Show/Hide Menu
Hide/Show Apps
Logout
Türkçe
Türkçe
Search
Search
Login
Login
OpenMETU
OpenMETU
About
About
Open Science Policy
Open Science Policy
Open Access Guideline
Open Access Guideline
Postgraduate Thesis Guideline
Postgraduate Thesis Guideline
Communities & Collections
Communities & Collections
Help
Help
Frequently Asked Questions
Frequently Asked Questions
Guides
Guides
Thesis submission
Thesis submission
MS without thesis term project submission
MS without thesis term project submission
Publication submission with DOI
Publication submission with DOI
Publication submission
Publication submission
Supporting Information
Supporting Information
General Information
General Information
Copyright, Embargo and License
Copyright, Embargo and License
Contact us
Contact us
The genealogy of the moral modules
Date
2003-05-01
Author
Bolender, J
Metadata
Show full item record
This work is licensed under a
Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License
.
Item Usage Stats
170
views
0
downloads
Cite This
This paper defends a cognitive theory of those emotional reactions which motivate and constrain moral judgment. On this theory, moral emotions result from mental faculties specialized for automatically producing feelings of approval or disapproval in response to mental representations of various social situations and actions. These faculties are modules in Fodor's sense, since they are informationally encapsulated, specialized, and contain innate information about social situations. The paper also tries to shed light on which moral modules there are, which of these modules we share with non-human primates, and on the (pre-) history and development of this modular system from pre- humans through gatherer-hunters and on to modern (i.e. arablist) humans. The theory is not, however, meant to explain all moral reasoning. It is plausible that a non-modular intelligence at least sometimes play a role in conscious moral thought. However, even non-modular moral reasoning is initiated and constrained by moral emotions having modular sources.
Subject Keywords
Philosophy
,
Artificial Intelligence
URI
https://hdl.handle.net/11511/63851
Journal
MINDS AND MACHINES
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1022902510039
Collections
Department of Philosophy, Article
Suggestions
OpenMETU
Core
The relation of freedom and evil in Kant’s moral philosophy
Aydın Bayram, Selma; Turan, Şeref Halil; Department of Philosophy (2006)
The purpose of this study is to examine concepts of freedom and evil, and to clarify their relation in terms of Kant’s moral philosophy. In this study, I firstly examine Kant’s understanding of freedom and the problems that this understanding leads to. I also discuss how the concept of freedom can be reconciled with the concept of evil expressed in the form of “propensity to evil”. Additionally, I attempt to show the significance of the notion of evil for Kant’s moral theory. Evil is one of the most critici...
The problem of justice in the philosophies of Rousseau and Kant
Ünlü, Özlem; Turan, Şeref Halil; Department of Philosophy (2011)
The aim of this study is to make a comparison between Rousseau’s and Kant’s theory of justice. This thesis defends the arguments of Rousseau’s democratic political theory against the claims raised by Kant. Rousseau and Kant formulate how to relieve the tension between individual and society. This tension is the one between individual and political freedom. Rousseau calls it the tension between moral and political freedom and Kant terms it as internal and external freedom. However, Rousseau ensures continuit...
Scheme-based Alethic Realism: Agency, the environment, and truthmaking
Baç, Mutlu Murat (Springer Science and Business Media LLC, 2004-05-01)
This paper presents a position called Scheme-based Alethic Realism, which reconciles a realist position on the nature of truth with a pluralistic Kantian perspective that allows for multiple "environments" in which truthmaking relationships are established. We argue that truthmaking functions are constrained by a stable phenomenal world and a stable cognitive architecture. This account takes truth as normatively distinct from epistemic justification while relativizing the truth conditions of our statements ...
Self-love and self-deception in Seneca, the Stoic
Sururi, Ayten; İnam, Ahmet; Department of Philosophy (2005)
In this thesis, Seneca̕s notion of self as self-love and the problem of self-deception are analyzed. In examining three types of self-love, اignorant, progressing selves,اthree models of self-deception are discussed. Self-deception is related to the problem of self-knowledge. I discuss the nature of self-love as self-esteem and self-preservation and self-shaping all of which are innate qualities and develop into more complex forms of knowing. Passions are concrete examples of the representations of deceived...
The role of human nature in Hume's ethics
Arslanoğlu Çelik, Şengül; İnam, Ahmet; Department of Philosophy (2008)
This dissertation aims to determine the role of human nature in Hume's philosophy. It will examine how moral motivation arises when one takes human nature as the basis of moral philosophyWhat is maintained here is that Hume approaches his rival rationalist philosophers whom he criticised for drawing on metaphysics and rational methods in building the foundation of their ethics. Hume’s “science of man” attempts to isolate the basis of ethics from metaphysical and rational elements. However, this paper demons...
Citation Formats
IEEE
ACM
APA
CHICAGO
MLA
BibTeX
J. Bolender, “The genealogy of the moral modules,”
MINDS AND MACHINES
, pp. 233–255, 2003, Accessed: 00, 2020. [Online]. Available: https://hdl.handle.net/11511/63851.