IMPARTIALITY AND OBJECTIVITY IN NORMATIVE ECONOMICS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES IN ADAM SMITH’S THEORY OF MORALS AND AMARTYA SEN’S THEORY OF JUSTICE

Date

2024-9-13

Author

Demirel, Deniz Naz

Metadata

Show full item record

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.

Item Usage Stats

135
views

55
downloads

Cite This

This thesis aims to examine the decision-making processes described by Amartya Sen’s theory of justice and Adam Smith’s theory of morals. It primarily appraises Sen’s dichotomy, i.e. his distinction between transcendental and comparative theories of justice, and the Smithian notion of impartial spectator to explore the roles of transcendental principles of justice and the voice of the public in ensuring that decisions within the scope of normative economics are objective. To this end, the way Sen incorporates the impartial spectator to his work The Idea of Justice and his claims that dismiss the role of transcendental theories in comparative assessments are inspected. These findings are compared and contrasted with Smith’s ideas on general rules of morality and the transcendental components of The Theory of Moral Sentiments. It is shown that both Smith and Sen attempt to establish strong ties between impartiality and objectivity and emphasise the crucial position of behavioural requirements of justice. Further, Smith’s and Sen’s views on the influence of one’s pursuit of self-interests on the impartiality and objectivity of judgements are revealed and scrutinised. The results of these discussions are used to pinpoint the relative weaknesses and strengths of the decision-making processes described by Smith and Sen.

Subject Keywords

objectivity, impartiality, Adam Smith, Amartya Sen, normative economics

URI

https://hdl.handle.net/11511/111007

Collections

Graduate School of Social Sciences, Thesis