Cooperative games under bubbly uncertainty

Date

2014-10-01

Author

PALANCI, Osman
ALPARSLAN GÖK, Sırma Zeynep
Weber, Gerhard Wilhelm

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The allocation problem of rewards/costs is a basic question for players, namely, individuals and companies that are planning cooperation under uncertainty. The involvement of uncertainty in cooperative game theory is motivated by the real world in which noise in observation and experimental design, incomplete information and vagueness in preference structures and decision-making play an important role. In this study, a new class of cooperative games, namely, the cooperative bubbly games, where the worth of each coalition is a bubble instead of a real number, is presented. Furthermore, a new solution concept, the bubbly core, is defined. Finally, the properties and the conditions for the non-emptiness of the bubbly core are given. The paper ends with a conclusion and an outlook to related and future studies.

Subject Keywords

Management Science and Operations Research, Software, General Mathematics

URI

https://hdl.handle.net/11511/54147

Collections

Graduate School of Applied Mathematics, Article