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Competitive newsvendor problems with the same Nash and Stackelberg solutions
Date
2007-01-01
Author
Serin, Yaşar Yasemin
Metadata
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This work is licensed under a
Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License
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Consider two newsvendors: (i) they compete satisfying substitutable demands searching Nash equilibrium or (ii) one is the leader deciding first, the other responds optimally playing a Stackelberg game. The leader profits more than she does in (i). We present conditions under which the leader's profit does not improve from (i) to (ii).
Subject Keywords
Competitive newsvendor problem
,
Nash equilibrium
,
Stackelberg game
URI
https://hdl.handle.net/11511/35885
Journal
OPERATIONS RESEARCH LETTERS
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2006.01.002
Collections
Department of Industrial Engineering, Article
Citation Formats
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BibTeX
Y. Y. Serin, “Competitive newsvendor problems with the same Nash and Stackelberg solutions,”
OPERATIONS RESEARCH LETTERS
, vol. 35, no. 1, pp. 83–94, 2007, Accessed: 00, 2020. [Online]. Available: https://hdl.handle.net/11511/35885.