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Mobile Prisoner's Dilemma Game Played On Diverse Habitats
Date
2011-06-08
Author
Celebi, Remzi
Kilic, Hurevren
Metadata
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Promotion of cooperative behavior in Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) game while players that are allowed to move between different gaming environments (i.e. habitats) is investigated. The stochastic mobile model under study is realized over connected habitats that are situated on a two dimensional grid environment. The players appearing in the same habitat are allowed to interact with their immediate neighbors. Mobility of a player is defined as movement from its habitat to another based on both obtained payoff and randomly assigned habitat diversity values. By the end of extensive experimentation, it is concluded that player mobility is an effective factor that contributes to promotion of cooperation in spatial evolutionary games. Also, even for higher values of temptation of PD game, habitat diversity supports and triggers a collective resistance for the emergence and promotion of cooperative system behavior.
Subject Keywords
Evolutionary game theory
,
Mobile prisoners dilemma
,
Promotion of cooperation
,
Habitat diversity
URI
https://hdl.handle.net/11511/65965
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R. Celebi and H. Kilic, “Mobile Prisoner’s Dilemma Game Played On Diverse Habitats,” 2011, p. 2600, Accessed: 00, 2020. [Online]. Available: https://hdl.handle.net/11511/65965.