CULTURAL FRAMEWORKS, GOLDMAN'S ONTOLOGICAL WARDROBE, AND A NEW PERSPECTIVE OVER VERITAS

2008-01-01
There are good reasons to reject absolutism about truth not only for theoretical (chiefly, semantic) purposes but also in connection with the issues of cross-cultural communication and understanding. In explaining the neorealist approach, an analogy given by Alvin Goldman is employed and it is maintained that despite its difficulties Goldman account is on the right track vis-a-vis truth and the ontological matters related to it.
PHILOSOPHIA-INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

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Citation Formats
M. M. Baç, “CULTURAL FRAMEWORKS, GOLDMAN’S ONTOLOGICAL WARDROBE, AND A NEW PERSPECTIVE OVER VERITAS,” PHILOSOPHIA-INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, pp. 96–107, 2008, Accessed: 00, 2020. [Online]. Available: https://hdl.handle.net/11511/55811.