A non-egological interpretation of Husserl's phenomenology

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2008

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Yeğin, Arzu

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In this thesis, I defend a non-egologic pure consciousness which is the initial position of Husserl in the Logical Investigations. There is anti transcendental ego argumentations in which I claim that self alienation of the "transcendental ego", incomplete reduction, the presence of the pre-reflective transcendental ego are the reasons to leave the claim about the existence of the "transcendental ego". I also claim that the possible solution of the mind-body problem depends on the denial of the "transcendental ego" in the frame of phenomenology. I defend the non-egologic pure consciousness which is not identical and reducible to whatever is material, including brain. Qualia, intentionality, intuition, philosophizing constitution acts of pure consciousness are used to support the claim about immaterial nature of non-egologic pure consciousness.

Subject Keywords

Philosophy., Knowledge, Theory of

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http://etd.lib.metu.edu.tr/upload/12609783/index.pdf
https://hdl.handle.net/11511/17831

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Graduate School of Social Sciences, Thesis

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Citation Formats

A. Yeğin, “A non-egological interpretation of Husserl’s phenomenology,” Ph.D. - Doctoral Program, Middle East Technical University, 2008.