Emotivism as a metaethical theory

Date

2023-9

Author

Çelik, Mehmet Fazıl

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Emotivism as a metaethical theory which arose in the twentieth century with the growth of analytic philosophy and logical positivism is the main subject of this study. This theory, which is accepted as a non-cognitivist meta-ethical theory, was first stated by A. J. Ayer in Language, Truth and Logic and later developed by C. L. Stevenson. In this study, the main purpose is to analyze the moral philosophy of Ayer and Stevenson. In accordance with this purpose, after briefly emphasizing the historical development of ethics and types of it, Hume’s is-ought distinction will be elaborated in the context of its influence on the emergence of the meta-ethical discipline. In addition, the general points of meta-ethics will be examined and G.E. Moore’s concept of naturalistic fallacy and open-question argument will be analyzed. In the following parts of this thesis, by considering their concepts of emotive meaning, the philosophical aims and methods of Ayer and Stevenson will be examined, and then the distinctions between their theories will be clarified. In this regard, the theoretical and pragmatic criticisms of their emotive ethical theories will be examined. Finally, the impact of emotional ethical theory on social moral values will be discussed.

Subject Keywords

Emotivism, Emotive meaning, Naturalistic fallacy

URI

https://hdl.handle.net/11511/105443

Collections

Graduate School of Social Sciences, Thesis