The role of intermediaries in corruption

Date

2005-03-01

Author

Bayar, G

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The aim of the article is to examine a briber initiated corrupt transaction and the role of intermediaries in such a transaction, using a game theoretical model. Clients applying the intermediaries do so to be able to get rid of high red tape applied by the officers. They prefer using intermediary instead of offering a bribe to the officers directly since they do not know which officers are corrupt (accepts a bribe offer) and how much bribe should be given to the corrupt officers.

Subject Keywords

Economics and Econometrics, Sociology and Political Science

URI

https://hdl.handle.net/11511/63967

Journal

PUBLIC CHOICE

DOI

https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-005-5916-8

Collections

Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Article

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Citation Formats

G. Bayar, “The role of intermediaries in corruption,” PUBLIC CHOICE, pp. 277–298, 2005, Accessed: 00, 2020. [Online]. Available: https://hdl.handle.net/11511/63967.