Independence of Central Banks and the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey

Date

2010-03-01

Author

Ayhan, Berkay
Üstüner, Mustafa Yılmaz

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The issue of central bank independence is a crucial aspect of the neoliberal administrative reform process. It aims to achieve the isolation of monetary policy from politicians, thus the democratic processes. Advocates of this view anticipate that inflation will decline when central banks conduct monetary policy accompanied by governance practices, such as transparency and accountability free from the interventions of self-oriented politicians. This article maintains that arguments for central bank independence, which is attempted to be presented as a rationalization-based technical improvement, should be settled within historical and ideological context. In this framework, the article will attempt to analyze the evolution of the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey along with its various policies implemented in different periods and the winners and losers of its inflation-focused policies following the independence reform.

Subject Keywords

Central Bank Independence, neoliberal reform, POLICY, GOVERNANCE, DISCRETION, RULES

URI

https://hdl.handle.net/11511/103395

Collections

Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Article