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Some results on cooperative interval games
Date
2014-01-02
Author
ALPARSLAN GÖK, Sırma Zeynep
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Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License
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Uncertainty is a daily presence in the real world. It affects our decision-making and may have influence on cooperation. On many occasions, uncertainty is so severe that we can only predict some upper and lower bounds for the outcome of our actions, i.e. payoffs lie in some intervals. A suitable game theoretic model to support decision-making in collaborative situations with interval data is that of cooperative interval games. Solution concepts that associate with each cooperative interval game sets of interval allocations with appealing properties provide a natural way to capture the uncertainty of coalition values into the players' payoffs. In this paper, the relations between some set-valued solution concepts using interval payoffs, namely the interval core, the interval dominance core, the square interval dominance core and the interval stable sets for cooperative interval games, are studied. It is shown that the interval core is the unique stable set on the class of convex interval games.
Subject Keywords
Management Science and Operations Research
,
Control and Optimization
,
Applied Mathematics
URI
https://hdl.handle.net/11511/63688
Journal
OPTIMIZATION
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1080/02331934.2013.784765
Collections
Graduate School of Applied Mathematics, Conference / Seminar