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Uniform trade rules for uncleared markets
Date
2009-01-01
Author
Kibris, Oezguer
Küçükşenel, Serkan
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This work is licensed under a
Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License
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We analyze markets in which the price of a traded commodity is such that the supply and the demand are unequal. Under standard assumptions, the agents then have single peaked preferences on their consumption or production choices. For such markets, we propose a class of Uniform trade rules each of which determines the volume of trade as the median of total demand, total supply, and an exogenous constant. Then these rules allocate this volume "uniformly" on either side of the market. We evaluate these "trade rules" on the basis of some standard axioms in the literature. We show that they uniquely satisfy Pareto optimality, strategy proofness, no-envy, and an informational simplicity axiom that we introduce. We also analyze the implications of anonymity, renegotiation proofness, and voluntary trade on this domain.
Subject Keywords
Economics and Econometrics
,
Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
URI
https://hdl.handle.net/11511/40246
Journal
SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-008-0312-1
Collections
Department of Economics, Article