Decision Support for Multi attribute Multi item Reverse Auctions

In this study, we address multi-item auction problems in a multiattribute, multi-round reverse auction setting. In each round, we provide the buyer with a set of efficient bid combinations, who then chooses the provisional winners whose bids collectively provide all the required items. We estimate preference information from the buyer’s choices and provide this to the bidders. The bidders update/improve their bids in order to become/stay competitive. The process continues several rounds. The developed interactive approach tries to have the more competitive bidders eventually end up winning the auction
21st International Symposium on Mathematical Programming (ISMP) (19 - 24 Ağustos 2012)


Decision support for multi-attribute auctions
Karakaya, Gülşah; Köksalan, Murat; Department of Industrial Engineering (2013)
In this study, we address multi-attribute, multi-item auction problems. In multi-attribute auctions there are additional attributes to the price and the comparison of bids is not straightforward. In multi-item auctions which are also known as combinatorial auctions, it is not so trivial to determine the winning bidders. We develop an auction decision support system (ADSS) that supports sellers to bid on multiple items. We demonstrate our approach in a multi-attribute, multi-item reverse auction setting. The...
Agent-level determinants of price expectation formation in online double-sided auctions
Avci, Ezgi; Bunn, Derek; Ketter, Wolfgang; van Heck, Eric (Elsevier BV, 2019-09-01)
For an auctioneer it is of utmost importance to design an auction mechanism that gives robust price signals which in turn increases auction performance. Information architecture and forward trading platforms are the two main information sources that could generate these price signals. However the traditional presumption that agents form rational expectations by accurately processing all available information in the online trading environment and forming their expectations accordingly has found mixed support...
Prediction of prices of risky assets using smoothing algorithm
Çapanoğlu, Gülsüm Elçin; Demirbaş, Kerim; Department of Electrical and Electronics Engineering (2006)
This thesis presents the prediction algorithm for the price of the share of risky asset. The price of the share is presented by dynamic model and observation is presented by the measurement model. Dynamic model is derived by using Stochastic Calculus. The algorithm is simulated by using Matlab.
Improving efficiency in multiple-unit combinatorial auctions: Bundling bids from multiple bidders
Köksalan, Mustafa Murat; Leskela, Riikka-Leena; Wallenius, Hannele; Wallenius, Jyrki (Elsevier BV, 2009-12-01)
In multiple-unit combinatorial auctions both bidders and bid takers can benefit from support mechanisms that suggest new bids for the bidders. We present a support tool called Group Support Mechanism, which suggests bundles of bids to several bidders not among the provisional winners. It improves upon the Quantity Support Mechanism we developed earlier. The efficiency of the final allocation is better when the Group Support Mechanism is used instead of the Quantity Support Mechanism, especially in cases whe...
Interim efficient auctions with interdependent valuations
Küçükşenel, Serkan (Springer Science and Business Media LLC, 2012-05-01)
We provide a characterization of interim efficient auctions and examine their properties in the presence of informational interdependent valuations. We show that buyers can be awarded the auctioned item less often than the efficient level. We also show that buyers obtain the item more often as the degree of heterogeneity in preferences increases, even though profitability of trade does not depend on the heterogeneity in preferences.
Citation Formats
G. Karakaya, “Decision Support for Multi attribute Multi item Reverse Auctions,” presented at the 21st International Symposium on Mathematical Programming (ISMP) (19 - 24 Ağustos 2012), Berlin, Germany, 2012, Accessed: 00, 2021. [Online]. Available: