A Bergsonian Critique of Spatialization in Husserlian Time Consciousness

Date

2024-1-11

Author

Öztürk, Ozan Bilge

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This study aims to analyze time consciousness from a phenomenological perspective, within the theories of Edmund Husserl and Henri Bergson. In this study, Husserl's tripartite structure of time consciousness (primal impressions, retention, and protention) based on intentionality and immediate givenness and Bergson's distinction between homogeneous time and pure duration grounded on the concept of intuition are discussed comprehensively. In this context, while Husserl holds time in similar characteristics to spatial relations, Bergson examines it as an internal and continuous flow. This study argues that Husserl's conception of time in spatial relations leads to an assumption of distance between different modes of time, and that such a conception deprives time of its freshness and fullness. In this respect, Husserl's consciousness of time does not fully correspond to the fluid and dynamic nature of time. In contrast, Bergson's intuitive model of time, which holds time as an ever-changing and indivisible flow, independent of spatial conceptions and analogies, offers a more coherent and comprehensive understanding than Husserl's theory based on spatial and external properties and is more faithful to the immediate and direct experience of time. In this respect, it can be further argued that Bergson is more faithful to the immediate givenness of time from a phenomenological perspective than Husserl.

Subject Keywords

Husserl, Bergson, Time Consciousness, Spatialization of Time, Phenomenology

URI

https://hdl.handle.net/11511/107803

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Graduate School of Social Sciences, Thesis