PHILOSOPHY AS ART IN ARISTOTLE'SPROTREPTICUS

2020-07-01
Observing certain affinities with Plato'sAlcibiades I, this paper argues that a distinction betweencare(epimeleia) of the soul and philosophy as its art (techne) is reflected in Aristotle'sProtrepticus. On the basis of this distinction, it claims that two notions of philosophy can be distinguished in theProtrepticus: philosophy asepistemeand philosophy astechne. The former has the function of contemplating the truth of nature, and Aristotle praises it as the natural telos of human beings; whereas philosophy astechnehelps nature to accomplish the end it designed for human beings. It emerges that according to Aristotle in theProtrepticusphilosophy is the art of making oneself coincide with one's nature as a human being.
METAPHILOSOPHY

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Citation Formats
R. Güremen, “PHILOSOPHY AS ART IN ARISTOTLE’SPROTREPTICUS,” METAPHILOSOPHY, pp. 571–592, 2020, Accessed: 00, 2020. [Online]. Available: https://hdl.handle.net/11511/44011.