Core of the assignment game via fixed point methods

Date

2011-01-20

Author

Küçükşenel, Serkan

Metadata

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This paper shows that the core outcomes of the assignment game coincides with the set of fixed points of a certain function. The lattice property of the core, as well as its non-emptiness, are proved using Tarski's fixed point theorem.

Subject Keywords

Lattice structure, Core, Stability, Assignment game, Two-sided matching

URI

https://hdl.handle.net/11511/32783

Journal

JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS

DOI

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2011.01.003

Collections

Department of Economics, Article

Citation Formats

S. Küçükşenel, “Core of the assignment game via fixed point methods,” JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS, vol. 47, no. 1, pp. 72–76, 2011, Accessed: 00, 2020. [Online]. Available: https://hdl.handle.net/11511/32783.