Competitive newsvendor problems with the same Nash and Stackelberg solutions

Date

2007-01-01

Author

Serin, Yaşar Yasemin

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Consider two newsvendors: (i) they compete satisfying substitutable demands searching Nash equilibrium or (ii) one is the leader deciding first, the other responds optimally playing a Stackelberg game. The leader profits more than she does in (i). We present conditions under which the leader's profit does not improve from (i) to (ii).

Subject Keywords

Competitive newsvendor problem, Nash equilibrium, Stackelberg game

URI

https://hdl.handle.net/11511/35885

Journal

OPERATIONS RESEARCH LETTERS

DOI

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2006.01.002

Collections

Department of Industrial Engineering, Article

Citation Formats

Y. Y. Serin, “Competitive newsvendor problems with the same Nash and Stackelberg solutions,” OPERATIONS RESEARCH LETTERS, vol. 35, no. 1, pp. 83–94, 2007, Accessed: 00, 2020. [Online]. Available: https://hdl.handle.net/11511/35885.