Improving efficiency in multiple-unit combinatorial auctions: Bundling bids from multiple bidders

Date

2009-12-01

Author

Köksalan, Mustafa Murat
Leskela, Riikka-Leena
Wallenius, Hannele
Wallenius, Jyrki

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In multiple-unit combinatorial auctions both bidders and bid takers can benefit from support mechanisms that suggest new bids for the bidders. We present a support tool called Group Support Mechanism, which suggests bundles of bids to several bidders not among the provisional winners. It improves upon the Quantity Support Mechanism we developed earlier. The efficiency of the final allocation is better when the Group Support Mechanism is used instead of the Quantity Support Mechanism, especially in cases when the efficient allocation consists of three or more bids.

Subject Keywords

Arts and Humanities (miscellaneous), Information Systems and Management, Management Information Systems, Developmental and Educational Psychology, Information Systems

URI

https://hdl.handle.net/11511/56100

Journal

DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEMS

DOI

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dss.2009.07.001

Collections

Department of Industrial Engineering, Article

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Citation Formats

M. M. Köksalan, R.-L. Leskela, H. Wallenius, and J. Wallenius, “Improving efficiency in multiple-unit combinatorial auctions: Bundling bids from multiple bidders,” DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEMS, pp. 103–111, 2009, Accessed: 00, 2020. [Online]. Available: https://hdl.handle.net/11511/56100.