Show/Hide Menu
Hide/Show Apps
Logout
Türkçe
Türkçe
Search
Search
Login
Login
OpenMETU
OpenMETU
About
About
Open Science Policy
Open Science Policy
Open Access Guideline
Open Access Guideline
Postgraduate Thesis Guideline
Postgraduate Thesis Guideline
Communities & Collections
Communities & Collections
Help
Help
Frequently Asked Questions
Frequently Asked Questions
Guides
Guides
Thesis submission
Thesis submission
MS without thesis term project submission
MS without thesis term project submission
Publication submission with DOI
Publication submission with DOI
Publication submission
Publication submission
Supporting Information
Supporting Information
General Information
General Information
Copyright, Embargo and License
Copyright, Embargo and License
Contact us
Contact us
A novel Nash-based low-carbon implementation in agricultural supply chain management
Date
2024-04-10
Author
Hamidoğlu, Ali
Weber, Gerhard Wilhelm
Metadata
Show full item record
This work is licensed under a
Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License
.
Item Usage Stats
104
views
0
downloads
Cite This
The transition to low-carbon agriculture is seen as essential for accelerating the implementation of ecologically friendly and climate-smart agricultural supply chain management strategies. Success in these efforts depends on robust policy frameworks, effective stakeholder participation, and the availability of agricultural products to customers. This study introduces a conceptual and operational structure for the incorporation and management of an agricultural supply chain with a low-carbon scheme through the establishment of a collaborative market environment involving farmers, agricultural enterprises, and consumers. Within this framework, agricultural enterprises and farmers engage in a cooperative Nash game to determine the extent to which they are willing to employ low-carbon practices in response to collaborative market prices and government policies, including subsidies and carbon taxes. The Nash game yields a unique Nash equilibrium, suggesting the possibility of cooperative negotiations among the parties with the goal of improving their financial gains. The proposed model is applied in two Brazilian sugarcane supply chain case studies, integrating with traditional biorefinery mills to produce and market ethanol as a gasoline alternative. Our results suggest that (1) successfully allocating government subsidies and taxes motivates low-carbon adoption; (2) the government taxation policy stabilizes the low-carbon supply chain, improving stakeholder market pricing and consumer affordability; and (3) reduced cost gaps between low-carbon and non-low-carbon alternatives increase low-carbon adoption. As a result, this study provides fresh insights on the Nash collaboration of stakeholders in accordance with government policies to create a cleaner and more affordable agricultural supply chain market.
Subject Keywords
Game theory
,
Low-carbon
,
Meta-heuristics
,
Nash equilibrium
,
Supply chain management
,
Sustainability
URI
https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?partnerID=HzOxMe3b&scp=85188553010&origin=inward
https://hdl.handle.net/11511/109326
Journal
Journal of Cleaner Production
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2024.141846
Collections
Graduate School of Applied Mathematics, Article
Citation Formats
IEEE
ACM
APA
CHICAGO
MLA
BibTeX
A. Hamidoğlu and G. W. Weber, “A novel Nash-based low-carbon implementation in agricultural supply chain management,”
Journal of Cleaner Production
, vol. 449, pp. 0–0, 2024, Accessed: 00, 2024. [Online]. Available: https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?partnerID=HzOxMe3b&scp=85188553010&origin=inward.