CAMP DAVID MEETINGS: AN ANALYSIS WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF BARGAINING GAME MODELS

Date

1989

Author

Yurdusev, A. Nuri

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In the analysis of the international conflicts and crisis and their settlements: the pros and cons of both utility models and game models have long been acknowledged by the students of International Relations (Schelling. 1967: Snyder and Diesing. 1977: Snidal. 1985). Here, it is attempted to analyse the Camp David case through the use of both utility model and game model at the same time. It is seen that how Camp David situation was reached can be explained in terms of utility model, and how it was concluded can be explained in terms of game model which shows a Called Bluff structure. It was the intersection of President Sadat's decision to recognize Israel and Premier Begins move to leave Sinai in return, which created the "bargaining range" and "actual range", leading to agreement at the end of the Meetings. The exclusion of some actors of the game and the inadequate definition of the situation and the issue is the reason why Camp David Accords remained to be a "dead letter".

URI

https://hdl.handle.net/11511/111460

Collections

Department of Economics, Article