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Core of the assignment game via fixed point methods
Date
2011-01-20
Author
Küçükşenel, Serkan
Metadata
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This work is licensed under a
Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License
.
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This paper shows that the core outcomes of the assignment game coincides with the set of fixed points of a certain function. The lattice property of the core, as well as its non-emptiness, are proved using Tarski's fixed point theorem.
Subject Keywords
Lattice structure
,
Core
,
Stability
,
Assignment game
,
Two-sided matching
URI
https://hdl.handle.net/11511/32783
Journal
JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2011.01.003
Collections
Department of Economics, Article
Citation Formats
IEEE
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BibTeX
S. Küçükşenel, “Core of the assignment game via fixed point methods,”
JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS
, vol. 47, no. 1, pp. 72–76, 2011, Accessed: 00, 2020. [Online]. Available: https://hdl.handle.net/11511/32783.