Critique of epistemic externalism and defense of foundationalist internalism

Altuğ, Ali Haydar
This thesis argues that epistemic externalism is untenable and defends that, although facing some severe problems, internalism is the only possible remaining option for a theory of knowledge and justification. It defends a foundationalist version of internalism, in which one’s beliefs about her own state of mind are taken to be certain. In this way, together with propositions of logic and mathematics, foundationalist requirement of certain and basic beliefs is rendered. Further, based on Laurence Bonjour’s argument on induction, this thesis offers an internal justification of induction and reliability, at least as a doxastic decision principle.
Citation Formats
A. H. Altuğ, “Critique of epistemic externalism and defense of foundationalist internalism,” Ph.D. - Doctoral Program, Middle East Technical University, 2015.