Central Banking in Developing Countries after the Crisis: What Has Changed?

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2016-07-01

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Cömert, Hasan

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https://hdl.handle.net/11511/94191

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Global South after the Crisis

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Central Banking in Developing Countries After the Crisis What Has Changed Benlialper, Ahmet; Cömert, Hasan (2016-01-01) The aim of this chapter is to assess how the theory and practices of central banking have evolved in developing countries in response to the crisis of 2008_9. Our findings suggest that the recent experiences of both advanced countries and developing countries during and after the global economic crisis have exposed the problems within mainstream monetary theory. In response to the crisis, mainstream thinking has been revised considerably. In line with this, there is also a shift in central banking practices...
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H. Cömert, Central Banking in Developing Countries after the Crisis: What Has Changed? 2016.