A computational account of coherence as a heuristic function for truth

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2022-9

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Yolaçan, Burak

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Coherence as a theory of truth claims that truth can be defined as coherence, i.e., a belief is true if and only if it coheres with other beliefs, no matter these beliefs are isolated from the mind-independent external world. In this sense, is it necessary to accept a coherence theory of truth in order to establish that coherence is truth-conducive? Or can this conduciveness be established in another way? To answer these questions, I first attempted to solve the major problem of coherence, namely vagueness, by transforming Bonjour’s criterion-based notion of coherence into a computational account of coherence by devising graph-theoretic framework along with quantitative coherence measures. With this way of formalising coherence of belief systems, it also became possible to deal with the problem of isolation objection via the ability to incorporate the cognitively spontaneous beliefs into the framework. By means of various test cases (in terms of rival theories) from history of chemistry, psychology, environmental science, legal reasoning, physiology, geology, astronomy, I put forward results to think that coherence as a heuristic function for truth in the long run, instead of being a theory of truth, is better suited for establishing a connection between coherence and truth, that is, coherence as a heuristic for truth functions as a device for discovering truth, i.e., securing convergence to truth rather than seeking the absolute truth in the presence of the underconsideration problem.

Subject Keywords

Coherentism, Justification, Heuristic, Truth-conduciveness, Computation

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https://hdl.handle.net/11511/99584

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Graduate School of Social Sciences, Thesis

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Citation Formats

B. Yolaçan, “A computational account of coherence as a heuristic function for truth,” Ph.D. - Doctoral Program, Middle East Technical University, 2022.