A Neoclassical Realist Analysis of Russian Intervention in 2015 and Non-Intervention in 2024 in Syria

Date

2026-5-20

Author

Özgül, Azad

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This thesis examines Russia’s changing foreign policy behavior with regard to her act of intervention and non-intervention in Syria at two critical junctures. By using neoclassical realism as a theoretical framework, the study offers a comprehensive understanding of why Russia intervened in Syria in 2015 to support the rule of Bashar al-Assad but refrained from doing the same act in 2024 when the broad coalition of opposition forces led by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham overthrew Bashar’s regime on December 8. Since there have been few studies benefiting from neoclassical realism in explaining Russia’s intervention in Syria, and her decision not to intervene in 2024 prompted further scholarly inquiry, this study aims to contribute to the literature by comparatively analyzing these two critical moments in Russian foreign policymaking, namely Russia’s act of intervention and non-intervention in Syria. After analyzing systemic, sub-systemic and domestic factors in both events, the study argues that even though systemic and sub-systemic factors have, to a great extent, affected Russia’s foreign policy choices, domestic factors, particularly leader’s perceptions as shown in the study, have determined her foreign policy behaviors at both critical junctures.

Subject Keywords

Neoclassical Realism, Syria, Russia, Intervention, Non-Intervention

URI

https://hdl.handle.net/11511/119133

Collections

Graduate School of Social Sciences, Thesis