Show/Hide Menu
Hide/Show Apps
Logout
Türkçe
Türkçe
Search
Search
Login
Login
OpenMETU
OpenMETU
About
About
Open Science Policy
Open Science Policy
Open Access Guideline
Open Access Guideline
Postgraduate Thesis Guideline
Postgraduate Thesis Guideline
Communities & Collections
Communities & Collections
Help
Help
Frequently Asked Questions
Frequently Asked Questions
Guides
Guides
Thesis submission
Thesis submission
MS without thesis term project submission
MS without thesis term project submission
Publication submission with DOI
Publication submission with DOI
Publication submission
Publication submission
Supporting Information
Supporting Information
General Information
General Information
Copyright, Embargo and License
Copyright, Embargo and License
Contact us
Contact us
The problem of self-knowledge in Kant's critique of pure reason
Download
index.pdf
Date
2010
Author
Haşar, Ekim
Metadata
Show full item record
Item Usage Stats
304
views
112
downloads
Cite This
The self-knowledge has been a central problem throughout the history of philosophy, but it has remained, as Kant also declares, as the ―most difficult‖ of all tasks of reason. In this study, I scrutinize the grounds of this difficulty and search for the answers to the question ―what can we comprehend about the notion of self from a Kantian standpoint?‖ In this respect, this study is a reading of Kant‘s Critique of Pure Reason with the focus of the problem of self-knowledge. We can see that this concept has a very substantial role in Kantian philosophy but it is not easy to derive a complete theory therefrom. He asserts three different conceptions of the self: the phenomenal self (the self as appears to oneself), the transcendental subject (the self as a transcendental condition of knowledge), and the noumenal self (the self as the free agent of one‘s actions). The problem is that there is no unity among these conceptions, and thus they do not have a common ground to indicate the existence of the self as a distinct unique entity. This study examines this problem along with the fundamental arguments of transcendental philosophy.
Subject Keywords
Apperception.
,
Self-knowledge, Theory of.
,
Transcendental logic.
URI
http://etd.lib.metu.edu.tr/upload/12612765/index.pdf
https://hdl.handle.net/11511/20194
Collections
Graduate School of Social Sciences, Thesis
Suggestions
OpenMETU
Core
The quiddity of knowledge in Kant's critical philosophy
Serin, İsmail; Ceylan, Yasin; Department of Philosophy (2004)
In this thesis the quiddity of knowledge in Kant's critical philosophy has been investigated within the historical context of the problem. In order to illustrate the origins of the subject-matter of the dissertation, the historical background of Kant's views on the theory of knowledge has been researched too. As a result of this research, it is concluded that Kant did not invent a new philosophical problem, but he tried to improve a decisive solution for one of the oldest question of history of philosophy i...
The critiques of the enlightenment by Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno and their understanding of a new method and philosophy
Yenisoy, Eylem; Turan, Şeref Halil; Department of Philosophy (2006)
The strong part of Horkheimer and Adorno’s philosophy is their critique of the Enlightenment. They argue that the consequent of the Enlightenment has been the destruction of the Enlightenment itself. There are two main reasons in the background of this destruction. First of them is the destruction of individual because of the understanding of reason in the Enlightenment. Individuals cannot define their existence beyond the determined roles of society any more. The second reason is the certain distinction be...
The formation of the self as mental unity and moral agency in hume’s philosophy
Neslioğlu, E. Funda; Grünberg, David; Department of Philosophy (2008)
This dissertation proposes to analyze the stages in the formation of the idea of self in Hume’s philosophy. According to Hume we have no a simple and individual impression that we can call the self where the self is the totality of conscious life of a person. Nevertheless, we do have an idea of personal identity that must be accounted for. He begins his explanation of this idea by noting that our perceptions are fleeting, and he concludes from this that all we are is a bundle of different perceptions. But ...
Critique of epistemic externalism and defense of foundationalist internalism
Altuğ, Ali Haydar; Ceylan, Yasin; Department of Philosophy (2015)
This thesis argues that epistemic externalism is untenable and defends that, although facing some severe problems, internalism is the only possible remaining option for a theory of knowledge and justification. It defends a foundationalist version of internalism, in which one’s beliefs about her own state of mind are taken to be certain. In this way, together with propositions of logic and mathematics, foundationalist requirement of certain and basic beliefs is rendered. Further, based on Laurence Bonjour’s ...
A Critical analysis of Kant’s discursivity principle
Okar, Sinan; Çırakman, Elif; Department of Philosophy (2019)
This thesis takes issue with the charge leveled against Kant, that the discursivity principle, which states knowledge of objects requires intuitions as well as concepts, remains unargued for in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, and therefore is an ungrounded presupposition underlying Kant’s Transcendental Idealism. I argue that Kant in the Introduction to the Critique Kant provides sufficient tools from which an argument for this principle can be reconstructed. Kant’s critique of metaphysics is taken as the f...
Citation Formats
IEEE
ACM
APA
CHICAGO
MLA
BibTeX
E. Haşar, “The problem of self-knowledge in Kant’s critique of pure reason,” M.S. - Master of Science, Middle East Technical University, 2010.