptical structure. In the panopticon, there is a tower surrounded by the cells of prisoners. The prisoners are monitored by the guardian in the tower, and the prisoners can only see the tower. Through this structure, the constant surveillance of people is the discipline of power. People are isolated, excluded and expected to behave in a certain way. The idea is that due to the permanent surveillance, people will refrain from committing any crime or offence. There is also the objective to prevent any mistake before committed because the structure makes it easier to intervene in any circumstance of disorder. (Foucault, 1977). Hence, in the logic and design of the panopticon mechanism, there is risk elimination, disciplinary mechanism and political autonomy. The sovereign controls, disciplines, separates and punishes populations through a continuous surveillance and control mechanism as it is depicted through the figure of the panopticon. The surveillance system applied by the Turkish institutions in order to prevent and control the migratory flows resembles Foucault's conceptualization. Foucault says that this panopticon schema can be applied within schools, hospitals and so on. In this case, it is implemented along the borders through electro-optical towers, border guards, cameras and monitoring vehicles in order to maintain order and security. The borders are monitored on a 24/7 basis with highly technological instruments to eliminate the risk the migrants might bring. First, the objective is to deter people from crossing as they will see the monitoring towers, vehicles and border police. The second is to detect and prevent them before they even attempt to cross the borders. With both objectives, through constant surveillance, migrants are controlled, excluded and disciplined.

Based on Foucault's *dispositif* of panopticon (Foucault, 1977) and Agamben's notion of the ban, which means banishment from the society and the sovereign's power to halt the rule of law (Agamben, 1998), Bigo uses the term ban-opticon in order to explain the process of unease. To him, the ban-opticon is a network of practices that leads to transnational (in)security. Through surveillance of certain groups, they are controlled at a distance. The usage of emergency practices in daily life, normalizing constant surveillance and controlling mechanisms, and profiling and excluding

specific groups are practices that are included in the concept of the ban-opticon (Bigo, 2008a). The securitization process, which is initiated due to the management of fear and technologization and digitalization of policing, has formed ban-opticon as a new genre of governance in the transnational system (Guild & Bigo, 2005). This type of management of unease leads to perceiving certain groups as others who are dangerous for the normalized group. As a result of the normalization of exceptional techniques such as biometrics, the usage of intelligence and databases, certain people are considered as a threat, profiled into a category to avoid in the future, their freedom is repressed, and they are estranged from the rest of the population (Bigo, 2006b). For the security of the normalized population, the alienated group is (in)securitized.

In the process of securitization of migration and border management policies and practices, the constant usage of surveillance and monitoring technologies such as 4x4 vehicles, armoured mobile vehicles, thermal and night vision cameras, databases, communication and radio systems, sensors, electro-optical towers, patrolling teams, training of border personnel, information networks are normalized as technologies used in everyday operations of border security. As it can be seen, these surveillance and monitoring technologies exist in all IPA periods as capacity tools. For the purpose of increase in the capacity of border management institutions, exceptional practices, which are essentially emergency responses, have become ordinary parts of Turkey's border management practices. Along with the institutional capacity increase, the capacity of border personnel is also important in the border management projects carried out for the fulfilment of IBM objectives in Turkey. As the border personnel is the main operators of border management, their knowledge of IBM rules, irregular migration, and the ways to detect and prevent irregular migrant are part of the (in)securitization process.

Through perpetual surveillance of borders, the migrants are made to be detected, filtered, categorized, excluded and prevented before they cross the border, as they are seen as a threat to internal security. Therefore, the efforts within the scope of IPA projects, the capacity-increasing projects to enhance border security, are securitizing practices, and the technologies used within these practices are capacity tools. These practices and tools lead to the (in)securitization process. On the one hand, the borders

and internal security are securitized. On the other hand, migrants are (in)securitized as they are considered as a threat biasedly before they actually commit any crime. As the sponsor of these practices and the source of the IBM rationale, the EU contributes to this (in)securitization process.

4.3 The Continuance of Border Management Projects in the IPA II Period

In the second period of the IPA, projects containing securitizing practices and tools continued to be programmed and implemented. Within the framework of the sector approach that came with the IPA II period, the subjects included in the 24th Chapter (Justice, Freedom and Security) were grouped under the home affairs sub-sector. The sector concept emerged within the IPA II period. In this regard, the home affairs sub-sector encompasses topics relating to three key priority areas: immigration and asylum, Integrated Border Management, combating terrorism and organized crime.

With Presidential Circular No. 2019/20, the Ministry of Interior has been determined as the leading institution of the Interior Sub-Sector. One of the central units of the Ministry, the General Directorate of Provincial Administration and its subsidiaries (General Directorate of Security, Gendarmerie General Command, Coast Guard Command and General Directorate of Migration Management) stand out among the main beneficiary institutions. On the other hand, in addition to the Ministry of Interior, institutions such as the Land Forces Command, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Trade, and the Ministry of National Defense can implement projects within the IPA-II Interior Sub-Sector to the extent that their duties cover (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Interior EU Affairs and Foreign Relations Department, 2021). As the main institution conducting projects is the Ministry of Interior, programming and monitoring-evaluation studies regarding the sub-sector of home affairs are carried out by the IPA Unit established within the Ministry of Interior's EU and Foreign Relations Department. In this context, in addition to the central units and affiliates of the Ministry of Interior, all relevant public institutions and organizations can prepare projects regarding the aforementioned priority areas of the Interior Sub-Sector. During the IPA II period, a total of 31 projects were programmed in the home affairs sub-sector, and

approximately 326 million Euros of EU funds were utilized. As it can be seen, a high amount of funds was provided for the home affairs project. In the period 2014, there were nine projects programmed under the interior-sub sector of home affairs. All these nine projects were related to migration or border security. Two of those projects, which are carried out within the scope of IBM policies, will be explained in detail.

Initially, the Directorate General of Provincial Administration and the Land Forces Command carried out the project 'Increasing Border Surveillance Capacity of Borders between Turkey and EU Phase II.' The project was programmed in 2014 and conducted between 21 December 2018 and 21 June 2020. 22.102.500 Euros were allocated to the implementation of the project. It aimed to strengthen the Land Forces Command's technical capacity to enhance border surveillance and security. The planned outputs were the procurement of 20 surveillance vehicles, the training programme for the border staff, institutional and individual capacity development, the provision of surveillance towers to control the EU-Turkey border and supplying of 20 armoured mobile surveillance vehicles (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs Directorate for EU Affairs, 2022e).

For the supply of armoured surveillance vehicles, in 2017, the contracting authority Ministry of Treasury and Finance Central Finance and Contracts Unit put the project out to tender. Aselsan, which is a Turkish defence corporation, won the tender. Two separate contracts with a total contract value of approximately 30 million Euros were signed for 57 security systems (Republic of Turkey Presidency of Defence Industries, 2019). 75 per cent of the contract amount was covered by the IPA Fund, while 25 per cent was covered by the national budget. On 16 May 2019, 20 armoured mobile monitoring vehicles were delivered to Land Command Forces with a handover ceremony. 20 vehicles out of 57 surveillance vehicles to be procured within the scope of "Procurement of Mobile Surveillance Vehicles for Increasing the Border Surveillance Capacity at Turkey and EU Borders" were handed over by the contractor company Aselsan (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Interior General Directorate of Provincial Administration, 2019a). The vehicles have land surveillance radar, 4x4 wheels, armoured structure, software-defined radios, gunshot location detection system, electrooptic sensors and security management software that enables these

sensors to be controlled and work together. With the onboard sensors, the short, medium, and long-range mobile surveillance needs of military units will be met despite the adverse weather conditions day and night. A target can be detected by the radar, or a sniper shot can be detected by the gunshot location detection system. The target can be located and coordinated on the digital map and can be monitored and followed by a thermal camera. All the video captures will be recorded continuously. These intelligence-driven technologies will be employed on the Thrace frontiers to detect irregular migrants; thus, the EU-Turkey borderline security will be maintained (Republic of Turkey Presidency of Defence Industries, 2019).

All the technological and digital instruments serve to identify irregular movements along the borders. Through identification, the personal data of individuals are collected, kept and used for the elimination of risk. So, there is a specific power relation in this circumstance. From a Foucauldian perspective, Amoore put forward that in the contemporary war on terror, borders have become biometric borders through which individuals are disciplined. Digitalization, technologization, data usage and expertise in the management of borders, and the exertion of biopower, which means a tool of governmentality in order to discipline bodies, individuals are divided in accordance to race, gender, identity and so on. Biometric borders regulate and control mobility from many aspects of day-to-day life. Individuals, who are subject to biopower, are divided into legal passenger/irregular migrants, civil/uncivil, and harmless/threat (Amoore, 2006). As Bigo asserted that internal security and external security have become the 'Möbius ribbon' in which internal security and external security are related to the perception of immigrants as 'enemies within.' With the technological developments and the old type of governmentality combined, immigration and the threat of terrorist movements are incorporated as a problem not because they threaten the survival of the referent object but because daily life is securitized (Bigo, 2001). Technological advancements have led to the application of authority and control over immigrants' bodies. As capacity tools, all the technological enhancement practices have the objective of increasing the surveillance and security capacities of border units in order to control the movements of migrants. This tight control and prevention mechanism, which is created by the technological border

equipments, actually separates the migrants from the society and securitizes migration and border management.

Besides the securitizing practices due to technical investments, the project also consisted of discursive securitizing practices created by the political actors. At the opening ceremony of the project, Muammer İnce said that Turkey's border security is an issue that directly affects peace and security in Europe. He once again emphasized the European factor in border security practices. In addition, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and Director for EU Affairs Ambassador Faruk Kaymakçı also delivered a speech by saying that Integrated Border Management is an important area in the financial cooperation between Turkey and the EU, and only 158 million Euros of support was provided to border surveillance projects between 2014 and 2016 in the IPA II period. He emphasized the importance of Eastern borders as well as the Western borders between the EU and Turkey for the security of the EU. Therefore, he said that the EU should further support efforts to increase Turkey's migration and border management capacity (Republic of Turkey Presidency of Defence Industries, 2019). As governmental figures, İnce and Kaymakçı initiated the securitization process through their speeches. By a speech act, they contribute to the securitization of migration and border management policies. In the notion of the speech act of security, there is a critical analysis of an issue that politicizes the issue and legitimizes the political decisions to respond to the issue. A speech act of security has an exceptionalizing effect that takes the issue from the realm of non-security to the realms of security through decisional gravity (Huysmans, 2011). In this case, İnce and Kaymakçı move the issue of irregular migration beyond the realm of non-security and transform it into a security problem by articulating that it is a threat to the internal security of Turkey. As a solution to the security problem, they present EU-funded IPA practices. In that sense, these speech acts are securitizing practices that lead to the securitization of migration and border management policies and practices.

The supply of physical and technological equipment continued in 2019. On 17 December 2019, the second delivery of the armoured mobile surveillance vehicles was made. The protocol regarding the delivery was signed by the Deputy Minister of the Interior and Deputy Minister of National Defense. The remaining 27 vehicles were

handed over to the Land Forces Command with a ceremony (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Interior General Directorate of Provincial Administration, 2019b). In May 2020, ten systems were delivered to the relevant border units in Edirne and Kırklareli, and all deliveries of the project were completed. Thus, on the Greece-Bulgaria borderline, the number of vehicles operating rose to 57 (Aselsan, 2020). In these practices, there is militarization of border management practices. First, the project was carried out by the Ministry of National Defense. Second, within the scope of the project, armoured vehicles which can be used in military actions were supplied. Third, even the collaboration on the supply of border technologies with Aselsan, which is a company producing high technological military equipment, shows the militarization of border management practices. The usage of extensive and new technology and militarization of border checks have become the utmost trends in the IBM strategy, which is highly based on the continuous surveillance of external borders (Duez, 2014). This militarized and technology-driven border strategy, promoted by IBM, has led to the securitization of migration since migrants have been considered as the same threat as the terrorist groups, and they have been excluded from the territory based on the categorization of being illegitimate and dangerous. Therefore, it can be said that the monitoring of the EU-Turkey border through the deployment of high-tech, armoured vehicles that resemble military tanks contributes to the process of securitization of migration and border management. To stop irregular migration, utilising military equipment securitizes migration by generating the conception of a 'security threat'. The use of military force for border surveillance is an extreme response to a problem. This securitizing practice is promoted, financed and supported technically by the EU.

Apart from the practices of physical capacity building on the borders, the project also aims to increase the capacity of the border staff and officials by providing them with training programmes. Within this scope, United Nations Development Programme is the implementing agency for the training of border personnel. There are two components of the training part of the project. First, the objective is to deliver face-to-face classes on irregular migration, human smuggling, cross-border crimes, and the EU's IBM approach. Second, the other aim is to improve distance education modules and systems on human rights and migration management to support physical learning programmes. To that end, eight face-to-face education classes were held, 2 study visits

to Spain, Croatia and Slovenia were made, and three distance learning training were conducted. To strengthen individual capacity via face-to-face, three different programmes were organized. Initially, the education programme and materials which were created in the previous phase of the project were revised, and the modules were updated. The sessions included subjects such as risk assessment, IBM policies, border surveillance, irregular migrants, smugglers, and international trafficking. In 2019, 208 personnel participated in training programmes held in Edirne, Antalya, and Kırklareli (UNDP, 2019b). As it is previously discussed as a capacity instrument, training programmes, in essence, are securitizing practices. The main points to pay attention to are the objectives and the curriculum of the training programmes. The purpose of these training practices is to raise the knowledge level of the border personnel on the prioritized issues that IBM requires to work on. These issues are irregular migration, smuggling and the usage of modernized border management tools. In order to deal with irregular migration, increase the effectiveness of highly technological equipment, and detect and prevent irregular movements along the border, the personnel's knowledge of these issues and IBM practices and rules is required. Therefore, the EU-funded IPA projects also support these training programmes to sustain security on Turkey's borders. As a capacity tool, the training programmes create the idea of migrants as a risk that border personnel should be aware and alert of. Therefore, as a capacity tool, training is a securitizing practice that the EU promotes through IPA programmes.

As another implementation regarding IBM, the establishment of a Turkish agency to collect, interchange, and analyse data regarding border security and conducting risk analyses through the collected and analysed data was an expected action by the EU (European Commission, 2016). Within this scope, the Ministry of Interior Directorate General of Provincial Administration programmed the Establishment of NACORAC and the Development of Integrated Border Management Integrated Database project in 2014. The main goal of the project is to enable different institutions to save their data regarding border management in an integrated database system so that these institutions can share the data, conduct common risk analyses, and cooperate with each other. Within that aim, a National Coordination and Joint Risk Analysis Center under the Ministry of Interior was planned to establish. The project duration was between

April 2017 and June 2021. The total budget of the project was 11.050.000 euros. Regulation on Interagency Cooperation and Coordination in the Field of Border Management dated 17 March 2016 regulates the procedures and principles regarding the establishment of the Integrated Border Management Coordination Board, Border Management Implementation Board and National Coordination and Joint Risk Analysis Center (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs Directorate for EU Affairs, 2022d). According to the regulation, the main responsibilities of NACORAC are creating a common risk strategy and joint risk analysis within the scope of border management; collecting and evaluating data related to border management; identifying, measuring, analysing, monitoring, reporting the controllable and uncontrollable risks and give warnings about the risks in order to reduce them. Also, it is responsible for determining and updating the risk analysis criteria, coordinating the institutions that are in charge of border control, sharing risk analysis data with national and international institutions and countries in compliance with the procedures, creating risk profiles and informing related units, and finally, organising training programmes about its field of activity.

With regard to the regulation, the risk is any threat to border security. Thus, risk analysis is the data processing and interpretation activities carried out in order to understand the probability and nature of the emergence of a threat and to make inferences about the measures to be taken (Presidential Decree 2016/8520, 2016). Data are more important than ever for border and immigration control (Leese, Noori, & Scheel, 2021). Specifically in the EU, with the smart borders policy, which is the automated process of border checks made by computers instead of human controls. It includes the data collection of immigrants, profiling them and detection of undocumented entry and stay. Smart borders are not only about borders but also about the surveillance of travellers' mobility. It can be entitled as dataveillance which means conducting surveillance via collecting information and data (Bigo, Carrera, Hayes, Hernanz, & Julien, 2014). In this case, practices on border management such as establishing a single body with the mandate of conducting risk analyses and recording everything happening at the borders, turning them into data, evaluating the data, interpreting the analysed data and turning it into information, sharing the information with other authorities or international agencies, using the information on risk analysis

in order to detect the threat are practices of dataveillance. Also, they are securitizing practices because they are practices in order to prevent risk and be prepared for uncontrollable risk emerging at the borders. Moreover, the processed data are used by police and intelligence services in order to draft policies on certain areas, such as migration and asylum (Balzacq, 2008). Therefore, the NACORAC's mandate is similar to this process in which individuals' information is analysed and used for the detection of risk. Therefore, it is a securitizing practice.

In 2015, There were eight projects that were programmed within the home affairs subsection. The total budget of the programme was determined as 137,840,000 Euros, and the EU contribution was determined as 118,940,000 Euros. It is aimed that the projects prepared by the Directorate General of Migration Management will contribute to the work carried out by Turkey in the field of migration and asylum and to the effective management of irregular migration. The projects aim to strengthen the surveillance capacity at land and sea borders. Seven of eight projects are related to migration, and two of them are related to border security.

Firstly, physical capacity growth was again among the important goals of IPA programming. Therefore, the Ministry of Interior-Directorate General of Provincial Administration and the co-beneficiary Turkish Land Forces Command programmed the project regarding the increase in the border surveillance capacity at Turkey's Eastern and Western Borders project and continued the project to the second phase. The project aimed to increase border security and monitoring capacity on Turkey's eastern and western borders by installing modern equipment and a border surveillance system. The project thereby, was expected to help combat irregular migration, human trafficking, cross-border crime, and smuggling. It also aimed to contribute to the harmonization of border management practices with EU IBM policies and strategies. The total EU contribution to the project was 29.965.000 euros and the duration of the project was between May 2019 and November 2021 (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs Directorate for EU Affairs, 2022f). As a part of the IBM objectives, the main expected results were supplying modernised equipment for border monitoring and security in the Eastern and Western land borders and providing training to nearly 800 Land Forces staff on border security, border management and migration.

More specifically, the project consisted of procurement and direct grant (training) components. Within the scope of the procurement component, it was planned to supply the surveillance command and control center, fixed surveillance units, wireless detection network, and energy and data transport network. Within the scope of the training component, training sessions were organized to increase the administrative capacity of the Land Forces Command against irregular immigrants. It was planned to provide training to 700 personnel working in the Land Forces Command Border Units within the scope of the Institutional Capacity Building Component of the Project, where the beneficiary institutions were the Border Management Department of the General Directorate of Provincial Administration and General Staff of the Turkish Armed Forces, Land Forces Command (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Interior, 2018). For the procurement component, it is planned to build electro-optical watchtowers on the western and eastern borders, consisting of 4 lots in total, in order to increase the surveillance capacity. The project was tendered by the Central Finance and Contracts Unit on 18 September 2018, and all four lots were approved by the EU Delegation (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Interior, 2019). On 15 March 2019, Aselsan won the tender for the supply of the procurement of border equipment (Ministry of Treasury and Finance Central Finance and Contracts Unit, 2019). In 2019, design and site exploration works were carried out by the contractor Aselsan. Within the framework of the project carried out in coordination with the Land Forces Command, infrastructure and production work for the electro-optical tower systems were established in Edirne in December 2019. As the output of the project, 211 surveillance and 130 communication towers were built. In December 2021, 79 surveillance and 115 communication towers were accepted to be installed. A total of 497 sets of wireless sensor systems were delivered to the relevant border units (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Interior, 2020).

The provision of such military-like mechanisms is an unordinary measure to tackle irregular migration since immigrants are not at the borders to raise war. It creates the idea that immigrants pose a threat to the integrity and security of the territory, and the only way to cope with this danger, is to adopt and implement unusual practices such as building surveillance towers and supplying surveillance systems that record everything on a constant basis and detecting every little move or heat near the borders.

Even giving tender to the defence company demonstrates the gravity of the situation. Immigrants are considered such a threat that defence technologies are necessary to eliminate the threat. Therefore, these practices, and capacity tools, have the objectives to increase the capacity of the respective border agency, such as Land Forces Command Border Units. By increasing the capacity, it is also intended to handle the dangerous situation caused by immigrants.

In the following years, similar projects continued to be programmed with common objectives. For instance, in 2016, within the scope of IBM policy, the project named 'Increasing Border Surveillance Capacity at Turkey's South Eastern Borders' was prepared by the Directorate General of Provincial Administration with an EU contribution of 23.630.000 euros (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs Directorate for EU Affairs, 2022a). The project was designed in order to decrease irregular migration and cross-border crimes by purchasing border surveillance hardware and providing training for the border personnel in order to expand the capability. The tender contraction for the installation of electro-optical towers and thermal cameras was made by CFCU. The contract for the supply of surveillance systems was signed between Aselsan and CFCU for a total worth 27.710.400,00 euros (CFCU, n.d.). On 25 November 2021, a ceremony was held to hand over thermal cameras to the Land Forces Command (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Interior, 2021c). In total, 153 thermal cameras were delivered to the border troops serving in the South Eastern region (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Interior Department of Strategy Development, 2022). With the supply of thermal cameras, it is aimed at supporting the prevention of irregular migration, undocumented entry and exit and all kinds of cross-border crimes and to strengthen the border surveillance capacity. With the thermal camera systems deployed in the provinces of Hatay, Gaziantep, Kilis, Mardin, Şanlıurfa and Şırnak along the Syrian border line in line with the needs of the relevant border troops, it is targeted to monitor the Syrian border, which has been in an unstable situation for a long time (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Interior EU Affairs and Foreign Relations Department, 2016).

All of these practices on borders are intended to prevent risks coming from the other side of the borders. The practices are in the nature of eliminating risks. However, by

eliminating the so-called risks, authorities govern the masses. Aradau and Van Munster argue that the war on terror, which is a campaign led by the U.S. after the 9/11 terror attacks, conducts the masses through surveillance, precautionary policies, profiling populations and so on. They conceptualize risk as a dispositif for governing social problems. Dispositif means diverse institutional, physical and administrative techniques, mechanisms and knowledge structures that make it possible to exert power on populations (Foucault, 1980). It is a way of conducting populations and controlling them through risk. Governing through risk necessitates constant surveillance and taking precautions for future catastrophes. The contingency of knowledge leads to the practice of those techniques. For instance, to prevent terrorist attacks, the technique of biometrics makes it possible to trace populations (Aradau & Van Munster, 2016).

Addressing migrants as a threat and source of risk leads to securitization. Moreover, taking extensive measures to tackle the risk coming with irregular migrants is a securitizing practice. In this case, constant surveillance systems to analyse and prevent risk securitizes migrants. As the characteristic of a capacity tool, border surveillance systems are securitizing practices that lead to the securitization of migration.

In 2016, another project was programmed as the continuation and the third phase of the demining and border surveillance projects. The project was programmed in 2016 and operationalized in 2021 with the objective of aligning with the IBM system. The beneficiary authority of the project was the Ministry of National Defence National Mine Activity Centre. The project operationalized in 2020 with a total of 18.550.000 euros of EU contribution. The project aimed to remove 80.000 of land mines. The third stage of the project contributes to the outcomes of the previous projects, which have cleared 46.000 of mines since 2016 (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs Directorate for EU Affairs, 2022g). Although the project reflects humanitarian objectives, it actually aims to make reforms in border management by altering the old-fashioned and risky way of protecting borders with more technological and intelligence-based border management strategies.

The traditional impression of borders as a territorial line has evolved into a place where the state exerts power on targeted people via detecting, deterring, excluding and pre-empting technologies (Pickering & Weber, 2006). It can be seen in Turkey's border

management practices as well. At a ceremony held on 28 September 2021 at the Iranian border on the skirts of Mount Ararat in the district of Aralık, the governor of Ağrı, H. Engin Sariibrahim stated that mines restrict Turkey's ability to act in security in the border areas. He also said that Turkey made a great effort to eliminate this problem, and the cleaning of minefields on the borders constitutes the infrastructure of Turkey's border security, and these efforts demonstrate Turkey's commitment to border security. He continued his speech by saying that nowadays, border security is provided through electro-optical towers, thermal cameras, lighting systems, wire fences, modern technological tools, unmanned aerial vehicles and concrete walls, while in the past, border security was maintained with landmines (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Interior, 2021b).

Through his speech, the governor shows how technology has evolved border management practices. Instead of traditional border control mechanisms such as landmines, more technology-based and complex border management tools have been used in order to maintain border security. New border management instruments such as unmanned aerial vehicles and biometrics and the enhancement of conventional border apparatuses such as walls, barbed wires and fences have turned borders into politicized technologies and security realms in which there is this purpose of controlling movements. It is a way of controlling populations by using tools such as surveillance technologies, statistics, demographics, and biometrics (Ozguc, 2020). As the governor stated, in Turkey, there is also border control oriented on new and highly technological apparatuses in the management of border security. All the instruments he mentioned are capacity tools securitizing border management practices. As (Balzacq et al., 2010) put forward that the police, the military and agencies continuously use technological instruments such as biometrics, databases, algorithms, sensors, drones, information, training and force in order to increase security. These technologically developed practices are securitizing practices used for the exertion of power on targeted people. Hence, the governor's articulation of the transition from traditional practices to more technological and modern practices, which are essentially securitizing in the achievement of border security, legitimizes the usage of securitizing tools in the border management strategies of Turkey. From this perspective, through

the speech act, government authorities contribute to the securitization of migration and border management in Turkey by justifying securitizing tools and practices.

On border security, as securitizing actors, not only Turkish government figures but also the EU figures contribute to the securitization of migration of border management in Turkey through speech acts. At the same ceremony, Nikolaus Meyer-Landrut, who is the head of the EU delegation to Turkey, delivered a speech emphasizing the usage of modern technologies in border management and stating the importance of the adoption of the EU's IBM policy, which supports demining the state borders (EU Delegation to Turkey, 2021). In both speeches and the project objectives, there is a repetitive highlight on the alignment with the IBM structure. Also, demining leads to the technological development of borders in order to monitor irregular crossings and fight irregular migration. Through modernised equipment on borders instead of mines, borders can be monitored and controlled more efficiently. Therefore, this project is important within IBM policy and has securitising practices.

In the EU's documents, it can be observed that IBM and border security are prioritized policy areas. Accordingly, the Annex to the Commission Implementing Decision adopting an Annual Action Programme for Turkey for the year 2019 highlights two projects that aim to enhance IBM in alignment with the EU *acquis* (European Commission, 2019a). These are the Drafting of a national IBM strategy and updating of the 'National Action Plan to Implement Turkey's IBM strategy and Increasing Border Surveillance Capacity at Turkey's Eastern and Western Borders Phase III. Also, related to border management and irregular migration, another project for increasing the capacity of the Turkish Coast Guards (TURCG) was described in the document (European Commission, 2019a).

First, in the scope of efforts toward complete alignment with the EU's IBM policy, the project named Drafting of a National IBM Strategy and Updating of the National Action Plan to Implement Turkey's IBM Strategy was programmed after the adoption of the action plan on IBM. The project took the efforts of creating a legally adopted IBM policy to a new level by aiming to transform Turkey's border management practices into more technology-oriented practices. To that end, it is planned to draft a National Integrated Border Management Strategy. After that, it is aimed to create a

National Action Plan for Integrated Border Management for the fulfilment of the objectives related to the EU regulations, policies, and strategies of IBM. As the main beneficiary, the Directorate General of Provincial Administration runs the projects with the co-beneficiaries, Turkish National Police, Gendarmerie General Command, Turkish Coast Guard, Turkish Land Forces Command, Ministry of Trade, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Agriculture, and Forestry. A unified policy is intended to be formed with the collaboration of different ministries. With the collaboration of many institutions, the project, as a regulatory instrument, aims to create a NAP for IBM as a basis for capacity tools to operate in. With the establishment of such a legal foundation, with IBM strategies, the regulatory framework will be aligned with the EU's standards and will be contained more technological and intelligence-based practices. Therefore, it will be the grounds for securitizing practices.

Second, the project named Increasing Border Surveillance Capacity at Turkey's Eastern and Western Borders Phase III was programmed to complement the previous phases of the project. In the second phase of the IPA, mainly, many projects are the characteristics complementary to the previous projects. The second or third phases of the previously conducted projects were carried out in this period. This project aims to improve border security by modernizing border surveillance systems and contributing to the prevention of irregular migration, human and migrant trafficking and smuggling, and cross-border crimes, as well as to ensure the continued development and implementation of border management and standards in accordance with EU's IBM policies and strategies. Surveillance masts such as radar masts, communication masts, internal-exterior electro-optical masts, shelter units, field sensor systems, and system rooms will be supplied as a part of this project to fill any remaining procurement gaps left over from earlier phases of the project and other EU funds allocated (European Commission, 2018).

If there was a war, using military means to handle irregular migration is an extraordinary and securitizing practice. As it is mentioned before, in the case of other projects, as a type of capacity tool, setting up surveillance systems can be seen as a securitizing practice. These practices create the image of irregular migrants as threats who put internal security in danger.

The maritime capacity increase was also important in the IPA II period. In that regard, Enhancing the Capacity of Turkish Coast Guard Command, which includes the supply of control boats, was programmed to that end. As a part of the border management policy reforms, this project proposes enhancement in the capacity of the Turkish Coast Guard Command by providing coastal patrol boats and technical training after the supply of the boats. The main purpose is to increase the surveillance, search and rescue capacity of the Turkish Coast Guard Command. By doing so, it is expected to increase security within the sea borders of Turkey. As a result of the project, by 2023, 129 boats are expected to be procured. In that way, the number of boats will have risen to 179, and the increase in number will help the Turkish Coast Guard Command's effectiveness in sea operations (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs Directorate for EU Affairs, 2022c). By the enhancement of the technical and individual capacity, it is anticipated to decrease irregular migration and cross-border crimes along the shallow seawaters in the Aegean and Mediterranean Seas (European Commission, 2019a).

As a responsible institution for the security of sea borders, the Turkish Coast Guard Command's capacity for surveillance has been increased through IPA-funded projects. In the EU, within the extent of IBM policies, FRONTEX is the agency which detects, rescues or pushes back irregular migrants by using complex digital surveillance technologies, boats, ships, radars and intelligence (Orsini, 2016). The governmentality of risk is linked with a state-driven emergency response within the FRONTEX practices (Neal, 2009). The practices of FRONTEX are excluding and risk-based practices since FRONTEX mainly aims to detect, prevent, deter, and push back irregular migrants trying to cross EU sea borders. These practices create the process of securitization of border management policies and practices. Leonard put forward that all the main practices of FRONTEX are securitizing as they are implemented to handle issues that are considered to be existential threats and exceptional practices. Surveillance practices also strengthen the perception of external borders of the EU are threatened by irregular migratory flows and should be safeguarded via complex technological instruments (Léonard, 2010). Similar to FRONTEX's securitizing practices, there is an effort to increase the capacity of Turkish Coastal Guards Command's surveillance and control capacity at sea borders. Through the deployment

of boats, more patrolling and searching activities are planned to be executed. As a result of these practices, irregular migrants will be spotted before they cross sea borders, and they will be prevented to enter the territory. As it is determined in the EU-Turkey deal of March 2016, Turkey is expected to block immigrants' exit from Turkey to cross EU borders through boats. Also, Turkey must accept the returns of the immigrant irregularly crossed to the EU territory (Ghezelbash, Moreno-Lax, Klein, & Opekin, 2018). Therefore, Turkey is obliged to operate surveillance, patrolling and controlling activities on the sea borders to prevent irregular migrants to cross the EU. With the financial and technical contributions to the capacity of Turkish Coastal Guards, more securitizing practices on sea borders are supported by the EU within the scope of IPA.

In 2020, projects related to border management continued to be programmed. In the annex to the Commission Implementing Decision adopting an Annual Action Programme for Turkey for the year 2020, the detailed intentions regarding the projects planned in the field of home affairs were described. According to this document, in order to improve cooperation between different branches of the armed services within IBM policy, the capacity of the NACORAC is aimed to be elevated. Therefore, a new project was programmed to make NACORAC operational. NACORAC has previously been established thanks to IPA funds, as well. To make further development in NACORAC's functions, a new project was introduced. NACORAC functions as a risk assessment center under the Ministry of Interior's Directorate General of Provincial Administration, with the mission of collecting data related to border management from all relevant national authorities in Turkey involved in border management, producing border management risk analyses, and sharing these outputs with all relevant national authorities in Turkey. The foremost purpose of the project is to achieve alignment with IBM standards by upgrading NACORAC's institutional capacity and interoperability with other government agencies (ICMPD, n.d.).

It is expected to make NACORAC thoroughly operational by 2021. The project will be implemented through indirect management with an international agency, the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD) and the technical assistance transferred by the European Border and Coast Guards Agency. ICMPD will

assist the beneficiary institution, which is the Ministry of Interior Directorate General of Provincial Administration, with its expertise in the field of migration (European Commission, 2020a). The actions that are envisaged to achieve are the creation of a road map based on a needs analysis, development cooperation between NACORAC and other agencies, establishing a Data and Risk Analysis Library system, supporting data analysis and risk analysis, and providing necessary training for the personnel and supplying physical equipment for unceasing operation of NACORAC (ICMPD, n.d.).

Analogous to FRONTEX, NACORAC has several similar objectives and duties, such as conducting risk analyses, collecting, storing and analysing data, and sharing information with related institutions. Léonard (2010) argues that activities of FRONTEX on risk analysis can be considered as securitising practices, which conducted to the process of securitization of migration in the EU. Collecting data, storing, analysing and sharing with the other agencies are part of the risk analysis process. Risk analysis can be seen as an early warning to detect possible security threats and respond to them accordingly. Risk analysis, even semantically, denotes the analysis of the things that put risk on important issues. In this context, irregular migrants are regarded as risk sources and security threats. Therefore, NACORAC's objectives are essentially securitizing practices on border management that contribute to the securitization of migration in Turkey.

4.4 Constructing Walls in order to Prevent Human Flows

In the globalized world, there is a dichotomy between maintaining open borders and strengthening borders through technologies and financial means. Globalization presents contracting concepts such as territorialisation/deterritorialization, global systems/local nationalisms, and maintaining security/increasing the free movement of capital (Brown, 2010). Basaran put forward that in the liberal states, security practices conducted via technologies of the rule of law, policing and space have become the ordinary mode of governing. This governance mode has led to the legal exclusion of certain groups outside of the border zones. Through legal exclusion on the border zones, the contrast between inside and outside emerges (Basaran, 2008). Walls are one

of the places where these kinds of contrasting situations take place. The tension between exclusion and inclusion is present in the borderlands. In the globalized system, walls are not built against the threat of invasion or wars between states, but they are constructed against the specific threat posed by non-state actors such as people, groups and organizations. In contrast to the Westphalian nation-state walls, the modern nation-state walls segregate the richer from the poorer or the insider from the outsider. Border walls are the places for policing, surveillance and blocking. Walls demarcate the line between us and them or friend and enemy rather than only determining territorial boundaries (Brown, 2010).

As Weizman argues, territorial architectures, such as walls, fences or checkpoints, are the permanent system of division and control. The wall can be considered as a shifting frontier that segregates rather than a linear dividing the territory into two halves. It does not only separate but also prevents movement (Weizman, 2017). In this perspective, with highly technological surveillance systems, border control mechanisms and wall structures target immigrants in order to deter, prevent and filter them.

Although it is argued that globalization leads to the deterritorialized and border-free system, along with the rising trend to build walls in other examples, such as the US-Mexico border wall, the EU has also been fortifying its borders through walls and fences. Specifically, since 2015, with the intense refugee movements, EU member states such as Greece, Hungary and Austria have been erecting fences in order to monitor, control, prevent and filter the movement of certain groups coming from undeveloped countries. In order to deal with migratory flows, The EU states tightened their border control systems rather than trying to contribute to the solution of the migratory complexities (Koca, 2019).

In contrast to the IBM strategy, of which the objective is to achieve open but secure borders, the EU has been fortifying border controls and actively filtering people in accordance with the assessment of legality. This increasing trend is also reflected in the Turkish border management system, as well. With the emergence of distress within the European States regarding migratory movements, Turkey has erected border barriers, as well. Although it is contracting with the IBM standards, along with all the

technological border management systems which are explained in the previous sections, a traditional way to secure borders, which is the construction of border walls, has also taken place in Turkey's border management policy. Consecutive terrorist activities, such as the Reyhanlı bombings, transformed migration policy and security policies. In order to handle security threats and strengthen border security, the Turkish government embraced new security action plans. The project on the Urgent Border Physical Protection System was one of the measures that were adopted in this context. The system contains the construction of walls, monitoring towers, barbed wire and technological surveillance systems (Müftüler-Baç, 2021). To block undocumented crossings and sustain internal security, under the scope of the European Integrated Border Management System, Turkey began to build kilometres of concrete wall along the Iran, Iraq and Syria borders. The wall is supported by other tools such as ditches, border lighting systems, camera systems, patrol roads, watchtowers, and secure wire-fence systems in order to create an effective border security mechanism. Building walls actually shows how Turkey's migration and border management policies shifted. In contrast to the open-door policy adopted in the first year of the refugee crisis, over time, the migration and border management policies have been transformed into strictly closed borders with the construction of physical border walls in order to achieve security (Arslan, Can, & Wilson, 2020).

With the works carried out between the years 2015-2021, the length of the border wall at Turkey's land borders has reached 1.028 km. In the four border cities, which are Ağrı, Hakkari, Van and Şırnak, walls and roads for patrolling were constructed, wire-fence systems were set up, electro-optic towers were built, and camera, lighting and sensor systems were installed (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Interior Department of Strategy Development, 2022). The Turkish-Syrian border has become the third largest border wall after the Chinese and the US-Mexico border walls. In addition to the construction of the wall, watchtowers, which are called Kulekol, were built as places for Turkish land forces to watch irregular movements along the border. Lastly, high-security doors were also added to the wall to resist attacks. As a result of these efforts of fortification of frontiers, it has been aimed at preventing the movement of people from Syria to Turkish land. The border wall between Turkey and Syria is the instance of a demarcation line which defines who should be admitted and who should not. Also,

it demonstrates the shift in the migration and border management of Turkey due to the effect of the alignment with the EU standards and the management of the refugee crisis. With the influence of these two factors, the surveillance and control mechanisms increased along the borders of Turkey. This increase is also seen in the EU's practices, such as the FRONTEX activities through Rapid Border Intervention Team. Both Turkey's construction of the border wall and the EU practices can be instantiated as practices of increased border securitization (Müftüler-Baç, 2021).

A wall is not just a constructed building, but it is also a differentiation mechanism. It forms the idea of 'us' and 'them.' Also, borders are responses to a perceived threat that is created by the building authority (Vallet & David, 2014). Walls and fences can be regarded as some kind of physical embodiment of the human desire to differentiate oneself from others while being a part of a community. There is this paradox between feeling like a member of a group but building walls and fences to be distinct from other groups. On the one hand, walls are means of security. On the other hand, they are tools of exclusion and blocking (Miller & Mills, 2021). In the case of this border management practice, borders divide the people inside the border and the outsiders, which are immigrants, from each other. As a capacity tool, building walls along the borders is a securitizing practice which employs the idea that the people outside of the borders are dangerous and they should be prevented from entering the territory physically.

Besides practices, Minister of Interior, Süleyman Soylu, articulated the importance of the Integrated Border Management system, border security, and prevention of irregular migration through walls, cameras and surveillance mechanisms many times. In a press release, he stated that thanks to the measures taken, 253,299 people trying to enter Turkey illegally had been blocked at the border since the beginning of 2021. Stating that Turkey has a success accepted by the whole world in managing the migration originating from Syria and the Middle East caused by civil wars and poverty, Soylu emphasized that Turkey has been preparing for a long time for possible scenarios after the withdrawal decision from Afghanistan, as in many other regions, regarding the fight against irregular migration. In fighting against irregular migration, he expressed the importance of the constant surveillance and control of borders in order to detect

migratory flows through unmanned aerial vehicles, armoured patrolling vehicles, thermal cameras, and electro-optic towers (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Interior, 2021a).

In his speech, he addresses both Syrian and Afghan immigrants as people to be prevented from entering Turkey in order to sustain internal security. As a securitizing actor, Soylyu, who is a government figure, defines irregular migrants as a threat to the internal security of Turkey, and he clearly expressed that their movement should be blocked. In order to impede their movement, he justifies the usage of highly-technological equipment, which are capacity tools. This preventive approach, with the usage of extraordinary tools, transforms immigrants into a source of danger even though there is no solid proof. He even glorifies the prevention of irregular migrants from crossing to Turkey and entitled this prevention as a success. He highlights the effectiveness of the wall, the constant surveillance system and the enhanced technological capacity tools in the management of irregular flows. As a discursive act, he takes the irregular migration issue beyond the usual policy agenda. He problematizes the issue of irregular migration by calling it a security problem and presenting migrants as a threat which can be dealt with through extraordinary means of constant surveillance and prevention. The problematization of irregular migration and the accent on unusual means as a resort to solve the problem take the issue beyond the daily political agenda and turn this issue into an existential threat which should be managed urgently. Hence, this process is a securitization process created by a securitizing actor through speech acts.

Later, the securitizing speeches on border management were repetitively performed by Soylyu. Recently, in the opening remark of a meeting, Soylyu also stated that the fight against irregular migration is one of the most challenging areas of migration management. He added that Turkey invested both a large group of staff and a significant technological investment in fighting irregular migration. He continued his speech by saying that despite the difficult geography, 1028 kilometres of firewall and security roads, 913 kilometres of lighting, 293 kilometres of cameras and sensors, 341 electro-optical towers, and 284 thermal cameras have been installed. The construction

and tender processes of the other parts are continuing (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Interior, 2022).

In this speech, Soylu directly addressed irregular migration as a problem that needs to be immediately solved. Also, he presented the construction of the border wall and technical equipment as a solution to the problem. So, he represented irregular migrants as a threat to be eliminated by extraordinary means to obstruct their crossings to Turkey. This discourse truly over-politicized the issue of irregular migration, and by addressing a threat, he justifies the usage of these securitizing practices. As Bigo asserted, a successful political discursive act leads to the (in)securitization process because it alters the process of decision-making, creates a politics of exclusion and exception and often favours repressive options (Bigo & Tsoukala, 2008b). According to the Copenhagen School, the success of the speech acts is only acceptable when the audience acknowledges it. So, the success of securitization is determined by the audience, not by the securitizing actor. If the audience does not accept the securitization, the speech act will only be a securitizing move (Buzan, Barry; Wæver, Ole; De Wilde, 1998). On the other hand, Paris School asserts that it is hard to determine whether the audience accepts it or not since the difference between the audience and the securitizing actor has become indistinct (Balzacq, 2010). Floyd argues that Securitization is only considered 'successful' in three steps. First, the description of a threat legitimizes the means used for responding to the threat; second, the change in the actions of the securitizing actor after the identification of the threat; and third, the action taken is legitimized by the securitizing actor regarding the threat they identified and stated in response to the threat (Floyd, 2016). From this perspective, regardless of the audience, the success and the effectiveness of a speech act are based on the securitizing actor's statements, actions and behaviours. In the discursive acts of the governmental figures in Turkey, it is visible that there is an identification of a threat which is irregular migrants. The usage of instruments to respond to the irregular flow of migrants is justified by the securitizing actor, who is a governmental figure such as the Minister of Interior. He justifies the construction of the wall and the use of highly-technological equipment to prevent irregular migrants from crossing Turkey's borders. He shows internal security as the main reason to deploy these kinds of instruments. Last but not least, after the minister identified irregular migration as a threat and he

explained the ways to cope with the threat, the construction of the wall continued. In the second speech, he emphasized the progress made in practices to sustain internal security. He praised the supply of capacity tools, such as electro-optical towers and cameras. That is to say, his speech added to the practices and the practices contributed to the discursive act, as well. To conclude, it can be said that as a securitizing actor, the Minister performed a securitizing act by describing irregular migrants as a threat to the internal security of Turkey through discursive acts. After the description, he legitimizes extraordinary measures to deal with the threat in the daily operation of the institutions of border management. Finally, the further actions, which are shaped by his discourse and the securitizing practices, continued to be executed.

To conclude, both the discursive and the non-discursive acts carried out by the government contribute to the securitization of migration and border management practices and policies. These acts address irregular migrants as a threat to be expelled and create a divergence between the society and the migrants as the insider and the outsiders. Through walls, the migrants are excluded physically, while through speech acts, they are alienated from the normalized group of society. Therefore, the securitization process is thoroughly perceptible in migration and border management practices. As a financial and technical contributor to the projects of border management and the sources of the IBM policies, the EU is a salient part of this securitization process.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

The outgrowing trend in migratory flows paved the way for precautionary practices in border areas in order to deter immigrants and reduce migration because there has been a perception of the threat coming from the other side of the borders. Specifically, after the crises in Syria and Pakistan, many people sought refuge in third countries. This intense movement of people created concern among many countries yet, particularly in the European Union member states. Many asylum seekers applied for asylum in Turkey, while others tried to enter the EU in an undocumented way. Some of these irregular migrants lost their lives on this dangerous journey, and some of them successfully entered the EU territory. However, the EU does not welcome all of these immigrants. Thus, the effort to reduce irregular migration has been an integral part of the EU's agenda for a long time. In order to eliminate the perceived threats thought to be caused by immigrants, the EU has developed several strategies. Integrated Border Management is a fundamental step toward creating a unified policy to protect the EU's territories and prevent irregular migration, uncontrolled movements, and smuggling.

As an intersection between the unstable regions and the EU, Turkey's state in managing migration and borders is crucial for the EU. In order to prevent irregular migrants from crossing all the way from Turkey to the EU, it is also necessary to restrain irregular migrants from entering Turkey and prevent the ones that are already in Turkey from reaching the EU's external borders. As a candidate and neighbouring country, Turkey has some requirements to fulfil. The EU expects progress in alignment with the *acquis* standards. Therefore, in the accession process, Turkey has got so much to do to meet the criteria. Under the scope of Justice and Home Affairs, border management is an important policy area to make progress in compliance with the EU

policies and strategies. Therefore, the EU both obliges and promotes reforms in border management. On the one hand, it obliges the reforms through the readmission agreement, the 2016 Statement, criteria for membership, and constant assessment and evaluations of progress. On the other hand, it promotes reforms in this policy by giving financial, technical, and physical assistance to Turkey. Specifically, the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance is a salient example of the promotion of reforms via extensive assistance programmes. This process can be defined as the externalization of EU policies to third countries. For different purposes and means, the EU transfer its policies to other states with strategic programmes. In this case, the EU transfer its border management policy, which is IBM, to Turkey in order to safeguard the external borders of the EU and prevent irregular migration, terrorism and human smuggling.

Since 2007, Turkey has been one of the beneficiaries of IPA funds. Within the scope of the funding programme, Turkey has been carrying out many projects in diverse policy areas with the objective of achieving alignment with the EU norms. Under IPA funds, border management is one of the key areas to be prioritized and to be cooperated on. There are three periods of IPA funds, and Turkey has been the beneficiary for all the periods. In all three periods, border management and migration have always been at the top of the priority components to make development. Both in progress reports and IPA official documents, the importance of border management and alignment with IBM policies has always been stressed. The EU repetitively evaluates compliance with IBM strategies and states that Turkey's border management policies should be in line with IBM.

This thesis firstly questions the IPA funds in the scope of their contribution to the practices conducted on Turkish borders and the securitization process in border management. Secondly, it also questions the European Integrated Border Management as a means of externalization of European border management through IPA funds. In this regard, secondary sources such as EU legal documents, Turkey's legal documents, the European Commission's progress reports of Turkey, the Republic of Turkey Ministry of Interior's annual activity reports, Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs Directorate for EU Affairs' online publications, press releases of the EU and Turkish authorities, news regarding border management practices are analysed in this

thesis. The border management practices, which are carried out by Turkey and funded by IPA funds as an extension of IBM, are scrutinized in order to show how these practices are characteristically securitizing practices and how the EU contributes to the securitization process in border management and migration policy areas through IPA funds by externalizing IBM policies.

The theoretical framework, which is securitization theory, is used for the analysis of practices. Initially, the classical understanding of the securitization theory, which is called the Copenhagen School's theory of securitization, is explained. For the Copenhagen School, securitization is a process in which an issue is taken by a securitizing actor and, through speech acts, presented the issue as a threat to the being of a referent object which might be a value or norm that collectively embraced such as nationality, the state or religion. Once the audience accepts the issue as a threat to the integrity of the referent object, the securitization process is completed. Unless the issue is acknowledged as a threat by the audience, the process cannot be a securitization process. Through securitization, the issue is taken to beyond mundane politics. It is such overly politicised that it extends to the border lines of the ordinary. The issue is portrayed as a threat that should be responded to immediately and extraordinarily.

Moreover, the securitization notion of the Copenhagen School is highly criticized by different scholars. The most well-known critic of this notion is the group of scholars called the Paris School. This school is influenced by philosophy and international political sociology. Thus, this theory synthesizes the classical securitization theory with an interdisciplinary perspective. According to this school, the securitization process is not only created by speech acts but also by practices. Also, these scholars put forward that even everyday practices can lead to securitization. Furthermore, it is also important that the issue that is presented as a threat is not required to be accepted by the audience. The distinction between the audience and the securitizing actor has become blurry. So, it can be said that the perspective of Paris School's securitization does not consist of concrete steps. The process of securitization is rather a subtle but effective process in which some referent objects are secured while others are de-secured. Therefore, securitization and de-securitization go hand in hand in the securitization process.

The securitization theory has continued to be developed by many scholars. A collective of scholars has adopted a more interdisciplinary way of analysing securitization processes. From the lens of international political sociology, anthropology, and philosophy, they focus more on the mundane practices leading to the securitization of many issues. They argue that the analysis of securitization is not only limited to discursive acts but also other practices distinguishing what is threat, fear, danger, protection, and security. The daily practices can also be securitizing practices. According to this approach, there are two tools in conducting securitizing practices: regulatory tools and capacity tools. Regulatory tools are instruments that aim to regulate the activities of targeted groups through policy regulations. By describing some acts as dangerous or threatening, regulatory tools aim to forbid those activities and reduce threats. Capacity tools are means to conduct the actions of individuals and groups in different ways. They include gathering, collecting, storing and analysing data, biometrics, training programmes, means of force, and other tools to reach policy objectives. The projects that have been analysed in this thesis include practices that can be classified as capacity tools.

In this research, the externalization of the European border management policies and the formation of the IBM concept as a single border management strategy are explained. Rather than the application of different national strategies, IBM aims to manage external borders in an integrated manner. Member states still have their own policies, but IBM is an important framework for the safety of external borders of the EU territory. With the rising irregular movements, IBM has become an integral part of the EU agenda. Therefore, in order to reduce security threats, the EU also promotes IBM to third countries. As a part of the enlargement policy, the EU expects candidates and potential candidates to be compatible with the Justice and Home Affairs policies. To be more specific, related to border management, the EU conditions candidates to apply IBM policies in order to make progress in the accession process. Also, the EU uses financial or technical assistance in the promotion of IBM policies. The assistance is continued to be given by the EU if the beneficiary applies IBM policies and carries out projects towards the implementation of IBM strategies. In this sense, the EU externalizes its own norms, standards and policies of border management to third countries. Therefore, the external borders are extended beyond the EU's territory, and

the demarcation of borders is blurred in practice. The shifting borders have resulted in the EU's involvement in the border management practices of third countries.

In the case of Turkey, under the scope of Chapter 24: Justice, Freedom and Security, the EU expects Turkey to implement the EU's common rules and norms for border control, visa and migration and asylum. In this regard, IBM is an important component of the alignment. To take Turkey's border management structure to the EU level and to make it aligned with the *acquis*, the EU expresses the necessity for the adoption and implementation of IBM. In the progress reports, this requirement has been repetitively stated, and the progress of Turkey's IBM process has been evaluated. Also, through the agreements on technical assistance, the EU regards Turkey to carry out projects on the development of IBM and achieving safe borders. The EU also assesses the performance of Turkey in implementing projects in order to integrate IBM policies into the legal framework and practices.

In this thesis, the instrument for pre-accession assistance is explained in detail. The legal and historical background of the assistance, the relation between IPA funds, the externalization of IBM as European border management policies, and securitizing practices regarding border management are scrutinized. IPA funds are the unified instruments that provide potential candidates and candidate countries with technical, financial and operational assistance in order to ensure their compliance with the EU standards, increase their capacity and competitiveness, and make their transition and accession process easier. With the aforementioned objectives, in 2007, the EU gathered different assistance mechanisms offered to candidates and potential candidates together under IPA funds. There are three periods of IPA with different programming. One of the unchanged priority areas throughout the three phases of IPA is border management. Since 2007, border management has been an important policy area to cooperate on and create projects in order to achieve secure borders and ensure alignment with IBM. Under the scope of IBM, many projects have been carried out in all IPA periods. The thesis argues that IPA funds are tools for the externalization of EU practices, strategies and policies related to the policy area of border management. Through IPA assistance, Turkey is expected to adopt the IBM strategy thoroughly. To explain IPA's role in the border management processes, the legal and historical

background of IPA assistance are explained. Within this line, legal documents, European Commission publications and online publications are used regarding the IPA's formation process.

Lastly, under the scope of IPA funds, the projects related to IBM are examined. The projects that are categorized under Integrated Border Management policy objectives are analysed. This thesis study shows that IPA-funded projects, as a reflection of the IBM policy of the EU, contribute to the securitization of migration considerably. The projects that have been carried out under the scope of IBM have objectives such as surveillance of borders on a 7/24 basis, stricter border checks, deploying armoured-tank-like monitoring vehicles, establishing a risk analysis center, collecting and analysing data regarding border activities, using high technology for monitoring and recording border activities, and training border guards in order to equip them necessary knowledge on irregular migration and cross-border crimes.

In this thesis, it is argued that while the projects carried out through the IPA externalize the IBM policies to Turkey, the practices within the scope of these projects securitize migration and border management. It is further argued that the practices within the scope of the projects play a role in the securitization process as regulatory and capacity tools. In this respect, the applications of each border management project are examined through these tools. As a result of the analysis, it should be said that the applications under the projects organized under the IPA as capacity tools and regulatory tools have emerged as a result of the externalization of the EU's IBM policies and contribute to the securitization of migration and border management. As a part of the IPA projects on border management, many practices are carried out by different agencies responsible for border management, such as the Ministry of Interior, Land Forces Command, Turkish Coast Guards, the National Police, and the sub-units under the Ministry of Interior. These practices include capacity tools which are setting up modernised surveillance systems; supplying armoured mobile vehicles, boats, electro-optical towers, thermal cameras and drones; conducting risk analyses; organizing training programmes for border personnel about irregular migration, smuggling and IBM policies; arranging cross-border cooperation on IBM standard practices; establishing NACORAC as a risk assessment center; and finally, building a wall along

the borders and supporting the wall with technological equipment. These capacity tools are apparatuses that lead to securitization by increasing the capacity of institutions and individuals for the sustainment of security. For example, the training programs organized aim to increase the capacity of people working in the field of border management by increasing their individual knowledge. By increasing the capacity in the field of irregular migration and Integrated Border Management, it controls the practices at the individual level on issues that may pose a threat. Technically provided equipment, such as electro-optical towers, armoured surveillance vehicles, patrol vehicles, unmanned aerial vehicles, radar and surveillance systems, and thermal and night vision cameras, increase the physical capacity of the relevant institutions by allowing threats at the border to be detected faster and prevented more easily. In this respect, they can be considered as capacity tools. Regulatory instruments, on the other hand, are the basis for the implementation of capacity instruments. With these tools, it is ensured that practices are carried out by drawing the boundaries of what is defined as a threat and what is security and what steps should be taken to ensure security in legal texts or regulations. For example, official documents of the European Commission on IBM are regulatory instruments. As an extension of this, it was desired to draw a framework for Integrated Border Management with legal regulations in Turkey. With the IPA projects, steps have been taken many times to make legal arrangements. In this respect, these applications contribute to the securitization process. In addition to these, the wall built within the scope of Integrated Border Management aimed to increase the capacity of the Turkish Land Forces as a capacity tool, making it impossible for immigrants to cross borders not only conceptually but also physically.

As a regulatory tool, practices have been carried out since the beginning of IPA projects in order to incorporate IBM regulations and standards into Turkish regulations. Drafting action plans to adopt IBM policies is an essential regulatory instrument as it functions as a rationale behind the capacity tools to be based on.

The instruments listed above are extraordinary tools to respond to irregular migratory flows as they create the perception that a threat should be eliminated promptly by highly-budgeted and technological, even militarised ways. Utilizing these kinds of

exceptional means in order to prevent irregular migration defines immigrants, asylum seekers and refugees as potential threats to the security of Turkey. Not only practices but also discourses exhibited by political figures are part of the securitization process. For instance, in many speeches made by two Ministers of Interior, irregular migration was considered as a security problem and the importance of the funds offered by the EU to solve this problem and the projects organized under these funds as a solution to these problems was emphasized.

Through the EU's financial and technical assistance and accession conditionality, the EU's border management policies and practices are externalized to the borders of Turkey. The EU governs Turkey's border management policies at a distance by the externalization of IBM policies and IPA project conditions. Therefore, border management projects in Turkey aim to bring Turkish policies and practices in line with the EU standard of migration management of IBM. Within the scope of IBM, these policies, projects and discourses, which consider irregular migration as a threat before it occurs, lead to systematic and strict practices against immigrants. For this reason, preventing immigrants from crossing the border, assuming that they will threaten internal security, leads to ignoring people who may actually be in need. This perspective essentially criminalizes migrants. Migrants, who are seen as a threat to internal security, are observed and prevented by many technological practices before arriving at the border. The threat is tried to be eliminated urgently and through extraordinary measures. These practices are part of the securitization process and reveal the distinction between 'us' and 'they'. Therefore, this is actually a (in)securitization process which is based on the concept of sacrifice. More securitization does not reduce insecurity; conversely, it leads to more insecurity and unease (Bigo, 2008b). The securitization process sets boundaries, forbids, and prevents people from doing something, and excludes groups, while it asserts that it does just the opposite (Balzacq et al., 2010). In the name of securing a certain group, it leads to the (in)securitization of others, and it even creates (in)security even for the respective group. In the case of migrants, while those who are inside the border are securitized, the immigrants outside the border are de-securitised. Turkey's border management policies and practices have been securitised through both discursive and non-discursive acts, with the deployment of capacity and regulatory instruments to prevent

irregular migration for the sustainment of internal security. Because the EU externalizes its border management policies to Turkey through the conditionality created by the accession process and financial incentives, the EU also controls Turkey's migration and border management practices by governing and policing at a distance. Hence, the EU contributes to the securitization process of migration and border management policies and practices in Turkey.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A. TURKISH SUMMARY / TÜRKÇE ÖZET

Türkiye her zaman ulusötesi göç hareketleri için önemli bir yer olmuştur. Kaynak, transit ve hedef ülke olarak Türkiye, göçmenleri kabul etmekte ve mülteci ve sığınmacıların ihtiyaçlarına proaktif bir şekilde cevap vermektedir. Son yıllarda, göç hareketleri önemli ölçüde yukarı doğru bir eğilim göstermektedir. Göç akımlarındaki artış eğilimi, sınırların diğer tarafından gelen tehdit algısının oluşması nedeniyle, göçü caydırmak ve azaltmak için sınır bölgelerinde ihtiyati uygulamaların önünü açmıştır. Özellikle Suriye ve Pakistan'daki krizlerden sonra birçok kişi üçüncü ülkelere sığınmıştır. Bu yoğun insan hareketi, başta Avrupa Birliği üyesi ülkeler olmak üzere pek çok ülkede endişe yaratmıştır. Birçok sığınmacı Türkiye'ye sığınma başvurusunda bulunurken, diğerleri de AB'ye belgesiz bir şekilde girmeye çalışmıştır. Bu düzensiz göçmenlerin bir kısmı bu tehlikeli yolculukta hayatlarını kaybederken, bir kısmı da AB topraklarına başarıyla giriş yapmıştır. Ancak AB bu göçmenlerin hepsini hoş karşılamamaktadır. Bu nedenle, düzensiz göçü azaltma çabası, uzun süredir AB gündeminin ayrılmaz bir parçası olmuştur. AB, göçmenlerin neden olduğu düşünülen tehditleri ortadan kaldırmak için çeşitli stratejiler geliştirmiştir. Entegre Sınır Yönetimi, AB topraklarını korumak ve düzensiz göçü, kontrolsüz hareketleri ve kaçakçılığı önlemek için birleşik bir politika oluşturmaya yönelik temel bir adımdır.

Siyasi olarak istikrarsız bölgeler ile AB arasında bir kesişme noktası olan Türkiye'nin göç ve sınırları yönetmedeki kapasitesi AB için çok önemlidir. Düzensiz göçmenlerin Türkiye'den AB'ye tüm yolu geçmelerini önlemek için, düzensiz göçmenlerin Türkiye'ye girişlerinin ve halihazırda Türkiye'de bulunanların AB'nin dış sınırlarına ulaşmasının da engellenmesi gerekmektedir. Bir aday ve komşu ülke olarak Türkiye'nin yerine getirmesi gereken bazı şartlar var. AB, müktesebat standartlarına

uyum konusunda ilerleme beklemektedir. Adalet ve İçişleri kapsamında sınır yönetimi, AB politika ve stratejilerine uygun ilerleme sağlanması için önemli bir politika alanıdır. Bu nedenle AB, sınır yönetiminde reformları hem zorunlu kılıyor hem de teşvik ediyor. Bir yandan, geri kabul anlaşması, 2016 Mutabakatı, üyelik kriterleri ve ilerlemenin sürekli olarak değerlendirilmesi ve değerlendirilmesi yoluyla reformları zorunlu kılmaktadır. Öte yandan, Türkiye'ye mali, teknik ve fiziki yardımlarda bulunarak bu politikada reformları teşvik etmektedir. Spesifik olarak, Katılım Öncesi Yardım Aracı, kapsamlı yardım programları aracılığıyla reformların teşvik edilmesinin göze çarpan bir örneğidir. Bu süreç, AB politikalarının üçüncü ülkelere dışsallaştırılması olarak tanımlanabilir. AB, farklı amaç ve araçlarla politikalarını stratejik programlarla diğer devletlere aktarmaktadır. AB, katılım müzakerelerinde yeni bir fasıl açmak veya vize serbestisi vaad etmek gibi bir kaldıraç sağlayarak, standartlarını ve politikalarını aktarmak için üçüncü ülkeleri koşullu olarak yönetmektedir. Göç kapsamında, 'şartlılık yoluyla dış yönetim' olarak adlandırılan bu süreç, üçüncü ülkelerle göç akışlarının müktesebat ve AB'nin standart uygulamalarına göre düzenlenmesi konusunda teknik ve operasyonel işbirliğine dayanmaktadır. AB, politikalarını ve standartlarını koşullara göre ihraç ettiği için oldukça hiyerarşik bir süreçtir. Bu durumda AB, dış sınırlarını korumak ve düzensiz göç, terör ve insan kaçakçılığını önlemek için Entegre Sınır Yönetimi politikasını Katılım Öncesi Mali Yardım Aracı yoluyla Türkiye'ye aktarmaktadır.

Katılım Öncesi Mali Yardım Aracı programı 2007'de birçok mali yardım programının birleşmesiyle oluşmuştur. Bu fonun temel amacı aday ve potansiyel aday ülkelerin yapılarının AB müktesabatıyla uyumlu hale gelmesi için gerekli desteği sağlamaktır. 2007'de başlayan bu program 7 sene sürmesi için tasarlanmıştır. Sonrasında, yedi senelik iki periyod halinde tekrar devam ettirilmiştir. Her üç program da Adalet ve İçişleri Politikası alanında yapılacak olan projeleri önceliklendirmiş ve bu politika kapsamında da sınır yönetiminin önemini vurgulamıştır. Sınır yönetimi başlığı altında düzenlenen her projenin AB'nin Entegre Sınır Yönetimi Politikası standartlarına uyum sağlanması amacıyla yürütülmesi öngörülmüştür. Türkiye de 2007'den beri bu mali yardım fonundan yararlanarak sınır yönetimi açısından birçok proje yürütmüştür. Hem mali yardımın ekonomik olarak Türkiye'ye faydalı olması açısından hem de üyelik sürecinde önemli bir yer tuttuğundan, Türkiye'nin bu program kapsamında yürüttüğü

projeler Türkiye için önem teşkil etmektedir. O sebeple iki mali yardım döneminde birçok proje yürütülmüş ve üçüncü dönemde de yürütülmeye devam edilmektedir. Bu projeler kapsamında, Entegre Sınır Yönetimi Politikası standartlarına ulaşmak amacıyla çeşitli aktiviteler içeren bu projeler başta İçişleri Bakanlığı olmak üzere birçok kurum tarafından programlanmıştır.

Entegre sınır yönetimi, AB'nin dış sınırların açık ancak iyi kontrol edilmesini ve güvenli olmasını sağlama hedefine ulaşmak için sınırların ve ticaret tesislerinin güvenliği ile ilgili tüm ilgili makam ve kurumların ulusal ve uluslararası düzeylerde işbirliğini gerektiren bir kavramdır. Birincil amacı, AB'nin dış sınırlarında etkin, işlevsel ve sistemli bir sınır yönetimi mekanizması oluşturmaktır. Buna göre, öncelikle dış sınırları etkin bir şekilde yöneterek, göçle ilgili olası risk ve zorlukları tespit ederek ve insan ticareti, terör hareketleri ve göçmen kaçakçılığı gibi sınırlarda ciddi suçları önleyerek iç güvenliğin korunmasını amaçlamaktadır. Bunu yaparken temel kriterler, temel hakların korunması ve AB içinde serbest dolaşımın sağlanmasıdır. Bu açıdan da birçok Türkiye ilerleme raporlarında belirtildiği üzere, AB Türkiye'nin Entegre Sınır Yönetimi politikalarını benimseyip pratikte de uygulamaya geçmesini beklemektedir. Bu kapsamda, Türkiye'nin organize suçları ve düzensiz göçü engellemesi, göç yönetiminde daha teknolojik bir yöntem belirlemesi, hukuki yapısını düzenlemesi, göç yönetimini risk analizine dayandırması beklenilmektedir. Katılım Öncesi Mali Yardım Aracı tarafından finanse edilen sınır yönetimi projeleri de bu pratiklere yönelik planlanmıştır. 2007 yılından beri, sınırın 7/24 izlenebilmesi için termal kamera ve gece görüşlü kameraların edinilmesi, sınırda elektro-optik kulelerin inşası, zırhlı gözetim araçlarının alınması, Entegre Sınır Yönetimi stratejisinin uygulanması için aksiyon planlarının oluşturulması, sınırdaki hareket ve aktivitelerin verisinin tutulması ve analizi, risk analizi yapılabilmesi için Ulusal Koordinasyon ve Ortak Risk Analizi Merkezi'nin kurulması, sınır polislerinin ve görevlilerinin Entegre Sınır Yönetimi hakkında daha bilgili olması, düzensiz göç ve organize suçlar hakkında daha bilgili olması adına eğitim programlarının düzenlenmesi, diğer ülke, kurum ve uluslararası organizasyonlarla sınır yönetimi konusunda işbirliğinin sağlanması ve artırılması gibi birçok pratik içeren projeler yürütülmektedir.

Bu uygulamalara ek olarak sınır görevlileri tarafından gerçekleştirilen risk değerlendirmeleri, istihbarat kullanımı ve paylaşımı, sıkı kontroller ve yüksek teknolojik gözetim faaliyetleri gibi uygulamalar, ayrımcı ve belirsiz hesaplamalara yol açmaktadır. Bu bakış açısıyla, riski tespit etmek ve buna göre önlem almak, ortadan kaldırmak veya en aza indirmek için özel olarak eğitilmiş farklı sınır uzmanları tarafından gerçekleştirilen uygulamalar, aslında insanların içeridekiler ve dışarıdakiler olarak bölünmesine katkıda bulunmaktadır ve göçmeleri risk olarak göstermektedir.

İlaveten, Entegre Sınır Yönetimi kapsamında Türkiye'nin İran, Irak ve Suriye sınırları boyunca duvar inşa edilmiş ve bu duvar insansız hava uçağı, elektro-optik kuleler, devriye yolları, termal kameralar, gece görüşü sağlayan kameralar gibi teknolojik ekipmanlarla desteklenmiştir. Bu şekilde, düzensiz göçmenlerin, kaçakçıların ve terörist militanların ülkeye girmesinin engellenmesi amaçlanmaktadır. Ancak bu projeler düzensiz göçmenleri suçlularla bir tutarak göçmenleri güvenlik tehdidi haline getirmektedir.

Bu Tez, AB'nin Türkiye sınırlarında yürütülen projelerin sonucunda oluşan güvenikleştirme sürecine katkısını incelemektedir. Temel araştırma sorusu olarak AB'nin Türkiye'de göç ve sınır yönetiminin güvenikleştirilmesine nasıl ve ne ölçüde katkıda bulunduğunu sorgulamaktadır. Bu tez çalışmasının temel argümanı, AB'nin yardım programları veya anlaşmalar yoluyla ekonomik ve teknik yardım sağlayarak politikalarını Türkiye'ye dışsallaştırması ve sınır güvenliğine yönelik projelerin yürütülmesine öncülük etmesidir. Böylece AB, Türkiye sınırlarındaki güvenikleştirme uygulamalarına fonlar aracılığıyla katkıda bulunur. Ayrıca, AB yardımlarının Türkiye'nin AB sınırlarına giderken Türkiye'ye giren düzensiz göçmenlerin oluşturduğu algılanan tehditten kurtulmaya yönelik güvenikleştirme çabalarına ne ölçüde katkıda bulunduğunu araştırmaktadır. Bu kapsamda, AB tarafından, AB'ye aday ve muhtemel aday ülkelere verdiği finansal ve teknik destek olan Katılım Öncesi Mali Yardım Aracı fonu altında yürütülen projelerin detayları incelenmiştir. Bu projelerin analiz edilmesi için bir içerik analizi yapılarak AB'nin resmi yayımları, Komisyonun Türkiye ileleme raporları, Katılım Öncesi Mali Yardım Aracı fonları ile ilgili yasal belgeler, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti İçişleri Bakanlığı'nın resmi yayımları, raporları ve faaliyet bültenleri, İçişleri Bakanlığı, Dışişleri Bakanlığı ve AB

Türkiye Delegasyonu'nun web tabanlı yayınları gibi ikincil kaynaklar incelenmiştir. Bu kaynaklar analiz edilirken teorik çerçeve olarak bu tezde güvenlikleştirme teorisi kullanılmıştır.

Güvenlikleştirme teorisi ilk olarak Kopenhag Okulu tarafından geliştirilmiştir. Bu teoriye göre, güvenlik hayatta kalmakla ilgilidir. Kopenhag Okulu'na göre güvenlikleştirme süreci birkaç belirli adımdan oluşur. Öncelikle, güvenlikleştirme süreci, söylemsel eylemler aracılığıyla güvenlikleştirici bir aktör tarafından başlatılır. Bu süreçte, bir olgu, bir grup ya da bir durum, bir referans nesnenin varlığına karşı varoluşsal bir tehdit olarak ele alınır ve bu nedenle acilen ele alınması gerektiği algısı yaratılmaktadır. Söylem yoluyla mesele sıradan siyasetin ötesine taşınır ve olağanüstü tedbirlerin kullanılması meşrulaştırılır. Tehlikenin belirtilen ciddiyeti ve acilen çözülmesi gerken bir durum olarak yansıtılması, güvenlikleştirici aktörün varoluşsal bir tehdit durumunda kuralları çiğnemesine izin verir. Son olarak, bu söylemler hedef kitle tarafından kabul edilmelidir. Güvenlikleştirme, yalnızca hedef kitle bir konuyu referans nesnenin canlılığına yönelik bir tehdit olarak kabul ettiğinde gerçekleşir. Hedef kitle bunu kabul etmezse, bu söylem yalnızca bir güvenlikleştirme hareketi olacaktır.

Kopenhag Okulu'nun bazı yaklaşımları Paris Okulu tarafından eleştirilmiş ve üzerine yeni düşünceler eklenmiştir. Paris Okulu, güvenliği analiz ederken politik, sosyolojik ve antropolojik yaklaşımları benimser. Bu yaklaşımı ayırt edici kılan şey, bu yaklaşımın yalnızca dilbilim veya siyaset bilimi perspektifine odaklanmak yerine disiplinlerötesi bir perspektife sahip olmasıdır. Paris yaklaşımının kendine has özelliklerini oluşturan üç unsur vardır. Birincisi, Paris yaklaşımına göre güvenlik, uluslararası ilişkiler disiplininde tek bir şemsiye 'hayatta kalma' kategorisine indirgenemez. Terim olarak güvenlik, birçok disiplinde farklı uygulamaları betimlerken kullanılabilir. Örneğin güvenlik, psikolojide grup düşüncesini, sosyolojide risk yönetimini, ve hukukta evrensel insan haklarını kapsayabilir. Yani güvenlik farklı disiplinler 'nesnelere' ayrılamaz ve tek bir güvenlikleştirme teorisi olamaz. İkinci olarak, Kopenhag Okulu'ndan farklı olarak Paris Yaklaşımı, günlük yaşamda güvenlikleştirmeye yol açan hem söylemleri hem de uygulamaları araştırır. Bu yaklaşım, yalnızca söylemleri değil, günlük pratikleri de analiz eder. Odak

noktasında güvenikleştirme uygulamalarından etkilenen insanlar vardır. Ayrıca, güvenikleştirmenin bir grubu güvenikleştirirken bir diğerini güveniksizleştirdiğini savunur. Bu süreç sonucunda bir grup savunmasız kalmaktadır. Son olarak, Paris yaklaşımı disiplinlerötesi bakış açısı ile politik antropolojiyi birleştirerek sosyotarihsel bir yaklaşım geliştirir. Bunu yaparak, sosyal dinamiklerin belirli bir zaman diliminde 'güvenlik' terimine nasıl farklı anlamlar yükleyebileceğini analiz eder.

Paris Okulu'nun düşünceleri yine Paris Okulu mensubu olan akademisyen kolektifi tarafından ilerletilmiş ve daha interdisipliner bir yaklaşım ortaya çıkarılmıştır. Bu yaklaşıma göre, güvenlik uygulamaları belirli araçlar aracılığıyla kullanılmaktadır. Güvenlik önlemleri o kadar karmaşık hale gelmiştir ki söylemler ve ideolojilerin çözülmesi giderek daha zor hale gelmekte ve güvenikleştirici aktörler ile izleyici arasındaki fark bulanıklaşmaktadır. Bu nedenle, güvenikleştirme en iyi şekilde, güvenlik uzmanları, araçları veya ajansları tarafından tehdit olarak tanımlanan sorunları ele almak için kullanılan sosyal araçlar olan politika araçlarına odaklanarak yorumlanabilir. Güvenlik uygulamaları temelde düzenleyici ve kapasite araçları olmak üzere iki tür araca dayanır. Düzenleyici araçlar, hedeflenen nüfusun davranışını 'normalleştirmeyi' amaçlayan bir politika düzenlemesi gibi politika araçlarına bağlıdır. Bu araçların temel amacı, belirli tehdit algıları sunarak, onları tehlikeli olarak gösteren bazı siyasi eylemleri yasaklayarak ve tehdidi azaltan belirli faaliyetlere izin vererek sosyal aktörlerin davranışlarını etkilemektir. Öte yandan, kapasite araçları, insanlara ve gruplara dış disiplini dayatmak için kullanılan belirli araçlar olarak tanımlanır. Politika hedeflerini gerçekleştirmek için gereken kuvvet araçları, talimat planları, bilgi teknolojileri, veri, biyometri ve diğer kaynaklardan oluşurlar.

Bu tezde, AB'nin Katılım Öncesi Mali Yardım Aracı ile sunduğu ekonomik ve teknik yardım aracılığıyla yürütülen projelerle Entegre Sınır Yönetimi politikalarını Türkiye'ye dışsallaştırırken bu projeler kapsamında hayata geçirilene uygulamaların göç ve sınır yönetimini güvenikleştirdiği savunulmaktadır. Bunu savunurken projelerin kapsamındaki uygulamaların düzenleyici ve kapasite araçları olarak güvenikleştirme sürecinde rol aldığı tartışılmaktadır. Kapasite araçları kurum ve birey kapasitesini arttırarak güvenikleştirmeyi arttıran güvenlik uygulamalarıdır. Örneğin, düzenlenen eğitim programları sınır yönetimi alanında çalışan kişilerin bireysel bilgisini arttırarak kapasitelerini arttırmayı amaçlamaktadır. Düzensiz göç ve Entegre

Sınır Yönetimi alanında kapasiteyi arttırarak tehdit olabilecek konularda bireysel düzlemdeki uygulamaları kontrol etmektedir. Teknik açıdan sağlanan ekipmanlar, örneğin, elektro-optik kuleler, zırhlı gözetim araçları, devriye araçları, insansız hava araçları, radar ve gözetleme sistemleri, termal ve gece görüşlü kameralar ise kurumsal açıdan fiziksel kapasiteyi arttırarak sınırdaki tehditlerin daha hızlı algılanıp daha kolay engellenmesine olanak sağlamaktadır. Bu açıdan kapasite araçları olarak ele alınabilirler. Düzenleyici araçlar ise, kapasite araçlarının uygulanması için birer temel niteliğindedirler. Bu araçlarla, neyin tehdit neyin güvenlik olarak tanımlandığı, güvenliği sağlamak için nasıl adımlar atılması gerektiğine dair sınırlar hukuki metinlerde ya da düzenlemelerde çizilerek uygulamaların yürütülmesi sağlanmaktadır. Örneğin, Entegre Sınır Yönetimi ile ilgili Avrupa Komisyonu'nun resmi belgeleri düzenleyici araçlardır. Bunun bir uzantısı olarak Türkiye'de de hukuki düzenlemelerle Entegre Sınır Yönetimi'ne dair bir çerçeve çizilmek istenmiştir. Katılım Öncesi Mali Yardım Aracı projeleriyle birçok kez yasal düzenlemelerin yapılması için adımlar atılmıştır. Bu açıdan bu uygulamalar güvenlikleştirme sürecine katkıda bulunmaktadır. Bunlara ek olarak ayrıca, Entegre Sınır Yönetimi kapsamında inşa edilen duvar da kapasite aracı olarak Türk Kara Kuvvetleri'nin kapasitesini arttırarak göçmenlerin sınırları geçmesinin yalnızca konsept olarak değil, aynı zamanda fiziksel olarak da imkansızlaştırılmasını amaçlamıştır. Bu açıdan, duvar sadece inşa edilmiş bir yapı değil, aynı zamanda bir farklılaştırma mekanizmasıdır. Farklılaştırma ve ayırıştırma aracı olarak 'biz' ve 'onlar' fikrini oluşturur. Ayrıca sınırlar, bina otoritesi tarafından yaratılan algılanan bir tehdide verilen tepkilerdir. Duvarlar ve çitler, bir topluluğun parçası olurken insanın kendini diğerlerinden farklılaştırma arzusunun bir tür fiziksel düzenlemesi olarak kabul edilebilir. Bir grubun üyesi gibi hissetmekle diğer gruplardan farklı olmak için duvarlar ve çitler inşa etmek arasında bu paradoks vardır. Bir yandan duvarlar güvenlik aracıdır. Öte yandan, dışlama ve engelleme araçlarıdır. Bu sınır yönetimi uygulaması söz konusu olduğunda sınırlar, sınır içindeki insanları ve göçmen olan dışarıdakileri birbirinden ayırır.

Yapılan analizler sonucunda söylenmelidir ki kapasite araçları ve düzenleyici araçlar olarak Katılım Öncesi Mali Yardım Aracı kapsamında düzenlenen projelerin altındaki uygulamalar, AB'nin Entegre Sınır Yönetimi politikalarının dışsallaştırılması sonucu ortaya çıkmıştır ve göç ve sınır yönetiminin güvenlikleştirilmesine katkıda

bulunmaktadır. Yalnızca uygulamalar değil, politik figürler tarafından sergilenen söylemler de güvenlikleştirme sürecinin bir parçasıdır. Örneğin, iki İçişleri Bakanı tarafından yapılan birçok konuşmada düzensiz göç bir güvenlik problem olarak ele alınmış ve bu problemi çözmek için AB'nin sunduğu fonların önemi ve bu fonlar altında düzenlenen projelerin bu sorunlara çözüm olacağına vurgu yapılmıştır. Bakanların da yaptığı gibi, siyasi figürler, konuşma eylemiyle göç ve sınır yönetimi politikalarının güvenlikleştirilmesine katkıda bulunur. Güvenliğin söz edimi kavramında, meseleyi siyasallaştıran ve soruna yanıt verecek siyasi kararları meşrulaştıran bir meselenin eleştirel bir analizi vardır. Güvenlikle ilgili bir konuşma eylemi, meseleyi kararsal ağırlık yoluyla güvenliksizlik alanından güvenlik alanlarına taşıyan istisnai bir etkiye sahiptir. Bu durumda güvenlikleştirici aktörler, düzensiz göç konusunu güvenlik dışı alanın ötesine taşımakta ve Türkiye'nin iç güvenliğine tehdit oluşturduğunu dile getirerek bir güvenlik sorununa dönüştürmektedir. Güvenlik sorununa bir çözüm olarak AB tarafından finanse edilen Katılım Öncesi Mali Yardım Aracı uygulamalarını sunmaktadırlar. Bu anlamda bu söz edimleri, göç ve sınır yönetimi politika ve uygulamalarının güvenlikleştirilmesine yol açan güvenlikleştirici uygulamalardır. Güvenlikleştirme aslında bir insanlıktan çıkarma süreci olarak da adlandırılabilir. Bu süreçte, söçmenler insani niteliklerinden koparılıp göçmene indirgenmektedir. Göçmenlerin Türkiye sınırlarına girmelerine engel olmak için onları tehdit olarak adlandırmak bir dışlama yöntemidir. Düzensiz göçü bir güvenlik tehdidi olarak ele almanın yanı sıra, güvenlik sorununa çözüm olarak sürekli gözetim sistemleri kurmak gibi uygulamalar göstermek, düzensiz göçle başa çıkmak için olağandışı yöntemlerin kullanılmasını meşrulaştırmaktadır. Bu uygulamalar olağanüstü olarak adlandırılmıştır çünkü düzensiz göç akımlarına yanıt vermek üzere tasarlanmış önleyici ve önleyici uygulamalar oldukları için düzensiz göçü engellemek için ortaya koyulmuş olağanüstü tepkilerdir. Bu uygulamalar, düzensiz göçmenlerin oluşturduğu bir tehdide, yüksek bütçeli ve yüksek teknolojik, hatta askeri araçlarla derhal yanıt verilmesi gerektiği algısını yaratmaktadır.

Teknoloji, yürütülen sınır yönetimi projelerinin önemli bir parçasını oluşturmaktadır ve önemli bir kapasite aracı türüdür. Askeri güçler, polis ve istihbarat teşkilatları sıklıkla insansız hava araçları ve biyometri gibi teknoloji araçlarını kullanır. Teknoloji tipik olarak daha yüksek güvenlik sağlayacak araç olarak kabul edilir. Teknoloji,

göçmenlerin aileleriyle iletişim kurmaları için etkili bir araç olmasına ve güvenli bir yer bulma yolculuklarını kolaylaştırmasına rağmen, ülkelerin her geçen gün izleme ve kontrol kapasitelerini artırmaları nedeniyle hareketlerine yeni engeller de getirmektedir. Sınır yönetimi süreçlerinde teknolojinin pratikliğinin yanı sıra, daha teknolojik olarak yönetilen sınırlara geçiş, aynı zamanda sınırları daha fazla izleme ve kontrol etmenin bir yoludur. Her anı yüksek çözünürlüklü kameralar ve termal kameralarla kaydetmek, veri toplamak ve risk analizi oluşturmak için verileri analiz etmek modern ama daha katı bir sınır kontrolüdür. Bu anlamda, sınırlara mayın döşeyen geleneksel bir sınır kontrol yöntemi yerine, daha modern ve daha insani görünen, insan haklarına hizmet eden ancak uzun vadede güvenleştirmeye sürecine de katkı sağlıyor. Ek olarak yüksek teknoloji kullanımının bir uzantısı olarak sınırları gözetleme araçları ve mekanizmaları, Entegre Sınır Yönetimi sisteminin önemli parçalarıdır. Bu nedenle Entegre Sınır Yönetimi kapsamında yürütülen projelerde gözetim ve denetim mekanizmalarının geliştirilmesine yönelik bileşenler bulunmaktadır. Sınırların sürekli gözetimi ile göçmenler, iç güvenliğe tehdit olarak görüldüğünden, sınırı geçmeden önce tespit edilir, filtrelenir, kategorize edilir, dışlanır ve engellenir.

AB'nin mali ve teknik yardımı ve katılım koşulluluğu sayesinde, AB'nin sınır yönetimi politikaları ve uygulamaları Türkiye sınırlarının dışına taşmaktadır. AB, Entegre Sınır Yönetimi politikalarının ve Katılım Öncesi Mali Yardım Aracı proje koşullarının dışsallaştırılması yoluyla Türkiye'nin sınır yönetimi politikalarını uzaktan yönetmektedir. Bu nedenle, Türkiye'deki sınır yönetimi projeleri, Türk politikalarını ve uygulamalarını AB göç yönetimi standardı ile uyumlu hale getirmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Göçmenlerin iç güvenliği tehdit edeceklerini varsayarak sınırı geçmelerini engellemek, gerçekten ihtiyaç sahibi olabilecek kişilerin görmezden gelinmesine yol açmaktadır. Bu bakış açısı esasen göçmenleri birer suçlu haline getirmektedir. İç güvenliğe tehdit olarak görülen göçmenler, sınıra gelmeden birçok teknolojik uygulama ile gözlemlenmekte ve engellenmektedir. Tehdit ivedilikle ve olağanüstü tedbirlerle bertaraf edilmeye çalışılmaktadır. Bu uygulamalar güvenleştirmeye sürecinin bir parçasıdır ve sınırın içindekiler ve dışındakiler arasındaki ayrımı ortaya koymaktadır. Dolayısıyla, bu aslında kurban etme kavramına dayalı bir güvenleştirmeye sürecidir. Bu anlayışa göre, bir grubun güvenliği için

diğer grubun güvenliđi kurban edilir. Daha fazla güvenlikleřtirme, güvensizliđi azaltmaz; tersine, daha fazla güvensizliđe ve huzursuzluđa yol açar. Güvenlikleřtirme süreci, sınırları belirler, insanların bir řeyler yapmasını yasaklar ve engeller ve grupları dıřlarken, bunun tam tersini yaptıđını iddia eder. Belirli bir grubu güvence altına almak adına bařlatılan güvenlikleřtirme süreci, diđerlerinin güvenliksizleřtirilmesine yol açar ve hatta ilgili grup için bile güvensizlik yaratır. Düzensiz göçü daha gerçekteşmeden bir tehdit olarak ele alan bu politikalar, projeler ve söylemler göçmenlere karřı sistematik ve katı uygulamalar sergilenmesine yol açmaktadır. Bu sebeple göçmenlerin henüz herhangi bir probleme yol dahi açmadan açacakları varsayılarak sınırdan geçmeleri engellenmesi gerçekten ihtiyaç halinde olabilecek kişilerin yoksayılmasına ve bu kişilerin ‘günah keçileri’ olmalarına yol açmaktadır. İç güvenliđe tehdit olarak görülen göçmenler daha sınıra yaklařmadan birçok teknolojik yöntemle gözlemlenerek ve engellenerek tehdit elimine edilmeye çalıřılmaktadır. Bu yöntemler güvenlikleřtirme sürecinin bir parçası olup ‘biz’ ve ‘onlar’ ayrımını ortaya çıkarmaktadır. Bu açıdan, sınırın içinde bulunan kişiler güvenlikleřtirilirken sınırın dıřında kalan göçmenler güvenliksizleřtirilmektedir.

Sonuç olarak Türkiye'nin sınır yönetimi politikaları ve uygulamaları, iç güvenliđin sürdürülmesi için düzensiz göçü önlemeye yönelik kapasite ve düzenleyici araçların kullanılmasıyla hem söylemsel hem de söylemsel olmayan eylemler yoluyla güvenlik altına alınmıřtır. AB, katılım sürecinin yarattıđı kořulluluk ve mali teřvikler yoluyla sınır yönetimi politikalarını Türkiye'ye dıřsallařtırdıđından, AB de Türkiye'nin göç ve sınır yönetimi uygulamalarını uzaktan yöneterek ve denetleyerek kontrol etmektedir. Bu bir açıdan uzaktan yönetim ve hatta Bigo'nun öne sürdüđu gibi uzaktan polislik yapılması olarak da adlandırılabilir. Uzaktan polislik, insanların ilgili bölgeye girmesini önlemek veya caydırmak için farklı uygulamaların ve teknolojilerin kullanıldıđı bir kontrol türüdür. Uzaktan polislik yaparken, sınır kontrollerinin ve gözetleme sistemlerinin yersizyurtsuzlařması ve teknolojileřtirilmesi ile iç ve dıř güvenlik alanlarının farklılařması söz konusudur. Bu perspektiften bakıldıđında AB Türkiye sınırlarında uzaktan yönetim ve uzaktan polislik faaliyetleri yürütüldüđu söylenebilir. Dolayısıyla AB, Türkiye'deki göç ve sınır yönetimi politika ve uygulamalarının güvenlikleřtirme sürecine katkıda bulunmaktadır.

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YAZARIN / AUTHOR

Soyadı / Surname : ALKAN
Adı / Name : Büşra Nur
Bölümü / Department : Uluslararası İlişkiler / International Relations

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