Deflationism about truth and the general form of sentence

Besler, Arman
Deflationism about truth is roughly the negative thesis that truth is not a substantial notion, and does not call for a reductive philosophical analysis. Deflationism comes in several main varieties, each focusing on a particular aspect/appearance of this negative fact, hence formulating the deflationary thesis under the guidance of that aspect/appearance. This study attempts to reformulate the deflationary thesis by (1) proposing a simple but illuminative typology of deflationisms, (2) detecting the correct type, and (3) interpreting the specification of the location of that type on the proposed typological map. The proposal is made under the guidance of certain insights concerning the nature of logical analyis, but specifically of the theme of the general/abstract grammatical form of sentence. The study concludes by showing the implications of the emerged neat picture of alethic deflationism with respect to the truth-conditional account of meaning.
Citation Formats
A. Besler, “Deflationism about truth and the general form of sentence,” Ph.D. - Doctoral Program, Middle East Technical University, 2015.