EXPLORING SCIENTIFIC REALISM THROUGH HASOK CHANG’S ACTIVE REALISM

Date

2025-12-11

Author

Özkan , Bora

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The gist of scientific pluralism is that natural phenomena cannot be comprehensively understood through a reductionist approach alone. Instead, explaining such phenomena requires the application and interpretation of multiple, coexisting perspectives. Based on this view, this thesis investigates the original contributions of Hasok Chang to contemporary philosophy of science, particularly his defense of a pluralist-realist position. He revisits the longstanding conflict between traditional realism and anti-realism by offering a unique synthesis grounded in pragmatist and neo-Kantian perspectives. Through what he terms “active realism,” Chang proposes a conception of science and knowledge that is both pluralistic and realist. He challenges the assumption that knowledge can be fully captured in theoretical or propositional terms and instead promotes the idea of “knowledge-as-ability,” which emphasizes practical competence and contextual action as integral dimensions of knowing. In doing so, Chang places epistemology within a dynamic and action-oriented framework. In this context, he substitutes the classical “correspondence theory of truth” with the concept of “truth-by-operational-coherence,” thereby emphasizing the operational success and internal consistency of knowledge claims over static correspondence with external reality. In this thesis, Chang’s position is analyzed in comparison with other major contemporary accounts of truth and realism, especially William Alston’s concept of “alethic realism” and Michael P. Lynch’s pluralist theory of truth, which includes his minimalist notion of truth. By examining the convergences and divergences between these perspectives, the thesis aims to clarify and articulate the conceptual boundaries of Chang’s pragmatist-realist philosophy. In addition, Chang’s interpretation of the Chemical Revolution as a historical case study is explored in detail. He uses this episode in the history of science to offer a positive reinterpretation of the “pessimistic meta-induction,” an argument often employed to undermine scientific realism. Chang’s analysis presents this historical transformation not as a failure of past scientific theories, but as evidence of the productive evolution of scientific knowledge.

Subject Keywords

Scientific pluralism, Pragmatism, Scientific realism, Chemical Revolution

URI

https://hdl.handle.net/11511/117400

Collections

Graduate School of Social Sciences, Thesis