Interim efficient auctions with interdependent valuations

Date

2012-05-01

Author

Küçükşenel, Serkan

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We provide a characterization of interim efficient auctions and examine their properties in the presence of informational interdependent valuations. We show that buyers can be awarded the auctioned item less often than the efficient level. We also show that buyers obtain the item more often as the degree of heterogeneity in preferences increases, even though profitability of trade does not depend on the heterogeneity in preferences.

Subject Keywords

Economics and Econometrics, General Business, Management and Accounting

URI

https://hdl.handle.net/11511/47783

Journal

JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS

DOI

https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-011-0226-8

Collections

Department of Economics, Article

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Citation Formats

S. Küçükşenel, “Interim efficient auctions with interdependent valuations,” JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, pp. 83–93, 2012, Accessed: 00, 2020. [Online]. Available: https://hdl.handle.net/11511/47783.