Show/Hide Menu
Hide/Show Apps
anonymousUser
Logout
Türkçe
Türkçe
Search
Search
Login
Login
OpenMETU
OpenMETU
About
About
Open Science Policy
Open Science Policy
Frequently Asked Questions
Frequently Asked Questions
Communities & Collections
Communities & Collections
Critique of epistemic externalism and defense of foundationalist internalism
Download
index.pdf
Date
2015
Author
Altuğ, Ali Haydar
Metadata
Show full item record
Item Usage Stats
0
views
0
downloads
This thesis argues that epistemic externalism is untenable and defends that, although facing some severe problems, internalism is the only possible remaining option for a theory of knowledge and justification. It defends a foundationalist version of internalism, in which one’s beliefs about her own state of mind are taken to be certain. In this way, together with propositions of logic and mathematics, foundationalist requirement of certain and basic beliefs is rendered. Further, based on Laurence Bonjour’s argument on induction, this thesis offers an internal justification of induction and reliability, at least as a doxastic decision principle.
Subject Keywords
Knowledge, Theory of
,
Externalism (Philosophy of mind).
,
Internalism (Theory of knowledge).
,
Justification (Theory of knowledge).
URI
http://etd.lib.metu.edu.tr/upload/12619635/index.pdf
https://hdl.handle.net/11511/25356
Collections
Graduate School of Social Sciences, Thesis