Persistent replication and reproducibility deficit in educational research: A comparative institutional analysis of crisis, institutional incentives, and science diplomacy

Date

2026-09-09

Author

Kulakoğlu, Büşra

Metadata

Show full item record

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.

Item Usage Stats

21
views

0
downloads

Cite This

This study examines institutional incentive structures shaping replication and reproducibility practices across seven social science fields, with a particular focus on education. Drawing on a game theory perspective, it conceptualizes these practices through the lens of the prisoner’s dilemma highlighting how fields may become locked into suboptimal equilibrium that discourage replication. Using a qualitative comparative approach based on fuzzy-set logic, the study identifies the institutional and structural conditions under which replication and reproducibility practices either emerge or fail to emerge. The findings suggest that shifts toward replication and reproducibility are more likely when fields experience either internal shocks or external pressures that alter existing incentive structures. However, the persistence of current equilibrium in some fields indicates continued resistance, raising concerns about the accumulation, trustworthiness, and accountability of scientific knowledge particularly in educational research.

URI

https://virtual.oxfordabstracts.com/event/76329/program?f=kulakoglu&date=%222026-9-10%22
https://hdl.handle.net/11511/120758

Collections

Department of Educational Sciences, Conference / Seminar