The flawed logic of theory-free natural kind reasoning

Date

2026-01-01

Author

Davoody Benı, Majıd

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This paper critiques the theory-neutral Natural Kind Reasoning (NKR) in consciousness science. It demonstrates a methodological incompatibility arising from McKilliam's (2024) proposal: deploying Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) within NKR directly contradicts the aspiration for theory-neutrality. I argue that IBE's inherent reliance on pre-existing theoretical frameworks undermines the possibility of a genuinely theory-neutral methodology for the science of consciousness.

URI

https://hdl.handle.net/11511/117980

Journal

NEW IDEAS IN PSYCHOLOGY

DOI

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.newideapsych.2025.101219

Collections

Department of Philosophy, Article

Citation Formats

M. Davoody Benı, “The flawed logic of theory-free natural kind reasoning,” NEW IDEAS IN PSYCHOLOGY, vol. 80, pp. 0–0, 2026, Accessed: 00, 2025. [Online]. Available: https://hdl.handle.net/11511/117980.