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THE WELFARISTIC CHARACTERIZATION OF 2-PERSON REVELATION EQUILIBRIA UNDER IMPUTATIONAL GOVERNMENT
Date
1992-01-01
Author
KORAY, S
SERTEL, MR
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Given two players whose declarations about their private preferences are to be used in enforcing imputations, i.e. individually rational Pareto optima according to the declared preference profile, the Nash equilibria of the revelation game so defined always induce individually rational outcomes according to the true preferences, and for all such outcomes there is (and we construct) a Nash equilibrium declaration of preferences which induces precisely that outcome.
Subject Keywords
Subgame perfect implementation
URI
https://hdl.handle.net/11511/64597
Journal
SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE
Collections
Department of Mathematics, Article
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S. KORAY and M. SERTEL, “THE WELFARISTIC CHARACTERIZATION OF 2-PERSON REVELATION EQUILIBRIA UNDER IMPUTATIONAL GOVERNMENT,”
SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE
, pp. 49–56, 1992, Accessed: 00, 2020. [Online]. Available: https://hdl.handle.net/11511/64597.