The problem of self-knowledge in Kant's critique of pure reason

Haşar, Ekim
The self-knowledge has been a central problem throughout the history of philosophy, but it has remained, as Kant also declares, as the ―most difficult‖ of all tasks of reason. In this study, I scrutinize the grounds of this difficulty and search for the answers to the question ―what can we comprehend about the notion of self from a Kantian standpoint?‖ In this respect, this study is a reading of Kant‘s Critique of Pure Reason with the focus of the problem of self-knowledge. We can see that this concept has a very substantial role in Kantian philosophy but it is not easy to derive a complete theory therefrom. He asserts three different conceptions of the self: the phenomenal self (the self as appears to oneself), the transcendental subject (the self as a transcendental condition of knowledge), and the noumenal self (the self as the free agent of one‘s actions). The problem is that there is no unity among these conceptions, and thus they do not have a common ground to indicate the existence of the self as a distinct unique entity. This study examines this problem along with the fundamental arguments of transcendental philosophy.


The quiddity of knowledge in Kant's critical philosophy
Serin, İsmail; Ceylan, Yasin; Department of Philosophy (2004)
In this thesis the quiddity of knowledge in Kant's critical philosophy has been investigated within the historical context of the problem. In order to illustrate the origins of the subject-matter of the dissertation, the historical background of Kant's views on the theory of knowledge has been researched too. As a result of this research, it is concluded that Kant did not invent a new philosophical problem, but he tried to improve a decisive solution for one of the oldest question of history of philosophy i...
A Critical analysis of Kant’s discursivity principle
Okar, Sinan; Çırakman, Elif; Department of Philosophy (2019)
This thesis takes issue with the charge leveled against Kant, that the discursivity principle, which states knowledge of objects requires intuitions as well as concepts, remains unargued for in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, and therefore is an ungrounded presupposition underlying Kant’s Transcendental Idealism. I argue that Kant in the Introduction to the Critique Kant provides sufficient tools from which an argument for this principle can be reconstructed. Kant’s critique of metaphysics is taken as the f...
The critiques of the enlightenment by Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno and their understanding of a new method and philosophy
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The strong part of Horkheimer and Adorno’s philosophy is their critique of the Enlightenment. They argue that the consequent of the Enlightenment has been the destruction of the Enlightenment itself. There are two main reasons in the background of this destruction. First of them is the destruction of individual because of the understanding of reason in the Enlightenment. Individuals cannot define their existence beyond the determined roles of society any more. The second reason is the certain distinction be...
The role of imagination in Kant's first critique
Barın, Özlem; Ceylan, Yasin; Department of Philosophy (2003)
The purpose of this study is to examine the role of imagination in Immanuel Kant̕s Critique of Pure Reason by means of a detailed textual analysis and interpretation. In my systematic reading of the Kantian text, I analyse how the power of imagination comes to the foreground of Kant̕s investigation into the transcendental conditions of knowledge. This is to explain the mediating function of imagination between the two distinct faculties of the subject; between sensibility and understanding. Imagination achi...
An inquiry into the disputable position of imagination in Kant’s philosophy
Atala, Müge; Çırakman, Elif; Department of Philosophy (2012)
My thesis aims to delve into Immanuel Kant’s formulation of the faculty of imagination in his Critique of Pure Reason and Critique of the Power of Judgment. In relation to the First Critique, it specifically concerns the relation of the “mysterious” function of imagination to the object and its representation as one of the fundamental steps of the emergence or production of theoretical knowledge. As regards the Third Critique, it scrutinizes the relation of imagination to reflective, as opposed to determina...
Citation Formats
E. Haşar, “The problem of self-knowledge in Kant’s critique of pure reason,” M.S. - Master of Science, Middle East Technical University, 2010.