Corporate Lobbying and Access in EU Trade Agreements: The Case of the Automotive Industry

Date

2026-3-16

Author

Harput, Halit

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The objective of this dissertation is to investigate how the European corporate interest groups mobilize information as a strategic resource to shape European Union trade policy-making processes. Using Pieter Bouwen’s (2002) “Logic of Access” framework, the research examines the exchange of information between the European automotive industry and EU institutions during the EU’s FTA negotiations with South Korea, Japan, and Mercosur. The study employs a qualitative comparative case study design to investigate the engagement of the automotive industry in these negotiations. Process tracing was used to observe the relationship between observed access opportunities and textual imprint on draft and final legal provisions, followed by an assessment of whether the textual imprint survived the inter-institutional bargaining and ratification politics. The results show that the automotive industry functioned as a strategic “chameleon”, and successfully adapted the content of its arguments to fit the differing information needs of the European Commission, Parliament, and the Council. At the same time, the results illustrate an asymmetrical pattern of outcomes among the three cases examined. The automotive industry was successful in shaping the technical architecture of all three agreement texts, but it had difficulty in shaping the distributive bargaining dynamics, particularly in highly politicized negotiation environments.

Subject Keywords

Corporate lobbying, EU Trade Policy, Automotive Industry, Logic of Access, Free Trade Agreements

URI

https://hdl.handle.net/11511/118791

Collections

Graduate School of Social Sciences, Thesis