Differential Attacks on Lightweight Block Ciphers PRESENT, PRIDE, and RECTANGLE Revisited

Date

2016-09-21

Author

Tezcan, Cihangir
Senol, Asuman
Dogan, Erol
Yucebas, Furkan
Baykal, Nazife

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Differential distribution and linear approximation tables are the main security criteria for S-box designers. However, there are other S-box properties that, if overlooked by cryptanalysts, can result in erroneous results in theoretical attacks. In this paper we focus on two such properties, namely undisturbed bits and differential factors. We go on to identify several inconsistencies in published attacks against the lightweight block ciphers PRESENT, PRIDE, and RECTANGLE and present our corrections.

Subject Keywords

Block cipher, Lightweight, Differential attack, Differential factor, Undisturbed bit

URI

https://hdl.handle.net/11511/31883

DOI

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-55714-4_2

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Graduate School of Informatics, Conference / Seminar

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Citation Formats

C. Tezcan, A. Senol, E. Dogan, F. Yucebas, and N. Baykal, “Differential Attacks on Lightweight Block Ciphers PRESENT, PRIDE, and RECTANGLE Revisited,” 2016, vol. 10098, Accessed: 00, 2020. [Online]. Available: https://hdl.handle.net/11511/31883.