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SPINOZA’S ONTOLOGY OF SUBSTANCE AND MODES: A ONE-CATEGORY HOLISTIC MEREOLOGICAL RECONSTRUCTION
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Date
2024-7
Author
Aksoy, Ilgin
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All through his career, Spinoza endorses substance and modes as the two categories of his ontology. In the Ethics, he defines substance as “what is in itself,” mode as “what is in another,” asserts in E1a1 that “whatever is, is either in itself or in another,” and in E1p15d explicitly concludes that “except for substances and modes there is nothing.” Therefore, whatever exists, is either a substance or mode for Spinoza. However, how to best interpret the relationship between these two categories, which he stipulates in terms of ‘being in,’ has been an enduring problem in Spinoza scholarship. The traditional approach to the problem understands this relationship in terms of scholastic Aristotelian distinction of being in or inherence, which defines ontological independence and dependence, that results in a two-category ontology which rules out a mereological structure of the relationship between these two categories. In this thesis, I attempt to reject this dualist reading and establish a one-categorical holistic mereological understanding of Spinoza’s substance and modes. I argue that the traditional dualist reading of Spinoza’s ontology does not afford a compelling account of Spinoza’s doctrines regarding hierarchical one-category being, bare substratum, and immanent causation along with his descriptions of the holistic mereological structure of the substance-mode relation. Instead, I advocate that priority monism provides us with a framework to reconsider this enduring problem and reconstruct substance and modes in terms of the single category of power [potentia] by challenging the traditional reception.
Subject Keywords
Ontology
,
Mereology
,
Early Modern Philosophy
,
Medieval Philosophy
,
Spinoza
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https://hdl.handle.net/11511/110380
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Graduate School of Social Sciences, Thesis
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I. Aksoy, “SPINOZA’S ONTOLOGY OF SUBSTANCE AND MODES: A ONE-CATEGORY HOLISTIC MEREOLOGICAL RECONSTRUCTION,” Ph.D. - Doctoral Program, Middle East Technical University, 2024.