The benefits of voluntary leadership in experimental public goods games

Date

2011-08-01

Author

Rivas, M. Fernanda
Sutter, Matthias

Metadata

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This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.

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We study the effects of voluntary leadership in experimental public goods games when each group member can volunteer to contribute before the other members. We find that voluntary leadership increases contributions significantly, compared to a treatment where leadership is enforced exogenously.

Subject Keywords

Public goods, Experiment, Voluntary leadership

URI

https://hdl.handle.net/11511/65134

Journal

ECONOMICS LETTERS

DOI

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2011.04.007

Collections

Economics and Administrative Sciences, Article